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WA-22NCvC-140-03/2023	PLAINTIF RD MINERALS SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN 1. ) TOTAL IPCO SDN. BHD. 2. ) MOHD ADZAM BIN ABD SOMAD	In tandem, the First Defendant’s application to set aside the ad-interim injunction is allowed.Total costs of RM30,000 (which this Court deems suitable) is awarded to the First Defendant.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e695d4ca-0aa4-4027-8556-48ec84a2f2a0&Inline=true	05/12/2023 10:13:20 WA-22NCvC-140-03/2023 Kand. 66 S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ytSV5qQKJ0CFVkjshKLyoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—22NCvC—1dU—03/2023 Kand. as as/12/2023 10:13-20 IN THE HIGH COURT m MALAYA AT KIIALA LUMFUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRIVORV, MALAYSIA BEIWEEN RD MINERALS sun arm (COMFANY No:20090102772<J(0100:«1-A)) PLAINTIFF AND 1‘ TOTAL IPCO SDN EHD (com FANV No: 202001025414 (11l1734-T) 2. Mom: AnzAM BIN AED soumn ....DEFENDANTS GROUNDS or JUDGMENT grombil mo Dafcndanls from car_rﬁng out mu Iucliun tor mm: in no. 11 g gnu, rum Schedull la Ih: Mgnay Landing Agreemtnt 1 sm ns\I5n\:»uncFVk4:n»<LyuA m. smm ...m.mm .. 0... w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Enclnaun 20: TM Finl nufu-aunt‘: Aggliuutiou in (ninth KM ur- p_anoud-imgmn In gncilon nnnlud on 25.3.2023 lnlroduc n [1] ms coun had gramaa an axoana ingunmmn applncalmn by me Plainmr when on 253.2023 me Phalnlm owed lhal us business was m due popardy should we Fnsl Davanaam aucnon of! us ousmass assans listed m M. 11 oi ma Furs! Schedule \|o man Money Lendmg Agreemem (Sacurad Loan) dated 16 5 2n22 (the agreement) [2] ma com ordered that me Dalendanm were nm In auonon 011 me Plaintiffs nusmoss assets. and max the Delendams wera pmhihﬂed vrom enlenng me P\a\nlIﬂ's orenuses. ma Pia-mm had submlﬂad mm It: sun was pusanatea on Mo gmunns nammy man man wu non-oompuanoa mm 515 and 51!? Money Lenders Am 1952 (MlA)by mo Fm uovonoum. Thus, In preserve mo slalus qua an on he oasss out me Pla\n\|N1 had given an underllkmg as In ﬂamlges, unis Courl gamed an ax-pans inluncuon and omam ma Plaimm \|o saws ms pupars on both the Delorudams. The Pl.IIn\|\fl was also req-ma «a me via Slawmnl cl Clam: The erparla Injuncllm was vahd my lwu weeks mm: 1a 4 21:2: whsn Ihis com would hear nrgumoms from an pamas. [3] On 10,4 202: as the First Davaneam was auwse \|n me as nlﬁdnvn In raply, ms Court gave mnner ammo": ma granted an aa-mnsnm \|n;unr.1Inn unlnl me dnsnnsal of ma arguments wntanparies. In objamlng In lhe P\amMf's appnoauon lor the iruunclwon, me First Delendam me also ﬁled -cs awn app\|>ca\|>on lo 5:! ma ix-parts mwncllm gramaa by ms 2 m yIsv5\1\:>uncFvIn«xLw:A «ma saw nmhnrwm .. U... a may he mm-y -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ aF\uNa v-max [31] To me Planmm. submissions ﬂu! VI wwll endure hardship and losses m we busmess mere damagss wculd nwl be adequate, «ms cam holds lhal whatever amount shank! be quantiﬁable, oonswdering the! the amoum awmg no me Fm Defendant is RM791,466.5B as av 21 11.2022 The updaled amoum Uwiny on 4 3,2023 I5 RM1,625,93D as me Fuamnu hid exhibited a cheque wrmen VI a smular am0un\| nl RM1,ﬂ1B,B71 24 dated 23 a 2:123 nm was never handed m me F051 Defendam which this Court cunslrues as not acuing m good lmlh lune imarmon was «.2 make good me dem cwmg me cheque should have been forwarded nu ma Fm Devandam even wmlst «me acmn ws hemg adjudicated m mis Court The Fwsl Delendant, being a hoensed munewender. «ms Caurl ﬁnds wuuld have no wssues wn relumlng the sum should «ms ceun Mes m Ins Plsmms favour [321 Thws coun funds that the msnce hes m nul exlending Ihe Interim mjumman as avnhed Var by the Plalnuﬂ. The balance of ennvemence Ines m the Fuel Defendants Iavaur. Conch: [33] Based on me above, «ms Conn sets aside \|he ad-Interim In;unc1nan, me Plammrs appneauon under Enclosure 3 [or an mlenm Inlunmmn umu me ﬁnal disposax at W: sun us msmussed. [34] In tandem, me Fnrsl oevendanrs appucaudn to sex aside me ad- mnanm mjunclwun Is alluwed 11 m yIsv5t1\:>uncFVIn»<LyuA «we saw nmhnrwm a. d... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum v-max [35] Tons: oosxs of RM3o,ooo (which «ms Conn deems suicame) -s awarded an me First Dnlendanl. DATED 5 JULY 2023 (VW ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSVONER HIGH COURT IN MALAVA KUALA LUMPUR Fur Ins Plaml/II: am Scan Wei, Wang Joan Wye and Yong Hut YVW T/n JW Wong .4 Pamvtr Fnv (he Delendanls Enc rs Lat, Jess Pang and 5.1” Soon (PDK) T/n Lsi A Asmcmes cpun on 28.3 202:. Arguments (or mm applications were heard an 5 7 2n23. The Plainnffs agumenxs [41 The Pnammn a onmpany mm a business at mmem products and ulhels has a paldaup came! of RM1,a5o,ooo since 2009 u needed that its annual mnome ns av me was RM1I,596,566 and lhere are mare man Imny workers emptoyed «or me nmnlng av ns busmass. [51 me First oenenaann Is a hcensed money lender under me MLA and is one :71 the subsvdianes ol Jade Menex Group Berhad (mes) The Secnnd Delendanl \s a licensed auclmneer apamntad by me Fun! Deﬁendam to auction ON the PVHIHUWS busmas assets [5] There were some plans lor me Piainhﬁ and anamer nl .lMGB‘s subsnmanes Var winch me rum Delendanl had en: to me P\aInW for camlal to operate ms busmess lur me purnase o1 me sen: man, In me amnunl at RMl,5nD,000 was the execuuen ov me egreemenn. Tne Fnaunm oonlemed max they were never sarvad me stamped agreement by me Fusl Defendant. [71 Tnereaneu. me said Man had \|o be shehled whereby me Plamuﬂ was Informed vemaﬂy met all umer ugreemems entered wamd be z:armeHad .1 and wnen ma Flamnff senlsd me amount awed pursuant up the agreemem The Plamlvll eonceneea they had made a law auempvs In omem me exact amount owmg no me Fvst wenaan: but me xener had laned In do so Inexeaa, a nenee n1 demand was Issued up we Flanrmli by the Flrsl Delendanl s snhcnnrs m yIsv5t1\:>uncFVIn»<Lw:A «we. s.nn ...n.mn e. H... e my me nrW\ruU\|Y mm: m.n.n Vﬂ mum v-ma! la] The Plalhtllv In response had lrlslmclad rts soHcI\|ofi to reply to the house ol demand. The Flrst Delendant then tssued a Nolloe d1 Repayrnertt dated 4 3.2023 wtth a luurteen—day reoaytnertt deadline To ‘mat the Flalntiff engaged the Flrst Defendahl vide the eurntnunlcatton appllcatlen ‘WhaIsapp' The response lrorn the Flrst Defendant was that the awed amount d1 RM1,Teo,75a3d must be pard vlde a stngle payment and was nanheqetlable [9] The Plalrltilt quened about the legal less or RMI61,B87 I2 and the late penalty marge oi RM‘a‘a71 12 but the Fuel Detehdanl refused tn prdvtde further explanatten. The Ptalnttws requests lor an olhcal statement cl account were also tghared. The Ftrst Delendant prmaeded to lssue a notlce td audtsun the Platnlllrs assets secured for the loan. The l=Iairttllt‘s legal rlatice for the statement at aomuhl vide its sdltcltors also tell on deal ears whereby the second Delendanl had lsaued and putaltehed a Notlce at Putallc Auclmh to be held on 23,3 2023. [ID] The Plalrltlﬂ contended that the Seclmd Delendant had entered the Plalnttrrs premlses and mad la selze the Plarntws assets, though unsuaaesslutly. The Plalhllﬂ lssued a nohoe la the Flrsl netendant that lt wtll apply to noun for an Injullcllon to slap the auetlon but at the same Ilme had prepared a cheque In settle the nulslandlrtg sum [11] The counsel lot the Plalnlllt sutmutted that lt had shown that ll dlsclnssd hmla llde serious lssues to be mad and mm! the lusttce ml the use hes In extendlng the lnjunclbcn until the hnal dtsposal cl lms ease to preserve the status dud, else the Plarntrll would not be able to carry on wllh lts business aI:1IVI\|les It was the submlssmns M the Platnttn that the rtorl—oempllanoe wllh the mandatory plovtslons ol the MLA mly result In o ru ytsv5duKmCF\II4sllKLyaIt “Nair snh nuvlhnrwm .. u... m M», r... nﬂglhnllly sun. dnumlnhl VI aFluNG pmul the BQYBQIYIBM votd lb Inillo The PIIIVIUW had aiso quesmrled whether the First Ddendanl could auzlton 011 [he Piainlﬁs business assets when \l did not list down the pamcttlar assets in the agreement The Inferes1 and ate penalty charges imposed by Ihe First De-rendant were tne issues to be tned raised by me Ptamtrti [121 It was submitted fa the Plairmﬂ that damages were not adequate remedy as the seizure at the Piainms Business assets wuu\d cause business suitenng to production we Piaintitt claimed it will lose current aliens and its reputation. Tne rslllefenganlsubec ns [13] Pursuant to the agreement, tne Plamltﬂ was required tn pay mgntnty installments tor a penod of twelve months trom 15.5.2022 unlll ta 5 2023 tor tne disbursed RMI.50D.U0\|7 ioan. Yhe amount and even imeresl ov payment together with me said lime Items wete sltpmaled m tne agreement. Htmaver, the Ptaintm nad only managed to pay two instaimems — RM1D,DOD on me 2022 and another RM10,000 an to.7.2u22. [14] conseouentty, me First netendant Issued demands to me Fliainllﬂ on 10.1 2023 and 4.3.2023 Failure at me Piaintiws settlement, the First uetendanx issued a wetter un 1932023 to mtorm the Piaintni that as failure to reottiy the de4au\t restmad In the agreement bemg annuued and an appointed noensed auctioneer — Semta Letong Enterprise — would eanduet me auction on the seounty on 23 32023 pursuant to Clause 5(4):») oi tne agreement ru yIsv5t1D>uticFVInt><Lwut “Nair s.n.i nuvihnrwm be u... w my the anmn.ny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ menu Wm! [151 The aumn was nm successml as the Fuss Deiendanrs r2nrasanta\|ive and me Second Devenaem were prevented «mm en\|ervIg ma prenusas [16] The First Defendant contended that me P\am\|\ﬂ nan breached lhe m<-pans Injunction granxaa by this Conn on 233 2023 and/or me ad— maenm order an 10.4 2023, and also Its underlakmg to «ms Caurl andlor clause 3 of the agreement by dlsposmg three assets wnham any order ov mis Cuurl and/urlha consent 0! ma Frrsx Dedendanl. [17] Fremised on me Court of Appears tests m Km Glrald Fvancis No.4 John v Mohd Moor Abdullah A on [1995] 1 MLJ ma; [1995] 1 cm 293 and also ma Federal Court‘: nacrsmn M Lin: Know Sdn and 3 Ann: 1/ Overseas mean Finance (M) BM 5 ms [1952] 2 MLJ 162,012 First Defendant submmed than mere were nu senous rssues m be med The Fast Delendam nigmugmed Io ms caun that we was a slra\ghl (mward moneylendmg use were wilhnul mspuoe. me Plarnmr nau aevaunea -n revayrnenl VI was me submissnn oi me First nevenaam «mu lhls action med by the Plamlm V5 unsuslamahla as the aﬂeged breach of 516 MLA was unlsname because .1 was on me reques\ or me maunnw Ihal lhe Fwsl Devenaanz kepl me custody of me stamped agreement. [ml me First navenuanrs subrmssmn Included me argumem that me Plamms oomenunn man the agmement us void «or uncenamry as mere was no panlcmansalsun of me secunly. was unsound Based on the PlamIM‘s uwn applvcauon for an mjuncllon to prsvenl ma aucnon a! me PIIVHDWS busmess assets — Items V71 no H UV the First scheme to the agreement. m yIsv5n\:»uncFVI4w<Lw:A «mm. s.n.r nmhnrwm a. U... w my r... nVW‘nlWY mm: mmn Vﬂ mum war Th court :1 [191 ms Conn‘: auavvlvon vs am drawn to me contention 01 me Pvsmvvrs ndndusddsme dv malarial lacs when i\| was more lhvs cdun m obtain an equitable renevov me ex-pane ivI]uvvc1AorI Three ssssvs nsvsd in no ‘M ov me Firs1 Schedule 10 me agreemavvl had avveady been disposed av and/or upgraded when he Plainmﬂ was before «us Own on 23.3.2923 ov wmcn this Court pavvvslakmgly granted me area In mjuncl the Defendants from Lzznduclvrvg auclvorv 09 all the assets hated In no 11 o1\|he Fvvs1 Schedule av the agvsemem. ms was exactly stated m me send ex—psne urdev and than Valer me adamenm uvderdaled 10.4.2023 [20] This com lalev diswveved at me inm-panes hearing mac some wems were upgraded and some were msposed av, which meant mac me ex-pane order and later we ad4n\|enm uvdev granted by nus ooun were vm\| aocuraleand may be meanmgxess, The Plalnlxlrs respdnss to cm. which conveyed vls posmdn that me mailer was vncansequenuav and trvwalv IS unacceptable. HIS mes! Deﬂawy malenal as Ihal V5 file hearl 07 [ha anpmcnan urdev There Is no excuse have na\| Io appnse ov dvsdose I0 INS Court 0' the actual vlams when It had al\ the opporluniry I0 be Vuﬂy {rank and candid with W5 Coun dunng the ex-pane élppllfauon This resulled Ihls Com m gvanung me ex-pane mjunctmvv over same assevslltems lhll did not sxvsl. [211 On wvvelvvev an uuuncudn should be gvamsd which .s an eqmbable vensv, Ina Irus vsw vsvd mu m Knat GI.-uld Francis Noll John (supra) veqmras (he Plzvnlifl I0 come wI\|h clean hands znbevl mm NH disclosure L77 malerlal facts must he maae avaﬂabb. The Plavnlm further Vallad In enhghlevv W5 Court ma: v\| was In: Plalnhﬂ whn haﬂ chased the Fvvsl 2 m yxsv5qu»uncF\II4:nv»<Lw:A «mm. smnv n-vvhnvwm s. d... w my me mvmuny mm: dnuuvvnvvl Vﬂ mum v-max Detendant tar tne lull drseursenrent M tne Rmtsuatuuu loan amount when the agreemenl ned ya! to be stamped. Neltner was Ihts oourt apprlsad me tact that lt was an the Plalrt\|tff‘s request that tne stamped agreement he kept by the Frrst Detendant [221 we court ﬁnds that order 29 Rule 2A Rules of Cowl 2012 (Rec) para (e) was not adhered In. It provtded tnat tne aﬂﬁdavtl in supporl at an ex—parte applreatlon must eentarn a clear and oonuse statwtenl at “(eJ any racrs whrch may lead Ihecourlnul to grant me app/lcallorl ex parts or at at/,-" [231 Yhe Plarmm nad ample uplaurtunity to appratse tnrs Court at any oerrecllon as In any facts 0! posluan when it was before INS Court an to 4.2023 wnen INS court mtlended the sx—psr1s lntenm tnjuncttnn pendlrlg the semen at cause papers on tne oetendants and tne drspdsal uf tne inter-panes trearlrrg for 0113 trtlunclton, but tne l>lerntm and not do so Klulma Palm all MIII Sdn Bhd A On v xdpem: semussm ltmrrrur Eht1[2D04] 1 ML! 316 relets to wtricn on mat gmurld alone, would jusmy the selllng asrde ottne ad-ln\|erlm lnjurtcuort granted [24] Frdrrl all the documents adduced by tne Flrst Defendant, rt ia dtmous mat the Plalntrtt n-d never challenged tne yalldrty el tne agreement. ln fact‘ at alnrest all stages at me events mat ouctmed between hem‘ the Plalntrtt clearly adrnltted to ewrng tne Frrat nelenderlt tne repayments to tne lean me was also not addressed by tne Flamull at lrrst rnstanca when It urged Ihts cdurt \|o grant the ex-pane lruuncuorl urgently rn yIsv5t1\:>uncFVIutxLw:A «war. a.r.l nuvlhnrwlll .. tr... M my r... nﬂmnnllly enn. dnuuvlml Vﬂ nFluNa vtmxl [251 As with me Veamed nromer Juslice Ong cnee Kwan An oelunn Prinlora Sdn Bbd v Maxﬁn Bin nernri .4. On [Kuah Lumpar cm: Sult Na. WA-22NCC»544-11/2020) (llnnponod) W5 Conn halos that the duty of mu and frank disclosure Is um dlschavgsd by merely exhuhmng documents In the application The Flammi was duly bound to draw this Court‘: allanlvon in maternal zvrdence of Issues Ihal may affect‘ VI this me most eertamly would have, «me Courl's eonsreemrion in granling me ex-pane inyunclion. See a\so unmd Kingdom Independence Party Ltd v Bruin: and mm [2019] EWHC 3527 (as), Brink’: Mal Ltd v Elcombe[198B] 3 All ER use and Furlda Soborarm 1:. Anal: and cum: vSanfos and others [2013] EWHC 2199 (Comm) [251 Gmded by me 0our1olApp:al ram In Damiyanli Kantilalboshi L Anor V Jigarlal Kanﬁlal Dasha [2004] 1 MLJ 456 wnere me paramount consxieranon even wnere mere were non-dwsclosuras Is whether the rusuoe 0! the case required Ihe granung or rather Ihe extension of me mtenm rnrrrncuen Here, me non-dvsclusures were material — \|hey had even arseoneuree or aﬂeeleu me sx-pans ereer 0! 23.3.2023 and the ea-rruerrrrr order an 10.4.2023 as me sumea mailer 07 Much (ms Court had mjuncted the Delendanls from aucmnrng on was nor m existence [27] ukewrse, the facts that me Pnarnmr had sought «or mu dlsbursemern belnre me eranrprng of the agreenrem and mat \|\| had requested lor me Fvsl Ddendanl re sate keep me srampea agreement ~ \|hal wen! (0 me me! onne argument en me Dona Me rssues \|a be man man lormed we base or me PIam\|rﬂ's algumem Ihal me mandalory prornerorrs at MLA were nor eerrrplrea wllh by me First nevenaem. m yxsv5qu»uncF\II4w<LyuA “Nana s.r.r mmhnrwm re. LAIQ4 w my r... nﬂmnnﬂly em. dnuumnl wa nF\uNG em lee] The Plalnlill had emvhaslzed lnal II had repealaaly mngm for ma statement 07 awourll from the HIS! Defendant when all he WNW!‘ the repaynlem was ﬁxed as lo the amount (mm and wlmum interest) and me llmaframe The l=la.nlm had run I ormed Ihls COLII1 man il had only made good two out ol Melve reuaymenls lo me Flrsl Delendant. [29] whal IS apparenl al lhls slage IS lnal \|he Plalnllff had beneﬁlled lmm me RMl.5oo,ooo loan dlsbursed by me Flrsl Delenuanl ol wnlcn repaymenl Iherelu was nm honoured by the Plainnll Thus Calm IS bound by lne COW! of Appaal‘s declsion In Dr Mansur bln Humln 5 Or: v Earlsan Tunaga Perannanq (M) Sdn BM 5 Or: [2019] MLJU 1552. ‘The Ienmed HCJ had also consmarsa lna submlsslon: by bolh learned counsel and mled lnal aver: lr ma transactlorl was lllegal, me Appellants could not seek any asslslarlce from the court as mey wave in pan uellcla m lne partaking In ma lllegal uansacllon. The Appellants had cons In man with unclean hands and were rhevelore rlul‘ enmlea to any beneﬁts that may sprlng mun the fuu/ltairl of equlry. " [:40] ms Cuurl will rlo\| extend me lnlenm Inlunclicrl as an equluble rellel I5 only deservlng lo mm me come wnn clean hands — aae Tm Sr! Bldul Kllulld uln Ibrahim v Bank Islam Miluysl-I and and anoum suit [2009] 5 ML! 416 and ranan sml Carp son and v Bunk lsmn Mn ysln BIll1[2DD4] B MLJ 1. 10 IN nsvsnumcrvusmm “Nair Smnl ...n.mn .. .l... M may he nﬂnlnnllly ml. dnuuvlnnl wa .nnnc Wrul	1,624	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
DA-22NCC-3-09/2018	PLAINTIF 1. ) LIZIZ STANDACO SDN.BHD. 2. ) GUOK NGUONG PENG DEFENDAN 1. ) ONG KOH HOU @ WON KOK FONG 2. ) ONG LIANG YU 3. ) LAU YONG FOONG	PENYATAAN TUNTUTAN: sama ada Pihak Plaintif mendapat pembiayaan RM43,412,500 atau RM112,025,000 dari Defendan 1 - sama ada 98 keping cek tunda tarikh berkenaan adalah untuk deposit dan pembayaran ansuran untuk pinjaman RM43,412,500 atau RM112,025,000 - sama ada geran-geran Hartanah Tersebut didepositkan sebagai sekuriti kepada enam (6) perjanjian jual beli tersebut - sama ada Pihak Plaintif telah membayar sebanyak RM15,650,000 kepada Pihak Defendan - sama ada SIP bertarikh 6.1.2017 adalah sah dan berkuatkuasa - sama ada SIP bertujuan membayar sebahagian atau keseluruhan pinjaman - sama ada PWC berhutang sebanyak RM82,804,940 dari GNP - sama ada Plaintif 2 secara salah mengesahkan jumlah hutang PWC kepada GNP adalah sebanyak RM82,804,940 melalui suatu Surat Jaminan dan Indemniti bertarikh 30.11.2016 - sama ada Surat Jaminan dan Indemniti itu sah dan berkuatkuasa - sama ada Pihak Defendan menunaikan beberapa keping cek tarikh tunda berkenaan setelah SIP dimasuki dan sama ada memaklumkannya kepada Pihak Plaintif - sama ada Pihak Defendan boleh menunaikan 98 keping cek berkenaan di bawah Bill of Exchange Act 1949.(xii) sama ada Pihak Plaintif berliabiliti apabila menghentikan bayaran kepada enam (6) keping cek yang cuba ditunaikan oleh Pihak Defendan.(xiii) sama ada Pihak Plaintif berliabiliti membayar kepada Defendan 1 sejumlah RM91,885,000 yang dipinjamnya - sama ada Pihak Defendan dihalang menuntut bayaran dari cek-cek tersebut apabila Pihak Defendan bukanlah pemberi pinjaman berlesen di bawah Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1951.	05/12/2023	YA Dato' Roslan Bin Abu Bakar	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b04e34ab-9d51-43b0-98d3-f57b585c85ad&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - DA-22NCC-3-09-2018 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: DA-22NCC-3-09/2018 ANTARA 1) LIZIZ STANDACO SDN BHD 2) GUOK NGUONG PENG … PLAINTIF DAN 1) ONG KOH HOU @ WON KOK FONG 2) ONG LIANG YU 3) LAU YONG FOONG … DEFENDAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Pihak Plaintif memfailkan writ saman serta pernyataan tuntutan pindaan ini terhadap Pihak Defendan bagi pemulangan sejumlah 98 keping cek tarikh tertunda bernilai RM104,025,000 yang telah diserahkan kepada Pihak Defendan sebagai sebahagian sekuriti untuk suatu transaksi pinjaman. [2] Manakala Pihak Defendan memfailkan tuntutan balas terpinda bagi suatu perintah supaya Pihak Plaintif membayar kepada Defendan 1 sejumlah RM20,140,000 untuk cek-cek tarikh tertunda yang dihentikan pembayarannya dan/atau alternatifnya membayar kepada Defendan 1 sejumlah RM91,885,000 dan suatu deklarasi bahawa Surat Ikatan Penyerahakan (Deed of Assignment) bertarikh 6.1.2017 yang dimasuki antara GNP Construction Sdn Bhd dengan Defendan 1 adalah batal dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan. [3] Plaintif 1 adalah sebuah syarikat sendirian berhad yang diperbadankan di Malaysia dan menjadi pemilik berdaftar hartanah- hartanah yang dipegang di bawah PT 548 – PT 571 dan PT 619 – PT688, Seksyen 17, Bandar Kota Bharu, Kelantan. [4] Plaintif 2 pula adalah seorang individu warganegara Malaysia yang mempunyai alamat penyampaian di Lot 1441, Taman Koperatif, Jalan Wakaf Mek Zainab, Kota Bharu, Kelantan. 05/12/2023 16:02:42 DA-22NCC-3-09/2018 Kand. 129 S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [5] Defendan 1 adalah seorang individu warganegara Malaysia yang mempunyai alamat penyampaian yang terakhir diketahui di No. 68, Jalan Landak off Jalan Pudu, Kuala Lumpur. [6] Defendan 2 pula adalah seorang individu warganegara Malaysia yang mempunyai alamat penyampaian yang terakhir diketahui di No. 11-10-3, Menara Antara, Jalan Bukit Ceylon, Kuala Lumpur dan/atau di No.26, Mesra Terrace, 7 Jalan Dutamas Raya, Dutamas, Kuala Lumpur dan merupakan anak lelaki Defendan 1. [7] Defendan 3 juga seorang individu warganegara Malaysia yang mempunyai alamat penyampaian yang terakhir diketahui di No. 68, Jalan Landak off Jalan Pudu, Kuala Lumpur dan merupakan isteri Defendan 1. Fakta [8] Plaintif 1 pada sekitar tahun 2013 berminat untuk membangunkan hartanah-hartanah milik berdaftarnya yang dipegang di bawah PT 548 – PT 571 dan PT 619 – PT688, Seksyen 17, Bandar Kota Bharu, Kelantan (selepas ini dipanggil “Hartanah Tersebut”) sebagai sebuah pusat membeli-belah borong (selepas ini dipanggil “Projek Berkenaan”). Untuk tujuan itu, Plaintif 1 melantik Platinum Wholesales City Sdn Bhd sebagai pemaju (selepas ini dipanggil “PWC”). Selanjutnya PWC melantik pula GNP Construction Sdn Bhd (selepas ini dipanggil “GNP”) sebagai kontraktor utama bagi Projek Berkenaan. [9] Bagi melaksanakan Projek Berkenaan, antara tahun 2013 hingga 2016, Plaintif 1 telah mendapatkan pembiayaan melalui enam (6) perjanjian jual beli Hartanah Tersebut secara berasingan dari Pihak Defendan (salinan perjanjian ini dilampirkan di muka surat 1-15, 46- 59 dan 150-163 dalam Ikatan Dokumen A1 dan muka surat 290-307 dan 377-394 dalam Ikatan Dokumen A2). [10] Sebagai sekuriti kepada pinjaman tersebut, Plaintif 1 mendepositkan geran-geran asal Hartanah Tersebut dan cek-cek tunda tarikh. Cek-cek ini selain dari menjadi sekuriti pinjaman, ia juga menjadi sebagai bayaran ansuran (Lampiran B dalam pernyataan tuntutan). S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [11] Pada hujung tahun 2016, Pihak Plaintif dan Pihak Defendan telah bersetuju menyelesaikan pinjaman tersebut. Dengan itu GNP dan Defendan 1 menandatangani suatu Surat Ikatan Penyerahakan bertarikh 6.1.2017 (selepas ini dipanggil “SIP” di muka surat 474- 477, Ikatan Dokumen A1). [12] Pada bulan Januari 2017, melalui peguamcara mereka, Pihak Defendan memulangkan semua geran berkenaan kepada Plaintif 1 (salinan surat penyerahan di muka surat 479-480 Ikatan Dokumen A2). Namun 98 keping cek berkenaan masih gagal atau cuai dipulangkan oleh Pihak Defendan. [13] Selanjutnya Pihak Plaintif memplidkan pada 16.3.2018 dan 19.3.2018, Pihak Defendan telah cuba menunaikan enam (6) dari 98 keping cek berkenaan tetapi telah diberhentikan bayarannya oleh Pihak Plaintif. [14] Manakala Pihak Defendan pula memplidkan bahawa selain dari pinjaman sebanyak RM43,412,500 tersebut (yang telah selesai dibayar balik), mereka juga telah memberikan satu lagi pinjaman sebanyak RM112,025,000 kepada Pihak Plaintif pada bulan September 2015 dan dan geran-geran asal Hartanah Tersebut serta 98 keping cek berkenaan adalah untuk bayaran pinjaman kali kedua ini. Isu [15] Isu-isu yang perlu diputuskan mahkamah dalam perbicaraan ini adalah (gabungan isu kedua-dua pihak): (i) sama ada Pihak Plaintif mendapat pembiayaan RM43,412,500 atau RM112,025,000 dari Defendan 1. (ii) sama ada 98 keping cek tunda tarikh berkenaan adalah untuk deposit dan pembayaran ansuran untuk pinjaman RM43,412,500 atau RM112,025,000. (iii) sama ada geran-geran Hartanah Tersebut didepositkan sebagai sekuriti kepada enam (6) perjanjian jual beli tersebut. (iv) sama ada Pihak Plaintif telah membayar sebanyak RM15,650,000 kepada Pihak Defendan. (iv) sama ada SIP bertarikh 6.1.2017 adalah sah dan berkuatkuasa. (v) sama ada SIP bertujuan membayar sebahagian atau keseluruhan pinjaman. S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (vi) sama ada PWC berhutang sebanyak RM82,804,940 dari GNP. (vii) sama ada Plaintif 2 secara salah mengesahkan jumlah hutang PWC kepada GNP adalah sebanyak RM82,804,940 melalui suatu Surat Jaminan dan Indemniti bertarikh 30.11.2016. (ix) sama ada Surat Jaminan dan Indemniti itu sah dan berkuatkuasa. (x) sama ada Pihak Defendan menunaikan beberapa keping cek tarikh tunda berkenaan setelah SIP dimasuki dan sama ada memaklumkannya kepada Pihak Plaintif. (xi) sama ada Pihak Defendan boleh menunaikan 98 keping cek berkenaan di bawah Bill of Exchange Act 1949. (xii) sama ada Pihak Plaintif berliabiliti apabila menghentikan bayaran kepada enam (6) keping cek yang cuba ditunaikan oleh Pihak Defendan. (xiii) sama ada Pihak Plaintif berliabiliti membayar kepada Defendan 1 sejumlah RM91,885,000 yang dipinjamnya. (xiv) sama ada Pihak Defendan dihalang menuntut bayaran dari cek-cek tersebut apabila Pihak Defendan bukanlah pemberi pinjaman berlesen di bawah Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1951. Kes Pihak Plaintif [16] Pihak Plaintif menghujahkan hanya membuat pinjaman dari Pihak Defendan sebanyak RM43,412,500 sahaja dan tidak pernah membuat pinjaman tambahan atau pinjaman kedua sebanyak RM112,025,000. Sebanyak enam (6) perjanjian bertulis dimasuki kedua-dua pihak bagi pinjaman RM43,412,500 di mana geran- geran asal Hartanah Tersebut didepositkan sebagai sekuriti pinjaman. [17] Saya mendapati adalah unik transaksi antara Pihak Plaintif dan Pihak Defendan ini kerana berurusan (dari dakwaan mereka) sebagai pinjaman yang melibatkan puluhan juta ringgit tetapi tidak mempunyai suatu dokumen spesifik berhubung dengan pinjaman serta butir-butir pinjaman. Walau bagaimana pun kes ini akan diputuskan berdasarkan kepada keterangan (lisan dan dokumentar) yang dikemukakan dihadapan mahkamah semasa perbicaraan. [18] Manakala sejumlah cek-cek tarikh tunda didepositkan juga sebagai sekuriti pinjaman dan sebagai bayaran ansuran pinjaman. Sebahagian dari cek-cek tersebut berjumlah RM15,650,000 telah S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 ditunaikan oleh Pihak Defendan dan meninggalkan baki 98 keping cek tarikh tunda yang belum ditunaikan. [19] Saya tidak mendapati keterangan yang boleh membuktikan bayaran sebanyak RM15,650,000 ini dengan sebahagian cek yang dikeluarkan tersebut. Pihak Defendan juga menafikan adanya bayaran tersebut. Dalam pernyataan tuntutan pindaan, Pihak Plaintif memplidkan terdapatnya enam (6) perjanjian jual beli Hartanah Tersebut dan setiap perjanjian ada dikepilkan cek-cek sebagai sekuriti tambahan sebanyak 98 keping (rujuk perenggan 8, pernyataan tuntutan pindaan) yang menjadi isu dalam tuntutan ini. Oleh itu saya tidak dapat menerima keterangan Pihak Plaintif bahawa jumlah tersebut telah dibayar kepada Pihak Defendan. [20] Selanjutnya Pihak Plaintif menghujahkan SIP telah dimasuki oleh GNP dengan Defendan 1, dimana GNP menyerahkan hutang PWC terhadapnya sebanyak RM50 Juta kepada Defendan 1 sebagai penyelesaian penuh pinjaman RM43,412,500 tersebut termasuk faedah. Berdasarkan kepada SIP juga, Pihak Defendan bersetuju memulangkan sekuriti yang didepositkan Plaintif 1 iaitu geran asal Hartanah Tersebut dan 98 keping cek tarikh tunda yang belum ditunaikan oleh Pihak Defendan. [21] Pihak Defendan hanya memulangkan semula geran-geran asal Hartanah Tersebut sahaja dan tidak memulangkan baki 98 keping cek berkenaan. Dihujahkan Pihak Plaintif tidak lagi terhutang dengan Pihak Defendan, termasuklah sejumlah RM82,804,940.87 seperti yang tercatit dalam Nota 1, lampiran Surat Jaminan dan Indemniti kerana telah dimasukan dalam SIP sebagai penyelesaian penuh serta diluluskan oleh Lembaga Pengarah GNP (rujuk di muka surat 478 Ikatan Dokumen A2). Kes Pihak Defendan [22] Pihak Defendan menghujahkan pinjaman RM43,412,500 adalah pinjaman lama dan telah pun diselesaikan sepenuhnya oleh Pihak Plaintif. Pinjaman selanjutnya yang diambil dari Pihak Defendan oleh Pihak Plaintif adalah sebanyak RM112,025,000. Untuk pinjaman kali kedua ini, sebanyak enam (6) perjanjian bertulis dan geran-geran asal Hartanah Tersebut telah didepositkan oleh Pihak Plaintif sebagai sekuriti. Cek-cek tarikh tunda sebanyak 98 keping tersebut adalah untuk pembayaran balik pinjaman kali kedua ini. S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [23] Seterusnya Pihak Defendan menghujahkan SIP yang dimasuki antara GNP dengan Defendan 1 adalah untuk penyelesaian sebahagian pinjaman kali kedua ini (RM112,025,000). Bagi pinjaman kali kedua ini, Pihak Defendan hanya memulangkan geran-geran asal Hartanah Tersebut sahaja kerana Pihak Plaintif masih lagi terhutang sebanyak lebih kurang RM62 Juta i.e. setelah menolak hutang PWC (RM50 Juta) seperti dalam SIP. Sebab itulah Pihak Defendan enggan mengembalikan 98 keping cek berkenaan. [24] Pihak Defendan juga menghujahkan SIP adalah tidak sah kerana kandungannya tidak tepat dan GNP sendiri tidak mengakui kandungannya. Penelitian dan penemuan mahkamah [25] Setelah mendengar kes dari kedua-dua pihak, saya mendapati pertelingkahan pihak-pihak adalah kepada sama ada pinjaman yang dibuat oleh Plaintif 1 dari Defendan 1 untuk membangunkan Projek Berkenaan berjumlah RM43,412,500 atau RM RM112,025,000. [26] Pertama sekali saya melihat kepada Projek Berkenaan dan tidak dinafikan ianya adalah suatu projek yang besar yang ingin dibangunkan oleh Plaintif 1. Dalam membangunkan Projek Berkenaan, Plaintif 2 akan menggunakan dua buah syarikatnya sendiri iaitu PWC sebagai pemaju dan GNP sebagai kontraktor utama. [27] Selanjutnya saya melihat kepada kesudian Defendan 1 untuk memberikan pinjaman bagi membiayai Projek Berkenaan. Bagi mendapatkan pinjaman kewangan ini, sebanyak enam (6) perjanjian jual beli dimasuki oleh Plaintif 1 dan Defendan 1 terhadap Hartanah Tersebut iaitu Plaintif 1 mendepositkan geran-geran asal Hartanah Tersebut kepada Defendan 1 (sebanyak 89 keping tanah) sebagai sebahagian dari sekuriti pinjaman. Selain dari itu Plaintif 1 juga mengeluarkan cek-cek tarikh tunda sebanyak 98 keping kepada Defendan 1 sebagai sebahagian lagi sekuriti pinjaman. Dari Lampiran A pernyataan tuntutan pindaan, baki 98 cek berkenaan adalah bernilai RM104,025,000. [28] Pihak Plaintif menghujahkan selain dari 98 cek ini, beberapa keping cek telah pun ditunaikan oleh Pihak Defendan bernilai RM15,650,000. Ini bermaksud keseluruhan nilai cek-cek tarikh S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 tunda yang dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif 1 kepada Defendan 1 adalah sebanyak RM119,675,000 (Ringgit Malaysia: Satu Ratus Sembilan Belas Juta, Enam Ratus Tujuh Puluh Lima Ribu). Tetapi tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Pihak Plaintif bahawa sejumlah RM15,650,000 telah dibayar oleh Pihak Plaintif (i.e. Pihak Defendan menunaikan cek-cek tersebut). Dan saya tidak menerima hujahan Pihak Plaintif berhubung dengan bayaran tersebut. [29] Berdasarkan kepada nilai cek berkenaan dan geran-geran Hartanah Tersebut yang didepositkan kepada Defendan 1, saya hanya dapat membuat satu kesimpulan atau inferens sahaja iaitu pinjaman yang diperolehi Plaintif 1 adalah sebanyak RM112,025,000 dan bukannya RM43,412,500. Jika pinjaman yang dibuat hanyalah RM43,412,500, tiada keperluan untuk Plaintif 1 memberikan sebegitu besar sekuriti kepada Defendan 1. [30] Saya kini merujuk pula kepada SIP bertarikh 6.1.2017 (salinan SIP di muka surat 474-477, Ikatan Dokumen A1). SIP ini telah ditandatangani oleh Plaintif 1 bagi pihak GNP dengan Defendan 1. Pihak Plaintif menghujahkan SIP ini adalah sebagai penyelesaian keseluruhan pinjaman yang di ambilnya dari Pihak Defendan iaitu untuk pinjaman RM RM43,412,500. Pihak Plaintif menyatakan melalui SIP ini, GNP menyerahkan hutang yang belum dibayar oleh PWC kepadanya kepada Defendan 1. [31] Dalam SIP jelas menyatakan PWC masih lagi berhutang sebanyak RM82,804,940 PWC dari GNP. Melalui SIP ini, GNP menyerahakkan hutang PWC berkenaan sebanyak RM50,000,000 kepada Defendan 1 sebagai penyelesaian penuh pinjaman Plaintif 1 yang diberikan oleh Defendan 1 (sebanyak RM43,412,500). [32] Diperturunkan sebahagian kandungan SIP tersebut: “WHEREAS:- (1) The Assignor is the creditor of PLATINUM WHOLESALES CITY SDN. BHD. (Company No: 1018940-U), a company incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1965 with its registered office at Lot 577, Section 19, Taman Limau Manis, Jahn Hamzah, 15050 Kota Bharu, Kelantan (hereinafter referred to as "the Company") in respect of a sum of Ringgit Malaysia Eighty Two Million Eight Hundred S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Four Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty (RM82,804,940.00) only (hereinafter referred to as "the Total Outstanding Sum"). (2) The Assignor is desirous of assigning to the Assignee and the Assignee is desirous of accepting the assignment of a sum of Ringgit Malaysia Fifty Million (RM50,000,000.00) only (hereinafter referred to as "the Assigned Debt") out of the Total Outstanding Sum.” [33] Saya mendapati keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Pihak Plaintif adalah bercanggah antara satu sama lain. Jika benar Plaintif 1 hanya mengambil pinjaman dari Defendan 1 sebanyak RM43,412,500 sahaja, mengapa perlu dinyatakan bahawa hutang sebenar adalah RM82,804,940 dalam SIP. Kemudian menyerahakkan pula adalah sebanyak RM50,000,000 sebagai penyelesaian penuh. Keadaan ini juga menyokong bahawa pinjaman yang di ambil oleh Plaintif 1 dari Defendan 1 adalah sebanyak RM112,025,000. [34] Membaca dan meneliti kepada kandungan perenggan (1), (2) dan (3) di bahagian Recital (“Whereas”), saya berpendapat adalah jelas diperuntukan bahawa GNP menyerahakkan hutang PWC sebanyak RM50,000,000 dari jumlah terhutang sebanyak RM82,804,940 sebagai penyelesaian keseluruhan hutang Plaintif 1 kepada Defendan 1. [35] Merujuk pula di muka surat 2 SIP, ianya jelas antara lainnya ditandatangani oleh Plaintif 2 dan Defendan 1. Saya berpendapat perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan dalam SIP ini adalah ringkas, tidak berbelit-belit dan kepada tujuan sebenar yang di niatkan oleh pihak-pihak untuk dilaksanakan. Perlu diingat Plaintif 1 dan Defendan 1 adalah ahli perniagaan yang berpengalaman dan transaksi ini melibatkan projek dan sumber kewangan yang besar. Pihak Plaintif saya percaya sudah tentunya mengkaji dan mendapat nasihat yang yang terperinci dahulu sebelum menyediakan dan mengemukakan SIP kepada Defendan 1. [36] Berdasarkan kepada SIP ini, GNP menyerahakkan kepada Defendan 1, hutang PWC sebanyak RM50,000,000 sebagai penyelesaian penuh. Isu sama ada PWC sebenarnya berhutang dengan GNP sebanyak RM82,804,940 atau lebih dari jumlah tersebut timbul setelah Defendan 1 menerima dari Plaintif 2 sepucuk surat iaitu Letter of Warranty and Indemnity bertarikh 30.11.2016 (salinan di muka surat 470 - 472, Ikatan Dokumen A2) S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 yang menyatakan keseluruhan liabiliti PWC setakat 30.11.2016 adalah sebanyak RM132,437,268.64. Jumlah ini disahkan melalui suatu dokumen “PWC Creditors Balance” yang dikepilkan bersama Letter of Warranty and Indemnity. [37] Semakan pada item 4 dalam dokumen tersebut mengesahkan hutang PWC terhadap GNP adalah sejumlah RM82,804,940.67. [38] Selanjutnya pada bulan Februari 2018, Defendan 1 telah membuat siasatan berhubung dengan Letter of Warranty and Indemnity Plaintif 2 berkenaan dan mendapati butir-butir SIP berhubung dengan penyerahakkan hutang sebanyak RM50 Juta berkenaan tidak pernah direkodkan atau dilaksanakan bagi menunjukan liabiliti PWC telah berkurangan sebanyak RM50 Juta. Juga Defendan 1 mendapati dari Statement of Account antara PWC dan GNP dari 6.8.2015 hingga 7.6.2017 (salinan di muka surat 481 – 483, Ikatan Dokumen A2) menunjukan hutang PWC dari GNP hanyalah sekitar RM50,670,661.51 hingga RM53,808,121.51 sahaja dan bukannnya RM82,804,940. [39] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan ini, saya berpendapat Plaintif 2 sepatutnya ada pengetahuan kepada data ini kerana dia adalah seorang pemilik dan pemegang saham kedua-dua syarikat PWC dan GNP. Saya berpendapat Plaintif 2 sepatutnya meneliti data- data berkenaan sebelum menyediakan dan mengemukakan SIP kepada Defendan 1. [40] Berdasarkan kepada data-data tersebut, Defendan 1 telah menandatangani SIP dan menerima hutang PWC sejumlah RM50 Juta. Saya berpendapat Defendan 1 telah memasuki dan menandatangani SIP dengan Plaintif 2 berdasarkan kepada maklumat dan data yang salah dari Plaintif 2. Jika Defendan 1 mengetahui kesilapan data tersebut, saya percaya Defendan 2 tidak akan memasuki dan menandatangani SIP. [41] Saya berpendapat Plaintif 2 telah melakukan suatu perbuatan fraudulent misrepresentation yang mana telah deceived Defendan 1 bagi memasuki dan menandatangani SIP. Oleh yang demikian saya memutuskan SIP boleh terbatal (voidable) dan boleh ditamatkan seperti yang diplidkan. Pendapat saya ini adalah berdasarkan kepada peruntukan Seksyen 17 Akta Kontrak 1950: S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 “17. “Fraud”. “Fraud” includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” [42] Keterangan menunjukan Plaintif 2 gagal memberikan respons kepada panggilan telefon Defendan 2 bagi mendapatkan penjelasan. Dengan itu Pihak Defendan cuba menunaikan enam (6) dari 98 cek berkenaan dan pembayarannya dihentikan oleh pihak bank atas arahan Pihak Plaintif. [43] Disebabkan SIP terbatal, maka Plaintif 1 masih lagi terhutang kepada Pihak Defendan untuk keseluruhan pinjaman sebanyak RM112,025,000, maka Pihak Defendan berhak memegang baki 98 keping cek tunda tarikh tersebut dan berhak menunaikannya di bank. Tindakan Pihak Defendan yang cuba menunaikan enam (6) keping cek berkenaan yang bernilai RM20,140,000 adalah betul kerana Pihak Defendan mempunyai hak berbuat demikian. Cek berkenaan mempunyai nilai, nama Pihak Defendan dan dikeluarkan oleh Pihak Plaintif. Pihak Defendan menjelaskan mereka tidak menunaikan keseluruhan cek tersebut pada awalnya kerana bersetuju dengan pemintaan Pihak Plaintif untuk tidak menunaikannya disebabkan Pihak Plaintif mengalami masalah kewangan. [44] Disebabkan enam (6) keping cek berkenaan yang bernilai RM20,140,000 telah dihentikan pembayaran oleh pihak bank (dishonoured) atas arahan Pihak Plaintif, maka Defendan 1 mempunyai hak untuk menuntut nilainya dari Pihak Plaintif. Tambahan pula nilai keenam-enam cek berkenaan tidak melepasi jumlah hutang yang perlu dibayar oleh Pihak Plaintif. S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [45] Hak Pihak Defendan ini adalah selaras dengan Seksyen 47, Bills of Exchange Act 1949 yang memperuntukan: Section 47 BEA 1949 “47 Dishonour by non-payment (1) A bill is dishonoured by non-payment – (a) when it is duly presented for payment and payment is refused or cannot be obtained; or (b) when presentment is excused and the bill is overdue and unpaid. (2) Subject to this Act, when a bill is dishonoured by non-payment, an immediate right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers accrues to the holder.” [46] Saya selanjutnya menerima penjelasan Defendan 1 bahawa pemulangan geran-geran Hartanah Tersebut kepada Plaintif 1 adalah disebabkan jumlah hutang Plaintif telah berkurangan dan 98 keping cek berkenaan mencukupi untuk menyelesaikan pinjaman (pemulangan ini dibuat sebelum Pihak Defendan mendapat pengetahun liabiliti sebenar PWC terhadap GNP). [47] Isu selanjutnya sama ada Pihak Defendan berhak menuntut dari Pihak Plaintif baki 92 keping cek tarikh tunda berkenaan (setelah 6 keping cek cuba ditunaikan dan ditolak oleh pihak bank di mana mahkamah memutuskan Pihak Defendan berhak menuntut nilainya dari Pihak Plaintif). [48] Meneliti kepada 92 keping cek berkenaan, saya mendapati terdapat tandatangan Pihak Plaintif di atasnya dan nilainya (value) diberikan kepada Pihak Defendan. Dengan itu Pihak Defendan menjadi pemegang untuk nilainya (holder for value). “Valuable consideration is presumed until the contrary proven” seperti peruntukan Seksyen 30 Bills of Exchange Act 1949. Tiada keterangan dikemukakan oleh Pihak Plaintif bahawa cek-cek berkenaan dikeluarkan secara frod, paksaan dan sebagainya. S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [49] Seksyen 30 Akta berkenaan memperuntukan: Section 30 BEA 1949 (page 41 Enclosure 91): “30 Presumption of value and good faith (1) Every party whose signature appears on a bill is prima facie deemed to have become a party thereto for value. (2) Every holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a holder in due course; but if in an action on a bill it is admitted or proved that the acceptance, issue, or subsequent negotiation of the bill is affected with fraud, duress, or force and fear, or illegality, the burden of proof is shifted, unless and until the holder proves that, subsequent to the alleged fraud or illegality, value has in good faith been given for the bill.” [50] Juga seperti yang diputuskan dalam kes-kes: Ong Guan Hua v Chong [1963] 29 MLJ 6: “In the first place what we are dealing with is not an action on an agreement which is set up as a contract, it is an action on negotiable instruments. The difference which is important here is that in an action based on a contract it is for the plaintiff to prove the consideration. In an action on a negotiable instrument, however, consideration is presumed and it is for the maker or the endorser of the instrument if he wishes to defend the action to prove that there was no consideration. This is because of section 30 of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance (section 30 of the English Act of 1882) which reads as follows: "Every party whose signature appears on a bill is prima facie deemed to have become a party thereto for value.” Ong Kee Chak v Au Heng Tong [1997] 5 CLJ 414: “[1] The appellant whose signature appeared at the back of the cheques was a party thereto for value and since value had been given the respondent was a holder for value. Bills and notes are an exception to the general rule and consideration is presumed till the contrary is proved. Accordingly the burden of showing that there was a total failure of consideration in respect of the said cheques rested with the appellant. In the present case that burden was not discharged by the appellant.” S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [51] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan tersebut, saya memutuskan Pihak Defendan berhak menuntut dari Pihak Plaintif terhadap 92 keping cek berkenaan setakat jumlah hutang yang masih tertunggak sahaja (sebanyak RM91,885,000 seperti yang plidkan dalam prayer 20 (ii) tuntutan balas pindaan Pihak Defendan). [52] Isu terakhir yang perlu diputuskan mahkamah adalah sama ada Defendan 1 adalah seorang pemberi pinjaman berlesen di bawah Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1952. Meneliti kepada isu ini, saya mendapati tiada keterangan berbentuk dokumen yang dikemukakan bagi menunjukan Defendan 1 adalah seorang pemberi pinjaman wang tak berlesen. Juga tidak pernah ditimbulkan isu Defendan 1 mengenakan apa-apa faedah dan tidak pernah diplidkan dalam pliding Pihak Plaintif. [53] Kedua-dua pihak adalah terikat dengan pliding mereka dan tidak boleh menjalankan kes melepasi apa yang diplidkan (prinsip kes Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Berhad [2015] 6 MLJ 1 FC dan kes R. Rama Chandran v Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147 FC). Oleh itu saya menolak dakwaan Pihak Plaintif ini. Keputusan [54] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan-penemuan saya tersebut dan atas imbangan kebarangkalian, saya mendapati Pihak Plaintif gagal membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Pihak Defendan. Dengan itu tuntutan Pihak Plaintif ini ditolak dengan kos. [55] Atas penemuan dan imbangan yang sama, saya mendapati Pihak Defendan berjaya membuktikan tuntutan balas pindaan mereka terhadap Pihak Plaintif. [56] Dengan itu Pihak Plaintif diperintahkan membayar kepada Defendan 1 sejumlah RM20,140,000 bagi cek-cek tunda tarikh yang diberhentikan bayaran oleh pihak bank atas arahan Pihak Plaintif dalam tempoh 30 hari dari tarikh tuntutan balas pindaan dibenarkan. [57] Pihak Plaintif juga diperintahkan membayar kepada Defendan 1 sejumlah RM91,885,000 dalam tempoh 30 hari dari tarikh tuntutan balas pindaan dibenarkan (jumlah ini diperolehi berdasarkan kepada pinjaman RM112,025,000). S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [58] Pihak Defendan dibenarkan memegang 98 keping cek tersebut sehingga Pihak Plaintif membuat bayaran penuh seperti yang dituntut atau jika tiada bayaran penuh dibuat, Pihak Defendan boleh menunaikan cek-cek berkenaan setakat jumlah terhutang sahaja (jika tarikh masih hidup). [59] Baki cek-cek berkenaan dipulangkan kepada Pihak Plaintif setelah Pihak Defendan mendapat balik bayaran hutang sepenuhnya. [60] Saya juga memberikan deklarasi bahawa SIP adalah terbatal dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan. [61] Faedah 5% setahun bagi bayaran di item (3) dan (4) dari tempoh keputusan kes ini sehingga bayaran penuh dibuat. [62] Pihak Plaintif diperintahkan membayar kos sebanyak RM25,000 kepada Pihak Defendan dan tertakluk pada 4% alokatur. Bertarikh: 1 November 2023. (ROSLAN BIN ABU BAKAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kota Bharu. PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak Plaintif: Tetuan Joseph Ting & Co, Suite 5-14, 6th Floor, IOI Business Park, No.1, Persiaran Puchong Jaya Selatan, 47170 Puchong, Selangor. Bagi pihak Defendan: Tetuan Alfred Lai & Partners, No. 36-2, Jalan 1/116B, Sri Desa Entrepreneurs Park, 58200 Kuala Lumpur. S/N qzROsFGdsEOY0/V7WFyFrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	29,433	Tika 2.6.0
02(f)-8-02/2023(P)	PERAYU 1. ) FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN BHD 2. ) HLA TOON TOOLSERAM 3. ) MAUNG AUNG THOU 4. ) MOONG BA 5. ) MOUNG BAN CHOWI 6. ) Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society RESPONDEN NAI NINN SARARAKSH	The central issue in these 4 appeals concerns the interpretation and understanding of the Attorney General’s consent obtained under Section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359].Of the four appeals, three appeals arose from the judicial review proceedings [JR proceedings] while the fourth appeal arose from proceedings related to Originating Summons No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 [OS 1128]. We heard all four appeals together. After full consideration of the submissions, reasonings of the Courts below and the records of appeal, we unanimously allowed the appeals relating to the JR proceedings and dismissed the appeal relating to OS 1128.	05/12/2023	YA Dato' Mary Lim Thiam SuanKorumYA Dato' Mary Lim Thiam SuanYA Dato' Nordin Bin HassanYA Datuk Abdul Karim Bin Abdul Jalil	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=38f7e754-ca8f-47d1-aabe-c8c5fa543a23&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - Five Star 5.12.2023 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 01(f)-3-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN PEGUAM NEGARA MALAYSIA … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-621-10/2021 Antara Peguam Negara Malaysia … Perayu Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou 06/12/2023 14:10:52 02(f)-8-02/2023(P) Kand. 40 S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016] Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-6-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN 1. NAI NINN SARARAKSH (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. HO CHOON TEIK (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … RESPONDEN- RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-02(IM)(NCvC)(W)-2553-10/2021 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … Perayu – Perayu S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Dan 1. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014] Antara 1. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Plaintif-Plaintif Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … Defendan-Defendan (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-7-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN HO CHOON TEIK (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-609-10/2021 Antara Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Perayu Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan Semakan Bagi Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-8-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN NAI NINN SARARAKSH (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-602-10/2021 Antara Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … Perayu Dan 4. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 5. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 6. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 7. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 8. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 9. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan Semakan Bagi Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No.K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No.K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden] CORUM: MARY LIM THIAM SUAN, FCJ NORDIN BIN HASSAN, FCJ ABDUL KARIM BIN ABDUL JALIL, FCJ S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT [1] The central issue in these 4 appeals concerns the interpretation and understanding of the Attorney General’s consent obtained under Section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359]. [2] Of the four appeals, three appeals arose from the judicial review proceedings [JR proceedings] while the fourth appeal arose from proceedings related to Originating Summons No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 [OS 1128]. We heard all four appeals together. After full consideration of the submissions, reasonings of the Courts below and the records of appeal, we unanimously allowed the appeals. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] Both the JR proceedings and OS 1128 arose from these salient facts. Vide a trust indenture dated 30.5.1845, on behalf of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the East India Company created a Burmese-Siamese Trust over a plot of land known as Lot 104 in Georgetown subject to terms and conditions as found in the indenture [the Trust]. On Lot 104 was/is a temple serving the Burmese and Siamese communities living on the island of Penang, and their successors in the said Trust. Expressly, the Trust was “for the management of the affairs of their Temple”. Four trustees, two from each community, were originally appointed to manage the affairs of the temple [Trustees]. Amongst those terms and conditions was that the trustees had no “right, power or authority whatsoever” to “grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer, convert or otherwise alienate the said piece of Ground or any part or parcel thereof”. The trust land “shall remain, continue for the benefit of the Burmese and Siamese S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Community of Prince of Wales Island and its Dependencies from henceforth forever”. [4] Despite those express terms and conditions, on 16.4.1994, the Trustees entered into a written agreement to inter alia, partition Lot 104 between the two communities. Lot 104 thus became Lots 2102 and 2103 and an order of Court dated 19.10.1994 [OS No: 24-665-1994 in the HC Penang] was secured to seal that agreement. The effect of that division left the temple remaining on the land held and still held by the Siamese trustees [Lot 2102]. The Burmese trustees continued to hold Lot 2103. [5] On 3.10.2002, funds which had been hitherto collected from the temple amounting to over RM3,778,523.73 were equally divided between the two communities. Again, another order of Court was secured to endorse the division of funds [OS No: 24-1209-2002]. Effectively, this left the original trust now standing as two separate trusts, one for the Siamese community in respect of Lot 2102 and the other for the Burmese community in respect of Lot 2103. For this purpose, the Attorney General’s consent was obtained on 1.6.2000. The High Court viewed this consent, referred to as the “1st Consent” as confirming the partition of the original Lot 104 into Lots 2102 and 2103 and that the original trust had been terminated. We will have more to say on this shortly. [6] Following this Court order of 3.10.2002, the trustees for the Burmese community [Penang Burmese Trustees] executed a new trust deed dated 31.7.2006 [Trust Deed]. Amongst its many terms were these: i. Subject to clause 7 of the Trust Deed, that the Penang Burmese Trustees shall have no power to sell the Penang S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Burmese Trust Property or any part thereof or mortgage the same or to create a charge to any third party thereon; ii. Pursuant to clause 7, the Penang Burmese Trustees shall have the power to enter into a joint venture agreement and/or transaction with any such future, potential Develop and/or Contractor to develop and/or construct and/or build on the Penang Burmese Trust Property upon such terms and consideration as the Penang Burmese Trustees shall deem fit and proper and for the best interest and future benefit of the Burmese community in Penang. [7] On 25.8.2006, the Penang Burmese Trustees, the applicants in the JR proceedings entered into a joint-venture agreement with Airmas Development Sdn Bhd to commercially develop Lot 2103. A Court order was obtained on 31.10.2007 to declare that this joint-venture agreement was validly entered into by the parties. As part of that development, Lot 2103 was subdivided into Lots 10029 and 10030. With the joint-venture, the earlier was registered in the name of the developer whilst Lot 10030 was registered with the Penang Burmese Trustees. [8] The developer then commenced an action at the Sessions Court against Nai Ninn inter alia for vacant possession of premises located on Lot 10029. Nai Ninn filed his defence and also counterclaim, claiming that he was the owner of the premises and was not obliged to deliver vacant possession as Lot 10029 was part of a charitable trust created under the 1845 Indenture; and that the developer’s ownership of Lot 10029 was questionable. This case was subsequently transferred to the High Court. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [9] Meanwhile, vide OS 1128 filed in 2014, Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik challenged the validity of the Court order dated 31.10.2007, that because Lots 10029 and 10030 are part of a public charitable trust, the AG’s consent under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] must first be secured before the order may be secured. Since there was none, the order was invalid and must be set aside ex debito justitiae. We understand Nai Ninn Sararaksh, of Siamese descent, lives on Lot 10029. In OS 1128, Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik have sued the developers as well as the Penang Burmese Trustees. [10] Although OS 1128 was filed in 2014, both Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik themselves did not procure the AG’s consent to file the action until 31.5.2016. In fact, Ho Choon Teik was not even a party to OS 1128 when it was filed. Armed with the AG’s consent, Ho Choon Teik then intervened and was added as the 2nd plaintiff to OS 1128. [11] Together with the developer and the Vice-Chairman of the Penang Burmese Association, the Penang Burmese Trustees filed the JR proceedings seeking to quash the AG’s consent dated 31.5.2016. The JR proceedings were filed on 30.8.2016. Decisions of the High Court [12] It is quite clear that the parties were fully aware of the two sets of proceedings. Unfortunately, the JR proceedings and OS 1128 were heard before different judges, and disposed of at different times. There does not appear to be any effort to consolidate the actions. This would have greatly assisted better use of time and resources, be it of the Court, counsel or the parties themselves. Each component share in that responsibility in the S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 administration of justice; and every effort ought to have been made, especially in order to obviate any inconsistent decisions, as happened in these appeals. [13] Insofar as OS 1128 was concerned, on 24.11.2017, the High Court allowed the claim and set aside the joint-venture agreement; holding that the agreement was unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect. At the same time, the High Court held that the division of Lot 2103 into Lots 10029 and 10030 was similarly unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect; that the subsequent registration of these subdivided lots to the developer and the Penang Burmese Trustees was also null and void. Further, the High Court set aside the order of the High Court dated 31.10.2007. Injunctive orders were also issued, effectively restraining the joint-venture agreement and the registration of the subdivided lots of Lot 2103. [14] The JR proceedings took a longer time to be disposed of; aggravated by the appeals involved. Initially, leave was refused by the High Court on the basis that the AG’s consent was not reviewable or justiciable. That decision was upheld on appeal. On 12.12.2018, the Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal and ordered the substantive application to be heard on its merits. [15] On 29.9.2021, the High Court in the JR proceedings allowed the application and quashed the AG’s consent. In addition, the High Court held that the Trust Deed of 31.7.2006 was a private trust; and that all the earlier orders granted by the Court, namely orders dated 19.10.1994, 3.10.2002 and 31.10.2007 are valid and binding. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Decisions of the Court of Appeal [16] Both parties appealed against those respective decisions. Thankfully, the appeals were heard by the same panel at the Court of Appeal. On 15.6.2022, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals in respect of the JR proceedings whereas the decision of the High Court in respect of OS 1128 was allowed in part. OUR DECISION [17] On 30.1.2023, this Court granted leave on the following 3 questions of law: i. Whether the consent of the Attorney General can be retrospective in light of the clear wordings and pre-requisites stated in Section 9(1) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 and the mandatory nature of Section 9(2) of the same Act and the decisions of the High Court in the cases of Ledchumanan Nagappan v R. Nadarajah & 2 Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 253 and Subramaniam Vallan & Anor v Dr. S. Sivasundaram & Ors [2016] 1 LNS 675 and whether such consent goes to jurisdiction? ii. In the light of the decision of the High Court which held that the subdivision of the original trust land should stay; that the land partitioned and given to the Burmese be vested in the remaining Burmese Trustee and as the beneficiaries of the Burmese Trust are ascertained or ascertainable individuals as held in Re Endacott [1959] 2 All ER 562, should the S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Burmese Trust be construed as a private trust or a public trust and whether the construction of a trust instrument and the original intention of the settlor under such circumstances, a question of law or a question of fact? iii. If a donor’s dominant intent is to restrict the charitable gift to the exact purpose specified in the Trust Instrument and for no other purpose, is the Court at liberty to presume that the donor still evinced a general charitable intent and effectuate the donor’s intent by applying the cy-prés doctrine to that gift? [18] From the submissions, grounds of decisions and the records of appeal, we were clear that the determination of the first issue was sufficient to dispose of all four appeals. [19] As indicated earlier, this Court had already opined that the decision of the AG under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] is justiciable and thereby reviewable by the Court. Further authorities may be gleaned from the decision in Peguam Negara Malaysia v Chin Chee Kow and another appeal [2019] 3 MLJ 443; that the AG’s power to grant or refuse consent is not absolute and is always subject to limits as prescribed in the statute itself. [20] Section 9 states as follows: (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust for public, religious, social or charitable purposes, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Attorney General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 obtained the consent in writing of the Attorney General, may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public for the purpose of— (a) asserting any interest or right in the trust property; (b) removing any trustee; (c) appointing a new trustee; (d) vesting any property in a trustee; (e) directing accounts and inquiries; (f) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (g) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged, charged or exchanged; (h) settling a scheme; and (i) obtaining such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. (2) No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with that subsection. [emphasis added] [21] From the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in appeals in relation to OS 1128, the AG’s consent dated 31.5.2016 was upheld on the following grounds. At paragraphs 22 and 23, the Court of Appeal reasoned that: [22] “…there was nothing wrong or improper in the AG granting his written consent for OS 1128 for otherwise it would be oppressive for Nai Ninn who has been asked to vacate his house to defend himself and to inquire into how the land, once held under a public charitable trust had been transferred to Five Star”. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [23] All that the AG allowed by his written consent is for Nai Ninn to ventilate his claim and for the Court to decide without taking side on the issue of the final outcome. We could not see how such a decision vested in him under s 9 of the GPA could be said to have been given unreasonably or irrationally such that no right-thinking decision maker would have given his consent. [22] At paragraphs 84 to 86, the Court of Appeal further rationalised why the AG’s consent need not be obtained before the commencement of OS 1128. According to the Court of Appeal, the expression- “… the Attorney General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Attorney General, may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public” (emphasis added) in s 9(1) of the GPA indicates to us that what is far more important in keeping with the rationale behind the written consent of the AG is that no frivolous action or suit is to be commenced or continued to completion without the AG having applied his mind to the action and having consented to it. If the action or suit has commenced already, then it is not to be continued, as would be a case where a second person is joined as a party to the action or suit, without the written consent of the AG. [86] As the AG has no issue with that and was fully aware of the action that had been commenced, it would be pedantic and pointless to labour further on the point at which the consent in writing was given. There was also no application filed by the defendants to strike out the OS before the written consent of the AG was obtained. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [23] In separate grounds written in respect of the JR proceedings, the Court of Appeal found that the AG did not act in bad faith when granting consent dated 31.5.2016; that it was important that “the AG did not take any partisan stand on the issues, but left it to the parties to persuade the Court”. The Court of Appeal further found that it was not legally wrong for the AG’s consent to be given as one of the issues which required probing was “how, why and when that a charitable trust for religious purpose could be turned into a purported private trust, no less with a commercial pursuit”. Consequently, the Court of Appeal found that there was “no good reason to review his decision”. [24] Amongst the many roles and duties of the Attorney General, an office constituted under Article 145 of the Federal Constitution, is the role and responsibility as custodian of the public interest; particularly in the matter of public, religious, social or charitable trusts. Such trusts are set up for the benefit of the larger sector of society and it is the AG’s duty to ensure that the intent of the relevant trusts is adhered to and safeguarded. [25] Some deliberations to this effect may be found in the decision of Chin Chee Kow (as the Secretary of Persatuan Kebajikan dan Amal Liam Hood Thong Chor Seng Thuan) v Peguam Negara Malaysia [2021] 5 MLJ 303. There, the Court of Appeal correctly explained the intention of Parliament in enacting section 9 of Act 359; that it is to empower the AG in the protection of charitable trusts from abuse and to prevent proceedings affecting the charity funds from unnecessary waste of such funds. [26] Similar views may be found in the earlier cases of Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor v Cheah Kee Wee & 15 Ors [1934] 1 MLJ 212; Haji Abdullah & Ors S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 v Ibrahim & Ors [1965] 2 MLJ 189; and Lee Eng Teh & Ors v Teh Thiang Seong & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 42. [27] In Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor, Whitley J cited and adopted Eldon LC's observations made in Attorney General v Green 1 Jacob & Walker 303, that it is the duty of the Court to take care that as little expense as possible should be incurred by the charity estate. Courts are reminded that safeguards are emplaced through section 9 [then under section 18 of the FMS Chapter 17, the precursor to Act 359] in order to prevent abuse, and to prevent proceedings against charitable trusts from being instituted too frequently for no other reason than because it is known that costs will be payable out of charity funds. In Lee Eng Teh & Ors, Gill J explained the consequences of non-compliance, that “…but for the consent of the Attorney General or his being made a party to the action, the present action would not be maintainable”. [28] The failure to comply with the mandatory requirements in section 9 renders any action or suit instituted not maintainable. In these appeals, not only was OS 1128 filed before the written consent of the AG was obtained, the written consent when finally obtained, is also clearly outside the terms prescribed by section 9. This is quite aside from the fact that both Nai Ninn and Ho did not meet its mandatory requirements. [29] The significance of non-compliance with the requirements in section 9 was explained in Ledchumanan Nagappan v R Nadarajah & 2 Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 253. There, the plaintiff who was seeking certain declaratory orders from the Court concerning the affairs of the Subramanian Temple at Batu Caves including an injunction to stop the celebration of Thaipusam at that Temple failed to obtain the prior written consent of the AG before instituting S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 his action. The application was dismissed when the learned Judge found inter alia that there was a “total failure to comply with the three preliminary requirements” under that provision. Although not named as a party, the AG’s representative had attended Court to express the view that the action should not be allowed to proceed since there was non-compliance of the requirements, namely there must be in existence of at least two persons having an interest, the prior written consent of the AG, and the suit itself being brought in the name of the AG. The Court agreed and was of the view that “it would not be necessary to say anymore”, on that point. [30] We agree with those principles and the approach. Sections 9(1) and (2) provide in quite clear terms how and when the AG becomes involved in such trusts, and what requirements must be met before matters relating to such trusts may be challenged in Court. First, it is in the nature of trust itself. The AG only becomes involved under section 9 where the trust is either an express or constructive trust set up for public, religious, social or charitable purposes. Next, there must be an allegation of breach of such a trust; or the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of such trust. In simple terms, Court action is contemplated. [31] Where proceedings in Court are indeed contemplated, section 9 mandates that whoever is moving the Court must first obtain the written consent of the AG. We can appreciate the rationale for such a requirement. As explained in the above case authorities, the process allows scrutiny by the AG to check against abuse and wastage of funds and other resources. Public, religious, social or charitable trusts are, by their very nature and intent, set up and intended for a larger community and purpose; serving an entirely different set of beneficiaries identified by some common cause or interest. Such trusts invariably would serve more than a single person. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [32] So, where there is an allegation of breach or where direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of such trust, and some suit or proceeding is contemplated, it makes good sense that the written consent of the AG is first procured. And, according to section 9(1), that written consent must be sought by two or more persons. Again, this makes good sense, appreciating the nature and character of such trusts. More than one disgruntled person or complainant must step forward to make that complaint and, secure the prior written consent of the AG. [33] The next requirement is that the application must seek any of the reliefs set out in section 9(1)(a) to (i). [34] In respect of the first requirement, there is present the intention to sue for an alleged breach of trust for the reasons relied on. The reliefs sought in OS 1128 are also within the reliefs set out in section 9(1)(a) to (i). However, the impugned written consent was sought only after OS 1128 had already been filed and it was sought by actually just one as opposed to the requisite two persons. The application by Ho to be joined as a party to an existing suit similarly suffers defects due to non-compliance of section 9. [35] Section 9(1) also deals with joinder; that there must be two or more persons intending to join, and not just the single person like Ho here. Again, this is understandable given the nature and character of the trust. This, too, is on the basis that the suit already instituted is valid to start with. Where the suit to which Ho seeks consent for joinder is itself flawed for want of consent under section 9, his application to join will not in the least alleviate the fatal deficiencies of the suit when it was first filed. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [36] In the present appeals, Nai Ninn was the sole plaintiff in OS 1128 when it was filed in 2014. He did not secure the AG’s written consent at the time of filing. Ho, on the other hand, applied to intervene and be joined as an additional plaintiff to OS 1128 which had already been filed by Nai Ninn. The records show that both of them then made that single application on 20.8.2015 and the AG gave his written consent on 31.5.2016 in the following terms: AKTA PROSIDING KERAJAAN 1956 [AKTA] PERSETUJUAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 9(1) PADA menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan oleh Seksyen 9(1) Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 [Akta 359], saya, TAN SRI DATO’ SRI HAJI MOHAMED APANDI BIN ALI, Peguam Negara Malaysia dengan ini bersetuju dengan permohonan Encik Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No KP: 400324-07-5301 dan Encik Ho Choon Teik (No. KP: 750707-07-5261) bagi meneruskan satu prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Pulau Pinang melalui Saman Pemula No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 untuk mendapatkan perintah seperti berikut: (i) satu perintah mengepikan pendaftaran nama-nama Defendan-Defendan sebagai pemilik Lot 10029 dan Lot 10030 secara ex debito justitiae atas alasan ketiadaan bidang kuasa dan ketiadaan kebenaran Peguam Negara di bawah Seksyen 9 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956; (ii) satu perintah injunksi tetap yang menghalang Defendan-Defendan sama ada oleh dirinya sendiri, pengkhidmat-pengkhidmat, ejen-ejen mereka atau sesiapapun daripada bertindak sebagai pemilik berdaftar hartanah amanah awam; (iii) satu perintah bahawa Defendan-Defendan mengemukakan penyata akaun bagi “Harta Amanah Keturunan Burma di Pulau Pinang” (“Penang Burmese Trust Property”) kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini; dan (iv) satu perintah bahawa segala wang yang telah digunakan oleh Pemegang Amanah Burma selepas 31.10.2007 berkenaan akaun hartanah amanah keturunan Burma Pulau Pinang dikembalikan dengan serta-merta dan didepositkan ke dalam Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dan kemudian pihak komuniti Burma Pulau Pinang. Bertarikh: 31 haribulan Mei 2016 S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [37] In our view, this written consent not only does not meet the terms of section 9(1), it clearly exceeds the restrictions imposed by section 9. It is a consent devoid of authority and mandate in several respects. That being so, the written consent is liable to be quashed, rendering OS 1128 as not maintainable and the High Court was thus right in issuing the order of certiorari quashing the said decision. [38] On the assumption that both Nai Ninn and Ho fulfil the conditions of having an interest in the trust, the application serves two different objectives depending on whose application we are addressing. For Nai Ninn, it was to institute a suit, or as it would appear, to regularise a suit which had already been filed at the time of the application for AG’s consent. As for Ho, it was to be joined as a party to an existing suit, OS 1128. In either case, both are alone for their respective purpose. In our view, this distinction of separate purpose or objective illustrates that their respective application was and is outside the meaning of the words “two or more persons”. [39] Further, in the case of Nai Ninn, his application is obviously outside the terms of section 9(1) as the AG’s consent was sought long after he had filed OS 1128 on 15.12.2014; almost as an afterthought. As can be seen, section 9(1) expressly requires the written consent to be procured before the suit is instituted. To say that consent may be sought and procured after Court proceedings for the reliefs mentioned in section 9(1)(a) to (i) have been instituted pays scant respect to the clear intention and requirements in section 9(1). [40] It also cannot be said that the AG is empowered to give consent retrospectively as this, quite clearly, runs contrary to the express terms of S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 section 9(1). Such an argument is like a double-edged sword as ironically, this suggests that Nai Ninn and Ho’s own complaint that the Court orders secured by the Penang Burmese Trustees are invalid for want of prior written consent from the AG is unfounded since consent may be given retrospectively. [41] In any case, the written consent of the AG uses the term ‘meneruskan’ which translates to mean “carry on” or “continue”. Such a term does not have the effect of retrospectivity but merely connotes permission or consent to proceed with what has already been started. Such a consent takes effect from the date of the consent itself which is 31.5.2016 and not 15.12.2014, the date when OS 1128 was filed. This leaves OS 1128 bereft of the necessary consent at the material time when it was instituted in 2014. [42] It must also be emphasised that the term “meneruskan” is not found in section 9 at all, especially in section 9(1) in which case, the impugned consent is without the authority of law. We find it not just difficult but a strain on the language to say that the words “institute” or “join” include “meneruskan”. [43] Perhaps, this becomes clearer when section 9(1) is contrasted with the power to grant sanction in cases of insolvency under section 471(1) of the Companies Act 2016 [Act 333]. That provision reads as follows: 471. (1) When a winding up order has been made or an interim liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms as the Court imposes. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [44] Section 471(1) uses the words “proceeded with or commenced”. This indicates that the power to grant leave to sue wound up companies is not limited to fresh actions or proceedings [“commenced”] but extends to the instance where actions or proceedings have already commenced [“proceeded with”]. In the latter, these actions may now proceed, carry on or be continued; or “meneruskan”. Again, these words do not appear in section 9(1) in which case, the AG’s consent of 31.5.2016 is without legal power or is outside the terms of section 9(1); and is thus invalid. [45] In addition, the Court of Appeal has overlooked the presence of section 9(2) which reminds the importance of compliance with the requirements of section 9(1): No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with that subsection. [emphasis added] [46] Section 9(2) reiterates the mandatory requirement of securing written consent before institution of a suit. Since OS 1128 was instituted before AG’s consent under section 9(1) was obtained, it is not “in conformity with that subsection”. While the AG has discretion on the matter of consent, it is with regard the grant, refusal or imposition of terms or conditions to such request for consent. The consent at all times must however, relate to a suit or proceeding which is yet to be instituted, and not to one which has already been instituted. In the latter case, the AG’s consent is in respect of whether the applicants for consent may be joined as a party to that suit already filed. We must add that in the latter case of joinder of party(s), the institution of that suit must, in the first place, have complied with the terms of section S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 9(1). In the case of OS 1128, no written consent was secured before it was instituted; aggravating the position yet further. [47] We do not find the High Court decision of Lee Chick Yet v Chen Siew Hee [1977] 2 MLJ 218 of assistance. Bearing in mind that it was a first- instance decision where the learned Judge opined that the Court could direct compliance of section 9 within a certain time period instead of striking out the whole action, that argument is flawed. Not only does it run contrary to the plain and unambiguous terms of section 9(1), but as pointed out earlier, the Penang Burmese Trustees similarly ought to have been given the same option. [48] The respondents had urged this Court to apply the principle of nunc pro tunc. With due respect, we decline to do so. [49] The principle is generally applied to cases involving court decisions, where the court seeks to correct their records on clerical errors. Black’s Law Dictionary explains the term as follows: ‘Now for then’ having retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power the court entered a nunc pro tunc order to correct a clerical error in the record. Acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be done; nunc pro tunc nearly described inherent powers of court to make the court records to speak the truth. [emphasis added] [50] That does not arise here at all. See also Kok Song Kong v BSP Co Sdn Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 440: S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 In the light of our conclusion that on the facts of the present case we are able to hold that the suit was instituted on 18 April 1984, it may strictly be unnecessary for us to say or do anything further; but out of caution we will direct that the writ be resealed nunc pro tunc, that is to say, with the date, 18 April 1984, which it ought to have borne in the first place. We do this in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction which the court has over its officers, not under any of the provisions of the rules. Where the rights of a party are threatened by an act or default of an officer of the court, the court clearly has such a power to correct the matter. [emphasis added] [51] No error prevails in the Court records for any correction; the only error lies in the impugned consent for the reasons we have already explained. [52] Before we leave this issue, we feel compelled to deal with a point made at paragraph 4 of the grounds of decision in respect of appeal on OS 1128. There, the Court of Appeal found that the written consent of the AG had been obtained in relation to the order dated 19.10.1994. We have poured through the records and we cannot find any consent to this effect. [53] There are only 2 consents issued by the AG, the 2nd consent dated 31.5.2016, the impugned consent has already been dealt with. The other consent, the first, is dated 1.6.2000 and it reads as follows: AKTA PROSIDING KERAJAAN 1956 PERSETUJUAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 9(1) PADA menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan oleh subseksyen 9(1) Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956, saya, Tan Sri Datuk Seri Mohtar bin Abdullah dengan ini bersetuju dengan permulaan satu prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang oleh Wong Hoong Keat (Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma di Pulau Pinang), (No. K.P. 3238892), Dr. Ko Ko Win (No. K.P. 9600855), U Khema Wuntha (No. K.P. US 035257736), Cheah Boo Eng (No. K.P. 4461657). Ong Ba Nee (No. K.P. 570101-07-5429), Prabandh Sanasen (No. K.P. 210819-71-5147) dan S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Songkeram @ Sungkram a/l Apau (No. K.P. 7644628) untuk memohon perintah- perintah seperti berikut: (i) (a) Bahawa pelantikan Dr. Ko Ko Win, U Khema Wuntha, Cheah Boo Eng dan Ong Ba Nee yang beralamat di Dhammikarama Burmese Buddhist Temple, No. 24 Lorong Burma, 10250 Pulau Pinang sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang pada 22 Februari 1998 menggantikan Maung Boon Khan dan Hia Toon Toolseram disahkan oleh Mahkamah; (b) Bahawa harta yang terletak di Lot 2103, Georgetown Seksyen 4, No. H.S. (D) 528, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang diletakhak atas nama Dr. Ko Ko Win, U Khema Wuntha, Cheah Boo Eng dan Ong Ba Nee sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang; (ii) (a) Bahawa pelantikan Prabandh Sanasen dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau yang beralamat di Chaiya Mangalaram Buddhist Temple, No. 17, Lorong Burma, 10250 Pulau Pinang sebagai Pemegang Amanah tambahan Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang dalam Mesyuarat Agung Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang pada 6 September 1998 disahkan oleh Mahkamah; (b) Bahawa harta yang terletak di Lot 2102, Georgetown, Seksyen 4, No. H.S. (D) 527, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang diletakhak atas nama Prabandh Sanasen dan Songkeram @ Sungkaram a/l Apau dan atas nama Pemegang Amanah yang sedia ada iaitu Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchap dan Sook Buranakol sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang; (iii) (a) Bahawa akaun terakhir Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma disahkan dan harta amanah termasuk wang tunai dalam Simpanan Tetap dalam akaun bank diserahkan kepada Pemegang Amanah kedua-dua tanah yang berkenaan iaitu Lot 2103 kepada Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma dan Lot 2102 kepada Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai; (b) Bahawa Wong Hoong Keat, Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma di Pulau Pinang dilepaskan sebagai Penerima Amanah tersebut; (iv) Bahawa semua kos yang timbul daripada tindakan ini dan kos permohonan ini dicukai dan diuntukkan daripada Amanah tersebut; dan (v) Lain-lain relif yang difikirkan patut dan suaimanfaat oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Bertarikh pada 1 haribulan Jun 2000. [54] With this consent, an order of Court dated 3.10.2002 was obtained granting orders which essentially dealt with the appointment of trustees and the vesting of Lots 2102 and 2103 on the appropriate trustees: ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN 1. bahawa Wong Hoong Keat, sebagai Penerima yang dilantik melalui Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi, Pulau Pinang bertarikh 14.12.1973, dilepaskan sebagai Penerima daripada mengutip segala sewa dan hasil (pendapatan) untuk harta amanah mengenai Amanah-amanah dalam suatu Dokumen Amanah menerusi Geran No. 2655 bertarikh 30.05.1845; 2. bahawa nama-nama Maung Boon Khan (K/P: A3103868) Hla Toon Toolseram (K/P: 3465236) dan Sook Buranakol (K/P 4083456) dibatalkan dan dikeluarkan daripada geran mengenai hakmilik tanah yang dikenali sebagai Geran No: 61389, Lot 2102, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang (dahulu di kenali sebagai H.S.(D) 527, Lot 2102, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang) dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau (No KPT: 450515-02-5097) digantikan dan diletakhakkan sebagai Pemegang amanah; 3. bahawa nama-nama Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchapan (K/P: 2190061) dan Sook Buranakol (K/P: 4083456), simati, dibatalkan dan dikeluarkan daripada geran mengenai hakmilik tanah yang dikenali sebagai Geran No: 61390, Lot 2103, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang (dahulu di kenali sebagai H.S.(D) 528, Lot 2103, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang) 4. bahawa akaun dalam Afidavit bertarikh 19.09.2002 oleh Penerima Harta Amanah Komuniti Thai-Burma di Pulau Pinang, En. Wong Hoong Keat, disahkan dan diluluskan dan daripada wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Juta Tujuh Ratus Tujuh Puluh Lapan Ribu Lima Ratus Dua Puluh Tiga dan Sen Tujuh Puluh Tiga (RM3,778,523.73) Sahaja dalam pengangan pihak Penerima setakat 30.6.2002, pihak Penerima diperintahkan:- (i) membayar wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Satu Juta Lapan Ratus Lapan Puluh Sembilan Ribu Dua Ratus Enam Puluh Satu dan Sen Lapan Puluh Enam (RM1,889,261.86) Sahaja kepada Tetuan Vello & S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Associates, Peguambela dan Peguamcara, Pulan Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak dan untuk membayar bersama-sama kepada Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchapan (K/P:2190061) dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau (KPT: 450515-02-5097) sebagai Pemegang-pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang; dan (ii) membayar wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Satu Juta Lapan Ratus Lapan Puluh Sembilan Ribu Dua Ratus Enam Puluh Satu dan Sen Lapan Puluh Enam (RM1,889,261.86) Sahaja kepada Tetuan G. Raju and Company, Peguambela dan Peguamcara, Pulau Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak dan untuk membayar bersama-sama kepada Maung Boon Khan (K/P: A 3103868) dan Hla Toon Toolseram (K/P 3465236) sebagai Pemegang-pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang 5. Bahawa pihak Penerima hendaklah memberi suatu akaun terakhir daripada 01.07.2002 sehingga 31.10.2002 dan selepas menolak peruntukkan untuk kos, perbelanjaan dan lain-lain bayaran yang patut, membahagikan serisama wang-wang yang dalam pegangannya dan membayar setengahnya (1/2) kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates, Peguamcara dan Peguambela, Pulau Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak Pemegang-pemegang amanah Thai dan setengah (1/2) yang bakinya kepada, Tetuan G. Raju and Company, Peguamcara dan Peguambela untuk dan bagi pihak Pemegang- pemegang Amanah Burma. 6. Kos yang dipersetujui sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Puluh Ribu (RM30,000.00) Sahaja diperuntukkan daripada tabung Amanah tersebut dan pihak Penerima hendaklah membayar wang sebanyak RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan G. Raju and Company, RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates dan RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan Pregrave & Mathews sebagai peguamcara-peguamcara untuk pihak-pihak dalam perkara ini masing- masing; dan 7. Bahawa Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah, Pulau Pinang hendaklah mendaftarkan perintah-perintah yang dibuat dalam perkara ini dalam geran-geran masing- masing. Bertarikh pada 3 haribulan Oktober 2002 [55] There is no mention, whether in the first consent or in this Court order of the splitting of Lot 104. This is hardly surprising since Lot 104 had already been split as far back as 19.10.1994: S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN:- 1. Bahawa harta amanah Thai Burmesa yang terletak di Lot No. 104 Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang dibahagikan mengikut pelan ukuran No. CAB/11/C/PG/92-P1 bertarikh 26 haribulan Ogos, 1993 danPerjanjian untuk Pecah Milik bertarikh 16 haribulan April, 1994 dan Perjanjian Untuk Pengurusan Bersama ke atas Tanah Perkuburan bertarikh 16 haribulan April, 1994 dan bahagian yang ditanda “1” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut didaftarkan dan diletakhak atas nama Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai dan bahagian yang ditanda “2” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut didaftarkan dan diletakhak atas nama Pemegang Amanah 2. Tanah Perkuburan yang terletak di bahagian yang bertanda “1” dan “2” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut diurus bersama oleh Pemegang- Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai dan Burma; 3. Encik Chuah Ah Bah dari Jurukur Chuah & Rakan, seorang jurukur tanah berlesen dilantik untuk memohon bagi pecah lot dan pembahagian keatas harta amanah tersebut; dan 4. Kos untuk permohonan ini dibayar dari kumpulan wang amanah. Bertarikh pada 19 haribulan Oktober, 1994. [56] For this “split” of Lot 104, there does not appear to be any consent from the AG, of any description, for what we see is a most critical departure from the 1845 Indenture. Conclusion [57] For the above reasons, we find for the purposes of section 9 of Act 359, the learned AG has no discretion to give consent after a suit has already been instituted. Worse when the application for consent is only made by a single person and not two or more persons. To say otherwise would defeat the ‘filter’ mechanism in the statute and the protective role that the AG plays as custodian of the public interest. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [58] In the circumstances, the impugned consent of 31.5.2016 is invalid and is liable to be quashed. The High Court had rightly granted the orders sought in the JR proceedings. Question 1 is thus answered in the negative. [59] In view of our answer to Question 1, and since OS 1128 was instituted without the consent of the AG, that OS is incompetent and not maintainable. We therefore do not see the need to answer questions 2 and 3. [60] The appeals in relation to the JR proceedings are thus allowed and the decisions of the Court of Appeal dated 15.6.2022 are set aside and the decision of the High Court is reinstated. In respect of the appeal in relation to OS 1128, the appeal is allowed and the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court are set aside. [61] There is no order as to costs. Dated: 5 December 2023 Signed (MARY LIM THIAM SUAN) Federal Court Judge Malaysia S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Counsel/Solicitors For the appellant Civil Appeal No. 01(f)-3-02/2023(P), No. 02(f)-6- 02/2023(P), No. 02(f)-7-02/2023(P), No.02(f)-8-02/2023(P): Karin Lim, A. Suppiah, Julinder Daliwal & Alisa Lim Wei Zhen Aznil Naziah Juli & Praba Peguambela dan Peguamcara Suite 2-05 Tingkat 2 Bangunan Wisma Pantai Jalan Kampong Gajah 12200 Butterworth For the respondent Civil Appeal No.01(f)-3-02/2023(P): SFC Shamsul Bolhassan, SFC Mohammad Al-Saifi Hj. Hashim, SFC Nurul Farhana Khalid, FC Nor Aqilah Abdul Halim & FC Nur Syazwani Abdul Aziz Bahagian Guaman Jabatan Peguam Negara No. 45, Persiaran Perdana Presint 4 For the respondent Civil Appeal No. 02(f)-6-02/2023(P) & No. 02(f)-7-02/2023(P): T. Gunalan Seelan, Balwant Singh Purba, Eng Yuh Pei & Tan Shin Yi Messrs. Balwant Singh & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 20-B (Ground Floor) Lebuh Penang 10200 Pulau Pinang For the respondent Civil Appeal No.02(f)-8-02/2023(P): T. Gunalan Seelan, Ong Ken-Jeen & Lee Min Yau Messrs. Vello & Associates Peguam Bela dan Peguamcara No. 105, Anson Road 10400 Penang S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	55,138	Tika 2.6.0
WA-12ANCvC-286-09/2022	PERAYU JIMMY ''S BREW AND BAKE SDN BHD RESPONDEN IMK RETAIL SDN BHD	This Court found that the Sessions Court undoubtedly dealt with the evidence thoroughly, identifying the income and costs before deciding that it was fair for the appellant to have the expenses that he claimed to have, before directing him to pay RM2,500.00 monthly. This Court does not find any error in the Session Court’s decision when it ordered for the Appellant to pay RM2,500 monthly to settle the amount owing which is the judgment sum. [22] This appeal is dismissed with costs of RM3,000. The decision of the Session Court is hereby affirmed.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ca358adf-79ab-4c8a-8ff2-2e851014f416&Inline=true	05/12/2023 12:37:37 WA-12ANCvC-286-09/2022 Kand. 24 S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—12ANCvC—286—ﬂ9/2022 Kand. 24 H5/12/2013 mm-27 IN YHE NIGH COURT or IIIALAVA AT KUALA LUNIPUR IN ms raven; TERRIYORV, muvsun CIVIL APPEAL no wA.12ANcvc-2:5-0912022 azrwzsu JIN\|MV'S anew AND BAKE sun am: ....APPELLANT (comuuv Nu: ua1m»K) AND 1DlK REYAIL sou am) nzsspounem (com-Aw no: sasesu) enounns or JUDGMENT T Apgenl [11 On 1592022 me sessmn own new auwea me Respondervfs Judgment Dsmnrs Summons against me Appenam and oraarea for a mommy paymem cf Rmzsnooc unm mu and ﬁnal seulemenx of me ]udglna1ldebLTha}uogmsmdd:Is RMn2,:m 72 sw J4u1ys:tswPa~srEsTnF9 «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm p] The Appeua:-rs amuse agaiml and Sewer: Conn‘: deusmn 15 um 11: mu and frank dwsdosurewnlh ma produmen M 1: bank swan:-nents fmm 31.1.2020 xo 31.12.2021, showed 111.-«me Appeuam had dmy a balance of RM9o.00. me hank s1a1emams were served an me Respondenn an 1552022 bekare me moss-exammauon M 1m Awellanfs dlrecwr on 5.0 2022 me Appeuann warmed «run we Session coon Judge had mled ma1 mam was no need for ma pooducuon 01 bank sce1emm1s1or2019. [:1 Vs\|,\|1Ia Appsllanlsubmmbd nu: ma Suuon coon Judge had Kskcn me poeihurl 04 me Sam nan-pmducluan o1 KM 2010 bunk ntallmem wu unteva-more \|u lhn Aopellam nnd had Med aullnsl mu Appellant TM Aooeuam impkwmd Ihat ms was ermneous as thus was no evndu-ce (0 Show Ina! me woman: had d1ss1pa\|ed or removed its 2139?; In deprwe me Respondent (mm me (rum dumnauon. [41 M me Audgmml was only omamed 1n 2020, me Aopeuam submilled Ihauhu bank saacamen1s oi 2019 had no 1915143110: The Appellanlhmhar suhmmed me1 ma session Cmm Judge and not sansry nevsen as «o In- means and sunny d1 me judgmtm debkzr more malung such an order. The casa a1 lam! (M) Sun and v Emonay Cour! Still and [2014] 0 cu 102 was mad [5] The Appeuam vnnloeed mis coun «a set was my order of cm seumn com on ma mnlenl man 11 is irsolvem so such ordu Is an abuse of mass: as It pmoed me corporate veil sm :4a1ysmyr=a.s;zan.rs «ma saw ...m.mm a. .1... w my 1... mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII .mm v-max [5] Al the susuon com. me Respondent had ulnamsd a judgmlnl m uevauh against me Appenann on 3.2 zozu var RM! 12.341 72 [1] The Appellant am not seme me sad judgment sum On 22 4 2022 um Respondent had ﬁled a Requestfordudgmenl Deblov sunrmns to newer ma sax: ludgmnnl sum Much men bscame a judgnenl aem owad by um Apneuann m cm Rsspondanl Tn nus, me Appallanl appoinlld solicitor: on 2: s 2022 to challsnga Im an Judgmem Dumur Summuns. [51 The Rupondenl and an Amandad Judgmanl Dlblor Summons on 5.3.2022 The Session coun cmiacrea me wnltun sutxniwonz. nf bmh padiss am ordered the Apneuam to pay me sum a! RM112,34\| 72 Wm! mommy msvalmemz. M RM2‘500.0D umil run and ﬁnal selﬂement :2! me said judgmem sum The Sullon Court’: daclslon [9] ma Sesslnn cam granlaﬂ me luvs under cm: 74 Rule 1lA Rules 01 com 2012 (Run) mm aHaws nor a judgment debtor xummons under :4 mm: DahIuIs'Ax1 1951 (ms Act). We session coun had Ilso returned to am) anus Act mac vmvidss ‘{6} Upon wen exammemn at rmrrappsalalvm as afniesal-1 the com! may omerthejudvment debtorrapiylha [adamant um sum (a)m ans sum meme: rarmmm or wnmn such penod as the court mly I/x, m sm :4u1ys:m«yPMrEaTnF9 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Iblby such msmmenls payabce Ilsuclv limes as me mm may ﬁx ~ [1 u] The Ssssmn Cowl mum that at me haar1ng.\|hs Appenam had vansa la ansuose MI ulsaosure an me ﬂnandal sxanus In 2019 even Ihcugh me cwll claim agamsn K commenced -n 2019. [1 u The S$slon com mnsmama Ihe AppeHunl‘s evidence that onnﬂnnad n had monayln zme but no bank slalamsnls were adduced ax ma hearing at ma Judgment Dahmr Summons The oral mummy tram me Awauznra dImc\|o( Donﬁrrnad mama Annennm had \n It: Duswssnn cm 2:119 bank statement run it was no! adduced for ma smmn Courfs eorusrdtvahon The svmerm at the hsarlng mma Judgment Dsblursumrnans [12] Anne hearing anms appeal, me zznunsellcnhe Appellamsubmined man 1: was ma Sesskm Court that ruled ma! mm was no naoesuly producing bank sulsmanu «or 2019, xx men wrongly held om ma non- dlanlosuru wns delberila I71 and mm In (he Appeﬂanl [1 :1 mi: Cuurl has smumd Ihfuugh ma Aupeal Racnrds at Em: :4. ma Sunwarnantary Aupeal Rewrds [Eric 5] and ma Sunplemanlal Rewards 01 Apnea! (No 2) [EM 51 There is nothing ea supvﬁrl me Anneuanrs wnbennan ms: the ssssmn Court Judge haa aglsed with ma pasmon of IheAp-pellankalmal lhanhe 2M9 bankilalememwas meuevam To sme that me sassm Conn Judge had taken an mun-«um as comenaed Is a sanous allagalmn Yhere is naming have In subscamiane mat am :4u1ys:EmyFMrEaTnF§ “Nair saw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he nrW\nnH\|:I mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-ma! [141 So nus COUVI canllm cnndude man me smlon Coal‘! and ruled at Irlal Ihal lhura was nu Med la Dmdues ma sald zma bank slalemam and on ma ulnar nanu conduded that m: Anpsllanl had not made a full and lrank dlsckzsurelu enable illo ascenaln me alloraalzllny «make good me ludgmenl sum. [I5] What ls cenaln ls max ll was lndaed ma poslnun at me Awallanl max me 2019 um sulemanl was lnalauaal in! ma Sesslon oaulra mnamamnen lor In ldiudlcamm ol ma pmcaaamgs at ma Judgment Daalara summons am (hi Snsiml com. Even al ma lppaal, ma Aaaallanl had alaaalaslly liken me posoﬁun man i\| was not mlauaax Tl-ls caunrs Anulﬂlg [16] From me wvilten submtss4ons oHheAp9ellanIallI1e sassam coun. lneee Ims rm challenge In ma Iacl that u had m us possssslon cm 2019 bank slalememwmcn was mt adauaad. Yhete was also an aﬂmlsslon by [M Appellant man In my mam were some murlays ln ma sam bank account. [17] In a nrouaalag on Judgmsrll usual Summon: Ilka ml: which was haard al ma Seulen Cowl, ma human In saualy ma court on me allamaailny ornthavwlse mm on ma Appellant The mun would consldur all avmenoa. mal and documentary lo deem manner such sum should be. The law urlders4(6)Deb1cls Acl 1957 pvwlaas. ‘Upon such axaminanon an-onappearanne as arfomsald, me man may ante! than/dgmenl rtsola (1: pay me [Imgmem deb! em-av - sm 34a1ys:EluyFMrEaTnF9 «ma s.n.l nuvlhnrwm a. u... a my a. mm-y am. dnuuvlnnl VII arlum vtmxl (5)m om sum whafha Immwnn at mrmn such penbd :5 ma court may ﬁx: or may such /matmems payable at such limes as the cam may ﬁx.“ ma] ms pnndpll 5 upheld n the aauu (M) Sdn Bhd V Emh Iy Courlsdn sun (supra) as Inﬂows “[271 The pm-upae m Khoo Wat Keong Ronme (supra) Is applicable as max :a precisely what the com has to do during mo examination process /a, lo samy uaan wnelhy me mdgmenl debtor has me mam Ind A-army to pay befovs making any omnrlal live/udgmenl dablor pa pay m we lump sum /mnw/m or wﬂlvm a spscvﬁedpemzd man by me mm! or m uucetmm at me nmss nm by Me com! amuﬁng to s 415 (5 arlb olms Debtors Acmspocuvuly ' [19] Based on me lvldenee ma: ma AupeHanl admnlad m having mansy: in the bank amoum in 2019 pm no expunamn as to what had happened la it. me Appellam cannoﬂaull me Respondenlcr ms court la mnclude. on a balance o1 prubabwmas‘ Ihal me money: were moved out ollhe Appeuanrs bank account. [20] runner, this Court cannm atmapl me Appellanfs oanlennon max lo we: ma Apveuam no pay -n Inslalmams av Rmzsm monthly to me Rupmdem Is 1anLamwn\| \|u pmmq lha cmpnrala vml The nmardld ml man me drredurs Io pay on said mnnmly insxawmams bu\| the AppeHan( Vanl Is Thus. we aupumem about piemmp ma ourpcrme veil in cm misumoewsd and does not am. am :4p1ys:m«yFMrEaTnF§ mm. saw ...m.mm .. p... w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm Qqndulau 5211 ms Coun mm: Ihal me Seaman: Court undnubladly duwnn ma evrdeoca lnnmughly, identifying Ihs mama and com befove deeming that ii was lairlar me apnsuannn have me exuenses man he daimed In have. before dlvecﬁrvg mm In nay RM2,5D0 no mommy ms Court was run rm any mm m me Sessmvw Cour\'s dedslcn when itordeved Iurma Aoneuanz Io pay nmsoo rnonlnlylo setlialhe amaunlawmg wmcn ts me wdgmeut sum. [221 m: appeal 5 dbmlssed mm cost: o1RM3‘00D The detxmn 111 me sum" coun Vs hereby alﬁlmed DATED JAPML 2023 WW ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDYCIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH comm VN MALAVA KUALA LUMPUR F12r1heAppe/rant. Damzn Es Km cnung, Jalsd Tee Wei .1». and Woon Lmg Li T/n s L Goon 4 Pm-mar: For Ibo Rnpondant: Phang Soon MuII/ rm Han .9. Partners sm :4u1ys:m«yPMrEaTnF9 % mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pm	985	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-12BCY-2-06/2022	PERAYU IMELDA NASREEN BINTI NASRUDDIN@BALCHIN RESPONDEN NORIZATUL AMIRA BINTI KAMSAN	Costs of this appeal is awarded to the Appellant. This Court allows the counsel for the Respondent’s plea that it is in the sum of RM8,000.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ed4aa6b4-cb7d-4802-8a17-7fbd0b2c0a6d&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:10:31 WA-12BCY-2-06/2022 Kand. 53 S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—12BCY—2—D5/2022 Kand. 53 us/12/2013 nezxn-31 IN THE HIGH count IN MALAYA AT KIJALA LUMPUR IN ms FEDERAL rsknnomt, MALAYSIA BETWEEN IMELDA NASREEN awn rusnunnm QBALEHIN APPELLANT NORIZATUL AMIRA snm xmsm RESPONDENT GROUNDS or JUDGIIEMI [1] Aﬂer a Ml trial the Sessmn Ocun had an 15 S 2022‘ entered the toﬂowmg judgment (2) demared man ma Appeuanrs commenl an ne( Facebook page an 2a m 2u2u amounted m z uelamalory smemem agamsl the nespenaem. m xKzx7xzLAm<F:ucywKhn 3%.. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [21 M (C) 1:!) (9) an mjuncllun ptvmbmng the Appellant (wflelher by herseli or neraganxsmcmvumarpusmng, publshlng orcausmg Ihersof any scanemencs wnnen or verbal any other aevamanary slakamenls agamsl me Respondent man are untrue mupncaung ma Respnndem wnn Ihe gwing ol «am Iesumony and/at changing and/av ve\|raA:(Ing her nasnmony wn um oourl proceedings olme wgn Conn .n Johnr Bahm cm: sun No. .lA~22NCVC-162-U5/ZOIB us Sum); ma Appellam puhhshed an unmnd\|\|mna\ apology (with terms sppmved D! by Ihe Respondent) wmcn muses a acaxamanc \|ha\| me de1ima¢nrys\|amment made was done wnn mahce on me pan M the Appeuanx. and that such apomgy remains on me Appeﬂanfs samas mama for thirty days: General damages IFHP19 sum av Rmsomw to be paid by me Apvillanl In ma Rasncnaem. Inlsreu M 5% on the sum of me genaral damages awarded, an cusls cl Rmmuoo to ba pan: by me Awmlant to me Resaondem rnan Faoabook comment ma saunon on-m doclamd \|o have aovamud and slandaredlhe Respondent pcnameu la a decxsiun dahvarsd 1 am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana s.nn ...n.mn a. U... a may he nrW\n\|U\|y mum: dnunmnl VI mum v-max [231 on me Appevama aetenoe of jusmcanon, ma Session cam held that in would unly succeed of an material soanamems m lhe punncauon were pmven mba true a\ para 45 onhegruunds ofjudgmenl. The Mean Cnumn DIloSIiDrMuhlnImId Sallen om IsmaII&AnorvNuruIIznh ht Anwlr mmmn a Ann: (2021) 2 MLJ 577 had new omemse. Tn succeed m ma aevance av jxmimalinn‘ ma Appellam need um pnwe max evlry ward us ma truth but me gar ol n or ma anmg arma mam charge .a weranca Is also made «a ma com av Appears daemon in D-to Sui Malummod Nlnr on. Jnnuluddln y Slsxom Toluvlxyan Mllaysln End 4 AnoI[2ﬂ1A]4 MLJ 242 [24] This com also xumea \|o as neramauon Act 1957 vmeruln lhe aaranoo otiuacmcamm Is pmvma cm ‘In an aman for libel or slander In respect of words camafnmg two or more dfstmcr chalyas agamsl me pla/Ivlrﬂ, a delenca of [uniﬁcation shall no! lad byresson only ma: me mnn aleverycnarge >5 not proved rl ms words no! pmea Io be (me do not materially mme me p/amwa mputalron having regard Io me yum 0/ ms rimammq charges " [251 1neue¢ore, n augm to he eva\ua\|ed whemev \|he Respondent had m tau mradad her posmon ax trial was vma\| me said svammenl uerated u was nolcnmacl (01 me sessxan own to mslead hacked mm ma oorrecmesl of ma daclsmn 0! the JB sun (ogelher mm me cause 0! Dr smnawa ma (paras so‘ 51 and 59 nllhe Session Court‘: ground: av fudgmaru) n was erroneous to have nam man ma ravaclmn by me Respondent is mule»/an\| became n was rv.1\| damrrmnud In ma JB sun (pm as :11 me Sassmn Court‘: grounds at )udgmIn\|) 1) am zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. am ...m.mm .. U... w may he mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [25] ms coun observed mm there was also no pruperevaluahnn dune Respondents replnallun as a result ollhs sam statement Where mere was no pmollhal me Rdspondanc s repocauan was malenaﬂy wmuvzd, me deasnoe anusuucanon snau nul ran ﬂlhe words were nu! proved Io hetme » see me Fedeml Coun‘s daemon m Abdul Ranman nun v Sunlvlngnm 5 Anor[19GE] 2 Mu es. [271 me Appeuanx had made dear .n me panlcwan ol gusuﬁcamn Ina case sne sougm \|o as! up and .uuuy(m1mo ms radaraw Cowl‘: decnsmn In Synﬂkll ﬁnk In Arrsalnngor Sdn and v Tlny Pu: Klnm w o [201 5] 6 MLJ197) Tnus, this Court considared Iha Appsuanns Dleaded dmsnce um en: said sunanum, In us nature: and ordinary meaning maznl ma! 4:) The Respondems evmenue In Ins JE sun mn\|rad\c\|ed me medics! moms and vepom‘ (m The Responderﬂ demed lhe prior dxsalssnns mm me meducav ofﬁoers and Dr Sakmah‘ my sna nad rem-some he: pnnr pcsman‘ (d) Her Evidence was umerenc no me account snn nad eamu Dravrded \|o me memes! dmcers and Dr Saklnah. [251 The Appellamhaﬂ adduced endsnce during the mar at me Sesswon Court to lhilify and slww mat me Respondanl had as a manner aflacl, retracted her earlier oaswion given prior to me man of me JR Sun. The Appeal Records eomalned me Interwews wnn me Respondent on separam oodasmns It was recorded me aewunl dc matiatelm day gwen 1: sm zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. s.nn ...m.mn .. H... In my n. mn.u-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! by the Respcndenl an we records mougn reourded on dwrerent days were consscem as mm an ma mnases called by the /19DsHanI—nne of ma mam matenax [acts was man Masywah was presemana mvulved in me home mm Tha\| nananve was vepsansa \|hree was to dmeuem medwca\ omcers an diifevenldales a\| amerem Iocanons. ms (act was ﬂamed when nne Rcspandanl aammaaly muacnea her pas-non when sna lesnfnsd in ma JB sun u was hev evidence In ma JE Sm! mm Masynan was mere In maraly provide support and encouragement ana man .1 was nu husband wm had delivered me baby [22] Inevnably n muﬂ be nnncludld man me smd Ilatamanl was sunsunually hue - in that sna had aamaa avurylhma she had mid ma medical alﬁcsls inﬂ Dr Sikinah ma delence a1]us(IIia;a(>on mus! omen. [an] The Sasslun Conn had faﬂed In zccrmi due cunsuderation In me ewdsncs oﬂhe naanncaue pmvlden The grounds at mdqrnent was silent as to ma evaluahon cf ma Appeuanrs evmanca max cmvlnnssd at independent oomemporaneoua evidence The Responoem on me other hand and ml oﬂer any cnrmbcralwe ev-aenoe to supporl her version :2! event [31] When ma Sessmn Oourl dechned «a draw adverse invsyanoa agamsl me Respondenl Mm had «am In adduce any ems: evidence‘ m oommmed an arm max snasnos was mauanan m namre as u some help \|o ﬁnd wnemer ma Respandenl naa not given ma accounts as per me rewards at me medical nmcers Yhus. in can he savany concluded mm w produced ms emaanna wanna be uniavourable m ms Respondsm 7 sea Wang KarJull A Anor v 57 Am pans mp San BMH2016] 5 MLJ 527 1; am zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «ma. s.nn lunhnrwm s. U... a my a. nrW\n\|U\|y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum v-max [321 The Respondent argued that me med\|ca\ mums, reports and notes am not comam vemaum slalernems «am lrom her She comended ma‘ they were me medical omuers‘ In\|eIpre'a\|\on anu summary er wha\| may had ummoca Be that as il may nu ma nm change the fact mm II was «mm and demed by the Respondenl during her \|esumL7ny m me as Suﬁ ms was conﬁtmen by me Resoondenl nersalldunng ms mal at lhe ssssxon Court. [331 u wls Ihn Vurlher summssnns 0! ms Angellanl mm Ins Raspenanm mly have had an mlenor motwe \|c Chang: or mlhar ralranl rm puslhan when she lasnﬁed m Ihe JB sun when sosorumg to ma Appellants summssiom was me sugguslmn pm In me Respondunt lhal ms asam ml her mam at me home mm. vas polanhaﬂy n crmunsl msusr max ms bemg unvesugzuaa by me aulhormes Thu Respmdenl admmad \|o krwwmg ms rapermssmns to an person not qualmeﬂ m medical prams ura daula \|a be mvo\~/ad In dehvsry af a baby Regarding «ms Issue. mus coun ﬁnds man «\| am not laclually amum man the (an man me sad statement ny me Appellant was m gm, we Agg Iolmm n [341 M them were mslanoes as above av lack ol judbcwal zppreclahcn av the ewaenoa. this courrs appeuane mcmennon ws warranted Refer to GM Vaok cm (H A Anor v Lu my cum @ Lu rock Sung A on [2005] 2 ML! 1 and Mg Hoo mu 5 Ana! V wsnay Tun Lot Pong (ndmlnlntrltrlx for nu «ms 0/ Tm Em Kwlnq, umsssu; L on [2020] 12 MLJ av sm xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKnn «mm. smuw ...m.mm .. U... w may he mm-y mm. dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [351 me session Caun had erred In me evalualmn ol me evvdenoe ro detemwle wnemer the aeoence at ruecrrrcenrurr was woven There were verlures In accord due wergm to me evraenee o1 mdapendem wrnresses caﬂed by me Aapeuant me appruprrace adverse In9e<em:e had also not been drawn agnmsl me Respondent [331 we mlsmradmn oi me Sessnon Cuurl rn me evamauon av me evruence mrmruea apoeuare Vntervenlwon — see me Own ol Annasrs daemon in Gunlryl Irmgrma Englnurs Pro Ltd vusu Ger:/an Sdn and L Dr! [2005] 6 MLJ 237 [37] ms com laund error m are Sesslun Cnurfs ruser. \|n arsrruss me aetenee 01 rusumcanun on me premrse me: me Appeﬂanl and run wnlad me Resnendam lo Dracure me xamers veﬁﬂcalmn (para 55 was grounds at judqmeml The faclual ﬁndings onne JB sum were also rrrappmzme \|o «ms case lncause may were nul iacluzl queshcns for -1e(ennma(Ion m we case the reasons for Dr sexrnaws loss were unmatevial la wmemer me said svauerrrerrx had deiamed me Responder“. All (uses showld man me Suslm Caunwas mrscaneewsd m coming tn ueusrar. [as] so. m mrs mslanoe, ms cam wru exemse us appellate powers and se\| asrue me Sessvon oaurrs daemon ms Conn ﬁnds that me said slalamem was not delamalory In nature given us nzlural and Dvdmary mesmrrg what rs apnarenlbased on me evxaerroe, me ApveHar\\| had duly pro»/an rrs defence ol juslmcaﬂan sm xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana s.r.r nmhnrwm .. H... w my r... nﬂmnuﬂly mum: dnuamnl VI mum WM Conn‘: urder {:59} ms appeal is auwma The demsion at me sessson Coun is set asude On this pmmse, ms coun mu not addruss ma appeal as In the genera! damages granled by me sessmn com. Yhe Rsspomem is omerea Io relum me RMsnIono pan: by Ihe AppeIIanI as damages wImm laurlean days The Respondenl KS aIsn nvdanad In mum RMIZISQU mm was paw \|n hat pevtammg Io me was awarded In her by Ina sesscn coun wIIhIrI the same me «am [40] Costs aflhis appeaI IS awaraaa In one Appcllanl ms Oourl News me wunul luv the Raspondan\|'s pIaa Ina: It 75 Ill Iha sum o1RM8,UOD DATED 7 NOVEMBER 2023 R02 MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH coum‘ IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Folrhe Appeuanr. Rafa EIlaen Suraya and Michelle Knor Chlew Hang T/n Ra/a‘ Darryl 5 Lon For Rnspondanl. Nur Izzam Zamam and Nur Aw/ah A1:/I1I‘rI rm CK Lmg Ilzamia & Irns .5 am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. Sum nanhnrwm .. I... In may he WWI-I mum: ﬂnuamnl VI .mIa wrm by me John! Bahru High court m me JE Suit As a bilafbeckground, ms! .15 Sm! was am a uevamanan sun n was bemeen one Masyxtah mm Md Hassan anu Dr samnan mun Sukxng The Responaem had (esliﬂed as a wulnass (er Masynlah Tm Faoebuok comment published on me Appeuanrs Gaga lead -Rap.-m Slngh me mamas! mam revealed ms mtervisw of ms mum and mm am 3:44 sclually happened In (no MO m we hosp«m/ and to Dr Sakmsn mum: dulmg Ina mm wan am 2” court mum Ielraclsd Ivar my and darned evlrymmg sho lam ma MO 5 Dr Sakfnih So the mud mm is not m D: sakmarwa Ilvour We are all dtvssmad All Dr Sakmsh wanlurl .5 to prune! Innocent mums so that mmvs /rka mi: wauld not nummn mm ' [3] The Sessmn coun did not ﬁnd that the sam svaxemm was pure\y about me diﬂerem aoeounx gwen to com on what me Respondent had prevlousw qwen to me madman omcer and Dr Sakinah. u vaunu that ma statement meant manna Rsspmmem was me cause of Dr sakmaws lass m ms JB Sm! N relied on one netlzetfs likewise underslarvﬂing [41 The defence aHL-shﬁmlmn raised by me Appeuam was reyecled. The Sassxon Cowl had rewewea me wanna: ol pldgmam my me as 5m! and mum Ihauhe reason Dr Saklnan had lorsl ma sun was nm due In em Respnndenfs lesumony The sassmn Conn held max me reasons as m why me cmm was auawed (and Dr Sakmah nan Vast) m ma JB sun wns not wllmn Ina Aupsﬂanfs knowiedge thus ma dlslmsssd (ha Appellant‘: pmadad defance of maununon sm zKzx7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana san-1 lunhnrwm .. U... a my a. mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! me am‘: we [51 The learned pdunsex «or me Appauam submmsd that m hmd me amamem aefamakzry was not reasonable espaeauy when he had raked on man one poem by a nauzen mp Ms :71 me underslandlng mac Dr Szkmah nad lbs! ma .1: sun as a consaqusnoe M me Respomenrs mummy N Iangm, n was summed me: me sasspn spun had and when n «auad In nonsmar me evidence that was produced a\| lnal mat showsd ma Raw<zndan\| lndend Md gvan a dmerann aecounl m her Xaslimony‘ not m dpapana ID M1H\|WlS nlsled m ma Appeﬂanrx uid sIaIemen\| Ix wu eonlendad lhal mmdy rmymg an the .13 Sun‘: gzpunda dc .udpmen< alone we: urroneoua. [5] n was immorsd by me waamed CDMHSE1 for the Appavam mm as a matter pv law, me Session com shoum have aw. meamnq to me said smemanl Iha\| is undersmod by me ordinary. -aasmaple, hlr-mmded raaderand ndune Ieadmg dra man‘ avid larscandal m The Appauam prayed Icr appeuate mcewemuon as u was submmed that me Sessmn cam nad Ieuad lo give any judxonal appremalmn so me amdanea mac ma Respondent as a matter cl can, dud prvvida a dMsren\| aocuunllo me heallhcara pm as compared «d what she had leslmed -n me JB sun Rgglxbylhcﬁn an n {a} m dulendmg me Sassmn op-ma ‘udgmant me Raspcndlnl subrmlloa lhal me namral and ordinary meaning 0! me 5:16 slahmlnl mud be undatslood and porcevvld I: ma Respondent had wvan «ansa am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. and nmhnrwm a. d... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! swam statement tn tne JE smt and mat sne had tenranea or enanged ner sla\|amen( wntm was utaerem ﬁvm me one gwen at the Interview earlier vntn the mamas: aﬁce( and Dr Sakmah u was out-mer submllhad that tt parlvayed me Respcndem as a nap, msnonest mason am untmstwonny. The case at cnuo Fno once a Chair Koo Lian v TM Chin: Press and [1998] 1 Mm an was tetenea ta [91 his Conn mam sutmsstans lmm tne Rupandem that me AapaHanl naa not pmvsn an a balance ulurabahlhhss mat Ihe deinmamry nnputanan VI tn. ADM uatamentwn lrul Tna law unaatsa Dslamattan Ad 1957 and ma case 0! Mohnmod Hlllz Mnhlmnd Nwdln 1/ am: nuts-n Ind Anomar Anna! [2019] 1 ML! 580 were cm. ms cmtrrs aﬂenlton was tnvma to ma aectsxm :2! me JB sun (hi! tom the documents contracted me Responuenrs tasttmony wnase credtbtllly was upttetn by the mat man It was me Responaenrs submtsstons mat the evidence mat me Appeuant had sougm In rely an (me pattent progress nnla‘ ms hnme hmh case repon and Dr Ssktnaﬁs nalas VI ma Respondents heallh record) was hwnd by tne Johor Bahvu Htgh court to be unlehable wtm nu credible value [10] II was also the Respondent's sumntgmns mat the said statement was published wtlh tnata ﬁde/malice. me lcHowmg reasons were cued (n) The Appeuant knew tnat ma evtﬂenne was run amamnucally cagent anu Credible‘ (I2) Tha AppeH\|It\| knew mat me nvtoenoe was challenged tn me J5 smt as tt am nol fully reilecl me Rsupondenfs full sm tKzK7x2LAnKF:wcywKhn “Nair s.n.t ...n.mn a. U... a may t... nﬂmnlﬂly mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ta) 1!) sla\|emen\|s precisely and accuratety during me trttewiew sasstms. The Appellant me no knawtodga an Ina um slmamanls as tme was nut mvntvad am trttetvtew ttmtatta wttrt ma Relpondeni and onuld not wnltmt or vandale he vatsctty at the R9lP0r\dBHf'! statements: The Annsttart: was not lrwohled tn Iha J8 set: and had no pevsonal knowiedge as \|o \|he actual testttttorty of me Respondent: Masyﬂah was not HIJIQOG out any cttmtttat nuance ind she had won hercase of me JE set, and The Appellant published the said s\|a\|emen\|be1nre havlllg had lull appratsai as to the grounds Oﬂuﬂgmertt omte JE Sui! [111 The emphasts tn me Respottaertra stmttttsstotts was on me fact that me Respundertt was nut the teasatt mat Dr Sakmah was urtsoccesstut to dalend the JE Sun kgmutta mu [121 It serves to asstat Ihal Ih: uttsttt background has ate supulalea below bekwa I5!65$VIﬁ wrtelnar (hate me error: tn lhe Ssssxnn centre daemon Ill rtmtng that (he Anpallanl was ttnbte Io! astumatton tn Fehrunry zota. mu amen‘: attentttxt had lumsd In In: use mm me ttteattt had dted rettowtttg a home ntmt ImdaVa supstvtstert ofa doula. The am tKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhG “Nair s.tt.t luvthnrwm be H... at my t... nﬂntnnﬂly mt. dnuavtnnl VI nFtuNa vtmxt mnmer was Ihe Respanaem. sne was men \|aken In Huspnar sunan lsmaﬂ in Jahor aahm lur nmner exanunanm and lruamlenl [13] Dr Saklnnh posud on Mr swan meme plalform sxaxemenvs In mauan m name mnn uelwevles These pubncacmns lurmed me bass 0! ma aeramanon clam: by Masyitah (Ina dcma Vnvowad in ma aam hams man by me aeuponuanu in ms .15 sun [141 ms Rlspundam had laslmad as a Mlnass Var Mesyuan in me as Sm! She iulnd m Ihe mal Ina: Meiyuah was run Anvnwed In Ina unwary prvcsis at her baby She nee dixpulad lha wnlams 01 her mamcav ruoordl [151 The Jnmx Bahru High com on 26.102020 denuded In lavaur nl Masyxuh and ordered Drsakmzh to pay uamaaes voraeiamanon. on me same day, the Appenam puansruea ma szwd stalanem on he! Faoebook page. T Can sassessmem [151 Yms Court‘: mac slap \s In assess whether the sam sla\|emenI ws defamatory The sad svanemem dsptded a Iacl mm m noun dunng me Mal M me JE sum nne Respondent had reuemea her yamon cl w1ua\ happened wmch was Informed \|u nne memcammaerana Drsakman That scanamenn «sen did nut convey any dalamalnry euemems ltjuslccm/eyed ma (ad lhnl me Rupondem had wvlhdrawn from her eamer pasmnn In onnsr words, nu ma (nal of «ne JE sun. me aesponoam no Vunqsr mamll ed her aumar slam es co wnu wu cnmmned .n ma medmal raoems sm xKzK7x2LAn<r:wcywKhn «mm. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e U... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum v-max [17] nus Coun ﬁnds laklng imn auonurll lne comexl arm clrulmslanaes ol Iha aala alalamanl, that those words did rm lmpule any dlsnanasly on ma pan or naa me capzbllily ol kxwerlng lne esmnallan me: Ill ma eyes al a reasnnable leaner (Rafa! In Umml Ifaﬂlda an All 5 Anor V Knnngkr-I sun End 5 on [2000] a MLJ 532 and Allied Physics Sdn and v Knrun Audll Naqm Mlslaysll 4-. Aner Ind anm lppeals [201 s] 5 ML] 113). [16] An objective conslmcnon U! the said slalemenl was neclsﬁlf‘/l nu ma Cnuﬂs lmslalal asaaumsnl ll does nal cnncluﬂs lnal the ma alalanlanl 01 me change H1 alanoa by ma Rupcndam at ma lnal can ﬁmoum lo ualamauan. rrrsspeclrva uiwhat man: plrllas ur ulnar nallzans understood lhal said alalanlanl mean!‘ ll ma non concluae lnal ll main: man. glven ns nalural and ordinary maamng —see Raub Auslrullln Gold Mining Sdn BM (in zraditors’ volunmy lrqulu-lion; v Nln Shiih Lu pm} 3 MLJ 720 and Llm Ki! Silny V Dztulr Dr Ling Llonq slk lllml 5 MLJ 523 [19] ms Calm agrees wlln lne Appellanfs con\|emlan lnal me reaction la me as sull could not reasonably be annoulea lo me said slatsmenl alone Given lna amaunl 01 pubilclly I\| amaclea W8 malnslleam meala coupled wlm slalemems Issued lmm lna DIveclul—GeneraA of Heahrl, me palms am even me Pelabal Mlﬂll wllayan Persekuluan ma Appellanl was mat the only one whose soclal mama page aaaressaa me JB SUWL several amcles an malnlllaam mama and posllngs an soclal mama all large mﬂoctad me lnleml ll had gamma «on. ma publlc As Ihs Appellant cannal salely be lllribuled lo mm pzrly am ne1lzans' commenls on ma mallan Ihe Sﬁlslon calm auanl nal to have nlaaaa much Iollance on mm to dalarmlne ma nalural ma omlnary mellllnu al am lKzK7x2LAnKF:wcywKhn “Nair a.n.l luvlhnrwm .. UIQG a may he analn.l-l -mm: dnunvlml VI arlum Wm! me said statement. The Ssssxon Courl nughl to have delemuned n omecuvsvy hmmelr Reference Is made to Raub Aum-u-n Gold Mining Sdn Bird (In crudlrorfvolumxryliquidation) mm sum: Lu (supra) at cam 23 pm- ‘Whether mu woods am delamatory He: m my nature 0/ Inc szaxemem In that n mus! have the landenny lo elect me rep-mmon ole person. martian‘ the qussllon muses In whose eye: the words mmplnlrnsd av mus! nm the Ilndsncy n: mm the plalnlllfa Iepulatron rn Ina LawofD¢lametron m Sfngapwa and Malaysra (76 Ed) by Kym R Evans (al p10), .1 75 mm: mm, m app/ymy mm now: run, my cum mus! rm to n pamcmu control may mar rs. whoaa syn: must ms estimation allhs plamhllbo rowed norm ms word: ale said In be aeramazory. In drtsmwmng me Isnle‘ Ins cam do-s no! look at the anus! s/rem ov me s/reqamns on me person's repmancn, or Ins msanmg oi the wards acmany understood or ram by me nszeners (see ./5 Jeyarstnam v Goh Chok Tong /1985] 1 MLJ 331) u :5 not enough (ha! me Imeners actually take me wards In a defamatory sense, rm my mum be reasonably jusnﬁed In so urmerslarrdmg me woms before they are found to be defamatory (us. Slraus Trmss Press (1975; Ltd, rne v Worksvs'Parry&Annr[1967[1 ML./ 155).“ [2u] In nlher words‘ me nme vacn mat the readers mm 5316 sxacen-en: underslnaﬂ the Vanguaga In a deVama\|ory sense does not make I! aavamamry unlass they was reasonably jusﬂﬁad m so understanding The s-um Oourlmuslsxamml me sand svamsmlnl men. even Mme ma smemanl num he Va-mad mom man mu, m a reuonabla, nbpecuve‘ and holistic manner Should \|ha cnnciuslnn be he! Ihe wards m me um sm xKzK7x2LAn<r:wcywKhn «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. U... w may he nrW\n\|H\|Y mum: mmn VI mum Wm! stalamem exposea me Respondent In hatred, onmempt, ndncule or nowereo her nn me esnnmannun otsoueny an name. lhen nn can be conomoezn man one sand smemenl was aovannanory Hone, man assessment by me sossnon connn was aosenn [El] rm: coun nsnnonnnaa no agree wnh me suomnssnons by me Appellanl man nna ssssnon Court‘; grounds onunngnnonnan para 52 snoweo man mere may have been mnlunderuandnng nnan nno sannn svalamam was auegea no be dalzmalery no no Reapondem and non no (ha mal gudga no ma JE snnnn The smnon com had lonmd man ma AppeHan\| In publnshlng nno sana stalemenl was premamm and promnonan is nn was done In an Impalnm mannlr wnlhoul mo osnnmn on maxim: nno aonuan lessons at me man nuduo nn alluwmq Mosynnans clinm m ma JE Sun Thrs com ﬁnds man n was ermneuus on nne pan onne Session Cowl when it ought no have aonnned ms mnnd as no whom: the sand snanennenn H1 nls nanural ano onnnnary meanmg was defamalory no me Responoenn [22] no concluding man me sand statement upon reading was non aevannanoryn this connrn nookea an n: oonecnnveny and non suonecnwony — which mean man Ihe Respundenfs nnnznarsnamnng uﬂhem and me Aooeuanns in\|enlmn on onnonnsmno me same ware non relevant no mns cowns assessmenn omne sand s1anemen(, ms comn vouno on mus count manna sessnon coun had non given due wenghl no nne nenevann sansnderations Ruler Io Utusln mmyu (M; Bhd v Dlhmln on. H] Omar [2u1 71 2 MLJ sun, Tun mm PMlnggINnlIAbun11-Rnhnun vaunuo V an Sdn am I Or: [1 my n MLJ 292 and DmeloraIForuls 5 Anal v Mn: Kun Yong a Mlu Klm snongmm xlcutnrs arms umnollllnu Minn, docusnd) 5 Anal Dm1lnDlbIlnlDﬂllI[2(l\|0]3 Mu 509 no am nKzK7x2LAm<F:wcywKnu “None s.n.n ...n.mun .. H... In may n... mnnn-y mm: dnuamnl VI arnnma v-man	2,117	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-12BCY-2-06/2022	PERAYU IMELDA NASREEN BINTI NASRUDDIN@BALCHIN RESPONDEN NORIZATUL AMIRA BINTI KAMSAN	Costs of this appeal is awarded to the Appellant. This Court allows the counsel for the Respondent’s plea that it is in the sum of RM8,000.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ed4aa6b4-cb7d-4802-8a17-7fbd0b2c0a6d&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:10:31 WA-12BCY-2-06/2022 Kand. 53 S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—12BCY—2—D5/2022 Kand. 53 us/12/2013 nezxn-31 IN THE HIGH count IN MALAYA AT KIJALA LUMPUR IN ms FEDERAL rsknnomt, MALAYSIA BETWEEN IMELDA NASREEN awn rusnunnm QBALEHIN APPELLANT NORIZATUL AMIRA snm xmsm RESPONDENT GROUNDS or JUDGIIEMI [1] Aﬂer a Ml trial the Sessmn Ocun had an 15 S 2022‘ entered the toﬂowmg judgment (2) demared man ma Appeuanrs commenl an ne( Facebook page an 2a m 2u2u amounted m z uelamalory smemem agamsl the nespenaem. m xKzx7xzLAm<F:ucywKhn 3%.. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [21 M (C) 1:!) (9) an mjuncllun ptvmbmng the Appellant (wflelher by herseli or neraganxsmcmvumarpusmng, publshlng orcausmg Ihersof any scanemencs wnnen or verbal any other aevamanary slakamenls agamsl me Respondent man are untrue mupncaung ma Respnndem wnn Ihe gwing ol «am Iesumony and/at changing and/av ve\|raA:(Ing her nasnmony wn um oourl proceedings olme wgn Conn .n Johnr Bahm cm: sun No. .lA~22NCVC-162-U5/ZOIB us Sum); ma Appellam puhhshed an unmnd\|\|mna\ apology (with terms sppmved D! by Ihe Respondent) wmcn muses a acaxamanc \|ha\| me de1ima¢nrys\|amment made was done wnn mahce on me pan M the Appeuanx. and that such apomgy remains on me Appeﬂanfs samas mama for thirty days: General damages IFHP19 sum av Rmsomw to be paid by me Apvillanl In ma Rasncnaem. Inlsreu M 5% on the sum of me genaral damages awarded, an cusls cl Rmmuoo to ba pan: by me Awmlant to me Resaondem rnan Faoabook comment ma saunon on-m doclamd \|o have aovamud and slandaredlhe Respondent pcnameu la a decxsiun dahvarsd 1 am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana s.nn ...n.mn a. U... a may he nrW\n\|U\|y mum: dnunmnl VI mum v-max [231 on me Appevama aetenoe of jusmcanon, ma Session cam held that in would unly succeed of an material soanamems m lhe punncauon were pmven mba true a\ para 45 onhegruunds ofjudgmenl. The Mean Cnumn DIloSIiDrMuhlnImId Sallen om IsmaII&AnorvNuruIIznh ht Anwlr mmmn a Ann: (2021) 2 MLJ 577 had new omemse. Tn succeed m ma aevance av jxmimalinn‘ ma Appellam need um pnwe max evlry ward us ma truth but me gar ol n or ma anmg arma mam charge .a weranca Is also made «a ma com av Appears daemon in D-to Sui Malummod Nlnr on. Jnnuluddln y Slsxom Toluvlxyan Mllaysln End 4 AnoI[2ﬂ1A]4 MLJ 242 [24] This com also xumea \|o as neramauon Act 1957 vmeruln lhe aaranoo otiuacmcamm Is pmvma cm ‘In an aman for libel or slander In respect of words camafnmg two or more dfstmcr chalyas agamsl me pla/Ivlrﬂ, a delenca of [uniﬁcation shall no! lad byresson only ma: me mnn aleverycnarge >5 not proved rl ms words no! pmea Io be (me do not materially mme me p/amwa mputalron having regard Io me yum 0/ ms rimammq charges " [251 1neue¢ore, n augm to he eva\ua\|ed whemev \|he Respondent had m tau mradad her posmon ax trial was vma\| me said svammenl uerated u was nolcnmacl (01 me sessxan own to mslead hacked mm ma oorrecmesl of ma daclsmn 0! the JB sun (ogelher mm me cause 0! Dr smnawa ma (paras so‘ 51 and 59 nllhe Session Court‘: ground: av fudgmaru) n was erroneous to have nam man ma ravaclmn by me Respondent is mule»/an\| became n was rv.1\| damrrmnud In ma JB sun (pm as :11 me Sassmn Court‘: grounds at )udgmIn\|) 1) am zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. am ...m.mm .. U... w may he mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [25] ms coun observed mm there was also no pruperevaluahnn dune Respondents replnallun as a result ollhs sam statement Where mere was no pmollhal me Rdspondanc s repocauan was malenaﬂy wmuvzd, me deasnoe anusuucanon snau nul ran ﬂlhe words were nu! proved Io hetme » see me Fedeml Coun‘s daemon m Abdul Ranman nun v Sunlvlngnm 5 Anor[19GE] 2 Mu es. [271 me Appeuanx had made dear .n me panlcwan ol gusuﬁcamn Ina case sne sougm \|o as! up and .uuuy(m1mo ms radaraw Cowl‘: decnsmn In Synﬂkll ﬁnk In Arrsalnngor Sdn and v Tlny Pu: Klnm w o [201 5] 6 MLJ197) Tnus, this Court considared Iha Appsuanns Dleaded dmsnce um en: said sunanum, In us nature: and ordinary meaning maznl ma! 4:) The Respondems evmenue In Ins JE sun mn\|rad\c\|ed me medics! moms and vepom‘ (m The Responderﬂ demed lhe prior dxsalssnns mm me meducav ofﬁoers and Dr Sakmah‘ my sna nad rem-some he: pnnr pcsman‘ (d) Her Evidence was umerenc no me account snn nad eamu Dravrded \|o me memes! dmcers and Dr Saklnah. [251 The Appellamhaﬂ adduced endsnce during the mar at me Sesswon Court to lhilify and slww mat me Respondanl had as a manner aflacl, retracted her earlier oaswion given prior to me man of me JR Sun. The Appeal Records eomalned me Interwews wnn me Respondent on separam oodasmns It was recorded me aewunl dc matiatelm day gwen 1: sm zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. s.nn ...m.mn .. H... In my n. mn.u-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! by the Respcndenl an we records mougn reourded on dwrerent days were consscem as mm an ma mnases called by the /19DsHanI—nne of ma mam matenax [acts was man Masywah was presemana mvulved in me home mm Tha\| nananve was vepsansa \|hree was to dmeuem medwca\ omcers an diifevenldales a\| amerem Iocanons. ms (act was ﬂamed when nne Rcspandanl aammaaly muacnea her pas-non when sna lesnfnsd in ma JB sun u was hev evidence In ma JE Sm! mm Masynan was mere In maraly provide support and encouragement ana man .1 was nu husband wm had delivered me baby [22] Inevnably n muﬂ be nnncludld man me smd Ilatamanl was sunsunually hue - in that sna had aamaa avurylhma she had mid ma medical alﬁcsls inﬂ Dr Sikinah ma delence a1]us(IIia;a(>on mus! omen. [an] The Sasslun Conn had faﬂed In zccrmi due cunsuderation In me ewdsncs oﬂhe naanncaue pmvlden The grounds at mdqrnent was silent as to ma evaluahon cf ma Appeuanrs evmanca max cmvlnnssd at independent oomemporaneoua evidence The Responoem on me other hand and ml oﬂer any cnrmbcralwe ev-aenoe to supporl her version :2! event [31] When ma Sessmn Oourl dechned «a draw adverse invsyanoa agamsl me Respondenl Mm had «am In adduce any ems: evidence‘ m oommmed an arm max snasnos was mauanan m namre as u some help \|o ﬁnd wnemer ma Respandenl naa not given ma accounts as per me rewards at me medical nmcers Yhus. in can he savany concluded mm w produced ms emaanna wanna be uniavourable m ms Respondsm 7 sea Wang KarJull A Anor v 57 Am pans mp San BMH2016] 5 MLJ 527 1; am zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «ma. s.nn lunhnrwm s. U... a my a. nrW\n\|U\|y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum v-max [321 The Respondent argued that me med\|ca\ mums, reports and notes am not comam vemaum slalernems «am lrom her She comended ma‘ they were me medical omuers‘ In\|eIpre'a\|\on anu summary er wha\| may had ummoca Be that as il may nu ma nm change the fact mm II was «mm and demed by the Respondenl during her \|esumL7ny m me as Suﬁ ms was conﬁtmen by me Resoondenl nersalldunng ms mal at lhe ssssxon Court. [331 u wls Ihn Vurlher summssnns 0! ms Angellanl mm Ins Raspenanm mly have had an mlenor motwe \|c Chang: or mlhar ralranl rm puslhan when she lasnﬁed m Ihe JB sun when sosorumg to ma Appellants summssiom was me sugguslmn pm In me Respondunt lhal ms asam ml her mam at me home mm. vas polanhaﬂy n crmunsl msusr max ms bemg unvesugzuaa by me aulhormes Thu Respmdenl admmad \|o krwwmg ms rapermssmns to an person not qualmeﬂ m medical prams ura daula \|a be mvo\~/ad In dehvsry af a baby Regarding «ms Issue. mus coun ﬁnds man «\| am not laclually amum man the (an man me sad statement ny me Appellant was m gm, we Agg Iolmm n [341 M them were mslanoes as above av lack ol judbcwal zppreclahcn av the ewaenoa. this courrs appeuane mcmennon ws warranted Refer to GM Vaok cm (H A Anor v Lu my cum @ Lu rock Sung A on [2005] 2 ML! 1 and Mg Hoo mu 5 Ana! V wsnay Tun Lot Pong (ndmlnlntrltrlx for nu «ms 0/ Tm Em Kwlnq, umsssu; L on [2020] 12 MLJ av sm xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKnn «mm. smuw ...m.mm .. U... w may he mm-y mm. dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [351 me session Caun had erred In me evalualmn ol me evvdenoe ro detemwle wnemer the aeoence at ruecrrrcenrurr was woven There were verlures In accord due wergm to me evraenee o1 mdapendem wrnresses caﬂed by me Aapeuant me appruprrace adverse In9e<em:e had also not been drawn agnmsl me Respondent [331 we mlsmradmn oi me Sessnon Cuurl rn me evamauon av me evruence mrmruea apoeuare Vntervenlwon — see me Own ol Annasrs daemon in Gunlryl Irmgrma Englnurs Pro Ltd vusu Ger:/an Sdn and L Dr! [2005] 6 MLJ 237 [37] ms com laund error m are Sesslun Cnurfs ruser. \|n arsrruss me aetenee 01 rusumcanun on me premrse me: me Appeﬂanl and run wnlad me Resnendam lo Dracure me xamers veﬁﬂcalmn (para 55 was grounds at judqmeml The faclual ﬁndings onne JB sum were also rrrappmzme \|o «ms case lncause may were nul iacluzl queshcns for -1e(ennma(Ion m we case the reasons for Dr sexrnaws loss were unmatevial la wmemer me said svauerrrerrx had deiamed me Responder“. All (uses showld man me Suslm Caunwas mrscaneewsd m coming tn ueusrar. [as] so. m mrs mslanoe, ms cam wru exemse us appellate powers and se\| asrue me Sessvon oaurrs daemon ms Conn ﬁnds that me said slalamem was not delamalory In nature given us nzlural and Dvdmary mesmrrg what rs apnarenlbased on me evxaerroe, me ApveHar\\| had duly pro»/an rrs defence ol juslmcaﬂan sm xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana s.r.r nmhnrwm .. H... w my r... nﬂmnuﬂly mum: dnuamnl VI mum WM Conn‘: urder {:59} ms appeal is auwma The demsion at me sessson Coun is set asude On this pmmse, ms coun mu not addruss ma appeal as In the genera! damages granled by me sessmn com. Yhe Rsspomem is omerea Io relum me RMsnIono pan: by Ihe AppeIIanI as damages wImm laurlean days The Respondenl KS aIsn nvdanad In mum RMIZISQU mm was paw \|n hat pevtammg Io me was awarded In her by Ina sesscn coun wIIhIrI the same me «am [40] Costs aflhis appeaI IS awaraaa In one Appcllanl ms Oourl News me wunul luv the Raspondan\|'s pIaa Ina: It 75 Ill Iha sum o1RM8,UOD DATED 7 NOVEMBER 2023 R02 MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH coum‘ IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Folrhe Appeuanr. Rafa EIlaen Suraya and Michelle Knor Chlew Hang T/n Ra/a‘ Darryl 5 Lon For Rnspondanl. Nur Izzam Zamam and Nur Aw/ah A1:/I1I‘rI rm CK Lmg Ilzamia & Irns .5 am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. Sum nanhnrwm .. I... In may he WWI-I mum: ﬂnuamnl VI .mIa wrm by me John! Bahru High court m me JE Suit As a bilafbeckground, ms! .15 Sm! was am a uevamanan sun n was bemeen one Masyxtah mm Md Hassan anu Dr samnan mun Sukxng The Responaem had (esliﬂed as a wulnass (er Masynlah Tm Faoebuok comment published on me Appeuanrs Gaga lead -Rap.-m Slngh me mamas! mam revealed ms mtervisw of ms mum and mm am 3:44 sclually happened In (no MO m we hosp«m/ and to Dr Sakmsn mum: dulmg Ina mm wan am 2” court mum Ielraclsd Ivar my and darned evlrymmg sho lam ma MO 5 Dr Sakfnih So the mud mm is not m D: sakmarwa Ilvour We are all dtvssmad All Dr Sakmsh wanlurl .5 to prune! Innocent mums so that mmvs /rka mi: wauld not nummn mm ' [3] The Sessmn coun did not ﬁnd that the sam svaxemm was pure\y about me diﬂerem aoeounx gwen to com on what me Respondent had prevlousw qwen to me madman omcer and Dr Sakinah. u vaunu that ma statement meant manna Rsspmmem was me cause of Dr sakmaws lass m ms JB Sm! N relied on one netlzetfs likewise underslarvﬂing [41 The defence aHL-shﬁmlmn raised by me Appeuam was reyecled. The Sassxon Cowl had rewewea me wanna: ol pldgmam my me as 5m! and mum Ihauhe reason Dr Saklnan had lorsl ma sun was nm due In em Respnndenfs lesumony The sassmn Conn held max me reasons as m why me cmm was auawed (and Dr Sakmah nan Vast) m ma JB sun wns not wllmn Ina Aupsﬂanfs knowiedge thus ma dlslmsssd (ha Appellant‘: pmadad defance of maununon sm zKzx7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana san-1 lunhnrwm .. U... a my a. mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! me am‘: we [51 The learned pdunsex «or me Appauam submmsd that m hmd me amamem aefamakzry was not reasonable espaeauy when he had raked on man one poem by a nauzen mp Ms :71 me underslandlng mac Dr Szkmah nad lbs! ma .1: sun as a consaqusnoe M me Respomenrs mummy N Iangm, n was summed me: me sasspn spun had and when n «auad In nonsmar me evidence that was produced a\| lnal mat showsd ma Raw<zndan\| lndend Md gvan a dmerann aecounl m her Xaslimony‘ not m dpapana ID M1H\|WlS nlsled m ma Appeﬂanrx uid sIaIemen\| Ix wu eonlendad lhal mmdy rmymg an the .13 Sun‘: gzpunda dc .udpmen< alone we: urroneoua. [5] n was immorsd by me waamed CDMHSE1 for the Appavam mm as a matter pv law, me Session com shoum have aw. meamnq to me said smemanl Iha\| is undersmod by me ordinary. -aasmaple, hlr-mmded raaderand ndune Ieadmg dra man‘ avid larscandal m The Appauam prayed Icr appeuate mcewemuon as u was submmed that me Sessmn cam nad Ieuad lo give any judxonal appremalmn so me amdanea mac ma Respondent as a matter cl can, dud prvvida a dMsren\| aocuunllo me heallhcara pm as compared «d what she had leslmed -n me JB sun Rgglxbylhcﬁn an n {a} m dulendmg me Sassmn op-ma ‘udgmant me Raspcndlnl subrmlloa lhal me namral and ordinary meaning 0! me 5:16 slahmlnl mud be undatslood and porcevvld I: ma Respondent had wvan «ansa am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. and nmhnrwm a. d... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! swam statement tn tne JE smt and mat sne had tenranea or enanged ner sla\|amen( wntm was utaerem ﬁvm me one gwen at the Interview earlier vntn the mamas: aﬁce( and Dr Sakmah u was out-mer submllhad that tt parlvayed me Respcndem as a nap, msnonest mason am untmstwonny. The case at cnuo Fno once a Chair Koo Lian v TM Chin: Press and [1998] 1 Mm an was tetenea ta [91 his Conn mam sutmsstans lmm tne Rupandem that me AapaHanl naa not pmvsn an a balance ulurabahlhhss mat Ihe deinmamry nnputanan VI tn. ADM uatamentwn lrul Tna law unaatsa Dslamattan Ad 1957 and ma case 0! Mohnmod Hlllz Mnhlmnd Nwdln 1/ am: nuts-n Ind Anomar Anna! [2019] 1 ML! 580 were cm. ms cmtrrs aﬂenlton was tnvma to ma aectsxm :2! me JB sun (hi! tom the documents contracted me Responuenrs tasttmony wnase credtbtllly was upttetn by the mat man It was me Responaenrs submtsstons mat the evidence mat me Appeuant had sougm In rely an (me pattent progress nnla‘ ms hnme hmh case repon and Dr Ssktnaﬁs nalas VI ma Respondents heallh record) was hwnd by tne Johor Bahvu Htgh court to be unlehable wtm nu credible value [10] II was also the Respondent's sumntgmns mat the said statement was published wtlh tnata ﬁde/malice. me lcHowmg reasons were cued (n) The Appeuant knew tnat ma evtﬂenne was run amamnucally cagent anu Credible‘ (I2) Tha AppeH\|It\| knew mat me nvtoenoe was challenged tn me J5 smt as tt am nol fully reilecl me Rsupondenfs full sm tKzK7x2LAnKF:wcywKhn “Nair s.n.t ...n.mn a. U... a may t... nﬂmnlﬂly mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ta) 1!) sla\|emen\|s precisely and accuratety during me trttewiew sasstms. The Appellant me no knawtodga an Ina um slmamanls as tme was nut mvntvad am trttetvtew ttmtatta wttrt ma Relpondeni and onuld not wnltmt or vandale he vatsctty at the R9lP0r\dBHf'! statements: The Annsttart: was not lrwohled tn Iha J8 set: and had no pevsonal knowiedge as \|o \|he actual testttttorty of me Respondent: Masyﬂah was not HIJIQOG out any cttmtttat nuance ind she had won hercase of me JE set, and The Appellant published the said s\|a\|emen\|be1nre havlllg had lull appratsai as to the grounds Oﬂuﬂgmertt omte JE Sui! [111 The emphasts tn me Respottaertra stmttttsstotts was on me fact that me Respundertt was nut the teasatt mat Dr Sakmah was urtsoccesstut to dalend the JE Sun kgmutta mu [121 It serves to asstat Ihal Ih: uttsttt background has ate supulalea below bekwa I5!65$VIﬁ wrtelnar (hate me error: tn lhe Ssssxnn centre daemon Ill rtmtng that (he Anpallanl was ttnbte Io! astumatton tn Fehrunry zota. mu amen‘: attentttxt had lumsd In In: use mm me ttteattt had dted rettowtttg a home ntmt ImdaVa supstvtstert ofa doula. The am tKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhG “Nair s.tt.t luvthnrwm be H... at my t... nﬂntnnﬂly mt. dnuavtnnl VI nFtuNa vtmxt mnmer was Ihe Respanaem. sne was men \|aken In Huspnar sunan lsmaﬂ in Jahor aahm lur nmner exanunanm and lruamlenl [13] Dr Saklnnh posud on Mr swan meme plalform sxaxemenvs In mauan m name mnn uelwevles These pubncacmns lurmed me bass 0! ma aeramanon clam: by Masyitah (Ina dcma Vnvowad in ma aam hams man by me aeuponuanu in ms .15 sun [141 ms Rlspundam had laslmad as a Mlnass Var Mesyuan in me as Sm! She iulnd m Ihe mal Ina: Meiyuah was run Anvnwed In Ina unwary prvcsis at her baby She nee dixpulad lha wnlams 01 her mamcav ruoordl [151 The Jnmx Bahru High com on 26.102020 denuded In lavaur nl Masyxuh and ordered Drsakmzh to pay uamaaes voraeiamanon. on me same day, the Appenam puansruea ma szwd stalanem on he! Faoebook page. T Can sassessmem [151 Yms Court‘: mac slap \s In assess whether the sam sla\|emenI ws defamatory The sad svanemem dsptded a Iacl mm m noun dunng me Mal M me JE sum nne Respondent had reuemea her yamon cl w1ua\ happened wmch was Informed \|u nne memcammaerana Drsakman That scanamenn «sen did nut convey any dalamalnry euemems ltjuslccm/eyed ma (ad lhnl me Rupondem had wvlhdrawn from her eamer pasmnn In onnsr words, nu ma (nal of «ne JE sun. me aesponoam no Vunqsr mamll ed her aumar slam es co wnu wu cnmmned .n ma medmal raoems sm xKzK7x2LAn<r:wcywKhn «mm. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e U... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum v-max [17] nus Coun ﬁnds laklng imn auonurll lne comexl arm clrulmslanaes ol Iha aala alalamanl, that those words did rm lmpule any dlsnanasly on ma pan or naa me capzbllily ol kxwerlng lne esmnallan me: Ill ma eyes al a reasnnable leaner (Rafa! In Umml Ifaﬂlda an All 5 Anor V Knnngkr-I sun End 5 on [2000] a MLJ 532 and Allied Physics Sdn and v Knrun Audll Naqm Mlslaysll 4-. Aner Ind anm lppeals [201 s] 5 ML] 113). [16] An objective conslmcnon U! the said slalemenl was neclsﬁlf‘/l nu ma Cnuﬂs lmslalal asaaumsnl ll does nal cnncluﬂs lnal the ma alalanlanl 01 me change H1 alanoa by ma Rupcndam at ma lnal can ﬁmoum lo ualamauan. rrrsspeclrva uiwhat man: plrllas ur ulnar nallzans understood lhal said alalanlanl mean!‘ ll ma non concluae lnal ll main: man. glven ns nalural and ordinary maamng —see Raub Auslrullln Gold Mining Sdn BM (in zraditors’ volunmy lrqulu-lion; v Nln Shiih Lu pm} 3 MLJ 720 and Llm Ki! Silny V Dztulr Dr Ling Llonq slk lllml 5 MLJ 523 [19] ms Calm agrees wlln lne Appellanfs con\|emlan lnal me reaction la me as sull could not reasonably be annoulea lo me said slatsmenl alone Given lna amaunl 01 pubilclly I\| amaclea W8 malnslleam meala coupled wlm slalemems Issued lmm lna DIveclul—GeneraA of Heahrl, me palms am even me Pelabal Mlﬂll wllayan Persekuluan ma Appellanl was mat the only one whose soclal mama page aaaressaa me JB SUWL several amcles an malnlllaam mama and posllngs an soclal mama all large mﬂoctad me lnleml ll had gamma «on. ma publlc As Ihs Appellant cannal salely be lllribuled lo mm pzrly am ne1lzans' commenls on ma mallan Ihe Sﬁlslon calm auanl nal to have nlaaaa much Iollance on mm to dalarmlne ma nalural ma omlnary mellllnu al am lKzK7x2LAnKF:wcywKhn “Nair a.n.l luvlhnrwm .. UIQG a may he analn.l-l -mm: dnunvlml VI arlum Wm! me said statement. The Ssssxon Courl nughl to have delemuned n omecuvsvy hmmelr Reference Is made to Raub Aum-u-n Gold Mining Sdn Bird (In crudlrorfvolumxryliquidation) mm sum: Lu (supra) at cam 23 pm- ‘Whether mu woods am delamatory He: m my nature 0/ Inc szaxemem In that n mus! have the landenny lo elect me rep-mmon ole person. martian‘ the qussllon muses In whose eye: the words mmplnlrnsd av mus! nm the Ilndsncy n: mm the plalnlllfa Iepulatron rn Ina LawofD¢lametron m Sfngapwa and Malaysra (76 Ed) by Kym R Evans (al p10), .1 75 mm: mm, m app/ymy mm now: run, my cum mus! rm to n pamcmu control may mar rs. whoaa syn: must ms estimation allhs plamhllbo rowed norm ms word: ale said In be aeramazory. In drtsmwmng me Isnle‘ Ins cam do-s no! look at the anus! s/rem ov me s/reqamns on me person's repmancn, or Ins msanmg oi the wards acmany understood or ram by me nszeners (see ./5 Jeyarstnam v Goh Chok Tong /1985] 1 MLJ 331) u :5 not enough (ha! me Imeners actually take me wards In a defamatory sense, rm my mum be reasonably jusnﬁed In so urmerslarrdmg me woms before they are found to be defamatory (us. Slraus Trmss Press (1975; Ltd, rne v Worksvs'Parry&Annr[1967[1 ML./ 155).“ [2u] In nlher words‘ me nme vacn mat the readers mm 5316 sxacen-en: underslnaﬂ the Vanguaga In a deVama\|ory sense does not make I! aavamamry unlass they was reasonably jusﬂﬁad m so understanding The s-um Oourlmuslsxamml me sand svamsmlnl men. even Mme ma smemanl num he Va-mad mom man mu, m a reuonabla, nbpecuve‘ and holistic manner Should \|ha cnnciuslnn be he! Ihe wards m me um sm xKzK7x2LAn<r:wcywKhn «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. U... w may he nrW\n\|H\|Y mum: mmn VI mum Wm! stalamem exposea me Respondent In hatred, onmempt, ndncule or nowereo her nn me esnnmannun otsoueny an name. lhen nn can be conomoezn man one sand smemenl was aovannanory Hone, man assessment by me sossnon connn was aosenn [El] rm: coun nsnnonnnaa no agree wnh me suomnssnons by me Appellanl man nna ssssnon Court‘; grounds onunngnnonnan para 52 snoweo man mere may have been mnlunderuandnng nnan nno sannn svalamam was auegea no be dalzmalery no no Reapondem and non no (ha mal gudga no ma JE snnnn The smnon com had lonmd man ma AppeHan\| In publnshlng nno sana stalemenl was premamm and promnonan is nn was done In an Impalnm mannlr wnlhoul mo osnnmn on maxim: nno aonuan lessons at me man nuduo nn alluwmq Mosynnans clinm m ma JE Sun Thrs com ﬁnds man n was ermneuus on nne pan onne Session Cowl when it ought no have aonnned ms mnnd as no whom: the sand snanennenn H1 nls nanural ano onnnnary meanmg was defamalory no me Responoenn [22] no concluding man me sand statement upon reading was non aevannanoryn this connrn nookea an n: oonecnnveny and non suonecnwony — which mean man Ihe Respundenfs nnnznarsnamnng uﬂhem and me Aooeuanns in\|enlmn on onnonnsmno me same ware non relevant no mns cowns assessmenn omne sand s1anemen(, ms comn vouno on mus count manna sessnon coun had non given due wenghl no nne nenevann sansnderations Ruler Io Utusln mmyu (M; Bhd v Dlhmln on. H] Omar [2u1 71 2 MLJ sun, Tun mm PMlnggINnlIAbun11-Rnhnun vaunuo V an Sdn am I Or: [1 my n MLJ 292 and DmeloraIForuls 5 Anal v Mn: Kun Yong a Mlu Klm snongmm xlcutnrs arms umnollllnu Minn, docusnd) 5 Anal Dm1lnDlbIlnlDﬂllI[2(l\|0]3 Mu 509 no am nKzK7x2LAm<F:wcywKnu “None s.n.n ...n.mun .. H... In may n... mnnn-y mm: dnuamnl VI arnnma v-man	2,117	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-41LB(A)-2-02/2022	PERAYU Pendakwa Raya RESPONDEN FIKRI BIN AB RAHIM	rayuan sabitan dan hukuman - seksyen 177 kanun keseksaan - memberi maklumat palsu kepada JAIS dalam mengisi borang peribadi - adakah okt tertakluk kepada arahan khas di bawah seksyen 6(4) dan seksyen 9 Akta SPRM 2009 (Akta 694) - dilindungi imuniti di bawah seksyen 72 Akta 72 - pembelaan di bawah seksyen 76 dan seksyen 79 kanun keseksaan - peraturan 4(2) peraturan-peraturan pegawai awam (kelakuan dan tatatertib) 1993- perkara 181(2) perlembagaan persekutuan - atas kapasiti peribadi tiada seorang pun yang dapat mengatasi undang-undang - penggunaan kad pengenalan bogus - samada semasa okt ditangkap khalwat berada di lapangan dan sedang menjalankan operasi penyamaran - urusan peribadi - samada tindakan berbentuk "good faith" - seksyen 52 kanun keseksaan - pembelaan fikiran kemudian - hukuman memberikan pengajaran - kesalahan serius - hukuman setimpal dan adil	05/12/2023	YA Dato' Norsharidah Binti Awang	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5290e28c-4a14-4666-8bc0-239d0e6f051b&Inline=true	05/12/2023 14:54:08 BA-41LB(A)-2-02/2022 Kand. 45 S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jOKQUhRKZkaLwCOdDm8FGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal EA—l1LB(A) ~2—n2/2022 Kand. 45 .7:/)2/2312 ,4 =4 as MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA cu smu-1 ALAM DI DALAM NEGERI ssumson DARUL EHSAN, MALAVSIA RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. EA-l1LB(A)-2-02/2022 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAVA FERAVU DAN FIKRI am AB RAHIM (No. Kl . 5o«w.n:.54aa) ALASAN PENGNAKIMAN I. PENGENALAN mi adahah rayuan oleh Pendakwa Rays (erhadap kepmusan Mahkamah Mapslrel (2) Shah Nam bervankh 11 Fsbman 2022 Mahkamah W Ie\ah membenavkan rayuan Pemyu dan lelah mensabi\|kan Responder: an bawah Seksysn 177 Karum Keseksaan dan memennlahkan Responden membayar denda RM1500 on mka gagal Bayer (:95 (3) bulan penjara II. PERTUDUHAN Perluduhan terhadap Responden adalah penuduhan pindaan Panama sepeni bsnkul sw K:KounR><zxzLm:o<Dn.arGw -ms Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm "Eahawa kamu pads 15 Drsember 2017/am «earn kurang ¢.00psgr bsnempav m Pe/‘aha! ./abmn Agsma Is/am Se/anger. Memzra mm, Ba/vgunan Sultan /divs Shah, Ssksysn 5, Shah A/am, dalam Dssrsh Petalfng, dslsm Negev? Sslangor Dam! Ehsan, yang tsrpaksa dr srsi undangmndsr-g supaya memben maklumst yang dikehendakr da/am Boning Mak/urns! Psrlbsrli, Bahagtan Psnyurusan Psnguslkussaan, Jsbatan Agama ls/am Se/anger pads semua Dutirsn yang drkshendekidti sepenicmampiran “A1” kapsds ssmang psrljawal awam Faﬁn Ankah mnn Mohamed Muslapa mo, Kad Pengena/an 900227-14-5030) yang kamu ketahur maven pa/su dan alsh yang dsmikian, kamu is/ah mslskukan kasslahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 177 Kamm Kssaksasn. ' III. FAKTA KES [1] Fakta Kes adalah ssbagaimana m perenggan 4 Kand 23, Hujahan Perayu [2] PadaI$12.2U171amVebih Kurang 2.4a pagu saw tangkapan (Blah dihual uleh SP3 dan pxsukannya lemadap Rsspanden dan semang warm bernama Nur ma mm. Muse (selepas ini amuk sebagai ‘Nur U25") :1. alamat Barnam, Zsva Raamanoa, Fersxaran Pmggwan, Bandar Pm Permai, A3300 Sen Kembangan. Ssmngar untuk salu kesalahan knarwac dx bawah seksyan 29m(a) a. my Enakmsn Jenayah Syanah Selangnr srN1DKumRKzkzLv.cD<DmarGw _ E Wane s.n.n...n..Mn..u;....aan,..annn.u.,.nnm..n.n.y...num am Fan hm [23] [N] [25] [23] am ‘u><umRKzkzLv.cD<Dn.arGw -ma Sum ...ua.. M“ be used a mm a. nﬂmnnﬂly mm; dun-mm a. .mm mm malahan name sm sendm uuak pemah mseam semass aasaqan, bagi Persyu my menuruukkan bahawa panmawaan yang maangknxan ini adalah pemmran Kemudlan Oleh m. Perayu memohon agar pernbelaan im dmmak kerana uaua bermeril sewn pmak Parayu leVahpun henaya msmbukﬁkan kesnya mewampam ksraguan dangan telah memenum segsh elemen d1 bawah pertuduhan. Respanden pma an daksm huiahannw msm jugs berganlung banyak kepada kelerangan olsh sm. Secara asasnya plhak Respnnden mengmuahkan bahwa Rssponden tidak bemlal umuk mengemukakan memm bogus Iersebul dengan sengaza sebaliknya beﬂau lenkal dengan mman c\eh SD4. Ruwk mahan Meh Responder: m perenggan 23 Human Perayu yang \|e\2Ih merujuk kepada kslerangan sun spa: Arshan sonata spasrﬁk saya kspada SaifI1/ Ezra! ada/ah supaya apaapa maklumaz den ape-ape srasaran, operasr‘, nsrkzm yang dlfa/ankan yang berksusn dungsn mak/umal yang drbsrlkan danpada says talus arau bsrkartan maklumabmsklumak wng L1/psrolehr man Fejabat Kama Pesuruh/aya fnihandaklah mrshsrakan dan max boleh dlbmcangkan Kspsda sestspa, uuax boleh dlbacnrken flan dimaklumkarl sssiapa, Isvmasuk/ah kepada sesnspa di ds/am SPRM, mslsmkan kepada vuganmzo [27] an ‘a><uunRKzkzLv.cD<Dn.arGw "Nana saw n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. mm-y MIN: dun-mm wa mum wrm kapada aaya, dsngan ksbsrvsran says sebagar Kslua Pesuruh/ays smw. Psrkara mi kamudiannya ada bebsrspa psrblncangsn yang dihadili bersama ss/spas ilu a/eh Safful Ezral belsama dsngsn F/kn. lni ads/ah unruk msngelakkan dsnpada berlskunys ksbacorsn mak/umat. IN penung ya, kersns aamaaa aaya kana ssbsgar Tlmba/an Psndakwa Raya di Penna! Feguam Nsgsrs, aamaaa aaya mengelvdalrkan srau membanfu Peguam Negara mengka/i ksnas sxssstan yang me/rbarkan was, make ma /ma: yang drslssat oleh pfhak Sunmanjaya Pancsgahsn Rasuah Marayara pada kstika nu ts/ah ham! .11 Internal. Jam‘ memm/ukkan bahawa wslaupun ur SFRM mak/umal yang ada rm max sslsmsl, sscala imsrnalpun max so/smat. Maka olsh sebab yang demikian. arshan spssillk says kapada ka.1ua—dua psgawaimria/sh mak/umal frlipellu dirahstakan dan ridak dibocorkan dan tidak dfmaklumkan kepsda sesraps, apa- Hnﬁ yang berkarlan dsnqan sfssalan ooerssi ﬂan [rigs risfkan my be/kaftan dsngan terssbln, YM9 maklumat kebanyskannya mevangkuml ks;-«es bstpmﬁl (inggf, yang mslfbalkan sgensr-sgsnsi penguatkuasaarv, make ianya per/u mranaaakan saknanya unmk dimak/umkun, panuran mendspa! Kebens/an aaya. Irv saw ananan yang rsyas. Fsguam Reapundan menambah dx dalam nujanannya bahawa SOP bagi operast undakan knas ml ‘special task Pagnzavzo far::e"ada\ah (ems kspadanya aanmak Ienkal kepada mana- mans sop yang berkallan dsngan Eahagian Slasiﬂan ﬂan jugs Bahagian Rvslkan. [23] Hujahan Respunden m peranggan 27 jelas menyaxakan bahawa, “As a result, the lzerenaas mass was that the Respondent fun-lishad the particulars in Fans B, C, D and E ollhe 1sr.IAIS Form because rra in good Islth believed himss/I la be duly-bound la pwlezrhls Dsnrl ldr/s bin Abdullah special ldenlily and to not reveal ms real lrtarvlily urlril and unless he received explfcn aulnonzalrarl from Dwt". [29] Plhak Responder: masih mengskmkan ruujahan pamaalaan ax peringkat Mahkamah Rendah bahawa Responder: aualar. terlakluk Kepada arahan khas di aawam seksyen 5(4) ﬂan sekyen 9 Ana swam (Akla am), amndungr lmumtl m hawah seksyan 72 Akla S94 dall pembelasn dl hawah seksyen 75 ﬂan seksyen 1e Kanun Kesaksaan. [so] oven mu secara xasamnmannya human aleh Respnnden menyaﬁakarl hahawa Respondsn aaalah lenkat dengan arahan uleh Kelua Pesuruhjaya seam iaihl sm unluk (idak mendedahkan am dan menggunakan pangenalan penyimaran bag: mengelakkan rahsia berkenaan dengan Iask lame Iersebul bccor. [31] Task iome nersebm permng kerana mellbalkan Kes barpmru ilngql nan Respurudan hanya kekal mamaluhi arahan S!NlDKDLl1RKlkzLv£DdDmIFGw E -ma Savmlunhavwﬂllxeusedmvan;ImenﬂglruﬂlyM1M5dnunmrrlwaaF\uNG puns! Paw <1 0' 1' sebagainuana lermaklub «ii bawah seksyen 5(4) dan sekyen 12 Ana SPRM (Akoa S94) dan dllakukan dengan sum hau. v. DAPATAM MAHKAMAH [451 Meruiuk kepada kes HEM Gruup Bhd (pnvlously known as unmu Engineers (M) and) v Gunny: lntergrllod Enginlavs no Lu 5. Anor (2n1a] supp MLJ 163‘ [26] min, me pnme issue VI respect cl ouesliens 1 In 3 is whether the CDIlI1DIAppeE/ had erred In /rllslfsrilvg min me ﬁndings 0/ reels 0/ me lnal [udgs ii is well settled law me: an eppellsle caulf wl// not gerlels/ly speaking, inlenlene mm the decision :1! a mini eoun unlsss ins Lrlsl caulr is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving ariis declsian A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial mun is gully ulna or insufﬁclenrjudfcfal appleciellen afsvidsnce (sea Chow Yes wen 5 Arm! v Choc Ah Pal‘ [1978] 2 ML] Mb,‘ WEI! or Thomas V Thamas[19l7]/\|C 434, and Gen Yuck Chm (F) 5 Arm! V Lee my chin @ Lse Tack sang a ole (20051 2 ML./ 1) ' {As} Mehkamah in m dalavn menilai rayuan kes lnl perlu perhallkan dengan lam: ﬂan Udak msncapuli dapalan Mahkamah Mailslml kecuaﬂ pada dapa\an Mahkamah In! Mahkamah Manslret «plan \ersa1ah di anlam membuat Kepulusannya W.m.munm.m E W vn-«am [471 [45] [49] [50] [51] [52] sw .a»<umm<zm.cmu,..arew -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm Unluk mu Mahkamah mHuru\| menysmak dan membandmgkan a\asan Mansm membual kepulusannya dsngen ksterangaw ksmvangan yang Ielah diberikan khususnya davipada sm dan sm Akasan Pengnaman nlsh Majislret bo\eh dirujuk :1. RR Jun: 1 daﬂ muka sural 11 sehinyga 42 Alasan Ieysebul amal terperincf dengan semakan Isrhadap keterangan-kelerangan yang lelah dwbenkan di hadapannya Du akmr ms Pendakwaan Msjisvel \|e\ah memanggu Respcnden untuk membexa am sslelah membual dapanan banawa pendakwaan bsnaya membukhkan kssnya. Namun makmr kes pamhmaan‘ Maﬁslral membuat dapalan oanawa pembalaan olsh Responder: Denaya merwnbulkan keraguan yang munasabah dan selerusnya meVepas dan membsbaskan Respomien. Maﬂstret membual dapaian bahawa pemhslaan Respnnden bukanlah man lsrkemuman dan hahawa keierangan sm adavah konswslen dsngan pembeksan Rwandan men ilu av da\am Alasan Penghaman mi isu elemen tidak akan dinilaw ssmula kerana [alas bahawa kesemua elsmen berkenaan dsngan perluduhan m bawah ssksyen 171 Kanun Kasaksaan ini lelah berjaya mzmkukan u HEM}? [531 on dalam hujahan o\eh Perayu, Perayu membawa Inga a1asan menyalakan bahawa pembelaan Responden sehsnamya ﬁdak wen dwercayai [541 Panama bahswa ssmasa tangkapan Rasponden bukan menjalankan lugasan, kadua bahawa maklumal dengan pengenavan ‘bogus’ mu diberikan bukan m mmah selamaldan keuga bahawa pambekaan Respnnden adalah permkvsn kemuman [551 Rujuk dahmu kepada Rekod Rayuan mu 2(5) an muka surat 355 anabila 504 menyatakan bahawa pemberian idenlili khas dwbenkan dan lidak baleh dubncorkan walau dengan apa keadaan askallpun. Namun seterusnya sm menyambung dangan menyatakan bahawa ianya unmk lujuan sasmasa siasatan dan nsikan. “Tadi Eda mak/umkan ﬁlm‘ den Sailul akan mom/xan ksd pangena/an khas, ada pevbmcangan cam psnggunssn ksd pengena/an’ Da/am perbmcsngan pads nuama mass identiw ms lidak be/ah dldettahkan, ds/am apa keadaan sska//pun idervmykhas Iidak DDIEIV dibocalkan. Da/am mambangunkan buhran Idenmy khss menyakang anlsls satu sama /am, is synchmmse sntars salu same lain digunakan utk rlslknn din operasi (ask lame.” [56] Selerusnya sm mamewaskan pula bahawa Responder! yang menenma kad pengena\an bogus‘ perm menlnggalkan sw .a»<umm<zm.cmu,..arew E -.4.» Snvmn-nhnvwmlxeusedmvarymem\g\ruHIyMwsdnu-mnlvunF\uNG pm Pm Im- [57] [56] [59] sw .a»<umm<zm.cmu,..arew -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm pengsnalan sebenar dan nanya mambawa si\|u pengenaxan saha,a. "Adakah /angkah /am yg dlbsrikan kspada Ffkn lzerkenaan penggumn rdentirr mm Says Ia/ah dnak/imaz olsh Sam/I E1151 :1: mans be/Isu beri snanan berkenaan ssmua apsvasr bsrxanaan Iaskluwe Film‘ akan bawa Kari idsnmy khas den tidak bum: in sendrn /nu fer/iba! di /spangsn. ‘ Saka Vagi sm memawab soakan peguam Rspcnden dengan berkala bahawa Rsspcndan perlu gunakan kad psngenaxan khas larsehul semasa (evhbat di lapangan. ms?! nu adakah pada mesa Responden dilangkap khalwal bshau berada di lapangan den sedang merualankan operas? penyamaran’! umuk menjawab persoalam ini bmeh dinyuk samma kepada hujahan oleh Perayu yang (Blah menuuk kepada kelerangan SD4. Psguambels. Apa yang bervaku pads malam 15 dlssmbsr 2017? SD61 Fania ma/am 15, says Ia/ah msndapaf panggilalv danpada seorang pegawal po/Is daripada BI/kit Amen yang dlkena/I muqwzu ssoagar ‘Evo", nsms singkatan dia lah Diurang n: banyak nsma-nams s/ngkal, yang name penuh tu says hdak berspa ingat. Iblsmm says nssa are memaklumkan kspads says nanawa Istsri Kepada Kama Polls Nagara pada kslika nu. Tan Sn’ Fuzi, lelah msnmggal duma dan akalv drkebumrkan se/spas subuh .1; lpah, Psnik. Oleh yang dsmrkran sslepss mensllma panggllan Islsion danpads peqawar po/Is bemsms Ibnamm rm say-I tolah mongnubungl Flkrl bsﬂanyakan blliau :1! mm. Dlmuklumknn bahaw: beliau plda Imika Ilu mung mu] -mun opmsl yang m-Iumk-n Ynkfurcu. Drs jugs zalan dimaklumkam Ibrahmv yang ssms, dia pun dah lahu bila saya Ie/efon dis Iarsobm. Make says aralvkan ma agar, okay you follow me untuk krta zfarah, ma standby, ma akan ks /pan. Ksna pergi swal kensna dia akan drkebum/Kan sebelum subuh. Jud! F/kn momaklumkan uyl bahawn opmsl maslh blrjalan, say: km tangguh dulu. Maka dye rninla kehenaran says unluk harsher sementara rnemmggu, nak balfk mmsh [auh, pd: msnunggu di safe housetalsebul. [an] .le\as me\aVu\ ketemngan SD4 aspen: an acas hahawa semasa SD4 mula-mma hubung\ Respnnden, Responden ssdang meruarankan aperasmya [61] Namun sm mar. mengarahkan Responder: umuk langguh dahum aperasmya dan mengmmnya ke Ipoh bag (Lunar! ﬂarah. sw ‘a><umRKzuLm:D<Dn.arGw E -m Sum In-nhnv WW he .15.. m van; M m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm vn mum puns! Paw H W 1' [62] [53] [541 [G5] [55] sw .a»<umm<zm.cmu,..arew -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm Responder: sememangnya (elah menangguhkan ope!-asmys apabila behau bemndek rnemaluhi arahan lersebul dan memnhon untuk pulang dahulu berehal sementara menunggu Subuh Responder: sendm yang «emu mermhlh untuk ke Iumsh sekamat Iersebul darn wanya nukanxan alas arahan danpada SD4 unluk bo\eh mengatakan bahawa Responder! pularlg ks mmah ope:-asx kerana hsranggapan masm di uaxam Iugas opsrasi Dleh mu Mahkamah bsrsetuju dengan hujahan o\eh Perayu bahawa pads mesa Oangkapan ai rumah selamal Responder: hukanlah a. dalam Iugasalvlya senmgga menyebabkan dia Ierpaksa menggunakan idenlm bogusnya. Selerusnya Rewonden cube menjalaskan bahewa Masai! mengapa behau mamhenkan makmmac bogus admah kerana Iidak pasu bahawa Iangkapan levsebul benar-benar o\sh JAWS. um ada\ah bemquan msruaga mlegnu siasalannya agar lidsk Ievbongkar Namun masalahnya bulvan yang mpsnuduhkan dusi bukannya di ‘rumah selamaf senauknya an pejabal JAIS Ruwk kepada nerluduhan kes admah jelas menyatakan xempac kesalah nu dwlakukan: vpgewmzi “Bahama kamu pads 16D/samba! 2017/3!" Isbvll kursng 1.00 peg! benempa! :11 P915123! Jsbsfan Agama /slam Ss/angor. Msna/s Utars, Eangunsn Sultan Idn's snan, Ssksyen 5, Shah Alam, dalam Dasrah Pefelirrg, dalam Nsgsn Sslsngar Dam Ehsan. yang terpakss :11‘ mi undang-undsng supsys mambsrl makmmaz yang drkshsndakr dalam Enrsng Maklumaf Psr/badr, Bahsgian Psngurusan Penguatkuasean. Jabalan Agama Is/am Sslangav pada se/-mm Dutlran yang drkahsndakl diisi sepem .1: Lampiran “A 1 ' kepadzl ssomng pen/swat awam Faun Arikah birm Mohamed Mustspa ma. Kad panganaran noo227-14-5930) yang kamu kelahui adalall aalsa den oran yang damrkran, ksmu Ie/ah me/akukan km/anan yang be/sh dihukum di lzawah ssksysn 177 Kanun Ksssksaan.“ [ea] Psngalaan banawa Rsspendsn terpaksa manangguhkan pembenan maldumal ssbanar kerana Iwdak mangevanui bahawa cangkapan Ilu sebsnamya oleh ms avau bukan [69] Pembelaun selarusnya oleh Respnnden av da\am xsu ml ada\sh hahawa henaa (erpaksa manulup idenmi ass! kemna mematuni arahan yang diberiknn oleh SD4 sah‘mgga\an dibenkan kebenaran umuk berhusl demxklan. U0] Ru]uk Reknd Rayuan Tambahan. kand.26 aw ms.1D. Psda perenggan (e), sm msmaklumkan Mahkamah hahawa behau apabrla msnggunakan M: penyamaran Ievsebul «dak bob?! mendedahkan wdenlﬂi sabenamya Vanna kebenaran so», syn ‘a><umRKzkzLv.cD<DmarGw ﬂ -ma am IIIVVDIVWN a. used m van; .. mn.u.y mm: dun-mm vu aF\uNG pm Pm in am [3] [4] [5] [5] U] srN1a><umRKzkzLv.cD<umarGw -ms Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm Semasa iangkapan Iersebut dibual‘ Responder: (e\ah menyerahkan kad uengenalan alas nama Darm Inns um AbduHah dengan Na. Kad Psngenmani B505BE—1D—62D3 manaka\a Numza lslah menyemnkan kad pengenalan alas name Nur Liza mm Muss dengan No. Kad Penpenalan: B3D9U2—D1-5176 keuada spa sale\ah dmurua o\eh spa. Setemsnya, Respondsn den Nuf Luza le\ah dibawa ke raqanan Jaaacan Agama \|s\am sexangur, Menara um, Bangunan Sultan Vdns Shah, Seksyen 5, Shah Alam (semis: inn dirujuk sebagsx Psjabal ‘JA\S') dan dxssrahkan kapada sm. Semasa av Peiabm ms, SP1 bevlugas bersuma-same spz dx kaunler 24 jam ms spa kemudiannya Ialah menyerahkan Berang Mahdumal Penbadi (P2) kepada Rsspormen ﬂan Nur Lxza dan Ie\ah memlma keduaduanya menglsl hmang xsrsebul 5?: dan swz (elah menenangkan kepada Respondsn den Nur Uza bahawa mereka Ierikat an swsw undang-undang umuk menyaomn yang benar. Borsng Mskmmat Penham IP2) mi Ie\ah d'us\ oleh Respunden di nanagan A, B, c, D dan E av hadapan sm a. SP2 Manakma bum-an an F man :1. met: sm atas makluman yang amenkan nleh Respnnden Responder: kemudvannya \|e\ah dilepaskan dengan jaminan sebinyak RM1,5DU.0D. Puaaamzn bo\eh mandedahkan Vdenmr sabenamya Aanpa kebenavan sm [71] Sekah lag! sm menyalakan psrkara yang sama an pemggan as bahawa max boleh mendedahkan men ya kecuah dengan kebenarsn SD4. [721 Selemsnya mm pma keleringan sun Dada persnggan at as dun 59. ms 21 Reknd Rayuan Tamhahan tarsehul: -s7. Says hanya bsrpsluang unluk msndapa! amhsn Iarjur darrpada Tan Sn‘ D1uIkﬂhAhmad smepas says keluar damzaaa Pejsbal ms. 35 Pads mm Dlsember 2017 [am Ianrh kurang 11 pagi, says man msnemun Tan Sn Dzu/krﬂi Ahmad dun memak/umkan berm mengsnai lanqkapsn says om. pmak ms sens Borang ms Panama msszm. 59. De/am pelbua/an felefnn zsrssbum Tan Sn‘ Dzu/krﬂr Ahmad re/an membelikan says kebsnaran mm msndsdahkan mamm ssbsnsr ssya kapada pihak ms " [73] Se\|erusIwa menurul Respundsn beliau Isiah membenksn semu\a maldumamya yang sebenar semasa nadir umuk henkan keterangan ur pejabat .IA1s pada jam 2.60 samur- mendapal Kehsnaran sm. srN1a><umRKzkzLv.cD<umarGw E -m Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm Paw 21 >4 7- JAIS dan semasa serbuan ma (elah hen mencm khas dan memberikan human yang menyakong idenmy khas, seteran mendapal pengesahan bahawa ssrbuan adanan ms saya arahkan mk dsdahkan wdermly sebenar beﬁau. “ [151 Naram pembelain yang dibawa men Respunden ada\ah bahawa beliau udak dapal memhenkan maklumal sebenar kerana belum msndapal kabsnaran den sm. pa] lni wga seiaiar dengan humhan oleh psguam Respundan bahawa Respondsn memaluhi den lerikat derlgan seksyen am Akla swam ; -(4) Trap—liap pegawal den pegawal rendsh Suruhan/aye Ilendaklah mempunyar apa-spa kuasa yang dfpemnlukkan bagmya dr bswah Akta /m dam hendaklall terrak/uk kepada arshsn, kswalsn darn pengawasan Kelua Pssuruh/aya mu msnamana pegawai /am Suruharusya yang /aw. mggi pangksmys danpadanya‘ darn hsndsklslv menjalamsn kuasanys, mtlakun-Knn fungslnya dan mommaikan Imw.I]lpnnnya dengan memaluhl apa-«pa -mu mu puunjuk yang dlnyurakan mm Ila-n mu bmulis blah Kama Posumhjnyn mu man:-mini pegawll I-In summnj n yang Iahlh Iinggi panqkamyu danpad-ny-." [77] Damn meluawab persoalan m. Mama: :1. dalam Alasan Penghakxmannya levah menjawah dsngan menuuk kepada kesehmman kcnleks seksyen e Iersehul dan mavuguk semara spesmk Kepada seksyen 5(3) Akva swam yang msnyamkan‘ "(3) Samua pegawau dan pegawaw renuan Sumhanjaya ia\ah anggma perkmdmalan awam am Persekutuan “ [75] Ruwk Rekud Rayuan ma 1. pads perenggan 13 d1 muka sum! 25: -[13] Peruncukkan mi dengan ielas menyatakan bahawa semua Degawaw SPRM kecuah Kelua Pesumhjaya man anggoia perkmdmalan awam am Persskuluan. Ferkmdmalan awam psrsskuluan ada\ah aapam yang lerkamiung dw dalam Parkara 132 Pevlemhagaan Persdxuluan senap pegawai awam Dersekuluan auaxan di kawal wha ﬁndakan maVa\ui undang-undang persekunuan, Penman map Ferkmdmavan Awam ﬂan pekeHHng pemadblran yang barkualkuasa. Jusleru mu m da\am kss av hadapan kila walaupun on auaxan dikehendakw -nenunni arahan yang diberikan u\eh Keiua Pasurumaya, namun arahan yang dibankan hanya perm ununm jika ia ndak bevlsmangan dengan undang-undang. Olsh yang damman‘ hujahan peguam on menyatakan on Aemaksa dw si idenlm disebabkan arahan Ke\|ua Pesummaya auaran lidak bo\sh mpanahankan In: adalah kerana on ssbagan pegawaw awam yang sedang berkhidmat seharusnya tahu undangundang unluk ﬁdak mendedahkan walau av: Dun mnan yang dibenkan o\sh pegawax avasan wa lldak boleh mendahumi undang-undang. Lebih-lemh Vagi (imam keadaan OKT keﬂka dnangkap kerana disyakn rrvekukukan khamal dun wen menyebabkan on mengillaml kepayahan undang- undang jnka Iwdak mendedahkan Idanull. srN1o><umRKzkzLv.cD<DmarGw E Nuns s.nn In-nhnv wmlxeusedmvsIWlmenvVn\ruH\|:IM1Ms dun-mnxvunF\uNG pm Paw 21 um Vsu yang dlbangkitkan peguam im (uga udak msmpunym mam pada pandangan mahkamah In: berdasarkan huraxan m alas." [79] Mahkamah mi berseluju denqan dapalan man Mauslrel. Raspcnden tidak buleh menggunakan undsng-undang dun arahan sebagai man melepaskan dinnya danpada lmdakan panbam. [Bu] Kes Responder: W ada\ah salu undakan penbam dan Izukamah alas xepasm sebagaw peruawal awam. Mas kapasm penbadi seorang swam ada\sh sermasa (enakmk kepada undang-undang (an Alas kapasm panbam «ads seorangpun yang dapal mengalasl undang-undang makahan Vang D1-Psrluan Agung dx bawah Psrkara 131(2) Periemhagaan Persekuluan Malaysia um haven dudakwa [521 Sebagal pemmx awam Responder: ssharusnya senliasa menuuk kepada Peramvan-Pera\|uran Pegawaw Awam (Kelakuan nan Ta'a\|ar1ib) 1993. Feraluran 4(2) -4 (1) Seseorang pegawal hendsklah pads seuap mesa dan pada sauap keluka mamhenkan oaan sans yang tank bemevan bag! kepada Yang dw-Penuan Agnng, negara dan Kerazaan. (2) Sessnrang psgawax max boIeh— aw .aKamm.aMoaa,...raw E -ma sum ...ua.. wm .. used m van; M .m,(n.u., MIN; dun-mm Va mum W Pm :4 no no lb) (0) [33] membelakangkan lugas arwamnya dem1 kepanungan perssrmi nnya, bemewakuan dangan sedemikian are yang mungkin menyebahkan kapemingan persendinannya bemanggah dengan lugas awamnya; berkslakuan dengan ans-apa cars yang mungkm menyebabkan syak yang munasabah hanawa— (.) .a Is\ah meynmarkan kepenungan persendiriannya bercanggah dangan lugas awamnya nmgga meniejaskan kegunaannya sebagai searing pegawai awanvatau (n) dia man menggunakan kedudnkan awamnya bag: faedahnya sendm ' a\am kes in! iehas bahawa semasa nangkapan: I) Responder: bukan men]a\ankan mgasan, ii) Kesalahan maklumal yang maenxan bukan an lsmpal menjalanksn tugasan, dan srN1c:><umRKzuLv.co<un.arGw -um smm n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm Plaeiimzl a.3 Tangkapan atas perkara khawwaz admah aras urusan peribadt. [341 SD4 da\am kerterangan-Keteyangannya turul membual psmewasan hahawa penggunaan kad pengenalan boqus'ilu admah digunakan semasa menjalankan ope!-asw. [55] 0\eh Ru (idak betbangkil hahawa Raspanden Ierpaksa menunggu sehungga mendapal kebenaran daripada 5D4 ssbelum mambual pendedahan sabenar idenlmnya. [es] Adakah pembslaan DKT bahawa lmdakannya menyalakan bum am yang lerdapal dalam Kan Fengenaxan Bogus yang dlpegang mehnya adalah salu mdakan berbenluk ‘good ism" disebahkan knnonnya musk boxer: mendedahkan wdenmw sebenarlanpa kebenaran pihak ahasan mu berasas axau «max. [an Mamam behan un\|uk OKT membuklikan bmir-bow dalam pertudunan sebagai “good faith" swam mana pemnluksn seksyen 52 Kanun Keseksaan. [ea] Rujukan kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Sili Nor Ailluh Mum Mn PP [2013] 5 CLJ di perenggan :47 mamuluskan sapeni benkut: T37] ssksysn 105 Am Ksrerangan W50 memparuntukksn nahawa mans-mans orang yang menu msngguna paksl apsapa pembelaarl am yaw dipsmnmkkan di bawah KK. beban unluk sw .aKuumz..Mmu,...rew E 'Nnl2 sum ...m.. WW .. used m van; M .m,m.u., mm; dun-mm VII mum W mu 1» vvzs membuktfkannya hsndsklsh dlpikul olsh orang nu, Seksyen 105 mempslunmkkan sspsrﬁ bsrlkut: 105‘ When apwson rs mused afany ommce, the burden ovpruving the sxrstenoe olcirbumstannes bnngmg the case wumn any of was general sxmpl/ans In the Penal Code, or within any special axceplion or nluvwo wnlsined m any amernarx ouhe same code, or in anylaw deﬁning ms oirencs, rs upon mm, and ms court shall presume ms absence oﬂnosa circumstances.‘ [591 cm gagal membuklikan ma Ierﬁbal dmam nenyamaran bagi salu nroxek Suruharuaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malayswa melihalksn indmdu berpmﬁl linggi. [90] GKT1eIah gagm menungukkan bahavwa ma telah Exercised due care and arremion’ apabna on bercadang unluk menggunskan pembe\aan ’good lam’, dw alas lmdakannya. [911 ‘Hand perkawtan di antara langkapan kes kha\waI on dengan indlvidu bervwﬁl tmggv yang dikalakan menjadi sumek kepada projak penyamaran on [921 Mahkamuh im membual dapaun bahawa gemnewaan yang umangmxan ada\|sh pemmran kemudian ﬂan cuha unmk hersehndung di ssbahk arahan oleh SD4. srN1aKumRKzkzLv.cD<Dn.arGw ﬂ -um sum n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Five 2: M n [931 Tuan Maiwslrel Ie\ah khilal dun segv undang»undang dan lakla apabila hanya membensrkan pambelaan on hsrasas sedangkan wa adaxah satu pembelaan Mr kemudian. [941 Mahkamah bemuas hali bahawa pmak pendakwaan bsriaya membuklikan kesnya melampam keraguan yang munasabah. Mshksmah in: menssmukan Responaen ﬂan meniatuhkan hukuman denda sebanayak RM1‘5DOiika gage! bayamga (3) bu¥an veruara. VI. HUKUMAN [as] Mahkamah Ie\ah memnerﬁmbangkan num-an kedua—dua pihak Peravu dan Raswnden ma laklar-Vaklor penngansn dan pemberalan hukuman [95] Respanden adalah mempakan pesavan penama dan «exam mempunyai kehlanja dan empal orang anuk D. samplng mu, isuan udak bekerja [971 Reslaonden mak bekena dan mempakan seorsng psgawiv pahng muds avanugenman amps! star. Respcnden luga dilelakkan da\am ‘garden !ssve'disebahkan kss mi [es] Namun begnu, Imdakan Responden menggunakaa msmm pa\su inl merupakan salu kesa\ahan yang senus. la mambari nama buruk kepada Jabalan di mana Imdakan Responder: rrvenyiﬂahgunakiln pm/eye’ W bagi menumpw kesalahan psnnam. srN1uKumRKzkzLv.cD<DmarGw g -m s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. nnmruﬂly mm: dun-mm VII mum puns! ms 2: vv 2: [Q9] Smam mu, hukuman bsrzujuan unluk memben pengmaran kepeda mereka yang cemnrong untuk mskakukan kesalahan yang sama ﬂan lerulama memka yang amen keisnmswaan menggunakan Kad Pengenawan Bogus da\am mewaksanakan (ugasan man. [100] Mahkamah berpendapal bahawa hukuman lersehul ada\ah am! den se(Impa1 den Ildak kelanaluan. Pmak-pmak:- Peraw mun Lokmnn bln Knslm [Pe]aba\| TImba\an Fendakws Raya Nsgeri Selangor] Respnnden. Puan Katrina bind Fund ‘ [Gobmd Singh Den A Co] srN1a><umRKzkzLv.cD<umarGw E -m Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm PW is r»' 2\| [51 Selenas ilu. pada cankn mg aama, jam Ienm kurang 2.uu peung. Rasponden sekall Vagl namr ks Banagan Pengumsan Pengualkuasa JAIS hag? muan siasaoan. Semasa s\asa\an, Responder: Ie¥ah memperkenmkan din sebagai Fwkn mu Ab Ramm. Responden iuga menyavakan bahiwa Respnnden dmunu aleh plhak avasan unmk memparkenaukan am Responden yang sehenar. [91 Sewrus selepas nu‘ salu Laporan Pohs (P4)IeVah dibualmeh sm susulan uerbuanan Responder: yang (elah membankan maklumal lidak nanar atau palsu dalam mengusl Enrang Maklumat Panbadi mo] Pmak Dembelaan lelah memanggu seramai smpal orang aakai Iermasuk Responder: untuk mamban kelerangan bersumpah. Respormen lelah mamangg ya (3) urang saksl mu SD2, sna dan sm bag: menynkong pembekiannya [11] Respanden Ixdak menaﬁkan bahawa ma mengemukakan maklumal palsu kepada penguankuasa JAIS. Namun begmu. Resnonden menagaskan bahawa lindakan Responden mangemukakan makmmac palsu kepatia penguatkuasa ms wauu mamm palsu yang man dnbenkan kepada Respcnden Edam: auaxukan selaras dengan arahan yang dﬂerima danpada Kama Fesummaya Suruhanjaya Penoagahan Rasuah Mavaysia (SFRM) pada masa ilu waitu Tan Sri uzulkwu bm Ahmed 1504). srN1a><umRKzkzLv.cD<umarGw E -ma Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm a. nﬂmnaﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm me I M 29 Iv. HIJJAHAN PERAVU m Perayu di daksm kes mi «em. mernfaﬂkan Peusyen Rayuan beninkh 13.2 2022 d\ Rskad Rayuan Jmd 1 muka aural a hmgga 9. [21 Psnayu calan mengemukakan Iima a\asan an dmarn Peusyen Rayuannya berksnaan dsngan kekhilalan Majzsnrac Namun d1 dslam hwihan o\eh Ferayu, (e\ah memmuskannya kepada saxu Isu Iaim samada Respanden aaawah bewl apahﬂa membsnkan makmmat pavsu Iarsanm kepada JAIS. [3] lni kerana bardasarkan kelerangan-keterangan, naaa pemkaxan hahawa Resparmen (alah memberikan maklumal pa\su kepada ms. Isu SAMA ADA RESFONDEN ADALAH BETUL AFAEILA MEMBERIKAN MAKLUMAT FALSU TERSEEUT KEPADA JAIS [41 Perayu dw dalam muahannya menyanmn bahawa pembekuan Responaan berganmng kspada kemangan sm. [5] Menumt Perayu katarangan SD-1 aaaxan jelas bahawa Sm bukan uawam operas: den lelah member! maklumsl palsu wawlu memm Dann ldns yang mana wanya auakukan semasa bukan da\am sknp Iugas. [51 Pads masa sama sm mengesahkan bahawa Responder: hdak hob?! mendedahkan idenmi Sehenar dan perlu hams am K:><uunRKzuLm:D<Dn.arGw -ma Sum IHIVVDIY wm be used m mm a. ammu-y mm; dun-mm VII mum pm Pm 5 N N menggunakan meauu palsu Dann ldns lni adaklh kerana um dapal kena\ pasu samasa tangloapan aamaaa pegawai langkapan semasa semuan benar-benar Pegawai ms alsu menyamar m Namun, begun, sm manyalakan semasa d« psmbal agama. Vdenlih sebenar Rsspondsn bo\eh mdeuankan Kenna memang benarlah bahawa ia (angkspsn ms ﬂan bukan panyamar [5] Perayu kemudlannya merujuk kepada kelerangan sm di muka Surat 355 RR mm 203; D’ dsﬂam ketsrangan sm menyanakan bahawa opemsx yang dijalankan ada\ah dilangguhkan dahum unluk menzlaram yep alas kemanan is\|ennya Meraka akan berangkal ke upon Perak pada sebexah pagl. [9] Perayu sslerusnya memenk ksievangan Sm sepsni dw bawah: PsguambeIa' Ana yang new/aku pads maram 15 dlsembev 2017? S114’ Paula malam 15, says Xslalv msndspal panggilan daripada ssorang psgswal polfs daripada Eula! Aman yang drkena/I sabegsi 'Eva", mama sirrgkatan die /an. Dlorsng m bsnyak nama-name smgkaz, yang aama psnuh H: says Iidak Izsrapa mgal. /mamm says rssa. Dls memak/umkan kspada saya srN‘a><umRKzkzLv.cD<Dn.arGw E Wane Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxeusedmyammenﬂmruulyMimsdnu-mmwanF\uNG W P-new-v Oshawa Islsﬂ kspads Kama Folis Nsgars pads kswks I'M, Tan Sn Full, lslah msninggal duma den aksn drksbumlksn selepas subulv ax /poh, Perak. man yang dsmfkian sslepas mananma panygﬂan lslslon dar/pads psgswat pans bemama Iaramm rm says Isiah menghubung: Fikri berrzmyakan be/fau dl mans. Drmsklumkarl ballawa behau pads kehka IILI sedsng man/a/ankarl aparaar yang me/ibatkan Tsskforca. ma yuga relalv dimak/umkan (brahim yang sams, ma pun dah tahu bila says ts/efon dra telssbur Make says arahkan dra agar, okay you lo/low ms unluk ma ziarah, dis standby, ma akan ks /poh Karla pevgr awe! kelana dra akan drksbumlksn ssba/um man. my Fikr/' memak/umksn says bahswa nperasi masih banalan, aaya ma nngvun dulu. Make dra mfnla ksbenaran ssya unluk belshst sementanz manunggu, nak balfk rumah /sun, [am msnunggu ar safe house lsrssbut. saya kats bsws, because yang msninggal tu islen kapsda Tan sn Fuzf, says sunm die Dawn seorang psga war wanna. Make Nu! uza akan balsa/ns den yuga saorang pemsndu Msmks axan amama says untuk ks man, man Haknn. rm amnan saya. mo] nmnax Dada kelerangan m aias hahawa sm Iekih pun mengarahkan hahawa operas1 dilangguhkan dahmu bagi msnghadvri maylis pengkebumian. (111 O\eh nu Perayu menghujahkan pembeiaan Rsponden man gage! apaaua mengalakan bahmva aenau lerpaksa menggunakan idenlm khas Dann Idns dan Iidak dapat mendedahkan Idsnminya yang sebenar pada mzsa tersebul sedangkan operasi man pun dnzangguhkan. srN,a><umRKzkzLv.cD<DmarGw E W Snvmnnuhnvwmlxeusedmvan;mem\g\ruHIyM1Msdun-mnxvunF\uNG W v-sewn [12] [13] [14] [15] sw .a»<umm<zm.coau,..arew -ma saw ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm Selamsnya Perayu menghmahkan pula berkenasn dengan psnggunaan Idsnhti Iersebul semasa mengwax borang di psjaba(JAlS. Perayu menghwahksn banawa mevalui kelarangan Sm manyavakan kepenuan merahsiakan idenmi sebenar ada\ah hag: melmdungi mak\uma\| berkenaan dengan task force (arpehhara sewn memelmara rumah se¥ama\| ‘safe house’. vni kerana kekhuauran sama ada \|angkapan lersebut berm- benar dam pe1sbs(.JAlS alau bukan Namun apabﬂa disahkan ianya tangkapsn nleh ms sehelah Responden dw bawa ke Pqabat ms make liada alasan bahawa wdenlill (ersebul masih perm dxrahsiakan dan perm kepada penggunaan idenlm penyamamn lagi. Ruiuk Nova kelerangan SD4 dl Rskod Rayuan Jmd 213) muka Surat 359 : Soslsn. Ksnsauan mengsrml ssrbuan bukan dad JAIS sdalan dari Fikri arau Tun Sn? ./awapan. Dalam ksadaan rslsebul mnmy khas psr/u dilindungi akan bocol maklumat Iaskforce dan spam/a dis 1e/an sshkan dis -1» psjsbst JAIS dan says benarkan ulk dsdshksn. Puguarzv [15] [1 7] [13] [191 sw .a»<umm<zm.cmu,..arew -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm sea/an: Inga! name manmy khas mm<snaan7 Jawapan: Name alas Darm /dns bin Abdullan Soalan' Ape rssksi Tan Sn‘ berkenatm Fikri tidak dedahksn Identity pada JAIS ksrrka :1/' sale house’ Jawapan Bag: says adalah waiar ksrana umuk me/mdungr rdsntily khss Perayu menghujahkan bahawa Resnonden bukan operasl/safshouss map! semasa d1 Pembat JAIS. perludullan serbuan dx temedap ssmasa rumah oxen mu isu berkenaan idsnlm semasa serhuan sama ads benar dan ms alau bukan selwlgga menyebsbkan Respamien mengemukakan Ademili penyamarzmnya udak lag! dapal dwperlahankan. Perayu selelusnya menghujahkan bahawa pemmaan Respnnden dengan kelerangan oleh SD4 admah pemwvan kemuman. Pe/ayu marujuk kepada keherangan sm di Rekod Rayuan Jilid 25 muka Sum! 3572 mums soalen. Ten su (ldsk psmah dipanggil umuk Den kelsrangsn barksnsan kss oxr. weleu re/en drpanygfl Tan Sn balsh psrgl serldiri untuk ban ksrsrangan’ Jawapsn. Tlada kspsl/uan untuk seys perm, says boleh pergl ksnspa seye perlu buat, sressxen aye/anken olsh PDRM [201 Perayu merujuk kepsda kes Noordin Sudnkalhulllh & 0:: v.PP[201D]1 cu m: [471 One additional pomr that we would like :9 make at we stage /s me: aespne me meeung with pm, me me: appellant did no! lake DWI to the MACC or to H5 supsnor to sxplam what may I-vappansd. The are: appsllalvl had me eemesr opportunily to explain lo we mac cl (0 ms supunol, yet he drd not do so. me enussran suggests me: (he teslrmony 0/ pm IS e fabrrcslran The learned High Court Judge was curred when His Lomsmp rs/sclad me svrdsnce of nww [21] Psrayu menghnqahkan bahawa kedudukan sm sehagaw Kalua Fasurumaya SPRM den seerang Pagawm Undang— undang sepulumya Vshlh mengelahul \|amang peuakanan proses swasatan penguaumesa [221 Olsh ilu apebﬂa ma undskan aen pihak sum membual penjehsan kepada PoHs bag! menerangkan kaadaan sebenar em ‘u><umRKzkzLv.cD<Dn.arGw E -use Sum In-nhnv M“ e. used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VB mum pm V-9! 4“ M iv	3,801	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-12BNCvC-40-03/2023	PERAYU YEIN INTERNATIONAL SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN KONE ELEVATOR (M) SDN BHD	On a balance of probabilities, the Respondent had failed to prove its claim. This appeal is allowed with costs of RM10,000. The decision of the Session Court is set aside.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=18444f9f-fa6c-4020-90ed-f3437b17dc08&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:53:03 WA-12BNCvC-40-03/2023 Kand. 22 S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—12mIcvc—au—o3/2023 Kand. 22 us/mzm us: IN THE HIGN COURT IN mun AT KUALA LIJMPUR m mE FEDERAL TERRIIDRV. MALAYSIA CIVIL APPEAL No: WA-I2BNOvC-40—D3/2023 aETwEEu VEIN INTERNATIONAL snu am: (counuv NO: 2o1w1ou45s4m754sa-K) APPELLAMI AND KONE ELEVATOR (M) sun sun (COMPANY N0: 19620100763!/E1391-H) . RESPONDENT GROUNDS or JUDGMENT mo session courrs dc [11 Aner a Ml max, me Sessmn Conn had allmvsd the Resnomenrs uaum ovRMza2.71s.2s They were car products supphed bylhe Appeuam Imt were aeveawe. The Sesslan Cour! had also ordered Far 5% mnerasx on me mdgmenl sum Costs at RMIU,0UU.DU wave addmonally warned to (he Respondsm sw r«avEGGzmEcq7mDuxIccA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm m The Sesswn Cowl neu rsladad me Appallanfs eonlennon that me delecs m me orauuole supolleo were ceueea by lne nanollng ol ma dellvery. mamas based on me Fanlhal me Appellant had ml called any wnness (mm sonenker Lnglsocs \|Mabysia) son and or Schenkzr Chlna Llo xlemen lo suppml lnal mlllenﬁun. [31 The Sesslon calm had oonsldsrad me plclunas and videos mak had reourded me oellvely ouuney wele loo Varand led laoonluelon. They on no: help me seem Court lo cunclllda lnel me Droducts sent and dehveled were In good wrldllnn. Till I [41 me Aonsllenlneo eubnnllea a law grounds elm:-see men lrldudsd: la) Tne seeslan ceun rlaﬂ enoo wnen me human nl proar was olaoed on me Appellanl lo pmva lnel me pmduele aellvored on me Ruporldent ware rm defective wnen lne mlnsen ol wool should have been on me Resporldinllc pmva meme pmducs dellvered were defecrivel (lay me Respemsenrs case hinged on «we allegeo uereouve puoduole alwmch me muons were neareay Ind ougnl nol lo have been consrderad by me seam court: (at The seeslm cam had eneu wharl lmlu nal welaenml mare wee no lzulal mrlnaction balwaan lne ellegoo oeleclive pmdu-:1 and on alleged breach olwananry an me lzualily olme Wwucts. no mzeezelzcmmumecn “Nair s.n.l n-vlhnrwlll e. o... m may he nﬂmnnllly enn. dun-mm VII mene Wm! ml The evidence showed me: me Respamlenn wdnass are no: knrw who had leken me nneregrenrrs m mm reperrs He could nor idermly me remarle and oommerla rn llrenr eillrer. Th's Coun ﬁnds lhal me comem cl mm me aelea reports rrrusl be aleulslree by llrelr maker(s]. The ahssme whlch would amounl w me conlene rneluang me prrolograpns Iflal me Aapellanr nan relied on‘ hearsay. [25] soln me aelecrs Iepons were heusay and canied no or very lmle pmbaliva value. see me com uVAppea\|‘1 declsion ln pm sum bln rq Monerned rr Wln uurrarrrrrrea Azrl urn wen com [2016] 3 MLJ 529 an para zu ‘However me respondent Ialled to cell me make! 0! me dccumenls to prove rls contents. In Amer: Bank (Malaysia) and V Yau Jrok Hua 11.29915 ML./1, rr was said rrral rr ls semsrl law mal me nrurn oflhe contents 0/ a document must be eslabllslred by me maker, ln omer wards, the maker olthe documents mus! be eellea to resmy la prove its eorrrerrre Non-camp!/anee wmr rrre rule rrrllreselrrn mo conrenre of rm documents being mndersd as hearsay and rnsreroru have we or no Probalrva." [25] ms waula in turn mean mel me Raspondenl had ya! la mscrrarge irs burden lo prove an a balance M prnbahlhlles me: am ne er me pmduas were ﬂelecﬁve. Exbsptlurme Mu tracked ales in 2m and me (our marl were bruugm al «rial, lne Respurrdenldia rm mscnarge Ils burden al woof The burden el prom had ya! la be snmed m me Appellant see me Federal cwrvs oeuslon ln ﬂung Vik Tnding v Liuz Plantation Sdn and [2017] 5 ML.’ see, ssI01 and loz Evidence Act 1950. Tm RIspmden\|‘s avldence a\| ml was lrrel mere were llny-nlne places el lne u rn rml7EGGzl'rlEcmlNDuxtccA “Nuns Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be used m my ee erwry ml. dun-mm wa erlurlc vwul Dfwucis that were defecﬁve - that oarvﬁrmanon was relied on boﬂh ma repom Thatﬁgure VS ml pmvell an a balance ol pwbabilmss Was an Anpellanl responsible for me allagaa serum [21] The Respondent nan not adduced avldsrloe lo shew an a balance M pmnalzlllues man me Appellam was responslble lor lne alleged deiecu. Aparl lrom me two craekea/aamagaa llles dlscavzred upml lhe reeelpl at the dellvery ol me prndums. (hare were other lealules VI me case man broke me usal mrlnedlon Because me alsoovary ollne alleged aeleas was anal eleven munms L71 aellvsry and 3'!!! a change al slmage wlm much handling am ma pzmdums, me Resplxlderll am produce any evldsnce In show on a balance at nmnanllillaa Iha\| me defects warn me alulamaa by me Awallanl Ind mal Ill muse amla and MI mull m ma defects or aamagaa pmauala I291 The Auvellant mu nol produce mama lmm its camar, a sub- clzrllmz.1nvPmll1al‘l Englnsennq whirl the defect: ana carnage could have been used by me hanulmg shlppmg am even sinrage There ms avldenee that me warehouse had a leakage issue ms com nulsd that the evldenoe sllowsd al the \|nln\| slla Irlspeclmrl male was no mmplalnla aiwalermalkslslallls Mme hlesa which appeared a year Islerwmch coula have been due \|o me humlully oondmorls ln storage. The Appellant also had ml pmduced any evldenoe la show mal me unevennes/walped slanes were not because alme lnsisllahon and how ll was calrled nul [291 There is nothing In ma Appeal Recoms mal slmaa man on a balance '01 Dmlvablllﬂes ma allegad dafems had lmmau when ma Appellirll nan handcd lwarlha pmducls yurchasod by me Relpandenlm 11 m mzeszalzcawumaca “Nair s.a.l nnvlhnrwm .. .l... M may he mm-y ml. ﬂan-mm VII .mm mm ma waiver‘: cavrier TM Ruspondent had Ilse Mac: to pmve max n oecurwd at me nunn men n had vsoarved mam. [30] ms Cnun Ihemfore eonaudes that me Respondent had actually failed \|u snow the cam! conneclmn between me Apneuanrs anegea breach o1 connect and the Respondenfs loss. Rsvarence Is made In Populu Indusmas Limited v Eastern Gnnncm uanufac-mung Sdn and [1959] 3 ML! 350. ‘A word now about general prmcrples Wnen a plain]!!! c/arms damages lmm a delandam, n: has to new that me ms: nu Inspect al wnich he mm damages was caused by me dulendanl‘: wrong. mu also that me damnges mac: ma ramole to be ucoverums - pq Tha Respormenl had procaadad no napme ma pmaucu. wiln purchual (mm a min: pany. ECW Rasouvma Sdn Ehd Hanever, ma ruplaoament was ml or me same specmcanon as mass bought lrom the Appenam rm replacement mes were more we we soaaﬁcalion 0? ma omer ophm — the ItHd<er measmsrnsnts wm me many pnue man was quoted byma Aupe\|lan\|huInotd1osan by me Respnndenl. Dnmagos -wuvod [32] This Cowl sets aside the damages awarded by the Sesien Conn because me speuﬁcamm»: my me pmducts veptaced was enunay amemn On a ha\ance nl pmnammas M loom: like me Respondent had ordered me wrung pmducls in me ﬁrs! place noun the Appeuann. Evan n my R§pDodsn\| were suoeesslul Vn pmvlng that male ware nave.-.1; and ma delecme pvoducu. were me raponsthmly 0! me Appsuanrs, u would u IN rmvEGGzmEcmmDutccA «ms smm ...m.mn be used m van; .. mn.u.y mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! no\| be raascnama lo awamucn damaqaslo ma Respcnaarruorrmvercm pmducls. ll scenrad man ansr using I'M: prvduds purcnauec (mm me Aapeuanx, xna Responder“ lound that the mcasuramems were nor sunanle. So. me Aapellam ougrrr noun be I1e\d responsmlc var rt. [33] Tnis Courl lurlher noted Ina! me 2n‘-/. supemsion ana overhead dlarges were nu\| pmven. there was no amence lo suppon me ngure mar ma Sessmn coon had awaraeo me Respondents. spacral damages must be Mﬂaded and rucven — Ong An Long v/Dr s Unatrvmod [1953] 2 MLJ 324. The gcnunl Iorms And ccnumans cl the purchase under my The nsspamanrs purchase omevconhinad the ganaril rcnrra and oondhons war suppcsad lo he allnnmd In Ilse pulchne ovuerumco ma Aapauanr by email an 2s.c.2ma hm ma cannanrs warn nar landamd an lnal Tnarewas also no msnhon cmrc gcoeran ncnns and cuncmcns in me my at me crnan The pulmaie omer nsen are our contain ms uunsral renns and mndninns rncy were also no: manilunld rn (ﬁe mrrespondenees batman the parties rmnr 24 5 2013 to 29.6 2013 [351 There was no evmcnce mar ma Appellant had cxpnssly agrcad In mam. in nanimrar, me wsnanry parroc or Iwenly-four mums wnera nannscerrrann «or defects wcwd be free 0! marge. me am nnre documentary evidence ccrrcnnrea nne same appsared was rn me Respanasnrs letter dated 27 92019 — man was over a year aner me uansaarm mare and purchase racrween them 14 rn rmvEGGzmEcmmDuxtr:cA “Nana s.n.r nnnhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... nrW\nnU\|:I mm: dun-mm vu .nuns v-mar [as] Heme‘ «ms coun ﬁnds lnal lne nespona-nrs general lame and eonanrcns were not binding on me Aupelznl, vmu ma nel have krnmleuge el rl. ellale n r n [:1] The Appeal riaeanas and me grounds cl Judgment by me Session Couﬂ have been nwreuea arm assessed. rnis oaun IS nonnuly neslvanr \|a lnlnﬂam wlln ma rlnarngs Mme Inal eoun nul Ill this case. me an ‘rugs were plainly wmng ms own is auldud by in rescue: Count‘: asersren VI Ng Han Kuli Anorv Wtndy rur Lu Pong 5 Or: [mu] lz MLJ 67 at para 74 ‘Thus, wmIs( rheve Is silgnl cmuenee in approach at appe//ale mrervenrion, both the UK Supreme own and our Feueral coun emecllvely snares a eumrnerr thvsad where rr has bean Imld Illal appellate /ntavvom/on ls jusllﬁad whore more is lack of mdlaal appmerauen of ewrter-ca.‘ [36] Tnis Cour! found inal lne ﬁnding mu mere were detects was erroneous as relianee was placed an M0 dslacl mpoﬂs Mild: wem hearsay and inadmissible as tn me mun onneir mnlems II was an ermr In ﬁm mat the Rsplwndem had drscharged its burden on a balance at pmbabilmes mar mere were aeteels as allsged ll was alse an error lo place the airmen on me Appellanl (or nol calling me camer m dispmve me Rzspondeufs eenlsnllon that me «steels were caused by me Apoellml and rum me lrensponallon and handling The human was on me 15 IN rml7EGGzl5lEcmmDuxtccA «me s.n.i n-vlhnrwm re used m mm r.. nﬂmnnllly MIN: dun-mm vu .mre we Resmnaunl no arms Ihal ma aaieas wen caused by me Avnallam Thai lam must be dschalged ml‘ before awning met me Appdlam had la. ea In pnwe [I131 ma defens were caussd by somalhlng else like n-ansvorlanun and handling [39] A funherenvvwas rellirluean clause 2 allhe RespLmdem‘s general le-ms and conullions wmcn evldarlea slwws was not a pan oi me mnlracc between me penis The ﬁnding maul Bwnd me Appellanmacause lime mi respond In me Respondent‘: wnespandences a ysal Ialer unaamiinaa ma evidence al lnal mat showed me Appellanl had no knowledge gill. Tiia Rsspnndamouuld nal produlx any avmancsmmm max II had Vnrvnrdasd me general terms and ccndlllonl all ma lime oi IM execution of we gonna, Yha communicauom helwaen (Mm an ml rnurlnon n‘ urllll a year Vale! In min when ma allsaed dalccu was dltcvvemd [40] There was also no oonsldemnon vial ma alleged defeas could havs been caused by me humidity VI s1uIage nrlhe leak issue in lna waraheuse. or men lhe unevannessfwarped pnmuais were not caused by me improper inslallanon Allmosa the Respomienrs wmesa had aﬂmlmed almal, were pusslblllhes. In any evenli mere was no moi mail me Apvellanl had given me alleged defects olme pmducls imm >aamen cmna The Respondent had ngl inspecled all ollnem. only line were conﬁrmed damaged ofwhlch ma Appallanl had made good since the numbed cl ales delwared was more man mal ordered 15 IN rmvEGGz6lEcqmlDuxtl:cA “Nair s.n.l ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he nﬂnlnnﬂly ml. dnunvlnnl VII nFluNG Wm! co-mm; an [41] On a balance ulvmbabilmes, me Raswndem had iaﬂsdla wave its claim ms appeal is allowed with com o1RM1o,ouo Tm daemon Mme Session Own ts set aside. DATED 25 AUGUST 2023 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER NVGH coum IN MALAVA KUALA LUMFUR For me Apps//anr Yap Zhen Jun rm Humlh Yew may 5 Pumas For the Rssaondem Mak Hon Pan T/rv Karen, Mak L Pampers 11 m rmvEGGzmEcmmDutccA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm la) The seealeu com had Mud lo nmwly evaluate ma lesllmonles ul me witnesses as to me quanmy at ma alleged aromas. (9) Yhe Session Cmlﬂ was umnemls when luaum lhal llilrlme and spot: an me products as ﬂalads, ll) The damauas ammea were unreasonable: (g) The was cf2D% supemslml and avemeam were ml woven, (In The Ixacl lo» wls not planned, and 0) The iensral lerms and omdmbn: taken lnlo account by me ssslon cam we»: run relevant. 15] me Applllamsubmmed that the Raspondsrll nan lallea In prove lrs (me an a balance ol pmbabllllles. me Appallanl lmplnred ms Cour! In inmrlara mm ma ﬁndmgs M me Sesslun Courl as mam was no plvve of me Alleged serene. and ma causal aanneallan and me leclual llnk betwun me amea delecla and me QLIIIVIY ol me nroaucu. e9_L¢§L2o.LLLu\|! [51 The pames had a am-ous buslrwsi aeallng In 2917 The Awallanl sllmiind mxluols lo me Respondent Mm was in me hllsinass at lnslallacim mudemlsaﬁon and rrlalnllnance e1 elervalnrs and escalatuls The Appellant‘: lradlng business included ms supply 00 marble‘ ﬁles‘ granite and lalzrlie products Then an 25 5 ms ma Raapemenl sent a m mzeszalzcmmumaaa “Nair Smnl n-vlhnrwm a. a... w may he nﬂﬂlnnllly mm: dun-mm VII nFluNG Wml pumnase emu to me Aanunanx. That was Dursuanl to Iluvtzﬁons sent by me AppeIan\|whin!1 me Reeponaenl had chosen me when wnn Ine Prim 0! RM1s4,324 15 The ether quomon sen\| was oi lmdter speciﬁcalions mm a slightly mgher price humle Responeenx had notchusen maxopnen and eanmmea me nrmum: onmnnerspedﬁcannns mm the lesser pnee Yhe dehvls are: mmwm mm my 50!: ran «an Yynn rn.n.n:-«a ea. mu m. (mm [um] {um} Gzsmgm Nov-vwumb Pahsmd woxsun 9 now am» 13638240‘ new! umm Famed semen m Iauw mm 27.94176 mil 151.3241: m Two days later. me Appaﬂanl submmed a tax mvuioe luv me said supplyemue pmdocts — aIota\of1,31I pisoas — 924 pines ereaseoane Baige Huneymmb am 392 pueoes ufG:swgrIe sage Lnmesmne. [3] The Respondent sppomled SchsnkerLugis\|K: (Malaysxa) Sdn Bhd as me carrier Mm had -n tum made arrangements fa! senenker cmna Lm namen Brand: to uuI\|ec1 me products a\| me memory In Xiamen, China on 30.3.2015 Tne evhenoe onne derail: nfme smpmemms Ihalme cargo that eomemea me produas were smpved to Port Knang. Mel customs n12aranoe.meproduc1s were taken no me camers warehnme faurorage to: arm: me. in tour month: [9] H15 Respondent had lnspoaod me proaucu mu one manm uwn arrival an me caviar‘: warehouse, The Respandenl can-plamea men Mo pieces cm: was were cmcknd The lnspecﬂon over me pmuaa umad . m nnvEGGzmEcq7mDaxtccA «me. am ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y em. mmn VII mum pm out by the Responttent was only over me oanrapee oretes more a was fuurtd Iwo tiies were oarnaoeo The rtespanoent requesteo tn: Appettant reptaeeo tne two cranked tites the Respondent had respundedlhallhere were nineteen extra pieces ottrtes in me cargo The Respondent trso ontereo 924 pisoes or me t-toneyeerne tites and 392 pieces at‘ me Limestone tttes. The Appettant naa delivered 3 mtira pieoas of the Hnrteycmtb tttee and tt extrs pieoes ot the Limestone tries. the Resp-merit oouto not onattenge mat it had reoetvso a totat or L335 neoes [tn] Yltareaﬂm. me Responoenttransponeo me prooucts to be stereo it the wareneuee nlPmntat1 Engtnaanng nus wns peesuse ttrara was a easy in me proterx lhal tne neeponoerrt nart eroaree tne proauot tor. To reouoa wan, I! ma deemed to arm ma product: in its sub-mrtnactors warenousa \|PmmIn Engineering) So. the pmdums were moved Vmm the storage at me earner to tnat ot ma :uh—omt(rnc1nfs warehouse The Respondent had not cameo ou ’ peetton upon the amval ottne products fur storawo in me sup-oontractors weretrouss. nre ptuouste were ﬂared more tor about etgnt rnontns oetore tnstattstron was carwad out tor me praise in 2019 [11] the Resvortdenl men instatted partottne pmducls torttetr pmjed. Eteven nrpnms etter imm tne ﬁme tne Respontterrt had reoervea tne pmducls, tne Responoent rneoe several oonrptatnte tnat me ptoouots were defsclive ano not in eonrptrenoe wrtn the epeomoatren oesonpeo in we purchase order. The Respondent claimed that tney were not at rnerottantatate quamy, nor were may at tor purpose. The Respondent ettegea that he detects were exlansrve and substantial There was a jutm sne meeting callsd by me neeponeent Mince tne Appettant had visitad 5 IN nttt7EGGzt5iEcmtNDuxtt:cA «me s.n.t tuvthnrwm r. u... m my r... ntwinaﬂly MW: dun-mm VII aFtt.tNG Wm! and mspected me stunes The defects were shown in ms Appeuerrrs duriw Ch: lolnl ma meeting on IS 7 201: The oomplernts mamas- [a)Cmcis and/or hamlne breaks rrr lhe Dmduds (Where many or urerrr were veoorded as'ch1p and mr); (I7)Yha Hunayocmns were demanded from me srarree, 1c)The smee were urrererrzmrved, and (d)Theru were hnles rrr are scores that measursd hrggerman 1cm. [:2] Evidence er ma: showed Ihal me Reeponaenr are nor rnsoecn an me nwduns at any point In um: bufore rr had csnied out lhe lnsullauon cl ms prerea. u only Imunlld rm numbor er ereres reeeruea and randomly chackcd «are number :1! u-ales cormspenﬂod re me number that r was \|a rrerre rscaivad u did not open all me cratesln msd(II1aav.1\I:l quenmy because at wm Nsklumvsr damage Dllhs srorre seceuse one. you opcrv me package. me mile wru be new usmsqed and we even easier to damage me ales 50. max is why we do no: open all me mes, lay um me noorsrmrrsn we checked The mcstilmxmam is re safsguardlhs lllss.“ [13] The Respomem had Vasned a [ever on me «areas on 219 2019 mar smghl me Appeurrrrr ro vemsdy me aeveae, The nespnrraeorr had also pmcuvaﬂ . uenrrrr mymn rurrrrr 4 10 2019 and had urrrr errerrrer rerrer in are Appellant on 14.10.2015 fhil om: me complllm an Inn pmdun: include: were erra srarrre rouaurna me Aweuerrrs hllune and/or refusal \|u remedy me wens, mhus Mdlmsnd were Aawid I: no Apoeﬂanl on ru rmvEGGzmEcq7mDutr:cA mu. sum nnnhnrwm r. u... w my r... mmrrsﬂly em. dun-mm vu .rrrrue v-max 7 11.2019 and 12 11.2u2n.A1nr1al. erronmrdelem reporn dened no 52020 was also nendered [141 Trre Resvorrderrn daimed man mey rrad \|o dlsmanlte me produus used ln nrrerr meet and replaced men with mere purehaeed lrerrr e mlrd perry Yhe Reswndenfs demands were ea lnllowe ..... a....r.,e... e........r (Rm 1 r.r...r.r Purmand IM 46! 4a 2 lauuurtv durvlanao s revmnll memo Sun Tan 7 217 an 417 T we Suparvnnrl e on»... nnsazza é 7 Ydul hill: CI wererneprdduersaeIocnrvo7 [151 ms ls eerrnrel ne me delm. as such we com mnamlnsd me Aoveal Racurds Io assess wnenrrer me wldema eddueed an nrlel could Mlp conclude. on a nzelenee er preoenlllau. man In preducns were derecnlve rm Reeponderrn clzirnad man ennrre nrrspeeuer. uper. vncalpl at delwery lr. Ocloblr 2019. 11 was \|u verity 1r.e eerrer.1 euarmry M crenee. Each or me elgnneen eaves rsoaived was "en opened In lnspad the qualily e1 me pmducls. The crates man were impeded were me damaged eranee. No other products were lrrscecned and urey were all nu1 rrrnd snnrage as me lnsrellaniorr (or me Resporrdenre pmjsd nad non yen begun. In lean, me pmdums were moved elner e eenelrr nlme perldd from nrre elerege or me mrrlefs to men one swdcnnrecners IN rml7EGGzslEcq7lNDuxtn:cA “Nana 5.11.1 In-rlhnrwm be u... m my r... nrwlrullly mm. dun-vlnrrl VII nFluNG v-mxl us: rnereoore, we could m7I be eoncluuea, on a baunoe o1 pmbanixmea Iha\| me pmducls sohi byme Appeaam were aececuve, apan lmm me «to uacked ﬁles The mspeclinn no the pmducls upon reoem by me Respandenlhersinmalayswa was crucial as (here were ntherilstures and everua mat eoum have mmrihumd lo the defects at me products. The products wvucn ma Respondent auegea were eeieeuve could have been me resuh at other things apan from me mar-uvecxunrrg huh The aHeg:d dececrs av amass‘ warwng‘ em bnakage may have had occurred during nransponaoou, smpmem and unsmtun handing Sluragewas alsu another Iezlure — me ploduds were emrea vemcally vmﬂst mere was oouxauum by ma AppeHalIl mallhevy should he stoned hnnlnmally as male was ma poearuluy max uamrmmg wumd occur n ma pmauua were slorod veruceury far ma long The wivehousa of Fmmll Erlainnedrw had a leak Vssue Mold and water spoumems were renenea xo nummy In storage me pomus slows: allnw wam Ia eaep and cause bmldun nl muld wwaler Svotslstsins. men there was also ma ins\|allalion cflha proaum — how it was done would have had men on me unevenness em/or me warm: charactsnsﬁcs once me proaucu. were mvanea [171 Eecauss man mesa features. lmlhe Raswmem to succeed In its claim, wt mus! prvvs on a balance at [rubabmoes that may wars alleged defects and that all moee oeatures am not bteam or break lhelau'ua\ link and causa\ connecum me: me Aweuam rm sold moss products alleged \|a have been delezmve. [us] The Respanuenz cook me pusluon mat me AppeHam was mpunsibla to newer me pmduds nl mermanlahie quality and In good eondmon and lhusunnsaasary farms Respandenlw inspect every none Vn each mm eighteen eranaa reeerveu rm Court Is unaue m aeelplmls a ru rmvEGGzmEcmmDutccA «wu. sum I-nhnrwm .. u... w my r... armmuu mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm mnhunliun at (‘hers seemed many pnsslbtllhes amt umbahmhss rl this wse K7181 the defect Mihe Drodumcmlld have hem Ihe resuh dsllippmgi handling. storage and even Insisllahon ufms mam In me man. 119} The Respondent had brought Iour shines in mai One had a walelmalk, one had broken and me ulna! lwu slemed aeieciive. Haw-var, In viaw man me evidence and umumsiances, the Respondeui Md wisp Io show on a balance otprpoaisalines man the aeiucis wean ma mix of ma Aweii.-mi (201 The avidence mowed mat me defects were aiseoverea aw me Installation DHIVB pmducts in ms pmisa much was nanny a yoaranei-me psiivecy om» pNduc1x.TIIs Respondent daimed maimosiomie sienna. with me honeycomb backing insiailed an me lrﬂ car vans had stained to warp. Those mm: were nighugmeu no me Appellanmunng me JDIM sits VBVID11 15.7.2019 [211 Suhsequenliy me Respendunt prvducud l defect rapon dalad 4 1o zu1n.Hawavar,m-nmpeaion was cameu aux brme purpose Mimi noon rm impocnun was named an] in July 2019 main sums of an daiects wura mahigm-p \|n the Appaunnx. The photographs in me deiuct reppn wevl UKSVI by Pmmarl Engineering‘ awoming In iris Respondwt some um: inmeen July and 0c1uber 2019 At trial. the Respnndem had relied on INS dialect rsoort and counted iiiim/—inur defecﬁve tiles as follows‘ i Crackad ﬂat s L , , 7 p+z»m.a 29 J umunluurvud n ‘ 9 IN rﬂVEGGz6\EEQ7!ND\|xlcCA “Nair s.n.i iuvihnrwm .. LAIQ4 M may i... mm-y mi. dun-mm VII .mm pm spmserr. I a Nah: ‘ 2 ’ mm ‘ 3: (221 There was man a mound eaves: mpnn dated the cammrrg yea: _ no 5 2020. which vas rm sawed arr ma Appellant rrra Rssponﬂnm wuld N71 give avidsnce as In whu mad when moss sets 01 arramgraprrs var me seeorra doisct veporl. The ﬁ9sDundsnI'swilnuss\|as1iﬁad matlham was a pnsslbllny Ihal mere ouuld be arr nvaﬂapping or photos and man ma makur oflhe sewnﬂ dailct repun was unsure more descrinﬁun ofma dafeds The cescrarany of me Raswndsnfs wrmess was ma: ma numbs me second defacl report therefore were not rehable. The emerru was mat mere were orrry ﬁllynine pseces m lclal (based on me ﬁrs! arra second Iepormhat were unsaﬁsfacmry Oulo11,316 prems nlpmducls delivered ca me Respondent. ms: wuuld any amount to 4.43% 01 me pmducts me Respenaem had purcnasea from the Appeuarrn. [231 The aerecx report: were nm given by me Respandsnl to me AppsIanL At man, are Aapenaac had made dear rt: abjecvcn lo bath me reporrs based on hearsay. The Appeuanl dunng me aeanng 0! ms appear, me Court or Applafs aeauren In Slmpn uamrara (nu Sdn and v ruraga marerrararru [2010] 1 ML! 375 was allod rn parueurar para 53: ‘I! la sewed law me: me rrrera /ear that a docunnnl ‘a mrked as arr sxmbd as P6 and N were rrr our case. arr: rrrx rerruer both documents eamrssrb/e umu me content rs proparry pruvsn. " r~ rmvEGGzmEcq7mDaxtacA “Nana s.r.r n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 m my a. mrmrry mm: dun-mm vu aF\uNG v-mm	2,264	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-22C-11-03/2023	PLAINTIF TROPICAL PROFILE (M) SDN BHD DEFENDAN CANTILEVER BUMI SDN BHD	1. Judgement of Enclosure 9.2. This plain & obvious case which is not sustainable.3. Defendant application to strike out the writ & statement of claim filed by the Plaintiff is a;;owed.4. Rm10,000 cost paid by Plaintiff to Defendant subject to allocator’s fee.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Sumathi a/p Murugiah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e4c0cb2e-6b1f-4f89-a52f-057e3b5ee3b3&Inline=true	GOJ - Tropical Profile v Cantilever.pdf IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN CIVIL SUIT NO.: BA-22C-11-03/2023 BETWEEN TROPICAL PROFILE (M) SDN BHD PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO: 311471-V) AND CANTILEVER BUMI SDN BHD (COMPANY NO.: 507788-T) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an application filed by the Defendant via Enclosure 9 pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 to strike out the writ and the statement of claims filed against it. [2] On 28.3.2023, the Plaintiff filed a Writ and Statement of Claim against the Defendant for, amongst others, the alleged sum of RM1,382,187.94 to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff for the usage of all materials, structures and equipment at the site of a project known as Shah Alam Package DASH CA4, Construction and Completion of Mainline and Other 05/12/2023 12:52:31 BA-22C-11-03/2023 Kand. 27 S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [3] The Defendant and the Plaintiff had filed their respective Affidavits and Submissions and I had delivered orally on 26.9.2023. [4] The Plaintiff being unsatisfied with my decision had filed a Notice of Appeal against my decision in allowing the application made by the Defendant for which I now write the grounds of my judgment. Salient facts as stated in the Statement of Claim [5] Tropical Profile was amongst the sub-contractors appointed by Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd for a project known as Penswastaan Lebuhraya Bertingkat Damansara Shah Alam Package DASH CA4, Construction and Completion of Mainline and Other - i. Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd was the Contractor appointed by Turnpike Synergy Sdn Bhd, the Employer for the Project ii. The contract between Turnpike Synergy Sdn Bhd and Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd was terminated. Following the termination of the contract between Turnpike Synergy Sdn Bhd and Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd, on 19.5.2021, Cantilever Bumi was appointed by Turnpike Synergy Sdn Bhd as the rescue contractor to complete the remaining works of the Project; and S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal iii. Cantilever Bumi took over the Project site in the condition and state as handed over by Turnpike Synergy Sdn Bhd. [6] onstruction materials and equipment belonging to the Plaintiff were left behind at the site such as:- i. Pre-cast, pre-stressed, post-tensioned concrete T- beams (Tbeams); ii. Concrete parapets; iii. Temporary works, including but not limited to scaffolding, ladders, staging, trestles, safety net, barriers, access platforms; iv. Steel reinforcement bars (rebars); v. PC strands, tendons, ducts; vi. Formwork, including but not limited to soffits; and vii. Concrete works, including but not limited to beams, parapets, portals, piers, slabs, that have been or are in the process of being cast, assembled and/or constructed. [7] Though the Plaintiff admitted to there being no agreement drawn between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, however, the Defendant has been alleged to be written to the Defendant to return the same which the Defendant had failed to do so. S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [8] between the representatives of Turnpike Synergy Sdn. Bhd., Peri Formwork Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., the Plaintiff and the Defendant on 22.10.2021, it was agreed that and returned to the Plaintiff as of 4.11.2021. [9] As a result of th via a letter dated 22.2.2022, the Plaintiff had claimed from the Defendant a sum of RM1,382,187.94 for losses and expenses suffered by it. Through the said letter, the Plaintiff had forwarded the details of the sum claimed as follows:- No Particulars of Costs QTY UNIT RATE (RM) AMOUNT (RM) 1. Edge Protection for Completer Deck Slab 1335 M 16.00 21,360.00 2. Cantilever Bracket include Edge Protection 883 M 69.00 60,927.00 3. Pier Soffit installed for Deck Slab 264 M 50.00 13,200.00 4. Permanent Formwork 1458.60 M2 98.00 142,942.80 5. Safety Net 22925 M2 15.00 343,875.00 6. Catch Net 22925 M2 22.00 504,350.00 7. Ramp 7C/P06 Hammer Head S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7.1 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 (PERI Scaffold) Rental per month (May 2021 to December 2021) Lost Material + Scrap Lost Material + Scrap Repair & Cleaning Sales & Purchase Installation Access Tower including safety net & toe board Safety Net Safety Net Edge Protection (Safety net & toe board) Completed Casting (Formwork, Concrete, Rebar & Shoring) 74.664 544 64 LS No No No M3 M2 M2 72.00 15.00 16.00 114,106.15 68,087.58 1,200.00 37,051.36 5,375.81 8,160.00 1,024.00 60,528.24 1,382,187.94 [10] agreement purportedly reached at the meeting on 22.10.2021 whereby As consequences to the said breach, the Plaintiff has suffered losses. S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [11] amounts to an admission, which the Defendant denies. [12] The Defendant on the other hand had filed this application pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 as it contents that cause of action, that the claim is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious and is an abuse of the process of the court. [13] that there is no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Furthermore, a Consent Judgment was entered into by the parties (including the Plaintiff) pursuant to a Civil Suit No. WA-22C-55- 07/2021 ( KL Suit 55 ) and in the same suit, an Injunction Order was granted against the Plaintiff wherein the Plaintiff was injunct against among others removing items from the site. [14] Based on the Statement of Claim filed by the Plaintiff, the as pleaded by the Plaintiff in paragraph 6(a) to 6(g) are the same as those recorded as prayer 1 in the Injunction Order in KL Suit 55. The Law and Findings of the Court [15] Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012: (1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that- (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, (2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph (1)(a). (3) This rule shall, as far as applicable, apply to an originating [16] It is trite that the summary proceeding to strike out pleadings will only be exercised in plain and obvious cases which is not sustainable (see: Abdul Rahim Abdul Hamid & Ors v. Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Ors [2000] 2 CLJ 457; [2000] 1 MLRA 111 [17] In the case of Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 1 MLRA 611, Mohamed Dzaiddin bin Hj Abdullah, SCJ (as he then was) held that - "The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) Rules of the High Court are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p. 91), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it "obviously unsustainable" (Attorney- General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L. & N.W. S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Ry. Co. [1892] 3 Ch. 274, CA). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA.). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 (which is in para materia with our O. 33 r. 2 Rules of the High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.". (Emphasis added) [18] As this application is made pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 (1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012, sub-paragraph (2) of the rule applies wherein no evidence can be led in the affidavit in support. Therefore, this summary proceeding is based on the pleadings only as stated in the case of Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v Sabah Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 192 where the Court of Appeal had stated the legal principles: d under O18 r 19(1)(a), ie do not have to look at the affidavits as no such evidence shall be admissible: O18 r19(2). We must consider only the pleadings for the purpose of determining whether, in the pleadings for the purpose of claim discloses a reasonable cause of action. The expression existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal remedy of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy QB 232 at p 242; [1964] 2 All ER 929 at p 934. The test to be applied is whether on the face of the pleadings, the court is prepared to say [19] In applying the above principles, in this case, it is undisputed that there is no written or any other form of contract(s) made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Therefore, there is no dispute that there is no privity of contract between them which could give rise to a breach of the same forming a cause of action. On this fact alone, it can be concluded that this is a plain and obvious case which is unsustainable. [20] As to whether the Plaintiff agreement by the Defendant based on the meeting held on 22.10.2021 can form a cause of action, the Plaintiff has relied on letters written to the Defendant from February 2022 onwards as prove that the there was an agreement between them. [21] This allegation was denied by the Defendant and the court was directed to the Injunction Order dated 28.10.2021 granted in KL Suit 55 as shown below:- S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [22] Therefore, I find the Plaintiff allegation that there is the breach of agreement unfounded. [23] Despite the above shown Injunction Order, being granted the aim to be scandalous, vexatious and frivolous and is an abuse of the process of the court pursuant to rule 19(1)(b) and (d) respectively. It is utterly clear that the process of the court has not been used with bona fide intentions and manner (see: Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v. Sabah Forest Industries Sdn Bhd (supra) and See Thong & Anor v. Saw Beng Chong [2012] 1 LNS 817; [2013] 3 MLJ 235). [24] The Plaintiff had also raised in its submission that the caused of action in this case is in tort as s.71 of the Contract Act 1950 was invoked. However, s.71 was not pleaded by the Plaintiff. As such, it is obvious to the court that the Plaintiff reliance on s.71 was a mere afterthought. Be that as it may, the injunction order dated 28.10.2021 has denied the Plaintiff the right to this claim. [25] In the upshot, I am satisfied that the summary process under this rule ought to be exercised as I find this as a plain and obvious case which is not sustainable. Therefore, allowed with costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant subject to allocatur fee. S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LsvA5B9riUlLwVO17jsw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	12,672	Tika 2.6.0
WA-12BCY-2-06/2022	PERAYU IMELDA NASREEN BINTI NASRUDDIN@BALCHIN RESPONDEN NORIZATUL AMIRA BINTI KAMSAN	Costs of this appeal is awarded to the Appellant. This Court allows the counsel for the Respondent’s plea that it is in the sum of RM8,000.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ed4aa6b4-cb7d-4802-8a17-7fbd0b2c0a6d&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:10:31 WA-12BCY-2-06/2022 Kand. 53 S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—12BCY—2—D5/2022 Kand. 53 us/12/2013 nezxn-31 IN THE HIGH count IN MALAYA AT KIJALA LUMPUR IN ms FEDERAL rsknnomt, MALAYSIA BETWEEN IMELDA NASREEN awn rusnunnm QBALEHIN APPELLANT NORIZATUL AMIRA snm xmsm RESPONDENT GROUNDS or JUDGIIEMI [1] Aﬂer a Ml trial the Sessmn Ocun had an 15 S 2022‘ entered the toﬂowmg judgment (2) demared man ma Appeuanrs commenl an ne( Facebook page an 2a m 2u2u amounted m z uelamalory smemem agamsl the nespenaem. m xKzx7xzLAm<F:ucywKhn 3%.. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [21 M (C) 1:!) (9) an mjuncllun ptvmbmng the Appellant (wflelher by herseli or neraganxsmcmvumarpusmng, publshlng orcausmg Ihersof any scanemencs wnnen or verbal any other aevamanary slakamenls agamsl me Respondent man are untrue mupncaung ma Respnndem wnn Ihe gwing ol «am Iesumony and/at changing and/av ve\|raA:(Ing her nasnmony wn um oourl proceedings olme wgn Conn .n Johnr Bahm cm: sun No. .lA~22NCVC-162-U5/ZOIB us Sum); ma Appellam puhhshed an unmnd\|\|mna\ apology (with terms sppmved D! by Ihe Respondent) wmcn muses a acaxamanc \|ha\| me de1ima¢nrys\|amment made was done wnn mahce on me pan M the Appeuanx. and that such apomgy remains on me Appeﬂanfs samas mama for thirty days: General damages IFHP19 sum av Rmsomw to be paid by me Apvillanl In ma Rasncnaem. Inlsreu M 5% on the sum of me genaral damages awarded, an cusls cl Rmmuoo to ba pan: by me Awmlant to me Resaondem rnan Faoabook comment ma saunon on-m doclamd \|o have aovamud and slandaredlhe Respondent pcnameu la a decxsiun dahvarsd 1 am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana s.nn ...n.mn a. U... a may he nrW\n\|U\|y mum: dnunmnl VI mum v-max [231 on me Appevama aetenoe of jusmcanon, ma Session cam held that in would unly succeed of an material soanamems m lhe punncauon were pmven mba true a\ para 45 onhegruunds ofjudgmenl. The Mean Cnumn DIloSIiDrMuhlnImId Sallen om IsmaII&AnorvNuruIIznh ht Anwlr mmmn a Ann: (2021) 2 MLJ 577 had new omemse. Tn succeed m ma aevance av jxmimalinn‘ ma Appellam need um pnwe max evlry ward us ma truth but me gar ol n or ma anmg arma mam charge .a weranca Is also made «a ma com av Appears daemon in D-to Sui Malummod Nlnr on. Jnnuluddln y Slsxom Toluvlxyan Mllaysln End 4 AnoI[2ﬂ1A]4 MLJ 242 [24] This com also xumea \|o as neramauon Act 1957 vmeruln lhe aaranoo otiuacmcamm Is pmvma cm ‘In an aman for libel or slander In respect of words camafnmg two or more dfstmcr chalyas agamsl me pla/Ivlrﬂ, a delenca of [uniﬁcation shall no! lad byresson only ma: me mnn aleverycnarge >5 not proved rl ms words no! pmea Io be (me do not materially mme me p/amwa mputalron having regard Io me yum 0/ ms rimammq charges " [251 1neue¢ore, n augm to he eva\ua\|ed whemev \|he Respondent had m tau mradad her posmon ax trial was vma\| me said svammenl uerated u was nolcnmacl (01 me sessxan own to mslead hacked mm ma oorrecmesl of ma daclsmn 0! the JB sun (ogelher mm me cause 0! Dr smnawa ma (paras so‘ 51 and 59 nllhe Session Court‘: ground: av fudgmaru) n was erroneous to have nam man ma ravaclmn by me Respondent is mule»/an\| became n was rv.1\| damrrmnud In ma JB sun (pm as :11 me Sassmn Court‘: grounds at )udgmIn\|) 1) am zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. am ...m.mm .. U... w may he mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [25] ms coun observed mm there was also no pruperevaluahnn dune Respondents replnallun as a result ollhs sam statement Where mere was no pmollhal me Rdspondanc s repocauan was malenaﬂy wmuvzd, me deasnoe anusuucanon snau nul ran ﬂlhe words were nu! proved Io hetme » see me Fedeml Coun‘s daemon m Abdul Ranman nun v Sunlvlngnm 5 Anor[19GE] 2 Mu es. [271 me Appeuanx had made dear .n me panlcwan ol gusuﬁcamn Ina case sne sougm \|o as! up and .uuuy(m1mo ms radaraw Cowl‘: decnsmn In Synﬂkll ﬁnk In Arrsalnngor Sdn and v Tlny Pu: Klnm w o [201 5] 6 MLJ197) Tnus, this Court considared Iha Appsuanns Dleaded dmsnce um en: said sunanum, In us nature: and ordinary meaning maznl ma! 4:) The Respondems evmenue In Ins JE sun mn\|rad\c\|ed me medics! moms and vepom‘ (m The Responderﬂ demed lhe prior dxsalssnns mm me meducav ofﬁoers and Dr Sakmah‘ my sna nad rem-some he: pnnr pcsman‘ (d) Her Evidence was umerenc no me account snn nad eamu Dravrded \|o me memes! dmcers and Dr Saklnah. [251 The Appellamhaﬂ adduced endsnce during the mar at me Sesswon Court to lhilify and slww mat me Respondanl had as a manner aflacl, retracted her earlier oaswion given prior to me man of me JR Sun. The Appeal Records eomalned me Interwews wnn me Respondent on separam oodasmns It was recorded me aewunl dc matiatelm day gwen 1: sm zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. s.nn ...m.mn .. H... In my n. mn.u-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! by the Respcndenl an we records mougn reourded on dwrerent days were consscem as mm an ma mnases called by the /19DsHanI—nne of ma mam matenax [acts was man Masywah was presemana mvulved in me home mm Tha\| nananve was vepsansa \|hree was to dmeuem medwca\ omcers an diifevenldales a\| amerem Iocanons. ms (act was ﬂamed when nne Rcspandanl aammaaly muacnea her pas-non when sna lesnfnsd in ma JB sun u was hev evidence In ma JE Sm! mm Masynan was mere In maraly provide support and encouragement ana man .1 was nu husband wm had delivered me baby [22] Inevnably n muﬂ be nnncludld man me smd Ilatamanl was sunsunually hue - in that sna had aamaa avurylhma she had mid ma medical alﬁcsls inﬂ Dr Sikinah ma delence a1]us(IIia;a(>on mus! omen. [an] The Sasslun Conn had faﬂed In zccrmi due cunsuderation In me ewdsncs oﬂhe naanncaue pmvlden The grounds at mdqrnent was silent as to ma evaluahon cf ma Appeuanrs evmanca max cmvlnnssd at independent oomemporaneoua evidence The Responoem on me other hand and ml oﬂer any cnrmbcralwe ev-aenoe to supporl her version :2! event [31] When ma Sessmn Oourl dechned «a draw adverse invsyanoa agamsl me Respondenl Mm had «am In adduce any ems: evidence‘ m oommmed an arm max snasnos was mauanan m namre as u some help \|o ﬁnd wnemer ma Respandenl naa not given ma accounts as per me rewards at me medical nmcers Yhus. in can he savany concluded mm w produced ms emaanna wanna be uniavourable m ms Respondsm 7 sea Wang KarJull A Anor v 57 Am pans mp San BMH2016] 5 MLJ 527 1; am zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «ma. s.nn lunhnrwm s. U... a my a. nrW\n\|U\|y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum v-max [321 The Respondent argued that me med\|ca\ mums, reports and notes am not comam vemaum slalernems «am lrom her She comended ma‘ they were me medical omuers‘ In\|eIpre'a\|\on anu summary er wha\| may had ummoca Be that as il may nu ma nm change the fact mm II was «mm and demed by the Respondenl during her \|esumL7ny m me as Suﬁ ms was conﬁtmen by me Resoondenl nersalldunng ms mal at lhe ssssxon Court. [331 u wls Ihn Vurlher summssnns 0! ms Angellanl mm Ins Raspenanm mly have had an mlenor motwe \|c Chang: or mlhar ralranl rm puslhan when she lasnﬁed m Ihe JB sun when sosorumg to ma Appellants summssiom was me sugguslmn pm In me Respondunt lhal ms asam ml her mam at me home mm. vas polanhaﬂy n crmunsl msusr max ms bemg unvesugzuaa by me aulhormes Thu Respmdenl admmad \|o krwwmg ms rapermssmns to an person not qualmeﬂ m medical prams ura daula \|a be mvo\~/ad In dehvsry af a baby Regarding «ms Issue. mus coun ﬁnds man «\| am not laclually amum man the (an man me sad statement ny me Appellant was m gm, we Agg Iolmm n [341 M them were mslanoes as above av lack ol judbcwal zppreclahcn av the ewaenoa. this courrs appeuane mcmennon ws warranted Refer to GM Vaok cm (H A Anor v Lu my cum @ Lu rock Sung A on [2005] 2 ML! 1 and Mg Hoo mu 5 Ana! V wsnay Tun Lot Pong (ndmlnlntrltrlx for nu «ms 0/ Tm Em Kwlnq, umsssu; L on [2020] 12 MLJ av sm xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKnn «mm. smuw ...m.mm .. U... w may he mm-y mm. dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [351 me session Caun had erred In me evalualmn ol me evvdenoe ro detemwle wnemer the aeoence at ruecrrrcenrurr was woven There were verlures In accord due wergm to me evraenee o1 mdapendem wrnresses caﬂed by me Aapeuant me appruprrace adverse In9e<em:e had also not been drawn agnmsl me Respondent [331 we mlsmradmn oi me Sessnon Cuurl rn me evamauon av me evruence mrmruea apoeuare Vntervenlwon — see me Own ol Annasrs daemon in Gunlryl Irmgrma Englnurs Pro Ltd vusu Ger:/an Sdn and L Dr! [2005] 6 MLJ 237 [37] ms com laund error m are Sesslun Cnurfs ruser. \|n arsrruss me aetenee 01 rusumcanun on me premrse me: me Appeﬂanl and run wnlad me Resnendam lo Dracure me xamers veﬁﬂcalmn (para 55 was grounds at judqmeml The faclual ﬁndings onne JB sum were also rrrappmzme \|o «ms case lncause may were nul iacluzl queshcns for -1e(ennma(Ion m we case the reasons for Dr sexrnaws loss were unmatevial la wmemer me said svauerrrerrx had deiamed me Responder“. All (uses showld man me Suslm Caunwas mrscaneewsd m coming tn ueusrar. [as] so. m mrs mslanoe, ms cam wru exemse us appellate powers and se\| asrue me Sessvon oaurrs daemon ms Conn ﬁnds that me said slalamem was not delamalory In nature given us nzlural and Dvdmary mesmrrg what rs apnarenlbased on me evxaerroe, me ApveHar\\| had duly pro»/an rrs defence ol juslmcaﬂan sm xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana s.r.r nmhnrwm .. H... w my r... nﬂmnuﬂly mum: dnuamnl VI mum WM Conn‘: urder {:59} ms appeal is auwma The demsion at me sessson Coun is set asude On this pmmse, ms coun mu not addruss ma appeal as In the genera! damages granled by me sessmn com. Yhe Rsspomem is omerea Io relum me RMsnIono pan: by Ihe AppeIIanI as damages wImm laurlean days The Respondenl KS aIsn nvdanad In mum RMIZISQU mm was paw \|n hat pevtammg Io me was awarded In her by Ina sesscn coun wIIhIrI the same me «am [40] Costs aflhis appeaI IS awaraaa In one Appcllanl ms Oourl News me wunul luv the Raspondan\|'s pIaa Ina: It 75 Ill Iha sum o1RM8,UOD DATED 7 NOVEMBER 2023 R02 MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH coum‘ IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Folrhe Appeuanr. Rafa EIlaen Suraya and Michelle Knor Chlew Hang T/n Ra/a‘ Darryl 5 Lon For Rnspondanl. Nur Izzam Zamam and Nur Aw/ah A1:/I1I‘rI rm CK Lmg Ilzamia & Irns .5 am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. Sum nanhnrwm .. I... In may he WWI-I mum: ﬂnuamnl VI .mIa wrm by me John! Bahru High court m me JE Suit As a bilafbeckground, ms! .15 Sm! was am a uevamanan sun n was bemeen one Masyxtah mm Md Hassan anu Dr samnan mun Sukxng The Responaem had (esliﬂed as a wulnass (er Masynlah Tm Faoebuok comment published on me Appeuanrs Gaga lead -Rap.-m Slngh me mamas! mam revealed ms mtervisw of ms mum and mm am 3:44 sclually happened In (no MO m we hosp«m/ and to Dr Sakmsn mum: dulmg Ina mm wan am 2” court mum Ielraclsd Ivar my and darned evlrymmg sho lam ma MO 5 Dr Sakfnih So the mud mm is not m D: sakmarwa Ilvour We are all dtvssmad All Dr Sakmsh wanlurl .5 to prune! Innocent mums so that mmvs /rka mi: wauld not nummn mm ' [3] The Sessmn coun did not ﬁnd that the sam svaxemm was pure\y about me diﬂerem aoeounx gwen to com on what me Respondent had prevlousw qwen to me madman omcer and Dr Sakinah. u vaunu that ma statement meant manna Rsspmmem was me cause of Dr sakmaws lass m ms JB Sm! N relied on one netlzetfs likewise underslarvﬂing [41 The defence aHL-shﬁmlmn raised by me Appeuam was reyecled. The Sassxon Cowl had rewewea me wanna: ol pldgmam my me as 5m! and mum Ihauhe reason Dr Saklnan had lorsl ma sun was nm due In em Respnndenfs lesumony The sassmn Conn held max me reasons as m why me cmm was auawed (and Dr Sakmah nan Vast) m ma JB sun wns not wllmn Ina Aupsﬂanfs knowiedge thus ma dlslmsssd (ha Appellant‘: pmadad defance of maununon sm zKzx7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana san-1 lunhnrwm .. U... a my a. mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! me am‘: we [51 The learned pdunsex «or me Appauam submmsd that m hmd me amamem aefamakzry was not reasonable espaeauy when he had raked on man one poem by a nauzen mp Ms :71 me underslandlng mac Dr Szkmah nad lbs! ma .1: sun as a consaqusnoe M me Respomenrs mummy N Iangm, n was summed me: me sasspn spun had and when n «auad In nonsmar me evidence that was produced a\| lnal mat showsd ma Raw<zndan\| lndend Md gvan a dmerann aecounl m her Xaslimony‘ not m dpapana ID M1H\|WlS nlsled m ma Appeﬂanrx uid sIaIemen\| Ix wu eonlendad lhal mmdy rmymg an the .13 Sun‘: gzpunda dc .udpmen< alone we: urroneoua. [5] n was immorsd by me waamed CDMHSE1 for the Appavam mm as a matter pv law, me Session com shoum have aw. meamnq to me said smemanl Iha\| is undersmod by me ordinary. -aasmaple, hlr-mmded raaderand ndune Ieadmg dra man‘ avid larscandal m The Appauam prayed Icr appeuate mcewemuon as u was submmed that me Sessmn cam nad Ieuad lo give any judxonal appremalmn so me amdanea mac ma Respondent as a matter cl can, dud prvvida a dMsren\| aocuunllo me heallhcara pm as compared «d what she had leslmed -n me JB sun Rgglxbylhcﬁn an n {a} m dulendmg me Sassmn op-ma ‘udgmant me Raspcndlnl subrmlloa lhal me namral and ordinary meaning 0! me 5:16 slahmlnl mud be undatslood and porcevvld I: ma Respondent had wvan «ansa am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. and nmhnrwm a. d... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! swam statement tn tne JE smt and mat sne had tenranea or enanged ner sla\|amen( wntm was utaerem ﬁvm me one gwen at the Interview earlier vntn the mamas: aﬁce( and Dr Sakmah u was out-mer submllhad that tt parlvayed me Respcndem as a nap, msnonest mason am untmstwonny. The case at cnuo Fno once a Chair Koo Lian v TM Chin: Press and [1998] 1 Mm an was tetenea ta [91 his Conn mam sutmsstans lmm tne Rupandem that me AapaHanl naa not pmvsn an a balance ulurabahlhhss mat Ihe deinmamry nnputanan VI tn. ADM uatamentwn lrul Tna law unaatsa Dslamattan Ad 1957 and ma case 0! Mohnmod Hlllz Mnhlmnd Nwdln 1/ am: nuts-n Ind Anomar Anna! [2019] 1 ML! 580 were cm. ms cmtrrs aﬂenlton was tnvma to ma aectsxm :2! me JB sun (hi! tom the documents contracted me Responuenrs tasttmony wnase credtbtllly was upttetn by the mat man It was me Responaenrs submtsstons mat the evidence mat me Appeuant had sougm In rely an (me pattent progress nnla‘ ms hnme hmh case repon and Dr Ssktnaﬁs nalas VI ma Respondents heallh record) was hwnd by tne Johor Bahvu Htgh court to be unlehable wtm nu credible value [10] II was also the Respondent's sumntgmns mat the said statement was published wtlh tnata ﬁde/malice. me lcHowmg reasons were cued (n) The Appeuant knew tnat ma evtﬂenne was run amamnucally cagent anu Credible‘ (I2) Tha AppeH\|It\| knew mat me nvtoenoe was challenged tn me J5 smt as tt am nol fully reilecl me Rsupondenfs full sm tKzK7x2LAnKF:wcywKhn “Nair s.n.t ...n.mn a. U... a may t... nﬂmnlﬂly mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ta) 1!) sla\|emen\|s precisely and accuratety during me trttewiew sasstms. The Appellant me no knawtodga an Ina um slmamanls as tme was nut mvntvad am trttetvtew ttmtatta wttrt ma Relpondeni and onuld not wnltmt or vandale he vatsctty at the R9lP0r\dBHf'! statements: The Annsttart: was not lrwohled tn Iha J8 set: and had no pevsonal knowiedge as \|o \|he actual testttttorty of me Respondent: Masyﬂah was not HIJIQOG out any cttmtttat nuance ind she had won hercase of me JE set, and The Appellant published the said s\|a\|emen\|be1nre havlllg had lull appratsai as to the grounds Oﬂuﬂgmertt omte JE Sui! [111 The emphasts tn me Respottaertra stmttttsstotts was on me fact that me Respundertt was nut the teasatt mat Dr Sakmah was urtsoccesstut to dalend the JE Sun kgmutta mu [121 It serves to asstat Ihal Ih: uttsttt background has ate supulalea below bekwa I5!65$VIﬁ wrtelnar (hate me error: tn lhe Ssssxnn centre daemon Ill rtmtng that (he Anpallanl was ttnbte Io! astumatton tn Fehrunry zota. mu amen‘: attentttxt had lumsd In In: use mm me ttteattt had dted rettowtttg a home ntmt ImdaVa supstvtstert ofa doula. The am tKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhG “Nair s.tt.t luvthnrwm be H... at my t... nﬂntnnﬂly mt. dnuavtnnl VI nFtuNa vtmxt mnmer was Ihe Respanaem. sne was men \|aken In Huspnar sunan lsmaﬂ in Jahor aahm lur nmner exanunanm and lruamlenl [13] Dr Saklnnh posud on Mr swan meme plalform sxaxemenvs In mauan m name mnn uelwevles These pubncacmns lurmed me bass 0! ma aeramanon clam: by Masyitah (Ina dcma Vnvowad in ma aam hams man by me aeuponuanu in ms .15 sun [141 ms Rlspundam had laslmad as a Mlnass Var Mesyuan in me as Sm! She iulnd m Ihe mal Ina: Meiyuah was run Anvnwed In Ina unwary prvcsis at her baby She nee dixpulad lha wnlams 01 her mamcav ruoordl [151 The Jnmx Bahru High com on 26.102020 denuded In lavaur nl Masyxuh and ordered Drsakmzh to pay uamaaes voraeiamanon. on me same day, the Appenam puansruea ma szwd stalanem on he! Faoebook page. T Can sassessmem [151 Yms Court‘: mac slap \s In assess whether the sam sla\|emenI ws defamatory The sad svanemem dsptded a Iacl mm m noun dunng me Mal M me JE sum nne Respondent had reuemea her yamon cl w1ua\ happened wmch was Informed \|u nne memcammaerana Drsakman That scanamenn «sen did nut convey any dalamalnry euemems ltjuslccm/eyed ma (ad lhnl me Rupondem had wvlhdrawn from her eamer pasmnn In onnsr words, nu ma (nal of «ne JE sun. me aesponoam no Vunqsr mamll ed her aumar slam es co wnu wu cnmmned .n ma medmal raoems sm xKzK7x2LAn<r:wcywKhn «mm. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e U... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum v-max [17] nus Coun ﬁnds laklng imn auonurll lne comexl arm clrulmslanaes ol Iha aala alalamanl, that those words did rm lmpule any dlsnanasly on ma pan or naa me capzbllily ol kxwerlng lne esmnallan me: Ill ma eyes al a reasnnable leaner (Rafa! In Umml Ifaﬂlda an All 5 Anor V Knnngkr-I sun End 5 on [2000] a MLJ 532 and Allied Physics Sdn and v Knrun Audll Naqm Mlslaysll 4-. Aner Ind anm lppeals [201 s] 5 ML] 113). [16] An objective conslmcnon U! the said slalemenl was neclsﬁlf‘/l nu ma Cnuﬂs lmslalal asaaumsnl ll does nal cnncluﬂs lnal the ma alalanlanl 01 me change H1 alanoa by ma Rupcndam at ma lnal can ﬁmoum lo ualamauan. rrrsspeclrva uiwhat man: plrllas ur ulnar nallzans understood lhal said alalanlanl mean!‘ ll ma non concluae lnal ll main: man. glven ns nalural and ordinary maamng —see Raub Auslrullln Gold Mining Sdn BM (in zraditors’ volunmy lrqulu-lion; v Nln Shiih Lu pm} 3 MLJ 720 and Llm Ki! Silny V Dztulr Dr Ling Llonq slk lllml 5 MLJ 523 [19] ms Calm agrees wlln lne Appellanfs con\|emlan lnal me reaction la me as sull could not reasonably be annoulea lo me said slatsmenl alone Given lna amaunl 01 pubilclly I\| amaclea W8 malnslleam meala coupled wlm slalemems Issued lmm lna DIveclul—GeneraA of Heahrl, me palms am even me Pelabal Mlﬂll wllayan Persekuluan ma Appellanl was mat the only one whose soclal mama page aaaressaa me JB SUWL several amcles an malnlllaam mama and posllngs an soclal mama all large mﬂoctad me lnleml ll had gamma «on. ma publlc As Ihs Appellant cannal salely be lllribuled lo mm pzrly am ne1lzans' commenls on ma mallan Ihe Sﬁlslon calm auanl nal to have nlaaaa much Iollance on mm to dalarmlne ma nalural ma omlnary mellllnu al am lKzK7x2LAnKF:wcywKhn “Nair a.n.l luvlhnrwm .. UIQG a may he analn.l-l -mm: dnunvlml VI arlum Wm! me said statement. The Ssssxon Courl nughl to have delemuned n omecuvsvy hmmelr Reference Is made to Raub Aum-u-n Gold Mining Sdn Bird (In crudlrorfvolumxryliquidation) mm sum: Lu (supra) at cam 23 pm- ‘Whether mu woods am delamatory He: m my nature 0/ Inc szaxemem In that n mus! have the landenny lo elect me rep-mmon ole person. martian‘ the qussllon muses In whose eye: the words mmplnlrnsd av mus! nm the Ilndsncy n: mm the plalnlllfa Iepulatron rn Ina LawofD¢lametron m Sfngapwa and Malaysra (76 Ed) by Kym R Evans (al p10), .1 75 mm: mm, m app/ymy mm now: run, my cum mus! rm to n pamcmu control may mar rs. whoaa syn: must ms estimation allhs plamhllbo rowed norm ms word: ale said In be aeramazory. In drtsmwmng me Isnle‘ Ins cam do-s no! look at the anus! s/rem ov me s/reqamns on me person's repmancn, or Ins msanmg oi the wards acmany understood or ram by me nszeners (see ./5 Jeyarstnam v Goh Chok Tong /1985] 1 MLJ 331) u :5 not enough (ha! me Imeners actually take me wards In a defamatory sense, rm my mum be reasonably jusnﬁed In so urmerslarrdmg me woms before they are found to be defamatory (us. Slraus Trmss Press (1975; Ltd, rne v Worksvs'Parry&Annr[1967[1 ML./ 155).“ [2u] In nlher words‘ me nme vacn mat the readers mm 5316 sxacen-en: underslnaﬂ the Vanguaga In a deVama\|ory sense does not make I! aavamamry unlass they was reasonably jusﬂﬁad m so understanding The s-um Oourlmuslsxamml me sand svamsmlnl men. even Mme ma smemanl num he Va-mad mom man mu, m a reuonabla, nbpecuve‘ and holistic manner Should \|ha cnnciuslnn be he! Ihe wards m me um sm xKzK7x2LAn<r:wcywKhn «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. U... w may he nrW\n\|H\|Y mum: mmn VI mum Wm! stalamem exposea me Respondent In hatred, onmempt, ndncule or nowereo her nn me esnnmannun otsoueny an name. lhen nn can be conomoezn man one sand smemenl was aovannanory Hone, man assessment by me sossnon connn was aosenn [El] rm: coun nsnnonnnaa no agree wnh me suomnssnons by me Appellanl man nna ssssnon Court‘; grounds onunngnnonnan para 52 snoweo man mere may have been mnlunderuandnng nnan nno sannn svalamam was auegea no be dalzmalery no no Reapondem and non no (ha mal gudga no ma JE snnnn The smnon com had lonmd man ma AppeHan\| In publnshlng nno sana stalemenl was premamm and promnonan is nn was done In an Impalnm mannlr wnlhoul mo osnnmn on maxim: nno aonuan lessons at me man nuduo nn alluwmq Mosynnans clinm m ma JE Sun Thrs com ﬁnds man n was ermneuus on nne pan onne Session Cowl when it ought no have aonnned ms mnnd as no whom: the sand snanennenn H1 nls nanural ano onnnnary meanmg was defamalory no me Responoenn [22] no concluding man me sand statement upon reading was non aevannanoryn this connrn nookea an n: oonecnnveny and non suonecnwony — which mean man Ihe Respundenfs nnnznarsnamnng uﬂhem and me Aooeuanns in\|enlmn on onnonnsmno me same ware non relevant no mns cowns assessmenn omne sand s1anemen(, ms comn vouno on mus count manna sessnon coun had non given due wenghl no nne nenevann sansnderations Ruler Io Utusln mmyu (M; Bhd v Dlhmln on. H] Omar [2u1 71 2 MLJ sun, Tun mm PMlnggINnlIAbun11-Rnhnun vaunuo V an Sdn am I Or: [1 my n MLJ 292 and DmeloraIForuls 5 Anal v Mn: Kun Yong a Mlu Klm snongmm xlcutnrs arms umnollllnu Minn, docusnd) 5 Anal Dm1lnDlbIlnlDﬂllI[2(l\|0]3 Mu 509 no am nKzK7x2LAm<F:wcywKnu “None s.n.n ...n.mun .. H... In may n... mnnn-y mm: dnuamnl VI arnnma v-man	2,117	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-12BCY-2-06/2022	PERAYU IMELDA NASREEN BINTI NASRUDDIN@BALCHIN RESPONDEN NORIZATUL AMIRA BINTI KAMSAN	Costs of this appeal is awarded to the Appellant. This Court allows the counsel for the Respondent’s plea that it is in the sum of RM8,000.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ed4aa6b4-cb7d-4802-8a17-7fbd0b2c0a6d&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:10:31 WA-12BCY-2-06/2022 Kand. 53 S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N tKZK7X3LAkiKF39CywKbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—12BCY—2—D5/2022 Kand. 53 us/12/2013 nezxn-31 IN THE HIGH count IN MALAYA AT KIJALA LUMPUR IN ms FEDERAL rsknnomt, MALAYSIA BETWEEN IMELDA NASREEN awn rusnunnm QBALEHIN APPELLANT NORIZATUL AMIRA snm xmsm RESPONDENT GROUNDS or JUDGIIEMI [1] Aﬂer a Ml trial the Sessmn Ocun had an 15 S 2022‘ entered the toﬂowmg judgment (2) demared man ma Appeuanrs commenl an ne( Facebook page an 2a m 2u2u amounted m z uelamalory smemem agamsl the nespenaem. m xKzx7xzLAm<F:ucywKhn 3%.. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [21 M (C) 1:!) (9) an mjuncllun ptvmbmng the Appellant (wflelher by herseli or neraganxsmcmvumarpusmng, publshlng orcausmg Ihersof any scanemencs wnnen or verbal any other aevamanary slakamenls agamsl me Respondent man are untrue mupncaung ma Respnndem wnn Ihe gwing ol «am Iesumony and/at changing and/av ve\|raA:(Ing her nasnmony wn um oourl proceedings olme wgn Conn .n Johnr Bahm cm: sun No. .lA~22NCVC-162-U5/ZOIB us Sum); ma Appellam puhhshed an unmnd\|\|mna\ apology (with terms sppmved D! by Ihe Respondent) wmcn muses a acaxamanc \|ha\| me de1ima¢nrys\|amment made was done wnn mahce on me pan M the Appeuanx. and that such apomgy remains on me Appeﬂanfs samas mama for thirty days: General damages IFHP19 sum av Rmsomw to be paid by me Apvillanl In ma Rasncnaem. Inlsreu M 5% on the sum of me genaral damages awarded, an cusls cl Rmmuoo to ba pan: by me Awmlant to me Resaondem rnan Faoabook comment ma saunon on-m doclamd \|o have aovamud and slandaredlhe Respondent pcnameu la a decxsiun dahvarsd 1 am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana s.nn ...n.mn a. U... a may he nrW\n\|U\|y mum: dnunmnl VI mum v-max [231 on me Appevama aetenoe of jusmcanon, ma Session cam held that in would unly succeed of an material soanamems m lhe punncauon were pmven mba true a\ para 45 onhegruunds ofjudgmenl. The Mean Cnumn DIloSIiDrMuhlnImId Sallen om IsmaII&AnorvNuruIIznh ht Anwlr mmmn a Ann: (2021) 2 MLJ 577 had new omemse. Tn succeed m ma aevance av jxmimalinn‘ ma Appellam need um pnwe max evlry ward us ma truth but me gar ol n or ma anmg arma mam charge .a weranca Is also made «a ma com av Appears daemon in D-to Sui Malummod Nlnr on. Jnnuluddln y Slsxom Toluvlxyan Mllaysln End 4 AnoI[2ﬂ1A]4 MLJ 242 [24] This com also xumea \|o as neramauon Act 1957 vmeruln lhe aaranoo otiuacmcamm Is pmvma cm ‘In an aman for libel or slander In respect of words camafnmg two or more dfstmcr chalyas agamsl me pla/Ivlrﬂ, a delenca of [uniﬁcation shall no! lad byresson only ma: me mnn aleverycnarge >5 not proved rl ms words no! pmea Io be (me do not materially mme me p/amwa mputalron having regard Io me yum 0/ ms rimammq charges " [251 1neue¢ore, n augm to he eva\ua\|ed whemev \|he Respondent had m tau mradad her posmon ax trial was vma\| me said svammenl uerated u was nolcnmacl (01 me sessxan own to mslead hacked mm ma oorrecmesl of ma daclsmn 0! the JB sun (ogelher mm me cause 0! Dr smnawa ma (paras so‘ 51 and 59 nllhe Session Court‘: ground: av fudgmaru) n was erroneous to have nam man ma ravaclmn by me Respondent is mule»/an\| became n was rv.1\| damrrmnud In ma JB sun (pm as :11 me Sassmn Court‘: grounds at )udgmIn\|) 1) am zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. am ...m.mm .. U... w may he mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [25] ms coun observed mm there was also no pruperevaluahnn dune Respondents replnallun as a result ollhs sam statement Where mere was no pmollhal me Rdspondanc s repocauan was malenaﬂy wmuvzd, me deasnoe anusuucanon snau nul ran ﬂlhe words were nu! proved Io hetme » see me Fedeml Coun‘s daemon m Abdul Ranman nun v Sunlvlngnm 5 Anor[19GE] 2 Mu es. [271 me Appeuanx had made dear .n me panlcwan ol gusuﬁcamn Ina case sne sougm \|o as! up and .uuuy(m1mo ms radaraw Cowl‘: decnsmn In Synﬂkll ﬁnk In Arrsalnngor Sdn and v Tlny Pu: Klnm w o [201 5] 6 MLJ197) Tnus, this Court considared Iha Appsuanns Dleaded dmsnce um en: said sunanum, In us nature: and ordinary meaning maznl ma! 4:) The Respondems evmenue In Ins JE sun mn\|rad\c\|ed me medics! moms and vepom‘ (m The Responderﬂ demed lhe prior dxsalssnns mm me meducav ofﬁoers and Dr Sakmah‘ my sna nad rem-some he: pnnr pcsman‘ (d) Her Evidence was umerenc no me account snn nad eamu Dravrded \|o me memes! dmcers and Dr Saklnah. [251 The Appellamhaﬂ adduced endsnce during the mar at me Sesswon Court to lhilify and slww mat me Respondanl had as a manner aflacl, retracted her earlier oaswion given prior to me man of me JR Sun. The Appeal Records eomalned me Interwews wnn me Respondent on separam oodasmns It was recorded me aewunl dc matiatelm day gwen 1: sm zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. s.nn ...m.mn .. H... In my n. mn.u-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! by the Respcndenl an we records mougn reourded on dwrerent days were consscem as mm an ma mnases called by the /19DsHanI—nne of ma mam matenax [acts was man Masywah was presemana mvulved in me home mm Tha\| nananve was vepsansa \|hree was to dmeuem medwca\ omcers an diifevenldales a\| amerem Iocanons. ms (act was ﬂamed when nne Rcspandanl aammaaly muacnea her pas-non when sna lesnfnsd in ma JB sun u was hev evidence In ma JE Sm! mm Masynan was mere In maraly provide support and encouragement ana man .1 was nu husband wm had delivered me baby [22] Inevnably n muﬂ be nnncludld man me smd Ilatamanl was sunsunually hue - in that sna had aamaa avurylhma she had mid ma medical alﬁcsls inﬂ Dr Sikinah ma delence a1]us(IIia;a(>on mus! omen. [an] The Sasslun Conn had faﬂed In zccrmi due cunsuderation In me ewdsncs oﬂhe naanncaue pmvlden The grounds at mdqrnent was silent as to ma evaluahon cf ma Appeuanrs evmanca max cmvlnnssd at independent oomemporaneoua evidence The Responoem on me other hand and ml oﬂer any cnrmbcralwe ev-aenoe to supporl her version :2! event [31] When ma Sessmn Oourl dechned «a draw adverse invsyanoa agamsl me Respondenl Mm had «am In adduce any ems: evidence‘ m oommmed an arm max snasnos was mauanan m namre as u some help \|o ﬁnd wnemer ma Respandenl naa not given ma accounts as per me rewards at me medical nmcers Yhus. in can he savany concluded mm w produced ms emaanna wanna be uniavourable m ms Respondsm 7 sea Wang KarJull A Anor v 57 Am pans mp San BMH2016] 5 MLJ 527 1; am zKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «ma. s.nn lunhnrwm s. U... a my a. nrW\n\|U\|y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum v-max [321 The Respondent argued that me med\|ca\ mums, reports and notes am not comam vemaum slalernems «am lrom her She comended ma‘ they were me medical omuers‘ In\|eIpre'a\|\on anu summary er wha\| may had ummoca Be that as il may nu ma nm change the fact mm II was «mm and demed by the Respondenl during her \|esumL7ny m me as Suﬁ ms was conﬁtmen by me Resoondenl nersalldunng ms mal at lhe ssssxon Court. [331 u wls Ihn Vurlher summssnns 0! ms Angellanl mm Ins Raspenanm mly have had an mlenor motwe \|c Chang: or mlhar ralranl rm puslhan when she lasnﬁed m Ihe JB sun when sosorumg to ma Appellants summssiom was me sugguslmn pm In me Respondunt lhal ms asam ml her mam at me home mm. vas polanhaﬂy n crmunsl msusr max ms bemg unvesugzuaa by me aulhormes Thu Respmdenl admmad \|o krwwmg ms rapermssmns to an person not qualmeﬂ m medical prams ura daula \|a be mvo\~/ad In dehvsry af a baby Regarding «ms Issue. mus coun ﬁnds man «\| am not laclually amum man the (an man me sad statement ny me Appellant was m gm, we Agg Iolmm n [341 M them were mslanoes as above av lack ol judbcwal zppreclahcn av the ewaenoa. this courrs appeuane mcmennon ws warranted Refer to GM Vaok cm (H A Anor v Lu my cum @ Lu rock Sung A on [2005] 2 ML! 1 and Mg Hoo mu 5 Ana! V wsnay Tun Lot Pong (ndmlnlntrltrlx for nu «ms 0/ Tm Em Kwlnq, umsssu; L on [2020] 12 MLJ av sm xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKnn «mm. smuw ...m.mm .. U... w may he mm-y mm. dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [351 me session Caun had erred In me evalualmn ol me evvdenoe ro detemwle wnemer the aeoence at ruecrrrcenrurr was woven There were verlures In accord due wergm to me evraenee o1 mdapendem wrnresses caﬂed by me Aapeuant me appruprrace adverse In9e<em:e had also not been drawn agnmsl me Respondent [331 we mlsmradmn oi me Sessnon Cuurl rn me evamauon av me evruence mrmruea apoeuare Vntervenlwon — see me Own ol Annasrs daemon in Gunlryl Irmgrma Englnurs Pro Ltd vusu Ger:/an Sdn and L Dr! [2005] 6 MLJ 237 [37] ms com laund error m are Sesslun Cnurfs ruser. \|n arsrruss me aetenee 01 rusumcanun on me premrse me: me Appeﬂanl and run wnlad me Resnendam lo Dracure me xamers veﬁﬂcalmn (para 55 was grounds at judqmeml The faclual ﬁndings onne JB sum were also rrrappmzme \|o «ms case lncause may were nul iacluzl queshcns for -1e(ennma(Ion m we case the reasons for Dr sexrnaws loss were unmatevial la wmemer me said svauerrrerrx had deiamed me Responder“. All (uses showld man me Suslm Caunwas mrscaneewsd m coming tn ueusrar. [as] so. m mrs mslanoe, ms cam wru exemse us appellate powers and se\| asrue me Sessvon oaurrs daemon ms Conn ﬁnds that me said slalamem was not delamalory In nature given us nzlural and Dvdmary mesmrrg what rs apnarenlbased on me evxaerroe, me ApveHar\\| had duly pro»/an rrs defence ol juslmcaﬂan sm xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana s.r.r nmhnrwm .. H... w my r... nﬂmnuﬂly mum: dnuamnl VI mum WM Conn‘: urder {:59} ms appeal is auwma The demsion at me sessson Coun is set asude On this pmmse, ms coun mu not addruss ma appeal as In the genera! damages granled by me sessmn com. Yhe Rsspomem is omerea Io relum me RMsnIono pan: by Ihe AppeIIanI as damages wImm laurlean days The Respondenl KS aIsn nvdanad In mum RMIZISQU mm was paw \|n hat pevtammg Io me was awarded In her by Ina sesscn coun wIIhIrI the same me «am [40] Costs aflhis appeaI IS awaraaa In one Appcllanl ms Oourl News me wunul luv the Raspondan\|'s pIaa Ina: It 75 Ill Iha sum o1RM8,UOD DATED 7 NOVEMBER 2023 R02 MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH coum‘ IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Folrhe Appeuanr. Rafa EIlaen Suraya and Michelle Knor Chlew Hang T/n Ra/a‘ Darryl 5 Lon For Rnspondanl. Nur Izzam Zamam and Nur Aw/ah A1:/I1I‘rI rm CK Lmg Ilzamia & Irns .5 am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. Sum nanhnrwm .. I... In may he WWI-I mum: ﬂnuamnl VI .mIa wrm by me John! Bahru High court m me JE Suit As a bilafbeckground, ms! .15 Sm! was am a uevamanan sun n was bemeen one Masyxtah mm Md Hassan anu Dr samnan mun Sukxng The Responaem had (esliﬂed as a wulnass (er Masynlah Tm Faoebuok comment published on me Appeuanrs Gaga lead -Rap.-m Slngh me mamas! mam revealed ms mtervisw of ms mum and mm am 3:44 sclually happened In (no MO m we hosp«m/ and to Dr Sakmsn mum: dulmg Ina mm wan am 2” court mum Ielraclsd Ivar my and darned evlrymmg sho lam ma MO 5 Dr Sakfnih So the mud mm is not m D: sakmarwa Ilvour We are all dtvssmad All Dr Sakmsh wanlurl .5 to prune! Innocent mums so that mmvs /rka mi: wauld not nummn mm ' [3] The Sessmn coun did not ﬁnd that the sam svaxemm was pure\y about me diﬂerem aoeounx gwen to com on what me Respondent had prevlousw qwen to me madman omcer and Dr Sakinah. u vaunu that ma statement meant manna Rsspmmem was me cause of Dr sakmaws lass m ms JB Sm! N relied on one netlzetfs likewise underslarvﬂing [41 The defence aHL-shﬁmlmn raised by me Appeuam was reyecled. The Sassxon Cowl had rewewea me wanna: ol pldgmam my me as 5m! and mum Ihauhe reason Dr Saklnan had lorsl ma sun was nm due In em Respnndenfs lesumony The sassmn Conn held max me reasons as m why me cmm was auawed (and Dr Sakmah nan Vast) m ma JB sun wns not wllmn Ina Aupsﬂanfs knowiedge thus ma dlslmsssd (ha Appellant‘: pmadad defance of maununon sm zKzx7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn “Nana san-1 lunhnrwm .. U... a my a. mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! me am‘: we [51 The learned pdunsex «or me Appauam submmsd that m hmd me amamem aefamakzry was not reasonable espaeauy when he had raked on man one poem by a nauzen mp Ms :71 me underslandlng mac Dr Szkmah nad lbs! ma .1: sun as a consaqusnoe M me Respomenrs mummy N Iangm, n was summed me: me sasspn spun had and when n «auad In nonsmar me evidence that was produced a\| lnal mat showsd ma Raw<zndan\| lndend Md gvan a dmerann aecounl m her Xaslimony‘ not m dpapana ID M1H\|WlS nlsled m ma Appeﬂanrx uid sIaIemen\| Ix wu eonlendad lhal mmdy rmymg an the .13 Sun‘: gzpunda dc .udpmen< alone we: urroneoua. [5] n was immorsd by me waamed CDMHSE1 for the Appavam mm as a matter pv law, me Session com shoum have aw. meamnq to me said smemanl Iha\| is undersmod by me ordinary. -aasmaple, hlr-mmded raaderand ndune Ieadmg dra man‘ avid larscandal m The Appauam prayed Icr appeuate mcewemuon as u was submmed that me Sessmn cam nad Ieuad lo give any judxonal appremalmn so me amdanea mac ma Respondent as a matter cl can, dud prvvida a dMsren\| aocuunllo me heallhcara pm as compared «d what she had leslmed -n me JB sun Rgglxbylhcﬁn an n {a} m dulendmg me Sassmn op-ma ‘udgmant me Raspcndlnl subrmlloa lhal me namral and ordinary meaning 0! me 5:16 slahmlnl mud be undatslood and porcevvld I: ma Respondent had wvan «ansa am xKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhn «mm. and nmhnrwm a. d... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! swam statement tn tne JE smt and mat sne had tenranea or enanged ner sla\|amen( wntm was utaerem ﬁvm me one gwen at the Interview earlier vntn the mamas: aﬁce( and Dr Sakmah u was out-mer submllhad that tt parlvayed me Respcndem as a nap, msnonest mason am untmstwonny. The case at cnuo Fno once a Chair Koo Lian v TM Chin: Press and [1998] 1 Mm an was tetenea ta [91 his Conn mam sutmsstans lmm tne Rupandem that me AapaHanl naa not pmvsn an a balance ulurabahlhhss mat Ihe deinmamry nnputanan VI tn. ADM uatamentwn lrul Tna law unaatsa Dslamattan Ad 1957 and ma case 0! Mohnmod Hlllz Mnhlmnd Nwdln 1/ am: nuts-n Ind Anomar Anna! [2019] 1 ML! 580 were cm. ms cmtrrs aﬂenlton was tnvma to ma aectsxm :2! me JB sun (hi! tom the documents contracted me Responuenrs tasttmony wnase credtbtllly was upttetn by the mat man It was me Responaenrs submtsstons mat the evidence mat me Appeuant had sougm In rely an (me pattent progress nnla‘ ms hnme hmh case repon and Dr Ssktnaﬁs nalas VI ma Respondents heallh record) was hwnd by tne Johor Bahvu Htgh court to be unlehable wtm nu credible value [10] II was also the Respondent's sumntgmns mat the said statement was published wtlh tnata ﬁde/malice. me lcHowmg reasons were cued (n) The Appeuant knew tnat ma evtﬂenne was run amamnucally cagent anu Credible‘ (I2) Tha AppeH\|It\| knew mat me nvtoenoe was challenged tn me J5 smt as tt am nol fully reilecl me Rsupondenfs full sm tKzK7x2LAnKF:wcywKhn “Nair s.n.t ...n.mn a. U... a may t... nﬂmnlﬂly mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ta) 1!) sla\|emen\|s precisely and accuratety during me trttewiew sasstms. The Appellant me no knawtodga an Ina um slmamanls as tme was nut mvntvad am trttetvtew ttmtatta wttrt ma Relpondeni and onuld not wnltmt or vandale he vatsctty at the R9lP0r\dBHf'! statements: The Annsttart: was not lrwohled tn Iha J8 set: and had no pevsonal knowiedge as \|o \|he actual testttttorty of me Respondent: Masyﬂah was not HIJIQOG out any cttmtttat nuance ind she had won hercase of me JE set, and The Appellant published the said s\|a\|emen\|be1nre havlllg had lull appratsai as to the grounds Oﬂuﬂgmertt omte JE Sui! [111 The emphasts tn me Respottaertra stmttttsstotts was on me fact that me Respundertt was nut the teasatt mat Dr Sakmah was urtsoccesstut to dalend the JE Sun kgmutta mu [121 It serves to asstat Ihal Ih: uttsttt background has ate supulalea below bekwa I5!65$VIﬁ wrtelnar (hate me error: tn lhe Ssssxnn centre daemon Ill rtmtng that (he Anpallanl was ttnbte Io! astumatton tn Fehrunry zota. mu amen‘: attentttxt had lumsd In In: use mm me ttteattt had dted rettowtttg a home ntmt ImdaVa supstvtstert ofa doula. The am tKzK7x2LAu<r:wcywKhG “Nair s.tt.t luvthnrwm be H... at my t... nﬂntnnﬂly mt. dnuavtnnl VI nFtuNa vtmxt mnmer was Ihe Respanaem. sne was men \|aken In Huspnar sunan lsmaﬂ in Jahor aahm lur nmner exanunanm and lruamlenl [13] Dr Saklnnh posud on Mr swan meme plalform sxaxemenvs In mauan m name mnn uelwevles These pubncacmns lurmed me bass 0! ma aeramanon clam: by Masyitah (Ina dcma Vnvowad in ma aam hams man by me aeuponuanu in ms .15 sun [141 ms Rlspundam had laslmad as a Mlnass Var Mesyuan in me as Sm! She iulnd m Ihe mal Ina: Meiyuah was run Anvnwed In Ina unwary prvcsis at her baby She nee dixpulad lha wnlams 01 her mamcav ruoordl [151 The Jnmx Bahru High com on 26.102020 denuded In lavaur nl Masyxuh and ordered Drsakmzh to pay uamaaes voraeiamanon. on me same day, the Appenam puansruea ma szwd stalanem on he! Faoebook page. T Can sassessmem [151 Yms Court‘: mac slap \s In assess whether the sam sla\|emenI ws defamatory The sad svanemem dsptded a Iacl mm m noun dunng me Mal M me JE sum nne Respondent had reuemea her yamon cl w1ua\ happened wmch was Informed \|u nne memcammaerana Drsakman That scanamenn «sen did nut convey any dalamalnry euemems ltjuslccm/eyed ma (ad lhnl me Rupondem had wvlhdrawn from her eamer pasmnn In onnsr words, nu ma (nal of «ne JE sun. me aesponoam no Vunqsr mamll ed her aumar slam es co wnu wu cnmmned .n ma medmal raoems sm xKzK7x2LAn<r:wcywKhn «mm. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e U... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum v-max [17] nus Coun ﬁnds laklng imn auonurll lne comexl arm clrulmslanaes ol Iha aala alalamanl, that those words did rm lmpule any dlsnanasly on ma pan or naa me capzbllily ol kxwerlng lne esmnallan me: Ill ma eyes al a reasnnable leaner (Rafa! In Umml Ifaﬂlda an All 5 Anor V Knnngkr-I sun End 5 on [2000] a MLJ 532 and Allied Physics Sdn and v Knrun Audll Naqm Mlslaysll 4-. Aner Ind anm lppeals [201 s] 5 ML] 113). [16] An objective conslmcnon U! the said slalemenl was neclsﬁlf‘/l nu ma Cnuﬂs lmslalal asaaumsnl ll does nal cnncluﬂs lnal the ma alalanlanl 01 me change H1 alanoa by ma Rupcndam at ma lnal can ﬁmoum lo ualamauan. rrrsspeclrva uiwhat man: plrllas ur ulnar nallzans understood lhal said alalanlanl mean!‘ ll ma non concluae lnal ll main: man. glven ns nalural and ordinary maamng —see Raub Auslrullln Gold Mining Sdn BM (in zraditors’ volunmy lrqulu-lion; v Nln Shiih Lu pm} 3 MLJ 720 and Llm Ki! Silny V Dztulr Dr Ling Llonq slk lllml 5 MLJ 523 [19] ms Calm agrees wlln lne Appellanfs con\|emlan lnal me reaction la me as sull could not reasonably be annoulea lo me said slatsmenl alone Given lna amaunl 01 pubilclly I\| amaclea W8 malnslleam meala coupled wlm slalemems Issued lmm lna DIveclul—GeneraA of Heahrl, me palms am even me Pelabal Mlﬂll wllayan Persekuluan ma Appellanl was mat the only one whose soclal mama page aaaressaa me JB SUWL several amcles an malnlllaam mama and posllngs an soclal mama all large mﬂoctad me lnleml ll had gamma «on. ma publlc As Ihs Appellant cannal salely be lllribuled lo mm pzrly am ne1lzans' commenls on ma mallan Ihe Sﬁlslon calm auanl nal to have nlaaaa much Iollance on mm to dalarmlne ma nalural ma omlnary mellllnu al am lKzK7x2LAnKF:wcywKhn “Nair a.n.l luvlhnrwm .. UIQG a may he analn.l-l -mm: dnunvlml VI arlum Wm! me said statement. The Ssssxon Courl nughl to have delemuned n omecuvsvy hmmelr Reference Is made to Raub Aum-u-n Gold Mining Sdn Bird (In crudlrorfvolumxryliquidation) mm sum: Lu (supra) at cam 23 pm- ‘Whether mu woods am delamatory He: m my nature 0/ Inc szaxemem In that n mus! have the landenny lo elect me rep-mmon ole person. martian‘ the qussllon muses In whose eye: the words mmplnlrnsd av mus! nm the Ilndsncy n: mm the plalnlllfa Iepulatron rn Ina LawofD¢lametron m Sfngapwa and Malaysra (76 Ed) by Kym R Evans (al p10), .1 75 mm: mm, m app/ymy mm now: run, my cum mus! rm to n pamcmu control may mar rs. whoaa syn: must ms estimation allhs plamhllbo rowed norm ms word: ale said In be aeramazory. In drtsmwmng me Isnle‘ Ins cam do-s no! look at the anus! s/rem ov me s/reqamns on me person's repmancn, or Ins msanmg oi the wards acmany understood or ram by me nszeners (see ./5 Jeyarstnam v Goh Chok Tong /1985] 1 MLJ 331) u :5 not enough (ha! me Imeners actually take me wards In a defamatory sense, rm my mum be reasonably jusnﬁed In so urmerslarrdmg me woms before they are found to be defamatory (us. Slraus Trmss Press (1975; Ltd, rne v Worksvs'Parry&Annr[1967[1 ML./ 155).“ [2u] In nlher words‘ me nme vacn mat the readers mm 5316 sxacen-en: underslnaﬂ the Vanguaga In a deVama\|ory sense does not make I! aavamamry unlass they was reasonably jusﬂﬁad m so understanding The s-um Oourlmuslsxamml me sand svamsmlnl men. even Mme ma smemanl num he Va-mad mom man mu, m a reuonabla, nbpecuve‘ and holistic manner Should \|ha cnnciuslnn be he! Ihe wards m me um sm xKzK7x2LAn<r:wcywKhn «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. U... w may he nrW\n\|H\|Y mum: mmn VI mum Wm! stalamem exposea me Respondent In hatred, onmempt, ndncule or nowereo her nn me esnnmannun otsoueny an name. lhen nn can be conomoezn man one sand smemenl was aovannanory Hone, man assessment by me sossnon connn was aosenn [El] rm: coun nsnnonnnaa no agree wnh me suomnssnons by me Appellanl man nna ssssnon Court‘; grounds onunngnnonnan para 52 snoweo man mere may have been mnlunderuandnng nnan nno sannn svalamam was auegea no be dalzmalery no no Reapondem and non no (ha mal gudga no ma JE snnnn The smnon com had lonmd man ma AppeHan\| In publnshlng nno sana stalemenl was premamm and promnonan is nn was done In an Impalnm mannlr wnlhoul mo osnnmn on maxim: nno aonuan lessons at me man nuduo nn alluwmq Mosynnans clinm m ma JE Sun Thrs com ﬁnds man n was ermneuus on nne pan onne Session Cowl when it ought no have aonnned ms mnnd as no whom: the sand snanennenn H1 nls nanural ano onnnnary meanmg was defamalory no me Responoenn [22] no concluding man me sand statement upon reading was non aevannanoryn this connrn nookea an n: oonecnnveny and non suonecnwony — which mean man Ihe Respundenfs nnnznarsnamnng uﬂhem and me Aooeuanns in\|enlmn on onnonnsmno me same ware non relevant no mns cowns assessmenn omne sand s1anemen(, ms comn vouno on mus count manna sessnon coun had non given due wenghl no nne nenevann sansnderations Ruler Io Utusln mmyu (M; Bhd v Dlhmln on. H] Omar [2u1 71 2 MLJ sun, Tun mm PMlnggINnlIAbun11-Rnhnun vaunuo V an Sdn am I Or: [1 my n MLJ 292 and DmeloraIForuls 5 Anal v Mn: Kun Yong a Mlu Klm snongmm xlcutnrs arms umnollllnu Minn, docusnd) 5 Anal Dm1lnDlbIlnlDﬂllI[2(l\|0]3 Mu 509 no am nKzK7x2LAm<F:wcywKnu “None s.n.n ...n.mun .. H... In may n... mnnn-y mm: dnuamnl VI arnnma v-man	2,117	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-22NCvC-744-12/2022	PLAINTIF SAGRADO DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD DEFENDAN TETUAN ZAILAN & CO	For this application, taking into account the journey of this proceedings and the circumstances, costs are to be awarded to the Defendant. If the Plaintiff had charted its legal path in these court proceedings properly, the Defendant need not employ so much resources to correct and check the positions of the parties. This Court also noted that the Plaintiff had not complied with the High Court order of 14.7.2023 straightaway. Such attitude of dilly-dally delaying all necessary action on the part of the Plaintiff is not appreciated. Costs of RM7,000 is reasonable in this instance.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d5babafc-a3ab-42aa-9d35-93079400f9c7&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:56:55 WA-22NCvC-744-12/2022 Kand. 64 S/N /Lq61aujqkKdNZMHlAD5xw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /Lq61aujqkKdNZMHlAD5xw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /Lq61aujqkKdNZMHlAD5xw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /Lq61aujqkKdNZMHlAD5xw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /Lq61aujqkKdNZMHlAD5xw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /Lq61aujqkKdNZMHlAD5xw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /Lq61aujqkKdNZMHlAD5xw *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—22NCvC—7dI—12/2022 Kand. 54 C5/12/201] 29:55-53 IN THE man coun IN IAALAVA Av KUALA LUMPUR IN ms FEDERAL TERRITORV, MALAYSIA clvlL use N wA.22Ncvc-nu:/znzz BETWEEN SAGRADO DEVELOPMENT sou sun (coumuv NO: 9651594)) PLAINTIFF AND TETUAN ZAILAN a co DEFENDANT DECISION Enclosure 1:: Delendanfs nggllcallon to strike out no Plalmllr: 9 glm unaar Diner 15 Rule 19 1 [a {b andlor la) Rules ulcuun 2012 lmredllcliun [I] The oelenuanrs apphcallon lo slrlke cul me Plamlllfs clalm IS pramlsed an Mu grounds The ﬁrslbass ls on me grounds manna Plamml has run locus Slandl as u had been s\|n.lck ollme reglslm 0! me Companles lNlLA:ﬂ1:\1NkKdN1MHlAD5nw -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm nu nllmrullly MIN; dun-mm VI] .mm mm oaminission Malaysia (ssw on 20 s.2n22 The sawnd basis iesled on me claiin Ihal me actim ‘is tlmebaned by me Linulelipn Am 1953. [21 The suilﬁled by me Pi wagainsmie Defendant is liar negligence — lne Defendant was me Plainlilrs lawyeis in its suu wliere Mulie oemenann sun and (Mulle Cemenarlg) nmumad a legal aciion agzlnsl II The Plainnli claimed met me Deifandanl had called lo advlcs in zula me Plaimrﬂ to slay the Mulie ceiuenang mun action wliilsl ma maker was being arhltrated [31 me Session Calm ruled in Mulie cenieneiigs favour an 27 2 2:217 and ins Flalnlm had lnshucled me uslenaem to appeal, which was mea on 9 :l 2011. llwas laiemisppveiaa maline Hign coun had slmck auune appeal due lo me lnie riiing am» Msniminuuni uuppeel. on 13 1 mm mm: was an uppliaeiian by ins Deifavldnnl for en extension oflime lo lile in. said Mamovzndum amppeul wnian was aisniissaa on is 7 mm [41 the Pleinlilrs soc pleaded neglipenpe fur me lane ﬁling er lne Memorandum of Appeal whereby me Dllendanfs ﬁled an epplicelion on ia.7.2oi7lui an extension onime Io regulense it When ilwes dismissed on 1a.7.2ul7, lne Plainoff comended ltial me nelendem had failed to aavise ina one an appeal In 1119 Cuun imxppeal la pursue elvpns In have me appeal rieenl on its meals. [5] According up me Plalnnffs pleadings, mere were spine attempts by me Dalenuam In resuscnele lne eppsel lnmugri ms ﬂllng M an eppilcsllon is: an axlansiun plnnienlea el me cypei Session Court in Kuala Lunipw in January znla. rne l=lainull was nu upuelea es up man peniculer in Imam-qqkKdN1MMlAD54w “Nuns s.n.i n-vlhnrwm be used M mm i.. uini.ii-y MIME dun-mm wa nFluNG WM! pmueedmg This was done aﬂsr Muha Cemenang had ﬁled a wdgmanl ﬂlblorsummans agains1 me Plzlnnﬂ The locus arm Flarnrm [51 In its subrmsswars on mus Lssua, me Derenaam had men the cam av nomn sum. A Ana! :1 Mailis Agama Islam Muaka 5 Or: [2021] MLRHU 1259‘ [2021] MLJU 1357, Leapad Holdings Sdn and vAsIan snlom Wlrohauxing Sdn Bind A Ann! Appeal [2019] MLJU 1720; 1202112 ML! 424‘ [2o21} I on 323, ASWJ Konsurﬂum sun Bird 1/ Allpoll Limo (M) Sdn Bhd A Anur[2m8] « LNS149, 12015] MLJU use am Daynhul Sdn am A Anor v Unmod Corridor Sdn Bhd A ms [mm MLJU ass; mm] 2 ssuz 212. rm: Oaun agrees mm me ralic demdandl and the Isgm pnnalplns upheld in me daorslons Thus, a chronology Mevems u dsvaﬂad nsuawvm mum anpururﬂ rem-nee as In the me name M mu scﬁon \|a ascenain whalhsr m awe-n\| lhe Devenaanrs contermon m A search conducted by me Piaxrmﬁ on 10 2 2023 revealed mac me Flamlili had been sxruek ewma ragsury a1ssM an an 5 2022. . 30 a 2022 — the Plainlrfl was stuck not me reg-sny at ssm - 20 122x222 — me Plainlxﬂ med this amen aga\’ns1lhe Defendanl . no.2 2023 — me Defsmanl msooveaed Ihmugh an ssm searm mm mm Deiemam was struck an its regisﬂy sinca an.e.2o22 . 15 2 2023 — me Defendan\|wm1a(o me Plainmvseexmg for the lsllsr \|a wimdraw me sun as n nan no laws . a 3.2o2a—me Plallmﬂappﬂedlu a stay om-us pmceedlngs panama me dvsposal at us apphnalmn lobe remszacea m me IegIs1ryv.71 SSM This apvhcaaun was wilhdmwn on 4 72172: as me nppllcallon fur rilnilalemenl was in be heard befure the Hvgh cuun. Juslice Wan Muhammad Amm presuasn. an 14. 2023 I1 wm struck out. cus\|s in me cause . 14.7 2023 — High Cwrl snowed remscaxemem, me Plamnﬂ was to tile aI1s1atuInvy documents wmun so days and lhal is svams was as 11 was never slmdx M!‘ from me registry of SSM . 14.5 2023 — Ims anpucallan Ia strike out me P\|amIAH’s smlwas heard bevure mus Court [5] The Highcuun order o1 14.7 2D23unders555 Oampan\esAa 2015 dweclad my me m1nsvalemm\| at me Plalnlm whereby me Plamlﬂl was raqum m ﬁle all slahnory documents wmnn 91: days memo! wulh one payment av RM2,ooo mm1msuan1va fees NI amen: undertaken by me Plalnull pm! us the mnstalemsnl mm on vaglslry n1ssM wara mnauim :5 11 n had never bun dissolved [91 A1 me hearing 07:14.5 202311.15 Court had mmcled for ma Plalrmﬂ m adduce evmnee of cm reinstatement m We SSM‘s ragistry. 11 was rsquirsd In shww Ihal :1 had eunpnea wnn me High com ovdar dalld 14.7 zuzs whim nsulled 1n Its reInsla\|emenl [10] mommy to me P\aInn‘Ws amnanv «led on 21 a 2023. n nas now been remsmed 17: ms ssM's regis1ry Thus, annmgn mere was emenoe Ia smmmanne F-131mm may have knawn abom iv: sums even nenxeme mung vflms sun. me mgr. Court Order dated 14.7.2023 and me Plammrs oompilanoe Ihedela eenmrm we (act Ihal me Plainmﬂ has me locus to proceed with this case. The preHm1nary\sws ralssd by me nevsnaann mm the P!a1mlIVd1d ncl have laws to ﬁle Itus acuon 15 not «comes. 4 1». m,s1....wNzm1Aus.w «w... 5.11.1 ......m11 .. ..... .4 mm .. .n.1..1-y mm: dun-mm VII .m1c M1 mo rum oﬂimv-blrrid [I1] The Defendant had subvmlhd that lite cause of acﬁan accrued on 13.4.2016 when Iile Defaidiinf aﬂegedly had iailsd In advise the Plamlﬂi In awly ler a slay ufprumedlngs in the Mulls Cernensng sun but referred the mane! Io arblltaﬁon instead to salie me ssue between lhem. Thai dale was man [VIE Defendant ﬁled the Plaintiffs defame and wurnemlalm In [he Mulia Cemeriang suI\ [V2] Relevant to «his palm is me case M om. EnagyInvesunenu.n1v rn. omms altln snip at VIsulMl Cavlllar z2n22] 1 ms 567, [2n22} MLJU m where n was new man aimnugh [ham Is no um. Iinul speciﬁed w Ill: 1 any 01 a noun amen when the mine! goes In Ilbilraﬁoni ll must be mad before any nlfiar acunn is taken in in. com ptucuedings Thus, hare ma dale when we dafuncs and counterclaim W... mm 5 ma can when me cause at Ecllon Iccruei [see Nnrl v Mm» [1 my I ms 55‘ [4971] 1 MLJ :2) [13] Thu coun agrees with ma Defendant’: mnmrilim that me Plammi was at libeny Io pursue a iegai claim againsl the Defendant wnmn SIX years Ihsreolunn\|12 4 2U12.Thuii ma wing nllhis action an 30.12 2022 meaaied lhs limilalmn peace is mnee, lime-burred. [14] An action mien is \|ime—barred VS cunsidued In be invoious, vexalions and an abuse Mpmcess otme com. The reqmiemenlrs under limbs (b) and (up M Dmer1B Rule mm RaC are rumued [15] Nnwavev, me clmm against me neiammni for neghgenae In falling lo me me Memorandum olAppeaI to ma High Courl within the lime Iegauy 5 INILQM-qqkKdN1MH\AD54w mm s.n.i ...m.mm be used m mm .. nrwinnﬂly MIN: dun-mm VII .mm mm oresorrbno his a omemrrroane nrwrrarrrrra cause ovaorrerr accrued Frvm are facts, 1: 7 2017 was when me Dererroarrr had men In an aoplrcarirxr to extand Mme \|L7 regmallse me Vale mrng Trrus, the llmnahon would only set m on 12.7 2023 For mis cause ulaclionr the Plaintiff was within me. The omrrr reuse: of acﬁon subsequenl lherelu whether orrernxy rrr oonrrectron wrm me auegeo nsghgenoe or as a result at rr ave wrurrn time and are auoweo. [rs] For rrrese causes 01 acuorr, mere was no sunrrriaarorrs by me navarraarnorr ma grounds omrrrcrr me ac1ron ougmro be struck out This courr will mararure rrare nrrs amen by wny or a NH Inal. II rs a use or neglngenea and mi: Cmm will make a ﬁnding or lad: upon me axarrrrrrenorr oiwlmesaes and avkiance ar urar rr rs rraz a dam ano omroos use Ina\| can on arspoaeo off summarily - sea Bandit Eulldu Sdn and v urrmdu yun Banking Carparllion am [1993] 3 MLJ as, [1 my 4 cu 7‘ mm] 2 AMR was. [111 There rs no new bdfvrv Irrrs Own in cake ma draslic measure of smkwg our rrra Piairmlrs olarm — sue Jonprr in Ptvlut Lump L on V urrmm FLO [2019] Supp MLJ 151. cc N17 1 srumors Sdn and v Ga-/ommenl omre snare afPonanq[1935] 1 MLJ 347 and son ‘Huang A Anorvsnw aorrg Dllong [1013] 3 MLJ 235, [2012] MLJU 1425; [2013] 3 AMR 355. Ordel [15] n rs onncluded mar me P\aInInV has locus In pursue mrs aonorr H ra new ralnslatad m Ihe rogrsuy or ssm and the High court oroer of u12u2: has been mmpued wmr The cause 07 acnon of rrsgugerroe s ru mast-rrqkKaNzMM\An5.w “Nuns Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm r.. uﬂmrrnﬂly mm: dun-mm vrn .rruuc v-mm agamst ma Delendanl haw an we rauum lo Idvlol P\aml\lhn 2016 \s mIIa—barred and hereby slmck out the cause M acnun for can-Are In ﬁle me memorandum afaweal wmun me snpulzted ﬁme varied as pnzviasa by law, for me Plevmﬂ‘ remains \|u be mad. 50 mm are me mhercauses av action mauullaw 4: [19] Fur this appllcanon, lakmg mm swounl me pumzy at mi: pmoeedmgs and me cnwmsmnees. wsls are to be awarded In me Defsmianl u the Plaunuw had chaned us Vega! paxn In these noun pmoeedmgs p1upeIIy,Ihe Delendanlnew nolemploy su much resources to coma and chuck me pus arm at the pames Thu Ouurl a\|s/.7 noted met me PLWIW had nol compHod wan ma mgr. Cowl omev 0! 14.7 2023 slralghlawny, such almude o1d\lly~d.a!Iy delaying an Mcesaary acnon on lhe pan cllnn Plamnﬂ is nouppvlcvlled com clRM7.000 V5 raawrlalﬂa in on; insunca lumen 22 AUGUST 2023 R Z MAWAR ROZNN JUDICIAL coMMIss\oNER HIGH coum IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Fur me FlaJnW Muhammad wt hm zanan T/n Mona]: Hazuty & Ismau For the Defendant Marianne Salua Paul and Febaa Shah Hang T/n Ho»Noeck9r A Pmqasam 2 INILQM-up:kKdN1MH\AD5aw mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm	984	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-24NCvC-852-03/2023	PEMOHON 1. ) MASHURA BINTI AHMAD 2. ) NOHD FADLI BIN ABDUL RASHID 3. ) MUHAMMAD RAFIE BIN ABDUL RASHID 4. ) NUR AZREN BINTI ABDUL RASHID RESPONDEN MIMAH BINTI DRUS	This internal family matter could have been settled amicably and amenably by engaging with the Respondent laced with a hint of compassion. The Applicants were also not wholly candid in their affidavits. Dragging an eighty-six-year-old woman of flailing health who happens to be a mother-in-law and a grandmother to court was unnecessary. This Court orders that the Applicants pay the client-solicitor costs of the Respondent.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8e5882f8-3b8b-4bcd-b8e4-69efa6acda35&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:35:07 WA-24NCvC-852-03/2023 Kand. 21 S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IJYjos7zUu45GnvpqzaNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—2dNCvC—852—03/2023 Kand. 21 H5/12/2013 uezli-07 in ms HIGH COURT IN MALAVA AT KUALA LUMFIAR IN YHE FEDERAL TERRIYORV, MALAYSIA ORIGINAYING summons N0: w;\.2mc»/C4524):/znzs BETWEEN 1. rusuuuu anm ANMAD (um: no M1023-71-5014] 2. noun FADLI am ABDUL RASHID (NRIC N0: «-151 20!-(155207) 3. uumnmm am: am ABDUL msmo (NRIE NO: 9:m:m1-14-5053) 4. NUR AZREN smn ABDUL nusmn [NRIC NO: Dam:-ossssa) H . APPLICANYS AND MIMAN sum Drzus (NRIC no: :\1mz2z-on-5054) . . nssrounsm IN uv.mm45mw..Na -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm GROUNDS or JUDGMENT m The Auplicanl sought an owner [mm mis Cowl \|u alder me Responaem to 5911 me uneﬁﬂh share she owns oi me pmpeny to me Apphcanls at me prevsmng market was 0! in me anemauve, an order ma: me Respondent ws pmmbmed Vmm Iransftxnng her sawd one-ﬁﬂh snare olms pmnenym herdaugmer Ramman mu sumn orany nlhevlhird pany unless agreed upon by me Applicants. ma cuurra uecmon [2] me Appncama cannot dlcialu Ihe Raapannenx mm .s a legal owner av one«Mh snare av ma pvcpeny to impart or seu her poﬂmn :71 line properly. Llkawnsa. ma Revspondam cam: be prevnnled or prombuled [mm Iransiurnng hur mm \|o my daughiar m (0 any ulnar «mm party she wlxhas rnarerere ms coun disrmasas ma Apulwcanlf Onqmulmg summons :05) and mam ca nay omars costs oVRM1U,000 and alw ma Responeenrs hgal com. T blckgruund ram: [3] The backgrmmd facts were taken min consideration by mus Ouun xo amve at us deasuon. The pmneny m ms case cuncemed a pmpeny man ‘s a (wusmvey \|ervaced house mm an address at No 35‘ Ja\an ms 213. Tamar: Dam Harun. mason Petallng Jays, Selangur (Hs(M)aona, PT ass. Mulum Pecanng, Daersh Petalmg‘ Se\angor) Awondmg \|o me «me me m \|I‘6us7xLIuA5Gnvwx-NO «mm. am ...m.mm .. U... a may he mm-y -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! - Every ongmaung summons shaﬂ sials m rls mmulamant an y provision of these Rt/tes #1 any pnnnaon nlany wmten law under wn/an tna com is berng moved. Every ongrnat/ng summons shall Include stmmonr or the Mayan an «mm mm gnlmm seeks the detnrmln-1/on or Inn ameuon a/tn Cmlll on as the case may be, a (xmcrso atatament ol (Ive mm or ramedy ctatmso m we Dlocsellmgs begun ay ma ongmaﬁrvg summons wnn aulfctanl pamcullvs lo toanmy ma nausa or cams ol action m Iespucl al man the p/Emllll Msrms that mm at mmady ' (ma empnasus 15 Mrs Conn‘: J [23] The Respondent had a\sc referred Older 5 Rule 4(1)1a\|id1b)RnC and Malayan Banking E-mad v sn' Dam Enginuerinq Sdn and (20061 7 ML.) m [24] The mmulement oi Ins 05 Is oeon-new barren nf any specrﬁc pmvwsmn ov a vmllen Vaw. me slatemem ov mum lhe Appncants wuqm lor delermnninan was also rmssmg m me as The defeds snow Iha\| me Appunan(s' :35 could nm be 5uS1aIned. As ueany mum! and deemed by (ms Conn. an the oames awn me pmveny equany — one-mm reooecmty. No puny can d\cIa\|e In whom an owner should saw or \|ransIe( ms pomnn In or how much lo dlspuss ms awnersmp int. mu com g or [25] In ma prermses, mus Ooun dismtsus xna Appuoanx: aponoatmn wun cosls ovRM1u,ooo am Lransvzutuss-wwx.NG “Nair Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e tn... a may t... mn.u-y -mm: dnunmnl VI mum v-max [26] The eondudar ramer, mlscunduct arms Appucams stood mnwamly apparent as per In Re H Somapah Dacunsed [me] 1 MLJ 25 Adwdlcaling on an ongmatvng summons wmch m nne cowl‘: judiaal npmmn mum not have been me, me oourl had awarded me costs m favour av me puny who naa suﬂered ma legal proceeding‘ an p33 n was heid ‘I have Mandy manhanatttho casts much have to be pm»/rdud ion they -7: the pIumNHx' coats of and mcmanzar to ml; ongmaung Summons. No 254 al um, and the coals 5/ ma salvclta: Ind ndvocatu wna wars appmnlad m ripresen! vamua c/asses ol persons ay the mm of the an ol November mo 1: cannot be domed mat the pruceodmgs rnmmad by rm: Ovigrnltmg Summons welu insmursd unreasonably, and for ma: mason Order 62 Ma 1 gives me a dwcmtnon m decfdrng ny wnam these costs shall be pan In snare/sing mar dtsaelron loan at least c/arm IV have gone Into the mole matter verymomagnry and to have amveu at my dsrztsian (here anent only sllsv a plolonged and anxious wnsiderarmn pma circumstances In wmcn mess pmneedmgs wens fnslmned and me legal plinuples app/rcable (herein we result /5 W5 — 1 ma, nmmon on my pan that the delandanl llusises must pay all these msfs psuona//y, because arllhese costs have bean uccasmlvsd by morr own gross negngcncs II! Inc discharge annex; ﬁducmy dulras “ ml the court 0! Appeal .n Saujun (sum) Sdn am v Trlnt Mmysu Salon 5 Snrvlcn Sﬂn Ehd[2U14] 5 MLJ 535 ma\n(alnod max lhe award or pom. n ma absoima dlscahon 04 me iudga hearing me mamer consmaramon: were mad: as m (ha laclual mslnx of mu can u sm Lﬂpsvzumssuvwz-Na «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. U... w may he nrW\n\|H\|Y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! me substance or ma prayers sought and me comma of the Appncams In avmrdmg costs m me Respondent‘: lavuur Tbs courvs dnscremn was examsea aucordmgly [231 ms mlemal family malty cnuld have been snmed amicab1y and amanably by engaghwg wvlh me Raspcndenl Vaaed mm 5 him 0! compassion The Applicants weru also ml wholly canard m \|ne<raIlloavi(s. Dvaggmg an a>ghty—s\x~year«old woman av flzmng mum Mm happens to B: a mother-In-law and :4 grandmalher to cow! was urmsoesszry Tin: Can?! orders man Ihe Apphcants pay me clienl-aollmlov was 01 Ina Raspandarﬂ DATED to scream 202: R02 MAWAR ROZAIN JUDVCIAL COMMISSIONER men COURT IN MALAVA KUALA LUMPUR For the Applicants’ Na]/3 Msdtha Mend Mahayaodm 7/n Dalm, snum A Sam For the Respondent Muhammad mm bin Lsmsn lagsthsl mm mm Nu/wa Rm. r/n NuﬁzA1!m Syuhada a Co 13 m w.mxumsmu.~a «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! properly belongs or me Apollcanls sno me Resporroarrr All haldlng an equal unarrlllr snare olma properly ll Mas evened by me Flrsl Anphcant mar me purllon at one Mm glvell \|o me Rpondenl was based on love and ma lannlral nslanonsnrp — ma Respondent ls ma oararrral granomolner no me seoono lo Fnurm Applxzanls Be ml as ll may. the Ilndlspulad lac: ls lhal me Respundenl ls be legal ane~ﬁfm awner allne properly. [4] Accomrrrg la Ihe amoavlu, xlre Dvevlous ownar or me pmpeny was en: Flrsl Aoplrcanra lala husband, are lane lamerlo me Second la Fnunn Applrunlr. wha was also lna lala son or me ﬁesporroenl (ma dsoaasad). Hls oarrrlse was on 10 a mm The Raspundlnl ma exolslneo mar me hlsmry ol lhe pmperty war lnal she had lmrrslmao lne proporly no me dlcaasad In zool la enable him lo ob\|aln lna nscussary ﬁnanual laorlllres lo carvy our rnrpruvernsnls an me prvperty rne mle a-so ourrnrmed ms pnrvious lransler lo Ihe crsooaseo and me was Bank‘: causal which his srnce been alsonargeo [51 The FlrstAppllcar\|f avarreo mal lna properly was ner nralrrrnanral home ano anal she had been lwrng mere lorlony-live years and oral may all were srrll hvlng there The Resoorroanl an ma arnar nana arspuleo lnsl oorrlsnoeo lime pared She had exolalned lnal she had llved In mac properly lot much longer as that was ha nrnmrnonlal name wlm hsr lare husband and lnal her ms son had also llved mere — \|hmughoul his llrsr nrarnaga befule ms mamage lo rlra FlrsIApphcarl( ls] wnal INS Courl vauno as a lacl rs Ihal all oﬂhem had baan reslorng an lnal property, even prllx la ma naceaseos o-mlrre In 2ol1. Tna Raspnndenl seerrrua no have Iusldad Ihera longer man lne Aoplrcam: Mosl lmpoﬂanlly, me llving enangrrmanla had alwnys bean mal we r srn w.mxumsnrw..na “None Smul luvlhnrwm rs. mad or may r... armn.rry mm. dnuavlml VI nFluNa Wm! Anphcanls acmmea the top floor whilst the Respondent swayed ac me mom ﬂoor For Ihe mp oacupams, a sepanam annanoe was made In ename duecl easemem unlc me my ﬂoor vmmom the need \|o snxsr me gmund ﬂour where me Respondent was ncmnylng {7} me calalysl «or me «mg 12! ms os was man in owns: 2022, ms Respandenl requesmd. Vida her mncnms, the angmal copy 01 me we 10 aﬂacl me Iransler av her ona»ﬁllh \|u hev daugmer Raruman bmu suam Avma V5 Ina slsla n-lawn: me Fun Anphcanl and ma palarnal aunllo ma Second lo the Foum Awvicancsp The Aophcanls ralusod lo zocada la (rue requm as may mu not agraa In sum lrinsfel mnce ma Rasp€mdan\| had refund to me mound Iluor at Ins pmperty mute on hwvg avrangamenl was that she n-u occupied in. [a] Vn me amcmns of ms names they mxercnsngsu vssuez. on ownership nl me pmpeny and me Innnq arrangements 01 me pmpecry They are actually seuarate and mslmcl fmm aacn oIhar.T11ere rnayumes and snuzuons where ownership nfa pmpenyand living arﬁangements are one and me same but m this case they ate nal. Dlmelshlg [9] All pames m cm case awn lhe paopeoxy jomlry and equally Each holds an equal share ovonsﬁfm aims pmpany Mme ownerm one-mm, no other party can diclala how and when k: \|srmmaIe sum awnersmp or we whom that nnamn Shara ougm m be sold km and lo! haw much Each awner n Vegally enlmed m llansiar o« sell as he pleases Vrv Inc Case of Mon-mud Rnmb/I bln mm y Supomlrondonr or Land: Kuchlng A sm w.mxumsnm.~a «mm. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e U... n my n. mmnnu-y mum: mmn VI mum Wm! A/nor sun Government ofsamwnk mm: 5 MLJ 441 al pl6ﬁ, mm) 3 AMR93, \|he1nHaw\ngIs referred tn‘ “The words 'pmpEny'has been expvamsdm Clrpux Juns, Vol 73;: 135 as Ioﬂows. ‘In )sgalusi_I79 'PV°06'1J/‘rs perhaps ms comprehensive wad mm can be employed and It may sogmly arms! the subjact matter In wnmn mnsmr ox/sts m u may sngnm, varunble ngms mu rmmsrs Dmlaclad by /aw av n my smmly mm It Is yum-uy ncognlud um pcuplnylncludu carlnln rights such u m rtgm of lcqulslllnn, pan-uron, us- cninymlnt ma dispolilfon. In mga! usage the word prcpanyfs a gamma Isrm Aecommg lo M. autharvlkzs on (Hrs question m vs 5 mm 0/ bvoad and extensive aﬂpmlalron and rt is arm a term ollarge man with the very broadest and most exzenswe smmcauon ms 5 very wmprahensrve wunﬂvavfng broad and oumpmhinsfw and exceedmgly complex meanmgs and rs perhaps me most eompvehsnsrve of all me terms that can be used. rne mm prupsrry Includes both real and psrsonal pmperly and nnimamy will be constmad as meanmg mm res» and personal pmpmy It memes both mtangfb/9 nghis and physical mmgs In tho mo: /aga/ ms. that word pmpmy slgrulras valualwe rights u lnlurasls protected by law and ms I: ma pr/mnry nppmoma and 12:05:19! sngmﬁcalmn of mm mm m modem /a_qn/ system, prnpsrly me/um pram./ry an Va/ulb/s ngm. ms mm Ming Vndncanvs and 5 sm \|I‘6ns7xuuA5Gvwwx-NO «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! aesarpnve of evsry possrb/9 interest mum a person can have In any and svsry Ihmg mar Is me sunset at ownarsrup by man and rrlomclrng every valuable rmaresrs, n can be emoyadas property am recognrzea as such equflsb/s mlsvesrs aa weuas /agar mreres1s and axlsndmg Io eve¢y spccves ol va/uabls rrgms at Interests m enner ms! or personal pmpeny or m easements, Iranclnsss and mmrpwal nareanamems. nra tsrm campnus me all nghls wmelv am rnmanm to the use, amoymam and arspaanan anmanma/ammgs ma bare passassmn. mm colour wrrglnl olanyllvlng ol vi/ul me rrgm to an pvotucfsd In one‘: poxssxsron a/a mg or m ma: pnvvlogea M/ongmg lo mm as an mdrviclull or sacursd to mm as n momoor lav ma Commonwealth mc/udmg are right iv confssnudrcraliy My rm/ssmn al that men one 90555559.: or ems’ [10] However. n rs not rig!“ in equate Ihe whole 0! me gruund ﬂour as one-mm ollhe vropeﬂy That may be ma agreed hving arrangements oi me panres as demonstrated by mar oonuuch buk man a distinct from awning lha\| grouna ﬂour at me pvuperly an me prennse man the ground ﬂoor squales ar measures In anennn olms Dmpeny Lmng an nn mum groggy my Fmm men menu. men agraemenl and arrangement cmvlirmed mu ma Ruvondanl was In occupy me ground near ana ma Appncarns mu second ﬂuor. They aH mspocllvlly anjoy me privacy ol II ng m mat properly whlreby me houwhohi and a uly Ink arms Appucanu And me 5 am Lﬂpsvzumssuvwa-Na “Nana s.n.r nmhnrwm .. U... a my r... nrW\n\|U\|y am. ﬂnuamnl VI mum war Respondent were separate and dtsnnct. wtltt ttre bul Ma statrway onm putstde me noose In enable dtroct and pnyate easement onto ttte second lloor, s appatenttttataltttougn attuated In me sante pmpeny, they all led their separate and prlve1Iehves.The use to enter and exi\| ttnouotr tne mam gate to enter the oropeny must be equally enloyed by each ct tttenu to enable tnetn to have access to man living arrangenrents on ttte propeny. [l2q eased on tner Hvtng Irrangemenm, tne Appllcanls nad tne ugh! to emay ttte second ttoor oi the property lnat tttey call ttren norne. Ltkewlss. ttte Rlspondem betng tna occupant on tne gmurtd ttoor. also nae me rrgnt to entoy he! abode. sne can Irwlla nar mm guests rttet lncludes her own grandenttd Muhd Akvam to kaap ner company lt goes wnnouteeytng lhil east. at ttren mspocllva ernoyrnent ttne Applicants and me nespondentl must be wtttrln ltnrtts — not to cause nulsance to me omen Pnvacy must also be respected otnerwtae l\| may lead to tortnrns acltorts [I3] sttoutd mere be any discorrtfnrl expenenced by any ot me Applicants or tne Respondent at the guests ottno dttrer, they would need In dtscuss and reaolye anncatety This ought to nave been done nature any drasuc acncns are taken. tn her alﬁdavlL me First Appttcant avened lhal all me Applrcants‘ ngntto snloynrent cfms prooanywas dented wttsn Mond Akram stayed on me gmund ttoor wlthau\| any eortstdatallan return nus slawmerll ls untenatzte as mo llvtng arrangements trad always been ma\| me Appttaants tlye and enloy the top llocr wtnlst me Respurtdertl opcupred me gmund noor at the prooeny. Theta was no evldence adduced \|nrough tne atltdautts ttted that Mohd Akram ttad drelumed pr carged mlo me Applicants prlyate enloyrrtant ct (hell abode ttterelore, wnetner or net MOM Akrlm acpontpanted tne Rsspcndant on me ground lloor was tntntatertnt to Applicants‘ npnt to enjoy lne propeny taste was r sru \|I‘6ns7zLluA5GvwvI1lnNG «an. s.n.t luvlhnrwm be u... a my t... annnln MIMI ﬂnuavlml y. muue p-not no evidence that Mona Akram had banged mm me Appmznrs‘ llvmg anangemanls on me lap Vkmr, nnv Ina! ne had usmpea the Ag naspamve one-ﬁﬂh ownemrnp of me properly ms Coun Is at me considered view mm (ms was Irrelevant to me relief sought which was to comps! me Respeneem \|o sell to me Apglvcanls her ons»fmh shave onne pmpeny er Io Vnjunox hev from Imnslemng me same In herdaughmr my ms Cmm observed two acnons by me Applicant vmncn (ms com Vrvwns upan — arm was the hacked of me mam gate (and also the back 9319) by me Applicants man had plevunlsd Mahd Akvam access «a me around llooroilhe mapcny wham ha ms 5 guesuome Respondam. The nesponuenx coo had N71 managed m enter the ground ﬂour whore me mes : law monms age in Am 2m 3: me mam ga\|e ene me um 9113 were mm by me Avnhcanls [151 me other was when may had allowed one Az\an whu is me sun of me Fvsl Awucann vmn hernrinrmarnage to emu me grwnd ﬂea acme pmpeny wnnom me pemusslon Mme Respondenl ms Cmm ﬁnds lha\| me Agpweanxe had breadved me wmg anangsmenls by aI\awIngﬁnstmc1Ing Az\an to do such and (oak photos of me state of me gmund ﬂoor lha\| Ihe Respondent had been hvlng and housed Mohd Akram as her guesl ms Com mnher notes me: me Respomenrs persona! bewnmngs were handled and ma been putomstde me properly. There may be wmous Vssues that arose mu 0! IN: eonauu 0! me Apphlzarﬂs However, we Vssue onne ewnemnp evme properly remained umhaken. sm w.mxumsnm.~a «mm. snn nmhnrwm be H... w may he mmneuly mum: dnuamnl VI mum v-max Wnlhout E ud ee [151 he Respcndem had vehemently had ubnected no me reverence and ansuosure av ‘wmmul prenudnce‘ nenner oflhs Rsspundentdaled 2 H2022 nnan sranea the quannurrr ulltve nespanaernrs War «or her anew shale onme pmpedy. The Raspandenl had nu\|wnsen(ed no nrne said dnsdosuve and prayed nrrannrrns courn dnsregavd me ounlems referred \|o mere-rn The Respondent rufsned to Ban Kunny Lling v Assacrma Wood mausnrm Sdn BM [1995] 2 cu ear As sum ma Rasporndanlsougm man this Cuun dnsvsgavd ma Rsspnndenls and mm and us mruanis mi The Aapnrcanv: arguments nrran nrra Rasnonﬂem had merrnicmea nne ralpacnva ueanmgs -n her iﬁﬂlvnn in renly Ia Paragraphs <3 \|o 11 were no! ennrrenyacwrana The Resporraann rm: interred is \|u me rrnsrary oﬂhe decsaseds awnersmp Mme provany as a resu\|\|o1(ha nransierrrom her She ma non menlkm an an muse suled nn 0:: said Islnar nn parnncunar Ihe quarnlum on her war for har arre—rmn on ma property. 5»: had nul wnsemad butnbnededwmerefersmsafhersaid lelter This Conn lanmd that me Applicants had Indeed breached me wnnhonnn pre1udncs' mle which they ought not to have had Locus stand: [151 The Rasponaenn had argued man me Apphnams an rmn have any nghl ovnn\|ews\| no be pmnecnea «om me Respcndann rnan argumernn was exlended no me con\|enImn Ihal mera was no rrrrnngerrrenn or oppvessnon by me Rerspondenn nor ma Apputanls na cammerwe mi: 05. The Responder“ had also campnarrm man he nnumnemenn or this os dnd non sun: any wacnﬁn: aannrac: sm w.mxumamu.~a “Nana sarn-n luvnhnrwm .. wed in my r... arnmruuly -mm: ﬂnuavnnnl VI arnurna v-man [19] We case 0! 01 smug Sdn and & 075 v Foam Wt may 5 anal (20211 10 MLJ 23¢ men: by me Responaem dean wllh an apphcatlon for an mvanuanan under the Trademarks Act 2019 me pmwsion ul law under saw of me saw ad 5 amamm from me sumecl mailer here ms coun opmad that me Respandenrs argume mlsmaoed [any The care ov mm maﬂer Much is me 0wnsr:h\p xssue and whelhev the ans-Ml! owned by Ina Raspendem name be mcxanea by olher games had been deliberated and concludod by ms Coun. in me mlerasls av [muse Thuugh n Vs ackncwiedged 01:! Iran mmmamam onne Applxcams‘ os was vamav ban-an Nu gggfgggn [211 The Respondent hmged «ms zugumam coumng lhu cumsrmon max 01: Auplicanls had no Vows in commence nus as The comer for ma Respondent cued Order 13 Rule 152 Runs: otcoun 2012 me) wmcn Ims Cmlrl snruggxea xo «onuw as mere was no applrcanon lo slvike am me 05 Nevertheless‘ n ‘s true (ha\| me Applmamx had lalled to show mac me Respondent had caused mjushce or loss \|o ma Apnhcants‘ respective shave mime property. urn to comply mm Rec [221 n was ma Respundanrs submlsswans Ihallhe Applicants had Vaﬂed \|o comply mm cm: 7 aux; 211A)and Rule 3(1jFlaC wmch requwed the following «arm at orugmalmg summons m sm \|I‘6ns7xuuA5Gvwwx-NO «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm!	1,737	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
PA-45-1-12/2021	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH 1. ) RAGESUTHEN A/L JAYASANKAR 2. ) SHARMAH A/L VELU 3. ) GOKULAN A/L SELVARAJOO 4. ) TATISAN A/L KUNASEGARAN	"Seksyen 300(c), 302 & 326 Kanun Keseksaan - Tertuduh 1,2,3, 4 & 5 dituduh dengan kesalahan membunuh di bawah Pertuduhan Pertama dan Ketiga - Tertuduh 1,2,3 & 4 di tuduh menyebabkan kecederaan parah ke atas Pengadu di bawah Pertuduhan kedua - Pengadu (SP7) adalah pengadu dan saksi mata tunggal di bawah kesemua pertuduhan.Isu, antara lain: (a) samada bencana tubuh yang dialami mangsa mencukupi pada lazimnya menyebabkan kematian dan samada didalam kes ini besar kebarangkalian telah menyebabkan kematian mangsa; (b) percanggahan dalam keterangan SP7; (c) percanggahan 2 laporan polis SP7; (c) percanggahan antara keterangan SP7 dan pengawai siasatan SP13 dan SP16; (d) keterangan SP7 bahawa laporan polis adalah palsu dan di benarkan oleh SP16; (e) samada ada keraguan berlakunya pergaduhan di tempat kejadian kedua; (f) kegagalan memanggil saksi material; (g) samada SP7 saksi yang kredibel; (h) samada terdapat kecacatan dalam Pertuduhan Pertama dan Ketiga; (i) kegagalan memeriksa semula saksi atas keterangan material; (j) samada penolakan keterangan SP7 mengenai kejadian di tempat kedua menyebabkan keterangan di bawah Pertuduhan Kedua selamat di terima.Dapatan, antara lainya: (a) terdapat keraguan samada bencana tubuh yang di alami mangsa besar kebarangkaliannya telah menyebabkan kematiannya; (b) terdapat percanggahan dalam keterangan SP7; (c) terdapat percanggahan antara keterangan SP7 dan SP13& SP16; (c) terdapat kegagalan memanggil saksi material; (d) percanggahan yang tidak di jelaskan mengikat kes Pendakwaan; (e) terdapat keraguan samada berlaku pergaduhan di tempat kedua; (f) SP7 di didapati saksi tidak kredibel dan keterangan mengenai kejadian di tempat kedua di tolak; (g) terdapat kecacatan dalam pertuduhan apabila fakta dalam pertuduhan tidak sokong keterangan kes; (h) percanggahan tempat berlaku perbuatan membunuh antara Pertuduhan Pertama dan Pertuduhan Ketiga; dan (i) dapatan SP7 tidak kredibel dan penolakan keterangan mengenai tempat kejadian kedua di bawah Pertuduhan Pertama dan Ketiga menyebabkan tidak selamat keterangan SP7 di bawah Pertuduhan Kedua di terima tanpa keterangan koroboratif.Keputusan: Pihak Pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie di bawah semua Pertuduhan - kesemua Tertuduh di lepaskan dan di bebaskan.	05/12/2023	YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e26fe870-80d1-4f45-aa5e-8a6776a69a5b&Inline=true	05/12/2023 08:25:45 PA-45-1-12/2021 Kand. 63 S/N cOhv4tGARUqXopndqaaWw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cOhv4tGARUqXopndqaaWw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cOhv4tGARUqXopndqaaWw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via 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02(f)-6-02/2023(P)	PERAYU 1. ) FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN BHD 2. ) HLA TOON TOOLSERAM 3. ) MAUNG AUNG THOU 4. ) MOONG BA 5. ) MOUNG BAN CHOWI RESPONDEN 1. ) NAI NINN SARARAKSH 2. ) Ho Choon Teik	The central issue in these 4 appeals concerns the interpretation and understanding of the Attorney General’s consent obtained under Section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359].Of the four appeals, three appeals arose from the judicial review proceedings [JR proceedings] while the fourth appeal arose from proceedings related to Originating Summons No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 [OS 1128]. We heard all four appeals together. After full consideration of the submissions, reasonings of the Courts below and the records of appeal, we unanimously allowed the appeals relating to the JR proceedings and dismissed the appeal relating to OS 1128.	05/12/2023	YA Dato' Mary Lim Thiam SuanKorumYA Dato' Mary Lim Thiam SuanYA Dato' Nordin Bin HassanYA Datuk Abdul Karim Bin Abdul Jalil	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e0eb9ef2-9c1f-41ba-81e0-edb1496ab306&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - Five Star 5.12.2023 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 01(f)-3-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN PEGUAM NEGARA MALAYSIA … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-621-10/2021 Antara Peguam Negara Malaysia … Perayu Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou 06/12/2023 14:08:51 02(f)-6-02/2023(P) Kand. 45 S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016] Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-6-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN 1. NAI NINN SARARAKSH (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. HO CHOON TEIK (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … RESPONDEN- RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-02(IM)(NCvC)(W)-2553-10/2021 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … Perayu – Perayu S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Dan 1. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014] Antara 1. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Plaintif-Plaintif Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … Defendan-Defendan (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-7-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN HO CHOON TEIK (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-609-10/2021 Antara Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Perayu Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan Semakan Bagi Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-8-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN NAI NINN SARARAKSH (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-602-10/2021 Antara Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … Perayu Dan 4. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 5. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 6. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 7. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 8. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 9. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan Semakan Bagi Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No.K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No.K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden] CORUM: MARY LIM THIAM SUAN, FCJ NORDIN BIN HASSAN, FCJ ABDUL KARIM BIN ABDUL JALIL, FCJ S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT [1] The central issue in these 4 appeals concerns the interpretation and understanding of the Attorney General’s consent obtained under Section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359]. [2] Of the four appeals, three appeals arose from the judicial review proceedings [JR proceedings] while the fourth appeal arose from proceedings related to Originating Summons No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 [OS 1128]. We heard all four appeals together. After full consideration of the submissions, reasonings of the Courts below and the records of appeal, we unanimously allowed the appeals. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] Both the JR proceedings and OS 1128 arose from these salient facts. Vide a trust indenture dated 30.5.1845, on behalf of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the East India Company created a Burmese-Siamese Trust over a plot of land known as Lot 104 in Georgetown subject to terms and conditions as found in the indenture [the Trust]. On Lot 104 was/is a temple serving the Burmese and Siamese communities living on the island of Penang, and their successors in the said Trust. Expressly, the Trust was “for the management of the affairs of their Temple”. Four trustees, two from each community, were originally appointed to manage the affairs of the temple [Trustees]. Amongst those terms and conditions was that the trustees had no “right, power or authority whatsoever” to “grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer, convert or otherwise alienate the said piece of Ground or any part or parcel thereof”. The trust land “shall remain, continue for the benefit of the Burmese and Siamese S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Community of Prince of Wales Island and its Dependencies from henceforth forever”. [4] Despite those express terms and conditions, on 16.4.1994, the Trustees entered into a written agreement to inter alia, partition Lot 104 between the two communities. Lot 104 thus became Lots 2102 and 2103 and an order of Court dated 19.10.1994 [OS No: 24-665-1994 in the HC Penang] was secured to seal that agreement. The effect of that division left the temple remaining on the land held and still held by the Siamese trustees [Lot 2102]. The Burmese trustees continued to hold Lot 2103. [5] On 3.10.2002, funds which had been hitherto collected from the temple amounting to over RM3,778,523.73 were equally divided between the two communities. Again, another order of Court was secured to endorse the division of funds [OS No: 24-1209-2002]. Effectively, this left the original trust now standing as two separate trusts, one for the Siamese community in respect of Lot 2102 and the other for the Burmese community in respect of Lot 2103. For this purpose, the Attorney General’s consent was obtained on 1.6.2000. The High Court viewed this consent, referred to as the “1st Consent” as confirming the partition of the original Lot 104 into Lots 2102 and 2103 and that the original trust had been terminated. We will have more to say on this shortly. [6] Following this Court order of 3.10.2002, the trustees for the Burmese community [Penang Burmese Trustees] executed a new trust deed dated 31.7.2006 [Trust Deed]. Amongst its many terms were these: i. Subject to clause 7 of the Trust Deed, that the Penang Burmese Trustees shall have no power to sell the Penang S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Burmese Trust Property or any part thereof or mortgage the same or to create a charge to any third party thereon; ii. Pursuant to clause 7, the Penang Burmese Trustees shall have the power to enter into a joint venture agreement and/or transaction with any such future, potential Develop and/or Contractor to develop and/or construct and/or build on the Penang Burmese Trust Property upon such terms and consideration as the Penang Burmese Trustees shall deem fit and proper and for the best interest and future benefit of the Burmese community in Penang. [7] On 25.8.2006, the Penang Burmese Trustees, the applicants in the JR proceedings entered into a joint-venture agreement with Airmas Development Sdn Bhd to commercially develop Lot 2103. A Court order was obtained on 31.10.2007 to declare that this joint-venture agreement was validly entered into by the parties. As part of that development, Lot 2103 was subdivided into Lots 10029 and 10030. With the joint-venture, the earlier was registered in the name of the developer whilst Lot 10030 was registered with the Penang Burmese Trustees. [8] The developer then commenced an action at the Sessions Court against Nai Ninn inter alia for vacant possession of premises located on Lot 10029. Nai Ninn filed his defence and also counterclaim, claiming that he was the owner of the premises and was not obliged to deliver vacant possession as Lot 10029 was part of a charitable trust created under the 1845 Indenture; and that the developer’s ownership of Lot 10029 was questionable. This case was subsequently transferred to the High Court. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [9] Meanwhile, vide OS 1128 filed in 2014, Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik challenged the validity of the Court order dated 31.10.2007, that because Lots 10029 and 10030 are part of a public charitable trust, the AG’s consent under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] must first be secured before the order may be secured. Since there was none, the order was invalid and must be set aside ex debito justitiae. We understand Nai Ninn Sararaksh, of Siamese descent, lives on Lot 10029. In OS 1128, Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik have sued the developers as well as the Penang Burmese Trustees. [10] Although OS 1128 was filed in 2014, both Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik themselves did not procure the AG’s consent to file the action until 31.5.2016. In fact, Ho Choon Teik was not even a party to OS 1128 when it was filed. Armed with the AG’s consent, Ho Choon Teik then intervened and was added as the 2nd plaintiff to OS 1128. [11] Together with the developer and the Vice-Chairman of the Penang Burmese Association, the Penang Burmese Trustees filed the JR proceedings seeking to quash the AG’s consent dated 31.5.2016. The JR proceedings were filed on 30.8.2016. Decisions of the High Court [12] It is quite clear that the parties were fully aware of the two sets of proceedings. Unfortunately, the JR proceedings and OS 1128 were heard before different judges, and disposed of at different times. There does not appear to be any effort to consolidate the actions. This would have greatly assisted better use of time and resources, be it of the Court, counsel or the parties themselves. Each component share in that responsibility in the S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 administration of justice; and every effort ought to have been made, especially in order to obviate any inconsistent decisions, as happened in these appeals. [13] Insofar as OS 1128 was concerned, on 24.11.2017, the High Court allowed the claim and set aside the joint-venture agreement; holding that the agreement was unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect. At the same time, the High Court held that the division of Lot 2103 into Lots 10029 and 10030 was similarly unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect; that the subsequent registration of these subdivided lots to the developer and the Penang Burmese Trustees was also null and void. Further, the High Court set aside the order of the High Court dated 31.10.2007. Injunctive orders were also issued, effectively restraining the joint-venture agreement and the registration of the subdivided lots of Lot 2103. [14] The JR proceedings took a longer time to be disposed of; aggravated by the appeals involved. Initially, leave was refused by the High Court on the basis that the AG’s consent was not reviewable or justiciable. That decision was upheld on appeal. On 12.12.2018, the Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal and ordered the substantive application to be heard on its merits. [15] On 29.9.2021, the High Court in the JR proceedings allowed the application and quashed the AG’s consent. In addition, the High Court held that the Trust Deed of 31.7.2006 was a private trust; and that all the earlier orders granted by the Court, namely orders dated 19.10.1994, 3.10.2002 and 31.10.2007 are valid and binding. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Decisions of the Court of Appeal [16] Both parties appealed against those respective decisions. Thankfully, the appeals were heard by the same panel at the Court of Appeal. On 15.6.2022, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals in respect of the JR proceedings whereas the decision of the High Court in respect of OS 1128 was allowed in part. OUR DECISION [17] On 30.1.2023, this Court granted leave on the following 3 questions of law: i. Whether the consent of the Attorney General can be retrospective in light of the clear wordings and pre-requisites stated in Section 9(1) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 and the mandatory nature of Section 9(2) of the same Act and the decisions of the High Court in the cases of Ledchumanan Nagappan v R. Nadarajah & 2 Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 253 and Subramaniam Vallan & Anor v Dr. S. Sivasundaram & Ors [2016] 1 LNS 675 and whether such consent goes to jurisdiction? ii. In the light of the decision of the High Court which held that the subdivision of the original trust land should stay; that the land partitioned and given to the Burmese be vested in the remaining Burmese Trustee and as the beneficiaries of the Burmese Trust are ascertained or ascertainable individuals as held in Re Endacott [1959] 2 All ER 562, should the S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Burmese Trust be construed as a private trust or a public trust and whether the construction of a trust instrument and the original intention of the settlor under such circumstances, a question of law or a question of fact? iii. If a donor’s dominant intent is to restrict the charitable gift to the exact purpose specified in the Trust Instrument and for no other purpose, is the Court at liberty to presume that the donor still evinced a general charitable intent and effectuate the donor’s intent by applying the cy-prés doctrine to that gift? [18] From the submissions, grounds of decisions and the records of appeal, we were clear that the determination of the first issue was sufficient to dispose of all four appeals. [19] As indicated earlier, this Court had already opined that the decision of the AG under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] is justiciable and thereby reviewable by the Court. Further authorities may be gleaned from the decision in Peguam Negara Malaysia v Chin Chee Kow and another appeal [2019] 3 MLJ 443; that the AG’s power to grant or refuse consent is not absolute and is always subject to limits as prescribed in the statute itself. [20] Section 9 states as follows: (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust for public, religious, social or charitable purposes, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Attorney General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 obtained the consent in writing of the Attorney General, may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public for the purpose of— (a) asserting any interest or right in the trust property; (b) removing any trustee; (c) appointing a new trustee; (d) vesting any property in a trustee; (e) directing accounts and inquiries; (f) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (g) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged, charged or exchanged; (h) settling a scheme; and (i) obtaining such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. (2) No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with that subsection. [emphasis added] [21] From the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in appeals in relation to OS 1128, the AG’s consent dated 31.5.2016 was upheld on the following grounds. At paragraphs 22 and 23, the Court of Appeal reasoned that: [22] “…there was nothing wrong or improper in the AG granting his written consent for OS 1128 for otherwise it would be oppressive for Nai Ninn who has been asked to vacate his house to defend himself and to inquire into how the land, once held under a public charitable trust had been transferred to Five Star”. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [23] All that the AG allowed by his written consent is for Nai Ninn to ventilate his claim and for the Court to decide without taking side on the issue of the final outcome. We could not see how such a decision vested in him under s 9 of the GPA could be said to have been given unreasonably or irrationally such that no right-thinking decision maker would have given his consent. [22] At paragraphs 84 to 86, the Court of Appeal further rationalised why the AG’s consent need not be obtained before the commencement of OS 1128. According to the Court of Appeal, the expression- “… the Attorney General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Attorney General, may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public” (emphasis added) in s 9(1) of the GPA indicates to us that what is far more important in keeping with the rationale behind the written consent of the AG is that no frivolous action or suit is to be commenced or continued to completion without the AG having applied his mind to the action and having consented to it. If the action or suit has commenced already, then it is not to be continued, as would be a case where a second person is joined as a party to the action or suit, without the written consent of the AG. [86] As the AG has no issue with that and was fully aware of the action that had been commenced, it would be pedantic and pointless to labour further on the point at which the consent in writing was given. There was also no application filed by the defendants to strike out the OS before the written consent of the AG was obtained. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [23] In separate grounds written in respect of the JR proceedings, the Court of Appeal found that the AG did not act in bad faith when granting consent dated 31.5.2016; that it was important that “the AG did not take any partisan stand on the issues, but left it to the parties to persuade the Court”. The Court of Appeal further found that it was not legally wrong for the AG’s consent to be given as one of the issues which required probing was “how, why and when that a charitable trust for religious purpose could be turned into a purported private trust, no less with a commercial pursuit”. Consequently, the Court of Appeal found that there was “no good reason to review his decision”. [24] Amongst the many roles and duties of the Attorney General, an office constituted under Article 145 of the Federal Constitution, is the role and responsibility as custodian of the public interest; particularly in the matter of public, religious, social or charitable trusts. Such trusts are set up for the benefit of the larger sector of society and it is the AG’s duty to ensure that the intent of the relevant trusts is adhered to and safeguarded. [25] Some deliberations to this effect may be found in the decision of Chin Chee Kow (as the Secretary of Persatuan Kebajikan dan Amal Liam Hood Thong Chor Seng Thuan) v Peguam Negara Malaysia [2021] 5 MLJ 303. There, the Court of Appeal correctly explained the intention of Parliament in enacting section 9 of Act 359; that it is to empower the AG in the protection of charitable trusts from abuse and to prevent proceedings affecting the charity funds from unnecessary waste of such funds. [26] Similar views may be found in the earlier cases of Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor v Cheah Kee Wee & 15 Ors [1934] 1 MLJ 212; Haji Abdullah & Ors S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 v Ibrahim & Ors [1965] 2 MLJ 189; and Lee Eng Teh & Ors v Teh Thiang Seong & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 42. [27] In Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor, Whitley J cited and adopted Eldon LC's observations made in Attorney General v Green 1 Jacob & Walker 303, that it is the duty of the Court to take care that as little expense as possible should be incurred by the charity estate. Courts are reminded that safeguards are emplaced through section 9 [then under section 18 of the FMS Chapter 17, the precursor to Act 359] in order to prevent abuse, and to prevent proceedings against charitable trusts from being instituted too frequently for no other reason than because it is known that costs will be payable out of charity funds. In Lee Eng Teh & Ors, Gill J explained the consequences of non-compliance, that “…but for the consent of the Attorney General or his being made a party to the action, the present action would not be maintainable”. [28] The failure to comply with the mandatory requirements in section 9 renders any action or suit instituted not maintainable. In these appeals, not only was OS 1128 filed before the written consent of the AG was obtained, the written consent when finally obtained, is also clearly outside the terms prescribed by section 9. This is quite aside from the fact that both Nai Ninn and Ho did not meet its mandatory requirements. [29] The significance of non-compliance with the requirements in section 9 was explained in Ledchumanan Nagappan v R Nadarajah & 2 Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 253. There, the plaintiff who was seeking certain declaratory orders from the Court concerning the affairs of the Subramanian Temple at Batu Caves including an injunction to stop the celebration of Thaipusam at that Temple failed to obtain the prior written consent of the AG before instituting S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 his action. The application was dismissed when the learned Judge found inter alia that there was a “total failure to comply with the three preliminary requirements” under that provision. Although not named as a party, the AG’s representative had attended Court to express the view that the action should not be allowed to proceed since there was non-compliance of the requirements, namely there must be in existence of at least two persons having an interest, the prior written consent of the AG, and the suit itself being brought in the name of the AG. The Court agreed and was of the view that “it would not be necessary to say anymore”, on that point. [30] We agree with those principles and the approach. Sections 9(1) and (2) provide in quite clear terms how and when the AG becomes involved in such trusts, and what requirements must be met before matters relating to such trusts may be challenged in Court. First, it is in the nature of trust itself. The AG only becomes involved under section 9 where the trust is either an express or constructive trust set up for public, religious, social or charitable purposes. Next, there must be an allegation of breach of such a trust; or the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of such trust. In simple terms, Court action is contemplated. [31] Where proceedings in Court are indeed contemplated, section 9 mandates that whoever is moving the Court must first obtain the written consent of the AG. We can appreciate the rationale for such a requirement. As explained in the above case authorities, the process allows scrutiny by the AG to check against abuse and wastage of funds and other resources. Public, religious, social or charitable trusts are, by their very nature and intent, set up and intended for a larger community and purpose; serving an entirely different set of beneficiaries identified by some common cause or interest. Such trusts invariably would serve more than a single person. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [32] So, where there is an allegation of breach or where direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of such trust, and some suit or proceeding is contemplated, it makes good sense that the written consent of the AG is first procured. And, according to section 9(1), that written consent must be sought by two or more persons. Again, this makes good sense, appreciating the nature and character of such trusts. More than one disgruntled person or complainant must step forward to make that complaint and, secure the prior written consent of the AG. [33] The next requirement is that the application must seek any of the reliefs set out in section 9(1)(a) to (i). [34] In respect of the first requirement, there is present the intention to sue for an alleged breach of trust for the reasons relied on. The reliefs sought in OS 1128 are also within the reliefs set out in section 9(1)(a) to (i). However, the impugned written consent was sought only after OS 1128 had already been filed and it was sought by actually just one as opposed to the requisite two persons. The application by Ho to be joined as a party to an existing suit similarly suffers defects due to non-compliance of section 9. [35] Section 9(1) also deals with joinder; that there must be two or more persons intending to join, and not just the single person like Ho here. Again, this is understandable given the nature and character of the trust. This, too, is on the basis that the suit already instituted is valid to start with. Where the suit to which Ho seeks consent for joinder is itself flawed for want of consent under section 9, his application to join will not in the least alleviate the fatal deficiencies of the suit when it was first filed. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [36] In the present appeals, Nai Ninn was the sole plaintiff in OS 1128 when it was filed in 2014. He did not secure the AG’s written consent at the time of filing. Ho, on the other hand, applied to intervene and be joined as an additional plaintiff to OS 1128 which had already been filed by Nai Ninn. The records show that both of them then made that single application on 20.8.2015 and the AG gave his written consent on 31.5.2016 in the following terms: AKTA PROSIDING KERAJAAN 1956 [AKTA] PERSETUJUAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 9(1) PADA menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan oleh Seksyen 9(1) Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 [Akta 359], saya, TAN SRI DATO’ SRI HAJI MOHAMED APANDI BIN ALI, Peguam Negara Malaysia dengan ini bersetuju dengan permohonan Encik Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No KP: 400324-07-5301 dan Encik Ho Choon Teik (No. KP: 750707-07-5261) bagi meneruskan satu prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Pulau Pinang melalui Saman Pemula No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 untuk mendapatkan perintah seperti berikut: (i) satu perintah mengepikan pendaftaran nama-nama Defendan-Defendan sebagai pemilik Lot 10029 dan Lot 10030 secara ex debito justitiae atas alasan ketiadaan bidang kuasa dan ketiadaan kebenaran Peguam Negara di bawah Seksyen 9 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956; (ii) satu perintah injunksi tetap yang menghalang Defendan-Defendan sama ada oleh dirinya sendiri, pengkhidmat-pengkhidmat, ejen-ejen mereka atau sesiapapun daripada bertindak sebagai pemilik berdaftar hartanah amanah awam; (iii) satu perintah bahawa Defendan-Defendan mengemukakan penyata akaun bagi “Harta Amanah Keturunan Burma di Pulau Pinang” (“Penang Burmese Trust Property”) kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini; dan (iv) satu perintah bahawa segala wang yang telah digunakan oleh Pemegang Amanah Burma selepas 31.10.2007 berkenaan akaun hartanah amanah keturunan Burma Pulau Pinang dikembalikan dengan serta-merta dan didepositkan ke dalam Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dan kemudian pihak komuniti Burma Pulau Pinang. Bertarikh: 31 haribulan Mei 2016 S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [37] In our view, this written consent not only does not meet the terms of section 9(1), it clearly exceeds the restrictions imposed by section 9. It is a consent devoid of authority and mandate in several respects. That being so, the written consent is liable to be quashed, rendering OS 1128 as not maintainable and the High Court was thus right in issuing the order of certiorari quashing the said decision. [38] On the assumption that both Nai Ninn and Ho fulfil the conditions of having an interest in the trust, the application serves two different objectives depending on whose application we are addressing. For Nai Ninn, it was to institute a suit, or as it would appear, to regularise a suit which had already been filed at the time of the application for AG’s consent. As for Ho, it was to be joined as a party to an existing suit, OS 1128. In either case, both are alone for their respective purpose. In our view, this distinction of separate purpose or objective illustrates that their respective application was and is outside the meaning of the words “two or more persons”. [39] Further, in the case of Nai Ninn, his application is obviously outside the terms of section 9(1) as the AG’s consent was sought long after he had filed OS 1128 on 15.12.2014; almost as an afterthought. As can be seen, section 9(1) expressly requires the written consent to be procured before the suit is instituted. To say that consent may be sought and procured after Court proceedings for the reliefs mentioned in section 9(1)(a) to (i) have been instituted pays scant respect to the clear intention and requirements in section 9(1). [40] It also cannot be said that the AG is empowered to give consent retrospectively as this, quite clearly, runs contrary to the express terms of S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 section 9(1). Such an argument is like a double-edged sword as ironically, this suggests that Nai Ninn and Ho’s own complaint that the Court orders secured by the Penang Burmese Trustees are invalid for want of prior written consent from the AG is unfounded since consent may be given retrospectively. [41] In any case, the written consent of the AG uses the term ‘meneruskan’ which translates to mean “carry on” or “continue”. Such a term does not have the effect of retrospectivity but merely connotes permission or consent to proceed with what has already been started. Such a consent takes effect from the date of the consent itself which is 31.5.2016 and not 15.12.2014, the date when OS 1128 was filed. This leaves OS 1128 bereft of the necessary consent at the material time when it was instituted in 2014. [42] It must also be emphasised that the term “meneruskan” is not found in section 9 at all, especially in section 9(1) in which case, the impugned consent is without the authority of law. We find it not just difficult but a strain on the language to say that the words “institute” or “join” include “meneruskan”. [43] Perhaps, this becomes clearer when section 9(1) is contrasted with the power to grant sanction in cases of insolvency under section 471(1) of the Companies Act 2016 [Act 333]. That provision reads as follows: 471. (1) When a winding up order has been made or an interim liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms as the Court imposes. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [44] Section 471(1) uses the words “proceeded with or commenced”. This indicates that the power to grant leave to sue wound up companies is not limited to fresh actions or proceedings [“commenced”] but extends to the instance where actions or proceedings have already commenced [“proceeded with”]. In the latter, these actions may now proceed, carry on or be continued; or “meneruskan”. Again, these words do not appear in section 9(1) in which case, the AG’s consent of 31.5.2016 is without legal power or is outside the terms of section 9(1); and is thus invalid. [45] In addition, the Court of Appeal has overlooked the presence of section 9(2) which reminds the importance of compliance with the requirements of section 9(1): No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with that subsection. [emphasis added] [46] Section 9(2) reiterates the mandatory requirement of securing written consent before institution of a suit. Since OS 1128 was instituted before AG’s consent under section 9(1) was obtained, it is not “in conformity with that subsection”. While the AG has discretion on the matter of consent, it is with regard the grant, refusal or imposition of terms or conditions to such request for consent. The consent at all times must however, relate to a suit or proceeding which is yet to be instituted, and not to one which has already been instituted. In the latter case, the AG’s consent is in respect of whether the applicants for consent may be joined as a party to that suit already filed. We must add that in the latter case of joinder of party(s), the institution of that suit must, in the first place, have complied with the terms of section S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 9(1). In the case of OS 1128, no written consent was secured before it was instituted; aggravating the position yet further. [47] We do not find the High Court decision of Lee Chick Yet v Chen Siew Hee [1977] 2 MLJ 218 of assistance. Bearing in mind that it was a first- instance decision where the learned Judge opined that the Court could direct compliance of section 9 within a certain time period instead of striking out the whole action, that argument is flawed. Not only does it run contrary to the plain and unambiguous terms of section 9(1), but as pointed out earlier, the Penang Burmese Trustees similarly ought to have been given the same option. [48] The respondents had urged this Court to apply the principle of nunc pro tunc. With due respect, we decline to do so. [49] The principle is generally applied to cases involving court decisions, where the court seeks to correct their records on clerical errors. Black’s Law Dictionary explains the term as follows: ‘Now for then’ having retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power the court entered a nunc pro tunc order to correct a clerical error in the record. Acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be done; nunc pro tunc nearly described inherent powers of court to make the court records to speak the truth. [emphasis added] [50] That does not arise here at all. See also Kok Song Kong v BSP Co Sdn Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 440: S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 In the light of our conclusion that on the facts of the present case we are able to hold that the suit was instituted on 18 April 1984, it may strictly be unnecessary for us to say or do anything further; but out of caution we will direct that the writ be resealed nunc pro tunc, that is to say, with the date, 18 April 1984, which it ought to have borne in the first place. We do this in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction which the court has over its officers, not under any of the provisions of the rules. Where the rights of a party are threatened by an act or default of an officer of the court, the court clearly has such a power to correct the matter. [emphasis added] [51] No error prevails in the Court records for any correction; the only error lies in the impugned consent for the reasons we have already explained. [52] Before we leave this issue, we feel compelled to deal with a point made at paragraph 4 of the grounds of decision in respect of appeal on OS 1128. There, the Court of Appeal found that the written consent of the AG had been obtained in relation to the order dated 19.10.1994. We have poured through the records and we cannot find any consent to this effect. [53] There are only 2 consents issued by the AG, the 2nd consent dated 31.5.2016, the impugned consent has already been dealt with. The other consent, the first, is dated 1.6.2000 and it reads as follows: AKTA PROSIDING KERAJAAN 1956 PERSETUJUAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 9(1) PADA menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan oleh subseksyen 9(1) Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956, saya, Tan Sri Datuk Seri Mohtar bin Abdullah dengan ini bersetuju dengan permulaan satu prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang oleh Wong Hoong Keat (Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma di Pulau Pinang), (No. K.P. 3238892), Dr. Ko Ko Win (No. K.P. 9600855), U Khema Wuntha (No. K.P. US 035257736), Cheah Boo Eng (No. K.P. 4461657). Ong Ba Nee (No. K.P. 570101-07-5429), Prabandh Sanasen (No. K.P. 210819-71-5147) dan S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Songkeram @ Sungkram a/l Apau (No. K.P. 7644628) untuk memohon perintah- perintah seperti berikut: (i) (a) Bahawa pelantikan Dr. Ko Ko Win, U Khema Wuntha, Cheah Boo Eng dan Ong Ba Nee yang beralamat di Dhammikarama Burmese Buddhist Temple, No. 24 Lorong Burma, 10250 Pulau Pinang sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang pada 22 Februari 1998 menggantikan Maung Boon Khan dan Hia Toon Toolseram disahkan oleh Mahkamah; (b) Bahawa harta yang terletak di Lot 2103, Georgetown Seksyen 4, No. H.S. (D) 528, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang diletakhak atas nama Dr. Ko Ko Win, U Khema Wuntha, Cheah Boo Eng dan Ong Ba Nee sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang; (ii) (a) Bahawa pelantikan Prabandh Sanasen dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau yang beralamat di Chaiya Mangalaram Buddhist Temple, No. 17, Lorong Burma, 10250 Pulau Pinang sebagai Pemegang Amanah tambahan Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang dalam Mesyuarat Agung Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang pada 6 September 1998 disahkan oleh Mahkamah; (b) Bahawa harta yang terletak di Lot 2102, Georgetown, Seksyen 4, No. H.S. (D) 527, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang diletakhak atas nama Prabandh Sanasen dan Songkeram @ Sungkaram a/l Apau dan atas nama Pemegang Amanah yang sedia ada iaitu Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchap dan Sook Buranakol sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang; (iii) (a) Bahawa akaun terakhir Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma disahkan dan harta amanah termasuk wang tunai dalam Simpanan Tetap dalam akaun bank diserahkan kepada Pemegang Amanah kedua-dua tanah yang berkenaan iaitu Lot 2103 kepada Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma dan Lot 2102 kepada Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai; (b) Bahawa Wong Hoong Keat, Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma di Pulau Pinang dilepaskan sebagai Penerima Amanah tersebut; (iv) Bahawa semua kos yang timbul daripada tindakan ini dan kos permohonan ini dicukai dan diuntukkan daripada Amanah tersebut; dan (v) Lain-lain relif yang difikirkan patut dan suaimanfaat oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Bertarikh pada 1 haribulan Jun 2000. [54] With this consent, an order of Court dated 3.10.2002 was obtained granting orders which essentially dealt with the appointment of trustees and the vesting of Lots 2102 and 2103 on the appropriate trustees: ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN 1. bahawa Wong Hoong Keat, sebagai Penerima yang dilantik melalui Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi, Pulau Pinang bertarikh 14.12.1973, dilepaskan sebagai Penerima daripada mengutip segala sewa dan hasil (pendapatan) untuk harta amanah mengenai Amanah-amanah dalam suatu Dokumen Amanah menerusi Geran No. 2655 bertarikh 30.05.1845; 2. bahawa nama-nama Maung Boon Khan (K/P: A3103868) Hla Toon Toolseram (K/P: 3465236) dan Sook Buranakol (K/P 4083456) dibatalkan dan dikeluarkan daripada geran mengenai hakmilik tanah yang dikenali sebagai Geran No: 61389, Lot 2102, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang (dahulu di kenali sebagai H.S.(D) 527, Lot 2102, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang) dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau (No KPT: 450515-02-5097) digantikan dan diletakhakkan sebagai Pemegang amanah; 3. bahawa nama-nama Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchapan (K/P: 2190061) dan Sook Buranakol (K/P: 4083456), simati, dibatalkan dan dikeluarkan daripada geran mengenai hakmilik tanah yang dikenali sebagai Geran No: 61390, Lot 2103, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang (dahulu di kenali sebagai H.S.(D) 528, Lot 2103, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang) 4. bahawa akaun dalam Afidavit bertarikh 19.09.2002 oleh Penerima Harta Amanah Komuniti Thai-Burma di Pulau Pinang, En. Wong Hoong Keat, disahkan dan diluluskan dan daripada wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Juta Tujuh Ratus Tujuh Puluh Lapan Ribu Lima Ratus Dua Puluh Tiga dan Sen Tujuh Puluh Tiga (RM3,778,523.73) Sahaja dalam pengangan pihak Penerima setakat 30.6.2002, pihak Penerima diperintahkan:- (i) membayar wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Satu Juta Lapan Ratus Lapan Puluh Sembilan Ribu Dua Ratus Enam Puluh Satu dan Sen Lapan Puluh Enam (RM1,889,261.86) Sahaja kepada Tetuan Vello & S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Associates, Peguambela dan Peguamcara, Pulan Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak dan untuk membayar bersama-sama kepada Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchapan (K/P:2190061) dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau (KPT: 450515-02-5097) sebagai Pemegang-pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang; dan (ii) membayar wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Satu Juta Lapan Ratus Lapan Puluh Sembilan Ribu Dua Ratus Enam Puluh Satu dan Sen Lapan Puluh Enam (RM1,889,261.86) Sahaja kepada Tetuan G. Raju and Company, Peguambela dan Peguamcara, Pulau Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak dan untuk membayar bersama-sama kepada Maung Boon Khan (K/P: A 3103868) dan Hla Toon Toolseram (K/P 3465236) sebagai Pemegang-pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang 5. Bahawa pihak Penerima hendaklah memberi suatu akaun terakhir daripada 01.07.2002 sehingga 31.10.2002 dan selepas menolak peruntukkan untuk kos, perbelanjaan dan lain-lain bayaran yang patut, membahagikan serisama wang-wang yang dalam pegangannya dan membayar setengahnya (1/2) kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates, Peguamcara dan Peguambela, Pulau Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak Pemegang-pemegang amanah Thai dan setengah (1/2) yang bakinya kepada, Tetuan G. Raju and Company, Peguamcara dan Peguambela untuk dan bagi pihak Pemegang- pemegang Amanah Burma. 6. Kos yang dipersetujui sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Puluh Ribu (RM30,000.00) Sahaja diperuntukkan daripada tabung Amanah tersebut dan pihak Penerima hendaklah membayar wang sebanyak RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan G. Raju and Company, RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates dan RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan Pregrave & Mathews sebagai peguamcara-peguamcara untuk pihak-pihak dalam perkara ini masing- masing; dan 7. Bahawa Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah, Pulau Pinang hendaklah mendaftarkan perintah-perintah yang dibuat dalam perkara ini dalam geran-geran masing- masing. Bertarikh pada 3 haribulan Oktober 2002 [55] There is no mention, whether in the first consent or in this Court order of the splitting of Lot 104. This is hardly surprising since Lot 104 had already been split as far back as 19.10.1994: S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN:- 1. Bahawa harta amanah Thai Burmesa yang terletak di Lot No. 104 Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang dibahagikan mengikut pelan ukuran No. CAB/11/C/PG/92-P1 bertarikh 26 haribulan Ogos, 1993 danPerjanjian untuk Pecah Milik bertarikh 16 haribulan April, 1994 dan Perjanjian Untuk Pengurusan Bersama ke atas Tanah Perkuburan bertarikh 16 haribulan April, 1994 dan bahagian yang ditanda “1” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut didaftarkan dan diletakhak atas nama Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai dan bahagian yang ditanda “2” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut didaftarkan dan diletakhak atas nama Pemegang Amanah 2. Tanah Perkuburan yang terletak di bahagian yang bertanda “1” dan “2” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut diurus bersama oleh Pemegang- Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai dan Burma; 3. Encik Chuah Ah Bah dari Jurukur Chuah & Rakan, seorang jurukur tanah berlesen dilantik untuk memohon bagi pecah lot dan pembahagian keatas harta amanah tersebut; dan 4. Kos untuk permohonan ini dibayar dari kumpulan wang amanah. Bertarikh pada 19 haribulan Oktober, 1994. [56] For this “split” of Lot 104, there does not appear to be any consent from the AG, of any description, for what we see is a most critical departure from the 1845 Indenture. Conclusion [57] For the above reasons, we find for the purposes of section 9 of Act 359, the learned AG has no discretion to give consent after a suit has already been instituted. Worse when the application for consent is only made by a single person and not two or more persons. To say otherwise would defeat the ‘filter’ mechanism in the statute and the protective role that the AG plays as custodian of the public interest. S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [58] In the circumstances, the impugned consent of 31.5.2016 is invalid and is liable to be quashed. The High Court had rightly granted the orders sought in the JR proceedings. Question 1 is thus answered in the negative. [59] In view of our answer to Question 1, and since OS 1128 was instituted without the consent of the AG, that OS is incompetent and not maintainable. We therefore do not see the need to answer questions 2 and 3. [60] The appeals in relation to the JR proceedings are thus allowed and the decisions of the Court of Appeal dated 15.6.2022 are set aside and the decision of the High Court is reinstated. In respect of the appeal in relation to OS 1128, the appeal is allowed and the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court are set aside. [61] There is no order as to costs. Dated: 5 December 2023 Signed (MARY LIM THIAM SUAN) Federal Court Judge Malaysia S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Counsel/Solicitors For the appellant Civil Appeal No. 01(f)-3-02/2023(P), No. 02(f)-6- 02/2023(P), No. 02(f)-7-02/2023(P), No.02(f)-8-02/2023(P): Karin Lim, A. Suppiah, Julinder Daliwal & Alisa Lim Wei Zhen Aznil Naziah Juli & Praba Peguambela dan Peguamcara Suite 2-05 Tingkat 2 Bangunan Wisma Pantai Jalan Kampong Gajah 12200 Butterworth For the respondent Civil Appeal No.01(f)-3-02/2023(P): SFC Shamsul Bolhassan, SFC Mohammad Al-Saifi Hj. Hashim, SFC Nurul Farhana Khalid, FC Nor Aqilah Abdul Halim & FC Nur Syazwani Abdul Aziz Bahagian Guaman Jabatan Peguam Negara No. 45, Persiaran Perdana Presint 4 For the respondent Civil Appeal No. 02(f)-6-02/2023(P) & No. 02(f)-7-02/2023(P): T. Gunalan Seelan, Balwant Singh Purba, Eng Yuh Pei & Tan Shin Yi Messrs. Balwant Singh & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 20-B (Ground Floor) Lebuh Penang 10200 Pulau Pinang For the respondent Civil Appeal No.02(f)-8-02/2023(P): T. Gunalan Seelan, Ong Ken-Jeen & Lee Min Yau Messrs. Vello & Associates Peguam Bela dan Peguamcara No. 105, Anson Road 10400 Penang S/N 8p7r4BcukGB4O2xSWqzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	55,138	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22NCvC-702-12/2022	PLAINTIF 1. ) SEE LEONG CHYE @ SZE LEONG CHYE 2. ) THE H INITIATIVE 3 SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) WONG BAN TIN 2. ) HENG SOOK THENG 3. ) HEVEAPLAST (M) SDN BHD 4. ) ZAINUDDIN BIN MAKSOM 5. ) SIEW FUI KONG	The First to Third Defendants’ application to strike out the Plaintiff's claim under Enclosure 24 is allowed. Costs of RM10,000 is awarded to the First to Third Defendants	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=67153dca-149c-4b9b-8049-ea573f8f3191&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:48:08 WA-22NCvC-702-12/2022 Kand. 50 S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yj0VZ5wUm0uASepXP48xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—22NCvC—7D2—12/2022 Kand. 50 as/mzm 29:42-ma IN YHE HIGH counu IN MALAVA AI’ KUALA LUMFUR nu ma FEDERAL YERRITORV, MALAVSIA CIVILCASEN w Move 02 212022 asmssn 1. sea LEONG cnvs @ sze LEONG cm: (NRIO N0: uo1w»7I.52m 2. THE H mnmmva a sun arm (COMPAN‘INO:13D1B1D-M) ....FLAlNT\|FFS AND 1, words an» TIN [muc NO: 5s1n15o¢5na7) 2. HENG soox mans man: no: ssn:c2s.nz.susa) :. NEVEAPLA.-sr (M) snu nun (comuuv NO: 1suo1nn1351(1Isua-U1) 4. zamunnm am MAKSOM [NRIC N0: mans-o1-sows) 5. SIEW FIJI KONG sw nVVZ5wumnuASepXP4axkD -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm [NRIC no: 590730-10-8119) anouuns or JUDGMENI mm Dofvn omosm nu! ma Flrsnn m The Fusfw me mm De1endants naa Med Order «a rule 19 Ruies at Cuurl 2012(RoC)undevhmhs\|h)ar(d)r:mng all me hmbs Io scma out me P1mn\|m‘sWr1Iand SIa\|amen\|nfC\aIm (soc) againsnhem Apmgment in dalaullulawsaranw nan been antamd zgamsl ma Fourth and mu Detenaams ruoscuvawy an 29.:.2a2: [2] The Firs( to me mm Defendants‘ eenunaea lhnl ma Plalrmﬂs‘ sunk to claim Durvurled lass and damages smrerea by me Plainmfs as a resin! at me frsuﬂmenl transfer ufa max :71 land Much was me subsect matter mma Shah Alam Hugh com sun No 22-233.2010 tsun my was a clear manuescauon nf hﬁgalmn by msrarmem ana us an abuse 01 pmcas The reasons cnaa are. (a) me P\ainﬁVfs' man was nme halted by Seclnn 6 am 29 av um umnauon Act 1953 (LA) as me causes of Icbon plleded ma aacma as eariy as Saulumbar zoos. and 1b) The muss and causes :11 action weaved had been/auahl be have bean uean wun m sun 233 whim was disvbsad afon 2711 2014 am nuvzs..u...msepx>4.ma «ma am ...m.mm a. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: ﬂan-mm VII mum pm su 213 [3] On 23 2 zum the First mama and See Ewe Lin (SEL) had wnrﬁaled Sun 233 against Heveaplasl Malkenng Sdn and (Heveap1astMaIke(mq) which rs a subswdary 0! me rm Dehndant, umm Overseas Bank Bemad (uoa), the Fourth neaenaanz, Messrs zaimmam Wan Nadzlm Ohua a. Maslmda. Kum Hm Engneamg Induslnls Sdn arm and Pubm: Bank Bamad Thu claim was hr in Iewvery oi . prooeny wnn a postal address 01 Lo\ 549 Jalan Subang 2, Tamer: Vnduslri Sg Fenaga, 47520 us: Subzng Jaya, Sahngor u was amen man we property was transferred m Hmapaasn Marxanng mmugn «we we 2 ask and purchase agrumml dated 25 12 me and : mmmanaum m «ram-.12: da(ad 214.2009 summed by the First Plalntiﬂ, SEL and Heveap\as1 Markenng A prayet nu ma dam! was also \|o canoe! me charges m favour o1 uos by Heveaptasl Marxenng no ms/2009 am 2737/2009 of me nmpeny [41 A1 ma mama! lame‘ me Fun and Second Dalandams were me directors of Hevaaplasl Mamaﬂng. [5] On 2711 2014 lhe Sm Nam Hugh Cnun had auowea me mum m sun 233. The cinema: were. (a) The sure and purchase agreement am the memmanmm at var-sievwere no( executed by \|he Fus1 Plaxrmﬂ‘ and SEL, and may were fvvsed: (la) The Fourm Defendant played a mam Me in ma whoie scheme but did run appear an mm; 3 sm ypvzsumnvnunsepxwaxkn mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm ls) H-yeauasr Marksung and me sollcﬂols concealed were irlwlved ln Ins wand. and (.1) The was cnargaa prusenlad by Hevaap1as\| Marxellng were you [51 ll wu mv-lad Ihal ma loss and damagos snﬁenad by the rim Plalnnﬂ ma SEL lo be assessed On luszuw (he appllcillun for a§essmenlo1damiae: was ﬁled but lane. withdrawn m The appeal by Heayeaplaslmalxaung agalnsl ms sald aacisian was dlsmlssed on 25.2.2015 bylhe calm ol Appeal. However. we appeal by UOB was allwaa. so, me aaasion man nullmea uoa s cualges on me pmpany was sax asuds The ml Flainﬁfl and SEL man omalnud leave [0 appeal lo ma Faﬂeml com agalnst ma com nf Appears daclsmn la nullify uoaa margin am the appeal was an-nlnaa on 10 7.2015. Yhara was a rel/lewaflhls Fadcral calm daclslon and on 22.4 2021 ltalﬁrmed its decision max dlmlisxed ma appsal by me Flrsl Flalnllﬂ and SEL T ssuil [5] on 13.122022 ma Flrsl Plalntvﬁ lagelher mun ma Second Plalrlmf ﬁled lms aull nasaa on ms cm L11 oonvaslon of ma prupeﬂy was Irarlslenedl urliusl enrlmmsnc, Dansplracy by unlawful means arm lraua. The sublet: rnaltlsr I! ma sama pmpeﬂy ma transaction In sun 23: mass causes olamn Ira pmnlaau an me am. :91 omaa I: mess in suil 233 The nllah soughllar are am yyvvzsumnvnunsevxwaxkn “Nair a.n.l n-vlhnrwm a. med w my n. nﬂnlnnllly mm: m.n.n wa nFluNG Wml la) Pa‘ImInlo1\eqa1 cdsxa RM‘L23D.863 we man smn oumfsun 233 and us appeaxs‘ Irv Ifve De4endanra to me Plainlxffs: my Paymem ofdischarge costs RM3,25S,2H 5810 remnwe the uoa mamas, by me Defendants to ma Piainﬁﬂs, (C) Pnymnnl M general damages in: wmnglul oonvarsmn of ma pmpeny and for lhe loss In we (mm 2242mm unm 2272n22 nu ; Conn’: -ssnssm m [91 Ad submitted by me Fvst in mm Deferudams, a daim is any suswmnaune w n Vs hmught vnlhln the nnnnanon prescribed by LA — In «ma case Mtfun swx years lmm me dale an wnmn me cause olicnon accrued wfudu Is pmvhled In as The nation vamaud Is calnulalad «um Ina date ol diacomy 0! such anagad fraud wnarauy .n ms 53 n was In zoo: The PIa\ntiﬂ:' sxamnem av Clavm (sac) para: 29 lo 32 sand that may had dlscnvemd man the pmpeny was hudulanﬂy Izanshnsd m December ma Vet man they Vnmalnd In aendn agnmsc Heveaplisl Marxanng, may dvd not ci\|e me Firs\| and Second navandancs (who wave nna directors at me rnensnax time) or ma mm Defendants. as defendants In Sun 23: Nor dwd the Flamms Inmate any mhsracbon bemoan Deoembef my and Deoemuerzumm damages that accrued vmn ma same mus: ovacnon. [101 Even n nwas mama: me Planmnffs nad dwswvaed me mvamemenz of ma First and Second Delenuams -n ma fraud during ma max at Sun 233, may vauad nd ﬁle any man against any or me am. Second 5! Yhnd nerandanu wnmn sdx ysarsoﬂhc we dnmuery, The Hrsmevandnm had «canned al (he Ir1alol§uI(233 Ax bask. llmnaxmn had sat .n by zuzu ma 5 am nWZ§wumﬂuASepXP4axkG «ma smm ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he nrW\nnU\|:I mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm ceun -n any lvinl‘ does ml aweol such cmnenuun. wnen mo Firs\| Plamml ma mlﬁaled sun 233 and menaaner praoeedsd wnn Ina!‘ he mu knuwiedge of and pnvy to m1orma\|inn that concerned we Involvement or me Defendants‘ wha\|aver umusl ennchmenl mat was sad to have beneﬁlled mem. mere was na apphcanun In amend me scaxsmem of clam: .n Su1(233 to add any or me Delendzms menu or even In I-n me cnrpovale van In nn allempl In hold me Fwrsl and Samoa De(e4\damz. Iwountabh In (Ms cows currsldeced view, mourmng nu: sun Vn zuzz lanlamounl xu Imganon by lnslalmams .n we use aqunvalcnt up sﬂaﬂhoughl ns x: has alraady been mmaan years nnee ma clusu or men acmaed [11] ms Caun‘s mew ws me nm oowea to eoncmde that me Plamhlls‘ use wfacﬁon for me (on ol oonvusxou ollhe pmpeny was a curmmnng cause 01 sction unnl uoas charges were dlsmalued, :2 accrued fmm 25.12.2005 Mum was me dale ol conversion 01‘ me prcpstty. The argumenu. ov a ecnlmuing cause of amen are laced (See Glnnrnlund Flnnnco Fucllmcs. m I/Dunks cmramnnw; Lad [19e2]2Au ER:-115) [121 Rallanca .5 placed on me Supreme Cuurfa dsciuon .n Cvidli cm (M) Bhd vFong 1.-n Sin (199111 cm :9, ‘The aacmne ol /mmezion m sard to be based an Ma broad oonsiderxtmns. Fm more rs a pmummion mat a ngn: not axerwsed In! a long mm )5 non—exIslenl The other mnsldevallon /5 me: :1 rs necessary that martels olngllt m general slluuld not be )eIt too mug In a stale orunceneinry or doubt at suspense. sm y‘uvz§wumnuAsspxP4.!xkq mu. sum n-nhnrwm .. u... m mm .. nrighvnﬂly mm: m.n.n VII mum pans! The /mama law .s pvvmufgaled for (he pmnmy ab/not of msnouragmg p/smmis from usepmg on the»! sums and more importantly to have a deﬁnite end m litigation nus rsin accord with the maxim mrelasl refpubllcae ul so: mus lifium thal m we mums: of ms slats (hate mus: be an and lo /rtigsmzn. me raaona/e of ms Ilrmtallon raw snoma be apprsaalsd and snlorced by me Couvts - ha] ms sun was imualed allsr me mam Cowl‘: aeasim m 2021 smnm Vt: eamer «season and munnuvned me uoa charges Ey 01:! um. ms rm Plsmiill had withdrawn its appmunn for in asieumem 91 asn-was berm Ihe Hwh com o ' wm In suit 233 more ssemea (a be an abuse 0! places: undnr hmb my Tms com does not mam KM maimms mnlermou mac us claim Is mmm «me as me avenue for appeal In Sun 233 was exhausled nnly nu 22.4 2021. The causes of aclzon lur nus saw am not accrue men but new In 2009 (see Amaank (M) Ehd v mmuyan bmamusn A Ors[2D13] 5 MLJ 443 and Anlﬂank (M) Bhd vaoaul A111 bln mas... L Dr: [zom] 3 ML.) my [141 In the mumuames. IN: sun is mime-aauea was Court will not ameﬂzln n as It Is nmy ﬁlnd lmnaon years anar ms causes :2! man accmsd As psi the cam olAppeal's daaslon .n Plrlrson Carp Sdn and v Fslnruddin am umnim (I/1 plmlnylln mm.) [2011] 2 MLJ A7, a um ﬁme«\|>arrad may he slmnk nut undei any 0! limbs ca Order 19 Rule 19(1) Rec [151 ms Court Is also at me considered View ma: ms Iasses and damages eoura have been claimed in me awHcanon (or asssssmem ai ms same max was mea at ma Shah Alam High court upon me uecsm \n R: lavuuv vac. me First P\aInM had chosen to wnharaw me sad 1 sm nwzs..u...msepx>4.ma mm. smsw n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my me mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm appluzanon Thus. whatever Issues could have bun vsnhhtad am lrﬁgated bad< man The daclrlne o1 res lumczna sans In benausl It covers matters mat slwuld and mum have been iuganed nun nol. see me Conn ol Appears demsnns in Tan Siew Chin Sdn Bhd v Perbaﬂanln Pongumsan sn Fnntnl [2913] 2 ML.) 513 and mm simumiun all Snanmugam v Aniun Fokus Sdn Blvd [2015] 3 ML.) 122. [16] me rel-svs no: payment at Vega! fees at Sun 233 and casts penawng In ma uoa chimes nughl In Mve um ven\|Ha\|ad and anmdxcaxsd at me manng allho asmsmem oldamlgss amla Shah Alam mgr. Cowl The Plainhﬂs had wua-ea n as compensanon for costs mar arose sum 5 ‘ 23:: was consumed In Rs malny To «ms cam‘: mm such daim far valiel laHs ofwivch me dcclrme oimsmdmata apphes‘ squarely under mu limb arms of process. [171 The summssims by me Plalrmﬂs mac Ims Sm! mvalved dmarann pamss and prayed lor umsrem rensrs wave conswleled um um aocemed by his court Al me and 01 me day. we miiafs prayed «or slammsd (mm m szma selalVa:1ua\|mn(l\|x me cause: ovacnon m Suvl 233. Due reHsls dalmsd lor wuld have been ullgnbed and Gamma ac ms -ssaumsm ol damages The ma m the case M Slc Koon mu 5 Anal v sa mm [1931] 1 MLJ 225 cﬂad by me Flalrmlfs an ausnngmsnea The Fun! Plamlmat me nsanng of assessment oi damages some have uaumad for me Vega! vases and alsu a ysasoname asumamn of nests mlaied la «rue uoa chanies, At that paint in «me, me appeﬂate coun had nunmed the Shah Nam mgr. cams declsmn penammgmme uoa marges and held them In be valid, sm yluvzswumnunsapxruaxkn «ma smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm [16] Al mia junmllal lms com nalos mal me Flu! la mm Delarvdanls were um names la Sui\| 2:: ur any nilhe sunsaquanl appeals lhemlrom, su we claim lor legal lees am discharge mass 0! uoe charges are mvelous and vexanous. The lens do ml show mall Elmer of me three uelemams were Ieglstered prwrlellors 01 lna prnpsrty. The pmpany was mglslered m me name of Heveaplasl Mnlkehng Upon winning lhe s n 2ol4. ll was men vagls1eled under me nams ol me Fla-ullls To clalm legal he: and cosls lmm me Flrsl In the rum: oelenuanls aﬂuf a mlmg by Shah Alam Hlgn Calm whlnh ls m five! ems Fm Plamlmi: wha\| lms Ouun em as lrivalcus am veuuau: net [19] ms Conn lalls back on ma Irvls lunaamenlal prlnc-ple Irlunclaled in sander Bulmor Sdn Bhd 5 (77: y Unitnd Malayan Bulking corpomion Ehd [@931 3 MLJ as This suil IS deﬁmlely on ma lace om, ohvlwsly unsuslalnable malaas and clmunslaneessreevldantmatlhe Plalnnﬂs‘ sun I5 nwoloua and vexanmls The Flrst Flalnml had me opponunlly tn vennlale all ma lseuea for me yells! m me amssmenl of damages years ago and mal makes lnls am: an abuse 01 pmcass. The Federal cams deelsion ln BouAnNgoI (p; vcnua Muuang (planed I: puma alum ol Kim Lang ru Tonlpla) [20119] a ML] 145 amrmld me daﬁnllmrl M abuse of Plvcau a\| para 9: ‘The term, anus. afproeuss oflhe court’, in ms rV9(1)(l1), has neon grven a we mtnrptelalion by the calm: ll mcludes consmaralron of me publm policy and me Interest of/usllce ma (arm szgl-mes me: me process ollhe mm mllsrhe used bona tide and ympeﬂy and must no! be abused me com! will prevent ma Impmper use oms machmery ll wul prevent (hi/udrclal pmcass oi Mlgallorl .. lran action was ml Dmughlbona ﬂea forms purpose of 9 am ylwzswumn-lAsepxP4axkG «ma a.n.l Iuvlhnrwm be ﬂied M mm s. nﬂmnallly sum. dun-mm VII nF\uNG ma obrainmg raw But for same one: ulm-vor mom or couatsmr purpose‘ m Hugh! be slruck am as an abuse olthe process 0/ the cum " [20] Tha Hrsna Third Decenaanw appucanan m sums out the Plalnmfs mam. under Enclosure 24 5 alluwed coscs o¢RM1D‘U0ﬂ Ls awsvved lo me First in Third Devsmams. DATED an AUGUST 2023 R02 MAWAR nozmu JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT VN MALAVA KUALA LUMPUR For my Prurntﬂr Rachel um N-Iv Ymg .4 Chan Kheng me together mm Ng zung Hm (PDK) rm Chang 5 Kheng Hoe For the Defendants‘ Fiona eodrpalsn R. Sundaladavan Ioqelhs: with Tan ws: Xhane 7/n Bodrpulav Ponnudura: De suv. sm ypvzsumnvnunsepxwaxkn mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm	1,368	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
AB-42S-4-03/2023	PERAYU TAN TEONG GHEE RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Criminal Procedure - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Criminal Procedure Code ss. 399 and 400 - Registration of Criminals and Undesirable Persons Act 1969 - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Increased penalty for administering dangerous drugs - S.15(1)(a) and s.39C of DDA - Whether there was prima facie case proved - Discrepancy in the Serial No. on the urine sample bottle - Whether the previous conviction record of Appellant sufficiently proved - Whether defence properly considered - Appeal against conviction dismissed - Appeal against sentence allowed	05/12/2023	YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e3505f14-e4bc-43c8-80bc-9b638ea7c06d&Inline=true	05/12/2023 13:21:22 AB-42S-4-03/2023 Kand. 21 S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N FF9Q47zkyEOAvJtjjqfAbQ *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m 15 AB—l2S—I—03/2023 as, 12/2023 14 DALAM MAHKAMAH YINGGI IIIALAVA DI TAIFING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARIJL RIDZUAN MALAYSIA rmvum JENAVAH N AE-425-4~01I2023 [PERBICARAAN JENAVAN NO.:AB—62D-136-1ﬂl2021 1 TAN TEONG GNEE [N0. KIP.: noaznoasussl ...PERAvU v FENDAKWA RAVA ...RESPONDEN [1 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Perayu, Tan Tecng Ghee, telah dnuduh an Mahkamah Sesyen Talplng pada 29.1u.2o21 unluk kesalahan benkul: Pummu E n n Eahawz kamu naaa 25/as/2021 Jam lebnh kurzng mm was lsenemnal m. Penna! Bahaman Slasatan Jenayah Mamum mu Peman Foﬂs Daemh mpmg dalam Daarah um Malana. dahm Nagan Pevak, lalah cmapau mnmasukkan dndah hlrbahaya mu MORPHINE ks damn baﬂan kamu sandm, ﬂan dengan mu kamu tshh mehkukin mm kesahnhan dlbawlh Sekxyan ‘\5(‘\)ta) Ah‘: amt. Eerbihayn 1952, ynng mans kamu sebehlm danpadn meLnkuk3n kesamhan um xevan dxsabhkan dengan ma (2) kesalahan .1. bawah Seksyen «suns» Akla yang samz mu Dada na/04/2n15 nan <5/ma/zazu 0\eh yanﬂ aemman kamu \|eIah melakukan mm kesmahan yang bmeh m hukum dlbawah sexswn we (1) Am my sama. Hukuman Pangim sahma lamnnh hdak kmang\1ma[5H£)Iun\|aup\|ﬁdak mslibim mm. m (shun am hemlak\ahJuga mxenmn mm hukuman sebal udak mum danDademn13)sehaI.sn.'. N FFm147xwEaAvJmwvAw mm Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm Kand. 21 2 15 E [2] Sslepas permcaraan penuh, Perayu lelah cﬂdapau bersa\ah den msamkan pada 2.3.2023 uleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (HMS) dan mkenakan Imkuman 7 talmn peruara dari cankn tangkap 2a 3.2021 dan 1 senacan mum Sena dvlemkkan dx bawah pengawasan AADK szlama Iemboh 3 Iahun selelah hukuman pememarsan selesaw [3] Rayuan Perayu Kelah mdengarpada 15 9.2023 uleh Mahkamah mi Fade 5.10.2023, Mahkamah mi telah msngesankan ssmfan yang mbuac o\eh HMS sena hukuman sebatan mlan Ietapi hukuman 7 calm pengara mkecep Ferayu Ielah memfavlkan rayuan lerhadap keselumhan kepumsan n den dwganlwkan dengan a tahun panjara dan oanxn langkap Mahkamah im. Arasan Pervghaklman ini mengandungl alasan saya dz\am menolak r-ayuan Perayu dan memendekkan lempoh hukuman penjars lersebut. RAVUAN TERNADAP SABITAN [4] akan sewenangwenangnya mengusik dapatan mahkameh bicara Auaxan undang—undang mamap bahawa mahkemah rayuan max me\ainkan hakwm pevblcaraan Ielah lerkhilaf dan segw fak'a a\|au undang— undang. lersalah arah am membual penﬂaxan keterangan yang twdak menwkupx yang bercanggah dengan keterangan yang ada. lm kerana haklm permcaraan mempunyax Kawemhan mehhal ﬂan mendengar sendlri kecerangan. Iingkah raku dan memhuat perulalan alas kredlbllm sam- Lai Kim Han 5. On V. PP [1931] I MLJ u (so); Fubllc Kassim[I91\|l]1 LNS 121; (197012 MLJ 79. sak Prosaculorv. Wan an Mahkamah ra)/han selerusnya akan menemi alasawalasan uauam [5] peusyen myuan din menenlukan sama ada msoxong oxen Ahasan z sw FFwmm«yEaAvJmwvAw -um s..1.1...m..wm.. used 1: mm 1.. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm m 15 15 an cn.n HMP kmvka membaukan kepuwsan Mahkamah Psrsakmuan ﬂmam kes nan an an s. V pp :11 1917 a 4 ,Iup5r\H7ankul llhlcaunsmme lieu Delawlbe Cmm alADn£a\ mzydmuxa hntween Iwo wnmouw demsxons mspeawe M me dale: M muse mlvflwmng da:\sIans' [251 Berlzmdaskan plmllp undang-undang yang dlvuluxkan dawn Kaiﬂalrp anaqwan Slnghlalsehm, Mahkamah mi mambuat upmuun msmlhh untuk lsrlkat denyan ksnumsen Mahkamah Rayllan dalam xaa Rosmun Saptay. Kavana Mankamah mu oerpeuana kapaua Dnnsw undarIg~und.an§ ms was bahawa ksdua-du: -nwuvnan nammaan, ISM wsso nos dan mm 2/zoos. mink dwgubm nanamakan man:-man: psrunlukan unuanqunuang den meh nu Mak memvunynn kual kusan Imdarvg-undang [29] Diet: nu. Mlhkaman lnl memuluskan am In llluln undmg-Imdlng ylrvy mnnnzpkan bahlwa Iampvl alv kcnclnn Rnspcminn wallh dinnbul .1. m 4... halal. J lamp-I alr kunclng Rupondnn dlamhil sen-um -in mam . ks :h.Juyn 1\| mpllalr "II R walldundlambil my: snhnnvik sun batnl, up-nr d m m . mm Ianusunc mumudaratkan m vlndakwnn Kevin: undlni-undlnl mm muwajlbkln proandnrnd-mllunn 2 [Fenekanan dwambah] [191 Seterusnya Mahkamah manarm isu kasnapan pm Bovang Cap Jari dan Eurarlg RJZE yang dIka\akan Iidak diperislaskan oleh pendakwaan. Mamjuk kepada muka suns! so di RRJ3 (P12). av aorang RJ2 cercaxan number kad pengenalan dan nama Ferayu letapl bangss mcaoackan sebagaw -MeIayu' dan agama sebagal ‘mam’ DI dalam Barang RJZS pula dlhujahkan sebagal oonlch hahawa muka sural 32 tidak menunjukkan namaltandatangan pegawa: (column akhir) (map: m muka sura\| 33 Iavdapalcalalan name/landalangan yang benznggungiawab pagawaw yang henanggungpwah (pendakwaan) sepem dikehendakx olsn 56 REQVSIVBHDVV of Criminals and Undesxrabls Persons Act 1969 [Act 7] (‘Aida 1-; Oleh Nu dmujahkan bahawa ads “lamps/mg’ lerhadap exam tersebut Namun. HMS menaapau sFa caran memben ketarangan bahawa semakan ks alas Borang RJZB mmk Pelayu Lelah dﬂakukan dengan Iellll aleh SP3 unluk memashkan hahawa rekud Iampau Ferayu n N FFm141xnyEaAvJmwvAw ma Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm ma nrW\ruH\|:I mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm m 1; (Islam kes W adalah kepunyaannya senan dan bukan kepunvaan or-ang lam (muka sure: 16 RRJ1) Pegusm juga berhuuah bahawa pennnan Mahkamsh-mahkamah yang bsrkenaan Auga max dnekslbrlkan unluk perbandingan. [20] membawa kepada isu rekcd kesalahan Vampau Iwdak dengtm betul uleh pwhak pendakwsan TFR bermqah nnnnwa $400 Kanun ‘ransom Jenayah ndaxan sebagai lambahan bagaimana sabwan lerdahulu boleh dibukiikan Pihak pendakwaan le\ah mengemukakan rekad yang dwperalehl danpada pendaﬂar jenayah, dan dmujahkan hahawa 5.5 ada\ah hanya untuk msndallsrkan rem sahnan lersehul. Femnmkan yang belul hagi pengamukaan rakod samtan lampau Valah $.10 ma 7. Kelelangan di P14 (muka Surat 37, RRJ3) mengesahkan pemyalaan dalam dukumen rekud sabwan Perayu bag! m]uan im adalah digunakan dalam perfalanan kompulsr yang biasa dan ketarangan ini tidak mcabaroxen punak Dembelaan, Perunlukan s 399(3) Kanun Tavacara Jenayah puva mernperunlukkan bahawa pihak penaanar panjenayah hendaklah mambeaksn keqerangan yang lelus ﬂan uada sebab kenapa Manxarnsn hdak mempersayalnya. [21] Femmukan s.4uo Kanun Taoaaara Janayah ada\ah sspam bsrikul “How pruvmus wlvvrdwun or anqumal may be pnma ma my In any ma-ry, mal or mher vmoeedvva under {Ms Code a nrevinus oamlclinn at acquilial or an order durecﬂng any person m be under the snvelwslnn aims police may he moved In artmuon m any nmennnae nmvlrled by any Vawiovlhu lime balm Wu laroe— (at by an emu oamﬁsd under me hand nuns oflicsr nawnu me cuslody ul the vewms al Ins cum whether at Mahysna ov me anpmc av Smgnwle wn whim that wnumn ur Iuqnma\ wns nm In be a cnpy nlﬂt: sentence ur under, nr (by \n case an mnwcunn edherby n ceriilimle ngnea by me alﬁcer wn change cl lhe plisﬂn Vn Mamysn nrme Repulﬂin oismgnpore u syn Frwmvxnyzaavlmwmw "Nuns s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VII .nuNG pm 1; m 35 m which (he pumshmenl ar any pen or n was I-mined. ar by Drodudmn at me warmm ov wmmllmem Imus! wmcn ma Dummmam was snmarsd‘ «ugmvm wnh, m -aw omme cases‘ we-nu am ma Idarmly uftha accused person with In: pew». an cnrwlnld m anqumsd (2) In case lha nmcer m chains on any arisen mu slate Vn any terminate swam Dy mm mm the ﬁnger pﬂnls mm swear an me oemﬂcale are Ihoee cl ms Pﬁlsun m wmm Ins camﬁcate rubles‘ max cemﬁcale she“ be smdencs 1:! the «am so slated. (3; Every Caun mu pmsume C» be genuine every dncumarll purpmlmg m be . I:em(u:.Ile av mnwnmn mu vurpumng In he mm by mg uﬁnsr in Dhllgz :11 any mm m Mamysxa urlha Rem: M Singapore, and mu also presume Inanhe amcevhywmm Ihsdncumemvurvorlslo heslaned waswhan ne smza n we owner m charge mine pnson mennoned m man dncumenl' [22] D1 da\am kes Mnhamad Vazid hln Mnhd Vnhava v PF [2015] MLJU 1929, VA Pesunmzaya Kehakxman Mahkarnah Tinggi lpoh lshah msmuluskan bahawa pembukuan raked sabllan lampau adalah me\a\ui seksyan 4D0(I)(a) mu ([2) Kanun Talacara Jsnayah aan mana-mana undang-urmang yang msmperunlukkan ysdermknan. Olsh nu. 5 ADD handaklah dlhaca dengan perunmkan Aida 7. Pstwken perenggan yang herkenaan ada\ah seperlu berikul. 131 \n my Vnw urban mu pnw-nu !ar (he made In mm Wsvlws mnvicimm Evwdancn Mn praviaus mnmm czm m.mm be mum by vinue cl s3c1\ans4DﬂH)(a) nr rm Howevanwhemmere Vs nnymherlaw mum Drw1ﬂslor‘am\hermer1e' Ia prove a pm/Won: eanv\r.1\en than such made us woman by mm xaw can also he usad Ills dear mac me wants “any Mher made‘ mmopmusvy be m ralahonlo proving a pvavxuus common [9] Iamlkooflin vmmm uclion um mullbu rudln bwllllrlclion mm m. n..mm- .. M c.:...s.. nd um. 'rIhIn p........ m cm (Rcun). rm wumm. m acun ihlclﬁully mu. um m. nulpﬁll um! imnm M scum Is ---.2 ccnsnlhtma Ind nmand m. llw providing for me renlsruunn .1: ceruln crimlnuls, . um hr other pumous connenleﬁ mm n". For we vmvosdlon x am awed by mm was m: by Hassan Anam GhamJC m s».mumm.n<.n. V. yr [:01 :1 V cm am when damdmg on 1; sw FFm147xhyEaAvJmwvAw «-um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm ma use on slmﬂav uwnnenc as F12 as pmm M ma mamaua cnnvlmans onne accused m mm case. man we learned JO onaawaa: suammn mm pcruntukln uksyul we Karnm nu ma A 5 [tin buhnwn mm mma nun... tlldlhulu Ilnnyl bnlill dllrlmuhkln donnn cabulan «am:-an p-yum: ynnn ml I . mm Mankaman sama an dilam Maraysra atau smaamna aliu nerakuan my dlrandaranyinl olell peqawal nealaaa nu-In Malaysia mu svnganura atiu .1-nyan menvemukakan mm. In Plmoﬂllrun. 125; Fads mndenat mshkaman ml skis yang mangawsl sells mirlgarmr psnaamyan Psnjenayah raan Am 7. Menglkut nmamma ma 7, .a nanu/uan baa! msrvyamkan dan memlnda unaanwnaana yang Is rnarvyidakarv pomnman mt Pendanaran pemnayan, warm atom-ans; M907! dmw, mnyan dan «an; Ismar: lollanlu bag! mma ram yang Dalsalwkurun aengannya Junwu‘ Fﬁvswur Vunv mannga mkad mahﬁwmah bimlalsud Dﬂgawal dad Puss! Pimfaﬂsran p.n,anayan Ma/a.V=4s alau Slngapuna ~ 2a [231 Psmnlukan berkenaan pembukuan cap jar! dan aamoan di bawah Akla 7 pula 7a\ah aapem berlkul: ‘am mengenaw up ,an din sahwtan yang dnhulu cu m Tenakmkkepada subseluyln (21 uaL>Iiap— , 25 as) harsh! cav Jan Hka dlsahkan dengan sswziemya men Denawa nanaaaanan 4a; pemkul surilin mau cahutan (aama Ida bumubung dangan cap Jam emu sslnmnyﬁl Elana- Wbardasatkan aaoaoan yaw mcanm dmipnda aanan aan M an unmwam nleh Pendaﬂar sebaual amanmsaaanman‘ man 1:) p-nkuan yang dnanﬂzvzngzm am. Flndaﬂzr bahawa— u) can an seaemang «am. dxbandmgkan dengnn nip .an ying Van! yang manmu dahulunya aIaukamud\|annya‘:1an as no czv Jan yam (em mhandlnskan ﬂu law: can Jan grant: an Jllna. na..aauan dmenma aanagas keleringin aaram rvuhkarnah dan ma-,am hukll yang cukup mengenai pelkara yang dwperihmknndmnmnya mmanuan Jlka akasnya mmmman. an m Aaamna Iva-Iva parakuan yang mruwk dahm pmmganuxcmu dlrnnma usbagal kalsmwgan Ua\am manuamanmamcaman atau tsnudun kmlsh menyaman Fendalur sebigmseuring sikxi dun nu (snuduh nemuzl demwzn dls hemzk\|ahmemher!kanmNs kzpaﬂa Pendakwn Rays As Mak kuranw nan:-ma sap-nun nan sanavum bermmarlya pemmaan Ilu “ 11 am FFwm7xkyEaAvJmwvAw «ma a.nn n-nhnrwm be used a mm In: nrW\nnU\|:I mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm 1n zn 25 [24] Mahkamah W neraamju dsngan nuyanan TPR teraehul an alas ﬂan Jugs ksputusan Mahkamah T\|ngg\ lpch lersahul mangenax cara bagaumana raked sabnan lampsu dibuknkan. ~auznanu:an'ng affTI:sr' dalam 5.2 Akﬁa 7 bermaksud '(a) me prasssulilvg psrlu Perkalaan paras: responsible for aumemiaanng ma mam: ofa case at the cone/usron of me base where a person is zzharged wrm a regmraue a/rencef. Selerusnya aurhsnricalmg omcsr ini akan msraporkan di bawah 5.6 kepulusan sarna ads terdapat sabnan (bmeh yuga mganmng dx bawah s.6(a)(‘u)sebagaI oonlah. apabila bun yamman berkelakuan hawk mpennnankan olsh mahkamah), apabna kes nu (amat. on da\am s.1Dm1aI< ada ksperman unluk mengsmukskan panncan-psnnnan mahkamah rzndah yang Ielall mensabilkan Perayu da\am 2 kes m hawah s‘15(I)(a) ADE sebelum , Mahkamah yuga da\am nan vu bnleh menggunakan anggapan 5 mm) Akla Keievangan 1950 bahawa ‘{2} ma: iudrcral and olﬁcfal acts have been regu/arty nerrormednt Lue vong Wu v PP [1962] MLJ 351 Pegawaiamgawax mg berkenaan lelah menjalsnkan Iugas rasrm masmg-masmg dalam merekodkan sabnan Kampsu Fe:-ayu den sslerusnya dlsahkan oleh spa. O\eh nu, uada men! juga da\am 2 lsu yang dmangxnxan (ersebul. [25] P‘ ak pembelaan selemsnya berhujah bahawa man ada kes pnma facis dlhuklwkan Ierhadap Perayu berdasarkan sernua kegagaxan pihak pendakwaan yang mnujankan di eras Says xelan menielaskan alasan says alas kenapa rayuan ini mask bermem mengenax mu-isu yang amangxnkan olen peguam Perayu. Bag: manyawab secava kssslumhannya, Mankaman Inl mendapaﬂ kslelangan yang zﬂkemukakan o\eh pmak pandakwaan ada\ah mun lerhadap Perayu Mahkamah im sehagai mankaman rayuan berpuas nan hahawa e\emen panama‘ kedua dan keﬂga dalam penuuunan Ie\ah dibuktikan. Bag 15 an FFwm7xnyEaAyJmwvAw -ma saw ...n.mn be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm wa muNG pm 15 ;n eleman panama dan kedua. Perayu Ierbukti Ie\ah memasukkan dadah Morphine ks datarn badannw. Dalam nal mi, anggapan ax bawah seksyen am) aaaran Iemakan secara ooerasi uemndangan (by apemnon at law). Vn merupakan snggapsn sxatmcn uamu: 'sacuan :7. Pvesumpuons. (k) n 2 plum: n charged Var an uﬂerlce a! consuming . dzmuemus drug or adrmmslenng . dangemus drug in himsew nr smnng any am: person ta ndrmmsler a dawemus am: In him, and any aangemus drug is mum .n we um: anne person shelved as a Msuhofa unne\|es\|wnduc1sA1 undavseclmv am, ma Person snan be pnasumaa, unm ma cantrary n proved, to have mnsumsd Ins drug at to ma admlnmmnd me am; to rnmsen av to have sulvarod any almv person to admlmsvarma drug to nun wn oommanmn oﬂms Au av n. mgulihcnn “ [26] olan yang damlklan, beban pembuktlan berpindah kspada Farayu unluk memhukhkan axas mmangan keharangkahan bahawa ma max memasukkan dadah lersehul ke dalam hadannya. Sakhyi v v PF [2022] 5 cu asn Anggapan statulan Ini membawa haban yang venin Ierhadap kes berm danpada sekadzr menimbmkan keraguarl Dendakwaan. Dalam ha! inn. walaupun HMS mendapah‘ Fera‘/U Iwdak benaya menimbulkan keraguan terhadap kes pendakwaan sedangkan heban pembukhan lelah berpmdah kepada Pemyu umuk memalahkan anggapan bahawa ma lelah memasukkan dadah lersebul ke ds\am badannya. alas mlhangan kabarangkahan, bsban W aualan svtdarmary burden sahaja darn max rnanuacacxan sahilan atas pa ' ' n maxsnnum keterangan yang diksmukakan uleh pihak psndakwaan Fakla yang naak boleh msangkal ialah dadah Morphine berada dalam badan Ferayu Txdak ada mana»mana kexanangan mkemukakan o\eh Perayu bahawa ma amenaman menganmu dadah lsrsebul sebagai ubsl alau lam-xaun ssbab. Conmhnya‘ ﬂka Psrayu Dam sahaja menjalam pemneaanan alau saaang menanma Iawatan avau mangammn ubabubalan dengan presknps\ 15 N FFwm1xkyEaAvJmwvAw Nuns smnw ...n.mn be used m mm n. nrW\nnU\|:I mm: ﬂan-mm wa .nuNG pm 15 dampada duklur Pmak pembelaan bo\eh melnanggil duklnr‘ pegzwal sains atan ahh larmasw yang mempunyai kepakaran bag: memberi kelerangan ax mahkamah bemubung dengan perkara im. Pembelaan boleh mengemukakan dekumen sokongan sepsm kad mm Iemu dengan dokturlpakar. kad mwacan, salman praskﬂpsx ubatan aeau sampel unac- unacan kepada mahkamah sahagal mm. (271 Se\anjuInya, dvpemmbangkan dengan waiar o\eh HMS. setewan menelm pembe\aan isu msngenaw pembslaan Perayu yang Iwdak Pemyu. Mahkamah W Juga rnendapaﬁ pembelaan yang dibawa oleh Persyu bersifal penanan semam-man din Iidak benaya memalahkan anggapan sfamlori yang Iakah heroperasx lerhadapnya. Sapem yang saya henkan oanlch an alas, «max ada psrkara sepem W amuat men pemhslaan dalam kes pembelaan mahupun dxkemukakan ax penngka\| pendakwaan, melainkan bergantung Kepada xsmsu lsknlkal yang sudah pun dipmuskan dalam beherapa case laws sebemm um. Oleh yang demikmn‘ Manxm-an wdak menaspau apaaua men! dalam 2 Isu yang terakhiryang mbangkmkan oleh Pena‘/u. [251 Eagi e\emen xexiga, selekih menelixz xesemruhan kelerangan spa dam kelelangan aokumsmar, Mahkamah W berpuas nan dengan kalerangen den penjelasan spa ﬂan mendapatn s\emen Kehga luga ls\ah dihuklwkan unluk mensabmkan Fevayu dengan kesalahan penam Iebih beta! di hawah s.a9c ADE lersebul Tidak ada kekmzvan apabila HMS menerirna keterangan SP3. seurang yang lehah mwanakan dw bawah Akta 7 Irujuk P10), yang telah menerangkan bahawa beﬁxu Iehah membuat semakan dengan raked dalam simpanan mhaknya can membandinikan can ]an, nambnr psndaﬂsran raked Ferayu cc15u9594, nombor kad pengenaxan den namanya n sw FFm147xhyEaAvJmwvAw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm m 1; In [29] Sebagan (ambahan, da\am menslm kelerangan saksl—sak.si pendakwaan‘ Mahkamah W herpues nan max lardapal percanggahan ma\|ena\ paua bv¥a—bI\|a mesa yang bmah menyababkan sahilan Parayu memadw naak selamal Jnka ada pun percanggahan‘ Va Aidak malarial den menunynkkan saksi Iidak mayar umuk mennnen ke\erangan yang betul m mahkamah dan mereka member‘! kelemngan berdasarkan Tngalan masing-maswn nn sunn Eng v PP [1933] 3 MLJ 15 on-nn slang Gun: v PP [1969] 2 MLJ as. Mahkamah mendapall juga lldak ada kelerangan umuk menuruukkan bahawa pmak pohs hendak menganiaya Psrayu atau ada sebab unmk berbahcng dalam ksterangan mamka PF v Shubnn Eln Abdul Rahrnan man] 2 MLJ :13. Mahkamah juga menuapan max ada apa—apa yang “inherently Incredible‘ da\m keterangan sm — SP7 dalam ka' ’ Mohamed Alias v PP[1981]1 LNS zon; Shah lnuan Ton v. PP & Anomor Case [2013] 1 LNS 377. [30] Mahkamah mi meruluk kepada kes PF v. Mohd Rzdxl Bln Abu Bnkar [Zuni] 5 ML! 393 yang memmncangxan vsu prime «acne den seknanya pembe\aan mpanggu, hagalmana mahkamah bawah penu msnangam pambexaan yang mbangmxan, xaxtu dengan menggunakan prinswp nnaangnnuang yang man mamap dalam kss Mac y PP [1253] 1 MLJ 25:. Mahkamah Pevsekuman \eIah memumskan bahawa: ‘M was oonnecnon, oounsel lnvme apneﬂam had veﬂerred m us \he case :4 pa vsawmnd Drs[1§71l2 MLJ we wneve SharmaJ he\dmauhelzIsIly of the dzfence dues nm mum me Dvusacuhon mm vrovlrvsl me pmmnnunz ca beyond mama ﬂuum w. in mm um that wllznzver rimmll cu: .. dncidud an an mm mm. Imlh Mlhn pnmunxon-s use as iﬁllnsl um mm, M m. dnfuux nary, . Mal luau: nnm In imomance mm on Drinclpll ma dawn In Mat vPP[1IGC\|] 1 mu 2:: an om mp «mm mm cnnvlcllnﬂ Ihu mus-u by nlvlnu duo consldnrallon as In whyﬂn dchncn scary, Iilouﬂh could not nu um, um nnmm a nasnnablc douhllntm pmilnlniun 9.... m... Ivnn mung». . gnag. ﬂan nut Inc-pt av 1\| syn FFm147xwEaAvJmwvAw -ma s.nn ...m.. wm he used m mm n. nﬂmnnﬂly mm; dun-mm vn mum pm belleva tho Incas-d's Ixnlmnllnn, ms .Iccuud mun nm as sonwmn Imlll ms cowl is sallsllmi lav sumnlnnt nascn um such -xmmuon docs nnl cast a nasonahln daubt m lhn prosmmon can Tn may this la! n In nm to much [In woms men by we gum.‘ mu ma... an lclull appﬂli-Iﬂon mm tail lo I»: rum onus cue um mum. In this c. .. wu inund mm thy Iunud an-I Judge oﬂered pracllcnlly no mm. why mu dnhnm, nnllrhhlumilnq in mslty um nncomtlncllm "um, um mum to cut .um...m. duuhi m an mmmxun us-. onmum. Io slain by my mm mm. nu any Iilaoud by In. {aw on Inc o-mm In cam in acuum. [Emphasis added] [31] Mahkamah W iuga menuuk keuada kes All Tun Bln Ahdullnh v PF [ma] 2 ML) svs mg memuluskan bahawa “proof beyond reasonable dc-ubr «idak bermakn Dmolbsyond the shadow oldaubr (ruwk Millerv Mlnlslnr ol Fonllons [I947] 2 All ER 312) Wa\aupLm laedah keraguan dlbsnkan kepsaa seorang \|enuduh, mahkamah bwcara Iidak wajav msmpsmmbangkan keraguan “lam:rfuIon'n ms naxuls alspsculanun‘ PP V Saimln a. D15 (1271; 2 ML] 15. [321 D. dalam kes Ali Tan am Abdul/ah (supra). Mahkamah memuluskan bahawir 1151 Indeed, mere denlnl or Dresenﬁnn - rm. Mary 01 Innncnncl, men as m (M clvcumnanus mm nus-m cast camml amount to unlnrublu dnuhl. Thu court‘: acclvlanu om» uxnlanallon enema by m Iucuxud pnuun mull :2. band upon Mann and summon sense. and nnnol as [Magical M lrvillonll. Yrn mmncn 01 msamus dauhl is u..m.u.m uyonlhl mumy ullh nvlduncn ma on an examination at .u (In Ivlduncn m . my 1nd nnnmhlt murmur and no! In In-alanon. In we present case, Ihe lezmad as m msludﬁmenx had very meuculnusw ounswdersd \|he aecsnes cl ms appeHan\| The learned JC ms sahsﬂed man me aprpaﬂam had ianed m cask any neasunable daum an Irv: pmsscuuon-s case and mac Ins charges weve moved beyond reascnahle am: ws are m oompbta agranmant wnh ms reamed 40 We are “man out \|hI mm-1 JC had um rmsdwreclad Mmseﬂ m any way tn eccasmn an ermr ewhsr on ms Yaw cu m mu: m 19 N mmmysammww ms Sum IHIVVDIY WW as used m mm me nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII .mm mm 15 2a 25 aa wananupaenane iueﬂelenee We ave urmmmousmanha lsnmad 1!) had not made any Mani lnlerences an «na iacls hetom Mm. wa «mm na meals -n «ma avPea\ We 9cx>mdmu\y annnsaaa Ina awaal and amrmsd ma wnwcuons am sentences on mm the cnargnssu [Penekanan ditamhah] [:3] HMS Ie\ah mendapali pemnelnnn tidak menimbulkan Ker-aguan Ierhadap kes pendakwaan dan selerusrlya rnendaDa\|i Perayu bersalah dan disabxtkan aengnn kesmahan yang dipenuduhkan 0\eh nu, jelas bahawa HMS Iidak mempemayai kelsrangan Perayu yang mempakan penaﬁan semaxa-mana. Msngambi] klra pr1ns\p dalam kes Mat v PF (supla) HMS adalah bsrhak unluk manaapan Perayu bersalah dan mansaanxannya aoas perluduhan dw hawah 5 15(1)(a) dzn dibaca dengan 5.390 ADB1952. [341 Daham penellllan says ke nus alasan penghakvnan HMS, saya mendapali slruklumya agak berbeza dengan bsbarapa alasan pengnnknnan mengenai szibnan dx bawah seksyen yang sama Im yang pernah aaya Hhat sebemm um Tetapx 1m max mswajarkan Mahkamah im umuk mengstepukan samtan Ierhadap Perayu olah sabab naua kegagalan kaamlan Ustlurs ofjuslicsj t1a\am kes an dapatan HMS Aalah pihzk pandakwaan eanan bsqaya membukhkan kes me\ampaui keraguan yang munasabah sssuaw dsngan keuavangan yang ada, Mahkamah wm jugs seielah nnanami kesemruhan kelerangan yang diksmukakan, berpuas nan banawa mhak ncsndaxwaan Ie\ah membukukan pemmunan lsrsebut Ierhadap Perayu melampam keraguan yang munaaaaan. oxen ilu, Mahkamah mendapau sabnan yang dxhual oran HMS adalah sslamai dan rayuan atas sannan telah dMo\ak. wawaunagaimanapun, rayuan Perayu axaa hukuman Isiah dihenarkan alas alasan di bawah zu syn FFwm7xnyEaAvJmwvAw Nuns sanaw n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. anann-y mm: dun-mm wa .nunc Wm! xn Fenghakwman darn kelerangan dalam vekod rayuan yang mruzuk secara nngkas sebagau RRJ1. RRJ2. km: and RRJ4. Dawn kes Tm, lerdapal bebewpa alasan dalam pensyan ra‘/uan mg boleh dmngkaskan sepem benkul menurm hulahan peguam Peray . L perbszaan pads nomhor an: d: balnl ssmpe\ unn ﬂan naua mm: samps\ terssbul dikemukakan semasa penncaraan, xagagaxan mengambil 2 sampex, ui kesvapan pada Burang Cap Jari dan Eurang mza yang lidak diperjelaskani xv rekua keselahan Iamnau ﬁdak mnukukan dengan belul. vi. kes pnma lacislidak dwbuklika , an vn. kegagawan menxmbangkan psmbs\aan Ferayu. [a] D! penngkae pnms iscia, psndakwaan penu membuldikan e\emen kssalahan sepam yang berikulz L bahawa Perayu \|e\ah memasukkan dadah Aersebnl ke dalam tubulmya: sampe\ unn Perayu Ie\ah mun dan disahkan mengandungw dadan bernanaya yang lersenar-av dmam Bahsgxan III. Jaduzﬂ Panama Akla Dadah Berbahava 1952. m. Perayu mernpunyax sekurang-kurangnya 2 sabnan Vampau dw bawah s.15(1)(a)Akla nadan Berbahaysﬂ-152(ADE). FAKTA KES [7] kesnw. SP3 adalah saksl danpada Fejabat Fendallar Rekod Jenayah manakala SP5 aaanan Jumtsknclogx yang manenma tmml yang mengammng: sampel urln Psrayu den Ann Knmla Hayal yang msn;a\ankan upan ke alas sampe\ urin Perayu Fakla ks memmjukkan ak pendakwaan rnernanggil 7 orang saksi umuk membukhkan s syn FFm147xhyEaAvJmwvAw -um smm ...m.mn be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm mwunu ATA5 HUKUMAN [35] Melalui F'13A nemuxu bahawa Perayu mempunyai rekod samum Vampau. Wmaubagaxmanapun, hukuman yang dualuhkan uleh HMS mu 7 (ahun psmenjaman adalah hukuman mavsimum yang bmeh dlkenakan m bawah 3.396 ADE Iersehul Mahkamah Im uaran mengeleplkan hukuman paniara 1 tahun lersehul den digarmkan dsngan hukuman psmara sslama 6 lahun. Hukuman sebalan dan pengawasan AADK dikzkalkan [36] Setelah mengamml klra keselunman hal keanaan kes ini Lian rayuan mmgasz Psrayu, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa HMS Vebvh memlokuskan Kepenﬂngan awam daripada kepemingan Ferayu Dv da\am kas Mnllamed Ahdullah Aug Swn King v PP[19cB]1 MLJ M1. Mahkamah Aglmg lelah memuluskan yang benkul ‘In assowng ma Vangm av custodial sentence, the bum mus! max al We mm: pwdura m parspscllva by wniwdsnng‘ Wsﬂy‘ me gravily oi the Iyne at oﬁence cnmmmnd‘ secnndty‘ me «am m (be oomrmsswon Mme chance‘ tmmy‘ we measure nr absence oi mlngahng la-mars, and, fourwy, Ihe semenues mac have been ‘mama m the pisl em mm uﬂsnces to delerrmns the «mm M sennencmg nanny. w any rm (an that a senlanu u1\mw1wnman\|Is\mpo5sd as a delevrenoe does rm mslﬂy me lenlanclv m passmg a ssntsucs olgwalsr Venglh than when ma lacls Mme oﬂence wirmm Yhi grmnly nllha type oluﬂsnce Involved musl be mnsmeleﬂ in me ugm mm Damcularlacls nllha amuse As mated hylames L). In R v Ladd L nmam [1915] Cr LR so. Thvmas Em.‘/clnpasdla m Cunenl semenamg Pmcuce p 1053 -wn run In look n the averlll nlcmre of um I. Itn ngm unhncu rm we Mal lnvolvemtnl, mu \|nIx\| mg... ml crlmlnullly mama. and m hue nu ma lhn nnunou in plnplclivl wilh ﬂu unhncni um um bun pnsnd an mint occnions fnroﬁullcu invnlvlnn crlmlnal acuvlly olthis «ma, mm». av mm. V: g m Illulr grivlly. Cluﬂy - dttevvemelelimnlhlsmbe .mn-.1‘ um bocauu me auenm In very swans, I: does um nlcns-rily fallow Inn on In: paﬂlcularlltns very lung semences m Jusllﬂl 11 N mmmysammwuw ma smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 15 10 15 [Fenskanan dwambah] [37] Du’ dalam kes Mohamad Jusoh bin Ahdullzll and Anor. v PP [1247] MLJ 1:0 pula, W\Han CJ menyatakan ‘In uur new no sentence can be aaaama by a shame msmemahcal Vormma. Maﬂyfacwrxmurl bl vakunlnw aowuntaccordlnutome mrwmslarvcesoleach mdunﬂual case ln\h:lruvsc1 wa mum draw attention «a ma manan wmch shamd aa man mm acmum xn «mg pumshmam: as am mu m nanamm/a um aa England 1Ha\IsMm Edmnny vmume 9, pnm 355 'IneCoun.1nﬂxiMIhe Dumshmenllarany Dlﬂwwlarcnme‘ wmaxa mm mnsmemllnn me name ac me oﬂenoe. Ihe mumananaaa m whmh u was comm-«ed, ma denies ov dehlzerznnn shown by the onenaen Ihe Pmvucahon wmch na has moan/96‘ n me mm \s am: at vwmencs‘ me nmncsdlnls M ma mama: wt in ma mm. M umenue. ma age and rJ1am:1ar" [aa] Esrdssarkan pnnsup dalam kss (srsebut, rayuan dalam rmligasx uaak wa;ar dxkstepukan begnu sahaja. samaaa di hadapan HMS, Perayu hanya memohun hukuman dmngankan nx hadapan says. peguam bermqah hahawa hukuman mamnum yang duztuhkan Iidak wauarsebab Km xan pemama Perayu disatmkan di bawah 5 sec [391 Mahkamah mi berpandangan bahawa kepsnhngan swam hendabdah dumbangkan dengan kepenungan pesa\ah sspem pnnsxp dalam kes PP v Loo Choon F:M[1\'I76] 1 LNS 102. Jwka .1 at dan segw hukuman. kesalahan uni membawa hukuman pemenjaraan antara 5 ke 1 lamm dan tidak lebm 3 sehalan. Kesalahan yang dﬂakukan Iersebut buleh dikalegurikan sebagaw kesa\ahan lldak serius ﬂka mengmumkman dalam seksyen 52A Kanun Keseksaan di mans dinyalakan ‘The wards ‘non- serious wanes" denote an offence pummms with Imprisonment for a mm or not more man van years. Oleh nu, Mahkamah mangammx Kira dalam keadaan Inn, kepsnungan pesa\ah maam Imleh dipsnimbangkan 2: N FFwm1xhyEaAvJmwvAw ma Snr1n\nnnhnrwH\I>e used m mm a. nrW\nnH\|:I mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm apabﬂa mbandingkan denaan kepenlingan awam. Seklranya pmak /egra/awe hemasral supaya hukuman 1 lamm dlkenakan lerus kepada pssamh, pemmuxan hukuman udak akan mgubal selama amara 5 hmgga 7 tahun dengan membsn bud! bwcara Kepada Mahkamah untuk 5 memmbangkannya. KESIMFULAN [401 Se\e\ah mengamm kira sega1a ketevangan, ha! keadaan dan fak\a an kes mi, Mahkamah im’ menmak rayuan alas sabium dan mengetepikan hukuman 7 (ahun peruara den menggamlkarmya dengan hukuman peruara selama 6 ram dan Iankh Iangkap. Hukuman Iain aikekawxan. as Benarikh 5 Disumher 202: km) NOOR RUWENA sum MD‘ NURDIN m Fuuluhlnyn Klhakimun Mahknmh Tlnggl Mnlnyn, Talplng 25 PERWAKILAN aux plhak Parayu: so En. Raven AIL Fonusamy P. Rnvn a co., Tniplng am plhnk Rnponden: 15 In Mohd. Waffy Ein lsmall Fnlabal Timbzlan Pendakwa Ray: Naguri Perak, Tzipinﬁ n sw mmmysammmm -ms Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm m 25 bahawa Perayu \|e4an dnangkap pads 27 3.2021 pads ‘am wemn kurang n.2u rnalam an rumah No 31, Jalan TM1/9. Taman Tupax Mas, Taiping, Ferak aeas kasalahan memllikl dadah jams nernzn, eramin dan lelah dibawa ke Pegabal Nark um) Taming untuk menya\ani ujwan sarmgan swan urin. Pada jam 12 on tengah malam 25 3 2921, pihak di Pepbal Narkotik VPD Tavpingtexan rnenghubungi Jabatan Kecemasan Hnspwal Taiping nmuk rnemnawn Pernyu ke sane bagx merualankan wan sanngan awal unn Kelapl plhak hospﬂal eelan meminla plhak nous merualankan ujlan sanngan awa\ unn lerssbul. memamphela e. [5] CV97: mu, Perayu \|e\ah msuruh memilin salah salu mm: sampel yang mssmakan nleh PDRM dan ma Ielah mernum bola‘ dengan No. Sin AD236289 mesm uleh SP1 ke oandas umuk mengambil swipe! urinnya unan sanngan aw:-1! urin Isiah ujalankan pads jam 12.05 Iengah malam uleh SP1 darn hasil wan sanngan awn! unn Ferayu mdnpnn pow untuk dadahienis Mornmne. SP1 memakmmkan nasu wan sanngan awe! samba! unn i\|u kepada Perayu dan selerusnya mengarahkan SP4 untuk mengislkan numnn pads label dw bolol sampe\ unn cemanun. Selepas mu, Perayu ssna s:-1 msnumnkan landstangan msreka paaa Ianex dw nmnx samps\ ur(n(srsebuI.SF1 kemudran te\ah seal halal serum! unn tersahut an hadapan Perayu.SP1 menyerahkan halal sampel Imn Perayu kepada SP7 (pegawai penyia§a\ kes) Dada hari yang sarna tam 5.30 pagi, [9] daﬂam kawakannya separuang mass semngga marnbu men SP2 unmk mnantar kepada SP5 pads 29.3 2021 [am wemn Kurang 3.30 pslang. sw dan SP5 mengesahkan semasa anemna masxngmesmg mendapan bola! samps\ Imn Perayu aﬂalah dalam Keadaan new dengan ssax, bannelerai Kelerangan SP7 mengesahkan bola! samba! unn Perayu berada dan nenanel dengan huliran Perayu, uandavangan Perayu den A syn ssmumyznmmwnw Nuns s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm to m tandalangan SP1 sehagai pemungm sampel urin harsebul spa menyerahkan mm sampel urin Perayu kepada spa pada hall yang same umuk uﬂan analnsa pada hari yang sama svs mengesahkan menerima bale! sampel win lersebutdalarn keadaan bank seperli di alas darn setelih membual ujian analisa mendapau samner unn Peravu Dnsml aaaan Morphine. [10] HMS berpuas hali bahawa tiada pecahan ramai kelerangan mm: Samuel yang msngandungi urin Psrayu dari masa ia diamhil semnggaxan szlesai upan analisa yang dibuat o\eh sva. Eurang Penniman Upan Dadah dalam Air Kancmg may yang dﬂengkapkan unmk pengesanan dadah dalam urin Perayu dan Laporan Patobgi \|P8)yang msemakan men svs ks alas samnel urin Perayu merupakan kelerangan dokumemar bag: mengaukan Ferayu dengan Marpmne yang dldapsn dalam badannya Oleh yang demman. seleiah merualankan pemrauan maksxmum atas kelsrangan saksl-saksx pendakwaan, HMS telsh memenggu Psrayu untuk membela am alas penudlman Iersabul. [11] sexelah mendengav kelerangan Perayu ($D1L HMS mendapali Perayu 'I\dak menankan ada memasukkan aw kencmgnya ke dalam bowl um. bemombor sm A02362E9 umuk lujuan ujlan saringan awe! pads hari kejaman, oleh Ru mahkamah bernendapat Nada ape-apa parcanggahan material yang Ixmbm berkenaan nombor sun note! an‘ kenomg mlluk on an da\am kes mi.‘ Rujuk kelerangan sm bsnkul: FE sm puhun nquk pad: ekxmhn P5 mm mm u)nlame( packst Han ma on: Don: smuh kamu um mu ><e\uarkar\ halal dam p.lk£\| mi number mi pad: Bake! den how adzkan same’ sm Sama 5 sw FFm147xhyEaAvJmwvAw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm PB Makah kamu .....u.«... an kanuna dava... bulul nu’? sm M: [.2] HMS menyslaksn .1. persnggan 3 alasan p...gr.........n ma... 5 hahawa: -3 .=..... p........... ........g... .......... .......u.. xx... ..... on .....p..1a.am m... ya... .2... pembelann menqaku .1... .....e...;.. .......~. cw ....... ...e........... ...=.......... memasukkar. .1..1... 1.. .1...... ...x..... .........y. .....1... s.............. n..1.......... .1. ....1.p... mahkamah .. .1... ...........1...g..... on m .9... ......x....... ...s........ ......... on Vayak .1........... .1. ..w... seuyer. .5 (.7 raj Ana .952 u... hukannya hukurnan .1. bawah seksyeﬁ sec 1.1 to. An... ya.-.1 ram: Karina on 1..1a.a... kai .... msnaﬁkan mknd .a.v»pa.. on .1. .1a.a... s... .. ....... ...k..1 ......u.. ..........y.. (.k....... m) x...y...... yang um. um... ........ ......n......... i..- .5 . M............ .... ...pan...a.a.. pe...;....... o1<T ......... ..1..... ..... p............ yam .............u.... hahawa ox. ..... ............ ...s..........y. aepelﬂmana .. ........ p.............. .1. .......n ............... .... ...... p............. .1. Diwali sskryer.15U)(aDADE «.52 s........... .1e...... .5. mkod ...np... 1.1 on 1. ..a..... m ...., mahkamah Inga navvenaanac Iekod ....a....... map... on u. .15.... 1...... ulih ........ ma .1... bukannya ......x cm... ..... a... a\as=n ......... Rgknd ma... on .1........... a... 5...... a....1....w.... ....a ...... .>......... .>....1..... .=...1....y... M....y.... u... s...g.p.... 4...... 5......" .....y.... 5...... Amen M...ys.. s............ .s...... .........g........ ........ 25 vmnanksan ma... .1... ....e.a..g.....ya .1. 1...... p......;...... a my... 5.... SFLHPSPJJ. sr-3 halal. ............ ......a.u_1... hahawa nemakan ks alas aw... mm. .x on .... .1........x.... dmgan cum. .1... SP3 .. dalam .... .... .1. .1...m ................ 5...». .....u .......... on .1. .1...... ks; .... ..1..... ........y.... on .1... ......... ...p....y..... arnng ... ...a..... ..........g... sva ......... TFR: .<..... s... .u..... sun... ........ ............ ........ yang ...,.... u... an 5...... no... umkarﬂ sm 5...... Jan: ma .... ...a..p.... .1.o..a. ........k... ........a .1.-w... as ............ ...p..1. :12 yang m... .1............ .a.... sahrlan mu .1... u.......... ...... beml ......., .......x..... .c .1... can ......y.. Jud. say. Isms celak mp... ........ ems .c.......... Renard ................. Sysram) Dada .....<.. 24/06/202. 1... 1...... x... lengak me i... .e......e .1...n..1. 5...... War. Baker. I»... sebemh .... ...<.. .. Iarvavar .a......, masa .1... danvzda 5...... FDRM .1... wen... we ......... ada. sswapas n. say: pan... .......a betul. numbav s s... .....m..z....u.....,.. «w... s... .......w... .. ..... . my .. .......-y um... ........ .. ....... Wm. m In 15 an no. llama‘ up an sen: vakodnya omen saw cop ﬂan mlunkzn (andﬂangin belenilnnkh nkah IagI' [13] Du penngkal kes puma /5179, HMS lelah mendapau rekod Iampau Farayu (ersebul mempunyal nama berdaﬂar dsngan nama Perayu ﬂan nombor kad pengenalannya dan um max amankan olsh Penayu dalam pembalaarmya Wa\aupLm pmak pembalaan cube msmsahar xacerangan SP3Ierset:ut,1elapIda\am pememsaan balas o\eh TPR ke seas Perayu 'n=R' Rumk iaksl kepada mmmn Fm vekod kasahnan Vamvau. Ermk Iewgnk mkud kunluhnn Vnmpnu ‘ , n; bahngwan am: In men nama slavanl-:7 sm Tan mug Gnu. wk seman ﬂu ad: number we, lengnk mmbnv IC nu beuyI7 Belul number IC you new slhn sm Eeml. rm Jam uebmd kzsnlahan Vnmpau ma mm enuk punyn’) sm» Namz dan mmbar wc adalah says Dunyn mam hawah mu raked sayﬂ Lnk Iahu adakah raya puma: [14] HMS seterusnya membincangkan kes Zul Axuandl Azlx 11. PF [2021] 2 cm 631, di mana Pesunmjayz Kehakiman dzkum kes rm Iehah memuluskan dengan yersandarkan kepada kes Mahkamah Persekuluan Abdullall Alan v. PP, And Other appeal! [2020] 9 CLJ 151 bahaw “ -my Radyvna on me vvinames vn Abdmlah Am V pp And Annmer Appezﬂ (sum-uLII1ls mun Is onhe wnsidered Mew mu ce 5 «an al on, much 3 a ganaml law, dose rm define who is me “nVﬂaeP‘ that can move one‘s prevvaus nanvlnlon‘ by vuadmg -um Ww\s\un harmumuusly wnn the Remslrauun ov Cnmlnals and unaamus Person: Am 1259‘ wmch \s a weuﬁc law relating m In yegmvzixun L11 cnmmzls, u \s apparent man lha -mm refarved to nu ma cwc is ma Ragmnr m cnm...ax; appmnlnd by Du Vang dx-Felwan Agung nndars 3 Mme negmmmm at c.amm.xs and um mhle Fersmls An «sea, whose Doweramnna mhenhmgs m In kew and mum me anniculars Many convlclmn or semenoe m Iespem M « veulstnahle nﬂence as specmea m me am and Second Schedules ollhe Ac! 7 sw FFm147xhyEaAvJmwvAw «-um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm nu 15 15 [351 Accmding \u we Iumnrmu om ibuve‘ n Is cbav mm to pmvu one‘: pvevmus oonnznon under any law ‘n W: munlry, n n wmnn lha vnwuv Ind mn-umancy ov me Reamer nl Cmmnals M the Fedenahon or any aiﬁnev znnmmoa ny nne Vans: owenuan Mona Dulsusnna 5 some Rbwslrainnn or Cmmna\s and unaesname Persons A:\| «use, and no one else’ men nu Mankzmah .n. barpenﬂapll had: an yang Ilmbul av dawn as Mr berkenaan kenmhin reknd hmpau on ying dlksmukzkan m\|\aluIsak:I$P3 lelubm kzranzu spa mauvaknn Dbunw yang \|7er\‘nu\\|ih a... mu unluk memlemukakan rekmi Vzmnau on dl dalam kes \nI" FENILAIAN DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAM 115] Sepem drnyatakan ox av./a1 Nasan Penghakuman rm, peguam Farayu lalah bamujah mangenal parkara bsrikul. i. perhelaan pada number sin d4 bola! snmpel urin dan «nan bolul sampel \|ersebut dikemukakan semnsn perbuzsraan: ii kegagalan mengarnbil 2 sampel; kesuaunn Dada amng Cap Jan dan aarang RJZB yang mask dipeflelsska w. rekad kesalahan Vampau max dlbukukan dengan oemx; vs kss pr/ms Isms max dvbuklnkan; clan vu ksgagalan memmbangkan pembelaan Fsrayu. [16] Vsu peybezaan pada nnmbur slri dw balul sampel unn \|imbu\| hanya kevana dawn RRJ3 dx muka surat 16. Ierdapal oamnn di P7 No Siri sow: ialah A0239296 dan Iiada ke\|erangan mengenai perbezaan Walaubagaimanapun HMS mendapam secam kesslumnannya uaaa pecahan ranlax ketemngan eksnhul Im oleh aehab semua saksv termasuk Ferayu mengesahkan bale! sampa\ unn dsngan Nu. Slri ADZSGZBS yang lelah dlgunakan oxen Farayu unluk mengumpul sampel urinnya Axnsan penghakiman HM: dikmik sebah hehau lndak mengulas pemeznnn N ssmwmzanmmw Nuns s.nn ...n.mn be used m mm o. nnnmun mm: dun-mm VI] munc pm m 1; an nombor sin Lersehul telam terns memelik ke\|erangan Ferayu TPR bemujan bahawa spa le\ah manyaxaxan bclol sampel (elah dilupuskan kenana Sudan Veblh 2 mmggu uylan di]a\ankan den uaaa permohanan oleh pnlis unluk memiapackan belal sampe\ unn Iersebut. [17] Mengsnaw 15;. ini, Mahkamah menuapam tiada mam dalam isu W uleh sebab \iada kesuapan HMS apanna belwau lidak mengulas secaia (erperinci Asu inv kerana HMS berpuas nan naaa pecahan raman kelerangan sksmu bolnl sampel urin yang lidak dikemukakan semasa permcaraan Lemh-Iamh lag: adalah undang-undang mamap bahawa norm sampe\ unn udak perlu dlkemukakan sebagal eksmn: Mohd Zulnn ' Minllzl v PR (20211 MLJU znoa. Malahan Pelayu sendin mengekm Ialah memasukkan sampal urinnya ka dalam mm: dengan No SVH AU236289, dan spa membual u an analisa seas sampex dalam mam: yang terleralandalengan, name dan nombarkad pengenalan Fevayu‘ jadvlidak nmbur FSH salah bowl atau sa\ah sampe\ dan sebagainyz [13] Dawn hal Isu kegagamn mengamrm 2 sampel min pma, Mahkamah mu berganlung kepsda keputusan dalam kes PF v. Rounan am Sapmy [21111] I LNS 1141. Mankamah Tmugn Inch dalam kss PP v Mahd audln Eln Mod All [2013] 1 LNS 2052 -Ielah membincangkan mengenaw Isu 2 mm: sampel um. nan menyalakzn. '[15]Pada mm W mdaval dua klpuwxan Mahkamah Rayuan yang memmnrawkan seam mendahnm meogenm pmsedur pengambxlnn samnel aiv xennxng unluk Iujuan Iqlan dadah nan seseomnq yang dlsyakt nevuaglh uadan venamam adenah kenmusan Mankamah Ra‘/uan dawn has New Slurvlul may om Noal zmwv V. Pcndakwa re-ya 1247171 4 cu «:4, [2017] MLJU can Dahm m mi, Mshkamah Rzyuan mlmumskzn Fanmzh Yllap Kelua Pulxs Negnvi ma mesa F103‘) dun Gan: Panduan Kememennn Kesmzlan Malaysha Eﬂanvsn 5/2002 mm sl2Dﬂ2')memDmIya\ mm was: ax s\sI umanwnaang Msmandanakan keduadna dukumen Mu memverunlukkan uepenuan penaambnan ﬂue (2; sampm an mm dan sesenr-lug ynng msiisalbaglsuam kas m hawah ADE. maki pengamhﬂln dua 9 N FFwm1x><yEaAvJmwvAw um 5.11.1 ...m.mm be used 1: mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 14> 2» an :5 man wnlnn an kencmq merwikan kanenaak undamhmdana yena mmamn [17'\|Kepulusan ksdna men Mzhkaman Rayuan mangenm vsu mam. semasa Mahkzmah Nu msndlnnav swara Dersama name» Jenagﬂ No A— use-23.05/2u17PPv Rnsmirv mg gmg gm 1 y§11§1danRayuarv Jemsyah Na W-an-195-awzuﬂ 99 V Muhammad smm hm Suleiman Dana 23 Fehmaﬂ mm (menu ml dlsebul ‘ks: Rnsman Sapvef] Dalam kes um Mahkamah Rayuan meﬂyalakanz ' Ivdnpil I=\u Wu uma yang ikan meungkuml kaduadua rayuan lanebut‘ mm Sam: ad: wrxw F1u3 dun ma sumnms an rs/zoo: memmmyan slams kual kussa undar\a—undnnﬁ (fame at my dan yang dermklan maruadl mandalnn umuk mpamm clan xegagaxm memmum saaem-man akan mampunyau kesan yang meruelaskan (Ma - [15] Dallm plrsnggan-plvanggan 55. as. 69, 71. 14 dan 75 kavutusarmya. M.m....r. am... mamulullum ..w.pm knplda isu undang-undang yang dlhadavarmys edalah mum bemasaman amsan-a\|as.nn yang * ynlaknn mm Devenwsan tevsebul Namaum. menunn Mahkamah Raynan mm, msc ma ﬂan KKM slzuoz mu Mada ma kuasa umannmnu Mnka. kanendak pengamhlhsn dua 42) mm: uimyd axr kuvcmg yang dbnyatakan dalam kadua— due Vnslmmen m. bukanlah kahandak undang-undarvu ying maldalnli ﬂan ”kemIIW.uk\|nan savanan Iarsehlﬂ mm mempakan sualu langkah mum waspada alauamahn'PF\|ldsm:o1\|evzDviWalwasD&da sedemman um bcleh muuadw .1... mampunyal mu kuzsa urvdang» Imdang 55 ngga Ianya memam sualu kevmppnn yang mm. pmsedursuhsmrmlunmk pi\|uhi' R5]JaIas sakah Kevmusan Mahkamah Rayuan dawn kes Roan-van sapuyman amuau dsngan msngambﬂ kwa kepmusan Mahkamuh Rayuan ﬂihm kesl»/nor Shanful mm (supm) Im barmakna kupvtusan Mahkamah Rayuan (mam kzs mman Sapfﬁylm hukzmsumu kapumsan parirvalrfam m. ma: harmakna Kedumauu kaoulusan Mahkamah Rayunn um ands Wlhll m. adalall "wad law ‘whmwa mvmuikan seam muktzmad den saamnya uleh Mahkzmah Fensklnuan Dan mm» N93 bahawa nulahan Pmak Peraw bihawn kapllmun Mahkzmuh Rzyuln dnlim ksslx/our snmm R111! (mpmmdak um lerpnkm Kevan: lenianm kapulusan namm «mm kes Nosman saprey adalah mak menwau on/«sip undanu-undang I271Mahkamah uu suaruinya mammuskan dalam memhual kevlllusan mnwa. ravllan m hadavan Mahkzmah Am sekarang. yang mhua( wlsous kepmlusan Mahlrsmnh Rayuiu dawn keskosman Sapummahkamah ml mum menqambll mm sane mampemmbangksn kepumsan Mnhkzmah dzﬂam ksduadua kes \|evsshul. Damn ksadaan ac mans lemavnt dun kevumsan Mahkamah Rawan yam: mambawa kesan yang bemeza seesaw pump yang larplkaw hag! M-hkzmsh Im adalah ispam dmyalakan 0197: Pan Swee m sm FFwu47xkyEaAvJmwvAw mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm	3,025	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-24NCvC-3174-09/2022	PEMOHON LAKSHIMIPRIYA A/P RAMACHANDRAN RESPONDEN IMPIANIKA DEVELOPMENT SDN. BHD	This Court will only award nominal costs to the Plaintiff as this Court finds that the Plaintiff on her part did not show any efforts to follow up on her obligations as to the payments within the time when she had executed the agreement for the second unit (5.8.2019) to the time when she discovered that the Defendant had been trying to contact her on it (in 2020). Costs of RM7,000 is awarded to the Plaintiff.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=20817eac-b69f-48e9-9bce-46bd381bac2e&Inline=true	05/12/2023 10:09:00 WA-24NCvC-3174-09/2022 Kand. 17 S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rH6BIJ26Uibzka9OBusLg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—2dNCvC—317l—09/2022 Kand. 17 as/mzm 10:09-on IN THE HIGH COURY IN MALAYA Av KUALA LUMI-‘UR IN THE FEDERAL YERRITORV. MALAYSM ORIGINAYING summons N0: w»z4Ncvc.a11us:2o2z BETWEEN LAKSNIMIPRIYA A/P RAMACHANDRAN (mm: ND: 911nz:ma»532A) PLAINTIFF AND IIIPIANIKA DEVELOPNIENY SDN BHD (courmv ND:1034S86-D) nsrsunun GROUNDS or JUDGMENT The Plaimnn ya [11 we Plamm. based on the Deienaanrs sdvemsemenl and mpnasan\|aIAcn, decided \|o purchase Mo unlls ol semned apamnems devehxaed by me Delandanl They were unns RCI-3709, Jems 5‘ mgm :7. Shock 01 and RCIABUS‘ Jams 5, TIngka\| 43, cum (:1 known A: R.\|1alvcI\|y Resldenaas (me an prupenlas) She has mad: me buobdng sw maauzamtszuwuausw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm and pal u total o1RMe,uou » Rmama my me as: mu: on 16 9 2015 and Rmamo on 22 9 2015 forms second mm. [2] Financing lar me said propemes was pmwred - «mm Hang Leona Bank Bhd1HLE) For me amuum av RM431,/I00 an 3 mzuna lo ﬁnance the ﬁrsl unll and RM491‘ﬂ57 (mm Unmzd Overseas Bank lmaraysaab Bhd (uoa) an 16 1\|) 2019 lo nnanca ma sewnd um [31 Thes:-1\e and purchase agmemem forme am mm was exacmed on 25.5 ms. The purchase was stand was RM541,7sn. For me second mm, me sale and purchase agreement was exacmad on 5.5 2mg. the purchase pnoa my Ina second mm was RMs4e.25o (both sane and pulchau sgmlmenn am mlbchvely hevumaner mvenad In 3: ma zgruamanlsj The wnaxnw had 3150 purchzsad Iwa lots Mpmlung spaces hr RM60.000 each [41 The FlainlH'Fs address in the agleamsuls was slalld at Level 14. Manara Pmshqe‘ No 1 Jim: Pinang, 50450 Kuara Lumpur Hnwervar, -n wmaspondencss were ssn\| lo Mr plewous rusidarmal address mam; 92 Royax Dcmam sn Pulremas 2, ovualan Kuchmg, 51200 Kuzla Lumvur (Royal Domam) [51 me Plainnu nad (awards ma end :11 2mg updated her dwesmndenue pamculars no B20-01 wa Residency, Ja\an Ipch, 51200 xuava Lumpur qvwa Raslaency) as she nad moved «mm her premods residential address vac she nad not recnwsd any corrsspnndenue {mm m Devenaann at this uunenl resdenual address sm maauzmmmadsm mm. s.n.‘ ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: m.n.n VII mum pm Code Focus sun and y Tan Ghee Has .5 Sons Sdn Bm1[zn13I4 MLJ 5:‘ Court o1Appea\| quovee as iouows. HaIDmy's Laws ul England «In Ed) para 538 afp 370 sets our the geneval mm mm. Where on. party m a canned has comm/(lad 5 senoas mam by a aalacws peﬂcrmance u by rapudlslmg In: oongauons under me mm‘:-net, ms innocent puny wvll have m right to nssmnd ms mnrrncl, mam lo huanumsollas drschlryed burn my obligulmn to tender mm; pedlzlmance, and we Iar damlvss /or lny /on he may have swam: as a resulloflha bread: rm amen mseomoss not tatmirlare the contract, ms innocent pa/\‘y having ma right In arm to heal me comes.‘ as wnnnufng or to la//mnatv u by rescission. MusMIL.Im Lamosru Mann Oenf1.3lPlc y Bum-.vwenn[1957] as 527 mp 5:15‘ [1957] 1 All ER267al pp 271472. (193712 WLRatp 1:. in ms sum: I/am ma W5 A snpuranon um Irma ix 0/ ma menu, in rnlalion In . pamculur wntmnua! vorm, dtnot-s that lime/y nerfonrlanca n s eondvﬁwv of mo cwmacf The comquence rs ma: delay m perfurrmnce is mated as going to the m4 of ms carmaa, wnrmr man: to ma maymtudz ame bmach .. u Iollaws than where a pmmmol lads en gave I/mely peliwrnance 0! an oblagalron rn respect of wmch me .5 expressly statsdtobe alme nssencs, five Injured party may elecllo Iamunals um rsouvel damages /n resaact 01 me promuors n m maauzmzmuausm _«m.. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm outstanding aboiganons. wmam ragarv Io ms magnrmde or me breach [251 Unhks xn me case 01 Amexen se1ar1Mj Sdn BM1supra).ev>dence showed that the names of \|errmnahon In em mse weve nal prupeny served on me P\amI1ﬂ Furmermore, Clause may at me agueemenns required that sum nonca cl Ierrnmzmcn shall only «eke emecn nm Vess men may days «mm me dale av lhe nahoe The names cl lavrmnallun son! by me Dnlendanl had unly given a potion! oi louneen days Yna nennmauon nnmxs lhumselvus were vrraguhr am not aoeordmg m «n. agvaamenls. As such. we cam declares that me Agreements Ir: um vahd and binding [26] In dedaring mm mm agreements are sum valid and mnmng, the Plamhli is under hsn7.1ntr3<:1ua\ obligabon Io make quad cne paymems lor me amounts owing. Failing which me uevenaam nee Ins option to Carmlnatn me agleemens ma men whatever paymems maeposn under stage 1 men had been made The Voﬂeﬂure mus\| be done awnmmg Io am. 11 av me agrelmanl. me time, was mmmeuon neuces mus\| be xssuad la Mensra Plunge unueee and mm!!! the Flnmnll cnnﬁrms an rlourds an updated address much would superseee me ene euneu in me iwsemsns. [27] The evidence avso showed Ihal anew me lennmaflon nobces dam 99.2u2u or both agreements were sem to me Mamml. [Mrs were subsequent muses lmm me Defendant on me PKa\nliﬂ(s1\H addressed In Royal Domain) damandmg payment for lale Vnteresl charges The names demanaea peymenn for late -meme: merges wmm were caluﬂated for venous aner me so callsd Iemunahon by me Delsndanl wmm was :2 m musuznuxbzuwuausw _«m.. smnw ...n.mm be LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: mmn wa mum Wm! accordmg m mew nolxuus - luuﬂsen dlys ailer D F 2020 (Which was no! accnnimg In the agreemems) This showed [hit Ihl Defendam had Ml Intended I0 fsrmillate Iile agreements became the Vate inlerul charges were meant for payments due when me agreements were sull me and aifecnve [231 Ammmg In ma agraamams, ones we agraemema are terminated, mm shnmd be no mom levy 0! me mlevnl payrnam charges This Ihwwnd Ina! Ins Delandanl had slw Intended to nmcaad with me aursemenxs even Iflar Ihs Irraqular llrmmsﬁon naliws Wm. Issued The nuﬁce 0! ma Inllresl chzrgas we mm under clausa 19 of me agramuems shawed ma De1emizn\|’s conaun and Imurmuu m pmaaaumg wnn me agreemeuts In any avam, ma argumlnl max 1115 Defendant cannul appmbale and repmbale Is mm as me temunanon names were magmar and no! Vdld. [291 ms Oourl aha mnstdered me argummls 12! me Defendant met as a party In the conI1ar.1, me Plamlm um um perlarrn her mnnacuuav abllgalmns cancammg me payments when me was Mme essence. She am nm do anywng In foﬂow-up an the paymams nequnmd. Pamcularly so mun aha needed (0 Day My her pcmon to: me banks In Vulcan (heir ﬂnanung In ma Delsndam Almaugn ma navenaam can act to cannvnaxa me agreements m instannes wbaru me Plainmv breached me lama, me tatminahon must be done properly and aomrmng fa ma harm: of ma agreanenl.vmn:I1 m ms case was not done acconiingly. In gamma! Sarawak Sun and -4531;‘ Tggam/5hr1@1s1g Q1 1; [2018] MLIU and ma Faderal Conn stated 013% n m maaumamuaaaam _«wa.. saw ...m.mm a. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm 15:] Th: llaal position an 1 ulnar: um grill; yr buundbz no [arms am» aronnmon -gmmnmnicn mg h-4 vulunlarilz axoculed and mi: includes rurmncc m anmlm doeument whm those man: can be found. whotim ma: ran the trouble olmglna lnem ornol. There puud knowledge mu an Ierms :11 amnnnlon agrcemenl In : aocumnx marred lo In In Igraemlnl an blndlng as Il may wave wrilun In me mm Igunmnnl nun. (541 The docluon awn Indiln Suwumv Caunln m. can ol 114 km v. Ballbhadru AIR (1:54) and 11, supgoﬂs rm mm pmpoxmnn. Vonhaurlnu Aiyar J in ma: cast mind: "When a conflict in wrninqis signudnypmlus, they nn: bound by an terms connarnoa thuarn whether they take [In huubro or madlng man or not“. Thll caun-a om [30] ms cam cansiuerea the appuuuon in me nriginallrvg summons or me Plamlzﬂ am: a\so Ihe counterclaim by me Defendant AH zﬂemalwn reliefs were alsoeonsrdsred. Prsmlssﬂ max mar-wenauonnzcus executed by me panies— Ihe aqrsauems, Itus coun exxmmsd whelherthey are snll valwd and enoonaeame [311 TM: Courlfmds arm asaamscna the agreements are valrd‘ bmdmg and enfaloeable on bum pamss. Each parly 5 to a-scnarge then‘ .- syn maauzauxbzuwuausm -nan smnw ...n.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm mnlraclual abllqaﬁons as Dev Ihe \|erms am: wndmoru agreed upon amxuingry wllhin two monlhs cum date arms 1udwrrIenL [321 ms Court wm any award nammal nests la me P\alnW as «ms cum ﬁnds man me Puemw on he: pan and no\| show any eﬂans mo Iouaw up on her obilgauons as ho the paymems wnmn me name whee: sne had execuled me agreement nu ma mm: mm (5 a 2m) to me «me when she mscuvered than me Dtlandanl had been Irymg la eonucl M! on n on znzuy sous av RM7.DOD Is awarded «a Ina Plalnml DATED 12 JULY 2023 R02 MAWAR RDZNN JUDVCIAL COMMISSWDNER men COURY IN MALAVA KUAIA LUMPUR For the P/amhll Dommc Sell/am a/I snanspvaqasam 1/n Domnln mgmm Tan 4 Ca Fur Delendarrr Adnln Ng am my together mm La! my me rm vc Pang, cnong 5 Gonion m maauzmzmuausm _«m.. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [51 Almpugn the pawnanu for me said properties were as Sdsedula Three up rm aqresmams, ma pamos nsd amen In mange ma payment terms The Flsmmi daimed om me Delsndanl had wawed ms requirement up pay 10% pr me purchase pace as aeposn as per me agreemzms but mmugn mstaHments, as opposed to me exprassed term In Clause 5(1) of me mm Smedule en me agreements. The P\aim1ff aarmau she had duly paid a laval of RM57,350 between me dale uf me ex.ecnl\an pme ayeemem to Sepvlemherzﬂm m On 21.9.2a2o me Plalmlﬂ rsceww a messsgs via me ‘whats App“ appncanan requiring ha! «a make a paymem av Rmusmo my me sen: pmpamas She ma sought clanﬂnalmn «pm me Devemm as am was Womlad max nar payments war: up m data There was no response Vrom me uovsndann. my On 5.112020 ma P\am\|m agavn wanna am De‘landam's ulﬁcs up Dhlim ms latest infurmnion on me ampum paid and the wane. due. She was mfomned by me Deisndanfs minagerlhal there was a mix up on me amoum man sun was due to pay with em apprnvsd loan ampum ofolher purchasers She was man mfnrmed max me aqrelmems were terminated we a name dated 9 9 2920 man was addressed up my parrespenasnpe address. The Piavmﬂnomed the Defendant that she had noueeewaa any uunespamenpe addressed In her current resn1enna\ address (Wva Residency) as updated m me Detemanrs records She also denied having breachad any Mme terms [91 The Plamlm lnsnsalhy went Lp Mr pmvmus uasmanua: aaanm uzayax Dnmamj ma aimvam mat mere wave nvsval Inter; and 2 sm maauzamsmpuama «ma saw ...m.mm s. p... w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm oorraspurvdanoss There were msc slalzemlnh cl accounts on the status orme omscanaung vaymenns and sxahxnenls oi in1e«es1 «or me D3YmenK furlhe said propenlzs dated a. 2020‘ 31.11) 2112171711 mo, 26 I1 202a and 2 1 2021 The Plamhfl claimed that me Bsuznoe oﬂhese mu waived ms lelmmanon nllhe agneemens Mme sax: pmpemes [I0] The Plalnlﬂf lherefule mnaenaea that me Defendant wa: nsgﬂgem 1n r1a\|updzImg1s mcnrds and saeks mus Conn’: order In declare Ihal me Kevmmalicm nuns: was Vrwalld‘ nwl and vow [11] The PIETHW alleged lha\| she had rupniedly informed (J1! Dehndznl man she was wiﬂlng lo pay the amoum ouulandmg and wrmnus mm the agreements for me said pmpemes builhe Defendant had -emu: Bl (ailad to cm so The Pla1nl1ﬂ‘s ptaysts are la) a ascraranon «nan me agreements dmed 25.6.2019 and 5 5 2019 psnaunmg me purchases at two serviced apartment unhs RCI~37l)91 Jul: B,T1ngka\|371 Elodx c1 ana ROI-4805, Jams E, Tmgknl 4!, Clock c1 known as Ruakcily Remdemxs (me said pmpa11les)ara valld. emu 1:2) in am: far Ipecrﬁu pmonnam at me Derenanm pursuant In «no Mo aqmamencswim1n iounaen days omus eeun man (:2) In me aﬂernanve en (D). an nrdertha\| the Delendam pays me Flalmiﬂ wvlhm vaumeen days or nus noun ordev an amoum of RM57,350IogelhetwHf1Intaraslof5% annuauy fmm 9 9 znzo unlil me date 0! «ms oaun omer, sm maauznu1xaz>uwuausLu mm. 5.11.1 In-v1hnrwH\ .. .1... w my 1... nﬂmnnﬂly mm. dun-mm VII .r1uNG v-mm my imam: ulsv. annually on me iudamsn: sum «mm ma data av Km: court oulerunlll M! and ﬁnal semmentl (2) costs: (I) Ilbeny for me Plalnhﬂlo make the necessary applicallons. Thu Dchndanfs irgumgms [121 Aceomlng la me Daleuaanl. ll had med numerous nmss In mnlacl ma Plalrllﬂl lor sppolnuusms la exeane me ugreemenls Due In the Ilme lapse and also lack orlullule \|o vespond, ms Defelldalll had an l2.o.2ola issued lamunallan mess lo each 0! ma agrsemerlts penalnlng la mm umls (Exhlbll D-2). ml The lnelanaanl averted ms Plulnlm man raswma neklrla time In pay ofwhich me Duleuuaul had agreed and ms ummnallon rlodlcos were wllhdrawn. ms Plzlmlﬁ men sanlsa cm rsquired naymenl (me 1 ms dlzpusn lav stage 1 paymsml whereby the agreamerll for RC1<i709 was executed on 25 6 2919 The agreemenlforlhe second unn ROI-4505 was sull nol executed allhal runs as mere wen: sull paymeuls oMng(h‘n1D'/u lorsIsge1 paymeml Almesna allulyzoleallermerecaapl ollwln ‘um «um me Plslrmff, me agreement lor unn RCH805 was executed on 5 E 2019 [M] The oelsnaaumalmea that on 30.6.2019 me Plalnon had informed cm Dafandan! lhal her correspondence aadrsss was Rayal Damaln and m musuznullazluvuauila _«ws.. s.n.l n-vlhnrwm s. u... M may he nﬂmnallly ml. dnunvlnrll VII .mm mm durued that me Plalrmv had updered lrer edrrespondenee eddress aner lnelu towards me and dune year, lo we Resldency. [:5] Tha nelendenldened lrevrng bleached I.errnsv.71meT>lIrd Sduadule to me agreement The Defendant aeoepled man an dale me amount received Ier Dom me unrle ernounled le RM57,35D Oul pl Ihzl sum. RM4:l,35n ms «or RCI-3709 end RMl4,uoll lur RCHB05 (Ext: lul. The dllfevenual surrr me Plelnml rred lerled up pay — Rmeazso luv ppm unllelsnrrprrlul Due lo me Plalrrlllrslellure Ln eeme me dmeremrel surn wllhln the requlred Ilmelrame. lne nrrenclng secured Inr mm unlle could nor be executed [I6] rrre Delendam srrpwed ell lrre neuees rssued lo me Plelrrml re rernrnd me paymem cwmg and me lele rnreresl crrerpee, all dared lnlween seplerrrper mm; In Sapllrnber zuzo qsxruerl n-5) The" are nolleer: er lerrrrrrurlen \|o me agloamarlts al both um: ware lulled on 9 9.2020 [ExhID\B LP-5 and D6). LLﬂi [17] The lad me: me Pleinliw lred purchased the Iwo unns v RCI~3‘/U9 and RCM805 is rrul drspuled. Nerllrer ls lrre lacl mat the Plarnlm had made inrlial payrnem ol Rl/l3,uuu for each respecnve unn Although me Defendant denred lhal M was me one reeporrerlale for me errerrgemem of me ﬂnandng laalmes for me Plelnlm. Ins lane remalrred that may were secured ler me purpose pmnerrung me two urrns me Ptelrrnlr purcrresed. Trrey were nn\| 1on=/. llrrancrng nu: ramer so"/. el vmlcrl the balance was In be pald by me Plalnlm This cuurr ﬁnds mac me dmecerrlral sums were knuwn la me Plalrrlm based on me dommanls and me clnmmslames of e sru Masuznulbzluvuauihu mu. senel nnvlhnrwm .. u... w my r... urrrmrru mm: dun-mm VII .nuue vwul me use on a balance of pmbnbﬂmws lhe Plsnnm had knuwn Iha\| ma ﬁnancefaahhes by mm ﬁn:nr:\a\ insmunnns were Insufﬁcwenl lo car-Iirlhe whole purchase pncs lar mm umls [151 The contennon is whelhet the (ermmalvon nodes was served an nannm, Tm: Courllums to me documeniary awaenoa exnrniua in an the amuams, Th: aoenmemary ewdenee shows man the banking vacnmss for me ﬁnanung at the sam pmpenns was only [or 30% a1 the pumhase price at the sand pmpedlss respecnvew The Plalnnll was eonxnscmany bound \|L7 pay me rest owed. This was nnannmeaxy wnrnn me Puamws knawiedge. [I9] Ya Illa Fhirmﬁs Demenllan [hill ms 10% mal was rsilullud in he paid‘ for RC1-3709 ~ RM54A75 0 RMEDOO (fur the ca! park) and hi RC\|— 4605 - RM54,62S 0 RMB.W0. the Defendant slalod Illa! il hld numsmusly Irild \|o cbnlld the Hainlm, This Conn ﬁnds lhal mam wen Indeid names: and oorresporldsnoos msued by the Dafendznl \|o me Plzmhﬂ — addussad lo the P\uin\|\ﬂ at Level 14, Munara Prsstme, No 1 Jalan Pinang, 50450 KUi\i Llmlnul (Menara Presngal This was me addrsss stated In the proforma Iorms oi Augml and Sepha¢nbe(2ﬂ1B and also the banks’ Vetlers 0! Mia: to ﬁnance Ina units. Those correspondences (rum the Defendant were dated 23 3 2019 mat staled the amcunl owing. The nances of Ierrmnallan Issued by the Delsndant pursuant \|a non-respanse 01 he Plawrmlf were dated 12.4.2019 The Fla‘ or! renewed Ihose correspondences addressed In Menara Pnasnge and responded to these. Paymems were made which resulted \n ma ax.eI:ul\an ol \|hE agreement: which awin slaled the Plammfs cwespomenou aﬂdrss as Ihi sama as above » Manara Predlge sm maauznmxmuwuaushu «wn. s.nn ...n.mn .. med w my n. nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm wa .mm mm [20] Ana mu agreements were mu-«uu —Ihe one la! Romans dated 5.3.2019, which snpulaned Manara Prestige as me sad address 0! ma mamw, me Devemam had issued vanous and numernus oarrespondemzs on me subseqmnt payments due (inclndmg muse under cvauss IO M me agreemems) bu\| may were anamssm co Roﬁl Domam These mduded me nunces anerrnmanon men 9 9 2020 whim are me sumac: matter of me Ptamnrrs sun The culraspandsnces am ml\eesma(wa¢eaddressen1\|u Royal Domain are name from August mm mm Seplemba 2029 There are the arms Iha\| me Pwamnn dammed to news naval received Tmy were only recovered and retrieved much latevwhzn mu Flamlwﬂ was Informed so by m. Defendant Vn 202a when the maumm vismau the Dafundanfs afﬂoe pursuant in a WhaIaAw message she rm ruosivea. The P\am\|\ﬂ had found at max new Domain eddrosa lna Deiendanfl aorrewondaneus «mm mm [211 No dcub\| max nlnuse :1 cl \|ho agreement: pruwuud ma Datanuam mo opnen no larmmale me agreements and form whatever amaum ma: had been paid mm Plaummailemu pay whalsver bmance owed and do: for man? man may days Huwevsn sum mice: :2! terrnmalicn by the Defendant wete nu! sen: lo an address in the agreements There Is nowhere m any aommems max staked me cmssponaenees psrta mg m the agreements ware In be sent to Row! Domam. nus Court Is ofma mnsmeree view that me means that me P\aInM was without nonﬁcanon and was not aware of me mrnzspandences from me Defmdanf Unlike ln memse oumalan Se(ar\|M)Sdn and vAkar seramau Sdn and 5. or: [zn21] MLIU 1924. whare me Court held aslnllmls sm muauzaummuausu: mu. sum ...m.mm .. u... m my u. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm /27) The dalandanle llrsl raised me nwllmslvl lnal mm was no cause or scfian agailm mam elnce lhiy had nevel rsmlvod any parpmed demand or any lemunanen nellco lvem me p/alnlfﬂat all They denied knowledge: or me lennlnallon of ma Tenancy Agleernenl: (251 mls is surplvslllg ls: evldenca shows errealve sewvce or [he Ierlmnation nallaa dazed 14 July 2020. The Tenancy Agreement dearly ln Clause ls azpnmded lnal any name required to be sewed IS deemed In have been alnnclenxly served nll was sslved eimel by having me same ldltressed to me llrsl delandanl and /sit at lne Plemlxes or dellvmd by mglslarad peel. (291 swd-nee amwrs (last me rucelpl el lne Ialmmalton ndllee ms acknowledged nyarepmenlallva oflhe Ilrslde/emilrllcompanyal lne Puma; on 15 Juiy 2020. ll anellld be emphasised lnel clause 502 merely mqlmd any rmlrci be addramd lo and tell all me mnuses. The plalnm nad nawm: dorm more man that The plalnlnvlell me lannlnaoon none» 5! me Frsmisss whrch receipt was else acknowledged by live said rapoesanvalwe Further, me Harmer ol semae by leavlng the relevant none: or dowrnenl al me prurmsas ls also canxlstnnt wlln the general rule set our ln Older 52 I A (1; la; ome RC 2012 en sennce on edrpaaxlon wnlcn l: by leavlng a copy elcaurz documenl al the Isqvslsled address of the mrpaallon (see also Labels speelansl lndustnes sdn Bhd v Medal sports llw sdnsnd (1997): CL/ 575). no] Them IS lnlls no quasnon anne rennlnallen not/cc navlng aaan eueeesslulry and eumaenlly sun/ed on ma ml dolandanl.“ m Mlsuzlulbzuwuauiw _«nla.. a.n.l n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w my a. nﬂﬂlnnﬂly am. dun-mm VII arlum v-mm R2] The Detenaanr had aannee max on we we me PliIn\|r\|!‘ ma inverrneu me uevenaanneenange ns address to Roynx Domam However. me Delendanl had ﬁlled to prowee any ducumenl ur any umer proof m we eannenupn aevore we com‘ me zgnaement fur RCMB05 was exemted on 5 3 2D19\|a1lerlhe dale me oevermam eenramea me Plamhﬂ had updated ner addrss) am supulavea me F1aw'nl\ffa correspondence aaaress ea Manara Prestige rnrs cam does no! sense! an Derenaams clam mar are address was In be upaarea In Royal Dnmam as me sgraernenuer RCI-4805 mu nalshowso In suppon Ina nevenaanve alarm [23] me Flaurvlm had cmnendod she had Wurmed me uetenuann luwams me and M 2019 0! mar enanpe -n eoneeponuenee Iddmss In her mrrern resra-nee - \/wa Resmeney. on a balance olpmbablﬁhes, this Ccurt ﬁnds mazme Decenaanc nan varied and/orwas negligemln upaaurrg rs reooms. ms rs prernrsea an all the other evidence wnere me Plarnmr was informed py me Defendam mac mere was a rmxvp of her aeeounxa and exner buyers The cummun\ca¢lons belwsen me pames pursuam xp me Pla\nIM's query on me slams ol me aereemema and/ur me purchase anne Iwo unlls showed mat me Deﬂandants were nu vevy carevul wrm men mcmd knping [241 C\ause1( onhl apreernems preyieea me Derenaanc me epnon ho annm and tannIna(e Irre agreenrencs when mere were aetsuns by me nernmv up pay any msvaurnenns gamble or any pan merear or laws paymsnls chavges fol more men mirty days When we Defendanl exereeea man epcion. me Defendant was requrrea up we nwﬁce In me Plainhﬂurhersnlialarsufnollesslftanmlmdaﬂv-C\auseI1(Z)provxd2s ma! sucn service of Ienmnamn notice was mandalmy. In me ease ol srn maauznurbzuwuausw “Nana s.n.r n-nhnrwm a. p... m mm r... nrW\rrnU\|:I mm: dun-mm wa mum vwm	1,994	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
02(f)-8-02/2023(P)	PERAYU 1. ) FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN BHD 2. ) HLA TOON TOOLSERAM 3. ) MAUNG AUNG THOU 4. ) MOONG BA 5. ) MOUNG BAN CHOWI 6. ) Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society RESPONDEN NAI NINN SARARAKSH	The central issue in these 4 appeals concerns the interpretation and understanding of the Attorney General’s consent obtained under Section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359].Of the four appeals, three appeals arose from the judicial review proceedings [JR proceedings] while the fourth appeal arose from proceedings related to Originating Summons No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 [OS 1128]. We heard all four appeals together. After full consideration of the submissions, reasonings of the Courts below and the records of appeal, we unanimously allowed the appeals relating to the JR proceedings and dismissed the appeal relating to OS 1128.	05/12/2023	YA Dato' Mary Lim Thiam SuanKorumYA Dato' Mary Lim Thiam SuanYA Dato' Nordin Bin HassanYA Datuk Abdul Karim Bin Abdul Jalil	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=38f7e754-ca8f-47d1-aabe-c8c5fa543a23&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - Five Star 5.12.2023 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 01(f)-3-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN PEGUAM NEGARA MALAYSIA … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-621-10/2021 Antara Peguam Negara Malaysia … Perayu Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou 06/12/2023 14:10:52 02(f)-8-02/2023(P) Kand. 40 S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016] Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Maung Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-6-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN 1. NAI NINN SARARAKSH (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. HO CHOON TEIK (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … RESPONDEN- RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-02(IM)(NCvC)(W)-2553-10/2021 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … Perayu – Perayu S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Dan 1. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan bagi Semakan Kehakiman No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014] Antara 1. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 2. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Plaintif-Plaintif Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) … Defendan-Defendan (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-7-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN HO CHOON TEIK (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-609-10/2021 Antara Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Perayu Dan 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan Semakan Bagi Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No. K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden (didengar bersama) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 02(f)-8-02/2023(P) ANTARA 1. FIVE STAR HERITAGE SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA TOON TOOLSERAM (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. MAUNG AUNG THOU (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. MOONG BA (No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 5. MOUNG BAN CHOWI (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. MAUNG SHWE WINN Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN NAI NINN SARARAKSH (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No: P-01(A)-602-10/2021 Antara Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No. K/P: 400324-07-5301) … Perayu Dan 4. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 5. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 6. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 7. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 8. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 9. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Responden- Responden S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Permohonan Semakan Bagi Kehakiman No: PA-25-32-08/2016 Antara 1. Five Star Heritage Sdn. Bhd (No. Syarikat: 942376-W) 2. HLA Toon Toolseram (No. K/P: 430113-07-5069) 3. Maung Aung Thou (No. K/P: 460804-07-5145) 4. Moong Ba No. K/P: 490906-07-5565) 5. Moung Ban Chowi (No. K/P: 621231-10-7713) 6. Muang Shwe Winn Sebagai Naib Pengerusi kepada Penang Burmese Society (No. Pendaftaran: 1410) … Pemohon- Pemohon Dan 1. Peguam Negara Malaysia 2. Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No.K/P: 400324-07-5301) 3. Ho Choon Teik (No.K/P: 750707-07-5261) … Responden- Responden] CORUM: MARY LIM THIAM SUAN, FCJ NORDIN BIN HASSAN, FCJ ABDUL KARIM BIN ABDUL JALIL, FCJ S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT [1] The central issue in these 4 appeals concerns the interpretation and understanding of the Attorney General’s consent obtained under Section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359]. [2] Of the four appeals, three appeals arose from the judicial review proceedings [JR proceedings] while the fourth appeal arose from proceedings related to Originating Summons No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 [OS 1128]. We heard all four appeals together. After full consideration of the submissions, reasonings of the Courts below and the records of appeal, we unanimously allowed the appeals. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] Both the JR proceedings and OS 1128 arose from these salient facts. Vide a trust indenture dated 30.5.1845, on behalf of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the East India Company created a Burmese-Siamese Trust over a plot of land known as Lot 104 in Georgetown subject to terms and conditions as found in the indenture [the Trust]. On Lot 104 was/is a temple serving the Burmese and Siamese communities living on the island of Penang, and their successors in the said Trust. Expressly, the Trust was “for the management of the affairs of their Temple”. Four trustees, two from each community, were originally appointed to manage the affairs of the temple [Trustees]. Amongst those terms and conditions was that the trustees had no “right, power or authority whatsoever” to “grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer, convert or otherwise alienate the said piece of Ground or any part or parcel thereof”. The trust land “shall remain, continue for the benefit of the Burmese and Siamese S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Community of Prince of Wales Island and its Dependencies from henceforth forever”. [4] Despite those express terms and conditions, on 16.4.1994, the Trustees entered into a written agreement to inter alia, partition Lot 104 between the two communities. Lot 104 thus became Lots 2102 and 2103 and an order of Court dated 19.10.1994 [OS No: 24-665-1994 in the HC Penang] was secured to seal that agreement. The effect of that division left the temple remaining on the land held and still held by the Siamese trustees [Lot 2102]. The Burmese trustees continued to hold Lot 2103. [5] On 3.10.2002, funds which had been hitherto collected from the temple amounting to over RM3,778,523.73 were equally divided between the two communities. Again, another order of Court was secured to endorse the division of funds [OS No: 24-1209-2002]. Effectively, this left the original trust now standing as two separate trusts, one for the Siamese community in respect of Lot 2102 and the other for the Burmese community in respect of Lot 2103. For this purpose, the Attorney General’s consent was obtained on 1.6.2000. The High Court viewed this consent, referred to as the “1st Consent” as confirming the partition of the original Lot 104 into Lots 2102 and 2103 and that the original trust had been terminated. We will have more to say on this shortly. [6] Following this Court order of 3.10.2002, the trustees for the Burmese community [Penang Burmese Trustees] executed a new trust deed dated 31.7.2006 [Trust Deed]. Amongst its many terms were these: i. Subject to clause 7 of the Trust Deed, that the Penang Burmese Trustees shall have no power to sell the Penang S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Burmese Trust Property or any part thereof or mortgage the same or to create a charge to any third party thereon; ii. Pursuant to clause 7, the Penang Burmese Trustees shall have the power to enter into a joint venture agreement and/or transaction with any such future, potential Develop and/or Contractor to develop and/or construct and/or build on the Penang Burmese Trust Property upon such terms and consideration as the Penang Burmese Trustees shall deem fit and proper and for the best interest and future benefit of the Burmese community in Penang. [7] On 25.8.2006, the Penang Burmese Trustees, the applicants in the JR proceedings entered into a joint-venture agreement with Airmas Development Sdn Bhd to commercially develop Lot 2103. A Court order was obtained on 31.10.2007 to declare that this joint-venture agreement was validly entered into by the parties. As part of that development, Lot 2103 was subdivided into Lots 10029 and 10030. With the joint-venture, the earlier was registered in the name of the developer whilst Lot 10030 was registered with the Penang Burmese Trustees. [8] The developer then commenced an action at the Sessions Court against Nai Ninn inter alia for vacant possession of premises located on Lot 10029. Nai Ninn filed his defence and also counterclaim, claiming that he was the owner of the premises and was not obliged to deliver vacant possession as Lot 10029 was part of a charitable trust created under the 1845 Indenture; and that the developer’s ownership of Lot 10029 was questionable. This case was subsequently transferred to the High Court. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [9] Meanwhile, vide OS 1128 filed in 2014, Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik challenged the validity of the Court order dated 31.10.2007, that because Lots 10029 and 10030 are part of a public charitable trust, the AG’s consent under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] must first be secured before the order may be secured. Since there was none, the order was invalid and must be set aside ex debito justitiae. We understand Nai Ninn Sararaksh, of Siamese descent, lives on Lot 10029. In OS 1128, Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik have sued the developers as well as the Penang Burmese Trustees. [10] Although OS 1128 was filed in 2014, both Nai Ninn Sararaksh and Ho Choon Teik themselves did not procure the AG’s consent to file the action until 31.5.2016. In fact, Ho Choon Teik was not even a party to OS 1128 when it was filed. Armed with the AG’s consent, Ho Choon Teik then intervened and was added as the 2nd plaintiff to OS 1128. [11] Together with the developer and the Vice-Chairman of the Penang Burmese Association, the Penang Burmese Trustees filed the JR proceedings seeking to quash the AG’s consent dated 31.5.2016. The JR proceedings were filed on 30.8.2016. Decisions of the High Court [12] It is quite clear that the parties were fully aware of the two sets of proceedings. Unfortunately, the JR proceedings and OS 1128 were heard before different judges, and disposed of at different times. There does not appear to be any effort to consolidate the actions. This would have greatly assisted better use of time and resources, be it of the Court, counsel or the parties themselves. Each component share in that responsibility in the S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 administration of justice; and every effort ought to have been made, especially in order to obviate any inconsistent decisions, as happened in these appeals. [13] Insofar as OS 1128 was concerned, on 24.11.2017, the High Court allowed the claim and set aside the joint-venture agreement; holding that the agreement was unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect. At the same time, the High Court held that the division of Lot 2103 into Lots 10029 and 10030 was similarly unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect; that the subsequent registration of these subdivided lots to the developer and the Penang Burmese Trustees was also null and void. Further, the High Court set aside the order of the High Court dated 31.10.2007. Injunctive orders were also issued, effectively restraining the joint-venture agreement and the registration of the subdivided lots of Lot 2103. [14] The JR proceedings took a longer time to be disposed of; aggravated by the appeals involved. Initially, leave was refused by the High Court on the basis that the AG’s consent was not reviewable or justiciable. That decision was upheld on appeal. On 12.12.2018, the Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal and ordered the substantive application to be heard on its merits. [15] On 29.9.2021, the High Court in the JR proceedings allowed the application and quashed the AG’s consent. In addition, the High Court held that the Trust Deed of 31.7.2006 was a private trust; and that all the earlier orders granted by the Court, namely orders dated 19.10.1994, 3.10.2002 and 31.10.2007 are valid and binding. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Decisions of the Court of Appeal [16] Both parties appealed against those respective decisions. Thankfully, the appeals were heard by the same panel at the Court of Appeal. On 15.6.2022, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals in respect of the JR proceedings whereas the decision of the High Court in respect of OS 1128 was allowed in part. OUR DECISION [17] On 30.1.2023, this Court granted leave on the following 3 questions of law: i. Whether the consent of the Attorney General can be retrospective in light of the clear wordings and pre-requisites stated in Section 9(1) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 and the mandatory nature of Section 9(2) of the same Act and the decisions of the High Court in the cases of Ledchumanan Nagappan v R. Nadarajah & 2 Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 253 and Subramaniam Vallan & Anor v Dr. S. Sivasundaram & Ors [2016] 1 LNS 675 and whether such consent goes to jurisdiction? ii. In the light of the decision of the High Court which held that the subdivision of the original trust land should stay; that the land partitioned and given to the Burmese be vested in the remaining Burmese Trustee and as the beneficiaries of the Burmese Trust are ascertained or ascertainable individuals as held in Re Endacott [1959] 2 All ER 562, should the S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Burmese Trust be construed as a private trust or a public trust and whether the construction of a trust instrument and the original intention of the settlor under such circumstances, a question of law or a question of fact? iii. If a donor’s dominant intent is to restrict the charitable gift to the exact purpose specified in the Trust Instrument and for no other purpose, is the Court at liberty to presume that the donor still evinced a general charitable intent and effectuate the donor’s intent by applying the cy-prés doctrine to that gift? [18] From the submissions, grounds of decisions and the records of appeal, we were clear that the determination of the first issue was sufficient to dispose of all four appeals. [19] As indicated earlier, this Court had already opined that the decision of the AG under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] is justiciable and thereby reviewable by the Court. Further authorities may be gleaned from the decision in Peguam Negara Malaysia v Chin Chee Kow and another appeal [2019] 3 MLJ 443; that the AG’s power to grant or refuse consent is not absolute and is always subject to limits as prescribed in the statute itself. [20] Section 9 states as follows: (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust for public, religious, social or charitable purposes, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Attorney General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 obtained the consent in writing of the Attorney General, may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public for the purpose of— (a) asserting any interest or right in the trust property; (b) removing any trustee; (c) appointing a new trustee; (d) vesting any property in a trustee; (e) directing accounts and inquiries; (f) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (g) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged, charged or exchanged; (h) settling a scheme; and (i) obtaining such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. (2) No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with that subsection. [emphasis added] [21] From the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in appeals in relation to OS 1128, the AG’s consent dated 31.5.2016 was upheld on the following grounds. At paragraphs 22 and 23, the Court of Appeal reasoned that: [22] “…there was nothing wrong or improper in the AG granting his written consent for OS 1128 for otherwise it would be oppressive for Nai Ninn who has been asked to vacate his house to defend himself and to inquire into how the land, once held under a public charitable trust had been transferred to Five Star”. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [23] All that the AG allowed by his written consent is for Nai Ninn to ventilate his claim and for the Court to decide without taking side on the issue of the final outcome. We could not see how such a decision vested in him under s 9 of the GPA could be said to have been given unreasonably or irrationally such that no right-thinking decision maker would have given his consent. [22] At paragraphs 84 to 86, the Court of Appeal further rationalised why the AG’s consent need not be obtained before the commencement of OS 1128. According to the Court of Appeal, the expression- “… the Attorney General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Attorney General, may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public” (emphasis added) in s 9(1) of the GPA indicates to us that what is far more important in keeping with the rationale behind the written consent of the AG is that no frivolous action or suit is to be commenced or continued to completion without the AG having applied his mind to the action and having consented to it. If the action or suit has commenced already, then it is not to be continued, as would be a case where a second person is joined as a party to the action or suit, without the written consent of the AG. [86] As the AG has no issue with that and was fully aware of the action that had been commenced, it would be pedantic and pointless to labour further on the point at which the consent in writing was given. There was also no application filed by the defendants to strike out the OS before the written consent of the AG was obtained. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [23] In separate grounds written in respect of the JR proceedings, the Court of Appeal found that the AG did not act in bad faith when granting consent dated 31.5.2016; that it was important that “the AG did not take any partisan stand on the issues, but left it to the parties to persuade the Court”. The Court of Appeal further found that it was not legally wrong for the AG’s consent to be given as one of the issues which required probing was “how, why and when that a charitable trust for religious purpose could be turned into a purported private trust, no less with a commercial pursuit”. Consequently, the Court of Appeal found that there was “no good reason to review his decision”. [24] Amongst the many roles and duties of the Attorney General, an office constituted under Article 145 of the Federal Constitution, is the role and responsibility as custodian of the public interest; particularly in the matter of public, religious, social or charitable trusts. Such trusts are set up for the benefit of the larger sector of society and it is the AG’s duty to ensure that the intent of the relevant trusts is adhered to and safeguarded. [25] Some deliberations to this effect may be found in the decision of Chin Chee Kow (as the Secretary of Persatuan Kebajikan dan Amal Liam Hood Thong Chor Seng Thuan) v Peguam Negara Malaysia [2021] 5 MLJ 303. There, the Court of Appeal correctly explained the intention of Parliament in enacting section 9 of Act 359; that it is to empower the AG in the protection of charitable trusts from abuse and to prevent proceedings affecting the charity funds from unnecessary waste of such funds. [26] Similar views may be found in the earlier cases of Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor v Cheah Kee Wee & 15 Ors [1934] 1 MLJ 212; Haji Abdullah & Ors S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 v Ibrahim & Ors [1965] 2 MLJ 189; and Lee Eng Teh & Ors v Teh Thiang Seong & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 42. [27] In Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor, Whitley J cited and adopted Eldon LC's observations made in Attorney General v Green 1 Jacob & Walker 303, that it is the duty of the Court to take care that as little expense as possible should be incurred by the charity estate. Courts are reminded that safeguards are emplaced through section 9 [then under section 18 of the FMS Chapter 17, the precursor to Act 359] in order to prevent abuse, and to prevent proceedings against charitable trusts from being instituted too frequently for no other reason than because it is known that costs will be payable out of charity funds. In Lee Eng Teh & Ors, Gill J explained the consequences of non-compliance, that “…but for the consent of the Attorney General or his being made a party to the action, the present action would not be maintainable”. [28] The failure to comply with the mandatory requirements in section 9 renders any action or suit instituted not maintainable. In these appeals, not only was OS 1128 filed before the written consent of the AG was obtained, the written consent when finally obtained, is also clearly outside the terms prescribed by section 9. This is quite aside from the fact that both Nai Ninn and Ho did not meet its mandatory requirements. [29] The significance of non-compliance with the requirements in section 9 was explained in Ledchumanan Nagappan v R Nadarajah & 2 Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 253. There, the plaintiff who was seeking certain declaratory orders from the Court concerning the affairs of the Subramanian Temple at Batu Caves including an injunction to stop the celebration of Thaipusam at that Temple failed to obtain the prior written consent of the AG before instituting S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 his action. The application was dismissed when the learned Judge found inter alia that there was a “total failure to comply with the three preliminary requirements” under that provision. Although not named as a party, the AG’s representative had attended Court to express the view that the action should not be allowed to proceed since there was non-compliance of the requirements, namely there must be in existence of at least two persons having an interest, the prior written consent of the AG, and the suit itself being brought in the name of the AG. The Court agreed and was of the view that “it would not be necessary to say anymore”, on that point. [30] We agree with those principles and the approach. Sections 9(1) and (2) provide in quite clear terms how and when the AG becomes involved in such trusts, and what requirements must be met before matters relating to such trusts may be challenged in Court. First, it is in the nature of trust itself. The AG only becomes involved under section 9 where the trust is either an express or constructive trust set up for public, religious, social or charitable purposes. Next, there must be an allegation of breach of such a trust; or the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of such trust. In simple terms, Court action is contemplated. [31] Where proceedings in Court are indeed contemplated, section 9 mandates that whoever is moving the Court must first obtain the written consent of the AG. We can appreciate the rationale for such a requirement. As explained in the above case authorities, the process allows scrutiny by the AG to check against abuse and wastage of funds and other resources. Public, religious, social or charitable trusts are, by their very nature and intent, set up and intended for a larger community and purpose; serving an entirely different set of beneficiaries identified by some common cause or interest. Such trusts invariably would serve more than a single person. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [32] So, where there is an allegation of breach or where direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of such trust, and some suit or proceeding is contemplated, it makes good sense that the written consent of the AG is first procured. And, according to section 9(1), that written consent must be sought by two or more persons. Again, this makes good sense, appreciating the nature and character of such trusts. More than one disgruntled person or complainant must step forward to make that complaint and, secure the prior written consent of the AG. [33] The next requirement is that the application must seek any of the reliefs set out in section 9(1)(a) to (i). [34] In respect of the first requirement, there is present the intention to sue for an alleged breach of trust for the reasons relied on. The reliefs sought in OS 1128 are also within the reliefs set out in section 9(1)(a) to (i). However, the impugned written consent was sought only after OS 1128 had already been filed and it was sought by actually just one as opposed to the requisite two persons. The application by Ho to be joined as a party to an existing suit similarly suffers defects due to non-compliance of section 9. [35] Section 9(1) also deals with joinder; that there must be two or more persons intending to join, and not just the single person like Ho here. Again, this is understandable given the nature and character of the trust. This, too, is on the basis that the suit already instituted is valid to start with. Where the suit to which Ho seeks consent for joinder is itself flawed for want of consent under section 9, his application to join will not in the least alleviate the fatal deficiencies of the suit when it was first filed. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [36] In the present appeals, Nai Ninn was the sole plaintiff in OS 1128 when it was filed in 2014. He did not secure the AG’s written consent at the time of filing. Ho, on the other hand, applied to intervene and be joined as an additional plaintiff to OS 1128 which had already been filed by Nai Ninn. The records show that both of them then made that single application on 20.8.2015 and the AG gave his written consent on 31.5.2016 in the following terms: AKTA PROSIDING KERAJAAN 1956 [AKTA] PERSETUJUAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 9(1) PADA menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan oleh Seksyen 9(1) Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 [Akta 359], saya, TAN SRI DATO’ SRI HAJI MOHAMED APANDI BIN ALI, Peguam Negara Malaysia dengan ini bersetuju dengan permohonan Encik Nai Ninn Sararaksh (No KP: 400324-07-5301 dan Encik Ho Choon Teik (No. KP: 750707-07-5261) bagi meneruskan satu prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Pulau Pinang melalui Saman Pemula No: 24NCVC-1128-12/2014 untuk mendapatkan perintah seperti berikut: (i) satu perintah mengepikan pendaftaran nama-nama Defendan-Defendan sebagai pemilik Lot 10029 dan Lot 10030 secara ex debito justitiae atas alasan ketiadaan bidang kuasa dan ketiadaan kebenaran Peguam Negara di bawah Seksyen 9 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956; (ii) satu perintah injunksi tetap yang menghalang Defendan-Defendan sama ada oleh dirinya sendiri, pengkhidmat-pengkhidmat, ejen-ejen mereka atau sesiapapun daripada bertindak sebagai pemilik berdaftar hartanah amanah awam; (iii) satu perintah bahawa Defendan-Defendan mengemukakan penyata akaun bagi “Harta Amanah Keturunan Burma di Pulau Pinang” (“Penang Burmese Trust Property”) kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini; dan (iv) satu perintah bahawa segala wang yang telah digunakan oleh Pemegang Amanah Burma selepas 31.10.2007 berkenaan akaun hartanah amanah keturunan Burma Pulau Pinang dikembalikan dengan serta-merta dan didepositkan ke dalam Mahkamah yang Mulia ini dan kemudian pihak komuniti Burma Pulau Pinang. Bertarikh: 31 haribulan Mei 2016 S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [37] In our view, this written consent not only does not meet the terms of section 9(1), it clearly exceeds the restrictions imposed by section 9. It is a consent devoid of authority and mandate in several respects. That being so, the written consent is liable to be quashed, rendering OS 1128 as not maintainable and the High Court was thus right in issuing the order of certiorari quashing the said decision. [38] On the assumption that both Nai Ninn and Ho fulfil the conditions of having an interest in the trust, the application serves two different objectives depending on whose application we are addressing. For Nai Ninn, it was to institute a suit, or as it would appear, to regularise a suit which had already been filed at the time of the application for AG’s consent. As for Ho, it was to be joined as a party to an existing suit, OS 1128. In either case, both are alone for their respective purpose. In our view, this distinction of separate purpose or objective illustrates that their respective application was and is outside the meaning of the words “two or more persons”. [39] Further, in the case of Nai Ninn, his application is obviously outside the terms of section 9(1) as the AG’s consent was sought long after he had filed OS 1128 on 15.12.2014; almost as an afterthought. As can be seen, section 9(1) expressly requires the written consent to be procured before the suit is instituted. To say that consent may be sought and procured after Court proceedings for the reliefs mentioned in section 9(1)(a) to (i) have been instituted pays scant respect to the clear intention and requirements in section 9(1). [40] It also cannot be said that the AG is empowered to give consent retrospectively as this, quite clearly, runs contrary to the express terms of S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 section 9(1). Such an argument is like a double-edged sword as ironically, this suggests that Nai Ninn and Ho’s own complaint that the Court orders secured by the Penang Burmese Trustees are invalid for want of prior written consent from the AG is unfounded since consent may be given retrospectively. [41] In any case, the written consent of the AG uses the term ‘meneruskan’ which translates to mean “carry on” or “continue”. Such a term does not have the effect of retrospectivity but merely connotes permission or consent to proceed with what has already been started. Such a consent takes effect from the date of the consent itself which is 31.5.2016 and not 15.12.2014, the date when OS 1128 was filed. This leaves OS 1128 bereft of the necessary consent at the material time when it was instituted in 2014. [42] It must also be emphasised that the term “meneruskan” is not found in section 9 at all, especially in section 9(1) in which case, the impugned consent is without the authority of law. We find it not just difficult but a strain on the language to say that the words “institute” or “join” include “meneruskan”. [43] Perhaps, this becomes clearer when section 9(1) is contrasted with the power to grant sanction in cases of insolvency under section 471(1) of the Companies Act 2016 [Act 333]. That provision reads as follows: 471. (1) When a winding up order has been made or an interim liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms as the Court imposes. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [44] Section 471(1) uses the words “proceeded with or commenced”. This indicates that the power to grant leave to sue wound up companies is not limited to fresh actions or proceedings [“commenced”] but extends to the instance where actions or proceedings have already commenced [“proceeded with”]. In the latter, these actions may now proceed, carry on or be continued; or “meneruskan”. Again, these words do not appear in section 9(1) in which case, the AG’s consent of 31.5.2016 is without legal power or is outside the terms of section 9(1); and is thus invalid. [45] In addition, the Court of Appeal has overlooked the presence of section 9(2) which reminds the importance of compliance with the requirements of section 9(1): No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with that subsection. [emphasis added] [46] Section 9(2) reiterates the mandatory requirement of securing written consent before institution of a suit. Since OS 1128 was instituted before AG’s consent under section 9(1) was obtained, it is not “in conformity with that subsection”. While the AG has discretion on the matter of consent, it is with regard the grant, refusal or imposition of terms or conditions to such request for consent. The consent at all times must however, relate to a suit or proceeding which is yet to be instituted, and not to one which has already been instituted. In the latter case, the AG’s consent is in respect of whether the applicants for consent may be joined as a party to that suit already filed. We must add that in the latter case of joinder of party(s), the institution of that suit must, in the first place, have complied with the terms of section S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 9(1). In the case of OS 1128, no written consent was secured before it was instituted; aggravating the position yet further. [47] We do not find the High Court decision of Lee Chick Yet v Chen Siew Hee [1977] 2 MLJ 218 of assistance. Bearing in mind that it was a first- instance decision where the learned Judge opined that the Court could direct compliance of section 9 within a certain time period instead of striking out the whole action, that argument is flawed. Not only does it run contrary to the plain and unambiguous terms of section 9(1), but as pointed out earlier, the Penang Burmese Trustees similarly ought to have been given the same option. [48] The respondents had urged this Court to apply the principle of nunc pro tunc. With due respect, we decline to do so. [49] The principle is generally applied to cases involving court decisions, where the court seeks to correct their records on clerical errors. Black’s Law Dictionary explains the term as follows: ‘Now for then’ having retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power the court entered a nunc pro tunc order to correct a clerical error in the record. Acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be done; nunc pro tunc nearly described inherent powers of court to make the court records to speak the truth. [emphasis added] [50] That does not arise here at all. See also Kok Song Kong v BSP Co Sdn Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 440: S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 In the light of our conclusion that on the facts of the present case we are able to hold that the suit was instituted on 18 April 1984, it may strictly be unnecessary for us to say or do anything further; but out of caution we will direct that the writ be resealed nunc pro tunc, that is to say, with the date, 18 April 1984, which it ought to have borne in the first place. We do this in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction which the court has over its officers, not under any of the provisions of the rules. Where the rights of a party are threatened by an act or default of an officer of the court, the court clearly has such a power to correct the matter. [emphasis added] [51] No error prevails in the Court records for any correction; the only error lies in the impugned consent for the reasons we have already explained. [52] Before we leave this issue, we feel compelled to deal with a point made at paragraph 4 of the grounds of decision in respect of appeal on OS 1128. There, the Court of Appeal found that the written consent of the AG had been obtained in relation to the order dated 19.10.1994. We have poured through the records and we cannot find any consent to this effect. [53] There are only 2 consents issued by the AG, the 2nd consent dated 31.5.2016, the impugned consent has already been dealt with. The other consent, the first, is dated 1.6.2000 and it reads as follows: AKTA PROSIDING KERAJAAN 1956 PERSETUJUAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 9(1) PADA menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan oleh subseksyen 9(1) Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956, saya, Tan Sri Datuk Seri Mohtar bin Abdullah dengan ini bersetuju dengan permulaan satu prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang oleh Wong Hoong Keat (Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma di Pulau Pinang), (No. K.P. 3238892), Dr. Ko Ko Win (No. K.P. 9600855), U Khema Wuntha (No. K.P. US 035257736), Cheah Boo Eng (No. K.P. 4461657). Ong Ba Nee (No. K.P. 570101-07-5429), Prabandh Sanasen (No. K.P. 210819-71-5147) dan S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Songkeram @ Sungkram a/l Apau (No. K.P. 7644628) untuk memohon perintah- perintah seperti berikut: (i) (a) Bahawa pelantikan Dr. Ko Ko Win, U Khema Wuntha, Cheah Boo Eng dan Ong Ba Nee yang beralamat di Dhammikarama Burmese Buddhist Temple, No. 24 Lorong Burma, 10250 Pulau Pinang sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang pada 22 Februari 1998 menggantikan Maung Boon Khan dan Hia Toon Toolseram disahkan oleh Mahkamah; (b) Bahawa harta yang terletak di Lot 2103, Georgetown Seksyen 4, No. H.S. (D) 528, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang diletakhak atas nama Dr. Ko Ko Win, U Khema Wuntha, Cheah Boo Eng dan Ong Ba Nee sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang; (ii) (a) Bahawa pelantikan Prabandh Sanasen dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau yang beralamat di Chaiya Mangalaram Buddhist Temple, No. 17, Lorong Burma, 10250 Pulau Pinang sebagai Pemegang Amanah tambahan Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang dalam Mesyuarat Agung Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang pada 6 September 1998 disahkan oleh Mahkamah; (b) Bahawa harta yang terletak di Lot 2102, Georgetown, Seksyen 4, No. H.S. (D) 527, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang diletakhak atas nama Prabandh Sanasen dan Songkeram @ Sungkaram a/l Apau dan atas nama Pemegang Amanah yang sedia ada iaitu Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchap dan Sook Buranakol sebagai Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang; (iii) (a) Bahawa akaun terakhir Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma disahkan dan harta amanah termasuk wang tunai dalam Simpanan Tetap dalam akaun bank diserahkan kepada Pemegang Amanah kedua-dua tanah yang berkenaan iaitu Lot 2103 kepada Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma dan Lot 2102 kepada Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai; (b) Bahawa Wong Hoong Keat, Penerima Harta Amanah Orang Thai/Burma di Pulau Pinang dilepaskan sebagai Penerima Amanah tersebut; (iv) Bahawa semua kos yang timbul daripada tindakan ini dan kos permohonan ini dicukai dan diuntukkan daripada Amanah tersebut; dan (v) Lain-lain relif yang difikirkan patut dan suaimanfaat oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Bertarikh pada 1 haribulan Jun 2000. [54] With this consent, an order of Court dated 3.10.2002 was obtained granting orders which essentially dealt with the appointment of trustees and the vesting of Lots 2102 and 2103 on the appropriate trustees: ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN 1. bahawa Wong Hoong Keat, sebagai Penerima yang dilantik melalui Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi, Pulau Pinang bertarikh 14.12.1973, dilepaskan sebagai Penerima daripada mengutip segala sewa dan hasil (pendapatan) untuk harta amanah mengenai Amanah-amanah dalam suatu Dokumen Amanah menerusi Geran No. 2655 bertarikh 30.05.1845; 2. bahawa nama-nama Maung Boon Khan (K/P: A3103868) Hla Toon Toolseram (K/P: 3465236) dan Sook Buranakol (K/P 4083456) dibatalkan dan dikeluarkan daripada geran mengenai hakmilik tanah yang dikenali sebagai Geran No: 61389, Lot 2102, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang (dahulu di kenali sebagai H.S.(D) 527, Lot 2102, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang) dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau (No KPT: 450515-02-5097) digantikan dan diletakhakkan sebagai Pemegang amanah; 3. bahawa nama-nama Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchapan (K/P: 2190061) dan Sook Buranakol (K/P: 4083456), simati, dibatalkan dan dikeluarkan daripada geran mengenai hakmilik tanah yang dikenali sebagai Geran No: 61390, Lot 2103, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang (dahulu di kenali sebagai H.S.(D) 528, Lot 2103, Daerah Timur Laut, Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang) 4. bahawa akaun dalam Afidavit bertarikh 19.09.2002 oleh Penerima Harta Amanah Komuniti Thai-Burma di Pulau Pinang, En. Wong Hoong Keat, disahkan dan diluluskan dan daripada wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Juta Tujuh Ratus Tujuh Puluh Lapan Ribu Lima Ratus Dua Puluh Tiga dan Sen Tujuh Puluh Tiga (RM3,778,523.73) Sahaja dalam pengangan pihak Penerima setakat 30.6.2002, pihak Penerima diperintahkan:- (i) membayar wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Satu Juta Lapan Ratus Lapan Puluh Sembilan Ribu Dua Ratus Enam Puluh Satu dan Sen Lapan Puluh Enam (RM1,889,261.86) Sahaja kepada Tetuan Vello & S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Associates, Peguambela dan Peguamcara, Pulan Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak dan untuk membayar bersama-sama kepada Bhikku Daeng a/l Nai Chan Satchapan (K/P:2190061) dan Songkeram@Sungkram a/l Apau (KPT: 450515-02-5097) sebagai Pemegang-pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai di Pulau Pinang; dan (ii) membayar wang sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Satu Juta Lapan Ratus Lapan Puluh Sembilan Ribu Dua Ratus Enam Puluh Satu dan Sen Lapan Puluh Enam (RM1,889,261.86) Sahaja kepada Tetuan G. Raju and Company, Peguambela dan Peguamcara, Pulau Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak dan untuk membayar bersama-sama kepada Maung Boon Khan (K/P: A 3103868) dan Hla Toon Toolseram (K/P 3465236) sebagai Pemegang-pemegang Amanah Komuniti Burma di Pulau Pinang 5. Bahawa pihak Penerima hendaklah memberi suatu akaun terakhir daripada 01.07.2002 sehingga 31.10.2002 dan selepas menolak peruntukkan untuk kos, perbelanjaan dan lain-lain bayaran yang patut, membahagikan serisama wang-wang yang dalam pegangannya dan membayar setengahnya (1/2) kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates, Peguamcara dan Peguambela, Pulau Pinang untuk dan bagi pihak Pemegang-pemegang amanah Thai dan setengah (1/2) yang bakinya kepada, Tetuan G. Raju and Company, Peguamcara dan Peguambela untuk dan bagi pihak Pemegang- pemegang Amanah Burma. 6. Kos yang dipersetujui sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Puluh Ribu (RM30,000.00) Sahaja diperuntukkan daripada tabung Amanah tersebut dan pihak Penerima hendaklah membayar wang sebanyak RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan G. Raju and Company, RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan Vello & Associates dan RM10,000.00 kepada Tetuan Pregrave & Mathews sebagai peguamcara-peguamcara untuk pihak-pihak dalam perkara ini masing- masing; dan 7. Bahawa Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah, Pulau Pinang hendaklah mendaftarkan perintah-perintah yang dibuat dalam perkara ini dalam geran-geran masing- masing. Bertarikh pada 3 haribulan Oktober 2002 [55] There is no mention, whether in the first consent or in this Court order of the splitting of Lot 104. This is hardly surprising since Lot 104 had already been split as far back as 19.10.1994: S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN:- 1. Bahawa harta amanah Thai Burmesa yang terletak di Lot No. 104 Seksyen 4, Georgetown, Daerah Timur Laut, Pulau Pinang dibahagikan mengikut pelan ukuran No. CAB/11/C/PG/92-P1 bertarikh 26 haribulan Ogos, 1993 danPerjanjian untuk Pecah Milik bertarikh 16 haribulan April, 1994 dan Perjanjian Untuk Pengurusan Bersama ke atas Tanah Perkuburan bertarikh 16 haribulan April, 1994 dan bahagian yang ditanda “1” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut didaftarkan dan diletakhak atas nama Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai dan bahagian yang ditanda “2” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut didaftarkan dan diletakhak atas nama Pemegang Amanah 2. Tanah Perkuburan yang terletak di bahagian yang bertanda “1” dan “2” dalam pelan ukuran harta amanah tersebut diurus bersama oleh Pemegang- Pemegang Amanah Komuniti Thai dan Burma; 3. Encik Chuah Ah Bah dari Jurukur Chuah & Rakan, seorang jurukur tanah berlesen dilantik untuk memohon bagi pecah lot dan pembahagian keatas harta amanah tersebut; dan 4. Kos untuk permohonan ini dibayar dari kumpulan wang amanah. Bertarikh pada 19 haribulan Oktober, 1994. [56] For this “split” of Lot 104, there does not appear to be any consent from the AG, of any description, for what we see is a most critical departure from the 1845 Indenture. Conclusion [57] For the above reasons, we find for the purposes of section 9 of Act 359, the learned AG has no discretion to give consent after a suit has already been instituted. Worse when the application for consent is only made by a single person and not two or more persons. To say otherwise would defeat the ‘filter’ mechanism in the statute and the protective role that the AG plays as custodian of the public interest. S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [58] In the circumstances, the impugned consent of 31.5.2016 is invalid and is liable to be quashed. The High Court had rightly granted the orders sought in the JR proceedings. Question 1 is thus answered in the negative. [59] In view of our answer to Question 1, and since OS 1128 was instituted without the consent of the AG, that OS is incompetent and not maintainable. We therefore do not see the need to answer questions 2 and 3. [60] The appeals in relation to the JR proceedings are thus allowed and the decisions of the Court of Appeal dated 15.6.2022 are set aside and the decision of the High Court is reinstated. In respect of the appeal in relation to OS 1128, the appeal is allowed and the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court are set aside. [61] There is no order as to costs. Dated: 5 December 2023 Signed (MARY LIM THIAM SUAN) Federal Court Judge Malaysia S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Counsel/Solicitors For the appellant Civil Appeal No. 01(f)-3-02/2023(P), No. 02(f)-6- 02/2023(P), No. 02(f)-7-02/2023(P), No.02(f)-8-02/2023(P): Karin Lim, A. Suppiah, Julinder Daliwal & Alisa Lim Wei Zhen Aznil Naziah Juli & Praba Peguambela dan Peguamcara Suite 2-05 Tingkat 2 Bangunan Wisma Pantai Jalan Kampong Gajah 12200 Butterworth For the respondent Civil Appeal No.01(f)-3-02/2023(P): SFC Shamsul Bolhassan, SFC Mohammad Al-Saifi Hj. Hashim, SFC Nurul Farhana Khalid, FC Nor Aqilah Abdul Halim & FC Nur Syazwani Abdul Aziz Bahagian Guaman Jabatan Peguam Negara No. 45, Persiaran Perdana Presint 4 For the respondent Civil Appeal No. 02(f)-6-02/2023(P) & No. 02(f)-7-02/2023(P): T. Gunalan Seelan, Balwant Singh Purba, Eng Yuh Pei & Tan Shin Yi Messrs. Balwant Singh & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 20-B (Ground Floor) Lebuh Penang 10200 Pulau Pinang For the respondent Civil Appeal No.02(f)-8-02/2023(P): T. Gunalan Seelan, Ong Ken-Jeen & Lee Min Yau Messrs. Vello & Associates Peguam Bela dan Peguamcara No. 105, Anson Road 10400 Penang S/N VOf3OI/K0UeqvsjFlQ6Iw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	55,138	Tika 2.6.0
WA-11BNCvC-12-03/2022	PERAYU HASHIM B MAHMUD RESPONDEN TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD	Oleh kerana Perayu masih merupakan pengguna yang dinamakan menurut akaun bekalan elektrik dengan Responden, maka Perayu bertanggungjawab untuk membayar kesemua bil yang tertunggak yang telah dibekalkan ke atas tanah lot tersebut. Rayuan Perayu kesemuanya tidak dapat diterima oleh Mahkamah ini. Rayuan ditolak dengan kos RM10,000. Perintah Mahkamah Majistret dikekalkan.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=02fc253b-9af6-4d2f-b161-6c4e02b35b0c&Inline=true	05/12/2023 12:28:17 WA-11BNCvC-12-03/2022 Kand. 24 S/N OyX8AvaaL02xYWxOArNbDA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OyX8AvaaL02xYWxOArNbDA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OyX8AvaaL02xYWxOArNbDA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OyX8AvaaL02xYWxOArNbDA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OyX8AvaaL02xYWxOArNbDA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OyX8AvaaL02xYWxOArNbDA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OyX8AvaaL02xYWxOArNbDA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OyX8AvaaL02xYWxOArNbDA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—11mIcvc—12—o3/2022 Kand. 24 us/mzm 12:22-17 DI mum: MAHKAMAH Tmcsl MALAVA DI KUALA LUMPUR DI DALAM NEGERI WILAVAN I»-Enaaxuvum, MALAYSIA RAVUAN sML N wA-11aNcvc.12-0312021 nu Aomuu NASNIM am Iurwlun [N0 KIP: Ano42s—n1-5051) PERAVU DAN TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD (no SVARIKAY: zaonssw) . JIESFONDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Kggmusan Mamumgn Mu mm [1] Selelah pevblmvaan penuh‘ Mahkamah Mauslra lelih mambenalkan lunlulan nespanaen yang bequmlah RMI9‘777.24 maaap Perayu ymg meruuakan jurmah nmgqakan bayaran ca, elekmk senkzl 3.11 2019 bag! Lo! :1 125, Kampung Sungal Rasau am a, 47120 Fuchong. sw L)yxBAva:Lll1xVWxOArN\|7DA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm [2] Rayuan Femyu menekmkan kepada kegagzxan Rasnnndan membukhkin kasnya karana dlhupahkan bahawa Responaan lidak menyerahkan mm: siekmk, Iermasuk Nous Penngatsn dan Nuns Pemmnngan kepaaa Perayu [31 Peuyu Iumlberhujah bahawa Mapslmlelah gagal mengambil ma «ma bahawa um \u\| \|evs2bu\|le\|ah dllum odsh Fsrayu ssgak 2e 12 zooe keplda Leong Yea Hang (Lanny) an aunt nnlmkasu manuakmrnkanlakla Vnl (elah a-mankan kapadu Rxponden Huianen Fevayu amara lalnnya nanm Mamm man gugal mlngambu ma bumwa turdapul buhm panyerahln nulls memnuu akaun man Perayu. [41 Dalam hujahan Periyu‘ Iuml dikelengahkan hahuwi xempu suatu Iempoh di mana Responaen lelah menyambung ssmula bekalan elekmk pada 27 5 2010 sedanqkalv— (3) (b) hmggakan ml paaa mas; ilu Isiah meucecah RM1B,0lw.00: Pevayu Hdak pernah membual wbirang hayaran kapada Raspnnaen seiak mlnjual Lanah um (afsehol kupaaa Lsong, dun lurzf pun wan ammar kaplda Raspumlan pads 25 12 zoos unmk mmmup lklun (c) llkm [5] Mahkamah In: leiah menarm Reknd Rayuan secara ksssluluhm am mandapah swam yang nenkm sm nyxaAvaau2zxvwxoAmnDA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! (a) pad: 15.7.1997 Parayu wan msmasuki komrak bekalan eleklnk aengan Responds" mm In! lanah comm Akaun bekalan elektnk Peniyu adalah utemooeuzzsvae an cawangan Bangi yang kemudlannya d ndahkan ke cavmgan Subsng Jays dengan nwubor akaun o131ous41335 (I2) pada 13.3 zoos Perayu man mevuual bi (man lersebul kepad: Laong Penyu kemudlannya zaemmaen kn mamas ham an suv umnangen. (cl terdapat Surat benankh 2612 2005 daripada Perayu kepada Responden unluk menammxan karmak beka\an elekuik ks zanan lot lersebm (“Surat ceuseoury, Tevvapat jugs akuan penenmaan Respundsn benarikh s1,2uo7 an alas Surat tevssbul. warau bagamuanapun‘ kssahman Surat lecsehul dlpemkalkan olsh Respmdm Vsu bamangkn yang dvpanumhangkan oteh Mahkamah dalam rayusn rm mam nma mu Forsyu barjuyu mumuzskan Muhklmah nus lmbanaan kebsvanﬂaluin‘ (a) Ievdanat Juga suval benanxn 21.11.2007 kerana muuglkul Perayu lrada nndakan yang uuambll clan Responden ouen yang agmman. Perayu bemqah suratkadua telah dia\amaﬂ<an kspada nespanaen un\|uk menump Ikaunnyl dengan Responder: ksrnnn Ferlyu bukanlah lag‘ pangguni an alamal prlrws larsabul $ura\| m 'ugI dlpomkmkan mu Responden yang mencabar Aanya ﬂask duamnaxkzrl‘ (e) Perayu lurul becsandarkan kepada surac Ierakhlmya berlankh 5.1.2005 dan bemujah bahawa kerana uada llndakan lanpl ; sm Dyxanvaauzzr/wxoAmnDA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm yang dlambﬂ meh Resyurvdsn Iarhadap sum! lavsebul, Purayu te\ah Cuba menukarnama pm-Ink Iklm unluk bekalan ekekhik ke man Im Iersebm danpada nama Perayu ke nama Yong Meng cnoy (Vang pakeria Leone: (9 ram sn.2ma Responder: lelah mnunup Iknun bukalln uleklnk llrsahumnn msnghamiv bll Iarukhiv kapad: Para man my Pada 151 2014 Responoen te\ah mancaukan hndakan ml dw Mahkamah Mapslrel unluk mcnunlul danpada Fzrayu pmlah yang dlkalakan lammggak xggmgunun [5] Mengmn mm bekalon e\ok\|r\k yarvg arparsamjul om Perayu din Rupondun, pcnyarahan an ukmx ks llnah Im Ievsahul y-ng merupakln Ilamai penggunun e\ekh1k adnlah pervyerahan ynng nmpuma Mahkamuh Im berpuzs hali bahawa ketermgan manunjukkan mam bil erektnk yang celan dihasilkan nish sun-m kampuhzr Respanden bsrkenaan dengan penmunaan elaklnk di laneh um tecsebm ada\ah leralur can lepai selaras dengan perunmkan .1. hawah seksyen gun, ma Kaerangan 195a [ma 56] Malah. berdasarkan penelilian Mankamah Im, amaun yang \|alkandung dalam Penyals Akaun lerssbul um dlcabav nigh Pernyu [71 scmunann dangan pemyavun Farayu huhawa beliau man mamnklumkan kapada Rslpnndun Oshawa DI lu bukan lagl p-ngguna eluktnk yang dbekalkan nleh Raspendcn «I much lat Inwebul, Mankamm sm nyxaAvaau2zxvwxoAmnDA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! ml munaamhﬂ nemahan bahawa Mmkamah Maimm msrudapah nndakzn dan percuhaan Faayu unmk memnklumkan dinlalau msmbenkan mm. unluk menamalkan bekalan erakmk aaaran ndak Ieramr karana. ta) Psrayu ra\ah gagalmenunjukkan lanah \auzrsebu\|le\ah auual Kepad: Lemg, (n) hamanrkan penaman Mnhkamsh lm, suva\| beﬂarikh 26 12.29115 hukanhh dlurahkxn oxen Parzyu kapada Rasponden ubalvknya surul nu dilernnkln alah Yong. Sabeum wnblhan jugs. knndungan sum mun-n adalnh Imak jelas ﬂan Iidak disahknn memandanalun saksi Yong ﬁdak mpamn ﬂan maua sahnnn mu dlknmukakan uleh Periyu. (ct bemasarkan sum! Pzrayu nsnamm 21 11 20:27 din a 1.2mm maapan uada apaapa bum yang menunjukkan bahawa vanya \|elah dnsernhkan kepada Respendan [51 Nlaiiure\| mendapaﬂ bnhawa Penyu lelnh ‘gags! mombenkan rnaklumen lengklp dun/atau murldepolkan slltua permahonnn um um wa/at momma unluk mangelak dnrlplds liahi/m’ unluk mnmbeyav or/Jan slekmk .-rsnegm pengguna mamuu! ABE‘ [9] Selelah menehh kasamna kecemngan da\am Rekud Rayuan, Mahkaman menaapan bahawa sernemangnya Parayu gagal menumukkan ballawa kesemua surat lersebul disamvikm kepada Rpmden unluk mmakan seweuamya. Sslam nu, Yong aualah saksl Am ma\|ena\| kerana pads mmanya Pmyu menegaskan hahawa beliau lalah s sm nyxaAvaau2zxvwxoAmnDA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm member! surat benankh 2512 was nu kipsds Yong mm mserahkan kepada Responden Namun begilu. Yong Iwdak dwpangqwl sebagar saw Perayu umuk mengesahkan swat nu msemhkan Peguambera Perayu semasa menjawab Mallkamah Memsltel msngenai sural nu seleoss 592 (pemlllk Dam Leong) memberl kecerangan banawa Yang (idak akan dlpanggll unluk memnsn merangan rem menjawab kspada Mahkaman Manscm ‘I dun‘! (max so Puln sabamelas sakar mm Im mm menyatakan llngsung Enak Vang yang hunlar Jam :aya percaya kn/su says Kenya mm Encvk Yong pun, mom‘ ma pun an ram; ubab Irnnsakst ml Encvk Leang su/ukupemrltk Inna)! pun yang kula ma tahu suvul nu lellpr‘ m Iunu mum kandax dm Ink mun pun mlnlron yang Enctk Yong yaw hanlar my say: psrcaya untuk /311 nik lender dokumcn In! momur Encik Yong mu. say: parcaya lak dspauuga. ' [101 men rm Ferayu Ielah menulun kesnya wnpa memmmikan bahawa sural benarlkh 26122006 Mu dan sure!-swat tdah dlserahkan kepadz Responded! Malahan, Perayu senum dalam kaneranganm pun naak «am mangtsshkan bahawa sural Kn Gan swat-sura\| lam halah dmanlar dan dlsevahkan kepada Relpcndan. nu Mahkamuh WM manuuk kepade kepmulan Mahkamah Rayuln daiam kss voonm M-cnimi-s Sdn and v Coil mm: Sdn End 5 Or: 1101512 cm 414 manqwkal Mahkamah um di maria vihak yang mm mahkzmah membual pensmuzn fzkla csnmu mermkul beban umuk membuknkannya alas Amhangan kebavangkallan. Beban kelerzngan hanya akan berahh apemla beban ilu dilepaskan lru aeians dengan penmtukan an bawah seksyen cm dan seksyen 10: Am Ketaningan 1950 (Lemhumlnnn Dhetliar Aligappan Q L Allavappan 3 Anal v Stem: Fllnﬂllon sun Bhd[2ﬂ17\| 2 MLRA 501 amqukj. s sm Dyxanvaauzzr/wxoAmnDA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [121 Old: yang dmmklan, Mahkamah Im bevnandangan Iiada kemlavan dalam dapalan Mahkanah Maﬁshaf apabxla mamuluskzn unluk um mengadikan mm senagax aksnim kes mengarnw ma sannan asal \|idak dlksmukakan dan mans pmsk yang buleh maruelaskm mm yang mempakan sallnan sekunder yang udak jaas Dleh kerana Respomsen menaﬁkan dan menyangkal pemyaiaan Fsrayu hahawa sum msem Man umancar kepada Responden, nuka beban unmk munbuxukan sauenukin adalah «amax ke alas Pemyu Eaban mi Iwdak rmspasuan nlsh Periyu Imluk mernbukhkan Rlspondeu Ialah manaﬂma sum! nu Akhlmyn Mahkamlh Inn mg. m-nu-pan baluwa kandungan mm \|ersahu( lakul yabanm hearsay’ — bcrdlsarkan saklyan 13A Am Kalerangan 1950 an uliuaankzuurayu-;suv v.u.riow4.u (19951 2 cu 33 OM! yang demikian, kzndungan IDD7 llnsbul hdak holsh menma sebagax kekerangan unluk pembe\aan Perayu [vs] Mahkamah Am manaupan bahawu ans lmbangln lvabarlngkallan swat benankh 25.122003 m Gan xumuumc um wujud wan... bagmmanupun, wsoaran sama ma mama sural larsebm zen-n diserahkan kopada Raspondan hdak dipal dlbukﬁkan clan Parnyu memandangkan, naaa anaapa memngan unmk memuaskan Mahkamah ml atas imbengan kebarangkalian bahawa Rsspovmsn lelah mendapal Lahu akan cam ueuemn dan sspammya bemndak unmk menukzr llama akaun Famyu kepada nama pemillk barn lanah lal Iavsebtﬂ Ianu Leoog. Perayu seudm belnh nnmben katerangm banawa bukan baﬁau yang msnysrankan sural mu Kepada Rsspanaan. [M] Hmahan Pauayu berkenaan dengan penyambungan elekmx unluk wakeuka pads (shun zom walaupun jumlah nu lerlunggak yang belum 1 sm nyxaAvaau2zxvwxoAmnDA mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VII mum pm mmaskan Idallh RM18,DO0I)0 mak menuurungkin spa-apa :um\ah yang Ierhmanq kepada Responds" [151 oxen ksrana Perayu masm memvakan penggma yang dinamzkan menuml akaun bekalan e\ekInk dengan Responden, mska Perayu benanggungJawsb unluk membayy kesemua on yang lemmggak yang lalah ameulkan kn am (anal! Am \|srssbul [1 n) Rayuan Parayu knsamuunya mu dapat dnanma oleh Mahkemzh in’ Ruyunn dﬂalak dengan kc: nmumoa. Perimnh Mahkamah Maixwd dikakalkan. BERTARIKH1 JUN mm W ' ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN PESURUNJAVA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH YINGGI MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Begi pmak Psiaylr MuIvammadAsfV bin zar-an T/n Moha]: Nazury A Isrvufl Bag! Pmak Raspondon Danlel Bank Jr Wsl T/n Shukal Beam 4 Partners sm nyxaAvaau2zxvwxoAmnDA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm!	1,112	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-22NCC-50-04/2022	PLAINTIF Bagan Hasrat Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN Suresh Kumar A/L Ramachandren	FRIENDLY LOAN: Moneylending transaction – Whether loans were friendly loans – Whether loans were actually moneylending transactions – Whether loans null and void – Whether borrower can deny knowing or understanding what they had signed with respect to loans taken − Burden of proof – Whether there is request to borrow for loan – The loan was given and taken – Whether the payments is an ‘agreed 5% profit’ – Borrower refused to repayment – Admission of the debt to the Plaintiff − Section 21 of the Evidence Act 1950.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=33442987-09fb-44ae-b2db-298b632e2271&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: BA-22NCC-50-04/2022 ANTARA BAGAN HASRAT SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 19960100427 [376773-V]) − PLAINTIF DAN SURESH KUMAR A/L RAMACHANDREN (No. K/P: 650505-08-5527) − DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant for a friendly loan in the sum of RM1,760,000.00, interest and costs. [2] The statement of claim only has 9 paragraphs stated about the parties, background facts and prayers/reliefs sought. [3] On 27-9-2023, I allowed the Plaintiff’s claims with costs (subject to allocator fee) and my grounds of decision (in Bahasa) is as follows: KEPUTUSAN (Selepas perbicaraan penuh) 05/12/2023 01:28:37 BA-22NCC-50-04/2022 Kand. 62 S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Tuntutan Plaintif [1] Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan ialah untuk Defendan membayar sejumlah RM1,771,572.60, faedah dan kos kepada Plaintif. [2] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa suatu pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 ialah pinjaman persahabatan tanpa faedah yang diberi oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan secara 8 kali bayaran pada tarikh-tarikh yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 4 pernyataan tuntutan. Terdapat pengakuan dan pengesahan hutang oleh Defendan bagi pinjaman persahabatan tersebut. [3] Defendan membela diri dan memplidkan bahawa Defendan tiada apa-apa hubungan dengan Plaintif; Defendan tidak pernah memohon apa-apa pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 daripada Plaintif; Plaintif bukanlah syarikat yang diberi kuasa di sisi undang-undang untuk memberi kemudahan pinjaman atau pinjaman persahabatan kepada mana-mana orang. [4] Plaintif memfailkan 3 isu untuk dibicarakan dan ditentukan oleh Mahkamah ini. Isu Untuk Dibicarakan 1: Sama ada Defendan telah menerima pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 daripada Plaintif. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Isu Untuk Dibicarakan 2: Sama ada Defendan telah menandatangani suatu pengakuan hutang bagi mengesahkan penerimaan pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 tersebut daripada Plaintif. Isu Untuk Dibicarakan 3: Sama ada terdapat persefahaman bersama antara pihak-pihak bahawa Defendan hendaklah membayar balik sepenuhnya pinjaman persahabatan tersebut pada atau sebelum 01/03/2022 kepada Plaintif. Isu dan dapatan Mahkamah [5] Dalam perbicaraan, Mahkamah ini telah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi kedua-dua pihak. [6] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan Defendan menyatakan bahawa – • Defendan ada membuat request melalui Plaintiff’s managing director bagi pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00. Peguam cara Defendan menghujahkan bahawa tiada secebis keterangan mengenai “request: dibuat oleh Defendan dibuktikan oleh Plaintif. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 • tiada apa-apa pinjaman persahabatan sebagaimana yang dituntut oleh Plaintif. Ini kerana bayaran yang diterima oleh Defendan ialah untuk 5% saham Defendan dalam syarikat KL Larut Sdn Bhd. Ini berdasarkan “profit sharing” dalam perniagaan mereka. • peguam cara Plaintif tidak pernah meminta maklum balas daripada peguam cara Defendan mengenai “arising from their business” dan “details of which are well within your client’s knowledge”. • keterangan SP3 yang hadir di Bank semasa kesemua 8 transaksi bayaran yang kononnya dibayar kepada Defendan. [7] Berdasarkan penelitian Mahkamah ini selepas meneliti semua dokumen dan keterangan lisan iaitu – Saksi Plaintif: SP1: En Lim Zi Liang, Branch Manager CIMB Jalan Ipoh (saksi sapina). SP2: En. P. Thiagarajan A/L Pavadai, Plaintiff’s Managing Director. SP3: En Sinniah A/L Muthusamy, mantan pekerja Plaintif. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Saksi Defendan: SD1: Tn Hj Mohd Zain bin Ghazali (saksi sapina). SD2: En Suresh Kumar A/L Ramachandran. Dan dokumentar yang dibentangkan oleh pihak-pihak di hadapan Mahkamah ini, dan hujahan bertulis (termasuk executive summary of written submission) serta hujahan balasan pihak- pihak, Mahkamah ini mendapati atas imbangan kebarangkalian Plaintif berjaya untuk membuktikan sebahagian sahaja tuntutannya terhadap Defendan. [8] Oleh yang demikian, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dan selanjutnya adalah diperintahkan bahawa – (a) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif jumlah sebanyak RM1,060,000.00. (b) tiada pengenaan faedah pada kadar 5% ke atas jumlah RM1,060,000.00. (c) Kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 (tertakluk kepada fi alokatur) dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. [4] The Plaintiff and the Defendant appeal to the Court of Appeal. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [5] Here, for the purpose of the Defendant’s appeal, I give my grounds for allowing the Plaintiff’s claims. And in another grounds of judgment, i will give my grounds for allowing partly of the Plaintiff’s claims. Background facts [6] The suit before this Court is between the Plaintiff (a private limited company registered as Bagan Hasrat Sdn. Bhd.) and the Defendant (Mr. Suresh Kumar a/l Ramachandran). [7] The Plaintiff pleaded that in or about the first quarter of year 2021, the Defendant had requested for a friendly loan in the sum of RM1,760,000.00. [8] The Plaintiff through its managing director agreed to provide the friendly loan, free of interest to the Defendant. And the disbursement of RM1,760,000.00 is by way of 8 tranches paid to the Defendant. Table 1 in the statement of claim stated the dates of the payments, amount and the payment’s vouchers. [9] The Plaintiff has pleaded that the Defendant signed an acknowledgement of debt and confirmed received the amount of RM1,760,000.00. [10] Therefore, the Plaintiff’s case is for the return of RM1,771,572.60 and this amount is being the total sum owing which includes interest of 5% totaling RM11,572.60. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [11] The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant was supposed to repay the loan on 1-3-2022. The Defendant failed and/or neglected and/or refused to repay within the agreed date. [12] In the defence, the Defendant has explained the relationship between the Defendant and the Plaintiff and also the trail for the sum claimed by the Plaintiff as alleged to be the friendly loan. [13] The Defendant pleaded as follows: • Defendan tiada sebarang hubungan dengan Plaintif. • Defendan tidak pernah memohon sebarang pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 daripada Plaintif. • pada masa material, Plaintif bukan suatu syarikat yang diberi kuasa di bawah undang-undang untuk memberikan kemudahan pinjaman ataupun pinjaman persahabatan kepada mana-mana orang. • secara alternatifnya, Defendan menyatakan bahawa Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai adalah pengarah dan pemegang saham di syarikat-syarikat KL Larut Sdn Bhd, Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd, dan KL Larut Holdings Sdn Bhd. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 KL Larut Sdn Bhd: • sekitar tahun 2010, Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai meminta Defendan untuk membantu KL Larut Sdn Bhd dan Defendan dilantik sebagai konsultan dan mempunyai hubungan perniagaan dengan Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai. • bagi tugas ini, Defendan menyatakan bahawa Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai memberi Defendan sebuah kereta Honda CRV dan membayar RM5000.00 sebulan sebagai elaun. Disamping itu, Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai juga membayar secara periodic kepada Defendan sebagai bayaran hasil keuntungan perkongsian perniagaan mereka bersama. Penafian Defendan mengenai pinjaman persahabatan kepada Plaintif: • sekitar hujung tahun 2021, berlaku perselisihan antara Defendan dan Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai. • akibat daripada itu, Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai menuntut Defendan mengembalikan kereta Honda CRV dan Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai memberhentikan bayaran RM5000.00 sebulan kepada Defendan. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 • seterusnya, Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai menuduh Defendan – ▪ menghilangkan wang derma kuil sebanyak RM200,000.00 yang didermakan oleh Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai kepada kuil. ▪ meminjam RM200,000.00 yang diderma kepada kuil daripada Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai dan tuduhan/tomahan itu disiarkan dalam akhbar Tamil Malar yang dimiliki dan/atau dikawal oleh Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai. Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd (Plaintif): • Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai ialah pengarah urusan dan ‘alter-ego’ kepada Plaintif (Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd). • Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai menubuhkan syarikat Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd (Plaintif) dan menggunakan anaknya bernama Palaniswaran a/l P. Thiagarajan sebagai pengarah Plaintif. • Defendan memplidkan bahawa Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai dengan niat jahat memperalatkan Plaintif (Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd dalam membawa tindakan undang-undang ini terhadap Defendan. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 The trial Issues to be tried: [14] The Plaintiff and the Defendant filed separately issues to be tried and after reading Enclosure C1 and C2, this Court finds, the issues to be determined are – (a) whether the Defendant has received RM1,760,000.00 from the Plaintiff as the friendly loan? (b) whether the Defendant has signed an admission of debt and confirmed receiving the amount RM1,760,000.00 from the Plaintiff as the friendly loan? (c) whether the Plaintiff can provide friendly loan to any parties? (d) whether the Defendant has entered into an agreement for the friendly loan? [15] There were 5 witnesses during trial, 3 of whom were the Plaintiff’s witnesses and the other 2 were the Defendant’s witnesses (Defendant and a subpoenaed witness). S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 The application of law to the fact Burden of proof: [16] In Pernec Ebiz Sdn Bhd v. CCI Technology Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 2 MLJ 117, the Court of Appeal held − “Even though the burden upon a plaintiff in a civil suit is only to prove its case upon a balance of probabilities, it must present its case sufficiently clearly to do so. It cannot merely file pleadings, file bundles of documents, proceed to trial, call witnesses to testify and argue on the various issue and expect the court to make out the case on its own for one party or other. … Where the party upon whom the burden of proving its case lies fails to do so, it fails to prove its case and its action must be dismissed.”. [17] Lord Goddard in Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 at p. 178 held− “… plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: ‘This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages’. They have to prove it.”. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [18] The well-established principle that the burden of proof at all times is borne by the Plaintiff on the balance of probabilities to establish his case against the Defendant or the existence of a legally enforceable claim against the Defendant. It is upon the Plaintiff, and certainly not the Defendant, to discharge that burden. It is for the Plaintiff to prove his case and satisfy the court that his claim is well-founded before the court can grant judgment on his claim. [19] The Court of Appeal in the case of Pioneer Conglomerate Bhd v. Tenggara Kapital Sdn Bhd [2023] 1 LNS 1626 held that “[9] It was common ground that at the Court below, there was only one core issue for determination namely, whether the sum of RM7,000,000.00 was an advancement given to the Respondent or a commission to the Respondent for arranging the shares in Ta Win Holdings Berhad for the Plaintiff. [10] In essence, the case before the trial Court revolved around the issue whether the evidential burden lay upon the Appellant/Plaintiff to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities that the sum of RM7,000,000.00 was paid to the Respondent as an advancement. It was the Respondent’s position that based on all the evidence adduced at trial, there was not a shred of documentary evidence to prove that the Appellant and Respondent had entered into an agreement for the money to be paid as advancement. Hence, that the LJ had correctly found that the Appellant had never adduced any agreement in respect of any money advanced and that there is no resolution passed by the Appellant’s board of directors S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 approving the advance of that RM7,000,000.00 to the Respondent.”. [20] The learned counsel for the Defendant has cited the laws on the burden of proof in a case is governed by sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950. and the cases of MIE-AFA Corporation Sdn. Bhd. v. Razali Mohd Sham & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 1267, the court explained that the burden of proof lies throughout with the party who wishes the Court to belief the facts of their case; and the Federal Court in the case of Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests and Ors [2017[ 4 CLJ 676 at page 698 held: [78] It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies, has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party.” Therefore, the learned counsel for the Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has the legal burden to proof the following: (a) the Defendant had sometime in first quarter in 2021 requested for a friendly loan from the Plaintiff for personal contingency to be used in several projects; (b) The Defendant was a runner cum dispatch with the Plaintiff and was paid RM 2,500.00 a month; (c) The Plaintiff had given a friendly loan of RM 1,760,000.00 to the Defendant; S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (d) The agreed date of repayment of the friendly loan was 1.3.2022; and (e) The Defendant owes the Plaintiff a sum of RM1,771,572.60; Findings and the decision [21] After the full trial, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has discharged the burden of proof. The Defendant indeed has received monies in the form of loan, by way from “a friend (Plaintiff and/or P. Thiagarajan)” to “a friend (Defendant/Suresh Kumar A/L Ramachandran)”. The sum borrowed is RM1,760,000.00. This Court has allowed the Plaintiff’s claim only for RM1,060,000.00 and the Defendant must return and pay this amount to the Plaintiff. The interest claimed by the Plaintiff is dismissed. [22] Exhibit P2 tendered on 13-7-2023 before this Court is a document stated that loan was taken by the Defendant from CIMB, jalan Ipoh in form of cash withdrawal by P. Thiagarajan. The dates for the cash are as follows: 15-4-2021 Cash RM410,000.00 28-4-2021 Cash RM250,000.00 22-6-2021 Cash-Self @ Home RM200,000.00 27-7-2021 Cash RM200,000.00 28-7-2021 Cash RM200,000.00 30-7-2021 Cash RM200,000.00 3-8-2021 Cash RM100,000.00 5-8-2021 Cash RM200,000.00 S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 TOTAL: RM1,760,000.00 In P2 also contained a handwritten note as follows: “Friendly loan agreement I Suresh Kumar I/C no 650505 08 5527 address No. 1, Jalan Indah 1/15 Taman Universiti Indah, 43300 Seri Kembangan Selangor Darul Ehsan have taken a friendly loan for personal contingency use in several projects from Bagan Hasrat (M) A/B registration number 19960100427 (376773-V) Lot 2753 Jalan Raja Nong off Jalan Sg. Jati Taman Klang Jaya 41200 Klang, Selangor. We have mutual understanding on the repayments of loan. The amount of loan is the as the above (RM1,760,000.00) taken from CIMB Bank Jalan Ipoh: enclosed together all the payment vouchers signed by me to Bagan Hasrat. Yours faithfully Witness signed signed Suresh Kumar A/L Ramachandren Thiagarajan A/L Pavadai”. [23] Exhibit P3 tendered on 13-7-2023 before this Court is the payment vouchers that refer to the dates of the loan given. [24] SP-1 is an officer of CIMB Branch Manager, Jalan Ipoh. SP-1 is the subpoena witness. In the cross-examination, SP-1 were asked about the purpose of the withdrawal by the Plaintiff, whether there is any approval from Bank Negara Malaysia, and nothing was stated that the withdrawal is for friendly loan. SP-1 has no knowledge whether it was for friendly loan or not. No re-examination for SP-1. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [25] The Defendant in his Defence and in his testimony before this Court stated the following: (a) Defendant has no connection with the Plaintiff and he vehemently denies making any request for any friendly loans or taking any friendly loans from the Plaintiff. (b) further denies entering into any friendly loan agreement with the Plaintiff. (c) the Plaintiff is not a company that is licensed to give out loans or friendly loans. The company is in the business of contracting and manufacturing concrete and spunpile. (d) P.Thiagarajan (SP-2) is a director and shareholder and the alter ego in several companies namely K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd, Bagan Hasrat Sdn. (e) SP2 had promised the Defendant 5% of the shares in K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd. (which is held on trust) and SP2 has been making periodic profit-sharing payments to the Defendant an advisor/consultant for K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd. (f) Defendant denied signing the friendly loan agreement and his signature on P2 is forged. (g) SP-2 (P. Thiagarajan) will from time to time make periodic payments to Defendant being profits from their partnership. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [26] The issue that Defendant has no connection with the Plaintiff and he vehemently denies making any request for any friendly loans or taking any friendly loans from the Plaintiff had been rebutted by the Plaintiff. The defence clearly pleaded that the Defendant would from time to time receive periodic payments from SP-2/P. Thiagarajan, so called as their “partnership business”. Exhibit P2 is a supporting document to “tell this Court” that the sum of RM1,760,000.00 is a friendly loan. The Defendant merely denies that his signature was forged. No proof to deny this. [27] The Plaintiff is not a company that is licensed to give out loans or friendly loans, therefore the Defendant pleaded that the friendly loan is illegal. The learned counsel for the Defendant submits that It is settled law that there shall be no interest charged in a friendly loan unless the lender is a licensed money lender and cited the case of Mahmood Bin Ooyub v. Lee Chi Leong [2020] 1 LNS 660, where the Court of Appeal held that agreement for a loan with interest by an unlicensed money lender is unenforceable. [28] The learned counsel for the Defendant further submits that the Plaintiff, which is not a money lending company have pleaded for interest of RM11,572.60, being 5% of the interest p.a. for the sum RM1,760,000.00. Hence the alleged friendly loan is illegal. This Court agree with the Defendant that no interest should be charged. But the sum of RM1,760,000.00 is not illegally taken and received by the Defendant. This huge sum is not be given freely and voluntarily by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [29] The learned counsel for the Defendant also disputed that the name of the Plaintiff in this Suit is Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd and this is not the “real company” given the money. The Defendant received the money from Bagan Hasrat (M) Sdn Bhd. However, I find that in Exhibit P2 itself, the name of the company is Bagan Hasrat (M) Sdn Bhd and Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd. And also, the company registration number is correct i.e. 19960100427 (376773-V). [30] It is normal that the Defendant denied the loan and to defend himself by saying that the Plaintiff is a company not to lend money, if it does, it is unlawful and/or illegal. Once the transaction of disbursement/payment made, the so called “borrower” certainly will say it is illegal to give the money to him. [31] The learned counsel for the Defendant submit that since the Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence before this Court to show that the Plaintiff is legally allowed to give loan to the Defendant or to any third parties, the alleged loan transaction is unlawful and/or illegal. To support its contention, the learned counsel for the Defendant submit that the Plaintiff did not produce any company resolutions for the alleged loan that was given to the Defendant. SP2 in his evidence confirmed that there is no company resolution for the alleged loan although the sum involved is over RM1.7 million. [32] I agree with the submission by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that for a friendly loan, no resolution is required. The former accounts manager of the Plaintiff (SP-3), testified that it was not the practice of the Plaintiff to make resolutions for friendly loans. SP-3 testified – S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 “We have a circumstance in our office when we give loans to our own staff and all we don’t insist on this resolution to be made.”. [33] In Shim Vui Geh v. Dayang Masturah Sahari & Another Appeal [2023] 10 CLJ 733, held (allowing appeal in part) Per Lee Swee Seng JCA delivering the judgment of the court: (1) The court believed the testimony of the lawyer who prepared the various documents for them to sign when she confirmed that both Dayang and Harun signed the documents in her presence in her legal firm and that she had explained in Bahasa Malaysia the contents of the documents to both of them and that they had understood the contents before they signed the documents. Both Dayang and Harun could not deny that they were bound by what they signed. The question was whether the law would render what they had signed as evidencing an illegal moneylending transaction or that whether the ‘security’ taken was valid under the law. (paras 34 & 39) (2) Shim and Harun were business partners and they were shareholders and directors in a company. They were clearly not total strangers who only met for the purpose of a loan. Shim had also known of Harun’s father and uncle. Whilst Dayang might not have met or known Shim before the loan transactions, she was clearly introduced to Shim by Harun as Harun had only one piece of land for security of the loan and as he needed to further secure additional loans, he had asked his mother to help. Under the MA, any person who lends money at interest is presumed to be a moneylender and becomes an unlicensed moneylender if he S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 does not have a licence under the MA, rendering the loans unenforceable and irrecoverable. Harun and Dayang had no evidence to offer on any allegations of a system, regularity, pattern or continuity where Shim’s lending was concerned other than to themselves. Thus, the presumption under s. 10OA of the MA had been more than rebutted by Shim. The High Court Judge had erred in finding that the transactions were moneylending transactions when there was no evidence of a system, pattern, regularity or continuity of Shim being involved in any moneylending transactions. (paras 48, 50, 57 & 68).”. [34] The Federal Court in the case of Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v. Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 10 CLJ 187, held (allowing appeal; setting aside decision of Court of Appeal) Per Abdul Rahman Sebli CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) delivering the judgment of the Court: (1) By cl. 1 of the loan agreement, the ‘agreed profit’ of RM800,000 to be earned by the respondent was the ‘consideration’ for the RM800,000 loan. Read with cl. 3, this ‘agreed profit’ of RM800,000 was, in fact and as a matter of law, ‘interest’ within the meaning of s. 2 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 (‘Act’), as it was a sum that was ‘in excess of the principal paid or payable to the moneylender’. When the respondent agreed to lend the RM800,000 to the appellants, subject to payment of another RM800,000 as ‘agreed profit’, it was carrying on the business of ‘moneylending’ within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act as it was ‘lending money at interest with or without security’. The S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 ‘consideration’ of RM800,000 payable to the respondent at any time before, or at the expiry of the agreement period of 30 days, was nothing but ‘interest’ at the rate of 100% disguised as agreed profit. By whatsoever label it was given, the RM800,000 was ‘any amount by whatsoever name called in excess of the principal paid or payable to a moneylender’. If a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, a corpse flower by any other name would smell as foul. The trial judge erred in focusing too much on the meaning of ‘moneylender’ without regard to the meaning of ‘moneylending’ and ‘interest’ when the three meanings must be read together and harmoniously. (paras 39-42) (2) The trial judge failed to direct His Lordship’s mind to s. 10OA of the Act. It is a rebuttable presumption, a legal principle that presumes something to be true unless proven otherwise. Section 10OA of the Act imposed on the respondent the legal, as opposed to evidential, burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that it was not carrying on the business of ‘moneylending’ when it lent the RM800,000 to the appellants at a profit of RM800,000. The presumption was that it was carrying on the business of moneylending ‘until the contrary is proved’. In the context of the present case, what it meant was that if no evidence was led by either side, on the question of whether the respondent was carrying on the business of moneylending, the burden of proof would not have been discharged by the respondent. Whether or not the respondent had succeeded in rebutting the statutory presumption, pursuant to s. 10OA of the Act, was essentially a question of fact. The court’s finding must be based on hard evidence and not on conjecture that is S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 unrelated to evidence. The Judges of the Court of Appeal, by agreeing with the trial judge, had not only perpetuated but had also compounded the error committed by the trial judge. (paras 43-46 & 48).”. [35] In the case before me, I agree with the Defendant that the Plaintiff being a private limited company and a separate legal entity is not carrying on the business of moneylending. But the money given by the Plaintiff and taken by the Defendant are there in the documentary evidence and the Plaintiff’s witnesses had showed to the effect that it had given the loan to the Defendant. [36] The Plaintiff did rely on Exhibit P2, the question pertaining to the maker of document has been answered by SP-3 (Mr. Sinniah A/L Muthusamy) who testified that the document was prepared by the late Pathmanathan (he has passed away). The printed phrases were prepared by SP-3 and the handwritten phrases were prepared by the late Pathmanathan. SP-3 also testified that the document was signed in the late Pathmanathan’s house and SP-3 also present. [37] The issue whether the Defendant had signed the document and/or his signature was forged, the burden to prove is in the shoulder of the Defendant. The learned counsel for the Defendant submits that − “In the case of PP V AHMAD NAJIB ARIS (2009) 2 CLJ 800 at page 830, the Federal Court established that held in order for a document which is computer print-out to be admitted as an evidence in court, it shall be accompanied with a certificate under Section 90A(2) of Evidence Act 1950 OR oral evidence to the S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 effect that the document was printed by a computer in its ordinary use shall be given during a proceeding. 22. In the case before this Honourable Court, NEITHER was there a Section 90(A)(2) certificate tendered, NOR was there any oral evidence given by the Plaintiff’s witnesses as required by Section 90(A) Evidence Act 1950. 23. It is also trite according to Section 73A of the Evidence Act 1950, the maker of any document must be called as a witness for that document to be admitted as evidence in court. 24. SP 3 during Examination-in-Chief stated ‘the document was prepared by late Patmanathan’. However, there was no mention of Patmanathan in the pleadings or in SP2’s written witness statement (PSPS2). There is also no evidence of a death certificate of one Patmanathan before this Honourable Court. 25. Accordingly, with greatest of respect, we humbly submit that the document on page 32 of Part C of the Common Bundle B1 (P2), is a disputed document and has failed page 32 as the friendly loan agreement between the parties. The document which was placed in Part C the requirements under Section 90(A) and Section 73A of the Evidence Act 1950. Hence the document shall not be tendered as Exhibit P2.”. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [38] Exhibit P2 has been admitted in this Court and all the questions raised by the learned counsel for the Defendant are just allegations to escape and exit from the obligation to repay the Plaintiff. Not only Exhibit P2 as the sole and material document that I have analysed before concluding that the sum of RM1,760,000.00 was in fact given and/or lent to the Plaintiff. The other documentary evidence i.e. the payment vouchers, the bank officers and SP-3 were the credible witnesses brought by the Plaintiff to prove its claims. [39] Pertaining to the issue raised by the Defendant that “DEFENDANT NOT BOUND TO DO FORENSIC ANALYSIS”, i.e.− “It is our humble submission that there is no requirement for the Defendant to do a forensic investigation on the documents (P2 and P3), as the Plaintiff had withheld the originals. Further, it is humbly submitted that the burden of proving the case is on the Plaintiff throughout the trial. If the Plaintiff fails to discharge its burden, then the Defendant need not adduce any evidence.”, I have decided that Exhibits P2 and P3 were tendered by the Plaintiff, the original documents also been produced. I have examined the documents and satisfied that these documents are cogent evidence that the Plaintiff had given out loans to the Defendant from time to time. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [40] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff did cited my decision in Seneba Crystar Sdn Bhd v. Nur Syamiza Zainal & Satu Lagi [2023] 1 LNS 323, where this Court held that – “[43] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa PENEGASAN Plaintif mengenai pemalsuan tandatangan pengarah syarikat Plaintif (SP1) itu dan pemalsuan tandatangan setiausaha syarikat Plaintif yang tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan dan ketiadaan analisis Jabatan Kimia adalah suatu kegagalan besar di pihak Plaintif.”. [41] Even though each case must be differentiated to the facts, I hold firmly on the principle of law that if the Defendant asserts that his signature was forged, then by all means, send the document (marked as P2) to the Chemist Department. There is no need to get the instruction from the Court via the judicial officers on the action to be taken. Both the parties must be ready to proof their case before this Court. [42] The other issues raised by the Defendant pertaining to the “DISCREPANCIES IN THE PAYMENT VOUCHERS”, I have satisfied with the explanation by SP-3 who is ex-employee of the Plaintiff. SP-3 had explained on the 8 pieces of payment vouchers tendered in court (‘P3’) and the documents are not fabricated or manufactured for the purposes of mounting a claim against Defendant. SP3 gave evidence that it was him who had prepared the vouchers. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [43] The other issues raised by the Defendant pertaining to the “DISCREPANCY IN THE CHEQUES ISSUED TO P. THIAGARAJAN (SP2)”, I disagree with the learned counsel for the Defendant that “There was no satisfactory explanation from either SP2 or SP3 regarding this serious discrepancy”. [44] For the payments of allowance paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the Defendant’s own witness has testified that there is a clear business relationship between the Defendant and SP2 with regards to the company K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd. Hj Zain Bin Ghazali (SD1), the Defendant’s subpoenaed witness gave the following testimony: (a) That the Defendant was appointed as K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd.’s corporate advisor pursuant to a letter issued by K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd dated 15.11.2015 addressed to Menteri Besar Selangor (Perbadanan)(MBI); (b) That there is a business relationship between SP2 and the Defendant wherein SP2 holds 5% out of his 60% shareholding in K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd. on trust for the Defendant; (c) That the profits earned by K.L. Larut for the year 2020 is RM10 Million – RM11 Million. Therefore, the payments from to the Defendant is part of the dividend for the Defendant’s share in the company. [45] SD-1’s evidence said that there is no document to show that the Defendant is the shareholder of the Plaintiff. SD-1 is subpoenaed by the Defendant to seek justice from this Court, as what SD-1 testified – “… I said when I was subpoenaed I thought I was here to give evidence so that justice can be served. So, I am not planning in any way to put Mr Thiagarajan or anybody in trouble. I am just a good Muslim giving real evidence because in Islam very wrong bagi evidence palsu. Satu dosa yang cukup besar and I don’t S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 want to do that. That’s why I am giving evidence based on my truth what I know but the truth and it doesn’t matter whether my evidence that I give will help Mr Suresh or not but I am giving it truth for the Court to try this case, that’s all.”. [46] SD-1 is the shareholder & executive director in K.L Larut Sdn Bhd and his evidence has nothing to do with the loan given to the Defendant by the Plaintiff. His evidence purely on the relationship/business relationship between the Defendant and P. Thiagarajan. SD-1 said that the Defendant and P. Thiagarajan were working together since 2010. Both of them (the Defendant and P. Thiagarajan) were detained by the police pertaining to K.L Larut Sdn Bhd. SD-1 testified that he was aware as the shareholder in K.L Larut Sdn Bhd, the Defendant has received 5% for its shares. [47] In my decision, I have deducted the payments that showed RM2,500.00 as payments for services from SP-2 to the Defendant. The payments to the Defendant should not exclude the loan taken by the Defendant from the Plaintiff. The Defendant has mixed-up the 5% profit payment to the Plaintiff with the loan. [48] When the Defendant was re-examined by its counsel, the Defendant did not know about “asal-usul” the payment in the sum of RM410,000.00 to him. But the Defendant knew it was from P. Thiagarajan. [49] The Defendant did not know the payments to his account and he only knew when he was informed that payment has been done. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [50] This Court will not explore on the issue pertaining to declaration to LHDNM on payments received by the Defendant. If the payments received by the Defendant as 5% profit for the Defendant’s shareholding, failure to declare to LHDNM should be taken in another action by LHDNM. [51] In arriving to finding of facts, I have consider the evidences from the Plaintiff’s and the Defendant’s versions. Accordingly, from the evidence, the Plaintiff’s version is more probable than the Defendant’s version. The payment vouchers did corroborate the Plaintiff’s case. Each of the money disbursed to the Defendant is supported with the payment voucher and it is not marked as “profit of 5% shareholding”. [52] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff refers and applies the provision in section 21 of the Evidence Act 1950 that the proof of admission against persons making them and by or on their behalf is relevant and may be proved against the person who makes them. And the learned counsel for the Plaintiff cited the case of Mohd Faris Ismail & Ors v. Fuji Xerox Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2022] 1 LNS 682, where the in applying the decision to the current case, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff submits that the admission of the debt to the Plaintiff and as such is relevant and admissible by virtue of section 21 of the Evidence Act 1950. [53] The Defendant (Mr Suresh) is not strange in this Court specifically on the duty to prove the case. Once upon a time, the Defendant has brought an action against one company for commission for its service as”land-broker”. In that case, the evidences led by the Mr Suresh be that by the witnesses and the documents were overwhelming and I have S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 allowed Mr. Suresh’s claims. However, in this Suit, Mr Suresh has failed to rebut the Plaintiff claims. Conclusion [54] In view of the foregoing reasons, the documentary and oral evidences before this Court, the friendly loan was given to the Defendant. The Plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof as required under sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950. Hence, this action against the Defendant should be allowed with costs and my decisions that – “Dan dokumentar yang dibentangkan oleh pihak-pihak di hadapan Mahkamah ini, dan hujahan bertulis (termasuk executive summary of written submission) serta hujahan balasan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah ini mendapati atas imbangan kebarangkalian Plaintif berjaya untuk membuktikan sebahagian sahaja tuntutannya terhadap Defendan. Oleh yang demikian, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dan selanjutnya adalah diperintahkan bahawa – (a) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif jumlah sebanyak RM1,060,000.00. (b) tiada pengenaan faedah pada kadar 5% ke atas jumlah RM1,060,000.00. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 (c) Kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 (tertakluk kepada fi alokatur) dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif.”. Dated: 1 December 2023. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Judicial Commissioner Shah Alam High Court NCvC12 Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Dr. Arun Kasi together with him Nicole Lee Hui Ching Tetuan Arun Kasi & Co., Kuala Lumpur For Defendant: Kumar A/L Thangaraju together with him Vijayaraj Edward Tetuan Kumar Thangaraju & Co., Kuala Lumpur S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	42,422	Tika 2.6.0
BA-22NCC-50-04/2022	PLAINTIF Bagan Hasrat Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN Suresh Kumar A/L Ramachandren	FRIENDLY LOAN: Moneylending transaction – Whether loans were friendly loans – Whether loans were actually moneylending transactions – Whether loans null and void – Whether borrower can deny knowing or understanding what they had signed with respect to loans taken − Burden of proof – Whether there is request to borrow for loan – The loan was given and taken – Whether the payments is an ‘agreed 5% profit’ – Borrower refused to repayment – Admission of the debt to the Plaintiff − Section 21 of the Evidence Act 1950.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=33442987-09fb-44ae-b2db-298b632e2271&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: BA-22NCC-50-04/2022 ANTARA BAGAN HASRAT SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 19960100427 [376773-V]) − PLAINTIF DAN SURESH KUMAR A/L RAMACHANDREN (No. K/P: 650505-08-5527) − DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant for a friendly loan in the sum of RM1,760,000.00, interest and costs. [2] The statement of claim only has 9 paragraphs stated about the parties, background facts and prayers/reliefs sought. [3] On 27-9-2023, I allowed the Plaintiff’s claims with costs (subject to allocator fee) and my grounds of decision (in Bahasa) is as follows: KEPUTUSAN (Selepas perbicaraan penuh) 05/12/2023 01:28:37 BA-22NCC-50-04/2022 Kand. 62 S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Tuntutan Plaintif [1] Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan ialah untuk Defendan membayar sejumlah RM1,771,572.60, faedah dan kos kepada Plaintif. [2] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa suatu pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 ialah pinjaman persahabatan tanpa faedah yang diberi oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan secara 8 kali bayaran pada tarikh-tarikh yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 4 pernyataan tuntutan. Terdapat pengakuan dan pengesahan hutang oleh Defendan bagi pinjaman persahabatan tersebut. [3] Defendan membela diri dan memplidkan bahawa Defendan tiada apa-apa hubungan dengan Plaintif; Defendan tidak pernah memohon apa-apa pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 daripada Plaintif; Plaintif bukanlah syarikat yang diberi kuasa di sisi undang-undang untuk memberi kemudahan pinjaman atau pinjaman persahabatan kepada mana-mana orang. [4] Plaintif memfailkan 3 isu untuk dibicarakan dan ditentukan oleh Mahkamah ini. Isu Untuk Dibicarakan 1: Sama ada Defendan telah menerima pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 daripada Plaintif. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Isu Untuk Dibicarakan 2: Sama ada Defendan telah menandatangani suatu pengakuan hutang bagi mengesahkan penerimaan pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 tersebut daripada Plaintif. Isu Untuk Dibicarakan 3: Sama ada terdapat persefahaman bersama antara pihak-pihak bahawa Defendan hendaklah membayar balik sepenuhnya pinjaman persahabatan tersebut pada atau sebelum 01/03/2022 kepada Plaintif. Isu dan dapatan Mahkamah [5] Dalam perbicaraan, Mahkamah ini telah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi kedua-dua pihak. [6] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan Defendan menyatakan bahawa – • Defendan ada membuat request melalui Plaintiff’s managing director bagi pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00. Peguam cara Defendan menghujahkan bahawa tiada secebis keterangan mengenai “request: dibuat oleh Defendan dibuktikan oleh Plaintif. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 • tiada apa-apa pinjaman persahabatan sebagaimana yang dituntut oleh Plaintif. Ini kerana bayaran yang diterima oleh Defendan ialah untuk 5% saham Defendan dalam syarikat KL Larut Sdn Bhd. Ini berdasarkan “profit sharing” dalam perniagaan mereka. • peguam cara Plaintif tidak pernah meminta maklum balas daripada peguam cara Defendan mengenai “arising from their business” dan “details of which are well within your client’s knowledge”. • keterangan SP3 yang hadir di Bank semasa kesemua 8 transaksi bayaran yang kononnya dibayar kepada Defendan. [7] Berdasarkan penelitian Mahkamah ini selepas meneliti semua dokumen dan keterangan lisan iaitu – Saksi Plaintif: SP1: En Lim Zi Liang, Branch Manager CIMB Jalan Ipoh (saksi sapina). SP2: En. P. Thiagarajan A/L Pavadai, Plaintiff’s Managing Director. SP3: En Sinniah A/L Muthusamy, mantan pekerja Plaintif. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Saksi Defendan: SD1: Tn Hj Mohd Zain bin Ghazali (saksi sapina). SD2: En Suresh Kumar A/L Ramachandran. Dan dokumentar yang dibentangkan oleh pihak-pihak di hadapan Mahkamah ini, dan hujahan bertulis (termasuk executive summary of written submission) serta hujahan balasan pihak- pihak, Mahkamah ini mendapati atas imbangan kebarangkalian Plaintif berjaya untuk membuktikan sebahagian sahaja tuntutannya terhadap Defendan. [8] Oleh yang demikian, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dan selanjutnya adalah diperintahkan bahawa – (a) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif jumlah sebanyak RM1,060,000.00. (b) tiada pengenaan faedah pada kadar 5% ke atas jumlah RM1,060,000.00. (c) Kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 (tertakluk kepada fi alokatur) dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. [4] The Plaintiff and the Defendant appeal to the Court of Appeal. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [5] Here, for the purpose of the Defendant’s appeal, I give my grounds for allowing the Plaintiff’s claims. And in another grounds of judgment, i will give my grounds for allowing partly of the Plaintiff’s claims. Background facts [6] The suit before this Court is between the Plaintiff (a private limited company registered as Bagan Hasrat Sdn. Bhd.) and the Defendant (Mr. Suresh Kumar a/l Ramachandran). [7] The Plaintiff pleaded that in or about the first quarter of year 2021, the Defendant had requested for a friendly loan in the sum of RM1,760,000.00. [8] The Plaintiff through its managing director agreed to provide the friendly loan, free of interest to the Defendant. And the disbursement of RM1,760,000.00 is by way of 8 tranches paid to the Defendant. Table 1 in the statement of claim stated the dates of the payments, amount and the payment’s vouchers. [9] The Plaintiff has pleaded that the Defendant signed an acknowledgement of debt and confirmed received the amount of RM1,760,000.00. [10] Therefore, the Plaintiff’s case is for the return of RM1,771,572.60 and this amount is being the total sum owing which includes interest of 5% totaling RM11,572.60. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [11] The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant was supposed to repay the loan on 1-3-2022. The Defendant failed and/or neglected and/or refused to repay within the agreed date. [12] In the defence, the Defendant has explained the relationship between the Defendant and the Plaintiff and also the trail for the sum claimed by the Plaintiff as alleged to be the friendly loan. [13] The Defendant pleaded as follows: • Defendan tiada sebarang hubungan dengan Plaintif. • Defendan tidak pernah memohon sebarang pinjaman persahabatan berjumlah RM1,760,000.00 daripada Plaintif. • pada masa material, Plaintif bukan suatu syarikat yang diberi kuasa di bawah undang-undang untuk memberikan kemudahan pinjaman ataupun pinjaman persahabatan kepada mana-mana orang. • secara alternatifnya, Defendan menyatakan bahawa Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai adalah pengarah dan pemegang saham di syarikat-syarikat KL Larut Sdn Bhd, Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd, dan KL Larut Holdings Sdn Bhd. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 KL Larut Sdn Bhd: • sekitar tahun 2010, Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai meminta Defendan untuk membantu KL Larut Sdn Bhd dan Defendan dilantik sebagai konsultan dan mempunyai hubungan perniagaan dengan Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai. • bagi tugas ini, Defendan menyatakan bahawa Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai memberi Defendan sebuah kereta Honda CRV dan membayar RM5000.00 sebulan sebagai elaun. Disamping itu, Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai juga membayar secara periodic kepada Defendan sebagai bayaran hasil keuntungan perkongsian perniagaan mereka bersama. Penafian Defendan mengenai pinjaman persahabatan kepada Plaintif: • sekitar hujung tahun 2021, berlaku perselisihan antara Defendan dan Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai. • akibat daripada itu, Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai menuntut Defendan mengembalikan kereta Honda CRV dan Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai memberhentikan bayaran RM5000.00 sebulan kepada Defendan. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 • seterusnya, Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai menuduh Defendan – ▪ menghilangkan wang derma kuil sebanyak RM200,000.00 yang didermakan oleh Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai kepada kuil. ▪ meminjam RM200,000.00 yang diderma kepada kuil daripada Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai dan tuduhan/tomahan itu disiarkan dalam akhbar Tamil Malar yang dimiliki dan/atau dikawal oleh Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai. Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd (Plaintif): • Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai ialah pengarah urusan dan ‘alter-ego’ kepada Plaintif (Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd). • Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai menubuhkan syarikat Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd (Plaintif) dan menggunakan anaknya bernama Palaniswaran a/l P. Thiagarajan sebagai pengarah Plaintif. • Defendan memplidkan bahawa Thiagarajan a/l Pavadai dengan niat jahat memperalatkan Plaintif (Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd dalam membawa tindakan undang-undang ini terhadap Defendan. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 The trial Issues to be tried: [14] The Plaintiff and the Defendant filed separately issues to be tried and after reading Enclosure C1 and C2, this Court finds, the issues to be determined are – (a) whether the Defendant has received RM1,760,000.00 from the Plaintiff as the friendly loan? (b) whether the Defendant has signed an admission of debt and confirmed receiving the amount RM1,760,000.00 from the Plaintiff as the friendly loan? (c) whether the Plaintiff can provide friendly loan to any parties? (d) whether the Defendant has entered into an agreement for the friendly loan? [15] There were 5 witnesses during trial, 3 of whom were the Plaintiff’s witnesses and the other 2 were the Defendant’s witnesses (Defendant and a subpoenaed witness). S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 The application of law to the fact Burden of proof: [16] In Pernec Ebiz Sdn Bhd v. CCI Technology Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 2 MLJ 117, the Court of Appeal held − “Even though the burden upon a plaintiff in a civil suit is only to prove its case upon a balance of probabilities, it must present its case sufficiently clearly to do so. It cannot merely file pleadings, file bundles of documents, proceed to trial, call witnesses to testify and argue on the various issue and expect the court to make out the case on its own for one party or other. … Where the party upon whom the burden of proving its case lies fails to do so, it fails to prove its case and its action must be dismissed.”. [17] Lord Goddard in Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 at p. 178 held− “… plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: ‘This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages’. They have to prove it.”. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [18] The well-established principle that the burden of proof at all times is borne by the Plaintiff on the balance of probabilities to establish his case against the Defendant or the existence of a legally enforceable claim against the Defendant. It is upon the Plaintiff, and certainly not the Defendant, to discharge that burden. It is for the Plaintiff to prove his case and satisfy the court that his claim is well-founded before the court can grant judgment on his claim. [19] The Court of Appeal in the case of Pioneer Conglomerate Bhd v. Tenggara Kapital Sdn Bhd [2023] 1 LNS 1626 held that “[9] It was common ground that at the Court below, there was only one core issue for determination namely, whether the sum of RM7,000,000.00 was an advancement given to the Respondent or a commission to the Respondent for arranging the shares in Ta Win Holdings Berhad for the Plaintiff. [10] In essence, the case before the trial Court revolved around the issue whether the evidential burden lay upon the Appellant/Plaintiff to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities that the sum of RM7,000,000.00 was paid to the Respondent as an advancement. It was the Respondent’s position that based on all the evidence adduced at trial, there was not a shred of documentary evidence to prove that the Appellant and Respondent had entered into an agreement for the money to be paid as advancement. Hence, that the LJ had correctly found that the Appellant had never adduced any agreement in respect of any money advanced and that there is no resolution passed by the Appellant’s board of directors S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 approving the advance of that RM7,000,000.00 to the Respondent.”. [20] The learned counsel for the Defendant has cited the laws on the burden of proof in a case is governed by sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950. and the cases of MIE-AFA Corporation Sdn. Bhd. v. Razali Mohd Sham & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 1267, the court explained that the burden of proof lies throughout with the party who wishes the Court to belief the facts of their case; and the Federal Court in the case of Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests and Ors [2017[ 4 CLJ 676 at page 698 held: [78] It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies, has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party.” Therefore, the learned counsel for the Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has the legal burden to proof the following: (a) the Defendant had sometime in first quarter in 2021 requested for a friendly loan from the Plaintiff for personal contingency to be used in several projects; (b) The Defendant was a runner cum dispatch with the Plaintiff and was paid RM 2,500.00 a month; (c) The Plaintiff had given a friendly loan of RM 1,760,000.00 to the Defendant; S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (d) The agreed date of repayment of the friendly loan was 1.3.2022; and (e) The Defendant owes the Plaintiff a sum of RM1,771,572.60; Findings and the decision [21] After the full trial, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has discharged the burden of proof. The Defendant indeed has received monies in the form of loan, by way from “a friend (Plaintiff and/or P. Thiagarajan)” to “a friend (Defendant/Suresh Kumar A/L Ramachandran)”. The sum borrowed is RM1,760,000.00. This Court has allowed the Plaintiff’s claim only for RM1,060,000.00 and the Defendant must return and pay this amount to the Plaintiff. The interest claimed by the Plaintiff is dismissed. [22] Exhibit P2 tendered on 13-7-2023 before this Court is a document stated that loan was taken by the Defendant from CIMB, jalan Ipoh in form of cash withdrawal by P. Thiagarajan. The dates for the cash are as follows: 15-4-2021 Cash RM410,000.00 28-4-2021 Cash RM250,000.00 22-6-2021 Cash-Self @ Home RM200,000.00 27-7-2021 Cash RM200,000.00 28-7-2021 Cash RM200,000.00 30-7-2021 Cash RM200,000.00 3-8-2021 Cash RM100,000.00 5-8-2021 Cash RM200,000.00 S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 TOTAL: RM1,760,000.00 In P2 also contained a handwritten note as follows: “Friendly loan agreement I Suresh Kumar I/C no 650505 08 5527 address No. 1, Jalan Indah 1/15 Taman Universiti Indah, 43300 Seri Kembangan Selangor Darul Ehsan have taken a friendly loan for personal contingency use in several projects from Bagan Hasrat (M) A/B registration number 19960100427 (376773-V) Lot 2753 Jalan Raja Nong off Jalan Sg. Jati Taman Klang Jaya 41200 Klang, Selangor. We have mutual understanding on the repayments of loan. The amount of loan is the as the above (RM1,760,000.00) taken from CIMB Bank Jalan Ipoh: enclosed together all the payment vouchers signed by me to Bagan Hasrat. Yours faithfully Witness signed signed Suresh Kumar A/L Ramachandren Thiagarajan A/L Pavadai”. [23] Exhibit P3 tendered on 13-7-2023 before this Court is the payment vouchers that refer to the dates of the loan given. [24] SP-1 is an officer of CIMB Branch Manager, Jalan Ipoh. SP-1 is the subpoena witness. In the cross-examination, SP-1 were asked about the purpose of the withdrawal by the Plaintiff, whether there is any approval from Bank Negara Malaysia, and nothing was stated that the withdrawal is for friendly loan. SP-1 has no knowledge whether it was for friendly loan or not. No re-examination for SP-1. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [25] The Defendant in his Defence and in his testimony before this Court stated the following: (a) Defendant has no connection with the Plaintiff and he vehemently denies making any request for any friendly loans or taking any friendly loans from the Plaintiff. (b) further denies entering into any friendly loan agreement with the Plaintiff. (c) the Plaintiff is not a company that is licensed to give out loans or friendly loans. The company is in the business of contracting and manufacturing concrete and spunpile. (d) P.Thiagarajan (SP-2) is a director and shareholder and the alter ego in several companies namely K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd, Bagan Hasrat Sdn. (e) SP2 had promised the Defendant 5% of the shares in K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd. (which is held on trust) and SP2 has been making periodic profit-sharing payments to the Defendant an advisor/consultant for K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd. (f) Defendant denied signing the friendly loan agreement and his signature on P2 is forged. (g) SP-2 (P. Thiagarajan) will from time to time make periodic payments to Defendant being profits from their partnership. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [26] The issue that Defendant has no connection with the Plaintiff and he vehemently denies making any request for any friendly loans or taking any friendly loans from the Plaintiff had been rebutted by the Plaintiff. The defence clearly pleaded that the Defendant would from time to time receive periodic payments from SP-2/P. Thiagarajan, so called as their “partnership business”. Exhibit P2 is a supporting document to “tell this Court” that the sum of RM1,760,000.00 is a friendly loan. The Defendant merely denies that his signature was forged. No proof to deny this. [27] The Plaintiff is not a company that is licensed to give out loans or friendly loans, therefore the Defendant pleaded that the friendly loan is illegal. The learned counsel for the Defendant submits that It is settled law that there shall be no interest charged in a friendly loan unless the lender is a licensed money lender and cited the case of Mahmood Bin Ooyub v. Lee Chi Leong [2020] 1 LNS 660, where the Court of Appeal held that agreement for a loan with interest by an unlicensed money lender is unenforceable. [28] The learned counsel for the Defendant further submits that the Plaintiff, which is not a money lending company have pleaded for interest of RM11,572.60, being 5% of the interest p.a. for the sum RM1,760,000.00. Hence the alleged friendly loan is illegal. This Court agree with the Defendant that no interest should be charged. But the sum of RM1,760,000.00 is not illegally taken and received by the Defendant. This huge sum is not be given freely and voluntarily by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [29] The learned counsel for the Defendant also disputed that the name of the Plaintiff in this Suit is Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd and this is not the “real company” given the money. The Defendant received the money from Bagan Hasrat (M) Sdn Bhd. However, I find that in Exhibit P2 itself, the name of the company is Bagan Hasrat (M) Sdn Bhd and Bagan Hasrat Sdn Bhd. And also, the company registration number is correct i.e. 19960100427 (376773-V). [30] It is normal that the Defendant denied the loan and to defend himself by saying that the Plaintiff is a company not to lend money, if it does, it is unlawful and/or illegal. Once the transaction of disbursement/payment made, the so called “borrower” certainly will say it is illegal to give the money to him. [31] The learned counsel for the Defendant submit that since the Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence before this Court to show that the Plaintiff is legally allowed to give loan to the Defendant or to any third parties, the alleged loan transaction is unlawful and/or illegal. To support its contention, the learned counsel for the Defendant submit that the Plaintiff did not produce any company resolutions for the alleged loan that was given to the Defendant. SP2 in his evidence confirmed that there is no company resolution for the alleged loan although the sum involved is over RM1.7 million. [32] I agree with the submission by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that for a friendly loan, no resolution is required. The former accounts manager of the Plaintiff (SP-3), testified that it was not the practice of the Plaintiff to make resolutions for friendly loans. SP-3 testified – S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 “We have a circumstance in our office when we give loans to our own staff and all we don’t insist on this resolution to be made.”. [33] In Shim Vui Geh v. Dayang Masturah Sahari & Another Appeal [2023] 10 CLJ 733, held (allowing appeal in part) Per Lee Swee Seng JCA delivering the judgment of the court: (1) The court believed the testimony of the lawyer who prepared the various documents for them to sign when she confirmed that both Dayang and Harun signed the documents in her presence in her legal firm and that she had explained in Bahasa Malaysia the contents of the documents to both of them and that they had understood the contents before they signed the documents. Both Dayang and Harun could not deny that they were bound by what they signed. The question was whether the law would render what they had signed as evidencing an illegal moneylending transaction or that whether the ‘security’ taken was valid under the law. (paras 34 & 39) (2) Shim and Harun were business partners and they were shareholders and directors in a company. They were clearly not total strangers who only met for the purpose of a loan. Shim had also known of Harun’s father and uncle. Whilst Dayang might not have met or known Shim before the loan transactions, she was clearly introduced to Shim by Harun as Harun had only one piece of land for security of the loan and as he needed to further secure additional loans, he had asked his mother to help. Under the MA, any person who lends money at interest is presumed to be a moneylender and becomes an unlicensed moneylender if he S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 does not have a licence under the MA, rendering the loans unenforceable and irrecoverable. Harun and Dayang had no evidence to offer on any allegations of a system, regularity, pattern or continuity where Shim’s lending was concerned other than to themselves. Thus, the presumption under s. 10OA of the MA had been more than rebutted by Shim. The High Court Judge had erred in finding that the transactions were moneylending transactions when there was no evidence of a system, pattern, regularity or continuity of Shim being involved in any moneylending transactions. (paras 48, 50, 57 & 68).”. [34] The Federal Court in the case of Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v. Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 10 CLJ 187, held (allowing appeal; setting aside decision of Court of Appeal) Per Abdul Rahman Sebli CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) delivering the judgment of the Court: (1) By cl. 1 of the loan agreement, the ‘agreed profit’ of RM800,000 to be earned by the respondent was the ‘consideration’ for the RM800,000 loan. Read with cl. 3, this ‘agreed profit’ of RM800,000 was, in fact and as a matter of law, ‘interest’ within the meaning of s. 2 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 (‘Act’), as it was a sum that was ‘in excess of the principal paid or payable to the moneylender’. When the respondent agreed to lend the RM800,000 to the appellants, subject to payment of another RM800,000 as ‘agreed profit’, it was carrying on the business of ‘moneylending’ within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act as it was ‘lending money at interest with or without security’. The S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 ‘consideration’ of RM800,000 payable to the respondent at any time before, or at the expiry of the agreement period of 30 days, was nothing but ‘interest’ at the rate of 100% disguised as agreed profit. By whatsoever label it was given, the RM800,000 was ‘any amount by whatsoever name called in excess of the principal paid or payable to a moneylender’. If a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, a corpse flower by any other name would smell as foul. The trial judge erred in focusing too much on the meaning of ‘moneylender’ without regard to the meaning of ‘moneylending’ and ‘interest’ when the three meanings must be read together and harmoniously. (paras 39-42) (2) The trial judge failed to direct His Lordship’s mind to s. 10OA of the Act. It is a rebuttable presumption, a legal principle that presumes something to be true unless proven otherwise. Section 10OA of the Act imposed on the respondent the legal, as opposed to evidential, burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that it was not carrying on the business of ‘moneylending’ when it lent the RM800,000 to the appellants at a profit of RM800,000. The presumption was that it was carrying on the business of moneylending ‘until the contrary is proved’. In the context of the present case, what it meant was that if no evidence was led by either side, on the question of whether the respondent was carrying on the business of moneylending, the burden of proof would not have been discharged by the respondent. Whether or not the respondent had succeeded in rebutting the statutory presumption, pursuant to s. 10OA of the Act, was essentially a question of fact. The court’s finding must be based on hard evidence and not on conjecture that is S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 unrelated to evidence. The Judges of the Court of Appeal, by agreeing with the trial judge, had not only perpetuated but had also compounded the error committed by the trial judge. (paras 43-46 & 48).”. [35] In the case before me, I agree with the Defendant that the Plaintiff being a private limited company and a separate legal entity is not carrying on the business of moneylending. But the money given by the Plaintiff and taken by the Defendant are there in the documentary evidence and the Plaintiff’s witnesses had showed to the effect that it had given the loan to the Defendant. [36] The Plaintiff did rely on Exhibit P2, the question pertaining to the maker of document has been answered by SP-3 (Mr. Sinniah A/L Muthusamy) who testified that the document was prepared by the late Pathmanathan (he has passed away). The printed phrases were prepared by SP-3 and the handwritten phrases were prepared by the late Pathmanathan. SP-3 also testified that the document was signed in the late Pathmanathan’s house and SP-3 also present. [37] The issue whether the Defendant had signed the document and/or his signature was forged, the burden to prove is in the shoulder of the Defendant. The learned counsel for the Defendant submits that − “In the case of PP V AHMAD NAJIB ARIS (2009) 2 CLJ 800 at page 830, the Federal Court established that held in order for a document which is computer print-out to be admitted as an evidence in court, it shall be accompanied with a certificate under Section 90A(2) of Evidence Act 1950 OR oral evidence to the S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 effect that the document was printed by a computer in its ordinary use shall be given during a proceeding. 22. In the case before this Honourable Court, NEITHER was there a Section 90(A)(2) certificate tendered, NOR was there any oral evidence given by the Plaintiff’s witnesses as required by Section 90(A) Evidence Act 1950. 23. It is also trite according to Section 73A of the Evidence Act 1950, the maker of any document must be called as a witness for that document to be admitted as evidence in court. 24. SP 3 during Examination-in-Chief stated ‘the document was prepared by late Patmanathan’. However, there was no mention of Patmanathan in the pleadings or in SP2’s written witness statement (PSPS2). There is also no evidence of a death certificate of one Patmanathan before this Honourable Court. 25. Accordingly, with greatest of respect, we humbly submit that the document on page 32 of Part C of the Common Bundle B1 (P2), is a disputed document and has failed page 32 as the friendly loan agreement between the parties. The document which was placed in Part C the requirements under Section 90(A) and Section 73A of the Evidence Act 1950. Hence the document shall not be tendered as Exhibit P2.”. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [38] Exhibit P2 has been admitted in this Court and all the questions raised by the learned counsel for the Defendant are just allegations to escape and exit from the obligation to repay the Plaintiff. Not only Exhibit P2 as the sole and material document that I have analysed before concluding that the sum of RM1,760,000.00 was in fact given and/or lent to the Plaintiff. The other documentary evidence i.e. the payment vouchers, the bank officers and SP-3 were the credible witnesses brought by the Plaintiff to prove its claims. [39] Pertaining to the issue raised by the Defendant that “DEFENDANT NOT BOUND TO DO FORENSIC ANALYSIS”, i.e.− “It is our humble submission that there is no requirement for the Defendant to do a forensic investigation on the documents (P2 and P3), as the Plaintiff had withheld the originals. Further, it is humbly submitted that the burden of proving the case is on the Plaintiff throughout the trial. If the Plaintiff fails to discharge its burden, then the Defendant need not adduce any evidence.”, I have decided that Exhibits P2 and P3 were tendered by the Plaintiff, the original documents also been produced. I have examined the documents and satisfied that these documents are cogent evidence that the Plaintiff had given out loans to the Defendant from time to time. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [40] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff did cited my decision in Seneba Crystar Sdn Bhd v. Nur Syamiza Zainal & Satu Lagi [2023] 1 LNS 323, where this Court held that – “[43] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa PENEGASAN Plaintif mengenai pemalsuan tandatangan pengarah syarikat Plaintif (SP1) itu dan pemalsuan tandatangan setiausaha syarikat Plaintif yang tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan dan ketiadaan analisis Jabatan Kimia adalah suatu kegagalan besar di pihak Plaintif.”. [41] Even though each case must be differentiated to the facts, I hold firmly on the principle of law that if the Defendant asserts that his signature was forged, then by all means, send the document (marked as P2) to the Chemist Department. There is no need to get the instruction from the Court via the judicial officers on the action to be taken. Both the parties must be ready to proof their case before this Court. [42] The other issues raised by the Defendant pertaining to the “DISCREPANCIES IN THE PAYMENT VOUCHERS”, I have satisfied with the explanation by SP-3 who is ex-employee of the Plaintiff. SP-3 had explained on the 8 pieces of payment vouchers tendered in court (‘P3’) and the documents are not fabricated or manufactured for the purposes of mounting a claim against Defendant. SP3 gave evidence that it was him who had prepared the vouchers. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [43] The other issues raised by the Defendant pertaining to the “DISCREPANCY IN THE CHEQUES ISSUED TO P. THIAGARAJAN (SP2)”, I disagree with the learned counsel for the Defendant that “There was no satisfactory explanation from either SP2 or SP3 regarding this serious discrepancy”. [44] For the payments of allowance paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the Defendant’s own witness has testified that there is a clear business relationship between the Defendant and SP2 with regards to the company K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd. Hj Zain Bin Ghazali (SD1), the Defendant’s subpoenaed witness gave the following testimony: (a) That the Defendant was appointed as K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd.’s corporate advisor pursuant to a letter issued by K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd dated 15.11.2015 addressed to Menteri Besar Selangor (Perbadanan)(MBI); (b) That there is a business relationship between SP2 and the Defendant wherein SP2 holds 5% out of his 60% shareholding in K.L. Larut Sdn. Bhd. on trust for the Defendant; (c) That the profits earned by K.L. Larut for the year 2020 is RM10 Million – RM11 Million. Therefore, the payments from to the Defendant is part of the dividend for the Defendant’s share in the company. [45] SD-1’s evidence said that there is no document to show that the Defendant is the shareholder of the Plaintiff. SD-1 is subpoenaed by the Defendant to seek justice from this Court, as what SD-1 testified – “… I said when I was subpoenaed I thought I was here to give evidence so that justice can be served. So, I am not planning in any way to put Mr Thiagarajan or anybody in trouble. I am just a good Muslim giving real evidence because in Islam very wrong bagi evidence palsu. Satu dosa yang cukup besar and I don’t S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 want to do that. That’s why I am giving evidence based on my truth what I know but the truth and it doesn’t matter whether my evidence that I give will help Mr Suresh or not but I am giving it truth for the Court to try this case, that’s all.”. [46] SD-1 is the shareholder & executive director in K.L Larut Sdn Bhd and his evidence has nothing to do with the loan given to the Defendant by the Plaintiff. His evidence purely on the relationship/business relationship between the Defendant and P. Thiagarajan. SD-1 said that the Defendant and P. Thiagarajan were working together since 2010. Both of them (the Defendant and P. Thiagarajan) were detained by the police pertaining to K.L Larut Sdn Bhd. SD-1 testified that he was aware as the shareholder in K.L Larut Sdn Bhd, the Defendant has received 5% for its shares. [47] In my decision, I have deducted the payments that showed RM2,500.00 as payments for services from SP-2 to the Defendant. The payments to the Defendant should not exclude the loan taken by the Defendant from the Plaintiff. The Defendant has mixed-up the 5% profit payment to the Plaintiff with the loan. [48] When the Defendant was re-examined by its counsel, the Defendant did not know about “asal-usul” the payment in the sum of RM410,000.00 to him. But the Defendant knew it was from P. Thiagarajan. [49] The Defendant did not know the payments to his account and he only knew when he was informed that payment has been done. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [50] This Court will not explore on the issue pertaining to declaration to LHDNM on payments received by the Defendant. If the payments received by the Defendant as 5% profit for the Defendant’s shareholding, failure to declare to LHDNM should be taken in another action by LHDNM. [51] In arriving to finding of facts, I have consider the evidences from the Plaintiff’s and the Defendant’s versions. Accordingly, from the evidence, the Plaintiff’s version is more probable than the Defendant’s version. The payment vouchers did corroborate the Plaintiff’s case. Each of the money disbursed to the Defendant is supported with the payment voucher and it is not marked as “profit of 5% shareholding”. [52] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff refers and applies the provision in section 21 of the Evidence Act 1950 that the proof of admission against persons making them and by or on their behalf is relevant and may be proved against the person who makes them. And the learned counsel for the Plaintiff cited the case of Mohd Faris Ismail & Ors v. Fuji Xerox Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2022] 1 LNS 682, where the in applying the decision to the current case, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff submits that the admission of the debt to the Plaintiff and as such is relevant and admissible by virtue of section 21 of the Evidence Act 1950. [53] The Defendant (Mr Suresh) is not strange in this Court specifically on the duty to prove the case. Once upon a time, the Defendant has brought an action against one company for commission for its service as”land-broker”. In that case, the evidences led by the Mr Suresh be that by the witnesses and the documents were overwhelming and I have S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 allowed Mr. Suresh’s claims. However, in this Suit, Mr Suresh has failed to rebut the Plaintiff claims. Conclusion [54] In view of the foregoing reasons, the documentary and oral evidences before this Court, the friendly loan was given to the Defendant. The Plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof as required under sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950. Hence, this action against the Defendant should be allowed with costs and my decisions that – “Dan dokumentar yang dibentangkan oleh pihak-pihak di hadapan Mahkamah ini, dan hujahan bertulis (termasuk executive summary of written submission) serta hujahan balasan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah ini mendapati atas imbangan kebarangkalian Plaintif berjaya untuk membuktikan sebahagian sahaja tuntutannya terhadap Defendan. Oleh yang demikian, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dan selanjutnya adalah diperintahkan bahawa – (a) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif jumlah sebanyak RM1,060,000.00. (b) tiada pengenaan faedah pada kadar 5% ke atas jumlah RM1,060,000.00. S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 (c) Kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 (tertakluk kepada fi alokatur) dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif.”. Dated: 1 December 2023. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Judicial Commissioner Shah Alam High Court NCvC12 Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Dr. Arun Kasi together with him Nicole Lee Hui Ching Tetuan Arun Kasi & Co., Kuala Lumpur For Defendant: Kumar A/L Thangaraju together with him Vijayaraj Edward Tetuan Kumar Thangaraju & Co., Kuala Lumpur S/N hylEM/sJrkSy2ymLYy4icQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	42,422	Tika 2.6.0
WA-12BNCvC-76-06/2022	PERAYU WR GLOBAL GROUP SDN BHD RESPONDEN KPF TRADING SDN BHD	There was no error by the Session Court in its reasoning and appreciation of evidence, fortified with its advantage of having had the opportunity to visually assess all witnesses for the parties – as per the ratio in the Court of Appeal’s decision of Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors and Another Case [1995] 3 CLJ 639 770.This appeal is dismissed with costs of RM10,000. The decision of the Session Court is affirmed.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=77af867e-97cf-486c-aeae-73373cdce898&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA CIVIL APPEAL NO: WA-12BNCvC-76-06/2022 BETWEEN WR GLOBAL GROUP SDF BHD (COMPANY NO: 201101008476 (936615-v)) …. APPELLANT AND KPF TRADING SDN BHD (formerly known as Felda Trading Sdn Bhd) (COMPANY NO: 199501028716 (357922-P) .… RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT The Session Court’s decision [1] After a full trial, the Session Court dismissed the Appellant’s claim for RM744,000 being the value of the goods (Korean gold fashion accessories) delivered to the Respondent. The Session Court found that as all orders from the Respondent were made in writing and that all items bought from the Appellant were documented, there were no orders for the 05/12/2023 12:22:49 WA-12BNCvC-76-06/2022 Kand. 24 S/N foavd8XbEiurnM3PNzomA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 said goods. This finding by the Session Court was premised on the testimony of the Appellant’s own witnesses. [2] The Session Court had also found that the Respondent had not agreed to the Appellant’s offer to buy the goods as they were not items sold by the Respondent in any of its branches. [3] The issuance of the invoice for RM41,159.50 by the Appellant to the Respondent together with the testimonies of the witnesses and messages on the application ‘whats app’ showed that the goods were delivered on a consignment basis whereby the Appellant could only claim for the goods sold. The Session Court found mistakes in the said invoice. The said invoice was also factored to Qiblatin Synergy Sdn Bhd (Qiblatin). [4] The Session Court concluded that the Appellant had not issued any invoice. Additionally, the Respondent had not at any time ordered the goods, whether in writing or verbally and thus was not liable to pay for all the goods delivered by the Appellant. This Appeal [5] The Appellant had submitted a few grounds of grouse which included the finding of the Session Court that: (a) The Appellant had no locus to claim on the said invoice against the Respondent as it was factored to Qiblatin. There were no other invoices issued by the Appellant. The Appellant submitted that this finding was erroneous when referred to Qiblatin’s letter S/N foavd8XbEiurnM3PNzomA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 that instructed for payments of the goods to be made directly to the Appellant’s account; (b) Did not consider the said invoice and delivery note formed contract in writing between the Appellant and the Respondent and under Section 92 Evidence Act 1950, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted for the purpose of contradicting them. The Appellant submitted that the Session Court was wrong in considering the oral evidence of the witnesses in concluding that the goods were sent to the Respondent on a consignment basis; (c) Did not consider there was a failure to respond to the letter of demand which had the effect of weakening the probative force of its defence; (d) The finding that the goods were delivered on a consignment basis that did not have any contemporaneous documents to corroborate such. The Appellant contended that the defence that the goods were sent on consignment was an afterthought; (e) Did not consider the principle of separate entities between the Respondent and Hotel Tenera (KPF Hotel Management Sdn Bhd) when the Session Court concluded that normally there were written orders from the Respondent to the Appellant and so there were none for the goods.; and (f) There was no cross-examination of DW4 on his testimony that PW1 had informed him the delivery of the goods was on a consignment basis when the Appellant contended there was. S/N foavd8XbEiurnM3PNzomA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 This Court’s assessment [6] The most pertinent question in this appeal was whether the Respondent had ordered the goods – 186 sets to the value of RM744,000. This Court had scrutinised the Appeal Records and found that the Appellant had not proven on a balance of probabilities that the Respondent had ordered the goods as per the Appellant’s contention. [7] The Respondent carries out a business selling sundry and daily necessities through its outlets for the FELDA settlers. The Appellant was its supplier for gas tanks/canisters and a few other sundry items. The order of business in terms of documentations of the supplies and payments were ‘surat perlantikan’ by the Respondent of the Appellant to supply the particular items. The orders communicated by the Respondent to the Appellant through cover letters and emails were vide ‘nota pesanan’ that confirmed the orders for the supplies required by the Respondent. The Appellant subsequently sent invoices with the items supplied and delivered and the Respondent processed payments on these complete set of documentations. [8] There is no evidence to show that the Respondent had ordered the goods in question. First of all, there was an anomaly as Korean gold accessories were not categorised as sundries and daily necessities for the FELDA settlers. There were also no forms of documentation from the Respondent in their usual business norm for the goods. This Court views that the testimony for the Plaintiff that the Respondent had ordered the goods verbally did not tip the balance of probabilities in its favour. It had only amounted to just a contention. This is because documentations were required to enable payments to be made by the Respondent. S/N foavd8XbEiurnM3PNzomA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [9] The Respondent’s witnesses testified that they were informed when the goods were delivered that the goods were on a consignment basis. The Appellant’s witnesses had earlier denied this but did not adduce evidence that the Respondent had desired for the supply of the said goods as per the normal course of their supplier-retailer relationship. This Court considered that there was no cross-examination on the testimony by the Respondent’s witnesses to challenge that it was on the basis of consignment that the Respondent had then accepted the goods. [10] This Court finds that the argument of the Appellant that a contract was formed by its invoice issued to the Respondent and also the delivery notes of the goods, misplaced and mistaken. This Court is not persuaded by the Appellant’s submission on the application of ss91 and 92 Evidence Act 1950. In this case, as there was no written contract or any other form of written document to show the order placed by the Respondent and the Appellant had supplied accordingly, the Session Court was correct to consider the oral evidence to make a finding of the parties’ intention and agreement. [11] As such, this Court agrees with the finding of the Session Court that on a balance of probabilities, the goods were not ordered by the Respondent but were delivered by the Appellant on a consignment basis. [12] This Court reiterates that the burden was on the Appellant to prove that the Respondent had ordered the goods outright as per the other items, and not on a consignment basis, which the Appellant had failed to discharge pursuant to Section101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. S/N foavd8XbEiurnM3PNzomA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] Therefore, the Appellant’s argument that the failure by the Respondent to respond to its letter of demand weakened the probative value of the Respondent’s defence, is secondary. The Appellant first have to prove its case on a balance of probabilities before the burden shifts to the Respondent. [14] In fact, there were a few questionable issues on the Appellant’s invoice particularly the accuracy of the goods delivered – it was stated as 186 sets but only 136 sets were delivered. There was also a stamp that the payment for the goods ought to have been factored to Qiblatin though this was later clarified. Thus, this Court finds that the invoice per se cannot be concrete proof to conclude that a contract was entered into between the parties for the goods. [15] So, this also goes to answer the first point of submission by the Appellant – that it had in fact locus standi to pursue for the payment from the Respondent. This Court finds that the Appellant does have locus to recover the amount due to it for the goods supplied but for those that had been sold by the Respondent as they were delivered to the Respondent on a consignment basis. In any event, the locus standi issue does not change the fact that the Respondent had not ordered for the supply of the said goods from the Appellant. Any error by the Session Court on this point does not change the outcome. The claim of the Appellant against the Respondent must fail. [16] This Court has also considered the other grounds in the Appellant’s Memorandum of Appeal and found them to be without merits. There will be no appellate intervention in this instant as the ‘plainly wrong test’ is not fulfilled – see Federal Court’s decision in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy S/N foavd8XbEiurnM3PNzomA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Tan Lee Peng, Administration of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1. [17] There was no error by the Session Court in its reasoning and appreciation of evidence, fortified with its advantage of having had the opportunity to visually assess all witnesses for the parties – as per the ratio in the Court of Appeal’s decision of Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors and Another Case [1995] 3 CLJ 639 770. Conclusion [18] This appeal is dismissed with costs of RM10,000. The decision of the Session Court is affirmed. DATED 13 JUNE 2023 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For the Appellant: Jennifer Chandran T/n Vaasan Chan & Chandran For the Respondent: Doshi Jyotsana T T T/n Abdullah & Zainudin S/N foavd8XbEiurnM3PNzomA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	10,833	Tika 2.6.0
WA-11BNCvC-20-03/2023	PERAYU AIA Berhad RESPONDEN KHANTAI A/P VELLAIAHKONNDA	This appeal is allowed. The decision of the Magistrate’s Court is set aside. Costs will be awarded in a nominal amount given the facts and circumstances of the Respondent – RM5,000 is awarded to the Appellant.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=247d18ff-34b7-47e4-ab3e-a543a13c6c2c&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:19:47 WA-11BNCvC-20-03/2023 Kand. 15 S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /xh9JLc05EerPqVDoTxsLA *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—11mIcvc—2u—o3/2023 Kand. 15 H5/12/2013 news-:17 IN THE men COURY IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRIVORV, MALAvsIA CIVIL APPEAL N Amgucvc n-as/2a23 aarwssn AIA EERHAD [Company No: nuns-D) APPELLAN1 KNANTAI up VELLAIAHKDNNDA (NRIC no: anions-as-5050) (As wk (0 Suns all Sonnaya NRII: Nu: 11n22s.nss911. am. Id/norninu) RESPONDENT GROUNDS or JUDGMENT 1 nlllnt Con sdec n [1] Aﬂer a full man me Magistrate Coun had allowed the Responderﬂs dawn and mdered lur me paymem at RM52.15U 26 by me Aupeilanlla !NlxhWLAw5EeP¢1VDuYxiLA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm Publlc Bank Ber1'laL‘l(PEB\|ln awomanee la me Insurance schedule, The amuunneok lmu aocount Rllma 74 which was the plemltml nayrnenmre ueceesea had mm the Appellanl nu hats menonnoot me ha 5 omre Maglstnrn on on: n [2] Yhe Respondent IS Irle wtle ol the oecaaseo who the Appellant lnstneo under a Maslev Pulley helo by was I Hlra Purchase Decreastng Tum Aeeeranu to the rneureo beamtg no. aoeonse on 2s 8 zuts (the ma lrlsurance pollcyj. The Reeeonoent w» rtomlluled by lne lnsursd de me apollcauon lonn oeneo ts nuts tor the said lnsurarlce pulley [3] tn the ward of the lnsuroo‘: death dumg (ha penoo whun me lnsurance coverage weun force‘ the Appellant was to pay PEB(he achml lnuemedness tnourreo by lne rneureo under the loan gralllud to the lnsured by FFB — subject to lne mixlmum amount on msurance of RM52,ﬂ00 [4] The insureo passed away on 2n t2.2nt5 due to lsoneenrlc heart dlsease and coronary artery lhmmbc Upon the Resporldervfs submlsslon other otalrn on me sala rnsurenoe pollcyon 11 2 zms, ll was msoovereo that the rnstneo had a medtcal hlslory — me onmrlary anglogrern that the Insured hao undsnakerl an 15 2.2014 haa diagnosed the lschaemlc Marl rtleeese Tha\| was nor dlsdnsed m Irle appllcalton lonn [5] The Aopettent had Ialected the alarm on 10 2.2017 and lorwaroeo ll: aemston to Paar mom to the Raspanﬂalll The Applllanl hao ennoeltea the ma rneuranoo policy lrorn rneeonon by reason or non- r em nnoroetszwoveemln “Nana s.n.t nuvlhnrwm be tn... e may r... nﬂmruﬂly em. dnumlml Vﬂ .nuna vtmxl [22] W713! amounted to delubeme or reddsss misranresemanon 15 slated m para 714) ai Schedule 9 FSA whmw Vs when the msurea Knew max. '(a) «r was untrue or mrsleadmg‘ or drd not care wlvalher or no! 1: was untrue arnusraaamg, and to} ma mam la wnuzh Ina nwapmanmon ralaxaa was mlavlnl (0 ms /rconssd msurar, nr my not earn wnamar at not yr was rsrmm: to me insurer “ [24] ms cam ﬁnds based an me «act: that me mlund hm mu knowladgl afhi: medvcal hiilory/cmudmm Thus, we answers n1‘NO‘ that he had uwen showed that he am nolcara whllherarnol may wereunlme or mxsleadmg » see ulaganaman Mumian v Pmdanriar Assmanu Malaysia BM [2020] MLJU 210 and rot s-k among v Grant Elstam Life Assunnas (M) Sdn BM [2017] 5 MM 317 (amrmeﬂ by Ina coun o1 Aupeau The mum: had signed me ﬁmu‘ he was bound by aH me conlsms ma: Induded me dedamuons Iherem. [251 Based on ma svudervce, ms Cowl aha observed that me Insured had, any having appH:d var ma savd Insurance pohcy an 15.7 2015 Much he had omamaa an 23 s zms, kep\| ms medwcal appomunenl WW1 Dw«: on 17.11 zms Ha was further Itealad and ablained memunons Ewdenoa .5 apnaram man he had at an malarial um. knew M Ms heart aanaman and ye! he um um disdosa ma sama m ma zpnucaban «am am Ixrmmmsz wavaamm «mm. san-1 nmhnrwm .. U... a may he mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! The issue an unenuman mg! [25] me Responaenn who was me clannnanl had gnvah evndenoe as PW1 llnztshe had nn knowledge on nnne pmcuremsnl onnhe sand insurance‘ nor delanns nhan nenn up \|u Its exezznmcn man nacn nnna hon dnslaoge man the nhsursa who had sngrnsd me applncalnon namn must be baunna by when he had arxnowledged Ind conﬁrmed nhananu [271 The Resporndenlwho wu me numld nomnrnee In me sand nrnsuranoe polncy laslmed nhan she had an: knnmladge an nhe nnsursfa medncal eondnnan Em n maﬂamd non, nnna Incl na man In: sum did have a mndicul oondilnorn - ha win diagnosed and treated below he no «use amn sngned (ha applncanon norm (on ma sand nnsuranou uuhcy nn was nan (orme Appennann \|n prove nhan nhe nrnsursd haa llgned me appnncannon namn non krmwlng nhe cohnemz. man he had snanaa no. In parlncnnlzr me maternal lanls la be dnsclused nh Pan 2- Heamn Qnnesﬁons om» awlicaﬁonn «mm [291 From the nzespannnenna evnaehae. ma nnsmed was nml highly educated and was my abneno mnverse In Tamnn aha Manay. The counsel lor nhe Responaem submrned nhan ma apphcanorn norm whnch was nn Englnsh nu allude no me connnehnnon nhan nnna nmnnved nnna hm fully aomonannanna nnna aahnenns nrn nhe apphcalnon vamn Haweveh nn ma non pleadcd nhan ma ured had navel nmderslood what he had uecnaree, cnrnﬂrlned aha signed nh Iacl, as nha svndsrme show he had applied nun nha sand nnsnnnanae polncy oven a ysav alter havnrng diagnosed wnnh nsmaamna haann dnsease aha annan several Icllow-up moans wvlh nmnmanns by way :2! pnasanaann medncannons On a balance on pmbabnhnnes. he wls cunicnous and aware when he had apphed nan me sand nrwnanaa polncy on ma madncsl Mala man nna niaclzlud nhan nu am 11 am nxhnnnmrnz wnvaamun «wan. sanun ...nn.mnn a. med a my n... nnhnnnny mm. dnuavnml VI arnunna v-man not undergo or had been diagnosed mm nean disease ms Cmm concludes mam amoumed \|u daxberate or Iecldess nusrepresemanon as descnbed m para m) M Schedule 9 dune An [29] Therefore, as allowed by me said msuranc: pohcy and me law‘ me Appeuanra repucﬂauon ohhe deam dam: and me canceumion was sad msmanaa policy was vand. See para 5 of Schedule 9 rsn that auaws me AngaHan( In mid me and msuranoe policy and mluse an alauns [30] I! n was ma Respendanu case max nn named dwd not know Mu! ne ned mined orlhal he was nal bnaved progeny an me In non com by me vaa omoerm. man i\ was (he nespdndenn who snourd have saved the was weeds; (0 eormbnnle we pom\| The Magusuam cdun nae ened when m named that the PBS omce-(sy was deemed we be au:nl(s) 01 me Appeﬂanl by wnue at 3151 do me rnsurande Act 1995 (IA) and (harsfors me Anneuanns «name to call as wnmesstesb was fatal to me Appellant. The lashmany dune PBB cmicevfs) under 5151 m would anly be relevant as lo we Respondent wsne was contending that me msuled had no! undemdod me comenls do me apphcanon form and mat he had waned his signature for [cu] Anyndw, me pdimmanne msureﬂ had no\| undamlmd men he had signed was no! pleaded by me Respundenl ms noun ﬁnds man it was nnsnaxan \|o demand mu «m Aapeuam was me rasponstbls party In can mam as wnnassas Nlsr 3H, n was run dlsuulsd that was Insuraﬂ nad apphed cm nna szm msuranca pohcy and had signed me applK:a\|Iun onnn ta connnn [hat ns nad undansndad all nbllgauons pursulnl \|o me sard Vnsuranca Dohcy man he nad apnuad for u am Ixnwumsz wdveamm «we. send! ...n.mn a. d... a may he mn.u-y mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum am [321 The Respondent‘: submiss\|ons1ha\| although me apphcaluzn [arm was pane! bundle 5 for Inal mean mat ms eomems sﬁll had \|u be pmven Vs mlsplacsd ms Vs because wtwas me Respcndem who had argued mm me appucsuon man meant other man what me dancenns sum was uo m the Respondent lo ssusvy the com on a ha\an:e L71 pvabahlmlzs max ms mwrad and not know or was not mvorrned olmeduty mdlsdnse aH lhe mama: Isms manned and mat he had me du\|y to lake Iuasanable can (0 Inawur an qusnnns acnmalaiy [33] The vans m Azinh blc Andull-In v Ann-Mnllysiun saga: sdn and [1995] 5 MLJ 569 um dmerenl «um um case an hand The own mare had 10 Im at wvvelher me deoeased knew he had diabetes wfuls\| have he msured knew on a ba\anca ol probabllmas 01 ms diugnasxs M rsduaemvc hean disease smce February 2014 us had been taking me prescribed medicahans since before he had sugnsd ms sppncanonvenu [34] ms Courl is ahnays slaw w mlaﬂare wi(h ms ﬁndings of me man cmm mu m (Ms mslanoe (here Is apparent am when me Mamslralz Court plaoed the burden at prwlon the AppeHanuo prvve matthe un.-awed knew and undemocd me terms and d-ma ofdnsmoaure in ms appllcahun form when wt was an awemed vam max he had cdmprened me lam: and sxgned n Ewdsrme an Ina! showed max ma Insured d.d have Mal medxw need cmuman and mac Ins Vschaemu; nearl mseaxe had bean diagnosed prior to ms Ipbhcahan For me sald msmme poucy, bu! did no! msclnse so. On me mm hind‘ ma Insurad nad slalad m we negsliva m specmc queauans «m disclosure on u. sm Ixrmmmsz wdvuumm «mm. Snr1I\nauhnrw\HI>e d... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! This Court‘: deuvswn [:5] 50, m (his msxanee, um Ooun wm exeruse ns appellale puwels and set ems me Magxsvahe Conn‘; dausmn. The Agpenam had duly prover: xu deience. On a be\anoe cl pmoamuues, me Ameuam was legally rIgh\| to came! me said msuvanoe penny on me grounds av nondisclosure! mnsrapresenlalnon We Appellant was anmled In reject Ihe mspanaenrs claim [34] rm: appeal ws allowed The decnsvun of me Magmram Cowl Is set aside Cuts win be zvmmod m a nommi\ nmoum gwen um facts and cvwmslances om» Rasymdam ~ RM5.ﬂ0n Is uwardad lo mu AppeHanl DATED 17 OCTOBER 2023 R02 MAWAR ROZNN JUDICIAL ooMMIss\o~ER HIGH mum IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Fol ma Apps//ant‘ Kan Feisiah ma Chris um Yen Nan T/n Azrm, mm Fank 5 Wang For Respondent‘ s. Nnvans/In logslhiv mm R Em/anesh T/rv Am‘ 5 Sudan .5 m :mn.m5z.~qvuur.;m «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! disclosure wmcn was ma msursds medical msmry. Foum-mg me mama»: sued me Appeuam at me Mag\|s11a\|e Conn [51 Alleva mu Inal aims Magistrate com. me Respondent‘: dawn was allowed II was held mm me human of wool lay on me Appeuanx In prvve mm m oamd rupudlale ns naoumes under me sam Insurance policy on me gmunds o1 m>ireDrasan(a\|mn and p1e—wn(rsc(ull non-msclosure by me msmea u was Iound \|ha\| (he Appellanl had luled m nmva ma mlsstalemanllvnlsrepresnntauon and nonvdnsclosure by me: mum. Hanca. lms Appam Ih.\LAn.&l [71 The Appenanrs main grouse Is me Magwshals cows ﬁnding that me Aupauam had failed \|n pmvs max the nanmsauosum and mwslepresenlabon on ma pan mma msured was because me Respanaam had failed m ll me PBB omoer who had wimessad/amended la me msurews swung at me apphuamn form to (eslwy at Iris! to mnﬁrrn ma‘ me msured was exmalned me [arms and conlenls cflhe appucauon (om: am had understood mam [231 The Appellam submmed Ihal ms ﬁnding was erroneous on me following hams ta] me Ipphcaum lnrm was ouea up by me insured, (by ma app\II:EI(Iun wls :ubrrIII\|ed by ma msmnd, sm Ixnwumsz wqvuamm «mm. saw ...m.mm .. U... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-max 1:) the apphcalmn form was sxgned by me vnsursﬂ (aulhemimy was agreed)‘ (.1) me deceased had dedared that he had unaamoou ms conlems ofme -Ipnllcaliun «arm [5] ma Aupaﬂanlsubmllled mm Merencelo Polygrlm mamas Sdn EM v 11.. Sarah 5 Ann! [(994] 3 ML! 127, smalmomm Corp Sdn End 5 on v urmn Trlnrpon san am: [1995] 4 MLJ 557, Bangkok Bank a-ma vS.lHm!u.IMu Sdn ans: Or: [2017] MLJU as and Lin w.;..m.m I Anal wwycom BMImd12013] 1 ms :22: man Ihe mum wu buund by the cams .n ma noplvcaﬁon «mm mm he had mqnad [10] The Appcllanl had alw mghllgmed mac me Respondent had um pluuad In her s1aIeme4r\I01cl:Im(hIHhe insured mu nu\| Imdevsland or was non axmamed «he terms and :x:n\|enls at me applvcahon rum Thus, ma Appellant submitted that me Magxswate Coun erred when il dud not ﬁnd [hat me msured was bound by ms own dec>aI1(im in me apphcaliun form (111 u was ma Aapeuanrs lurmer grouse ms: the burden m plead ma relevzn\| (acts arm in wave «am/umue inﬂuence/msrepresennamon on me pan 12! FEB nrme Appeuamwas on the Respondent n was subrmlled am «he Magnslrale coun had ened when n lauued and/av penalised ma AppeHanl for no\| caumg ma am: from was Io pmvs atherwsn The AppeHanl oanlendad max me Maglslmta Caun enea whan n pwaoea me buman oi pmavon Ina Appeuam to show man Ins Insured had undalslwd and was axpwamaa Iha cam mu contemx 0! ma appuaamn «am by m Ixnmumsz-r9qvDuYxsLA «mm. saw nmhnrwm a. U... a may a. mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-max ca g me PBE olﬁcer lo Isslnfy when nne insured had sngned nn and me Responaenn am no( plead nmerw-se. [12] Yhe Appeﬂanlsubrnmed man in had pmven nts aenenae on a balance an probabnlnnes man snaweu. (a)The nnsuma medncahun msnmy exnsnea and was we. uamnere was a rnismplewnlalnun on me pan at the muted nn ms appucannan fov me Iorm whan he had mum in anscnose nn: lc)Tha meancan Nswry ms mllenll \|n lha underwmmg: \|d)The rnnmpmsennnnmn on me part onm inlurad was deliberate -ms rocklna In g ggu : -nu-mm [131 There was no remnnan emanee adduced agannsl nnenesn-mamas of the Appenanrs wnlnasses anman on me Insured‘; madman hadqgvuund As such, gmded by me Feaeran Caur\'s decsnon In rakako Sakai: vNy Pek Yum [2009] 6 MLJ 751, me foﬂomlng facts are aeoenled as hue‘ \|a)0n 15. 2014 he had undergone comnary angnngram lha\| revealed nmee vessel unseases; (h)On 27.2.2014 own (me cardnn\|hnracnc Irainee and meancan oﬂicarwho had minded no the Insured zl n-mspnvan Sadsng) had axplanned In me insured me dnagnoals 0V ms madmal conmnnon — nschaemnc haunt disease momnna no own, n. had axplamad the nature cl such anmse und haa advixed lha Insured In undergo a coronary revucuvanxalmn surguy (hypau mgery) 5 sm Ixnwumsz wqvumnnn «mm. smun ...m.mn .. med m may n... nrW\n\|H\|Y -mm: dnuavnml VI nF\uNa v-man but mu msursd omen lur phamuacalogxcal Iraalmanl (by way 01 ounsummg medlcanonsly 1c)0n 2s a 2014 me insured allandad a 6n1low—-Ap amok wxm nwa mar: he dlagnoms of ischlermc hazrl disease was mnde known ‘:2 ma Insured aum auemnam: uunduclod by Dw4 Mudrcaﬁom wm vmscrlbad to ma msumd. (d)On 271 2015 me msureo anenasa a fulluwup meek wum DW4 wnera the diagnosis :2! wschaemlc heart dnseaye was made known to me nsumi during assessmencs oonducted by DWA Meduiahons were presumed to me /nsured, 1e)On 23 a was me Insured allanded a fallow-up cheat wilh am when ma magnum ul ischanmic heart mama was made known (9 me msumd dunnn assessmulls eonaucm by DWA Madicamms wave pvisuibed to ma Insured, and (n 0711711 20150-2 Insured amended aiaﬂowup mack mm uwa where ma magnoss 01 uscnaecmc hear! disuse was made knuwn \|a me Insured dumvg assessments mnduded by uwa Mndmannns was prescribed to me Insured [141 mu Insured‘: appincalicn form for me Insurance cnwerage 1: dslsd 157 zows — 5:: m m uma lrame. u was allar he had lacawed medical (naavlmenl and advise «mm DW4 on was xepame nccasmns. An un puma fact VI \|haI u was mu mama who mu sxgnad n. The aaclarauen m the avnhcauun «arm lhzl van nﬂrmud !7y(hIm:u1sd read sm Ixrmmmsz wqvuumm «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! / have read and undsvstood Mu cements olme apphcalrun/pmposal folm mcrumng all wammgs and notices Ihsvain and] have fully and accurately answered all me quesnon: In Me ﬂppltcalron/pmposal for, and the olive! quasﬁons sskedhy AIA, Ilalvy. alter Mty rsadami Imdevslood me quest [15] me pre-conlricmal dlsdnsure ablnganan us expressly stated and when we ms-«ea axgned ma appucaﬂon «am. he Icknomsdged and conﬂrmad Iha anumnng 1;) I am swam ma: n is my pve¢ontrlclu-/ duly oldrssmsum mm Imus! mm» msonam cm not to mrlraprisenr la to give /am answwsﬁnlbrmahan wnsn mmnng lny qumrons awed by AM and that /Im m answsnhn qussnons Mly and acwrstsly/cunscuy, M / have read and understood me contents or me appncar»on/pmposa/ Ibvm muumng all warnmgs and nollcus msnsin and I have lul/y and accurately answeled all me quesrrons In me appllmllcrl/plaposal rum and me other ques!4onsasksdbyAIA,1fany, after having my ancmaasnu undemooa me queslrans.‘ (5) Ilulty understand mm my answers and/or statements grvan m raapecl 11/ mo aueslrons mm byAlA, and any other relevtnl documents compmsu by mu m mnscnan mm ma lppﬂcanan/pmpoaal mu m any msdrcal report or amendments (nallectwaly rolntrod to as we m;mnu.mn~) um sm Ixnwumsz nvqvuumm «mm. smuw ...m.mm .. U... w may he nVW‘Hl‘W mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! re/evanl In NA in decrdmg whether lo accept my applvcalmII/ pmposal or not and me /3195 and terms to be apmmrt (.4) I am awm that yr any ol my anawsm or statements or mlormahon grven bymmsnol accurate/correct, ma pa/icyrnay oa uvmdeﬂ, my claim domed or reduced, me temu or me palm)’ changed or vaned, or me Pa/my termmatad - [ea] A In whulhlr ma Insulad mama: Muury as wanna mm was submclld \|a be msclued, mm cams auanuon mum on Part 2 Haaﬂh Qmsliunx at ma appncamon form The msurea had mwemo in me On ma Iouowmg queuron: is evldancsd by Inc No‘ n ma -1 In me pas: 5 months. nave you had or been advised Io have any one/more of ma In/Varwmg bualmnnl/hosuflaﬁsalmn /aiagnosnc teslstmcludmg rm no:/rnnreara X-Rays, ECG, or scan, u/rzasounu), orner man for pveemplayment scmemngs/naunns company 1:! M53 appncanou medical chock-ups, In: any medrcal oom1tﬁon(s) 7 2 Have you been medrcally amnaea by any medrcal officers or plsclmonsrs or been diagnosed, treated or gwen mearcatuon tar any one/more al was lollowvng. naan msaaaa, mks: cancer, tumour of any mu; mv mfoclron, AIDS‘ mgn blond pressure, mamas, aamma or ulnar rasprrslory msomaca ur/nary or kidney unease; hepallflx,‘ Ilvor duuaas, Mood d1.mrdaIs,'mInIll or nervous msordersy apdopxy, am or neck am Ixrmmmsz wqvuamm «ma. Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e U... a my me mm-y mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm‘ pam; any all-var sermus or pmlonged r//rues: or rrumy. any physical defects?‘ [17] Yhe deem repcn omually slalzd me cause 01 dealh ov me insured on 30.12.2015 wmm was xscnennc hszn dnsease and camnary arlery lhmmbosu . Emenoe ﬂunrlg the cm: exammalmn at DW2 (me medical name: who mm conduclad me pesunonern on me inauvad) leshﬁed mat thus was evmenoa that (ha nu-nee um um medics! nean condition, However, Dwz nasnnea (hal sha was not able to conﬁrm Muemer me mnnea mama man. 3 heen II\|ad< dua k) the madmzzﬂ neen oondmon, only (hat he had a pwvensxw of probably getting a hazrl-altank Dn e {mama oﬂnrobibilmesn Pmrnised on Ina . nae‘ 0»: Cum salmy mncluﬂes me: me msmea um haw that medical sandman an diagnnled an 27 2 ma u was samelhlng wnmn me Vnsureds knowledge man he had not disclosud in me applncahun «nnn [131 \n ms regam, «ms coun us anne considered new»-ac msu-nmacenel whether me Respondent’: subrmssinns are we - that me cause ovdeam by me Insured was me accvdenlaualan mu 1A/I5, Tzman Pevmduslnan Jaya, Ara uannneara‘ Pslallng Jaya as mereus no evldenuelu prove ems. we 5 because me neue is nomnscuosure and mlsmnreeenlalxcn where we msurea an nul nonesuy declare lhat he sunerea from mac msd\|ca\ oendllnan. Yhal mvonnznmn was relevant and required mcannanon that needed In be assessed by lhe Appellam for grannng me said msurance pohcy \|n me Vnsured [13] nww me Appennnr: underwnler had lesuﬁed Iha\| Ina Dalnndam wumd not have granted me said mxurance uulncy (n (he Insured nea K known me: me innned mu swam that meaicer Dundmon Thus, (he sm Ixnwumsz r°wVDuYxsLA «mm. s.nn ...n.mn .. U... n my me nrW\n\|H\|Y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! cause of death is vnmalenal because the Issue 5 wnemet me Appeuam was wrong m canoeumg me sand msuranoe pointy on me bass at now dxsdosure and mssrepresemauon {znl As such smlemenl/Ininnnation was maxanal m the mnsldevalmn av xssumg me said msurance poHcy. xx Vs concluded man we mum had mmepresenled andlnr am not msclnse me mam-an Iaclslwormainon on ms memes: mndman/hrslory The law under me and Scnedme 9 01 me Fminum SlrvioasAc12D13 (Fan mqulmd ms Vnsurad (make raasnnahle cum max ms amwnn to me q-muons an aocura\|a and oumpkne Whale ma Insured ram made deliberate or ncklus rm5reprIsan(a\|Ian‘ ms AppaHan\| may zvmdlha sa suranol whey and muse paymerwlnl any clam. me law embedded me common Yaw pnnclvle of utmost gm mm — see me Court 0! Appeafs demsinn m Loony Kum Whay v as: Insunncezu; Sdn and [2006] 1 MLJ nu. [21] The Appeuam had also aumcxsc [ms caurrs ansnaon In me slalumry presummm under para 7(B)u1Scha1u\|e 9 FSA mataﬂ mwrmauon asked in me appucamn form was relevam Vn mus "mam. me Appellant had demonstmed so mmugn ns underwnler DW1. The evmenc: conﬁrmed that ii me Anpeuam had known me madman msmry of me msmed, ms appncauon would nav: been rejected. (see Tln Siew Wei v Gran Euxcm Life Assurance (Malaysia; Bomnd [2021] MLJU 1909 man wls alﬁrmed by the coun of Appeal an 22 6 2022 [221 Yhe Appsnsm m In submxssmns had uuuled Mllrburys Laws of Mnlnysll, Vol an. 2917 mm». man slated ma: pnnmpla ws universally applmd \|e all Vnsurance wnasexs — me duty In dnsdote an nuuensx «am and mu plnlas mus! mm make a m\snapIusen(a(inn 013 manual vsu m am Ixnwumsz wqvuamm “Nana sm.‘ nmhnrwm .. U... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm!	2,008	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
DA-12B-47-10/2022	PERAYU 1. ) Mohd Riduan Bin Zainon 2. ) LARGUS ENGINEERING SDN BHD RESPONDEN 1. ) Muhammad Hafizuddin Bin Azhar 2. ) Mohamad Azamuddin Bin Azhar	KEMALANGAN JALANRAYA: sama ada L/HMS berdasarkan kepada keterangan di hadapannya telah khilaf dalam memutuskan Perayu-Perayu bertanggungan 100% dalam kemalangan tersebut - sama ada gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS adalah adil, munasabah, tidak rendah atau melampau dan dapat memampaskan Responden-Responden.	05/12/2023	YA Dato' Roslan Bin Abu Bakar	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d21943d9-7e8e-46f3-914c-f9da0eba94cf&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - Appeal 12B-47-10-22 MVA Md Ridzuan 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO: DA-12B-47-10/2022 ANTARA 1) MOHD RIDUAN BIN ZAINON 2) LARGUS ENGINEERING SDN BHD … PERAYU DAN 1) MUHAMMAD HAFIZUDDIN BIN AZHAR 2) MOHAMAD AZAMUDDIN BIN AZHAR (dua orang kanak-kanak yang mendakwa melalui sahabat wakil dan ibu yang sah KHAZANAH BINTI HUSIN) … RESPONDEN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Pihak Perayu (Pihak Defendan di peringkat Mahkamah Sesyen) memfailkan rayuan ini kerana tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang terpelajar (selepas ini dipanggil “L/HMS”) terhadap keseluruhan isu liabiliti dan kuantum dalam suatu kes tuntutan kemalangan jalanraya. Pihak Responden pula (Pihak Plaintif di peringkat Mahkamah Sesyen) memfailkan rayuan balas terhadap kuantum sahaja (gantirugi am dan gantirugi khas). [2] Perayu 1 adalah pemandu motor lori bernombor WPG 6920 dan merupakan agen/pekerja/pengkhidmat kepada Perayu 2 pada masa material. [3] Perayu 2 pula adalah pemilik berdaftar motor lori bernombor WPG 6920 dan merupakan majikan/prinsipal kepada Perayu 1 pada masa material. [4] Responden 1 adalah penunggang motosikal bernombor DCA 3908 pada masa material. [5] Responden 2 pula pada masa material adalah pembonceng motosikal bernombor DCA 3908. 05/12/2023 16:09:47 DA-12B-47-10/2022 Kand. 26 S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Fakta [6] Pada 29.1.2019 jam lebih kurang 4.30 petang, Responden 1 menunggang motosikal bernombor DCA 3908 bersama Responden 2 sebagai pembonceng, bergerak dari tempat mengaji Al-Quran di Kampong Tualang untuk balik ke rumah mereka di kampong yang sama melalui Jalan Kampong Tualang, Kuala Krai, Kelantan. [7] Apabila sampai di hadapan loji air Kampong Tualang, motorsikal berkenaan telah bertembung dengan sebuah sebuah motor lori bernombor WPG 6920 yang dikatakan berada di bahu jalan sebelah kiri. [8] Perayu-Perayu telah mengalami kecederaan dan motosikal pula mengalami kerosakan. [9] Semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen, L/HMS telah memutuskan Perayu-Perayu bertanggungan 100%. Isu [10] Isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah ini adalah: (i) sama ada L/HMS berdasarkan kepada keterangan di hadapannya telah khilaf dalam memutuskan Perayu-Perayu bertanggungan 100% dalam kemalangan tersebut. (ii) sama ada gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS adalah adil, munasabah, tidak rendah atau melampau dan dapat memampaskan Responden-Responden. Penelitian dan penemuan mahkamah [11] Setelah meneliti dan menimbangkan hujahan kedua-dua pihak, rekod rayuan, nota keterangan, eksibit-eksibit dokumentar dan alasan penghakiman L/HMS, saya mendapati dan memutuskan seperti berikut: ISU LIABILITI [12] L/HMS telah memutuskan Pihak Perayu bertanggungan 100% dalam kemalangan berkenaan. Terdapat dua versi bagaimana kemalangan berlaku. Versi Pihak Responden adalah bahawa semasa motosikal yang ditunggang Responden 1 dan dibonceng S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Responden 2 sampai berhampiran loji air Kg. Tualang, motorlori yang dipandu Perayu 1 berada di bahu jalan sebelah kiri telah mengundur ke jalan utama dan selanjutnya menyebabkan berlakunya perlanggaran antara motosikal dan motorlori berkenaan. [13] Versi Pihak Perayu pula adalah bahawa motorlori berkenaan telah membelok ke kiri dan dalam keadaan berhenti sekejap di hadapan pagar loji dan tiba-tiba Perayu 1 terdengar dentuman di bahagian belakang motorlori tersebut. [14] L/HMS sebelum membuat penemuan liabiliti, telah menimbangkan fakta-fakta berikut: (i) semasa Penolong Pegawai Penyiasat sampai, kedua-dua kenderaan terlibat masih berada di tempat kejadian seperti tandaan “G” (motorlori) dan “H” (motosikal) dalam Rajah Kasar/kuncinya (P1 dan P1K). (ii) foto-foto kenderaan dan tempat kejadian (P2A-G). (iii) kerosakan kepada motorsikal (motorlori tiada kerosakan). (iv) sebelum kejadian, kedua-dua kenderaan datang dari arah yang sama (dari atas ke bawah dalam Rajah Kasar). (v) versi kedua-dua pihak (vi) mengenai hujahan Pihak Perayu, L/HMS telah: a) menerima penjelasan Responden 2 berhubung dengan kelewatan membuat laporan polis selama lebih kurang 2 ½ bulan dari kejadian kerana menunggu Responden 1 sedar dari koma. b) menerima penjelasan Responden 2 dalam percanggahan membuat tandaan “tempat kemalangan” olehnya dalam Rajah Kasar dan foto tempat kemalangan kerana Responden 2 keliru dengan tanda- tanda dalam Rajah Kasar tersebut. c) menerima keterangan Responden 2 yang menyatakan motosikal terlanggar bucu belakang kiri motorlori tetapi membuat tandaan di bahagian belakang sebelah kiri motorlori. L/HMS memutuskan ini bukanlah isu material S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 kerana kebiasaannya bagi sesetengah orang bahagian tepi dipanggil juga bucu. d) dalam laporan polis Responden 2 ada dinyatakan bahawa motorlori mengundur (P10). e) tidak menerima hujahan cuai sumbangan oleh Pihak Responden kerana Responden 1 tidak mempunyai lesen memandu dan ketiadaan lesen memandu bukanlah suatu kecuaian. (vii) ujud percanggahan dalam keterangan Perayu 1 kerana dalam laporan polisnya (D21) yang dibuat beberapa jam selepas kejadian menyatakan dia memberi isyarat ke kiri untuk masuk ke loji air dan pada masa membelok itu dia terdengar dentuman di bahagian belakang motorlori. Manakala dalam keterangan di mahkamah pula menyatakan semasa kemalangan berlaku, dia sedang menunggu dalam motorlori menantikan kelindan membuka pintu pagar loji. (viii) kegagalan Pihak Perayu memanggil kelindan motorlori berkenaan sebagai saksi. (ix) kegagalan Pihak Perayu memanggil seorang pekerja bernama “Helmi” yang bertugas di loji hari itu sebagai saksi. (x) Perayu 1 di tuduh dan mengaku salah di bawah Seksyen 43 (1), Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987. [15] Saya bersetuju dengan pertimbangan-pertimbangan L/HMS tersebut dalam memutuskan versi Pihak Responden lebih probable kecuali kepada fakta bahawa Perayu 1 telah mengaku salah kepada pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 43 (1), Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987. Pertuduhan tersebut adalah bersifat “kes jenayah” iaitu melakukan kesalahan dengan melanggar undang-undang. Manakala tuntutan “kes sivil” adalah suatu tuntutan gantirugi berdasarkan liabiliti setiap pihak. [16] Saya berpendapat fakta ini tidak boleh dijadikan pertimbangan dalam menentukan liabiliti pihak-pihak. Tetapi fakta-fakta lain yang dipertimbangkan oleh L/HMS pada pendapat saya adalah mencukupi untuk membuat keputusan berhubung dengan versi mana yang probable dan memutuskan liabiliti. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [17] Selain dari saya mengambilkira pertimbangan-pertimbangan L/MHS, saya juga mengambilkira panjangnya (length) motorlori berkenaan dari depan ke belakang dan sama ada semasa berhenti di hadapan loji air berkenaan, sebahagian atau ada sedikit bahagian belakang motorlori berada di atas jalanraya. Berdasarkan Rajah Kasar (P1) dan foto di muka surat 431 dan 432 Rekod Rayuan, adalah di dapati sedikit bahagian motorlori (bucu) masih berada di atas jalan (melepasi garisan putus-putus jalan yang bertanda “D”). Saya juga mendapati jalan di mana berlakunya kemalangan tersebut adalah sempit (lihat foto di muka surat 435 dan 436 Rekod Rayuan). [18] Satu lagi pertimbangan utama saya ialah umur Responden 1 semasa menunggang motosikal berkenaan pada masa material iaitu 12 tahun 4 bulan dan tidak mempunyai lesen memandu. Mengikut prosedur Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan, bagi membolehkan seseorang itu memiliki lesen memandu sama motosikal atau lain-lain kenderaan, seseorang itu mesti dahulu layak dari segi umur (16 tahun). Selanjutnya perlu melalui ujian bertulis bagi memastikan orang itu faham kepada undang-undang serta peraturan jalanraya. Kemudian menduduki pula ujian praktikal di mana seseorang itu perlu memandu atau menunggang secara kompeten. [19] Jika lulus kepada kedua-dua ujian itu baharulah seseorang itu mendapat lesen memandu apabila telah faham peraturan jalanraya dan berkompeten dalam mengendalikan kenderaan. [20] Saya berpendapat Responden 1 tidak memenuhi ciri-ciri tersebut dan tidak dapat menghargai (appretiate) atau menilaikan sesuatu pemanduan yang baik dan berhemah seperti tidak memandu laju, memakai topi keledar, sentiasa peka kepada keadaan jalan dan pengguna lain, cuba mengelakan berlakunya kemalangan dan sebagainya. Sehubungan itu walau pun dikatakan Perayu 1 mengundurkan motorlorinya pada masa material, tetapi masih ada tugas pada Responden 1 untuk berhati-hati dan menggunakan kemahiran serta pengalaman menunggang motosikal (yang mana saya berpendapat Responden 1 tidak mempunyai ciri-ciri sedemikian). Atas alasan ini saya memutuskan terdapat cuai sumbangan sebanyak 30% dari Pihak Responden dan 70% di Pihak Perayu. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [21] Berdasarkan kepada pertimbangan-pertimbangan ini, saya bersetuju dengan dapatan L/HMS bahawa versi Pihak Responden adalah lebih probable dan berdasarkan kepada pertimbangan- pertimbangan yang saya ulaskan, saya memutuskan kadar liabiliti adalah 70% kepada Pihak Perayu dan 30% kepada Pihak Responden. Sehubungan itu rayuan terhadap liabiliti dibenarkan dan keputusan L/HMS diketepikan. ISU KUANTUM [22] Sebelum memutuskan isu kuantum ini, saya telah merujuk kepada beberapa kes mantap berikut sebagai panduan iaitu: Ong Ah Long v Dr. S Underwood [1983] 2 CLJ 198: “It must be borne in mind that damages for personal injuries are not punitive and still less a reward. They are simply compensation that will give the injure party reparation for the wrongful act and not for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act, so far as money can compensate...”. Wong Li Fatt William (an infant) v Haidawati bte Bolhen & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497: “In considering the issue of quantum of damages, I bear in mind that an award must be fair which means that there must be a proper compensation for the injury suffered and the loss sustained”. Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [supra]: “It is well established principle that special damages, have to be specifically pleaded and specifically proved.... The reason that special damages have to be specially pleaded is to comply with its object which is to crystallize the issue and to enable both parties to prepare for trial”. [23] Saya juga menggunakan prinsip “good gracious test” yang diberikan oleh mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes United Plywood & Sawmill v Lock Ngan Loi [1970] 1 LNS 164: “The general principle is that an appellate court can only interfere with an assessment if it is considered so inordinately low or inordinately high as to make the court exclaim: Good S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 gracious, is that the sum which has been awarded, that sum has to be altered...” [24] Bagi isu kuantum, selain dari meneliti dan menimbangkan hujahan kedua-dua pihak, rekod rayuan, nota keterangan, eksibit-eksibit berbentuk dokumentar dan alasan penghakiman L/Mgt, saya juga merujuk kepada nas undang-undang dan Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards 2018 (selepas ini dipanggil “Compendium”). Berdasarkan kepada pertimbangan- pertimbangan tersebut, saya mendapati dan memutuskan seperti berikut: Gantirugi am (atas kadar liabiliti 100%) [25] Dalam notis rayuan, Pihak Perayu merayu terhadap keseluruhan isu kuantum yang melibatkan Responden 1 dan 2. Ini bermaksud meliputi gantirugi am dan gantirugi khas. [26] Dalam memorandum rayuan dan memorandum tambahan pula, Pihak Perayu bermula dari perenggan 11 menyatakan secara spesifik alasan rayuan kepada gantirugi am iaitu item nursing care dan kepada item-item lain atas alasan terlalu tinggi berbanding dengan trend gantirugi (manifestly excessive) dan pertindihan award (overlapping). [27] Pihak Responden dalam rayuan balas pula merayu terhadap award kepada item pertama sahaja (traumatic severe brain/head injury with cerebral concussion, skull fractures and intracranial haemorrhages) yang diberikan kepada Responden 1 sebagai terlalu rendah. Tiada rayuan balas kepada award yang diberikan kepada Responden 2. (1)Responden 1 (i) traumatic severe brain/head injury with cerebral concussion, skull fractures and intracranial haemorrhages. [28] Bagi kecederaan ini, Responden 1 mengalami residuals berikut (berdasarkan Laporan Pakar dari Hospital USM bertarikh 11.6.2020 di muka surat 437 – 443 Rekod Rayuan, Laporan Pakar tambahan dari Hospital USM bertarikh 28.11.2021 di muka surat 483 – 484 Rekod Rayuan dan Laporan Pakar dari Kumpulan Klinik Perdana S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 bertarikh 23.12.2020 dan 21.10.2021 masing-masing di muka surat 497 – 509 dan 435 - 436) Rekod Rayuan: a) severe memory impairment b) walk with hemiparetic gait c) right hemifacial weakness d) facial nerve palsy was noted on the right e) right sided weakness with loss of dexterity in his dominant hand f) expressive dysphasia g) mild facial asymmetry h) dystonia [29] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM350,000 bagi item ini dan tambahan RM7,000 untuk cerebral concussion. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM160,000. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM161,000. [30] Saya menolak hujahan Pihak Perayu bahawa amaun gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS sebanyak RM161,000 sebagai excessive kerana Pihak Perayu sendiri mencadangkan sebanyak RM160,000 i.e. berbeza RM1,000 sahaja. [31] L/HMS telah menimbangkan perkara-perkara berikut dalam memberikan gantirugi tersebut: a) amaun yang dihujahkan Pihak Responden terlalu tinggi b) Responden 1 tidak lumpuh bahagian kanan badan c) Responden 1 boleh berjalan dan mengangkat sedikit tangan kanan d) tidak memakai topi keledar dan penolakan 30% dari award e) Compendium f) kes-kes undang-undang. [32] Selain dari pertimbangan L/HMS tersebut, saya juga menimbangkan residuals yang di alami Responden 1 yang mana akan menjejaskan kehidupannya pada masa ini dan di masa hadapan. Saya juga menimbangkan umur Responden 1 masakini, aktiviti harian, peluang untuk mendapat pendidikan, prospek sembuh seperti sebelum kemalangan, prospek mendapat pekerjaan di masa depan, prospek untuk berkahwin, inflasi dan kejatuhan nilai Ringgit. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [33] Saya juga merujuk kepada laporan perubatan (Rekod Rayuan di muka surat 403 – 409), laporan pakar (Rekod Rayuan seperti yang nyatakan di atas) dan foto-foto Responden 1 selepas kemalangan (Rekod Rayuan di muka surat 467 - 474). Saya mendapati kecederaan di kepalanya amat parah dan tempurong kepala bahagian kiri terpaksa dibuang. Ini menyebabkan keadaan fizikal kepada Responden 1 tidak dapat dipulihkan seperti sebelum berlakunya kemalangan. [34] Saya faham bahawa gantirugi bukanlah bertujuan untuk memperkayakan atau mendapatkan keuntungan. Gantirugi ini mestilah seboleh-bolehnya meletakan semula Responden 1 kepada keadaan seperti sebelumnya berlakunya kemalangan. Prinsip ini telah diputuskan dalam kes: Appalasamy a/l Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71: “Thus, one must not forget the general rule that the function of damages in tort actions is purely to put the Plaintiff in the position which he would have been in had the tort not been committed in the first place and this can only be done through a reasonable award of damages. [35] Berdasarkan kepada kesemua pertimbangan-pertimbangan di atas, dan berdasarkan kepada prinsip “good gracious test” yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes United Plywood & Sawmill v Lock Ngan Loi [supra], saya berpendapat gantirugi yang diberikan L/HMS tidak mencerminkan suatu award yang munasabah. [36] Saya juga mengingatkan diri saya bahawa kadar dalam Compendium adalah sebagai satu panduan sahaja kepada mahkamah supaya mahkamah mempunyai suatu base bagi menentukan jumlah gantirugi dan tidak bertindak secara “pluck the figure from the air”. Abdul Waffiy bin Wahubbi & Anor v A.K. Nazaruddi bin Ahmad [2017] 2 PIR 1: “the compendium is not meant to stifle the rights of the parties to submit below or above the stipulated quantum, nor it is meant to fetter the courts discretion. As such, judges and lawyers are at liberty to depart from the compendium in the event case law or factual circumstances so dictate.” S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [37] Dengan panduan dalam Compendium dan kes-kes undang yang dikemukakan, saya mengenepikan award L/HMS dan menggantikan dengan award sebanyak RM300,000. Dan setelah ditolak 20% kerana tidak memakai topi keledar, award yang diberikan kepada Responden 1 bagi item ini adalah RM240,000. Saya berpendapat amaun ini adalah munasabah, tidak rendah dan tidak melampau bagi memampaskan kecederaan, kesengsaraan dan keilatan Responden 1. (ii) degloving injury and soft tissue injury [38] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM15,000 bagi item ini. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM5,000. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM15,000. [39] Saya bersetuju dengan L/HMS yang merujuk kepada panduan Compendium dalam memutuskan jumlah ini. Dan berdasarkan pertimbangan lain yang saya nyatakan dalam item (i) iaitu umur Responden 1 masakini, aktiviti harian, peluang untuk mendapat pendidikan, prospek sembuh seperti sebelum kemalangan, prospek mendapat pekerjaan di masa depan, prospek untuk berkahwin, inflasi dan kejatuhan nilai Ringgit, saya mengekalkan gantirugi sebanyak RM15,000 yang mana amaun ini adalah munasabah, tidak rendah, tidak melampau dan mencukupi untuk memampaskan Responden 1. (iii) scars [40] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM12,000 bagi item ini. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM12,000 juga. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM12,000. [41] Dari rekod prosiding, Pihak Perayu mencadangkan amaun yang sama. Parut ini pada pendapat saya akan berkekalan pada tubuh Responden 1 hingga ke akhir hayatnya kecuali dia menjalani pembedahan yang mahal bagi mengatasinya. Berdasarkan kepada bentuk dan saiz parut ini saya bersetuju dengan gantirugi sebanyak RM12,000. Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan kerana amaunnya munasabah, tidak rendah, tidak melampau dan mencukupi untuk memampaskan Responden 1. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (iv) pain and suffering pembedahan masa hadapan [42] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM10,000 bagi item ini dan RM30,000 bagi pembedahan yang telah dijalankan. Manakala Pihak Perayu tidak menghujahkan kepada item ini. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM5,000. [43] Merujuk kepada kecederaan Responden 1 (melalui foto-foto, laporan perubatan dan laporan pakar) saya berpendapat Responden 1 perlu menjalani pembedahan di masa hadapan bagi memulihkan kecederaan yang di alami dalam kemalangan ini. [44] Bagi setiap pembedahan dibuat, sudah semestinya seseorang itu akan mengalami kesakitan dan kesengsaraan pada masa pembedahan serta selepas pembedahan. Berdasarkan kepada panduan dalam Compendium, keadaan kecederaan Responden 1 dan pembesaran keadaan fizikalnya di masa hadapan, saya membenarkan rayuan ini untuk pain and suffering pembedahan masa hadapan sebanyak RM10,000. Amaun ini adalah munasabah, tidak rendah, tidak melampau dan mencukupi untuk memampaskan Responden 1. [45] Oleh yang demikian keputusan L/HMS diketepikan. (2) Responden 2 (i) cerebral concussion [46] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM7,000 bagi item ini. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM5,000. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM6,000. [47] Berdasarkan kepada laporan perubatannya (Rekod Rayuan di muka surat 423 - 424), panduan dalam Compendium, kes-kes undang-undang yang dirujuk, keadaan kecederaan yang di alami Responden 2 dan kesakitan serta kesengsaraan yang dilalui, saya berpendapat gantirugi sebanyak RM6,000 yang diberikan oleh L/HMS adalah munasabah, tidak rendah dan tidak melampau. Rayuan bagi item ini ditolak dan keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (ii) facial laceration (1 cm) [48] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM5,000 bagi item ini. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM3,000. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM4,000. [49] Saya mengambilkira kecederaan ini adalah di bahagian muka sepanjang 1 cm (laporan perubatannya dalam Rekod Rayuan di muka surat 423 - 424) dan akan mencacatkan rupa paras jika tidak dirawat dengan betul dan sempurna. Ini akan menjejaskan masa depannya. Sehubungan itu berdasarkan kepada panduan dalam Compendium dan kes-kes undang-undang, saya memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM5,000 dan ianya adalah munasabah, tidak rendah, tidak melampau dan mencukupi untuk memampaskan Responden 2. Keputusan L/HMS diketepikan. (iii) occipital haematoma (5 cm X 5 cm) [50] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM8,000 bagi item ini. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM3,000. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM4,000. [51] Dengan mengambilkira jenis kecederaan ini (lebam) dan boleh semboh seperti biasa, saya mengekalkan gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS sebagai munasabah, tidak rendah, tidak melampau dan mencukupi untuk memampaskan Responden 2. Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (iv) scar [52] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM8,000 bagi item ini. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM5,000. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM5,000. [53] Dengan mengambilkira jenis kecederaan ini (calar) dan boleh semboh seperti biasa, serta berpandukan pada Compendium dan kes-kes undang-undang, saya mengekalkan gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS sebagai munasabah, tidak rendah, tidak melampau dan mencukupi untuk memampaskan Responden 2. Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Gantirugi khas (atas kadar liabiliti 100%) [54] Bagi gantirugi ini, Pihak Perayu merayu terhadap gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS sebagai khilaf kerana tidak diplidkan, tidak dibuktikan dengan spesifik dan tidak dibuktikan dengan kukuh. [55] Pihak Responden membuat rayuan balas terhadap award kepada Responden 1 untuk item-item kos perubatan dan pembedahan masa hadapan, kos jagaan keluarga, nursing care dan kos membeli lampin dan lain-lain (i.e. susu berkhasiat, vitamin dan kos pembelian alatan perubatan di masa hadapan). Tiada rayuan balas kepada award yang diberikan kepada Responden 2. (1) Responden 1 (i) kos-kos dokumen (RM1,746) [56] Dokumen-dokumen yang terlibat ialah laporan polis, Rajah Kasar dan kunci (RM16), carian JPJ (RM10), laporan perubatan HKK dan HUSM (RM220) dan laporan pakar neuro HUSM (RM1,500). [57] Terdapat resit dikemukakan bagi dokumen-dokumen ini. Jika pun tidak terdapat resit pada dokumen-dokumen ini, saya mengambil judicial notice bahawa dokumen-dokumen ini ada dikeluarkan, dibeli dengan harga berkenaan dan sering digunakan dalam prosiding mahkamah atau mana-mana prosiding lain. [58] Rayuan ditolak dan keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (ii) kos perubatan dan pembedahan (RM86.40) [59] L/HMS memberikan gantirugi bagi item ini berdasarkan pada resit yang dikemukakan. Rayuan ditolak dan keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (iii) kos perubatan dan pembedahan masa hadapan [60] Keterangan dari pakar Pihak Responden (SP2) mengesahkan Responden 1 perlu menjalani rawatan cranioplasty dan kos di hospital kerajaan adalah antara RM7,000 hingga RM23,000. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [61] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM23,000 bagi item ini. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM16,000. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM16,000. [62] Saya mendapati tiada bukti tepat bagi menunjukan bahawa kos rawatan berkenaan adalah RM23,000 seperti yang dipohon oleh Pihak Responden. SP2 telah memberikan anggaran di peringkat minimum hingga ke peringkat maksimum. [63] Saya berpendapat amaun yang diberikan oleh L/HMS adalah munasabah, tidak rendah dan tidak melampau. Oleh itu saya menolak rayuan kepada item ini dan keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (iv) belanja keluarga menjaga di hospital [64] Sekali lagi saya mengambil judicial notice bahawa hubungan ahli keluarga di Malaysia adalah rapat dan akan membuat lawatan ke hospital jika ada ahli keluarga yang dimasukan ke wad. Dan jika keadaan pesakit ahli keluarga ini serius, mereka akan menemani pesakit di hospital. Oleh itu tiada keperluan bagi mengemukakan resit bagi item ini. [65] Saya mengekalkan dapatan L/HMS iaitu RM50 sehari X 46 hari RM2,150. Rayuan kepada item ini ditolak dan keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (v) kos kerosakan pakaian dan kasut [66] Saya berpendapat resit diperlukan bagi membuktkan item ini kerana pakaian dan kasut mempunyai pelbagai jenama, kualiti dan harga. Gantirugi sebanyak RM100 yang telah diberikan oleh L/HMS munasabah dan average. Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (vi) kos jagaan keluarga (terhadap Responden 1) [67] Responden 1 menuntut kos penjagaannya oleh ibunya (SP6) dan kakaknya (SP7) bermula dari tarikh kemalangan (29.1.2019) hingga tarikh pemfailan writ saman (7.7.2020) iaitu selama 3 tahun 7 bulan (43 bulan). [68] SP6 (ibu) memberikan keterangan bahawa dia bekerja sebagai pembantu kedai makan (Restoren Ideal) yang diusahakan oleh SP3 dan dibayar gaji RM50 sehari. SP3 telah mengesahkan perkara ini S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 di mahkamah. Manakala SP7 (kakak) bekerja di Syarikat Suria Muhabat Sdn Bhd (perkhidmatan wang berlesen) dengan pendapatan RM1,3000 hingga RM1,500 sebulan. Kedua-dua mereka telah berhenti kerja kerana perlu menjaga Responden 1. [69] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM2,000 sebulan bagi item ini. Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM600 sebulan. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM1,300 sebulan. [70] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang ada di hadapan mahkamah, saya tidak dapat mengambilkira pendapatan SP7 kerana sebelum kemalangan dia baharu bekerja selama 6 bulan dan berhenti pada bulan Mac 2019 setelah Pihak Responden terlibat dengan kemalangan. Kemudian dia bekerja semula pada bulan Januari 2020 dan seterusnya berkahwin dan tinggal di Kuantan, Pahang. Ini bermaksud dia tidak menjaga Responden 1 secara berterusan dari mula berlakunya kemalangan hingga writ saman difailkan di mahkamah. [71] Saya selanjutnya meneliti gaji SP6 iaitu RM50 sehari dan bekerja dari jam 7.00 pagi hingga 4.00 petang selama 6 hari seminggu. Dalam sebulan purata pendapatan SP6 sebulan adalah lebih kurang RM1,200. Saya berpendapat amaun ini adalah yang sebenar bagi pendapatan bulanan SP6. [72] Berdasarkan formula yang digunakan oleh L/HMS, pengiraannya adalah seperti berikut: RM1,200 X 43 bulan = RM51,600. Dengan itu keputusan L/HMS diketepikan. (vii) nursing care [73] Berdasarkan kepada laporan terkini dan kes-kes undang-undang yang dikemukakan Pihak Responden, jangka hayat seorang lelaki di Malaysia masa kini adalah 76 tahun. Manakala laporan pakar Pihak Perayu (D23) menyatakan jangka hayat “seorang pesakit lelaki” antara 49 tahun hingga 56 tahun. Berdasarkan kepada kedua-dua anggaran tersebut dan berdasarkan kepada kecederaan yang di alaminya, saya berpendapat jangka hayat yang munasabah adalah seperti yang dinyatakan dalam laporan pakar Pihak Perayu. Oleh itu multipliernya adalah 40 tahun (dari umur 16 tahun semasa perbicaraan). S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [74] Keadaan keilatan Responden 1 akan berkekalan untuk beberapa lama. Berdasarkan laporan pakar Pihak Perayu (D22), keadaan fizikal Responden 1 memerlukan dia mendapat bantuan (assistance) dan pengawasan dalam aktiviti kehidupan harian. Sehubungan itu berdasarkan kepada pertimbangan-pertimbangan tersebut, Responden 1 memerlukan seorang penjaga hingga akhirnya. [75] Saya juga menerima keterangan SP4 dan menggunakan judicial notice bahawa gaji minima seorang pembantu rumah sekarang adalah RM1,300 sebulan. [76] Tiada potongan contigiencies pada kadar 1/3 perlu diberikan kerana kes-kes mantap telah memutuskan tidak boleh berbuat demikian bagi item nursing care. Kedudukan ini telah dinyatakan dalam keputusan kes CHENG BEE TEIK & ORS v PETER SELVA.RAJ & ANOR [2005] 2 CLJ 839 yang menyatakan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang telah memerintahkan pemotongan 1/4 bagi kehilangan pendapatan masa hadapan, kos prosthesis masa depan dan kehilangan penanggungan telah diubah kepada tiada sebarang pemotongan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan yang telah mengikuti keputusan dalam: NORAINI BTE OMAR & ANOR v ROHANI BIN SAID & ANOR [2006) 3 MLJ 150 dimana Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan: “no deduction ought to be made on account of contingencies and other vicissitudes of life as was practice under the common law.” [77] Prinsip ini juga dengan jelasnya diikuti dalam kes diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu kes IBRAHIM YUSOFF & ANOR v ABDUL GHAFFAR MD AMIN [2009] 1 LNS 1383. [78] Oleh yang demikian saya memutuskan multiplier dan multiplicand bagi item ini adalah: RM1,300 sebulan X 40 tahun X 12 bulan = RM624,000 Bagi item ini keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 (viii) kos membeli katil hospital, suction pump dan ripple mattress [79] Rekod prosiding menunjukan Pihak Perayu tiada bantahan kepada kos ini berdasarkan resit dari Tawakal Medical Centre sejumlah RM3,700. Sepatutnya peguamcara Pihak Perayu menyatakan secara jelas dalam notis rayuan dan memorandum rayuan mereka dan tidak menyatakan secara am sahaja. Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (ix) kos menyewa motokar [80] Rekod prosiding menunjukan Pihak Perayu tiada bantahan kepada kos ini berdasarkan resit dari Klezcar sejumlah RM440. Sepatutnya peguamcara Pihak Perayu menyatakan secara jelas dalam notis rayuan dan memorandum rayuan mereka dan tidak menyatakan secara am sahaja. Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (xi) kos membeli lampin dan lain-lain [81] Pihak Responden memohon gantirugi sebanyak RM480,000 bagi item ini (berdasarkan resit (Id15) mengikut pengiraan RM1,000 sebulan X 40 tahun X 12 bulan). Manakala Pihak Perayu menghujahkan sejumlah RM3,000. L/HMS pula memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM3,000 atas alasan resit yang dikemukakan ditandakan sebagai Id sahaja. [82] Bagi item ini saya mengambil judicial notice bahawa Responden 1 memerlukan lampin pakai buang untuk beberapa tempoh sahaja kerana keadaan Responden 1 yang boleh bergerak sendiri dengan bantuan pembantu rumah untuk ke bilik air. Saya berpendapat tempoh yang munasabah adalah 5 tahun. Bagi item lain seperti vitamin, susu, ubatan dan sebagainya memerlukan bukti yang kukuh bagi menunjukan Responden 1 betul-betul memerlukannya. [83] Oleh itu gantirugi untuk kos membeli lampin pakai buang adalah: RM200 sebulan X 5 tahun X 12 bulan = RM12,000 [84] Rayuan balas bagi item ini dibenarkan dan keputusan L/HMS diketepikan. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 (2) Responden 2 (i) kos dokumen [85] L/HMS memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM40. Jika pun tidak terdapat resit pada dokumen-dokumen ini, saya mengambil judicial notice bahawa dokumen-dokumen ini ada dikeluarkan, dibeli dengan harga berkenaan dan sering digunakan dalam prosiding mahkamah atau mana-mana prosiding lain. [86] Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (ii) belanja keluarga melawat [87] Seperti tuntutan Responden 1, saya mengambil judicial notice bahawa hubungan ahli keluarga di Malaysia adalah rapat dan akan membuat lawatan ke hospital jika ada ahli keluarga yang dimasukan ke wad. Dan jika keadaan pesakit ahli keluarga ini serius, mereka akan menemani pesakit di hospital. Oleh itu tiada keperluan bagi mengemukakan resit bagi item ini. [88] Saya mengekalkan dapatan L/HMS iaitu RM50. Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. (iii) kos kerosakan pakaian dan kasut [89] Seperti tuntutan Responden 1, saya berpendapat resit diperlukan bagi membuktkan item ini kerana pakaian dan kasut mempunyai pelbagai jenama, kualiti dan harga. Gantirugi sebanyak RM100 yang telah diberikan oleh L/HMS munasabah dan average. Keputusan L/HMS dikekalkan. Keputusan [90] Atas imbangan kebarangkalian, sebahagian rayuan Pihak Perayu dibenarkan dan sebahagian lagi ditolak. Begitu juga rayuan balas Pihak Responden di mana sebahagiannya dibenarkan dan sebahagian lagi ditolak. [91] Atas alasan tersebut, pihak-pihak menanggung kos masing-masing. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [92] Faedah 2.5% setahun dari tarikh pemfailan saman hingga tarikh penghakiman ini dan 5% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman hingga penyelesaian penuh. Bertarikh: 1 Disember 2023. (ROSLAN BIN ABU BAKAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kota Bharu. PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak Perayu: Tetuan Wong Yam Kah & Co, 3818, Jalan Hamzah, 15050 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Bagi pihak Responden: Tetuan Azhar & Fazuny, No. F3, Lot 478, Seksyen 14, Jalan Bayam, 15200 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. S/N 2UMZ0o580aRTPnaDrqUzw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	35,439	Tika 2.6.0
WA-12ANCvC-286-09/2022	PERAYU JIMMY ''S BREW AND BAKE SDN BHD RESPONDEN IMK RETAIL SDN BHD	This Court found that the Sessions Court undoubtedly dealt with the evidence thoroughly, identifying the income and costs before deciding that it was fair for the appellant to have the expenses that he claimed to have, before directing him to pay RM2,500.00 monthly. This Court does not find any error in the Session Court’s decision when it ordered for the Appellant to pay RM2,500 monthly to settle the amount owing which is the judgment sum. [22] This appeal is dismissed with costs of RM3,000. The decision of the Session Court is hereby affirmed.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ca358adf-79ab-4c8a-8ff2-2e851014f416&Inline=true	05/12/2023 12:37:37 WA-12ANCvC-286-09/2022 Kand. 24 S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 34o1yqt5ikyP8i6FEBT0Fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—12ANCvC—286—ﬂ9/2022 Kand. 24 H5/12/2013 mm-27 IN YHE NIGH COURT or IIIALAVA AT KUALA LUNIPUR IN ms raven; TERRIYORV, muvsun CIVIL APPEAL no wA.12ANcvc-2:5-0912022 azrwzsu JIN\|MV'S anew AND BAKE sun am: ....APPELLANT (comuuv Nu: ua1m»K) AND 1DlK REYAIL sou am) nzsspounem (com-Aw no: sasesu) enounns or JUDGMENT T Apgenl [11 On 1592022 me sessmn own new auwea me Respondervfs Judgment Dsmnrs Summons against me Appenam and oraarea for a mommy paymem cf Rmzsnooc unm mu and ﬁnal seulemenx of me ]udglna1ldebLTha}uogmsmdd:Is RMn2,:m 72 sw J4u1ys:tswPa~srEsTnF9 «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm p] The Appeua:-rs amuse agaiml and Sewer: Conn‘: deusmn 15 um 11: mu and frank dwsdosurewnlh ma produmen M 1: bank swan:-nents fmm 31.1.2020 xo 31.12.2021, showed 111.-«me Appeuam had dmy a balance of RM9o.00. me hank s1a1emams were served an me Respondenn an 1552022 bekare me moss-exammauon M 1m Awellanfs dlrecwr on 5.0 2022 me Appeuann warmed «run we Session coon Judge had mled ma1 mam was no need for ma pooducuon 01 bank sce1emm1s1or2019. [:1 Vs\|,\|1Ia Appsllanlsubmmbd nu: ma Suuon coon Judge had Kskcn me poeihurl 04 me Sam nan-pmducluan o1 KM 2010 bunk ntallmem wu unteva-more \|u lhn Aopellam nnd had Med aullnsl mu Appellant TM Aooeuam impkwmd Ihat ms was ermneous as thus was no evndu-ce (0 Show Ina! me woman: had d1ss1pa\|ed or removed its 2139?; In deprwe me Respondent (mm me (rum dumnauon. [41 M me Audgmml was only omamed 1n 2020, me Aopeuam submilled Ihauhu bank saacamen1s oi 2019 had no 1915143110: The Appellanlhmhar suhmmed me1 ma session Cmm Judge and not sansry nevsen as «o In- means and sunny d1 me judgmtm debkzr more malung such an order. The casa a1 lam! (M) Sun and v Emonay Cour! Still and [2014] 0 cu 102 was mad [5] The Appeuam vnnloeed mis coun «a set was my order of cm seumn com on ma mnlenl man 11 is irsolvem so such ordu Is an abuse of mass: as It pmoed me corporate veil sm :4a1ysmyr=a.s;zan.rs «ma saw ...m.mm a. .1... w my 1... mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII .mm v-max [5] Al the susuon com. me Respondent had ulnamsd a judgmlnl m uevauh against me Appenann on 3.2 zozu var RM! 12.341 72 [1] The Appellant am not seme me sad judgment sum On 22 4 2022 um Respondent had ﬁled a Requestfordudgmenl Deblov sunrmns to newer ma sax: ludgmnnl sum Much men bscame a judgnenl aem owad by um Apneuann m cm Rsspondanl Tn nus, me Appallanl appoinlld solicitor: on 2: s 2022 to challsnga Im an Judgmem Dumur Summuns. [51 The Rupondenl and an Amandad Judgmanl Dlblor Summons on 5.3.2022 The Session coun cmiacrea me wnltun sutxniwonz. nf bmh padiss am ordered the Apneuam to pay me sum a! RM112,34\| 72 Wm! mommy msvalmemz. M RM2‘500.0D umil run and ﬁnal selﬂement :2! me said judgmem sum The Sullon Court’: daclslon [9] ma Sesslnn cam granlaﬂ me luvs under cm: 74 Rule 1lA Rules 01 com 2012 (Run) mm aHaws nor a judgment debtor xummons under :4 mm: DahIuIs'Ax1 1951 (ms Act). We session coun had Ilso returned to am) anus Act mac vmvidss ‘{6} Upon wen exammemn at rmrrappsalalvm as afniesal-1 the com! may omerthejudvment debtorrapiylha [adamant um sum (a)m ans sum meme: rarmmm or wnmn such penod as the court mly I/x, m sm :4u1ys:m«yPMrEaTnF9 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Iblby such msmmenls payabce Ilsuclv limes as me mm may ﬁx ~ [1 u] The Ssssmn Cowl mum that at me haar1ng.\|hs Appenam had vansa la ansuose MI ulsaosure an me ﬂnandal sxanus In 2019 even Ihcugh me cwll claim agamsn K commenced -n 2019. [1 u The S$slon com mnsmama Ihe AppeHunl‘s evidence that onnﬂnnad n had monayln zme but no bank slalamsnls were adduced ax ma hearing at ma Judgment Dahmr Summons The oral mummy tram me Awauznra dImc\|o( Donﬁrrnad mama Annennm had \n It: Duswssnn cm 2:119 bank statement run it was no! adduced for ma smmn Courfs eorusrdtvahon The svmerm at the hsarlng mma Judgment Dsblursumrnans [12] Anne hearing anms appeal, me zznunsellcnhe Appellamsubmined man 1: was ma Sesskm Court that ruled ma! mm was no naoesuly producing bank sulsmanu «or 2019, xx men wrongly held om ma non- dlanlosuru wns delberila I71 and mm In (he Appeﬂanl [1 :1 mi: Cuurl has smumd Ihfuugh ma Aupeal Racnrds at Em: :4. ma Sunwarnantary Aupeal Rewrds [Eric 5] and ma Sunplemanlal Rewards 01 Apnea! (No 2) [EM 51 There is nothing ea supvﬁrl me Anneuanrs wnbennan ms: the ssssmn Court Judge haa aglsed with ma pasmon of IheAp-pellankalmal lhanhe 2M9 bankilalememwas meuevam To sme that me sassm Conn Judge had taken an mun-«um as comenaed Is a sanous allagalmn Yhere is naming have In subscamiane mat am :4u1ys:EmyFMrEaTnF§ “Nair saw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he nrW\nnH\|:I mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-ma! [141 So nus COUVI canllm cnndude man me smlon Coal‘! and ruled at Irlal Ihal lhura was nu Med la Dmdues ma sald zma bank slalemam and on ma ulnar nanu conduded that m: Anpsllanl had not made a full and lrank dlsckzsurelu enable illo ascenaln me alloraalzllny «make good me ludgmenl sum. [I5] What ls cenaln ls max ll was lndaed ma poslnun at me Awallanl max me 2019 um sulemanl was lnalauaal in! ma Sesslon oaulra mnamamnen lor In ldiudlcamm ol ma pmcaaamgs at ma Judgment Daalara summons am (hi Snsiml com. Even al ma lppaal, ma Aaaallanl had alaaalaslly liken me posoﬁun man i\| was not mlauaax Tl-ls caunrs Anulﬂlg [16] From me wvilten submtss4ons oHheAp9ellanIallI1e sassam coun. lneee Ims rm challenge In ma Iacl that u had m us possssslon cm 2019 bank slalememwmcn was mt adauaad. Yhete was also an aﬂmlsslon by [M Appellant man In my mam were some murlays ln ma sam bank account. [17] In a nrouaalag on Judgmsrll usual Summon: Ilka ml: which was haard al ma Seulen Cowl, ma human In saualy ma court on me allamaailny ornthavwlse mm on ma Appellant The mun would consldur all avmenoa. mal and documentary lo deem manner such sum should be. The law urlders4(6)Deb1cls Acl 1957 pvwlaas. ‘Upon such axaminanon an-onappearanne as arfomsald, me man may ante! than/dgmenl rtsola (1: pay me [Imgmem deb! em-av - sm 34a1ys:EluyFMrEaTnF9 «ma s.n.l nuvlhnrwm a. u... a my a. mm-y am. dnuuvlnnl VII arlum vtmxl (5)m om sum whafha Immwnn at mrmn such penbd :5 ma court may ﬁx: or may such /matmems payable at such limes as the cam may ﬁx.“ ma] ms pnndpll 5 upheld n the aauu (M) Sdn Bhd V Emh Iy Courlsdn sun (supra) as Inﬂows “[271 The pm-upae m Khoo Wat Keong Ronme (supra) Is applicable as max :a precisely what the com has to do during mo examination process /a, lo samy uaan wnelhy me mdgmenl debtor has me mam Ind A-army to pay befovs making any omnrlal live/udgmenl dablor pa pay m we lump sum /mnw/m or wﬂlvm a spscvﬁedpemzd man by me mm! or m uucetmm at me nmss nm by Me com! amuﬁng to s 415 (5 arlb olms Debtors Acmspocuvuly ' [19] Based on me lvldenee ma: ma AupeHanl admnlad m having mansy: in the bank amoum in 2019 pm no expunamn as to what had happened la it. me Appellam cannoﬂaull me Respondenlcr ms court la mnclude. on a balance o1 prubabwmas‘ Ihal me money: were moved out ollhe Appeuanrs bank account. [20] runner, this Court cannm atmapl me Appellanfs oanlennon max lo we: ma Apveuam no pay -n Inslalmams av Rmzsm monthly to me Rupmdem Is 1anLamwn\| \|u pmmq lha cmpnrala vml The nmardld ml man me drredurs Io pay on said mnnmly insxawmams bu\| the AppeHan( Vanl Is Thus. we aupumem about piemmp ma ourpcrme veil in cm misumoewsd and does not am. am :4p1ys:m«yFMrEaTnF§ mm. saw ...m.mm .. p... w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm Qqndulau 5211 ms Coun mm: Ihal me Seaman: Court undnubladly duwnn ma evrdeoca lnnmughly, identifying Ihs mama and com befove deeming that ii was lairlar me apnsuannn have me exuenses man he daimed In have. before dlvecﬁrvg mm In nay RM2,5D0 no mommy ms Court was run rm any mm m me Sessmvw Cour\'s dedslcn when itordeved Iurma Aoneuanz Io pay nmsoo rnonlnlylo setlialhe amaunlawmg wmcn ts me wdgmeut sum. [221 m: appeal 5 dbmlssed mm cost: o1RM3‘00D The detxmn 111 me sum" coun Vs hereby alﬁlmed DATED JAPML 2023 WW ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDYCIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH comm VN MALAVA KUALA LUMPUR F12r1heAppe/rant. Damzn Es Km cnung, Jalsd Tee Wei .1». and Woon Lmg Li T/n s L Goon 4 Pm-mar: For Ibo Rnpondant: Phang Soon MuII/ rm Han .9. Partners sm :4u1ys:m«yPMrEaTnF9 % mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pm	985	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-12BNCvC-40-03/2023	PERAYU YEIN INTERNATIONAL SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN KONE ELEVATOR (M) SDN BHD	On a balance of probabilities, the Respondent had failed to prove its claim. This appeal is allowed with costs of RM10,000. The decision of the Session Court is set aside.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=18444f9f-fa6c-4020-90ed-f3437b17dc08&Inline=true	05/12/2023 09:53:03 WA-12BNCvC-40-03/2023 Kand. 22 S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N n09EGGz6IECQ7fNDexfcCA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—12mIcvc—au—o3/2023 Kand. 22 us/mzm us: IN THE HIGN COURT IN mun AT KUALA LIJMPUR m mE FEDERAL TERRIIDRV. MALAYSIA CIVIL APPEAL No: WA-I2BNOvC-40—D3/2023 aETwEEu VEIN INTERNATIONAL snu am: (counuv NO: 2o1w1ou45s4m754sa-K) APPELLAMI AND KONE ELEVATOR (M) sun sun (COMPANY N0: 19620100763!/E1391-H) . RESPONDENT GROUNDS or JUDGMENT mo session courrs dc [11 Aner a Ml max, me Sessmn Conn had allmvsd the Resnomenrs uaum ovRMza2.71s.2s They were car products supphed bylhe Appeuam Imt were aeveawe. The Sesslan Cour! had also ordered Far 5% mnerasx on me mdgmenl sum Costs at RMIU,0UU.DU wave addmonally warned to (he Respondsm sw r«avEGGzmEcq7mDuxIccA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm m The Sesswn Cowl neu rsladad me Appallanfs eonlennon that me delecs m me orauuole supolleo were ceueea by lne nanollng ol ma dellvery. mamas based on me Fanlhal me Appellant had ml called any wnness (mm sonenker Lnglsocs \|Mabysia) son and or Schenkzr Chlna Llo xlemen lo suppml lnal mlllenﬁun. [31 The Sesslon calm had oonsldsrad me plclunas and videos mak had reourded me oellvely ouuney wele loo Varand led laoonluelon. They on no: help me seem Court lo cunclllda lnel me Droducts sent and dehveled were In good wrldllnn. Till I [41 me Aonsllenlneo eubnnllea a law grounds elm:-see men lrldudsd: la) Tne seeslan ceun rlaﬂ enoo wnen me human nl proar was olaoed on me Appellanl lo pmva lnel me pmduele aellvored on me Ruporldent ware rm defective wnen lne mlnsen ol wool should have been on me Resporldinllc pmva meme pmducs dellvered were defecrivel (lay me Respemsenrs case hinged on «we allegeo uereouve puoduole alwmch me muons were neareay Ind ougnl nol lo have been consrderad by me seam court: (at The seeslm cam had eneu wharl lmlu nal welaenml mare wee no lzulal mrlnaction balwaan lne ellegoo oeleclive pmdu-:1 and on alleged breach olwananry an me lzualily olme Wwucts. no mzeezelzcmmumecn “Nair s.n.l n-vlhnrwlll e. o... m may he nﬂmnnllly enn. dun-mm VII mene Wm! ml The evidence showed me: me Respamlenn wdnass are no: knrw who had leken me nneregrenrrs m mm reperrs He could nor idermly me remarle and oommerla rn llrenr eillrer. Th's Coun ﬁnds lhal me comem cl mm me aelea reports rrrusl be aleulslree by llrelr maker(s]. The ahssme whlch would amounl w me conlene rneluang me prrolograpns Iflal me Aapellanr nan relied on‘ hearsay. [25] soln me aelecrs Iepons were heusay and canied no or very lmle pmbaliva value. see me com uVAppea\|‘1 declsion ln pm sum bln rq Monerned rr Wln uurrarrrrrrea Azrl urn wen com [2016] 3 MLJ 529 an para zu ‘However me respondent Ialled to cell me make! 0! me dccumenls to prove rls contents. In Amer: Bank (Malaysia) and V Yau Jrok Hua 11.29915 ML./1, rr was said rrral rr ls semsrl law mal me nrurn oflhe contents 0/ a document must be eslabllslred by me maker, ln omer wards, the maker olthe documents mus! be eellea to resmy la prove its eorrrerrre Non-camp!/anee wmr rrre rule rrrllreselrrn mo conrenre of rm documents being mndersd as hearsay and rnsreroru have we or no Probalrva." [25] ms waula in turn mean mel me Raspondenl had ya! la mscrrarge irs burden lo prove an a balance M prnbahlhlles me: am ne er me pmduas were ﬂelecﬁve. Exbsptlurme Mu tracked ales in 2m and me (our marl were bruugm al «rial, lne Respurrdenldia rm mscnarge Ils burden al woof The burden el prom had ya! la be snmed m me Appellant see me Federal cwrvs oeuslon ln ﬂung Vik Tnding v Liuz Plantation Sdn and [2017] 5 ML.’ see, ssI01 and loz Evidence Act 1950. Tm RIspmden\|‘s avldence a\| ml was lrrel mere were llny-nlne places el lne u rn rml7EGGzl'rlEcmlNDuxtccA “Nuns Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be used m my ee erwry ml. dun-mm wa erlurlc vwul Dfwucis that were defecﬁve - that oarvﬁrmanon was relied on boﬂh ma repom Thatﬁgure VS ml pmvell an a balance ol pwbabilmss Was an Anpellanl responsible for me allagaa serum [21] The Respondent nan not adduced avldsrloe lo shew an a balance M pmnalzlllues man me Appellam was responslble lor lne alleged deiecu. Aparl lrom me two craekea/aamagaa llles dlscavzred upml lhe reeelpl at the dellvery ol me prndums. (hare were other lealules VI me case man broke me usal mrlnedlon Because me alsoovary ollne alleged aeleas was anal eleven munms L71 aellvsry and 3'!!! a change al slmage wlm much handling am ma pzmdums, me Resplxlderll am produce any evldsnce In show on a balance at nmnanllillaa Iha\| me defects warn me alulamaa by me Awallanl Ind mal Ill muse amla and MI mull m ma defects or aamagaa pmauala I291 The Auvellant mu nol produce mama lmm its camar, a sub- clzrllmz.1nvPmll1al‘l Englnsennq whirl the defect: ana carnage could have been used by me hanulmg shlppmg am even sinrage There ms avldenee that me warehouse had a leakage issue ms com nulsd that the evldenoe sllowsd al the \|nln\| slla Irlspeclmrl male was no mmplalnla aiwalermalkslslallls Mme hlesa which appeared a year Islerwmch coula have been due \|o me humlully oondmorls ln storage. The Appellant also had ml pmduced any evldenoe la show mal me unevennes/walped slanes were not because alme lnsisllahon and how ll was calrled nul [291 There is nothing In ma Appeal Recoms mal slmaa man on a balance '01 Dmlvablllﬂes ma allegad dafems had lmmau when ma Appellirll nan handcd lwarlha pmducls yurchasod by me Relpandenlm 11 m mzeszalzcawumaca “Nair s.a.l nnvlhnrwm .. .l... M may he mm-y ml. ﬂan-mm VII .mm mm ma waiver‘: cavrier TM Ruspondent had Ilse Mac: to pmve max n oecurwd at me nunn men n had vsoarved mam. [30] ms Cnun Ihemfore eonaudes that me Respondent had actually failed \|u snow the cam! conneclmn between me Apneuanrs anegea breach o1 connect and the Respondenfs loss. Rsvarence Is made In Populu Indusmas Limited v Eastern Gnnncm uanufac-mung Sdn and [1959] 3 ML! 350. ‘A word now about general prmcrples Wnen a plain]!!! c/arms damages lmm a delandam, n: has to new that me ms: nu Inspect al wnich he mm damages was caused by me dulendanl‘: wrong. mu also that me damnges mac: ma ramole to be ucoverums - pq Tha Respormenl had procaadad no napme ma pmaucu. wiln purchual (mm a min: pany. ECW Rasouvma Sdn Ehd Hanever, ma ruplaoament was ml or me same specmcanon as mass bought lrom the Appenam rm replacement mes were more we we soaaﬁcalion 0? ma omer ophm — the ItHd<er measmsrnsnts wm me many pnue man was quoted byma Aupe\|lan\|huInotd1osan by me Respnndenl. Dnmagos -wuvod [32] This Cowl sets aside the damages awarded by the Sesien Conn because me speuﬁcamm»: my me pmducts veptaced was enunay amemn On a ha\ance nl pmnammas M loom: like me Respondent had ordered me wrung pmducls in me ﬁrs! place noun the Appeuann. Evan n my R§pDodsn\| were suoeesslul Vn pmvlng that male ware nave.-.1; and ma delecme pvoducu. were me raponsthmly 0! me Appsuanrs, u would u IN rmvEGGzmEcmmDutccA «ms smm ...m.mn be used m van; .. mn.u.y mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! no\| be raascnama lo awamucn damaqaslo ma Respcnaarruorrmvercm pmducls. ll scenrad man ansr using I'M: prvduds purcnauec (mm me Aapeuanx, xna Responder“ lound that the mcasuramems were nor sunanle. So. me Aapellam ougrrr noun be I1e\d responsmlc var rt. [33] Tnis Courl lurlher noted Ina! me 2n‘-/. supemsion ana overhead dlarges were nu\| pmven. there was no amence lo suppon me ngure mar ma Sessmn coon had awaraeo me Respondents. spacral damages must be Mﬂaded and rucven — Ong An Long v/Dr s Unatrvmod [1953] 2 MLJ 324. The gcnunl Iorms And ccnumans cl the purchase under my The nsspamanrs purchase omevconhinad the ganaril rcnrra and oondhons war suppcsad lo he allnnmd In Ilse pulchne ovuerumco ma Aapauanr by email an 2s.c.2ma hm ma cannanrs warn nar landamd an lnal Tnarewas also no msnhon cmrc gcoeran ncnns and cuncmcns in me my at me crnan The pulmaie omer nsen are our contain ms uunsral renns and mndninns rncy were also no: manilunld rn (ﬁe mrrespondenees batman the parties rmnr 24 5 2013 to 29.6 2013 [351 There was no evmcnce mar ma Appellant had cxpnssly agrcad In mam. in nanimrar, me wsnanry parroc or Iwenly-four mums wnera nannscerrrann «or defects wcwd be free 0! marge. me am nnre documentary evidence ccrrcnnrea nne same appsared was rn me Respanasnrs letter dated 27 92019 — man was over a year aner me uansaarm mare and purchase racrween them 14 rn rmvEGGzmEcmmDuxtr:cA “Nana s.n.r nnnhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... nrW\nnU\|:I mm: dun-mm vu .nuns v-mar [as] Heme‘ «ms coun ﬁnds lnal lne nespona-nrs general lame and eonanrcns were not binding on me Aupelznl, vmu ma nel have krnmleuge el rl. ellale n r n [:1] The Appeal riaeanas and me grounds cl Judgment by me Session Couﬂ have been nwreuea arm assessed. rnis oaun IS nonnuly neslvanr \|a lnlnﬂam wlln ma rlnarngs Mme Inal eoun nul Ill this case. me an ‘rugs were plainly wmng ms own is auldud by in rescue: Count‘: asersren VI Ng Han Kuli Anorv Wtndy rur Lu Pong 5 Or: [mu] lz MLJ 67 at para 74 ‘Thus, wmIs( rheve Is silgnl cmuenee in approach at appe//ale mrervenrion, both the UK Supreme own and our Feueral coun emecllvely snares a eumrnerr thvsad where rr has bean Imld Illal appellate /ntavvom/on ls jusllﬁad whore more is lack of mdlaal appmerauen of ewrter-ca.‘ [36] Tnis Cour! found inal lne ﬁnding mu mere were detects was erroneous as relianee was placed an M0 dslacl mpoﬂs Mild: wem hearsay and inadmissible as tn me mun onneir mnlems II was an ermr In ﬁm mat the Rsplwndem had drscharged its burden on a balance at pmbabilmes mar mere were aeteels as allsged ll was alse an error lo place the airmen on me Appellanl (or nol calling me camer m dispmve me Rzspondeufs eenlsnllon that me «steels were caused by me Apoellml and rum me lrensponallon and handling The human was on me 15 IN rml7EGGzl5lEcmmDuxtccA «me s.n.i n-vlhnrwm re used m mm r.. nﬂmnnllly MIN: dun-mm vu .mre we Resmnaunl no arms Ihal ma aaieas wen caused by me Avnallam Thai lam must be dschalged ml‘ before awning met me Appdlam had la. ea In pnwe [I131 ma defens were caussd by somalhlng else like n-ansvorlanun and handling [39] A funherenvvwas rellirluean clause 2 allhe RespLmdem‘s general le-ms and conullions wmcn evldarlea slwws was not a pan oi me mnlracc between me penis The ﬁnding maul Bwnd me Appellanmacause lime mi respond In me Respondent‘: wnespandences a ysal Ialer unaamiinaa ma evidence al lnal mat showed me Appellanl had no knowledge gill. Tiia Rsspnndamouuld nal produlx any avmancsmmm max II had Vnrvnrdasd me general terms and ccndlllonl all ma lime oi IM execution of we gonna, Yha communicauom helwaen (Mm an ml rnurlnon n‘ urllll a year Vale! In min when ma allsaed dalccu was dltcvvemd [40] There was also no oonsldemnon vial ma alleged defeas could havs been caused by me humidity VI s1uIage nrlhe leak issue in lna waraheuse. or men lhe unevannessfwarped pnmuais were not caused by me improper inslallanon Allmosa the Respomienrs wmesa had aﬂmlmed almal, were pusslblllhes. In any evenli mere was no moi mail me Apvellanl had given me alleged defects olme pmducls imm >aamen cmna The Respondent had ngl inspecled all ollnem. only line were conﬁrmed damaged ofwhlch ma Appallanl had made good since the numbed cl ales delwared was more man mal ordered 15 IN rmvEGGz6lEcqmlDuxtl:cA “Nair s.n.l ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he nﬂnlnnﬂly ml. dnunvlnnl VII nFluNG Wm! co-mm; an [41] On a balance ulvmbabilmes, me Raswndem had iaﬂsdla wave its claim ms appeal is allowed with com o1RM1o,ouo Tm daemon Mme Session Own ts set aside. DATED 25 AUGUST 2023 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER NVGH coum IN MALAVA KUALA LUMFUR For me Apps//anr Yap Zhen Jun rm Humlh Yew may 5 Pumas For the Rssaondem Mak Hon Pan T/rv Karen, Mak L Pampers 11 m rmvEGGzmEcmmDutccA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm la) The seealeu com had Mud lo nmwly evaluate ma lesllmonles ul me witnesses as to me quanmy at ma alleged aromas. (9) Yhe Session Cmlﬂ was umnemls when luaum lhal llilrlme and spot: an me products as ﬂalads, ll) The damauas ammea were unreasonable: (g) The was cf2D% supemslml and avemeam were ml woven, (In The Ixacl lo» wls not planned, and 0) The iensral lerms and omdmbn: taken lnlo account by me ssslon cam we»: run relevant. 15] me Applllamsubmmed that the Raspondsrll nan lallea In prove lrs (me an a balance ol pmbabllllles. me Appallanl lmplnred ms Cour! In inmrlara mm ma ﬁndmgs M me Sesslun Courl as mam was no plvve of me Alleged serene. and ma causal aanneallan and me leclual llnk betwun me amea delecla and me QLIIIVIY ol me nroaucu. e9_L¢§L2o.LLLu\|! [51 The pames had a am-ous buslrwsi aeallng In 2917 The Awallanl sllmiind mxluols lo me Respondent Mm was in me hllsinass at lnslallacim mudemlsaﬁon and rrlalnllnance e1 elervalnrs and escalatuls The Appellant‘: lradlng business included ms supply 00 marble‘ ﬁles‘ granite and lalzrlie products Then an 25 5 ms ma Raapemenl sent a m mzeszalzcmmumaaa “Nair Smnl n-vlhnrwm a. a... w may he nﬂﬂlnnllly mm: dun-mm VII nFluNG Wml pumnase emu to me Aanunanx. That was Dursuanl to Iluvtzﬁons sent by me AppeIan\|whin!1 me Reeponaenl had chosen me when wnn Ine Prim 0! RM1s4,324 15 The ether quomon sen\| was oi lmdter speciﬁcalions mm a slightly mgher price humle Responeenx had notchusen maxopnen and eanmmea me nrmum: onmnnerspedﬁcannns mm the lesser pnee Yhe dehvls are: mmwm mm my 50!: ran «an Yynn rn.n.n:-«a ea. mu m. (mm [um] {um} Gzsmgm Nov-vwumb Pahsmd woxsun 9 now am» 13638240‘ new! umm Famed semen m Iauw mm 27.94176 mil 151.3241: m Two days later. me Appaﬂanl submmed a tax mvuioe luv me said supplyemue pmdocts — aIota\of1,31I pisoas — 924 pines ereaseoane Baige Huneymmb am 392 pueoes ufG:swgrIe sage Lnmesmne. [3] The Respondent sppomled SchsnkerLugis\|K: (Malaysxa) Sdn Bhd as me carrier Mm had -n tum made arrangements fa! senenker cmna Lm namen Brand: to uuI\|ec1 me products a\| me memory In Xiamen, China on 30.3.2015 Tne evhenoe onne derail: nfme smpmemms Ihalme cargo that eomemea me produas were smpved to Port Knang. Mel customs n12aranoe.meproduc1s were taken no me camers warehnme faurorage to: arm: me. in tour month: [9] H15 Respondent had lnspoaod me proaucu mu one manm uwn arrival an me caviar‘: warehouse, The Respandenl can-plamea men Mo pieces cm: was were cmcknd The lnspecﬂon over me pmuaa umad . m nnvEGGzmEcq7mDaxtccA «me. am ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y em. mmn VII mum pm out by the Responttent was only over me oanrapee oretes more a was fuurtd Iwo tiies were oarnaoeo The rtespanoent requesteo tn: Appettant reptaeeo tne two cranked tites the Respondent had respundedlhallhere were nineteen extra pieces ottrtes in me cargo The Respondent trso ontereo 924 pisoes or me t-toneyeerne tites and 392 pieces at‘ me Limestone tttes. The Appettant naa delivered 3 mtira pieoas of the Hnrteycmtb tttee and tt extrs pieoes ot the Limestone tries. the Resp-merit oouto not onattenge mat it had reoetvso a totat or L335 neoes [tn] Yltareaﬂm. me Responoenttransponeo me prooucts to be stereo it the wareneuee nlPmntat1 Engtnaanng nus wns peesuse ttrara was a easy in me proterx lhal tne neeponoerrt nart eroaree tne proauot tor. To reouoa wan, I! ma deemed to arm ma product: in its sub-mrtnactors warenousa \|PmmIn Engineering) So. the pmdums were moved Vmm the storage at me earner to tnat ot ma :uh—omt(rnc1nfs warehouse The Respondent had not cameo ou ’ peetton upon the amval ottne products fur storawo in me sup-oontractors weretrouss. nre ptuouste were ﬂared more tor about etgnt rnontns oetore tnstattstron was carwad out tor me praise in 2019 [11] the Resvortdenl men instatted partottne pmducls torttetr pmjed. Eteven nrpnms etter imm tne ﬁme tne Respontterrt had reoervea tne pmducls, tne Responoent rneoe several oonrptatnte tnat me ptoouots were defsclive ano not in eonrptrenoe wrtn the epeomoatren oesonpeo in we purchase order. The Respondent claimed that tney were not at rnerottantatate quamy, nor were may at tor purpose. The Respondent ettegea that he detects were exlansrve and substantial There was a jutm sne meeting callsd by me neeponeent Mince tne Appettant had visitad 5 IN nttt7EGGzt5iEcmtNDuxtt:cA «me s.n.t tuvthnrwm r. u... m my r... ntwinaﬂly MW: dun-mm VII aFtt.tNG Wm! and mspected me stunes The defects were shown in ms Appeuerrrs duriw Ch: lolnl ma meeting on IS 7 201: The oomplernts mamas- [a)Cmcis and/or hamlne breaks rrr lhe Dmduds (Where many or urerrr were veoorded as'ch1p and mr); (I7)Yha Hunayocmns were demanded from me srarree, 1c)The smee were urrererrzmrved, and (d)Theru were hnles rrr are scores that measursd hrggerman 1cm. [:2] Evidence er ma: showed Ihal me Reeponaenr are nor rnsoecn an me nwduns at any point In um: bufore rr had csnied out lhe lnsullauon cl ms prerea. u only Imunlld rm numbor er ereres reeeruea and randomly chackcd «are number :1! u-ales cormspenﬂod re me number that r was \|a rrerre rscaivad u did not open all me cratesln msd(II1aav.1\I:l quenmy because at wm Nsklumvsr damage Dllhs srorre seceuse one. you opcrv me package. me mile wru be new usmsqed and we even easier to damage me ales 50. max is why we do no: open all me mes, lay um me noorsrmrrsn we checked The mcstilmxmam is re safsguardlhs lllss.“ [13] The Respomem had Vasned a [ever on me «areas on 219 2019 mar smghl me Appeurrrrr ro vemsdy me aeveae, The nespnrraeorr had also pmcuvaﬂ . uenrrrr mymn rurrrrr 4 10 2019 and had urrrr errerrrer rerrer in are Appellant on 14.10.2015 fhil om: me complllm an Inn pmdun: include: were erra srarrre rouaurna me Aweuerrrs hllune and/or refusal \|u remedy me wens, mhus Mdlmsnd were Aawid I: no Apoeﬂanl on ru rmvEGGzmEcq7mDutr:cA mu. sum nnnhnrwm r. u... w my r... mmrrsﬂly em. dun-mm vu .rrrrue v-max 7 11.2019 and 12 11.2u2n.A1nr1al. erronmrdelem reporn dened no 52020 was also nendered [141 Trre Resvorrderrn daimed man mey rrad \|o dlsmanlte me produus used ln nrrerr meet and replaced men with mere purehaeed lrerrr e mlrd perry Yhe Reswndenfs demands were ea lnllowe ..... a....r.,e... e........r (Rm 1 r.r...r.r Purmand IM 46! 4a 2 lauuurtv durvlanao s revmnll memo Sun Tan 7 217 an 417 T we Suparvnnrl e on»... nnsazza é 7 Ydul hill: CI wererneprdduersaeIocnrvo7 [151 ms ls eerrnrel ne me delm. as such we com mnamlnsd me Aoveal Racurds Io assess wnenrrer me wldema eddueed an nrlel could Mlp conclude. on a nzelenee er preoenlllau. man In preducns were derecnlve rm Reeponderrn clzirnad man ennrre nrrspeeuer. uper. vncalpl at delwery lr. Ocloblr 2019. 11 was \|u verity 1r.e eerrer.1 euarmry M crenee. Each or me elgnneen eaves rsoaived was "en opened In lnspad the qualily e1 me pmducls. The crates man were impeded were me damaged eranee. No other products were lrrscecned and urey were all nu1 rrrnd snnrage as me lnsrellaniorr (or me Resporrdenre pmjsd nad non yen begun. In lean, me pmdums were moved elner e eenelrr nlme perldd from nrre elerege or me mrrlefs to men one swdcnnrecners IN rml7EGGzslEcq7lNDuxtn:cA “Nana 5.11.1 In-rlhnrwm be u... m my r... nrwlrullly mm. dun-vlnrrl VII nFluNG v-mxl us: rnereoore, we could m7I be eoncluuea, on a baunoe o1 pmbanixmea Iha\| me pmducls sohi byme Appeaam were aececuve, apan lmm me «to uacked ﬁles The mspeclinn no the pmducls upon reoem by me Respandenlhersinmalayswa was crucial as (here were ntherilstures and everua mat eoum have mmrihumd lo the defects at me products. The products wvucn ma Respondent auegea were eeieeuve could have been me resuh at other things apan from me mar-uvecxunrrg huh The aHeg:d dececrs av amass‘ warwng‘ em bnakage may have had occurred during nransponaoou, smpmem and unsmtun handing Sluragewas alsu another Iezlure — me ploduds were emrea vemcally vmﬂst mere was oouxauum by ma AppeHalIl mallhevy should he stoned hnnlnmally as male was ma poearuluy max uamrmmg wumd occur n ma pmauua were slorod veruceury far ma long The wivehousa of Fmmll Erlainnedrw had a leak Vssue Mold and water spoumems were renenea xo nummy In storage me pomus slows: allnw wam Ia eaep and cause bmldun nl muld wwaler Svotslstsins. men there was also ma ins\|allalion cflha proaum — how it was done would have had men on me unevenness em/or me warm: charactsnsﬁcs once me proaucu. were mvanea [171 Eecauss man mesa features. lmlhe Raswmem to succeed In its claim, wt mus! prvvs on a balance at [rubabmoes that may wars alleged defects and that all moee oeatures am not bteam or break lhelau'ua\ link and causa\ connecum me: me Aweuam rm sold moss products alleged \|a have been delezmve. [us] The Respanuenz cook me pusluon mat me AppeHam was mpunsibla to newer me pmduds nl mermanlahie quality and In good eondmon and lhusunnsaasary farms Respandenlw inspect every none Vn each mm eighteen eranaa reeerveu rm Court Is unaue m aeelplmls a ru rmvEGGzmEcmmDutccA «wu. sum I-nhnrwm .. u... w my r... armmuu mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm mnhunliun at (‘hers seemed many pnsslbtllhes amt umbahmhss rl this wse K7181 the defect Mihe Drodumcmlld have hem Ihe resuh dsllippmgi handling. storage and even Insisllahon ufms mam In me man. 119} The Respondent had brought Iour shines in mai One had a walelmalk, one had broken and me ulna! lwu slemed aeieciive. Haw-var, In viaw man me evidence and umumsiances, the Respondeui Md wisp Io show on a balance otprpoaisalines man the aeiucis wean ma mix of ma Aweii.-mi (201 The avidence mowed mat me defects were aiseoverea aw me Installation DHIVB pmducts in ms pmisa much was nanny a yoaranei-me psiivecy om» pNduc1x.TIIs Respondent daimed maimosiomie sienna. with me honeycomb backing insiailed an me lrﬂ car vans had stained to warp. Those mm: were nighugmeu no me Appellanmunng me JDIM sits VBVID11 15.7.2019 [211 Suhsequenliy me Respendunt prvducud l defect rapon dalad 4 1o zu1n.Hawavar,m-nmpeaion was cameu aux brme purpose Mimi noon rm impocnun was named an] in July 2019 main sums of an daiects wura mahigm-p \|n the Appaunnx. The photographs in me deiuct reppn wevl UKSVI by Pmmarl Engineering‘ awoming In iris Respondwt some um: inmeen July and 0c1uber 2019 At trial. the Respnndem had relied on INS dialect rsoort and counted iiiim/—inur defecﬁve tiles as follows‘ i Crackad ﬂat s L , , 7 p+z»m.a 29 J umunluurvud n ‘ 9 IN rﬂVEGGz6\EEQ7!ND\|xlcCA “Nair s.n.i iuvihnrwm .. LAIQ4 M may i... mm-y mi. dun-mm VII .mm pm spmserr. I a Nah: ‘ 2 ’ mm ‘ 3: (221 There was man a mound eaves: mpnn dated the cammrrg yea: _ no 5 2020. which vas rm sawed arr ma Appellant rrra Rssponﬂnm wuld N71 give avidsnce as In whu mad when moss sets 01 arramgraprrs var me seeorra doisct veporl. The ﬁ9sDundsnI'swilnuss\|as1iﬁad matlham was a pnsslbllny Ihal mere ouuld be arr nvaﬂapping or photos and man ma makur oflhe sewnﬂ dailct repun was unsure more descrinﬁun ofma dafeds The cescrarany of me Raswndsnfs wrmess was ma: ma numbs me second defacl report therefore were not rehable. The emerru was mat mere were orrry ﬁllynine pseces m lclal (based on me ﬁrs! arra second Iepormhat were unsaﬁsfacmry Oulo11,316 prems nlpmducls delivered ca me Respondent. ms: wuuld any amount to 4.43% 01 me pmducts me Respenaem had purcnasea from the Appeuarrn. [231 The aerecx report: were nm given by me Respandsnl to me AppsIanL At man, are Aapenaac had made dear rt: abjecvcn lo bath me reporrs based on hearsay. The Appeuanl dunng me aeanng 0! ms appear, me Court or Applafs aeauren In Slmpn uamrara (nu Sdn and v ruraga marerrararru [2010] 1 ML! 375 was allod rn parueurar para 53: ‘I! la sewed law me: me rrrera /ear that a docunnnl ‘a mrked as arr sxmbd as P6 and N were rrr our case. arr: rrrx rerruer both documents eamrssrb/e umu me content rs proparry pruvsn. " r~ rmvEGGzmEcq7mDaxtacA “Nana s.r.r n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 m my a. mrmrry mm: dun-mm vu aF\uNG v-mm	2,264	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-12BNCvC-122-09/2022	PERAYU NOR AZRI BIN OMAR RESPONDEN MRCB ENGINEERING SDN BHD	There will be no appellate interference as the ‘plainly wrong test’ is not satisfied – Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 and Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441. This Court’s orderThis appeal is dismissed. The Session Court’s decision is affirmed. Costs of RM8,000 is awarded to the Respondent.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=35ee8e69-672b-407f-98a8-0d8ac06bc61a&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA CIVIL APPEAL NO: WA-12BNCvC-122-09/2022 BETWEEN NOR AZRI BIN OMAR (I/C NO: 691205-05-5343) …. APPELLANT AND MRCB ENGINEERING SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 198201002031 (81777-T) .… RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT The Appeal [1] The Session Court dismissed the Appellant’s claim for RM145,278 being the contended gratuity the Respondent owed the Appellant and damages for breach of the contract of employment. The Appellant submitted that the Session Court had erred in finding the Appellant’s employment status from 1.9.2000 to 29.2.2004 was pursuant to a genuine fixed-term contract. 05/12/2023 10:36:36 WA-12BNCvC-122-09/2022 Kand. 28 S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] The Appellant claimed that he was entitled to the gratuity payment having consecutively served ten years of employment with the Respondent under the latter’s employment and benefit plan. The Appellant submitted he was a permanent employee of the Respondent and that the Session Court had erred as it ought to have addressed the construction of the employment appointment letters as a question of law instead of relying on his evidence in cross-examination. The Appellant’s employment [3] The undisputed facts of the case corroborated by the documentary evidence below tabulates the Appellant’s appointment as an employee with the Respondent: Date of Letter Employment Terms Employment Period 19.9.2000 Eighteen months contract as Resident Engineer 1.9.2000 to 28.2.2002 10.1.2002 Extend the contract as Resident Engineer for a further ten months 1.3.2002 to 31.12.2002 23.12.2002 Extend the contract as Resident Engineer for a further two months 1.1.2003 to 28.2.2002 1.3.2003 Appointed as Resident Engineer for a fixed term of twelve months 1.3.2003 to 29.2.2004 1.3.2004 Long term employment as Resident Engineer From 1.3.2004 [4] During his employment with the Respondent, the Appellant had tendered his resignation thrice – on 5.10.2005 which he later withdrew S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 and the Respondent had accepted the withdrawal of resignation on 27.10.2005. The second time on 11.1.2008 which he had again withdrawn; that was accepted by the Respondent on 11.2.2008. The final time he gave his one-month notice of resignation was on 15.4.2014, the Respondent had accepted this so his last day of employment was 14.5.2014. [5] The Appellant’s demand for gratuity was based on the following term on gratuity issued by the Respondent on 1.4.2002, namely the following clause: Clause 7.1.(c)(iv): “A Gratuity based on the last drawn salary will be paid to an employee or his estate who resigns after completion of at least ten (10) years continuous service with the company.” Clause 7.1.(f): “The Gratuity shall be a lump sum payment equivalent to one month of the employee’s last drawn basic salary for every completed year of service or proportionally for any incomplete year.” [6] What must be considered for this appeal and to determine whether the Session Court was correct in finding that he was not a permanent employee entitled to such gratuity, was the Respondent’s circular of 4/2002 dated 16.8.2002 issued to all its employees. That circular was a notification of changes to the current terms and conditions of employment S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 and benefit plan which was effective from 1.9.2002. For gratuity, it was plainly and clearly stated as follows: “The current benefit shall remain for employees who are currently employed as permanent employees. This benefit shall cease to be extended to all new employees effective 1st September 2002.” This Court’s finding [7] Thus, the status of the Appellant vis-à-vis his employment with the Respondent at each respective time was determinative as to his entitlement to the gratuity claimed. From the undisputed documentary evidence, as of 1.4.2002 the Appellant had already completed his eighteen-month contract as the Respondent’s Resident Engineer. He was on his first contract extension by virtue of the Respondent’s letter dated 10.1.2002 which had extended his contract as Resident Engineer for ten months. So, the Appellant’s contract of employment was from 1.3.2002 to 31.12.2002. As of the time the Respondent’s term for gratuity was effective on 1.4.2002, the Appellant had only served nineteen months of continuous employment with the Respondent. [8] When the Respondent’s circular became effective on 1.9.2002 that provided gratuity to only those who were permanent employees, it did not include the Appellant. He was still serving the Respondent as the Resident Engineer contracted for employment until 31.12.2002. [9] On 1.3.2004, the Appellant’s status of employment was no longer on contract basis. After thirty months of employment with the Respondent as Resident Engineer on contract basis, vide the Respondent’s letter of S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 1.3.2004 the Appellant was offered appointment on permanent basis. A clause on termination of the employment was stipulated in the contract giving parties notice of one month or payment of one-month salary in lieu of notice. With the Appellant’s acceptance, he became a permanent employee of the Respondent on 1.3.2004. [10] His resignation was accepted on 21.4.2014 and his last day under the employment of the Respondent was 14.5.2014. During that period of employment as a permanent employee, the Appellant was reassigned to Dubai. For the secondment there, Al-Fattan MRCB took over his employment. His station in Dubai was from 1.11.2006 to 21.4.2008 when he was reassigned back to Malaysia, the Respondent then took over his employment from Al-Fattan MRCB. [11] Before this Court even starts calculating the period served as a permanent employee, based on the circular the benefit of gratuity was only for permanent employees which at that particular material time the Appellant was not. The benefit of gratuity was also not extended to all new employees as of 1.9.2002 of which Appellant was only appointed as permanent employee on 1.3.2004, some two calendar years later. Therefore, the Appellant did not have any claim for gratuity based on the circular. [12] This Court noted that no evidence showed the Appellant’s previous service of thirty months on contract basis was converted/backdated as permanent employee or that the thirty months of the said previous service on contract basis was added or taken into account in any calculation of benefit entitlement when he was employed as a permanent employee of S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 the Respondent. As of 1.3.2004 the Appellant’s appointment was a fresh tenure. [13] As a new permanent employee, the Appellant had to undertake pre- employment medical examination, assigned new staff number (M01265) that replaced his old staff number (ME0053) and completed a new staff appointment form. Both the Appellant and the Respondent were bound by the terms of their contracts they had executed – there was no acknowledgment or inclusion of the Appellant’s previous service to the Respondent when he had accepted and assumed as permanent employee on 1.3.2004 – refer to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Datuk Yap Pak Leong v Sababumi (Sandakan) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 587. [14] As with the Session Court, this Court will not re-write any contracts between the two parties and interpret and enforce the plain meaning of the Appellant’s contract of employment on a fixed term dated 1.3.2004 and also the Respondent’s circular of 16.8.2002 – refer to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mulpha Pacific Sdn Bhd v Paramount Corporation Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 294. [15] Furthermore, it was not the Appellant’s pleaded case that his past tenure on contract basis with the Respondent was incorporated into the contract of permanent employee in the letter dated 1.3.2004. The Appellant was bound by his pleadings – see RHB Bank Bhd (substituting Kwong Yik Bank Bhd) v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd [2010] 2 MLJ 188. As per the established legal principle, the Appellant’s claim must be decided on the issues pleaded that bind the parties – Court of Appeal’s decision in Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v Robert Doran & Ors and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 174. S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [16] This Court has considered the Appellant’s contentions including where he claimed that the letter of 1.3.2004 was a letter of variation of his employment terms. Such contention is unacceptable. The Respondent’s letter dated 1.3.2004 which was accepted by the Appellant was clearly and certainly a fresh offer of employment permanently as Resident Engineer – Job Grade 14. This was undisputed by the Appellant himself during his testimony at trial. As the fact that his past tenure was not incorporated or considered into his new contract of employment dated 1.3.2004. The Appellant did not demand for any gratuity at the time of his resignation. [17] The Respondent’s letter dated 5.5.2008 to the Immigration Department of Malaysia conclusively confirmed the fact that the Appellant was employed as a permanent employee since 1.3.2004. There is no evidence of the Appellant having had any dispute on this. [18] A scrutiny of the evidence in the Appeal Records shows that the Appellant had initiated its claim on the basis that his former colleague (PW1) who had resigned a year later, had received gratuity payment from the Respondent. Though PW1 concurred that the terms of their contracts may differ, there was nothing to show that PW1 was contractually entitled to such payment. In any event, the Appellant had not shown any term of his contract of employment that would entitle him to such payment, to succeed in his case before the court. Consideration of the Appellant’s arguments [19] The Appellant submitted that the Session Court was erroneous when it did not decide his employment status on a question of law. The S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Appellant when he submitted that he was a permanent employee from the very beginning invited this Court to the decision by the Federal Court in Ahmad Zahri bin Mirza Abdul Hamid v AIMS Cyberjaya Sdn Bhd [2020] 5 MLJ 58. However, that case concerned a judicial review of the Industrial Court’s award under the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The issue was whether the dismissal was without just cause or excuse. The factual matrix there was different as the employee had worked for a group of companies under one enterprise so there was an issue of piercing the corporate veil – all of which did not arise here. [20] The Appellant highlighted the fact that he was in continuous employment without any intermittent breakssince 2000. Based on the evidence in this case, the Appellant’s submission cannot be equated to the conversion of his contract into that of permanent employment. As with the Session Court, this Court refuses to impose an interpretation not within the ambit of the contract into it. [21] This Court finds that the Session Court had considered everything – from the documentary evidence to the oral testimony of witnesses. There are no errors in its grounds of judgment. The reasoned decision illustrated the consideration of the Appellant’s contentions and also the appreciation of the evidence adduced. [22] The Appellant had failed to show on a balance of probabilities that he was entitled to the gratuity claimed. On the other hand, what was very clear from the evidence adduced is that he was only employed on a permanent basis with the Respondent on 1.3.2004, of which he was not entitled to the gratuity benefit by virtue of the circular. The Appellant himself testified that his contract had expired on 29.2.2004. Thus, his S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 submission that he was a permanent employee of the Respondent from 1.9.200 is devoid of merit. [23] There was also the argument of the payment of arrears raised by the Appellant. It was contended that the payment of RM708 would not have been paid to him if the Respondent did not recognise or carry forward his past tenure on contract into the contract of employment as a permanent employee. The Appellant however had failed to show the payment was for arrears from January 2004 to February 2004. The Appellant did not adduce any evidence to show that the Respondent would not have paid if it did not recognised or carry forward his past tenure on contract. The Appellant also had not adduced evidence that the said ‘arrears’ showed that there was a continuity of service of the Appellant’s employment. [24] Additionally, this Court considered the Appellant’s reference to Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Tafakul Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 417 and Open Country Dairy Limited v Able Food Sdn Bhd [2021] 6 MLRA 244 but the evidence in this case shows no such incorporation of the benefit/gratuity into the Respondent’s letter of 1.3.2004 or any other subsequent letters. [25] There will be no appellate interference as the ‘plainly wrong test’ is not satisfied – Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 and Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441. S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 This Court’s order [26] This appeal is dismissed. The Session Court’s decision is affirmed. Costs of RM8,000 is awarded to the Respondent. DATED 21 JUNE 2023 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For the Appellant: Farrandy Iskandar bin Norshahid together with Amir Feisal Ariff T/n Farrandy & Co. For the Respondent: Rutheran Sivagnanam together with The Wen Miin T/n Sivagnanam & Associates S/N aY7uNStnf0CYqA2KwGvGGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	15,347	Tika 2.6.0
BA-22NCC-2-01/2023	PLAINTIF SHANGHAI MENGBASA HEALTH MANAGEMENT CO. LTD DEFENDAN LEE GIAN HUI	Permohonan Injunksi di bawah Aturan 29 Kaedah 1(2A) Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 memerlukan pendedahan fakta yang jujur dan tepat. Keputusan Mahkamah adalah berdasarkan imbangan kemudahan.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Zaharah Binti Hussain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f378fa17-5e03-48a4-bb3e-c353b718c942&Inline=true	05/12/2023 15:22:48 BA-22NCC-2-01/2023 Kand. 109 S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N F/p48wNepEi7PsNTtxjJQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA—22NCC—2—01/2023 Kand. me as/12/ma ,5 22 424 MANKAMAN TINEGI MALAVA m smm ALAM DALAM NEGERI ssuuson DARUL EHSAM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL no BA 2m: /2021 AMIARA SHANGNAI MENGBASA NEALIH MANAGEMENT ca. LTD (No.SyarikII: m1o2:wMA1K2xErxn) ...PLAlMTlF mm LEE GIAN HUI (no. KP: 910511-Iurun) ...DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Fnngunalau [1] pm 2 Ogns zuza Mahkamah um lelah menuvak permohonan Fla! unmk mendaualkan Parinlah lniar-nana Imunksw dan salamumya telah mangamhkan supaya scok yang dlrampas o\eh Pwsmm meralm Penman wenm mmnu: (ex-Dana) benarikh 15.01 mm iallu 1315 um AAA awe Quanmm Energy THz Appamus dlpmangkan sernula kepada Godex Enlerpnse Sdn Bud dawn mass 1 bman dari csnxh pvannlah mu. nu 72Nc(—oI/292: sw mus..N.pmmnmaq 'NnI2 Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used M mm u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; mm. VII mum pm m Flam hanya meruyu xemudap sebehanlan darlpsda kepumsan Mahkamah ml wawlu yang memumskun Plaintifunluk msngsmbalikan gm yang dirampas men Flam bsrdasarkan Palinlah Vmsnm Vnjunksi tersebm dalam iempoh sam bulan dan larlkh perimah «arsenal. Lnurb-mung kn [11 Manna! ada\ah sehuah syarika\| antarabangsa den cmna yang menga\uaN(an pmduk penapas a\r unwk uuadaman oxen syankal-syaﬂkal pengednr dad negaru lam m Penuarah umsan Plamlii iaﬂu Pmlesor Zhang Hangkaf man anu. menubuhkan 2 syanxm ssbagav Pangadar unmk Plammdi Ma\a 1.AAA GreenoeH Sdn arm (Nu Syarikar zmamoanosz mam7s—Ap 2 AAA Gnaeneeu Inoemsmonsv sun and (Na Syankal zaum aanmzz (1 42ass2—A) [5] PM Zhang Ie\ah meksnllk Maysnnrv (Pasporl cmna Na E642B3036) sebagai Kama Fagawaw Eksakum (CEO) unluk msnguruskan ksauamm syarikal (evsebul Clk Lee Gan Hul(De1endsn) Idalah Pambanm Psribadx kepeda CEO lemMzu\|. Mu zrucc rulznzs sw np4s..~=u:wpmnmuw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ﬂ Ia] Mayanan mm czo (emu mencadanakin Godax Emurpris: Sdn Ehd (Gadsx) unmk mengmxporl barangan Iarsebul danpada mm‘: dam selamsnya mengsdarkannya kapada Syankatsyankm xampaun ax Mala)/s15 rn Flawntilmah mangaruaman 137: unit AAA MD" Quamum Energy TH: (sink mama) kapzda cso dan Defeman unmk penedmaan ax Ma\ays\a olsh Godax M Namun sluk tarsebul mar. gaga\ msaaman kspnda pangsdeh pengedar ﬂan bays!-an jugs lidak duemskan kepada P\amM wamupun Kerdaval syaral dalam weuannanv-nq ananaaxangan. o\ah Godex supaya memhuat hzyavan aanum ssbslum stvx dibenkan kspada Godex M Usaha P\a\nM umuk msndaualkan semma smklarsebunelah gzgal. can dan Delendan dnkalakan le\ah menyembunylkan sink (evsebul an gudang yang dwahnakan un) Berdusarxen {akin dan mamexakang yam cﬂnyatakan duh P\am\|\\| im, Mahkamah Ielah msmberikan Permlah mlanm lvuunksx lerhidap Imenuan unluk menﬁambahkan snok fersebul dan menyanakan av mana am. zzncc nx/znzz sw np4s..~=u:wpmnmuw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ﬂ Vokavl guaana ﬂan mambenarkan P\amm unmk memasum gudang Iursabul l1Il Pads 2 One: 2023 Muhkimah man mennlik Dermohonan P\a\nlN unmk mendsvalkan Fennlah Vnter-Fans Vmunksw dan sawanjumya mengarahkan supaya sink \|ersebuI mpunanguan kepada Godex Entemnse sun and dawn mass saw omen nan nmxn Derinlah (121 Lacamaxakang ﬂan «ma yang dinenuangkan olah Dalandan adalah bemeze aanpada Imruewakana yang dhyullksn Men P\amM‘ semasa Darmahonun un\|uk lniunksi secara ex-Dims lsrsebul I13) Mmnan (cam tevsawz aaavun was pemansna sanam dan Fsnlarah Godex Malihan P\i\nl\Hahu menaenai kewujudan Gadsx dam Flaimilsandm yang mar. mangzrahkan cso umuk manggunakan Gndex unuux menqwmpurl sink «ersemn, [15] Da(andan sabaaaw Pambanlu Penbadl kepada CEO dan Jugs uakuua dv MA lnlemalmnal ﬁdak ads kawalan lerhadap syarlkal (msehlﬂ [151 Swk lersebul Ielah port uleh Gndex umuk AAA Sdn am an AAA Vnlemallonal Sdn Bhd ms arahan Plawmlsenam MA sun Bhd can nan zvccc ru/1012 sw mus..~=ummv«-«Jaw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm AAA Vnlemaﬂanal senam Hdak msmbayar unluk a1ek Iersabm kepada xa Dufandan un\|uk mambayar bag: plhzk [I6] Stok lanebut um dmanurkepada Defandan mam d\harI\|av swan P\a\|nli1 samin kapada Gudm yang manyimpannya m sebuah gudanq Jexas bahawa pemkman dw sml adahah an amara Plalnm dengan Mayenan (CEO) Gan Godex nan bukannya denier! ueienuan. und-nu-unuunn Mona-nan Inlunksl [I7] Mshkamah memluk xepsda Anmn 29 Kaadsh 1 my Kandah- kasdah Mahxaman 2012 (2; Permohnnan nu wen dibual melaml sualu nous permohannn yang msoxona aanqan sualu amuavn an we satu xea nulardesaky bolah dwbual sacara ax-Dans 12A) Anaawz sokonaan suacu Wnnahonan yang ﬂibuul ma-a ex-pans, lsﬂrah mengandungl mam pemyanaan yang \|e\as dan rmgkas dun pedal mengenaw — (5) fakva yang membsngkilkan nunmnan my (1)) «ma yang mernnangkmn permahonsn mjunlsl manna, (C) lakta yang msandarxan un\|u\|< member! msmxasu sInAr1zMc(—n1/102; syn sxumnmzwpmmuw -ma smm n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nrW\nnH\|:I mm: dun-mm wa mum Wm! plrmohonan ncara ax-pane. 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Tlnaksn Jalzln USMD/1A‘Ta\pan Trtangls 47620 Suhann Jaya Selangar ow Ehasn No. Tel : 0366379700 Emai\' elscale Rui 3122023239 erma\a we mm P-aunmcm Ruponuonlnomdnu Tainan T.L Chan 5 Co. No 22‘ Mezzanine Hoar Jalan ssrxut Tamer: Panama, Cheras ssma Kuawa Lumpur sw np4s..~=u:wpmnmuw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm gm nuznnmm Rulukan Kes‘ 1. KueIGs1a\|d Francis Noe! John v Mom Nam hm Ahdmlah & Ols mu 12M(:—n1/Inn sw mus..~=ummv«-«Jaw «-um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm	1,362	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
DD-83-31-02/2019	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH Ibrahim Idham Bin Mat Daud	Section 41(1) Road Transport Act 1987 - plead guilty mid-trial - appeal against sentence - section 173A Criminal Procedure Code - conditional discharge - bond of good behavior - no conviction - prosecution cost - principle of sentencing - concept of public interest - public servant - effect of conviction on public servant - accused background - mitigating factor - time is of the essence - discretion of the court	05/12/2023	Tuan Mohd Fauzan Bin Mohd Suhairi	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c9b60403-cc14-451d-be71-4459517e8b72&Inline=true	1 IN THE MAGISTRATE’S COURT OF BACHOK IN THE STATE OF KELANTAN DARUL NAIM CASE NO.: DD-83-31-02/2019 BETWEEN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND IBRAHIM IDHAM BIN MAT DAUD (IC NO.: 901007-03-5707) CORAM: MOHD FAUZAN BIN MOHD SUHAIRI, MAGISTRATE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT INTRODUCTION [1] The accused was charged under section 41(1) Road Transport Act 1987 on 19 February 2019, detail as follows: “Bahawa kamu pada 27/09/2017 jam lebih kurang 11.15 pagi di Jalan Bukit Temalong, Gunong di dalam daerah Bachok, di dalam negeri Kelantan telah memandu kenderaan 05/12/2023 23:18:27 DD-83-31-02/2019 Kand. 17 S/N AwS2yRTMHUWcURZUX6Lcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 m/kar no. AEL8878 jenis Perodua Kelisa di atas jalan tersebut secara merbahaya sehingga menyebabkan kematian seorang pejalan penama Mamat Bin Rendah, dengan itu melakukan kesalahan di bawah seskyen 41(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (Akta 333) dan boleh dihukum di bawah peruntukan yang sama”. The sentence: Penjara selama tempoh tidak kurang daripada 2 tahun dan tidak lebih daripada 10 tahun dan denda tidak kurang daripada lima ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada dua puluh ribu ringgit. [2] The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed trial. This case took a long period of time spanning from 2019 to 2023 comprising of a lot of mention dates, trial dates, and postponements due to various reasons. Not to mention, this case was presided by three Magistrates and prosecuted by five Deputy Public Prosecutors in total. In the middle of the trial sometime around 2022, unfortunately, the initial defense counsel in this case passed away. A new defense counsel took up the case to speed until the disposal of the case. [3] On 6 September 2023, the accused changed his plea and pled guilty to the charge. This Court fixed the next mention date on 3 October 2023 for Fact and Sentence. On the 3 October 2023, this Court, without recording conviction, ordered the accused be discharged from the charge on the condition of him entering into a bond to be of good behavior for a period of two years on RM 2000.00 bail with one surety, under section 173A(2)(b) Criminal Procedure Code. This Court also awarded RM 1000.00 cost to be paid to the Prosecution, in default of 7 days jail. Aggrieved by the decision, on 12 October 2023, the Prosecution appealed against the sentence passed by this Court. [4] Hence, this is the Grounds of Judgment of this Court. S/N AwS2yRTMHUWcURZUX6Lcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 PRINCIPLE OF SENTENCING [5] In the case of PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V. JAFA BIN DAUD [1981] 1 MLJ 315, his Lordship Justice Mohamed Azmi observes as follows: “A ‘sentence according to law’ means that the sentence must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section, but it must also be assessed and passed in accordance with established judicial principles. In assessing sentence, one of the main factors to be considered is whether the convicted person is a first offender. It is for this purpose that before passing sentence, a Magistrate is required to call for evidence or information regarding the background, antecedent and character of the accused.” [emphasis added] [6] On the same principle, his Lordship Judicial Commissioner Augustine Paul (as he then was) in ZAIDON SHARIFF V. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1996] 4 CLJ 441, held as follows: “The phrase “pass according to law” in the subsection adverted to means that the sentence imposed must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section but it must also be assessed and passed in accordance with established judicial principles (see Re CHONG CHENG HOE & ORS [1966] 2 MLJ 252, PP V. JAFA BIN DAUD [1981] 1 LNS 28; ; [1981] 1 MLJ 315 AND PHILLIP LAU CHEE HENG V. PP [1988] 2 CLJ Rep 144; ; [1988] 3 MLJ 107). The right to determine the quantum of punishment on a guilty party is absolutely in the discretion of the trial court. It will exercise that power judicially and will not tolerate any encroachment or even semblance of encroachment by either the prosecution or the defence in respect of that right.” [emphasis added] [7] His Lordship Justice Hashim Yeop A. Sani J (as His Lordship then was) in PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V. LOO CHOON FATT [1976] 2 MLJ 256, expressed the following observations: S/N AwS2yRTMHUWcURZUX6Lcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 “In respect of sentencing there can be only general guidelines. No two cases have exactly the same facts to the minutest detail. Facts do differ from case to case and ultimately each case has to be decided on its own merits. In practice sentences do differ not only from case to case but also from court to court. All things being equal these variations are inevitable if only because of the human element involved. But, of course, there must be limits to permissible variations.” SECTION 173A CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE [8] For ease of reference, the provision of section 173A Criminal Procedure Code is reproduced below: “173A Power to discharge conditionally or unconditionally (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 173, the Court shall have the powers contained in this section. (2) When any person is charged before the Court with an offence punishable by such Court, and the Court finds that the charge is proved, but is of opinion that, having regard to the character, antecedents, age, health or mental condition of the person charged, or to the trivial nature of the offence, or to the extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment or any other than a nominal punishment or that it is expedient to release the offender on probation, the Court may, without proceeding to record a conviction, make an order either- o (a) dismissing the charge or complaint after an admonition or a caution to the offender as the Court seems fit; or o (b) discharge the offender conditionally on his entering into a bond with or without sureties, to be of good behaviour and to appear for the conviction to be recorded and for sentence when called upon at any time during such S/N AwS2yRTMHUWcURZUX6Lcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 period, not exceeding three years, as may be specified in the order. (3) The Court may, in addition to any such order, order the offender to pay compensation for injury or for loss (not exceeding the sum of fifty ringgit) or to pay the costs of the proceedings as the Court thinks reasonable or to pay both compensation and costs. (4) An order under this section shall for the purpose of revesting or restoring stolen property, and of enabling the Court to make such order as to the restitution or delivery of property to the owner and as to the payment of money upon or in connection with the restitution or delivery, have the like effect as a conviction for an offence committed in respect of such property. (5) If the Court is satisfied by information on oath that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his bond, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension. (6) Any offender when apprehended on any such warrant shall, if not immediately brought before the Court having power to sentence him, be brought before a Magistrate who may- o (a) either remand him by warrant until the time at which he is required by his bond to appear for judgment or until the sitting of a Court having power to deal with his original offence whichever shall first happen; or o (b) admit him to bail with a sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for judgment. (7) The offender when so remanded may be committed to prison and the warrant of remand shall order that he shall be brought before the Court before which he was bound to appear for judgment or to answer as to his conduct since his release. S/N AwS2yRTMHUWcURZUX6Lcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (8) This section shall not apply- o (a) if the offender is charged with a serious offence; or o (b) if the offender is charged with the commission of an act of domestic violence as defined under section 2 of the Domestic Violence Act 1994. [9] In PP V. MORAH CHEKWUBE CHUKWUDI [2017] AMEJ 0782, the Court of Appeal enumerated circumstances that may invite the application of section 173A: “[5] It is well established that there are a number of factors that courts take into consideration before sentencing. Some of them are as follows: (a) the gravity or severity of the facts constituting the offence; (b) the circumstances in which it was committed; (c) the rampancy of such offence in the area; (d) the offender’s previous record; (e) the offender’s contribution and support to his family members; (f) the offenders means; (g) the effect of conviction and sentence on his job opportunities; (h) the age and health of the accused; (i) whether it is his first offence; (j) whether the accused had cooperated with the police after the commission of the offence; (k) whether the accused had pleaded guilty; (i) status of the accused; (m) whether there was violence during the crime; (n) public interest, etc. [6] All these factors where applicable need to be addressed by the defence to secure a just sentence. It is equally important for the prosecution to rebut the facts adduced by the accused if they are not bona fide, as ultimately the power to sentence is placed on the trial judge and the judge had to rely on the facts adduced in court...”. DECISION OF THIS COURT [10] The accused, as pointed out by the learned defense counsel, is now a public servant. He is currently a staff at the Jabatan Kemajuan Masyarakat (KEMAS), being employed as Pemaju Masyarakat (Grade S19) sometime around 2021. On this note alone, this Court is of the utmost and considered view that the accused be given a second chance in life. Being a public servant, as well serving under KEMAS, he is an asset to the S/N AwS2yRTMHUWcURZUX6Lcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 community and the country. If the accused is convicted under the charge, he will be imprisoned, and unfortunately, will also be subject to dismissal from the current employment. This serves no purpose to the goal of principle of sentencing particularly to the underlying element incorporating public interest. [11] This Court also took note of the factor in regards to the background of the accused. The accused is the only child that lives with his mother who suffered stroke and in need of intensive care at home. As pointed out by the learned defense counsel, the accident happened in 2017, and the accused was charged in 2019. Up until the present time, the accused together with his family had given full cooperation to the authorities and the Court regarding this case. He was being bailed by the police after the investigation up until the date that he was charged in Court. The accused never failed to turn up in Court on all the dates fixed by the Court. The defense counsel submitted that through these years, through these hard times, the accused already suffered enough with all the time spent, costs expended and the amount of depression faced by him and his family. The accused had to put off his desire to build a family in order to focus on this case that he worried will be detrimental to his future wife and children. This Court is of the view that time is of the essence in this factor. Hard times and difficult situation faced by the accused as in this particular case warrant sensible consideration by this Court. [12] This case took years that started rolling in 2019 up until this year, 2023. At the risk of repetition that the initial defense counsel also had passed away mid-trial. Much of the Court’s precious judicial time has been spent and the case was still at the Prosecution stage at that point in time. The accused, in pleading guilty has contributed to saving a lot of the Court’s time and cost, as well as saving taxpayers’ money. The accused is a first- time offender. As submitted by the learned defense counsel, through these years, the accused has not been involved in any criminal case nor traffic offence. This manifests to the fact the accused was remorseful and a heedful road user. This Court considered these factors to be ancillary in the decision of this Court. S/N AwS2yRTMHUWcURZUX6Lcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [13] Alluding to the submission of the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, three Prosecution witnesses have testified in the trial. Thus, this Court in awarding cost of RM 1000.00 to be paid by the accused to the Prosecution, weighs this as just and proportionate to the particular circumstances of this case. [14] In the upshot, it was for all the reasons aforesaid that this Court is of the considered opinion that the order passed to the Accused is well-grounded and warranted. [15] On a final note, this Court finds these words illuminating to ponder upon; in the case of Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Fadzli bin Mohd Amin [2019] MLJU 1741: “Similarly, with the decision made by the learned magistrate, this court is hopeful that the suspended sentence would give the respondent another chance in life and that he will ‘turn over a new leaf’. If the order of the suspended prison sentence has the effect of reforming him, then public interest has indeed been served and best served as if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living (See decision of Hilbery J in Rex v Kenneth John Ball [1954] 35 Cr. App. R 164).” Dated 5 December 2023 sgd MOHD FAUZAN BIN MOHD SUHAIRI Magistrate Magistrate’s Court Bachok Kelantan For the Prosecution : NURSYAFIQAH BINTI MOHAMAD Deputy Public Prosecutor For the Accused : NIK SAIFUL ADLI BIN BURHAN Messrs. Irmohizam Rosley & Nik Adli S/N AwS2yRTMHUWcURZUX6Lcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	14,827	Tika 2.6.0
DA-12B-45-10/2022	PERAYU 1. ) MOHD HASANI BIN MOHAMED NOR 2. ) NURSHAHIRAH BINTI JAMALUDIN RESPONDEN 1. ) TENGKU MUHAMMAD AMIRUL BIN TENGKU YAACOB 2. ) KU NURA BINTI TUAN AB HAMID	RAYUAN SIVIL: Isu yang perlu diputuskan dalam kedua-dua rayuan berkenaan ialah sama ada gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS adalah adil, munsabah tidak rendah atau melampau dan dapat memampaskan Perayu-Perayu.	05/12/2023	YA Dato' Roslan Bin Abu Bakar	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=62509e56-910c-42c1-ba77-1a1ccb91ede7&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - DA-12B-45-10-2022 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO: DA-12B-45-10/2022 ANTARA 1) MOHD HASANI BIN MOHAMED NOR 2) NURSHAHIRAH BINTI JAMALUDIN … PERAYU DAN 1) TENGKU MUHAMMAD AMIRUL BIN TENGKU YAACOB 2) KU NURA BINTI TUAN AB. HAMID … RESPONDEN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Perayu-Perayu memfailkan rayuan ini kerana tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan kuantum yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang terpelajar (selepas ini dipanggil “L/HMS”) dalam suatu kes tuntutan kemalangan jalanraya. [2] Perayu 1 (Plaintif 1 dalam kes di Mahkamah Sesyen) pada masa material adalah pemandu motokar bernombor PKY 3873. [3] Perayu 2 (Plaintif 2 dalam kes di Mahkamah Sesyen) pula pada masa material adalah pemilik berdaftar motokar PKY 3873. [4] Responden 1 (Defendan 1 dalam kes di Mahkamah Sesyen) adalah pemandu motokar bernombor WHJ 5458 pada masa material. [5] Responden 2 (Defendan 2 dalam kes di Mahkamah Sesyen) adalah pemilik berdaftar motokar WHJ 5458 pada masa material. Fakta [6] Pada 4.11.2016 jam lebih kurang 10.40 malam, Perayu-Perayu dalam perjalanan dari Ketereh ke Pulau Pinang dengan meniaki motokar bernombor PKY 3873. Sampai di Jalan Melor – Ketereh, motokar yang dipandu Responden 1 bernombor WHJ 5458 yang datang dari arah bertentangan telah memasuki laluan Perayu- Perayu apabila memotong sebuah lori treller dan terus bertembung dengan motokar Perayu-Perayu. 05/12/2023 16:05:02 DA-12B-45-10/2022 Kand. 26 S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [7] L/HMS memutuskan Pihak Responden bertanggungan 100% (liabiliti). Rayuan ini adalah terhadap kuantum sahaja. Isu [8] Isu yang perlu diputuskan dalam kedua-dua rayuan berkenaan ialah sama ada gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS adalah adil, munsabah tidak rendah atau melampau dan dapat memampaskan Perayu-Perayu. Penelitian dan penemuan mahkamah [9] Sebelum memutuskan isu kuantum ini, saya telah merujuk kepada beberapa kes mantap berikut sebagai panduan iaitu: Ong Ah Long v Dr. S Underwood [1983] 2 CLJ 198: “It must be borne in mind that damages for personal injuries are not punitive and still less a reward. They are simply compensation that will give the injure party reparation for the wrongful act and not for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act, so far as money can compensate...”. Wong Li Fatt William (an infant) v Haidawati bte Bolhen & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497: “In considering the issue of quantum of damages, I bear in mind that an award must be fair which means that there must be a proper compensation for the injury suffered and the loss sustained”. Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [supra]: “It is well established principle that special damages, have to be specifically pleaded and specifically proved.... The reason that special damages have to be specially pleaded is to comply with its object which is to crystallize the issue and to enable both parties to prepare for trial”. S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [10] Saya juga menggunakan prinsip “good gracious test” yang diberikan oleh mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes United Plywood & Sawmill v Lock Ngan Loi [1970] 1 LNS 164: “The general principle is that an appellate court can only interfere with an assessment if it is considered so inordinately low or inordinately high as to make the court exclaim: Good gracious, is that the sum which has been awarded, that sum has to be altered...” [11] Setelah meneliti dan menimbangkan hujahan kedua-dua pihak, rekod rayuan, nota keterangan, eksibit-eksibit dokumentar dan alasan penghakiman L/HMS, saya mendapati dan memutuskan seperti berikut: GANTIRUGI AM (atas dasar liabiliti 100%) Perayu 1 (i)severe traumatic brain injury [12] Peguam Perayu 1 menghujahkan gantirugi sebanyak RM350,000, manakala peguam Pihak Responden menghujahkan sebanyak RM70,000 dan dikira bersama dengan kecederaan di item (ii) iaitu C1 & C2 stable fracture. L/HMS telah memberikan award sebanyak RM180,000. [13] Dalam memberikan jumlah gantirugi tersebut, L/HMS telah menimbangkan faktor-faktor berikut: (a) award wajar dikira berasingan kerana melibatkan anggota badan berlainan. (b) berdasarkan laporan pakar Pihak Responden (laporan terkini), Perayu 1 telah boleh berdikari untuk makan, ke bilik air dan memakai pakaian. (c) laporan berkenaan juga menyatakan Perayu 1 boleh menaiki motosikal untuk membeli barang di kedai berdekatan. (d) gagal mendapatkan rawatan susulan di hospital (psikaitris). (e) gagal mengikuti rehabilitasi yang dicadangkan pakar. (f)perkembangan positif bahawa semakin pulih. (g) otoriti-otoriti (case laws). S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (h) Compendium of Personal Injuries Awards 2018 (selepas ini dipanggil “Compendium”). (i) kecederaan kepada item ini: (aa) impairments due to right fronto-parietal lobes injury (ab) cerebral concussion (GCS score 13/15 & 8/15) (ac) cognitive impairment, irritability, apathy and headache (ad) intracranial hemorrhage (ae) skull fracture (af) right intraparenchymal bleed (ag) subdural hematoma with midline shift [14] Tujuan gantirugi bukanlah untuk mendapatkan faedah atau “kekayaan” tetapi untuk memampaskan Perayu 1 seboleh-bolehnya kepada keadaan asal seperti sebelum kemalangan. Appalasamy a/l Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71: “Thus, one must not forget the general rule that the function of damages in tort actions is purely to put the Plaintiff in the position which he would have been in had the tort not been committed in the first place and this can only be done through a reasonable award of damages. [15] Saya mendapati terdapat faktor-faktor lain yang gagal di ambilkira oleh L/HMS bagi mendapatkan suatu jumlah gantirugi yang adil, munasabah, tidak rendah dan tidak melampau. Faktor utama ialah ketidakupayaan Perayu 1 dalam kehidupan harian ekoran dari kecederaan yang di alami iaitu (berdasarkan kepada Laporan Pakar dari Gleneagles Hospital bertarikh 22.2.2021 di muka surat 260 – 267 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3): (i) severe impaired mental functions (ii) skull defect over right temporal region (iii) injury to bilateral motor tracts (iv) reduced power for grip and brisk reflexes (v) incapable to live independent [16] Juga Laporan Pakar dari Island Hospital bertarikh 30.12.2020 di muka surat 247 – 250, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3) yang menyatakan: “In my opinion, patient is having severe disability secondary to his head injury as his mental functions are severely impaired.” S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [17] Saya juga berpendapat bahawa kadar dalam Compendium adalah sebagai satu panduan sahaja kepada mahkamah supaya mahkamah mempunyai suatu base bagi menentukan jumlah gantirugi dan tidak bertindak secara “pluck the figure from the air”. Abdul Waffiy bin Wahubbi & Anor v A.K. Nazaruddi bin Ahmad [2017] 2 PIR 1: “the compendium is not meant to stifle the rights of the parties to submit below or above the stipulated quantum, nor it is meant to fetter the courts discretion. As such, judges and lawyers are at liberty to depart from the compendium in the event case law or factual circumstances so dictate.” [18] Oleh yang demikian berdasarkan kepada pertimbangan- pertimbangan di atas dan pertimbangan umur Perayu 1, peluang bekerja, hubungan dengan keluarga serta masyarakat, inflasi, kejatuhan nilai Ringgit dan kos sara hidup, saya membenarkan rayuan Perayu 1 terhadap item ini. Dalam menentukan award yang adil, munasabah, tidak rendah dan tidak melampau, saya juga mengambilkira kegagalan Perayu 1 mendapatkan rawatan susulan di hospital (psikaitris). Dengan itu saya mengenepikan award L/HMS dan menggantikan dengan gantirugi sebanyak RM250,000. (ii)C1 & C2 stable fracture [19] Bagi item ini saya bersetuju dengan keputusan L/HMS bahawa ianya perlu dikira secara berasingan kerana melibatkan bahagian badan yang berbeza. [20] Peguam Perayu 1 menghujahkan gantirugi sebanyak RM50,000, manakala peguam Pihak Responden menghujahkan sebanyak RM70,000 yang dikira bersama dengan kecederaan di item (i) iaitu severe traumatic brain injury. L/HMS telah memberikan award sebanyak RM25,000. [21] Dalam memberikan jumlah award tersebut, L/HMS telah menimbangkan kecederaan tersebut telah menyebabkan Perayu 1 mengalami rotary subluxation of C1 & C2. Ini bermaksud Plaintif 1 mengalami kesukaran untuk menggerakan bahagian kepala dan leher seperti sebelum kemalangan. Keadaan ini telah dinyatakan dalam Laporan Pakar dari Damai Service Hospital bertarikh 14.1.2022 (Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3, muka surat 268 – 276) dan S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Laporan Pakar dari Gleneagles Hospital bertarikh 22.2.2021, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3, muka surat 260 – 267). [22] Laporan perubatan dan laporan pakar Pihak Responden mengesahkan kecederaan ini boleh sembuh walau pun mengambil masa yang lama. Keadaan ini memerlukan kesediaan serta tanggungjawab Perayu 1 dan keluarganya untuk mengambil tindakan dengan betul dan munasabah. Malah dalam laporan pakar Gleneagles Hospital (seperti di atas), dinyatakan dari keterangan keluarganya, Perayu 1 sudah boleh menaiki motosikal untuk ke kedai berdekatan. [23] Berdasarkan kepada pertimbangan-pertimbangan tersebut dan berpandukan kepada Compendium, saya berpendapat award L/HMS adalah adil, munasabah, tidak rendah dan tidak melampau. Sehubungan itu saya menolak rayuan bagi item ini dan mengekalkan keputusan L/HMS. (iii)scars [24] Peguam Perayu 1 menghujahkan gantirugi sebanyak RM40,000, manakala peguam Pihak Responden menghujahkan sebanyak RM3,000. L/HMS telah memberikan award sebanyak RM8,000 setelah menimbangkan kecederaan ini adalah pada right side of the head with a skull defect (post-op) and right neck dan panduan dalam Compendium. [25] Berdasarkan kepada prinsip “good gracious test” yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes United Plywood & Sawmill v Lock Ngan Loi [supra], saya berpendapat tuntutan Perayu 1 sebanyak RM40,000 bagi item ini adalah terlalu tinggi. Parut berkenaan di bahagian kepala boleh ditutup dengan topi (contohnya) dan di bahagian leher boleh ditutup dengn baju yang dipakai. [26] Saya berpendapat award L/HMS adalah adil, munasabah, tidak rendah dan tidak melampau. Sehubungan itu saya menolak rayuan bagi item ini dan mengekalkan keputusan L/HMS. S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 GANTIRUGI KHAS (atas dasar liabiliti 100%) Perayu 1 (i)kos penjagaan (nursing care) [27] Laporan pakar terkini Pihak Responden mengesahkan Perayu 1 telah boleh berdikari untuk makan, ke bilik air dan memakai pakaian. Laporan berkenaan juga menyatakan Perayu 1 boleh menaiki motosikal untuk membeli barang di kedai berdekatan (Laporan Pakar dari Gleneagles Hospital bertarikh 22.2.2021, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3, muka surat 260 – 267). [28] Perayu 2 (isteri Perayu 1) dalam keterangannya semasa disoal balas telah menyatakan Perayu 1 perlu diberi peringatan untuk makan walau pun makanan telah disediakan oleh Perayu 2 sebelum pergi kerja. Perayu 1 hanya makan apabila disuruh makan oleh Perayu 2 setelah pulang dari kerja. Perayu 2 juga bersetuju bahawa keadaan fizikal Perayu 1 adalah “macam” normal di mana boleh bergerak sendiri ke sana sini. Selain dari itu ibu Perayu 2 tinggal bersama dengan mereka. [29] Saya berpendapat (berdasarkan kepada keterangan tersebut), Perayu 1 bukanlah mengalami keilatan kekal seperti lumpuh atau tidak dapat bergerak. Walau pun laporan pakar Pihak Perayu dan Pihak Responden mencadangkan Perayu 1 memerlukan seorang penjaga dalam aktiviti harian, saya berpendapat keterangan Perayu 2 (isteri) adalah lebih boleh diterima kerana dia sentiasa berada dengan Perayu 1 di rumah. Manakala kedua-dua laporan tersebut dibuat setelah memeriksa Perayu 1 di premis mereka dalam suatu tempoh yang singkat. [30] Dengan itu ketidakupayaan Perayu 1 hanyalah kepada masa makan sahaja dan ibu Perayu 2 yang tinggal bersama mereka boleh membantu mengingatkannya kepada Perayu 1 semasa Perayu 2 pergi kerja. [31] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan-penemuan tersebut, saya menolak rayuan bagi item ini dan mengekalkan keputusan L/HMS. (ii)kehilangan pendapatan [32] Pihak Perayu mengemukakan seorang saksi iaitu majikan Perayu 1 (Pegawai Sumber Manusia dari Syarikat BW Yee Seng Steel S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Industries Sdn Bhd) yang mengesahkan Perayu 1 mula bekerja di syarikat itu mulai 24.2.2014 hingga 1.11.2016 sebagai seorang store keeper. Tetapi tiada keterangan dikemukakan bahawa Perayu 1 bekerja semula dengan sebuah syarikat lain bermula dari 2.11.2016. Juga tiada keterangan dikemukakan bahawa Perayu 1 dibenarkan bekerja separuh hari pada hari yang sama apabila mendapat panggilan kecemasan keluarga di Kelantan. Perayu 2 sendiri (isteri Perayu 1) tidak dapat memberikan keterangan di mana Perayu 1 bekerja semula. [33] Saya tidak dapat menerima keterangan Perayu 2 (isteri Perayu 1) yang dia tidak tahu langsung pekerjaan baharu suaminya. Saya mengambil judicial notice bahawa suami isteri akan saling mengetahui pekerjaan sesama mereka kerana ini adalah punca pendapatan keluarga. Tidak mungkin Perayu 1 berhenti kerja pada 1.11.2016 tanpa berbincang dengan isterinya (Perayu 2). Perayu 2 mempunyai masa yang mencukupi untuk bertanyakan kepada Perayu 1 berhubung dengan perkerjaan baharu sebelum kemalangan iaitu dari 2.11.2016 hingga 4.11.2016. [34] Saya juga mendapati tiada keterangan dikemukakan bagi membuktikan pekerjaan baharu Perayu 1. Tiada surat tawaran, kad kerja atau apa sahaja dokumen bagi menunjukan Perayu 1 bekerja di syarikat baharu pada 2.11.2016. Saya juga berpendapat, jika sebenarnya Perayu 1 bekerja di tempat baharu, majikannya sudah tentu akan menghubungi Perayu 1 setelah beberapa hari tidak datang kerja. [35] Tiada juga keterangan dari ahli keluarga Pihak Perayu yang mengesahkan kakak iparnya sakit teruk (ectopic rupture) dan mempunyai peluang 50%-50% untuk selamat. Keterangan ini adalah perlu bagi membuktikan majikan baharu amat bersimpati dan prihatin sehingga membenarkan Perayu 1 bekerja separuh hari sahaja pada hari pertama masuk kerja. [36] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan tersebut, saya memutuskan Perayu 1 gagal membuktikan dia mendapat dan bekerja di syarikat baharu mulai 2.11.2016. [37] Satu lagi isu bagi tuntutan item ini adalah sama ada Perayu 1 mempunyai prospek atau berkeupayaan mendapat pekerjaan baharu yang sesuai dengan kelayakan serta pengalamannya setelah berhenti dari pekerjaan lama. Keterangan menunjukan S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 pekerjaan Perayu 1 sebagai seorang store keeper dengan Syarikat BW Yee Seng Steel Industries Sdn Bhd adalah dari 24.2.2014 hingga 1.11.2016. Tiada keterangan yang menunjukan mengapa Perayu 1 berhenti bekerja dengan syarikat itu. Dengan mengambilkira keadaan ekonomi sekarang, saya berpendapat hujahan peguam Perayu 1 bahawa Perayu 1 mempunyai peluang pekerjaan di masa hadapan adalah suatu spekulasi sahaja. [38] Berdasarkan kepada kesemua penemuan tersebut, saya menolak rayuan bagi item ini dan mengekalkan keputusan L/HMS. Perayu 2 (i)closed fracture neck of right 5th metacarpal bone [39] Peguam Perayu 1 menghujahkan gantirugi sebanyak RM12,000, manakala peguam Pihak Responden menghujahkan sebanyak RM4,000. L/HMS telah memberikan award sebanyak RM6,000. [40] Berhubung dengan tuntutan untuk item ini, saya mendapati Peguam Perayu 2 tidak menghujahkan kesan dan ketidakupayaan akibat dari kecederaan yang di alami Perayu 2. Hujahan hanyalah kepada pekerjaan Perayu 2 sebagai seorang jururawat yang memerlukan skil tangan dalam bidang pekerjaannya. [41] Selain dari itu dihujahkan juga kepada faktor-faktor kejatuhan nilai matawang, inflasi, kesakitan yang di alami dan rawatan serta komplikasi yang akan ditanggung di masa hadapan. Tiada keterangan kukuh dikemukakan bagi menunjukan berlakunya ketidakupayaan pada masa ini atau komplikasi di masa hadapan. [42] Berdasarkan kepada panduan dalam Compendium dan otoriti-otoriti yang dikemukakan, saya memutuskan award L/HMS adalah adil, munasabah, tidak rendah dan tidak melampau. Sehubungan itu saya menolak rayuan bagi item ini dan mengekalkan keputusan L/HMS. Keputusan [43] Atas imbangan kebarangkalian, sebahagian rayuan Perayu 1 dibenarkan dan sebahagian lagi ditolak. Manakala rayuan Perayu 2 ditolak. S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [44] Kadar faedah untuk gantirugi yang diberikan oleh L/HMS dikekalkan. [45] Pihak Responden (secara berkongsi) diperintahkan membayar kos kepada Perayu 1 sebanyak RM5,000 dan tertakluk pada 4% alokatur. Bertarikh: 30 November 2023. (ROSLAN BIN ABU BAKAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kota Bharu. PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak Perayu: Tetuan S. Kuppusamy Fadzil & Co, No. 27, Tingkat Atas, Jalan Bayu, 09000 Kulim, Kedah. Bagi pihak Responden: Tetuan Othman Hashim & Co, 1st Floor, PT 371, Rumah Kedai Lembah Sireh 15050 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. S/N Vp5QYgyRwUK6dxocy5Ht5w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	18,419	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22NCvC-724-12/2022	PLAINTIF USAHA MAJU JAYA SDN BHD DEFENDAN HONG LEONG BANK BERHAD	In conclusion, the Plaintiff’s suit is obviously unsustainable, frivolous and vexatious under Order 18 Rule 19 Rules of Court 2012. The Plaintiff’s claim is hereby struck out. Costs of RM10,000 is awarded to the Defendant. Costs must be paid forthwith.	05/12/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=931a9640-5e05-47c8-bdc2-d9bfbfec6529&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO: WA-22NCvC-724-12/2022 BETWEEN USAHA MAJU JAYA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 200301033951 (636372-T) …. PLAINTIFF AND HONG LEONG BANK BERHAD (COMPANY NO: 193401000023 (97141-X) .… DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT The Plaintiff’s suit [1] The history of Plaintiff’s claim stemmed from two banking facilities obtained – one from the Defendant for RM1,550,000 in 2008 and the other from EON Bank Berhad for RM1,420,000 in 2011. Thereafter in the year of 2011 pursuant to the High Court’s vesting order the Defendant took control of all assets and liabilities of EON Bank Berhad. The Defendant notified the Plaintiff that the loans were consolidated. 05/12/2023 10:48:34 WA-22NCvC-724-12/2022 Kand. 39 S/N QJYakwVeyEe9wtm/vxlKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] As a result of the default by the Plaintiff, both finance facilities were withdrawn and terminated by Defendant on 23.7.2013. The repayment of the facilities was demanded from the Plaintiff and the two guarantors – Abdul Rahim Zakaria and Haslina Abu Hassan. The fixed deposits were liquidated in the sum of RM255,200.19 and were utilised to settle the overdraft facility in full and the balance to contribute towards the repayment of the other finance facilities. On 24.10.2013, a judgment in default was recorded against the guarantors. [3] A notice of consolidation of all the accounts dated 20.12.2013 was served on the Plaintiff that informed its liabilities of the combined finance facilities secured by the two properties. The Plaintiff was also notified that the judgment in default obtained against the two guarantors was affirmed on 27.1.2014. [4] Subsequently, on 29.4.2014 the Defendant obtained an order for the sale of the property collateralised to the first loan. On 5.5.2014 the Court granted an order for the sale of the property collateralised to the second loan. [5] It was the grouse of the Plaintiff that the non-payment was due to the unilateral variation and imposition of stringent terms of the loans when they were consolidated by the Defendant following the said vesting order. [6] Be that as it may, pertaining to the orders for the sale of the two properties, the Plaintiff negotiated with the Defendant a proposal to sell the property collateralised to the second loan by private treaty and settle both the facilities. The objective was to keep in abeyance the execution of S/N QJYakwVeyEe9wtm/vxlKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 the order for the sale of both properties with a view to settling the loans by way of the private treaty arranged by the Plaintiff. [7] According to the Plaintiff’s statement of claim (SoC) suit, its claim for special damages is based on the Defendant’s breach of their agreement pertaining to the sale of the properties to settle all the amount outstanding to the Defendant. The Defendant’s application to strike out under Order 18 Rules 19 Rules of Court 2012 (RoC) [8] In its application, the Defendant had implored this Court the Plaintiff’s claim on the face of it was obviously unsustainable as it can be determined by the facts and the contemporaneous documents pertaining to the two banking facilities, the court orders and the correspondences thereto. [9] This Court scrutinised the Defendant’s letter dated 18.1.2017 that conveyed the conditional agreement which amongst others the Plaintiff could redeem the said property at RM2,070,000 via upfront payment of RM500,000 and the balance owing of RM1,570,000 to be remitted by 10.3.2017. [10] The Defendant had also conditionally agreed to grant the Plaintiff indulgence of six months up to 28.6.2017 to fully settle all sums due. The Defendant agreed to withhold foreclosure actions against both properties. There was also a clear term that in the event of default of any of the terms then all sums due and payable together with interest would become S/N QJYakwVeyEe9wtm/vxlKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 immediately payable and the Defendant would be at liberty to execute the orders for sale of the properties. [11] There was a breach by the Plaintiff of the agreed terms as it had only remitted the RM1,570,000 from the sale proceeds of the said property on 1.6.2017 and had failed to settle the amount sum outstanding. Thus, the Defendant proceeded with the public auction of the property collateralised to the first finance facility provided by Hong Leong Bank Berhad. On 4.3.2019 it was sold for RM1,710,000 to Super Memory Map Property Sdn Bhd. [12] There were some litigations that took place following the event but the courts had ruled in favour of the Defendant. There was no appeal so the parties must be deemed to have accepted the correctness of the judgment which was binding on them – refer to Syed Omar Syed Mohamed v Perbadanan Nasional Bhd [2012] 9 CLJ 557. The cause papers of all the previous litigations show that the issues that the Plaintiff raised here had been adjudicated by our courts. Hence, the legal principle of res judicata applies to the issues on the two properties, the orders for sale pertaining to them and the actions thereto. Reference is made to Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1997] 2 CLJ 104. [13] This Court had also examined the reliefs prayed for by the Plaintiff. This Court finds that the prayer for statements of accounts on the two banking facilities is frivolous and vexatious as the contemporaneous documents and the chronology of events show that the Plaintiff had known the status of each banking facility, including the amounts owing for the term loans, trading line and overdraft facilities, at all material times. S/N QJYakwVeyEe9wtm/vxlKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [14] Guided by the Court of Appeal’s decision in KGN Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pan Reliance Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 CLJ 611, the Plaintiff was estopped from contending otherwise based on its conduct and the chronology of events that showed the Plaintiff had full knowledge of the amounts that were owing. [15] The prayers that sought declaration for: (i) The agreement of 18.1.2017 was valid and that the Defendant had breached it; and (ii) The sale of the property collateralised to the first banking facility sold by the Defendant as null and void. [16] This Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s claims are also frivolous and vexatious as this Court finds that the Defendant had not breached the agreement of 18.1.2017 and that the sale conducted was properly and legally executed. [17] The Federal Court’s decision in Michael C Solle v United Malayan Banking Corp Berhad [1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 267 is hereby referred to: “The principles of construction to be applied to the undertaking are similar to those applied to an ordinary contract. The intention of the parties are to be gathered from the language used. They are presumed to have intended what they said. The common and universal principle is that an agreement ought to receive that construction which its language will admit, which will best effectuate the intention of the parties, to be collected from the whole of the agreement.” S/N QJYakwVeyEe9wtm/vxlKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [18] This follows that the claim for special damages must fail. It is the duty of this Court to give effect the clear intention of the parties that were obviously and plainly stated. The Court of Appeal in Setapak Heights Development Sdn Bhd v Tekno Kota Sdn Bhd [2006] 2 CLJ 337 cited with approval the ratio in Central Bank of India Ltd, Amritsar v Harford Fire Insurance Co Ltd AIR [1965] SC 1288: “Now it is commonplace that it is the court’s duty to give effect to the bargain of the parties according to their intention and when that bargain is in writing the intention is to be looked for in the words used unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If those words are clear, there is very little that the court has to do. The court must give effect to the plain meaning of the words however much it may dislike the result.” [19] There are no exceptions in this case – in the absence of fraud and misrepresentations, all parties are bound by what they have expressly agreed to – see Chin Well Fasteners Co Sdn Bhd v Sampath Kumar Vellingri & Anor [2005] 4 CLJ 394. [20] This Court finds that this suit is a plain and obvious case to apply the summary proceeding of striking out – see Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation [1993] 4 CLJ 7. The Court’s order [21] In conclusion, the Plaintiff’s suit is obviously unsustainable, frivolous and vexatious under Order 18 Rule 19 RoC. The Plaintiff’s claim is hereby S/N QJYakwVeyEe9wtm/vxlKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 struck out. Costs of RM10,000 is awarded to the Defendant. Costs must be paid forthwith. DATED 14 JUNE 2023 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For the Plaintiff: Jayadeva S/O T Thirugnanam together with Loganathan P.L Suppiah T/n Syarikat Radhakrishnan For the Defendant: Satish a/l Vasudevan Nair T/n Satish Alli & Associates S/N QJYakwVeyEe9wtm/vxlKQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	10,157	Tika 2.6.0
PA-22NCvC-81-05/2022	PLAINTIF 1. ) SPROUTYPOD, INC. 2. ) JOHN CLAUS KONGSTED WOO DEFENDAN Daniel Paul Schurer	Defamation – Whether impugned words are defamatory – Defence of justification – Whether impugned words are true – Defence of qualified privilege – Whether repayment of loans to plaintiff is fraudulent – Whether illegal moneylending.	04/12/2023	YA Dato' Quay Chew Soon	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=932a406b-1ac4-44ed-b781-82189696290d&Inline=true	04/12/2023 15:36:59 PA-22NCvC-81-05/2022 Kand. 134 S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality 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portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 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a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N a0Aqk8Qa7US3gYIYlpYpDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PA-22llCvC-81-D5/2022 Kand. 134 D4/12/2023 13:26 39 IN THE HIGH COURT or MALAVA IN PENANG CIVIL su T NO PA INC 1-05/2012 laelween 1. SPROUTVPOD. INC. 2. JOHN CLAUS KONGSTED woo .. Plalnllws And DANIEL PAUL SCHURER Delendanl GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Imluduclion 1. me Is an action by me l=Iainmls agains1 the Delenuanl cm Ier eeaernauon and unlawful Inlenerenoe wllh Irade Aﬂer a lull Inal, I dlsmlssed the Flamllﬂs‘ l:IaIm. Here are the grounds 07 my judgment Thl (rlal 2 The Inal lock place over: days on 3.4 2023, 5.4.2023 and I3 4 2023. The wilnesses who Iesliﬁed at one trial were wlmeea ” Name ” ' Desul llon , Fnrlhe Plalnmk PW I 'JONl claue Kungrygd woe rne re l=IaInlI« I Forms Delendam # nw 1 Dams! Paul Schuver Yhe nelenaam __ Background lama 3 The 1" l=IaInlIH (“Campany”) Is a Iorelgn company Incorporated In lne Stale nl Delaware II'\| me Unlled slalee of Amerlca The 2"“ Plelnull (‘P2’) Is a Danlsh clllzen who lives In Penang, Malaysla on a ma Issusd under me Mala My Second Home nrogramrne P2 IS a dlrsctar and me CEO ollhe company. D was a direclor of me company 4. F2 and D entered Inle a collaoorallve Prulect Leller cl Ir-lenl on 27.7 2020 II was agreed man F2 would be reeponemle Iar lhe lurIaIng. execuliun ol markellng slralegy and general managemenl ol the spmulyI=od PFOi§c\| D wuuld be responsible lurdesignlng me Spmu\|yPod I m ﬂN1l.sD:7LIS3s:VlVlraVvDG «we. Smul luvlhnrwlll be 0.... a may I... nﬂnlnnﬂly -mm: dnuavlml VI nFluNﬂ Wm! prudum, accessorles and us packaging They agreed to snare proms ln me pruoonlon at 70% lo P2 and 30% lo 9 P2 and D lerrnea ine company on s in 2120 as me vehicle ln execullng the Spmu\yPud pmlecl 5 P2 and D were mined by MS Jessica Frsdoncl (“JaslicI") on 10122020 Jesslca held lne pas: n oi cnlei Brand omeer .n me Company. Togelherihey were ausmess partners l'FuIinders“)Io develop the wellness lo manufamure, market and sell units 01 SpruuIyPDd. SpmulyFad ls a glass oonralner deslgned by D lor suslalnaale loeu pmducllon It allows seedlings or sprouis to be grown oonvenlenlly ln an aeslnellcally pleaslng corllalrler in me mmlun nlme's home. 6 SpmuIyPud was launched on me plalloml el Klokslaner \|o omaln lunus lhmugh crawelunulng \|o slan mass produollen oi urllls oi Spmu€yPod The Fourmera had promised yla okslarrer mal uoners to me pro1eei('i:aekers')wno gave uss59 or more would as given unlis or SpwuIyPod. Tooale, rnass proauellon oi Spmutl/Pod umls has yel to begin. When ine cvuwdlunding oarnoalgn on Klckslaner ended, me Founders slanea anomer omrdlunalng campaign on Indlegugo Evnnls landing to me ﬁling M me ineuru suit 7 on 22.12 2021‘ D discovered lrral P2 had withdrawn the sums n1 US$100‘DUD and USSSDMUD lrorn me Company‘: bank account an Mercury aenk ln ine unllea Slates omrnerlca And lranslerrea ine monies to his personal bank acoounl al climank. Fenang, leaving a small aalanee oi aoproxirnaiely uszsaaco la usswoo. Betore P2's said lransler of me rnonles, lrlere was no Board at Dlremers‘ resolution to authuvrze P2 lo dc so. Nor was D informed as a director oi lne Company B D sent a WhsIsApp message on 2212.2o2l Io F2 to ask nlrn Io explaln rumsell P2 are no: all one rnalenal «me reply lo lne said message D men \|rlel1lo eernmunleaie wlin P2 yla a video call legelller wllh Jessica on 22 12 2021, nul P2 dld not lake me call Tnls was eennrrned by ’ me lnreau el Slack messages among me Founders. In his message al 1257 pm, D wrole. "We warllod In give ynu an acnaslan lo explain your acnuns in a vldea call yarsleuiay Nowever, you relum ll As we anmurlned yesleldayl we wlll nal have a call wlin you loaay rrs I lal. our lhit now From now on‘ we wlll only cnmmurllcaie wlln you In wmmg ll 9. P2 did not respund no any at me messages ln me aloresalg thread. P2‘s llrei email \u oonﬁvm that he nan laken ine sald monies lmm lhe ru ﬂN1IAu:7us:IwvlvlvVvDG 2 mu. Smnl mrrlhnrwm u. u... m my l... nﬂmnnllly MVMI dnuuvlnrll VII nFluNG Wm! reimbursement irain tne Protect revenue was and is not Doiiilﬂa at thv tlme P2 wmmiew ine ieiai sum at U5$150,El1D. and (ii P2 nad net at any Ilms -made a demand tar tn. m\|um' di the iaan Sum and nad witndrawn tnetdiai $ulV\ ai \|JSS‘i5\|7,9ﬁﬂ trriiawidiiy No notice of withdrawal at In. funds 32 The t=iaintiiis were not abie Io shdw that P2 had given any notiee oi the withdrawal oi the companys ltmds to the Company ar D (as a director), aeiore it was done on 20 & 21.12 2021 The eariiest naiinaatian was P2's email dated 22.t2 2021 to n and Jessica. one day aiter he had already transierred the iands to his peisonai account, Even then, the ndtincation was done in an uhltque manner in the said erriaii - “As you have rightiuity pointed out 1 have had my initiai slanup loans repaid ' 33. There is no evidence oi D or Jessica ever pnlnllng tnis cm to F2 when they had no inkting at the rnateriai time why he had withdrawn the tdnda. Aitndugn P2 claimed that he had iniormed D oi his intended withdrawal ai the Company‘; idnds, there is na evidence to suppon suen ciaim sums tmdlr the Loan Agreements are not duu ya! :14 P2 ient money to the company via 5 Luan Agreements dated 10112020 (in the sum in uss15,0oo), 11 12021 (in the sum oi 115550000), 15 3 2021 (in the sum oi US$35.000), 9 5 2021 tin the sum of uss15.cuui and 19.10 2021 tin the sum 0! Us$15.oo0) Out oi the said 5 Lean Agreemen\|s,1n 4 oi them which are dated 19 11 2020, 11 12021, 15 3 2021 and 9.62021, there IS the iouowtng clause under the headlrvgi “Repayment oi Loan“ Ra mn n aandwerwiii pay back tne amount at lhis note incidding me itnanee enarae, an tne anniversary oi each M tnis taan agreemeri 35. out ai the said 4 Loan Agreements. dniy the nrst Loan Agreement dated 19.11 2u20 had achieved its nist anniversary when P2tra11slemed um tne Oompanys idnds en 20 a. 21 12.2021. Yhis iirst Loan Agreement dated 19 11 2020 provided iar a loan at usst5,000 dniy. 36 The mn ioan agreement, which is the Loan Agreemem dated 19 10 2021. does not have a similar provlslun In pay on the anniversary IN ﬂAul3D:7LIS3s:VMraVvDG “ «war. s.n.i luvihnrwm a. HIGH a may a. annn.ii-i MW: aaa.i.n. VI nFit.INﬂ Wrui of tne loan agreement. tnsteed, under the heading or “Repayment or Loan‘, rt Is prevmea ’Emmwe¢ wtI\ pay back rne amount onms nete, rnetumng rne ﬁnance charge, at me requesr at rne Lender’ 37 I accept fhal Ina luan under the Mlrl Loan Agreement dated 19 10.2021 was also not due yet Because there vs no evtdertce Irva\| P2 nart made any requesl to me Company to repay hum the loan under tnat Nth Loan Agreement or under any or the other Loan Agreements 32 Moreover, P2 had eernmntea sew tn fmanoe tne spreutypod prujecl untrt tne Oompany could generate enough revenue \|o pay hlrn bauk In the cauaeoratrve Project Leneret Intent dated 27 1 2020‘ P2 had taken on true lulluwing as his obltgallon - ‘lund me Fmyecl untrt retmbursenrenttrurn Project revenue ts possible“. P2 has not been able to snow that in me Itme ol tne wi arawat at tne cnmpanys lunds on 20 e 21.12 2c2t, tne Sprotm/Pod pmjec\| had generated ennugn revenue to pay rum back the loans 39 Aooordtngly. I rtmt tnet P2’s wllhdrawal ula tutal sum olUS5150t9D0 trom tne cempanya bank accounl to repay his teens to the Company was premature because tar P2 made no reauesr u) rne Comparwto do 50 baimu wmndmwtng rne lunds on 2:: 5 2t \|2.2ﬂ2It tm Save tar ms nrvt Ln-In Agreement dated as tt 2D2l1.\rIa\|oans urater tne atner Luau Agreemems were not due yel er rud nat Iulfmed rne are aarntnaane rm regaymem tn he Mada, and to) P2 nad mmmmsd rumsalf ta lund the Company unnt retmeumamem tram tne Iavemu dlrwod numtne SprcuIyPoﬂ pmrea Is pcsslma Trtantme had not arm-ea yeusme pmpect had yet to generate any revenue Withdrawal of the funds In non authorized by the Company an on me Issue 01 tne absence ot a Board :11 Directors‘ reeolutron authunzmg P2 to Iransler the Company's tunes \|o rnmselr, P2 retrea on a document known as ‘Aclton by Unamntcus Wnnen Consent or tne Beam at Dtreetors‘ dated 5 10 2020 (“Eastern wrmvn consent‘) In pamculan ttems 5 and 12 tnerein wrncn reads. “5 Orfnwg Sm ﬂAA1nst1a7us3gvtv\pVvDn ‘2 “Nana S-rm nuvthnrwm be u... a my n. nrW\rrnH\|:I nnn dnuumnl vn murtc v-mat nasowsu That ma cnrer Execulwe omser rs aulhonzed \|u srqn ano deliver nny agvvsmsnl rn the name or ma Compiny and In mnsrwrss ubhgals nns osmpany m any rsrxp51:lve\:lmg\|o maliall an ms buamlss av ms campany_ and In delegnlz such eurnpmy .n ms Cmet Executive one dnscmmn <2 Manaaemem er Fscal Anarrs RESOLVED That lhs omcsrs :71 ms Company ave aulhanxed sna dlvacud, m rne Mﬁcsrs‘ arsmpan, rp Ielscl and assrgnau rnsm ums In (mu pne ar mum hanksormherirnancnai msmuuans asndeposrlaryellunds ollhe Company. and mm nns waver owners are nullwnzed In anen ans m.rnra.n_ M me name or Ihe company. a checkmay sayrnas. sars asposn. pavmu ovamevzccounloracmums wnn sara uaposrnary. RESDUIED runrnsn rnsune slandavd farm 01 esrpeme banking srnnansrar Iesnmlauns at suan banks av nnsnsrar rnamuuans nssaumy la assampnrsn ans laregnmg resmulrnn and shewmg me penscns aulhnnzzd to draw on susn assounn, am anbmved and aasmea as me resonumns ohms Board‘ and me smears are aumonzed to sxecumy canny‘ and newer a copy meraor no sum banks uIﬁnanua\ rnsmunans as (M vasammns nnnrs Company‘ 41 P2 assers that nns Board‘: Wmlen Consent aHcws In deal will: nne Company‘s Iunds without the need lor a Board resoluuun I arsagree The Boards Wnllen ccnsem dues ncl pvuvide a blanket consent «or F2 lo do anyming he wants In my urew. nne Boards Wmlen consem and In pamwlar «em 12 xnerernr mere\y auunanzs me smears ol me company «a select e ﬁnancral rnsmuuen “as a aeposnory at mnds of the Company“ And lo open and mamtam me cpmpenye amount wan sucn aepesuory. Tnere is nothing m nns Boards Wnllsn Consent wnrsn authorizes P2 to withdraw nne sara sum :2! uss15c,9oo from me cpmpanys account to repay his loans 42. To my mmd, ms Boanfs wrmen cansem, rncmdlng nsm 5 (herein. rs operanonax In nature. It cannot be relrea on by P2 In hansler me said sum of usswsuaoa, wnrcn oomnnsrss me Cempsny‘s subslanua! asse1s. Furthsmmre, r sonsruer P2‘: rename on me Board's Wrmen Consent to he an aﬂenhuugm and non buna ﬁde fur the rpnpwing reasons (I) n 15 nm pnuadad by nn. P\imM: In In. S1alemw\| an curm ar ans aspry us Deierme. la» n rs nor menupnea rn nne Pblnlws‘ wuness Slalemem al P2 Ms w 1) (ch P2 an no: one the Board swnuan Consam m Merwvy Ear-K as we source p« N: suxmmy m nra amsrna a\ mu ma\sn:l «may wnen ns was living «a peumldz Msrsu.y Bank In rm nns smpenxmn nlma saasum, and srn wﬁqmu-7us3gvrv\pVvDu ” «nu. s.n.r ...n.rmr a. u... a my s. ansrn.rr-y mum: ﬂnuamnl y. muna p-mar Lu} P: d.d non rexy on me Boards Wmien consam wnon n and Jessma omaored no ms wnnorawa: acme sand sum or usuwsuu 43. Moreover. Amcle 31 at me Ey\aws 0! me company supulates the requirement :71 oblammg me appmva\ 0! me Board of Dxreclors bevure exerorsmg any Darporate power as a dvreclor. u reads “:1 Ema suo,eor no «no pronouns M01: Demwave uenemr corpomnon Law and any umuauons In the seminal: or moorporauon or was. byiawx re\aImg lo ac1IDn reqmrad In D: appmved oy rne stuckhaldals or by me nmslanamg sham ,nno own... ond lﬂlivs Mm: corpoulion man no nunanod ano on aorwrm pawln smu no exnrclud by or under mo dlndlon of mo soon: or Dinnmrs “ 44. D argued Ihallhalexecuuvs power m rlems 5 and 12 of we Board's Wnllen consem are subject \|o me dunes and responsmmuas or dnecmrs stipulated m secnon 213 onne Ma\aysIan Companies Am zurs and me ﬁduciary dunes owed by a dwreclor to me company And that F2. as me can 0! ma Company. ws expeded to acl m good [arm and In me best mleves\| :2! ma company. D pomled out that the company has a loop» Ma\ay n address 0! opelalmn at No 15-17. Ahla Hpnzon, Lomng Keyora, 11200 Tamung aungsn, Pulau Pmang. Mawaysra, Accurdmgw, D submmed mat the Company and us dvrecmrs are suoyecn \a me cornpames Am 2015 0! Maxaysra. 45 However, D nad pravrously sand that me company “has no ousrnass opclatrons /17 Malaysia" This was In the comexl nl D's appuoauon fur secumylorcosls yrde Enclusure 7 dated 6 7 2022 Enclosure 7 was made under order 23 Me 1 of the Rmes or com 2012 In Enclosure 1, D requested secumy «or costs m ma sum a(RM160,0DD(a1 RMau.uoo lor each Plamum. The grounds or me appnoauon slated m Encbsure 7 reads’ “r) The 1“ Plarnﬁﬂis a rare :1 company ; H) aom Plamrms are nclordman/y rasrdard rn Malaysra, ) Born Prarnzms nave no assets nu ma /urrsdlclmn, M The 1-4 Plaml/II company has no busrness opelatrons rn Malaysia," Inordemauy, Enclosure 7 was aumuad m pan wnere ma company (but not P2) was ordered m deposn a sum or RM5D,000 ‘mm ooun. 46. The (act al the mailer S that the Company is a lcrexgn company inoorporamd m the Stale cf Delaware m the Umled Sfales M America, As far as I can tell‘ Ihe Company has not been regwslered m Malaysia as 8 foreign company under semen 552, Dnvxsxorn (Forewgn Companies). Pan srn ﬂAA1\|Aua7us3gv\v\pVvDn 4 «nu. s.n.r nmhnrwm o. u... w my r... or1mn.HIy mm: dnuumnl y.. mono om V 0! me Cumpames AC1 2016 As such, \ am not convmoed that the Company and Ms directors are governed by me Compames Acl 2015 M Maﬂaysia, 47. Be lhal as K may, on the vaﬂsy I accept that lhe wimdrawal of the cmnpanya cums by P2 was not beneﬁcial co me Company The wulhdrawal ol mnas nas left the Company wunau: anougn money to cum us pmmwse \|u me backers Dr to pay us crednors. The ellscl on the Company was cﬂppllng Cleaﬁy, the sand wnhdrawal M {undl has adversely nnpameu me company 43. Tna aymanoe show that P2 was mo(Iva\|ed by the retrieval or nis came! and ma rauucnon ol ma ﬁnancial nsks wnen he zmnsvenec me Company's funds to rnmsaw. (:7 In. sum L11 usswsnaan wulhdmwn by P2 cmnpnsaa ms malm «or ms loan sum cl ussuso can And usssoo as rewmhursemenl ca ms aayanom «na Camvanv Var Feoebook advemsemenlsy tn) The wIIhdvawa\ 04 mo company: tuna; .\| an ml\|erIa\ Mme wns In Dre— nnnn ms anucnum lax ay ma Malnysmn govemmem an repalnamn av [mogul «unas. wmch was In be Lake elven ham 1 1 21122 And unncn lax wwuld nama be home hyF2 (n) In Ina Ansvmv \|o uuswnn 11 m In: wnnass naumunuws PW H. P2 aam. amuvvgn other unngs, may he had wllhdmwn me bun sum m avusd (be I:aD<LII mmnm aver vecmnamn av me mnaau lmm vmemn swrces “ Funhen Ins Deiundam vequsmsc 1“ PVIMIIK) aanupnnys accounl in be mama unlll nn fullhlr nnhce desmle the Dehndam bang my lwara mm In: wwmdrawalalHSS150y90l) hum ma mmpnny mmunl in me was repaymem ov mans m aymd slnclzrcanwm cnmvm measures taken nyms Malays-an wwennnem ' (H) M m amau dated 22 :2 2u21 nuns aw p-Imgriph. P2 amsssxy sand mat ht wnnunsw the man sum in Even ms nnnnnam (an an the an nun. Rmgglﬂmm vnnagn snmces ’As you have namvuuy named om I have naa my mum! uanup bans repay: ms nas naupenea new to avwd slnclar uanax oontvol measures‘ mummy oanngn tvanslar lax. hemg nnpasaa m Mahyma on 1-‘ .lanuaIY zuzz‘ M In ma um: emml daled 2212 24721 at me am payaurapm P2 nan arm prepnnng I1-we nnanaax Overvrevw 2: :2 2021 ur ma company, wncludad an nnmznsaavuslgvxvwnvpnn 5 «nu. Snr1I\nauhnrw\HI>e u... a my .. anmnauly mum: ﬂnuamnl vn .nnna v-ma! tnet the Company's pmspects were hteak AM rte ota notwam Ia ueet tne Hsk oi m:\| bang nble In remverthe kzan sum Atsat tn tne nnettstat Lwevvlsw enu tn esseestng out eyetatt ettuutten, I see mote ttnanctal mk utttn I setetyem wttttng to near- 49. In any case, the striclercapttal contra! measures Cﬂlltd notjustlty F2‘S repayment at the teens at ute ntetenet ttnte. As the tepetnetten at tetetgn Iurtds wllt cnnttnue to be exempted lrom tax for another 5 years Imtlt 31 12.2025. On thts point‘ D quoted an extract lmrn DelotIIe's arltcle entitled "GutdeIIrtes Issued on Tax Treatment 0\| Foreign Souvce lncume tecetueu in Metayeta' ’Hvwevev, tuttewtnu ttte gaxalte at the tnmme tett tsxempttetty (No 5) meet 2u22 [P UtA)234/2\|122]aII¢tlI5\|lImme Ynx tExemphon) (No 5) otaet zazz [F u up zztstzuzztt eentttn FSI notetgn mules tooomel tucetwee Dy eettetn cetegattee ultax testuents tn Meteysta wttt ourtttvtustu he exempled ttent tax II)! annlhsv 5 years uttttt at Decsmhav2D25[Ia1arta uutsueetewen dated 21] tuty 2n22t These orders pmvlas poms stenttenttens en mttett Meteyeten tax tumem may quamy not an meeme tax ettemutten and cnr\dI\|1ons tttat am eputtuztte lar en exemptten- ‘rm 2" Pleitttin tuitttanw mom tnottoy man rte Icnl the cotttpuny so. The Ptetnttrts deny D‘s euetment that me tenet sum et usxtsuteou taken by P2 Is mote tnen me sum he rtea tent the Company Eu! when tetettea to the llst ot deposits made by him to me compattys amount at Mercury senk, P2 admllted under cmss-examination that he had nteue e tetet ofUS$143,227 onty '0 New t tetet to sunate 52‘ at page ssa ms ts ttte rewrd L71 tne lumi depostted by you tn tn. mmp.nny‘s awounl at Mammy Bank, Isn‘\| ttw ceute you teueut ute page numDeVD\|ease7 veg. 550 Bundle 32 met us carnal suny, you ate answering my uuestten Ihls ts ttte record at the sums nsnosttsd ztyyeu tn tne mmpartys eeeeunt an Mercury Bank That te eeneett yes ms reccm shows met tne eetuet ammmt deoostted by you tn ttt. mmnany‘s accounl at Mercury Bank ts enty USS143,227tsrt‘1tl" A ves, and man s e teuen hr I\|' ct) o>o)- 51. tn his answer ll) Questtort 22 ol the Ptamtttts‘ Wttness Statement (WS PW t). P2 claims that he was “retmDursed' the sum at US36,B43, which eempneee 'appmved expendttures" from the wtet loan sum et US515D,0UD. stu ﬂM1lAD:7LlS3wVMpVvDG ‘° «utt. s.n.t mmhnrwm be u... M my st. tnttnntty stttt. dnuumnt VI nF\uNa Wm! ‘‘I leaned me I“ r-lainim a torai ol USD15n,lXw l was relmbulsed u5Ds,s43 in apimwea expenailuras, and lrie naianaa el usDu:H57 was rerrrmea Io eur eenip-ny aewunl, a total 0! USDWSDJFDU equwalsm re the loan amerrnl the aerarls er mlmbursemem M avnmved exnemllure el mine lrrai I Mve paid on beM1lolIne1"Plalmmcarl be leuna aIpg1m—1HCABC—V1 “ 52 Al all material limes, P2 had held our to D and Jesslca trial he had lent a late: sum el US$15ﬂ,CIUD. witneul lnlomllrlg them trial he had set all a surri el US$S,B43 agarnsl me letal lean sum. The Plslnllﬂs have lslled to slww any evidence rhal rhe aeuuelien of lire sum of usssma was approved try the Euard er Dlvec1ors (cl enable ll in he called “appmved expenditura“ or ltiat the Board 0! Direclurs had knowledge that P2 was sening all the sum cl ussaaaa ag nsl lrie lotel loan surrr Flmherr F'2's payment to hrrnsetllar his claims, wrlrraut the Board ol Drrecwrs approval lndlcales lnat he has been dealing with the cernpenys lunas es rl lhey were his own Because he has nm glverl an aeeeunt ol such eeelrnge lo the Board at nrreclers. 53 I accept that by Irarlslerring out me total sum of US$15D,90G Io hlrnsell, P2 had taken more ltian man he had lenl lhe Company The delails cl payment ol the “appmved experiarlures' have only surfaced because or the aelion herein. l do not lina it to tie credible for the lollowing reasons: tel There is ne evlderlcelerldeled ey ine l>lnlnlrlls mar >2 me made a rerruesl oraernana lorlne return eltne loan sum errhe-approved eXDEHl1ﬂ\|lM5'.‘H his answer \|u oueslron 2o ollrie Flalvmlli wnness slalernem tws l=w Hr i=2 lefsrstulha pluvlilonforlhl leans lo es relunrea on usrnana Buﬂallon In nmvlde iny evldence rrrar such damind was made eerere ne wrrlrurew lne xzm sum oz: wrial were lne ananaenienls an rne advance loan to me 1" Plalrllﬂf‘ A The Rupaymml ul Lean ‘Bunuwel will pay back iris amount at lnrs rrele. rr-clue g the rinanes wargsr en tire annlvusary oi this lean agreenren nr‘PreniymenlL11Lnan Eomwwerhnsme nghl re pay back lne wnele arneunl ar any llnre ll aenewer pays neleie tiine Lenderwtll relrrna rrre uneemea rrnanee charge are slated assay In me Loan Aareemenls tn) rns svl ml 471 in. ‘appvovod akpsndltulsf lgalnil in. rural iaan sum er ussrsame V! net pieaded ey (Ive nainrirrs Nul ll ll merlmned in any er rne eanrenrrserrrreeusrleerrnrenrs The PlnlrlllKs' amempl re set err Ihe sun. al me ‘avhmved exverldllures‘ appears re he an anenhaughl in older la e><D\alrl Irle shoﬂ Daymerll er rhe mlal loan sum srn nﬂﬁaznsu-vuslgvlvlwvnn " «nu. s.n.i luvlhnrwm .. u... in vsﬂy r... erwlriullly MIMI ﬂnuavlml vn .nune mar 54. in lne premises. I am salisned lnai P2‘s nansler ol lne iaial sum cl US$15U,9DU lroni rlie compariys lurlds lo sell is a iraudulenl am, as delined earlier. ll is nolaole lnai even aﬂer naiiing nolice oi me 1‘ Pllhllcahon. F2 nas noi al any lime given any assurance lnai lie would not lake oul more money iiom lne Company's panli aocounl or inai he would return lne money lake" by nim 55 ’ regard lo D's plea ol iusiilicaiion, ii is my liriuing inai D nae proveninaiilie impugned slalerrienl vegardlng F2 in lne 1" Pub calion is Irue. ln respecl cl lne company, lnere is noining in lne 1“ Punlicaliori lo casl any aspersion againal lne company Nanylhlng, lne company is a victim oi F2‘: wrongliil aclion As sucn, lne company has no basis lor a claim lor libel against D arising from lne 1-‘ Puollcalioii. “Ia Loan Aguumenls Ira nm unontonaabla undur (VII uloiiiiyleriilers Act 1951 55 aelcre leaving lne 1“ Publicalloii, l will deal wiln D‘s coiiienlion lnal lne loans lroni P2 lo ine company are egal nioneylending lransacliona. D suomiued lnai all me Lean Agreemenis are illegal and rioi enlorooanlei lnerelore P2 is non enlilled to recover lne loans lroni lne company 57 According lo D, wnen F2 lenl lne money lo me company, ne was already living in Malaysia All lne 5 Loan Agreerrienis were signed by F2 wliilsl in Malaysia This makes all lne Loan Agveemems suoiecl lo lne Moileyleniiera M11951 of Malaysia D eubmined lnal lne loans lrom P2 lo ine company are illegal nioiieylenoing li-ansaclions wnicn lall wllhln lrle purview of lne said Acl As P2 is an unlicensed morieyleniler wno carries on me ousinesi. M moneylenuirlg I disagree. 58. Flrs\|Iy, as irienlioned earlier in lne context oi D's applicailon lor secunly lor oosls, D nail oonoeded that the company nes no assels and no business uperallone in Malaysia. The corrioariyi. aoaouni, inio wnicli lne loans lroiri P2 were depcslledi is wiin Mercury Bank in lne United slaies ol America in umer words. lne loans occurred oulside lne iunsoioiion o1 Malaysia Tne loans were paid in a Foreign company and inlo an ollsnore bank aooounl in lne Unlled slales of America. As such. I take lne yiew lnal lne loans nol «axe place in Malaysia and is rioi caugni by lne Malaysian Morieyleiiders Acl l95l. 59 Secondly‘ me loan lrom P2 to lne company is a dlreclnfs adyanoe. l do noi oonsider FZ lo oe a rnorieyleiider, nor lne loan lroni nini lo lne company io be a nioneylenairig iraiisaclion, wilnin lne amoii uf ine ni ﬂl5a\|Au:7LlS3ﬁVlVVvVvDG “ “None s.ii.i nuvlhnrwlll a. ii... a yaw i... nﬂilnnllly MVMI dnuuvlnnl y.. nFluNG WVM Moneyteriders Act 1951 . Aiter att the cettatmretive t=ro[ect Letter ot Intent dated 27 7.2020 stated that F2 woutd . “(und the Pro]sc1“ in other words] it was eentemptated by the panies that F2 wautd previde iundtrig (in this case, the teams] to the ccnipany so To lend money is not the same thing as to carry on the business of inoneytending (see the Prtvy counett case e1 chow voong Hang y Choong Fah Rubber Menu/actery [1959] t MLPA 447: [1950] t ms 171 [1952] 1 MLJ 74]. The Meneytendere Act 1951 is not designed to inyattdate every single rndrieytending transaction per se. it is nnly apptieabte to a teriderwho is carrying on the business ufmcineylendtng as a tiusiness it is not targeted at moneytending but rather the rrieneytenders (See the Federet coun cases oi veep Moat‘ v chu Chin Hus A Or: [t9eo]1 MLRA 439; [19su]1 ms 169, [1951] t MLJ14 and Ngut MU! Khtrt & Aridr V sriiespre Elms & company Ltd [1919] 1 MLRA 313, [1979] 1 LNS so‘ [1930] 2 MLJ 9; 51 The company was a new setup Even oetcre the inception at the company. the parties had agreed that P2 woutd be respunsihte tc pruvtde the ﬁnancial means ot the contvaru/s operational costs Towards this end. the names had entered into the Loan Agreements D signed 3 oi the Loan Agreements (the ones dated 19.11 2020. 11.1.2021 and 15 3 2021] an taehatt at the Company Having done so, it would be inequttable [or D to new turn amund and chattenge the Loan Agreements as being unenioreeahte tn the clvcumstanoes, the initiat Working capitat provided by F2 to the company cannct be ccnstnied as tttegat mortaylsndtng. 52 Thtrdty, it is neeessary to show some degree d1 system and centinuity in order to establtsh that P2 is 8 inoneytender withrn the meaning of the Meneytenders Act 1951 Granted that here there were 5 toens and 5 Loan Agreemems. Eu\| they were at given to the same peredn t.e the company. And puisuant to the understanding that P2 win prowde tundirig to the Company So this is reatty a case where the expected tundtng was provided by P2 to the company through separate instalments and at various stages, instead 0! all at once 1 do not see any pattern ct marteylendtrtg being carried out by P2 is: Here, 122 nevev advenised or announced or held htmeett out in arty way as carrying an the [witness ct mcneytending (See the deﬁnition oi -mcrieylender in section 2 oi the Mcneytenders Act 1951 ). t ain satistied that P2 is not a meneytender and dues not carry on the business of rneneytending as envtsaged under the Mdneytenders Act 1951 IN ﬂN1Lsu:7LlS31:VtVtpVvDG ‘° «rt... s.n.t luvthnrwttt be u... In my the nﬂﬂtnnttly um. dnuavtml vn nFtuNa v-mat 64 II S noteworthy that me oetenoe 01 nttegat moneyiendirtg was never raised by D in me oonespondences excnangea oetween tne names at tne Itme wnen me 1-‘ Puhltcaltan was made Thts datenoe was onty ratsed hr tne ﬁrsl tune m D’: sct\|totlors' repty totne F\atnttffs' nmtoeoldernartd dated 21.12022. Thts suggest mat at the palm ot Ihe 1" Fubltcatton, the auegatton ot tllegal monaytenomo was not in D5 mmdset He never ouesnoneo P2 on me purponeo megsttty ot lhe loans. D was only conoernoo about me wimorawat at tne Company‘s ltmds wtlhoul autnonsatton lmm the Euard ol Dtreotors. wnten, WV ' mmo. nas jeapardtzsd the sproutyt=od pnqect am he wanted an explanation «om F2 Thu 2''‘ Publication 65. I new mm to me 2"“ Pubhnaﬁon Tne 2"“ Pubhcanon was pubtisneo on 7.4 2022 wnen 0 pos\|sd tt on the Ktckslzrler page 0u\| ottne whole 2"“ Pubhcaltort, the Ptatnttus take tssue wttn the iottowtng paragrapn only The oyarau onssat-n.on M cur team was a rexull ov a awenence ov opunons retateo to $150,900 hetng lrans1erred tnam lm camoanys us hank acnaunt In the can-s oensonat Mzlaystan bank amount on December 2:‘ ZDZ1 The balance ten m the awoum was not enouon Ia lulrtH pteoges ov pay nu\|M2\|ndtng trwmces Attnougn Jessica an: r yenememty ahpeoled to tns tnsnsven ot money, me can John Cliux xonosteo woo nalttsad In mum me money to tns company so tt \5 notahte tnat the Platntirts oo nunake tssue mm the ves\| owns 2” Fubllcaltort The Flalnhﬂs‘ acceptance at the rest at the 2"“ Pubhcalmn LS gnmoant as tne oontents Iheretrt ave cnnﬂrrnalvort ot tne Irulh ot a range bans ot as defense. 57 The thud pavagraph ot me 2"” Fubhcalton states mat D and Jesstca are unable to access tne lndregago account after thetr removal trom the company taut yet me updates on tt owes the irnpresstnn tnat there Is stttt a team womng on me Spr\)u\|yPod protect me lttdtegogo accaunt .5 uwned oy Ihe cso 0! sonouyeoa, tna Alta! our lenntnahon fvom the company. Jessta and n have been removed a: oousaonsons Mme campatgn mereiars, we unnnl laces: n or create updatu Evin moan IM Ianattani In mu an two mm. suoo-sunatu... a. son . u.n. behind nu wot-ct, Ind our plcluns and namu in sun an Ihe cnmpnlgn o... , Jnnlnl . a 1 na nu longer purl at tn. sprout-/Pen campatgnsuvv ellher otaaonn since the end M2021 - sm ﬂM1IAt1:7uS3wvtv\vVvDG 2" «mm. s.n.n nuvthnrwm a. o... w my n... onnnnn mm: dnuumnl wa artum v-mat Company's bank account was sen\| at 3:16 pm on 22 12.2021 «o D and Jsssvca. n am not gwe any mducahon mac P2 would be mlurmng me said nmds or man he wamd na\| he cakmg out more mnus m the rumre As P2 mo nol explain ms sam aclmn at the material lime despvls D's eﬂons to conv.ac1 mm, D Mule 10 Mercury Bank on 22122o21 at 144 pm Io wllhhmd \|he sawd payments made to F2 lvcm the Company's bank account D's sawd email was rejeded Dy Memury Bank as K was sent from ms personax ernau awaum. and no: me uusuness email address m me reoards o4 Mercury Bank 10 D senl am we same man agam an 23 12 2021 at 12 17 pm {ram ms busmess ernau ao1>cun\| D's sewd emaﬂ us me 1-‘ Puh\|iI:-xlion cumoxaunaa 0! by me Pxannxins. It reads- ‘From Svrmm/Po«‘l—Dan>eI Sam 2: uacunosrzuzc 12:7 To Iubsu:aI@msrcury cam‘ Murcury Sumacl Atmunlm mnmzw URGENY R: acowm no ssoumzaa DeivSIv. msase wnhhnld vavmenls made on Deoemhev 2¢s« by our cso John Woe 1:: ms parional accoum mm vaymenls ave lvauculsnl ano ws wﬂl seek usgax swan asiamsl John was me payments were made yesleninyan Deeemberzt me amounts are 5 me can and s soasnu Swncevsm nana: Schuvm Fmmaev a. may Desxgn Oﬂxoer SDmu\|yPod“ 11 Apparenuy D heheved man ms mIemalIona\ money uansver cransacnon would take several days to be enacted. However, D was unsuccesslul m ms attempt to map me sam payments to P2 12 D wroue \|o P2 via Slack on 2312 2021 at 12 57 pm lhal notice w\H be gwen Io Indlegogo to shut down me Ccmpam/5 campaign As there are Insufﬁuenl funds Ia star! producuan olSpwulyFod and to mum the promise made by me Founders D had wnuen 3 am ﬂM:\|.sua7us3s:Vw\pVvDn «mm. s.nn lunhnrwm .. U... a mm s. nrW\n\|U\|y mum: ﬂnuamnl y. mum Wm! ea The P\amMfs' appepranaa oH.l1eAhrm paragraph afme 2"“ Fuhlrcahan rs an ad slun a1 me rrrrnr puns avermems rn me srarerrrenr at Delerrpe ar paragraphs 15 M015 7 thereof Vn panicular, paragraphs 15 1 and 15 4 or me Deverrce meads the reasons why D was ccmpeued Io pubhsh me 2"“ Prrplrcarron. “:5 NH: Derenaanr was aornpeuep up nuhhsh rne sara upaare to preserve nrs rnreamy anu Kauulahon as me 22-1 Plamhﬂ was srru rrsrnc me pt-rrar uronprrn or ‘we’ In Mr wsw-as on ms company s eanrpa-pr. paps anrrmrpn ms Dafendam and Ms Jumca Fradonu nan bow remrma hum rna company by me 2"-1 Plamlm smc: rne ena ar Deuembzv mm The 2~ m.rnrrwa prm an rnaregpga an 2 remrary 2n22 rs reprrrarrcea as ram: 15 4 As we Delendanl was unahle to remove ms nameand prrorpqraprr Drum ma reravarrn Dave on lnmewqn ar me rnarsrranrrrre, he had no uwon pm to port ma 2- wpprrcarron 50 man the back!‘ would not b: undv rna rmprmron mar ns was slrll mvulved rrr rne mrlnagemenl nﬂhe Company :5 5 n was nmy on 2: May 2022 mar me Darenaanrs name was remnved «ram me camparprr vane cl SwI7n1yFod on Imreaupo arm. on a June 2022 ms vmnnuravh arms an-naan: and ms psrwrrar stalamant were vamoved lrom me up rzmP¢’§" page 15 a aerara rne posrrrra ar Ihe 2m Publrcnlmn ma due ra me wrpnarpr mpressran Elven by the 2p rrrarnrrrrs Posts, mere were angry backers who were arreprrna (hewoummami arar: ma Founders as may rm nor nrmrrnar ma nsrsnaanr and M: Fvaoano nap been rernrma «ran. rn. Campavry 15 1 The Defendnm has been asked byahackerﬂhetme nerenaanmraa smnen me campanys mane’)/' 69 As «or me Impugned paragraph, 1 see no aevarrrarory imprrrarron in r: as me oorrcerrr rs prrrery a statement oHac1. When asked under cross- arramrnarrarr to pom! arrcwnrcn words rrr ma impugned paragraph were not cams, F2 slmggled to up so. The words “drﬂerenoe p1pprmorrs- n are rmpugnea paragraprr, to my mind, rs a sraremanr pr raar As ll true that — "The overau urssulurrurr of [me Founders] team was a resuu a1 a aruererrpe or opirrrorrs velaled up $150,900 berng lranslerred lwm the comnarv/s us bank scmuru to me cecrs persona! Malaysran bank aceorrnr on December 21. 2021“ 70. Actually, rr was tactful of D to describe rna arspms among are names regardrng P2's wrrrrarawan at me Company‘: lunds, as a “difference :2! oprnrorrs' The arpromarrc tone 0! the 2“ Publicacrprr does not suppon me P1ainm1s' claim 0! rrralrpe against D After complaining about me impugned snr nnM1\|.sua7us3gvrv\pVpDn 2‘ “Nppe s.n.r runparwm r. p... a my .. anrrnnrrr mum: aaa.n.nr VI .rrrrna v-ma! words in me 1= Pubhcsllon, u was ramer Ironldor me Plainhﬁslo quesuorr D (or ommmg one word '!rauduIenc' in me 2"’ Puhlrcarion. 71. nunrrg reexaminauon. D exmawned ms armssron ahhe words 'iraud' or 'vrauduIem' In the 2"“ Publrcauorr. An Nuwr n nusr «-2 me second puhhcalmn at Bumﬂe :21 page 13 n was wggeued In ywu man you n you unra aanam nnara was no «raud. ywu wmﬂd have armouncsc u m we wand In me second puauruuan wny me you drsaureew A I wanned m exercise respunsrpxe pnumallsm mars umyx wanred to urn: me use puns word: -rraud- ar ‘lvaudmen ‘unly rvn was absolmmy nsusslnry Bul n he edruen aims second vublsulmn. n ma nuloonsIdarI\| necessary ra menmn (hose wows‘ 72 Vn any case. 1 see no defamatory rmpuumon m me pnrase -dmerence or dprmans: P2‘s (aﬂure up rdenmy words omer man “dnﬂsrence 01 opvuuns" wmch were not vans m ma 2'” Pubhcatxanr Is an adrmssron man the res\| do me rmpugrred paragraph are vans and maretcrer lme Accordmgly, «mm me rmpugned paragraph mean, we Ioupwrng statements are !ac\|s- The bamnoe Veﬂ In the account was nnl enough to iulﬂll pledges or pay ou\|standing mvorees" As weu as 'A\\|hough Jessica and I vshemenﬂy u\|>1ecled to me Iransler ul maney, the CEO John craua Kungsled Woo refused to remm the money in ma aampanyr 73. Prenused an the almve, \ am satisﬁed mm the PVSVHMVS have Valled m prove mar me am pubnaaupn rs davarnacory. They have In fact. (aci\|ly admilled thal other than the phrase‘ “dmerenee of upInIunS'r the rest 01 me impugned paragrapn rs fauna! 74. Ii \ am wrung apeuer n s also my ﬁn Ing mar nne delence or nuamrad prwuege rs auauaple to D \n we present case A prwneged oeeasron is me where the person wrra makes a commumcaliun has an Inleresl or a du\|y uagax, social or mpran up make u to me person up whom u Is made And me peraan up wrrom m was made has a oorrapundmg rnxerasr or duly tn reaerua rt. Tms reeiprpeny rs essenuau [See me Hausa c! Lords case of Adam v ward [1917] AC we at 334). 75 \n Fmancisl /rrlorrnanon Services v Hap sauen H]./anan [2012] MLJU 1751‘ lhe Fatima! coun ouihrved ma mndnmns cor quamred pvivxlegs: 1171 rrr. mndrlrans re; quarmaa pnvtlagu Ia anse as a dsrsm was lard out rang agp m Toogood v SpymIg[V834]1 cw R 191 and rrorn mrs passage puaarpn sru ﬂM:IAua7us3gV\v\pVvDn 1? «war. s.n.r mmhnrwm rs. med w my r... nrW\rrnH\|y mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ .nuue war Parke‘: wmcll nu hurl mamaaau Llndloy L ./ m Stuart r/Ball [1291] 2 on ;m as havlng ‘been lvaauerllly quatad, and always mm appmvnl “ That lllusrrbus paasage spssklng all/as publication afslalsmenls false In (sol and lnlurlou: to ma Lwaraclsr olanolner name we law eoneuers sum puolcallon at mallueus urllass ll ls ralrly mud: w a person in me dlsrhlrvu alum! nublic erlmvm -iuly. wmmu low at rmxrll, nr in MI candad 1:} his awn . lirs. in mm»: wllun his innmst is concamtd /rl such cases me occaslon prevent: me mfsmnce ol malice, which me law draws from urlaumorlzed mmmunlcallm, and allows a aualmea «elem dspendmv on lhs absence av actual mam V fa/"Y warranted by any reasonable octznorl cl oxlgoncy and Ilorlcslly mads, sum oomrwmcallonx ma pm:-ma an ln. common eonuemnee and wenm cl wuafv. unamelaw has nolmnndcdmﬁﬂgﬁlfomalelhum mm. unynnrmw /lmu: - 76 Duamled pnvllsge ls aﬂorded \|o muse who maxe tielamalory slalemsnls ln me dlscharge cl some publlc or prlvale duty, wnemer legal or moral, W In lhe wnducl ml men awn anaws, In maliars where mew MIEIESI is euncemed Em anly it me pubhcallun derived frum llgm and honest motives 77. ln Da!o'Dr Low Bl‘n Tick v Daluk Chang Tho Chm and other appeals [2017] 5 MLJ 41:, Ihe Federal ceun held lhal me aelenoe VS no\| available II me delenaanl has been actuated by mahcs or has used Ihe aoaaslon «or some lndlrscl or wrong mauve The Federal Court sald (at page 435) -155; mu Dmnq (sue dslunce aluueme-1 Dﬂvlloge IS not muscle N I! IS elm-m that 5 dslsrldanl has been actuated uy actual or express mallce .1 line has usea Me occasion Var some malreel oi wvong mm ln Raysl Aauarrum a Summer and Winter Garden Soclely v Parklrlsoﬁ (1992) 1 as 43 Lam L./ sale Nu! only must me occulon mm m. plivillql, but the accasomv must be made use olbana we and mlmuu mallcs The dsfsndanl I! an/y srvmled :9 ma Dmtecllon olrha wlvlléve «me use: ms occaslon In accordance wlm the purpose far wmcll ms occaslm zloss Na ls not eumllm to ma Plulsctlon ov me Pﬂwleya W19 use me accaslon for same Vldlrscl 0! wrong molm ~ 73 Qualiﬁed pnvilege depends on Ihe oocaslon upon which me commumcallon >5 made. and not the cnmmunlcallon mu, The communlcallon musl be made m Dursuarme av a duty or an a mailer m whlch [here was a common lnlsrest H1 the pany maklng and he party rsoslvlng n Whether an nccaslan .s s prwllegsd accasmn depends on me circumstances of each case, me nalure at me mlmmamn and me relation of speakev and reel n\| In or Low (sum). the Fedeval Cowl said (a\ nage 433)‘ em ﬂﬁqlsu-7uS3gVlvlvVvDG 23 «mu. Smul luvlhnrwm .. u... u my u. nﬂmnnﬂly mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! ‘[A6] lluawhd privihgi depends on in. oncllinn upon wnicn in. commumc: an is mldc, and not me communlcltlnn nserr A qushlled pnmg. occasion rs an oeeasian whirl in. person wna inms . cummunicaﬂolv has an Vntvvstarl duty, leg , soeiaiorinorni la make It to me pevsan to whom it I! made, and in. pinion In vtllnm It is so made Ins - covvesponding inktrlsr or duty tn Nevin it rune communication were made M pursuance Ufa duiy at an a minor in wnim mare was a cnmmizn lnruur in the anny maklny and ma pnnyncelvlnv It me Lwccasvon rs sard 10 my one oi quairm pnmgs wheihsr an occasion is s prrwiegad oncasion depends on the ercumsrenees oleabh case‘ are nature dune riiarrnamn and me relation or xplnkzr end mcwient, U is ror ihsnidge aione Ia dettrmini as e mairer ol/aw wnemer me ocvzsion II pnwlcgud V 79 I am saiieiied «ha: D has discharged his burden oi proving ma deienee of quahﬂed pmniege. Both the 1* and 2" Publicanons were pumished under quahﬂsd pnuuege 50 In regardIo\he1“PubIIoahon. D was oumpeHed to issue the subiecl email to Mercury Bank. Because as 5 direclor of ms Company, D was under a legal and moral dmy lo prmeci the assets 0! the Company and be aeeduniame lo me backers by «axing uigeni aclron to slap me \|rans1ev oi ins comaanys «ends in P2 Mercury Bank had a cuvresponding iegai and mum‘ duly \|o receive lhe 1‘ Publication AS \\| has a duly and mleresl in pievennng any pany iron. abusing its iaemnes nor his own gains and to me detriment ul ins eeaouni noider 31 win regard mine 2"” Publication, D was compeHed in issue «he Same because he was under a soeiai and meiai duly lo Inlorm the bankers concerning the slams dune Spr0u(yPod plqacl And when had happened to ihe cornpanys money. The backers had a corresponding inieresi to receive me 2"‘ Pubhcalion as they had conlnbmad \|o ihs company's iunde and were expeciing ihe Company lo fulﬁl us promise in deiiuer Sprau\|yPod unns It can be seen irom me ihread oi comments on Kickslarler than many backers were upset ihai mere were no updates seidis the 7'" Pubhcahon 32 ln hum pumioanons, D‘s m for pubhsmng lhe impugnsd words was bona fide He was discharging his duty as a director by trying to praieci me Cumpany‘s asseis and be aeoouniame to «he backers I am sausried ihai D has not used me occasion lor any indirect or wrong monve. Thus, I conclude ihai me deienee of duaimed pmniege VS aiioided H: D in me insiani ease No Malice In daioai the dofnuco oi Qunliﬁod Privilege srn ﬂM1IAu:7LiS:IwVMvVvDG 2‘ «we. s.n.i nmhnrwm e. u... e my r... ennnn-y mm: dnuumnl n. mum WM as For cprnplaaanasa. i see no malice on irre pan 01 0 Which would otherwise deieal his aaianae nf quallﬁed privilege. 34 in Raul) Australian Gold Mlmrlg surr Bhd (lh credrlors' V0/unlary liquidation) v Hue Shleh Lee [2019] 3 MLJ 720‘ the Federal Conn interpreted malice as being reckless or acling imarilmnally wiihoul ]iAS( cause or excuse. The Federal Courl said (al page me) 1401 ‘Make’ naa been Mil:/ally rrrlarpralaa by lrra owns as parrrg ruck/:5: imnaaaorraara, prejudwv wunialrbellelm ma lrum p/lrra stlstvmsnl ‘MaVlm'may pa astabllsrlad by srramrg my! my delerldant um rm! behellrl ma mm olwhal rra uriaraa 14:; A: deﬁned m the 050901’: Carlmss D/clmnary mrr 54) Im word ma/lu‘ moans‘ W—wlN or svrl motive persuna! split or lIl—wll/ aarr-omrraa cal/ad szlusl rrrarrae, axprass ma/lu or rualra. in Inc! 142; /n law an ac: ra mallcibus rmarra mlervllorlal/y wimnul1us1 aausa ov mm sa larrg aa a person oellem m (ha [mm or wrral rr. says am Is no! ruxlosx. ‘malice’ cannot be rnrarrea from in. lac! mai ma aural ra unreasonable, Plsllldloed cl unfair‘ as In my opmiun, D was not ac1ua\|ed py malice He had an rionesl belief in me lruirr olwrrai he Sal in me 1-‘ and 2"“ Puhliaalmns. Nolmng In me said puplicalrorrs indicate that me Plainllﬁs were a \|arge\| of an improper mollve. I am al ms Dplnlon max D was noi reckless in making ma 1-‘ and 2"“ Puplicalrona. He and rum make them Wﬂhoul Just cause or excuse He was not monva\|sd by illwlll There was no lnlenuon lo verui personal spile agamsi ma Plalnllﬂs. In srmn, no rnallpe on his pan cl D urulavnul ' lnrllrnmzl with nrade as under me claim oi unlawful inierlererwe wllh trade, paragraphs 1810 20 Mme slalsrnenl 01 claim pleaded IE ma Delendanlhasaclzd in malama pylrrlerverinp wnhme lawml Dunn»: aovalis an me vi Flalrlllﬂ wnrr me sale IMBMVOII la lnluu ma w PLlmml's business and reoulallmr, in wmari al an mauvlal mm. in. D-4end.In\|knnws that ma 1" maimm waa only opemllng a ma hank nccmml man was malnialnsd with Mammy Bank where lhe ongoing and iipmrmrip crawaipnaing exercise mu la he mamellaa (mouuh unis bank account 19 me oeranaam knew Ihanhe publlcamn onria aloramamranaa ualamaipry slzlemenls wama lmpacl ma cladlblllly pl ma P\amllW: and la: la me closure in bank acwum by the Bank mm. will aliacmely Weveul me lzlairnm hem rsulvllvg mamaa cram plaagers ind r or arawalunaipg am nﬂﬁqlsu-7uS3gVlvlpVvDG *5 “Nana a.n.i luvlhnrwm a. HIGH a my a. nﬂmnnllly MIMI ﬂnuavlml VI arlulia aw emu min then nusmaaa The oareaaan: knew me mam Manna! snumes nuns overinon and axpandmu elme an P\a\nml was aama «mm me punnc ov cvvwdluldlrug exermse and aaumm omev sources as: Aa a mun at me rmaauanra Imeﬂerenoe aa Wluslvﬂed shave. me Bank had eaasea to close we 1“ P\am\|M‘s max aaaaum and me natural consequences lharwl ma caused has 04 husmess uppollunw aau names to ma 1“ Flmmﬂfs mveslmenl valuawm when eaamaa Var Miner Vundmg ma damage and lossesoccumanmme mamuna a Dsvvmnem and wvepnrable wn name m.em»a gmdan opponumly M nuamess had seemed iorevev’ 57. Vn paragraph 19 of me S\|a\|emem at claum, me Phsxntwlfs blame me closure at lhe company's bank awcunl on Us “publication av ma amemanxuoned defamalury stalemens" Hawsvsr‘ wt Is rm possume that the unsure of me bank accoum on 6 1 2022 coma he annbmea to me 2"‘ Publiuallnn, which was made 3 mcnms later on 7 42022 as A pevson who .s carrying an a lav/M (rade has a ngh\| to he nmcauea llom any unlawlm interference wun u. The essence ul melon is del\|bera\|e mcerverence with lhe puauws mleresls by un\awM means The Intention to Iruure musl be a cunmbulmg cause or me plslnl s wuss (see me High cam cases 01 Worldwide Rota was Sdn Bhd v Ranavd Ong cnaaw Joan [2010] 5 MLJ 297, Megnaway Enlerpnss Sdn Bnd I/Soon Lrarv Hock (sale propnsml or me mm Performance Audio A Car Accessol/es Enfelplise) 120091 3 MLJ 525: Ken Ho/dmgs Bhd .; Ors V Sn S9/Ira Sdn End a 075 (201419 MLJ H55). as Reeeauy, the Court av Appeal m Puaneswalan aﬂ Rsngsnatha/1 (trading under me name and awe or rs»: Herbal Wurldj & 015 v Jyalhy Labolarovies Ltd [2023] 1 MLI I92 EIDDNVEG (he deﬁntlun cl umawful mlerlerence exlvaaed from Jasmme Food Corp Sdn Bhd V Lsang Wat Choon 3. Anor(2D16] 11 MLJ 812. The Cour! of Apnea! sad (at page 237 - 235): me: ma raamau /mg: am relevmd In me use ouaamm. Food com sun arm v Lcong Wm Clvoan 5. Ana! 12015111 MLJ 912, where Auzah Nawaw J (Haw um} held a: rauaws I49] wzm mama to the Issue a( unrawmr Intedmwvm wlm mas, ma mm m Msgnaway Enterprrsn Sdn and ham ma! umawtur mtalfarvnce mm me Is pmvud n the aevenaama have sold and oﬁurad lav sells: as Pmducl mm rnhmges me pzammrs oopynghl Al p we (ML./7. n 145/A—F (cu), ma cuurl Mid aa vavaws am mnaaaaavuasavmavaau 23 «mu. sum mmhnrwm a. mad as my a. anamua am. dnuumnl Vﬂ mum v-max [49] Although unlawful rrvlsrfarenca mm ...... .5 a ﬂavalopmg ton and .1 urIcIt1mnambn,nsuxrsIarIursbayomidaublnndcinnrnofrlsfuamrssam dandy ..e....... ... H 5. R .lMvnsnn1MsIays:s]Ehd V H z Rlohnson We: L.....m. .4. Anar!w95I 2 cu 5a1aIp 593 z....a.... Vanm ﬂalsr ran. may aulnarmes. saw: .1 on. poison acnbarataly ...:...v.n.s MM .... may or o..s...sss 5/ llmlhsr, ...... ms 5:: by ..........r... .......:, lhsl »x, Dy an ad ma. he .s nL7Ia.‘l»bsrry ... .»........, Ihsn n. .5 aclmg unlawfully, even ...a..gn he does nommcure a. mduo: any actual breach avmnuaa Taraaay Hole! co m v comns 5 ors!1969l 2 cr.1asaIp139perLom uen.....v MN [50] By sslhng. onenng lo! se... and drrmbullrlg .... .....-man syslam winch .s ...n...gng .... pm.../rs wpynghr, .... .1.i...u....: has »....v..s.. ...... me p/.w...:rs mm [51] The wawr... means emmoyed hers n my act or ss/ling. arrenna ro. saw and drslrmuhm an ...rm...q may 0! ma p.a...r.rrs armmsrl Iyilsm [52] As 2! result elm: dalandlnls urvliwfulmlurfilumx with ma Dlammfs ma, ... .».......~. gmm... and ..........s.. ..m been ...-...e.. ...... dnmct and mantel neashve mnscauence on the Dlalnllﬂa sates. [531 In mo e..c.....s.z..m, rm that the caveman. .: News to me pmnwr «or lm mn orunuwmr rnterfaurvse wrlh Inc plumlﬂfx trade a. ousuness (159lWe .9.” ...... the teamed ,....gs that although the ...m .... found unlawful mtederenne mm made s......g our of waynahl ...r..ngs...e... wmch resulted ... .....a.. adv/arse co.-usavusness Io .... pm... me same many .5 caussd ./m.... .s Pluwdmv ..n..w....a.4 ulvasswvollhavmsl Dun w......m¢ ma: ahucd mu plJmM’s rnputlllorv and goodwill mm s4m»lnr wnspquanms “ 90. As can be seen lmm me above auIhun\|\|es‘ lhe mlerfersnce with the F\amL1ffs' husmess has 1.: be carried cm by unlawfm means. Vn me mslanl case, as acls could not have consumed unlawvul .me.ve.ence nl me Company/s business nor comribuled lo I15 Voss lor lhe loﬂomtng reasons 1a. In me 1" Fubhcamn. u 5 acl ... wrmrvw an emawl to Merwvy Bank to wmnnom he oansoe. at cm. Company: lunds to wzx hank aooounl was no. ... uN:w1u\ 34:1 A: n was lclmg ... ...; capacity as a a..sm. mm Comnnny and was duchirgmg .... duly ... pmtsci ...; Company‘: axseis 3...: m safeguard ...; Oompanys repmamn .. lullwlhng us p.n.n.se m we buckets. (bi D an no. al any (we veQues1 ma\| Mevcury Rank dose ma Oamoarlh accoun\|, my ... .... 2»: Fubhlzahon. D‘: ..:. ... Dﬂwng ms nvarsxlgl an we ...a.egoga page In e><nLam me smmlmn m me u..:xe.s was am no. ... mega. act mam. the .>..a.....ns my va....a dank ...... one navavvanh am Mme wmle nosnnw 5... nnmzmuuvuszgvmpvpnn 2’ «...... s.... .......w... .. .... .. W... .. .......... ...... ﬂnuamnl .. .......a ...... Even men. P2 was hard pvsissd m smgle out me ward: ‘Much were nm has and my me Cmnpany w-I! nm eammg any vvvenua an n: business In mass produce Spmu\|yFm1 umls nea nut yel cnmmenced rne Company had mt bum e busmess or a repulalmn Dr gondww wmen name be damaged nnaeee, VIM: Pzsad m tikmg am mosloHheCumpanYs :vm\nb\e mnes mm Dvougm any rmscem husmess \|u a wvnplml mp And mined I15 mpmsuen by rnvdenng nne Cumpany unabla In mm its moms: 10 lm backlrs 91 Tne evidence suggest that me Companys bank account was mused by Mercury Bank as a resun 0! P2‘: omaucn. ounsldenng me fullnwmg (I! on 23 I2 2921 a\|1D oz pm, P2 sent en eman m Mercury Bank xtalmg that r: was a ‘(ormev empuayec mesa employment wun the Company had been Ierrmnalou me am emaﬂ anemplsd to pelsunde Mevcury Bank «a unuocxme Company‘: bank zcoounl on Denemhevzcl, 2021‘ m 43 PM PST jnhn@spm\nywd cam wmue neev Stan muse be .nvennee ma! om venner Imnlnyee. Damel semen m a wuss ea rage sna maluoe -n we aounnam er having ms empxey»nsnuenn.n.xee, has anemvlld m sabolnge our Dusmess and was damn: m on! Business Ialalmnsmps Thnugh nurlnmuev empxoyee, Dimel semen .s nm an amllunzed usev mr 3 smnalory to ourbank aamunl Vawrecwale mm yuu mm mm ouracwnnl. u pmdlnl Avalon when laced wmn me mnespovdenuu you were aanl I can assure you man than V: no hair! m the eueqauon Daniel Schurer has pulloﬂh The psyrnsnu relerved It: were we-paymsnlx nl loam me: I had pemnsuy fronted me eempany In Mi mule! slsrmv Dhgse. You wm nna IN dncumenlalmn eonnnnmg mu: Kym need lurlhuumunnaluzn m omens; unbckoulbankaccaunlmease do nox nesusne In wnlan me am mgllds. Jnhn wan Founder u. cao 5nmu\|yP-ad‘ an nuwmr, me bankaﬂneeral Mercury Eank ceneeuy pmmea nu] ma: Dwi: sx the «me sun en. ultha busmus vwnels And Ihalme compenys hank amaum wmm run be umocked mm them was a oonsensui urcme msmess sm ﬂAA1\|.su:7us3gvw\pVvDn 1“ «mm. smuw lunhnrwm be H... e may he nrW\n\|H\|Y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! owner nay: am the umev The man dalad 2s :2 202: at an 20 «mm lhs sam Dank olﬁoer we rewoduosd Iukrw ‘On me‘ 23 D9: 2021. 00 20. Comphance <he\In@men:ury eom> wrote m John — Our veooms show ma: Damel ws sun a Dusmais owns! rm aowum worn he umocked urml mm buslrvess Lrwnlvi ellhsv aaveu (0 a ouursu m zwony av one may: om ms 017137 and we haw: niﬁcwal documenmmn av man can sm- (0) msceaa oiawvoammg mo msalveme manuso Ihal lmz company‘: bank accaum may Ba um-mu, F2 duubbd dawn am came and a sum: my wlpnvive exlrcvvasm buy um ma emlva nhamlvmdmg at n and Jews: lnr uss21 Ind ussv 79 \|avec1wu\y 40) m an emu dated 51 2022 aI6‘37 an, F2 mm m Dstsuade me hankulﬁoav a\| Msmury Bank man the documsns were u. owe! -on January 5. 2022, s 37 PM vs! ,[email protected] mm wmle Dear Slain Thank you (0! yuwamau and many New Vaar As per yum rsquuu, mu uwlveuhlp structure 0! spmmyvm Inc has undergone n mm. where L m mammy sharemmer. have man: out Ihe m\mr1Iy sharehalders As a resull‘ s am me sale sharehulderoi um mmpany as my 3 Januaw 2022 nu updatsd sharshwdsv rsgmv Vs sncloled and as nremam and camp-ny Iecreuly I may tml the mlarwmmn m me document Vs we and carved Lmma me my on our awuum as m some urqency. as we as mnlauun (my a new mamnng push Waluv W5 weak am me our am card operalwnnul m ulnar no my «an»: ad Dampllgn runnumme, we have mu. Insure due gm mum an m makz pnymenls MlMu\| delay Eesl veeams, Jnhn Wm) Fuundav a. sec Sn-uuIyPw' {ab 02: gruund for urgency m his ilmve-menlmned emu dated 51 2022 which Vs Dﬂymg lar 3 markeﬂna camnamn am overdue mlls. seems rather mm: as he «an lusldeaued omme Company: bank acwum, leavmc my aboul ussama m u n P2 was rvaﬂylucnrsd on ma um; no me cum;-any. ha wuuld not have uaummse 015 may av the cumpam mm. m mmaay 2:: sm uikqtsu-vuslsyvmpvvno «mm. M.‘ ...m.mm .. 0.... a my me mm-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! m ‘H any case, \|mz bank omcer al Memury Sank calm nvl scram we dncumemanon and duclirllmn made by F2 m ms above-mennurved emaﬂ ¢a\|ed 5.1 2022 The reply (mm Mercury Bank ma .n nnmx dmed 612022 n vawuducad below on rm a Jan 21:22, no 3:‘ Ecmvlmnce <»el\o@marcury com) wmle H1 John . unfarlunalely. IhzI's run a sulﬁuwl dncumem We need samalmng enher men wmh ma uuvummarI\| m same «asnmn uodalmg me husmess ownevsharesy or:aMwma\|\un(mm the clue! sharehmdusthal may have been bwgm um E.n:n:a\ly, n one person can with u up M 3 word documwt and present xx as pnaov wunum any nlher oanlmls, mm .5 nm gmng In mm Vnrauv vlavposes’ (ab Yhen lhg lane m P2‘: emaxl dam: 51 2022 an H I2 am In Mummy Bank changed annn being dummusm admomshlng ‘On January 5 m2. :1 25 AM F'ST;ohn@1pmuB/Den cum wrote. Dear Stan Let me ﬁrst pmm am that by your Iogrc, a «onnarumca cl our company. who n um 2\| xsgnamry In our bank acoonnu, mama nm be me lo laclmzle . man an nur onmparvy bank awoun\| by sImp\y sending yuu an mnnn without you asoaﬂzlnmg we yanany M the Iﬂalms on which may allemm m msmpi um busmsu vehllmnshup As cso. nremenn, and company Iacvauly. 1 like my dunes and msnansmnunes senousxy and would nnl lnbncane lube ducumami Such an act would consmm. a cllmmnl oﬂense As man, you can ve:\| assured an documents n have xnd mu send in you are one arm mlnci Ls! me am rennna you Inal a Dmzwava wnxwulmn dues rm ﬁla man Imnsfers or shareholder raglslvs «a any Gevemmem bady mm in rm umvwsmns In the Dalawam Genera! Covporahon Law \o aﬂnw my men ﬂlmui. m fume! mmomy shavuhomavx have been brought am .n a minority buymﬂ vnumnng ma company‘: aymwn I enema douumams nmvmg mac ram 1 S1ockhn\|d:rA\|:1inn By Wnnen Conwm 2 Bylaws 3 mm alsham nansun : Photo ov Cmbank Cashier‘: Check no 044925 In! the amaum oi was» zn uqmvabenlm uso2<. sued In Dams! Paul Schmeras vaymam my share: 5 am Amy mu 29sz5n371a (pruol av dehvery ov me abovn Casmer 5 Check) sm nnnmsuavuszgvwvwpvpuq 3“ «wn. s.nn ...n.nyn n. med n my n. nnnnun -mm: mmn y. muNa v-max “I draﬂsd : \|ax\| mu: we ml! posl as a hacker update m m. wmmg days. n you dDH'\|I1MnrelheVundS mm we need Vnrlulﬁmxem Hel yau ram :1 Delete In give yau a mu dance to oomam your actions Ansu, we a mm m kmzw rm ynu wanl m exphzm your admns In uur Xmckevs, who \|0i1(lI5\r many And r\ever\he\ess, were are alsa sum slrvlce cnmnanvesmal W5 awe maney What am you 90mg 10 say In hum? Lasl hm mu rem we mu mmna Imiwegagur (eﬂ mam man we me An mam funds \|u sian pmductmn and ask mam m snu« dawn uurcampawgn I know mac you dun’! sham uur vames but uussrca and mom mm mm more penme mu boss my mew money because 01 you near namrs - 13 There was rm reply fmm P2. nespne D‘s abuvememiunea name to P2 vra Slack on 23 12 2021 m publish “as a hacker update m we cammg days“ on Indlegogo, D are nal do so. 14 After lakmg ouuhe Ccmpanys1unds,P2 posted a number 0! updates on Vndxegogo The sand updates are vepmduced be\ow: ale an s\|ed n P2un\ 122021 by SnmmyPuo, me Dec 30,2021 A 12 ASAM oysarago HaUDY New Year‘ Deav aacmsr Think yvu nu lnr your suppoﬂ We are prepannq our Vial vwnd M mnlkemnq slamnu eany January 2022 In Mach more amazmg backer: Aﬂev uur ﬁnnl mamzlmg‘ our iocus mu be umuvad amund manuiaclurmg Ind prepmng our business our um gzneml consume! mam l\|‘s an very axcnlrng and chnlbenwnu and we wouldn't um mm: (ms larwllhoul youv support Happy New Year! 5DV0\|ﬂyFo¢' gateﬂ mm by P2 9,; 53 gm 9.. 2 2 zuzz sru nnamnuavuszgvxvwpvpuq ‘ “Nun: sum lunhnrwm u. med u may r... uﬂmruﬂly -mm: dnuamnl VI muua um s Screenpnrll M hank siaienisnt showlrlg lransler ul usm is m Jesslca Lynne Fmdano as paymenl tar shaiss rhs above shuuic be mule than uasquais Dmal lur ynu In unlock om acoouvil it Head be. i request ybu IVWONE yuur superiors as we rim Immsdlalu aicmrl an this I trust our accounl WIH be ulllacksd wnhum delay su that we can Msume DHIVIIBEE as usual ana save Ihe <:u:\| and hassle at mvalvlnu legal saunas: Ben regmds. John Woo Founder s. cm snruutyl=oa- ini Mevcmy Bank‘: ruponse ta vzs ahovemerlllorled eniaii was has is conveyed in its bank allieers emall mates: 5 i m2 at 4 av IN ‘On mu. a Jan 2022, no 52, Cumpllinne <h:Hn@merct1ry Dom) wiuts HI John ws durl\| sntiuuais wl\|7I our processes using able to resolve this dllpllle as-represented within an amounl oi iinis «lung in yum uusiness nbjenltves The aistinsirons you ave asking us to rnm 3!! legal in nature and outsns the sums mu: agrssnisnts and abtllly Ia arbtlmle seaauss ul ths uuuianaing ucurw nnrlcelvm an the aomurit. we are closing youl account sna milllﬂg a chetk tar ihs remallldel onunus to the shipping names: on ﬁle Best Rzgnms. S\|an' iii ll would appur lmm ih. shave email \|hre3d that II was P2's ounuust tuwaists stun, the bank olﬁcel cl Mercury Bank, which staitsa Ml as muneous lherl grauuaiiy pttshyi that caused Melcury Bank In class the aomum ana mtIhe1"F‘tthIlcaItori Corlstosllﬂﬁ that Mercury Blnkdld nut close the account alter the I" Pubhcanan on 23 i2 zazi nor an it issue any warning to do so his Company‘: bank -Ictmml was ckvsed on s i zuzz, 2 weeks aﬁar ihu 1" Publlcntlan Due it would seen, to P2: «change uisnisits and nalthe P‘ Puuiisauon 92 in this circumstances, the Ptaintilis have tailed lo show that there is any an all unlawiul imerferenoe of the oonipanys business oommllled via the 1“ Publication As tor the 2" Publication which was published on 7.4.2022. there is nothing in the 2"“ Pubhcalmn which could have uitsrlerea with the Company‘s business when the oompanys operations haa mine to a slandsttll well taeloie 7.4.2022. SIN Iﬂﬁoﬁ\|3D:7LlS3§VMDVvDG 1‘ «nu. a.n.i luvlhnrwm s. u... a vsﬂy i... snsn.iiu MIN: ﬂnuavlml VI urlutta vlmxl 93 ll would appear lnal KI waa P2's aallorl ol lrarlslerrlrlg the bulk pl lne Company's lupus lo mrrlsell, and leaving a small balance only lrl llle Company’: bank account, which lplerleraa wllrl lrle Company's business. As lrle Company ls lell crlppled lmanclally and unable \|o slarl producliun or Sprou(yPod and fulﬁl ils ohllgallorl la \|he backers. lam sallslled that the Plalrllllls have lallea lp prove \|helr claim lor urllawlul lrllerlererlce Wllh \|rade agalrlsl D, Damagu 94 Gwen my ﬁndlng agalnsl delamallorl and VI Vavuur of lhe delsnees pleaded by D‘ \|he qllesllon ol awardlng damages dues H01 arlse Neverrheless, Iwlll make some observallorlsslrlce lhe Plalnllffs requested lor usszoonuo as general damages and US$1D0.DOD as aggravated damages 95 FIFSL the award 0! damages must not be exarbllarll or excesslve Damages srloula he compensalury and npl plmlllve The Ion or defamallon exlsrs I0 pro\|ec1r not the person ur the pockm. bu\| lhe repulalmn of the person delamed In ac\|iunslorde1amatlcln, damages are awarded \|a epmperlaale lrle plalrrlllllor lhe lruury Io ms reyurallon They aperale la vlndlcale lrla plalrlllll \|o lrle public and la aprlaale hlm lpr me wrong done The Federal Cowl In L/rrr Gt/an Eng 1/Ruslarl bl'n Kasslm and another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 514 at 57 ' 2021] 4 CLJ 155 a\| 199 observed‘ “[180] Now, ma lward al damage: I! maarll lo be colwtrlsltwy and not a mam. ror untold was/lh In a case where men ls aurraga la rﬁnulalran me camparualrpn mus! lrlulme sucrl sum as would vlndlcale ms or rm aooa HBIVW and lame lrllo auourll ln. dlslvassl rum um! hum!/ABUDH which [He deiamatavy Dub/lcallllll has caused ' as. Second, lhe lrerm cl damages awarded show lhal ll ls nu longer V! the realm ofrrlllllons of ringgll As remarked by the Ccurl 07 Appeal ln Sysd Nadrl Syed Harurl ls Ann: V Llm Gusrr Eng s olrlar appeals [2019] 4 MLJ 259 al 275‘ [2019] 2 CLJ 631 a\| 649‘ “the days 0! mllllon Rlnggll award fur deiamallon has long gone and cunslgned lo hlsmry”. I Ihlnk Mal Serlllmenl remalns walla, rrolwllnslamlmg oral lhe aealsmrl el ms courl pl Appeal was overruled by lrle Federal Conn by a maprily deaslon lrl Llm ellan Eng v Ruslsn olrl Kasslrrl (supra) 97 In Llew vew Tlsm 5 ors v Cheah crlerlg I-loo A ors [2001] 2 CLJ 385, llle calm on Appeal reduced lrle awards lolallmg RM1 mllllerl la :2 IN nﬂhqlbﬂaruslgvlvlpvpun «war. Sana! Inmhnrwm a. LAIQ4 a mm .. nﬂglruuly ml. dnuuvlnrlr VII nFluNG pans! RM1ao,ouu The Iouowmg observahon onne Ccurl omppeal xs mslmclive [al page 395;: ‘In me Muses: ormskmg our assess»-vsnl we have not over/ooksd ms mun! mm: In Mrs munlry or uams and awards :n atfimalrun cans rurlmng mlu samarnnmon mgr: No doubt mar mm was sun by ma dactsvon olfhrs Com :n MEG Pillar V ran sn Dula l/mun! Tun Chad Wnurv [mus] Ills a nscvsmn that nasoesn mum rmsundurslaod ma under/yrngpmﬁosoahyaflhak decxsmn ya lhz! nuury In rvpulslmn .s as, mm: more, nnpman: In a member clam scanty man the lass on hmb am we wnn me Irma has some wnen we mam on-ck (M mg as: by that case ms rs lo snsmw man an aclrun luv auamunan rs not usad as an Mama oroopnmnan Dmsrwvsa ms consmunanarguuanm D//vudom alsmvasston mu ». mnasma Musory ' 98 Thild, me various facials me! should be taken me aocmml In assessing damages was set ml! by We Courl cl Appeal "1 Chm Chann v Chua Jw Meng [2005] 2 cu 559 al 573 Namew — (a) me gravity :2! ma alIegal>on,1D)lhe size and Inﬂuence onne cimmauon, 1c)\he eflecl oflhe pubhcahon, (.1) ms extent and nature av the c>a>mam‘s repmauon. (e) the nanawcur 01 ms aatanaam and (f) the behaviour ov me dalmant In mm case‘ ma cam al Appeal redussd the award of damages lrom RML5 on In RM200‘00ﬂ 99 I am cnnscwcus «nu damages Vnv defamaﬂun are ‘at large’. There \s no ﬁxed scab or lonnma. Each case is lo be decwded on us own mar s, based on us own «ms and mumszanues Be that as u may. I admit lhe perspeciwe advocaled by me Federal caun In Lrm suan Eng -/ Rus/an um Kassun (supra). That aamages car umury to reputation should not be grealerlhan damages lor per3nna\ nary clam Or at least, a sense 01 prupomun should be mamlalned beiween me two The Federa\ court said (a\ page 513 — 514, ML!) 7152] n ma mos! ssnous ass: of dllamanon in name.» av rntegnvy ami honoun lcnnnul rmugrne gnnlml dnmagus in uxmsd ma quantum that n usually swardnd m psr:ona/ fnyuly dam: to a Nemlanl who n my dnszbled These m/unes are m most cases psmlansm and nnmmma wlv/ls! a man: Mpulalron may be reslnmd and me damage can In somv cases bu lrinsvenl m cnaractar I18JlAxrw»alrcaIl;4 a man who has Dun Us/amed annm bl mu m be In a woln pouhon man one we has load the use olwlsrpens arms or nu anammy rn Mccsuy v Auvcvutvd Nawsospms Ltd (No 2; [ms] 2 as as a! p 1129, Dlnlock LJ and -/ dc not behave that the an today Is momsarm ma mans renutanan than ol M: We and Ivmb may ye-als /alen m John v MGN Ltd [1996] 2 All ER 35 won. v mam. Ina ux Cuun omppsa/, III swvlar vein, and u ft m our vmw ulfervsxw m publvc apmtovv and nghl/y m that a delnmation plamlrlf should rlcuvuv damages Ionrwry Ia repunanon greater, psmapa by a am nﬂAA1\|.su-7us3gvw\pVvDn ‘’ «ma. san-w ...n.mn a. HIGH a my .. MEVHIHIY mum: ﬂnunmnl VI .r\uNa v-max srgnrﬁcanl raaar, mar. pr ma! same pram: rraa burr "mama a helpless orrppra orarr msansale vagerama 7». turn mam our vmw came wnsmudgex, and manual, anpuru be rraa in am ma arreruam or was (0 mean mmnansan: rrumow, nlwuvu, mm: are other views wmzvv mac! such camnansoruu and Iffumpts rp temperate damages lav paworvsl wane: and dzmagvs for aurumaum /see caamr A Go ma V Brooms and am>mer[1972]1AN ER 201 -1 p 524; There rs no dmlbtmg that the Ma term are dlﬂarsnl and ma law awards damages urrrararury although the compensation prmclplc mam: the sums Those views narwtmstarnirng, /4 rs asstnbar m m. publfc uuaraaz, w my Iswssvnant, zp mafmam a sense olprupcmun bnwsen damages RN unit or mass wmngdomgs m ma Iegmmatv puhln: mlmmm that ms raw imura one over the mar r: would m nus way serve as a week as srr Thoma: Eingham MRlIaI9rLoId BIrIgIIsm)on:wvodm.Iohn men, onmnaasonehﬁeneaaollhs award uldamagas /ardelamsrlon - too Wm: regard Ia Ihe Company‘: busmess and repumon, D canvassed me rouowmg arguments. 4a; P23 vwn cnmempnraneuus dowmsnlshawthalme curuparryram maak vmapacxa «n ms emml enlmao ‘Fvnanuzﬂ 0veMew' da1ad 22 122021 at 1515‘ wmch was aam shnnly mar he had wurrarawu the mm mm M usscsomu on 20 5 21 «mm, P2 painted a bleak muure or me Company‘: pmspeuﬁs m explam why he wllhdvswlhu am sum -naar Jassxca and Damal I have pveparsd . lwnancxm avervwew that was . clear nmlure Mwhere wa stand mud wmu muaupaa ua ahead We wm N01 he sandmg pm any amamems \|a hackavi a\ mu puml ua we have not sacrum «p uquuara ma pprupany Furnaw ma mmpany Vs we and we In wurkmg on soimmvs to uscura us fulure From um overwew. you can see that us have mmel\nanr:\|a\cha1l9ﬂ9u‘ and npan rruru seuunm; ﬁnarmng, ma mnpor chaﬂenges an In exeamun or ma lrinsmun mm a going concern and ma aooomnlnymg ﬂawoday ppsranpru As you have numcuuy ouuruaa out n have has my wruuax stamlv bans renmd ms has happsnad narwm avmd sInc1evcapMa\oonlrolmes:ure: Vnnmdlng Vuvalgn vanxlerl-x, heme Impasse In Mahyna an ‘\|:\| January 2n22 Am u. ma ﬁnanam uuarwew and m Isseumg our nveraﬂ -uuauprr, 1 ssﬁ more ﬂnandal Hsk man I apmy am wmuuu up near ma .s ml upponuuny «pr Spmulyﬁod, me ro slam} an us mm (set, and our opponumty to we rv mveslms see me Mum pmennal u. ma busxness modal wa mm mm mu: how haillo move cumm In mu next can sru -namsuavuszgvwvwpvpuq 3‘ «mu. sum lunhnrwm a. met! a may r... uuuuu -mm: dnunmnl VI mum p-mar NB' rm Mama and the wdapsd ﬁnanclll mmsw me umrﬂy uorvﬁdamm Ben vegards. John Woo Founder a. ceo 5DIv.wM’o¢' an In 01: Fmsncwal Ovumew pvevnmd by hum. >2 se\s am In: numhers Much gm mm muse up mnsider mg Company a ﬁnam:\alr1sk A nsk wmcn F2 says he vs no lonwerwmma to hear Theloﬂowm pecans are exuaom «mm In: F\nan::na\ Uverwzw 'Chal\|9n9uVacmg Sproulyﬁod, Inc m Ilarumomng mm . gamg mnoem 1 Shun mm namxnm esumale $31 Ms-35.146 2 cmwamnamg M1iHmenl mugh esumale smmx: 3 Vrwenlmy mmauv ammo anus, vouuh esumale xzuwno 4 mmal corsumav mama! markeimc huduet $100,000 5 Execution 5 nay-may Wirwuns Ommnx cm mderal pnnnly) a)FInd z pusmss pannen mo can pmvme apnax and ms amung busmess operauon setup to handle ma nay-no-nay upmum cl spmuvywoa, M: Falurmal cawuldatu mdude ma suppnen ela m sen mg mmrainy cjﬁznse camul and mm“ into 3 gomg onnnem and mm me o/uan\snIAnnamse\ves a» uqmaace 012 company.“ (:7 m In Im my um nbovenamed ‘chaﬂvvgu «mug SpmmyPod‘ Inc m \rsnuIInnIng mm a going mncem', me man lmhwlmes am up up a range «mm 3441 us \a 3646.146 wma. ‘s we\l nbwve me sum cl $139,413 moewed us pledges lmm me hackers my P2 was ouncamed ahom Ins company: am, m wnhnue tn uper-Ila because the Dompiny was sumnng hum Based an lhz numbers m we Fmancml Drvuwew and my dsduclmn me Campinys mm‘ as lmm me clsh veccwed. me Cnmpxny was mm smlelina losses av saw 5 as al the FiMncIa\ Overview 2: :2 2:22: mmmli weaned (cam moewsm :4 :«p,41 3 ms Lliblhhu s 19 M9 Shun-lam: man mnlraus s a 127 cmmngenmam ‘es s m cm Exvenses pand $136282 Tale! kisses s sums‘ sm .mm.ms:mpvpua 35 «mm. sm-1 nanhnrwm .. 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Use” uv The company has no vevsrme exuepx my me memes mmnbmed try me beaten The Company sum emu meneym eennce providers, venom am cvsdllols nnmuumg u Is ne had advanoud mama: on penew at me Comniny (K) r-2. under crossexamlnanpm claimed Ina! ne mu\dn'l scan vmﬂumnn al spvoup/Peas am lms Is m\| pome pm by me opnlamvovanaws emews bemun mm and ms suvphsv In me e-nan thread on 26 1 2022 betwun me enpeunn ene P2, m an be seun men nu simplu pt spmmynm wars ready and were to be moved to P2 Huwevev. :2 men ne ecnen enenmn m man: we order var pmducuon er SvImAyPods because by me: me ne had cleared nul In: Company: hank an:mun\| and (here was no money to p1aﬂ Dmdudmn. Armnnna to P2‘: Financial Overvmw, Ihe company rsqu-nu USS7u.ow to carryuunha cnmpmnmng lulﬁlmsnl 4n Fmm the mm emenee. Ms smmn mat the samp\asnlSpmmyPL1d were ready and (hat mm pmﬂucman oauld hive sinned n :2 ma nlaued me ordec wen we has no: apne al any me \n any case. P2‘: euepenen that en pnmlsu-vusluvxvwpvpno 3’ «nee senm ...nmn .. H... e my .. enmnumy mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum em he cau\dn'\| start pmdu-mun pv Spmuly/Pods was am puaaap, and .5 also noi Dame pm by In: puruamppram-.5 document! (my Initlad m Warming ma hackers !ha1 mu Company has no more moneym nan pmduclmn an SpvoulyPud, P2 pr ms uppaces on In. lnmegnan campaign page pave ms Imprsrnmn mac pnxiucbun of spmpxwpas has begun am Mamas ma ddsy m pmamm on ma ulvbal suvmychaln runes and evan we wil wn umma (ny Fmm me mmmmls Iefl by Ina backers on Kkkslartev, the backers were ahendy dlsappmmad by the company‘: snencs and «am... up delwev ma spromyvppp as promised Even more I: pushed the 2M Pubhcanun, Ins hackers mm pgnpxap mat mara were no undanzs all me Hams av me p-oaucnpn :11 SnmmyPods and had pnﬂad Ihev ppmmsm an Kwuxsvsnev tn express Iheﬂselmgi S0 much so Ihalsﬂewamans pr a sum aranea lo emerge Ml mm nagahva mmmenls aparrm ma Cumpnnvy am: Ina Founders an m ma ppm domahw and can be run by mm. A samplmg ullhs comment: ave repmduoeﬂ below Junrm smrm ‘xx seams hke mm people uppx my Sam and lbeydmpped Ml In: «ace Mme am. I'm gmnu m we a hand dawn - K. 1». pear mmmunicamn and lad: av hDne:\|y1u5Mss a ponmlz uaumrpmawsuu IdunbM7u\|IheyvnI\ be renprrmnp anythmgta anyone N>oo\a 'VVuw Na lmnsrparency and mi prpper cnmmumcahun «pr munms’ Ylvey delaed men urmagram ind Fncebook page $ad\y ma \|us\| names acmss as a scam Haw‘ Rhona Pakanun ‘bamed Ihe\r lnslagum pap. Why wppm yuu do um: unlasr a warn (emum Lasx mxsnaner s support as no way or rapoO\mg' Ron Wnhon We snomp have apaaa up who may: we (am so we can Vegnlw no any mam ' Slmnn Khan -may have new dalstad mm: lnstagvam page uaarw a s4:am\n- Ron wanm. mean, mnsﬂy «pm. (51421 the Van Ihsy wnu Nov upaana us here. lhal we an um um taken and wnl nsversee me pmmm Donna -x veachea pm In men. mmyumaa The neasc may can up .. owe mew backers ma counliy 01 pelmdm uvdaxe . 4p) P2‘ as me Camparv/s CEO‘ look no acurpn In address the backer!’ oumptamu In prper In rescpra the oprnpanys Iepmauon and ppopwrn Thsve was a deaﬂenmg snevvce on rm pm as me can onm Company up glue nn appoum up we backvs an vmal he had done with ma hackers‘ money Indeed‘ -n was ma mm mndun ul wlmdvawmg me pm at ma am ﬂM1\|.sua7us3s:v\v\pVvDn 3‘ «mm. Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e p... a may .. pﬂmnnﬂly -mm: dnuamnl VI mum p-mar CumDiny:ﬁmds\|ha\|pul me Company m me predwmmenml oeino nnama «o Mm na pnamna to the {makers am: In pny us aedﬂars (D) In n-s answer In Qussmm 57 ea the maunmu wwnm smamam Lws w 1 >‘ P2 veltes on lwo comments m auppon rna n=:annms- clawm can oamaaaa up An smau dalod 31 a 2021Vmm one Hieu Nan. n) An nnamao decumen\|cal\ea ‘Damage no Svrnu\|yFod, Inc's Casmow ano Vamaﬂan’ (:17 The apaysmannanaa amau cam 31 a 2921 hum N u Ngo cinrml ha wnsldamd as manna for an ususmam at aamagas as n was nan pmpirad as such Ina sum man will wnhln by Hleu uoo .n ms oapaony as me Aooonm Nnrdwnre Mnnaaer lor Ina-eonpa u was a markennﬂ pucn In persuade the companys manaaemam m extend spmulwpas cmwovunmna exams to rnmaaapp The sewn emau mpnuoms only 5 iuwass npnas anovamuo menlmn pnuacuwnan nao gona on lndwogugv anavaunoa-o tn In the undaled ooonmam caﬂed Damnge to spmu-woo. Inn‘: casnnaw and vamauon: xna mam aaxm byme P\amIMs Is slaled as nouows. -spmuryvoo, Ino km a vmmmum M US515U,WI7m nmnoa In the um qaanasov zuza Funhemmre me marke« yams nl Sprwlwody Inc was soyamny namawwn gum (mm a saooasann husmess wnn very good pmspsdi Ia vnnuaﬂyzam." 1:; Yup avpmam clmm us sounoos ll besl as n .a onaooaonaa by any anonao nnanman svalemenls cl ma company 1:) P2. as nno company: CEO‘ has no: been mung lha ﬁnancial vevons lurma company umpanny Apoomma no lnl Emmy Search on ma company from nna sma 94 Delaware unoar nna Iubmls ac 1.: Imonnanon: ma Lnl nnanaax mum maa wxs m 2ﬁ21.wh\|ch would he Var the nnanomu year nl 2:720 As at ma aona ul me savd oooomann «man .s a 2 2023). line annual moon onna company larme years 202: am: 2m have no« been mac M The Pkannws naya «am to smrw rna nnanma: slam: onna company bcfon ano may mu m ana 2m »=oonca1»ona,voun.m«p chum lhul «na Cnmplny ha: swam} any oamaas In Iispsulhsrsuf (y) ‘H any oaae even me ﬂnamnal reams onne company were ayauapne. xney womo only showxhal me company was slrwuhna m stay aﬂoat P2‘ Fmancwal Orvemew had pmamaa a bleak mom «on the company Wan mom ms company: bank aucoum was clued F2: mason fur wnllurawmu tn. cpmpanys vamp as vawmld m ms amau ﬁlled 22 12 my anucmngllve Fm.nm:L.I\| Overvxew‘ \: pom IeIhng- so m the SIN u1Ml5u-7us3s:Vw\nVvDG 39 «ma a.nn...n.,on.,.o....aan...nnn.ny.n.n.aaa.n.n.p..mna am ﬁninmal Dvuview and .n assessmu om menu anuaumn, I see man ﬁnzncml Mk man I sD\a\y am wmmg In mav- lw) Pzs Fmanaan Dvuwaw dated 21 12 2021 vs a conlemwlnneous aocumann on ma mher hand‘ me uaaumam ammea “Damage to Snvuulyﬁud, Inc’: casnnaw and vamauan- a undnlbd u saams to have bosn planned as an anannoum pamapa w\\|h me mlenuon m gaugmg damages mm D ma sam ducumem was my marmorved lurme man me In ma PlamWs' wnnaaa smamam (ws PW <7 lb vahdlly \: queslrunabls as a san.san-ma aacamann prepaved by F2, who .a nm a aaaunaa exvaﬂ an vamsoan F2’: evrdewe ralahng tn ma abnve-menlxoned aman man 31 a 2921 «am Hlsu Ngu and ma ﬂnwmenl emmad “Damage m Spmulyhda Inc‘s Casmluw and VnIunuDn' smaw be dmegarded. as may Dmvlradld P2: own cnntempcranecus aman dalad 2212 2a2< and ma anama rmanuancwa ' ()1) ma cnmumnaa sum av usm $2.41: was amrmanc luv ma Comniny ra hnve suanaa pmumm av samunwms Bscauss awarding Ia P25 Funamax Ovsrwaw, any n sum an ussmuuo was mzuved in my om ms cmwamnmng (ulmmem So, when F2 wvllvdrsw man at me Campanys manay, m aammaa me aaam «nan {urine Company as u coma nD\| a-an pnaaacmn an samnyvoas The Ovmpany also mum nm gal more rmney lmm cmwulundmq as its uaammxy was as «ane.smama«av 101. wuh regard In P2‘: reputauon and siandlng, D canvassed the lnllawlng arguments 4.; P2 has been mvarllgalnd by Ike Damsn when comaaa anama lrom nmnmg Intsmei scams men have aaen aavaraw mpolh ladged mm the Damsh vohca against P2 um ms company‘ Onenmcare mm aasaa an aﬂogalmns an mm cnmmlnm -n Denmark and Singapore >2 nas nan damed he has new op-emlmg a wmmny ciﬂed onanuan cam m Smgapnre under me name :71 John Chm Kanqsleﬂ Woo wxlh ma emnll aanrassaa no c\auv@Dnama\I:.Im com and jckwﬂonenulcare cam 3mDnQs1o\|7vem Lb) Hawevev, nne Irwesnqauun by ma Danish pence mu) ms wmpmlms agam P2 and ms oumpany could nut pmoeed because F2 cum nan be named Dy ma Danrxh pa! a ma was Dommumcated va D by a Semcr Pmsecmov av cm pmlus m Mann Jutland. Denmark in an anaauaa le1lev.ma somanu at man ..a repmduosd below ‘Nordpyharvds Fnhn Joumalnr 51 oo.m7nma92—22 Jyﬂandxgadl 27 gm Aawnorg Dam 23 «aama: 2022 we assume — Fax secumaa Sagnbehnnmer mm as . nr Dame! sanum Jalan rmpna 22 Tmplka Famnghu 11100 Emu Femnghn Pennng am -nnmnuavuszgvwvwpvpuq ‘° «ma. Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e met! a may a. anan.u-y am. dnuamnl VI mane v-max try 5DruulYPud‘ Inc Feb 2, 2:122 ‘ 11 mm 12 momhs age Progress Undue my Backers. "tank you my ham a pan ucounaumay to we 5DIunlyPud m Vila suppxy cm. mines have made vlucmemem uke mud! Iangerman expeﬂed Yms u . qlnbnl prcmem nul M: «or us, pmduclxon ‘s shwmg dawn lav evetyane wave wamng hreiessw la net everything done we-re mwon max for dalwefy m we sewnd uuanev mzuzz, and we malty ivbremate Your pittance Ouv vnunly .. la dehvev on uur mm-mumenu In you and w¢‘l\ kuap you updilod an mu progress m me meanum spvumypoa sour w yen have any uuesmns you can man us 31 he\ln@ max: may F2nnlum n nn1432ﬂ22 by Sum-AIYPod. 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I cannm nnaw Wu access In the remzmmc mz\|ena\ onne case runnannonn I can conﬁrm mm the polnue m Denmark have mveshgalod 0:: use. hm n has nm been possum: cm nn. Doha «a mud Ins wmpany nwner. men 15 my we have mm me case wun hesl renews nneumuel mum. Aonagaam Suummnldigef 1:1 Them .s also a Vener mea an 1 ma lmm me Norm .)m\and Pwce co me oannn Cemvitnkm and Consumer Anlnonly mscussmﬂ me mveslmalxon min P2‘: uﬂvmas P2 Ivar ruuulamad ma contenm unm mm Indeed‘ P2 Vela: an xn. «mm nl an: um mm wmcn mmudu (M H»: - ‘The gvods ardered were renewed hy Ihe cnsmmer, 347 (here .. nu «ma .n on; case‘ Ia) Aocomwngw D1/ve\Y\|7\9 on me «mm M me wnlenls M me zlnvsala leller daled :0. 202lHrum1M Nuﬂh Juliana Pom, P2 has also aﬂmmed Ina vast 471 ms contents (harem mm. are 4.) Yhe Mann mum Pulroa Doparlmsm had cnndunad nu mvesﬁaannon min In: business practices M P2 under www g\umsnmm— nnhne com, wwwonenlalcare com vamaua. (up Th: Danish Campallllon and Consume! Amhonly had waged a wmpllmt 471 «mu aga-um P2‘: Business band an wmplalms by mimblm av 01: vublu: 16) We abnve—menl\nr\ed coM\us\an by lhe Dnhce max (here wns no In-and IS Mmﬂed In In» (ad Ina! me vlcum mu reoewe me mas ordered Howeven we said mncmnun dues rvu\| my \|o me umer alkaaahons a9iIns1 >2 m wiped of swing medwulws magaﬂy. cvea\|\W.7 a EUDEWWIMV WP lu uumvd mnm buy \\|\egi\ medxcmes and onmn.ng mam wnn ‘egilachon when my mluied m nay sn gamma-vuslswmnvpuo “ «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. H... n my .. nnmnumy mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! to Burma ms slew M cnmmnmls auzm F2‘ on at-mwe—men\|\onad Welter dzled so 7 2020 Iran ms Nulm Juuavvd Pulne nlsn exphams whythe Damsh poms wls dmpnmu me case ‘The wesugauun unwed am by me Specul wmmmm my sums Eeonurmc and Inlammrnnm Cnmss shows mm Ihe pecan behind me am. wubulz Ian Denmark m was A. Ihe mmpamas mum me wabsnu have addressei m vannus plums xn Smgapun, n u assumed max me Dervetralarls alw 2 vemdem (here In view ullm awe, u Vs assessad mat mu nm he possum In ovum n own mm Im the exlradmun or ms pvsnn ior manor Invaxlsgalmn em pusmble pmsenmmn Imduv Danish law 19) Happearsmal lhslnveallgnnnn aga1ns\|P7 nae cusad because the Damsll news ma m\km1w ms exact nocauon on Numnmanam mau=2 was um pmsecmeﬂ «arms scams rammed agamsl mm‘ may have men Iupmled m .umo\es on severe! nsmn. news wehsmes as well as an we wabslle M Ihe namsn Medncmes Agency me amdsi can be acwnad wa me VnHowmu um mxps /lwww avusen ax/naws.nms..snyuemg4rue»sans» kundev_184D57 aspx Mlys /Iiulkahhdmlanv\a.ﬂkIar\IkaVh9\:cﬁrvna-xnyﬂemwinter-kundev~ mud-\nkinw2D12—ll»D Mlps //nymaav wz dklknml/2ﬂ\|2—l)9—1I—hel5aﬁrvna-mydemp»(mer- kundev hllpuj/;ylLmdsr pollen ﬂklHvss1I\/hmmssundhed/sundhed/amc\|e4E35543 nee hlws /rmsmmvnnng dk/amk\er/nyhednrlluslsafmnarsnyderag-(mun Nlpl /n.egem.sasIsuy:asw. dk/dn/npnleker/medbcn muluen-lmr ud\nMeI/umqaaabamlmanlslaemev/spoarusmaa!-og-xvmvm— gmmsammeq-smpnumemnasneussnanmsm (W m we amue nubﬁshed m Medwalw d:Ind12 9 M12. me wb-We reads ‘A namsnswnsa mun company mac sells msgsx medvcmes In mck Danes and lhmatens mm mm dam wﬂadtun .s causlng Incluamng ummems vm consumers and my ms Dnmsh Health and Mamcmss Au1hunIy' (n In the send amda m Msdwnlch H .s slam, Imungs\| miner (mugs, as Mlows sm wﬁqmuavuszgvxvwpvvnn ‘1 «mm. sm-w nmhnrwm s. HIGH w my s. mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ‘The company. wnnan ns Dannsmnwned and noanaa nn Snnuavomn ovoranas lrnruwh a man: company -n ma seycnannax lax haven, ano ma Damsh Hsallh ana Msdncmu Aulhunly has veponud mo company no mo pulncl fur nllegaﬂy ulhng medrcmars Behind nna mmpany .a me Dune John cnaoa xonganao woo The Damsh neannn and Medmmes Aumomy has nremousny been on warnnna consumers aoannsnma scam company hm uoapna nav-nu maao H-annn D nmllk aware onus on-nca, nne mmpany nu non cnan-.:-o nti mums. nun mm ns Also an amen: oanao M 7 2m 5 nupaaneo an 712 an an on me name» Maoncnnaanoanoy waosnna wmch necammends auanns\|mm1nasnnW nronnuonsnmm F2 sonmpanvn onannan Care Tna Dannsin MsdI:maiAuannY no a smammann agency The nonnnmng am axlvac1s¢rum\ha sanﬂ amon- ‘We rec mmano nnan yau da non purchise ‘Gnumxnmnrnﬂ and ‘Snw Pnlmeua mooocns nom onannan Care aa you nsk nmponnna medncnrnes nnnaaanly nmo Denmark The oomnany >5 knnwn by seyevan rnamesn nmnoo-nu www onennanmo ax, www anannancann com, mmgnoooumouannnna on ma wvtwsawpalmmlo ak ma aomoany ns non registered m namnano ano the mmuany smps ns pmducts «mm. among nlhers. Snrvuapme ano Swhzeﬂanﬂn allhough nna websdes may we we nne nmmssnan nnan me Dmﬂudsare shipped nmm Denmark In aoonoon. yau nsk Indmg up wnlh a aubscnphun no ma omoocna. omen can aa onnaonn no gen on an Many ouswmers wna have relusad no pay mew mu nmm ononnan Cave hay: made In New mz\| may have mwwsd Imus nmaanomno wuymmg «mm oaon connaannon and ua nna nu mclusnon nu In. an (Cudm repomrng huvuu) aa a aao ama- tn» P2 nao aomnnoo man we onamau Care mmnames are ms The abovemermoned amdes are aasnny aooessnhle on me nmamel. (M) nn nna pvuunl nu, P2 I: ma can an nna Oompany na onnnooo no gm mu hackln an accuum on Weir monoy ano ma slams on me prmucimn on sonoowooa as Dan on ma nmmnse mooe Imde¢ Ihe mcyananon namns M oaa However, >2 ma kept snnom nonwnnnsnanonno man In: backers are renanmn no me company as oenna nan ona scam 102 P2’: charader. persona! repunannon and snanomg are renevann m nne assessmenl on damages punsuann no secuon 55 on ma Evndence Act 1950 wnncn neaoa am nﬂmnwa-vuslgvnvnpvvuo “ «on... san-n luvnhnrwm a. o... a my a. anamn-y om. ﬂnuavnml VI arnurna v-man cllalaalal as arm ﬁg galllagaa In CMICIIISSMEVEE1 Ihal me charadef 471 my palm ls Such as In am we amalllllal dimnqes wmcn he ouam In IIDBIVG la re\ev37ll' ms. D has duly pleaded the panlculals regarding P2‘s pasl nusllless deallngs al paragraph 22 of the Statement 0! Delerlce In DP Vysrldran DP Vyandrarl V Kama! Smgh & Ols [2000] 3 MLJ 22, the Hbgh Cnun held Iha\| ll ls always laglllmale lo allack me crlalamelolule plalmlll ln all aallall lol aelamalloll as (he plallllllrs GhafaC\|Er ls malanal lll deleml ng damages The ' n com sald (al page 52) -lll ml :1 ls uupmpnale la quote a passag. Imm ol 5 Mam Pmclrca! rmlls ml CV05:-Exﬁmmﬂlroﬂ m 5.1, 1990 This I! me: he Said 2! p 715 In aallms flu aalamanall, ll I! always lagllmlam to attack ma omaraclsr or (N plallllm, wrlamu onlal he bemmes a mass VII ms ml mall Tm: ql.las1:on M such any: l’: one omulla lactrcs lime! mall alpmrmlonal alrllcs m plalllmrs maracm ls dWlc1ly nlalallal DH ma 755118 as In now much lla has been dam-aysd by what ma aa/alluanl rlaa sent or wllmn amlm Hansel ms manllal m which rl. my D: handled by noposlng counsel la la be many alsllllgulsm ilum pure Cmssrstammallaﬂ la mall - 104. In a lecenl case cl vl/rl‘gm v McCormaL‘k [2023] EWCA Cw 392, me English Courl al Appeal llrlallllnously upheld lhe Engllsll l-llgll cams declsloll on a dalamalloll case wrllcll awarded llamlrlal damages cl :1 In the appellarll, The Ellgllsll ooun ol Appeal set am we lelavalll law on the assasslrlelll ol damages lar uevamallorl. amcllgsl Ulhers, as (allows -sl The law plmmlas ms: the dalmarlfs l-purallan before Dub/IGBIIOII OHM defimallon was gulad me prasumplloﬂ ls l-mmanla, mu ewdsncs IS Iﬂmmad /or Mal purnaae on/y l l goes 10 ms IEICVIIII mm: o/the clalma/ll's IIDIIISIIDH ma lalls wllhm one ola hmllld langa av caleqones: sue Gillsy all Llpel alla Slander 13-A ed a! pan: so-aal ID 344291 The Lmdamllng rsllorlale 79! ml: apomach IS Iruwly lnﬂuenced by case nlallagmlanl mnsideratrons alla la panlamr mo IIEEI1 Ia amla lwasll»gl»g- ml-ms see Bufslem al(41[-[42] (May ml and mmal V News Group Nswsaapels ua /29061 swcn CW Sm‘ pooal l wuz 3459 al[29ll lull (421, 15-71 [Keene LJ} Ono rucognlsed nalspwy cl aalnlsslpla GWGIHCC all had IEDMIBIIOII ls prsvmus Ulmmnl mnwcvrons [see G506)/VOrtIlsm5PruJ:LldI1967l lcls 33J)Mlorax!undpdm laalclalslllclms W prvvlous cNl/ lmg.!Ilon' (599 mmal a!Il7]-145]) sum aulﬂolllllrva plum GIHIIIICJBIIDHS ala dssmsd Io lesull MI lanmalmal hﬂﬂﬂ 55 That IS new Lulu namllng exp/amod Illa matter M Spmdal V Flam FWHS [1961]AC1I)9al 1 142 ‘ml were VIM so. me plalnftﬁwnuld mom aamgu for I char-cur which be m llomm u ammm, am: ml: ma llw will not pamllrlllla ampllaals ls mllla; Thu laasolllllg aINell(L.Iln Pamplllv at nasal with wnlcll Pumhas LJ axpl-ssly agleaa, Bbvsam to rm to be DIV meaa same am nﬂA4n\|3D:7LIS:llgVMpVpDQ “ “Nair a.ll.l nuvlhnrwm a. U... a may l... nﬂﬂlnnﬂly ml. dnuuvlml Vﬂ nFluNﬂ Wm! rrrras ms area m way mil Olrv¢rLJ Ippmaclndllla mattann Pamnlm ar «:4; when he aouma mil ‘by Ms mans /ms clarmnnll had Ioﬂcnsdany nyhl m be mgmdsd as ofgaud gen5m/ repulalmn“ [again Hlnve added me emphasnsj 57. srppparaar V News Grow Newspapers Ltd (20921 LIKNL 40, /2092) r wm arm provraes a mum rscsnl and aulhumahve slalsrmnl our-e ranenare ms darmant a Voomaﬂ gaarksapan sun: ror an auegarrorr me: he ma 't7IIuwn“ marem Tho aeisnaam ram to wave (Iva! A. had, but ma swamp. r: udrlucvd maae pram me: he had made a wimp! egreernenr m up so me Home ofLard: upheldme /my’: verdrctm rmur prme clarmanmm he/dlha! me clalmlnt was deservlnﬂ ulna mom mm [V m nommu aamages Lam Bmaham axprarrrm al I24] “ run (on at aaramanprr prutacrs mesa mas. Iipufnlmns hm/I pm unlawfully Iruurad n arrarua um. mm: protlctfon to than mm harm, or dcsulvr to harm. Ira rinumlon dlsonring cl hgll pmncllnn A/rml 9 November 1994 when me newspanerpabﬂshed us my amdes aopm mm, ma 3PDeIlanI's paw»: rawlalmn was urrpramrsnaa am rre had rr. ran.» actad /n a waym wman no dsoenl wmznasl rooroaner wouldlci rt wouldba arr ﬁrvnl la/usliev rra cow‘! ollaw mm to cwlrd :uA:tnrml u.m.,.a to . mln shown rp nm mind in men Illgrln! brunch at his Iigll And maul abltgltinnl - AI I54] Lam Habnause axpramaa why me maUud99 smzu/:1 new grven me My “a Faﬂwlrn L1»vn1ron‘ ‘A Pnmnlm dniclron uddreuas me svtuslran worem a marrrmrre enlmad In a vetdrcl in ma (avum on me [uslrfrcahon rsaue bur me evrdence properry perme me/my on Me Issue aﬂusl/ﬁczvnn has msuosemrramre r¢P\|lhmeIl Io wnrerr he rs enmled Is so eepmmeu that me aamam men In should as awardad ta ma aarruyu to are ropulltlan by mo (Ix rryppmesn asrema ovypumsarran snpum pa rndmxd balaw 2:. me: an wauld bu .pp.apn.r. fur . pr mtlfwith nn impocnbla rnnmnﬂnn, rnzybo even In . nomlnnl Mun ‘ 105 Havrng regard to me apove. my view rs ma« damages or any) «or both Plalnhﬂs ought to be nommal. In lme with me pnactlcs to award a single award at damages, 4 wnuld na\| make a eeparane award (or aggravated and exemplary damages. rms s to ensure that awards are not exoesswe and lo avord “duub\e coumin as the circumstances gmng nse to exernpxary, aggravated and genera! damages are usuaﬂy rnexlneably intertwined (See me coun M Appeal ease or umsarr Melayu (M) Bhd v Olnman Dm H/ Omar [zun] 2 ML! eon). In any event, aggravatsd and sxemwary damages are not warrarnea m we presem case conclusion 45 am ﬂM1l3u:7LlS3s:VMraVvDG “Nana a.n.r nmhnrwm a. U... a my r... mra.u-y am. dnuamnl VI mum war 106 On a balance ol pvobabllltlss. l lmd man the Plalnllﬂs have not pmven their clalm lur defamallan and unlawful inlenevenoe with trade agalnsl D. Furthermore I ﬁnd‘ on a balance at probabilmas, mat D has sucueedsd m proymg ms delenue DY luslllIca\|lol'l and quzhlled prlvllegs. I Ihereiore msmlsssa me Plainms‘ clalm. 1 ordered the Plamulvs to pay costs of RM1ao,ooa lo D 101 The urder lar coals lakes into aomunl wee Irllerlucumry appllcauons in wmcn aasla ln me cause were amered Namely— (ll Enclosure 7 daled 411.2022. which was an appllcallarl ﬁled by D lur securlly lor cosls a a 5\| lhe Plalnlllls, lul Enclusure 13 aalea 21.72022, whlch was an apollcallon Ned by P lo expurlge oerlaln paragraphs al D‘: amuavul aaleu 3 7 2022 (Enclosure 5;, man was ﬁled in suppon 0! me appllcallcn lor secumy var cuss, and (my Enclosure as daled 5.11.2022. mm. was an applicallon Ned by D lor leave to ﬁle a Re] er [0 me Reply lo Balance llled by me Plalnms. was In Dunnecllan with D‘: appllcaliun tor sacunly lor costs was Enclosure 7 dated 8.7 2022. I had Ordered the 1" Flamllfl to pay a sum Ol RM5D,D00 into cowl as secunly lor oosls As a mnssquenllal order, l dlrecled Ina! \|he sald sum be released 10 D and apphed towards me costs awarded ln his 'a\IDUl ln me Instant suil Dated 15 seplenmer 2023 X may Chow Soon Judge Hlgh caun at Malaya, Penang Clvll Dlv lcln NCVC 1 a lawn Huang. ran New Slang and Ynn Zhen vu (Messrs Pele! Huang 4. Rlchahﬂ for me Flalmlﬂs Daphne Chay and Dnunny Law (Mann Choy 4 Assoclnlasﬂurme Delendanl gm Dam‘ Sell Anwar my lbramm y m Nvw sum Tlmes Pmss (M) Sun and 4. Ana! [mm] 2 ML.) :92 syamal Eska/an A» Sclangur Sdrl am v Tony Pun Klam Wee um 51 3 cu :77 Rap Syahm hm nu Baker .4. Ann! y Marusel Slrlgh Dnlllan and DUIEI appeals [mm 3 MLJ 452 16 m nﬂAq\|AD:7LIS:lgVlVlpVpDQ «mu. a.n.l nuvlhnrwlll .. u... w my .. nnglnlllly mm: dnuuvlnnl VI arlum pmul Dale’ San Anwar om Vbmmm V om‘ Sen Dr Malramrr hm Monamavi (112991 4 ML! 59 crmw Voong Hung Vcnmg rm. Rubc9vManu/M1011 ]19e12] 1 MLRA 447. ]1seu]1 LNs17‘]1sn2]1 ML! 7: ‘/can Mom V cm. um Hus A Ors[196U] 1 MLRA 4334196011 ms 1as. [19s1]1 ML! 14 Ngm Mu] KIM] 3 Am» V Glfitspu Bros s Cnmpany Lm nm] 1 MLRA 313‘ ]1m]1 ms 50, [1950] 2 MLJ 3 Adam V wam]1917] AC any Financial lnlomralrun Somme: V Hal: Saﬂeh H1 Janzr] ]2u12] MLJU 1751 Dalo'D( Low B11] rm] V Daluk Chang Tm: Chm andafnerappozlls [21:17] 5 mm 413 Ram Aumalran Gold Mmmg Sdr] Blvd ﬁn aumlurs‘ volunlary lfaufdalmnl V we sman Les ]2n1e] 3 MU 72o wonawm R01: 020: S67] am1VRm1a Dug Chenw.Ioor] [21111]] e MLJ 297 Mogrlaway Enterprise Sdn Bhd V Soon 21.3.. Hock {sum proonenw 5/ Inc Km] Pvdurmnnoe Audm .1 Car Acveuanes Enlarprlsel [2009] :1 MLJ 525 Ken Nuldmg: am: 5 0m VSIV Sslfm 5:11] am: 5 o:s]2u14] 3 Mu 558 Puansswarar] ax] Rsnganaman nmvmg umw me name and we 1)! 7s]: Home! W1:rr11)& Ors V ./yomy Laoomoms Ltd [was] 1 ML! 192 Jalmma FoodCarp Sun arm I/Lzoﬂg War Chmn &Anar \|2n1e] 11 ML! 512 Lml em Eng V Ruslan bm Kemp. and another aopsal ]2o21] 2 Mu 514] [21121] 4 cm 155 Syeﬂ Nada Syad Harm] 4 Ana! V Lrm Gum Eng A ollvarapnlnls ]2u19] 4 MA 259, E01912 cm as] how Yaw Tram A Ors V cnun smug NM .9 Or: [20171] 2 cu ass Chm 6000!] V cm 11.1 Meng [ms] 2 cm 5139 or vqanman vKarpa7S]ngh .4. Ora ]2ooa] 3 MN 22 Wnum V Mccomlack [21:23] EWCA ON 392 llmsan Mala]/ll M Bﬂdv Glhmarv hm H1 Omsr[2D17] 2 Mu am Lm.r_m1.9n_1aa 56 run 9 Mine Da(amemnAcv1957 Simon: 21: and 592 av me Campamsa A51 2016 Order 23 Ma 1 ollns mes a1Co1m 21712 Saclmr] 2 omre Mormyﬂmdors AC! 11:51 Search 55 0/mo Ewdenn A21 1950 «1 sm IﬂAq\|5D:7LIS3gVMpVpDQ «mm. 5.1.1 IIJVVDIVWW .. 11.... In M1, 1... m1]1n.1.] mm]: ﬂnuamnl VI mum 1.71.1 sw mnmmmsmwpvpuu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm Sumu(yPod Is now spmuxyvuaw Deav seems, Spruulyﬁorl .5 now Surou\|yPo¢"‘ Durhauemnrk mgvsvation has olmzlaﬂy been Ned The pas\|mun\|hs have been chaﬂenglng bulwe ave dilenvﬂned co succeed wan a me Iuuk‘ we sheum he em to my Dark: ms auaner we wHl have an meepm uudane ready Var an our backer: ham Ind:eGaGa and Kmkslarlav won 15 Oecasmnallye P2's updaxes on mdiegogn pmnusmg dehvery a1 SarouiyPods are shame on Kxckslaner Maanwhﬂe, Ihe backers al Kwckslaner were beginning \|o voice (heir displeasure about Ihe luck at mmmauon on me dehvery dates (or Spmu(yPuds Then we eommems (mm me backers on Kmkslarter became more vureevul and targeted the Founders as a whme Dawn M’ w nalelo be me beamra! bad news‘ rm K5 Mavaﬂy mm do anylrurv; I! you recon . campawgn belare m ends. mey — nughl unul u down, um aller we campaign and: me unly nmvun mal hacklrs have agam creators Is In «axe logxl an-on ' Rhona Fallersnn 'Da\a\|e¢ tlmr Insmgram page Why womd ynu an (M5 umeii asxam. Ran w.n.m 1 have seen we me (my missile new Lsrcy am hava NEVER maeved (:15) wound x leel, mesuy «arm [i\cHhH:cl1heyW\LL NOT updaiu us I1:Ie.(hn\|we an have been taken and mu nuev see me nvoauw 16 On 742022‘ D posled me 2"‘ Puhlieaxiun, wmeh Is repvoducea below “Re $vmu\yPud me nemex Schurev Am 1 ma Bea! xnmanu Commumly. Damnl here Ihe ﬁe-ygnav behmd SpmulyPm1 As Jessma ha: pomlod mu m her \..\| name, me two ow us haw been (envunmed horn Spruub/PM Inc by czo John cseue Kungslad Wm m me Deoemher2U2\Thavv1uv=.\nm not speakmq here as a company muse: (whmm am no longer) me .3 purely 3 private update sm -naqmuavuszgvwvwpvpnq ° «mm. sew ...m.mm be H... e may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! many 0! you have bean wondalmq abam on status 04 mp ummngn am why (hive avvﬂ Mme updails an Kwdulsﬂar and nnmsgpgn, In lwlnlzd m uluvde mme miammimn Ina Inmeqepo acmunl 15 owned by me can 0! SvIoMYPud. In: Me! out tarmlnahnn hum the company, Jessma and 4 have pun nnnovaa as pouappmm mm ramvawgn nnamemn, we can-nn apcm n av man updalu Evan lhuugh ma language .n (us In! Me updmes luggeu nnnu lheve .5 mu 3 learn behind «nu mm. and nur plnure: and names are sun an In: campargn M925. mm mm x me no Vonuer pan 01 me spmnxysau campangns an ekher manonn since In: end 012021 N\|sma\|\ve\Yn Ina Klcknallar acwunl was sat up by Jewca‘ mm. nna worksd as cmav Brand omw pa spnnnywoa Sims hav nannunnupn, plv Klckslaﬂsr promcon. me has mad h: uanam ma nannpmgn m the cso‘ bu\| wnhmd wanes: me avenau dnssohmnn at our Izsm was a Iesull or 3 dmerenoe ovopumons remixed to $150,901) Damn xransvma «mm \|he <>omvanYs us hank aoouunl to me can D¢Iwna\ Mahyslan bank aowum an Dwembev 21‘ 2021 The nawanua II -n we awuum Wu npc ennugh ta: cum pmgaa or pay oulstindmg unvpnm Mlhuugh Janna um‘! I vlhamcnﬂy pm:-:u.u «.2 ma Immierol maney. Ihe cso John cum Konwsled Wan mum in Mum me mnney la the mmpany on Decemhev 24m. 2021, Ina cEo senl me a letter pa larrmnallon «mm my punlum or Co-Founder and cm: ueugn ompev A09-dnyi1aIur.J¢ss\A:a was she lervmnatsd m the am lulmn In uurlervnlruhun lalilrs‘ weweve mm mm we and nm nm mg mm to speak on hehm ol me mmpnny nnymnre and waum lane legal aclmn wlwe en not adhere m Ims requesl Fov ma masons menlmned above‘ namm Jessa: nor I have any mum .n¢onnaupn atom the status andlulﬁlmenl uﬂhu campawgn suy sale Damn nu Phlnlllk’ can 17. The Plammls‘ achon ws based on nae: ansmg (mm the 1“ and 2"“ Fubl\|ca\|inns In respect arms 1-‘ Pubucauon, the F\aml\|lls aver that me impugned wums lhevem referred to me Cumpany and P2. The Campany claims n has suwereu loss ov RM1,509,825, derwed as «allows (a) The bank awuum av on company m Mercury Bank was blacked and wmequanlly upm‘ rawllmg m on: Company: was ul clvwdmndmg revenue 4:! usswsszsa {aquwllpnl m RMs5s,a25; wvncn was nu ma mnlzrul me In pmqress an In: tmwdiundmg pmfmm Vnrhegnge The Company nns cnnseﬂuermy lnsl an; napalm! which n womd have made mmunn the sand cnwmvunuana nlannnn, nanuery Rmssaazs, anu SIN nﬂﬁqlsu-7uS3gV\v\nVvDG 7 “Nana Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e HIGH n vsﬂy .. pnmnamy mum: mmn vn mum Wm! (D) we Company has suneiad a general lass al is value amaunling la usizoamn legiriyaiem lb RM850rDﬂﬂ) is we Company plead ' ma alleinaliye vial D has bbmmmad liie leil bl ebbnainia uriiawlul inleiieience againsl the company's business. Tho nuaridanrs defence is D denies lnal me 1" and 2"“ Publicalipns were direcled al me company D avers lnal me 1-‘ and 2"’ Pubiicalions reterred lb P2 only D denies lhal lne impugned words are delamaiury Further and in ma allernalive, D pleaded lne delences bl iusliiicaliun and qualiﬁed privilege Decision 20 ii is my winding lnal me impugned words are nbl delamalory llunner ﬁnd manna delenpe pliuslilicalibn as well as gualined prlvllege nave been succsslully pipvan. Here are my reasons. The lmpugmd word: are not duiimaiury 21. in my opinion, lne impugned words are rial capable pl bearing any detamelory meaning as pleaded Tris lollowing biin pies are applicable in deleimining lnis issue (3) Me burden calls an ins wlainliws lo DMVE lnai Ilse impugned wards carry aeiainalgry irnpuiamns. (D7 The mun snpim nol iook alum impugned wards in isolalibn Mvln gaming wnelneiineia are dalzmaholy lmpulalmrlsy and (c) wnan lna impugned words are exlianad lnun a may 0\| lexlr ma provv way In asless whelher Ihers is any drfnmmnry inipuialion I! up Vuok nl me l>unI.ex\| pl me said words lsae in. Hign cairn ease aa DaIo'$aIv Anwar blrl /brahlm y The Nuw Sﬂails rinias Press (MI sdn BIIUA Anor lzmnl 2 ML! :92 a15UA— my 22 In respea 111 the I“ Publlcalion, the impugned slalemerll does expressly describe P2: aclicn 0\| wllhdrawlng the ConIpany‘s lunds as -iraudulenr aul as discussed beiim lne descnpllun is jushﬁed. 23 in respeal bl me 2” Publicalibn, a large pan or me impugned slalamenl nas been lacilly admllled by P2 as being laaliial and is lherefare, lnie. in any case, P2 has not been able lo idenlily any words which cavry daiamalbiy impulaliuns in me 2"“ Publicaliori SIN mA4q\|bD:7US3gVMpVpDQ 5 “Nair a.n.i nuvlhnrwm be UIQG w my i... aniin.ii-y MIMI dnuuvlnnl Vﬂ nFiuNG Wm! Deoence ol Jusliﬁnalion 24 Jusuncsudn rs a oomplene detence lo a deternauon amen. It Is vrelevant whether mere Is rnanoe ll me impugned slalemsnl Is true. The burden Is on me ddendant Io show that me devamamry rrnomanrons are substannsuy (me (See me Federal com case er Syalikal Hekalan Air serengor Sdn Bhd v rony Pua Kram wee (20151 5 cm 477 a\| 497, me Conn ov Apnea! case ulRa1a Syahrir bin Abu Bakar 5. Anal v Manjeez Smgh Dhillon and other appeals [2020] 3 MLJ 452 an 500). 25 under secuon 5 0! me neqemeudn Act 1957‘ me delsnce 0! yvstmceuen ‘shall net can by reason only that the truth 0! every charge rs not proved vl me words not proved in be (me do not malenaﬂy inyvre me plamhffs repulauan havmg regard to the mun 1:! me remaining charges“ \|Ua\|\|awsIheveloreIha\|wha\| is ﬂue, cannot be delamalcry (See me Hrgn Cour! case ml Dara‘ Sen" Anwar an Iorarrrrn v Dare‘ Sen Dr Mahalhir arr Mohamed [1999] 4 MLJ 58 at 69). 26 1 am of «he ammon lhal me decence 0! yvenmcauen has been proven on e nenanoe of probabmllss m the rnuam ease D has dvscharged ms burden o1 snowmg max the impugned wards are svoscarniauy me Here rs my exmanalmn The 1-' Publication 27 RecaH lhat the 1“ Publication Is an erneu sent av D Ia Mercury Bank on 23 122021. The Plamlms allege men me ermre ernan cornpnses me wnpugned words However, I odnsmer that me nmy words wmon the Plammls mum take umeclxon «e, and much cuuld have any delamalary mIpu\|aI\ons, wnuld be —“TI1ese payrnerns are Vraudulervt" The rest oune email are statements 0! undispmed lads. The payments m quesuan are as descr-bed m the 1" Pun:-canon, which are - ‘payments made on Deoembev 2w by our ceo John Woo lo we personal aocaunl” 2a The words 4n me 1“ F-vmreemn » -we wm seek Vega! achon agarns: John wed: .n my wew, do nul carry any oevsmecory Impulaucns agamst the Planrmﬂs There rs nmmng devsrnemry about expressmg an mention in lake Iegax ac1Ion against a person Indeed, -n ms eonrrnunaeauons with n and Jes , P2 had expressed such an mlerman on many occasions. What Is iuudulonn r~ mnmasrussevrvovpuu «ma. s.n.r nmhnrwm be mad e may r... nﬂmnnﬂly am. dnuamnl vn mum mar 29. Aewrdtng lo Black's Law Drctmnary, a ‘lraudulenl act‘ 5 deﬁned as - ortducl rnvolylng bad larln. snunesly, a lack ot lrllegmy, or moral lumllude' l agree wrth D that l=2's lranslerel the sum aIUSS15D,!-100 lronr the Company‘: hank amount to his own personal account, Is a traudulent act, as denned above, based an tne tollowlng grounds. nra payment trom are company to me 2'“ Pl was tmudulent an The parties‘ respective pesrtrons en the Iegalrty n1 P2‘s transter ottrre Company's lunds to hlmsell are trrese. D pleaded that F2 nad uruawtuuy wltndrawn the sum el usstmsoo un 22.12 2021 and transterred rt to lus awn bank aeepunl wrtlrout trre autrronzatron ol a Board or Drrecters' resolutron In turn, me Platntrtts pleaded tnal P2 had made dtreclor‘s advance to me company pursuant to 5 Loart Agreements dated I9.1l2020r11.12021.15 3.2021, 9 6 2021 and la to.2o21 between me company and P2 And that P2 was enzrtled tp request ler repayment and has trre rlgnl to pay back tne serd loans at any Ilme 31 I rrnd ma\| the transfer at the Company's tundt. ln trre sum at US!15D,9D0 to P2 as repayment ol P2's loans ls unlawlul lortne lotlowing reasons tar aelere F2‘: sald trenstar ettne rnonles, rrrere was no dtscusslnrt wlth u or Jesstca Nor was trrere any edard nl Dtvs¢1or:' reaelutron to aulhmtze F2 lo do w! tar The cdrnpany nae an oatrgeten re start pnrduetrsn ol spramyseds to tutnl me pmmlss made rn ns nmwdlmttilrta ampalgrl on Klckglanen 1:) rne company has no revenue axcevl lnr tne memes mrltnbutod by tne backen: And srltl owes rnaneytp aenrree prdvrders, vendors and eredrtors. rd; Atrtrougn P2 nad lull memes lo the Company pursuant to trre Loan Auvesmami prepared and stgrtea by nrrrrseltrne lnul surn was not due yet. Le) tn tne Cnllabomtlve Fmlacl tstteratlnterrtdaredzr 7 mo Ilgnsd between P2 and o. winch was prepared by P2, ll Is slated tnat F2 wtmld V -trrnd tne Pmlecl urnrl velmburwament trenr Project revenue a ppssrele-, to me sprauryvod pmled was rlu\| gsrlamltrvq any revenue y"t (91 By rrareterrlnp out we total sum nl U5$l5u,wur P2 rrad tnkevl nrore tnan wnat ne had lent tne Cumnnny: tn) we Eamvarty was nn\| rn a pwtran In return the said loan eurn yet or ln tn. wulds enne tne Gcllabotiltvl prayed Leueror lrtten\|dlhed 27 7 2020, srn ﬂM1IAt:ta7uS3s:VlvlpVvDG W «ma s.n.r nuvlhnrwm a. med a my a. anrln.u-y sun. dnuuvlml Vﬂ arlurta vtmxl	6,230	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-24-52-09/2022	PEMOHON HARITHARAN A/L MUGUNTHAN RESPONDEN 1. ) Ketua Setiausaha, Kementerian Dalam Negeri (KDN) 2. ) Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia 3. ) Kerajaan Malaysia	Citizenship - Whether the Plaintiff is a citizen of Malaysia by operation of law under Article 14 (1)(b) read together with Sections 1(a) and 1(e) , Part ll, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution (FC), Article 18 and/or Article19 of the FC.	04/12/2023	YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=12297a92-8b2a-409a-92d6-0669f1985079&Inline=true	04/12/2023 12:26:33 WA-24-52-09/2022 Kand. 33 S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N knopEiqLmkCS1gZp8ZhQeQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—24 52—o9/2022 Kand. 33 nu/12/2:323 ]2:2b'3J nun MAHKAMAN mace: mun nu KUALA Luuwun mun wuuun psnssxumm xunu LLIMPIJR. muvsu (mm.-.m< KLIASA-KUASA Knm smm wsuu Aug 5 mwumn Da\am Penkara Amkel ¢4n)Ls7,vs.19 Jadual Kedun Pnnambagaan Persekuluan Malaysxa. Dan Dalam perkam Pllimrin sax-1 Pevammwemman Pendahran Negavz 1990 .1... Aklz Fsndailalan Negava «ago. Dan Akla RzMSnesmk.1B5O Dan mum mum Alumn-Aluran 7 u... 73 Kaedan-Kaedah Mahkamah‘ zmz mmu 1. vummanm AIL muaunmm (sun Kalahlrzn No. n-mr Avmzsy PLAINTIF mu 1 new: szmusnu xauzmsnum mum NEGERI 2 xsrua PENGARAM JAIAYAN PENDAFVARAN uzauu. uuuvsm a. xeruuuu mnuxvsm RESPDNDEM-RESPONDEN My 1 of 1. sm kmvilmmkcswlclznnaﬂ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Judgment lnlroducllon 1. The Ptatntnv ﬁled an appltcalion by way oi Ongmalmg Summons (05) dated t7.s.zo22 (Enclosum I) seekmg inter aka the loﬁowmg orders - 1.1 A dedaralmn mat the Plaintm is a Mmaysxan cmzen by operahon auaw underArucIe £411}(b)and/crAnic\e Iﬂollhe Federal Oonsmuhnn (Fe), 1.2 A declaralwcn mat the Plammt Is a Ma\ays\an cmzen pursuant \|n Arms 19 onna ‘C! t 3 An order direclmg the Respondents to Issue a Bmh camnaata la ma Flamufi statmg mat the F\amM1 IS a Mataystan cmzen Wwlhln Iwanlyone (20 days from ma eats ollhe Courfsorder: t A An order mrecttng me Respondsnls to Issue a Mykad slzlxng tnat \he Plamhlf ts I Msmyswan an hm lwerm/-nne 121; days lrwn tne date at the own s Order. t 5 An ordev mat ma 1-‘ Respanﬂenl regxslers and updates Ihe F\a\|nhWs name to the Reqwsler pursuant \|o secuon 4 at Ihe Nalwonal Reglslralmn Act 1959 and Regmanons 11 and 14 at In: Regulalwons of Nalwonal Rsgtslralmn 1990, and 1.6 An award lnr damages Incmdlng geneval damages andlor damages to be calculaled «or breach talcansmumnal ngms 2 \n gist. the apphcalwon oancems tna cmzansmp status unhe Plmntiw undev me prowsnons ol Ihe Fe. 3. Anerme heanng. 1 dwsmvssed me Plamlrffs as (Endosure 1) The reasons lav me deosuon are set down bstcw ngezcvu m knuvi-r4Lmk<:s1gZbBZrtQ¢D “Nana Sam nmhnrwm a. H... In may he mm-y -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mans v-max 34 In men Sinw Bung 5 Anal v. Kama Pungmh Jabeun Pnndanann Negan a. on [2n17] 5 MLJ 662: [2017] a CLJ 16: [2017] 3 MLRA :53; me Coun 0! Appeal had slated as Mluws, - 12:] Amde mm») cl me Fades! consmmnn sncapqulalas ma nqulrumlnl av clllzuuhlp by Jul wlk x.-. am. a! mum; Mme para om M pan :1 0! ma Sewnd Schedule av Ihe Federeﬂ Cnnsululnun mm {mm a uuzen ol any mumry) enaaasunnes me mq mm: at cillxlnl p by Jun unaunnu hy mono or Imuuu [211 mus n wuuld apoear mu m. Iuwnd appvlllm would nun to sadsly mm on vlqul mm or ms loll ann [us sangulnls In ord-r In mm: me via nmum: nfnrl mum und para my 5! null. Sucond Sclludu Ioﬂhe Federal Conslllmiun Areteno Chm Koo» Nan (Sumg an benaw av nnsen am as mwgnuun vnorescmuuve Ia cnn ha Nee mum Fendallar Eesar Kelahvran aan Kemauan MalIys1a[ZDI6]7 MLJ 111: ‘ (emphasxs added) as Tne burden or pmvmg me we qualAﬁz:a\|mn \ e lhe person was not born a emzen of any Doumry hes on the P\aIn\|IN lhi\| at Ihe urns of ms bmn. based on the nneage, does not acqmre cmzensmp at any country. (See Lim J-n Hsian L Anor (supra): Than slow sang a. Anor (SW9!) :6 In me ms(an\| case, one F\a\rmfV Is an megmmaxe person at me tune of ms bmh. Therefore, ms lineage could only be uaceable to ms bAc\og\::a\ mamer, Nlpa Rukanna whu .s a Tnauanu cmzen 37 Tnerevore, \|he Flalrmﬂ am not mm me mud quahﬁcahon as Plavmff cannot be said Ms net be Dom a cmzen of any country because at me ume of ms Lmn based on ms hneage‘ ne acqmmd the cinxenshwp orhus mologmar mmher. Nipa Rukanna who is Tnauand cmzen. lxsunnnl of M uyal-n Inumauonel P pan 38 II vs me considered wew :71 [ms Courl lhal me xssuanee of me Ma\ay$Ian \|n(ema\|iuna\ passpon to me Plamuu I5 melevanx for me p... u at :4 sm knnvEInLmkcS1§ZuBZnQ¢D “Nana saw ...n.mn a. U... a may a. mmnnuly -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum am purpose nfdeterrmnlng the PVarnI\fi‘s cmzansmp by operahon of law. Ths pravvsmns of Article 14mm) ov me FC read together mm Sermon 1‘ Fan H, Second Sohedme at me FC had expressly provided for ma raqmsme qu canon for me aoquismon ol Malaysxan auzensmp by operauon of law and me rssuanoe m a Malaysxan mxerrrauonax passpon rs not pan ol [ha reqursme quahﬂcahons. as I «ma sunborl «or my View by referring to the Federal Court case of cm; a. Anor tsunra) wherem II was hem as {mlows - 1201 Cmzensmv nyopemmanawrsmrommrarorruymMexaysra Many cmmmas r.. ma worm Iacngmle mu prrrrcrr-we ac ulnxunsmv band an nsown ser Mcmena eswen ns me we sch and ,..s sangu 5 Me Hence. rr 1! safe In mnclms Inst whulmr on: is quallrlud u - mum. ny ovnrnmn Mlnw nlluvllly mull bu lactnnd rrsrr. an cvinrinn -ml:-ddld In 1M rcn-en. upon me we cunslrunlun 01 um I-lcvlnl vrovlu on lemphasws added] 40 On lhe wssue or wssuanca of Ihe Imemanonan pazrsporuo lhe Plamhﬂ, 1 ﬁnd thal n has been exmamea by «he Respondents through the Afﬂdavu m Remy Na 2 amrrrrea by Ahmad Rashexry bin Anum Ramm, rrrrmalarr Pengarah Bahaglan KeseVama\an dan Paspon Maxaysre, Jabatan umgresen Malaysra dated 61 2023 (Endcsuve \5) when he slales ss vouows. » w saya merum De/emluan12A6davnEaIasanP\amm1dmxelahdmasxhau men Feguam man Penekmuan um sesungguhnya menyalaknn sepemnerruur 5) FIG: mu Pupnn mu y-I. Pllmlﬂ dlhlunrkln mm pm. 29 Jun 20:12, mum Jabatan Imwrsserr Maliysla bolum aurneqrasnkarr dengln .l.Ihzun Pendalumn Megam. m Semakan semuln m In ‘Snmnk K ymr. Parmohonan Fl pun mu-ym Anurlhlnlln (van pm u.2n2s rrmm-pan -mu Fla’ ril mm “Pnrmullollan turrrrmlanr, my ruluk Faﬁbat mugreserr Sesahnan tarvgkav Wayar ‘Semak Keﬁayakan Pemnarran Paspan Mamym AnlmIbnngsn(FMA)‘\|1un:mkh 4 Jnmnn 2:223 auammman sebaaav ‘eksxhal mm Paul u at :1 sm kmvEInLmkcS1§ZbB2l1QID “Nana smm lunhnrwm r. U... m may r... mm-r -mm: dnuamnl VI mum WM cj Semakan mm mewenax nagamm Paspan Mllaysva Anlambangsa mam: dukeluarkan men mam. lrmgvecen Kala Sham pad: xema Mu udak ﬂapll dwhuax memandangkan kesemua ﬂakumen nelrmhonan P\a\mMs\ah auupusxan seunnan swat danpada Pengarah Imwgnesen Neoen Ke\anIzn benankh 5122022 dnampmun soblgun 'aks1b\|\| mu‘ 5 Saya wga Ielah mnzshwzlkan men Psguam Kman Fersekuluan ﬂan muagilkan mm vnmnluunn mu nnuuh-nun mu-yu. u. Fllinll (max 5 em. membuklllmn hahma memm mm»: .m......... nu. mullluikulmn u undangmnﬂlnu m huah Fnrkara cmxn) Purlnmbaunn Pnrsclunnan. s Dalam ape we mm... mm kutarnl luarnn Plllnlﬂ yang bend: dalam aem JPN mm. Mrpak .1... harkumkunsl. P. In vupon vmnm « an m no: u Fun In Ind:/mvmllhall auu mecninsuhkan sums lcevtamanegaraan rmnmym nrdnpn nan... nkod JPN " [emphasis added) 41 Based an the above 1 am 0! «he wew that (he P\amIMs‘ rehsnee on me Issuance ofme Malaysia mternatlorm passport to the Plamtm m seeking cmzensmp by operation nl law Is cleaﬂy mwswaoed unsllip undovllrliclu 18 Ind/ov I9 of an F0 42 Havmg read Amdes 13 and 19 anne FC, mus coun Is of me vxew Inal unhke cmzenshnp by operenon anew under Anu:\e 14 aims FC‘ Anicle 18 and/or Amde 19 a! me FC reserved exduswvely to me Federa\ Govemmem mscreuon Io gram cmzensmp by way at regxsiraluan or nalurlhzalvon. Such msaeuon .5 exercxsable upon apphcahon berng made \|o me Federa\ Government 43 However‘ 1 ﬁnd lha\| m we presem case‘ except [or a prevuous apphcahon made under Amele 15»: of the Fc, [here was no applucalmn ever made by me Piaimm to the Fedeml Govemmenl under Amc\e1a andlor Aniale 19 omue FC 44 More Imvorlamly. nus Ccurl Is or the mew (hat any deuslun by the Federal Govemmentm me exerase oi ms discretion undevAnIcle ca and/or Amcla 19 of the FC Is not ravwewame vn a noun of IIW‘ as me u M 1: sm kmvi-1Lmkcs1gZu9znQ¢D «we. saw ...m.mm .. H... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! pmwdea by secnan 2 of Pan VII Second Schedule o! the Fc, As such, mans beyond me mnsmcmanal reach of ms caun. Conelu-Ion 45. Pmrmsea on me afnvesawd reasons, I nnd lhal me F\aInhﬂ'5 os (Encvosure 1; has nu mem m law as As such‘ lhe P\amM’s OS(EnD1asure 1; is dlsmlssed wmn no order as to cos\|s. Dated our December2023 Ahmad Kama! hm Md Shah Judge Hugh com Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For me Flalmm Clk R Renuga Ramayah Tamar: R Renuga Ram A Go Peguambela dan Peguamcara 4122, Jalan USJ 21/10 47530 sunang Java Selangor 1RuJ.Tuan RRC/CICIZ/2021) Fur me Respondents: cm Farah smmaaa m Ramh Semcr Fedemx counsax Jahalan Peguam Negara. Eahaglan Gunman‘ No 45. Psrsvsran Pemana, Presml 4‘ 52100 Pulraﬁya u... n M u m knuvEInLmkCS1§ZbB2nQID «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Backtlrottnd Facts 4 The backgrmmd tact: at the 03 are gathered from the cause papers and the sttbmtsstcrts of the names trespeettutty adopt them sttbtect to some modtﬁcaltons 4.1 The Ptarntrtt‘ was bum an 29 4 2001 tn Parak. Malaysta The htrth at the Ptarnhtt was registered an tt 5.2001 as per Btrth Oemﬁcate Ne AV 79329! (See Paragraph 4 and Exhthtt H-1 of the Flu" Aniduvit in suppart (AlS)) (Wt 4 2 The Ptatrtltff Ctatmad to he the biotogical son a1Mugtm\|han all Ealakrtshnart, a Malaystan ctltzen. (Ssei Paragraph I and Ellllbll Hr2 Mthe Plninliffs AIS] 4.3 The hretegieat mother or the Platrtltil Is a Thartand ctltzen named Ntpa Rukanrta (Thattand Passport No: H464136). The htetogtcat mother ten the Ptarhtrtt when the Ptarhhtt was about 1 year 2 months Old! tsee Paragraph sth) and Respondents‘ Atﬁdavit in Reply (AIR) tenet. 13)) 4.4 Mugtmlhan and Ntpa Rukanrta were never marned: 4.5 On 29.6 2002, the Platnltﬂ was tssued B Malayatan tnternatranat passport wrth the status ol a Mataysran ctltzen, (See Paragraph 4ta) M the Rnspondonlr AIR tarret. l5)) As In 2009 when Ptarnhtf was In stand rd two, Ptatntrtrs tether went to change the new tmh cert tmte (green colouv) as requested by the schaet management A search was done and the Platntiifs Btnh Certthcate was extracted. It was anty then the Flatnltﬂ discovered that the extracted Btmt certrncate stated 'EUKAN WARGANEGARA" tsee Exhihtt N-7 of the Ptaimirrs AIS) 4 7 The Ptarntrnapptred torcrtizenshrp under Amete 15A 0! the FC tdr three trrnes. an the appttea ohs were unauecesstuh and (see Paragraph 14 and Exhibit JPN-1 and JPN-2 at the nmnd-ntv AIR (Encl. 12)) me a cl ll IN kruavEI=tLrnkcs1gZuBzrtQ¢D “Nair smut ...n.rwn r. t... M mm r... nﬂmnnttly MIMI dnuuvtnht Vﬂ mum v-mat 4 3 Hence. me presenl os by me Plannml Tm dncision of In! Court 5 The Pkamuﬂ subnms Iha\| he is a Medaysxan cmzan by openmon of law under Amcle I4(I)(b)01me FC read Iogelherwxm secuons 1(a) and 1\|s),ParHLSecand Schedule 0! me FC. 6 ArIic\e14m Part III ovme FC reads asloﬂows ~ “cltlunshlv byepannbn 04 law um Subpecl lo the pmmm. av um. Pm mu lohcwlw Derwns am unten- by opelauon av Vaw. mm .5 we say‘ (.1 any vvvon Dom mm mm. . Dly wll u =-um oun- Fedtmion by vinuu oﬂhe pmusums coma ed n pm: of Int sccond smauun. and (by every D6/Son mm on o. my Mmaysta Day. and havmg any ov me quaumnom speciﬁed M Fin n olma Sucond Schedme ' 7 Seclxonk Pan VL Second Schedme cl the FC pruvudss as vouows Fan in smun Schedule cmzsusmp av owsounou or uw or pznsous warm on an AFTER MALAYSIA my 1 SuD\|ec1 In the Dmvmnn: nY an m of (ms cm-smut-on, me fuﬂowmg psrwns Dam on ur aflev Malayma Day as cmxans by upuamn av law‘ lhal x. to say. my many pmon born wnmn um namum Mwlwu pannll am an Inn a um mm at on raw: -mm : cmm or p-rmn-any resident In me Emma", and Am wary canon Dom omsme um Fedemlmn mm «mu m at me nme mm: mm a allzan and euher was born ‘:1 Ihedederahan or :1 m. hm: a! ma mm: m me sumac aims Fedlliuun m M 2 rate. and p... - at 1: sm kmvEInLmkcS1§ZbB2nQIQ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! (c) every persar. Dom mllsuu lnr Fsdsvallurl wrlma lalnar Is al lna lime ulm: bmh a aluzen and whose mm rs Wllhlﬂ one yasralns ncculvancl or wllhln suan lprrgar parlad I: ma saaml suvernrnarll may ln Dzﬂlcular case sllpw. regaleraa B! a mnsulzne nun. Federabon ul, ll ﬂoucuri ln arunarorln alemlory vruwlbsd for (Ni purpase by araer cl Ihe vsnp dl~PemIan Agarlg. reglslaraa wrln ma Faaaral Guvemmerll and ml everypersnrl bum WI Sllvgapnva plwnpss parenlone al leas\| ls al rna Mme al me him! 1 mlzen urld we I! not bum . clllzan mhsrwlse man by vlllut allm viriaraphl «nu lal mry plnorl ham wllhln ma lmrarlpr. who not ham . anlnrr ol ny counlry nnrorrrrlu Mill by VWIIAI 01 ml» peragnrpvl (emphasls added) 3 Based on male 1A(1)(b) ollne FC lead logelnar wlln sacnon Hal. Pan ll, second schedule umre FC, ll ls clear lnal tor a pelsan la be a Malaysian clllzen by uperallon at law pursuanl lo mesa provlslarls, ma raqurs es qualmcallon to be Iumlled are: la) The person was ham an or after Malaysra Day. (D) The person was born wllnlrr «ha Faaeralrcnl and lo) Al lne llnra 0! ma person’: lmr. pna pl ms paranls ls a Malayslan cllizerl or permanent resldenl In the Federalmn Q. In \|he inslanl case, ll ls not dlspuled Iha\| me blological mother uf the Plalnllll Is a Thallarld pruzen by me name of Nlpa Rukalvla as reoovded In ms plan eerllﬁcale. lo. Therefare, «ms courl is pnna vlew mal lhe Plalnlln has rrcl lumlled me requrrsrrlenls lor clhzenshlp by oparalrorl cl law under Amcle 14(1)(b) ol me FC. ll ms Cuurl Is 01 lne mew lnal lne ongln elme palernal and malamal slde pl lne Plalnllff rnual he asaenalrraa and ms existence al rnarrlage rnusl he pmven pealaa me place pl birlh furlhe Plarnlmlo llualrry lor cllrzenslup by pperallon pl law under Arllcla l4m(b) cl \|he FC. »...s.m SIN knnvEInLmkCS1§ZDB2llQID «ma. Sum luvlhnrwm rs. p... a my r... nﬂmrluﬂly MIMI dnuavlml VI nFluNa Wm! 12. 13 14. 15 16. 17 The can that me Flamtiﬂ was born rn Malaysra ano me varrrer Is a cmzen cl Malaysia amne dos not MNI rne requrremenr «or crrrzensnrp oy nperauon ol Vow, more so wnen ner malagucal momer rs a Thailand o zen. ma :5 paoaose cmzensrup rs oonrenea by law under Amcle 14(1) (b)01lhe FC wnen the varrrer who rs a onizen is Vegaﬂy rnarned to me mother oeiore me Plarnnﬁ was born or rn circumstances where me parem rs mamsd arrer me Flamm was born rn accordance mn Sedvon 3 and A or me Legiurnacy Act 1961. Based on Amcle 14u)(p) at me FC read rogerner wnh secrron 1(a), Pan II, seoono Schedule onne Fc, \ nno mar \he ﬁrs! and seoono oualrncanon has oeen lumen bylhe Pl ffwhere me Plairmfv was porn after me Malaysia Day and ne was porn rn Ferak, wumn rne Federahan. However‘ me Plamvﬂ mo nor (emu rhe Imrd reourrernenr. Therefore‘ fur a person ro fulﬁl thelmrd quanrrroenorr r e anne rrrne or me persons om one or nrs parenns rs a Ma\ays\an oruzen or pernranenr resroenr rn rrre Federauonr ne rnusr prove mar one a! me oronogrsal paranls (ii rre was oorn Vsgmmaleb or me orologreal rnorrrer no ne was oerrr ruegrurnane) Is a Maraysran cmzen or pennanenuy resmenl m are Faderaﬂnn In the present case. mere rs no orspure that Muguntnan as orang Yang Mengaku Dm seoagar Bapa unoer sermon 13 and Nrpa Rukanna. me P\a\n(rﬂ's rnmher was never married‘ thus left me Plarnm as me person who was born out on wedhxzk re an rlregmmane son at me \|ime of bmh. lam of me view max r! a person rs an Iﬂegmmale person at me time of ms ornn and me reverence \|o ‘parenls“ m Sechon 1(3), Pan ll, seoono scneoule oune FC rs rp be oonsxrueo as “nrorher Tnrs rs based on Seclmn 17‘ Pan Ill, seoono Schedule of the FC wnrcrr provmes aslouows — 17 For me purpose 1:! 9. III -21 um. comrsrurion mt villus re a pinion‘: mm at In mu pmrrr. or In on of hls pulnu, M: m ve\a1vun\a a person wrro xsnuopmmm n1 oocerrarrm as nruurrcu r... s al In rn kr-uvE-1Lnn<cs1gZusznQuu “None s.r.r nmhnrwm re p... a may r... nrW\ruH\|y mm. dnuamnl VI mum WM to his iiiaiii-i, aiia accoicingiy seciioii is pi (his Scheoule siiaii um apgiy to sum a peisisii “ iemphasis added) 18 mhd suppon for my view hasad an the Cowl oi Appaai case oi Lim Jun Hiiian a Anor v. Kama Peiigaiah Jabltan Pcndlflllln Nlglll A Ors[2ﬂ17] 6 MLRA 426: [2017] 3 cu 411; 1201:] a NILJ 545 where II was herd - ii. iii. use 51 an iiiegiiiiiiiau child. in wnﬂl ‘pilllnf is aisiiaima In rvhrio his blolnvicll iiioih-i. seciioii IT a! Pin HI uiihs saasiiii CnrilH\|uhnH slate: as Inﬂows For ihs piiiposs oi i=aii iii oiiiiis coiisiiiuiipii nimiim u. n p-rxiuim Izmir one his pai-iii. one OIII oi hil DIVIIIII. m iii IEIIHDII nu p-isoii who is Vlleglllmihe to be tonslllled is vuhvuncu lo . lI\|9”1Ifi IVIH ssmiciiigiy miiuii I9 N lhli scheauie shaii iioi avlaly In such a peisisiii (emphasis aimedi 19 Funhei. in chm T Em Bnrmllla (uorang dl buwlh umui u-ii membawa iiiidakaii iiii mnlalui pup. yang sari um sahahal wakllnyl Flnlntﬂ Kedua) is Aiioi v. Keiua P-iigauii Pllldlﬂtlrlll Ncgnn M lynn 5 or! man] MLRAU 51; [N20] 4 cu 5w: man] 3 MAR mi [2020] 3 MLJ 534. me couii at Appeal hard (hat- 1e1 Reamw iiie above aiiea DVDVVSIDVVS VII iiiia ihm wiii llD\ in any Dmbllm ll: china is B0!!! leglllmale In a miisi who I: . Mnlnyxlnn cilix-n IVIII if M II born oulsidn lhl mmiiiiii. Bul iii iii. iimiii appeal, [he thllﬂ ms ham nul D’ wlﬂlock. He was iiisgiiiiiiau ai Ihl Ilml om. ii. sp mm com iii. DIDDIIIVII. SICIIOVI 11 in Pin Ill oﬂhe sscpiin Schndulo vpocrﬁ ally siipiiisiss iiiai Ether" iii uiuieii In . DIVIDII who II Illlﬁlllm . min In Illl mulhn (emphasis aduedh 20 coming hack \|o ihe iacis in ihe pieserii case. ii is noi dispuied iiiai the Piaiiiiifi was bum on 29.4 2001 and a pinh eenincaie was issued to ihe Piainiin in which, his iaihei is Maiaysiaii ciiizeiisriip and his piaipgicsi maihei is Mipa Rukahiia, a Thaiisiia naiioiiaiiiy pm 7 ai :4 SN kmPEIqLmkCS1§ZDBZriQIU «wu. s.ii.i nuvihnrwm be u... M may i... nﬂmhnﬂly MIMI ﬂnulﬂlnl p.. nF\uNG Wm! 22 23 24 25 26 27 Based on the abuvei lam Mme considered view lhat the Plaintill is an illegitimate person at me time oi his birtti. by virtue oi section 17, Part III, second Schedule oi the Fc, tlie word ’pavems’ in section 1(a\|i Pan ll, second schedule oi tne FC sriall be construed as ‘mother’ Wilh regards to trie lumllineni cl tna requislla quallftcalmrl lor citizensnip as alluded to earlier. l ant oi trie view that the Plalmlﬂ fulﬁlled ttie ﬂrsl and ltie second qualrncanpn when tiewas born alter Malaysia Day on 29 A mot and he was porn in Palak, witriin Federahorl However, the Pleintilldid nul lumll tna tnird oualincation because nis nietlteris nm a Malaysian eitixen or permanent resident in the Federallun The above view taken would not be complete wllhnu\| relerririg to the Federal ccun case of CTEB 5 Anor v. Kntio Pengerali Pondlfnran Negara. Malaysia 5 on [2021] 4 IIILRA an; [2021] e cl..l 411; (202115 AMR M1: [2021] 1 ML! 215. we issues in me present case are subslanuaﬂy lar to the issues in CYEB (supra) wnare oatri cases mrloem tne issue oi citlzenstilp under Arllcle I4(1)(b) oi the F0 read icgetnerwitn sec\|ton1(h)i Fan ll, second Schedule ollne FC as well as tne issue clan tllegnirnate criild and the application cl section l7, Farl lll, Second Schedule cl tne FC. in use (supra), trie criild I e. the First Appellam was tmrri outside Malaysia, to a Malaysian Ietrier i.e tne second Appellant and a Filipino rriotrier and at me time of tiis tairin rirs parents were not legally married. Hence me First Appellant is Illegitimate at trie time al nis pinn. Tne Appellants had med an originating summons at me l-iign court In seek a declaration triet me First Appellant is a Malaysian Clllzan by operation el law pursuant to Anicle 14(t not or tne PC. The Appellants originating sunirrions was dismissed by the High Conn The Appellants ttien appealed to tne court cl Appeal. The court of Appeal dismissed ttie Appellants appeal and aiﬁrrnett the decision oi trie High court. Yrie iudgrnent of me court a1Appeal is repdned in ctiari Tli Em a-rrnlllo (ueranp dl bawen umur dun Pualnill IN krrlvilrurrikcslglcbzrinaﬂ «war. Smll mrrlhnrwlll be it... e van! i... nﬂnlrullly MIMI dnuuvlnrlt Vﬂ aFluNa mi rrl-rrreewe Iirldlkln lnl mllalui nape yang uh mu Iahzlzl wakilrlya Plllrlm Kndua) a. Arrorv. Kelua Pengarell Perldaflamrl Nngn ,M: yI\|al§Ors(supra). 2a subeequenlly, me Appellants were grenled leave to appeal ld me Federal com agalnsl me ceurtolAppeel‘s declslorl On 25.5.2021, Ihe Federal calm by a malomy drsrnlesed me Appellanls‘ appeal. we orders olme Hugh Court as emrmed by me com 0! Appeal are malnlalned 29 Upon perusal enhe merorlly decision ellrre Federal calm in crsa (supra), I ﬁnd that me sallenl legal prlrrclples eerr be dlslllled whrch are as «allows 29.1 Flrslly. lhe eoqulsilrorr of cnlzerrshlp by eperallan of law under Anlcle14 oflhe FC ls based on me lu lmenl al quallﬁcatlons sel out In me FC and such qdelrllee s mus! be rrrel at me (lme Mb rm, 29 2 secerrdly, slnce cmxenshlp by operallon ol law re delermrrred al urnn, olner laws men relreepecwely quelrly a person such as the Legllimacy AC1 or Adeplron Act cerrrrol be used In construe me quelincalrnn at max person: 29:: Tmrdly, Secllon 17, Part lll, Second Schedule e1 me FC apnlles lo Seaman 1, Pan ll, Second Schedule oi lhe PC by Vlflue at me quallfying words lrr seclron 1, Pan ll, Second Schedule of the F0 and by vlrlue omnlcle :1 cl me FC, 29.4 Founhly‘ Sectlon 17, Part lll, Second Schedule vflhe FC ls clear and urremnrgdeus mel me relerence Io ’paren(‘ or "(BRIEF In ralallon m an lllegillmale child is \|o be wrlslrued as ‘mclhef Therelole, an illegilrmale chlld‘s cmzenshlp lellrme me clllzenshlp ol hls mmer; and 29.5 Fiﬂhly. based on the Iegislalive hlslory. rl V5 also lrre lnlenhcrl and pos on onhelramers dnhe FC that err lllegllrmele cmlds cmxensrrlp ls lo lelldw me erllzensnrp ollne rrlolner and null me lelner r... 1 al In r~ kr-avEnrlLmlr::s1gZo9znQ¢u «we. Smnl luvlhnrwm .. UIQG e may r... nﬂmruﬂly -mm: dnuavlml vn nFluNﬂ vmul 30. Therefcra. apmylng ma Iawtnlhe facts oHl1e presannease, 1! vs clear that me Plawmfhs not a Makayslan omzen by cperalmn at Vaw under Ar\|\::\e14(1)(b)readKog:(her wrm seclinn 1(a) Fan u oune Second Schedule or me so and sechon 17 Part III 0! lha sacona Schedule of me FC section 14 Pm ll Second scrraaula cmha Fc 31 Secuan «(ay Pan 11‘ second Schedule Mme FC provides as1allows' 1 Sumac! to ma pmwsaons owan m an [ms crmmrmmr. um caunaamp pusorrr horn on or arm Mnlnylil my Irv cmzunx by opuauon ol I3w,l)1nl\$\|o say (e) every person horn wiltlin m r a ramrrr who Is rm born a zillion pr ny counlry Mlluwl In-n by vimu of mu paragraph (emphsms added) 32. In vnlerprelmg Seclmn 1(e)u1FanllofIhe Second Schedme 0! me FC, me F\am\|\m rmslmerprelad and rgnorae me raqunrsmenl 07 “not born a cmzerr of any country“ m Szcuon Ne) wmcn reqmres ma evraenoe 01 Irneage as established by decided case law. 33 In Lim Jen Hsiarr A Anor (supra) the Court at Apnea‘ held as loHows: - 1271 Amde mm) as ma Facets! Cansmumzn encspsmzles Ihn nqulrumlnl cl clltxoushlp by jns snll \|.e. by an plus. of hi : we DIV: rm 4:! Fun In, Second Schedula pr ma Fademl corrmumrr mm Dom a cmzen at any wunhy) cavsmalas cm nqulnmunl M mnanmp by Jun ungulnll . by blnod or nu.-no. [231 rm u would aposav man rm mm Ippcllnnl would nun era sausvy mm Iha nqairumunls jun soll arm rus sangulnls In nvvcr in mm rr. nqulnm-Ah M .n 1l(1Mb)\|rId 1mo1P-nu. smrrm Schoduln mm. FIdurI\|ConIIiluI1on(mfev\o Chm moor Nah {Suing on behalf ul nrmsan arm as Imgalmn represenlalwe rp cm. Jla Net. cm) v Pendanzr Eesar Kebhlran dan Kemunin Ma\zyS\a mom} 7 ML! my (emphasis added) »a.. an o! 1» am kmvi-r4Lmkcs1gZuB2nQ¢D “Nana saw nmhnrwm r. p... a may r... mm-r mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum war	1,875	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
AA-62-35-04/2023	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MUHAMMAD AZRIEN BIN MAT HUSSIN	Guilty plea - attempted murder - Section 307 Penal Code - Public interest - Seriousness of the offence - Rehabilitation - First Offender and plea of guilty - Remorseful	04/12/2023	Puan Ainul Shahrin binti Mohamad	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=96b2d410-5a17-4246-ad53-8570671aaaa3&Inline=true	1 IN THE SESSIONS COURT AT IPOH 1 IN THE STATE OF PERAK 2 CRIMINAL CASE NO. AA-62-35-04/2023 3 4 BETWEEN 5 6 PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 7 8 AND 9 10 MUHAMMAD AZRIEN BIN MAT HUSSIN 11 12 JUDGMENT 13 14 INTRODUCTION 15 16 [1] This is an appeal by the accused on sentence of 7 years from the date of 17 arrest (12.4.2023). 18 [2] The accused was charged under section 307 of the Penal Code for attempted 19 murder. The charge read— 20 Bahawa kamu pada 11.04.2023 jam lebih kurang 10.51 malam bertempat 21 di hadapan Bangunan Angsana Mall, Jalan Raja Ashman Shah, Kampung 22 Kastam Greentown 30450 Ipoh, di dalam daerah Kinta, di dalam negeri 23 Perak, didapati mencuba membunuh orang dengan niat sehingga 24 menyebabkan cedera ke atas Norfatiha binti Zulkifli, KPT: 950222085556. 25 Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di 26 bawah seksyen 307 Kanun Keseksaan. 27 28 CASE FOR THE PROSECUTION 29 30 [3] The prosecution tendered the psychiatric report of the accused. The report 31 stated that accused has two conditions, namely Substance Dependence and 32 Antisocial Personality Disorder. 33 04/12/2023 08:53:03 AA-62-35-04/2023 Kand. 17 S/N ENSylhdaRkKtU4VwZxqqow Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [4] The report also stated that the at the time of the commission of the act as per 34 the charge, the accused was in sane mental state and was aware of the nature 35 and consequence of his action and able to understand that his act was wrong 36 and against the law. 37 [5] It was also stated in the report that the accused was mentally stable and able 38 to be brought before the Court to face trial and defence. 39 [6] That part of the psychiatric report (Kand. 7) read— 40 (b) Semasa kejadian seperti yang dituduh pada 11 April 2023, beliau 41 berada dalam keadaan mental yang waras dan sedar akan sifat dan 42 akibat daripada perbuatannya serta mampu untuk mengetahui bahawa 43 perbuatan tersebut adalah salah dan bertentangan dari segi undang-44 undang. 45 (c) Keadaan mental beliau adalah stabil pada tarikh laporan ini ditulis. 46 Beliau layak dihadapkan ke mahkamah untuk dibicarakan serta mampu 47 membela diri. 48 [7] The accused was brought before the Court on 20.11.2023 and the charge was 49 read and explained to the accused in Malay. The accused admitted that he 50 understood the charge read and explained in Malay and pleaded guilty. 51 [8] The nature and consequence and penalty for pleading guilty were read and 52 explained to the accused in Malay and the accused admitted that he 53 understood the nature and consequences of pleading guilty as well as the 54 penalty and maintained his plea of guilty. 55 [9] The prosecution tendered the facts of the case. The facts of the case was read 56 and explained to the accused in Malay. The accused understood the facts of 57 the case read and explained in Malay and admitted as correct (except for the 58 word “ragut” in the 1st paragraph is amended to read “gaduh”). 59 [10] According to the facts of the case, on 11.04.2023 at about 10.51 p.m. at 60 Bangunan Angsana Mall, Jalan Raja Ashman Shah, Kampung Kastam 61 Greentown 30450 Ipoh, the accused attempted to murder the victim, Norfatiha 62 binti Zulkifli, by using a knife. The victim suffered deep cuts to both hands and 63 joint of 3rd finger on the left hand. 64 [11] The facts of the case was tendered and marked as exhibit P1. 65 [12] The prosecution then tendered the following exhibits— 66 S/N ENSylhdaRkKtU4VwZxqqow Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 a. Police report Sg Senam/2333/23 – tendered and marked as 67 exhibit P2; 68 b. Police report Sg Senam/2337/23 - tendered and marked as 69 exhibit P3; 70 c. Police report Sg Senam/2339/23 - tendered and marked as 71 exhibit P4; 72 d. Police report Sg Senam/2342/23 - tendered and marked as 73 exhibit P5; 74 e. Sketch plan and key - tendered and marked as exhibit P6 and 75 P6k; 76 f. 10 photographs of the scene of crime - tendered and marked 77 as exhibit P7(A)-(J); 78 g. 2 photographs of the victim - tendered and marked as exhibit 79 P8(A)-(B); 80 h. 2 photographs of the knife - tendered and marked as exhibit 81 P9(A)-(B); 82 i. Borang Bongkar - tendered and marked as exhibit P10; and 83 j. Medical report - tendered and marked as exhibit P11. 84 [13] All exhibits were showed and explained to the accused, the accused 85 understood and admitted all the exhibits as correct. 86 87 SENTENCE 88 89 [14] After taking into account the guilty plea of the accused and the exhibits, the 90 Court accepted the guilty plea of the accused and found the accused guilty 91 and convicted the accused of the charged preferred against him. 92 [15] Mitigation of the accused (self-represented) read— Pohon hukuman kurang 93 dari tarikh tangkap. 94 [16] Reply by learned DPP Evangelin read— Pohon hukuman setimpal. Mangsa 95 masuk hopital 3 bulan. Tiada sebab untuk ditikam. Pengajaran kepada OKT. 96 [17] The Court considered the guilty plea of the accused and the mitigating and 97 aggravating factors and the entire case, this Court sentenced the accused to 98 7 years imprisonment from the date of arrest. 99 S/N ENSylhdaRkKtU4VwZxqqow Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The law 100 101 [18] Section 307 of the Penal Code reads— 102 (1) Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under 103 such circumstances, that if he by that act caused death he would be guilty 104 of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may 105 extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused 106 to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable to 107 imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years. 108 [19] The maximum imprisonment provided for under this section is 20 years, hence 109 the sentence of 7 years imposed on the accused was within the ambit of the 110 law. 111 112 Public interest 113 114 [20] The interest of the accused must be balanced with the interest of the public. 115 The sentence imposed should be such as to be a lesson to the accused so as 116 to turn his criminal ways to an honest living. At the same time, the public must 117 be assured that they are protected against such offenders. 118 [21] In the case of R v Ball (Kenneth John) [1951] 35 Cr. App. R. 164, the Court 119 held— 120 …The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is 121 induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living… 122 123 Seriousness of the offence 124 125 [22] The offence committed by the accused was a serious offence as reflected by 126 the severe punishment provided under the Act. 127 [23] The sentence imposed must reflect the seriousness of the offence. In the 128 same case of R v Ball (Kenneth John) quoted above, Hilbery J. had this to 129 say— 130 Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but 131 fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the Court to decide what is, 132 within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the 133 S/N ENSylhdaRkKtU4VwZxqqow Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, 134 but in regard to each criminal, the Court has the right and the duty to 135 decide whether to be lenient or severe. 136 137 Rehabilitation 138 139 [24] One purpose of a punishment is rehabilitation, to turn the accused into a better 140 person in the society and to allow him a chance to turn a new leaf. 141 142 First Offender and plea of guilty 143 144 [25] The accused was a first offender and that fact was taken into account. 145 Furthermore, the accused had pleaded guilty and thereby saved the court's 146 time and cost of the prosecution. 147 148 Remorseful 149 150 [26] The plea of guilty of the accused could be taken as a sign of remorse. Further, 151 the accused had spent 7 months and 8 days in remand pending disposal of 152 his case, and that remand period was taken into consideration in imposing the 153 custodial sentence. 154 155 CONCLUSION 156 157 [27] The Court accepted the accused person’s guilty plea and found the accused 158 guilty and convicted, and sentenced the accused according to the law and had 159 taken into consideration the mitigating and aggravating factors before 160 imposing the sentence. 161 162 Dated this 30th day of November, 2023 163 164 Signed, 165 166 S/N ENSylhdaRkKtU4VwZxqqow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2023-12-04T08:59:47+0800	9,168	Tika 2.6.0
WA-25-73-03/2023	PEMOHON AGENSI PEKERJAAN RELIABLE (M) SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN 1. ) TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PENGGUNA 2. ) SUMITHA A/P MUTHUSAMY	Order 53 rule 3(6) of the ROC 2012 - Out of time - Application for extension of time to file leave for judicial review - Whether the Applicant provide good reason for the delay.	04/12/2023	YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1740d3f6-2c29-4305-b665-cdf0fc378aad&Inline=true	04/12/2023 12:34:17 WA-25-73-03/2023 Kand. 31 S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 9tNAFyksBUO2Zc3w/DeKrQ *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—25-73»o3/2n23 Kand. 31 bu/12/2023 12.3.-17 mum ummum Imam MALAVA nu KLIALA LUMPUR mum wluuu rsnssxurum KUALA LUMPLIR, ruuvsm qnnuuum KuAsn.KuAsA mus) wsmo uuruxssuuuuu AN :4 m :s1a—az/2n Da\am Ferkara Pemmlmnan umux Seminar: Kehakxmnu um. Dawn Pemara Permomnan om. Pamahun um. K..a......... a-9» Mamullun Salu Pennlah umuk M¢mu...m.. Awud Bag: pm. Vang Memmml 1.»... Penuntzng max Ham! yang dnioeluaman aleh Tnmmm Yuntulan Pengguna nag. Tumman No rmmwwr (F)-zscrzozc benankh 22 3 2922 o... Da\amPerkarnPavamran5,14 .5 we 21. 25 Perawran—PeraIuvan Pe.....a....g... Purvgguns n..o....ar Tunlulan Penggunﬂ} 1999. Dan Dalam Pnrkarl Slklyun 25.2. .1... Pevenggani Gan BJadua\|AkI.u Mahkamah »<.m....a.. 1951, Dan Dalam Pemarz Murzn 53 cu... A....s.. 92 Km... 4 nuaanxaman Mahkamah 20.2 ANYARA Mr . 9. .1 sm m.ryuauuzz.;..m.m “Nate 5.... .......w... .. ...... .. may .. ..«....u.. mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum pm... AGENSI PEKERJAAM RELIABLE (M) sun awn (Mo. sumxn: zn12mo:ua2(In2uao-x) Pzmonou mu 1) mnaurm. nmmma psuesum 2) suurrm AIF mmwsmv (N0.KIP:l5awA—1A-M02) nsswounswzasrouuau Judgmanc Introduction 1 The Applicant med an appncanon far leave lo onmmenoe 1ud\c\a\ review proceedmg (Enclosure 1) under Order 53 of me was or com 2012 (ROC) saekmg mler aha me Iollowmg orders ~ 11 Bahawa kebenaran dlbenkan kepaaa Pemohon umuk rnemlallkan permehunan semakan :1. sum m luar Iempoh rnasa: 12 aanawa kebenalan ausankan kepada Pemohan umuk memfailkan permahanan semakan an sml dan dnanggan sehagau hank den wen anenma unmkd rakan; 13 Eahawa kebenan-an dwberlkan kepada Pemahan dl bawah Alma" 53 Kaedah 2 Kaedah—Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 unluk memwakan prosndmg Semakan Kehaknman lemadap Respanden—Responden barman dengan Award bagi Pihak Vang Menunlut Jxka Penemang Tmak Ham: berlarikh 22.3.2022 yang ﬂIk2\uEIrI(an oleh Respondan Penama \|erhadap Pernchan dv alas lumutan yang awaukan oleh Responden Kedua an Tunman No TTPM-WP-{F}-260-2021 unluk ram-reuryang benku\| . 1 31 Salu pennxah bahawa Award Aersebul yang dukeluarkan oleh Respanden Ferlama adalan d\bs\|a1kan,t1an ma xuuv m mmrytsauazzczw/Duxrq «mm. saw ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! :ll. 32 :53 35. as Based on \|he facts presented belore thls Court, I ﬁnd that the 1“ Respondent nad granted tna Award rn favour dune z“= Respondent on 22.3 2022 he Award was personally served to \|he Appllcanl on 1.4 2022 The Apphclnt ﬁled the present appllcatlon on 24.3.2023 Based on the Award ﬁrsl comrnunrcsled k) the Applicant on 1 4 2u22 and the present appllcatron was ﬁled on 2A 3 2023. there ls an unaccounted delay at 8 months and 23 days Drd lne Annlrcant provide a oood reason lor me lnordlnzte delay lor breach ol ststulary nme lrarne to me leave tor ludlclal revlew7 lnstaad of axplainlng a good reason (or me delay‘ the Apyllcant argued that tnere was no delay The Applicant dented redennng Ihe service at aorarrg 1 and me Award and argued mat -l was sent to lrre wrong address However‘ havlng perused me cause papers, I nnd that based on Mﬂdavll svldenoe, sarlllca aV the Award was made la the bu ass address ol me Aun\|lcanta\BB-11‘ Plaza Mont xrara, No 2, Jalan Klara, Kuala Lumpur The sand address was reglstered wllh Ihe Companles Commlsslon al Malayera (ccul) tccm adduu}. Evldenoe produced before thls court snows mat the Award was left on me glass door at lhe Appllcant s ollroe alter relusal lo acknowledge el trre servtde lnereby oomplred wllh order 62 of me Rot: as a good and regular servrce Yharelure. ll credlbly rammed \|he Apphcan\|‘s wnlenllen 07 not receiving tne Award This can be gleaned lrorn the 2~= Respondents avermsnl In her Afﬁdavﬂ (Enclosure 7) when she states as VOVIOWS. - lb) saya Iesumwuhnya menegnskan banam say: tehh serara kedrrl rnenyerarrltan Award Tnblmal lelsebutdl pslnbzt wuean Pemohon pada 1 42022 Aplbtll many. on». nay: yang lngln mmycvlhkln Awam nu Plhak klkimnqln Pumohnn man rnnnoesalrkan kznadn em but in Na 1t, stock 3 Man! K] 1 mm, Jnlnn bﬂnrn sum: Kuala Lnmvur n pniabll urunu atau pumlinaan lmnonon. Seulnh Ityl hvllll rnurmnranu rulunn unluk mnnynmpullun Awlrd Yvtbtmnl itu hand: klltlununn Pomohnn dr mum vanremn p... 1: er .\Y rn wtnrytsauuzzezw/Duxro “None a.n.r mmhnrwm .. tn... a may r... ortnlrullly -mm: dnuuvlml Vﬂ nrlurta vmul telah nnanuhui luiuan pdnyimpalan mink: nub: mug. k 4... nvggnn m-rllrlmi uvahxn Award llu dnngan rs...-pmum. lay: an Iunr v-1-bu um... Fuuolwn uammrr mm klu am mm [In lam an plhllg maslh dalam um. opmsi urunn mu mm; H p u um... Pumnhon mm Awlnd nu menu dlurallkan. Justem rm, ﬂakwaan Pemohon hanya mnngtlahul Award nu danpada sural RHE Bank berlanim as 03 2oz: semasa pambekuzn bank emu sulalah pnhksanann Award rlu bunaku lswluno «max perm Make perenggan 11 Earn 12 o Aﬁdawl sekongan ﬂan pevenggan H ﬂan :2 3 Flmyulaan mun amamran am am Mann ray Lmmen alas keengganan Pemamn umuk mensvlma Aware mu amen munnnﬂ-nhllwan pvnenmaan‘ uyu umnkn mllulnkknn Awlni m. an pimu masuk cumin pcjnhll uruull Pumnhon hug nlas amampak mu mm dlknln Juliana rm saya rnamasnrarr bahawa Dada sehzp mzsa yang Milena! Award rlu Marv dmemahu ﬂan dvserahkan kepada Pavmmn sacava kedm ﬂan Pemohnn mammmynl ponqluhuln nmk-mm Awlrd nu lulxpl um mullkniun nlunlu nan Ildak nnnwrnbil sums ﬂan menﬁhinn sehmgga pm aluun RHE am man dlbekukan ursepemn mﬂaku pnhkunaan Sesaunln surec Serahan Award Tmhunm benankh M2022 dan Glmbav-Gamhav Fullbsl uruun Pemahon aruampmrr ar am: scum kmekwdsn arnemeken senagar Eksmbn 'SA- (empnesrs added) 37 Based on me 2” Rasponaenra avannerns has made clear me: me 2“ Responaem had went to me Apphcanfs omae premrses aocardmg to me CCM address our servme ollhe Award on 1 4.2022 but me Apphcanfs svawpmaer had remseu to accept me service after made known av the purpose cf eempe in mm deaprra me Appncanrs scaw/orﬁcer has conﬁrmed me mrreclness 0! me address 0! same 35 Ey remsmg to accept the persona! servroe Mme 2"“ Respondenlr n leﬂ wnh no chance huua leave the Award al the oonaprcupus pan 0! Ihe Apphcanrs amoe smce me Apphcant has ansmpnea la evade the servroe after having Informed to lhe Applrcanu me purpose of servroe and may are my aware or the Award 39 Based on ma above, this Coun rs 01 me mew me same: has been subscarmauy acmeved and the (acts 01 me msmrrn ease slrong\y Pig! :2 n! 17 am munrytsauuzzczw/Daxro “Nana sew nmhnrwm .s. U... a may r... mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum war 40 41. 42. 43 rndraata me Apphcanl nas been aware ol Ina Award butforwhalever reason most? (0 be mdoienl In the case of HLSL Managnmlnl Holding Sdn Bhd v. sunnl sun and [2015] IAL.Iu 298, me Hugh Oourl neld — 1251 The Court has liken . mm-I uwmueh an urvlu manner at Ihu regnslemd address av some amer prmmpm Mime address as long as sumac can be sad [D have been Iubllulllsw as me my rnere was arse mlhmglo Indicate mam-e De1end:nldld.lnl:cL nave noun a! an anion huvln hm nu chasm _ for wluhnr nmn, in In indallnt unhl ma sen-na asme appncandn was Med‘ (emanasrs added) runner, the photographs taken and exmblted to me 2"‘ Rasaondenrs Amdavu cleany Shorl Ihe Appnaanrs arm and business Vicence aaanng wim Apullcanl s name The Aapncam dud nal deny and cnauenge the pnazograpns are not genmne or have been doclored Tna phamgraphs wsuauy snow the slruclure 0! the Annlrcanrs omce, Ihus remlmg and rebuumg me Aopncanrs oonvenuon that may were omy aware of me Award aﬂer being mfofmed by RHB Bank BM on 3 3 202: la be Inherenﬂy xmprobahle lo be we (See pages 34 35 A 31 In pd! exh “SA-2" n1 2'-4 Rupandanra R-ply Amdavn at nnclouuro 7) Tnerevare this coun takes me vnsw that no spemﬁc challenge to me pnmographsamnunl \|a admission onne racxs and evidence as true. The Award was Iherelure personaﬂy served an the corracx busmoss address and afﬁce premises onne Aanlncanl. In respect 0! sarwoe at me Benin; 1, the 2"‘ Respondent m paragraph 121h) at her 2"“ Respondents Nﬁdavrl of Encmsure 7 avers as lonzw-rs. — «am samn nu say: mnmqattran oanaw. Tunlulan rarsaxnn mah duauuan man saya m Respcnden Panama sqak 2532021 Psguamczra sayn ynvsg lamlhum (Man mangnrahkan panghanvar a... as o! n rn munfytsauuzzczw/Daxro «ma. s.r.r lunhnrwm .. d... a may r... nrW\n\|U\|y -mm: dnuamnl VI .nuna v-max samavlrlya vmux mevlahanvar nernyauan Tunlvlarl Bunny 1 (srsenux kepada Pemerlan Say: nwlyllalcan banawa Pemyalaarl Tumutan aoranq v lsrsebol lelan ﬂlhalnhlf xeo-do Psmohorl veal: Kedlrl oan lelah dlslkm vensrlmaan olen max Pemohon paaa zazmzz oengan manuvunkan cap -ynml Par-mun n-n -anoalenbon meogikul psrlanmaarl Sebagal lamhahan. Mobs Femengavan bigl Tunlman Ielsebul lelan dlkelualkan olsn Resunnaen Punzma was :7 2 2022' 45 Based on me above, (his cum belleves ma: me Appnoanrs slaﬂlofﬁcsr wno had ackrlawledgad reoelpl ol me Borang l musl have possesseo me power and auIhorl\|y(o ecceol servlue olBorang 1 on beballanhe Appllmnl regarolas onnelrslalus lnlhe Appllcanl anu me servlce nas meuhe requirements under Regvlanon 15(2) ol lne consumer Prclacllnrl (The Tnbunil «or Consumer cleirns) Regulalinrls 1999 45 In lhe case or Svl mmnm conzr-elm Sun and v. srl Kn!-dl Sdn End [2001] AME] 0192-, (200113 MLRH 459; zann 2 MLJ 570 me Hugh Court held me . - A n .s my luaomannnal since we so-noanv search lmm ma ROC xhuws lhal me busmess moreee ol the oslenoanz ms me ‘(an Kwan Sang names: and me neqlslered aaareu in (II K-mpung Furluarl aaoress RK Consullanl Sdrl ana muslhave been anmomaa bylhe eel-noanno room. dncuminuuoll on ma dabndlnrl mun. l mm lnarevora xztlsﬁod Ihal mu wlll ana sxaxernan: ol dalm mm vrupeﬂy served on Ihe aeleooanl at ll: raglsllrad nddrass‘ (emphasls added; 47 Having perused me cause papars am the reasons glverl by me Appllcanl ln the moan V1 svbpon (Enclosure 3). l ﬁnd me: me Appllcanl had no good reason lbr val mg to me me appllcallorl lor leave for ludlclal revlew ‘MIMI! ume 45. In me lnslanl case, I am ollhe view that me Appllcanl slarms gulny ol an lmexplalned delay ol 3 months am 23 days to apply lor leave «or judlcial review 49. II ls seltled law Ihal any pany wna does not aonere lo we llme prescrlbed In perlorrn a oenam acl, nmsl nave a plauslbla and reasonable explanahcn lor us fallure la ac1 wl\|hin \|ima v... u av 11 srn wlnrytsauuzzezw/Demo «wave Smnl luvlhnrwlll be v... a may r... anvln.l-v am. dnuavlml vn move vtmxl 50. 51 52 53 54 The Applscanl ln ma presanl case did l1o\| pruvlde any good reasan [or lhelr lnomlnale delay as to why Ihey are unable In llle lnalr leave Ippllcauun lo: ludlclal raylaw wl\|hlrl lne slaluwry llme lrama The Appllcarlt mmayar contended lnal llnay were rlal lala wlln deﬁance am denlal manner ln lhelrapp callurl iovleaveand sull argulng ﬁllng (or ludicla! revlew ls wlmln me slalulory ume lranle as may alleged may only aware onna Award on la 3 202:. l ﬁnd me Appllcanrs sland of no lateness lnas lnerelay oonlradlcled and ls lrlcorulslenl wl\|h \|helr appllcallon lay an axlanalon ul llrne to file leave as prayed in prayer(1)afEnl:lusure1 To my mlrld, prayer (ll 0! Enclosure l llsell l5 an admission lnal mere IS a delay for cm of llme. elnerwlsa mere ls no yalla reason lcr me Anpllcanx lo seek tor rellei cf exlanslun ollrme TM Appllcant furlhar mnlanusu lrlal lnere is no prajudloe lo me 2"‘ Responaanllorlna delay Ncweyerl I ﬁnd such conlemlon nas no relevance la lne delay run! a good reason lor lne delay caused. on ma same lSSue, I have declded ln Dolik Nlnlmu Sdn Ehd (supra)asioIlaws — ml The Applleanl mnnu mbrmls lnal ma Amandmanl appl man wlll M71 muse urelua-aa la lna Respurldenl However, l arn ul me vlew al allnmlgn ll may he lrwusd lnal nu pmludlca had been snown ln.l by null l5 not good enougn Alllmmy ln supponol such a praparslllcn can be louna lll me case ol Mum! lunall Mn AM Ghlnl u. xam Pungarah Pmdnfurnn mm. [am] I MLRN1ZU:\|2a11l5 CLI I§\|}:[2I1I2[l Mu 7a7 whee Azzah All J las an. men wasl nela as «allows — ’[l q Havllvg wrlrldeled the exnlanallnn our ms aalay, l nna lne Aanllcalws sxplanallnn lnal he needed Ilmew llna a lawyer and ms lawyernnedadllme to check nls runner and nu dllﬁculty lrl uerllrlg lame to mac? WM! ms sallcllor ale ml satlslaclofy lo small for ma aalay In my mus ma npirlloll n is Imm mu whuhur an dulay Gnu um one: on lny pnluﬂlcu la la» Rupnrldnnl nr . lmm pany. "la whmlsilon nu preluulu a ma is no . mm clnry axpunmn for may In llllng tor ludlclll nvhw. with ma unlnr F-ueral M-lunnl that an -pnlleanl has e. Id In ml. cumly xnllln ma mm ﬂu IM -nnml....l.ly .u monIhI' dnlay In making l lppllul on. On lhls around .Ilnn- ln. apallemn br mu-nan of lime ounm m bl dlsmlssla. Carlseouenlly, Ihe mull has nu junsdlcllun lo naar lna Evvlnalllzu lov leave In Abdul aann... a... Ammn lllllnns 01: V Daluk Barldzr Kuala urnpara Anol [2008] 5 MLJ 704 [zone] new 505 Abdul mm Embong JCA las Hls Lmdllllp marl wax) uld Inallhe r... 15 M 17 am wlnrytsauuzzczw/Duxro “Nana s.n.l luvlhnrwlll as UIQG a my me nﬂﬂlrullly ann. dnuavlml VI mane ml wun may sxermse us mnsmm nnly awn annguury oumpnaws wvm ms xmpelalwe reuuhemem 0! mm wt mas: o 5: R a at me RHC (see alsn Rnvlndr-In V M-Iliyxlan Exammauuns comm Whaiherlhe apwieauan inran umevm oenmraﬂ has mems mm! \s mmam: (emphasis added) conclusion 55 For an [he reasons given above, lam Mme vIew\|ha\| W5 appncamn was ﬁled ou\| mums and does not sahsfy ms smm reqmremem on a lune lrame which Is lundamenlal and goes \|n wnsdmon under order 53 Rule 3(6) 0! the R00 56. Svnee me leave fol]ud\c1a\ review appllcahml was only Wad by [he Applicant on 24 3 2023, m was deariy beyond me supmaxea three (3) months period. The application (or an exlensxen M time had a\so not been supparlad with good reason lhI\| u shomd be granted 57. Based on the above, I allowed lhe 2"“ Respcnuenrs PO and u-sm-am me leave applmauun (Endusure V) wnn cosxs cl RM5‘00u.00 la the 2“ Respondent subject to \|he anocacor lee Dated 0 l.fDenember 2023 M\/\/\/\ Ahmad Kamal hm Md snaruu Judge High Courl Kuara Lumvur v... is at 11 m w<AFytnzuu2zc:wD<xrq «mm. Snr1I\nauhnrw\HI>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! Counsel For me Applicant m mnuauu2z.;..m.m En, Muhammad syanq hm Salleh (Cik Ezreen bmﬂ Abdul Rahman wllh mm) Tetuan mm: a. Syaﬂq Peguambexa ﬂan Peguamcara 61-1,Jalan PJU 5120. Thu Slrand, Kola Damansar 41310 Fevzhng Jaya. Selangor (Ru; Tuan S/ASL/GL/D030) En cmom Lee Te\|uan Lee a. van Parlnershlp Peguambsla den Feguamcava MK2Au7r10, Mom Kwara M2, N0 15, Javan sunan Han Ahmad shah, Kcmwsk Kerajaan, 50430 Kua\a Lumpur me :1 cl :7 «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! la 2 Sam deklirasl hahawa Responden Panama telah benlndak berlenlangan dengarl pmsedur undang-undang apahlla memberlkun Award larsebul kepsda Responden Kedua. 2 ln essence. (he Appllcanl ﬁled lnls avpllcallon (or an almgamenl and/or exlenslnn onlme lo ﬁle leave {or ludlclal review and leave lor ludlclal levlew respecllvely under Order 53 Rule 311) and 316) Mine RDC prlmarily on ma ground ul pmcedural lmproprlely mal me declsmn or the 1*‘ Respondent‘ Consumer clalm Trlbunal was manned by non-anenaanoe of me Appllcanl al me date al me haarlng on 22 .2022 :l Afte< the heanng_ I dlsmlssed me Appllcanrs Leave Appllcallon (Enclosure 1) ms ludgmenl slates me reasons lar my declslorl Blckground Fact: 4, The background laczs at me appllcahon gamma hum lne cause papers are largely unmspulsa and can be summanzed as fellows — 0.1 On 2532021 the 2"” Respondent Ned a consume! alarm before the 1“ Respondent at lhe Trlbunal cf Kuala Lumpur (Tribunal) under clalm no TTFM-WP-(P)-2602021 agalnsl ma Applucanl [or falluls lo dellver housemald ecoommg m me terms lrl agraementslgned on 29.8 2D\|9enlered into between the 2”‘ Resparmenl and the Applicant 4 2 on 22 :.2a22, V7 lhe absence at me Appllcant, lhe Tnmmal awarded me 2"“ Resnanaenl me sum 0! RM41.6B740 (Awlrd) against the Appllnanl 4.3 On 24 3.2023 the Appllcanl med me presenl judlclal revlevw apphzzahun ln enclosure l aﬂer me 2" Responaenl had executed (he Award by way of gimlshee proceedlngs MW?! ch me show cause order dated 20.2.2023 has been uhtalned (tom the Maglslral: Ccun. An abyolule order 0\| garvllshee was granted on so 5 2023 by me Maglstrate coun Fuelul 11 m wlnfytsauuzzezw/Dsxrq «mu. Smnl navlhnrwlll be mad u may he mm-y mm. mm. VI muue mm 4 A The Auplicarll conlended lhal lhe Borang 1 has been wlongly addressed renderlrlg man. [0 have no proper knowledge Mine 2”’ Respondenfs clalm at he Trlburlal, The ADDVlCan\| alleged they wera only aware oflhe Award on 13 3 2023 nu Law 5 Order 53 Rule 316) el lhe ROG provides lnal an appllcallon snall be made pmnlplly and ln any event wilnln wee nmnlns lrom the date wnen lne grnunds on me appllcallorl «rel arose orwhen lne declslorl is ﬁrs! cummunlczled lo lne Appllcarll Case law aulnonlues have esfabllshed ma: when an ex pane leave applicallon was nal ﬁled wllhlrl me 5llpu\|a\|ed lnne, lne Judgmenl would ee lrregular 6 Funher, me Cuurl oi Appeal ln Menleri Eesnr Mogul Plhang nenll Mlknlur v. Snruln eomlleng Mnkmur sun Ehd [mm] 5 cu 123;[2o1o11 NILRA 325; (201014 Mu zen nela lnal ~ [18] me High Com lnllsludgmunlwzllullha vlswlhal me 40 days specmad under0rdev 5: Rule sun was nol rlgld lam oflho V! w the judg- umd ln mlln am In um ham pveaulbea by mu NIII It not rigid I lm III Inn 1 with um um nrx cuunul me: e. wlm me I: cum nlescllbed by in nu“ is mnennunul en ll gemnlnneelnlonlsee Mersmi Dmrllmu ce Sdn and v Yhe Mlrllstsrul labour e M-anpawer 5. AIlor[1953] 2 cm 7 [1953] cu (Real zeal ml ll Ia lmylrldvn men In appllcnlon lor judlclal lwlew [5 mm wlmln lam (Ahmad Jam Muhd Jahn V Fangavah Kabudayaan 2. Kesenlarl Jumr 5. ms [zone] 5 cu A73) (emphasls added) 7 The com has no jurlsdlchon la gram leave whare lhe Appncanl 15 out el Wile er cannol acoolml rm lne delay lo \|he sallsfacllon ollne noun under Order 53 Rule 315) and :7) cl me Roe ln Abdul Rlhnlln aln Abdulllh Munlr L on v. Dnluk Blmllr Ku Lumpur a. Anor [mm] 2 MLRA 39v: [zonal 5 cu ens: (20031 e MLJ 704. me Court at Appeal HI dlsmlsslng me appeal againsl me aeclslon ol Ihe Hlgh coun rleluslng lne judlclal revltw appllcahonl neld man the lurlsdlcﬁon ullhe Hugh Oaurl \|o enlennln an appllcallorl lor lualelal renew “may only be exevclsea upon obllgalery Pun n M 11 m wlnrytsauazzczw/Duxrq “Nana s.n.l nuvlhnrwm .. UIQG M my me nﬂmnnﬂly ml. dnuuvlnnl Vﬂ nrlum Wm! camphance with the Imveralwe requirement oitrrne set under oroer 53 Ruie 3 onne Ruies ol High court mac (RHC) a The deusion oflhs Feoerai Courl in wong Klu Noon); & Anorv. xetua Fongarali Jlhnun Alam Sukitar A Anor [2ﬂl3] 4 AMR 2115 I10”) 3 MLRA 515; [2013] 4 MLJ 161; [2013] 4 CL! 193 reamrms this position holding that the Federal Court tie on in Musing Omnibus no son Bhd v. mo M (er of Lxbaur 1. mrrpowor A Arror mu] 1 MLRA 111; [tan] cu Rap 256; new 2 MLJ tau amt Ravindran v. Moioysio Examlnntlon Council [1934] I MLRA2:H;[l9B4]1 CLJ Rep 320; [19:41 1 cm 232: [1 Ill] I MLJ 16! which had pieciudeﬂ an axaminslion 0! Inc nrenis oune case V7 considering an apphcalion iorextensron ottrme tor ieave to me an appitcationior judiciai review is stiH good law even though were decided prior to the amendmeni to Order 53 Rule 3(6) oitne RHC in 2000, and subsequently adopted VI lhe ROC Raus sneni PCA tas ne tnen was) tteirvenng tne tudgment ollhe Feaerai court reiLera\|es the rule WV me ioiiowtng \|erms' . {an} tne time came in aopiyrno our iuorctai iavlew wsscnbed by tne nutu u mndamonlal tr poem imlsdichon Ind one in. mi iudgs had re.eereo tne explanahurt tor tne delay «or extension oi lime ha avbly «pr iudiciai raviewt 1\| toitm tnrn tne Cu-m no tangy has Ins iuHsrﬂic\|\an la near tne appircanon tor ieove iariuornat routs». wnetner me apnhcalmn nas menu av not, n trvelsvartt' 9 me Feuerar Courl tn Wong Kin Hoorro (supra) also reainnns me principle tnat under Drdev 53 Rule ate) and t7) oi the ROC wnetner an extension oittrne ougntto be granted or otherwtsa is an exercise of ruatcrai discretion Tnus. tne court nas tne general power to exteno nrabrtdgemetime limIlunderOrder53 Rule stayana (7) 0! ins ROG if tnere are good reasons to do so Fro Iminary objection (mi to A\| tne outset oi tne hearing‘ tne ieerneo oounsei for tne 2“ Respondent raised a P0 premised on the ioiiowrng gruunds — a) The Applicant latter: to tntituie the Animation lhe written law with speciﬁc panrouianiy on whal provisions the Appllcaliori (or aonogernent and/or extension at unre to me Leave for tuotcrai review is made: and v... sari: IN rmnryuouozz.;..ro.m “None s.n.t nuvihnrwm .. u... M my r... oﬂmruﬂly mini: mmn Vﬂ .nuna vtmxi b) The Judlclal revlew Leave Appllcarlorl was map out of (ms. nu declslarr ohm ceurx wlrmrer the Applicaliovl is comp: nt 11 12. 13. 14. 15. Havlng perused me cause papers, l ﬁnd that in ore body oi Enclosure 1, me Appllcanl rails lp rrrlrlule me Applrcallorr el me wrlllen law wi\|h speclflc parllcularlly on wrral pmvlslnrl lrre appllcallon lpr alanugerrrenlarrdlnrexxenslorr ollrrrre m me Leave [or ludlclal revlew is made. Nolhlng was menrrenaa in Enclosure 1 re move we Honourable Court var rellef under me parlieular order 53 Rule 3(5) pl lrre ROG. Order 53 Rule 315) cf me ROC ls a speerne provlslan ler abrldgemenl ol Ilme lor ludlclal revlew. Trrerelore, lam ol lhe Vlew \|ha\| merely lo sue me general pmvlslbn ol paragraphs 1 and 3 el seczrprr 25(2) at me ceurrs pl Judicature An 1964 re lrlsufﬁclenl In lrre Inlllulemerll srrrrply because me general pmvlslon ls sumecl to aerrugerrreru ol llme ‘pvescrlhed by any wrltlen law“. The specrllc prescnbed wrlllen law In lhe lns1arlI case Is order 53 Ruleslsl elme am: by applylrlg lrre rnaxrrrr olgerreralrs speeralreus rron derogaru. Therefore. lp slale lrre general proursren wrlrroul me speciﬁc pmvlslon has been pleaded, rt rs rrrsumelerrl la mave Ihe ceun. Trrerelore, lam or me vlew that In order lor me Appellant lo move a Court to use ls aulhorlly urreer order 53 Rule 3(6) pl lhe R0310 hearlhis Appllcallon and grant me relreve sDl.lgh1rIheAppeI\|arlImu$\ plead and svele specmcally, accurately arm clearly are provisions of lhe wrrnerr law Khlll glve xhe Courl me aulhorlly 10 gram me ippllcallorl ln lrre lntltulemenl sealer. onrre Applicant‘: Appllcallan Otherwise. me Appllcatlarl ls llewed, mall and wllnoul rrrerrl and srreuld be drsmleeed In llmlne caee laws seem to suggesl lnal ll rs e slnel requlremenl pl law ler me rreed le mmply mm me rnluulernerrl rule. ll la renal and the Court should rrpl prpeeed wllh llre heanng er me Appllca\|lorl wllhom uruem ru mlnfytsauuzzezw/Dexro “Nana smal luvlhnrwlll .. met! a may r... pﬂnlrullly rm. dnuavlml vn muue war appmpnate mm-ulemem urﬂess the Issue was not brought to the Cow’: auermon [Sea And An a Jum Sﬂn am: v. Rum: n/I Jaikmun [1019] MLRAU :07; [2019] 6 ML] am; [2019] 1 LNS 1416; SPNB Asplrall sdn Bhd v. wlra am Develnpmnnl Sdn Bhd [2n21] MLRHU an [2021] 1 LN5 :50; Taman sundar Blru Maul Sdn Ehd v. Bindings corpuracions son Bhd [man] 4 MLRH 171: [2010] 5 cu 33) 16 Farmer, I mew that lhe PO on ma wssue ol mmmemenx raised was not a mere Lechmcalny as me aevecn m Inmmemenl was nm a rumor urregu\an\|y \ha\| ocmd be cured. 17. I ﬁnd support ior my wew by velemng to me Cowl c! Appeal case 0! umayauumu Ponnunmy v. VAB may 3:: NIJII1 hm Rank. Pordaua Mnnlori Malaysia 5. Ors (mu) MLRAU :55; [21117] 1 MLJ 235; [2011] s CLJ 297 where Tengku Mavnun Tuan Mal JCA (now emu Jusuce) has decided max me prehmmary cmeclmn an me ISSUE of mmmemem reused by me pmseculmrv was not a mere lechmcalrly and such abjewon was upheki by mecuun as me coun msagreea max me aevem m mmulemenl was a mmnr rrregulanly wmch could be cured 13 We Veamed cmev Jusuoe held as vouaws - “Our Duclslon [13]Haw1g oonsmered me subrmssmus and me aumormes we mm \|21a\|mI pnllmln omaenan mm: by m pmllclmnn wn not at men karmic: mu iuuu ollaw which go In Ihn moloflm .umIunm of ma court. In me nlrcumsunc-I. wn Ilplnlﬂ me pmllmlmzy summon and w. drvmssad me anpanv w. ncm gwe our reasons lnlltulnmnm my run appsnam ma Iuhmmcu man In: ism of mum. -nu was a [15] A summer we was canvassed m Kama Pemamh lmngtesen Mabyswa Mn Neng Fan [2007] 2 cu m. [man 3 ML! 97 whsrum 1u\kaYIwMakmudm JCA[now CJM):aIﬂ any qucu) n 1a5rMLn [11] Sunaquhpun wan salu danpada mink-uM< Delkava kepada pemmna» lersebm aaa msnyaxskan Kanun Tzucara Jenayah mum m munrytsauazzczw/Dqxro «mm. am ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl vu .mm Wm! l‘ KN“) dlhll: rwalinllyi adalan da bawlh p-mnluuan mini KYJ ny. (emphasls added) lg In one case vfchuaw chow Khoorl @1-an Chow Klloun (trading as camay Holnl) v. Abdul Jollari bill Abdul Rahman [1595] 4 cu 121: [1995] 1 MLRA 679: [1595] l MLJ 451: (I915) 1 MAR 159: me Court or Appeal had slaled that » ml Flmdnmsrlul pnnclpla Ihal a party musl nm lake ms uppunurll D7 Court by nlrpme n V! my oplmorl max an ovigil-sling procul rlqllirivlu in mm cmnnl musum. wllll mlllcmll panlaulamylelxlm m In bending er ln Is body. mu mum o1RuI-i ovcoun ulldlrwhichlht Cﬂlﬂl in n. a mom olherwlsellwouldbc In Imharvlsslllﬂ Dludllla and IIIIYBG llahle In in Itruck nul mrass saarlerlmlndn ' (emphasls added) 20 Further, ma lmponarlce l-A slallng lnlllulement aowlalely ln appeal was also declded ln Data‘ Srl nl Hun Len; @ nu I-lean Lens v. tall Illny cm n A Anor [2016] MLRHU 1553; [2016] MLJU 1500 where Mend azlan Jc (now JCA) held lhal Order 7 r 2(lA) of lhe lane on lnlllulelnenl ls a mandalory lequlremenl and me Courl has no power to remedy an lrvegularily wnldn ls lundamenlally delacllva and lnelallule la lnclude lnlllulamanlonlle Rules olcoun or slalule under wmcn me COUVI ls moved canndl be remedled when he sald as follows. - -[es] Otdel 7 I may reign (a mu won! I hall" In nsplcl or an nquircmnnl Io sub mu provision 01 law no Illppod IM mlon in lhn Inlllulllmnl. rlalnly ms ls a nlanamny ruquirullum. The Daurl umppeal In Malayan Ballkmg EM V Kaay Knng Chuwnn 5 Am)! [Zulu] l MLRA $81 [mm] 5 MLJ oal [mm] 6 cm 172. ln lxs ludgmem dellverad bynbdul Mallk lsnau JEA nald mull lnllruzllvaly :1 «allows V 124 Slmply am a lama: lo admply wlm me lequllanlanl at me mles would be naalad as in lrvagulamy and ls curable sum. cowl ms no pawn! In many an lnequlamy vrlllcll hlnlillllullally uuhcllvo. Thu lhu mun. ca mama. n lnmunanl-nu at lbw ml. of cnuﬂ or mm. ulldur which the calm - movld cmmvl In rvrlludiod Manclllak (M) Sdn SM v Maybarl Flnanoe and (Na 1) [2000] 4 MLRN 592. lzomla MLJ 135 [zoolla cm 254 lzaoopmmlusso aln M9 (emphaies added) vaulalﬂ am munrytsauazzczw/Duxrq “Nair s.n.l nuvlhnrwm .. l... M my l... nﬂmnnllly ml. dnuuvlnnl Vﬂ nFluNG Wm! 21 Further. on me same Issue, I have deemed m Doﬂk narunm sun arm v. Kulun P-ngmn H. I D: m no or! [2022] MLRHU W: [2022] 12 MLJ 23312022]: cu 112 as loHnws ~ 1171 In ‘(Ink Nu mm... S: I am. am V. Vﬂbunll llyuln K. Ilm A on [mu] a mum 454, [2011] 7 cm 544 man AM J (:5 ma man was) new as mum 116] In an plium case me only mmm m u. npplicminn lur um ; in III: lnmulumuu In ma caaa oi Chnow mm mm. a. run Chew Krvncn (Yang emaga banana! camay Hole!) V Amm Johan bun Amm Rahman [1995] 4 cm :27 Gnpal Sn am JCA(u he lhln w1s)sa\u an onqmaung Drooess requmng an \nIAIu\emen( mus! slalu, Mm smmm pammuanuy, exlherm msnaamng arm II! hady m. \|1aM:onu\a olwnﬂ undvr mu. me cum .5 Damn moved. umerwse m wmﬂd be an embarvassmg plaamng and miy in n In tn be slmal om‘ unhss socmr amenaud Yhu purpoln nl lnlllulomtnl In In gin nallcllu en. mar plﬂy mu n-Inn of 1»: you mum In av -a um anwnum bung mm. by unpnn. Nowever, me nﬂlullmlnl . nolubslllml Ior a pmper pleaﬂlng luv leave which ouuhlm bu mpauua nu mu body an». appnuuan my nu naanauun-uuum loprly vomm n on: Mun mm. mam. lam oflhn u W «ran an awn cation var man: man. made vnlhom ﬁm napmng lurlnd ahlalnlng um. I: dnlncuvn Ind qwuly xmgununu is an ahuse M vrocus. Thu 4.‘ an to obuln luv: nwlti In tho coun lacking Auvlxdlcllnn to may on appllnamm (or lmlclal mmu (emphasis added) 22 Based on (I19 I993‘ pmvis\orI above this Court us of the vmw that smne the Apphcant nas (allied to aocumely and dearly mead me relevant legs! pmvnsmns umm Omar 53 Rm: 3(5) of the R00, me Auplicanfs Apphcauon harem IS ﬂawed‘ fatal and wwthuul merit. 23 Yhetﬂore, based ml the above aulhnrihes, I am (.31 me mew mat the Appncanm of ma Apphcant purporled In be an appllcahan For an abndgemanland/orextensnun aflimelo me Leave icrjudlclm review brought Imdel Order 53 07 Inc ROC has failed (D slate specuﬂcaw ma relevant wrmen law which gwes the power aﬂhis Caurl to move and gramme rehel prayed (or. p... 9 al 11 am munrytsauuzzczw/Dqxrq «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! 2o. Premlsed on me aloresa-d reasons. l ﬁnd Iha\ me P0 ralsed hy the 2"“ Respdndenx has menls and aoonrdlngly, l uphold me 2"“ Reepondenl s ohlecllon l-leweyer, Voroumplemnass, l mu new deal wl\|h me second PO ralsed by lne 2"“ Resoondenl Gut ol time 25. 26 27 28 29 Tne Applicam submlls lnel lnere are no delays ln lhelr leave Appllcallon lor ludlcaal revlew (Endosure 1; Even W mere are delays, me Aeelrcaru argued lnal nun-rzumphance wlln ma elululory lrrne lrenre whlch IS rnandalory in nalure lo me me leave for rudreral vevlew ls leennrcamy by relylng upon the ease el Flnlaya sun and v, rung Twinq Lol A 01: [man I ms IM; [2022] MLRHU 133. I lrna Flnlaya (supra) has no apphcallon to we present case as l! releles lo lne appllcauon In rnlroauce Vresh euulenoa and l\| does no: relale la oeun jurisdlcllon le hear ludlclal vevlew nralrer l-loweuer, ln me presenl case lne slalmory Ilme lrama In me leave lor ludlclal veview IS a eoneern 04‘ me mun llmsdlollcn whlch musl be made pmmplly and any lnordmale delay to seek calm lmsrvenllon ls lalal and me ceun has no dlscrelmn la regulanse nenmnlpliance for -neolenl lmganl rnrs cdun ls ol me vlew lnel wnen a proulsmn In lne rule ls mandalory in nalure, rl sneuld nel be superseded or curaale Dy order 1A or order 2 Rule I or Rule 3 aflhe Rot: lsee. Dull Vang Amnl Mull: Tunku Ibrahim lsmell Ihnl sulun lslandeml-Mei Tunku MIhkohJuharv. D-lukcnm-In Hanruh bin Mend Near ls Anmhel Appeal [mas] 4 MLJ 149: [2009] 1 MLRA 52:: [nos] 4 CL! 319) Ills lnle anal me «me lrenre rn applyrng rudioral review prescnbed by lne ROCls1um'1amenLa\and>l9aesla me lunsdlclion and once me Inal ludge nad rejeeled «ms explinallon my me delay bvexlenslan al llme I0 apply an judlclal reurew, than me ceun no longer has (he lurlsdl IOVI to near me apphcallan for leave lnr ludiclal reyrew (See. wenp Klm Heeng 3. Ana: lsupra» FIge1neH1 ru wlnfytxmlazzczw/Ddxro «mu. sum nmhnrwm .. med m my r... nﬂﬂlnlmy mm: m.r.n Vﬂ arlurla vmul	2,259	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-22NCvC-786-12/2021	PLAINTIF PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN SURIA STONOR DEFENDAN 1. ) WOODTEC VISION SDN BHD 2. ) LOONG TIEN HOONG 3. ) CHIN KAH LEONG 4. ) KOO POH CHEONG 5. ) VINCENT YONG SIONG 6. ) CHANG WILLIAM TAT NIN 7. ) CHENG PING LIONG 8. ) WONG CHONG CHE 9. ) TAN SRI ABDUL AZIZ HUSSAIN 10. ) ABD JAMIL BIN ABD WAHED SHAIK11. ) NG LEE LING1 2. ) SIEH KOK JIUNPIHAK TERKILANYap Teak Sing	11th Defendant’s application to set aside all cause papers filed in this suit under Order 27 rule 3 of the Rules of Court and under Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court- based on the argument that the Plaintiff’s solicitors were not authorized to institute proceedings against the Defendants as the Joint Management Body did not obtain the required resolution to institute proceedings for the alleged wrongs against any of the Defendants-Abuse or process-not utilised the rules in good faith-there are serious issues to be tried-must be addressed through witnesses and tested through cross-examination-Conflict of evidence as shown in the affidavit evidence cannot be resolved solely through a summary hearing-dismissed.	04/12/2023	YA Dato' Indera Mohd Arief Emran Bin Arifin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f3ee6c2c-8f77-432a-9c48-f85134a08129&Inline=true	Grounds for dismissing striking out 11th Defendant- Perbadanan PengurusanSuria Stonor (2).pdf 04/12/2023 17:21:02 WA-22NCvC-786-12/2021 Kand. 163 S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LGzu83ePKkOcSPhRNKCBKQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal I-m—22m:vc—7as—12/2021 Kand. 153 ;4,12,:nu 1« pm DALAM MAHKAMAH ‘HNGGI MALAVA DI KUALA LUMPUR (EAHAGWAN SIVIL) GUAMAN NO: wA-22Ncvc-vac-12/znzl ANTARA PERBADANAN FENGURUSAN SUFHA STONOR .PLNNT\|F DAN woumac VVSION SDN BHD & 11 LAGI DEFENDANDEFENDAN GROUNDS or JUDGMENT (Enclosure 12:-11“ Defendant’: application to set nlde wm under Order 27 rule 3 (2) and Order 92 rule 4 aﬂlle Rules of Caurlj I sw L43ma:aePKmcsPnRNKr:aKu an ‘Nuns Sum INNDIV M“ be used m mm u. nvwvuﬁlv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm A. Introduction 1 This rs my reasonrng for msmlsslng me 11'“ De1enaam's apphcauon 1o se1asrde an cause papevs Ned In lhws sum under Order 21 rule 3 of me Riﬂes of Court and under Order 92 rme 4 o1 the was o1 com 2. Ha»/mg heard the pamss and cons1denng me cause papers ﬁled herein, 1 am at ma vraw lhal lhis is nm a smtablz case 1a be disposed a1 summarﬂy as suggested by\|he11"' Defendant B. Rnasoning of (his Conn (1) Abuse ovrrocess »agg\|ication is a ruse bytlle 11'" uevenaam la assays the nnlhaggealahle aonsguenaes of an Order 13 rule 19 app ca on 3. The 11'" De1enuan1 contends ma1 order 27 rule 3 c1 me Rmes o1 Court 2012 cam be used to sinks our me sun summanly The 11" Delendanl alsu suggests thal nms Couﬂ cumd uuhze res puwers under Order 92 rme A of ma Rmes at Cmm \|o strike nut lms sml N u3maaaPKmcsPnRNKr:aKu ma Sum INNDIY wm be 15.4 m mm ra nvwvuulv mm; nnmnunl VII mma VWLI1 person eoncerrung me grarmng olball m an bmerwrse ardmary case we runner note rn parrreurarmar 5 41B orme Ac! rs an enzrrely new ssclmn mlroducsd by me Dangerous Dmgs (Amendmenlj Act 1978 (Act A425) and became aperarive on 10 March 1973 Genera/ibus specialia demgant rs a cardmal principle bnnzerprexanbn /r means ma: where a special I-Vovrsron rs made rn a sbecra/ starule, mar snemal ﬂrovrsron exc/udes the operauon of a gene/alpmv/slo/1 in me general /aw. [saa also PP v. cnu Bsow Hm [1932] cu (Rep) 255 at p 291}. The provrsrons olsﬁ 0/ ma Crlrmnal Procedure Code whrch caurlsel far we respanden! seeks Ia rely an has no relevance whatsoever ta me matrelm Issue belare us " 21 Therefure, havmg cunswdered me «acne and me arguments posed \|u me‘ I lmd that me pleadmgs dD show seveva\ serious wssues to be tried. The P\amlif1 ws enmled lo have us day m Court and snow as dawn var me auegea wmng done by the prewous members a! the Managemem communes as pleaded m the scanamenn bi (Nam: Tna Defendants womd not be prejudiced as mey wm be gwen an avenues In presennnen defence and even me wssue bnne locus slandl, wmey mead n, a\| Inal AH these wssues must be addressed mrbugn wmnesses and tested «nrougn cross- exanunauan 1; N L43maaePKm:sPnRNKI:aKu ; we Sam M... Mu be baa. m mm me ammm am; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm 22. I ilnd that as mere are serious issues to be tried, \|he7I the requirements oi Bands! Eullder sun and v United Malayan Banking Carponlkian Ehl:l[1.V.v.'l]3MLJ .15 has been sansﬁed. Tnis maﬂershould be setdown lertnal The lusllce otttns case could only be resolueu at trial. 23. Conﬂln at evidence as snown IVI tne alnaanl evidence belore me nanllo\| be lesolved solely tnmugn a summary hearing as suggested by the 11"‘ Deierldanl I Niel to Meellam Rosallne V Wllllarn Slllglm [20117] 4 ML! 541. wnere me court ol Appeal s\|a(ed. » "(:1 To appreclale all these allegations, a minute examination of all the documents together mm the relevant terms at the sale and raurcnase agreement ought to be undertaken And rt is lor this reason‘ tnal tne Striking out under tne summary procedure undsrordsr ls rule la 0/ the RHC cannot be invoked two City Dsvslapmsnl Sdn lane V. Everlss Departmental store Sun and [1998] 1 LNS 101, 1199915 MLJ A2) it IS quite obuiaus that paints at law reouinng serious argument nas been raised and rt is not arrrzrcpnale to strike rl out without a trial (on Trievesa v sia Hok cnai/199213 cm Rep 14 1992] 1 ML] 215) A complex case, 11 sin L43x.uaJePKm:sPnRNKl:aKu wane Sum Ilumhll will be used M mm nu nlwlrulllv em; nnmmnrll vn AFVLING wet ﬂ me me present appeal. cannot and should not be sumrnanly slluck out (Pam/m /meme! Ltd v camna com Pte Ltd M20013 SLR 25). 17} /n apmymg to srnke out ma respanasnrs clam under omar 15 rule 19 buns RHC, no! ress man erghl conllurling armaums were fr/ed by ma pames befme me /-agn Calm I navs read all (hese afﬁdavns and I mus! categorical/y say war they conlam a bagsfull of issues and facts neranng to me a//egauons of rmua, oolmston and m/srsprssenlal/on In rs/anon m ma zransrar of ma pmpsny to ma mm: apps//an! who was ma Iaunn defendant bslors ma mgn Court The allrdawts arso ravaa/ed that mare are Issues a! fraudulent misrepresentation by me trustees afthe sauery as well as me Dona ﬁdes or the transaction between me third apbe/«an: who was me Iourrn defendant rn the High court and the trustees oltne soaezy. 13} /n my mgmanr, /1 /5 no! law re; a Mags 0/ ms H/gh Court to resa/ve can!/ms ofevrdence an amaam m a slnkmg autproceedmg when an issue ofcrerlibilrlyis inva/ved ms IS amual/y (he scenana wnrcn me learned judge or the High court had (0 reckon mm rne appropnate we re do so would be by way bra drscovery orby way on: cmssexamlnslran at me ms! pmper (Noor ./ahsn ble Abuur Wahab v Md yusarrmn Amanshah .5 Ana! (199412 cu 249, 121704} 1 cu ISL 383, (1994) 1 MLJ 155) 1; 5w L43zuaaePKm:sPnRNKI:aKu ‘Nata Sam M... M“ be used m mm s. nﬂmruﬂlv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm I91 nie power to strike our is delvvetilrom trie rules and me inriererit [unediction oitne calm as envisaged in ordersz ruie 4 oltne RHC. Edgar./aseph Jr J. (Isle-ISC./] in Paciﬁc centre sun. Bhd. v unileu Engineers (Malaysia) and. [1934] 2 cu Rep 319, [1934] 2 M L .I 143, at page 147 aptly Said that the inherent iIm‘sdl'cliarl ol the court includes all tire powers that an necessary ‘lo fulﬁl ilsellas a court allow’; 'to upnold, to protect, and to mini tne jtldlclnl function of administering]-mice according to law in a regular, orderly and enectiue manner.’ [10] nie scope or order 92 rule A onne RHC is very wide and it is not capable oloeing defined in a precise manner At liie end olriie day‘ me duty or tne court IS to ‘make an oniel as may be necessuy to prevent ln]ustlce or to prevent an nurse or tire process orrne cont-t" (Re Singapore Souvenirlnduslry [Pie ) Ltd Dr H c Huang Dan RakaIi—Rakan v The Liotndetor olsingepore Souvenir /nduslly (Pre) Ltd [7985] 1 LNS 159, [1996] 1 MLJ 14, Low Fang Mei & Arior v Kc reek song & ore and otiier applications [1959] 2 cu Rep 14715, [151-3913 ML] 140, HO 1 [1992] 1 SLR 454. c A 1 and Jami! Hassan V. Kang MW [1991] 1 LNS 41,- [1992] 2 MLJ 45) ' in sin LG1.uIJePKkDcSPnRNKDBKD -one s.ii.i .on..i Wm re used m mm me nVWVuU\|‘1 Mtms ﬂnmmnnl vn AFVLING witli C. ordars nmuis court 24. Based on the above, I dlsrmss me 11'” Devenaanrs applucauon and ss\| down Ims mailer var max and cos! n a cause Dated 3"’ November 2023 aw lnder: Mohd Ariel Emran hln Arllln Judge High Caurl Malaya Kua\z Lumpur NCVC 3 :5 5w L43maaaPKm:sPnRNKr:aKu an ‘Nuns Sum .W..v M“ be used m mm a. nvVWuH\|Y mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm Keﬂy Khan logelherwnlh um Dams cmm1e\s lav me wanna Msssts Mans a. Khan Amen»; and sm.m.s Chwng s.k Kwan wunselfur D11 Messy: sx Cheanﬂ Advocate: and $uI\ulms :5 sn L13x.uaJaPKkDcSPhRNKCBKu um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ﬂ 4. lﬂnd lhal lhrs ls merely a ruse by lhe 11"‘ Delerrdarrl lo escape lhe consequences clan appllcahorl \|o smke out urrder order ls rule 19 ollhe Rules alcaurl 5 The11‘” Delerrdanrs grounds are nul based on an admission o1fac\| as requlred under order 27 rule 3 dllhe Rules olcourl 2012 um are based ml his allegation lhal lhe claim is baseless, lrlvolous and vexalious 5 The 11"‘ Delerldam contends (Hal lhls essenllally based on the argumenl that the Plalnllffs sclllclmrs were not aulhanzed lo lnslltule pruceedlngs agaIns1 lhe Delendants as the Jolm Managerrrenl addy did nol obtain lhe requlred resolulion lo lnslilule pwueedlngs lorlhe alleged wmngs agalnsl any ollhe Delerrdanls. 7 Thereldre. such an argument lalls squarely wlmrn me powers pmvided rar under order 18 rule ls dnhe Rules of cuurr s. The 11"‘ nelerrdarrlcarrnollry lo circumvent lhe rules and lhe oourls ol Judlcature Acl by applylng \|o slrlke oul a clalrrr nul wmngly relylrrg on 3 5w u3zua:aePKm:sPhRNKl:aKu -we Sum M... wlll be used m mm we nlwlrulllv MW; nnmmnnl VII muue wrul emrrer Order 27 or under the mherem powers 0! Courl under Order 92 rule 4 of me Rules o1 (Dunn 2012. 9 On this alone, «ms Court Is jushﬂed m msmrssmg (ms apphcauan as \l is an abuse 0! process and shomd no\ he entenalned by this Courl x rerer to me decrsrorr or me Bowl 0! Appeal in lndah Desa Sauiana Corporation sdrr Bird & ars v Jamus Foorlg Chung Yunn [zoos] 1 CL! 651:- "(:11 rrrs caurr rras an Inherent/urrsmclron m prevent an abuse of as process R515 Zamal Abidin Rafa H] Tachrk & ors v Bn'!ish— Amerrcan Life 5 General Insurance Bhd (199313 cm 605 SC [52] /I/ustlarfcms clan abuse or rrre process unrre ccurr include: (a) An rmemron to emba/ass me uererraarrzs Ansa Tekmk (M) Sdn. arm v Cygal Sdn. am/[1959] 1 LNS 25‘ or (£1) wrrsre the process al ms court rras rror been used m a bone frde manner and has been abused Had: Hassan V surra Remnis scrrr and 1 Or: 1200416 CL] 225 [E3] The caregarres or abuse of process 0! the court are never crosed and wr/r cerrsrn/y pro//lerate pursuant to me myrvad or A sw L43ma:aePKm:sPruRNKI:aKu ; -we Sum Mr... M“ be used m mm nu murr.r-r mm; nnmmnrrl vn mum Wm ﬂ crrcumsiances avar/an/e lmm me Ianual mamx found In each pamcu/ar case. " no, This appncauon shows Khan the 11"‘ Deienuann has run nmhsed me rules m good nanm Thus cam cannon aHaw me 11" Delermann Ia bypass me Cuuns cfJudncaIur2Acn and the m\es(ha\|prevenIsIhe11"' Dananaann (rum appeahng (rum an app\|nn:a\|non undev Order 15 Me 19 uflhe Runes of coun 2012 (ll) Time are urlous Issues to human 11 I also ﬁnd (ha\| the aHega\|nun that the Plaintiffs snln ms were not aunfnunzed In ad and msmune proceedmgs us lar from swear, contrary In when has been suggested by the 11* uenenaam. I do not find any form on admission as suggested by the 11"‘ nevenaam and than this manner should be ﬁxed lcr man. 12 On me nssue onnhe aulhurlly of me Pnammrs sol Ions, I refer no me nennev on engagemenn shown m Encnosuvs 154 and pan om-e resolulion 5 5w L43maaePKm:sPnRNKn:aKu -ma Sam M... wm be used m mm a. nﬂmruﬂlv Mnms nnmmnnl VII mnwa Wm shown Dy the Platrmff authonztng tne cmmnualtmv olthe suit againsl at! at tne Detenaants. ta. Theretere. tms Caurl IS at the aptnmn tnat the Plalnllff nas shown sutﬁctent ewdence lhat the sohcilors have been duIy retained by the Plaintm and autnonzed to conttnue the suit agamst me Defendant t4 whetner \|I'IIs IS true or mhsrwwe‘ snouIa be best deal WIU1 at tnaI wnere It tne Defendants nave pteauea tms ISSLAS‘ men they woum be aumonzeu In cross-examme me matnttrrs wttnesses and have \|\|'IIs Issue detenvwted I cannot in good Iaitn summarily allow the 1t‘" Defendanfs aDD\|IcatIorI I77 vtew oltne contrary oontenltons by the ants. I5 Anotner Iaetor I have ecnsmerett IS tnat the F'laIrI(IW has produced documentary evtdence In suppmt Its oantenuan It IS not merely a bare avennem and justmes a tnamugn Invesltgalinn lhruugh crass exammauun ol wttnesses I cannot summanIy dlslmss me P\|ainIIﬂ“s SUII based on the current evidence betore me N Lt3x.uaJePKm:sPnRNKI:aKu we Sum INIVIDIY wIII be used M mm nu nIwIruIV\|Y mm; ﬂnmmnnl VII AFILING VWLII ﬂ 16, Even rnms Cowl were to accent that ms aupncauon rs based on a genuine allempl lo resalve this mspme m accordance with Order27 Mme Riﬂes DI Caurl 2012. \ ﬁnd (Vial this application does no\| fall wI\|hm the requirements 01 me said proviso. 17. I rever to the decision ov me coun 0! Appeal in Kawan Lama Builders sun Blvd & Anal v syarrkar Lumul Quarry Sdn and [2021] 1 cu 311. where Hanmah Fanxullah JCA sxateu: - “[21]On1sr 27 r 3 ofms R06 2012 psmuls a party :0 ms sml to app/y Iorlina//udgmenl an pan oflhe relielsaughl m mg statement ofclaim I221 rrre Purpose, oi course, olexrractmg an admrsslon orracr rs to enable a party to oorarrr speedy /udgmenl where we othelparry has made a p/am admrssron srrumng ms lame! to succeed rrr ms c/arm and undrspured /acts that prowde an svldentrary ham: [or me calm to cam:/ude mar [here are no friable Issues Ior Ina! 1231/: rs irrrporrarrr xo note maro 27 r 3 of me ROC 2a12rs concerned wrm adm/sslons affect‘ and it does rror rnanerarry such admrssron was made In a p/eamrrg, or atnerw/se. ms court rrr me 7 5w L43zuaaePKm:sPnRNKI:aKu -um Sum Mr... M“ be used m mm u. mrmr.u-r mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm ﬂ case orvnnal Kurner Jayaramalv v. Azrnen Md No: [2010] 3 cu 332 states mat the wonis “ororr:erwrse“. rne words ‘or atrvsrwrss‘ tn tne sau1 nne are or generer app/matron and justrly tne makmg olan order or/udgrnent where an admrssrcrl rs made byletter 0! other relevant documents er agreements wtncn c/eany snow that me defendant has no deience to me plaintt/rs o/errn They are not oonnned lo edrntsston eantatned tn tne pleadrngs alone... [24] /n our new, a mun can pass a /udgmervt under 0 27 r. 3 an the basis mat the statement made by the games an any documents The an/y condmurv IS tnat there must be clean unequivocal and unarnnrguoue, 125] /n Re-Registered Tmde Mark "Cemrra"[1.970] 44 AL./R 191 J tzarwtck co, spsakrng on me nne or the H/gh coun which Is expressed In equivalent‘ lsnns ta our 0. 27:: 3‘ sard al p. 192. The pawers which the Ru/es give to a Justrce in Chambers must be exercrsed with great caution but In a c/ear case a proper exercise arrne Poser WW vb!/rare me delay rnvo/ved in a neanng and wm save unnecessary expense. 2 en LGx.ua:aePKm:sPruRNKI:BKu -we Sum M... Mu be used M mm we nﬂmruﬂlv Mm; ﬂnmmnrvl vn mtme wrm ﬂ 125) /t IS, therefore, necessary Mal me lac! or more admmed be fden!///ed wnn c/anry. rne adrntsston must be deal and no! stmply etnaenee of last upon which the plamm would have to rely to sslab/Ish me cause ofacmn (see Vlthal Kumar (supra)) 127] As was conectly slated by the learned ./C rn his judgment, [hrs rule enm/es a parry rn receipt 0! clear and exp/rcrt adnussion ollacf from an opponent, to app/,v1o court /07 "speedyjuI.1gmem' upon the saw adm/sston by way 0/ a summary procedure. without naytng to wall tor the detennmatmn al any other autstandmg rssuss between the games (see vaeanun Ra/amanrkam y. Kalatsslvt Perumal 120121 9 cu 912, [2012] GAMR 229, Global Deslar (M) Sdn Bhd y Kua/a Lumpw Glass Manufacturers Co Sam and [2004] 5 cu 167: vong Ban Htn v. Laksamana Realry Sdn BM [2003] 3 cu 129‘ Carabao Exports Ply Lm y. On/me Management coneu/tanta Sdn Ehd E Ors [1988] 1 uvs 35, [1988] amu 271, and Vtlhal Kumar./ayaraman y Azman Md Nar (2010) 3 cm 332‘ [2010] 2 ML] 57) " 1E The evidence pruduced by the Detenuant, even me Nmice to Adnut, does not constitute a clear, unequtvocal and unambtguous admlsston that the Ptatnttfrs solictlors were not autnonsed or even tnat the stem ts wttnaut ment. I do nol agree mat the nerenaant nas shown tnat the taste 9 5w Lt3maaePKm:sPnRNKI:aKu wane Sum M... Mu be used M mm a. amt-y MW; nnmmnnl vn nF\LING Wm ﬂ as shown m ms applncauon laHs wnrnn the sum order In zne errcurnsnanoes, I ﬁnd (ml the 11" De(em1anl‘s renanee on Order 27 ride 3 rs mrspleeea and W5 applucahon shomd he ersrnrssea 19 I am a\so ulthe opmlun Ihal Order 92 of me Rmes ul Ccurl 2012 manual be rehed upon byIhe11“'Delendant Where were exrsts a specmc Droviso, sucn as Dvder18 rule 19 of the Rules or Courl. Ihal is apnlrcable In the 11" De!endant's crrcumstanoes than the regal maxim‘ speera/ra dsroganl gsneralrbus” wrll he eppncebre. 20 I refer to the aecrsron or Rare Az\an snan CJ (Maraya; (as ne then was) in PP v Chew siew Luan [1982] CL! 235 wneve ne explarned: ‘The Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Rev/sod - 19847)/s an Ant speciﬁcally designed to regulate me rmponarion, exporranon, manufaclure, sale and use at rmer a/ra, darvyerous drugs, and ‘re make spears! provisions re/azrng in me /u/rsdfolfon af Courts rrr respect of affsncss mereunaer and merr man em Ior purposes connected mslewrlh“ In emer words, are Act rs In substance a special law passed by Peruamenr m derogaltan a! me rights af .3 in sw L43zuaaePKm:sPnRNKI:aKu -we Sam M... Mu be used m mm a. mwwruulv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum wrm	2,230	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-45A-49-08/2020	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH Ong Hau Chan	Mahkamah ini telah mempertimbangkan dan memutuskan bahawa faktor kepentingan awam hendaklah diutamakan dan mengatasi kepentingan-kepentingan peribadi OKT. Ini kerana kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh OKT adalah jenayah dadah yang merupakan suatu kesalahan yang berat dan serius.HUKUMANPERTUDUHAN PERTAMA DAN KEDUASetelah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dari kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara seumur hidup terhadap OKT dari tarikh tangkap dengan 12 kali sebatan sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 39B(2) ADB 1952 bagi pertuduhan pertama dan kedua.PERTUDUHAN KETIGAKesalahan Di Bawah Seksyen 39A(1)Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa hukuman penjara 4 tahun (bermula dari tarikh tangkap) manakala hukuman sebatan tidak dikenakan menurut seksyen 288 KTJ kerana hukuman sebatan bagi pertuduhan Pertama dan Kedua ialah 24 sebatan kesemuanya. PERTUDUHAN KEEMPATKesalahan Di bawah Seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa hukuman empat (4) tahun bagi pertuduhan terhadap OKT dari tarikh tangkap.Kesemua hukuman berjalan secara serentak dan dikira dari tarikh tangkapan. Segala ekshibit dikembalikan kepada polis melalui TPR untuk dilupuskan selepas rayuan. Ekshibit dokumentari disimpan dengan selamat di Mahkamah.	04/12/2023	YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b111e0a9-ca54-4150-9eb0-d4eddc6940ae&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45A-48-08/2020 DAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45A-49-08/2020 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN ONG HAU CHAN (NO KP: 911030-10-5813) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [1] Ong Hau Chan (OKT) telah dituduh dengan empat (4) pertuduhan iaitu dua (2) pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) dan satu (1) pertuduhan masing-masing di bawah seksyen 39A(1) dan seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya (ADB) 1952. Pertuduhan-pertuduhan sepertimana di ekshibit P2 dan P4 seperti berikut: 04/12/2023 10:32:19 BA-45A-49-08/2020 Kand. 42 S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (BA-45A-48-08/2020) Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu pada 25 Mei 2019, jam lebih kurang 9.45 malam bertempat di B-13-13, Tower B, Amerin Residence, Jalan Impian Indah, Taman Impian Indah, Seri Kembangan, dalam Daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya jenis Ketamine seberat 37,623.9 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 39B(2) akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu pada 25 Mei 2019, jam lebih kurang 9.45 malam bertempat di B-13-13, Tower B, Amerin Residence, Jalan Impian Indah, Taman Impian Indah, Seri Kembangan, dalam Daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya jenis 3,4 Methylenedioxy Methamphetamine (MDMA) seberat 299.15 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 39B(2) akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Ketiga S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Bahawa kamu pada 25 Mei 2019, jam lebih kurang 9.45 malam bertempat di B-13-13, Tower B, Amerin Residence, Jalan Impian Indah, Taman Impian Indah, Seri Kembangan, dalam Daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah didapati dalam milikan dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seberat 15.30 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39A(1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama. BA-45A-49/2020 Pertuduhan Keempat Bahawa kamu pada 25 Mei 2019, jam lebih kurang 9.45 malam bertempat di B-13-13, Tower B, Amerin Residence, Jalan Impian Indah, Taman Impian Indah, Seri Kembangan, dalam Daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah didapati dalam milikan dadah berbahaya jenis Nimetazepam seberat 1.25gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 12(3) akta yang sama. [2] Kesemua pertuduhan telah dibicarakan secara bersekali. NARATIF KES PENDAKWAAN [3] Pihak Pendakwaan telah mengemukakan seramai 6 orang saksi. Saksi-saksi tersebut adalah- S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 SP1 – Chee Kee Tong (Pemilik premis/rumah) SP2 – Sjn Md Suhaimi b Md Sihat (Jurufoto) SP3 – Insp Mohd Idzahar b Mohamed (Pengadu) SP4 – Insp Shaedan b Mohd Yusoff (Pegawai Penyiasat) SP5 – Sjn Muhammad Arwan b Masu’ut (Jurustor) SP6 – Khairul Anwar bin Norhan (Ahli Kimia) [4] Bertindak atas maklumat dadah maka pada 25 Mei 2019 satu tangkapan telah dibuat oleh Pengadu iaitu Insp Mohd Idzahar bin Mohamed (SP3). Sejurus tangkapan dibuat, turut dijumpai bersama OKT segugus kunci beserta dua kad akses. Hasil daripada tangkapan, SP3 ke Amerin Residence di mana dikatakan tempat tinggal OKT. Semasa pemeriksaan di rumah tersebut, SP3 dan pasukannya telah menjumpai bahan disyaki dadah di dalam almari sebuah bilik di rumah tersebut. [5] Barang-barang kes seterusnya dirampas. SP3 kemudiannya membawa balik ke balai untuk siasatan lanjut (Laporan Polis ekshibit P11 dan P12). SP3 turut membuat tandaan pada barang-barang kes seperti berikut: A plastik lutsinar berisi serbuk disyaki dadah syabu dengan ab: 165gram dalam bahagian tengah kanan almari B plastik lutsinar berisi serbuk disyaki dadah ketamine dengan ab: 441 gram di bahagian tengah kanan almari S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 C bekas plastik berisi pil pelbagai bentuk disyaki ecstacy dengan ab: 1035gram dalam bahagian tengah kanan almari D 40 keping aluminium foil berisi pil disyaki eramin 5 dengan ab: 120gram dalam bahagian tengah kanan almari E beg hitam dengan 1 alat penimbang, 1 alat penimbang digital, 3 mangkuk, 1 penyeduk dan 1 penapis dalam bahagian bawah kanan almari F kotak telwin dalamnya 6 peket Nestle Everyday berisi bahan disyaki dadah ketamine dalam bahagian kiri bawah almari G beg roda dalamnya 22 peket Nestle Everyday berisi bahan disyaki dadah ketamine dalam bahagian bawah kiri almari H beg roda spears dalamnya 22 peket Nestle Everyday berisi bahan disyaki dadah jenis ketamine dalam bahagian bawah kiri almari I kunci mangga pada pintu hadapan grill, 1 helai baju jenama Poligan dalam almari bilik no 2, 1 pasang seluar panjang jenama bu yue dalam almari bilik 2, 1 paspot atas nama OKT di atas meja kabinet TV dan 1 ‘tenancy agreement’ atas nama OKT dalam laci kabinet TV [6] SP3 seterusnya menyerahkan OKT serta barang rampasan kepada Pegawai Penyiasat yang bertugas iaitu Insp Shaedan bin Mohd Yusoff (SP4). [7] Siasatan lanjut oleh SP4 mengesahkan bahawa premis tersebut dihuni oleh OKT. SP4 turut mendapati bahawa tempat dadah yang dijumpai adalah dari bilik milik OKT di premis tersebut di mana barang kes telah diambil dari dalam laci almari milik OKT. SP4 juga mendapati tiada orang lain yang tinggal di rumah tersebut selain OKT. [8] Barang-barang kes disyaki dadah tersebut telah dihantar ke S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Jabatan Kimia Malaysia untuk dianalisa dan Ahli Kimia iaitu Encik Khairul Anwar bin Norhan (SP6) telah mengesahkan bahawa barang yang dirampas oleh SP3 adalah dadah-dadah yang disahkan sebagai dadah berbahaya jenis Ketamine, MDMA, Methamphetamine dan Nimetazepam sepertimana pertuduhan dan berat bersih bagi barang- barang salah tersebut seperti di ekshibit P25. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN Kes prima facie [9] Di akhir kes Pendakwaan, tugas Mahkamah adalah untuk mempertimbangkan dan menilai secara maksimum keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan bagi menentukan sama ada satu kes prima facie telah dikemukakan terhadap OKT dengan menilai keterangan saksi pihak Pendakwaan yang kredibel yang telah membuktikan segala intipati pertuduhan. Ini adalah seperti yang dinyatakan dalam seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (KTJ). Selain itu, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Balachandran v PP [2005] 2 MLJ 301 telah menghuraikan akan ujian prima facie. [10] Justeru, bagi mengemukakan satu kes prima facie, pihak Pendakwaan perlu membuktikan intipati kesalahan iaitu: S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (a) Dadah tersebut adalah dadah berbahaya seperti yang tersenarai dalam ADB 1952 dengan berat bersih seperti dalam pertuduhan; (b) Dadah tersebut berada dalam milikan OKT dan OKT mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap dadah yang dirampas; dan (c) OKT telah melakukan perbuatan pengedaran dadah tersebut (berkaitan Pertuduhan Pertama dan Kedua). Pembuktian Initipati (a) Dadah tersebut adalah dadah berbahaya seperti yang tersenarai dalam ADB 1952 dengan berat bersih seperti dalam pertuduhan. [11] Berdasarkan keterangan SP6 iaitu Ahli Kimia yang melakukan analisa, tidak dipertikaikan bahawa barang kes dadah tersebut merupakan dadah berbahaya seperti yang disenarai dalam Jadual Pertama ADB 1952 iaitu jenis Ketamine seberat 37,623.9gram, MDMA seberat 299.15gram, Methamphetamine seberat 15.30gram dan Nimetazepam seberat 1.25gram. Ini disahkan pada ekshibit P25. [12] Mahkamah menerima hasil analisa dan keterangan SP6 selaras S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 prinsip dalam kes Munusamy Vengadasalam v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492. Intipati pertama telah dibuktikan. Pembuktian Initipati (b) Dadah tersebut berada dalam milikan OKT dan OKT mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap dadah yang dirampas. [13] Untuk pembuktian dadah tersebut berada dalam milikan OKT, rujukan boleh dibuat dalam kes-kes berikut bagi memahami dan menterjemahkan maksud milikan atau “possession”. (antaranya kes-kes Chan Pean Leon v PP [1956] 1 MLJ 237 , Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v R [1949] 1 MLJ 54, Leow Nghee Lim v Reg [1956] 1 MLJ 28, PP v Hafiszamri b Ahmad & Anor [2007] 1 MLJ 497, Saad Ibrahim v. PP [1968] 1 MLJ 158; Pendakwa Raya v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 6 MLJ 393; Public Prosecutor v Abdul Rahman bin Akif [2007] 5 MLJ 1; Choo Yoke Choy v PP [1992] 2 MLJ 632 ; PP v Hong Ho Aik [2008] 7 MLJ 589 dan PP v Kung Yang Song [2010] 9 CLJ 483 dirujuk). [14] Pemilikan harus mempunyai ciri-ciri kawalan atau jagaan dan pengetahuan akan barang yang dimilikinya. Kawalan atau jagaan membawa maksud mempunyai penjagaan dan pengawalan atas barang tersebut. Seterusnya, pengetahuannya akan sifat barang yang berada S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 dalam pengawalan dan penjagaan itu menunjukkan pemilikan ke atas barang tersebut. Dengan itu, pemilikan adalah apabila seseorang dalam keadaan mempunyai kuasa untuk menguruskan barang itu sebagai pemunya dengan mengecualikan orang lain. [15] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Abdul Rahman bin Akif (supra) menggunapakai prinsip dalam kes Tan Ah Tee & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1978] 1 MLRA 273; [1980] 1 MLJ 49 yang memutuskan: “Indeed, even if there were no statutory presumptions available to the prosecution, once the prosecution had proved the fact of physical control or possession of the plastic bag and the circumstances in which this was acquired by and remained with the second appellant, the trial judges would be justified in finding that she had possession of the contents of the plastic bag within the meaning of the Act unless she gave an explanation of the physical fact which the trial judges accepted or which raised a doubt in their minds that she had possession of the contents within the meaning of the Act.”. [16] Seterusnya Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Parlan bin Dadeh v Public Prosecutor [2009] 1 CLJ 717; [2008] 6 MLJ 19 memutuskan bahawa intipati mengenai pengetahuan boleh dilihat dari inferen atau kesimpulan fakta- "Proof of knowledge is very often a matter of inference. The material from which the inference of knowledge can be drawn varies from case to case. It would be sufficient for the prosecution to prove facts S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 from which it could properly be inferred that the accused had the necessary knowledge." [17] Intipati yang diperlukan untuk membuktikan pemilikan ialah kawalan fizikal dan pengetahuan. Untuk memenuhi unsur fizikal, ia mesti ditunjukkan bahawa OKT berada berhampiran dengan dadah dan dia boleh mengendalikannya seolah-olah ia adalah miliknya. Bagi unsur mental atau mens rea pula, perlu dibuktikan bahawa OKT berniat atau berhasrat untuk berurusan dengan dadah tersebut (intended to deal with the drugs) seperti diputuskan dalam kes Abdul Rahman bin Akif (supra). Dalam erti kata lain, keperluan unsur fizikal dan mental tersebut perlu wujud dan dibuktikan sebelum pemilikan dapat dibuktikan. [18] Dengan itu, pihak Pendakwaan harus membuktikan OKT mempunyai kawalan atau jagaan dan pengetahuan akan dadah yang berada dalam jagaannya itu dengan mengecualikan orang lain mempunyai akses pada tempat di mana dadah itu dikatakan dijumpai. Selain itu, pengetahuan itu boleh ditunjukkan dari fakta hal keadaan sesuatu kes itu. [19] Mahkamah mendapati OKT mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap barang kes dadah tersebut berdasarkan fakta-fakta berikut- S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (a) SP3 dan pasukan tiba di premis yang dihuni OKT dan barang kes telah dijumpai di satu bilik di mana OKT merupakan penyewa di premis tersebut; (b) SP3 telah memeriksa dan merampas kesemua barang salah tersebut. Turut dirampas dari almari yang sama adalah sehelai baju, sehelai seluar, passport antarabangsa milik OKT dan perjanjian sewaan premis (Tenancy Agreement) atas nama OKT selaku penyewa dengan pemilik premis tersebut iaitu SP1; dan (c) Tiada tanda-tanda yang menunjukkan OKT menghuni premis tersebut dengan mana-mana individu lain semasa SP3 dan pasukannya menyerbu masuk premis tersebut. [20] Nas undang-undang adalah jelas berkaitan dadah yang dijumpai telah disembunyikan di dalam laci almari di dalam bilik OKT di mana dadah tersebut dibungkus di dalam beg peket Nestle Everyday (peket susu tepung). Dadah-dadah tersebut bukan sekadar disembunyikan di dalam almari malah dibungkus dengan peket susu serbuk agar tidak dikesan oleh pihak berkuasa. Mana mungkin untuk mengatakan OKT S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 tidak mengetahui kandungan peket-peket susu serbuk tersebut malahan tidak ada penjelasan mengapa OKT menyimpan ‘susu’ dalam stok yang begitu banyak. [21] Di dalam kes ini, OKT merupakan penghuni dan penyewa kepada premis dan bilik yang mana dadah tersebut itu dijumpai. Merujuk kes PP v Zolzaya Natsagroj [2015] 6 CLJ 579, Mahkamah menyatakan- “(1) The prosecution's evidence showed that the bag containing the drugs was found inside the respondent's bag concealed from view, the respondent was the sole tenant of the room and nobody else had the key to the room. Therefore, at the material time the respondent had actual possession, custody and control of the exh. P67. The respondent had admitted putting the drugs in her bag. The concealment of the bag supported the inference of knowledge of the contents of the bag. Based on the quantity and weight of the drugs, the trial judge had rightly invoked the presumption under s. 37(da) of the Act. Therefore, the trial judge had correctly ordered the respondent to enter her defence. (paras 21)” [22] OKT ditangkap hanya selepas SP3 dan pasukannya telah menyerbu premis tersebut. OKT pada asalnya tidak berada di rumah. Beliau hanya dibawa pulang kemudian oleh SP3 dan pasukannya apabila OKT telah disoalsiat oleh SP3. Hasil daripada soalsiasat tersebut, barang-barang salah tersebut dijumpai di premis OKT. Selain itu, semasa serbuan dilakukan, tiada individu lain yang berada di rumah tersebut. Oleh itu, adalah inferens yang nyata bahawa OKT mempunyai pengetahuan ke atas dadah yang dijumpai. S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [23] Selain itu, pihak Pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan OKT mempunyai kawalan atau jagaan dan pengetahuan akan dadah yang berada dalam jagaannya itu dengan mengecualikan orang lain mempunyai akses pada tempat di mana dadah itu dikatakan dijumpai. Berdasarkan ini intipati (b) telah dipenuhi. Pembuktian Initipati (c) OKT telah melakukan perbuatan pengedaran dadah tersebut. [24] Di dalam kes ini, bagi intipati pengedaran, memandangkan intipati pemilikan telah berjaya dibuktikan, maka Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa satu kes prima facie dibuktikan menurut seksyen 180(4) KTJ, dengan pemakaian anggapan bawah seksyen 37(da) ADB 1972 untuk pengedaran berdasarkan berat dadah. Oleh itu, anggapan pengedaran di bawah s 37(da) ADB 1952 adalah terpakai. [25] Intipati (c) telah dipenuhi. KEPUTUSAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN [26] Setelah Mahkamah meneliti keterangan melalui saksi-saksi S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Pendakwaan bersama ekshibit yang dikemukakan dalam kes ini, hujahan kedua-dua pihak serta setelah diaplikasikan prinsip penilaian maksima terhadap kesemua keterangan yang dikemukakan, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa wujudnya suatu kes prima facie terhadap OKT berdasarkan keterangan yang jelas untuk intipati pertama dan kedua serta dengan bergantung kepada anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(da) ADB 1952 bagi intipati ketiga. [27] OKT telah dipanggil untuk membela diri dan diberikan tiga (3) pilihan sama ada untuk memberi keterangan secara bersumpah, memberi keterangan bersumpah dalam kandang OKT atau berdiam diri. OKT memilih memberi keterangan secara bersumpah. KES PEMBELAAN [28] Di peringkat Pembelaan, OKT memilih untuk memberi keterangan bersumpah dengan menggunakan Pernyataan Saksi (PS-D1) serta keterangan lisan. OKT telah memilih untuk tidak memanggil lain-lain saksi. Naratif kes Pembelaan [29] Berikut adalah keterangan OKT melalui penyata saksinya, PS-D1. S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Secara ringkasnya, OKT menyatakan dia berasa kasihan dengan rakannya Goh Liang Sin bersama teman serumah Goh Liang Sin iaitu Wong Wai Lin yang mana tempoh penyewaannya hampir tamat dan menawarkan untuk tinggal sementara di rumah OKT. [30] Seterusnya OKT menyatakan pada hari kejadian pada 29 Mei 2019, rakannya ingin memindah barang ke rumahnya tetapi OKT tiada di rumah dan teman wanita OKT bernama Pham Nhunga yang berada di rumah OKT telah membenarkan untuk urusan pemindahan barang ke rumah OKT. [31] OKT seterusnya menyatakan pada perenggan 14 PS-D1- “Pada jam lebih kurang 12 tengah hari teman wanita saya telah memaklumkan saya bahawa Goh Liang Sin dan Wong Wai Lin telah datang ke Condo saya dan meletakkan beg pakaian, kotak-kotak dan barang lain ke dalam bilik kedua di unit kami. Mengikut teman wanita saya selepas meletakkan barang tersebut di situ mereka telah terus beredar.”. [32] OKT seterusnya menyatakan pada sebelah petang jam 4.30, Goh Liang Sin telah memintanya menghantar ke tempat kerja kerana tiada pengangkutan. Oleh itu OKT telah membantunya ke tempat kerja. Setiba di tempat kerja Goh Liang Sin, OKT telah diserbu sekumpulan lelaki yang memperkenalkan diri sebagai polis. Tiada barang salah dijumpai pada OKT. S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [33] OKT kemudian dibawa ke rumahnya sekitar jam 8 malam dan dadah telah dijumpai. OKT menafikan pengetahuan mengenai dadah yang dijumpai dengan menyatakan ianya adalah milik Goh Liang Sin dan/atau Wong Wai Lin dan OKT tidak pernah menunjukkan almari tempat simpanan dadah itu kepada Polis. ANALISA DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH DI AKHIR KES PEMBELAAN [34] Beban pembuktian pihak Pembelaan di akhir kes Pembelaan adalah dengan menimbulkan keraguan munasabah ke atas kes Pendakwaan. Manakala beban ke atas pihak Pendakwaan pula adalah untuk membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. Ini seperti yang diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 182A KTJ. [35] Berdasarkan seksyen 182A KTJ, jika Pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kesnya melampaui sebarang keraguan yang munasabah, OKT hendaklah didapati bersalah dan disabitkan. Namun jika sebaliknya, Mahkamah hendaklah melepas dan membebaskan tertuduh. (Rujuk kes Balachandran v. PP [2005] 2 MLJ 301; [2005] 1 CLJ 85 dan Mohamad Radhi bin Yaacob v. PP [1991] 3 MLJ 169). Kes Public Prosecutor v S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Mohd Amin bin Mohd Razali & Ors [2002] 5 MLJ 406). Mahkamah Persekutuan juga telah menjelaskan tentang maksud seksyen 182A KTJ. [36] Oleh itu, OKT memikul beban untuk membangkitkan keraguan munasabah ke atas kes Pendakwaan selain menyangkal anggapan pengedaran dadah di bawah seksyen 37(da) ADB 1952 atas imbangan kebarangkalian. [37] Menjadi anggapan bahawa OKT mengedar dadah tersebut sehingga dibuktikan sebaliknya (until the contrary is proved). OKT dengan ini perlu mengemukakan keterangan yang mencukupi untuk mengakas anggapan tersebut atas imbangan kebarangkalian (rujuk kes PP v. Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89; [1968] 1 LNS 116, Ng Chai Kern v PP [1994] 2 MLJ 210; [1994] 2 CLJ 593 dan Mohamad Radhi v PP [1991] 3 MLJ 169; [1991] 3 CLJ 2073). [38] Setelah dibuktikan OKT mempunyai milikan mens rea dadah tersebut, keterangan SP6 yang tidak dicabar berkaitan jenis dan dadah yang terlibat telah membolehkan aplikasi anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(da) ADB 1952. [39] Setelah menilai keterangan OKT dan saksi pihak Pendakwaan, S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Mahkamah mendapati naratif pembelaan OKT adalah sukar untuk dipercayai memandangkan ianya merupakan penafian kosong yang tidak menimbulkan sebarang keraguan munasabah ke atas kes Pendakwaan yang telah berjaya dibuktikan kesnya. Keterangan OKT seolah dibuat semata-mata untuk melepaskan diri dari kesalahan yang telah dilakukan. Tiada keterangan bukti lain yang menyangkal bahawa dadah telah dijumpai di premis yang diduduki OKT. [40] Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa atas imbangan kebarangkalian, OKT telah gagal mengakas atau mematahkan anggapan pengedaran. Mahkamah mendapati cerita dan pembelaan OKT tidak menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah bahawa OKT tidak mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan atas dadah yang dijumpai di premis yang didudukinya dan dadah bukan miliknya. [41] Ini berdasarkan kes Liam Heng Boon v. PP [2014] 5 MLJ 259 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan: "So the appellant had to rebut the operative presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of the DDA on the balance of probabilities. That level of rebuttal places a higher evidentiary burden on the appellant." [42] Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa keterangan bukti kes Pembelaan S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 bukan sahaja sekadar satu penafian tetapi juga tidak menyakinkan (not convincing). Pembelaan OKT tidak disokong (uncorroborated) dengan keterangan dan pembelaan yang dikemukakan adalah penafian semata- mata yang tidak disertai dengan bukti kukuh. Oleh kerana kes pembelaan hanya sekadar penafian semata-mata, ia tidak dapat membantu OKT. [43] Penafian semata-mata tanpa sebarang keterangan sokongan tidak dapat menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah (rujuk kes Ong Hooi Beng v PP [2015] MLJU 22 (CA) dan Ali Tan bin Abdullah v PP [2013] 2 MLJ 676 (CA)). Ia juga seperti diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes D.A. Duncan v PP [1980] 2 MLJ 195- “[4] Now this evidence, if accepted and believed, is clearly sufficient to establish a prima facie case against the appellant. The High Court at Alor Star accepted it and called on the defence. The defence was, in effect, a simple denial of the evidence connecting the appellant with the four boxes. We cannot see any plausible ground for saying that the four boxes were not his. In the circumstances of the prosecution evidence, the High Court came, in or view, to the correct conclusion that his denial did not cast a doubt on the prosecution case against the appellant”. [44] Pada peringkat ini, OKT seharusnya menyangkal anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(da) ADB 1952. Walaubagaimanapun, pembelaan OKT yang bersifat penafian semata-mata tanpa keterangan sokongan menunjukkan Pembelaan gagal menyangkal anggapan tersebut. [45] Seterusnya dalam kes Mohd Hanafi Safii v PP [2012] 1 LNS 814; S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [2013] 5 MLJ 87 Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan: “It is thus not enough for an accused merely to assert absence of knowledge. The facts of the case must be examined as a whole to see whether he had good reason to suspect that he was carrying drugs. In Yeo Choon Huat v. PP [1998] 1 SLR 217, this court held (at pp. 226-227): In short, ignorance is a defence only when there is no reason for suspicion and no right and opportunity of examination; ignorance simpliciter is not enough.” [46] Berdasarkan kepada prinsip-prinsip kes di atas, adalah terbukti keterangan OKT ini hanyalah bersifat penafian semata-mata dan tidakpun menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah. Selain itu, Pembelaan juga tidak memanggil mana-mana saksi untuk mengesahkan versi OKT di dalam kes ini walaupun berpeluang berbuat sedemikian. Alasan yang dinyatakan pihak Pembelaan semasa menutup kes ialah “We applied for subpoenas for Wong Wai Ling and Goh Liang Sing we are unable to trace them.” (rujuk Nota keterangan halaman 106). [47] Oleh itu, setelah meneliti keterangan kes Pembelaan terhadap kes Pendakwaan dan menimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan kes ini, Mahkamah mendapati pihak Pembelaan telah gagal membangkitkan keraguan munasabah ke atas elemen pemilikan mens rea dadah berbahaya seperti dalam pertuduhan. S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [48] Seterusnya Mahkamah mendapati pihak Pembelaan juga telah gagal menyangkal anggapan pengedaran dadah di bawah seksyen 37(da) ADB 1952 yang terpakai terhadapnya sepertimana mengikut prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes Mat v Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 LNS 82; [1963] 1 MLJ 263. [49] Dengan itu setelah Mahkamah ini menimbang kesemua keterangan, didapati bahawa OKT gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan munasabah ke atas kes pihak Pendakwaan mengenai dadah yang dimilikinya serta atas imbangan kebarangkalian gagal mematahkan anggapan pengedaran ke atas dadah tersebut. Sebaliknya pihak Pendakwaan telah membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan munasabah atas alasan yang telah dijelaskan. Sehubungan itu, Mahkamah mensabitkan OKT dengan kesemua pertuduhan terhadapnya. Isu-isu Lain (a) Saksi yang tidak dipanggil [50] Di dalam hujahan pihak Pembelaan, antara isu yang diutarakan adalah bahawa terdapat saksi-saksi yang tidak ditawarkan kepada pihak Pembelaan antaranya Wong Wai Lin, Goh Liang Sin dan Ahmad Nizam S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (penama-penama). Pihak Pendakwaan menghujahkan pertuduhan ke atas OKT di dalam kes ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa barang salah ditemui di dalam rumah OKT sendiri dan bukanlah dijumpai di mana- mana tempat lain yang melibatkan penama-penama tersebut. Oleh itu, penama-penama bukanlah saksi material. [51] Persoalan yang timbul adalah adakah pihak Polis telah menjalankan siasatan dengan baik? Berdasarkan keterangan terdapat dua unit telah diserbu pihak Polis di Amerin Residence di mana salah satunya merupakan rumah OKT dan satu lagi rumah Goh Liang Sin. Mereka tidak dipanggil kerana bukan saksi material untuk kes ini. Pihak Pembelaan juga bercadang untuk memanggil mereka sebagai saksi pembelaan tetapi akhirnya tidak dipanggil. Berkenaan ‘teman wanita’ Vietnam, walaupun terdapat usaha mencari tetapi tidak dapat dijumpai. [52] Pihak Pendakwaan seterusnya menghujahkan bahawa siasatan telah dibuat mengikut SOP yang ditetapkan dan tindakan untuk membentuk satu pertuduhan ke atas OKT telah dibuat berdasarkan hasil siasatan dan keterlibatan OKT. Penama-penama yang dibangkitkan Pembelaan tidak langsung berkait dengan barang salah yang ditemui di dalam rumah OKT dan tidak dibuktikan. S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [53] Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kes Ghazalee bin Kassim and Ors v PP [2008] 1 MLRA 381 dan kes Mohd Shamshir bin Mohd Rashid v PP (2008) 6 CLJ 768 adalah berkaitan. [54] Oleh itu, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Pendakwaan bahawa penama-penama bukan saksi yang material untuk unfolding the prosecution’s case memandangkan peranan penama-penama tersebut tiada kaitan dengan penemuan barang salah di dalam premis OKT. (b) Pernyataan Rakaman Percakapan di bawah Seksyen 112 KTJ [55] Pihak Pembelaan telah berhujah untuk mendapatkan pernyataan rakaman percakapan penama-penama. Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan seksyen 112 KTJ adalah jelas (Husdi v Pendakwa Raya [1980] 2 MLJ 80). Oleh itu isu ini tidak dapat dipertimbangkan. Mitigasi [56] Budibicara menentukan hukuman adalah terletak kepada Mahkamah yang membicarakan. Sebagaimana diperuntukkan di dalam seksyen 183 KTJ, apabila seseorang OKT itu disabitkan dengan kesalahan, Mahkamah hendaklah menjatuhkan hukuman menurut undang-undang. Di dalam kes Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315 telah S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 diputuskan bahawa: “A sentence according to law" means that the sentence must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section, but it must also be assessed and passed in accordance with established judicial principles.” [57] Berpandukan kepada kes Jafa bin Daud (supra), budibicara tersebut hendaklah berpandukan kepada prinsip undang-undang yang telah ditetapkan. Dalam mempertimbangkan hukuman yang sesuai dan munasabah terhadap OKT bagi pertuduhan terhadapnya, Mahkamah ini telah turut mempertimbangkan kesemua faktor-faktor peringanan hukuman yang dihujahkan oleh Peguambela OKT [58] Dalam rayuan mitigasi, Peguambela telah merujuk dan memohon Mahkamah mempertimbangkan hukuman alternatif selain hukuman mati setelah pindaan yang baharu kepada seksyen 39B ADB 1952 agar menjatuhkan hukuman pemenjaraan seumur hidup. Selain itu, ini merupakan kesalahan pertama OKT. [59] Mahkamah mempunyai pilihan untuk menjatuhkan hukuman mati atau penjara seumur hidup dan minimum 12 kali sebatan ke atas OKT di bawah seksyen 39B(2) ADB 1952. S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [60] Semasa OKT dituduh dan mula dibicarakan, hukuman bagi kesalahan pengedaran dadah di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) ADB 1952 adalah hukuman mati. Namun menerusi Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 (Akta 846), yang berkuatkuasa pada 4 Julai 2023 melalui warta [PU(B) 229/2023] bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B ADB 1952 telah dipinda iaitu apabila disabitkan hendaklah dihukum dengan hukuman mati atau penjara seumur hidup dan hendaklah, jika dia tidak dijatuhkan hukuman mati, dihukum sebat tidak kurang daripada 12 sebatan. Ini bermakna, budi bicara diberi sepenuhnya kepada Mahkamah untuk menentukan pilihan hukuman (rujuk kes: Loh Hock Seng v Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 13 dan DA Duncan v PP (supra). [61] Manakala seksyen 3 Criminal Justice Act 1953 (Revised 1988) [Akta 345] mentafsirkan hukuman penjara seumur hidup sebagai pemenjaraan untuk tempoh 30 tahun. [62] Mahkamah ini telah mempertimbangkan dan memutuskan bahawa faktor kepentingan awam hendaklah diutamakan dan mengatasi kepentingan-kepentingan peribadi OKT. Ini kerana kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh OKT adalah jenayah dadah yang merupakan suatu kesalahan yang berat dan serius. S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 HUKUMAN PERTUDUHAN PERTAMA DAN KEDUA [63] Setelah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dari kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara seumur hidup terhadap OKT dari tarikh tangkap dengan 12 kali sebatan sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 39B(2) ADB 1952 bagi pertuduhan pertama dan kedua. PERTUDUHAN KETIGA Kesalahan Di Bawah Seksyen 39A(1) [64] Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa hukuman penjara 4 tahun (bermula dari tarikh tangkap) manakala hukuman sebatan tidak dikenakan menurut seksyen 288 KTJ kerana hukuman sebatan bagi pertuduhan Pertama dan Kedua ialah 24 sebatan kesemuanya. PERTUDUHAN KEEMPAT Kesalahan Di bawah Seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [65] Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa hukuman empat (4) tahun bagi pertuduhan terhadap OKT dari tarikh tangkap. [66] Kesemua hukuman berjalan secara serentak dan dikira dari tarikh S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 tangkapan. [67] Segala ekshibit dikembalikan kepada polis melalui TPR untuk dilupuskan selepas rayuan. Ekshibit dokumentari disimpan dengan selamat di Mahkamah. (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI SHAH ALAM (JENAYAH 4) TARIKH: 3 Disember 2023 S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 PIHAK-PIHAK PEGUAMBELA Messrs Grace S. Nathan Advocates and Solicitors Suite 11.01, Level 11 South Wing Menara OBYU 4, Jalan PJU 8/8A Damansara Perdana 47820 Petaling Jaya, Selangor. PENDAKWAAN TPR Mohd. Heikal Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor S/N qeARsVTKUEGesNTt3GlArg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	34,987	Tika 2.6.0
BA-45A-2-01/2020	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH 1. ) Mohamad Sabri Bin Mat Arifin 2. ) Mohd Bukhari Bin Abdullah	1st and 2nd Accused were charged of having common intention to traffic in dangerous drug under section 39B (1) of the DDA. Duty of the prosecution to prove each ingredient of the charge through direct evidence or by using presumptions to form a prima facie case against both Accused. Both Accused were acquitted and discharged at the end of the prosecution’s case for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden.	04/12/2023	Puan Roszianayati Binti Ahmad	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8c8f52ee-cbd4-4ae2-b1a5-66b2a9be3f79&Inline=true	BA-45A-2-01-2020 (PP vs Mohd Sabri bin Mat Arifin & other.pdf 04/12/2023 14:35:28 BA-45A-2-01/2020 Kand. 178 S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 7lKPjNTL4kqxpWayqb4/eQ *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal aA—45A—2—o1/2020 Kand. 175 ;4,12,:nn 14 2:42» IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA A7 SHAH ALAM SELANGDR CRIMINAL TRIAL NUMBER:- BA-45A-2-01/2020 BETWEEN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND 1. MoHD SAERI am MA1 ARIFIN 2. MOHD BUKMARI BIN ABDULLAH GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Innodmian [1] The Accused were bum charged wmh an olfence under lhe Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA') (or the onenoe ol zramcxmg m Memampnenamme read Iogetherwuh sechon 34 0\| \|he Pena! Code. The charge agams\| mam reads as follows — Eahawa kamu bersamasama Dada 2/os/2019 jam Vebm kurang 12 so Iengah malam m rumah alamat No 7-3, Tingkal 2. Jalan ms 3/46, Taman sn Mama. Petalmg Jaya, dalam Daerah Pexanng, dx da\am Negen Selangar Daml Ehsan «swan maapau mengedar dadah herbahaya wawtu Memamphetamme 1 5w 7\><P:Nn¢mxvwayub4/ex: -ms Sum INNDIY M“ be used M mm u. nvwvuﬁlv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum DWLM E seberal as 09 gram, ﬂan dengan nu kamu Ielah melakukan suam kesalahan an bawah seksyen ass (1; ¢a) Ak\|a Dadah aemahaya 1952 yang hmeh mnukurn dw bawah seksyen 395 \|2\|Ak1a yang sama dan mbaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan dan se\aras dengan seksyen 54 Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Man Mandaton 2023 (Akla 546) Brief Fact: [2] [3] on 2 3 me at about 12 so am‘ asked an Inlormauon‘ a pohoe Ieam led by Vnspecwv Haﬁzle bun lbramm (SP5) together with 9 other members raided a premise at unn 7-3 Tmgkal 2. Jam: ms 3/45 Taman sn Mama F-a«anng Jays (ma prsmxse) when may amvsd, nney found the gnuea door of the premxse was Vacked wan a padluck spa mstmcled ms naan. to break ma padmck \|u gam access to the pvenuse He znen opened me urﬂocked wooden dam and SP5 along wwth nus raldmg team amerea the premise and found Iwo Malay males were swung on the sofa In me living room Tne two 0! them were Idermﬁecl as the 1sI and Ina 2nd Accused Amannng to SP5, bum Accused xaakac nervous and shack Aner mtroducing mmself as a pohce omcer, SP5 mu a phys\ca\ search on bo\|h Accused bu! and not ﬁnd anymvng wrong. on mnher Inspecuon onne pranuse, wmnessea by ms rammg team, SP5 vouna 2 5w nmmmaxpwayuwac -ma Sam M... Mu be used a mm ca nvVWuH\|Y mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm the application oi a 'presumption upon presumplion‘ is that the presumed eiemeni oi possession under s. 3‘/id) is used to invoke uie presumption oi ireinoking unuer s aviaai witiioui any Dnnslderalmn tnei ine element oi possession in s 37(da) requires a Wound‘ possession and not a ‘deemetf possession The phrase ‘any person who is iouno in possession oi‘ entails an ainrmaiive iinaing oi possession beset: on aaduoea evidence To invoke a presumption onrainoking ieunoeu noi on prooi oi possession but on presunieo possession peseo on prooi oi niere cusiody and oontroi, constituteo a grave deparlure iroin the gerieval ruie lhat trie prosecution was required to prove the guiit oi an accused peyono a reasonapie ooupi. (paras 145.145) [14] Through the ouioonie oitnis case, inevitspie ioriiie pmseculion to prove me element or possession‘ based on the adduced evidence to make out a prime lacie case oi treiiicking by invoking the Dresumpliart under section 37 toai oi the DDA in Feaerei Court's ease n1AbduIIIn Ann v. PF 5 Other Aggeals gum 9 cu 151 ii was decided mat e lei] To conoiuoe on this issue, it is our unanimous view that having iound that actual or afﬁrmative possession oi the impugned drugs pv the accused had been estapiisriea based 1] N 7\KF\|NYL6N:xDWaY\|lh4/ex) use s.ii.i Ilumhli M“ be used M mm we niwiruﬂlv Minis ﬂnmninnl VII nFiLING WM! an credible evrdence and me wergm 0! me drugs m quesuarr exceeded the slamtory IIrm\|, we learned max Judges were ermueu [0 Wm that a pnma fame case ned been made am under s 1BD(4)o1Ihe cpc, by mvnkmg the presurnpuorr ol Irafﬁcking under s 37(da) dune DDA This approach rs ocrren rrr wew. [15] True a\so means men «he prasecuhon has \|o prove not druy ‘physxom s\smen\|‘ hm a\so ‘mental s\emen1‘ onmn Accused wrren mey were serd re have m pessessren er me dangerous drug. In me case of Chan Pean Leon 1/ PF(1D56 22 ML] 217 Tnernsen J describes possession as ioncws - To put rn mrrerwrse, (here Is a prrysrcan s\smenl and a rnerual e\emen\| which must new be present berere pessessron rs made nut The accused mus1 nul only be so smuaced that he can dea\ wrm me «rung as re N bebnged (0 mm. for examme rrave It 171 ms pocket or rrave n Vymg rrr iroru oi mrrr orr a lable u musl else be srrewn that rre had me Imenlmn erdeelrng mm il as rm belunged Io rum shomd rre see any eecasren re du 50, m other words, Iha\| he had some animus possidendr‘ [16] In «ms case, noun Accused were at me saia In lmm ollhe le\ev\s\nn were me bag corruurung me drug was mdderr Bul n rs Inadequa\|e rune facts omy mducals that hour Accused were m close proxrrrruy 12 sw 7\KP:Nnm:xpway\|zh4/ea \ were sum nummv wm be used m vs-W we mwvuulv mm; nnmmnrrl vn mum wrm to where the dangerous drug was situated put tt must also be shown that lhey knew about the extslenoe ol the drugs Base on me evtdence led by SP5, me only eutdende l.ha\| the prdsecuttdn could relted upon to pruve mat lhe Accused persons allegedly had knowledge at the dangerous drug is mat they appeared nervous and shock upon seetng the police learn. Nevertheless, such conduct can also be tnlerred as pure pantc and natural reectton dl tnndcent rnen alter the prerntse had been ldrced entry by the poltce. Federal Caurl tn PF v. Tan Tm Eek [M511 cu Asa satd » The vacuum dl me respdndent ltavtng dropped the bag and dtsplayed reactton ol shock can pe lacts upon whtch the prosecutton can InVI\|e me than court lo tnler guttl on pan of the respendenl over the presence at the drugs tn the bag but such odnduet ts equally Dunslslerlt wllh an tnnecent man who ts in a state or pure bantc leans tn that way [t7] Thts court ts bound to adopt the inlerence lltat is ntostlavoureple \|o the Accused where there were more than one tnlerences lnat can be drawn tram a set at lacls Thus, tn the absence at other clear etndenee In support the tnretenoe or knowledge tn the present case, I round that the prosecuttdn had ratted to prove that path Accused had knowledge ml the extstence ol the dangerous drug to Prove N 7lKFlNYL¢N:xvWaV\|lh4/an nae s.tt.t Ilumhll M“ be used M mm me nlwlrulllv Mvlls nnmmnrrl VII nFluNG wot ﬂ ‘possessmrf and to mvake me presumpnon ov Irafficking under sermon 37 (Ga) 0! me DDA [<3] Auerneuuely me prosecuuen rrwrred \|ms court to use presumphon under seclmn 37 (6) at me DDA Tms sechcm reqmres the presecumon to prove that oem Accused had m custody or under «her oonlml anylmng whatsoever oonlammg any dangerous drug \|n ename me deeming pnmsrons under this secuon \|o oorne mm may, In snun w me prosecuuen Is able to prove mat the Accused persons were In custody or under their control the Clly Eyeware bag can g as 09 gram Mecnarnonenamrns‘ the Accused persons be deemed to have been in possessmn oi sucn drug, and shaH unm the contrary rs proved‘ be deemed ro have known une nature at sucn drug. [1 9] What rs cusreuy and oonrrow In Leow Nghee Lim y. Rgina [1955 1 LN§ 5;‘ the coun slated — Cuslodymeans having care Drguamlansmp, goods m cusmdy are m we care dune cusrooran and, by necessary Imphcalmn, ne rs rakrng care of them an uehaw 0! someone else veu carvum take care or guuds umess you knuw wnere mey are and have me means oi exerc 9 contra! cverthem Cuslody Iherelore rnnplres knowiedge ol the existence and N 7\><P:Nnm:xpWay\|1h4/ex: use S-rm mm... mm be used m mm re nnmneulv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm whereabouls olme goods and ooweroi control overthem, nnl amourlllng lo bbssessron. Cusmdy llkewlse may be sole or lnlnt and l\| has the same elemem or excluding mhers The mam dlstlncllnn between custody and possessron ls that a custodian nas not me power oldrsposel. control must be praved as a lecl and rt nrusl arlse lrom Ihe relatrerr cf the person to me goods, rrresbeolrye o1 wrrether lney are cumraband. An example may make mrs clearer. suppose that one oi the assistants in this case smoked a baniculer Dvand ol tobacco, not sold In the snop and to the knowledge ortne accused. kept n rn mat drawer, No doubt we aeouseu could, at any trme, tell the assrsnant to keep hrs tobacco sornewrrere else He Duuld resume oossessrerr or drawer aut so long as he allowed me assistants to keep merr small personal Ihlngs ln the drawer, the mmgs were in lrrerr oontrol, not ms. He could not reasonably order them \|o wow away harmless lobaooo, oonsrstently wlm the sxlsllng arrangement Tne argument fur Dumral rs based solely on me cormaband nature onne thing — not on me crrounnstances rn wbrcb rt was kept N 7lKFlNYL¢N1xvWaY\|lh4/an we s.rr.r Mn... err be used m mm we mwlrulllv sun; nnmmnrrl vn AFVLING wrul EE [20] In the case of Public Prosocurar V4 Aug Bonn Foo (19791 1 LNS m Gurm chn ‘man J saro that ‘con1ro\‘ rs were the person rras power of arspesar ever a property. He sand — Bu\| rne mun In me Englrsn case M Domus Mleg el cre v Bank 0! Eﬂmand [1950] Ch 333 has s ' that the word 'conIru\|' "wI\|\| cover the right to men the possessor wha\| is to be done“ with pmneny Bu\| nne word "power" alone, re use ms ordinary dreuonary mea g, srmply means the aormyro do something oranylhmg and me said expression "power 0! drs90Sa\“ wmcn rs not w my opinion. used as (ec7rmca\ words, was. 1 lrrirrk. used by Taylor J. and Thomson u. (as they men were) In the abuvemenlmned cases to mean me aurmy re deal with a movame nrrng as owner to me exclusrun of omers Tnere is Iherelare a power of arsposax, and therefore pussessron In law wnere a person rs so smAa\|ed with respect m a movame nnrng, suen as a dangerous drug m mrs ease, rt ne has the power to deal wrrn it as owner \|u rne exclusion or all emer persuns and wnen me cvcumslances are such that ne may be presumed to do so H7 case 0! need sw 7\r<PrNn«nxpWay\|1h4/ax: were Sam M... wm be used m mm we arrrmr-r mm; nnmmnrrl wa mum pmu E [21] [22] To cartclude. custody ts sornetntng less than possesston and has the e\emen\| at exchtsweness Evert though the dustedtan has no power ot mspasal‘ he must know the whereatrout ol the thrng to exerctse eentret and care over the ‘ﬂung’, rn this case the crty Eyeware bag tn short‘ custody rrnptres knowledge or the exrstenee and whereahout ot the thtng Meanwhﬂe oontvol ts the atnlrty to den! wtth the thrhg as rt he IS the owner to the exotuston 0! others and hes pewer ol dreposat aver rt On the evrdenoe adduced rn thrs case, there rs he evrdenee wha\|sctever to prove that \|he Amused persons had custody or under therr t>on\vo\ the my Eyeware bag The tacts showed that the bag was tucked Demrtd the tetevisron at the thnhg mom. No evrdenee to show that both Accused Knew the exrstenoe ot the bag hrdden bemrtd the tetevrsren tor them let exerctse centre: orcare etthe bag, tet atone tn have the puwer dt drspesat aver the bag Through the evrdence of Mr Edvart Chang (SP1), owner ot the premtse and SP2, Rosm em Ruskin, nerghoour ot the 1“ Accused, they (esttﬁed that the 15‘ Accused was rentrng the prernrse and was seen guirtg in and uuﬂmm the premise But these evidence are not condustve to assocrate the drug wrth the 1‘ Accused The tact that the 1“ Accused was renting the setd Drermse and was seen at the prernrse re not enough to prove that he knew the exrstence at 17 sh T\KPtNTLm:xpway\|1h4/st: -we Sam M... Mu be used m mm me enrn.rw Mtms dnmmnnl w. mutta pmtt the bag behind me le\ev\s\on, Apan lvom mat. besme the 1“ Accused, sn=2 had a\so (esliﬁed max he had seen more men 2 m3 persons gmng m and out from me premise. Hus ewdence mmng crass exammaucun was as such — S Kamu kata tmggE\ d1 unll 7—3k sebelah mm 73 den kamu Kala cam aaa orang keluar masuk um! 7-3 dan kamu udak oamkan, selam orang ksmu cam da\am Mahkaman Lam ada ramau lagx orang yang keluar masuk darn unI\| tersebuﬁ J Tak ada\ah vamai lap! adalah 5 Lebm dari 2-3 orang yang keluav masuk rumah \|ersebuI’7 J Va sebab wak\|u keqa klla lak Calm lam waklu lam (ak Iahu [231 The prosecuuorvs case wsiunher weakened by me evidence or spa who zesmued mat he had seized a shaver and an underwear vrom \|he premxse cor DNA ana\ys\s. He said we chemIs\| reporl mmed out [D be negauve Not omy the chemist report some not link holh Accused \|u me premise and the bag hm m alsu suggested that amer unawuals could also be me uccupams of me we-mse and may have somemmg to do wmh the bag. In m. n mused reasoname daubl m the prosscLman‘s case. 13 sw 7\KP1Nnm:xpw:1\|1h4/an ‘ -we Sum mmnnv M“ be used m vs-W we nvVWuH\|Y mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm ﬂ (M 4'" Elemout - they did so in tttrth-rance ot a common inlnnlion. [24] It ts the duty ot the prosecution to prove that both Accused were sate to have acted wtth a common trttenttoh pursuant to s 34 at the Penat code Unloﬂunately‘ there was no evtdenoe or any ctrcumstance from which tt might be mterred that bout Accused were acting in oohcert or had pre-ananged plan to tratttc tn the setd drug The mere tact that the 2"“ Accused was sttttng at the we tn the premise wtth the 1" Accused ts tneumctertt to draw an mterehce ot a common trttenttort to tramc tn the dmg. In court 0! Appears case Snngsil uatoom & Ors v.PP[2016l1 cm 39 ttwas decided that - [28] The extstence ot common tntentton ts a ouesttort ot tact and I\| may be proved by dtrect evtdence or by way at tnterences «mm the ctrcttrnstances otthe case or upun proved «acts Having perused the evtdertce, we optned that the evtdence does not support the extstehce of common tntehtton ct them all to commtt the ottertce. Apart trom the tact that the appellants were arrested lagelher In the sate room, there IS a dearth of Evtdence to hnk them with the wmmtsston 01 the chme VI turtherenoe or the common tntenliun The prosecuttch vetted to estabttsh that the appetlants have some knowtedge that an act may be commttted which ts cohsrstent wtth the ta N 7tKF\|NYL6N:xDWaY\|lh4/st) we Sum M... MU be used m mm me ntwtruttlv MW; nnmmnnl VII AFMNG wot lunhevance oi me common mlenzlon or would he ln lunherance oi lne common Inlerltlan [29] The proseclmon musl also eslabllsh l.ha\| there was a plea arranged plan to Dnmmll me crlmlnal act ol havlng lmlawml Dcssesslon of me ﬁrearms and bullets and me sad act was done In concerllo mal Dve-arranged plan. Such planrllng could develop on the spot or In the course 01 he oommlsslarl 0! We ollenee. However, we lounu none 0! mass ellher llmllgn dlrecl evldenoe or by way 0! lnlerences lmm me circumstances ol me case Belng Iogelller m me same room wl\|hou\| more can hardly he s ’ lo constitute a pre-arranged nlan. Conclusion [25] Fur the reasons menliuned In mi; Judgement‘ I lmmu mal the prosecullnn had lallea 10 Wave a pnma lacie case agalnsl both Accused. mereloremey were aoquilled and dlscharged wllhaul lnelr dsiencs belng callaa DATED 25 SEPTEMBER 2023 ~ﬁ« N e.~l~\% ROSZIANAVATI A MAD Judlclal commlssloner h courl of Malaya Shah Alam, Selarlgor 20 N wlmmuxpwayuwaa ma Sum M... M“ be used M mm o. nlwlrulllv MW; nnmmnnl VII .;lmo Wm E [4] a black bag wrmen my Eyeweav‘ conlammg mree transparent masucs comammg wrrne coloured subslanoe suspected on being drug placed behmd a television wmch was sruranad In me Hvmg roam Enclk Rahman hm Mcmamad (5:24), a Smenoe omcar cdnmmed man we subslance Donslsts of as 09 grammes Memamprrenamirre wmch rs hsled in the Frrsr Schedme of me DDA, SP5 awed serzed IWO smns, two we jeans and me braken pazﬂock [mm me premrsa. The M0 accused were then arrested and brarrgm Io pahce sraucn for mrmar mves\|\|gamn lnvesugahng omcar lnspeclor Nurul Hadr hm Harun Mensa! qsps) had a\so seized a shaver and an underware from me premise iov dedxyribonucxerc acrd (DNA) oompanson. Duly amra aaun at me alase amre pmseculinn'§ case [5] The Law regammg me prosecution‘: burden av pmolal me end 0! us case Is wsu established. Section 160 M the Cnmmal Pmoedure code pravrues Pvocedure auer wnclusrdn of case for prdsecrmorr 130 (1) When the case var the prasecuuon Is concluded, the com shall cdnsrder wrramer me nrasecuhon has made am a pnma vacra case against me accused sw 7\KF1NYL¢knxvWa1\|lh4/an -ma Sam M... MU be used m mm me mtmruulv mm; nnmmnnl VII Mme wrm Cunnsol: For nu proucution Mohd Shahrul Ekhsan mn Hasum Deputy Public Prosecutor Kamar Peguam Negara Ares 5 No 45,Lnl 457‘ Presmt 4‘ Pzrswaran Perdana 62100 Pulrqaya For my 1“ Accusod — Luqman Ham om Aznartwun him » Mona Norazman mn Adnan) Ashraﬂ AV-Hxrian 8. Associates D~&-I & D-B-2 Mam Avenue 2 Ja\en Saran Wang M I6/M Seksyen we mum: Shah Alam For me 2"‘ Acnuud - Data‘ Joshua T.Samba\han Nn.3A-20‘ Block A3‘ Lexsure Cnmmeme Sauare‘ No.8, Jalan ms axe. 46150‘ Peiahng Jays, Semngor sw 7\><P:Nn«nxpw:y\|1h4/ex: ‘ -mm Sum mm. M“ be used M vs-W u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm (2) If me coun llnas znal lne nvoseeulion has nol made om a prime lacle case agalnsl lne accused, me coun shall record an order al acqulual (3) ll me Cuurl ﬁnds Ihal a prlma lacie case nas been made out agalnsl me accused on the orlenee charged me Conn shall call upon me accused to enler on ms clelsnce (4) For one purpose ohms secllon, a pnma lame case I5 made eul agalnst me accused where lne pmsecullon has adduced cvedlble evidence proving eacb lngredlenl ol lne blrence whlch ll ulvebulled or unexplained would werranl a canvlchorl. [5] At me end nl the prclsecu(lan's case, the calm musl suhlecl me evldence led by me prosecullcln lo a maxlmum evaluatlun In ﬁnd wnemer me prosecution nas made cm a prlma Yacle case The evldence adduced al me end at me proseeullons ease nmsl be 50 slmng lnal ll can be avennmwn only by evlderloe In reblmal ll lallows lhal lf lna Accused remaln sllenl, he must be louna guilty. A ccmslderallon of wnemer there ls any reasonable doubt In lhe prl)secuIlDrI's case musl also be made Tbls means. l were is a reasonable doubl, a prlma lame case has nol been successfully N wlmmuxpwaluwae we Sum Mn... wlll be used m mm we nllﬂlrulllv sun; nnmmnnl vn .;ln~a Wm % proven by the prosecution Federa\ own In Balacharvdran v, PP 129051 1 cu as s\|a(es - smce nne com, m ruhng thal a pnma «acne case has been made um, must be sausﬁed manna evidence adduced can be overthrown only by evidence in rebuIIa\ :1 follows that n m \s not rebulled u must pvevau Thus, if me accused e\ecls Io remam silent ne mus\| be conwczea Tne test at the close 0! me case hr the pmsecuuan would merelore be Is me evvdsnoe sulﬁcwenl to convict me accused n he men: to remem suenw lune answer us in me alfvmalwe then a pnma fame case has been made out. Tms mus\|, as 01 necessny‘ vztlulre a conswderanan 0! me exwstence ov any reasoname doum in the case lar the pmsecunan w mere ws any such «mum mere can be no pnma lame case (see a\so Lggi Kgw Qhgi Q Angrv. Pﬂggkgg Rgxg pm 1 g1_.g 734- PP v‘ Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar goes 1 on 457) Whelher me pmseculinll had pmven it‘: case [1] The essential elements 0! me ollence ol uamcxmg m dangerous drugs as skated m sermon 39BH)(a) oi me Dangerous Drugs Act 1552 are as laHows: N 7\KP:Nn«uxvwayub4/so ms Sum M... M“ be used m mm me mwmulv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm EE (l) lnal the drug ls dangerous drug wlznin me dellnlllon ol me Dangerous Drugs Acl 1952 ll) both me accused were ln possesslan onne drug: \|lll)Ihey were Iralﬁcklng In Ihe drug‘ and (lv)lhey dld so ln lurlherance of a common Vllenllun 1- n rmnl — vmuthor «ll. drug is dnngurous drug wmlin ll.- dellnlllon of Dangerous Drugs A.cl1952 [5] To prove me ﬁrsl element, lne pmseeumn called spa a Sclence Ofﬂcer who works al Naraalles Dlvlslon‘ Department af cnemrslry Malaysia‘ Pelaling days. He leslmed on nus experlence and ereaerrllal as a Sclerlne Oﬂlner who naa allended varlaus relaled courses and workshops His exparllse was not challenged lnraugnaul me me! He leslmed mal on 5/8/2019 ne renewed an envelupe marked ‘HM’ bearing Polls Di—Raja Malaysia seal lrum \|he lnvesllgalmg omeerr SP6 Upon exarmnalion cl lne envelope inside lnere was a bag wrluen ‘Clly Eyewear‘ oonsisling of 3 plasma pacxels eaen marked as HL H2 and H3 conlarnmg claar cryslal suuslanca. Aﬂer ne named out numerous \|esIs na ascerlalned lnal there was a net: welghl ml 112 39 grammes oonsisling of as 09 grammes Melnampnelarmne His ﬁndlngs were sel our ln his veporl marked as P12. The reporl slaled lrral Melnarrlphelarnlne IS a slN 7lKFlNYL¢N1xvWaWh4/an wane S-rm Mn... wlll be used m mm we mm.l-r mm; nnmmnrrl vn AFVLING wrul E dangerous drug hsled m me First Schedule 01 me om From ms evwdence, I1 is prover: that the substance found In the bag behind lhe \|e\evxs\an Is Indeed dangerous drug wuhm the meamng and deﬁmuan 0! me DDA (ii) 2"“ ulomunt - both the nccusnd wnre in possnssion of mu drug on) 3" clement - my mu tramcklnq In an drug [9] n was s\|alet1mthe pmsecuucn's opemng Sta\|smenIs marked as Pa an how may mended to prove these 2 elemerns The excerpts are aslouows — 9 Fmak Dendakwaan setevusnya akan membuklikan mewul saksvsaksw rlendakwaan Sena ke\|erangan dokumemar bahawa kedua-dua OKT1elah melakukan pengedaran me\a\m kelerangan secara Vangsung dengan menggunakan perunlukan m bawah seksyen 2 Ana Dadah Eerbahaya 1952 Pendakwaan akan membuklkan Derbualan mengedar dadah Ie\ah uuakukan secara bersama-sama o\eh kedua-dua om dengan mengguna pakaw penmmkan mbawah seksysn 34 Kamm Keseksaan (wawtu nIa\| bersama) dan pmak pendakwaan juga bergamung kepada anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 (da) Am Dadah Bemahaya 1952. secara sw 7\KF1NYuM:xvWay\|1h4/so -ma Sum M... wm be used m mm a. nvVWuH\|Y mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm ﬁg auemamnya, pmak pendakwaan aka" Dergantung kepada anggapan dr nawan seksyen 371d)Ak1a yang same [10] The prosecuuan mended to prove that the Aeeused persens were W] nramckrng m ore dangerous drug mrdugn dvecl evidence as denned under section 2 more DDA secuon 2 dl me DDA deﬁned trafﬂcklng as:- "\|rafﬁckmg" Includes me domg many 01 me following ac\|sr\|ha1 rs to say, manulachmngd rmponrng, expartmgd keepmg. concealing‘ buying, seurng, gnnng, renewing, srerrng, adm enng‘ transpomngr car g. sendrng. d rmg, procunng, supmymg or dismbutmg any dangevous drug otherwise than under the aumoﬂly 0{ INS AC\| or Ihe regulahons made under me Am. Loukmg at me evrdenee ed by SP5, mere was no direct evrdenoe whatsoever to prove Iha\| mm Accused were m me an oltrafﬂcklng in me dangerous drug, The mere presence m me nvrng room «mm wnere me bag ocnlammg (he drug was vaund without any oven act of me Accused persons does not consmure an act or rramckrng m as deﬁned under seeudn 2 av me DDA Prwy Cuuncil m Ong An Chuan v Pub Prosecutor 3. Koh on cheng v Pub 1: Prosocurol (19801 1 LNS 181 sard: sw ‘nKP:Nnm:xvWayub4/er: -use Sam M... M“ be used m mm we mwmulv mm; ﬂnmmnnl vn mum wrm 3% [12] To “tvall\c“ m a conlvolled drug so as In consmme the offence ov lramckmg unaer search 3 Invawes sornemrng more lhan passrye possession or sewaomrnrsnrahnn oi me drug, n mvclves doing or offering In do an averl an M one or other of the kinds speciﬁed m paragraph (a) onhe deﬂmuon ol '\|ralﬂc“ and "\|raffIckmg" in semen 2. Thus‘ the pmseclman haa tamed to prove «nan both Accused had nramckea m the dangemus drug by way oi arrest svmence under seclmn 2 ol me DDA The prosecullon had also slated m their Opemng Statements that they inlended to use presumption under section 37 may of me DDA or a\\|emaIwe\y lo use presurnpuon under secnon 37 my oilhe om. Sechon 3‘/(d)cv1me om sLa\|es. my any person who rs found is have had in his custody or under his control anyzhrng whatsoever oonrarnrng any dangerous drug shall, unm (he canlrary rs proved, in doemnd to have been In posusslnn of such drug and shall, unm the mntrary Is proved, be deemed to have known «he nzlure olsuch drug: whrle secuon 37 (Ga) of me DDA states — Ida) any uerson who is Iound in possession 0!- 5w 7\KP:Nnm:xvWayub4/an -use Sum M... wm be used m mm me nHWuH\|Y mm; nnmmnnl vn mum Wm EE [13] (xv!) 50 grammes or more -n we-gm ol Methamphetamine: otherwise men m accordance WW1 me authority cf urns Act or any olher wnuen Vaw‘ shall be presumed. unm me cannery Is proved, In be (rafﬁcking in me s ' drug, II is «me Vaw that me prosecunon cannol use presummion upon presumpuon to prave me element 0! (ralﬁckmg It cannot use presumed element av posssssxon under s. am) to mvoke une presumpuon of lrafﬂckmg under s. 37(da) because me wane: requives wound‘ in possesswon wmcn us an emnnenve nnaing 0! Possession Dased on adduced evidence Federal Com m me case at Anna Nudo Arenza v. PP & Anomu Aggeal. mm 5 cu me when u ueemeu in smke down seclmn 37/-\ cl «he DDA s\|a(ed my me presump\|I0ns under s 37(d) and (da) relahe to the wee centre! and essemial elennems 0! me offence of drug Irafﬁckmg, namely possession 0! a drug‘ knowiedge 0! me drug and lramckmg Once the essenuax mgredxems ol the owenee are presumed, the accused Is waned under a Vsgal burden to rebut me presumption: an a balance er preneeumes It Is a grave evoswon lo the presumpnon of Innocence hnused In an. am 0! the PC. But the mosl severe sﬂech (anlamountto uemg harsh and oppressive. ansmg from m sw 7\KP1Nnm:xvWay\|1h4/en ‘Nata Sum M... wm be used m mm we mwwnnulv Mtms m.n.n VII mum Wm	2,835	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-22NCvC-830-12/2021	PLAINTIF LAKEFRONT RESIDENCE SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN 1. ) TETUAN LUI & BHULLAR 2. ) HASNESHPAL SINGH BHULLAR A/L KARAMJIT SINGH 3. ) BRYAN LUI SHIEN VIENG 4. ) CHANDNI A/P ANANTHA KRISHNAN	Amendment statement of claim-whether the said amendment serves no purpose or is useless-The proposed amendments intended to add a new cause of action of conspiracy to injure the Plaintiff by instigating the class action by the purchasers against the Plaintiff before the Shah Alam High Court-amendments were useless and do not create a valid cause of action against the Defendants-one of the main essential characteristics for a complete cause of action of conspiracy is missing or is misunderstood by the Plaintiff from the proposed claim-Plaintiff has failed to plead the damage that it has suffered because of the alleged wrong by the Defendant and Sew for an alleged claim for conspiracy -dismissed.	04/12/2023	YA Dato' Indera Mohd Arief Emran Bin Arifin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a4b44754-bf29-465e-ac4d-a9213a734e7a&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCVC-830-12/2021 ANTARA LAKEFRONT RESIDENCE SDN BHD …PLAINTIF DAN 1. TETUAN LUI & BHULLAR 2. HARSNESHPAL SINGH BHULLAR A/L KARAMJIT SINGH 3. BRYALN LUI SHIEN VENG 4. CHANDNI A/P ANANTHA KRISHNAN …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN Grounds of Judgment 04/12/2023 17:23:44 WA-22NCvC-830-12/2021 Kand. 104 S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 A. Introduction 1. The Plaintiff seeks leave to amend its Statement of Claim as seen in the Notice of Application in Enclosure 88. 2. This Court is of the opinion that the application is without merit and dismissed the same on 27-10-2023. 3. The reasons for the said dismissal are contained in the following paragraphs. B. Applicable law for Amendments 4. It is trite law that generally ample latitude should be given to a litigant to amend its pleading if the other side is not prejudiced, and it does not change the characteristic of the defence or claim. See Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha (M) Sdn Bhd [1983] 1 CLJ 191. 5. Nevertheless, this Court is duty bound to consider whether the said amendment serves no purpose or is useless. A pleading that is on the face of it is bad in law will not create any real question or issue S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 that must be determined by this Court. See Collete v Goode [1878] 7 Ch D 842 and Ponnusamy v Nathu Ram [1959] 1 LNS 73. 6. Good J in Ponnumsamy v Nathu Ram (supra) stated: - “Taking the first of those propositions, Bowen LJ in the case of Lawrence v. Lord Norreys [1888] 39 Ch D 213, 215 says: No Court ought to refuse leave to make such amendments (that was with reference to a later amendment alleging fraud) if it saw any reasonable prospect, or, I made say, reasonable probability, that a case could be made of fraud which would defeat the statute - that there was any substance in the case, that it was not simply fiction and imagination. That passage goes to show that the Court should look at the probable consequences of the amendment, and it would appear to follow that if the amendment would be ineffectual then it ought not to be allowed to be made. That principle was followed in the case of Morel Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. The Earl of Westmoreland [193] 1 KB 77 as appears from the judgment of the Master of the Rolls where he refused an application to amend the pleadings on the ground that the plaintiffs would S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 fail even if the amendment were allowed. And in Wood v. The Earl of Durham [1888] 21 QBD 501 where the plaintiff was a professional jockey suing for damages for libel charging him with unfairly hand dishonestly riding the horses in a particular stable, the defendant pleaded a justification and afterwards applied to amend his defence by adding a paragraph alleging that at the time of the publication the plaintiff was commonly reputed to have been in the habit of unfairly and dishonestly riding horses in races, so as to prevent them from winning. It was held that as general evidence of the plaintiff's bad reputation (if admissible) could only be given in reduction of damages, and not in answer to the action, the paragraph did not contain a statement of material facts on which the defendant relied for his defence, within the meaning of O. XIX r. 4, or a ground of defence which must be raised under O. XIX r. 15, but was a denial or defence as to damages claimed or their amount, within the meaning of O. XXI r. 4, and therefore ought not to be pleaded, and leave to amend must be refused.” S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 7. In this case, having considered the proposed amendments, I find that the said amendments were useless and do not create a valid cause of action against the Defendants. C. Proposed Amendments are useless 8. The proposed amendments intended to add a new cause of action of conspiracy to injure the Plaintiff by instigating the class action by the purchasers against the Plaintiff before the Shah Alam High Court. 9. The Plaintiff further contends that the actions of the Defendants with the collusion of a third party known as Sew had caused the share price of the Plaintiff’s principal, MCT Berhad, to drop and had enabled the Defendants to purchase and control the main company. 10. The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants had promoted their firm with one Sew to create false accounts and false representations to the purchasers to promote themselves and did cause the share price of MCT Berhad to drop. S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 11. The Plaintiff further claims that the Shah Alam Suit was wrongful as it was barred by Res Judicata and due to the alleged limitation period preventing the purchasers from instituting any further claims against the Plaintiff. 12. I find that the said proposed amendments to be useless as the Plaintiff has failed to suggest a valid cause of action against the Defendants for conspiracy. 13. It is trite law that a claim for conspiracy requires the following elements to be satisfied and pleaded by a litigant: - (a) There must exist a combination or an agreement or intention between two or more persons to cause injury to another. (b) the acts are carried out in accordance with that agreement or that intention. (c) the Plaintiff suffers damage as a result of the said action. See Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ 394 and Lornho plc v Fayed [1991] 3 All ER 303. S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 14. The gist of the Plaintiff’s complaint in these amendments lies with the alleged fact that the Defendant had allegedly (i) conspired with one Sew to cause the purchasers to agree to employ the Defendants to sue the Plaintiff for late delivery of the properties, (ii) that the cause of action in Shah Alam were wrong and (iii) that as a result of which the share price in MCT Berhad had fallen leading to damages to the Plaintiff. 15. I find that one of the main essential characteristics for a complete cause of action of conspiracy is missing or is misunderstood by the Plaintiff from the proposed claim. The Plaintiff has failed to plead the damage that it has suffered because of the alleged wrong by the Defendant and Sew for an alleged claim for conspiracy. 16. When I peruse the proposed statement of claim I find that the damages claimed against the Defendant, if any, arise from the alleged suit filed in Shah Alam and the alleged reduction of the share price of MCT Berhad. S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 17. Firstly, the proceedings in the Shah Alam High Court are still pending and have yet to be decided. Whether the Plaintiff is correct that the said suit is valid or otherwise is a matter that is best left to be decided by the said Court. This Court will not interfere with those proceedings and to allow the Plaintiff to argue on the validity of those proceedings before this Court would be wrong at this juncture. In other words, the validity or otherwise of those proceedings should not be the subject of a matter fresh suit until such time the said proceedings have been finally disposed with a final finding by the arbiter of fact. 18. Secondly, the Plaintiff did not specify what damage it has suffered because of the alleged wrongs. The only damage it claims lies with the alleged reduction of the publicly quoted share price of MCT Berhad. That would surely not be the losses claimable by the Plaintiff as it would surely not have shares in its principal. Neither did the Plaintiff show the amount of shares it holds in MCT Berhad and the alleged damages it has suffered because of the Defendants actions. If any party suffered any such damage, it would surely be shareholders of MCT Berhad and not the Plaintiff. S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 19. The other reason I do not allow the amendments is the fact that the alleged conspirator, Sew Soon Seng, was not made a party to this suit. The Defendants are partners and members of the firm known as Messrs Lui & Bhullar, the 1st Defendant. If the Plaintiff is correct and intends to institute a claim for conspiracy against the Defendants and Sew Soon Seng, then surely Sew Soon Seng must be added as a party to the suit. This was not done and to allow this proposed amendment would be wrong. 20. I am also of the opinion that allowing the amendments will enable the Plaintiff to thwart the Defendants’ right to act as Advocates and Solicitors to represent their clients in the Shah Alam proceedings. 21. I am of the opinion that the Defendants have a right to represent their clients in those proceedings and to have all avenue to represent their client’s case without fear and favor. The claim may be wrong as suggested by the Plaintiff, but that issue is best left to be decided before the said Court and not ventilated through a collateral attack on solicitors as suggested by the Plaintiff. S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 22. I refer to the judgment of Viscount Simon LC. In Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] 1 All ER 142: ‘If that predominant purpose is to damage another person and damage results, that is tortious conspiracy. If the predominant purpose is the lawful protection or promotion of any lawful interest of the combiners (no illegal means being employed), it is not a tortious conspiracy, even though it causes damage to another person.' 23. The Plaintiff have also claimed that the Defendants did breach the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 and the Legal Profession Act in causing the purchasers to agree to be represented by the Defendants. 24. I have combed the said statutes referred to by the Plaintiff or impliedly referred to by the Plaintiff and find that these do not create any statutory duty or any statutory cause of action that is enforceable by the Plaintiff or by any members of the public. S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 25. Any breach of the said statutes will only attract penal or disciplinary actions against the Defendants. These statutes do not create any publicly enforceable cause of action. I refer to the decision of Harminder Singh J (as he then was) in David Chelliah @ Kovilpillai Chelliah David v Monorail Malaysia Technology Sdn Bhd [2009] 4 MLJ 253 and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Shahidan Shafie v Atlan Holdings Sdn Bhd [20178] 4 CLJ 587. 26. Even if I am wrong on the above issues, I also find that the Plaintiff’s proposed amendments changes the suit’s character drastically that it prejudices the Defendants. To add a new claim for conspiracy based on new allegations not appearing in the original pleaded case, without one of the main alleged co-conspirators being added in as a party, is surely prejudicial and unfair on the Defendants. This would be a drastic change to the character of the suit. 27. In the circumstances, I cannot allow the Plaintiff leave to amend the Statement of Claim to add a new cause of action that does hold water. The proposed amendment is a non-starter and should not be allowed to pass the opening gates. To do otherwise will be a waste of judicial time and resources best served for other endeavours. S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 D. Decision 28. For the above reasons, I dismiss the Plaintiff’s application to amend its Statement of Claim and cost in the cause. Dated 27th October 2023 Dato’ Indera Mohd Arief Emran bin Arifin Judge High Court Malaya Kuala Lumpur NCvC 8 S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Shamani Perumal counsel for the Plaintiff Messrs. Sree Harry & Co Advocates and Solicitors Harneshpal Singh counsel for Defendants Messrs. Lui & Bhullar Advocates and Solicitors S/N VEe0pCm/XkasTakhOnNOeg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	13,497	Tika 2.6.0
AA-37J-3-08/2022	PLAINTIF AJIT KAUR A/P SAJJAN SINGH DEFENDAN KALWANT SINGH A/L SURJAN SINGH	SAMAN PENGHUTANG PENGHAKIMAN - Saman Penghakiman untuk Penghutang Penghakiman diperiksa atas sumpah tentang pendapatan yang ada atau telah diperolehi sejak tarikh Perintah Persetujuan untuk membayar jumlah yang telah ingkar dan juga menunjukkan sebab mengapa tidak patut ditahan dalam penjara bagi keingkaran itu – Sama ada Penghutang Penghakiman telah mungkir terhadap Perintah Persetujuan yang telah direkodkan - Sama ada Penghutang Penghakiman perlu membayar keseluruhan tunggakan nafkah dari bulan Januari 2016 sehingga bulan Julai 2022 berjumlah RM197,500.00.	04/12/2023	YA Dato' Abdul Wahab Bin Mohamed	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6790f797-ea9a-4328-851c-75975046e913&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - AP Ajit Kaur v, Kalwan Singh.docx 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI IPOH DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN WRIT PELAKSANAAN NO: AA-37J-3-08/2022 Dalam perkara mengenai Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh Petisyen Perceraian No: 33-554-2003 Dan Mahkamah Majistret Ipoh Permohonan Nafkah No: 78-2-2003 Dan Kaedah 73 (2) dan 73 (4) Kaedah- Kaedah Prosiding Perceraian dan Hal Ehwal Suami Isteri 1980 ANTARA AJIT KAUR A/P SAJJAN SINGH (NO. KP: 611221-10-5854) …PEMIUTANG PENGHAKIMAN 04/12/2023 11:00:59 AA-37J-3-08/2022 Kand. 39 S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 DAN KALWANT SINGH A/L SUJAN SINGH (NO. KP: 660419-08-6821 …PENGHUTANG PENGHAKIMAN PENGHAKIMAN S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 PENGENALAN [1] Permohonan ini adalah satu Saman Penghutang Penghakiman (“Judgement Debtor Summon”) yang difailkan oleh Ajit Kaur a/p Sajjan Singh (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Pemiutang Penghakiman”) terhadap Kalwant Singh a/l Surjan (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Penghutang Penghakiman”). FAKTA RINGKAS [2] Pemiutang Penghakiman memohon untuk pengeluaran Saman Penghutang Penghakiman terhadap Penghutang Penghakiman berdasarkan satu Perintah Persetujuan bertarikh 15 April 2003 yang diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah Majistret (No.1) Ipoh, melalui permohonan nafkah 78-2-2003 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Perintah Persetujuan”). [3] Pemiutang Penghakiman mendakwa bahawa pihak Penghutang Penghakiman telah melakukan kemungkiran terhadap Perintah Persetujuan yang telah direkodkan. Kemungkiran ini melibatkan pembayaran wang nafkah berjumlah RM197,500.00 yang sepatutnya perlu dibayar dari bulan Januari 2016 sehingga bulan Julai 2022. Justeru, berdasarkan kemungkiran yang didakwa oleh Pemiutang Penghakiman itu, Pemiutang Penghakiman telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk pelaksanaan iaitu Saman Penghutang Penghakiman S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 bagi menuntut kesemua jumlah bayaran nafkah tertunggak yang belum dijelaskan secara sekaligus iaitu berjumlah RM197,500.00. ISU-ISU Sama ada Penghutang Penghakiman melakukan kemungkiran terhadap Perintah Persetujuan. [4] Pihak Penghutang Penghakiman berhujah bahawa Penghutang Penghakiman tidak melakukan kemungkiran kerana Penghutang Penghakiman tidak perlu lagi membayar nafkah terhadap dua orang kanak-kanak yang dinyatakan dalam Perintah Persetujuan setelah kanak-kanak tersebut mencapai umur 18 tahun selaras dengan Seksyen 95 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta 164”) sebelum pindaan. [5] Pihak Penghutang Penghakiman berhujah bahawa peruntukan Seksyen 95 Akta 164 sebelum pindaan adalah terpakai dalam kes ini kerana Perintah Persetujuan direkodkan sebelum pindaan kepada Seksyen 95 Akta 164 dibuat. Pihak Penghutang Penghakiman berhujah bahawa walaupun terdapat pindaan kepada Seksyen 95 tersebut, pindaan itu tidak terpakai bagi kes ini. Seksyen 95 Akta 164 (sebelum pindaan) memperuntukkan seperti berikut: S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 95. Tempoh perintah penjagaan dan nafkah. Kecuali jika sesuatu perintah mengenai penjagaan atau nafkah seseorang anak dinyatakan sebagai selama sesuatu tempoh yang lebih singkat atau jika sesuatu perintah itu telah dibatalkan, perintah itu hendaklah tamat apabila anak itu mencapai umur lapan belas tahun atau jika anak itu adalah dalam keadaan hilang upaya dari segi jasmani atau mental, perintah itu hendaklah tamat apabila anak itu tidak lagi berada dalam keadaan hilang upaya itu, mengikut mana-mana yang terkemudian. (penekanan diberikan) [6] Pihak Penghutang Penghakiman berhujah bahawa peruntukan dalam Perintah Persetujuan jelas menyatakan bahawa bayaran nafkah adalah untuk pihak Pemiutang Penghakiman dan kedua kanak-kanak. Pihak Penghutang Penghakiman menegaskan bahawa bayaran nafkah terhadap kedua kanak-kanak tersebut sepatutnya dihentikan setelah kanak-kanak tersebut mencapai umur 18 tahun. [7] Pihak Penghutang Penghakiman berpendirian bahawa pihak Pemiutang Penghakiman telah gagal memfailkan permohonan untuk variasi Perintah Persetujuan bagi menjaga haknya dan permohonan yang difailkan di Mahkamah ini adalah mengelirukan pihak mahkamah. S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [8] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada peruntukan yang relevan berkaitan Perintah Persetujuan tersebut seperti berikut: “MAKA ADALAH PADA HARI INI DIPERINTAHKAN SECARA PERINTAH PERSETUJUAN bahawa Defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Pemohon RM2,500-00 sebulan sebagai nafkah untuk Pemohon dan kanak-kanak yang bernama Vishal-Rai Singh Sidhu dan Jagdis Singh Sidhu. DAN ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN bahawa bayaran pertama RM2,500-00 hendaklah dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Pemohon pada atau sebelum 3 hb Mei 2003 dan selepas dari itu tiap-tiap bulan pada sebelum 3 hb tiap- tiap bulan. Nafkah RM2,500-00 tersebut hendaklah dimasukkan dalam Akaun Simpanan Bank Pemohon di Maybank No. Akaun 1081787101566.” [9] Semakan Mahkamah ini terhadap semua kertas kausa yang difailkan oleh pihak-pihak berkaitan Perintah Persetujuan bertarikh 15 April 2003 dapati bahawa Perintah Persetujuan diatas masih berkuatkuasa dan tidak pernah diubah atau dibatalkan. [10] Berdasarkan peruntukan dalam Perintah Persetujuan di atas, Mahkamah ini dapati bahawa Penghutang Penghakiman dikehendaki membayar nafkah sebanyak RM2500.00 bagi tiga (3) individu iaitu S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Pemiutang Penghakiman, seorang kanak-kanak yang bernama Vishal- Rai Singh Sidhu dan seorang lagi kanak-kanak bernama Jagdis Singh Sidhu (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Kanak-Kanak tersebut”). Mahkamah ini dapati bahawa tiada pecahan (breakdown) terhadap peruntukan sebanyak RM2500.00 nafkah tersebut. [11] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Penghutang Penghakiman bahawa setelah kedua kanak-kanak mencapai usia 18 tahun, keperluan untuk membayar nafkah terhadap kanak-kanak tersebut adalah digugurkan selaras dengan Seksyen 95 Akta 164 (sebelum pindaan). [12] Namun demikian, walaupun keperluan untuk membayar nafkah terhadap dua kanak-kanak tersebut adalah digugurkan selaras Seksyen 95 Akta 164 (sebelum pindaan), Mahkamah ini dapati bahawa Penghutang Penghakiman masih mempunyai tanggungjawab /obligasi untuk terus membayar nafkah terhadap Pemiutang Penghakiman seperti dalam Perintah Persetujuan. [13] Mahkamah ini juga tidak bersetuju bahawa keperluan memfailkan permohonan variasi terhadap Perintah Persetujuan perlu dibuat oleh pihak Pemiutang Penghakiman. Hal ini demikian kerana Mahkamah ini berpendirian bahawa adalah menjadi tanggungjawab pihak Penghutang Penghakiman selaku pihak yang perlu membayar nafkah untuk memfailkan sebarang permohonan variasi sekiranya Penghutang Penghakiman merasakan bayaran RM2500.00 adalah tidak lagi relevan setelah kedua kanak-kanak tersebut mencapai usia genap 18 tahun. S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [14] Memandangkan peruntukan nafkah dalam Perintah Persetujuan tersebut tidak menetapkan pecahan (breakdown) daripada jumlah RM2500.00 tersebut berapakah jumlah nafkah yang layak untuk pihak Penghutang Penghakiman, kegagalan untuk memfailkan permohonan variasi bererti bahawa Penghutang Penghakiman bersetuju untuk terus membayar nafkah sebanyak RM2500.00 kepada Pemiutang Penghakiman. [15] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti semua kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan oleh pihak-pihak dan dapati bahawa pihak Penghutang Penghakiman telah gagal membuktikan bahawa terdapat bayaran nafkah dibuat kepada pihak Pemiutang Penghakiman dengan cara memasukkan ke dalam akaun bank Pemiutang Penghakiman selaras dengan Perintah Persetujuan. Oleh itu, mahkamah ini dapati bahawa terdapat kemungkiran daripada pihak Penghutang Penghakiman terhadap Perintah Persetujuan. Sama ada Penghutang Penghakiman perlu membayar keseluruhan tunggakan nafkah dari bulan Januari 2016 sehingga bulan Julai 2022 berjumlah RM197,500.00. [16] Pihak Penghutang Penghakiman berhujah bahawa pihak Pemiutang Penghakiman tidak boleh menuntut tunggakan nafkah dari bulan Januari 2016 sehingga Julai 2022 kerana peruntukan Seksyen 86(3) Akta 164 menghalang sebarang tuntutan tunggakan nafkah S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 terhadap nafkah yang terakru lebih dari 3 tahun sebelum sesuatu guaman itu dimulakan. [17] Pihak Pemiutang Penghakiman berhujah bahawa Seksyen 86(3) Akta 164 tidak terpakai bagi kes ini. Hal ini demikian kerana Seksyen 86(3) hanya terpakai dalam situasi tuntutan bagi tunggakan nafkah yang terakru sebelum sesuatu guaman perceraian dimulakan atau tuntutan tunggak nafkah yang terakru sebelum dekri perceraian diberikan. [18] Seksyen 86(3) Akta 164 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 86. Menuntut tunggakan nafkah. (1) … (2) … (3) Tiada apa-apa amaun yang terhutang sebagai nafkah boleh dituntut dalam sesuatu guaman jika ianya terakru kena dibayar lebih daripada tiga tahun sebelum guaman itu dimulakan. [19] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Chitra Danapalan v Augustine Charles Retnasingam [2016] 1 MLRH 97 yang mana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan seperti berikut: [38] I agree with the learned counsel for the wife, Mr David Charles, that the "more than three years" referred to in s 86(3) covers the period of more than three years S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 prior to the filing of the divorce petition for dissolution of the marriage and for maintenance and that recovery of maintenance could not be for more than three years after it had become due prior to the filing of the divorce petition and not after. In other words, the bar to claiming for more than three years is in relation to the institution of the suit as in the filing of a divorce petition. An action for recovery of maintenance as in an attachment or execution process, is not referred to as the filing of a suit. The amount of maintenance assessed is payable for the period in which the order for assessment said it should be paid and payable upon service of the order assessing the amount. [39] I cannot see how the Parliament could have faulted the wife here merely because the whole process of assessing the maintenance payable to her after the Court of Appeal order of 7 July 2010 took more than three years. (penekanan diberikan) [19] Berdasarkan kepada otoriti di atas, Mahkamah ini berpendirian bahawa Seksyen 86(3) Akta 164 adalah tidak terpakai bagi kes ini. Hal ini demikian kerana tuntutan tunggakan nafkah yang dipohon oleh Pemiutang Penghakiman bagi kes ini adalah melibatkan tunggakan nafkah selepas pemberian dekri perceraian. Mahkamah ini berpendirian bahawa tuntutan ini tidak terhalang oleh Seksyen 86(3) Akta 164. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini berpendirian bahawa pihak Penghutang Penghakiman S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 adalah bertanggungan untuk membayar keseluruhan tuntutan tunggakan nafkah dari bulan Januari 2016 sehingga bulan Julai 2022 berjumlah RM197,500.00. [20] Penghutang Penghakiman dalam affidavit balasannya memaklumkan Mahkamah bahawa dia tidak mempunyai sebarang harta dan simpanan melainkan kereta. Penghutang Penghakiman juga menyatakan bahawa dia membayar ansuran bulanan hutang kad kredit sebanyak RM300.00 sebulan dan mulai September 2023 sebanyak RM460.00 sebulan. [21] Penghutang Penghakiman turut memaklumkan bahawa Penghutang Penghakiman tidak mempunyai sebarang pendapatan kerana dia tidak lagi menjalankan amalan guaman. Namun, Penghutang Penghakiman tidak mengemukakan sebarang bukti atau dokumen sokongan bahawa dia telah berhenti dari menjalankan amalan guaman. Mahkamah ini dapati bahawa bukti-bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Penghutang Penghakiman tidak mencukupi untuk membuktikan bahawa dia berada dalam kedudukan kewangan yang tidak kukuh. [22] Semasa penghujahan lisan oleh pihak-pihak, peguam terpelajar Pemiutang Penghakiman dengan persetujuan Pemiutang Penghakiman telah secara sukarela memohon kepada Mahkamah ini untuk dikurangkan tunggakan nafkah dari bulan Januari 2016 sehingga bulan Julai 2022 berjumlah RM197,500.00 kepada RM40,000.00 sahaja setelah mengambil kira kedudukan kewangan Penghutang Penghakiman dan faktor umur Penghutang Penghakiman. S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [23] Setelah meneliti kesemua kertas-kertas kausa dan hujahan- hujahan yang difailkan oleh pihak-pihak dan mengambilkira kedudukan kewangan Penghutang Penghakiman, Mahkamah ini dapati bahawa Penghutang Penghakiman telah mungkir terhadap Perintah Persetujuan yang telah direkodkan dan oleh itu Penghutang Penghakiman adalah berhutang kepada Pemiutang Penghakiman sejumlah wang sebanyak RM197,500.00 yang telah dikurangkan kepada RM40,000.00 dengan persetujuan Pemiutang Penghakiman. KESIMPULAN [24] Mahkamah ini dengan itu mengeluarkan perintah seperti berikut: (i) Penghutang Penghakiman hendaklah membayar Ringgit Malaysia Empat Puluh Ribu (RM40,000-00) sahaja sebagai bayaran tunggakkan nafkah kepada Pemiutang Penghakiman. (ii) Jumlah RM40,000-00 yang tertunggak tersebut dulu hendaklah dibayar secara ansuran bulanan dalam jumlah RM800-00 tiap-tiap bulan pada atau sebelum 7 haribulan. (iii) Penghutang Penghakiman hendaklah meneruskan pembayaran sebanyak RM500-00 setiap bulan sebagai S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 nafkah bagi Pemiutang Penghakiman dan nafkah ini akan ditamatkan hanya sekiranya Pemiutang Penghakiman berkahwin semula. (iv) Penghutang Penghakiman hendaklah membayar RM1,000- 00 sahaja sebagai kos Saman Penghakiman ini kepada Pemiutang Penghakiman tertakluk kepada fi Alokatur. Tarikh: 30.11.2023 t.t (ABDUL WAHAB BIN MOHAMED) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA IPOH, PERAK S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Pihak-pihak Peguamcara pihak Perayu: Tetuan Clinton Tan Peguamcara dan Peguambela No. 2, Jalan Kiara, Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03.64130912 017.8076858 Emel: [email protected] Peguamcara: Encik Clinton Tan Kian Seng Cik Rachel Nyow Qiang Wei Encik Foo Joo Liang Puan Carissa How Cik Yeo Sher Minn (PDK) Peguamcara bagi pihak Respondent: Tetuan Ramesh Dipendra Jeremiah Law Peguamcara dan Peguambela No. 9-2, Tingkat 2, Jalan Medan Setia 1 Plaza Damansara Bukit Damansara 50490 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03.20956505 Faks: 03.20957505 Peguamcara: Encik S. Ramesh Puan Ng Jean Yeen S/N l/eQZ5rqKEOFHHWXUEbpEw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	16,336	Tika 2.6.0
AB-83D-693-07/2020	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH GOH CHENG CHENG	JENAYAH - Bicara penuh - Pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 15 (1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 - Keterangan mengenai identiti botol urin milik tertuduh - Percanggahan material pada 2 digit terakhir pada nombor siri botol urin yang terdapat dalam Borang UPD dengan 2 digit terakhir pada nombor siri botol urin yang terpapar dalam gambar- botol urin – Pembetulan dilakukan oleh saksi lain - Tiada penjelasan munasabah daripada pihak pendakwaan berkenaan percanggahan material – Kegagalan pegawai penyiasat untuk menyiasat - Tertuduh dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan di akhir kes pendakwaan.	04/12/2023	Tuan Prabakaran A/L Rajoo	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=41ab27bd-5960-492b-9b49-bd8f6d197316&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - AP MUKTAMAD GOH CHENG CHENG AB-83D-693-07/2020 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET TAIPING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN KES JENAYAH NO.: AB-83D-693-07/2020 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN GOH CHENG CHENG (NO K/P.: 790716086292) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Selepas bicara penuh) Mukadimah [1] Dalam sesuatu pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 15 (1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (‘ADB 1952’), keterangan mengenai identiti botol urin yang diambil daripada tertuduh adalah sangat mustahak kerana sampel dalam botol urin tersebut membentuk perkara pokok bagi pertuduhan ini. Sebarang kelompangan dan percanggahan yang serius berkenaan dengan identiti botol urin tertuduh tanpa penjelasan munasabah daripada pihak pendakwaan adalah mudarat kepada kes pihak pendakwaan lebih-lebih lagi satu sampel botol urin adalah memadai bagi tujuan ujian saringan dan analisis kimia. 04/12/2023 14:34:50 AB-83D-693-07/2020 Kand. 75 S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 2 [2] Dalam kes ini, mahkamah telah melepaskan dan membebaskan tertuduh di akhir kes pendakwaan setelah mendapati pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan satu kes prima facie ke atas tertuduh kerana terdapat kelompangan yang serius berkenaan dengan identiti botol urin tertuduh tanpa sebarang penjelasan munasabah daripada pihak pendakwaan. Mahkamah berpendapat adalah tidak wajar untuk tertuduh dipanggil membela diri di atas kelompangan dan kelemahan kes pihak pendakwaan tersebut. [3] Penghakiman bertulis ini mengandungi keseluruhan analisis bagi keputusan mahkamah tersebut. Pertuduhan dan kes pendakwaan [4] Tertuduh telah dituduh dan dibicarakan atas pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 15(1)(a) ADB 1952 kerana telah didapati memasukkan dadah berbahaya jenis Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine ke dalam badan tertuduh. Pertuduhan tersebut adalah seperti berikut: “Pertuduhan: Bahawa kamu pada 23/11/2019 jam lebih kurang 0335 hrs di Pejabat Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik, Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Taiping dalam Daerah Larut Matang dalam Negeri Perak, telah didapati memasukkan dadah berbahaya jenis amphetamine dan methamphetamine ke dalam badan kamu, oleh yang demikian itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawahseksyen 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 15(1) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 38B Akta yang sama.”. S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 3 [5] Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil tujuh orang saksi untuk memberikan keterangan dan telah kemukakan tujuh belas ekshibit bagi membuktikan kes mereka. Pihak pembelaan pula telah kemukakan dua ekshibit di peringkat pendakwaan. [6] Secara ringkasnya kes pendakwaan adalah seperti berikut. Pada 23.11.2019, pada pukul 2.30 pagi, Inspektor Zulkifli bin Ariffin (SP1) telah mengetuai sepasukan polis daripada Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Taiping dan membuat serbuan di rumah No. 582, Taman Pertama, 34000 Taiping, Perak. Hasil daripada serbuan ini, SP1 telah menahan tertuduh bersama-sama dengan empat lelaki Cina. [7] Kemudian SP1 telah membawa tertuduh ke Pejabat Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Taiping untuk menjalankan ujian saringan awal urin ke atas tertuduh. Pada 23.11.2019, pada pukul 3.35 pagi, SP1 telah mengarahkan Koperal Roshaida Izwaniza binti Ismail (SP2) untuk mengiringi tertuduh ke tandas untuk membolehkan tertuduh memberikan sampel urinnya di dalam botol bernombor siri 0781247 yang dipilih oleh tertuduh sendiri. [8] Setelah tertuduh memberikan sampel urin di dalam botol urin tersebut, tertuduh telah membawa botol urin tersebut ke tempat ujian saringan awal urin dijalankan sambil diiringi oleh SP2. SP1 kemudian telah membuat ujian saringan awal urin dihadapan tertuduh. Hasil ujian saringan awal mengesahkan urin tertuduh dalam botol urin tersebut mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine di mana jalur ujian (test strip) bagi S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 4 Methamphetamine menunjukkan tanda positif manakala jalur-jalur ujian yang lain menunjukkan tanda negatif. [9] Seterusnya SP1 telah mengarahkan Koperal Shamsul Kamal (SP3) untuk mengisi butiran tertuduh pada pelekat label pada botol urin tertuduh. Setelah SP3 mengisi kesemua butiran tertuduh pada pelekat tersebut, SP1 telah menurunkan tandatangannya dalam pelekat label tersebut sebagai orang yang menjalankan ujian saringan awal dan kemudian telah meminta tertuduh menurunkan tandatangan pada pelekat label tersebut sebagai empunya sampel urin dalam botol urin tersebut. [10] Setelah botol urin tersebut dimateraikan dengan materai keselamatan, SP1 telah menyediakan satu Borang Ujian Pengesanan Dadah Dalam Air Kencing (‘Borang UPD’) (P5) dan seterusnya meminta tertuduh untuk menurunkan tandatangan pada borang tersebut. Kemudian SP1 telah membuat satu laporan polis seperti mana Laporan Polis Taiping Repot 8932/19 (P6). [11] Pada 23.11.2019, pada pukul 5.00 pagi, SP1 telah menyerahkan tertuduh bersama-sama dengan barang-barang kes iaitu satu botol urin yang mengandungi sampel urin tertuduh, satu sampul plastik botol urin (P2), satu plastik berwarna kuning bernombor siri 0781247 (P16), satu jalur ujian Methampetamine (P17), satu Borang UPD (P5), dan satu Borang Serah Menyerah (P7) kepada pegawai penyiasat kes ini, Sarjan Rosmawati binti Che Dan (SP7). [12] SP7 kemudiannya telah mengarahkan Sarjan Mohd Tahni bin Salleh (SP4) untuk menghantar botol urin yang mengandungi sampel urin S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 5 tertuduh ke Jabatan Patologi Hospital Kuala Lumpur untuk dianalisa. Puan Nik Nadhirah binti Nik Mustafa (SP5) iaitu Juruteknologi di Jabatan Patologi Hospital Kuala Lumpur telah menerima sampel botol urin tersebut di kaunter. [13] SP5 kemudiannya telah menyerahkan sampel botol urin tersebut untuk dianalisa kepada Puan Nurulshuhada binti Shoib (SP6) iaitu Pegawai Patologi. SP6 telah menganalisa sampel dalam botol urin tersebut dan mengesahkan sampel tersebut mengandungi dadah jenis Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine. Kedua-dua dadah ini adalah dadah berbahaya yang disenaraikan di Jadual Pertama Bahagian 3 ADB 1952. Penilaian maksimum dan prima facie [14] Tugas utama mahkamah ini di akhir kes pendakwaan telah digariskan dalam peruntukan seksyen 173(f) dan seksyen 173(h) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Di peringkat ini, mahkamah ini mesti membuat keputusan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap tertuduh bagi pertuduhan yang dituduh ke atasnya. [15] Dalam menentukan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie, mahkamah ini harus melakukan penilaian maksimum terhadap kesemua keterangan pihak pendakwaan termasuk menilai kredibiliti keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dalam menentukan sama ada elemen kesalahan berjaya dibuktikan atau sebaliknya. Sekiranya lebih daripada satu inferens atau kesimpulan yang timbul daripada hasil penilaian ini, inferens yang memberi manfaat kepada tertuduh yang patut diterima oleh mahkamah ini (lihat kes Abdullah bin Atan S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 6 v PP & Anor Appeal [2020] 9 CLJ 151, Balachandran v Public Prosecutor [2005] 2 MLJ 301, dan PP v Ong Chong Heong [1998] 4 CLJ 209). Dapatan dan keputusan di akhir kes pendakwaan [16] Setelah melakukan penelitian dan penilaian maksimum terhadap kesemua keterangan pihak pendakwaan, mahkamah ini mendapati pihak pendakwaaan telah gagal untuk membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap tertuduh dalam kes ini kerana wujudnya kelompangan yang serius berkenaan dengan identiti botol urin tertuduh tanpa sebarang penjelasan munasabah daripada pihak pendakwaan. [17] Keputusan ini berkait dengan isu yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan berkenaan percanggahan material pada 2 digit terakhir pada nombor siri botol urin yang terdapat dalam Borang UPD (P5) dengan 2 digit terakhir pada nombor siri botol urin yang terpapar dalam gambar-gambar botol urin yang mengandungi sampel urin tertuduh (P3(A-C)). [18] Pihak pendakwaan telah bergantung kepada gambar-gambar botol urin yang mengandungi sampel urin tertuduh kerana botol urin yang mengandungi sampel urin tertuduh tidak dikemukakan sebagai keterangan di mahkamah. [19] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa sememangnya pembetulan telah dibuat kepada 2 digit terakhir pada nombor siri botol urin yang terdapat dalam Borang UPD supaya ianya selari dengan 2 digit terakhir pada nombor siri botol urin yang terpapar dalam gambar-gambar botol urin yang S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 7 mengandungi sampel urin tertuduh. Pada awalnya iaitu sebelum pembetulan dilakukan, nombor siri botol urin yang terdapat dalam Borang UPD adalah 0781233 manakala nombor siri botol urin yang terpapar dalam gambar- gambar botol urin adalah 0781247. [20] Kemudian pembetulan telah dibuat pada 2 digit terakhir pada nombor siri botol urin yang terdapat dalam Borang UPD kepada 0781247 daripada 0781233. Pembetulan ini adalah dalam bentuk pindaan iaitu dengan memotong secara keseluruhan nombor siri botol urin asal yang tercatat di Borang UPD dengan tulisan tangan dan kemudiannya ditulis semula dengan nombor siri yang baharu iaitu nombor siri yang terpapar dalam gambar-gambar botol urin yang diambil oleh SP7. Mahkamah akan merujuk kedua-dua perkara ini sebagai nombor siri asal dan nombor siri baharu di Borang UPD. [21] Mengikut keterangan pihak pendakwaan, pindaan pada nombor siri botol urin yang terdapat dalam Borang UPD tersebut bukan dilakukan oleh SP1 iaitu orang yang menyediakan Borang UPD namun telah dibetulkan oleh SP4 atas arahan SP7 iaitu pegawai penyiasat dalam kes ini. [22] Bagi memahami konteks kepada isu ini dengan lebih lanjut, adalah penting untuk memahami keterangan-keterangan pihak pendakwaan yang berikut. (i) Orang yang menyediakan Borang UPD ialah SP1. Namun, SP1 memberikan keterangan bahawa dia hanya sedar berkenaan pembetulan tersebut ketika SP1 memberikan keterangan di mahkamah. SP1 memberikan keterangan S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 8 bahawa dirinya tidak dimaklumkan berkenaan pembetulan pada nombor siri botol urin yang terdapat dalam Borang UPD yang disediakan olehnya. SP1 juga memberikan keterangan bahawa SP1 tidak membuat sebarang pembetulan pada nombor siri botol urin dalam Borang UPD. SP1 juga ketika pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam bela terpelajar tertuduh gagal untuk mengesahkan sama ada nombor siri pada sampel air botol urin tertuduh yang dibuat ujian saringan olehnya adalah nombor siri asal atau nombor siri baharu. (ii) SP7 iaitu pengawai penyiasat pula telah memberikan keterangan bahawa beliau telah memaklumkan berkaitan pembetulan pada nombor siri botol urin dalam Borang UPD tersebut terlebih dahulu kepada SP1 sebelum pembetulan tersebut dilakukan oleh SP4. (iii) SP4 memberikan keterangan bahawa pembetulan pada nombor siri botol urin dalam Borang UPD dibuat atas arahan SP7. Mengikut SP4 lagi, nombor siri baharu pada Borang UPD telah diberikan oleh SP4 kepadanya. [23] Dalam keadaan ini, wujud dua fakta atau keterangan yang berbeza daripada pihak pendakwaan. Oleh itu, timbul persoalan yang kemudiannya menjadi satu keraguan munasabah berkenaan keterangan yang mana satu yang perlu diterima oleh mahkamah ini kerana kedua-dua keterangan ini bertentangan berkaitan identiti botol urin tertuduh dan tidak boleh dinafikan kedua-duanya membawa dua inferens yang berbeza. S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 9 [24] Inferens yang pertama ialah botol urin milik tertuduh adalah sebenarnya bernombor siri asal iaitu 0781233 dan inferens kedua ialah botol urin milik tertuduh adalah bernombor siri baharu iaitu 0781247. Yang dihantar untuk dianalisis ke Jabatan Patologi Hospital Kuala Lumpur adalah botol urin yang mempunyai nombor siri baharu iaitu 0781247 di mana sampel yang terdapat dalam botol urin tersebut disahkan oleh SP6 mengandungi dadah jenis Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine. Apa yang terjadi kepada botol urin bernombor siri asal iaitu 0781233 tidak diketahui oleh mahkamah ini. [25] Apabila terdapat dua keterangan berbeza yang menimbulkan dua inferens yang berbeza seperti di atas, maka adalah tanggungjawab mahkamah untuk memilih inferens yang memihak atau bermanfaat kepada tertuduh iaitu botol urin milik tertuduh adalah sebenarnya bernombor siri 0781233 di mana statusnya tidak diketahui dan botol urin yang mempunyai nombor siri 0781247 yang dihantar kepada pegawai patologi untuk dianalisis adalah bukan milik tertuduh. [26] Selain daripada dua inferens di atas, keterangan-keterangan pihak pendakwaan juga telah menimbulkan persoalan-persoalan berikut yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan di mana pihak pendakwaan gagal untuk memberikan penjelasan yang munasabah. Persoalan-persoalan yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan adalah seperti berikut: (i) Sekiranya SP1 hanya sedar akan pembetulan tersebut pada tarikh perbicaraan di mahkamah, bagaimanakah SP7 telah memberikan keterangan bersumpah bahawa beliau telah S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 10 memaklumkan berkaitan pembetulan tersebut terlebih dahulu kepada SP1? (ii) Adakah SP7 telah bertindak untuk menyelindungi kesilapan pihak polis? (iii) Mengapakah SP7 perlu menyelindung kesilapan tersebut sekiranya pembetulan tersebut tidak bersifat oblique motive? (iv) Apakah tersembunyi di sebalik pembetulan tersebut yang ingin disembunyikan oleh pihak polis? (v) Mengapakah pihak pendakwaan langsung tidak mengemukakan sebarang penjelasan terhadap percanggahan material ini? [27] Pada pandangan mahkamah ini, di samping persoalan-persolan di atas yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan, apa yang penting untuk pihak pendakwaan adalah untuk menjelaskan berkenaan kecelaruan yang timbul berkaitan dengan identiti botol urin tertuduh. Namun, dengan hormatnya, pihak pendakwaan tidak berbuat demikian sekali gus mewujudkan jurang dalam kes pendakwaan. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Zaifull bin Muhammad v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2013] 2 MLJ 348 yang telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “[35] With respect, we could not agree with the prosecution on this issue. We are of the view that, in the circumstance of this case, it is incumbent on the prosecution to offer some explanation for the discrepancies. With the S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 11 discrepancies left unexplained, this created a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the drug exhibit. In the circumstance, the defence should not have been called at the close of the prosecution case.”. [28] Pegawai penyiasat (SP7) juga gagal menyiasat berkenaan perkara ini dan tiada sebarang keterangan daripada SP7 tentang bagaimana terdapat kesilapan (jika ada) berkenaan nombor sir pada Borang UPD. Pada pandangan mahkamah dengan hormatnya, dalam keadaan apabila wujud kesilapan begini, pihak pegawai penyiasat sepatutnya menyiasat terlebih dahulu bagaimana dua digit terakhir pada nombor siri botol air urin dalam Borang UPD dan dalam gambar botol urin adalah berbeza pada awalnya dan mengapa ianya dibetulkan kemudian. Bukan dengan mengambil tindakan mudah dengan meminda nombor siri botol urin pada Borang UPD supaya ianya selari dengan nombor siri yang terdapat dalam gambar botol urin. [29] Selain itu, SP7 juga tidak menyiasat berkenaan siapakah empunya kepada botol urin yang tertera nombor siri asal tersebut jika benar ianya bukan milik tertuduh? Harus diingat bahawa pihak pembelaan telah menyatakan dari awal kes pendakwaan bahawa kemungkinan nombor siri asal dalam Borang UPD ini adalah nombor siri kepada sampel botol urin milik tertuduh. Pihak pembelaan juga telah meletakkan pembelaan bahawa urin dalam botol urin bernombor siri baharu tersebut bukan kepunyaan tertuduh tetapi individu-individu lain yang ditangkap bersama-sama dengan tertuduh ketika serbuan dibuat oleh SP1. Pihak pembelaan juga telah mencabar tandatangan yang terdapat di pelekat label pada botol urin bernombor siri baharu tersebut adalah bukan tertuduh (lihat D9 dan D12 (A- B)) yang mengandungi sampel tulisan dan tandatangan tertuduh. Oleh yang S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 12 demikian, kegagalan SP7 untuk menyiasat berkenaan perkara ini menimbulkan pelbagai kemungkinan dan anggapan. [30] Mahkamah juga ingin menekankan bahawa mahkamah tidak boleh melihat percanggahan ini hanya sebagai satu kesilapan manusiawi (human error) kerana ianya boleh menjejaskan keadilan kepada tertuduh mengambil kira pembelaan tertuduh sejak awal kes pendakwaan. Malah jika ianya hanyalah satu kesilapan seperti typing error, SP7 seharusnya menyiasat perkara tersebut dan pembetulan pada Borang UPD seharusnya dibuat oleh SP1 itu sendiri iaitu orang yang menyediakan Borang UPD dan bukannya orang lain. Malangnya, dalam kes ini SP1 hanya sedar berkenaan pembetulan pada nombor siri botol urin pada Borang UPD yang disediakannya hanya pada hari SP1 memberikan keterangan di mahkamah. [31] Dalam keadaan ini, beban terletak di bahu pihak pendakwaan untuk menjelaskan percanggahan ini dalam membuktikan satu kes prima facie ke atas tertuduh kerana kes pendakwaan hanyalah bersandarkan kepada dakwaan bahawa tertuduh telah memasukkan dadah ke dalam badannya. Pihak pendakwaan hanya mampu membuktikan dakwaan ini bersandarkan kepada sampel urin yang diambil daripada tertuduh. Apatah lagi dalam keadaan hanya satu botol sampel sahaja diambil SP1 daripada tertuduh dan pihak pendakwaan juga hanya kemukakan gambar-gambar sampel botol urin tersebut ketika perbicaraan dan bukannya sampel botol urin itu sendiri. Justeru apabila identiti botol urin yang mengandungi sampel urin tertuduh sendiri menjadi tanda tanya, jadi bagaimana pihak pendakwaan mampu membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap tertuduh? S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 13 [32] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Mohd Azmeer Yusnar bin Romli lwn Pendakwa Raya [2020] MLJU 1905 yang telah memutuskan bahawa: “[48] Pada pendapat Mahkamah ini, percanggahan keterangan saksi- saksi pendakwaan mengenai kewujudan nombor siri botol pada label botol urin tersebut adalah serius dan telah menimbulkan keraguan terhadap identiti botol urin itu, iaitu sama ada botol urin yang digunakan oleh SP4 untuk mengambil urin Perayu dan dilabelkan di Balai Polis Arau tersebut adalah botol urin yang sama yang diserahkan oleh SP5 kepada SP3 untuk dianalisa.”. [33] Rujukan juga dibuat kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Ahmad Saiful Islam bin Mohamad [2023] 2 MLJ 950 yang menjadi panduan kepada mahkamah ini: “[54] To our minds, the prosecution has to ensure that the urine specimen in the bottle which was sent to SP5 for analysis was actually taken from or belonged to the respondent. In the absence of any DNA evidence, the prosecution must ensure that there is no mistake in the labelling of the bottle which would otherwise affect the identity and credibility of the respondent’s urine sample. There must not be any break in the chain of evidence. Anything short would definitely raise serious doubts as to whether the urine sample was actually taken on the day in question and whether the urine sample actually belonged to the respondent.”. Kesimpulan [34] Oleh itu, di akhir kes pendakwaan, setelah mahkamah meneliti hujahan kedua-dua pihak, meneliti keseluruhan keterangan-keterangan dihadapan mahkamah ini dan membuat satu penilaian maksimum terhadap segala keterangan-keterangan tersebut, mahkamah mendapati bahawa S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 14 pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap tertuduh berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dibincangkan di atas. Mahkamah berpandangan adalah tidak selamat untuk sabitkan tertuduh dengan keterangan seperti ini apabila tertuduh dipanggil membela diri dan jika tertuduh memilih untuk berdiam diri. [35] Maka seperti yang dikehendaki oleh seksyen 173(f)(ii) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, tertuduh dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan ini dengan serta merta. Wang jaminan dipulangkan semula kepada penjamin. Bertarikh: 04 Disember 2023 t.t. (PRABAKARAN RAJOO) Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Taiping Perak Darul Ridzuan S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AB-83D-693-07/2020 15 PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak pendakwaan: Puan Nur Aqilah Syaza binti Ariffin Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Pendakwaan Cawangan Taiping Tingkat 4, Wisma Majlis Perbandaran Taiping, Jalan Taming Sari, 34000 Taiping Perak Darul Ridzuan. Bagi pihak tertuduh: Cik Pavithira bersama-sama dengan Cik Kartika P. Ravee & Co., 41, Mezzanine Floor, Market Road 34000 Taiping Perak Darul Ridzuan. S/N vSerQWBZK0mbSb2PbRlzFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	23,093	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24F-142-05/2023	PEMOHON L A D RESPONDEN S A T	Family law - Husband's application for joint guardianship and custody of daughter - Husband and Wife residing in separate countries - Whether guardianship should be joint - Whether custody should be joint - Whether practical and reasonable to grant joint guardianship and custody	04/12/2023	YA Puan Evrol Mariette Peters	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a4eb6a4e-58d5-49f6-85c4-c6eaeff20617&Inline=true	WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24F-142-05/2023 In the matter of Sections 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12 and 19A of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 And In the matter of Sections 88 and 89 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 And In the matter of the Child, DEL (United States of America Passport No. *) BETWEEN LAD …PLAINTIFF AND SAT …DEFENDANT 04/12/2023 10:29:51 WA-24F-142-05/2023 Kand. 33 S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This was an application (“this Application”) by the Plaintiff husband for, inter alia, joint guardianship, custody, care, and control of the child of the marriage, unsupervised access to the child, and permission to bring the child back to the Plaintiff’s current residence in Minnesota, United States of America during the summer and Christmas holidays. [2] In the interest of privacy of the parties concerned, and sensitivity of the issues in these proceedings, the Plaintiff, Defendant wife, and the child of the marriage have been anonymised in this judgment as LAD, SAT, and DEL respectively. The factual background [3] The Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively “the Parties”) were married in the United States of America (“the US”) in 2004 and subsequently registered their marriage in Malaysia in 2016. The Parties are blessed with a daughter (“the Child”), born in July 2015. The Parties and Child resided in the US until May 2020, after which they returned to Malaysia. [4] As the passage of time ensued, the marital foundation began to erode, characterised by escalating conflicts. While the Plaintiff averred that the situation of residing with the Defendant’s parents in Malaysia became stressful, the Defendant alleged that it was the Plaintiff's S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 substance and alcohol addiction as well as violent behaviour that had contributed to the acrimony between the Parties. [5] The culmination of these discordant episodes reached a pivotal juncture in May 2022, when the Plaintiff departed from Malaysia, and returned to the US. Although both Parties had different versions that precipitated the Plaintiff's return to the US, that was the turning point of the marriage. [6] In May 2023, the Plaintiff filed this Application, whilst in June 2023, the Defendant filed for divorce. This Application was allowed partially only, for the following reasons. The issues [7] The issues that had to be addressed by this Court were in relation only to the Child, namely (i) whether custody of the Child should be joint or sole; (ii) whether guardianship of the Child should be joint or sole; and (iii) whether the Plaintiff should have access to the Child, and if so, on what terms. Contentions, evaluation, and findings [8] When assessing the appropriate allocation of guardianship and custody for the Child, and deciding whether it should be sole or joint, paramount consideration must always be accorded to the welfare of the Child. This imperative is expressly articulated in section 88 of the S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act”) and section 11 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 (“Guardianship of Infants Act”). These provisions unequivocally emphasise the centrality of the Child’s welfare in guiding the determination of guardianship and custody: Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 Section 88 – Power for court to make order for custody (1) The court may at any time by order place a child in the custody of his or her father or his or her mother or, where there are exceptional circumstances making it undesirable that the child be entrusted to either parent, of any other relative of the child or of any association the objects of which include child welfare or to any other suitable person. … *** Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 Section 11 – Matters to be considered The Court or a Judge, in exercising the powers conferred by this Act, shall have regard primarily to the welfare of the infant and shall, where the infant has a parent or parents, consider the wishes of such parent or both of them, as the case may be. [Emphasis added.] [9] The concept of ‘welfare of the child’ finds elucidation in a multitude of legal precedents, notable among them being Teh Eng Kim v. Yew S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 Peng Siong, Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1982] 1 MLJ 189, Tan Sherry v Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] 1 LNS 1586, and Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] 1 LNS 1325. [10] I was also guided by the Federal Court in Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722, in its reference to the Singapore case of Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS 77, wherein the expression ‘welfare of the child’ was explained in the latter case by Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was), in the following passage: The expression 'welfare'... is to be taken in its widest sense. It means the general well-being of the child and all aspects of his upbringing, religious, moral as well as physical. His happiness, comfort and security also go to make up his well-being. A loving parent with a stable home is conducive to the attainment of such well-being. It is not to be measured in monetary terms. [Emphasis added.] [11] The Federal Court in Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors, through the opinion of James Foong FCJ, proceeded to explain ‘welfare of the child’ in the following passage: [53] According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn, reissue (Mackay edition), para 443 the term, "welfare principle" is a set of factors used when "a court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child or the administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising from it, the child's welfare must be the court's paramount consideration". In the English Children Act 1989, under the heading ‘welfare of the child’ is a set of factors that must be taken into account when deciding on such cases. These are for example: the wishes of the child; his feelings; his age; his sex and his background and the capabilities of the parties S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 involved. Thus, this term "welfare principle" relates to certain factors to be considered and their priority during deliberation in such cases. [Emphasis added.] [12] The meaning of ‘welfare of the child’, therefore, must be considered in the widest sense, and all factors necessary must be weighed against one another for this Court to arrive at a decision. It would be impossible to enumerate specifics, since circumstances in each case are varied. Whether custody should be joint [13] Although the doctrine of tender years as found in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act did not technically apply since the Child had already exceeded seven years, as she was seven years and ten months old at the time of the hearing, I took the view that sole custody, care, and control should be granted to the Defendant, for the following reasons. [14] It was crucial to note that although the Parties had separated, the Child had continuously resided with the Defendant. Although the Plaintiff emphasised that the Child is almost eight years old, it was undeniable that the Child is still young and would be reaching puberty in a few years. [15] Numerous precedents, such as K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135, Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 LNS 440 and Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234, elucidate that in cases S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 involving very young children, it is deemed in the child’s best interest to be under the care of their mother for the sake of their welfare. In Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong, the dynamics of the bond between a young child and mother were expounded by Raja Azlan Shah FCJ (as he then was) in the following passage: The youngest child, Bernard, is of tender years. In my opinion, his place right now is with the mother. "No thing, and no person," said Sir John Romilly MR, in the case of Austin v. Austin [1865] 35 Beav 259 263 "and no combination of them, can, in my opinion, with regard to a child of tender years, supply the place of a mother, and the welfare of the child is so intimately connected with its being under the care of the mother, that no extent of kindness on the part of any other person can supply that place.." This view has found judicial favour in many jurisdictions: in Australia, for example, in Kades v. Kades,(4) the High Court, in a joint judgment stated: "What is left is the strong presumption which is not one of law but is founded on experience and upon the nature of ordinary human relationships, that a young girl, should have the love, care and attention of the child's mother and that her upbringing should be the responsibility of her mother, if it is not possible to have the responsibility of both parents living together." In Canada, Muloch CJ in Re Orr [1973] 2 DLR 77 commented that, "In the case of a father and mother living apart and each claiming the custody of a child, the general rule is that the mother, other things being equal, is entitled to the custody and care of a child during what is called the period of nurture, namely, until it attains about seven years of age, the time during which it needs the care of the mother more than that of the father... [Emphasis added.] [16] As such, I was of the view that the Child would need her mother, the Defendant, for support. It was crucial to clarify, at this juncture, that I am not making a blanket statement about fathers being incapable of providing necessary support for their daughters. However, in this specific situation, the Plaintiff S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 may not be equipped to offer the mental and emotional support needed by the Child, who might also feel uneasy and embarrassed discussing female-oriented issues with her father. [17] On this point, I found instructive the case of Yong May Inn v. Sia Kuan Seng [1970] 1 LNS 176, where in granting custody of three children to their mother, Sharma J opined in the following passage: ... The children are all girls and although it is not absolutely essential that they should remain in the custody and care of their mother, they are bound to feel freer in her company than in the company of their father and more particularly so when one of them is reaching an age when she may need the advice of her mother most. [Emphasis added.] [18] In our contemporary reality, open conversations about sensitive topics often hinge on the gender of the confidant. When it comes to a female pubescent child seeking understanding and support, it is natural for her to lean towards her mother as a confidante. [19] Considering the Child’s ongoing hormonal and physical development, the Defendant, being the mother, is uniquely positioned to comprehend and attend to the Child’s evolving needs. This has been a consistent aspect of the Defendant’s role, where emotional support has been consistently provided and should continue to be a cornerstone of their relationship. S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 [20] The Plaintiff claimed that he had a good relationship with the Child and that the Child would be happier where she was very familiar with the Plaintiff’s family members. He further averred that the Child had spent her earlier years in the US, and would be better adjusted there. [21] I found such contention lacking in merit as the Child, currently 7 years and 10 months old, had spent her more formative years in Malaysia. She appeared to be well-adjusted and has been attending school and other co-curricular activities without any disturbance, and has developed relationships with friends and also with the Defendant’s family members. [22] Therefore, it would not be in the best interest of the Child to remove her from her current environment. This view is supported by the precedent set in the case of Wong Kim Foong (F) v Teau Ah Kau @ Chong Kwong Fait [1998] 1 MLJ 359, where the Court emphasised the importance of maintaining a child’s stability by avoiding the upheaval of familiar surroundings and circumstances. [23] The Plaintiff further contended that the Defendant’s family members were interfering and made it challenging for him to reside with the Defendant and the Child in the Defendant’s parents’ house. [24] In my view, it is not uncommon to face challenges with in-laws; such situations are a normal part of many family dynamics. Despite all the challenges that the Plaintiff faced in residing with the Defendant’s family members, there was, however, no evidence indicating that the Defendant was an unfit or neglectful mother. S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 [25] In fact, since 2020, the Child has been under the Defendant’s care in Malaysia and it was undisputed that the Defendant has effectively managed the Child’s education, health, and activities. Even after the Plaintiff relocated to the US, the Defendant continued to responsibly oversee the Child’s upbringing. [26] Contrastingly, the Plaintiff’s record is not without blemish. Although he had disputed most of the Defendant’s averments in her affidavits, and relied on the cases of Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 1 CLJ 721, and Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 4 CLJ 539 to convince the Court that such averments should not be considered, the irrefutable evidence was that the Plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence, despite justifying that the incident took place in 2009. Additionally, the Plaintiff admitted to consuming alcohol although he denied being an alcoholic. [27] The Plaintiff’s assertions against the Defendant, particularly regarding unsubstantiated fears of parental alienation, were speculative and lacked factual support. On the contrary, the Defendant has consistently demonstrated her competence as a mother. [28] Given the geographical distance between the Parties and the contentious nature of their relationship, I opted against joint custody and awarded sole custody, care, and control to the Defendant. Practical considerations play a role in this decision, as the day-to-day management of the Child would be challenging with the Parties S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 residing in different countries. Their acrimonious relationship further reinforces the impracticality of joint custody in this case. Whether guardianship should be joint [29] The Plaintiff had also insisted on joint guardianship, based on sections 3 and 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, both of which read: Section 3 – Duties of guardian of person The guardian of the person of an infant shall have the custody of the infant, and shall be responsible for his support, health and education. Section 5 – Equality of parental rights (1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of an infant or the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant or the application of the income of any such property, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal. (2) The mother of an infant shall have the like powers of applying to the Court in respect of any matter affecting the infant as are possessed by the father. [Emphasis added.] [30] I was unable to agree with the Plaintiff, in light of the fact that the relationship between the Parties was marked by intense acrimony and hostility, making cooperative co-parenting a nearly insurmountable challenge. Numerous accusations were exchanged, and although S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 each Party disputed the allegations made by the other, the undeniable reality was their inability to maintain a civil discourse. This discord would have severe implications for the well-being of the Child, especially when it concerns crucial decisions. [31] The Child’s welfare was, therefore, at risk, particularly in situations where unanimous decisions were imperative. The contentious nature of their relationship posed a significant threat to the Child’s best interests. [32] I, therefore, took the position that instead of granting joint guardianship to the Parties, the Defendant should be granted sole guardianship, while simultaneously acknowledging the imperative of collaborative decision-making in certain pivotal matters. These encompass determinations relating to the Child’s name, gender identity (or change thereof), religion, and major non-emergency medical decisions. The Defendant had also conceded that decisions on these matters should be made jointly. [33] However, while the Defendant will retain exclusive decision-making authority in all other facets falling under the purview of guardianship, it was incumbent upon her to dutifully apprise and keep the Plaintiff abreast of the Child’s developments. [34] Beyond fundamental aspects such as the Child’s name, gender identity (or change thereof), religion, and major non-emergency medical decisions, the Plaintiff insisted on retaining authority to determine the S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 Child’s residence and whether the Defendant could take the Child abroad. I found this demand unreasonable, given that the Parties had already been leading separate lives coupled with the Defendant’s filing for divorce in June 2023. In my view, it was essential for the Parties to move forward independently. [35] Considering the circumstances, I took the position that the Parties should have the freedom to advance their lives. Consequently, if the Defendant chose to travel abroad or reside in another country, the Plaintiff should not impede such decisions, provided the Defendant keeps the Plaintiff informed of the Child’s whereabouts. This stance is particularly relevant since the Plaintiff is currently not residing within the country of the Child’s residence, emphasising the need for flexibility and cooperation in the interest of the Child’s well-being. [36] In granting both guardianship (except for specific items carved out), and custody solely to the Defendant, I drew guidance from the case of Shyam Ishta Puthucheary v Rajveer Singh Dhaliwal [2011] 5 CLJ 310. [37] In a manner akin to the current situation, the court, in that case, displayed reluctance in the aforementioned case to award joint guardianship and custody to a parent residing abroad. This reluctance was based on the substantial distance and logistical challenges associated with such an arrangement. The court’s stance as articulated by Yeoh Wee Siam JC (as she then was) in the case, is instructive: S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 [39] In this case, the defendant lives in Australia. In view of the distance, it would be impracticable for the court to grant joint custody and guardianship of the said children to him. The plaintiff, as the mother of the children, apart from having to make day-to-day decisions regarding her care and control of the children, would also need the legal right to decide on the education, health, immigration, and other legal matters regarding the said children. Since the defendant is so far away in Australia, it is only proper that the plaintiff be given sole custody and guardianship of the said children so that things can run smoothly in her upbringing of the children. [40] If the defendant lives in Malaysia, and lives in the vicinity of the residence of the plaintiff and children in Malaysia, there is some likelihood of him being granted joint custody and guardianship of the said children, but not in the current situation, given the distance. [Emphasis added.] [38] It was crucial to emphasise that the primary focus of the Court is the welfare of the Child. The preferences and desires of the Parties are subordinate to the Court’s overarching concern for the Child’s welfare. As such, this Court was unable to allow the Plaintiff’s prayer for joint guardianship. [39] With the paramount goal being the Child’s best interests, it was imperative that, except for the Child’s name, gender identity (or change thereof), religion, and major non-emergency medical decisions, sole guardianship should be granted to the Defendant. However, this is contingent upon the Defendant keeping the Plaintiff informed and updated on decisions falling within the purview of guardianship. S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 Whether Plaintiff should have access to the Child [40] It was crucial, at this juncture, to underscore the significance of acknowledging the fundamental right of a child to maintain a continuous and meaningful relationship with both parents. While I decided to grant sole guardianship and custody of the Child to the Defendant, it was fundamental to emphasise that neither parent holds inherent superiority over the other. The dynamics of a child’s relationship with his or her father and as opposed to that with his or her mother are different, but this divergence should not be misconstrued as diminishing a father’s rights in comparison to those of the mother. [41] Considering that the Defendant shall be granted sole guardianship (except for specific items carved out), custody, care, and control of the Child, it was only fair and just to accord the Plaintiff access. The Court is vested with the authority to impose terms and conditions within a custody order, as stipulated by section 89 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 89 - Orders subject to conditions (1) An order for custody may be made subject to such conditions as the court may think fit to impose, and subject to such conditions, if any, as may from time to time apply, shall entitle the person given custody to decide all questions relating to the upbringing and education of the child. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an order for custody may- S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 (a) contain conditions as to the place where the child is to reside, as to the manner of his or her education, and as to the religion in which he or she is to be brought up; (b) provide for the child to be temporarily in the care and control of some person other than the person given custody; (c)provide for the child to visit a parent deprived of custody or any member of the family of a parent who is dead or has been deprived of custody at such times and for such periods as the court may consider reasonable; (d)give a parent deprived of custody or any member of the family of a parent who is dead or has been deprived of custody the right of access to the child at such times and with such frequency as the court may consider reasonable; or (e) prohibit the person given custody from taking the child out of Malaysia. [Emphasis added.] [42] Therefore, despite the discord between the Plaintiff and Defendant, it was crucial to recognise the Plaintiff as the biological father of the Child, emphasising the Child’s right to maintain a relationship with both parents. In consideration of this principle, this Court identified no justifiable reason to deny the Plaintiff access to the Child. [43] Given the Defendant’s assertion that she harboured no objections to the Plaintiff’s access to the Child, the Court granted access in the following manner: (a) Unlimited virtual access to the Child; S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 (b) Unsupervised and overnight access to the Child from Friday 7 pm to Sunday 7 pm whenever the Plaintiff travels to the Child’s country of residence, with a stipulated 10 days' notice to the Defendant regarding his trip to the country where the Child resides; (c) Unsupervised and overnight access during the summer and Christmas holidays when the Defendant brings the Child to the Plaintiff’s country of residence. The Defendant, on the other hand, will maintain virtual access to the Child on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, for a maximum of 30 minutes between 7 pm and 8 pm during that period. Conclusion [44] In the upshot, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after scrutiny of all the evidence before this Court, and submissions of both Parties, sole guardianship (except for specific items carved out), custody, care, and control are granted to the Defendant, whilst the Plaintiff shall have access to the Child, specifics of which have been stipulated above. Dated: 4 December 2023 S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Plaintiff – Ezane Chong; Messrs Ariff Rozhan & Co For the Defendant – Chew Jia Shi; Messrs Yap Siew Yee & Co Cases referred to: ➢ Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 1 CLJ 721, ➢ Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 MLRH 769 ➢ K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135 ➢ Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1982] 1 MLJ 189 ➢ Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722 ➢ Shyam Ishta Puthucheary v Rajveer Singh Dhaliwal [2011] 5 CLJ 310 ➢ Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] 1 LNS 1325 ➢ Tan Sherry v Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] 1 LNS 1586 ➢ Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS 77. S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-142-05/2023 4 December 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 ➢ Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234 ➢ Wong Kim Foong (F) v Teau Ah Kau @ Chong Kwong Fait [1998] 1 MLJ 359 ➢ Yong May Inn v. Sia Kuan Seng [1970] 1 LNS 176 Legislation referred to: ➢ Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 – sections 3, 5, 11 ➢ Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 – sections 88, 89 S/N TmrrpNVY9kmFxMbq7/IGFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	30,991	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22NCC-558-11/2022	PLAINTIF HARTA PACKAGING INDUSTRIES (PERAK) SDN BHD DEFENDAN IQZAN HOLDING BERHAD	CIVIL PROCEDURE: Application for summary judgment – Recovery of amount outstanding under a corporate guarantee – Whether the corporate guarantee was executed by the defendant – Whether the corporate guarantee was a personal guarantee of the signatories – Whether the defendant raised triable issues – Rules of Court 2012, O14	04/12/2023	YA Puan Adlin Binti Abdul Majid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0b0f6295-73e9-4828-a257-ba37e9ae4010&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO: WA-22NCC-558-11/2022 ANTARA HARTA PACKAGING INDUSTRIES (PERAK) SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 199101011172 (221484-M)) … PLAINTIF DAN IQZAN HOLDING BERHAD (sebelum ini dikenal sebagai “Ire-Tex Corporation Berhad”) (No. Syarikat: 200201008458 (576121-A)) ... DEFENDAN JUDGMENT A. Introduction [1] The plaintiff filed an application for summary judgment against the defendant, for the sum of RM1,637,981.77. [2] The court allowed the application, for the reasons set out below. B. Background Facts [3] The defendant is the holding company of Ire-Tex (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (“Ire-Tex”). 04/12/2023 11:43:06 WA-22NCC-558-11/2022 Kand. 69 S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [4] In consideration of the plaintiff agreeing to supply and deliver goods to Ire-Tex, the defendant executed a corporate guarantee dated 30 April 2016 in favour of the plaintiff (“Corporate Guarantee”). [5] Ire-Tex failed to pay amounts outstanding to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff commenced an action against Ire-Tex vide Alor Setar High Court Suit No. KA-22NCC-10-04/2018 (“Alor Setar Suit”). On 20 December 2018, a consent judgment was entered into between the plaintiff and Ire- Tex, pursuant to which Ire-Tex was ordered to pay RM1,637,981.77 as full and final settlement of the matter (“Consent Judgment”). [6] However, the amount was not paid, and Ire-Tex was wound up on 30 September 2019. [7] The plaintiff thus filed this action, claiming the outstanding amount of RM1,637,981.77 from the defendant. C. Principles of Summary Judgment [8] Order 14 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”), which the plaintiff’s summary judgment application is premised on, provides that: “(1) Where in an action to which this rule applies a statement of claim has been served on a defendant and that defendant has entered an appearance in the action, the plaintiff may, on the ground that the defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such a claim, or has no defence to such a claim or part thereof except as to the amount S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 of any damages claimed, apply to the Court for judgment against that defendant.” (emphasis added) [9] The manner in which an application for summary judgment shall be made is set out in order 14 rule 2 of the ROC. Order 14 rule 2(1) provides that the application must be supported by an affidavit verifying the facts on which the claim is based, and stating that in the deponent’s belief, there is no defence to that claim. [10] Once the preliminary requirements under order 14 rules 1 and 2 of the ROC have been met by the plaintiff, namely: a. the statement of claim has been served on the defendant; b. the defendant has entered appearance; and c. the affidavit in support of the summary judgment application has verified the facts upon which the claim is based, and has stated that there is no defence to the claim, the plaintiff would have established a prima facie case against the defendant. [11] The burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the court as to why judgment should not be given against it (see National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300). S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 D. Considerations [12] It is undisputed that the writ and statement of claim have been served on the defendant, and that the defendant has entered appearance in the proceedings. In the affidavit in support of the summary judgment application, the plaintiff had also verified the facts upon which the claim is based, and had stated that there is no defence to the claim. [13] The plaintiff’s case is premised on the Corporate Guarantee. The Corporate Guarantee provides that in consideration of the plaintiff supplying goods to Ire-Tex, the defendant shall guarantee payments due by Ire-Tex to the plaintiff. [14] Amounts were due by Ire-Tex to the plaintiff, and as such, the plaintiff commenced the Alor Setar Suit. The Consent Judgment was entered into, pursuant to which Ire-Tex was ordered to pay RM1,637,981.77 as full and final settlement of the matter. [15] However, the amount remains unpaid. [16] The plaintiff’s solicitors issued a letter dated 1 July 2022, demanding the amount outstanding from the defendant, but no payment was forthcoming. [17] In its affidavit in support of the summary judgment application, the plaintiff provided a statement of indebtedness dated 29 August 2022, certifying the amount of RM1,637,981.77 due by the defendant to the plaintiff. S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [18] Based on the facts as set out, I find that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case against the defendant. The burden has shifted to the defendant to satisfy the court as to why judgment should not be given against it. [19] Thus, I moved on to consider the defendant’s case. There are three main defences raised by the defendant, namely: a. The defendant denied it had ordered or requested goods to be delivered to Ire-Tex; b. The defendant denied it executed the Corporate Guarantee; and c. The defendant contended the Corporate Guarantee is a personal guarantee entered into by the signatories of the Corporate Guarantee, Christopher Purcell and Lai Soon Ong (“Signatories”). [20] On the first defence, the defendant’s denial that it had ordered or requested goods to be delivered to Ire-Tex, the defendant argued that it is a separate entity from Ire-Tex, and cannot be made liable for Ire-Tex’s debts. The defendant supported this argument with the fact that it is not a party to the Alor Setar Suit and the Consent Judgment. [21] I am of the view that this defence has no basis in law. Section 79 of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that: S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 “A “contract of guarantee” is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the "surety"; the person in respect of which default the guarantee is given is called the "principal debtor", and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the "creditor". A guarantee may be either oral or written.” (emphasis added) [22] The Corporate Guarantee falls within the definition of a contract of guarantee under section 79 of the Contracts Act 1950, as it is a contract to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person, namely Ire-Tex. [23] The Corporate Guarantee provides that in consideration of the plaintiff supplying goods to Ire-Tex, the defendant shall: “(a) guarantee, as principal/s and not merely as surety/ies the payment on demand of all monies due to you and the discharge of all liabilities incurred to you, in respect of the Goods & Services by the Customer up to a limit of RM3,000,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Three Million only) and (b) further undertake to indemnify and keep you fully and completely indemnified against all losses, actions, proceedings, claims, demands, damages, cost and expenses including but not limited to legal fees on a S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 outstanding amount due to the plaintiff, as it did not order goods and products from the plaintiff and was not named in the Alor Setar Suit and the Consent Judgment, to be highly misconceived. The defendant’s liability arises from the Corporate Guarantee, under which the defendant had guaranteed the payment on demand of all monies due to the plaintiff, RM1,637,981.77 had been made to the defendant, by a letter dated 1 July 2022 from the plaintiff’s solicitors. No payment was made by the defendant. As such, pursuant to the Corporate Guarantee, the defendant in law, and is not an issue that should be tried at the full trial of this matter. defendant denied it had executed the Corporate Guarantee. It also solicitor and client basis: whatsoever which you may incur or sustain by reason of the failure on the part of the Customer to pay all monies due to you and discharge all liabilities incurred to you by the Customer up to a limit of up to the limit of RM3,000,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Three Million only).” (emphasis added) [24] As such, I find the defendant’s argument that it is not liable for the following the supply of goods to Ire-Tex. [25] It is not in dispute that a demand for the outstanding amount of is liable to the plaintiff for the sum of RM1,637,981.77. [26] Thus, I find the first defence raised by the plaintiff to be unfounded [27] The second and third defences will be addressed together. The S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 contended the Corporate Guarantee is a personal guarantee given by the Signatories. [28] It is in evidence that the defendant issued a directors’ circular resolution dated 27 May 2016 (“Resolution”), which ratified the Corporate Guarantee and provided authority to any of the defendant’s directors to sign the Corporate Guarantee on behalf of the defendant. [29] One of the plaintiff’s directors, Lim Kok Siong, witnessed the signature of Christopher Purcell in the Corporate Guarantee. [30] I find there to be sufficient evidence before this court to support the plaintiff’s case that the Corporate Guarantee was executed by the defendant. As such, I am unable to accept the defendant’s denial of the execution of the Corporate Guarantee as an issue to be tried, that would warrant a full trial of this matter. [31] In assessing the defendant’s argument that the Corporate Guarantee is a guarantee given by the Signatories, I considered the following provisions of the Resolution: “… approval be and is hereby given for the Company to execute a Corporate Guarantee ("the Corporate Guarantee") in favour of the Supplier to secure the Customer's liabilities incurred to the Supplier… That upon the execution of the Corporate Guarantee, the Company will further undertake to indemnify and keep the Supplier fully and completely indemnified against all losses, S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 actions, proceedings… which the Supplier may incur or sustain by reason of the failure on the part of the Customer to pay all monies due to the Supplier… That authority be and is hereby given to any Directors of the Company to sign and execute for and on behalf of the Company, the Corporate Guarantee and all other relevant documents pertaining thereto, if so required. That authority be and is hereby further given for the affixation of the Company's Common Seal onto the Corporate Guarantee and all relevant documents in connection therewith in accordance with the Company's Articles of Association, if so required.” (emphasis added) [32] It is clear from the Resolution that the Corporate Guarantee is executed by the defendant. The Signatories are directors of the defendant who signed and executed the Corporate Guarantee on behalf of the defendant, by authority of the Resolutions. [33] The defendant also argued that as the Corporate Guarantee was not executed by the defendant’s common seal, it is a personal guarantee provided by the Signatories. I first observed that this defence was not pleaded by the defendant, and must necessarily fail. Further and in any event, the provisions of the Resolution do not support this defence. S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [34] The Resolution provides that authority is given: a. for any director of the defendant to sign the Corporate Guarantee; and b. to affix the defendant’s common seal onto the Corporate Guarantee, “if so required”. [35] It is thus clear that the Signatories signed the Corporate Guarantee on behalf of the defendant, and not in their personal capacities. Further, the Resolution provides that the common seal shall be affixed onto the Corporate Guarantee, only if required. The fact that the common seal was not affixed does not mean that the Signatories signed the Corporate Guarantee in their personal capacities. [36] With the findings made, it is my considered view that the second and third defences raised by the defendant are inherently improbable and inconsistent with undisputed contemporaneous documents. They are not issues to be tried which must be considered by way of a full trial. [37] I am guided by Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ord [1992] 1 MLJ 400, where the Supreme Court held that: “Under an O 14 application, the duty of a judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other in an affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal, or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable in itself, then S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 the judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue not triable …” (emphasis added) [38] I find the case before this court to be one in which the facts asserted by the defendant are clearly inconsistent with undisputed contemporaneous documents. E. Decision [39] From my assessment of the evidence before this court, I find the defendant has not raised any credible defence or triable issue. This is therefore a plain and obvious case justifying the grant of summary judgment against the defendant. [40] The summary judgment application is allowed, with costs. Dated 27 November 2023 - sgd - ADLIN ABDUL MAJID Judge High Court of Malaya Commercial Division (NCC6) Kuala Lumpur S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Counsel: Plaintiff : Justin Voon (together with Caroline Lim) of Messrs. Justin Voon Chooi & Wing Defendant : Kunamony Kandiah of Messrs. Mohd Latip & Associates S/N lWIPClzKEiiV7o36a5AEA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	15,488	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24-53-09/2022	PEMOHON KINING EXETON SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN KASTAM DIRAJA MALAYSIA	Originating Summons(OS)- Appeal against the decision of the Custom's Appeal Tribunal dated 29.8.2022-Whether the Appellant's service and supply are exempted from the GST as they had obtained a certificate of GST Relief(COGSTR) from Majlis Perbandaran Kuantan(MPK)- Whether MPK is eligible to issue.a COGSTR to the Appellant.	04/12/2023	YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=311e5fc7-06a4-46b6-aecd-5d1e811631a0&Inline=true	04/12/2023 12:42:53 WA-24-53-09/2022 Kand. 22 S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x18eMaQGtkauzV0egRYxoA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal t-11-24-53»o9/znzz Kand. 22 bu/12/2023 12:42-53 mum IIANKAMAN nnsm ruuu nu xum LUMPUR mum wnuvm rsnszxuvuua KUALA Luuwun, muvsm (nmmau KIJA§A—KUA3A nus) sum: rsmuu ug wua.s:mnr2n22 mam Pemava bemenasn pmpek dengan perv-ul ‘cadnngln Mumbma KA:mp\vki Pemandamn Kuanvan mm a. 1035 Lat 22. Snklyen 30, Jam: van n Fmm Kuamm Pahang Dam! Makmuf DAN mum Pamara mengenax Rum ks Tnbunm Rzyuan Keslam m Pulraays Nu Rzyuan MOF nzx mo-ma/37 Lzuzm nan Kenulussn Rnyuin am as as 2022‘ um Dalam Pelknm manganaw Vnnman Jahavan Kaslam Dwma Malaysia UKDM) Ru] No unsansm berlankh 22072020 No Loumoaw benlnkh 22012020 dan Na uwmaaasu beninkh 2a 07 mm mm Da\am Fenkam m mm. Aluvavu 7 can Amvnn 55: Kndan-Kaodah Mnhkaman 2m2. um mum seam a. man Sekuyen ma Akta Cukaw Earang ﬂan mammaun 2nuA(An.m2y van ma sm nu .namu.w-mm. «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! xwwe EXEYON sun anu mo svwxn 447521-xp peruvu DAN KEYUA FENGARAH KASTAM RESFDNDEN Judgmum Imroduclion 1 he Appeuam Is appealing agamsl the decxslon or me Customs Appaa\ Tribunal mm at Pulrayaya Appeal Na MOF 'rR><.7ou- are/37(2o2o) dated 29 5.2022 wmch dismissed the Appenanrs appea\ 2. The Appellant ﬁled an ongmaung Summons (os) aanea 27 9 2022 (Enclosura 1} pnmanly seekmg the vonawing reuels - 2 1 Kepulusan Tnbuna\ Rayuan Kastam dl Fmrajiya dengan Nu. Rayuan MOF TRK 1oo-s/s/3742020) yang mbenkan pada 29 B 2022 yang meno\ak rayuan Ferayu dﬂarbahkklni 2 2 Rayuan Perayu kepada Tnbunal Rayuan Kaslam .1. Puxrajaya dengan ND Rayuan MOF TRK 7006/8/37(2U20I dwbenarkan‘ 2 3 Kepmusan Kelua Pengauah Kaseam Diraja Malaysia melalux aural dengan number rujukan LI71531 1904 berxankh 22 2 2020. LDEAZDYGOSO berlankh 22 7 2020 Gear: LMEVDOAASD benankh 20 7.2020 dlkelepnkan dan dwbalalkan; 2 4 K05 permahanin mi dlbayarweh Respanden‘ dar- 2 5 Apaapa rem yang Mahkamah yang Mulal ml anggap sesua\ dan adul 3. Alter me hearing. I dismissed the Appenanrs as (Endosure 1) I wwll new sex aul ma grounds «or my :1 Ian 2 at u m m.M.mm.vo.wm. «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 28 runner, llem 3 ollhe Fusl Schedule sxanes as follows‘ n, T m (2) (3) (M ‘ (5) Ilsmn Persons cm. Conditions ommcatata Na beswgnedby 3 Fnderal or All poaastsnnm m. Quads ..un.s mm sum excludmg wnponaa or pumhased I depamnam Govemmem wtmkaum Vmm . vswswred ursuchomev Daulnmnnl and Delsan or rmrchased amcer mpoﬂed under the warehousmg Inlrmlzed 1 mnmr ‘ sch:/In‘ byhrm cars \ (bﬂml ..¢ .,.. ....~ by the depanmenlmneemad W. W. ..,.., .,. ‘ othvvaie mm. M 1 .x .... .. ..mm ‘ .,, ma 0. mnoemeu (n:)Thu M M .\ duvlﬂnunlnl vali ‘ mm W lid in not \ rauvmasm am on any mhu «um \ 29. Cleanylrum me sad omen nnlyxne Fedem and State Government deparlmenls are enxiuea la the rahal and by virlue of suhsechon 56(4) onne GsTAn 2014, are angmle to vssue a cenmcnte 01 rehaf 30. Band on me ﬂndmgs oi ws Coun on me Fits! Issue above, MPK is nemver a Federal nor a S\|a\|e government but a mu‘ aumorny as deﬁned m Section 2 of Act 171 and was not nsteu under me said Schedule Pine 11 at 1: sm nu nnﬁnuuzvn-nRvmA «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuanml VI .HuNa Wm! 31. Thus lnrs court vrew mat the lssuance at the COGSTR signed by ane Muhammad Azna bun Arm Ram, Pangaralr Jabalan Kaluruteraan, MFK la the Appellant was rltagal 32 Tne Appellant tn lnetr wntten suprnlssron submlts lhatlhe COGSTR dsled 1211 2015 (Exhibit NPG-G MAME) was rlol challenged by me Respondent However, upon perusal ol Paragraphs 11 and 12 ml tne Allrdavlt tn Reply at Muhammad Bukhon Bln Atlas dated 91 2023 [Enclolurl 51‘ I ﬁnd tnat tr clearly vellecls tne Rsspondenl s posmcn on the valldlly pr tne coesw prvduced by tne Appellant Cuncluslon 33 Premlsed on the aloresala reasons. l am ollrre vlew tnal only the Federal and stare gayernrnant aapannrents are enllllsd lo tna retrel as provlded ln Paragraph 2 cl GST (Relref) Order 2014 [F U(A) 273/201] and by lllﬂue a1 supsectran 5514) elthe GST Act 2014, are ellglble ta rssue a certtlrcate at relrel slnpe Ml=t<ts nernera Federal nor a state guvemmem, MPK ts not entrrleu \|o me relrel‘ what more to lssue a oenlﬁcate ufve1lef(COGSTR) 34 Based on the above. rt can be concluded that the Appellant who ls a EST-registered person, was never enllllsd to any exempllon or rellel Irorn paying (ax lor lnetr serylce anp supply \|a ma said prolecl 35 Thls court ﬁnds Lha\| me appeal by tne Appellant ls wlmoul merits The aecrsion pl the CAT ls not larntea wrtn ma arrur 01 law and/or mtinnalny andlor ttnreasanapleness lhal warrants the rntenrantron of the court. 36 Szrlce rny declsml ts based on Ihe above Iwo lssues, I wtll not address tne PO raised by lne Respondent Le. whether the custom Appeal Trlpunal Should be made a party to the os. uge 1) ml 13 IN na.n.aanaa.ywma;t “Nana s.n.r ...n.rwrrr .. tr... a may r... annn.rr-y sun. dnuavlml VI nFluNa war 37 As such. I dismissed me Appeﬂanfs Os (Enclosure 1) wllh mass :21 RM3,ooo.uc wnnom me euocatcr lee. cuunsols For me Appellant For «he Respondent m ne.M.nezm.w-mm. «mm. smuw ...m.mm .. H... e may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Dated‘ otf Deoemhev 2023 Ahmad Kama! bin Md snemu Judge Hugh court Kua\a Lumvur En Fem Lee Teong Ghee (En Mahd Afzan tun Mohd Sarwana with him) Tewan T G Lee 3. Assumes Peguambeve ﬂan Peguamcara Um! 35, 6-1, Jalan Semarak Apl 2‘ Dxamond Square Commercia\ Cemre‘ on Jalan Gombak. 53000 xuexe Lumpur (Ru, Tuan D23/LT/21/LTG/AFZ) cm Nabiﬂa Nauasha m Nagmuddin Federal Counse\ (Clk NUNV Akhllah, Federal Caunsd Wllh her) Jabalan Kaslam Dwraja Malaysia, Bahagxan Perundangarl‘ Aras 4 Smalarl. Kamweks Kementenan Kewangan‘ No 3, Perslaran Ferdana‘ Presml 2‘ 62596 Pu\|raJaya musaus Bankaraund Facts 4 Yhe Daokgmund has in ms appeal gathered (mm the cause papers and subnussmns 0! me names can be summanzed as Iouows: » 41 Kimng Exelan Sdn and (ma Annenam) is a company regxslered under Secuun 21 or me eooas and services Tax An 2014 [Am 752] [GST Ac! 2:114; mm GST mgwslralnon number nnoamozaaa and lheirﬂrsl taxable penad was on 1 A 2015 unli\ 30.4.2015‘ 42 The Appellant s the contractor (or a Dmjecl known as “Cadangan Membma Komweks Perbandaran Kuanlan (MFK) G1 mas Lo! 29, Seksyerl 30, Jalan Tanah Pulwh. Kuanlan, Pahang Darul Makmur (tho 1 Pmincl) as the suppner and pnmaer ovsannaes var construe Ion malaria‘, 4 3 Maﬂvs Perhandaran Kuanlan (MPK) [nnw known as ‘MEWS Eandaraya Kuantan“] .s me employer of the sad Played; 4.4 MPK has Issued a Vener 0! accapvanca ol lender (swax Se\|ujulenma Tender) daleu Jmy 2011 (Ru; No MPK/J/A/wrr: 03/2010) \|a me AppeHanI wherem me Appauant execmed an 14 7 N11 (nu comm: Dacumunlll. 4 5 An auan was oanduded by Bahagxan Pemaluhan Zon Tengah Unit 1 (WPKL) Ke\ana Jaya‘ Smanguv an (he Appennnn la: 3 «exams penods that are y Anril 2015 — December 2015, Vi January 2016 — December zms, and uv January 2017 — December 2017 4 5 The «um: nnamg shows the Appeﬂant was m maacn :11 semen 9 arms esr M12014 as me sad pvo\|eCl' a taxable servms and supwy on a standard rate max us 5% to be vmpossdn rug; 1 av 1: m xta-Munanuuxvnankvxm «mm. s.nn nmhnrwm s. U... a may n. nrW\ruU\|y -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! 4,7 The Anpellanl contends that tneir service and supply are exempted lrom me GST as they had ablalrled a Certiﬁcate pt Goods and Services Tax Reliel (coGsTR) lrom MFK, A 5 on 5.7 2ot7, at the Round Taple Discussion, a tnoiougn dlicusslurl an Sedlon an and section 55 pnne GST An 2014 was done and the culwme ortrie discussion was MPK is not a government rienpe, exemption does npl apply to me said pmiecti 49 The Respondent tnen issued 3 Bills pl Demand (son) claiming lpr me GST against me Appellant lay me liaxalicn period between l4.2uts to st 12.2017 amounting lis RM557,‘l 35,34 based on me «allowing schedule: 7 claims Rev No Date Taxahle l>enop_ Amuuﬂl RM misemaa Vzzvzoza 14201 siizzois I4 was Vloaaznmuau 22 1 me I I2 me 333 sea 74 L14E'IDUMeO 2n 7 zpzp I i zuini i2 2m1 u me u TOTA 551 «as s4 A to The Appellant dissatisﬁed witn lne SOD and appealed ID on on 7.4.2022 claiming tney were exempted irpni naving to pay ins ssr over tne supply made lowards MPK as tney apiaineit a COGSTR lroni MFK: A it on 29 a 2022. CAT pismissee ine Appellants appeal wim no arderas lo epsls and amung me reasons far the said iudgnienl are 7 ai MPK is a local autripnly and not a Federal gpyeninienl or State gpveinnient. Tneielpie, section 64 of GST Act 2014 does not apply and ne lax exemption is applicable tcwards me said pmiect and pi MFK is not an exeinpleit pany in paying EST nenoe, MFK is not eligible lo issue a \|ax exenipiipn Cerllﬁcale to the Appellant. »...mu IN x1lnMﬂElbu\lz\lDviRYxnA «we. s.ii.i navlhnrwlll be UIQG a may i... nﬂnlnullly MIMI dnuavlml VI miiiie mi 4.12 Aggrieved by me decision of me CAT. the Appeiiani ﬂied iriis 05 in cnaiienge me same Trio doclslon oi Ihe court Firs: Isaul Whllhar lhl contrnct Olllurld bolwun [ho Appellant and MPK wu indud I contract bclwun ﬂll Appllllnt Ind looll Iulhorily (Plllik aukum Yempatan) and rim a corllracl puma... me Appellant and mm: gomnnimx or sun governmllll 5 nie Appeiiani Submils iriai based on me uunlract document enclosed in Exnipii 'HPG-1' in me Appaiianrs Aiiidavii in suppun (MIS) (Enclosure 2), ii is cieaimai me said pioieci VS a prajecl by irie Goverrimem of Maiaysia » 5.1 The words KERAJAAN MAi.AvsiA (FERUNTUKAN KEMENTERIAN PERUMAHN1 DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN) is clearly visipie on me needing and ma signing page (See' pan: is of Exiiipii “HPG-1 of Ans), and 5 2 The words “For and on panel! <3ovsmmsni' aisp sIa\|ed visibly on me signing page (see 5:39:51! and 2\| oisxii “HPG- 1 M AAIS). 6 The Appeai was lurther supporled byirie iesiimpny and evidence of SP1 (me subpoenaed wiinessi during irie examination in cniei regarding ine MFK latter daied 26.1.2017 which was execuiea Dy SP1 (5 . xhibil “HPG-5" in AAIS). 7 me Appeiiani lurlher relied on S!C1IDrI 94 oi the Evidence AcI1950 in suppon its argument semipn 94 omie Evidence Act195D siaies as iaiiows — ’ExCIIlx>Ml iwevideiice lulinllapplicalion ampcuniuiua Ixrillnn vans When ianguep. used in a documam VS pisin In iiseii and Minn ii sppiiu accuiaieiy in me exlslﬂig iacisi emenee may mi {)5 given in sin». lha\| ii was mt mean! id appiyid nuzh ism ' Da;e5nﬁ 13 IN xi!-MﬂElbuuxVD9iRVmA “Nair s.n.i nuvihnrwm be UIQG M my i... mii.ii-y mi. m.i.ii Vﬂ nFiuNG Wm! 10 11. 12 13. smna The Appenanx clavmed that n has clearly pmved by documentary evidence and by wwlness leslimony m me «am ofSP1 whom is a Dlvwsxon Chef 0! H15 Pubhc Works Ind Specwal Pmpcl MPK Enguneermg Deparlmern msulymg wt \s a Malaysia Government Prams! and not by MPK SP1 \|esl\|mnny IS a relevant lact that me Cam must take Inlo consvdera n as he IS a person wwlh spacval knovmedge (‘INNS manar ‘M\|N7I Sermon 49 0' me Ev\denoeAc1195D Having perused me ground: 17! mdgmenl oi we learned Chairman 0! lhe CAT, \ ﬁnd lhal the learned cnauman was eonem in nonuumng that MPK Is a local aumomy and is separate ironn me Federal Gavemman\| and gwemmem 01 we Stale This 15 oonsunam wnh me deﬁnmon of Local Aumcmy as deﬁned m Sscxmn 2 M the Law Government Act 1975 (Act 17I)wmcn read as vanows: - ‘loam authority‘ means any Clky Cnuncll, uumclpu Council or nmneu Coum: mm can: may be and m Manon tame Federm Tevmmy meansme Camrmssnnev av me any of xuara Lu/upur awmnled Imdev uunn A ac me Federa\CamIaIA.:1I9Sﬂ (emphasis added) u rs to be noted that a oonlmcl on benan oi zne Federal or State gnvemmem and {or mane:-s cnnnecled Iherewllh are governed and regulated by me Government Contracts Act 1949 (Ml 12a). Secnon 2 01 Act 120 scans ma: . ‘Cumrlcl on u-mu M the Gav-rmmnl All mnvacts made .n Mz\ays4a on seven aﬂha Government snau. .1 reduced In wnlww‘ bu m. Vnme name uﬂhl Gnvimm-n\|ulM Iys-a and may be mm by a Mvmsler or by my public olﬁcer may aulhonzsd m wvmng Dy a Mwsxen unhal spmany m my mmwlav ass‘ ov aanemlly cm nu mnmcu ban)»: a cenam value .n ma dsnaI1men\| or otherwise as may I): spaemed -n ma au(hunnmn.' Based on the above, it Is my vwew man m is wrong lor me Appehsnl In My an semen 94 ov me Evudence AL1 when mete Is a speaﬁc provwsxun reqardmg me government’: oonxract In M31120. a... 5 al :3 .nam...uo..avm. «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. U... w may he mn.u-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 14. is 15 17 18 19 Based on me maxim bi ‘genemiia epeei IbuS non deroganl“. iiiis Courl is oi me view mai Act 120 which is a speeiiio Am governing rnaners peria ie «be eonii-Ict eniereo by or on benaii or me gevermnenr prevails over \|he generai pmvision oi seciion 94 oiine Evioenee Ad 1950 ms com is bniie viswlhal me rnere words oi “Keraiaan Malaysia \|Perun\ukai1 Kemenlenan Parumzhari dan Kersiaan Tempalan) on me neaoing and signing page asweii as me word ‘Forarm en behail Government on me signing page does not ab inilio make il a gevernmeni oeniraci ii is me considered view of «ms Court iiiai I\| Is not me du\|y of me Resporidem Io pmvs man me ooniraci enierea helween me Appallam enp MPK was i-ioi a governrneni oenireci as cisimed py me Appeiiani in men Afﬁdavii in paragrepns is and is at me ANS [Enclosure 2), but In5\|ead. ll is me duly oi me Appeiianl Io pmve lha\| me eocalied ‘Gavamment coniracr may eniereo Ink) were pmperiy executed as per me requirement or AC: 120 This Court lines inar me Appeiiani had never discharged me onus on merit to wave mai inere was In ine existence :1! a miller: auiharlxalion issued by a Mimsier aiiowing Data Hap Zuikiﬂi Bin Haii Vaacob io envera corilrazzt on benaiioi me Govemmenl oi Maiaysia pursuam in seclion 2 oiine Aoi This coin views inai ihe absence oi me wnnen aumonzaiion must mean lhal Daio Haillulkﬂll Bin Haii vaeoob had ria\| been aeiegaiee wiin me aumoricy ie aoi ior me Govemmem oi Malaysia Thli is because a govemmem comracl requires wriiien auinorizaiien giving power in are public omesr by me Minisier of Malaysia aiiowing nirn/ner la enier a cuniracl on benaii or me gnvemmem To say einerwise wnuid vaniarnouni io noi giving a pmvisiorl oi ine iaw me inierpreiaiion rneani by me Legisiaiure Tne High Court in me case or Meerouc Ennrpriee in Or: v. Flnglull P-rid iken Ne ori seiangor I on [zoom 4 IIILRH sis; [2010] I cu 592 heid as ioiiaws ~ 17] me ianpuege mo in c. 2 or Ncl no It pllin, nnciu Ind unlmhiuueui. me iileral and xlrinl oennniciion mie must men apniv ill im-rpreiinp me said Dltivilioil rweng Pm Hing v binai Abidiri Pmih a. Am2r[i99ﬁ] 1 MELR is iissui 2 ML! 410. [1990] i cu (Repi am. e... 1 ei I3 rn xi!-Mﬂﬁliuuxvﬂvnkvxnl “Nana s.n.i luvihnrwiii be mad a may i... nﬂninuiily MVMI dnuaviml vn .nuva mi 20 Bylhe ma: cnnﬂlucllon, nslmpvy Vlquins a mm... awmvxaaan by Ina mum dclcnd-M u Enclk Zulnnl man. was to mm 1 eumncl lurand on man M I». mum: duhndam. w than u. no wnltun amhoriullon gum in Encll Zainul Abvdm prior to me making cl Ihn mm dun 4 Dccnmbn ms, nu contxlcl - an by Ina plamllﬂs m nan bun united must he mum: to bu an Inmo. Tn uy omslwnie wama nmamoum to ml gmng n omvman M 01: law ma .mevprevauon mean by lhu Legsla\|me' (amphasxs added) Funher‘ -n the case of sum: sun Ehd y. Gmrlmmnnl emu auto :21 Sabah man 2 MLRA 667: [zonal 1 MLJ 743; [zoos] 1 cu I23, the Federa\ coun made u dear as to me cansumeuon of the mlerprevahun of semen 3 av Act I20 me equwalenl provision at much is contavned m Senior: 2 M me An as veganis to me Federar Government when m sexd as vonows: » -m In a cnnlratl wave a snare Govemmsnl ws Invulvad as a aany the mansion on 3 mm: GavemmanlConv.mcLsAcl194§(me1949 M) \s awhcame Yhe appwmunanna WA9Acxhm1 been unlarvﬂnd in Sabah and Sarawak an as Seplsmbev ussa seem 3 crime 1949 An mans- CL comm an Bchaﬂnﬂ a Star: emmmum (11 Au cantracts made m Mnvayma on behalr at a Stale Gavemmanl snaﬂ .1 reduced m mug. he made m me name ac the snare Gavsmmam Mme Slave ov by my Dumuc nmcalduly aumonzee m wrmna ray the cm: Mmm, enher speaauy m any pamamar man an genenﬂy Var nu cunlracu amw a mam yam. m m. depanmam av mnemse as my be smmea m we amhunzamn (2. m we appmmn ul W5 semen Ia Sabah am Sllavak -cw Mmzar Includes any Slale MImu5r(emphas\s added) [81 my Hunca we envy oﬂhaounlrlcl luvmvhmber hzoema l7y(haM\|mxIuIw1m me appellant um1er515 M m Enaclmem was m mnlormuly wI\|h Ins vsuuwamanln M a 3 av ma 1949 Act Th: um: mo. um um- considlrltion mm Is umamm timumluncul can a vuhllc aﬂlcnr an kgilly ammmua In Imnr um such . nonlucﬂor Ilmbcvllclnu wlth ma -an-Inn: In am vim it run only no dam :1 Inc mwmnams Ms 1 am. me man sallsﬂed. In amerwuvds‘ ms puhhc Mﬁcuv mual chum ma -ulmnzsl-on M (M MIrus\|er m mung In act on man an me Svate Govemment To aapny muse requllemams uupuumu by a 3 n! ma mu m m in: Ins!-nt can. In seuausam nun Buml, a pnblh: mm mull show um n. has mo wmn aummiuliun M In: uumsm mm m could an on behall M m. .- pcndcnl an nny dcnllnu emr Inc said r x In m. Wnhom mu nuussary vtrillun mmonuuan ohhnld mm.“ his acmm would an void and my .1. mm was nothing name us nor u an coum ma 5! my . ma. Idducud by RM app. nm to show ma! me set mu Null Buml had been arnnud wnn Inch mm... lulnorintlan \|a -:1 on bumll of mm mm. sum emmmm. Therelme n sunpxy means max the Semusaha Hun Bum ma nnl bun dategalzd wvln ma nulmnly m an! ior me responam \n the cucumstanoes our answev In x». 1:: queslmn would be m the negahve ' (emphasws added) 21 Thus Courl takes me mew that regalﬂess alwho came varward o xesmy on Iheappearanoe ollhe saxd words on me contracl in exh it HPG-1 cl ANS. 1Enc\osura 2) M the rormanon at me said canvas! was not m accordance wnh \|he prevxswons a1\|helaw.rl would sun be mud and not blndmg on me Govemmem 22 Based on me above 1 see no reasnn m disturb Ihe (ma-ng o! the CAT when n correcﬂy hem mat Secnon 54 of me GST Act 2014 us not apphcable to the sam prcjeci smce me 557 was signed by Dam Hap Zulkﬂlx Em Ham Yaacob vn ms capacny as me Yang Dwpenua MFK‘ a \o::a\ aumumy and not on behalf nflhe Federar or Stale govemmenx Swarm Inna when-er IIIPK is eligible ta vssun mo Cerliﬁcale 01 Goods and s-wines Yax Rnllnl (coesm) to «M Applllanl 23 The Appellant subrmls that MFK lhmugh SP1 zweady Ieshhed and suppoﬂed by the eonlracl ducumam (hat me said prayed is a Ma\ays\a Gwemmenl project under me prowswon av me Housing and Local Government MmIs\|ry merelore no GST Vs chargeable. 24 Accommgxy, me Appeuann oamenus that the MPK has Issued coesm dated 12 11.2015 under smon 56 at al the GST Act 2014 mm um Inn! at n. This Iacmwas non bamg challenged (See Exhl : HPGa"ofAAlS]. Funhenlhe relueffarm usmbe signed by me head oi deparlment wmch m uns case was signed by me s M n m xta-Munﬁnuuxvne-nRvxaA «mm. saw ...n.mm .. U... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! me dlredor ofengmeenng depaﬂment (See pm 225 of oxhiblt man of ms). 25. It us to be noted mat under Secnun 55 av lhe GST M12014 only a Mmnsler has (he power to grant relnel by way at Order In the Gazelte. 25 Seclion 56 vnhe SST Act 201:: states as (allows: » an. rawnomunmma mm mm m we Mxmsier may by am. an up Guam and sumau to such wrsdwrons as he dsem: m 10 Imports rulwevu any amen aromas cl perwnslvom ma paymem Mme wnole or my pan at me tax Much mly be charged ma mm on my mum. nupcly Mgoods av semoes or any rmponalmn algneﬂsor dass olgwds <2v (3) m Wham a Iaxabte aman Iupplwal gum or samces In . petson or a den M persons reﬂened to m sunvamon H) at Dzragranh mm. ms (anbla psnan shaﬂ be renewed lmm margmg Ind mHec1mg tax due and payarxa on me saaaxy (emphasvs added) 27 I one max in me lime 0! ma Iaxnhle penoa m mama (Am 2915 — December 2D17).1he gazette ordermatwas m eﬂecl relenea to in me shave paragraph during that tune was Paagraph 2 at GST (Rem) Ovder 2014 [P U(A)273/2D14}wm\|ch slales as Inﬂows‘ - 2 nummm. charging and paymcnl mu m The persons suacma1m mmmn m at me Fws\| Schedule ave relieved (mm the aaymanmv 1:): an Ina acqmsman of genus specmaa m cnlumn (.2) av ma Fm Smedwa mm: ca me mndulmns as specmd m cammn m mm Fvrsl Suxeaule (2; we person waumea vn oalumn (2)0401: seam scmauna am Ielwewed lmm chlvgmg tax on ma Npwy an mans macmsa m calumn 1:) 0! ma Semnﬂ Sclvsdme sumam to me candnmns is specfﬁld m uu\umn1A)ul ma Sewnd scheme m We person designated m culumn (5) cl me Flnl $che¢ula am ma saaana scmuz. man produce 3 ennmcila mg...-1 by uuch durqnalad person as nescnbed m the Inn: Schedme In the gum cl goods and -mm lax »... m M 1: sm nu u3GnuuzvDvnRvxnA «ma. sm-1 nmhnrwm .. U... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum v-max	1,747	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
K-01(A)-240-05/2021	PERAYU Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar RESPONDEN 1. ) LEE LAI TEE 2. ) LEE SIEW HONG 3. ) TEE NURSING CARE CENTER SDN. BHD	semakan kehakiman - seksyen 27(2)(a) Akta Perancangan Bandar dan Desa 1976 – Akta Perancang Bandar dan Desa 1976 - (Akta 172) dan Kaedah-Kaedah Pengawalan Perancangan (am) 1995 - Aturan 53 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 – Seksyen 23(2), Seksyen 25(2) dan Perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (Akta 91) - perintah certiorari - perintah mandamus - gantirugi teladan - gantirugi aggravated – kacauganggu - seksyen-seksyen 80, 101(v) dan/atau 107 Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976 (Akta 176) dan/atau Undang-Undang Kecil 7, 8, 9, 14, 23 dan/atau 25 Undang-Undang Kecil Pelesenan Tred, Perniagaan Dan Perindustrian (Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar) 2010 - tanggungjawab statutori Perayu - “ultra vires” - Lembaga Rayuan - “legitimate expectation” - “illegality” - “irrationality” -“procedural impropriety”- “proportionality” - rayuan Perayu dengan kos sebanyak RM30,000.00 meliputi kos di Mahkamah ini dan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Perintah oleh Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dengan itu diketepikan.	04/12/2023	YA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamKorumYA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamYA Datuk Ravinthran a/l ParamaguruYA Dato' Mohd Nazlan Bin Mohd Ghazali	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9579e012-55e0-428e-b52c-634fd72c972e&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. K-01(A)-240-05/2021 ANTARA MAJLIS BANDARAYA ALOR SETAR … PERAYU DAN 1. LEE LAI TEE 2. LEE SIEW HONG 3. TEE NURSING CARE CENTER SDN BHD … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Alor Setar Dalam Negeri Kedah, Malaysia Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman No. KA-25-17-2019 Dalam perkara berkenaan dengan satu permohonan untuk semakan kehakiman oleh Lee Lai Tee (No. K/P: 800302-02- 5664, Lee Siew Hong (No. K/P: 700903-02-5282) dan Tee Nursing Care Center Sdn. Bhd. (Existing Company No.: 1149761-P)(New Company No.: 201501024432); 04/12/2023 10:41:34 K-01(A)-240-05/2021 Kand. 63 S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Dan Dalam perkara berkenaan dengan keputusan-keputusan Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar yang mengeluarkan notis-notis supaya, memulihkan semula tanah dan bangunan kepada keadaan asal dalam hal pemajuan tanpa kebenaran merancang, Borang D, mengikut seksyen 27(2)(a) Akta Perancangan Bandar dan Desa 1976, bertarikh 19.9.2019 dan 4.12.2019; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Akta Perancang Bandar dan Desa 1976 (Akta 172) dan Kaedah- Kaedah Pengawalan Perancangan (am) 1995; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 53 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 23(2), Seksyen 25(2) dan Perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (Akta 91) S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Antara 1. Lee Lai Tee (No. K/P : 800302-02-5664) 2. Lee Siew Hong (No. K/P : 700903-02-5282) 3. Tee Nursing Care Center Sdn. Bhd. (Existing Company No.: 1149761-P) (New Company No.:201501024432) … Pemohon-Pemohon Dan Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar … Responden] [Disatukan di bawah Perintah bertarikh 4.3.2021 dengan [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Alor Setar Dalam Negeri Kedah, Malaysia Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman No. KA-25-13-2019 Dalam perkara berkenaan dengan satu permohonan untuk semakan kehakiman oleh Lee Lai Tee (No. K/P: 800302-02- 5664, Lee Siew Hong (No. K/P: 700903-02-5282) dan Tee Nursing Care Center Sdn. Bhd. (Existing Company No.: 1149761-P)(New Company No.: 201501024432); Dan S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Dalam perkara berkenaan dengan keputusan Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar bertarikh 15.9.2019 yang membatalkan Lesen Perniagaan Pusat Jagaan Orang Tua bertarikh 19.2.2018 dengan No. Lesen: G 43/E)13/17 dan Lesen Iklan 10147; Dan Dalam perkara berkenaan dengan Notis Kesalahan No. 0002604 bertarikh 14.10.2019 yang dikeluarkan oleh Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai s. 107 Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 53 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 23(2), Seksyen 25(2) dan Perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (Akta 91) S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Antara 1. Lee Lai Tee (No. K/P : 800302-02-5664) 2. Lee Siew Hong (No. K/P : 700903-02-5282) 3. Tee Nursing Care Center Sdn. Bhd. (Existing Company No.: 1149761-P) (New Company No.:201501024432) … Pemohon-Pemohon Dan Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar … Responden] KORAM YAACOB HAJI MD SAM, HMR RAVINTHRAN A/L PARAMAGURU, HMR MOHD NAZLAN BIN MOHD GHAZALI, HMR ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Rayuan ini dibawa oleh Perayu iaitu Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar terhadap keputusan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Alor S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Setar, Kedah yang telah membenarkan permohonan semakan kehakiman oleh Responden-responden. [2] Setelah mendengar dan menimbangkan hujahan lisan serta hujahan bertulis pihak-pihak, kami sebulat suara telah membenarkan rayuan Perayu. [3] Kami perincikan di bawah ini alasan-alasan mengapa kami membenarkan rayuan oleh Perayu tersebut. Latar belakang kes [4] Responden Pertama (Lee Lai Tee) dan Responden Kedua (Lee Siew Hong), ialah warga negara Malaysia dan kedua-duanya mempunyai alamat kediaman yang sama di No. 81, Taman Kekwa, Fasa 2, Jalan Kuala Kedah, 06600 Alor Setar, Kedah. [5] Responden Ketiga (Tee Nursing Care Center Sdn. Bhd.) ialah sebuah syarikat sendirian yang diperbadankan di Malaysia dan mempunyai alamat berdaftar di No. 7c, Pusat Perniagaan Shahab Utama, Susuran Senangin, Lebuhraya Sultanah Bahiyah, Alor Setar, Kedah dan alamat perniagaan di No. 88Q, Taman Kekwa Fasa 5, Jalan Kekwa 10, Jalan Kuala Kedah, Alor Setar, Kedah. [6] Perayu (Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar) ialah pihak berkuasa tempatan untuk Bandar Alor Setar, negeri Kedah ditubuhkan di bawah Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976. S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [7] Pada sekitar tahun 2015, Responden-responden telah memulakan perniagaan komersil pusat jagaan orang tua Tee Nursing Care Center Sdn Bhd di Geran Mukim No. 31562, Lot 70285, Bandar Alor Setar, Kedah. [8] Pusat jagaan tersebut kemudian telah berkembang ke Geran Mukim No. 31561, Lot 70284, Bandar Alor Setar, Kedah. Kedua-dua lot tersebut yang masing-masingnya ialah rumah kediaman dua tingkat, terletak sebelah menyebelah. Lot 70285 beralamat di No. 88Q, Taman Kekwa Fasa 5, Jalan Kekwa 10, Jalan Kuala Kedah, Alor Setar dan Lot 70284 beralamat di No. 88R, Taman Kekwa Fasa 5, Jalan Kekwa 10, Jalan Kuala Kedah, Alor Setar. [9] Pada 5.3.2018, Responden Pertama dan Responden Kedua telah membeli Lot 70283 bersebelahan yang beralamat di No. 88S, Taman Kekwa Fasa 5, Jalan Kekwa 10, Jalan Kuala Kedah, Alor Setar. Responden-responden bercadang untuk menggunakan premis kediaman di Lot 70283 tambahan tersebut sebagai tempat memberikan perkhidmatan fisioterapi dan rawatan lain untuk orang-orang tua yang tinggal di pusat jagaan Tee Nursing Care Center. [10] Pada 26.10.2017, Responden-responden telah mendapat pembaharuan Lesen Permit Perniagaan No. G 43/E)13/17 dan Lesen Iklan 10146 dan 10147 yang dikeluarkan oleh Perayu untuk Responden- responden menjalankan perniagaan pusat jagaan orang tua dan mempamirkan papan iklan di premis No. 88Q dan 88R. Tempoh sah lesen permit perniagaan tersebut ialah satu tahun dan dikehendaki diperbaharui pada setiap tahun tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat yang dikenakan oleh Perayu. Lesen permit perniagaan semasa Responden-responden ialah untuk tempoh 1.8.2019 hingga 31.7.2020. S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [11] Pada 24.1.2019, Perayu telah menolak “Permohonan Kebenaran Merancang Terhad Untuk Membuat Perubahan Matan Bangunan Bagi 2 Unit Rumah Berkembar 2 Tingkat Sediada Dari Kediaman Kepada Pusat Jagaan Warga Tua Di Atas Lot 70283 dan Lot 70284 Seksyen 49, Bandar Alor Setar, Kedah” yang dipohon atas nama Lee Lai Tee (Responden Pertama), Lee Siew Hong (Responden Kedua) dan Chuah See Seng (muka surat 453 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3). [12] Lanjutan daripada itu, pada 13.9.2019, Responden Pertama telah diserahkan dengan notis “Tunai Syarat Lesen Pusat Jagaan Orang Tua” oleh Perayu. Notis tersebut mengatakan seperti berikut (muka surat 464 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3): “2. Untuk makluman pihak tuan dikehendaki mematuhi syarat- syarat yang telah ditetapkan oleh pihak Majlis. Oleh itu, tuan diminta untuk: 2.1. Ditegah menimbulkan kacau ganggu bunyi bising pada waktu malam. 2.2. Dikehendaki menyediakan tong sampah yang sesuai dan sempurna. 2.3. Dilarang membuat halangan kereta/kenderaan kepada rumah-rumah jiran di kawasan tersebut. 2.4.Dikehendaki mengemukakan kebenaran merancang dari Bahagian Perancang MBAS. S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 3. Sehubungan itu, dengan penerimaan surat ini pihak tuan dikehendaki mematuhi syarat-syarat tersebut dalam tempoh (14) hari 27 September 2019 dari tarikh surat ini dikeluarkan. Jika pihak tuan gagal mematuhi arahan ini dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan, kelulusan lesen ini akan dibatalkan dan tindakan undang-undang akan diambil jika tuan masih menjalankan perniagaan.” [13] Pada 15.9.2019, Perayu telah mengeluarkan notis kepada Responden-responden untuk membatalkan lesen permit perniagaan Responden-responden. Notis tersebut juga menghendaki Responden- responden menghentikan operasi dan menurunkan papan iklan di premis tersebut. Dalam notis bertarikh 15.9.2019 tersebut, Perayu memberikan dua alasan untuk pembatalan lesen perniagaan G.43/e) 13/17 dan lesen iklan 10146 dan 10147, iaitu “lesen premis nombor rujukan G.43/e) 13/17 dan Iklan 10146, 10147 di Alamat 88 Q & R, Taman Kekwa Fasa 5, Jalan Kekwa 10, Jalan Kuala Kedah, 06600, Alor Setar, Kedah telah melanggar syarat lesen iaitu menyebabkan kacau ganggu dan wujudnya bantahan daripada orang awam berkenaan pembukaan premis ini.” (muka surat 447 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3). [14] Pada 18.9.2019, Responden Ketiga menulis kepada Perayu untuk “Rayuan Lanjutan Lesen Operasi Pusat Jagaan Selama 36 Bulan”. Antara alasan Responden Ketiga mengapa lanjutan tempoh wajar dipertimbangkan ialah Responden Ketiga ingin tahu bentuk kacau ganggu yang dikatakan berlaku kepada jiran-jiran berdekatan premis dan ketiadaan pengetahuan Responden Ketiga bahawa kebenaran merancang perlu didapatkan terlebih dahulu daripada Bahagian S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Perancang MBAS untuk pemajuan ketiga-tiga lot premis tersebut termasuk kerja-kerja tanah (muka surat 456 – 457 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3). [15] Pada 19.9.2019, Responden Pertama dan Responden Kedua telah diserahkan dengan “Borang D, Notis Supaya Memulihkan Semula Tanah dan Bangunan Kepada Keadaan Asal Dalam Hal Pemajuan Tanpa Kebenaran Merancang, Kaedah 14(1) mengikut Seksyen 27(2)(a) Akta Perancangan Bandar dan Desa 1976” oleh Perayu. Notis tersebut mengatakan seperti berikut (muka surat 450 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3): “Bahawasanya pada pendapat pihakberkuasa perancang tempatan pemajuan yang butir-butirnya di bawah ini telah dijalankan tanpa kebenaran merancang. Dan bahawasanya pihakberkuasa perancang tempatan adalah puas hati bahawa suatu permohonan untuk “kebenaran merancang” berkenaan dengan pemajuan itu telah dibuat di bawah “seksyen 22/subsekyen 24(3) Akta Perancang Bandar dan Desa 1976 sebelum pemajuan dimulakan, diusahakan atau dijalankan dan pada menjalankan kuasa-kuasanya dengan wajar, PBPT telah enggan memberi kebenaran merancang bagi pemajuan itu: Kamu dengan ini adalah dikehendaki mematuhi dalam tempoh Empat Belas (14) hari dari tarikh notis ini disampaikan dengan kehendak-kehendak dinyatakan di bawah ini, supaya tanah itu akan dipulihkan semula setakat yang mungkin seperti keadaan sebelum pemajuan itu dimulakan. S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Ambil perhatian bahawa, Menurut subseksyen 27(9) Akta Perancang Badar dan Desa 1976, kegagalan mematuhi apa-apa kehendak notis ini dalam tempoh yang dibenarkan adalah melakukan suatu kesalahan dan boleh dikenakan denda tidak lebih daripada satu ratus ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi enam bulan atau kedua-duanya dan denda tambahan sehingga lima ribu ringgit bagi tiap-tiap hari kegagalan itu diteruskan selepas sabitan yang pertama bagi kesalahan itu.” [16] Pada 19.9.2019 dan 30.9.2019, Responden-responden telah menulis kepada Perayu untuk memohon supaya pembatalan lesen perniagaan Responden Ketiga ditarik balik. Antara alasan ialah mereka telah mengambil tindakan memberhentikan bunyi bising sejak aduan pertama bertarikh 24.6.2018 dan Responden telah membelanjakan kos yang besar untuk renovasi kerja bangunan dan mengadakan pusat jagaan orang tua tersebut dan akan mengalami kerugian jika perpindah ke lokasi lain (Muka surat 460 – 462 dan 467 – 469 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3). Mengikut rekod Responden, terdapat 41 orang tua menginap di pusat tersebut yang masih berstatus rumah kediaman dua tingkat (muka surat 485 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3). [17] Pada 6.10.2019, Perayu menolak permohonan lanjutan tempoh masa yang dipohonkan oleh Responden Ketiga (muka surat 481 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3). [18] Pada 30.10.2019, Responden-responden telah memfailkan permohonan semakan kehakiman (judicial review) bagi mencabar keputusan dan notis-notis yang dikeluarkan oleh Perayu tersebut. Antara S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 alasan yang dikemukakan oleh Responden untuk memohon semakan kehakiman ialah Responden-responden tidak diberikan penjelasan berkenaan dengan alasan-alasan pembatalan tersebut dan tiada pendengaran diadakan oleh Perayu untuk memberi peluang kepada Responden-responden untuk memahami kesilapan dan/atau ketidakpatuhan dan membela diri (muka surat 95 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1). Responden-responden oleh itu memohon untuk mendapatkan relif-relif berikut (muka surat 86 – 87 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1): “1) memohon satu perintah certiorari dengan tujuan untuk membatalkan keputusan Responden (Perayu) bertarikh 15.9.2019 yang membatalkan Lesen Perniagaan Pusat Jagaan Orang Tua dengan No. Lesen: G43/E)13/17 dan Lesen Iklan 10146, 10147 dan mengarahkan Pemohon (Responden-Responden) memberhentikan operasi perniagaan dan menurunkan papan iklan di premis-premis yang dikenali sebagai No. : 88Q & No. : 88R, Taman Kekwa Fasa 5, Jalan Kekwa 10, Jalan Kuala Kedah, 06600 Alor Setar, Kedah (“Keputusan Pembatalan”); 2) memohon satu perintah certiorari dengan tujuan untuk membatalkan keputusan Responden (Perayu) yang mengeluarkan dua Notis Kesalahan Serta Tawaran Kompaun dengan rujukan No. 002604 dan No. 000982, kedua-duanya bertarikh 14.10.2019, kepada Pemohon Kedua (Responden Kedua)(“Keputusan Notis Kesalahan”); 3) memohon satu perintah mandamus dengan tujuan mengarahkan Responden (Perayu) mengembalikan semula S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Lesen Perniagaan Pusat Jagaan Orang Tua dengan No. Lesen : G43/E)13/17 dan Iklan 10146, 10147; 4) bahawa Keputusan Pembatalan dan Keputusan Notis Kesalahan tersebut digantung dengan serta merta sehingga pelupusan akhir dan muktamad permohonan untuk semakan kehakiman ini; 5) Gantirugi dan kerugian yang dialami oleh Pemohon (Responden) akibat pemberian Keputusan Pembatalan dan/atau sepanjang kewujudannya, termasuk gantirugi teladan dan gantirugi aggravated ditaksirkan dan dibayar oleh Responden (Perayu) kepada Pemohon (Responden); 6) bahawa kos-kos dalam permohonan ditanggung oleh Responden (Perayu); 7) relif-relif selanjutnya atau yang lain sebagaimana yang difikirkan sesuai dan berpatutan oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini.” Permohonan semakan kehakiman oleh Responden-responden tersebut disokong oleh afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Responden Pertama (muka surat 120 – 151 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2). [19] Pada 3.2.2020, Responden dan Perayu telah memasuki satu perintah persetujuan bersama yang membenarkan Responden meminda perenggan 5 dan perenggan 6 relif-relif asal kepada relif pindaan seperti berikut (muka surat 113 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1): S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “5) Memohon bagi satu perintah supaya gantirugi yang dialami oleh Pemohon-Pemohon akibat pemberian Keputusan Pembatalan dan/atau sepanjang kewujudannya, termasuk gantirugi teladan dan gantirugi aggravated dan dibayar oleh Responden (Perayu) kepada Pemohon-Pemohon (Responden-responden); 6) Memohon satu perintah bahawa kos-kos dalam permohonan dibayar oleh Responden (Perayu) kepada Pemohon- Pemohon (Responden-responden).” [20] Perayu (Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar) dalam afidavit jawapan mereka mengatakan bahawa perniagaan yang dijalankan oleh Responden-responden iaitu Rumah Orang Tua dan perkhidmatan urut tradisional yang beroperasi di dua lot rumah kediaman tersebut telah dijalankan oleh Responden-responden tanpa mendapatkan kebenaran merancang (planning permission) daripada Perayu. Terdapat ubah suai material premis-premis Responden-responden untuk tujuan menjalankan aktiviti perniagaan tersebut. Perayu juga mengatakan operasi dan aktiviti Responden-responden juga telah mendatangkan kacauganggu kepada jiran seperti menjemur pakaian dan tilam-tilam dan bantal di padang permainan kawasan perumahan tersebut. Terdapat juga bunyi bising daripada penghuni Rumah Orang Tua yang mengganggu ketenteraman jiran-jiran di taman tersebut. Di samping itu perniagaan rumah urut Responden juga telah menyebabkan berlakunya halangan lalu lintas di kawasan tersebut oleh pengunjung-pengunjung rumah urut. Terdapat juga lampin-lampin (diapers) yang telah digunakan oleh orang-orang tua yang dibuang oleh Responden secara bersepah tanpa menggunakan S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 tong sampah yang sewajarnya. Atas semua kejadian tersebut, terdapat aduan oleh jiran-jiran yang membantah kehadiran perniagaan Responden dalam kawasan kejiranan dan taman perumahan tersebut. Dengan yang demikian Perayu mengatakan Responden telah melanggari syarat lesen perniagaan yang mewajarkan lesen tersebut dibatalkan lebih-lebih lagi perniagaan Responden tersebut memerlukan satu kebenaran merancang diperolehi terlebih dahulu oleh Responden daripada Bahagian Perancang MBAS (muka surat 252 – 265 dan 299 – 304 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2). Prosiding dan Keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi [21] Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan relif-relif yang dipohonkan oleh Responden-responden disamping memerintahkan Perayu membayar kos sebanyak RM50,000.00 kepada Responden- responden. [22] Antara alasan Yang Arif Hakim membenarkan permohonan semakan kehakiman Responden-responden adalah seperti berikut (muka surat 53 Rekod Rayuan Tambahan): “92. A cursory examination on the exhibits such as the Cancellation Decisions, Form D, the appeal letters by the Applicants seem to show one thing that the Respondent had not provided nor informed the Applicant of its reason for cancelling the business license. 93. My findings is fortified by reading the appeal letters written by the Applicants to the Respondent to attempt to find out the reasons behind the Cancellation Decisions. From the appeal S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 letters, it is clear to me that the Appellant were desperate in finding out the reasons for the Cancellation Decisions. It defies logic if one were to believe that the Applicant were aware of the reasons for its Cancellation Decisions.” [23] Seterusnya Yang Arif Hakim membuat dapatan seperti berikut: “115. The Respondent being a local authority is accountable for its decisions. As I have mentioned earlier, I am not convinced that the Respondent had conducted proper investigation to inspect the purported complaint. 116. Furthermore, it is also vital to inform the complaints to the Applicants when the complaints were first lodged to the Respondent’s attention. I cannot emphasize enough that by cancellation the license without proper explanation would cause humongous trouble to the public bearing in the mind the license involved here concerning a nursing home and a number of elderlies. Such decision ought to be made in proper course of hearing and investigation. 117. On totality of the aforesaid, I am of the considered view that the Cancellation Letters and Form D were made on grounds of illegality, irrational and procedural impropriety as propounded by R Ramachandran. I find that the Appellants had proved its merit in both JR13 and JR17 and I hereby allowed both Reviews with cost of RM50,000.00 for both JR13 and JR17 subject to allocator.” S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [24] Perayu yang tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan Yang Arif Hakim tersebut telah memfailkan rayuan kepada Mahkamah ini. Rayuan Perayu [25] Melalui Memorandum Rayuan bertarikh 13.7.2021, Perayu memberikan alasan-alasan berikut dalam mencabar keputusan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi: 1. Yang Arif Hakim yang bijaksana telah khilaf dari segi undang- undang dan/atau fakta dalam gagal menghayati makna dan efek sebenar seksyen-seksyen 80, 101(v) dan/atau 107 Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976 (Akta 176) dan/atau Undang-Undang Kecil 7, 8, 9, 14, 23 dan/atau 25 Undang-Undang Kecil Pelesenan Tred, Perniagaan Dan Perindustrian (Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar) 2010 (UUK2010), serta membuat dapatan undang-undang dan/atau fakta yang salah berkenaan peruntukan-peruntukan Akta 176 dan/atau UUK2010 tersebut, terutamanya berkenaan isu-isu berikut: (i) kuasa dan/atau tanggungjawab statutori Perayu dalam memperbaharui dan/atau membatalkan lesen di bawah s. 107 Akta 176; (ii) kuasa dan/atau tanggungjawab statutori Perayu dalam menghapuskan dan/atau menghalang kacauganggu serta aktiviti perniagaan yang tidak sah dalam kawasan Perayu; S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 (iii) tindakan Responden-responden yang menjalankan perniagaan secara tidak sah, menyebabkan kacau ganggu dan/atau mengubahsuai dan menggunakan secara tidak sah; (iv) tindakan Perayu secara betul dan sah dalam memberhentikan dan menghalang aktiviti perniagaan Responden-responden yang tidak sah dan/atau menyebabkan kacauganggu. 2. Yang Arif Hakim yang bijaksana khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta dalam gagal menghayati makna dan/atau efek sebenar seksyen-seksyen 19(1), 21, 22, 23, 25 dan/atau 27(2)(a) Akta Perancang Bandar dan Desa 1976 (APBD 76), serta membuat dapatan undang-undang dan/atau fakta yang salah berkenaan peruntukan-peruntukan APBD 76 tersebut, terutamanya berkenaan isu-isu berikut: (i) kesalahan Responden-responden dalam membuat pembinaan tanpa kebenaran dan tukarguna bangunan tanpa kebenaran; (ii) budibicara dan tindakan Perayu dalam menolak permohonan Responden-responden untuk kebenaran merancang; (iii) kegagalan Responden-responden merayu kepada Lembaga Rayuan terhadap keputusan Perayu menolak permohonan untuk kebenaran merancang; S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (iv) Responden-responden dihalang dan diestop daripada menyoal atau memperkatakan penolakan permohonan untuk kebenaran merancang; (v) Pengeluaran Notis Borang D kepada Responden-responden dibuat dengan sah dan betul di bawah s. 27(2)(a) AJPB 76. 3. Yang Arif Hakim yang bijaksana telah khilaf dalam gagal mengambilkira dan/atau menghayati kesemua keterangan dan/atau dalam membuat dapatan atau keputusan yang bertentangan dengan kesimpulan munasabah yang tunggal yang boleh disimpulkan daripada fakta-fakta dan keterangan yang telah dikemukakan, terutamanya berkaitan isu-isu berikut: (i) tindakan Responden-responden yang menjalankan secara tidak sah, menyebabkan kacauganggu dan/atau mengubahsuai dan menggunakan bangunan secara tidak sah; (ii) Perayu telah dengan betul dan sah membatalkan lesen-lesen tersebut dan mengeluarkan Notis Borang D tersebut. 4. Yang Arif Hakim yang bijaksana telah khilaf dalam gagal mengambilkira dan menghayati dan/atau dalam membuat dapatan atau keputusan yang bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip semakan kehakiman, terutamanya berkenaan isu-isu berikut: S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 (i) bahawa “decision-making process” yang telah digunakan oleh Perayu itu munasabah dan betul; (ii) bahawa keputusan pentadbiran berdasarkan budibicara Perayu tidak boleh dengan sewenang-wenangnya disoal atau dipertikaikan; (iii) bahawa Perayu telah bertindak secara munasabah dan bukan secara “ultra vires”. [26] Melalui Memorandum Rayuan Tambahan Perayu bertarikh 20.10.2021, Perayu telah membangkitkan alasan-alasan rayuan tambahan seperti berikut: 1. Yang Arif Hakim yang bijaksana telah khilaf dari segi undang- undang dan/atau fakta dalam memutuskan bahawa Responden- responden tidak tahu atau tidak dimaklumkan mengenai sebab- sebab untuk pembatalan lesen perniagaan berkenaan. 2. Yang Arif Hakim yang bijaksana telah khilaf dari segi undang- undang dan/atau fakta dalam memutuskan bahawa Perayu telah tidak menjalankan siasatan atau siasatan sewajarnya tentang aduan kacauganggu dan/atau aduan penggunaan premis secara tidak sah terhadap Responden-responden. S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Analisa dan keputusan kami [27] Kami mempertimbanghkan terlebih dahului hujahan oleh peguamcara Perayu bahawa Responden-responden tidak memohon dan mendapatkan kebenaran merancang (planning permission) terlebih dahulu daripada Majlis Bandaraya Alor Setar (MBAS) apabila menjalankan pengubahsuaian dan tukarguna premis dua rumah kediaman iaitu No. 88Q dan No. 88R, Taman Kekwa untuk menjalankan perniagaan Rumah Jagaan Orang Tua dan perkhidmatan urut tradisional. Peguamcara Perayu menghujahkan bahawa permohonan untuk kebenaran merancang yang dibuat oleh Responden-responden telah ditolak oleh Perayu pada 24.1.2019. Maka yang demikian menurut peruntukan Seksyen 23 Akta Perancang Bandar dan Desa 1976 (APBD), sekiranya Responden-responden tidak berpuas hati dengan penolakan kebenaran merancang tersebut, maka Responden-responden perlu membuat rayuan kepada Lembaga Rayuan negeri seperti mana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 23 APBD tersebut. Responden- responden tidak ada membuat rayuan kepada Lembaga Rayuan. Oleh itu Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersalaharah di bawah undang- undang apabila menimbangkan dan mempersoalkan isu keperluan kebenaran merancang dan penolakan kebenaran merancang oleh Perayu dalam membenarkan permohonan semakan kehakiman Responden-responden. [28] Dalam isu kebenaran merancang, Yang Arif Hakim mengatakan seperti berikut (Perenggan 102 dan 103 Alasan Penghakiman, Rekod Rayuan Tambahan): S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 “102. In addressing the issue of planning permission, the question is whether planning permission is needed in the first place. The Respondent had submitted that the planning permission from the Planning Permission Unit is required where there is complaint against the license holder. In this context, I find it difficult to accept such policy when the Applicants were not made of its requirement and later the license was revoked for Planning Permission was not obtained prior. Under such circumstances, it create instability and uncertainty in the local council and all the license application for whenever there is complaint new or additional rule could be inserted. The same cannot be said to situation when someone has not complied with the existing by-laws or rules or has breached it willfully. 103. In any event such policy was in existence and Applicant were being obvious inadvertently, the next question I ask is whether the Applicant was aware of its failure to obtain prior to the Cancellation Decisions. It is undisputed that the Applicant had later attempted to apply the Planning Permission and/or appeal for extension of business license, but such non-compliance of Planning Permission was not informed to the Applicant prior to the Cancellation Decisions. Once again, no opportunity was afforded to the Applicants to overcome or remedy any non-compliance of the rules and requirements.” [29] Kami meneliti keterangan yang ada seperti yang dideposkan oleh pihak-pihak dalam afidavit masing-masing. Adalah suatu fakta yang tidak boleh disanggah bahawa permohonan Responden-responden untuk S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 kebenaran merancang telah ditolak oleh Perayu pada 29.1.2019. Sejak 6.8.2017 iaitu hampir dua tahun sebelumnya, Responden Pertama telah mempunyai pengetahuan tentang keperluan mendapatkan kelulusan merancang daripada Perayu semasa Responden bercadang untuk membuat tambahan dan ubahsuai sebuah rumah berkembar 2 tingkat sedia ada di atas No. 88Q Taman Kekwa Fasa 5. Melalui surat bertarikh 24.1.2019 Perayu telah memaklumkan kepada Responden Pertama dan Responden Kedua bahawa permohonan kebenaran merancang yang dipohon oleh Responden Pertama dan Responden Kedua telah ditolak. Melalui surat bertarikh 24.1.2019 tersebut juga Perayu memaklumkan kepada Responden-responden bahawa tindakan di bawah seksyen 28 Akta Perancang Bandar dan Desa 1976 akan dilaksanakan oleh Perayu. Jelasnya, Responden-responden telah mempunyai pengetahuan tentang keperluan mendapatkan kebenaran merancang (planning permission) sejak tahun 2018 lama dahulu melalui “Permohonan Kebenaran Merancang Terhad Untuk Membuat Perubahan Matan Bangunan Bagi 2 Unit Rumah Berkembar 2 Tingkat Sediada Dari Kediaman Kepada Pusat Jagaan Warga Tua Di Atas Lot 70283 dan 70284 Seksyen 49, Bandar Alor Setar, Kedah Darul Aman Untuk Lee Lai Tee, Lee Siew Hong & Chuah See Seng” (muka surat 681 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 10). Pada 24.8.2019 seramai 12 orang penduduk Taman Kekwa tersebut membuat aduan bertulis kepada Perayu. Penduduk tersebut mengadu bahawa operasi perniagaan Responden yang menjadikan dua buah rumah kediaman sebagai pusat jagaan orang tua telah mendatangkan gangguan kepada ketenteraman penduduk Taman Kekwa lebih-lebih lagi dengan kehadiran seramai 100 orang pekerja asing yang menduduki premis Responden tersebut. Penduduk tersebut memohon Perayu menghentikan aktiviti perniagaan Responden (muka surat 685 – 688 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 10). Melalui surat bertarikh 13.9.2019, Perayu meminta Responden antara lain S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 mengemukakan kebenaran merancang dari Bahagian Perancang MBAS (muka surat 704 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 10). Arahan Perayu tersebut adalah jelas bukan lagi meminta Responden mengemukakan permohonan untuk merancang tetapi mengemukakan dokumen kelulusan merancang jika telah diperolehi oleh Responden-responden. [30] Berdasarkan kepada fakta-fakta yang terdapat, kami dapati Responden-responden telah mempunyai pengetahuan tentang keperluan Responden mendapatkan kebenaran merancang daripada Perayu untuk pengubahsuaian lot-lot rumah kediaman kepada perniagaan dan rekod melihatkan seramai 41 orang tua menginap di premis tersebut walau pun kebenaran merancang tidak didapatkan terlebih dahulu oleh Responden daripada Perayu atas ubahsuai lot-lot rumah kediaman kepada perniagaan yang telah dilakukan oleh Responden-responden di premis- premis tersebut. [31] Seksyen 19 Akta Perancang Bandar dan Desa 1976 (Akta 172) melarang mana-mana orang daripada menjalankan apa-apa kemajuan (development) yang melibatkan perubahan penggunaan bangunan tanpa terlebih dahulu memohon satu kebenaran merancang daripada pihak berkuasa perancang tempatan. Dalam kes kita ini pihak berkuasa perancang tempatan bagi Bandar Alor Setar ialah Perayu. Seksyen 21 Akta 172 memperuntukkan kaedah bagaimana permohonan merancang dibuat oleh mana-mana pemohon. [32] Seksyen 2 Akta memberikan definasi kemajuan (development) seperti berikut: S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 “Development” means the carrying out any building, engineering, mining, industrial, or other similar operation in, on, over, or under land, the making of any material change in the use of any land or building or any part thereof, or the subdivision or amalgamation of lands, and “develop” shall construed accordingly.” [33] Daripada definasi seksyen 2 Akta 172 tersebut, adalah jelas apa- apa perubahan material atas kegunaan tanah atau premis bangunan termasuk dalam maksud kemajuan. Di dalam kes ini, Responden- responden membuat pengubahsuaian atas dua lot rumah kediaman berkembar dan ditukarguna daripada rumah kediaman kepada premis perniagaan untuk menempatkan orang-orang tua dan perkhidmatan urut tradisional. Maka itu kebenaran merancang hendaklah didapatkan terlebih dahulu. Respondent mempunyai pengetahuan atas perkara tersebut. Pemikiran terkemudian yang diutarakan oleh Responden- responden bahawa mereka tiada maklumat awal atau tidak diberitahu oleh oleh Perayu tentang perlunya mendapatkan kebenaran merancang wajar dilihat oleh Yang Arif Hakim secara saksama kerana fakta jelas melihatkan Responden-responden ada pengetahuan awal terhadap perkara tersebut. [34] Permohonan untuk kebenaran merancang oleh Responden- responden telah ditolak oleh Perayu pada 24.1.2019. [35] Seksyen 23 Akta 172 memperuntukkan bahawa rayuan terhadap keputusan pihak berkuasa perancang (Perayu) boleh dibuat kepada Lembaga Rayuan negeri dan rayuan tersebut hendaklah dibuat dalam tempoh 30 hari daripada tarikh keputusan tersebut disampaikan kepada pemohon. Dalam kes di hadapan kami ini, Responden-responden tidak S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 membuat apa-apa rayuan kepada Lembaga Rayuan terhadap keputusan Perayu. Ini adalah keperluan dan kaedah di bawah statut. Maka itu Responden-responden telah terhalang untuk menimbulkan atau membangkitkan semula sebarang isu berkaitan dengan penolakan permohonan kebenaran merancang dalam permohonan semakan kehakiman di hadapan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut. [36] Atas alasan yang kami huraikan di atas, kami perbendapat Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersalaharah yang menjurus kepada satu salaharahan dari segi undang-undang apabila membuat dapatan bahawa tindakan Perayu yang mengarahkan Responden-responden mendapatkan kebenaran merancang adalah tidak mengikut undang- undang, tidak munasabah dan tidak mengikut prosedur. Jelasnya dapatan oleh Yang Arif Hakim bertentangan dengan keterangan yang terdapat dan undang-undang terhadapnya. Oleh itu kami bersetuju bahawa hujahan Perayu mempunyai merit dalam isu ini. [37] Kami menimbangkan pula alasan rayuan dan hujahan peguamcara Perayu bahawa Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta apabila membenarkan permohonan semakan kehakiman Responden-responden atas alasan Responden- responden mempunyai ekspektasi undang-undang (legitimate expectation) untuk lesen perniagaan mereka tidak dibatalkan atau berhak untuk diperbaharui. Yang Arif Hakim mengatakan bahawa Perayu tidak membuat siasatan untuk mengesahkan kewujudan kacauganggu dan bagaimana Responden-responden telah melanggar syarat lesen perniagaan mereka. Yang Arif Hakim juga memutuskan bahawa Perayu telah gagal memberikan Perayu peluang untuk didengar sebelum Notis S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Pembatalan Lesen Perniagaan dan Iklan dibatalkan oleh Perayu pada 15.9.2019. [38] Permohonan semakan kehakiman oleh Responden-responden (JR 13 dan JR 17) adalah untuk mendapatkan perintah certiorari Mahkamah untuk mengenepikan dan membatalkan Notis Pembatalan Lesen Perniagaan dan Iklan yang dikeluarkan oleh Perayu kepada Responden- responden pada 15.9.2019 dan membatalkan Notis arahan Perayu untuk premis-premis tersebut dipulihkan dan dikembalikan kepada bentuk asal. [39] Peguamcara Perayu menghujahkan bahawa Responden- responden mempunyai pengetahuan tentang kacauganggu ketenteraman dan masalah halangan lalulintas akibat daripada aktiviti perniagaan Responden-responden di premis tersebut. Peguamcara Perayu menghujahkan bahawa Perayu telah beberapa kali mengeluarkan notis kepada Responden-responden atas kacauganggu yang ditimbulkan daripada aktiviti perniagaan Responden-responden. Antara kacauganggu tersebut ialah bunyi bising daripada penghuni premis termasuk sesi karaoke, penggunaan taman permainan di taman tersebut oleh Responden untuk menjemur tilam dan bantal, pembuangan sampah yang tidak sempurna, halangan lalulintas di sekitar kawasan premis tersebut di mana Responden juga menjalankan perkhidmatan urut tradisional kepada pelanggan-pelanggannya. Semua perkara tersebut menjadi aduan dan ketidakpuasan hati kepada jiran dan pembeli kediaman di taman tersebut yang juga mempunyai ekpekstasi untuk tinggal dengan aman dan tenteram. [40] Peguamcara Responden-responden sebaliknya menghujahkan bahawa Perayu tidak memberikan penjelasan kepada Responden S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 tentang kacauganngu yang dikatakan berlaku akibat aktiviti perniagaan Responden. Peguamcara juga menghujahkan bahawa Perayu telah dinafikan peluang untuk didengar sebelum Perayu membuat keputusan membatalkan lesen perniagaan dan iklan. Peguamcara Responden juga menghujahkan bahawa Responden telah mematuhi syarat lesen perniagaan yang dikeluarkan oleh Perayu. Peguamcara Perayu juga menghujahkan bahawa Responden mempunyai ekspektasi yang sah (legitimate expectation) untuk aktiviti perniagaan mereka diteruskan dan lesen perniagaan tidak dibatalkan. Peguamcara Responden juga menghujahkan bahawa Perayu gagal membuat penyiasatan yang sewajarnya sebelum membuat keputusan membatalkan lesen perniagaan dan iklan Responden. Peguamcara Responden merujuk kepada kes berikut untuk menyokong hujahan Responden : Leong Pui Kun v Lembaga Jurutera Malaysia [2001] MLJU 757, Ang Sun Khoon v Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang [2016] 11 MLJ 516, Syarikat Bekerjasama-Sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1996] 2 MLJ 697, Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang v Datin Noorzaina Mat Zain & Anor [2019] 4 CLJ 36, Mayland Valiant Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Subang Jaya [2018] 4 MLJ 685, R. Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145, Ngiam Geok Mooi v Pacific World Destination East Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 85. [41] Seperti yang telah kami nyatakan pada awal penghakiman ini khususnya pada perenggan 20, tindakan dan keputusan Perayu membatalkan lesen perniagaan dan iklan Responden dan arahan untuk Responden-responden mengembalikan premis kepada bentuk yang asal adalah dibuat setelah aktiviti perniagaan Responden masih mendatangkan kacauganggu dan bantahan oleh penduduk Taman S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Kekwa. Fakta melihatkan Responden telah mempunyai pengetahuan tentang kacauganggu yang ditimbulkan daripada aktiviti perniagaan mereka sejak tahun 2016. Bantahan oleh jiran-jiran masih berterusan hingga tahun 2018 dan 2019. Keterangan juga menunjukkan bahawa Perayu telah mengeluarkan banyak notis-notis ke atas Responden berkaitan kacauganggu yang diakibatkan oleh aktiviti perniagaan Responden. Notis terakhir Perayu kepada Responden ialah bertarikh 13.9.2019 sebelum keputusan pembatalan lesen perniagaan dan iklan dibuat oleh Perayu pada 15.9.2019. Pada 19.9.2019, lanjutan daripada pembatalan lesen perniagaan Responden tersebut, Perayu telah mengeluarkan Borang D Notis Memulihkan Semula Tanah dan Bangunan Kepada Keadaan Asal. Oleh itu keterangan adalah jelas melihatkan Responden mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa penduduk Taman Kekwa ada membuat aduan kepada Perayu dan tidak bersetuju terhadap aktiviti perniagaan Responden dijalankan di kawasan kediaman taman tersebut. Tindakan penduduk membuat aduan kepada Perayu adalah teratur daripada mereka dibiarkan berkonfrantasi secara langsung dengan Responden yang mungkin akan menimbulkan masalah yang lain. Responden telah diberikan secukup masa untuk mematuhi keperluan undang-undang tetapi masalah kacauganggu masih berterusan sehingga pada 13.9.2019 Perayu buat kali terakhir mengeluarkan notis kepada Responden tentang kacauganggu yang masih berlaku. [42] Dengan kegagalan mendapatkan kebenaran merancang, menukar kegunaan lot-lot kediaman premis kediaman dua tingkat kepada premis perniagaan pusat penjagaan orang tua dan perkhidmatan urut tradisional, dan kacauganggu berterusan yang masih berlaku, kami berpendapat Perayu mempunyai budibicara mutlak untuk membatalkan lesen perniagaan dan iklan Responden-responden. Tindakan Perayu tersebut S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 bukan dilakukan secara drastik atau wewenang. Undang-undang tidak memperuntukkan hak untuk didengar diberikan kepada pemegang lesen perniagaan sebelum keputusan membatalkan lesen perniagaan dilakukan oleh pihak berkuasa pelesenan kerajaan tempatan. Kuasa tersebut boleh dijalankan baik semasa lesen perniagaan masih sah laku atau semasa permohonan pembaharuan lesen perniagaan dan iklan. Mengadakan atau menambah sesuatu tatacara substantif yang tidak diwujudkan di bawah undang-undang adalah satu salaharah yang serius yang mewajarkan Mahkamah ini diperingkat rayuan bercampur tangan terhadap keputusan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut. Parlimen tidak memperuntukkan hak tersebut ketika undang-undang tersebut digubal dan diluluskan. Kami juga berpendapat “legitimate expectation” tidak terpakai kepada Responden-responden kerana Responden- responden sejak dari awal telah gagal mematuhi undang-undang dan Responden mempunyai pengetahuan penuh terhadap ketidakpatuhan tersebut. Responden tidak boleh mengatakan mereka berhak meneruskan aktiviti perniagaan dan mendapatkan pembaharuan lesen perniagaan untuk aktiviti perniagaan yang tidak sah dilakukan dipremis tersebut. Pentadbiran dan perjalanan undang-undang dalam kawasan pihak berkuasa tempatan akan menjadi huru hara (chaotic) jika ini dibenarkan tanpa dibendung dengan efektif oleh pihak berkuasa tempatan lebih-lebih lagi aktiviti menggunakan rumah kediaman yang terdapat kejiranan sebagai pusat perniagaan seperti Responden jalankan tersebut. [43] Prinsip undang-undang adalah mantap mengenai alasan-alasan permohonan semakan kehakiman seperti yang dijelaskan dalam kes R. Rama Chandran (supra), iaitu “illegality”; “irrationality”; “procedural impropriety”; dan “proportionality” sebagai alasan-alasan yang S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 membolehkan sesuatu permohonan semakan kehakiman dibenarkan. Kami tidak bercadang membincangkannya satu persatu. Kami berpendapat keputusan oleh Perayu tidak tergolong dalam mana-mana alasan tersebut untuk suatu semakan kehakiman dibenarkan. Kesimpulan [44] Berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan yang telah kami nyatakan di atas, kami membenarkan rayuan Perayu dengan kos sebanyak RM30,000.00 meliputi kos di Mahkamah ini dan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Perintah oleh Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dengan itu diketepikan. t.t. (YAACOB BIN HAJI MD SAM) Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia Bertarikh 27 November 2023 Peguamcara: Bagi pihak Perayu: Kanesh Sundrum Nurul Jannah Zakariah (Kanesh Sundrum & Co) S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 Bagi pihak Responden-Responden: Ronald Lee Chun Lung Ooi Shi Pin (P. Ravee & Co.) S/N EuB5leBVjkK1LGNP1yyXLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	47,054	Tika 2.6.0
DA-A73KJ-150-02/2023	PLAINTIF SITI HAWA BINTI YUSOFF DEFENDAN 1. ) WAN AHMED FITRI BIN WAN AHMED MUZANI 2. ) NOORAZLINA BINTI ROSLI	Permohonan Kebenaran Notis Pihak Ketiga (Aturan 16 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012). Permohonan ditolak tanpa perintah terhadap kos.Tidak prejudis.Kelewatan yang tidak munasabah.	04/12/2023	Tuan Mohamad Hafizul bin Awang	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a34034dd-4628-4096-a405-7d55d66aa5e3&Inline=true	04/12/2023 15:31:24 DA-A73KJ-150-02/2023 Kand. 27 S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 3TRAoyhGlkCkBX1V1mql4w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal DA-A73KJ-150-D2/2023 Kand. 27 54/12/2023 1; :1-24 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISYRET «cu BHARU DALAM MEGERI KELANTAN DARIJL MAIM, MALAVSIA GUAMAN N 7:u<.M5n-an/202: ANYARA sm HAWA anm vusosr (N0. KIP: 5il1515-05-5504) PLAINTIFF DAN 1, wan AHMED FITRI am wan AHMED MUZANI (No. KIF: sJoaz4.aa«s:19) 2. uoonAzLmA awn RDSLI narsumuosranmu (NO. K/P: ae1u1941s—ann2) ALASAN zgusmxlmnu PENGENALAN [11 Im adzlah permohunan Ex—Par!e bag: Nalis Mlma Kebenaran Untuk Mengeluarkan Na\|is Pmak Ketiga (Lnmplrln 13) yang lalah dulaﬂkan men Delendan pads 9.10.2023. Imluk menjzmlkan Muhammad Fakhrul NJYRM helxcxsxlvtm Ww -hm. Sum’! IIIVVDIY wmbeusidmvam\|menv\n\ruH\|:IM1Ms anu.mnmamuNG W Syakmn hm Mona Azmnn (Na KP ouosuwa-may dan wuaun hm Daud (Nu. KP 72n1oa—n:ssns1),senagaipmak ke\|iga wng diuadnngkan an dawn kes rm. Felmohcman mvdIhua\|ban1asarkan Aluran 15 Ka2dah1 Kaedalrkneﬂah Mahkamah 2012 AKKM 2:112) [21 Amara alasan yang dikemukakan uleh Delendan adalah ksrana pmak kenga yang dlcadangkan adalah nemmk dan pemandu bag! molasiml pendaﬂalan ma 9372 Molnukal JDE 9372 adalan momukal yang leﬂibat dalam kemawangan pada 2-: m 2m. [3] Pads (9 102023. setelah mambaca kenas kausa dan klanﬁkasn senava llsan yang dvkemuknksn oleh D ndan‘ Mahkamah lidak barvuas nan umuk menggunakan hudr hlcara bag: memnenman Nous Pmik Kama dlkeluarkan Pada 31102023, Plainhl teluh menfaﬂkan Nous Rayuan can henkul adslah a\asan-alasan Mahkamah umuk ndak mamhen kebenalan kzagt Defendan mengeluarkan Nam Flhak Kenya KRONOLOGI mu FAKTA RINGKAS KES [4] Pzda 2722023, Phinm man mamankln wm Saman uan Penyanaan Tunlutan Ievhadap Delendan berkenlan mnmun ganllmgw aklbal kewmangan jalamaya yang beﬂaku pada zunzma, as jahn bemamplmn Pun malnm Dam Lundang, Kdla Sham Kslancan [51 Dedendan Mzh memasukan Memorandum Kehadinun pads 11 4.2u23. Pada Pengumsan Kes kali mags, 24.5 2923 yang dilmapkan unluk kemaskmi shtus pamiallan Pembeluann Paguam Daiendln \|a\|ah memnhon perlangguhan bag: mendapulkan nrahan ne4ena.n unluk IN arkaayhslxcxsxlvvmzww Nuns snnnw n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. mn.u-y mm: m.n.n VI] muNG pm menemskan pms g plhak keega Imupun ssballknya. sebalum meneruskln dangan pemfallarl Pembelaan [51 Pan: Pengumsan kall keumpal, Pegusm Defendan mengasahkan bahawa \|elah menomrxan Pembelaan Eerdasslkan semakan Mshkimah‘ Pembeban dliavlkan pad: 56 2023, dan Peguam mak menymxun hasral unluk menerusm dangan pruning mhak Kalrga lsu belkanaan Nuns Pmak xeuga telah (Idik hmbul lagl sahlngga nliding talah manggap lnlup pada me 2m m Samasn Pengurusan K-s yang dhmapkan pada 5 92:12:, mamm dan Delendan Ielah membenkan mum Iapang -mnux diletankan sehagaw tavikh Bfcava Penuh Bmara Pemm lelah drtetapkan pm 25.10 2023 Isu berkensan Nous Plhak Keirga mga hdak (imhm sehingga mun perbmaraan dilalapkan Nnmun begnu. um 910 mm. ianu 15 hzn sebemm Iankh peﬂzicavaan, Delenden «swan menrauxan Nous Mlma Kabenaran Unluk Mengeluarkan Nuns Pihnk Keng. gs) Semasa kes dlpanggll pada 19102023, Peguam Delendan menyztakzn hahzwa Dsdendan (Anak Guam) mm membenkan arihan umuk menfailkan Nn\|is Mima Kebenaran Llnluk Mengalualkln Moms Fwhak Kama dan mangasahkan sebemm mi znak guam memberikan arahzn unmk hdak moneruskan dengan Nous Fmak Kauga. UNDANG mum: YERFAKAI [9] Dafsndan bnlah membawa pmmmg plhak kemga «am.-may pmak kahga ying diczdangkan unluk rnenunlul sumbsngan, mdemnm mu seburang mm mu remedv yang subahagran haszmya suma sepem yang IN arkaayhslxcxsxlvvuqww -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm mmmm ohh plamlll Pmsndlng plhak kehga umymakan dalam Atunn 15 Kaedah 1 KKM 2012, sepani benkut (1) Jika dalam sp&Bpa!iIvda)u1n sunning delsndan yang lalsh memaxukkln klhsdrram (5) Inervunfuf tsrivad-ID sisearlrvv yang bslum /lg! memndr pmak auam unauan nu apaapa sumbangan am Isnggung rugl.‘ (:2) mermnlul Ismadap manamana omng apa—apa labs! azau tamed!’ yang bemubungan aangan alxu berkartan acme-n nar pemna ull bag: unaakan nu darn selzahagiun besumya same delvgan beberapa Iemedi alau In/tel yang :1r‘!untu!a)sII plamm; sum (0) msnghendakr aanawa aparapa pama/an atau ml yang bemubunq-In dengan alau berkwlan uangan narpamara aaa: bag: Imdakan Mu pann drtvnluknn bukan Sana}: anlara plamm dan aeranvan (slap: [uga anlars sslalv seorxrlg alxu Aaduaaua melska dan ssssarang yang namn Iagr manjaal pmak dnlam lindnkln nu, mnka. tenukfuk keﬂndn Derenvgan (21. delendsn bolen mengs/ualknn auam Imus da/am Bamng 13 may 19, mengikul Nana yang saauai (yang mam: .5-sblglr ‘nous I3/hak xsaga" aa/am Arman Im), mangammnm suam Dsmyaruanlervl: lnmll/Inn yaw drbua! ramaaapnya dan. mengikul mama—m.!nu yang berkenaan, sama aaa lantang /unis aan alasan runman yang mmaz olelmya atau renzang Benn:/an alnu >:u yang nemak drlenlukan IN arkaayhslxcxsxlvtmqww -ma an.‘ n-nhnrwm be used a mm a. nrW\ruU\|:I mm: ﬂan-mm wa mam Wm! (2) Ssanarlq defend-vn <1-I/am sesustu name» Irdak bclsh mengelu-man mm non: mm kelfgu Ianpu ﬁmbelmmn Mahkamnh melsmksn mm «in mange/uarkan nous nu ssbelum menyumpaikan pemne/unnw kapada p/..mn/. (penekannn sendin dnambah) nu) Defendzn memeﬂukzn kebanaran Mahkamah unluk meneruskan dengan Nuns Pimak Kenga memsmﬂangkan Pembelaan lelnh dlsamvlwknn keoadn Fkunhl dan Mnhkamah mempunyui mm. mam unluk membenuvkan peunohonan . alau sebaumya Kalmnaran daweda Mahkamah men mfailkan mala u\|is psrmohonan sacara ex- Dans sepenl yang dmyatakan da\am Aluvan In Knodah 2 KKM zuuz seven: v-nu benkur :1) sum psrmohunsn mmtn Ksbsnurarv urvluk mengeruarm nuns prhnk Kenya bo)eIv -11bunl me/slur nulls permallonan secam ex pane dulam Boning 20 Islam Mankarnuh man mengalahkan permolvolvan nu dlsampaikan ANALISIS DAN unvgmu MAHMMA5 1) KELEWATAN um: nmx MUNASABAH tmonnmnz nsum [11] Mnhkamah mendapah Defendan msnlallkan penmahonan unluk rnendapadran kebenaran bagi mengeluzlkan Nalis Pihak Kenya larlalu ls'wa\| lalfu 1a han sabemm (ankh pelbhzarsan Perm dnngatkzn hlhawa nelvs pmak mg: penu dwkeluarknn dengan segela beg: mennelakkan IN arkaayhslxcxsxlvvuqww -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm saharang kelwmlzn da\zm lindakan mama Mahkamah ini menquk kepada kes Mankamah Riyuan‘ Damumr Hasan Mohamed Rashrd v Mum-Code Eleclmnrcs Indus-I/I05 (M) Bird 5. Anal [2012] 1 LNS 25:, pad: punnggan 14 sepeni yang benkur ml :1 u . delay ma: »s so gross and inomums and rt abuses the prnmss ol the com ws haw oonmerua ms judgment nl Kang Hwee Gee ./ (late! JCA) in Kswangan Bersalu am:-1 -/. Vrclory Ceramics Vnduslnbe Sdn Bhd A A 0rs[2002)1LNS 14, [2D02]5ML./ 225m regmmtns Issue aldeluy We have .5/so canuaerea me mdqmenl amouur Maltk am Islvsk, ma m Razshalv Ervtarpnse San Bndv Arab Mal-Iysran Finance BM [2010] 2 cm 457, (2/4, about me dulaylhnl wa: sum to be too may lo emturs. /:21 /1 Deals mpemron in say me me trial belnre the Venmedmdmral mmnusslonor am ptuoeuding smoolhly We have been adwsed that Gordon Ton Chun Ton . ma ms: as/endam, is mrmmu/ly ill and lo! IIM mason mm m an wsmonlnifurysncy Nvatllls malshou/I1 proceed sxpeumousvy as scnowlsa. The cnmpany pmceedmgs wuuhi inmaary /mmer delay ms campmmn ullho Ina! neanng m mmd mu: me second delendant look hie awn sweet rune m ﬁlmg ms lmrdpartypmcusdfngs [12] Mnhkamah mendapau kelewalan yung «mum Idalah max munzsabah dan Isada a\asan wag kukuh dikemukakan aleh Peguam Denemian mam permohonan unmk menpelaskan berkenazn kelewaun tevsebm Pegunm nemaan hanya menyatakan bahawa IN arkaayhslxcxsxlvvuqww -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm sehelum ml Delendan mengamhkan Imtuk ﬁdak munemakarl dengan pmswding keuga dan hanya memben arahin unluk meniallkan parmnhonln mauan \|ankII pevbicaraan Ielah dwetapkan [13] Bevsandsrknn kepada ks: DnIo‘AbuI Hassn Mahnmed mama v Mum-Cod: Elacmzmcs Imiuslnes (M) am a. Armr[2ﬂ11] 1 ms :5: (supra), Mahkamall mendapzli ke\|ewa\|an ml adamh salu penyalahgunaan pram Mahkamah [abuse or mun‘ pmcaas) dzn akan melengahkan pemraraan an anma Plalrmi dam Detendan sapeni yang lelah duadualkan. [141 Wamupun pennohonan adalah pelrnohnnan sxjzans‘ Mamuaman mengamhﬂklm panyakuan Pmlnufyang menyarahkan kspada Mahkamah samaada unluk membenarkan pennahonan ml man sehlhknya dan menyalakan bahawa pevmohonan im adalah Iwaal 2) mum PREJUDIS IERHADAP DEFENDAN vzuvl PREJUDIS TERNADAP PLAINIIF [151 Mahkamah maugumon kvni huphan lrsan Dafandan, bahzwa Mm Pmak Kenga jika may mbenarkan akan memprejndnkan Dmenuan din uada Imdakan berasmgan yang boleh dilailksn higi menunlm ganurugl cemausp nlhak knhga yang dlcadangkan Mamun, Mahkamah mandapaxi bahawa liaﬂa plejudn umauap weman waraupun pavrmmunan udak dihanavkan Gan mhanalkan Malah pica pelmohnnan mu dlbenarkan, tarvya plejudh Iamadap Plainm, kevana akan msnyebabkan pelhicmaan akan dnangguhkin dun lidak dapqt bauaxan dangzn lancav seven! yang Ielah dqadualksn Manama, «anyn akan mangambll mm unmk menyamsalkan puamg pihak ke\|iga ﬂan menetapkan Xavikh pevbinnraan yang ham D1 IN arkaayhslxcxsxlvvmzww -ma saw n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. nrW\ruH\|:I mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm dalam kes KL Em crry Sdrv and v Tuck Sm Engmsenng .; Canslmclvon Sdn and s. OIs[2\|)1l]MLI\|J 1s:n;[2n1a]1 LNS117§,Mahkamah1'\|ngg\ pada pemnggen 22 munyalakan srepeni bariku\| -wrrrm e mrd Party Fmceadmg pIump(q/ blnugnl would cunlribule In much rrne and costs savings, me reverse :3 [me when mere rs mdrdrrrezn end urlexp/amsd delay in carnrnencrny a rnrrd Parr, Proceeding.’ (161 psnuamzn pemmhunan pvosiding pmak keﬁga peda penngkal Vewal akan msmnnnyaw kesan menangguhkan yuvblcarian Kelawalan mu dlsebabkan nleh mass yang dlpaﬂukan nnmk Dhdmﬂ ﬂan sebereng arahzn pra—p2rhi::araan yang dlbenkan kepnda delendan dan plhak keliga dalam pmsidwng pihak keliga unluk diselesaikan Bersandarkin kepma kes yang mpmusun aleh Mahkamah Tmagl dalam Kewengerr Esrsalu and v Vmlaly cemrmcs rrrdusmes san arms. or: [2002] 1 LNS 14 yang manyalakan eepeni benkm '7! is clsar me: me sm defendant's upplmaban 1.5 an abuse of me pnrcess ol the court, which e rssponsdlls counsel would not new med, To brmg rrr omerpari/as .31 this we slags ol the pmlzsedmgs when can rnnnegemeru rs bemg conducred wauld have the em.-er ul delaying me rr/nrrrmrs sml lb! many more months orevan years given me lee: ﬁnal, me Jni parry claims would nave ms! to be served M! an we run mree mm: pamss (lukmg, say. 9 months}: each ol me 37:1 party may have (0 me men defence end serve mern on me existing perm: lllkmg, say, enamer s munlhs), me extsfilvq rremee IN armrnavcvexuvvnqwe -we sew nnnhnrwm .. used m mm r. mmnnuly MW: dun-mm wa .mm mm may have m amend than defence (faking, say, unalllsr 5 months) Maanwmlo. Pindmv ms ruwlartsalfon al the mm paw pmneedtngs, ma prawn! case mar-agemsnl would have to be posmarred for anolher year or ac um ma appncanon bean auawaa to pmcesd it would have naan uryusl In ma nlammz me 5:» delendan! on me other fund would nava garnau an undue advantage anna expense onne plammm rial havmg In answer to ma p/amn/rs claim sooner Appropriately, M9 am dslamiam shaufd ﬁle a xepurnla aclinn agamsf ma mm: pamss (171 Mahkamah berpemnapan bahawa pelmuhonan yang diimlkan nleh Delendan aaanan pnnyahhgnnsan pmsea rnahkamall Tmdakan mama akan mvanggunuan salami bemulan-hulan. malan henzhurl-Iallun‘ unluk pihakjxhak memlallkan‘ menyampmkan den menunda plmmg Jnka Branding pvhak kelwga dihenarkan plda sammggu yabemm unxh perbicalaan, ia akan menyebabkan plqudls wng kalara kepada Plamlrt rnenﬂhanwrkan mnykaannya unluk msnyelesaikan kes dengan cepal Scblhknya. defeman uaak akan mangalami sehamng ptqudls sehuvanya pmsxdmg pmau keuga ﬂlkebaplkan us] Delendarl memplmyai hak unluk membawa saman mm cemaaap pmak keuga. Lela Jehih aw, Defendan (idak dlsekal mas: kevana mas: mula henalan ﬂan Iankh dalandan dipenanggung1awnhk.an Had mas: (nmnamm) hsnya barmula dau Iankh Defendan mpenanggungjawabkan (llhat xawangan IN arkaayhslxcxsxlvvuqww -ma am ...m.mm be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm Barsslu Blvd v Wclary Cerlmics /ndusmes Sdn Blvd 5 on R002] 1 ms 14 5 Mal Aha urn Man v Medical supennremem. Gervernl Hospital, rawmg. Pelak A ommm 1 Mu 225, [ms] 1 cm 137). Keslmpguw [191 Se\|elah menelil: mhs nerlnnhonan, amam yang man difallkan, Ivlahkaman an am xmbannen kshevangkallin msndapill hihawi Iinya adaluh um ndil unluk mecnnenaman permohcnan an Lampvran 13 oxen yang darmkvzn, Mahkamah msnulak dan mambata\kun permnhanun di Lamniran 13, (anpa perinlah unluk kas. EERTARKH 4 DISEMBER 2023 MOHAMAD HAHZUL BIN AWANG MAJISTRET MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET (1) KOTA EHARU KELANTAN IN arkaayhslkcksxlvtmqww -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm	1,364	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-25-212-06/2021	PEMOHON NURUL IZZATI BINI MUSA RESPONDEN 1. ) JABATAN PERKHIDMATAN AWAM MALAYSIA 2. ) INSTITUT TADBIRAN AWAM NEGARA (INTAN)	Application for judicial Review - Order for Certiorari and Mandamus in relation to the decision of the Responddnts not to accredit the Applicant with Postgraduate Diploma in Public Management Programme INTAN 1/2020 and not to appoint her in the PTD service scheme.	04/12/2023	YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=94c167e5-6791-4720-a7da-61a162039eae&Inline=true	mum uncxmm nmssu MALAVA on KUALA LUMPUR mum wuuvm pzrzssxurum KUALA LUHPUR. muvau (uoucunu KUASA-KIJABA mus) mam AN samuuu KEN >4 wusm.as»2n21 Da\.am peikara mengenau pemmhanan kzbanaran / Penman Csmurzn ﬂan Mandamus dalam nummqan Denymgkuran din / alau mzk mempemkuun Dlplnma pmamwmn Fewumun Awsm (um Inian ram 202:». Dan Damn pmm marvwrm Pullman Program mpmma Pascasgwazah Fengumsnn mm rum man an 1/zaza‘ Dan Dzlam penars mengenm Stsysn um Alla mm mm 195:: Dan Dalam penal: mengenaw Jaauax 1 Akls Mahkamah xanmnm wan. Dan Da\am pencara mengenaw Mayan 53 Kaeaan-Knedxh Mxhunuh 20:2 ANTARA NURUL wzzan awn MUSA 4N0 K/F ssa7auI—s52s) vsmonou mm PIMIMSS 1 manna» PERKHIDMATAN nwm MALAYSIA 2 msrrrur noamw awm NEGARA LINTAN1 RESPDNDEN— RESPONDEN Judgment lnnoducllan 1. The Apnhcant Med an avnllcalvon (or judicial review [Enclnsurc 15) under Order 53 vf Ina Runes or court 2012 (RDOL 2. The Apphcant was gram-ea weave to apply [or Judicial review agamsl lhe neeponaanu. Io seek me lollowmg rene 21 An order a! Cemaran lo revoke me decwswn to remove me Avmicanl «om [ha Dmloml xn Public Admmmrallorl program and demon m not awam me Annlwcam with Faslgraduale mpmma m mane Management No W020: 2 2 An order or Mandamus for a rewew and/or recheck or me Appﬁtanfs smnng and progress m me Diploma .n Pubhc Aamnnsuaunn Program and to award me Apphnanl mm a Postgraduate Dwpkama in Public Management. 2 3 General Damages. 2.4 All other dvecuons deemed necessary ana Incidental thereto: and 2.5 Cos1s 3 In 9131. me Anaheim ﬁled ms yudu:Ia\ rewaw lo obhsm rehals m Manon to me decwslon onne Resvondenls \|u expe4 me Amman: [mm the Postgraduate mplarna m Public Managemenl (mu) No 1/znzo Program and nut m aecrean her wnh me DPA (thu imP“ilnId Dan on) me 2 use 12. at u Whelher s amsmn vans wuhm ws category .s a question ms: Magus by mew lrmnmg and upenlrwu shumd he -an uqmpced m answa at am lhurs wumd be somexnmg hamy wrong mm um ;ud\cra\ system In jusniy me mums’ sxevuse nl um. I01: man I mmk ‘s ladly no Vungur nuded m Vwwourvl Raddme‘sIngeuIous swlanahon In Edwards Y Eanrslaw [1956] m 14, or uriuan-My u s gmund Var . eouns mmssx M . declson uyesmmug Mu am «mm «mm undeﬂname mislake ul law by me dedsson makev InImn.IHXy by now can stand on rt: own tut as an accepted ground on Much a damsmn may be nllacknd Iry Jumcwal Review \ have described ma mm head as 'pm¢m1uml imprupriIly' ramar mm lmlum Io nhlsrw ban: mlls of nalwal mince or lamuem 3:! mm prtwaduvalfawvessnrwzrds me persnn whnwm be alledﬁ by Ihe ﬂecwsmns This .. usuuss xuwephbﬂﬂy Ia jndwcm mew under mu: head wvsn a\so raulure by in admmusmuva lnbuna\ m observe pmmduml mm men we sxpm-xy use down m ms lngwsmwt Inslmm-M by mm. M: wnsdschnn .s mnfevnd, even when-2 such mm ones ml mvmue my amsx av mu.-m wince Lord mam aha rnenlkinad praponlonlllly‘ as . possum: immh mm mmsw mm callnd Iordevebpmem ' [emyhaul added) Funher, me Cour: of Appeal In and sor Dr. Ahmad Zahid hln mm dl, M-nun mum Nngnrl. Knnunlnriln an m Nuwl A or: v. sue Lin: 5. On [mu] 1 MLRA 5413 [2013] 6 cu 285; [mu] I MAR 43:; [1013] 2 MLJ 738 explamed me \|esI or reasonablenuss In a pm: 1 review as «wows: 1:91 The xesmv reasonableness ha: Dean Ins suhgeu at many mses over me dacadasm nlhurcommunweallluunldxtlmm Fmaxlmvll mauung wnn me mumsmees undev munch we own wuld werveue In quash Inn asusxan cu in mmmmnu. umber or lnbunal on ground of urvlawnameness or malmnalny, mnmy J :11 me msh Com m The sun (1: KM Fmsecmrun M am Kzegnn um Eom J Lyugnu v. ms Slarduﬂ vm-ms Camnensalmn Tnbunil[1985] IR 342 mu number or sum mcumslanoes Indmarsm terms They are a u .5 Imvﬂamamzﬂy a variance mm reason and mmmnn sense 2 u m masasnsmue Var heanng in me mm cl plain raalon and common sense and ms 11 n! s: 13 14 3 Bocausa me mm .s snlnsﬁed mal xne decrsmnmaksr has mama ms ahhqalum Manny Du mus\| nm nngnanuy rqecl or anngam lundamuvlal mun common nun m rlanmng ms dwswon m] In Meadnws V Mmslzr for mm Ea-.my and Law Revonn and olhcrs [Zola] IE5: 3 Denham 4 m hardlcla (time) u! Dunne lulluwmg lest Tmstust mcludesmslmplwed oonsmuhenal nnnmmn nuunumnn olaH dsasmm ikmg Much sfiacu ngm) and am. lmar nu.‘ ma dams-cw mlksr should ml ﬂmegard iumiumemal reason or wmmon sense m reach: n. av Mr domsmn ma mnshlulmum nnnunon m ]unAd:cI>un arvsex m\|er aha «mm me duly M me mums Co muted oonsmImona\ ngms when a aaasxomnaxm makes a umwn man man ngms men or 1:»/wewmg me reasunahlenesi av mo daemon. (a) me man: mus: be rauonalry nonnsusd to me ubpeclxvs no me ksglslnhon and no: amxmvy‘ unwrulbaled on or rnlmnm nnnnamnnnu (I71 m. mm: afma Demon musl he unpaved as we as vnssnme and (cm Ihe eflea on nqms should he Dv¢v0Amua\ nu ma omecuve In addman, a uemsmn mat Involves an error n1 law ws subject to nudvcval IBVYBW as exwamed by \|he Federal Coun In MIJIII Follumiuln Pulau Plnlng v. Syuvikal Bakuriasamrsama Selhagunl Sungal Golugor Dengan Tanggungzn pm} 1 MLRA I38; [1§§D] I CLJ H5; [H3913 AMR 3519; [1390] 3 MLJ I, where M states‘ “M mu nnw, (humlmu amass more us special cwtumsunoai Qavemmg a pamcmzrcase nmmnanmng 2 pnvalwe dzuse. um-a mm be be cnaunngea, em ma. ludlclal mu--4 mu n. In Impneh nu hum: of law mad! by an Idmlnlnmlvvn body or mhun-II an we wnmﬂ add, mlermr cmms ln the wards 01 mm Dennmg .n Pezrlman v Harrow snnnm mm) AI 9 19, no mum at ulhnnxl nu nny Jlmldlctlon in make an enur M In on much In doclilon nu us. up-onus. u 4: kn Inch Incrml. unon umtldv unnuucunn nd elnlnnﬂ will III In com-,1 xv [emphasis added) Based on me voregaang passages, u is my vxew that to succeed vn an apphcalion my menu renew, lha Applicant must snow that me Respondenxs had, among omers — a Asked men the wrong quaslmns, b consmered vre\evarvI matters. Dzll u n n c Farled to lake relevant mamers rnlo Cunslderallcrlr d Farled la apply me proper pnnuple(s) pl Ilw. ndlor e Reached e dsmslon that was so perverse man no reasonable lnpunal under simrlar circumstances would have reacne Tlro doclsien of me coun conlmmral nlallnnshlp 15. 15 17 Havlng perused Ihecause papers‘ I am at the vrewlnal me declsiorl 0! ma Raspnndanls ls governed by an agraamsnl between me Applicant and lrle Respondents by an alter lener dared 6 12.2019 The Appllcanl had agreed and signed lne aceeplanoe lener deled 15.12 2019 The pnncrple than me aonvacl 0! me Guvernmenl lalls under pvlvate eenlﬁcl law can he denved lrern the com of Appeal case of Ktlana Magah Development sdn and v Kmjaan Ncaurl Jnhor 3. Another Appul[2nl1]2 MLRA 452: (201910 CLJ 804 Is lollpwe: 1301 Eeinre pmeeeﬂlng lurmsr we me» lo deal brieﬂy wrrn rne dﬂerence belweerl publlc hw and pm/ale law ngms Fubllc lnw we appranena, governs relmnsnrpr bvtwean Govemmenls dr nublnc aulharlnas and suhlec1s.wMva\|7la emrrumy concerned nas power In mllur: man allecl rne rlghlx dr suhlith Inch e. In: rnauer more us Ihal re lnrld acdursnmn. Alimllonallyr pubh: lsw also governs vslabanvlrpa lnal as M durum oancem Ia snclery such as crlmlnal law In snpnr puhllc law powers cannot be exemlsed by any anvil: rnaw-dual or enmy Pnvaxe law on me elher hand‘ deals wnn lne relarmsnrps he\|ween urlvale lndmdulls or Inlrlles wllh whlch lm Sula 4; not dlnclly wncsmed. as In me relelrpnr between hushand and wn1e.lhelaMr ol contract and law or vans Gnvnrnmtnls and public Iulhorlllu Inc can be Iuhlnmd to nrivlll law an In mes um. um yavIrnmIn(:o1mIl:1I war. a prvvalz Individual or a mrpomlan la :rl\|9l mm 2 lmnsamn Pnvale law ls ln. auunlalpan up vmllc law‘ (emphasls added) u... 1: ul :3 19 19. 20 21. Applymg the prmcwples o1 law and case law above In ma lacls in me prese111 case, 111s my view ma1 this mse vans wxlhm the mmractual nature mar. 15 gavemed by private conuacl law and no: gaverned W Dublu: law Funher, me \|es\| on whelher an act, 011115511111, conduct er dec1s1on ought to be the sub]ac\| mailer nl prwala ‘aw as apposed to 1udic1al rewew proceedings 1s based pnmanly on me source «mm which the ac11am1ss1or1,oondu::\|or decrsion emanates. I ma support for my vmw by relemng 1» mo men Supreme Court case of Ganda on Indus! oi Sdn EM .5 on v. Kuala Lumpur Commodlly Exchlngc & Annr[1931]1 MLRA 361;[15B6] 1 cu 4:; [ma] 1 ML! 174 when 11 yevanaa 11: me deusion a1 Rlglnl v. Panel on Tzki-ovurs and unrgurs, Ix parla 11.1.1511 plc a. Anor [1931] All ER 554 wherem Lloyd L J sam» 01 mum: ma source 11111111 Wwar w1H when perms usuaﬂy be aemm 11 me some 171 Dawn! 15 :1 smuu. or s11bon11n:1o lugixlnlion 11.11:. a 11.111 Inn cl r1y111n nooy11-an-11:11 wllihl ubjtcunlud 1.1 uvirw. 11. :1 111 mm 1111 of 1 scale, my mum 171 may 1: coma-:1u . .. 11» an 121 prlvaln arhllrallon. mu. clurl um Irhltrulor 1; not -11 J-chm 1-11111:: mm. in R v Drwmai Comma! 1:11»: uamuav 1111111 Cmzncd Var me Cratl o1uen1a1recnn1c1ans ex 1: Nea1e 119531 1 ALL ER 327 1195311 as ml!’ (ernphasns added) In the 1ns1an1 case‘ me 11ec1s1ons made by the Respondents are as vouows: - 1a) The Dwcnplunary Board's daemon on 19.11 202Dwh1cMound ma Apphcanl gmlty o1 wolaung Rules 51:11 91 191111 and 19111111) or lhe DFA Program Rules and as p1m1s>1men1 mused a 11educ11on 0! 1o disuphnary marks under me Personamy (comm11man1ana Dnscwphna) Campnnanl and a wammg \|n «he AppI1ca111 as slated in me 1e11ev daled 13 1121121) (See: Enclosure 5, Exhlhll “mu-7, pages 112- 11:), 11:) The aec1s1o11 of me lNTAN‘s Aocrsdnalmn commmee on 10 11 zcza not \|n accledll 111: Applmanfs DPA as a 11211111 o1 1a111ng 1o achlevs me mwmum Gmde B var me Persanamy me 14 1,1 as 22 23 Deveiuprriern ceirippnerii aria tailing me overall DPA eemmuriii~a1ai1 by a iener dated 17 11 2021) (see Enclosure 5, Exhibit “NIIIl~l. pug" 115.1 17); (C) The decision uuririg \|he Mesyuaral searcri corriirimee Kelua Perigaran Ferkhidmalan Awairi (MSCKPPA) NO 1/2020 pri 4.12. 21:21) wriicri rejecied 1rie Appiicarirs appeal and upheld irie aecrsicn al are INTAN‘s Aepreailaiiori corririimee esmriiimicalea by way or a ieller daled 17.11 2n2o (sea- Enclosuu 5. Exhlbll “NIH-12, page 131)); and mi The uecisieri ollrie Top Managerrraru a1 me 2"‘ Respariuerii on 10.3 2021, wriicri iriivpnriea lire Appiicaril by way pie leltsr dated 11.3 3021 iria1 lrie Disciplinary Board s decision on 9 11.2020 ari¢lrieiN1AN s Aocreaiiaiiori coriirriruee aeeisieri on 1011 2020 none aecreail liie Appiicariil is nriai aria does rioi require mnrier review \|Ses‘ Enclosure 5. Exliipil “NlM- 1a, pugnl 135-135): The pawer 1o make all o1 lhese ueeisieris rrieri1ipried above is derived lrprri lrie DPA Program Rules. Aaaaerriii: Rules aria porieiiipri of lhe al1er Iallev which form pan arid pamei of me agreeriieril by Vlmle pl paragraph 7 5 oi the ower ieiler dated a 12 2019 as Ipiipws. - 7.5 waiau aoa piiri syaral yang \|emz dwlg aaiaiii surzl iawaiari Im uieriipuari uinlnh llﬂlklvk In nu eyermyeru i-in yiﬂw lsncaridurig aiarri Surat lawsran hnasiswai dokunien penarljlzrii penslullri lurirl Program an mun aaii dﬂkumerl-dﬂkumali 1.... yang bevkillari (emphasis ended) I and mail: - 1a) The Disci ary Board in arriving a1 me decision on 911 21120, was satisfied Iha! mere was a rmia1iori oi lrie DPA Program Rules cpirirriinen by me Appiiearil nie nisaipiiriary Board exercised ils puwer under rule 23 01 \|hB DPA F-iegrem Rules. pimisriea by deducllng 10 aiseipiirie marks uriaer iiie cerripoiierii oi peisoriainy assessrrienl arm a warm DPA Program Rulu lri Pm A — Enclosure 5, Ex 4, pages 15-16) Fueisalu 24 25 1:2) The decision or me MAN s Aocredriei-on Commrllee during Ihe \|NTAN‘s Accreditation cornrnmee meeting (Mesyuaral Jawainnkuasa Pensuiian INTAN) on 10.11 2020 IS pvrsuani ie Rule 23 11:21 of in Academic Ruies; (See page 14 04 Academic Rules in Pan 3 - Enclosure 5. Exhlblt NIM-4. page 99 5 Lerner of am: dxmi 11.12.2111: » Encioaun 31 Exhibit Nllll-1. p-nu :2 — :5) 1:) The declsmn during 1ne Mesyuarai search Commiuee Kelua Pengeren Parkhudmaian Awam (MSCKPPA) No 1/2020 on 4.12 2020 which reieoled 1ne Appiicanrs appeai and upheld me uccismn oi the INTAN‘s Awredilallon Commillee commumcalsd by way or a rener eaiee17.11.2o2o1s pmvided for in rule 36-39 of me DPA Program Rules, (See an Pmgnm Rules in Pan A 7 Enclosure 5, Exhibﬂ NIM-4, u-nu 31-33) (11) Meanwhile, me decision oi me Top Management of me 21° Responaeni an 10 3 2021, which Inlnrmad ine Apphcanl by way oi a iener dated 11 3 2021 1na11ne Disciplinary Board's decision on 911.2020 and me \NTAN‘s Accreditation ccrnnunee decision on 10,11 21:20 no: in accredu \|he Aopi:1:an1 VS ririai and does not require iuriner review is a reiteralion oi me earher lmpugned Decisien ias mere is no avenue far runner apneei nroviaea \|n me Appnceni under lhe DPA Program Rules aiier me decision is made by MSCKPPA! u is evident imni me above 1na1 ine Respondents CIBCISVOHS iau w11n1n the reaim oi pnvaie contract law and mi ﬂubhc law, ihereiere I am 0! \|he v1evv1r1a1me Respancerii 5 decisions are no1 amenable 1o iudiciai rev ew and hence 1nc ApnIican1‘sjud1aai review uughl 1o be dismissed in Ahmad Jafri bin Mohd Jami @ Md Johari v. Fungnrah Kehudaynn a. Kesenian John: 1!. Or: [21:10] 1 ML! 145; [21:10] 1 MLRA 521; (201015 cu us‘ me Federal Conn rieia - -1211 In view ea we, let us begin ny rvs1 askma ourseives a pvennnriary queﬂion 1; ma anpeuarirs complain! av griavanou alrwnabla luv iudrciai raviewibelure evvi wnsiaerirrq vmemrine Pmtxdure adnmed ev him 1. lppmpviIIa)7 11 mscumpliml 1. m1nmar1nb\eloriud1<:1a\ veviewlhen mere VS no dispute as (0 me vmceﬂme adnmed since ne .5 ac may to commence ms acmri by my otwnl arangunaung summon) so rslwe Pas: uni); [221 [EA] [311 [511 have to delemune me parammsrs no mailers men are amename Var mam vewtw n ‘S w\ﬂe\y annealed that mt every demsmn made by an aulbanlmnve body .5 .un;m- «or mama! mwew Yo qualify mm mull 5. . snﬂlclenl public law eltmtnl in cm ducislon made. Fur m1s,ms nu-mry In Inmlnn mm. m nun. mm pawn! Ind Inn nllun M an ductsron mad ; whtmtr mu dncmorl was mad. nude! :1 Iululary pwav [:55 para ea Hmshury Laws a(Engum‘ u edn znm Rerssue vol um To muscme (ms we mu refer ho a number so aumonues mvolvmg dllmlssal non samoe by a Dubhr. zulmmy ' 50 based Iargeiy an the lam ma the vesoomenl was gwen me light «a anlvr Into . oanvucz av smmgymtnl wmn ma npphcanl wmch mcludss nna nqnn uf msrmssen me Calm af Appea\ lound M7 pubhc law element .n In: -ppucam s :omp\aml In enmle mm m me admlnulvalme mmsdlas souqhl m \|h21udama\ Ievvew Fmm Ina puuuzllvn umnonm above wl observed mu rm Ihe apueuam to he amenable «or ;uﬂ\c4a\ review men must be me pruulcl Mun mnunm puma lhw necennrylu mu remadlu oi admlmshatlve Yaw‘ We nbserved mun . chaﬂsnge on ma vse ol appmpnale procedure us very much iac1 based Thus u is nqcnsnry can iudgu wnun mm-nu an Inch mum to am ncuuin wftulhlv than [I . pull!‘ Int element in cm dispntn. lithe mun or Inﬂlnnemen bum solﬂy on Iubnunllvt Drlntlplu I21 publlc Iiw um. um Ippmpnlk process should h by way -:4 o 5: at nu me. If n is : mlxllne nl public um my D Ilw men In noun mun ummu. whlcll at nu mun prldnmlnam. If n has nubmnnl I public I- ulumull than me ﬂmcedun undcr o 5: of me RHC mus: be an-wu¢ um. an mum mu‘ prmss. Bu! 1: line man: is until! pnvltu law mnuull nonnirnlnu a public Iulllolilix um man. to commune: Inch nuan uwdtr0 5: M m. ENC Is nnl suluhle Ame «mm m. (here come Lu nmev dmumslznces me mu Iund .n we Dam Dv Zambry Much depends an me «am elm: can Bul mnmuy. ma eoun Ihould ho umlvici In Illvwlnl a malmerwmch slmuld bu by my me 5: mm mm lo pm In an mama: com. I’: y mu n {I npomﬂ lo my Iwllclnl suklnu mdlclal review to pluck lny mod. ho pnfers. as nupuea m Kudung wmnm, would, In our cnnlldnrid uplnlun, Isl nndulnq o 53 um; mac mdundanl This u mnamly ml 0: mlenllnn no me makers MIN: rule Mm had a purpose In rmna When we purpnse ohms rm: u m an Imvrsil on ma aanumsuanan men lhls lu\s must he adhered to excem n ma u-ma ana excemnonal cwcurmlances mscuiied (emphasis added) u... 17 M 1: 26. (See aiso VKK (Malayiil) Sdn Bhd v. Ponnarah Tilrllh ﬂan Galian Johor ]2a21] 5 MLRA 41a; [2021] 5 cu 119: [2021] s MLJ nu) mus. based on the above, i1 is my View me] me Applicanl is not enmied io appiy ior ]udiuai review since ine aiieged dispuie is in me ieaim of onvaie law irivoiving a oeniraei between lhe Appi ml and me Respondenis Being a privaie iaw nianer, ]udiciai review is no1 aoprooiiaia and me proper remedy ier ine Appiicarii IS oiiiy damages and noi a Public iaw remedy. Tire Rnxwndouu should not in nlmod in the judicial ru wt 27 28 29. (ion i1 iscne submission oi the Respondentsihamie impugned decisions were noi made by me Responderiis {ml by Lembaga uisipiin Program DPA INTAN and Jawalankuasa i=ersi]iian INTAN The Respnridenis iunner Submit inar Lembaga nisipiin Program DPA INTAN and Jawalarikuasa i>ersi]iian INTAN snouid nave been made a pany io iriis apoiicaiion, Therefore] I\| is suommed maiinere was a ieiai error by not naming ine decision makev iiseii nameiy Lembaga uisipiin Program DPA INTAN and Jawa\|ankuasa Persiplan VNTAN. Aooordingiy, inis appiicabori is inoompe1eni and snouid be srrueir oui. The ideniiiy oi ine decision maker oi (he lmpugried Decision nas been reiiecied in ine ien/er iniorniing ine impugned Decision as ioiiowa - 29.1 iiie dsduclion oi 1o discipline marks under Ihe oeisoneiiiy assassnieni component and a warning was imposed by me Disciplinary Board (Lenioaga nisi n Program an mun) as evidenced irom me iener daied 1311 202a (see: Ellclolurv e. Exh\|blt “NIMJ, p-rm 112.112]; 29.2 the decision oi the VNTAN s Aoerediiaiion cornniinee meeiing on 10112020 nai 1a accredit ine Applicant ior DPA as communicated oy way oi a iener daied 17 H 2020 (See Enclosure ii. Exhibit “Niim. pages 115.117), Pale u vi a: so 32. 33. 34 29.3 ms decision during the Mesyuaral Srch cdrnmniee Kema Pengaran Penmidmaian Awam (MSCKPPM No 1/2020 on 4 12.2021: which releclad me Applicanrs appaal and upnald irre decision oi the lN'rAN's Accrediiaiion Corr-rnmee cdrnmunimiad by way pl a leuar daled17,11,2o2ois provided «or in rules 36-39 oflhe DFA Program Rules (Sea' Encloluro 6. Exhibit “NIIII-I5. pages 185-186): Having perused me cause papers, namely in me Respondent‘: Amdavil in Encidsure 19, page 6, paragraph Sm). Endosure 191 pages L5 paragraphs 6(9) and (f), Enclosure 19, paragraph zxtldl pages 940, ll was cieany slated max .1 was me Lembaga nisipiin Program DPA INTAN and Jawaiankuasa Parsililan INTAN lhal made the impugned Decision and nollne1“ and 2"” Respondenls Based on the above. i am at the DDWHOVI lhal ine appl on was brougnl agamsl me wrong pany as me Respondems named In this appllca\|I!m was rim ma decision maker cl ma lmpugned Dsclsiun Funnermare. I am at me View ml the Appiicani rnusi corrscily ldenllly ma pariy responsibl: lpr ms decision in ma exelclse ul Ihe public duty orruncupn which he alleged had adversely alvecled rum. in ma case or Councll ol Clvll smlco Union: a. on (ccsu) v. “The sublecl mailer pi uvary \|u¢A<:laY nmw is a declsmn made by same person or (body an personsr wmm I shall csil ms ascimn makzi or else a mfuul by him up make a dai:>slan' In the case of Amhlgn llp Snunuvuun v Koiua Pongmh lmlgmon Malaysia 5. ors [2011] ll MLRH 512; [2012] 1 cu mi; [2012] I MLJ in al Inn. Rorrana Yusuf J (as sne men was) held as (allow: 7 112; ms since me rirsl Respondent and mid Respondeni are noi dnclsian makeli pi ma impugrlad daclborl, ,udi=iai nmaw cannot in againai menu 1: dun ll dmersnny, mun II no avclslon by the First Ind Sucimd R pondunl lhll is bﬂonihlx counts r vkw.0n mi- ground‘ aim, Inn ipgllcallon ought to In muck om (emprraars added] u... I! o! 3: as as 37. as mman me Federal com vn me case ol Mallll Plvbandann Pulnu Plnang v. syarnm Baku samaasnma s-mag-ma Sunqal Gelugor mngan nnggung-n [ma] 3 cu as; uses] 1 IIILRA m;[1m;mu1;[mn1: Anna 3529 held max » -u .x ugm In say.a1Ihuuk or Bemg nu.‘ ma Idmnmslvmwe Vaw a much concerned wvlh the weqanw no vmceduvas Veamng up «u a decnsunn and av caurse, n4 me daemon user! It I. Imrdom 2 mam: of nm Ilul irnpuruncu In cnmcﬂy iamivy an an n naught «o In impugned. Furmermare. when me dalean wmch a aaasum ws made 15 maponam .: may bu necessary «o know winch or a mm M Isl: cnnsmulea me eﬂeclwe daemon for Ins nwwse ,1 the scheme in quesuon The sama mm whum namnuum an appeaun he nmughl rmm a demswon Falvun to oxmm mm basic ruquiumanls could luv: lllal nun!-qulncn: as me vanawmg ammnues mu serve to mumah (emphasis added) Meanwhile, nu the case olwanq cnoon vm Lwn nm' so Hi M-nun: H] All Fongorull Lomhagn Tnlutonlh Kumpulan Sokungan (No.1) Jabllan Imigman Mnlaylia a. Vang Llln (202017 cu 621: [mun] 4 MLRA 651 me Court of Appeal snressed mat u would render ma mama: review apphcauon rm leave to become mcompexem w the judwmal mew aupﬁcanon Is taken agamst an maocurale deals on or agams\| an maccurale publm aulhunly In the case oisooy oi Lung v. Trans Resources Corporation Sdn and [2002] 1 CLJ J05: [2001] t MLRH 274. Law Hop Bung J (as he then was) held as1aHaws - ncuuon mly bc 4 mm In "mvolous" u Wcxlllnul” wr-u .a o - usly unsnsumahla eg wheueme Demon ‘s resnumcana av whore mu wmnu Dirty ls lacing 5IIud.arvMhuuIme1n am umuslmea see Mamym mun com Pnclwca‘ supra‘ (emphasis added) Thevelore, based on Iheabove‘ lam onne vlewlhalme Apnucanrs appumaunn [or ‘umcual revxew ws Vncompelenl and nasw on «ms gvound alune uugm m be struck cm. Fig: w n! 33 4 Mar the heanng, x dismissed the Applncanfs ]udIcra\ rewew sopzrcanarr (Enclosure 15). Thrs1udgmen\| ooncams me full reasons lor my dacwsvan Blclwmund rum 5 The backgruund Iacxs gathered from me cause papers Amdavrr m Supparl and subrmsswons :4 the pames are \|avge\y unorsomed and can he surrunanxea as louows — 5 1 The Aaphcant had been oﬂered enrolmsnl mm the DFA No 1/2020 Program as a pamclpant on a lulmme basis lor 10 mamhs vwde an offer vane: Hand 6 12 2019 (Sea. Elll:I<ll\|l!I 5. Exhibit Nml. plge 32-50). 5.2 The Vemar oi the order had slipmalad oenum condmons wmcn comprise a! amongst omers me lorrowrng terms’ 52IThB DPA Pamcxpams am nut aHuwed to delay reglslarmg for me man No «/2020 Program and are reqorreo lo follow an me prescribed modules suwessiuﬂy umll me uzmpbllnn 0! Che programme (See‘ Enclosun 5. Exhibit NIM-1. pago sa.rr.11); 5.2 2 Dunng me DPA Program‘ pamcwpanls are vequvred to amde by the corvdmofls set out In the letter 01 after and 3H RMS Sal by me Nauenal Institute of Pubhc Adm rrauon (mum (See‘ Enclolun s, Exhlhll Mm:-1, punt as. rm); 5 2 3 The pamclpams «mm mne to Irma will be assessed w\|\|h respacc to tour mmponems wmch are as laHaws* 4.) Fersonamy [Commitment and Dusouplmel (sahsrah-kornmrran darn msrmm); [bl Academwcr (c) Health and phys\ca\ mess. and (up Secumy screenrngﬂapraan Keselamalsn) P-use! 1: vlllieuiar nu impugned decision is ruasollnblu mlonal and prnpurllonatz 39. rlie Applicant argued tha\| lne Respcridenfs aclion is unreaeanaala wnen ii lailed (0 lake inlp cnrlslderillcn aniengsl mners, reasons raised by me Applicant in me wnnen represenlaiiun, an However, i ﬁnd lnai lne Applicanrs eonlenlion on lnis issue is without basis. I nna lnail lrie Disciplinary Board had exercised lne power conferred on il reasonably min a proper basis and iiisii cahorl aner all malarial vans, piapes cl evidence wllnesses and defence have bean scrutinized properly before arriving at me impugned Decision M The Disciplinary apara was salisfred with the ﬁnding 0! ins invesligalion d1a\| \|\|'leApp\|lcarl\| was involved in a verbal and pnysical allerealian with Nu! Nazinan blrI\|I Kaniarul Zaﬁk ana deemed lnal lrieie was a Violation of Rules 8(::). 9, 19(3) and ID in (vii) of me DPA Program Rules wliicri is as iollows. “Pnrllurnn 5: ma Iulakuan Pcsma Plogrlm mu ssseorm pelaiar Pvogrnm an lldik with — [cl ham up.-in dsngan Sedemlklin cam saningg. mnlvlbllmkkln run. alai. mencemalkan Imaj Program DPA VNTAN dan Perkhudmalan Awim Fnulnnn ll: Puuru mar-iri mu Mndnklnh llllllj um mun sour: liuiiluuun llsan yang boleh mencemalka ei Pmarnm nu, mun mu Pukhldmllnu Awlnl Ilml Inn in dlllm mu dl luar kimpll INYAN separuann lemwi progllm Pernlunn I9: Plrllurln ul Aslimi 'Pesena Progmm on aiksrieriaaxi memzluhi pemmmn ai asiarna seperii berlkul (er Mlnﬂlklah ni-nlm ui. klllkulrl dun (Idnk msilgglrlggu psng7mvIl- p-mun. lain deﬂﬂarl am can saniipuri in min mlllkllkln p5rI<ira—pIrkara yang barlemlngarl aanpnn iiii.. againa moml dan akmik sspsm berlkm in n 2733 42. 43 W BIr\|IrIgklvd:nbIlg.Iduh" (ernphasws added) More mlponanlly, me Applicant had adrmﬂed m the physxu\ ahercahon mm Nur Nizmah bvnh Kamarw Zaﬁk who is a co» pamclpanl and saugm an gwe an exmanalxon (or her behaviour dunng me mcmem Foﬂowmg thereto the Discxphnary Baavd Imposed a punvshmenl o! aeducuon oi ID discwplmary ruavks under me Personamy (cemmumenx anﬂ Dvsclphna) Componenl and a warmng aa punishmenl Proponionaliw 44 A5. 46. It \s a «me Vaw that as a general rune, me mun mu not mtervere m matters pervammg lo pwtessuunaw dis pllne um weave matters (0 me mscupunary body :2! mac pmvessmn The com oi Apnea! in Gana Mumusamy V4 Teman L M ong 3. co mu] 2 MLRA 10!: [1935] 3 MLJ 341; men] 4 AMR cum-, [1 W3] 4 CLJ an hs\d as vouows: » n I! Drlmlvlly luv mnmborl chm Bum a - wnauamounu In umducl unbecoming mu ammcale am sollcllor. Oouns mun nsosssinly exercise cam-on Man nntanznmng an applzﬂ m men me cemml enema .5 whevaar DamwIarwnﬂu<:\| As unnmﬁssmnal and uses memvng canal mleﬂewence wm be me Olhemse mu be me own and nanhe pmvessm Inalwm delelmme ma Yirdsnck :11 Dmleumnm bshavmur A calm will be nnlhlld to IMIHOII only In whal has been found by a mscnpnrury commiiln in be unprvk luul conduct wlll mu 5. eommmu lo bu nuch ny an em mlnlunu minibus ollhal vrofinmn. (omphas-s added) In mun Pogunm v. Data‘ an Dr. Muhamad Shafn Abdullah 2\|'l16] G MLRA 1: [2016] I CL] 74?: [2016] 5 AMR 70 . 2013] 5 MLJ 572 al 581. the Federal Calm held: I79] We were mmdad mm MU wmed Dnncapblmt as - nmmv mu. on mm m mums of pmtesslunal dlsclplm but mnuu ol a man». In Inc body umuma by Plrlllmlnl me u N 33 47 48. A9 50 m ngum. . d an Iplme members om». nmfinian. All mm is nqulnd I: m. lklpllnlry body an: lulny In canylnu am In dulles, and :1». m min m-mama thoroughly with an. dollbuzﬂon ma undunlandlun given to me has of ma cumpllinl. Unlui Inn uuwrpunuy wmmllun (ha m in oi as raw"! can bc Ihawn to have em: in wine 1. orw have avenenkeé, mm wad. nr dunnlrdud nmn m nu milk: mm, one u a mm m m mmianly. CM mun cum um imnrfere. exam in the raresl or clu . ms pnncnpb has been npphed wnswslsnﬂy by our nouns (see cases M Re A salxcnlor (No 2; (49231 93 ms 761 Re A 5uhc\lor [1959] 3 AH ER em, Kenn $eHar v Lee Kwang, Yennakoun v Lse Kwing [1 van} 2 ML! 191 uses} ‘ MLRA 451 Gan: Mmhunmy V LM CR9 a. Co [1993] 3 ML! :41. [1 my 2 MLRA zua: Meraun\| V Law Socwely of Snskaxmawan K2092] a WR 2141 However, name on me has nun cucumstanees mnwnam «ms case we were cl me ‘new that In: (am that the slalemenls were Vnudnlmy m uuww not aummaucany Veaa m me oondusmn that (her: had hean vubhcny warm the meamng at Ihe mm Rmas The statements man be read mm. me content nf Ina amnvaly cl um amclui and sunoundmg cvrcumll-ncn: (emphasxs addsd) Therefore, :1 us my vwew ma‘ me seventy or lemency of the pumshmenl wmposed ws nnl wwlhm the purview 01 [ms Court. The Federa\ Cam In me case 01 N9 Hock cneng v. Pengarzll Am Fonjara 5. Or: [1995] 4 CL! 405; mm 2 MLRA 14¢; nwa} 1 MLJ 153; men A MR 419 had slated max lhe lesl \|o be adoplad us not what Ihe coun \|hInKs to be me appmpriane penany, but u 15 [or the msmpnnary \|rIbuna\ Io delermme he seriousness of me miswnduct av us members and to pass me appmpnaxe punvshmem. (Nearly, one Apprlcanfs verba\ and physical allercauon wtth Nur Nalmah bum Kamarm Zaﬁk Is a conduct unbecnmmg at a panmpam cv1theDPA Program who use po\|enIna1Adm\|nIs\|raIwe and Dlpkzmallc Ofﬁcev Thus, this Court \s or me mew max me power confened on the msuplmary Board under Ride 2a 01 me DPA Prugmm Rmes was exemsed reasanamy mm pmper bass and .-mrﬁcamun. um 1: cl 3: Rational 51 52 53 Tne Drscrchnary Board‘s decrsron had resmred m ma Avbhcant camng lo acmeve the rmmmum requrrerrrem av Glade B wrm respect Ia me Fersonamy Development Component Ieaarng la me Apphcam vamng me cwerau DFA. The nrscrpnrrary Boards aecrsrcn has led in ma aecrsrorr 0! me INTAN s Aweunauon Oomrmllee on 1011 2020 nallo accredrl me Appnrcanrs DPA as a resuh ouamng to achieve me rmmmum Grade E «or me Personamy Developmem Component and famng me cverau DPA commumcaled by a Iener dated 17.11 2020 (See: Enclosure 5. Exhibil NIM-I, pages mam) The cacrs n rmne INTAN'i Accramraucn comrnraee rs rarronax and propurllonale as it 15 In accordance mm the Academvc Rmes wmcn Is exh1b1Ied(See Enclosun 5, Exmbn NIM-4, plqos 01-I01 @ as. Is) 13 Ktdudukan Akademlk <3 1 wunarar purlu lmncanal gran nrrrrrrrru-rr 3 we may nag: soﬁan rmrrn yln] dllalanl. <3 2 Peuarar 1uga penu mencapar gvad mmlmum Imus ylng mlelapkan bag: purua nramrn unluk mac Knmpunun . lmwk din Kamnonen Pembangunan Sahsmh :33 Palajnr yang am: mondapal and mlnlmnm a (me am) blwi lullap maaul mu hag: puma In-rklh unluk an-p Kan-normr Andlmik Gan Kumnorun Pumblngunnn sum-yr . um-I qagil kuallumhln program d-In mm. a nramrr uarxpm mtnﬁlkull pvoﬂrlm Faktor-Faklor Pnnamaun v-mar 22 Pu..." In Iﬁummknn rnripidl min]: . pengallan seurarm: r.) Gnual rrrurcapan gm: mlnlmum a (ms 100) Dual u p modul Inn haul nunu markah unluk u up Kompanln Akadcmlk ﬂan Kompomn Fumhannunan Sam w- (enrpnasrs added] mennvsz wmmar mu Rspondnnn decision is in accordance with established pmvisnons 54. Perusung the chronology of (acts m remuon lo the Rspondenrs net: on‘ x ﬁnd the laﬂowmg event occurred.- Subkhmur Pumbangunan Mada! lnsan (sxmn an 29 10 2020 zsmzazn remcved a when oampxam «um Nur Nmnanamu Knmavm mu wxlh vanpecna ma pnymuv allercauan belween Nev and me Apgncam ax Asmma menu, MAN (See sncmun 1:. van: ,[¢u))) 3 n ma sxwm nut-ducted m mlemnl mvuha an by to exammlnq ccrv vswmmns and oauea slew nesses 4 n ma Vrom nmongll ma psﬂmpznls arms on Program and Dreams an mun-anon raven [Sn Enclocun 19, an s.ln(u)I.(I)I)a1s»:mun«mm m, 125(3):) 4 n 2020 sxwn has vssued a smwuusa Veuurdnled : m me iv the Annncam and me Avlzhmnl .s matured Io submn a mu... ramy to SKFMIwnmn1wumng any av rm um than 511 20201395 :y.::......1n, pain 545. mm)» - Shaw cm. kmr d-mi unazv Enclonuu 5, Exhlbﬂ um-5, plwls muns) 5 n mm The Acumen: has “mum a mum renly m sum: ounﬁvmlw Ihere was - any:-cm anarcauan and p-wean her nmnuxanon my me mmdem (See Enclnlun 13. mu 6. mum . nanm mausnlnmraund A.II.2I)2n-Ennluun s. Exhi : um-5, pm: munsy 5 u 2u2a smm has Dreamed . Mmuxe In In: Dxreaovo! mm WW3’! cnnmms m. .m.mm.. vuvml cl m. Avbhcanls use and several manerswete amonsed \|c nu. nmm oi mm mcludmg me mswcuon Ia nxsmvl uertam resiulahons under me up» Prwram am as the on Fmgvam .. nunng ms Ind and The Dvucwr ol INTAN wind (Sat EIIGIDIIIYI 15‘ DUI! 1a.[1S(n)!7 s.n.2n2u Apan mm me wnllen reply. Ins Nlnluam was also am to pmxae In Ixvlunabun vnlh Ivlpecl «a un- srvuw cause Lensrtsee Emzlucurnis. pun-o,[51o)1) 9 n ma Ann: M: nmcsemng me Dusaplxrwy Baaru mega man mu Avvicanl I! nuH\y 01 vbvlllmq Rulu BN2) 9 19 (3) and as (D M: M me on Pmgmm Rules and .5 Dunrshalﬂe by doducnnn M 10 dlnmﬂnn mums mac! Ihe comlxmenl ul persmzlwly assessmem and 3 w:m\n9 KS5: Enclown 1:. m. s, (Mull) IDH mo mum Aacradxunovu Cummings mm»: II: mewml deuded that pursuant to Rule 22 at Acadermc Runes me Avblwclnt Mn not a .w.ma m. DPA m n n In acheve the mmlmum Grade 5 var me Fersnna Iy Devmavmem Comvmuenl(See Ennlonnn us. via: a. Islam 11 11 mo Search Cumrmllae Masnw me by 01: Dwnctzu: Gansml ul Fubhc SIMDQ mm mu mo Aanbcmu mu «mu m mam me ccndmons cl-Ivbcmlnenua me pm Service Schlma . (See Enﬁasun s, Exhlhil "Nlln-I”. Blgns na- 111.111! 13 n 2020 Deusxon at line umplmsvy Board has been dehvered In ma N1Dhc:n(vIaImar¢uIa¢131I.2O20 . zsee Enplosme a, Exmbll "Mum. us) . Blues 112- 17 u 202:: Deasion o1melNTAN’s Amreﬂnahan Cnmmmee ml m accvadntme Avmscanls DPA has bun deiwrrad ho mu Aw-cam vh a mm cam 11 n.2u2u . LSee Enclalun a, Exhlhll NIM-I”. um um my 55. Based on me above cnmnowgy, rl ws my View that the pmcaedlngs have been condudad based on rule 25 of the DPA Program Rules. vuzztulu (See: pages 13.14 M on Program Rules; Enclowu 6 Exhibit NIM-4 psgu an-101 @ 13.79) Charge sheet 55 57. 55. 59 We Avnllcant runner argued that me aemsron made by me Responaenxs is unreasaname as mere ws no charge snesx wssued to me Appllcanl as per rule 26 01 DFA Program Rules and «nus me Apphcanl has been denied me n9h\| Io represent nersev Even though mere ws no charge sheet issued by the Respondents to me Apphmnt as required undcv Me 26 (v) or DPA Program Riﬂes. Inna max me Apnncanx awreaay knew about me charges based on me Show cause Ieuer dated 4 H 2020. Hsvmg perused me said show cause xener amen 4 n.2u2o, x nna max the snow cause Inner conveyed wwkh sumcrenc manly and oenamy the conlempkiled cnarges agamsl me Applicant and nnnnea her \|o runnsn me Respcndenls mm a wnuen usuemenr wmch was mrmshed m great dam. ms can be gleaned «rem me cnnlenl onne snaw cause lsllev daled A 11 2020 men states as vauaws — '2 Admin dhnakmmkan bahawa salu lamran lelah mlenma alen Sub Kluster Pemhanﬂunan Mouex nnsan msmul Tadbxran Awam Negara mum yang menyatakan barvawa puan pad: 2 Oklobur zozo uumm), I-klur pukul I on hlllanu no man, puln man dldlkwl benennkat ﬂan munukul pnum bcmlrni Nur Naxihah Bimi Klmnml lnﬂk tsmnn :) an Knw: In Aunmn Mular, mun Bukll Klan. 3 Berﬂasarkan swasalan yam} dﬂakukan oleh Sub xuusuer Pembangunan Modal Vnsan 1SKPMIL INTAN dan memmbangkan sega\a maklumal yang dvienml pm dlnylkl lnllh bcmnqklr nu. oumun an kawasan pnmis mun am - an can but bnlnh dursmn In nanny pmmm am‘ an p-mu ... 1I\|:) .4... (mm; an hawah Penman mg m Dlphml Pncasiswuah P-nuumnn Awam (nu) mu» m: (emphasis addedi u... 21 am so at 62 as 64. 65 Added to that, t ﬁnd that the Respondents had exercised their disuetioflary power under we 40 of the DPA Program was to exempl lhe appltcahnn 1.11 Rule 25(d) In 261i) M We DFA Program Rules when conducting the pmceadirigs towards the Apphcant Through the exernphan. the Resuandems rnay skip the procedure to give the charge sheet and request the Appircant to provide the representation Rule A0 at the DPA Fragrant Rules states that — atom Fengumsan Tanmggi INTAN nrsrrpunyar kuasa unluk memberi apa— up. Darvwuwih-Iv yum! amrmn aesuai dannada kavﬂriuarv irepertuan Feratumn W’ In the irislan\| case‘ I rind that thsApptrcaht was given the oppcrlunity at being heard during the omueedings which were new on 9112020. The proceedings am not sirnpiy discuss ahnm ms Appircanrs iarnrty background but aisa the representation made by me Applicant. This had been mentioned In oamgiaph 27 oi the 1* and 2” Respondent‘: Amaayir in Repiy ethrnrea on 13102021 [Encloium :5]. seared on Enciasure as which V! the Apphcanrs Amaayrt Repiy exhibilmg a transtzrinl M the Disciplinary Euanfs proceeding on 9 11 2020 prepared by the Applicant based on a ramming dons by her estaphsnes that the crime meahng tasted at least so minutes between 141:5-5 15pm) where the Applicant was given amnle oppoﬂuniiy tp explain the incident and pvovide her ius\|iﬁcalion. (See Enclosun 33. Exhlhll Mm-2n, pagls 12.29) Therelorei the Appiicanrs contention that she was rhereiy given a mtnule to provide her oetenca during the meeting on 9 I1 znzu cannot be true. tsee Enclosuri 6, page 12,122]: pa as 17-19. [MD in any event, upon perusal or the cause papers, I am at the considered View that sumcteht nght to be heard had been given to the Aoplicanl in M0 stages petore the puriIshmen\| had been mekd cut. The Applicant was entrtied tp Mu chances lo aetenae nerseit. one In a wrillen repiy to the show cause letter dated 4.11.2020 and another one during the proceedings which were hem on 9 11.22320 thus, I view that the decision made by the Respondents does not laim with irrationality as the issue of no light to be hearu is a nan— starter. me xr at aa as Tnerevore, ] View man me t1]sI:1'pHnary pmceedings conducted by me Respundems agams4 me Apphram are m amurdanux mm me aslabhshed procedure laud down ]n (he DPA Program Rule, Academic Rme and wmmn me discrehon ollhe Respondenls. [my Io give a mason s7. Anomenssue raxsed bylhe Apphcarvl ]s thatlhere has been a [auure by [he Responnems to we reasons to the Applvcanl m arnwng at me lmpugnnd Demsmn ea However, I ﬁnd that there Is no express pruwslon m me DFA Program Rmes wmch moses 2 du\|y on me pan ov me Responaems to grve a reason 10! lhe wmposman 0! such pumshmem 69 I ﬁnd support (or my mew by relerring to me Feaerax court case 0! Nomln H] Zakaria (Yimhalan Kenna Polis K-Iaman) 5 Anor v. Mohd Noor Abdullah [2004] 2 cu 711; [2004] 1 MLRA 357; [2000] 3 AMR ass as loHows » Readmg the umvasmns [.17 me 1970 Rogulaucni m I15 enlvvely I uo na .=q...mmnm mm» 0-: mpouamn so In {Manned oilhe posslhllily nl hlm mug dlnmusnd or ndunud m nnk 0. m. mm m I: mnviclnd at any 01 [M charges pnhmd Iuimt nu ﬂu mow cluu mm or prior 00 on sun on me dlsclpllnary en: ry. mm is no pmvlslan imponlna . u.r uhllnlllon .- mu wvlcribod by nu.ZB(1\|o1IhnI993 Rennlallun Smne :2. ma Iuulalwns Impou nu duly on me 1-‘ App Ilunl lo mom ma nlpondlnl m Inn um nppoﬂunlly [71 um nmmnou or his unsmxssm or ndunlnon in nnk, cm or appuuam clnnvl n. nm in nu. dopriwd um respondent on a mocedu mmess .s mm cannot ». any man» ofdmy whnn um xms in In temphasxs added) (See also. Minisur 0! Labaur, Malaysia v. ssn]w Oberoi & Anor [1990] 1 MI.J 112; [10n]1 MLRA 215; [1000] 1 cu zoo; Plllak sukuan Nuguri Szbah v. Suaumlr Balllullhunn [2002] 3 MLJ 72; [2002] I MLRA 511; [2002] 4 CLJ 105; [2002] 3 MAR 2017]. Fag: 1; M as Mlndamul 70. 71. 72 73. 74. One of the rehab sough\| by (he Apphcenl \s a Mandamus Order that a re w and/or reassessment oflhe Applicant‘: soonng and progvess In me DPA Program Is carried am and m aoaremr me Aupllcanl wun the DPA Program (See Enclolun 10. pg: 4, [:(\|:)}) The Federal Court IVI Minisur M Financ Governmemo1$abah v. P-trojuu san arm (200514 MLJ an . zuua] 5 cu :11: [2003] 1 MLRA ms‘ new (ha\| an amarotmanaamus can be granted eilhar (aj undar Secuon 44 at me Speciﬁc Rahal Ac! 1950 (saw: or (b) we addmunm powers 0! me H>gh caun provided by paragraph 1 oi the Schedule to the Couns ouudicacure Act I9e4(cJN I! vs a\sa to he notes that omer 5: Rme 1(2) anne ROC Pluvwdes Ihal this order1D. 53b ws sumac! to the pawl ‘ ns 01 Chapter vm of Pan 2 0! me SRA, Yherefore, any appucaupn (or an war of mandamus made by way 0! ;ud\::IaI rewew proceedmgs must comply wnh ma neqmremenl oi sechan 44 or me sun Secuon 44 at me SRA reads as1aHows. “ENFORCEMENY or vusuc nunes Fowl! tn onﬁr public xlrumx mu mm m do within splciﬁn acts u m A Judas may make an mﬁer raqulmvﬁ any specmc acl Ia be done or lumomar by any wsor. noldma a pumm umber vmemer 01 a Dclmanznt nr a Iemvwarv name, or :11 any cmpammn at my noun ummnaua M7 um mun Com Fmulam m _ (a) an zvnhmﬂon Vor sum an order be made by some perm wnaaa nmpeny Vmnnl-use‘ or pevwnal nwhl man be Anru-so by the vomeanna Omani]. anna case may be‘ at me sand spec-na nc1. ﬁuexuaixi (see Enclolun 6, Exhnzn HIM-1. plan 36. \|7.2(a)—(d)] 5.2 4 Fenure by any pamclpanls ro earnpuy wrrn any an or more of me rules or favlure re eenreve rne mlmmum Ieqmremenl 0! assessments womd resun rn me termmaunn evme Agreememand rna pamdpanls mu be expeued at any true «rem comm g wnn Ihe DPA program (see: Enclosure 6. Ex r I! MINI-1, pagos an- 37r (7.21): 5 2 5 Nocwrmsrannrng Ihe commons onntamed In me Venerof nnerr me pamcrparus are also sumeu ro omer oorrdmorrs speciﬁed m the Ieller owerrrrg scholarsmpr agreements. rules :71 me DPA Program and other re\e»/ant dacuments (See Enclosurn e, Exmnlz NIM-1, pug: :1, (7.51); 5.2 5 Amongst the established Rmes maunrrrr pan and name! 55 me wearer o1 uuer are — (a) Peraturan-Peraturan Program orproma Pascaslswazah Peﬂgurusan Awam (DPA) Insulul Tadbumn Awam Negala (INTAN) [DPA Pmgnm Rules): and re; Peramran Akaﬂermk Pmgram Dnploma Pascasnswazah Pengurusan Awarn (om; lnsmul Yedblran Awarn Negara (VNTAN) (Aeauernre Ru\|ol)r (See: Enclosun 6, Exmnn NIM-4, pagns s1-101); 5.3 The Applicant rndrcaced her agreernerrr by srgrnng the Ameprarree Letter on 15122319 (See Encmure 19. Exrrnsn “DAS-1. pago Is) ind mareaner me Appﬁcznl enkered mm a scnolarsmp agreement (see Enclosurn 5. Exhibit NIM-1. pngu 32-50); 5 4 The Applicant vepcrled lar aarnrssron In me DPA Pmgram on 191.2u2c(see Enclosure 19, page 5. (Gun); 5.5 On 29.10 2020, Subklusler Pembangunan Modal lhsan (SKPMI) received a verbal comwainllvom Nur Nazmah hint: Kamarul Zaﬂk, a pamapanl rrr rna DPA Program wrm respacr vuualss (b) sum doing budnaanng ls, under any law lor me «me henna .n fem eueany lnamnbenwn me person Drcauﬂ .n mlunu publlc chlraat or on llne nbmonsbbn WV ll: mnnnm cnaraclsr lb) W016 unnlbn 0! ms Juana (he domg or lmbaanng n mnsanlm In ngm ..nd wstxts. my me applrcam nas no omusneunc and a¢aqua\|e legal remedy, and la) lne remedy myen by me bmennbl-an nnwnl be wmvlila (2; lhkllllg M m uecwn snall be desmea la llllhnnle . Judas- (sun make my bnm bmdlng on ma vnng d-—P5nuarl Mum‘ (mm make any omernn any sewanlbuny sbuannnnnl W Malnyila. as such merely «a mama III: u\|l:fic\Ion an s slsnn won and zsaya-mnsnl,or (c) In make any umar wnla. ls blneawlse expressry excluded by any taw lar lne Ilme belrlg WI tame‘ 75 In Kaon Hoi Chow y. Pretam sinun [19721 1 MLJ1BOB; [1972] 1 MLRH 497. sharma J (as be men was) had omllned lcur prsrequlsllas eesenual In one lssue of an order unuar secllon 44 or me SRA er a mandamus‘ m Whether me Apphcanl nas a clear and ammo legal ngm lo the pellet sbbgm: (Ir) wnalner mere us a duly nnbosed bylaw an me Respendenu: lnl) wnelher such duly I5 or an lmperallve mmls\|eHa\| character -nvblylng no yudgmenc UV disbraclbn on the ban al ma Resnondents, and (iv) Whamar \|he Applluam has any remedy. amer man by way 0! mandamus‘ lor the enlamemenl at me ngnl which has been denied lb mm 76 Based on me case, In order to Issue me order of mandamus, me Applicant musl snow nol only lhal ne nas a legal ngnl In have me acl porvbnned bul mel me ngrn mus! be so clear, spec WC‘ and well deﬁned as to be Iree fmm any reasonable oonlmversy Tne older eannbl be Issued wnen me nghl IS dbubuul, or ls a qualmed one or when n depends upon an Issue of Iael to be deaonnlned by me me an 5133 77. 75 naspundanrs. The failure no snow me exvstenoe of any vegan tight to compel the perlarmance of a lega\ aury cast upon me Rsponoents will deny me order at rnanaarnus. Anclhev rrnponam hurd\e man needs In be crossed by me Appncarn for an older cl mandamus is to show Ihamrere rsa may xmposed by law on me Responaenvs In Ihu absancu or sucn Vegal dury, me mandamus she}! not he agarnsr the Respondents. saaap an me ezrove, \ em a! me consraerep vmw that there rs no promsrorr at law Imposmg an pblrgauon or duty on me Respondents to rewew and/orcany oula reassessmenlol me Appncanrs scnnng and progress m the DPA Program and lharaaﬂer m accrean me Apphcanl wnn me DPA Progmnr Conclusion 79 so. Pvemlsed an me afaresaxd reasons, I am of me mew that lhe grounosrorme Applncatmn are under me ounnaw or pnvale Vaw and "'19 aaarsrons anhe Rsspondems are made m aceoruanoe wun lhe escablrsned procedure and are not (armed with any error oi law, Irvauunahly, unreasonahleness pr prooeaural rrnprppnery that warrant ma Intervanlmn onna mun As such, the Applxcanrs applrcaupn lur a 1udrc\aLrev\|ew(Enc\osure 15; rs dismissed wun cosxs ol RM5‘00D so without the auocarprvee Dated DLt_ Decemher20Z3 /tux/\/\ Anrnaa Kama! hm Md Shahrd Judge Hrgn coun Kua\a Lurnpur val! 32 or 3: counsels Far the Apphcanl For me Respondents Cxk Hasnna Hakxmw (Cwk Farah Mama Fadzm En. Ng Kheng Fax & Cwk Norharzah shammeen wnn her) Teluan Hasnna Hakim: Peguambela ﬂan Peguamcava Elock A, A—3A~3, Auvu Haza. Nu1,Ja\an PJU an. Damansara Avenue‘ Bandar Sn Damansara mu 9. 52200 Kuala Lumpur (Ru; Tuan 2021/HH/LTN/HH/05/02) Cwk Kogllambvgar NP Mumusamy Federa\ Counsel Jabalan Peguam Negata Bahagxan Guaman, No 45. Pelslaran Perdana. Presml 4‘ emu Pulraiaya uueisuua lo a pnysucal al1erca11an wrm me Appl1carr1 a1 Melor Hoslel. VNTAN (See Enclosuu 19, pug! 5.1511)»; 5.5 FoHawingIhereto,ar1 mlernal mvesngallon was conducted an 3.11 21:20 and 411 20211 by SKFMl by exzmlnlng lhe ccrv racormrrgs and mlsrvlewlrlg wilnesses whlch comprlsed or panlcrpanls of me DPA Program 1er me purpose cl assisllrrg 1nIhelnvesllgaIlnn(See' Errcloaurs 19, page 5, [6(k)]): 5.7 Based on the lrlves(lgallor11 SKPMI found "16! (hale was slrnng emdence In support the complalnl at a physlcal allercahurl between me Applxcam and Nur Nazlhah blr1\|l Kamarul Zaﬁk (see Euclcsura 19, van. 5, IBM): 513 The 2"‘ Responaem Issued a shew cause lelter daled 4.11.2020 lo we Applicarn and Appllcanl was nzqulred to submll a wnllen reply on me SKFMI wlthln 1 wurkmg day or no laler man 5112020 (See. Encloauru 5, Exhlhll Nlul-5, pagan 104.105 5 Enclocura 111, pagas 56, [a(m)1); 5 9 The Appllcam submlﬂed a wnllen reply da1ed 5 11 2020 lo SKFMI and cannrmeu man (here was a prrysrcal allarcal-on between the Apphcarll and Nur Nazlhah Elnli Kamarul Zaﬁk (see Enclosura 5. Exhlbll NIM-I, pages ma-109 A En:\|osIlrI19.pIuI 5. [6(n)]); 5.10 Apar1 lrom ma wnllen reply. me Appllcanl was also requesleu \|D attend a meellrlg sasslon chalred by the Dlru1:\|or 01 VNTAN an 911.2o2o1a earn a me charge agalrlsl lhe Applrcanl (See Eualcsurn 19. pint a. 1611:)”; 5 11 Aﬂer rreanr1g1r1a Apphlant 1r1 herdeVer1oe and examlrwvg me s\|a\|emer1t of me wrlnessas in me lrlvesllgallon reporl daled 5.11 .2o2u1 the Discipllnary Board slllmg on 19 11 21:21: luund oral the Applicant 1s gullly 171 vlolahrlg Rules a(c),9,191alar1a 1911)1w) oflhe DPA Program Rules resulung ln 10 ﬂlsclpllrlary marks belng deducted lrum lhe Applrcanra mark «or Personallly (Commllment and Dlsclpllne) carr1parrerr1 and was glven a wamlng (See: Enclosure 19. page e,[:1p)]); 5.12 Thereafter. lNTAN's Accrsdllallon camruinee lrr a rueelmg held on 11: 11.2020 declded m accordance wnh Rule 23 1(b) ollhs Academlc Rules not \|o accradll (ha Appllcanlfor a DPA. r... 5 or u The decision was made as aria had raiieu \|0 achieve me mlnlmum required of Grade 3 wim respect In Perwnality Development cnmpmiam resulting in me Applicanl 1aiiing me avera1inPA Program lSee: Enclosuru 19. pan: 6. [°(‘l)D¢ 5 13 The decismn a1 me Dlsci nary Board was oommunica\|sd by way 00 a inner dated 13 11 2020 (ser Enclowrl 6. Exhibit NIM-1. naqua 112-113); 5.14 Meanwmie. me 1NTAN‘s Accredilallon Committee decision nm to aotrﬁdrl the Appiicam was communicated by way of a leller dated 17 11 21:21) (See Enclosure a, Exhlbll NIM-8, plans 115117); 515 The Apphcanl submllled an appeai by way at a letter daled 191120211, mm mspsnl Io ma lmpugnad Daaisians (sea. Enclosun 6. Exhlbll NIM-101 Plats 123-124): 5 15 aywayoia iauer aaiaa 7 12 2o2o,1r1e Applmanl was invaimaa met me Mesyuarat Search commmee Keiua Pengarah Ferkhldmalan Awam 1Msc»<PPA1 No.1/2020 had on 4 12 2020 ieieaau her appeal aria upnaia ma aaaisian 0! me lNTAN‘s Accredilimcn commmee wmch was communicated by way at a iemer aaieu 17.112020 (see: Enclosure 6. Exhibit NM-12. page 1:01: 5.17 nissausnea wim me deuslon, the Appiicam proceeded to apaeai ia me Direcwr General o1 Public Service by way a1 a letter aaiea 312 21m (See: znaiaann 6, Exhibit NIM-13. pages 133 - 186).Io me cmai secrevary to me Goyemmem o[Ma\|I a by way of a ieneraaiaa 2 2.21221 1see: Enuoauro 1:. Exhibit 11114.14. pagas 139-15n)and1be Prime Mimsler a1 Maiaysia by way at a lellev daled 2.2 2021 (see Enclosure 5. Exhlhll mul-1s.1:nau 132-152): 51a The AnphcanI's appeai iener dated 2.2.2021 10 the Chief secreiaryw me Gbvemmeni a1 Malaysia was 1orwa1de¢ lo 2"‘ Respanaenrs affine: 5 19 Fouowmg a meeling by me Top Management b1 me INYAN on 10 3 2o21.1ne Appiicam was infannad by way at a ienei da\|ed 113 2n211r1a1— vase s at 33 6 (at (Lav The Dxsclplmary Eoard's deusion on 9 11 2020 and me lNTAN‘s Aeoreanauon cornmiuee demsmn on 10.11 2u2o not In accrednlhe Appncanx xi ﬁnal and does not requna furlher review and The dacrsmn is .n line wrm me decision by me puonc servuoe Department commumcaled oy way 0! a wener daled 7.12.2020 Informing me Apphcanl man nerappeax had been rspected (Sea Encloluvo 5. Elhlblt NIM-I5. plgos 155 _ 15s) nenos, me prsservl 'nd\:La\ Mview apphcanon by the Appnoanc. TM Au;-allc-III‘: urouna var ma Judlclnl review 7 In gust. ma Anphcants appncanon harem Is based on ma vouowung grounds. . n) The Respondents had connnmsa an ermr ollaw m makmg Ihe Dsmsmns m: U ounzlludmg that [he Apphclnl had breached INTAN DPA Program Rules and INTAN Academic om Program Rules. «he Appncam was sumecn to an unfaxr procedure‘ mac me Aopucanrs oral and wnilen repressnvauons m wendung nersew were not taken min acoounh max me Apphcanl ought to be Inlormed cl me reasons «or me Decisions which wnclude me score/marks our-e ournponems In the DPA Program to conclude that she had cameo me ennre DFA Program; and that me Applxcam ought to know the reasons for me Decisions and be aﬂowed In make wriuen renresenlamzns only lhsrlaﬂer. »...maa In 5) Tna Respondenle nad lalled ta lake lnw account the lollowrng. u H) HI] v) me oral and documentary evldencelrepresenlauon by me Anpllcanl to me allegallons made age-nsl ner in the Reply letter and ddnng me Dlsclpllrlary Preeeedlng; mat the Appllcant was rntstreated by cadet Nur Nazinah: tnal lne DPA Program was tne only way ldrtne Appllcanl In heeonre a FTD Ofﬁoer. tne relevance and rrnpacl ol Ihe Declslans an the ApphCarVts' good name‘ credmtlny, career development and prospecl/amhilion Io beaming a cwll servant and/or n FTD Omoert and k: account furlhe Decisluns wntcn atlecl lhe ennl servlee generally Tne Declslons were irrauenel and unreasonable as lne Respmldenls i) ll.) lalled lo appreclale that me Respondents contributed to lna ambiguous sllualmn whale (he ounndenea and Irllegmy ollhe Respondents are being questioned by me Deatslons: felled to eppreclale lna reasons gtven by the Apnlicanl la delend nersell nature me Dlsclpllrlary Pruceedlng and met me allegallans were generally mmor. perry and rechflable and in some cases lnmrrect and untnlorrned, tailed [0 make a curved d on when ll nad daclded tnal lnere were breaches ol tne INTAN DPA Pmglam Rules and the VNTAN Academic DPA Program Rules by me Applrcanl wrnan were sencus and lusllﬂed me Respondents‘ Declslons: lallad Io appreaate met me Respondents had been glven me oppnﬂuntly ta evaluate and analyze lne evtdential prod wnen me Appllcanl responded wllh me - n! 3: G) the Law v) lurlher suppomng documents and rearesenled mmugn me era! represenvalians and appea\ letters; and me uemsiens are wmbeﬂaneed and dnspmpnmonale to me App\man\|‘s conduct m view of all the circumsvanoes mm are wunm (he Respondents‘ knwxeage The Respondents had sumecied the Apphcanl to an unlarr procedure by\|he1oHo»nng I) xi) m) M [sued to relneve a recnrded Slalemem hum the Applicant dunng me rnvesngauon more cmmng \|o me decrsron to Assue me Show Cause Leller and lhereaﬂer I/.1 hold a msapxmary Proceedmg agamsnhe Apphcanlz failed to give pnur nolioe to me Apphcanl \|a aﬂend me Dnscuphnary Pvooeedvng. «sued «a give prior nolvce to me Apphcanl m can her wunesses to attend me Drscrnlrnary Pmoeemng, vanea to mlarm the Appncann lhal she wauld be aﬂorded sufﬁuenlumelu defend nersen but Instead mformed her mat she was gwen 1 mmule a\| me man 01 me Dlscpmary Proeeedrng to do so and wrnch acuon 15 unreasunalﬂe and b1ased,and Vaxled m gws sufﬁcxenl nouce onne Decwsrons before me Graduauon Ceremony Instead nnnree (3) days pnor :3. Judicial renew rs generally concerned mm the decrslon making process wheve me rmpugned decxsmn .5 ﬂawed on me ground 0! proeedum umnrbnrieay 9. However. the law has now developed to allow a decrsaon to be :;haHenged on grounds o! Illegamy and irrauunamy, whmh then pemuls me Ceurlslo scrunnuzs \|he decrsmn not only lor we process, hul also for substance vuescus no 11. It \s senled law that me High cum wiH not mlerlere mm a aacxsm of me Respondents unless u can be eslal1hshedlhal\|he deuswo mleaed win. errors 0! waw. In me Fedeml Coun case :71 Akira Sales 5 Service (M) Sdn Blui v. nmnm Zn In. Ahdulllh and nu-mm ipplal [2011] 3 mum 53:; [am] 2 cu 51:s;\|2aIa11 MELR 33 (201512 MLJ 537. me liberal appmach on ]ud\c\a\ rswew In R. Rnma Chnndvan V. The lnduslrlnl Conn 94 M. yn. L Anor mm 1 mm 145: men 1 cm 141 has been re-emphaswzed as lollows 1:s1m me same appeax, Edna! Joseph Jr rca (Euloll Chm m agreement) sum Ina! m mm mm be reviewed vm substance as well as lawman: ‘u ‘s anen sawu that we-new review a wrwevnod nut war. we demon mu xneueusm.-manng pmcas (See 2 9 Cum Oonslame mNmm Wa\as Foucev Evins[I9B1]‘\| wLRI155y Thvsprupuiman auulﬂaunvnmn may wen mnve-y Ihe Imnnessoon met me jmsdldwon u! we courts m Judwdal Raw-w prouedmgl .; wnnnsu m use: wheve Ina amneved parly has run vecuwed «aw maxmun by on ammnly m mm he has been sumected Pu\|aW6ere<\l\y. \n me words ov um Dwack In Count“ on: s. . u . I On u Minillnrfov KM CMI51rvI::u[13I§] AD :74, where Ihe impugned decwswan ws ﬂawed on the gmund av Dmosdunl mmmnnaly Bm Lam Dwmooks mm gmunds cm Vmpugmng a aecmon suscsphbla In Juduml Rmnsw mike n nbundinliy clear max Inch - dcclslon Is also open a chillnnw on mums 01 ‘I lgalily‘ and Wrrxtionnllly‘ and In pr-um. um pormh: KM courts «mun: such an: . nel only luv plocux, hm alsn lm subluncn Vn om. comul n \s mm: «e note how Laud Dvplock [at up mum deﬁned Ihe wee gmunds oi mew, m wn, L.) megamy. uu mnlmnaluy mu jprooedurzlnmpmpnaly Tm: Vs howhu pal m By *IIhgnIIly' u . ground rm Judk:m\ Rm.“ u man man ms aocmon makur mun undumznd comm the hw mat reaulakas ms deassan-maﬂng gmmana muslgwe enema n Whememe hi: wr nnl .: pnraxceﬂunca a .u:.c.ame aueslnon m be deemed‘ m the event ov mspme. by muse perwns ms wages‘ Iry vmam ma Jwmx Duwuranhs man. .s exalun u ly ‘In-AIlonIllIy'. I mean what can by new be nuocmcuy releuza to as ‘wadneiday umawnamenur us. Assucmlad pmmm Home House: Lm v Weﬂnesbury com um] I KB 22:) xx IDD\|VI!\|UIdI€:1llUHW7VIChllIa ammgmun mmum ulloglc arafaooemed mom! sundavus Ina! rm sensime person vmu mad mum: ms mma «ma nuaswn lo be «mm mull! Mve amved rank n .1 as	54,608	Pytesseract-0.3.10
KB-43-3-06/2023	PEMOHON LIM SOON PING RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Revision of Sessions Court Judge's order dated 29.5.2023 whereby the SCJ ordered the confiscation of the Applicant's lorry under section 26(1) of Control of Supplies Act 1961 [Act 122]. Issue whether the exercise of discretion under the provision was exercised judiciously by the SCJ.	03/12/2023	YA Puan Narkunavathy Sundareson	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6cbcbac7-e802-4be1-8eb4-47c2649d2d0f&Inline=true	03/12/2023 10:22:20 KB-43-3-06/2023 Kand. 13 S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal na—a3—3—us/2023 Kand. J3 :3/12/2023 10:22:20 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI SUNGAI FETANI SEMAKAN JENAVAH M 3-4 as/2023 LIM soon PING v. PENDAKWA RAYA GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT lnlrvduction 1 we xener dated 115.2023 (Enclnsure 1), Lu" Snnn Pmg (Accused) Llang Sheng Wing Trading (Lwsn and Jip Sheng Trading 3. Transport sun and asked for rewsron orme erder dated 295202: wherehy me Veamed Sessmns Court Judge (sen) ordered the cunftscallnn of lorry beanng regis1ra\|Iun number PFS s22 (Lorry) qcunﬁscalxon amen 2 ms com‘ havmg perused me suhmwsswuns Men by names and heard ora\ suumissmrrs aﬂowed me Ievwswan The fullawmg are me reasons for the daemon Background facts 3 The Accused was charged In sessmns com on 2952023 In CnmIna\ Case No KB-52-9434/2023 (or bemg m passessmn of 4.000 was 0! diesel, a ccmlmlled amcle‘ wmch rs an onence under semun 21 0! me cannon av Supphes Ad 1961 [Aer 122] m xvqabamauuaxzvcumnw 1 Wale sum runny Mu ». us« w «my me nugwruuly mm mm... V1 mung We A The Accused, whn was Impresenled, meaded gumy on lhe same day and was sentenced \|o ﬁne av RM 12o‘ooo oo. The Ieamed SCJ a\su dvvecled mac me Larry and the pmeeeds fmm the sale of me mesa: amounlmg lo RMen,2oa on be conﬁscated under sermon 25 av Act 122 5 Nicole Lee Ax Yiin (Lee) afllrmed an amcaaw: [Enclosure 5] my LSVVT‘ semng out that - (n she was the diredor oi LSWT. a uansponaﬁon and Voglsncs company; my LSWT had baughl me Larry from Hang Seng Motor Sdn and but had yet to aWe<7l1I1eIrans1er ov me Lorry mlo their name; and (In) me Accused had rented me Lorry lrum LSWT an 1 4 zaza 5 LSWT quesnuned the pmuriecy ov me learned SCJ's cunnscanon Order on me grounds that (here was no mqulry Into awnsrshlp of Ihe Lorry before the order was made LSWT was not aﬁorded a nghl to be heard and did not know abcu\| me Cunflscanon Order until a few days Water They avgue that lhvs was contrary to Article 13 M me Federm ConslilImarI1FGL 1 Muhamad Muhanm hm Abdul Rahman, Assistant Enlarcement Ofﬂoer qomcer) wmn lhe Mmrstry of Domestic Trade and Costs M Lwmg‘ Cawangan Kedah mepanmenn afﬁrmed an afﬁdawt [Encsosure 9] snanng inter aha, chat — m xmabamauuaxzvcumnw Wale sum lhlhhﬂ wm be um In new m. mwgmuly mm 3..."... VI muus wvm (:1 me had rammed a slalement «om Lee on 25 4 202:1 regarding me Larry, and 111) Lee was were me: me nepsmnenn had taken poeeessuon cf the Lorry under section 21 AC1 122 because they had reason to behave VI was used 1n the cnmmlsslorl cf the oﬂence Submissions 11 The Apphcams argue me: me cennscenon Order was not a yumaous exercise 0! mscnet-on because me HMS reueu to make proper mqwy bedure making me order 9 Tne pmeecunng ofﬁoer mere\y asked ver me urder lar conﬁscauon slalmg mac mm: was no dam: rrom anyone lor me return o1 the Larry 10 The Deputy Public Prosecutor (ow) pmmed nut me re\evan( pmwsmns .n Am 122 and relerred nne Court to me Hansard cued 27 11 2014 wnerem zne Honourable Deputy Minister exmauneo the need rm xne amendments 1o me said Au 11 was (a ennanee the pumshmsnl pmwsmns and to empawer the come to con1.sce1e any vehicle‘ vessel av mheranlcle by means olwtuchlhe oﬂence was cummlled m xmammduuaxzvczimnw 1 ms sum lhlhhﬂ M11 e. um In my me .nnn.1-y Wm 11..."... VI enuus bum! 11 The DPF med several amhormes on s1azmory m1erpreca1mn and menmcuon onhe Cr:m1s1n cunslrulng an Actci Parliament The DPP sumnmed that the pmwsnon 1n secuon 25 Act 122 allows vow the oonﬂscauon oi prupedy belungmg In someone mher than me OKS and reiarred «ms com to — the declslan nlAhu Bakar mn Kalar.lC (now J) In PF v Chang S1ew Fan 2016 3 CLJ 511 whereun Hus Lordshup allowed the conﬁscalxon oi severan Kerns mcludrng a lorry and a Toyota Hilux wmch were used In the oomrnussiorr of lhe offence even Ihuugh lmlh veh1c1es were nol owned by the respondent His Lordshups dec1s1on was uphem by the Court o-«Appeal, and 111) me dec1s1on of Sabmn Ja'alar JC1n Agus v. PP 2015 2 cu ﬂwhereln HIS Lordsmpmsallowsd the conﬁscation M H ship used 90! smuggling dleser on the grounds that cunﬁscanun comd on1y be done to the properly or me accused Hus Lordship decision was reversed by me Courl omppeen Analysis and hndmgs 12 Seclmn 2511) o1Aet 122 oanlers the puwerzo conﬁscate and reads “when; any person 1s convicted or an awence zgamsl «me An ma court my order «he cunfisnaliml in whale or m pan or- rn xmaoamduuaxzvcumnw we sum runhnv wm e. ow. re vetny 1... .nn..n, «H: mm... m mung Mn 13 m x1qaMm4uuazEvczm1nw mu. sum rumhnv Mu e. uw. e vetny n. .,nn..ny mm anuumnl y. mung Mn (3) any oanImHed amcle In respecx oi wmcn me oﬁence has been wmmlned wmch nas been sewzed by, Dr has mherwlse some ink) me possession at me CunlroHer er any person aclmg undev rns aulhonly, (say any properly do me accused, vehicle, vessel or dcner zmcley by means olwmcn ma aﬂenoe nas been commllled N which we mended lo be used lar the cnmmissmn m an dwenee mums! «ms Act‘ or (b) me pmoeeds drsave of any eucn cannoued amde W i\| has been sold under secnon 12 “ The Honuuvame Deputy Mnmsler gave the veuawing exmanaunn dunng the second readmg oi the Bill to amend Act 122 — “Tuan Pengemsn dan Ann-ann Vang Berharmal, cadangan plndaan im ada\ah mengambll knra penmgkalan kss mehbalakn banana kewalan dan sunendi, kepenuan hukuman yang dstsn-an! kepada pesalah dan xepenuan menyusun semma subswdw negara . Amara :;m—cIrI utama Kepada csdangan pmdaan Im ada\ah eepem benkul — nu) rnempenexaekan kuasa mahkamah unluk -nememxan apae apa kenderaan‘ vessel aoau barang lain yang digunakan untuk xuyuan melakukan kesa\ahan‘ dan Keempaly menggubal semma subseksyen 2s unmk memelaskan bahawa pka seseorang dwsabllkan dengan sualu kesalahan, mahkarnah buleh membual pennnan perampasan secara 14 15. 16, kesemruhan alau sebenagran apa-ipa kenﬂevaan. vessel, harla Ienuduh alau barang lam yang dengannya eueru kesmahan nelab duexuken den membual perrnrarr menyerahkan hens (enuduh yang drrampae kepada Pengawm alau rnanaanarra nrang yang dmamakan u\eh Pengawa\ dan Fengawal nendaman member: arahan bevkenaan dengan pempusan narla lenuduh nu ' Tlvs Court agrees wllh the DFP‘s subrmsslons lhat the Sessmns Court, heanng the oilenoe, re Indeed empowered ln order me conlrscalion 0! any property, vehwde, vessel nr durer amcle used m the cnmmxssmn 07 the oﬂence regardbss of wheﬂher I! belongs (0 me accused The rssue in me present case as not about me source or scope or the puwer accorded «b the Court to order the cnnﬁscauun‘ but ramerwnetner max pcwev was exerused wdlclnusw by me Veamed sc.I omerwrse, me protecnon under Amde 1: FC, \|ha\| an awner cannot be depnved at me propeny save m accordance wllh law, wuuld be rendered Illusory on the quesmn a! wnen amoums m a judicious exercise at drscreudn, «ms Cnurt lound excerpts mm me iollowmg judgmems be be mgmy mstruzmve e 1») Data‘ SH Mahd Nam bin H Abdul Razak v Public Prggguldr 2023 3 MLJ 40 at 75, whevem Abdul Rahman Sehh CJSS exmamed » HI) wuurcrmoacrxrorr rs a dwmun mm rs walworssxdarad, dixcroel. w\:e\y c4I<:\|mup:<:\| see mm: Law omorrsryqneruxe 9m Eoy A msclemen (ha! '3 ml exerased ;udl::mus\y rs nm 3 mo exzvmse M orsoremorr and rs name m be oer asrae “ Am Sugennlendenl of Land and Survey Degarlmenl Ku-:nrrrg— D\vIs\ana\ ofvioe & Anor v Ratnawan bimr Hasbi Mnhimad Suleiman 202012 MLJ 553 at 612, wherem ldrus hm Harun FCJ held » ‘In N, Wan Hnbm Syed Mahmud V Daluk Pallnggv M Abdul Tarb Mahmud & Anar[I9EB] cu men) 149, (he supreme Conn an pages 15010151 helm 'u rs am well ailabhmad that won an sxavcise of oawranrorr wi\l not no murvaroa with by .r. Ipyelllle Cami save rn exceptions! lane: such us where Ihe dedsmn Mme mal Judge Is shown (0 be based an erroneous assummuane 0! law or can or mm no reasonable exwaruuorr rs gwarr for the daemon u r; rum unallﬁh than me appuume Cmm miglﬂ haw: exevmsed we orxomm dxllevzmiy Sac Eqmlnhle Remadass, by Sply, cw son and Hzdmnr Producbons uo L 075 V Namrﬂan 5 AMJIIHIBSI 1 AC 121 We rruam and man a uocrsmrr wru be :9: am: an appear n In: com 71:: iaﬂed to an r.. acmrdanua mm vamgnizad prarrororu - Rxsflvanoa miy aka be madam me decman mm; Conn In Lrarr Ksow Sdn Bhd 5 Ana! v Q/arses: Cn9dvIFmanms (MI Sdn arm. 0r.s[19282l cu map» 152 al page «as as an aumouly man an ovdav prevmsvy rum nymo oourr could be:e\|2sIdaw>ma1hu “ms. Mmscnebnn by (M cum! hehzw such as the Calm L11Appea\ herein wm based upon 3 mwsundelsunmng Mme law and the ram before rc- sm xmabamduumzvcumnw -mu. sum ...mr wm ». um w my me arV§\n\|HIy mm; daamr-nl «. nF\LIN5 Wm 17 18 19 211 21 22. ru xmammduuaxzrcumnw \n the present case, Lee averted that (ha! me learned SCJ was rntorrned by prosecunorr that “Tiada sebarang tunlutan dibual oleh rnana-rnana pmak (emadap keduadua mcmlon ' [pare n Enclure 8] ms avermenl was admmed by me Ofﬂoer [para 12 Errerasure 9]. That exetemern by me prosecuuon rs whnHy urrrrue because by 29 5 2023, me owner had aheady rewrded Lees statement and knew that Lswr were dawmlng ownership or me Lorry LSWTwere only aware that me Depanmern had taken pesaeseron uHI1ewLurry There s nu mfuvmalmn wnemer they were Informed that «her Larry was at nsk or cormscanorr or w lhey were notmed at me heinng dale Gomg by Lee's amdawl, rt waum seem mat they were kepl m me dark about lhe cunrrseauon Order because me Depanmern accented Lees documenls relating to owrrersnrp or me Larry the day aner me urdev was made Pruseeunun also ma na\| exrnm me nner Vanls L11 \|he case which have been read oullolhe SCJ upon recurdmg the Accused’s gurny plea Tnese Isms wouru have been crucial as n womd have set out nowme Larry was used m meeernrnrseren onrre oﬂencs and ruanry prasecIman's reasons for eeekrng \|he mrvﬁscamn order This court is rnindvul that Act 122 Is sueru about auormng owners (other man the accused) nf vehicles, vessels and other amcxesr a right to he heard before a conirseauon arder rs made. war. sum murmur M“ e. um law may he .nnr.r-r vvws anuunnnl m muus perm 2: But the conhscatiorr order had the ettem at deprtvtng Lswr ot owhersmp ot the Lorry. The exemee at the dtecretton under seclton 2s(aat Ac! t22 cannot oe judtmnus W‘ the Court maktng the order was not tutty appratsed ot all the relevant lacls about the ownership at the vehrcte used tn the commtsstart ot the offence under ssctton 21 Act t22. 24 From the tests 0! the present case. II is patently dear that the learned sct rnade the Conﬁscalturt Order on erroneous and tnoornptete taets about ewnerehtp of the Larry As a resun, the connsoehon order slrlpped LSWT or tnetr mndementat ngnt to hold and eruoy tnetr properly guaranteed by Article 13 FC 25 In ttgnt otthe above, ttus court trhds that the cohhseattoh order ts ltable to be set astde Decision 26 Thts court ettews the apphcamn tar tavtatoh of the teamed SCI: and sets asrdetne cohhscatmh order dated 29 5 2023 The matter rs rermtted to the teamed SCJ to reconstder prosecution's epphcettoh ter a cohhscatton erder Dated 25 November 2023 Judicial Commtsstunsr Htgh court or Mataya at Sungat Petant IN ﬂqamtaduuotztczmtnw Wale sum ruuvthnv MU e. um law may he .nha.nr was mm... 2. murte bum! Peguam bag? nihak Pumohon R Thevan Teman Hakim R Thsvan 8: Co Na 55, 2% Floor, Jalan Pangkalan. Taman Pekin Barn, osooa sungar Penam, Kedah mgr plhlk Rupomlen TPR Syazwanl Zawawx TPR Rushna Vdns Pejabax Fenasman unaang-unaang Negen Kedah Dam! Amen Aras 4‘ Elok C, Wxsma Darul Amen‘ 05250 Alor sznan Kedah m xvqammauuaxzvczmnw wu Wale sum lhlhhﬂ wm be um In new m. mwgmuly mm 3..."... VI muus wvm	1,360	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
KB-43-3-06/2023	PEMOHON LIM SOON PING RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Revision of Sessions Court Judge's order dated 29.5.2023 whereby the SCJ ordered the confiscation of the Applicant's lorry under section 26(1) of Control of Supplies Act 1961 [Act 122]. Issue whether the exercise of discretion under the provision was exercised judiciously by the SCJ.	03/12/2023	YA Puan Narkunavathy Sundareson	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6cbcbac7-e802-4be1-8eb4-47c2649d2d0f&Inline=true	03/12/2023 10:22:20 KB-43-3-06/2023 Kand. 13 S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7q8bALo4UuOtEfCZJ0tDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal na—a3—3—us/2023 Kand. J3 :3/12/2023 10:22:20 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI SUNGAI FETANI SEMAKAN JENAVAH M 3-4 as/2023 LIM soon PING v. PENDAKWA RAYA GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT lnlrvduction 1 we xener dated 115.2023 (Enclnsure 1), Lu" Snnn Pmg (Accused) Llang Sheng Wing Trading (Lwsn and Jip Sheng Trading 3. Transport sun and asked for rewsron orme erder dated 295202: wherehy me Veamed Sessmns Court Judge (sen) ordered the cunftscallnn of lorry beanng regis1ra\|Iun number PFS s22 (Lorry) qcunﬁscalxon amen 2 ms com‘ havmg perused me suhmwsswuns Men by names and heard ora\ suumissmrrs aﬂowed me Ievwswan The fullawmg are me reasons for the daemon Background facts 3 The Accused was charged In sessmns com on 2952023 In CnmIna\ Case No KB-52-9434/2023 (or bemg m passessmn of 4.000 was 0! diesel, a ccmlmlled amcle‘ wmch rs an onence under semun 21 0! me cannon av Supphes Ad 1961 [Aer 122] m xvqabamauuaxzvcumnw 1 Wale sum runny Mu ». us« w «my me nugwruuly mm mm... V1 mung We A The Accused, whn was Impresenled, meaded gumy on lhe same day and was sentenced \|o ﬁne av RM 12o‘ooo oo. The Ieamed SCJ a\su dvvecled mac me Larry and the pmeeeds fmm the sale of me mesa: amounlmg lo RMen,2oa on be conﬁscated under sermon 25 av Act 122 5 Nicole Lee Ax Yiin (Lee) afllrmed an amcaaw: [Enclosure 5] my LSVVT‘ semng out that - (n she was the diredor oi LSWT. a uansponaﬁon and Voglsncs company; my LSWT had baughl me Larry from Hang Seng Motor Sdn and but had yet to aWe<7l1I1eIrans1er ov me Lorry mlo their name; and (In) me Accused had rented me Lorry lrum LSWT an 1 4 zaza 5 LSWT quesnuned the pmuriecy ov me learned SCJ's cunnscanon Order on me grounds that (here was no mqulry Into awnsrshlp of Ihe Lorry before the order was made LSWT was not aﬁorded a nghl to be heard and did not know abcu\| me Cunflscanon Order until a few days Water They avgue that lhvs was contrary to Article 13 M me Federm ConslilImarI1FGL 1 Muhamad Muhanm hm Abdul Rahman, Assistant Enlarcement Ofﬂoer qomcer) wmn lhe Mmrstry of Domestic Trade and Costs M Lwmg‘ Cawangan Kedah mepanmenn afﬁrmed an afﬁdawt [Encsosure 9] snanng inter aha, chat — m xmabamauuaxzvcumnw Wale sum lhlhhﬂ wm be um In new m. mwgmuly mm 3..."... VI muus wvm (:1 me had rammed a slalement «om Lee on 25 4 202:1 regarding me Larry, and 111) Lee was were me: me nepsmnenn had taken poeeessuon cf the Lorry under section 21 AC1 122 because they had reason to behave VI was used 1n the cnmmlsslorl cf the oﬂence Submissions 11 The Apphcams argue me: me cennscenon Order was not a yumaous exercise 0! mscnet-on because me HMS reueu to make proper mqwy bedure making me order 9 Tne pmeecunng ofﬁoer mere\y asked ver me urder lar conﬁscauon slalmg mac mm: was no dam: rrom anyone lor me return o1 the Larry 10 The Deputy Public Prosecutor (ow) pmmed nut me re\evan( pmwsmns .n Am 122 and relerred nne Court to me Hansard cued 27 11 2014 wnerem zne Honourable Deputy Minister exmauneo the need rm xne amendments 1o me said Au 11 was (a ennanee the pumshmsnl pmwsmns and to empawer the come to con1.sce1e any vehicle‘ vessel av mheranlcle by means olwtuchlhe oﬂence was cummlled m xmammduuaxzvczimnw 1 ms sum lhlhhﬂ M11 e. um In my me .nnn.1-y Wm 11..."... VI enuus bum! 11 The DPF med several amhormes on s1azmory m1erpreca1mn and menmcuon onhe Cr:m1s1n cunslrulng an Actci Parliament The DPP sumnmed that the pmwsnon 1n secuon 25 Act 122 allows vow the oonﬂscauon oi prupedy belungmg In someone mher than me OKS and reiarred «ms com to — the declslan nlAhu Bakar mn Kalar.lC (now J) In PF v Chang S1ew Fan 2016 3 CLJ 511 whereun Hus Lordshup allowed the conﬁscalxon oi severan Kerns mcludrng a lorry and a Toyota Hilux wmch were used In the oomrnussiorr of lhe offence even Ihuugh lmlh veh1c1es were nol owned by the respondent His Lordshups dec1s1on was uphem by the Court o-«Appeal, and 111) me dec1s1on of Sabmn Ja'alar JC1n Agus v. PP 2015 2 cu ﬂwhereln HIS Lordsmpmsallowsd the conﬁscation M H ship used 90! smuggling dleser on the grounds that cunﬁscanun comd on1y be done to the properly or me accused Hus Lordship decision was reversed by me Courl omppeen Analysis and hndmgs 12 Seclmn 2511) o1Aet 122 oanlers the puwerzo conﬁscate and reads “when; any person 1s convicted or an awence zgamsl «me An ma court my order «he cunfisnaliml in whale or m pan or- rn xmaoamduuaxzvcumnw we sum runhnv wm e. ow. re vetny 1... .nn..n, «H: mm... m mung Mn 13 m x1qaMm4uuazEvczm1nw mu. sum rumhnv Mu e. uw. e vetny n. .,nn..ny mm anuumnl y. mung Mn (3) any oanImHed amcle In respecx oi wmcn me oﬁence has been wmmlned wmch nas been sewzed by, Dr has mherwlse some ink) me possession at me CunlroHer er any person aclmg undev rns aulhonly, (say any properly do me accused, vehicle, vessel or dcner zmcley by means olwmcn ma aﬂenoe nas been commllled N which we mended lo be used lar the cnmmissmn m an dwenee mums! «ms Act‘ or (b) me pmoeeds drsave of any eucn cannoued amde W i\| has been sold under secnon 12 “ The Honuuvame Deputy Mnmsler gave the veuawing exmanaunn dunng the second readmg oi the Bill to amend Act 122 — “Tuan Pengemsn dan Ann-ann Vang Berharmal, cadangan plndaan im ada\ah mengambll knra penmgkalan kss mehbalakn banana kewalan dan sunendi, kepenuan hukuman yang dstsn-an! kepada pesalah dan xepenuan menyusun semma subswdw negara . Amara :;m—cIrI utama Kepada csdangan pmdaan Im ada\ah eepem benkul — nu) rnempenexaekan kuasa mahkamah unluk -nememxan apae apa kenderaan‘ vessel aoau barang lain yang digunakan untuk xuyuan melakukan kesa\ahan‘ dan Keempaly menggubal semma subseksyen 2s unmk memelaskan bahawa pka seseorang dwsabllkan dengan sualu kesalahan, mahkarnah buleh membual pennnan perampasan secara 14 15. 16, kesemruhan alau sebenagran apa-ipa kenﬂevaan. vessel, harla Ienuduh alau barang lam yang dengannya eueru kesmahan nelab duexuken den membual perrnrarr menyerahkan hens (enuduh yang drrampae kepada Pengawm alau rnanaanarra nrang yang dmamakan u\eh Pengawa\ dan Fengawal nendaman member: arahan bevkenaan dengan pempusan narla lenuduh nu ' Tlvs Court agrees wllh the DFP‘s subrmsslons lhat the Sessmns Court, heanng the oilenoe, re Indeed empowered ln order me conlrscalion 0! any property, vehwde, vessel nr durer amcle used m the cnmmxssmn 07 the oﬂence regardbss of wheﬂher I! belongs (0 me accused The rssue in me present case as not about me source or scope or the puwer accorded «b the Court to order the cnnﬁscauun‘ but ramerwnetner max pcwev was exerused wdlclnusw by me Veamed sc.I omerwrse, me protecnon under Amde 1: FC, \|ha\| an awner cannot be depnved at me propeny save m accordance wllh law, wuuld be rendered Illusory on the quesmn a! wnen amoums m a judicious exercise at drscreudn, «ms Cnurt lound excerpts mm me iollowmg judgmems be be mgmy mstruzmve e 1») Data‘ SH Mahd Nam bin H Abdul Razak v Public Prggguldr 2023 3 MLJ 40 at 75, whevem Abdul Rahman Sehh CJSS exmamed » HI) wuurcrmoacrxrorr rs a dwmun mm rs walworssxdarad, dixcroel. w\:e\y c4I<:\|mup:<:\| see mm: Law omorrsryqneruxe 9m Eoy A msclemen (ha! '3 ml exerased ;udl::mus\y rs nm 3 mo exzvmse M orsoremorr and rs name m be oer asrae “ Am Sugennlendenl of Land and Survey Degarlmenl Ku-:nrrrg— D\vIs\ana\ ofvioe & Anor v Ratnawan bimr Hasbi Mnhimad Suleiman 202012 MLJ 553 at 612, wherem ldrus hm Harun FCJ held » ‘In N, Wan Hnbm Syed Mahmud V Daluk Pallnggv M Abdul Tarb Mahmud & Anar[I9EB] cu men) 149, (he supreme Conn an pages 15010151 helm 'u rs am well ailabhmad that won an sxavcise of oawranrorr wi\l not no murvaroa with by .r. Ipyelllle Cami save rn exceptions! lane: such us where Ihe dedsmn Mme mal Judge Is shown (0 be based an erroneous assummuane 0! law or can or mm no reasonable exwaruuorr rs gwarr for the daemon u r; rum unallﬁh than me appuume Cmm miglﬂ haw: exevmsed we orxomm dxllevzmiy Sac Eqmlnhle Remadass, by Sply, cw son and Hzdmnr Producbons uo L 075 V Namrﬂan 5 AMJIIHIBSI 1 AC 121 We rruam and man a uocrsmrr wru be :9: am: an appear n In: com 71:: iaﬂed to an r.. acmrdanua mm vamgnizad prarrororu - Rxsflvanoa miy aka be madam me decman mm; Conn In Lrarr Ksow Sdn Bhd 5 Ana! v Q/arses: Cn9dvIFmanms (MI Sdn arm. 0r.s[19282l cu map» 152 al page «as as an aumouly man an ovdav prevmsvy rum nymo oourr could be:e\|2sIdaw>ma1hu “ms. Mmscnebnn by (M cum! hehzw such as the Calm L11Appea\ herein wm based upon 3 mwsundelsunmng Mme law and the ram before rc- sm xmabamduumzvcumnw -mu. sum ...mr wm ». um w my me arV§\n\|HIy mm; daamr-nl «. nF\LIN5 Wm 17 18 19 211 21 22. ru xmammduuaxzrcumnw \n the present case, Lee averted that (ha! me learned SCJ was rntorrned by prosecunorr that “Tiada sebarang tunlutan dibual oleh rnana-rnana pmak (emadap keduadua mcmlon ' [pare n Enclure 8] ms avermenl was admmed by me Ofﬂoer [para 12 Errerasure 9]. That exetemern by me prosecuuon rs whnHy urrrrue because by 29 5 2023, me owner had aheady rewrded Lees statement and knew that Lswr were dawmlng ownership or me Lorry LSWTwere only aware that me Depanmern had taken pesaeseron uHI1ewLurry There s nu mfuvmalmn wnemer they were Informed that «her Larry was at nsk or cormscanorr or w lhey were notmed at me heinng dale Gomg by Lee's amdawl, rt waum seem mat they were kepl m me dark about lhe cunrrseauon Order because me Depanmern accented Lees documenls relating to owrrersnrp or me Larry the day aner me urdev was made Pruseeunun also ma na\| exrnm me nner Vanls L11 \|he case which have been read oullolhe SCJ upon recurdmg the Accused’s gurny plea Tnese Isms wouru have been crucial as n womd have set out nowme Larry was used m meeernrnrseren onrre oﬂencs and ruanry prasecIman's reasons for eeekrng \|he mrvﬁscamn order This court is rnindvul that Act 122 Is sueru about auormng owners (other man the accused) nf vehicles, vessels and other amcxesr a right to he heard before a conirseauon arder rs made. war. sum murmur M“ e. um law may he .nnr.r-r vvws anuunnnl m muus perm 2: But the conhscatiorr order had the ettem at deprtvtng Lswr ot owhersmp ot the Lorry. The exemee at the dtecretton under seclton 2s(aat Ac! t22 cannot oe judtmnus W‘ the Court maktng the order was not tutty appratsed ot all the relevant lacls about the ownership at the vehrcte used tn the commtsstart ot the offence under ssctton 21 Act t22. 24 From the tests 0! the present case. II is patently dear that the learned sct rnade the Conﬁscalturt Order on erroneous and tnoornptete taets about ewnerehtp of the Larry As a resun, the connsoehon order slrlpped LSWT or tnetr mndementat ngnt to hold and eruoy tnetr properly guaranteed by Article 13 FC 25 In ttgnt otthe above, ttus court trhds that the cohhseattoh order ts ltable to be set astde Decision 26 Thts court ettews the apphcamn tar tavtatoh of the teamed SCI: and sets asrdetne cohhscatmh order dated 29 5 2023 The matter rs rermtted to the teamed SCJ to reconstder prosecution's epphcettoh ter a cohhscatton erder Dated 25 November 2023 Judicial Commtsstunsr Htgh court or Mataya at Sungat Petant IN ﬂqamtaduuotztczmtnw Wale sum ruuvthnv MU e. um law may he .nha.nr was mm... 2. murte bum! Peguam bag? nihak Pumohon R Thevan Teman Hakim R Thsvan 8: Co Na 55, 2% Floor, Jalan Pangkalan. Taman Pekin Barn, osooa sungar Penam, Kedah mgr plhlk Rupomlen TPR Syazwanl Zawawx TPR Rushna Vdns Pejabax Fenasman unaang-unaang Negen Kedah Dam! Amen Aras 4‘ Elok C, Wxsma Darul Amen‘ 05250 Alor sznan Kedah m xvqammauuaxzvczmnw wu Wale sum lhlhhﬂ wm be um In new m. mwgmuly mm 3..."... VI muus wvm	1,360	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022	PLAINTIF WAN KAM SANG SEBAGAI BAPA YANG SAH DAN PENANGGUNGAN KEPADA WAN MEE FONG, SIMATI, UNTUK DIRI SENDIRI, DAN BAGI PIHAK PENANGGUNGAN-PENANGGUNGAN YANG LAIN DEFENDAN KOO TIEN WEE	Kemalangan jalan raya - permohonan untuk mencelah oleh syarikat insuran - sama ada insuran patut dibenarkan mencelah di dalam prosiding bicara atau memohon deklarasi polisi tidak sah dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasa di Mahkamah Tinggi	03/12/2023	Puan Lailawati Binti Ali	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6c704553-85b2-4dc5-b8ae-cab7b1dd704c&Inline=true	JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO. JA – A53KJ – 887 – 12 / 2022 ANTARA WAN KAM SANG sebagai bapa yang sah dan penanggungan kepada WAN MEE FONG, simati, untuk diri sendiri, dan bagi pihak penanggungan- penanggungan yang lain … PLAINTIF DAN KOO TIEN WEE … DEFENDAN DAN ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD … PEMOHON / PENCELAH DICADANGKAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Lampiran 19) PENGENALAN [1] Ini merupakan rayuan pemohon / pencelah yang dicadangkan (“pemohon”) terhadap keputusan Mahkamah bertarikh 16 Oktober 2023 bagi permohonan plaintif di bawah Lampiran 19. [2] Lampiran 19 adalah permohonan pemohon untuk mencelah dalam prosiding ini atas alasan tuntutan plaintif ini tidak dilindungi oleh polisi insuran kenderaan yang dikeluarkan oleh pemohon. 03/12/2023 14:20:09 JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Kand. 42 S/N U0VwbLKFxU24rsq3sd1wTA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee 2 [3] Mahkamah menolak permohonan pemohon dengan kos RM1,000.00 dan kini pemohon telah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap keseluruhan keputusan tersebut. PERMOHONAN PEMOHON [4] Kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan bagi maksud permohonan ini adalah seperti berikut: i. Notis Permohonan bertarikh 22.9.2023; ii. Afidavit sokongan pemohon bertarikh 26.9.2023; iii. Afidavit jawapan plaintif bertarikh 3.10.2023; iv. Afidavit balasan pemohon bertarikh 11.10.2023. [5] Di dalam Notis Permohonan tersebut, perintah-perintah yang dipohon inter alia adalah seperti berikut: a) kebenaran mencelah di dalam prosiding ini dan dinamakan sebagai defendan kedua; b) plaintif meminda tajuk Writ Saman dan Penyata Tuntutan dan menyerahkannya kepada pemohon sebagai defendan kedua; c) pemohon dikehendaki memfailkan pembelaan dan menyerahkannya kepada defendan kedua; d) tiada penghakiman dimasukkan ke atas defendan kedua sehingga pelupusan kes ini; e) tuntutan ini digantung sehingga pelupusan Saman Pemula dan/atau tuntutan balas pemohon untuk perintah deklarasi dilupuskan. S/N U0VwbLKFxU24rsq3sd1wTA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee 3 [5] Alasan untuk mencelah seperti yang dikemukakan melalui affidavit sokongan pemohon ialah: i. Pemohon merupakan penanggung insuran bagi motorcar JNT 8009 bagi tempoh 18.9.2019 - 17.9.2020 melalui polisi insuran no. 17VJB0025335-02; ii. Pelindungan insuran tersebut dilanjutkan ke atas penumpang- penumpang motorcar JNT 8009 bagi tempoh yang sama tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat dan terma-terma di bawah Endorsement 100; iii. Motorcar tersebut terlibat di dalam kemalangan jalan raya pada 18.3.2020 di KM 20.3 Lebuhraya Link Kedua Arah Selatan ketika dipandu oleh defendan. Isteri defendan Wang Mee Fong iaitu Simati di dalam kes ini adalah penumpang di dalam motorcar tersebut. Kemalangan tersebut telah meragut nyawa simati Wang Mee Fong; iv. Menurut Endorsement 100 tersebut, tuntutan plaintif ini tidak dilindungi oleh pemohon kerana tiada bukti menunjukkan semasa kemalangan berlaku simati dikehendaki menumpang motorcar tersebut atas sebab atau berkenaan dengan satu kontrak pekerjaan; v. Menurut siasatan, pada masa kemalangan simati dan defendan sedang dalam perjalanan pulang daripada pemeriksaan pakar di sebuah hospital di Selangor dan pada ketika itu juga Kerajaan Malaysia telah mengumumkan Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan kerana Covid-19. [6] Plaintif telah membantah permohonan ini atas alasan: S/N U0VwbLKFxU24rsq3sd1wTA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee 4 i. Polisi insuran yang dikeluarkan oleh pemohon dan dibayar oleh defendan meliputi penumpang-penumpang kenderaan tersebut terutamanya simati; ii. Semasa kejadian simati dalam perjalanan urusan pekerjaan di mana simati merupakan kerani yang bekerja dengan defendan; iii. Simati dan defendan tinggal berasingan di alamat rumah yang berbeza; iv. Notis Statutori diberikan kepada syarikan insuran pemohon pada 29.12.2022 dan pemohon pada bila-bila masa tidak pernah memberitahu mereka mempertikaikan terma-terma polisi tersebut; v. Pembelaan defendan tidak pernah membangkitkan isu ini; vi. Permohonan ini difailkan lewat setelah perbicaraan kes telah berjalan dan satu saksi telah dipanggil dan dilepaskan; vii. Tindakan ini melibatkan isu kecuaian. Sekiraya pemohon mempertikaikan terma-terma polisi insuran, pemohon sepatutnya memfailkan satu tindakan antara pemohon dan defendan dibawah s 96 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 mengenai isu taksiran terma polisi insuran tersebut. ANALISA DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [7] Dalam memutuskan permohonan ini Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes Amgeneral Insurance Berhad v. Nantha Kumar Arumugam [2016] 1 LNS 1437 yang mana isu yang sama timbul. S/N U0VwbLKFxU24rsq3sd1wTA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee 5 [8] Di dalan kes tersebut, pihak insuran telah memfailkan permohonan untuk mencelah dan dijadikan salah satu daripada defendan di dalam prosiding tindakan kecuaian kemalangan jalan raya di Mahkamah Majistret. Alasan untuk mencelah ialah polisi insuran kenderaan defendan yang terlibat tidak melindungi tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan. Permohonan pencelah/insuran dibuat di bawah Aturan 15 kaedah 16 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012. [9] Di dalam rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi, YA Hashim Hamzah H, (pada ketika itu), memutuskan: [11] … In the present appeal, the dispute between the parties revolved around the statutory obligation on the part of the Respondent as the Second Defendant's insurer under section 96(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (RTA 1987"). … [15] As submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant, I agree that the liability of the insurer under section 96(1) of the RTA is a contingent statutory liability created by the statute and dependent upon the judgment obtained by the claimant. … [22] First and foremost, I am of the view that the wording undersection 96(1) of the RTA 1987 is very clear and unambiguous. Under section 96(1) of the RTA 1987, , the insurer bears a statutory obligation to pay for any judgment sum obtained against the insured except if the insurer's case falls under any of the exceptions provided under section 96(2) and (3) of the RTA 1987. ... [24] Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of section 96(1), (2) and (3) of the RTA above. … [26] … , I am in full agreement with Mohd Zawawi Salleh J (as he then was) in Europlas Construction Sdn Bhd v. Leighton Contractors (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd S/N U0VwbLKFxU24rsq3sd1wTA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee 6 [2011] 1 LNS 320 who quoted the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Saiyad Mohd v. Abdulhabib [1988] 4 SCO 343 (349) where it was held that- "A procedural law is always in aid of justice, not in contradiction or to defeat the very object which is sought to be achieved. A procedural law is always subservient to the substantive law. Nothing can be given by a procedural law what is not sought to be given by a substantive law and nothing can be taken away by the procedural law what is given by substantive law. " [27] Both of these authorities were referred to by Abu Bakar Jais JC (as he then was) in the case of Kejuruteraan Letrik Man Hoe Sdn Bhd v. Max-Benefit Sdn Bhd & Anor; Cergas Tegas Sdn Bhd (Dalam Likuidasi), Liberty Wonder Sdn Bhd & Tow Lin Fook (Applicants) [2013] 1 LNS 1217 when confronted with the same issue under O. 15 r. 6(b) of the ROC 2012 regarding the joinder of a party although premised on different provision of law (under the Companies Act 1965 ). [28] Based on all of the above, I am of the view that even though the application of O. 15 r. 6(b) of the ROC 2012 gives a wide power to the Court to ensure that all matters are effectively adjudicated upon procedurally, the exercise of this power should not contradict nor defeat the purpose of any express, clear and unambiguous statutory provision, such as section 96(1), (2) and (3) of the RTA 1987. [29] In the present case, the effect of allowing the Respondent's application to intervene and to put forward its defence on the ground that the insurance policy did not cover the Appellant's claim would tantamount to defeat the whole object of section 96(1), (2) and (3) of the RTA 1987. [30] Another alternative would be for the Respondent to pray for a declaration under section 96(3) of the RTA 1987, in which I was made to understand, had already commenced in a separate forum. Therefore, no injustice was done to the Respondent by this order.” S/N U0VwbLKFxU24rsq3sd1wTA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee 7 [10] Berdasarkan nas undang-undang di atas Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan tindakan pihak insuran mencelah di dalam prosiding kecuaian di Mahkamah Bicara atas alasan polisi insuran yang dikeluarkan olehnya tidak melindungi defendan terjumlah kepada tindakan bertentangan dengan s 96(1), (2) dan (3) RTA 1987. Ini kerana liability pihak insuran/pencelah di bawah Akta tersebut bergantung kepada dapatan kecuaian terlebih dahulu oleh Mahkamah Bicara tersebut. Sekiranya pihak insuran berpendapat polisi yang dikeluarkan tidak melindungi defendan di dalam tuntutan plaintif terhadapnya, maka pihak insuran boleh memfailkan permohonan deklarasi bahawa polisi insuran tersebut tidak sah dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasa di bawah seksyen 96(3) Akta tersebut di hadapan forum yang berlainan. [11] Sama seperti di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, isu utama yang ditimbulkan oleh pemohon ialah sama ada tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan diliputi di bawah polisi insuran no. 17VJB0025335-02 bagi motorcar JNT 8009 yang dipandu defendan yang mana melibatkan tafsiran klausa di bawah polisi tersebut. [12] Walaupun A15k16 KKM2012 memberi kuasa yang luas kepada Mahkamah untuk membawa masuk dan membatalkan kehadiran pihak-pihak di dalam sesuatu tindakan, kuasa tersebut tidak boleh mengatasi mana-mana peruntukan statutory seperti seksyen 96 Akta tersebut. S/N U0VwbLKFxU24rsq3sd1wTA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-887-12/2022 Wong Kam Sang v Koo Tien Wee 8 [13] Pada pendapat Mahkamah, forum yang sesuai bagi pemohon ialah permohonan deklarasi di Mahkamah Tinggi bagi satu perintah mengisytiharkan bahawa polisi insuran terbabit adalah tidak sah dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan di dalam tindakan di antara plaintif dan defendan dan bukannya mencelah di dalam prosiding ini. KESIMPULAN [13] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati tiada merit di dalam permohonan ini dan Notis Permohonan Pemohon di Lampiran 19 ditolak dengan kos RM1,000.00 dibayar kepada plaintif. Bertarikh pada 3 Disember 2023 ………………………………… LAILAWATI BINTI ALI Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Sivil 3 Johor Bharu, JOHOR Bagi pihak pemohon: Bagi pihak plaintif: T/n Kanaga Suresh & Co T/n Teo & Assoc. S/N U0VwbLKFxU24rsq3sd1wTA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	12,813	Tika 2.6.0
KB-12B-2-03/2023	PERAYU 1. ) NOOR SHAHIRA BINTI ROSLY 2. ) MOHD AYOB BIN CHE ALI RESPONDEN ABDUL RAHIM BIN ABDUL JALIL	Rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (HMS) bertarikh 8.3.2023 atas isu liabiliti sahaja. Isu sama ada keputusan HMS yang Perayu bertanggungan 100% untuk kemalangan tersebut menunjukkan penilaian keterangan yang betul.	03/12/2023	YA Puan Narkunavathy Sundareson	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=102e566e-7c0c-4ee2-a405-4449a27148d9&Inline=true	03/12/2023 10:25:00 KB-12B-2-03/2023 Kand. 15 S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N blYuEAx84k6kBURJonFI2Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ma—12a-2-03/2023 Kand. J5 :5/12/2023 10:25:03 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI suucm PETAIII DALAM NEGERI KEDAH RAVUAN SIVIL NO. K5425-2—naI2n2: ANTARA 1. NDOR SHAHIRA BINTI ROSLV 2. MOHD AVDB am CHE ALI FERAVU—PERAVU DAN ABDUL RAHIM BIN ABDUL JALIL ...REsPoNnEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAII Fendahnlnln 1 Im adalah rayuan (erhadap kepulusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (arms; benankh 2 3 2023 eras wsu namxm sahma 2 Unmk kemudahan wjukan‘ nmax-nmax sepemmana uqukan mereka di Mahkamah Sesyen axan dmuuk 3 Setelah menehu sura\|z:ara rayuan Im dan manan kedua plhak‘ Mahkamah ml memumskan unmk membenavkan rayuan ne1enaan—De¢endan Eenkul adalah alasan umuk kepumsan cersenuc Prusidlng vml Plnlnrif ahlmmah Sexyen 4 versr Pram (SP2) mxah bahawa pada 912019 ram mum kuvang 5'30 pagr ma dalam veuaxanan din Sldam ke Kumpung Jenmg menawkw moluswkzl dengan rmmbal pendanararr PHX 2:55 (Momsrkau. Detandan Panama, yang sedang memandu kerela dengan no Dendaltavan PDN aaa (Kerem dalang ﬂan arch nenerrmrgan dsngan law an telah mewanggarrrya 5 Plamm raum xerpetanxing ke dalam Dam darn (ems pengsan Pramw Dash nomhor panaanaran Kereta msehut kerana pemandu Kerem cersehm dan kampung yang sum. 6 sanar. Maior RF/95198 Rmamanxkam all Subramamam. penalnng pegawal penylaszl (SP1) Ielah memben kelerangan bahawa rempar keraman aaaxah man mrmur dan hanyi cukup Im\|uk laman sebuah kerela dan sehuah momsrkax Mmosrkax lersehul merrgaxamr kerasakan leruk axmar psrlanggaran nan raum he dalam Pant Kere\|a \|evsebu( hanyi aaa kesan calir di bumper hadzpzn yebelah kanan 7 Da\am penywasalannya, belvau dwmaklumkan nleh Defendan Panama‘ ksvosakan kevada Karate lersebul alum: renanggar \|embok vumahnya m uvuaxumkauklunrlzn Wale sum IHIHDIV wm be um w may m. mtgmuly mm anuumnl m muws wvm 29 HMS nerkmlav da\am kspumsannya alas aau mekamsma kemalangan Pengecaman Kmu 30 Berkenaan Isu pengecaman Kerela Aersehm‘ HMS nerpelqav I menyatzkan [W5 12. 13 RR Tamb\|nIn]» \ -u=:a..mncamxamanuxeyana sebelumveﬂangwnlannu a. unamralk knala mu any can no phat dan cum delendnn yang memandu mu; mu xmna meleka mum: szkampurlg Agxk mu! untuk manolak upwgecamarnm Dan dawn maneml Kepadlan vn, Mahkamah mendnpali bahavwi dzfendnn «nan neqesex deman mam» m mlnn mu ilu «ma: xsdav nan bslwau meneruskan peumam sgbnb mm palkam m. bsriaku Agak man Imluk scseomna unluk membcm um maunan sepem wrn Kepida orlnﬂ ma wags! mklmpung dangannyi (inpa asasdan Maser: ynng mum- at Walau bagalmanapun mu henemangan dengan ketemngan yang dirakamkan semasa pemenxsaan bales Plamm [m/s :9 RR Tambahan]~ -s saya kacakan maldumal kereta ml keluarga kamu yang bemahu kumu Kamu sendm hdak lahu ada kelela Tenlang kerela ml \ak wuyua Keluargi kamn yang banlamﬂ am MvuEAxA4m<auR1unrI2a "Nate sum rumhnv M“ a. um law may m. angwnnuly mm anunvmnl «. muus mm J Masa saya kemav danpada Haspllal‘ kaklk siya hawa pergw bawa saya lenguk kereta Mu, tenguk kevela wm sahaja‘ saya dapa\| tau macam mana keleda wlu Vangar slyi. Mahkamah Lawyer kala ssbsnamya pasal bah xema Mu, no plan lenis kevela nu wmua, kehlama hang yang henk\ahu hang‘ bend ke \ak new J sam- 32 oaram Vapuran pohsnya [mls 25 RR] dan kelerangannya dx Mahxaman, Plamm mengenatpasu keref: yang mewanggamya bevdasavkan namnor pendaﬂarzn saha;a Plamtﬂ max menyehul ape-apa Derkenaan jams kerexa mu wama kevela lersebm. as Semua pemenksaan mama, Plamm member! ke\|erangan benkul [m/s as RR}- ‘Sehelum kere\|a i\|u beﬂanggar maxwxzx saya, saya «swan nampak nombor ksreu rlu darn says «am kevela nu sebab pemindu sekampung saya 34 lm dmaﬁkan men Detendan semasa pemenksaan balas [ms 52 RR Tambahan] m Nvuaxumkauklunrlzn W. sum rumhnv Mu be us« w vetny m. nugmuly mm anuumnl m nrwuus W.‘ 35 Jlka benar kedua Prarnm dan Delendan duduk sekampung, rm akan msmhanlu krearnum pengecaman pa ‘ P\aInIW berkenaan Kerela Iersebul warau hagaimanamm Mada sebarang srasaczn arnuau unmk mengeszhkan perkara Im Penerrcrarr aramax kedua P\aInIWdan Delendan Perlama (pada phding, lzpnran par masmgdllasmg dan pemenksaan mama) rugs max membsrl spa-spa paneerahan alas rsu Ini as Walaupun Plamm mengecam Kerela nu dengan posrm Mahkamah rru sukar menevima ketevangan \|evsebu\| keranz Ianya “highly rmpmhable" sesenrang bcleh msngmgatl nombor pendaﬁaran kenderaan yang meranggarrrya (anpa bmiran laniul. 37 Mahkamah rru bememat HMS xerpelarar xemnrramalam mam ar dan menenma kelerangan vramm berksnsan pengecaman xerera yang melinggamya Kesan cnlar pad: Kam- as Bevkenazn kesan calar pads Kerela (emebul, HMS xsrpelazar mendapall [mrs 12 RR Tambahan]— - lerdapal Kesan caﬂar pergeselan pada bumper depan kerela Delendin yang kmsrsren dengan penemuan ram Im Kehrangan Defendan yang cuba menerangkin kaaan calar nu dsngan menymakan ra lelianggar dengan Iembuk, hdak bmeh dnevima kelana sexrranya bsvlaku perianggaran sepemmana :1 r4 Nvuaxumkauklunrlzu Wale sum IHIHDIV M“ be um w may m. artgrruuly mm mm... m mm perm yang dlnyilakan, max akin Kesan ca\ar sspem rm ya akan mengalarm kemsakan yang Iebm Iemk ' as. HMS lerpelmar giga\ memhual penrlaran yang (epa\| ke aras huk\|\—buk\|\| senyap Da\am mennlak vevsl Defendzn Panama, nanau gagal memmbang — (i) kacarangan Davanuan bahatwa Kerela Iersehut kerela Vama kepunyaan bapa memlanyi ﬂan dva lvdak mgal mxa yeﬂanggaran dengan Iembnk mmahnya beﬂakn [mix 51 RR Tambahlnl; yr.) kelerangan SP1 nanawa terdapat kesan kekumngan pm calar ar bumper Kerera lersebul darn bahawa lemhok mmah Davanuannavanaan berwarna men [m/s 2125 RR Tanmananl: an (my MotnsIka\ (erssbm yang urxarakan rawan bevgesel dengan Karena (ersebul berwama him namun hdak rnanrrrggauran apa—ap2 kaaan pada karara bsrwama puuh mam kaaan calir larsebul [rn/s 29 RR Tambahanl. AD auku-bum senyap ml menjamkan yerar Defendan Panama “xrmelenlw move pmbzb\|e' dan versi Wainlw ‘ m uvuEA-rA4mrsuR1anrI2a Wane sum rumhnv Mu a. um a may m. arrmrry mm dnunmnl «. muus mm 41 Mahkamah Irv hememat HMS lerpela;arterkhHa1dal2m menHa1 Gan meno\ak kexerangan F\a\|n(Ii berkenaan kesan ca\av Dada Kereta tersebm Kewluun 42. Secara kesehuuhan, Mahkamah im mendapau kepmusan HMS cerpelzjar menuruukkan um pe ' tan kemvangan yang new a\|as mu-Asu yang dlhuralkan an alas. Kekrmaian Im mewayarkan Lampunangan di penngkzl vayuan 43 Dalam keadaan Im, Mahknmah ml memhenarknn rayuan De1endan—Delendan dengan kos Kepulusan HMS \|erpe\a]ar heninkh 0.3 2023 alas vsu uamlm mketemkan 44 K0; cmetapkan paaa RM 5000.00 ﬂan lenakmk kapada 0 alokilur. Eenznkh 29 Okmber 2023 Navkun sum son Pesurunzaya Kehakxman Mahkzmah ﬁngg. Ma\aya m Sungzw Pelam m NvuEAxA4mksuR1unFI2a Wale sum rumhnv Mn ». um law may m. .m.u-y mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm Pequnm bagi pilnk Ferayu 1 dzn 2 Puan Amnah bmli Abdul Lani Tetuan Dass, Jamal: 5. Associates Na. 23, Langknk Csmpaka 1, Pers\aran Cempaka‘ EandarAman;aya‘ oaaou Sungai Peeam Kedah Pegulm bani \|7IMk Rnrlondnn Encwk Subramamam Gavlndan Telusn Sha 5. Co A49‘ T\ngkal1 dan 2, Cm\|a Sayang Resnrl Home‘ uauuu Sungm wensm, Kedah. m uvuaxuuksuklunrlzu W. sum lhlhhﬂ MU .. wed In mm m. mwgmuly Wm anumgnl VI muus wvm Versl Dafandun e vem Defendan Fenamz (sow) adaran bahzwz dia menggunakin Iaman yang sama ﬂan Taman smam Km ke Kzmpung Jerung Imluk menghamar anaknya ke Iadlka Dia menaﬂkan ma lerHba\| dalam apaapa kemalangan pada 9 1 2023 Kevela «ersebux mmk Dana menuanyi 9 ma mengesahkan kerasakan pads Kama lersebul ambax terlanggar lembok mmahnya tetapw ma max mgal bﬂa kepman um bsrlaku Keputusan HMS m Pada aazczz, HMS Ielah memuluskan Delendan Panama benanggungan wan coo‘-/. umux kemalangan yang benaku nada 9 1 2019 Prosldlng di Muhknmlh Tinggi H Kedua pmak lelah mengemukakan nwahan barlnlxs unluk vayuan im 12 ne1enaan—uevem1an mendakwa HMS \|evsHap davi s-:94 cam dzn undang-Imdang dalzm kemﬂusan bellau kerana hellau glgil memberl pemmbangan sewawnya kepada kelerangan yang dnkemukakan (imam perbmarzan m Nvuaxumkauklunrlzn Wale sum IHIHDIV wm be um law may m. mwgmuly mm anuumnl m mm wvm <3 Defendawﬂelendan mencabar kelevangan P\amM berkenaan pengecaman Kereta Ievsehul kevana Plainlil celan pengsan sehalk sahaja kemalangan Ievsebu\|. 14 Berdasirkan ke\|erangan Plainmsendm‘ ma hanya mengecamu berkenaan kemalangan ﬂu dan kakaknya uetenaamuevendan hemmah xegagaxan memanggﬂ kakak Pram sebagar saksl menimbulkan Infsrens negam av bawah seksyen 114(9) Akla Kelerangzn 1950 (Akla ) 15 Pemelasan Delendan Fertama unzuk kesan calar dv bzhaglan bumper kanan Kereta Iersebm adzlah dia le\ah melanggav lemhnk rumannya. SP1 telzh member! Kelefangan kesan ca\ar lersebm berwama kakumngan dan ne4enaan-Deaenaan bemuiah um konslslen dengan wama oren pada lembnk rumahnya Langsung uaaa kesan wama mm pada Kereta lersebul yepem MnIusika\ (erssbut 16 Berdasarkan kemsakarl pasta kedua kenderaan knasnya Ker2\|a (ersebuh De1em1anrDe¢endan bemwan mekamsma ksmalangan ada\ah bersﬂal gesuelan lni henemangan dengan puavng dan kslerzngan hsan F\a\|nM. 17 Havnm pula hsrlwjah kepmusan HMS hahawa Delenﬂan Panama herunggungan 100% unmk kemalangzn mu hams mkekalkan m Nvuaxumkauklunrlzn Wale sum lhlhhﬂ wm be uw In vemy m. W..m, MW: human! VI muus wvm 15, Pwamur merujuk kepada kesan calar pans Kama Iersebul yang max knnsmen dengan Kelerangan oecenuan yang ma te\ah melinggar lemhok rumahnya Main"! yuga mempsrsnaxxan kebeman yang anm (slrange comcmenoep Ddandan melanggavlembok vumahnyi paaa masa kemalangan (ersehm napmn Mankmuh Fmmp rlyuzn 19 Mahkamah lelah berpandukan pnnsxp undang-«ndang umum berxawan bmangkuasa rayuan da\am kes-kes Gan vaek AnarvLee m cm Lee Tack a. Ors 2005 2 MLJ 1 an) 2004 4 CLJ 309 2004 5AMR 7211, UEM smug Bhd v Gervsys migrated Engmeels me Lld a. Anov 2010 MLJU 2225 a\| Egg 2§1, Dream Pvagam sun and v Atlas Housmg sun BM 2015 2 MLJ ma: A64. Ng Han Km a.Anor vwendy Tan Lee Feng admIms(ra\|nxlonhe eslale nlTan Ewe Kwung deceased) & Ors 2020 12 Mu 67 ax 51, MMC on 3. Gas Englneenng sun and v. Tan Bock Kwee & Sans Sdn End 2016 2 MLJ 425 a\| 434) m Nvuaxumkauklunrlzn Wale sum IHIHDIV wm be um law may m. mwgmuly mm anuumnl 2. mm wvm 20 Mahkamah Im (elah member: pemauan kepada penghakwman (imam kes Nnr Azllna bin“ Abdld A V Exgen Fruecl Management Sdn BM! 2017 MLJU 230 2017 5 CLJ 58, Havmindev smgh HMR (pads kellka mu) menghuvaxkzn keadaan-keadazn .1. mana czmpunangan vayuan (appeHale mxewerman)wa;armvakuxan d1 20 — “{3} vmeveme mum: look mln mom mm“ cnnswdslilmna and vane: m gm due mm: la velevim culmdnnlxunl (sue DIIUCIDV :1! ram: 3 Anar V M." Kim Tang 5 :4... Km: Stung {ma executors at Ma ezslatsalﬂlau Mmy. deceased) &AnorandanoIhsraaDee/R010] 3 MLJ 509): (:2) where mere wns no proper evnhnnnn at His ewdnnos by m. ma! judge (:9: Ln mm Hanlams San and V mm Charm San am1[2m791 5 ML! 1;‘ 1:» where we daemon avmed al ny live max mun ms wm.auu-4.1.“: awreclalmn cl the meme (see Gan vm Chm (P15 Anal V L... In cm @ Les rm Songl Or: \|2an5] 2 ML! 1;‘ my where . ms: cmm r... m hmdamemally rmsdlvecied Itseﬂ, Inal no mnmnzhh cum! much had pvopeﬂy amen men and asked the puma quesuons, waum have amved al me same onnclusmn (see R-915 Lab Shumddln hm rm Ahmm-I rmr. 5 0/: V Sn sm Sandman smlzoasl 2 MM an. M W... nu. ma! mg. was plainly Mung m am»/mg at his amen ma Laying Clwv Q Lea Tack Saw V Gan ‘/oak cm [2003] 2 Mu 97)‘ (n where a ml judge had W mlmfeslly «. .a In dim: pm”. mm: Ymm 1\|: undoubted a.mm.,,a .71 nemg and hearing wwlmsus M m. mm and m Iuzchlng his cundutlun, an no! pvopeﬂy anaxysea Ina enweiy ov me avldenoe which was amen below mm {see Frnl Cam-vtsdn and V Warm Yew Lomma &PVan!aLmn Sdn and [2915] o sm hWuEAx34mkBLIR1unFI2O -mu. sum mm wm ». um In mm m .m.u-y mm; nan-nl «. AFVLING Wm Mm 593 which «anma Lha Fmry Cmmcn caxe of cm KM Esng V CI»m7KokNoe 5. 0r:[1BS4]2 MLJ1G5)‘i7Iﬂ (9) Wm nu. judgmsnl m based upon . wvang nvemke mm m Mlzw {see Psrembun (M) Stir: Blvd V Conley Cnnstmclran Sdrv and [21:12] 4 ML.) us» ' 21 Mahkamah mu man menehn suralcava rayuan, i\asan penghaklman HMS «erpemar dan mqzhan kedua pmak HMS (erpelqar man mengnumkan kedurdua velsl kemalangan yang drkemukakan aleh p\hak—pmak da\am alasan penghakxman beliau. uakanisma kumn/-ngan 22. HMS telan menenma vem kemawangan Plavml dan menmak vars! Deiendan alas arasan benkm — m ja\an cempax kejidlan adaluh Jalan «ecu saha.a yang Iebm menyerupaw sepeni jalall mmuar. dam (H) kesan ca\ar pelgeselan pans bumper depan Kereaa (evssbm msnyokong penemuan beliau bahawi kedua kenderain Isiah bargesel Lian «max herianggar ' sm NvuEAxA4mksuR1unFI2a -W. sum rumhnv wm ». um law may m. .m.u-y mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm 23. 24 25 Dalam I\a5an psnghzkxman heliau. HMS lerpslijar menya\|akan[m/511 Rekod Rayuan (RR)TamhaI1an]— “Mahkamah bemendlpil kemsakanrkerusakan molasikal nu auaxah akiba\| pergesexan dengan ksrela lersebm dan selerusnya nupak Ipablla molasikal i\|u ]a\|uh ke denim pant‘ maka impak «wan yang menysbabkan kemszkan pada malasukm nu kehhatan levuk Apa yang beﬂaku walzh apamla kema uetenaan hergesal dengan monankax Pwamm, xa lelah \|eIpelanling dengan mutasxkalnya ke da\am pant. Kalau benzku penanggavan dw hadapan yang lmleh menyebahkan kelem nu vemux, «enmayar mmosukax nu kemek. ' Walaupun HMS nerpemar menaapzu mekamsma kemalangan wtu belsihl geselan kerana sehuah moloslkal htﬂeh bergasel dangan ssbuah Kama lanpa dlsedan Lﬂeh pemandu kelela Dapalan mi hdak dlsnkong sebarang nqukan kzpada kelevangan mahupun a\asan Dapa\|an im bevstfat spekmam din sukav dﬂevima mamandangkan hsniasarkan keterangan P\amM kamalangan nu helizku pada wakm pagl. cuaca cs/ah dan lvada kenderaan lam a. [man \|\|u sekmya vevsw Plamm ham, musmul Delendan Penama yang datang dan arah herleniangan ndak akan psrasaan kshadlran Wainlwl alas Mmarsxkal tersebut lebm— Vebm lag! jika kedua kenderaun \|\|u bergeser a\|au beﬂanggav m Nvuaxumkauklunrlzn Wale sum IHIHDIV wm be um law may m. mwgmuly mm anuumnl m mm wvm 25. sawanyumya, belnau Ielah memeriksz kerosakan kepada y a\au nenaku psriangqaran an ‘ kenderaan dan mendapau naaapan yang omen menyebzbkan keve(a nu remuk, «emu vayar mmoswkal mu ksmek.' [ms 11 RR Tzmbahan] Dzpatan im adalah umuk menynkung penemuan Iaxna hellau yang kemakangan nu aklbal geselan ML7k:sAka\ dan Kama 27. Wahau hagalmanapuny HMS nerperajar gagax memmbang kerasakin paaa Muxoaukav (erssbut dalzm konteks - m phdlng F\amM yakm » ~ I\ba—I\ba malokar Defendan Nu PDN 333 yang dalang din man hadapan menoembom ks yalan Plamm yang sah dan (ems rnekanggav Plainul secara mengeym dan menyababkan aam penanggaran berlaku dengzn mnlasl al Pramm '[perenggan 4 ml: 12 RR], (ii) kmerangan Plamm samasa pemenkaaan mama yakm - “llpablla saya sampax m Jalan Kg Jerung dengan nbadiba sebuah kevela no PDN 353 yang man datang dan hdapan den masuk lam" szya dan me\anggaI malosxkﬂ saya. wawaupun saya e\ak says max sempal e\ak dzn pellanggaran beliaku [ms 93 RR] dan m uvuaxumkaukianrlzn Wale sum runny Mu a. um In mm m. mtgmuly Wm nnumanl VI arwuus puvm um kelsrangan Wamlxl semasa pemeviksaan bales yakm [m/s as, as RR Tambahan]~ “J . sly: nampak kereda Nu ma: Vain daripada UEDEII‘ saya ke \|epi sebab plan Nu keen sahaja. DI: man rempuh says, saya masuk ke da\am pan! Saw sedav-sedan says dalim pin! 5 Lepas nu ma Isms man rempuh J V: s Dia rempuh vm dxa mew Vangar J’ Va ma ma: langar “ 28 Kepulusan HMS \|erpe\|a;al unwk meneﬁmn versl Plamtw yang bertemlngan dengan kemsakan pads Motaswkal, plldmg dan ke\|evangan Plamm an Mahkamih membelakangkan pnnsnp bahawa Mankamah hams member! kepumsan sE\alas dengan plldmg pihak-plhak Ini savanan Mihkimlh Persekuluan dalam kes Menah Sulnng v Lwm Sun 3. Ann! 193; QL Reg 253 an mana on; (3.! menyanakan m 264 — ‘I mu n is ngoeaslly m lhls clan \|u ampnasue once anam mm the Com: would awe (Vmrdocmons m mu wcardanoe win: (he pbaawms As Lam Raddme sam m Essa Pstrwsum Ca ma 1/ Soulhpan Comarulron [ma] 2 wow an 91 u an Appeume Cmm ‘s m Inenl .=\....m ax padzmly cv rneva lumlllum ldn am we mm pan may have «a way m our max sysIem' sm hWuEA-<A4mkBUR1unFI2O -W. sum rumhnv wm ». um law may m. .m.u-y mm unaumnl «. muus mm	2,129	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
JB-12AC-1-06/2023	PERAYU JM LETRIK SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN 1. ) IR TS. HAJI KAMARUZAMAN BIN KASIMIN 2. ) JABATAN KERJARAYA JOHOR 3. ) Kerajaan Malaysia	Appeal – Decision from Sessions Court – Application for striking out – Writ and statement of claim - Order 18 Rule 19 (1) (a) and (d) ROC 2012 – Whether discloses any reasonable cause of action - Whether any triable issues - Claim by nominated sub-contractor - Against Government in a project – Whether privity of contract exists – Deduction of LAD from progressive claims due to main contractor – Whether nominated sub-contractor agreed to such deduction – Whether nominated sub-contractor objected to deductions – Whether nominated sub-contractor demanded full sum.	03/12/2023	YA Tuan Suria Kumar a/l Durairaj Johnson Paul	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5222a026-754c-4647-8cd0-b71a07802747&Inline=true	JB-12AC-1-06/2023 [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI MUAR DI DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO: JB-12AC-1-06/2023 ANTARA JM LETRIK SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 178143-K) …PERAYU DAN 1. IR TS. HAJI KAMARUZAMAN BIN KASIMIN Ketua Jurutera Elektrik Negeri Johor 2. JABATAN KERJA RAYA NEGERI JOHOR 3. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN (DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI MUAR DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO.: JB-B51C-1-08/2022 ANTARA JM LETRIK SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 178143-K) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. CLEAN IMAGE SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 192988-H) 03/12/2023 09:44:30 JB-12AC-1-06/2023 Kand. 16 S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 2 2. IR TS. HAJI KAMARUZAMAN BIN KASIMIN Ketua Jurutera Elektrik Negeri Johor 3. JABATAN KERJA RAYA NEGERI JOHOR 4. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN) KORAM: SURIA KUMAR A/L DURAIRAJ JOHNSON PAUL PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN  ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN  PERMULAAN [1] Kes ini melibatkan tuntutan oleh pihak “Nominated Sub-Contractor” terhadap majikan dalam satu projek walaupun tiada hubungan kontrak sesama mereka. [2] Hubungan kontrak yang wujud adalah di antara pihak Majikan dan Kontraktor Utama serta antara Kontraktor Utama dan “Nominated Sub-Contractor”. LATAR BELAKANG KES [3] Perayu/Plaintif dalam kes ini merupakan Sub-kontraktor, Defendan Pertama merupakan Kontraktor Utama dan Responden- S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 3 Responden/Defendan Kedua hingga Keempat, khususnya Defendan Keempat merupakan Kerajaan Malaysia dan/atau Superintending Officer (S.O.) bagi tujuan Perjanjian-Perjanjian yang akan dinyatakan selepas ini. [4] Defendan Pertama telah memasuki satu perjanjian ‘Cadangan Meroboh Dua Blok Bangunan Sedia Ada dan Membina Semula Bangunan Pejabat Baru 2 Tingkat di Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan (JPJ) Cawangan Muar Johor” bertarikh 23.03.2017 bersama Defendan Keempat. (“Perjanjian Utama”). [5] Peruntukkan dalam Perjanjian Utama membolehkan Defendan Keempat menamakan Sub-kontraktor (“nominated sub-contractor”). Defendan Keempat telah menamakan Plaintif sebagai Sub- kontraktor bagi kerja-kerja pemasangan Elektrik di tapak projek Perjanjian Utama. [6] Dalam Perjanjian Utama juga terdapat peruntukkan di mana setelah Sub-kontraktor dinamakan, Kontraktor Utama hendaklah memasuki Perjanjian Sub-kontrak dengan Sub-kontraktor yang dinamakan. [7] Oleh yang demikian, Plaintif telah menandatangani satu surat setuju terima tender bertarikh 22.6.2017 yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan Pertama bagi tujuan kerja-kerja pemasangan Elektrik dan kemudiannya memasuki kontrak formal dengan Defendan Pertama bagi tujuan ‘Pemasangan Elektrik dan ELV Bagi Cadangan Meroboh 2 Blok Bangunan Sedia Ada dan Membina Semula Bangunan Pejabat 2 Tingkat di Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan (JPJ) Cawangan Muar (“Perjanjian Sub-Kontrak”) bertarikh 20.7.2017. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 4 [8] Dalam Perjanjian Utama, Defendan Pertama hendaklah menyiapkan dan menyerahkan kepada Defendan Keempat bahagian-bahagian dan keseluruhan projek mengikut masa yang ditetapkan dalam Perjanjian Utama atau pun dalam tempoh apa- apa lanjutan yang dibenarkan. Gantirugi Tertentu dan Ditetapkan (LAD) akan dikenakan terhadap Defendan Pertama jika terdapat kelewatan oleh Defendan Pertama dalam penyerahan bahagian- bahagian dan keseluruhan projek mengikut masa yang ditetapkan. [9] Defendan Pertama telah gagal untuk menyiapkan dan menyerahkan kepada Defendan Keempat bahagian-bahagian dan keseluruhan projek mengikut waktu yang ditetapkan dan apa-apa Tarikh perlanjutan dan LAD telah dikutip melalui bayaran interim. Dalam memperakukan bayaran interim, bayaran kepada sub- kontraktor juga akan dikenakan LAD sebagaimana bayaran ke atas Defendan Pertama. [10] Plaintif telah tidak berpuas hati dengan LAD yang dikenakan terhadap bayaran-bayaran interim dan telah membuat tuntutan kepada Defendan-Defendan seperti berikut:- No. Kemajuan Nilai kerja Bayaran diterima Tertunggak 1. Tuntutan kemajuan No. 1 RM 20,132.00 RM 20,132.00 RM 0 2. Tuntutan kemajuan No. 2 RM 36,600.00 RM 36,600.00 RM 0 3. Tuntutan kemajuan No. 3 RM 27,000.00 RM 27,000.00 RM 0 4. Tuntutan kemajuan No. 4 RM 44,800.00 RM 0 RM 44,800.00 5. Tuntutan kemajuan No. 5 RM 349,400.00 RM 91,600.00 RM 257,800.00 6. Tuntutan kemajuan No. 6 RM 88,400.00 RM 27,441.00 RM 60,959.00 S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 5 DAPATAN DAN ANALISA Isu tiada hubungan kontrak (privity of contract) [11] Defendan Kedua hingga Keempat telah membuat permohonan menurut Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1) (a) dan (d) KKM 2012 untuk membatalkan tuntutan Plaintif. [12] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen YB telah membenarkan permohonan Defendan Kedua hingga Keempat tersebut dan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap mereka telah dibatalkan. [13] Plaintif tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan tersebut dan merayu ke Mahkamah ini sekarang. [14] Mahkamah ini ambil maklum bahawa menurut Seksyen 29 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 and Aturan 55 Kaedah 2 KKM 2012, rayuan ini adalah satu pendengaran semula di hadapan saya. [15] Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan sesuatu permohonan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1) KKM 2012 adalah “trite”. Sila rujuk kepada kes-kes Bandar Builder Sdn. Bhd. & ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, Tan Wei Hong (a minor suing through guardian ad litem and next friend Chuang Yin e & ors v Malaysian Airlines Bhd and other appeals [2019] 1 MLJ 59 and Protasco Bhd v PT Anglo Slavic Utama & ors [2020] MLJU 1413. [16] Plaintif bukanlah pihak kepada Kontrak Utama di antara Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Keempat. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 6 [17] Klausa 60.1 Kontrak Utama berkenaan “Nominated Sub- Contractors” memperuntukkan seperti berikut:- “60.0 NOMINATED SUB-CONTRACTORS AND/OR NOMINATED SUPPLIERS 60.1 The S.O. shall obtain tenders for Nominated sub- Contractor’s or Nominated Supplier’s work or services, or for the supply of materials or goods in respect of which Prime Cost Sums or Provisional Sums are included in the Bills of Quantities, and the Contractor shall, on the written instruction of the S.O., enter into such sub-contracts with the Nominated Sub-Contractor or Nominated Supplier as the case may be and such sub-contracts shall be in the form as referred to in clause 60.2(b)” [18] Klausa ini menunjukkan pihak yang akan memasukI kontrak bersama “Nominated Sub-Contractors” adalah Defendan Pertama. [19] Manakala klausa 61.1 Kontrak Utama memperuntukkan bahawa bayaran terus akan dibuat oleh Defendan Keempat kepada Plaintif sebagai “Nominated Sub-Contractors” dan sebarang bayaran kepada “Nominated Sub-Contractors” iaitu Plaintif akan diandaikan sebagai bayaran yang telah dibuat kepada Defendan Pertama sebagai kontraktor utama. “61.0 PAYMENT TO NOMINATED SUB-CONTRACTOR OR SUPPLIER S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 7 61.1 The S.O. in issuing Interim Certificates under clause 28 or the Final Certificate under clause 32 hereof shall state separately the amount of interim or final payment due to each Nominated Sub-Contractors or Suppliers which amount subject to clause 61.2 hereof, shall be paid by the Government direct to the Nominated Sub- contractors or Suppliers. The amount paid by the Government direct to the Nominated Sub-contractors or Suppliers shall be deemed to be a payment to the Contractor by the Government under and by virtue of this Contract.” [20] Lanjutan daripada itu, klausa 62.0 Kontrak Utama memperuntukkan secara nyata bahawa tidak ada apa-apa dalam klausa 60 dan 61 Kontrak Utama tersebut yang boleh menjadikan Defendan Keempat bertanggungan kepada Plaintif. “62.0 NO LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT TO NOMINATED AND/OR SUB-CONTRACTOR OR SUPPLIER Nothing in clauses 60 or 61 or anything else contained in this Contract shall render the Government in any way liable to any Nominated and/or Sub-Contractor or Supplier.” [21] Selanjutnya Surat Setuju Terima Tender telah ditandatangani antara Defendan Pertama dan Plaintif. Defendan Keempat bukanlah pihak kepada Surat Setuju Terima Tender ini. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 8 [22] Defendan Keempat juga bukanlah phak kepada sub-kontrak yang dimasuki di antara Defendan Pertama dan Plaintif. [23] Klausa 4 Sub-Kontrak pula memperuntukkan bahawa Plaintif adalah diandaikan sebagai telah meneliti Kontrak Utama serta mempunyai pengetahuan penuh mengenai terma-terma dalam Kontrak Utama tersebut. “4.0 MAIN CONTRACT The Nominated Sub-Contractor shall be deemed to have examined the Main Contract or a copy thereof and to have full knowledge of all the provisions of the Main Contract except the details of the prices included therein.” [24] Ini bermakna, Plaintif diandaikan sebagai mempunyai pengetahuan dan pemahaman akan klausa-klausa 60, 61 dan 62 dalam Kontrak Utama tersebut yang dirujuk di atas. [25] Seterusnya, klausa 34.0 Sub-Kontrak memperuntukkan bahawa sekiranya perkhidmatan Defendan Pertama di bawah Kontrak Utama ditamatkan, maka perkhidmatan Plaintif juga akan ditamatkan. “34.0 TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACTOR’S EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE MAIN CONTRACT If for any reason the Contractor’s employment under the Main Contract is terminated, then the employment of the Nominated S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 9 Sub-Contractor under this Sub-Contract shall thereupon also be terminated.” [26] Manakala menurut klausa 39.0 Sub-Kontrak, Plaintif boleh memperolehi sebarang hak atau manfaat dalam Kontrak Utama setakat yang terpakai kepada kerja-kerja Sub-Kontrak dengan membuat permintaan hanya melalui Defendan Pertama. “39.0 NOMINATED SUB-CONTRACTOR’S CLAIM TO RIGHTS AND BENEFIT UNDER THE MAIN CONTRACT (a) The Contractor will, in so far as he lawfully can at the request and cost of the Nominated Sub- Contractor, obtain for him any rights or benefits of the Main Contract so far as the same are applicable to the Sub-Contract Works but no further or otherwise.” [27] Ini bermakna Defendan Keempat bukanlah majikan Plaintif dan Majikan Plaintif adalah Defendan Pertama. [28] Selanjutnya, klausa 35.0 Sub-Kontrak pula memperuntukkan bahawa bayaran menurut Kontrak Utama akan dibuat secara terus kepada Plaintif oleh Defendan Keempat. [29] Klausa 35.0 ini juga mengandungi suatu “Proviso” yang menyatakan bahawa peruntukkan dalam klausa ini atau mana- mana klausa lain dalam Sub-Kontrak tersebut tidak boleh S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 10 menjadikan Defendan Keempat sebagai bertanggungan terhadap Plaintif. “35.0 PAYMENT TO NOMINATED SUB-CONTRACTOR Subject to clause 37 hereof, the amount certified as due to the Nominated Sub-Contractor in any Interim Certificate issued by the S.O. in accordance with the relevant provisions in the Main Contract shall within the period for honouring payment certificates stipulated in the Main Contract be paid by the Government direct to the Nominated Sub-Contactor. PROVIDED THAT nothing in this clause or anything else contained in this Sub-Contract shall render the Government in any way liable to the Nominated Sub-Contractor.” [30] Daripada bacaan dan efek kesemua klausa-klausa ini secara kolektif, Mahkamah berpuashati bahawa tidak wujud suatu hubungan kontrak (“Privity of Contract”) di antara Defendan Keempat dan Plaintif untuk menjadikan Defendan Keempat bertanggungan terhadap tuntutan Plaintif. [31] Tambahan pula, Klausa 62.0 Kontrak Utama serta klausa 35.0 dalam Sub-Kontrak dengan jelas dan nyata memperuntukkan bahawa Defendan Keempat tidak boleh dijadikan bertanggungan kepada Plaintif dan ini telah pun dipersetujui oleh Plaintif sendiri. [32] Plaintif telah pun mempersetujui klausa-klausa ini dan sekiranya Plaintif ingin Defendan Keempat bertanggungan dalam apa jua keadaan, Plaintif tidak seharusnya mempersetujui klausa-klausa ini. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 11 [33] Plaintif berhujah bahawa isu tiada hubungan kontrak (“Privity of Contract”) antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan Kedua, Ketiga dan Keempat tidak diplidkan dalam Pembelaan. [34] Mahkamah telah meneliti keseluruhan fakta-fakta yang diplidkan oleh Defendan-Defendan Kedua, Ketiga dan Keempat dalam Pembelaan mereka dan mendapati bahawa walaupun fakta ini tidak diplidkan secara nyata, namun sekiranya perenggan-perenggan 8.1 dan 8.2 dibaca bersama fakta-fakta lain yang diplidkan dalam Pembelaan, ianya membawa maksud bahawa Defendan Keempat tidak boleh dijadikan bertanggungan kepada Plaintif disebabkan tiada hubungan kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Keempat. [35] Plaintif telah mengemukakan 3 otoriti untuk menyokong hujahan mereka bahawa walaupun Plaintif bukanlah pihak kepada Kontrak Utama di antara Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Keempat, namun Plaintif masih boleh menuntut terhadap Defendan Keempat. [36] Kes pertama adalah PBLT Sdn Bhd v Prestasi Reka Sdn Bhd & Ors [2020] MLJU 2056. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa fakta kes ini boleh dibezakan dari segi fakta kerana wujudnya Surat Indemniti yang dikeluarkan oleh sub-kontraktor kepada Majikan. Hakim Lim Chong Fong (pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan bahawa wujud hubungan kontrak terhad (“limited privity of contract”) di antara majikan dan sub-kontraktor dalam kes tersebut kerana pihak sub- kontraktor telah memberikan satu Surat Indemniti kepada pihak majikan mengenai beberapa perkara atas balasan pihak majikan beri akujanji untuk buat bayaran secara terus kepada sub- kontraktor. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah dalam kes tersebut telah memutuskan bahawa sub-kontraktor boleh menuntut terhadap S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 12 majikan terhadap keingkaran bayaran sijil interim dan sijil muktamad walaupun sub-kontraktor bukanlah pihak kepada kontrak utama antara majikan dan kontraktor utama. [37] Dalam kes kita di sini, tiada Surat Indemniti sedemikian sebagaimana dalam kes PBLT Sdn Bhd v Prestasi Reka Sdn Bhd & Ors. [38] Selanjutnya, kes kedua iaitu Pembinaan BLT Sdn Bhd v Nazarin (NBM) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1254 juga boleh dibezakan dari segi fakta kerana wujudnya suatu Surat Akujanji serta representasi dan keyakinan dari pihak Defendan kepada Plaintif bahawa sekiranya pihak dikenali MIYA gagal untuk membayar mereka bagi kerja-kerja “scaffolding” yang telah dibuat atau akan dibuat, Defendan akan membayar kepada Plaintif. Selanjutnya, Mahkamah juga dalam kes tersebut telah membuat satu penemuan bahawa kausa tindakan Plaintif dalam kes tersebut adalah berdasarkan kepada kemungkiran akujanji yang diberikan oleh Defendan untuk membayar Plaintif sekiranya pihak MIYA tersebut tidak membayar. [39] Kemudian Plaintif merujuk kepada kes Mega Mayang M & E Sdn Bhd v Utama Lodge Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2018] MLJU 1323 untuk hujahan bahawa Plaintif juga dalam alternatifnya berhak untuk membuat tuntutan menurut “quantum meruit” berdasarkan Seksyen 71 Akta Kontrak 1950. [40] Prinsip pemakaian Seksyen 71, Akta Kontrak 1950 ini telah diputuskan oleh Privy Council dalam kes Siow Wong Fatt v. Susur Rotan Mining Ltd & Anor [1967] 1 MLRA 53. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 13 [41] Kes Siow Wong Fatt ini telah diikuti oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Tanjung Teras Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2015] 9 CLJ 1002 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan tuntutan oleh sub- kontraktor yang bukan pihak kepada kontrak utama untuk bayaran kos pembinaan “super structure” memandangkan majikan dalam kes tersebut telah manfaat darpada pembinaan “super structure” tersebut. [42] Mahkamah juga dalam kes Tanjung Teras tersebut membenarkan tuntutan “quantum meruit” oleh sub-kontraktor kerana mendapati majikan langsung tidak membayar kontraktor utama untuk pembinaan “super structure” tersebut. [43] Walau bagaimanapun dalam kes di sini, segala bayaran bagi kerja- kerja yang disiapkan oleh Plaintif telah pun dibayar kepada Defendan Pertama melalui tolakkan (“set-off”) daripada tuntutan LAD yang terakru kepada Defendan Keempat daripada Defendan Pertama. [44] Ini bermakna, sekiranya Mahkamah bersetuju dengan tuntutan Plaintif di sini, maka Defendan Keempat perlu membuat bayaran sekali lagi bagi kerja-kerja yang disiapkan oleh Plaintif di mana bayaran ini telah pun diambil kira melalui tolakkan (“set-off”) LAD yang terakru kepada Defendan Keempat daripada bayaran kemajuan kepada Defendan Pertama. [45] Tambahan pula, sekiranya Plaintif bergantung kepada tuntutan berdasarkan kepada “quantum meruit”, Plaintif tidak boleh bergantung kepada kadar bayaran yang ditentukan menurut Kontrak kerana tuntutan berdasarkan “quantum meruit” bukan S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 14 berdasarkan prinsip “contractual damages” tetapi berdasarkan “restitution for the work done”. Sila rujuk kepada kes Spatial Ventures Sdn Bhd v. Twintech Holdings Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 LNS 729 di mana telah diputuskan oleh Nallini Pathmanatha. J (pada ketika itu) :- “24. The position in law is that an assessment for restitution on the basis of quantum meruit is in reality a measure of the costs of the work done, a matter which does not depend upon the contract and therefore will not be trammelled or limited by the contract rate. This gives the plaintiff, not contractual damages, but restitution for the work done… 25. It follows from the foregoing that the Plaintiff cannot seek to recover damages on quantum meruit basis by reference to the scale in the contract or on the contract price. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim premised on the scale costs in the letters of engagement is not a tenable basis on which to assess or award damages and accordingly the said basis, in accordance with the law, is rejected.” [46] Dalam kes di sini adalah jelas bahawa Plaintif menuntut menurut kadar-kadar bayaran yang ditentukan oleh kontrak. Ini boleh dilihat daripada dokumen-dokumen sokongan untuk tuntutan kemajuan bersama-sama invois yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif sebagai ekshibit-ekshibit “ZB-9”, “ZB-10” dan “ZB-11” dan butir-butir tuntutan dalam perenggan 9 Pernyataan Tuntutan. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 15 [47] Jelas bahawa ini adalah tidak memadai dari segi undang-undang untuk satu tuntutan berdasarkan kepada “quantum meruit”. Oleh yang demikian, hujahan Plaintif bahawa Plaintif boleh menuntut berdasarkan berdasarkan kepada “quantum meruit” tiada merit dan ditolak. Pengetahuan dan persetujuan Plaintif berkenaan potongan Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) daripada bayaran kemajuan. [48] Menurut Plaintif, mereka tidak menerima bayaran sebanyak RM44,800.00 bagi bayaran kemajuan No. 4, bagi bayaran kemajuan No. 5, hanya menerima sebanyak RM91,600.00 serta bagi bayaran kemajuan No. 6 hanya menerima sebanyak RM27,441.00 meninggalkan baki sebanyak RM363,559.00 yang masih belum dibayar oleh Defendan Keempat kepada mereka. [49] Menurut Klausa 40.2 Kontrak Utama, Defendan Keempat berhak memotong sebarang Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) daripada bayaran kemajuan kepada Defendan Pertama. [50] Menurut hujahan Defendan-Defendan Kedua, Ketiga dan Keempat, Defendan Pertama telah tidak menyiapkan projek tersebut dan telah dikenakan Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) yang telah dipotong daripada bayaran kemajuan kepada mereka menurut klausa 40.2 Kontrak Utama. [51] Manakala, menurut klausa 4.0 Sub-Kontrak, Plaintif diandaikan sebagai telah meneliti Kontrak Utama serta mempunyai pengetahuan peruntukkan-peruntukkan Kontrak Utama tersebut. Ini menunjukkan, Plaintif mempunyai pengetahuan penuh mengenai S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 16 hak Defendan Keempat untuk memotong Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) daripada bayaran kemajuan yang Defendan Pertama berhak. [52] Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif sebenarnya mempunyai pengetahuan penuh mengenai perkara ini dan telah menerima dan bersetuju (“acquiesce”) terhadap pemotongan Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) tersebut daripada bayaran kemajuan kepada Defendan Pertama yang akan dibayar kepada Plaintif kerana:- (i) Bagi bayaran kemajuan No. 4 untuk jumlah RM44,000.00, Plaintif tidak mengemukakan sebarang invois kepada Defendan Keempat untuk tuntutan sebanyak RM44,000.00 disebabkan potongan Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) dibuat daripada bayaran kemajuan ini kepada Defendan Pertama yang merangkumi jumlah ini. (ii) Bagi bayaran kemajuan No. 5 untuk jumlah RM349,000.00, Plaintif hanya kemukakan invois bertarikh 8 November 2019 untuk jumlah sebanyak RM91,600.00 setelah mengambil kira potongan Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) dibuat daripada bayaran kemajuan kepada Defendan Pertama. (iii) Manakala bagi bayaran kemajuan No. 6 untuk jumlah RM88,400.00, Plaintif hanya kemukakan invois bertarikh 27 November 2019 untuk jumlah RM27,441.00 setelah mengambil kira potongan Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) dibuat daripada bayaran kemajuan kepada Defendan Pertama. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 17 [53] Fakta ini menunjukkan Plaintif mempunyai pengetahuan penuh mengenai pemotongan Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) daripada bayaran-bayaran kemajuan No. 4, No. 5 dan No. 6 sejak tahun 2019 lagi dan telah tidak kemukakan sebarang bantahan. [54] Sekiranya Plaintif tidak bersetuju, Plaintif seharusnya megeluarkan bantahan kepada Defendan Keempat. Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes David Wong Hon Leong v Noorazman Adnan [1995] 4 CLJ 155 telah memutuskan seperti berikut:- “During argument, we registered our surprise at the learned Judge's reluctance to enter judgment for this sum of RM100,000. After all, the appellant had failed to respond to the letter of 17 December. If there had never been an agreement as alleged, it is reasonable to expect a prompt and vigorous denial. But, as we have pointed out, there was no response whatsoever from the appellant. In this context, we recall to mind the following passage in the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr. J. in Tan Cheng Hock v. Chan Thean Soo [1986] 1 LNS 42 [1987] 2 MLJ 479-487: In Wiedemann v. Walpole [1891] 2 Q.B. 534, 537 an action for breach of promise of marriage, it was held, that the mere fact that the defendant did not answer letters written to him by the plaintiff in which she stated that he had promised to marry her, was no evidence corroborating the plaintiff’s testimony in support of such promise. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 18 Lord Esher M.R., in his judgment, remarked, Here, we have only to see whether the mere fact of not answering the letters, with nothing else for us to consider is any evidence in corroboration of the promise.’ (Emphasis added). Earlier, in his judgment, he said, ‘Now there are cases - business and mercantile cases in which the Courts have taken notice that, in the ordinary course of business, if one man of business states in a letter to another that he has agreed to do certain things, the person who receives that letter must answer it if he means to dispute the fact that he did so agree. (The emphasis is ours.)” [55] Lehih-lebih lagi Plaintif juga langsung tidak mengeluarkan invois untuk tuntutan bayaran kemajuan No. 4 dan invois untuk jumlah penuh bagi tuntutan bayaran kemajuan No. 5 dan No. 6 terhadap Defendan Keempat serta menuntut untuk jumlah penuh invois- invois tersebut. [56] Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada Notis Tuntutan juga dihantar oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan Keempat untuk menuntut jumlah RM363,559.00 yang dituntut oleh Plaintif sekarang. [57] Kesemua fakta ini menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif sebenarnya mempunyai pengetahuan penuh bahawa Defendan Keempat berhak untuk memotong dan telah pun potong Denda Gantirugi Tertentu (LAD) daripada bayaran-bayaran kemajuan tersebut dan telah tidak membantah. S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 19 [58] Fakta ini turut mendedahkan bahawa Plaintif tidak jujur dalam membuat tuntutan ini terhadap Defendan Keempat. KEPUTUSAN [59] Maka, berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan tersebut di atas, Mahkamah mendapati tiada isu yang perlu dibicarakan dan tiada guna sekiranya suatu perbicaraan penuh dijalankan. [60] Oleh yang demikian, Rayuan Plaintif ditolak dengan kos dan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen YB bertarikh 19.6.2023 dikekalkan. Bertarikh pada 9 November 2023 di Muar dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim. t.t. SURIA KUMAR DJ PAUL Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Muar Johor Darul Ta’zim Kaunsel : Bagi pihak Perayu : Amy Chia Mei Yan Bagi pihak Responden-Responden : Nur Syamim Fateha binti Mohd Amin S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12AC-1-06/2023] November 9, 2023 20 Peguamcara : Bagi pihak Perayu Tetuan K.H Tan & Co. Peguambela & Peguamcara No. 5-18, Tingkat 1 Jalan Ibrahim 84000 Muar Johor [Ruj. No.: TKH/OR/1207/22/ac] Bagi pihak Responden-Responden Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Melaka Unit Guaman, Aras 1 Blok Laksamana Seri Negeri Ayer Keroh Hang Tuah Jaya Peti Surat 20 75450 MELAKA [Ruj. No.: PN/MK/PP/26/01/1/2023(2018)] Tarikh Pendengaran : 2 Oktober 2023 Tarikh Keputusan : 9 November 2023 S/N JqAiUkx1R0aM0LcaB4AnRw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	28,758	Tika 2.6.0
NA-A53KJ-133-02/2021	PLAINTIF 1. ) AZMI BIN BAHARIM (mendakwa sebagai ibubapa yang sah dan orang tanggungan Muhammad Akmal Syazwi Bin Azmi, simati) 2. ) SHEPIAH BINTI ABD.RASHID (mendakwa sebagai ibubapa yang sah dan orang tanggungan Muhammad Akmal Syazwi Bin Azmi, simati) 3. ) MUHAMMAD IZZAT SAFUAN BIN MOHD NIZAM (menuntut untuk kecederaan diri) DEFENDAN YUVANNESWARY A/P PERIASAMY	Burden of proof as prescribed by section 101 of the Evidence Act - dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist-‘balance of probabilities’ as ‘more probable than not’ and which is ‘not so high as required in a criminal case-but if the probabilities are equal, it is not discharged-Defendant’s version was more probable based on oral testimony from the witnesses and the silent evidence of the police reports of both the Plaintiff and Defendant, the sketch plan of the accident site, the photographs, and the damages to the vehicles- 'contributory negligence,' does not mean breach of duty-It means the failure by the person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his property so that he becomes the author of his own wrong-loss of support, I refer to section 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956- any deduction for living expenses under the subsection of s. 28A Civil Law Act 1956- case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be 16	03/12/2023	Puan Mazni binti Nawi	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6738ba92-a2d1-4f3c-bb40-6b33b9d791d6&Inline=true	IN THE SESSIONS COURT AT SEREMBAN IN THE STATE OF NEGERI SEMBILAN DARUL KHUSUS, MALAYSIA CASE NO.NA-A53KJ-133-02/2021 BETWEEN AZMI BIN BAHARIM SHEPIAH BINTI ABD RASHID (as the parents and dependents of MUHAMMAD AKMAL SYAZWI BIN AZMI, the deceased) MUHAMMAD IZZAT SAFUAN BIN MOHD NIZAM (claiming for his injury) … PLAINTIFFS AND YUVANNESWARY A/P PERIASAMY … DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT Introduction [1] An appeal was filed on 22 September 2023 by the Plaintiffs and on 25 September 2023 by the Defendant on the issues of liability and quantum decided by this Court on 12 September 2023. 03/12/2023 21:18:46 NA-A53KJ-133-02/2021 Kand. 46 S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 The factual background [2] The proceedings at the Sessions Court originated from an accident that occurred on 16 September 2020, involving a motorcycle WD 4285 A ridden by the deceased, and a motorcar WQG 8440 driven by the Defendant at North-South Highway. [3] To prove their case, the Plaintiffs had called 4 witnesses while the Defendant called 3 witnesses. Plaintiffs’ witnesses were - (a) Inspector Nor Fadzilah bin Mohd Zainuddin, the Investigation Officer (“SP1”); (b) Mr. Zafarull bin Ismail, the deceased's Employer ("SP2"); (c) Mr. Azmi bin Baharim, the First Plaintiff (“SP3”); and (d) Mr. Muhammad Izzat Safuan Bin Mohd Nizam, the Third Plaintiff (“SP4”). The defendant’s witnesses were - (a) Mr. Ashaari Sulaiman, PLUS Officer (“SD1”); (b) Mr. Ahmad Fuad bin Mohamad, PLUS Officer (“SD2”); and (c) Mrs. Yuvanneswary a/p Periasamy, the Defendant. S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [4] I apportioned liability at 72:25 between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. Both parties appealed against my decision, with both claiming that the other should have been made 100% liable. On quantum, both parties were also dissatisfied with my decision and appealed against the award. Liability [5] At this juncture, Plaintiffs had the legal burden of proof as prescribed by section 101 of the Evidence Act, which reads: “Burden of proof 101. (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.”. [6] This reminder was also administered by the Federal Court in WONG THIN YIT V. MOHAMED ALI [1971] 1 LNS 151 in the words of Ong CJ: “In a negligence action, the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence. The plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the defendant’s negligence. Evidence is the foundation of proof, with which it must not be confounded. Proof is that which leads to a conclusion as to the truth or falsity of alleged S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 facts which are the subject of inquiry. Evidence, if accepted and believed, may result in proof, but it is not necessarily proof of itself.”. [7] Evrol Mariette Peters, J in SABRI ABDUL TALIB AND VT LOGISTICS (M) SDN. BHD. V. TIONG MEE KOOI [2021] 1 LNS 2275 also emphasised that - “The standard of proof on the Plaintiff to prove his claim was on a balance of probabilities. The term ‘balance of probabilities’ was described in Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 by Denning J (as he then was) as ‘more probable than not’ and which is ‘not so high as required in a criminal case…but if the probabilities are equal, it is not discharged’. The standard, therefore, does not allow for any guesswork, speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Miller v. Minister of Pensions has been assimilated into Malaysian jurisprudence through several cases, including Inas Faiqah bt Mohd Helmi (an infant suing through her father and next friend, Mohd Helmi bin Abdul Aziz) v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 MLJ 1.”. [8] The Third Plaintiff, who was the pillion rider, testified and alleged that the Defendant had suddenly driven her car into his lane, causing the accident. On the other hand, Defendant consistently testified through all her witnesses that her car was parked in the emergency lane because she had some trouble with her car, and the PLUS authorities had placed cones for her. Furthermore, she had kept the emergency lights on all the time. [9] The investigating officer [IO] SP1 testified that she went to the accident site at 10 am the following day. She had recorded statements S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 from all the witnesses and concluded that the Defendant’s car was parked in the emergency lane before the accident. [10] Based on SD 1’s and SD 2’s statements, the PLUS Officer, the IO (SP1) concluded that the accident occurred at 9.50 pm on 16 September 2020, and there were cones in place behind the Defendant’s car. Court’s finding [11] Both the deceased and the Defendant were traveling in the same direction on the North-South Highway. [12] In determining the liability, I refer to the almost similar facts of the case in RINA AZIRA HASRI VS SYARIFAH SALWA SYED ZAINOL ABIDIN [2023] 1 LNS 1645 where Narkunavathy Sundareson, J stated that - “[18] The issue raised by the Plaintiff on the placement of the cones and the suggestion that they were placed post the accident is without merit. The sketch plan [Exhibit P1] clearly shows that the cones were placed on the right side of the emergency lane. They were not placed directly behind the Defendant’s car such as to impede the Plaintiff and cause them to scatter post impact. [19] The photographs clearly show that the point of impact was to the left side of the Defendant’s rear. This must surely mean that the cones did not hinder the Plaintiff’s path.”. S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] In this case, after evaluating evidence from all the witnesses, I concluded that the Defendant’s version was more probable based on oral testimony from the witnesses and the silent evidence of the police reports of both the Plaintiff and Defendant, the sketch plan of the accident site, the photographs, and the damages to the vehicles. Contributory Negligence [14] Hence, the issue was whether the Defendant contributed to the negligence. The term “contributory negligence” was highlighted by the Supreme Court in LAI YEW SEONG VS CHAN KIM SANG [1987] CLJ REP 151; [1987] 1 CLJ 352 as follows: “.. negligent as used in the expression 'contributory negligence,' does not mean breach of duty. It means the failure by the person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his property so that he becomes the author of his own wrong.”. [15] In this case, based on the facts and evidence I found, on the balance of probabilities, the accident was also contributed by the Defendant. [16] I refer to the words of Narkunavathy Sundareson, J in Rina Azira Hasri Vs Syarifah Salwa Syed Zainol Abidin [2023] 1 LNS 1645 that stated: “[21] ….. Here the Defendant stated that she … parked in the emergency lane because she had some trouble with her car and the PLUS authorities had placed the cones for her. The Magistrate accepted her evidence but found her to be 25% liable for the accident for failing to take sufficient precautions. S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 …. [23] This Court finds that the Magistrate adopted the right approach in determining liability. From the evidence presented by both parties, it is clear that the Magistrate had evaluated their evidence and drawn the proper conclusions. She was correct to hold that the Plaintiff was 75% liable for the accident.”. [17] Therefore, in this case, on the balance of probabilities, I accepted the Defendant’s evidence but found her to be 25% liable for the accident for failing to take sufficient precautions. Quantum for the First and Second Plaintiff Loss of support [18] It was submitted that the Deceased was working with MBF Protection Services Sdn. Bhd. as a security guard, earning an average sum of RM 1652.73. per month. His pay slips were tendered in Court through his employer’s representative as exhibits and were marked as P4. [19] The defendants objected and argued that the deceased did not receive such an amount of pay because he was only working for a day. Therefore, claims for loss of support should be rejected. [20] In this case, SP2 had testified that the deceased was entitled to earn RM 1652.73 per month but because he was only working for a day, his employer compensated his dependents for only RM 1,000.00. S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [21] To calculate the loss of support, I refer to section 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956 as follows: “Compensation to persons entitled for loss occasioned by death 7. (1) Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof , the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death has been caused under such circumstances as an amount in law to an offence under the Penal Code [Act 574]. (2) Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, child and any person with disabilities under the care, if any, of the person whose death has been so caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor of the person deceased. (3) The damages which the party who shall be liable under subsection (1) to pay to the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought shall, subject to this section, be such as will compensate the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought for any loss of support suffered together with any reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the party liable under subsection (1): S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Provided that— (i) in assessing the damages there shall not be taken into account— (a) any sum paid or payable on the death of the person deceased under any contract of assurance or insurance, whether made before or after the coming into force of this Act; (b) any sum payable, as a result of the death, under any written law relating to employees’ provident fund; (c) any pension or gratuity, which has been or will or may be paid as a result of the death; or (d) any sum which has been or will or may be paid under any written law relating to the payment of any benefit or compensation whatsoever, in respect of the death; (ii) damages may be awarded in respect of the funeral expenses of the person deceased if such expenses have been incurred by the party for whose benefit the action is brought; (iii) no damages shall be awarded to a parent on the ground only of his having been deprived of the services of a child; and no damages shall be awarded to a husband on the ground only of his having been deprived of the services or society of his wife; and S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the damages under this section the Court shall— (a) take into account that where the person deceased has attained the age of sixty years at the time of his death, his loss of earnings for any period after his death shall not be taken into consideration; and in the case of any other person deceased, his loss of earnings for any period after his death shall be taken into consideration if it is proved or admitted that the person deceased was receiving earnings by his own labour or other gainful activity prior to his death; (b) take into account only the amount relating to the earnings as aforesaid and the Court shall not take into account any prospect of the earnings as aforesaid being increased at any period after the person’s death; (c) take into account any diminution of any such amount as aforesaid by such sum as is proved or admitted to be the living expenses of the person deceased at the time of his death; (d) take into account that in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be 16; and in the case of any other person who was of the age S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 range extending between thirty-one years and fifty-nine years at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be calculated by using the figure 60, minus the age of the person at the time of death and dividing the remainder by the figure 2. (3A) Any action under this section may consist of or include a claim for damages for bereavement and, subject to subsection (3D), the sum to be awarded as damages under this subsection shall be thirty thousand ringgit. (3B) A claim for damages for bereavement shall only be for the benefit of — (a) the spouse of the person deceased; (b) the child of the person deceased; and (c) the parents of the person deceased. (3C) Where there is a claim for damages under subsection (3B), the sum awarded shall be divided equally between them subject to any deduction likely to be made in respect of all costs and expenses including costs not recovered from the defendant. (3D) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may from time to time by order published in the Gazette vary the sum specified in subsection (3A). S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (3E) An order made under subsection (3D) shall be published in the Gazette and as soon as possible thereafter, shall be laid before the Dewan Rakyat; and if the Dewan Rakyat passes a resolution annulling the order, it shall be void but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder or to the making of a new order as from the date of notification in the Gazette of the passing of the resolution. (4) The amount, other than the amount awarded under proviso (iii) to subsection (3) and the amount recovered under subsection (3B), so recovered after deducting all costs and expenses, including the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned parties, or any of them in such shares as the Court by its judgment or decree directs. (5) Not more than one action shall be brought for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint, and every such action shall be brought within three years after the death of the person deceased. (6) In any such action the executor of the deceased may insert a claim for and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect, or default, which sum when recovered shall be deemed part of the assets of the estate of the deceased. (7) The plaint or writ or summons in any such action shall give full particulars of the person or persons for whom or on whose behalf S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 the action is brought, and of the nature of the claim in respect of which damages are sought to be recovered. (8) If there is no executor of the person deceased or there being an executor no action as in this section mentioned has, within six calendar months after the death of the person deceased, been brought by the executor, the action may be brought by all or any of the persons, if more than one, for whose benefit the action would have been brought if it had been brought by the executor, and every action so to be brought shall be for the benefit of the same person or persons and shall be subject to the same procedure as nearly as may be as if it was brought by the executor. (9) It shall be sufficient for any defendant in any action brought under this section to pay any money, he is advised to pay into Court as compensation, in one sum to all persons entitled under this section for his wrongful act, neglect or default without specifying the shares into which it is to be divided. (10) If the said sum is not accepted and an issue is taken by the plaintiff as to its sufficiency and the Court thinks the same sufficient, the defendant shall be entitled to judgment upon that issue. (11) In this section unless the context otherwise requires— “child” includes son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, stepson and stepdaughter; “parent” includes father, mother, grandfather and grandmother; S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “pension” includes a return of contributions and any payment of a lump sum in respect of a person’s employment: Provided that in deducing any relationship referred to in this subsection any illegitimate person or any person who has been adopted, or whose adoption has been registered, in accordance with any written law shall be treated as being or as having been the legitimate offspring of his mother and reputed father or, as the case may be, of his adopters.”. Living expenses [22] To determine the living expenses, I refer to the case of MARAPPAN NALLAN KOUNDAR V. SITI RAHMAH IBRAHIM [1990] 1 CLJ (REP) 174 which states as follows: “[3] The court should not make any deduction for living expenses under the subsection of s. 28A CLA as there was no proof or admission in this case as to what the actual living expenses of the plaintiff were at the time when she was injured.” [23] Besides that, I also refer to the words of Mohamad Abazafree, J in the case of NAGENTHIRAN THANGARAJOO VS MUHAMMAD AZWAN MOHD AFANDI & ANOR [2023] 1 LNS 1180 that stated as follows: “[25] Berkaitan pemotongan kos sara hidup, Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Marappan Nallan Koundar v. Siti Rahmah Ibrahim [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 174 telah menyatakan seperti berikut; S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [3] The court should not make any deduction for living expenses under the subsection of s. 28A CLA as there was no proof or admission in this case as to what the actual living expenses of the plaintiff were at the time when she was injured. (rujuk; Lau Lee Ching & anor v. Muhammad Faiz Md Yusof [2019] 1 LNS 2109). [2023] 1 LNS [26] Sehubungan dengan itu, menggunakan pendekatan yang sama, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa Tuan HMS adalah tidak terkhilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa jumlah ganti rugi kehilangan pendapatan adalah tertakluk kepada pemotongan sebanyak 1/3. Oleh itu jumlah RM1,143,857.00 hendaklah dipotong sebanyak 1/3 menjadikan jumlah yang sewajarnya diawardkan adalah sebanyak RM862,571.40”. [24] Therefore, I allowed a deduction of one-third from the deceased salary. Multiplier [25] For the multiplier, I refer to the proviso in (iv) (d) to subsection 7(3) Civil Law Act 1956 as follows: “(d) take into account that in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be 16; and in the case of any other person who was of the age range extending between thirty-one years and fifty-nine years at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be calculated by using the figure 60, minus the age S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 of the person at the time of death and dividing the remainder by the figure 2.”. [26] To interpret the application of the proviso to subsection 7(3) I refer to the Court of Appeal’s decision Cheng Bee Teik & Ors V. Peter Selvaraj & Another Court Of Appeal, Putrajaya [Civil Appeal No: P- 04-93-2002] as follows: “The issue before us is, what is the proper interpretation that ought to be given to the proviso to s. 7(3) of the CLA, which reads: (iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the damages under this section the Court shall: (d) take into account that in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years' purchase shall be 16; and in the case of any other person who was of the age range extending between thirty-one years and fifty-four years at the time of his death, the number of years' purchase shall be calculated by using the figure 55, minus the age of the person at the time of death and dividing the remainder by the figure..” [27] By virtue of the proviso in paragraph (iv) (d) to subsection 7(3) Civil Law Act 1956, loss of support based on 100% liability was calculated as follows: Deceased age (a) at date of accident: 21 Multiplier: 16 [RM350.00 x 12 x 16 = RM67,200.00 S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Bereavement [28] With reference to subsection 7(3) Civil Law Act 1956, I awarded RM30,000.00 for bereavement. Funeral expenses [29] I also award RM 3,000.00 for funeral expenses. Quantum for the Third Plaintiff [30] For general damages, based on the Revised Compendium of Personal Injury, I awarded based on 100% liability as follows: (a) Laceration wound right little finger with extensor digiti minimi tendon RM 6,000.00; (b) Degloving wound left forearms RM 16,000.00;and (c) Soft tissue injury over the left foot RM 3,000.00 [31] For special damages, I refer to the case PANG AH CHEE VS CHONG KWEE SANG [1985] CLJ (REP) 236 as quoted by the Plaintiff which stated as follows and allowed claim for the cost of repair of the motor-cycle and towing: “The two items (funeral expenses and repair of motor-cycle) on which there was much argument and in respect of which we also restored the awards of the learned President are special damages. True, special damages must be proved - see Judgment of Lord Goddard in BonhamCarter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd. [1948] TLR 177, S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 178, quoted in Lee Sau Kong v. Leow Cheng Chiang [1961] 27 MLJ 17. Being special damages they are therefore not really a case of “measuring the immeasurable” Rushton v. National Coal Board [1953] 1 All ER 314, but to what extent the Court in the first instance was satisfied that the claims have been proved on the balance of probabilities. It is clear from the record here that as regards the cost of repair of the motor-cycle the appellant had said in her evidence- in-chief that the deceased’s motorcycle was sent for repairs after the accident and tendered a receipt for the payment of the repairs although she was not the one who made the payment. True, in cross-examination she also said that she had not taken the motor- cycle for repair herself. There is no dispute that the damage to the motor-cycle was as a result of the accident and that the photographs of the damage are shown in the Photographs P4A, B and C. There is also sworn evidence that the motorcycle had been sent for repairs and certain payment had been made towards the repairs. These claims had been pleaded and particularised in the statement of claim. We do not therefore think that the learned appellate Judge was correct in disallowing the award of RM400 made by the learned President for this item.”. Cost and interest [32] Interest was also allowed as follows: (a) the interest rate of 5% per annum on the general damages from the date of the issuance of writ to the date of the judgment; (b) the interest rate of 2.5% per annum on the special damages from the date of the accident to the date of the judgment; and S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (c) the interest rate of 5% per annum on the whole judgment from the date of judgment until full payment. [33] Costs were allowed according to Order 59 rule 23(1) of the Rules of Court. Conclusion [34] To recapitulate, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after scrutiny and consideration of all the evidence before this Court, including the written submissions of both parties, I found that liability at 75:25 between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and the amount awarded was fair and reasonable. (MAZNI BINTI NAWI) Session Judge Session Court (4) Seremban Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus 3 December 2023 ____________________________________________ For the Plaintiffs: Messrs G. Dorai & Co No. 7, Jalan Mawar 1, Taman Mawar 48000 Rawang S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Selangor For the Defendant: Messrs Sekar Gill & C. Suren, No.507 & 507-A, Jalan Melaka Raya 12, Taman Melaka Raya 75000 Melaka S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	27,395	Tika 2.6.0
NA-A53KJ-133-02/2021	PLAINTIF 1. ) AZMI BIN BAHARIM (mendakwa sebagai ibubapa yang sah dan orang tanggungan Muhammad Akmal Syazwi Bin Azmi, simati) 2. ) SHEPIAH BINTI ABD.RASHID (mendakwa sebagai ibubapa yang sah dan orang tanggungan Muhammad Akmal Syazwi Bin Azmi, simati) 3. ) MUHAMMAD IZZAT SAFUAN BIN MOHD NIZAM (menuntut untuk kecederaan diri) DEFENDAN YUVANNESWARY A/P PERIASAMY	Burden of proof as prescribed by section 101 of the Evidence Act - dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist-‘balance of probabilities’ as ‘more probable than not’ and which is ‘not so high as required in a criminal case-but if the probabilities are equal, it is not discharged-Defendant’s version was more probable based on oral testimony from the witnesses and the silent evidence of the police reports of both the Plaintiff and Defendant, the sketch plan of the accident site, the photographs, and the damages to the vehicles- 'contributory negligence,' does not mean breach of duty-It means the failure by the person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his property so that he becomes the author of his own wrong-loss of support, I refer to section 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956- any deduction for living expenses under the subsection of s. 28A Civil Law Act 1956- case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be 16	03/12/2023	Puan Mazni binti Nawi	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6738ba92-a2d1-4f3c-bb40-6b33b9d791d6&Inline=true	IN THE SESSIONS COURT AT SEREMBAN IN THE STATE OF NEGERI SEMBILAN DARUL KHUSUS, MALAYSIA CASE NO.NA-A53KJ-133-02/2021 BETWEEN AZMI BIN BAHARIM SHEPIAH BINTI ABD RASHID (as the parents and dependents of MUHAMMAD AKMAL SYAZWI BIN AZMI, the deceased) MUHAMMAD IZZAT SAFUAN BIN MOHD NIZAM (claiming for his injury) … PLAINTIFFS AND YUVANNESWARY A/P PERIASAMY … DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT Introduction [1] An appeal was filed on 22 September 2023 by the Plaintiffs and on 25 September 2023 by the Defendant on the issues of liability and quantum decided by this Court on 12 September 2023. 03/12/2023 21:18:46 NA-A53KJ-133-02/2021 Kand. 46 S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 The factual background [2] The proceedings at the Sessions Court originated from an accident that occurred on 16 September 2020, involving a motorcycle WD 4285 A ridden by the deceased, and a motorcar WQG 8440 driven by the Defendant at North-South Highway. [3] To prove their case, the Plaintiffs had called 4 witnesses while the Defendant called 3 witnesses. Plaintiffs’ witnesses were - (a) Inspector Nor Fadzilah bin Mohd Zainuddin, the Investigation Officer (“SP1”); (b) Mr. Zafarull bin Ismail, the deceased's Employer ("SP2"); (c) Mr. Azmi bin Baharim, the First Plaintiff (“SP3”); and (d) Mr. Muhammad Izzat Safuan Bin Mohd Nizam, the Third Plaintiff (“SP4”). The defendant’s witnesses were - (a) Mr. Ashaari Sulaiman, PLUS Officer (“SD1”); (b) Mr. Ahmad Fuad bin Mohamad, PLUS Officer (“SD2”); and (c) Mrs. Yuvanneswary a/p Periasamy, the Defendant. S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [4] I apportioned liability at 72:25 between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. Both parties appealed against my decision, with both claiming that the other should have been made 100% liable. On quantum, both parties were also dissatisfied with my decision and appealed against the award. Liability [5] At this juncture, Plaintiffs had the legal burden of proof as prescribed by section 101 of the Evidence Act, which reads: “Burden of proof 101. (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.”. [6] This reminder was also administered by the Federal Court in WONG THIN YIT V. MOHAMED ALI [1971] 1 LNS 151 in the words of Ong CJ: “In a negligence action, the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence. The plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the defendant’s negligence. Evidence is the foundation of proof, with which it must not be confounded. Proof is that which leads to a conclusion as to the truth or falsity of alleged S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 facts which are the subject of inquiry. Evidence, if accepted and believed, may result in proof, but it is not necessarily proof of itself.”. [7] Evrol Mariette Peters, J in SABRI ABDUL TALIB AND VT LOGISTICS (M) SDN. BHD. V. TIONG MEE KOOI [2021] 1 LNS 2275 also emphasised that - “The standard of proof on the Plaintiff to prove his claim was on a balance of probabilities. The term ‘balance of probabilities’ was described in Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 by Denning J (as he then was) as ‘more probable than not’ and which is ‘not so high as required in a criminal case…but if the probabilities are equal, it is not discharged’. The standard, therefore, does not allow for any guesswork, speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Miller v. Minister of Pensions has been assimilated into Malaysian jurisprudence through several cases, including Inas Faiqah bt Mohd Helmi (an infant suing through her father and next friend, Mohd Helmi bin Abdul Aziz) v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 MLJ 1.”. [8] The Third Plaintiff, who was the pillion rider, testified and alleged that the Defendant had suddenly driven her car into his lane, causing the accident. On the other hand, Defendant consistently testified through all her witnesses that her car was parked in the emergency lane because she had some trouble with her car, and the PLUS authorities had placed cones for her. Furthermore, she had kept the emergency lights on all the time. [9] The investigating officer [IO] SP1 testified that she went to the accident site at 10 am the following day. She had recorded statements S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 from all the witnesses and concluded that the Defendant’s car was parked in the emergency lane before the accident. [10] Based on SD 1’s and SD 2’s statements, the PLUS Officer, the IO (SP1) concluded that the accident occurred at 9.50 pm on 16 September 2020, and there were cones in place behind the Defendant’s car. Court’s finding [11] Both the deceased and the Defendant were traveling in the same direction on the North-South Highway. [12] In determining the liability, I refer to the almost similar facts of the case in RINA AZIRA HASRI VS SYARIFAH SALWA SYED ZAINOL ABIDIN [2023] 1 LNS 1645 where Narkunavathy Sundareson, J stated that - “[18] The issue raised by the Plaintiff on the placement of the cones and the suggestion that they were placed post the accident is without merit. The sketch plan [Exhibit P1] clearly shows that the cones were placed on the right side of the emergency lane. They were not placed directly behind the Defendant’s car such as to impede the Plaintiff and cause them to scatter post impact. [19] The photographs clearly show that the point of impact was to the left side of the Defendant’s rear. This must surely mean that the cones did not hinder the Plaintiff’s path.”. S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] In this case, after evaluating evidence from all the witnesses, I concluded that the Defendant’s version was more probable based on oral testimony from the witnesses and the silent evidence of the police reports of both the Plaintiff and Defendant, the sketch plan of the accident site, the photographs, and the damages to the vehicles. Contributory Negligence [14] Hence, the issue was whether the Defendant contributed to the negligence. The term “contributory negligence” was highlighted by the Supreme Court in LAI YEW SEONG VS CHAN KIM SANG [1987] CLJ REP 151; [1987] 1 CLJ 352 as follows: “.. negligent as used in the expression 'contributory negligence,' does not mean breach of duty. It means the failure by the person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his property so that he becomes the author of his own wrong.”. [15] In this case, based on the facts and evidence I found, on the balance of probabilities, the accident was also contributed by the Defendant. [16] I refer to the words of Narkunavathy Sundareson, J in Rina Azira Hasri Vs Syarifah Salwa Syed Zainol Abidin [2023] 1 LNS 1645 that stated: “[21] ….. Here the Defendant stated that she … parked in the emergency lane because she had some trouble with her car and the PLUS authorities had placed the cones for her. The Magistrate accepted her evidence but found her to be 25% liable for the accident for failing to take sufficient precautions. S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 …. [23] This Court finds that the Magistrate adopted the right approach in determining liability. From the evidence presented by both parties, it is clear that the Magistrate had evaluated their evidence and drawn the proper conclusions. She was correct to hold that the Plaintiff was 75% liable for the accident.”. [17] Therefore, in this case, on the balance of probabilities, I accepted the Defendant’s evidence but found her to be 25% liable for the accident for failing to take sufficient precautions. Quantum for the First and Second Plaintiff Loss of support [18] It was submitted that the Deceased was working with MBF Protection Services Sdn. Bhd. as a security guard, earning an average sum of RM 1652.73. per month. His pay slips were tendered in Court through his employer’s representative as exhibits and were marked as P4. [19] The defendants objected and argued that the deceased did not receive such an amount of pay because he was only working for a day. Therefore, claims for loss of support should be rejected. [20] In this case, SP2 had testified that the deceased was entitled to earn RM 1652.73 per month but because he was only working for a day, his employer compensated his dependents for only RM 1,000.00. S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [21] To calculate the loss of support, I refer to section 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956 as follows: “Compensation to persons entitled for loss occasioned by death 7. (1) Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof , the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death has been caused under such circumstances as an amount in law to an offence under the Penal Code [Act 574]. (2) Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, child and any person with disabilities under the care, if any, of the person whose death has been so caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor of the person deceased. (3) The damages which the party who shall be liable under subsection (1) to pay to the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought shall, subject to this section, be such as will compensate the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought for any loss of support suffered together with any reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the party liable under subsection (1): S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Provided that— (i) in assessing the damages there shall not be taken into account— (a) any sum paid or payable on the death of the person deceased under any contract of assurance or insurance, whether made before or after the coming into force of this Act; (b) any sum payable, as a result of the death, under any written law relating to employees’ provident fund; (c) any pension or gratuity, which has been or will or may be paid as a result of the death; or (d) any sum which has been or will or may be paid under any written law relating to the payment of any benefit or compensation whatsoever, in respect of the death; (ii) damages may be awarded in respect of the funeral expenses of the person deceased if such expenses have been incurred by the party for whose benefit the action is brought; (iii) no damages shall be awarded to a parent on the ground only of his having been deprived of the services of a child; and no damages shall be awarded to a husband on the ground only of his having been deprived of the services or society of his wife; and S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the damages under this section the Court shall— (a) take into account that where the person deceased has attained the age of sixty years at the time of his death, his loss of earnings for any period after his death shall not be taken into consideration; and in the case of any other person deceased, his loss of earnings for any period after his death shall be taken into consideration if it is proved or admitted that the person deceased was receiving earnings by his own labour or other gainful activity prior to his death; (b) take into account only the amount relating to the earnings as aforesaid and the Court shall not take into account any prospect of the earnings as aforesaid being increased at any period after the person’s death; (c) take into account any diminution of any such amount as aforesaid by such sum as is proved or admitted to be the living expenses of the person deceased at the time of his death; (d) take into account that in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be 16; and in the case of any other person who was of the age S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 range extending between thirty-one years and fifty-nine years at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be calculated by using the figure 60, minus the age of the person at the time of death and dividing the remainder by the figure 2. (3A) Any action under this section may consist of or include a claim for damages for bereavement and, subject to subsection (3D), the sum to be awarded as damages under this subsection shall be thirty thousand ringgit. (3B) A claim for damages for bereavement shall only be for the benefit of — (a) the spouse of the person deceased; (b) the child of the person deceased; and (c) the parents of the person deceased. (3C) Where there is a claim for damages under subsection (3B), the sum awarded shall be divided equally between them subject to any deduction likely to be made in respect of all costs and expenses including costs not recovered from the defendant. (3D) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may from time to time by order published in the Gazette vary the sum specified in subsection (3A). S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (3E) An order made under subsection (3D) shall be published in the Gazette and as soon as possible thereafter, shall be laid before the Dewan Rakyat; and if the Dewan Rakyat passes a resolution annulling the order, it shall be void but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder or to the making of a new order as from the date of notification in the Gazette of the passing of the resolution. (4) The amount, other than the amount awarded under proviso (iii) to subsection (3) and the amount recovered under subsection (3B), so recovered after deducting all costs and expenses, including the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned parties, or any of them in such shares as the Court by its judgment or decree directs. (5) Not more than one action shall be brought for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint, and every such action shall be brought within three years after the death of the person deceased. (6) In any such action the executor of the deceased may insert a claim for and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect, or default, which sum when recovered shall be deemed part of the assets of the estate of the deceased. (7) The plaint or writ or summons in any such action shall give full particulars of the person or persons for whom or on whose behalf S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 the action is brought, and of the nature of the claim in respect of which damages are sought to be recovered. (8) If there is no executor of the person deceased or there being an executor no action as in this section mentioned has, within six calendar months after the death of the person deceased, been brought by the executor, the action may be brought by all or any of the persons, if more than one, for whose benefit the action would have been brought if it had been brought by the executor, and every action so to be brought shall be for the benefit of the same person or persons and shall be subject to the same procedure as nearly as may be as if it was brought by the executor. (9) It shall be sufficient for any defendant in any action brought under this section to pay any money, he is advised to pay into Court as compensation, in one sum to all persons entitled under this section for his wrongful act, neglect or default without specifying the shares into which it is to be divided. (10) If the said sum is not accepted and an issue is taken by the plaintiff as to its sufficiency and the Court thinks the same sufficient, the defendant shall be entitled to judgment upon that issue. (11) In this section unless the context otherwise requires— “child” includes son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, stepson and stepdaughter; “parent” includes father, mother, grandfather and grandmother; S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “pension” includes a return of contributions and any payment of a lump sum in respect of a person’s employment: Provided that in deducing any relationship referred to in this subsection any illegitimate person or any person who has been adopted, or whose adoption has been registered, in accordance with any written law shall be treated as being or as having been the legitimate offspring of his mother and reputed father or, as the case may be, of his adopters.”. Living expenses [22] To determine the living expenses, I refer to the case of MARAPPAN NALLAN KOUNDAR V. SITI RAHMAH IBRAHIM [1990] 1 CLJ (REP) 174 which states as follows: “[3] The court should not make any deduction for living expenses under the subsection of s. 28A CLA as there was no proof or admission in this case as to what the actual living expenses of the plaintiff were at the time when she was injured.” [23] Besides that, I also refer to the words of Mohamad Abazafree, J in the case of NAGENTHIRAN THANGARAJOO VS MUHAMMAD AZWAN MOHD AFANDI & ANOR [2023] 1 LNS 1180 that stated as follows: “[25] Berkaitan pemotongan kos sara hidup, Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Marappan Nallan Koundar v. Siti Rahmah Ibrahim [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 174 telah menyatakan seperti berikut; S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [3] The court should not make any deduction for living expenses under the subsection of s. 28A CLA as there was no proof or admission in this case as to what the actual living expenses of the plaintiff were at the time when she was injured. (rujuk; Lau Lee Ching & anor v. Muhammad Faiz Md Yusof [2019] 1 LNS 2109). [2023] 1 LNS [26] Sehubungan dengan itu, menggunakan pendekatan yang sama, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa Tuan HMS adalah tidak terkhilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa jumlah ganti rugi kehilangan pendapatan adalah tertakluk kepada pemotongan sebanyak 1/3. Oleh itu jumlah RM1,143,857.00 hendaklah dipotong sebanyak 1/3 menjadikan jumlah yang sewajarnya diawardkan adalah sebanyak RM862,571.40”. [24] Therefore, I allowed a deduction of one-third from the deceased salary. Multiplier [25] For the multiplier, I refer to the proviso in (iv) (d) to subsection 7(3) Civil Law Act 1956 as follows: “(d) take into account that in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be 16; and in the case of any other person who was of the age range extending between thirty-one years and fifty-nine years at the time of his death, the number of years’ purchase shall be calculated by using the figure 60, minus the age S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 of the person at the time of death and dividing the remainder by the figure 2.”. [26] To interpret the application of the proviso to subsection 7(3) I refer to the Court of Appeal’s decision Cheng Bee Teik & Ors V. Peter Selvaraj & Another Court Of Appeal, Putrajaya [Civil Appeal No: P- 04-93-2002] as follows: “The issue before us is, what is the proper interpretation that ought to be given to the proviso to s. 7(3) of the CLA, which reads: (iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the damages under this section the Court shall: (d) take into account that in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years' purchase shall be 16; and in the case of any other person who was of the age range extending between thirty-one years and fifty-four years at the time of his death, the number of years' purchase shall be calculated by using the figure 55, minus the age of the person at the time of death and dividing the remainder by the figure..” [27] By virtue of the proviso in paragraph (iv) (d) to subsection 7(3) Civil Law Act 1956, loss of support based on 100% liability was calculated as follows: Deceased age (a) at date of accident: 21 Multiplier: 16 [RM350.00 x 12 x 16 = RM67,200.00 S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Bereavement [28] With reference to subsection 7(3) Civil Law Act 1956, I awarded RM30,000.00 for bereavement. Funeral expenses [29] I also award RM 3,000.00 for funeral expenses. Quantum for the Third Plaintiff [30] For general damages, based on the Revised Compendium of Personal Injury, I awarded based on 100% liability as follows: (a) Laceration wound right little finger with extensor digiti minimi tendon RM 6,000.00; (b) Degloving wound left forearms RM 16,000.00;and (c) Soft tissue injury over the left foot RM 3,000.00 [31] For special damages, I refer to the case PANG AH CHEE VS CHONG KWEE SANG [1985] CLJ (REP) 236 as quoted by the Plaintiff which stated as follows and allowed claim for the cost of repair of the motor-cycle and towing: “The two items (funeral expenses and repair of motor-cycle) on which there was much argument and in respect of which we also restored the awards of the learned President are special damages. True, special damages must be proved - see Judgment of Lord Goddard in BonhamCarter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd. [1948] TLR 177, S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 178, quoted in Lee Sau Kong v. Leow Cheng Chiang [1961] 27 MLJ 17. Being special damages they are therefore not really a case of “measuring the immeasurable” Rushton v. National Coal Board [1953] 1 All ER 314, but to what extent the Court in the first instance was satisfied that the claims have been proved on the balance of probabilities. It is clear from the record here that as regards the cost of repair of the motor-cycle the appellant had said in her evidence- in-chief that the deceased’s motorcycle was sent for repairs after the accident and tendered a receipt for the payment of the repairs although she was not the one who made the payment. True, in cross-examination she also said that she had not taken the motor- cycle for repair herself. There is no dispute that the damage to the motor-cycle was as a result of the accident and that the photographs of the damage are shown in the Photographs P4A, B and C. There is also sworn evidence that the motorcycle had been sent for repairs and certain payment had been made towards the repairs. These claims had been pleaded and particularised in the statement of claim. We do not therefore think that the learned appellate Judge was correct in disallowing the award of RM400 made by the learned President for this item.”. Cost and interest [32] Interest was also allowed as follows: (a) the interest rate of 5% per annum on the general damages from the date of the issuance of writ to the date of the judgment; (b) the interest rate of 2.5% per annum on the special damages from the date of the accident to the date of the judgment; and S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (c) the interest rate of 5% per annum on the whole judgment from the date of judgment until full payment. [33] Costs were allowed according to Order 59 rule 23(1) of the Rules of Court. Conclusion [34] To recapitulate, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after scrutiny and consideration of all the evidence before this Court, including the written submissions of both parties, I found that liability at 75:25 between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and the amount awarded was fair and reasonable. (MAZNI BINTI NAWI) Session Judge Session Court (4) Seremban Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus 3 December 2023 ____________________________________________ For the Plaintiffs: Messrs G. Dorai & Co No. 7, Jalan Mawar 1, Taman Mawar 48000 Rawang S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Selangor For the Defendant: Messrs Sekar Gill & C. Suren, No.507 & 507-A, Jalan Melaka Raya 12, Taman Melaka Raya 75000 Melaka S/N kro4Z9GiPE7QGszudeR1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	27,395	Tika 2.6.0
JA-A72NCvC-420-04/2022	PLAINTIF NASITAH BINTI SALLEH DEFENDAN 1. ) ROYCE TECHNIC 2. ) KHAIRUL HAFIZAL BIN ABD JABAR	Perbicaraan Penuh-Kes Sivil-Beban Pembuktian di tahap Imbangan Kebarangkalian-Sijil Perakuan Seksyen 90A(2) Akta Keterangan 1950 -Pembuat Dokumen hadir-Sama ada Defendan boleh berlindung di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Langkah-langkah Sementara Bagi Mengurangkan Kesan Penyakit Koronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) 2020 (Akta Covid 2020-Sama ada Defendan telah pecah kontrak atas kelewatan menyiapkan rumah Plaintif-Aturan 34 kaedah 2 KKM 2012 -Sama ada gantirugi dibenarkan.	02/12/2023	Puan Noorfazlin Binti Hamdan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3a821418-b846-4f30-a0f9-2a9b0ebbc011&Inline=true	1 DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO: JA-A72NCVC-420-04/2022 NASITAH BINTI SALLEH [No:Kad Pengenalan: 650905715428] …PLAINTIF Dan 1. ROYCE TECHNIC [No.Syarikat : JM0785573-P] 2. KHAIRUL HAFIZAL BIN ABD JABAR [No.Kad Pengenalan: 800317015493] …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (BICARA PENUH) PRAEFATIO: [1] Ini merupakan Alasan Penghakiman bagi rayuan Defendan- Defendan yang tidak berpuas hati terhadap keseluruhan keputusan di akhir kes perbicaraan penuh Mahkamah Majistret Sivil (1) Johor Bahru pada 21.09.2023 di mana Mahkamah telah membenarkan sebahagian Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan iaitu sebanyak RM 18,104-00. 02/12/2023 23:42:48 JA-A72NCvC-420-04/2022 Kand. 66 S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] Seramai 6 saksi telah memberikan keterangan seperti berikut: Saksi Plaintif Nama Saksi SP1 Muhammad Aminuddin bin Khairuddin (Anak Plaintif) SP2 Suriadi bin M.Rasyid (Kontraktor bumbung) SP3 Mohammad Hanafi bin Abu Hassan (Kontraktor kabinet dapur) SP4 Nasitah binti Salleh (Plaintif) Saksi Defendan Nama Saksi SD1 Khairul Hafizal bin Abd Jabar (Defendan Kedua) SD2 Azhar bin Abdul Karim (Pengurus Syarikat Azhar Setia Bina Enterprise) FAKTA KES: [3] Plaintif telah melantik Defendan-Defendan untuk mengubahsuai rumah kediamannya yang beralamat No.7, Jalan Emas 8, Taman Sri Skudai,81300 Johor Bahru (Selepas ini disebut sebagai rumah Plaintif). Satu sebutharga bertarikh 24.04.2021 telah dikeluarkan oleh Defendan- Defendan yang mana jumlah pengubahsuaian rumah Plaintif sebanyak RM87,000-00 yang telah dipersetujui kedua-dua pihak. Plaintif telah membuat bayaran secara berperingkat kepada Defendan-Defendan. [4] Antara terma lain dalam sebutharga tersebut adalah tempoh kerja untuk menyiapkan rumah Plaintif adalah dalam masa 120 hari dari tarikh S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Defendan-Defendan memulakan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian rumah Plaintif (selepas ini disebut kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut) iaitu pada 03.05.2021 dan akan tamat pada 31.08.2021. [5] Plaintif mendakwa kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut telah gagal disiapkan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam tempoh tersebut. Akibat kegagalan itu, maka Plaintif terpaksa menyewa rumah dengan anaknya sendiri iaitu SP1 selama 6 bulan sementara menunggu rumah Plaintif disiapkan. Plaintif juga telah melantik kontraktor pihak ketiga untuk menyiapkan rumah Plaintif yang tergendala itu. [6] Versi Defendan pula menyatakan disebabkan pengumuman Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan (PKP) penuh daripada 01.06.2021 sehingga 28.06.2021 dan satu Pelan Pemulihan Negara yang mempunyai 4 fasa menyebabkan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut tidak boleh dijalankan. Plaintif ada dikatakan ada pengetahuan hal tersebut dan telah bersetuju kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut hendaklah dihentikan. [7] Defendan-defendan mendakwa Plaintif juga tidak menamatkan kontrak sebaliknya terus membuat bayaran progresif semasa dan selepas PKP kepada Defendan-Defendan. Plaintif telahpun membatalkan kerja- kerja pengubahsuian tersebut yang mana ia satu tindakan yang tidak munasabah kerana kelewatan bukanlah berpunca daripada Defendan- Defendan. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN: [8] Beban pembuktian kes oleh Plaintif adalah di tahap imbangan kebarangkalian sepertimana ditekankan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru menerusi YA Noor Hisham Ismail JC dalam kes Cheah Hock Chuan v Ng Fook Ten [2023] 1 LNS 2070 seperti berikut: S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [27] Selain itu, perkara penting yang harus dilihat dalam sesuatu kes sivil adalah mengenai beban pembuktian iaitu di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Takrif 'imbangan kebarangkalian' (balance of probability) sebagai mana yang diputuskan di dalam kes Inggeris iaitu Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 sering dijadikan rujukan dan diterima pakai oleh Mahkamah-Mahkamah di dalam negara ini iaitu apabila Hakim Denning mentakrifkan frasa tersebut sebagai 'more probable than not' dan tidak sebagai mana yang dituntut bagi kes-kes jenayah iaitu 'melampaui keraguan munasabah' (rujuk: Inas Faiqah bt Mohd Helmi (an infant suing through her father and next friend, Mohd Helmi bin Abdul Aziz) v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 885; [2016] 2 MLJ 1)”. [9] Seterusnya, jika wujud sebarang konflik atas keterangan- keterangan kes, maka Mahkamah berpandukan kes Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Guan Teik Sdn Bhd v. Hj Mohd Noor Hj Yakob & Ors [2000] 4 CLJ 324 memutuskan: “Held: Per Siti Norma Yaakob JCA: [1] Where conflicting evidence is presented, it is the duty of the court not only to weigh such evidence on a balance of probabilities but also to look at all the surrounding factors and to weigh and evaluate the contemporaneous documents that may tend to establish the truth or otherwise of a given fact”. Oleh yang demikian, berikut adalah isu-isu yang hendaklah dipertimbang oleh Mahkamah secara compos mentis yang akan dihuraikan di bawah ini. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 ISU-ISU BERBANGKIT: (a)Penandaan dokumen ID7 Plaintif sebagai ekshibit P [10] ID7 di muka surat 66 hingga 110 (Ikatan Dokumen Bersama Bahagian C) merupakan perbualan WhatsApp antara Plaintif dengan SD1 yang dapat menunjukkan situasi progres kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian rumah Plaintif. Rujuk keterangan SP4 seperti berikut (Rujuk WSSP4) 31. S : Apakah yang kamu lakukan apabila Defendan-Defendan tidak menyiapkan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian sepertimana yang telah dijanjikan? J : Saya telah memaklumkan ketidakpuashatian saya terhadap kerjakerja pengubahsuaian tersebut kepada Defendan-Defendan melalui perbualan WhatsApp di antara saya dan Defendan- Defendan.(Rujuk mukasurat 68 hingga 110 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama ditandakan sebagai Ekshibit “P-______”) [11] Peguamcara Defendan berhujah Plaintif telah gagal mengemukakan Sijil Perakuan Seksyen 90A(2) Akta Keterangan 1950 menjadikan ID7 tidak boleh diterimamasuk sebagai keterangan. Manakala, peguamcara Plaintif berhujah telahpun menyediakan Sijil Perakuan Seksyen 90A(2) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan oleh itu Mahkamah hendaklah menerima masuk ID7 sebagai ekshibit. [12] Sebagai panduan, Mahkamah merujuk Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukkan: Kebolehterimaan dokumen yang dikeluarkan oleh komputer, dan pernyataan yang terkandung dalamnya 90A. (1) Dalam mana-mana prosiding jenayah atau sivil sesuatu dokumen yang dikeluarkan oleh komputer, atau sesuatu pernyataan S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 yang terkandung dalam dokumen itu, hendaklah boleh diterima sebagai keterangan mengenai apa-apa fakta yang dinyatakan dalamnya jika dokumen itu telah dikeluarkan oleh komputer itu dalam perjalanan penggunaannya yang biasa, sama ada atau tidak seseorang yang mengemukakan dokumen itu ialah pembuat dokumen atau pernyataan itu. (2) Bagi maksud seksyen ini boleh dibuktikan bahawa sesuatu dokumen telah dikeluarkan oleh komputer dalam perjalanan penggunaannya yang biasa dengan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah suatu perakuan yang telah ditandatangani oleh seseorang yang sama ada sebelum atau selepas pengeluaran dokumen itu oleh komputer itu bertanggungjawab bagi pengurusan pengendalian komputer itu, atau bagi perjalanan aktiviti yang baginya komputer itu digunakan. [13] Mahkamah mendapati sepanjang prosiding berjalan, peguamcara Plaintif bukan sahaja telah gagal untuk mengemukakan Sijil Perakuan Seksyen 90A(2) Akta Keterangan 1950 tersebut melalui saksi SP4, malah ia hanya dimaklumkan secara statement from the bar sahaja.Buktinya seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 65) Peg. Plaintif : Dengan izin, Puan. Plaintif ini ada menyediakan perakuan di bawah seksyen 90A(2) Akta Keterangan, bagi pengendalian komputer dan tekefon bimbit peribadi milik Plaintif ini. Peg. Def-Def : You did not produce it earlier. Hakim : Kenapa tak kemukakan? Peg. Def-Def : Saya bantah, Puan. Saya bantah. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [14] Adalah diingatkan ID7 terkandung dalam Bahagian C Ikatan Dokumen, maka tanggungjawab Plaintif untuk membuktikan keesahan kandungan dokumen tersebut secara ketat menurut Akta Keterangan 1950. Nas-nas undang-undang yang dirujuk oleh pihak Plaintif bagi isu ini hendaklah dibezakan dalam kes ini kerana Peguamcara Plaintif telah gagal untuk memohon menandakan Sijil Perakuan Seksyen 90A(2) Akta Keterangan 1950 tersebut pada bila-bila masa. Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpendapat tiada sebarang Sijil Perakuan Seksyen 90A(2) Akta Keterangan 1950 berjaya dikemukakan oleh Plaintif. [15] Walau bagaimanapun, adakah undang-undang secara ketatnya mengkehendaki Sijil Perakuan Seksyen 90A(2) Akta Keterangan 1950 perlu dikemukakan oleh SP4? Mahkamah merujuk kepada nas undang- undang mantap dalam kes Gnanasegaran Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 4 CLJ 6 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan: [2a]Sub-section (1) of s. 90A allows the production of computer generated documents or statements if there is evidence, firstly, that they were produced by a computer, and secondly, that the computer produced them in the course of its ordinary business. However, once the prosecution adduce evidence through a bank officer that the document is produced by a computer, it is not incumbent upon them to also produce a certificate under sub-s. (2), as sub-s. (6) provides that a document produced by a computer shall be deemed to be produced by the computer in the course of its ordinary use. [2b] In the present case, since Zainal had stated that the statement of accounts were computer printouts, the first part of sub-s. (1) has been proved and it would be superflous for him to issue a certificate under sub-s. (2). Once the Court accepts the evidence of Zainal, S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 and there is no reason for the Court not to, the prosecution has succeeded in proving what s. 90A(1) requires them to prove, namely that such document was produced by the computer, and in view of the deeming provisions of sub-s. (6), the second part is also proved. Hence, there is no reason for the Court to reject the whole of the evidence of Zainal. [16] Apabila dikaitkan dengan kes semasa, Mahkamah mendapati terdapatnya keterangan SP4 telah mengesahkan rekod perbualan WhatsApp tersebut datangnya daripada telefon yang berfungsi dengan baik. Keterangan SP4 seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 100) Peg. Def-Def : Tak pasti. Okay. Masa WhatsApp ini dibuat lah WhatsApp ini, ada tak kamu tahu handphone kamu ini dalam proper working order? Saksi SP 4 : Ya. Peg. Def-Def : Tahu? Saksi SP 4 : Tahu. [17] Begitu juga diputuskan oleh kes Ermiadi v. PP [2023] 1 LNS 56 oleh Mahkamah Rayuan yang merujuk kes Hanafi Mat Hassan [2006] 3 CLJ 269 seperti berikut: Upon perusal of the note of the proceedings, we found no error committed by the learned trial judge in admitting the evidence of CCTV recording (P10 and P45) pursuant to s. 3 of the Evidence Act and ruled that it was fulfilled s. 90A of the Act. On this point, we relied on the case of Hanafi Mat Hassan v. PP [2006] 3 CLJ 269at PP 302-302 which held: S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 "A careful perusal of section 90A(1) reveals that in order for a document produced by a computer to be admitted in evidence it must have been produced by the computer in the course of its ordinary use. It is therefore a condition precedent to be established before such a document can be admitted in evidence under section 90A(1). The manner of establishing this condition has been prescribed, it can be proved by tendering in evidence a certificate as stipulated by section 90A(2) read with section 90A(3). Once the certificate is tendered in evidence the presumption contained in section 90A(4) is activated to establish the computer referred to in the certificate was in good working order and was operating properly in all aspects throughout the material part of the period during which the document was produced. Section 90A(4) must therefore be given its full effect as it has a significant role to play in the interpretation and application of section 90A. Ordinarily a certificate under section 90A(2) must be tendered in evidence in order to rely on the provisions of section 90A(3) and (4). However, the use of the wards may be proved in section 90A(2) indicates that the tendering of a certificate is not a mandatory requirement in all cases. In PP v. Chin Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649, a plethora of authorities was referred to in ruling that facts to be presumed can, instead, be proved by other admission evidence which is available (at pp 722- 723). Thus, the use of the certificate can be substituted with oral evidence as demonstrated in R v. Shepherd [1993] [A1] 225 in dealing with a provision of law similar to section 90A. Needless to say, such oral evidence must have the same effect as in the case of the use of a certificate. It follows that where oral evidence is adduced no establish the requirements of section 90A(1) in lieu of the certificate the presumption attached to it, in particular, the S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 matters presumed under section 90A(4) must also be proved by oral evidence. [18] Apabila prinsip tersebut dikaitkan dengan kes semasa, memandangkan SP4 telahpun mengesahkan ID7 datangnya daripada telefon yang ditakrifkan sebagai komputer menurut Seksyen 3 Akta Keterangan 1950, maka Mahkamah boleh bergantung kepada anggapan subseksyen 6 yang memperuntukkan: (6) Sesuatu dokumen yang dikeluarkan oleh komputer, atas sesuatu pernyataan yang terkandung dalam dokumen itu, boleh diterima sebagai keterangan sama ada atau tidak ia dikeluarkan oleh komputer itu selepas bermulanya prosiding jenayah atau sivil atau selepas bermulanya apa-apa penyiasatan atau siasatan yang berhubungan dengan prosiding jenayah atau sivil atau penyiasatan atau siasatan itu, dan apa-apa dokumen yang dikeluarkan sedemikian oleh komputer itu hendaklah disifatkan telah dikeluarkan oleh komputer itu dalam perjalanan penggunaannya yang biasa. [19] Walaupun peguamcara Defendan-defendan mencabar tentang tiadanya laporan pakar bagi ID7 tersebut, namun cabaran tersebut hanya bersifat umum sedangkan ID7 tersebut secara prima facie telah diterima masuk sebagai keterangan. Tiada sebarang keterangan yang ditunjukkan oleh peguamcara Defendan-defendan bahawa kandungan ID7 telah dikacau ganggu oleh mana-mana pihak untuk mereka-reka ID7 tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah menandakan ID sebagai ekshibit P7 dan segala keterangan perbualan WhatsApp yang dirujuk oleh SP4 dalam keterangannya hendaklah diterima oleh Mahkamah secara in toto sebagai keterangan yang dapat menyokong kes Plaintif. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (b)Sama ada Defendan-Defendan telah pecah kontrak kerana gagal menyiapkan rumah Plaintif mengikut terma sebutharga 24.04.2021? (c)Sama ada Defendan boleh berlindung di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Langkah-langkah Sementara Bagi Mengurangkan Kesan Penyakit Koronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) 2020 (Akta Covid 2020)? [20] Kedua-dua isu ini digabungkan kerana berkaitan. Defendan- defendan berhujah disebabkan oleh PKP menyebabkan Defendan- defendan tidak boleh menjalankan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian rumah Plaintif tersebut dengan merujuk kepada seksyen 7 Akta Covid 2020.Keterangan SD1 seperti berikut: (Rujuk WSSD1 m/s 3-4 soalan 11) 11.S Apakah faktor-faktor yang dimaksudkan tersebut? J Faktor tersebut adalah Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan (PKP) penuh atau “total lockdown”akibat pandemic Covid-19 yang telah diumumkan oleh kerajaan dari 01.06.2021 sehingga 28.06.2021.Juga setelah itu kerajaan telah mengumumkan Pelan Pemulihan Negara atau “National Recovery Plan”yang mempunyai 4 fasa.Maka dari Tarikh 01.06.2021 sehingga 28.06.2021 saya dan syarikat saya iaitu Defendan Pertama telah dilarang sama sekali oleh kerajaan untuk melakukan apa-apa kerja Pengubahsuaian.” [21] Pihak Plaintif pula berhujah semasa memasuki kontrak tersebut, Defendan-defendan sedia maklum bahawa PKP akan terjadi dalam negara. Ini bukanlah kali pertama PKP berlaku. Oleh itu, kegagalan Defendan-Defendan menyiapkan kerja-kerja tersebut dalam masa 120 hari dari tarikh Defendan-Defendan memulakan kerja-kerja tersebut menjadikan Defendan-Defendan telah pecah kontrak dan Akta Covid 2020 tidak terpakai ke atas kes ini. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [22] Dalam mempertimbang isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk semula kepada seksyen 7 Akta Covid 2020 yang berbunyi seperti berikut: Section 7 of the Temporary Measures For Reducing The Impact Of Coronavirus Desease 2019 (Covid-19)1 Inability to perform contractual obligation The inability of any party or parties to perform any contractual obligation arising from any of the categories of contracts specified in the Schedule to this Part due to the measures prescribed, made or taken under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 [Act 342] to control or prevent the spread of COVID-19 shall not give rise to the other party or parties exercising his or their rights under the contract. [23] Manakala berikut adalah senarai kategori jenis-jenis kontrak yang terlibat dalam Jadual Kedua Akta Covid 2020 tersebut: 1. Construction work contract or construction consultancy contract and any other contract related to the supply of construction material, equipment or workers in connection with a construction contract 2. Performance bond or equivalent that is granted pursuant to a construction contract or supply contract 3. Professional services contract 4. Lease or tenancy of non-residential immovable property 5. Event contract for the provision of any venue, accommodation, amenity, transport, entertainment, catering or other goods or services including, for any business meeting, incentive travel, conference, exhibition, sales event, concert, show, wedding, party S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 or other social gathering or sporting event, for the participants, attendees, guests, patrons or spectators of such gathering or event 6. Contract by a tourism enterprise as defined under the Tourism Industry Act 1992 [Act 482] and a contract for the promotion of tourism in Malaysia 7. Religious pilgrimage-related contract Hal ini bererti kerja-kerja tersebut adalah termasuk dalam senarai Jadual Kedua tersebut kerana ia melibatkan kontrak pembinaan. [24] Selanjutnya, prinsip pemakaian seksyen 7 Akta Covid 2020 banyak dibincangkan dalam kes-kes seperti di dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru di dalam kes Ravichanthiran Ganesan V. Lee Kok Sun & Ors [2021] 1 LNS 1581 menerusi YA Evrol Mariette Peters JC(pada masa itu) telah memutuskan: "In any event, there are two aspects to section 7 of the Covid-19 Act that the Plaintiff was required to establish, namely, that a party was unable to perform the contractual obligation; and that such inability was due to the measures prescribed, made or taken under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 to control or prevent the spread of COVID-19. … At this juncture, it is imperative to bear in mind that the Covid-19 Act is not a legislation that can be resorted to by any litigant attempting to avoid liability or debt merely because such debt or the enforcement of the same arose during the Covid-19 pandemic. Regard must be had to the purpose of the Covid-19 Act, that is, to provide for temporary measures to reduce the impact of Covid-19." S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [25] Begitu juga dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur menerusi YA Aliza Sulaiman JC di dalam kes SN Akmida Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2022] 2 CLJ 302; [2021] 1 LNS 1874 memutuskan: “[80] With respect, I do not think that a party can simply invoke s. 7 of the Covid-19 Act just because the country is experiencing a pandemic and that there have been, and still are, MCO in force to curb the spread of the disease. The situation plaguing the nation, in general, and the plaintiff as a contractor for the project, in particular, does not relieve the plaintiff from the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that: (i) it is unable to perform any contractual obligation whereby the precise duty or duties under the contract should be specified; (ii) the inability to perform the contractual obligation arises from one of the categories of contracts as listed in the Schedule to Part II of the Covid-19 Act; and (iii) the inability to perform the contractual obligation is due to the measures prescribed, made or taken under Act 342 to control or prevent the spread of Covid-19. The precise measure as prescribed, made or taken under Act 342 must be identified and the nexus between the said measure and the plaintiff's inability to perform its contractual obligation(s) must be demonstrated. Hence, even if the plaintiff has established that its contract with the defendant falls under the said item 1, the plaintiff has clearly failed to prove elements (i) and (iii) as outlined above to the satisfaction of this court.” S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [26] Begitu juga pendirian Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur oleh YA Liza Chan Sow Keng JC dalam kes United Malaya Stores Sdn Bhd v. S Selapa Sivalingam & Anor [2022] 6 CLJ 469 telah memutuskan: “(3) The Covid-19 pandemic did not excuse the plaintiff from not paying any rent at all from May 2021. The plaintiff had not shown satisfactorily that it was unable to perform its contractual obligations under the TA; and that such inability was due to the measures prescribed, made or taken under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 to control or prevent the spread of Covid-19. The plaintiff was not affected due to the measures implemented by the Government as department/convenience stores being an essential service and goods provider were allowed to open.” [27] Apabila dikaitkan dengan kes in casu, Mahkamah mendapati adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Defendan-defendan untuk membuktikan ketidakupayaan mereka untuk melaksanakan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut jika hendak berlindung di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Covid 2020. [28] SD1 mengemukakan bukti pihak Kerajaan telah mengumumkan PKP penuh bertarikh 30.05.2021 sepertimana D12 (m/s 1-3 Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Defendan-defendan) dan dilanjutkan sehingga 28.06.2021 dan selepas itu diikuti dengan Pelan Pemulihan Negara sebanyak 4 fasa. Menurut SD1 lagi, menerusi Pelan Pemulihan Negara mula dikuatkuasa pada 05.07.2021, kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian rumah telah dibenarkan beroperasi oleh kerajaan namun memerlukan permit daripada Kementerian Perdagangan Antarabangsa Dan Industri (MITI). S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [29] Bagi tempoh PKP Penuh iaitu pada 01.06.2021 hingga 28.06.2021, Mahkamah mengambil Notis Kehakiman bahawa semua sektor telahpun diarahkan untuk tidak beroperasi sepenuhnya. Keadaan ini menjadi faktor kepada Defendan-defendan untuk terhalang daripada menjalankan kerja- kerja tersebut menurut kontrak. Malah, pihak Plaintif melalui SP4 sendiri mengakui bahawa beliau tidak menyuruh dan berharap Defendan- defendan menjalankan kerja-kerja sepanjang tempoh itu. Keterangan SP4 seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 73) “Peg. Def-Def : Okay. So, kamu tak expect… maknanya 28 hari itu, kamu maafkan mereka, betul? Saksi SP 4 : Betul. Saya tak suruh diaorang buat kerja. Peg. Def-Def : Okay. So, bukankah masa 28 hari itu sebahagian daripada 120 hari? Saksi SP 4 : Betul, tapi pada masa yang sama…” [30] Selanjutnya, pada awal bulan Julai 2021, ketika Pelan Pemulihan Negara diumumkan sebanyak 4 fasa, Mahkamah mendapati SD1 telahpun membuat permohonan permit kepada pihak MITI secara atas talian. Akan tetapi telah ditolak sepertimana D13 dan menyebabkan Defendan-Defendan tidak dapat melakukan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian rumah Plaintif dan mengakibatkan kelewatan yang berterusan. [31] Mahkamah meneliti butiran D13 di ruangan Nota/Notes tercatit perkataan Maklumat projek tidak ada/tidak lengkap.Sila pastikan maklumat projek diisytihar (CIDB). Pada hemah Mahkamah, punca D13 tidak diluluskan adalah disebabkan faktor yang dinyatakan di ruangan nota tersebut dan disahkan sendiri oleh SD1 ketika dicabar oleh peguamcara Plaintif seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 145-146) S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Peg. Plaintif : Okay. Jadi, En. Khairul setuju dengan cadangan saya, kerja pengubahsuaian rumah perseorangan adalah satu kerja yang dibenarkan tapi kena buat permohonan, betul ya? Saksi SD 1 : Ya. Peg. Plaintif : Okay. Dan En. Khairul dan buat permohonan itu? Saksi SD 1 : Dah buat. Peg. Plaintif : Okay tapi tak… tapi telah ditolak dan alasannya bukan sebab apa-apa tapi sebab maklumat projek tidak lengkap seperti yang dinyatakan. Maklumat projek yang dipohon itu tidak lengkap, betul? Saksi SD 1 : Ya, kalau tengok daripada sini. Peg. Plaintif : Dan ini adalah permohonan yang En. Khairul isi, betul? Saksi SD 1 : Ya, betul. Peg. Plaintif : Jadi, ini adalah kesalahan En. Khairul sendiri sebab En. Khairul yang tak masukkan maklumat projek dengan lengkap sebab itu permohonan ditolak walaupun kerja tersebut adalah satu kerja yang telah dibenarkan untuk dibuat dalam tempoh PKP, betul? Saksi SD 1 : Tak setuju. [32] Mahkamah berpendapat adalah satu kekhilafan di pihak Defendan- defendan sendiri yang gagal untuk membuat permohonan yang sempurna kepada pihak MITI.SD1 cuba menerangkan bahawa Defendan-defendan tidak mempunyai sebarang masalah untuk mendapatkan kelulusan permit bagi projek-projek di tempat lain kecuali di rumah Plaintif sahaja sedangkan permohonan yang serupa telah S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 dibuat.Namun,penjelasan SD1 tersebut tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan sokongan bebas yang lain dan oleh itu ia wajar diketepikan. [33] Malah, terdapat keterangan lain yang menunjukkan keterangan SD1 bercanggah dengan keterangan lain apabila menafikan ada membuat pengubahsuaian tersebut dalam tempoh Pelan Pemulihan Negara sedang berkuatkuasa. Buktinya, Mahkamah merujuk kepada P7 dan gambar-gambar perbualan WhatsApp antara Plaintif dan Defendan di dalam Bahagian B Ikatan Dokumen Bersama B m/s 19-45. Mahkamah mendapati kandungannya adalah serupa dengan P7 tetapi P7 telah dimasukkan di dalam Bahagian C Ikatan Dokumen Bersama. Perkara ini juga diakui oleh SD1 seperti berikut (Rujuk NK m/s 131): Peg. Plaintif : Kita rujuk pada mukasurat 22, pada Bundle yang sama. Saksi SD 1 : Okay. Peg. Plaintif : Ini adalah screenshot, setuju? Saksi SD 1 : Betul, ini screenshot. Peg. Plaintif : Okay, ini adalah screenshot perbualan di antara En. Khairul dengan Plaintif, setuju? Saksi SD 1 : Ya, betul. [34] Bagi isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada Aturan 34 kaedah 2 KKM 2012 yang berbunyi: (2) At a pre-trial case management, the Court may consider any matter including the possibility of settlement of all or any of the issues in the action or proceedings and require the parties to furnish the Court with such information as it thinks fit, and the appropriate orders and directions that should be made to secure the just, S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 expeditious and economical disposal of the action or proceedings, including— (d) the contents of the bundle of the documents referred to in subparagraph (c) shall be agreed on between all parties as far as possible and this bundle of agreed documents shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as Part A; (e) if the parties are unable to agree on certain documents, those documents on which agreement cannot be reached shall be included in separate bundles and each such bundle shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as follows: (i) Part B – documents where the authenticity is not disputed but the contents are disputed; (ii) Part C – documents where the authenticity and contents are disputed; (Penekanan diberikan) [35] Situasi ini telah meletakkan Defendan-defendan dalam posisi yang tidak konsisten dalam pembelaannya kerana memilih memasukkan P7 dengan gambar-gambar perbualan WhatsApp m/s 19-45 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama dalam dua Bahagian yang berbeza sedangkan kedua-duanya merujuk kandungan yang serupa.Jika benar SD1 menafikan itu bukan WhatsApp yang dihantar olehnya kerana ia boleh direka-reka atau dicipta, maka sepatutnya kesemua dokumen itu dimasukkan dalam Bahagian C. [36] Oleh yang demikian, disebabkan dokumen tersebut berada di dalam Bahagian B, maka tiada sebab untuk SD1 mempertikaikan lagi keesahan dan ketulenan kewujudan perbualan WhatsApp tersebut dan oleh itu perbualan WhatsApp di m/s 19-45 boleh diterimamasuk oleh S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Mahkamah dalam mempertimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan saksi- saksi.Tambahan pula P7 juga telah diterima masuk oleh Mahkamah,maka kedua-dua keterangan dokumentar tersebut boleh digunapakai dan dirujuk oleh Mahkamah. [37] Berbalik semula kepada isu penafian SD1menjalankan kerja-kerja semasa PKP Bersyarat dan Pelan Pemulihan Negara berkuatkuasa. Penafian SD1 tersebut bercanggah dengan keterangan SP4 dan perbualan WhatsApp m/s 19-45 tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati sememangnya Defendan-defendan ada menjalankan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian sewaktu PKP dan/atau Pelan Pemulihan Negara berlangsung. Berikut antara perbualan SD1 dan SP4 dalam tempoh material: Tarikh SD1 SP4 25 Oktober 2021 (m/s 22) Kk tau semua siap bulan 11 27 October 2021 (m/s 24) Smua da jalan kak Tolong pilih mozek table top Nnti sya sent lgi utk tandas Lantai dapur Ni pilih satu2 utk table top dlu Pening nnti sya Salam Khairul kk minta sambung kerja mcm biasa. Khairul tolong siapkan semua akhir bulan 11 ni. Bukan perangai kk suka marah tp sedey tgk keadaan rumah mcm tu..Cornice pun kena pasang. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Alhamdulillah.Bukan sifat kk marah..keluarga pun kk tak marah apalagi org luar (m/s 45) Sebelum 1hb tingkap semua pasang Tkasih banyak (m/s 43) Smlm diaorg pasang ruang tamu dgn bilik (m/s 40) Rumah akk da byk siap Sya cuba nk siap kn bulan nii Dari catalogue thc ke 19 November 2021 Ada2 Besok rumah ada org tak nk hantar sink toilet bowl [38] Berdasarkan perbualan WhatsApp tersebut dan P7 menunjukkan kedua-dua pihak telahpun bersetuju agar kerja-kerja tersebut disiapkan pada November 2021 dan bukan lagi pada 31.08.2021. Perubahan tempoh masa ini sudah semestinya disebabkan pengumuman PKP Penuh oleh Kerajaan kerana kedua-dua pihak juga akur tentang PKP Penuh yang berlangsung pada 01.06.2021-28.06.2021. [39] Persoalan seterusnya, bukankah Pelan Pemulihan Negara bermula pada 05.07.2021 yang mana permit hendaklah diperolehi terlebih dahulu oleh Defendan-defendan. Walaupun permohonan permit D13 tidak diluluskan oleh pihak MITI pada 08.07.2021, namun keterangan perbualan WhatsApp lebih menyokong versi Plaintif bahawa hakikatnya Defendan-defendan sememangnya telah meneruskan kerja-kerja S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 pengubahsuaian dalam tempoh Pelan Pemulihan Negara berlangsung. Mahkamah juga mendapati keterangan SD1 mengakui bahawa Plaintif hanya bersetuju kerja-kerja dihentikan pada masa PKP penuh tetapi bukan semasa Pelan Pemulihan Negara (Rujuk WSSD1 m/s 6-7 soalan 22). [40] Hal ini bermaksud, tempoh 120 hari ditambah 28 hari (PKP Penuh) menjadi 148 hari bersamaan 28.09.2021 adalah tempoh lanjutan yang boleh dikuatkuasakan oleh Defendan-defendan menurut seksyen 7 Akta Covid 2020. Walaupun Defendan-defendan mengemukakan D15 iaitu Sebutharga Defendan-defendan yang telah menempah barang-barang mentah daripada SD2 untuk rumah Plaintif seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 177) Peg. Def-Def : So, dari segi pembekalan barang-barang dalam invois ini? Saksi Sep Def : Ada yang barang yang stok lambat sampai. Peg. Def-Def : Okay. Puan, mohon ditukar tanda sebut harga ini, Puan. D15 [41] Akan tetapi, ketika dicabar oleh peguamcara Plaintif jelas menunjukkan Defendan-defendan yang telah lewat menempah barang- barang mentah daripada SD2 iaitu hanya pada 20.11.2021 sedangkan tempoh lanjutan kerja iaitu bulan November hampir tamat seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 180) Peg. Plaintif : Okay. Dan setuju dengan cadangan saya, pada 20/11/2021, barulah Royce Technic mendapatkan sebut harga dan dikatakan membuat pembayaran kepada En. Azhar. Saksi Sep Def : Ya. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Peg. Plaintif : Okay, dan En. Azhar sendiri pun tak pasti bila En. Azhar dapat deposit dan keluarkan sebut harga ini, bila tarikh yang pasti En. Azhar boleh hantar barang dan pasang barang-barang tersebut. Saksi Sep Def : Ya. [42] Keterangan SD2 tersebut tidak konsisten dengan keterangan- keterangan sekeliling yang lain untuk menunjukkan ketidakupayaan Defendan-Defendan selepas tempoh PKP Penuh. Apa yang dapat ditunjukkan hanyalah kelewatan Defendan-defendan membuat tempahan barang-barang mentah daripada SD2. Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan penilaian-penilaian di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat Defendan-defendan hanya boleh berlindung di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Covid 2020 dalam tempoh PKP Penuh sahaja (28 hari) dan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian dikehendaki siap pada atau sebelum 28.09.2021. [43] Secara alternatifnya, Defendan-defendan hanya dibenarkan lanjutan masa setakat bulan November 2021 atas variasi terma tempoh yang dipersetujui bersama berdasarkan keterangan perbualan WhatsApp antara SD1 dan SP4 dan P7 yang dinyata sebelum ini. Manakala, bermula bulan Disember 2021 telah dikira sebagai kelewatan yang tidak dibenarkan oleh undang-undang kerana itu adalah tempoh Defendan- defendan sebenarnya pecah kontrak kerana gagal menyiapkan kerja- kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut. [44] Isu seterusnya, Defendan-defendan juga berhujah bahawa Defendan-defendan tidak pernah menggagalkan diri daripada menunaikan janji secara keseluruhan tetapi tidak diberi peluang kerana Plaintif telah juga membenarkan lanjutan masa dengan membuat bayaran progresif dan tidak membangkitkan isu kelewatan. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [45] Bagi isu ini, Mahkamah berpendapat tindakan Plaintif yang membuat bayaran progresif tersebut adalah disebabkan penyataan Defendan-defendan sendiri yang meyakinkan Plaintif bahawa kerja-kerja telah dilaksanakan seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 130) Peg. Plaintif : Setuju tak dengan saya bahawa sebelum permohonan tersebut dilakukan, maknanya sebelum En. Khairul buat permohonan MITI ini, En. Khairul telah memaklumkan dan seterusnya meyakinkan kepada Plaintif bahawa En. Khairul telah mula kerja. Saksi SD 1 : Ya. Seterusnya di m/s 135 SD1 berkata seperti berikut: Peg. Plaintif : Saya katakan kepada kamu bahawa Plaintif telah membuat bayaran sebanyak RM83,250.00 kepada kamu bagi kerja- kerja pengubahsuaian ini. Saksi SD 1 : Ya, betul. [46] Malah, pembelaan Defendan-defendan yang mengatakan bahan- bahan mentah tidak dapat dibeli sepenuhnya adalah bercanggah dengan keterangan SP4 dan keterangan sekeliling yang lain. Pembelaan seperti berikut: “Peg. Def-Def : Tak pasti. Okay, setuju dengan saya, bila pelan pemulihan negara start, pun ada kesukaran dapat bahan mentah walaupun dapat MITI punya permit sebab demand daripada orang ramai mendadak secara tiba-tiba, setuju? Saksi SP 4 : Saya tak setuju. Peg. Def-Def : Apatah lagi kes dia. Langsung tak boleh buat kerja. Memang dia tak boleh order pun barang-barang kamu, setuju? S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Saksi SP 4 : Saya tak setuju”. [47] Keterangan-keterangan di atas menjadikan sebenarnya versi pihak Plaintif adalah lebih kebarangkaliannya berbanding versi Defendan. Sepertimana ditekankan oleh YA Yaacob Haji Md Sam J (pada masa itu) dalam kes Segaran Mathava v Landfeld Quasa Engineering Sdn Bhd & yang lain [2014] 1 LNS 158: “[27] Prinsip undang-undang adalah mantap (trite) jika terdapat dua versi keterangan yang bertentangan di antara saksi-saksi di atas perkara yang sama, maka mahkamah boleh menerima versi keterangan saksi yang mahkamah berpuashati sebagai keterangan yang meyakinkan mengikut tahap imbangan kebarangkalian.” Mahkamah berpuas hati Defendan-defendan ada menjalankan kerja- kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut walaupun dalam tempoh Pelan Pemulihan Negara. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah menolak pembelaan Defendan-defendan tersebut. Isu-isu yang tidak diplidkan & Tidak dibicarakan (i)Sama ada Plaintif berhak menamatkan kontrak tanpa sebarang notis? (ii)Sama ada Plaintif berhak melantik kontraktor lain tanpa alasan? [48] Kedua-dua isu ini digabungkan. Pihak Defendan-Defendan telah berhujah tentang tiadanya sebarang notis penamatan yang diberikan oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah sependapat dengan hujahan peguamcara Plaintif di mana isu ini sememangnya tidak pernah diplidkan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam pembelaan mereka. Sebagaimana prinsip undang-undang mantap telah ditekankan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru menerusi YA Evrol Mariette Peters JC S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 dalam kes Ravichanthiran Ganesan v Lau Kok Guan @ Low Kok Guan & Others [2021] 1 LNS 899 seperti berikut:- “[18] More recently, the fundamental rule of pleadings was reiterated by Ramly Ali FCJ in the Federal Court case of Samuel Naik Siang Ting v. Public Bank Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 944; [2015] 6 MLJ 10, in the following passages: It is a cardinal rule in civil litigation that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded…. The Supreme Court in Lee Ah Chor v. Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 667; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 239; [1991] 1 MLJ 428, had also emphasised the importance of pleadings and ruled that where a vital issue was not raised in the pleadings it could not be allowed to be argued and to succeed on appeal (see also Ambank (M) Bhd v. Luqman Kamil Mohammed Don [2012] 3 CLJ 551; [2012] MLJU 56 FC).[Emphasis added.]” Oleh itu, isu ini hendaklah ditolak oleh Mahkamah. [49] Secara alternatifnya, jika isu ini wajar dipertimbangkan, Mahkamah mendapati keterangan SP4 yang menunjukkan sebenarnya telah cuba berunding dengan Defendan-defendan, namun gagal kerana Defendan- defendan hanya mendiamkan diri. Keterangan SP4 seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 102) Peg. Def-Def : Dan saya juga katakan kalau you telah…kamu telah berunding dan membenarkan beliau untuk menyambung kerja selepas beliau boleh melakukan kerja, nescaya beliau akan melakukannya, betul? S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Saksi SP 4 : Masalah saya, saya tak dapat respon. Saya tak setuju. Peg. Def-Def : Kalau kamu berunding… Kamu cuba… kalau kamu cuba berunding. Saksi SP 4 : Saya nak berunding tapi saya tak dapat jawapan. Jawapan memang tak dijawab oleh pihak Defendan. Peg. Def-Def : Itu jawapan kamu, ya? Saksi SP 4 : Ya. [50] Keterangan SP4 juga disokong oleh keterangan perbualan WhatsApp di m/s 21 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama yang menunjukkan Defendan-defendan lewat membalas/memberikan respon mesej-mesej daripada Plaintif. Aik baru jawab ke tuan?xpe pape settle lawyer. Sebab saya ada org yg urus kn. Sya management urus hal order barang Ni pun bukan urusan sy,sy tau cabinet siap,tuanpun xjawab berapa lama [51] Begitu juga dalam P7 menunjukkan SP4 terpaksa bertanya berkali- kali dan mengejar SD1 supaya rumahnya dapat disiapkan segera: “Saksi SP4: …Kalau Puan merujuk 30 kepada mukasurat 110, Bundle B. Ini dah beri banyak extension dah tapi tak ada improvement, tak ada progress report, tak ada apa. Tak ada respon. Merujuk kepada last paragraph, “Tolong lah buat cepat, letih kejar macam ini. Bayangkan kalau you yang customer macam mana. Khairul…” saya sampai ke tahap saya nak nombor kontraktor sebab saya nak cepatkan. Jadi, Khairul S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 cakap, “Khairul janji dengan kakak nak siapkan rumah tapi tak apa, kakak pun dah letih kejar. That reflects he’s not doing his job.” [52] Tindak-tanduk Defendan-defendan yang hanya berdiam diri tersebut menunjukkan Defendan-defendan sendiri tidak berminat meneruskan kontrak tersebut dan selanjutnya di bawah seksyen 40 Akta Kontrak 1950 menjadikan kontrak tersebut dianggap telah tamat. Dalam menghadapi situasi itu, Plaintif tidak ada pilihan lain selain mencari kontraktor lain untuk menyiapkan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian dan membaiki segala kecacatan yang berlaku. Oleh itu kegagalan tiadanya notis penamatan oleh Plaintif tidak menjadikan tuntutan Plaintif fatal terhadap Defendan-defendan kerana pecah kontrak itu berpunca daripada tindakan Defendan-defendan sendiri. (ii) Lain-lain Isu-isu yang tidak dibicarakan: [53] Pihak Defendan-Defendan telah menimbulkan pelbagai isu sepertimana di perenggan 8(a)-(g) hingga 10 sepertimana dalam Hujahan Bertulis mereka. Walau bagaimanapun, kesemua isu itu bukanlah menjadi isu-isu untuk dibicarakan dalam kes ini dan hanya bersifat difikirkan kemudian. Maka adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah mengenepikan kesemua isu tersebut. Isu: Sama ada masa bukanlah menjadi intipati terma kontrak? [54] Defendan-defendan merujuk kepada kes DC Contractor Sdn Bhd v Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (2014) 11 MLJ 633 dan berhujah masa dalam kes ini bukanlah menjadi intipati kontrak kerana Plaintif telah bersetuju agak kerja-kerja tersebut dilanjutkan masa. [55] Sepertimana dapatan Mahkamah sebelum ini, segala tindak-tanduk Plaintif seperti membuat bayaran progress walaupun tempoh masa 120 hari telah luput tidak menjadikannya menolak masa sebagai intipati S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 kontrak. Akan tetapi, lanjutan masa untuk menyiapkan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut telah diberikan dan dipersetujui bersama sehingga November 2021 sahaja. Situasi ini menunjukkan masa adalah sangat material dan menjadi intipati terma kontrak kedua-dua pihak. Plaintif berhak menamatkan kontrak serta menuntut ganti rugi atas kelewatan Defendan-defendan. Isu: Sama ada Plaintif berhak menuntut ganti rugi atas kegagalan Defendan-Defendan? [56] Mahkamah telahpun memutuskan Defendan-defendan telahpun lewat menyiapkan kerja-kerja tersebut menyebabkan kontrak boleh ditamatkan oleh Plaintif. Merujuk kepada seksyen 56(1) Akta Kontrak 1950, selain menamatkan kontrak tersebut, Plaintif juga berhak untuk menuntut ganti rugi daripada Defendan-Defendan. Mahkamah berpandukan kes Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd v. M-Concept Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 CLJ 309 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: [13] We are of the same view. The defendant's failure to deliver vacant possession has rendered the agreement voidable. The plaintiff therefore had an option either to continue with the contract or to rescind it. Section 56(1) of the Contracts Act 1950, clearly gives the plaintiff that option. The section reads: When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Oleh yang demikian, berikut adalah kos-kos yang telah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah terhadap Defendan-defendan: (i)Kos pendawaian elektrik sebanyak RM540-00 [57] Bagi kos ini, Mahkamah mendapati SD1 mendakwa memandangkan sebutharga dan perjanjian tidak spesifik menyatakan bahawa kerja pendawaian termasuk pendawaian elektrik bagi pemasangan penghawa dingin, maka ia dikira kos tambahan. Berbeza keterangan pihak Plaintif,SP4 pula menjelaskan seperti berikut: Peg. Plaintif : Okay, tadi kamu juga ada ditanya, dicadangkan bahawa pendawaian di dalam sebut harga adalah general dan tidak spesifik untuk aircond dan kamu setuju. Namun, kamu juga mengatakan bahawa aircond juga… kos aircond juga adalah termasuk di dalam kos pendawaian tersebut. Boleh jelaskan? Saksi SP 4 : Boleh, saya sudah… mengikut quotation RT, pendawaian… electrical wiring. So, fahaman saya adalah untuk semua. Untuk fridge, untuk… apa, fridge, tv, apa-apa lah yang memerlukan elektrik termasuk aircond. Saya… ini untuk electrical wiring. [58] Malah,Mahkamah mendapati SP4 ada memaklumkan pendawaian elektrik turut melibatkan pemasangan aircond kepada SD1 melalui WhatsApp dalam P7 seperti berikut: Peg. Plaintif : Okay. Saksi SP 4 : Saya pun sudah maklumkan kepada Khairul berkenaan ini. Melalui surat mukasurat 93. 25/9, 21:12. Peg. Plaintif : Apa yang kamu nyatakan? S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Saksi SP 4 : “Nanti setiap bilik ada aircond and kipas, hall pun nak letak aircond. Kipas yang sedia ada sebab baru lagi. Terima kasih banyak.” Khairul menjawab, “okay kak.” [59] Merujuk kepada sebutharga D11, terdapat kerja-kerja “eletrikal wiring” yang perlu disediakan oleh Defendan-defendan. Namun, tiada keterangan lanjut mengenai apakah kerja-kerja yang termasuk dalam “elektrikal wiring” yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak. Secara logiknya, sesebuah rumah yang diubahsuai sudah tentu memerlukan sistem pendawaian bagi membolehkan alat-alat elektrik boleh digunakan oleh pemilik rumah.Bukti perbualan WhatsApp P7 tersebut juga telah menyokong versi Plaintif dan oleh itu adalah wajar untuk membenarkan kos sebanyak RM540-00 tersebut. (iii)Kos pemasangan kabinet-kabinet dapur sebanyak RM 9840-00 [60] Merujuk kepada Sebutharga D11, Mahkamah mendapati pemasangan kabinet-kabinet dapur dinyatakan di item 3 BAHAGIAN DAPUR. Defendan-defendan mengakui bahawa masih tidak memasang kabinet-kabinet dapur tersebut (Rujuk NK m/s 137) [61] Manakala keterangan SP3 mengesahkan jumlah kos pemasangan kabinet-kabinet dapur bernilai RM9840-00(Rujuk NK m/s 41). Keterangan SP4 disokong oleh SP3 yang mengesahkan telah memasang kabinet- kabinet dapur SP4 dan mengisukan sebut harga di m/s 47 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan kos ini sebanyak RM9840-00. (iv) Baki pembelian dan pemasangan pintu pagar sebanyak RM 1899 [62] Bagi kos ini, Mahkamah mendapati Defendan-defendan mengakui masih belum memasang pintu pagar dan ianya termasuk dalam Sebut S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 harga D11 item 1 BAHAGIAN PARKING KERETA HADAPAN RUMAH. Keterangan SP4 seperti berikut: (Rujuk WSSP4 Jawapan No.24) 24. S : Adakah Defendan-Defendan mempunyai pengetahuan isu pemasangan pagar ini? J : Defendan-Defendan mempunyai pengetahuan penuh berkenaan pemasangan pagar ini dan telah berjanji dengan saya untuk membayar gantirugi sebanyak RM4,000.00. Namun pada 6.1.2022, Defendan-Defendan hanya membuat pembayaran sebanyak RM2,000.00 sahaja dan meninggalkan baki sebanyak RM2,000.00. [63] Keterangan jumlah RM4000-00 tersebut juga tidak ada dinafikan oleh Defendan-defendan. Namun, keterangan menunjukkan Defendan- defendan telah memulangkan RM2000-00 kepada Plaintif akibat kegagalannya memasang pintu pagar seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 93- 94) Peg. Def-Def : Okay. Sungguhpun Defendan-Defendan tidak memasang pagar tersebut, setuju mereka telah memulangkan RM2,000.00 untuk pemasangan pagar dengan bank transfer, bayaran bank transfer kepada kamu. Saksi SP 4 : Saya setuju tapi dijanjikan RM4,000.00. Bukan RM2,000.00. Peg. Def-Def : Tapi sekurang-kurangnya dia pulang balik RM2,000.00, betul? Saksi SP 4 : RM2,000.00 sahaja. [64] Jumlah kos bagi Item 1 dalam sebutharga D11 adalah berjumlah RM74,000-00 yang melibatkan (8) jenis kerja termasuk memasang pagar baru. Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah wajar untuk jumlah S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 tuntutan Plaintif sebanyak RM3899-00 ditolak dengan RM2000-00 (jumlah yang telah dipulangkan oleh Defendan-defendan) menjadikan tuntutan sebanyak RM1899 dibenarkan untuk kos pagar baru. (v)Kos pembinaan bumbung baru sebanyak RM3,500-00 [65] Bagi kos ini, Mahkamah mendapati sebenarnya Defendan- defendan telahpun memasang bumbung baru rumah Plaintif. Namun Plaintif telah menunjukkan wujudnya kecacatan bumbung baru yang dipasang oleh Defendan-defendan: (i)Keterangan SP4 (Rujuk WSSP4 m/s 7 para 25) Defendan-defendan menyatakan kepada saya bahawa beliau akan meroboh dan membina bumbung baru konkritG30 Water Proofing dan menukar atap lama kepada atap baru jenis “metal deck”. Walau bagaimanapun,Defendan-Defendan telah melakukan kerja-kerja tersebut dengan tidak sempurna sepertimana yang telah dijanjikan oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada saya.Oleh itu,saya terpaksa melantik En.Suriadi bin M Rasyid untuk pembaikan dan pembinaan semula bumbung rumah saya yang berjumlah RM3,500-00. [66] SP4 juga tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan peguamcara Defendan- defendan bahawa disebabkan PKP dan Pelan Pemulihan Negara, maka kerja-kerja pembaikan bumbung tidak boleh dibuat. (Rujuk NK m/s 141) Peg. Def-Def : Okay. Berdasarkan gambar-gambar P5, saya katakan, bumbung ‘metal deck’ telah siap dilaksanakan, setuju atau tidak? Saksi SP 4 : Ya. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 Peg. Def-Def : Cuma kalau ada apa-apa masalah, Defendan- Defendan sanggup untuk membaiki cuma PKP, keadaan PKP, beliau tidak boleh melakukan kerja-kerja. Kalau ada masalah itu, kalau ada apa-apa masalah pun lah pada bumbung, yang saya nafikan, tidak boleh lakukan kerja sebab PKP dan pelan pemulihan negara, setuju? Saksi SP 4 : Tak setuju. [67] Malah, didapati SD1 tidak boleh mengesahkan kerja-kerja membaiki bumbung adalah sempurna seperti berikut: Peg. Plaintif : Boleh tunjuk di Mahkamah bagaimana kamu tahu bahawa pemasangan bumbung oleh pekerja kamu itu adalah sempurna dan teratur? Saksi SD 1 : Kita tak tahu sejauh mana kita… Peg. Plaintif : Boleh tunjuk kat Mahkamah? Saksi SD 1 : Saya tak ada. (ii)Keterangan SP2 Mahkamah mendapati SP2 adalah salah seorang kontraktor yang diupah oleh Plaintif untuk membaiki semula bumbung baru rumah Plaintif yang dibuat oleh Defendan-defendan. Keterangan SP2 seperti berikut: Saya telah pergi ke rumah Plaintif dan memeriksa bumbung Plaintif dan seterusnya mendapati bahawa bumbung rumah Plaintif tidak berada dalam keadaan yang selamat untuk diduduki dan kerja-kerja yang dilakukan oleh kontraktor tersebut adalah di dalam keadaan yang tidak memuaskan. (Rujuk WSSP2 jawapan No.2) S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [68] Keterangan SP2 disokong oleh gambar-gambar keadaan bumbung yang rosak yang diambilnya di muka surat 41-67 Ikatan Dokumen Bersama. Walaupun dicabar oleh peguamcara Defendan-defendan tentang bilakah kebocoran dalam gambar-gambar itu, namun SP2 adalah konsisten dengan jawapannya seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s Peg. Def : Itu saya tanya. So, tentang kebocoran, tentang bumbung pecah, rabung pecah, ini semua minggu lepas lah? Saksi SP 2 : No. Itu gambar semasa saya buat caj yang RM3,500.00 tersebut. Peg. Def : Okay. Kebocoran ini minggu lepas lah? Saksi SP 2 : No. Kebocoran yang gambar itu yang sebelumnya. [69] Dalam kes ini juga pihak Defendan-defendan mencabar tiadanya bukti untuk menunjukkan bayaran sebanyak RM3500-00 telah dibuat oleh SP4 kepada SP2.Namun, SP2 telahpun mengesahkan telahpun menerima bayaran RM3500-00 tersebut dan bukti bayaran secara online. (Rujuk NK m/s 37) Peg. Plaintif : Sudah pun berlaku, okay. Okay, tadi En. Suardi juga dicadangkan bahawa dokumen pada mukasurat 58 hanyalah merupakan sebut harga dan tiada apa-apa pembuktian bahawa pembayaran RM3,500.00 telahpun dibuat kepada En. Suardi. Boleh En. Suardi jelaskan bagaimana sebenarnya pembayaran dibuat kepada En.Suardi? Saksi SP 2 : Okay, pembayaran dibayar melalui bank online, iaitu kakak transfer kepada akaun saya. Sayangnya saya tak dapat buktikan hari ini sebab saya kata handphone yang saya gunakan itu S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 telah jatuh ke dalam kolam tapi saya rasa kalau semak daripada akaun saya, in shaa Allah ada. [70] Pihak Defendan-defendan juga mempertikaikan SP2 tidak memiliki repot daripada pihak pakar seperti jurutera pembinaan dan arkitek bertauliah untuk membuktikan penjelasan SP2 bahawa bumbung rumah Plaintif bocor disebabkan kerja-kerja Defendan-defendan. [71] Namun, Mahkamah mendapati Defendan-defendan tidak ada langsung memplidkan sebarang keperluan repot-repot daripada pihak pakar tentang kebocoran bumbung tersebut sebagai pengesahan keterangan SP2 menjadikan ianya hanya bersifat difikirkan kemudian dan wajar diketepikan. [72] Secara alternatifnya, SP2 telah menunjukkan keadaan bumbung Plaintif yang sememangnya dalam keadaan berbahaya dan mempunyai kebocoran. Pada hemah Mahkamah, tiada sebab untuk Mahkamah menolak keterangan SP2 tersebut mengambil kira kerja SP2 dalam membaiki bumbung rumah boleh mengesan masalah bumbung rumah yang bocor dan disokong gambar-gambar adalah memadai dan mencukupi untuk mengesahkan wujudnya kecacatan atas kerja-kerja membaikpulih oleh Defendan-defendan tanpa perlu laporan pakar seperti arkitek bertauliah atau jurutera pembinaan mahupun quantity surveyor.Keterangan SP2 ini juga telah menyokong keterangan SP4 secara keseluruhannya. Oleh itu, kos sebanyak RM3,500-00 wajar dibenarkan dalam Tuntutan Plaintif ini. (vi)Bayaran sewa rumah selama 3 bulan: Disember 2021 hingga Februari 2022 sahaja (RM700 x 3 bulan) RM 2,100 [73] Mahkamah juga telah membenarkan kos ini selepas mendapati Defendan-defendan telahpun pecah kontrak akibat gagal menyiapkan S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 rumah Plaintif selepas November 2021.Kiraan tempoh lewat bermula Disember 2021 sehingga Februari 2022 sahaja. Keterangan SP1 menunjukkan SP4 walaupun ibunya sendiri, namun kos sewaan rumah diambil kira dengan menolak nafkah bulanan ibunya daripada RM1,000- 00 menjadi RM300-00. [74] Keterangan SP4 seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 11) Peg. Def : Bukan, ini mak bayar kamu cash lah? Saksi SP 1 : Bukan, saya kurangkan allowance saya pada mak saya bulan-bulan, sebagai tanda sewaan. Allowance yang saya beri mak saya bulan-12 bulan, saya kurangkan supaya jumlah jadi macam ini lah, RM700.00. Peg. Def : Oh, jadi tidak ada duit berpindah tangan lah? Saksi SP 1 : Kira bulan-bulan saya beri kat mak saya, saya kurangkan lah perbelanjaan itu. Peg. Def : Ya lah, maknanya mak you tak beri you tunai. Saksi SP 1 : Betul. … Saksi SP 1 : Kira saya beri cash kepada mak saya lah. Tandanya mak saya… kira macam mak saya bayar kepada saya lah sebab saya kurangkan perbelanjaan itu. Peg. Def : Oh, so sekarang you kata you bagi mak kamu cash? Saksi SP 1 : Betul. Peg. Def : Sebab kurangkan perbelanjaan? S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 Saksi SP 1 : Bukan. Maksunya daripada contoh RM1,000.00 saya bayar mak saya 26 bulan-bulan, saya kurangkan kepada RM300.00. Keterangan SP1 menyokong keterangan SP4: (Rujuk WSSP4) S : Bagaimana pula selepas September 2021? J : Akibat daripada kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian tersebut yang tidak dapat diselesaikan dalam tempoh masa yang telah dijanjikan oleh Defendan-Defendan, maka anak saya telah meminta saya untuk membayar sewaan bulanan dari September 2021 sehingga Februari 2022, iaitu selama enam (6) bulan sebanyak RM700 sebulan. [75] Pada hemah Mahkamah,penolakan wang sara hidup SP4 daripada SP1 merupakan salah satu bentuk kerugian yang dialami oleh SP4 akibat pecah kontrak oleh Defendan-defendan.Walaupun tiada pertukaran tunai RM700-00 antara SP1 dan SP4,namun hakikatnya wujud kerugian di pihak SP4 secara tidak langsung akibat pecah kontrak Defendan- defendan tersebut.Oleh itu, kos sebanyak RM 700-00 x 3 bulan (Disember 2021,Januari 2022 & Februari 2022) berjumlah RM2,100-00 adalah wajar dibenarkan. (vii)Perkhidmatan kerja-kerja pembersihan di rumah Plaintif [76] Pihak Defendan-defendan mendakwa telahpun mencuci rumah Plaintif sebelum keluar seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 96) Peg. Def-Def : Arahan saya, mereka telah membersihkan dengan sepenuhnya dan segala kotoran ini dilakukan oleh kontraktor- kontraktor kamu yang lain yang telah masuk selepas dia berhenti. Saksi SP 4 : Itu saya tak setuju. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 Walau bagaimanapun ia dinafikan oleh Plaintif dan telah menuntut RM450-00 atas kerja-kerja mencuci dan membersihkan rumah Plaintif. [77] Bagi isu ini,pertamanya, Mahkamah mendapati kerja mencuci rumah Plaintif sememangnya termasuk dalam skop Sebut harga D11 iaitu “kerja membersih membuang segala barang yang tidak berkenaan/diperlukan”.Kos sebanyak RM450-00 tersebut dikeluarkan oleh plaintif selepas semua kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian telahpun dibuat oleh Defendan-defendan dan juga kontraktor pihak ketiga.Oleh itu, pada hemah Mahkamah memandangkan skop kerja ini termasuk dalam Sebutharga D11 namun ianya sudah sewajarnya bertindan dengan kerja- kerja kontraktor pihak ketiga, maka adalah wajar Mahkamah membenarkan hanya separuh perlu dibayar oleh Defendan-defendan manakala separuh lagi ditanggung oleh pihak Plaintif sendiri.Oleh itu,kos sebanyak RM225-00 dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah. KEPUTUSAN: [78] Setelah mendengar, meneliti dan mempertimbang kesemua keterangan-keterangan saksi-saksi, keterangan ekshibit-ekshibit, hujahan-hujahan kesemua pihak, Mahkamah berpuas hati memutuskan pihak Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan kes terhadap Defendan- defendan di tahap imbangan kebarangkalian dan membenarkan sebahagian Tuntutan Writ Saman pihak Plaintif berjumlah RM18,104-00 terhadap Defendan-defendan dengan faedah atas jumlah Penghakiman pada kadar 5% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman hingga penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad.Kos adalah mengikut skala.Curia Advisari Vult. S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 Bertarikh: 2 Disember 2023 Diputuskan oleh: NOORFAZLIN BINTI HAMDAN Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Sivil 1, Johor Bahru Pihak-pihak: Peguamcara Plaintif- Munirah Najihah & Sharmaine Fairuz dari Tetuan Munirah Najihah & Co Peguamcara Defendan-defendan-G.K Sritharan bersama dengan Raja Gunaselan dari Tetuan G.K. Sritharan & Co S/N GBSCOka4MEgSqbDrvAEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	63,164	Tika 2.6.0
PA-25-10-02/2023	PEMOHON BALAGURU A/L RAMIAH RESPONDEN 1. ) MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD 2. ) MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA	Judicial Review –Applicant seeks order of certiorari to quash Industrial Court AwardWhether errors of law committed by the Learned Chairman warranting the issuance of certiorari to quash the said Award;Whether there was a change in the stance of the employer of reasons for dismissing the Applicant;Whether there is evidence of the Applicant having personally benefited from the monies received from customer;Whether the Applicant had breached the code of ethics and the policies by even receiving the monies in the first place from customer when there was absolutely no reason to do so;The Court finds that the Learned Chairman’s finding that the Applicant had committed misconduct was a finding of fact arrived at upon hearing the testimony of the witnesses and especially after having considered the explanation proffered by the Applicant which was not accepted by the Learned Chairman.The Court finds that the Learned Chairman had fully appreciated the issues before her and the decisions and conclusions arrived at were predominantly reached upon a scrutiny of the documents and more importantly, the oral testimony of the witnesses and such findings of fact ought not to be interfered with.The application is dismissed with costs.	01/12/2023	YA Dato' Anand Ponnudurai	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7f41e727-c911-4f08-9e47-2a4baba2bee5&Inline=true	01/12/2023 08:10:49 PA-25-10-02/2023 Kand. 29 S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N JdBfxHJCEeRypLq6K5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 1>A—25—1u—o2/2023 Kand. 29 21/12/2023 29:12-4'4 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI PULAU PINANG DALAM MEGERI PULAU PINANG MALAVSIA (EAHAGIAN RAVUAN DAN KuAsA»KuAsA KHAS) PERMOHONAN UNTUK SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAM No.PA-z5-1o- 02/2023 Dallm Perkara mengenal suam permnhonan untuk kebensran /pennlah cemcran ﬂan manaamua berkenaan Awad No. 2523 (shun 2022 herlankn 29 hanbulan Navember 2022 yang dlbuat dalam kes Mahkimnh Psiunhaan Malaysxa, Clwlngan Pulau Fmang. Na Ken 9/4-1615/21 Dan Dalam Fevkara Seksyan 2011) AM: Pemubungan Pemsahaan‘ 1967 Dan IN ./naIxH.AcEeRyDLw<5Q up n at n ma Sum In-nhnv M“ be used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VII mum puns! Dalam Penkara mengenal Seksyen M(1\|Akla Relief Spesmk. 1950. Daram Parker: menganm Jadual 1, Akta Mnhknmah Kenmnan 1564 Dan Dllam Perkm Amran 53 Kndarr Kledah Mahknmin 2012 AN'lARA BALAGURU AIL RAMIAH ...PEMOHDN DAN sw ma:xH.AcE=RvnLwK5Q me x M )1 mm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm the LC Ihsn pmeeeasroodrrsidarar paragraphs 45 and 49 dune sard Award rne crarnranrs ponrenripn rrrar me saoend enarge lacked parrrcurars and was run generally worded but rravrng edrrsrdared ma evidence and resrinrnny. answers W5 quesrron in the negatrve, 1 me LC men concludes it paragraph 50 of me sard Award rnar based on porn the oral and ddeurnenrary evidence, the clarmarrr nad misused ms posraen and saﬁaled rnonres {mm the customer which was a breach of the bank's Furure Ready code of Ethics and Conducr Pulrcy. The LC at paragraph 51 :71 me send Award men ﬁnds and oonchldes mar repeivirrg momes (mm a cusrarrrer rs unemicar and a serious breach. k. me LC ﬁnaHy proceeds ta cerrsraernure punIshmenla1d\srmsss\ was warmmed and whi\|s1 acxnowraugrrrg mar me ceurr can srrike down a asrnrssar on gruunds M dispmperrrpnarrry, ﬁnds mar srrrre bank employees rre cusmrans or public rrrnus, hrs nrrseonduer warranted drsrnrssar as rne bank could no longer repose me necessary rrusr to rrrernrerrr rrrrn In errrproyrnenr any longer i 's Grounds for Thll Ilcaﬂonl ‘rm R-s ondant mm§ [1A] rne AppHc:n( rn rahancu or me nunrardus grounds set our rn we order 53 at In: Ru of court 2u12 srarernanr have raised several matters and submitted on rnerrr wrrh a vrew of persuading me man the LC had commilled rmrious errors :11 raw in arnvrrrg an srn 1daIxH.rcEeRypLw<5q nu u an: we s.n.r In-nhnrwm re used m van; me nr1g\ruHIy sun. dun-mm VIZ mum puns! the sand Award I wtll deal wllh the matters raised and consider and analyse the submission of both names on each el those gruurrds /tasues so retsed. The reason (or the tennlrralten [15] Al the outset, the Appllcant complains that navrng llllsd the disrntsssl letter wrtn the capllorl ‘DISMISSAL soucmne MDNIES FROM CUSTOMERS’, the bank had manger: lls stance to subsequently allege that the set 0! ‘receilllrlg monies‘ ls senous rnteeonduee Thle change‘ the Applicant contends, alfecls the reltamltty and credlhlllly d1<:ow—2 and the reason for lhedtsrntssal [16] I ﬁnd rm nrerlt tn thls eententron lor two reasons Firstly, there is ne doubt that the bank has Indeed pleaded In thelr statement ln Reply that the actor reeelyrng mamas lrmn the eustomer was a bleach el the terms olemploymenl More lmponarllly tneugn. wltn respect to teamed Counsel furIrl:App\|ican(, one should not be ollnded by [he caplmrl ol the disrnlssel letter but should also oonslder the substance at the letter ol disnnssat. A perusal ol the same wlll undoublsdly reveal that ll expressly relers to the ehou cause letter and the AppIio.snt‘s reply thereto As seen eavllar‘ the show cause letter olstlnclty r-lened In an atlegauon ol reeewlng lacaeplmg the said rrlenles As sum, tn my view, the was not a case or chnngtng stanoe at all. slN teernoczanyntelxse me :2 en- -use s.n.t n-rlhnrwm rs used m yaw ms nﬂnlrrellly sun. dun-rlnrrl wa nFluNG Wml Allggal rloimalerlalenurs [17] Learned counsel «or me Applicant men relero lo lhe various r:nncIus>crls reached by me LC Ind eemenoe then such an Award wns linered wllh enera bl law on many mums [1 5] ll ls may ccnlenaea lhal lhe LC nab relleo lo Idhere Io cstablishad ludlclal prlnuples enuneeleo by our Supenar Court: In mu regent lt cannot be dlspulad lhal lhe LC correctly roemmea lhe lrne case lewanu was fully aware lhiﬂha bun-len was on me bank lo pmducs cavern eviaence lhal lhe Apbllcam oommlllad mlsconducl [19] on we leeue, the Appllcanl lakes umbrage lhal eesone lhe lenerol ulsmlssal relernng la a fact or “acllcmnf. (here was no evldence 01 me same In we regard, n was pnirllad am that cow-2 hoe admltted that the second charge was indeed one ol seluahng and lhal cow—2 had admmed ln croea-exarnmalion that «he lame lmplled lhal lne Apglicam hac aakea me customer lar money Rellanoe was also placed on the evldence bllhe customer that «he Clalmaﬂl one not request the money but mat a was he who Inslsled on name lllo the Avnllcanl [201 In my wew, me Appl m‘s bbmenuah wauld have some marl! nlhe ONLY allegalloll agalns1 the Appllcant was sollcmng monles «mm the cuslarner wllh respect, the eonlenlwn new I5 premised on the basis lhal me Appllcanl was dlsmlssed only an sallclllrlg lunbs. However, wmlst mere may lndeed be a mllerence between sol-cning and reuelvlng. me Acpllcanl seems to have overlooked the lam charge h the Sald show cause lener as well as me pleaded slN malxH.lcEeRvl>LaK5Q Paﬂeuodu ‘Nuns a.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used a mm he bﬂmnallly eon. dun-mm Va arlum we [21] [22] SN iaaixwicsanypiauwsq -waa s.n.i In-vihnrwm be used M van; ins nﬂginniily sun. m.n.n wa arium wmi case. in mi: regard, inera is no doubt mat the nrsi sham refers in me mi of receiving/accepting and the second charge raYers lo ine sci oi sollciialian in inis regard, .i must aisn rial be lorgnnen that ins LC nas found that me veoeivlng of mania: was iisell a senous misconduct. cnncaiiy. inns must aiso be viewed WI iight at the Aapiicanfs own lane! in rspiy to the show cause wnere ne siaies that the mslnmer asked fora iavoin but he namsea as il was against the bank's oooe oi ethics in do 50. Such a slalamenl in my view is very \|eMirigV In any event‘ In saiaras sohcmng IS cnnoemed, me LC am examine me evidence iea and M pannmlar mnsidered the ioiiowing facis sucn as Ihal lhe payments were made well oeiana any loan was approved, no reoeipis were Issued, deposited Into his personal asoouni as weli as me oeiaiaa reunn nﬂunds only In May 2020 and uonciuded at paragraph 47 crime said Award lhal the inference was mat the monies were paid as a business Iransaclion and nm a favour. ncannoi aiso be over1ook2dIha\|me evidence adducsd was via! me ﬁrs! two payinenis received by me Applicant IVI Juiy 2019 were even before me cimamsr naa even auommaa me loan appllcaliurl In COW—1 which was on 1" August 2019. These Wei: conclusions leached by me LC upon an ubpc\|ive assassmanl M Ihe evidence and the cmdibilily al Ihe wlinesses and il camiol be said Il'ia\| sum a mndusinn was irrational or based on no evidenoe. I! was u\|so In evidence Ilia Iniliai Whalskpp uummunimtim oamen COW-1Indlhecusinmer pnanaina -ssuanoe aims shim mum imiar which many led In an inierenoe man in was me ciairnani wnn raquaaiaa ma cuslnmer 191 me money. Pagellaﬂl [23] Sam on ma Issue oi ma second charge relating m sonaning, the Anpllcam also comanaa that me referenoe to and ﬂndmq by the LC that n was a mam of ma whey was a slgmﬁnt evror aa cowaz had annulled that the breach was actually only VI relauan to subdauses (a; am m of clause 1 2 and not clauses 1 name (:1) as pteaded In my vwew, \| does not tantamount ID i malenal departure lmm me plaamngs as subdauses (a) and (4) are the appncanna clauses penalning m reeewvng memes and aamg m aunlhct M mlevesl [24] The Applicant also rawses me wssue that the pelucy only came mic «me on 21“ May 2o2a.e,a1\|erma msmiassal leltevand/or that me amwnbery pohcy was ncu\| menmaned m the show cause ov Ienerov msmussal However, :1 Is dear (ram me ewdenca ol cow-2 that must the policy was rewawea m late May 2020‘ wt was mdeed In exvslence pnov to such review ‘me Lo atmnusly (ound cow-2 a aeumre wwness As such, beanng m mmd such evmenee, I cannot oanclude that me LC's lmumg that them was such a mason wu ane that was mamonal or mad: In emu! of ‘mu [251 lalso see no mm m ma Applncnrvfs compllmt that me LC use rum apaury wmch pamcular Iwmb ui ma puhcy ma Apphcanl had bvaamsd Sum wls oarmmy not Iatnl ind, WI any uvam. smne she accapw cow.2-s swam-a, Ilwns obvious mama LC agreed max nmnwaunaawaaa (a; Ind m) we ma anas breached [26] The Aupltcanl Ihen submits lhatlhere Is no pmhlbmon m the pohcy for emproyaas to mcaiva payments divedly mm men bank account aw ma:xwcE=RvnL¢K5Q ma )5 M14 -waa am n-nhnrwm be used m van; ms mmmy mm: dun-mm wa nF\uNG puns! [27] [28] sin lﬂElxHJCEeRypLwK5Q ‘Nuns s.ii.i In-vlhnrwﬂl be ﬂied M my me nﬂglrullly MIME m.i.ii wa .riiine wnxl However, cow-2 riad iestitied triat amnlwyscs are iuiiy aware that tney cannot accept money into their personal admunes This is eertainly corriinan sense in my view. criiicatlytrieugn, I need npi go tiirther than the ciaiiiianrs mm admission in me reply in me show cause letter where he slated that he told trie customer lliat it was agalns1 tiie bank's mite eieiriiceip receive irie nianey. in my iurtrier view, quile apart ironi the teat that ll was irie Applicantwm dictated the amounts to be paid into iris bank account, rie must have also pmvided trie deiails oi riis personal bank aoeouni in ieelitavre trie tiansiers. Moving la the eeiiiplairii nwv mat irie eriarges were vague and due process denied, I again see no merit in the said complaint. Guns aparl lmiii iiie ciairriani being able to fully understand trie show cause and was able in reply which clearly indicated iriat lie undeistood ine enarges levelled against riini, me LC riad also addressed tiiis Issue and iaund inet irie chargﬂ were not vague. Tnat concluston in my view was a wrrecl one. [Reier In decided cases sucri as Fabuv Group v. v.ui Rn]: Mnllll Bin Raia him] Ahldin (uaui Perriiita No. iu-25.-in-so) as well as Poovan Slnnuuriy A Ariar v. Mnlnyslutt Alrllnu system seiriied mm] 2 LNS 1\|'l6l which have held IVIEI what is important Is the! me employee krimvs wriat lie is being charged ler]. Tne Applicant men mntends trial iriaie was no evbdencs of nini having personally benefited iruni me iiinriiei. and inns raises dnubls ezmut trie Valldlly oi the allegaﬂnns. with respect, l INHK tne Appliranl rniieea irie point. The issue is wtietrier tie nreacried tne dad. at eiriies and the policies iiy even receiving irie rneriies in tiie MI: is iii u ﬁrs! pusee when there wns absomlsry no reason to do so. The Lo was onhe view ms: be me oommmea misconduaand. ir! my view‘ lrlal W55 3 ﬁnding Oi lad arrived at upon hearing lhe \|ssumany of me witnesses and aspeeauy aner having considered me explanation praﬁerea by [he Apphcani which was not awepled by me LC sum Findings of fact based an me mednbiriry of witnesses are. mm respecn. nvl suscepﬁbielo reviau by the High Caun. [see me case 01 Wllllarn Jam as co (M) Sdn and v s aammgam [2mm]1 ML! 1; [1991] 3 AMR 2535] Further. if we Applucanvfs mrliermcn 01 not having benaﬁlled parsanaliy is 10 be accepted asa defence, then Ilcauld lead In absurd siluauanswhere an employee who has wrongfully received monies will Just have In shim proof or relurrwig me same so as to escape discipilnary action Such a pruposilicn certainly does not SI! well with the concept 07 equity and good Dorlscienoe whim the industrial Cnun is mandaled In appiy [291 The Apphcam also submits that Insuﬂician evidence was adduced ma: me Apphcani had breached any policy and Iha\| any such ﬁnding was aessa an a mere assumauon and specuialion However, a reading ollhe Said Award In its miailly WM ciearly revel! malme Avp\|>can\| had ncl denied renewing muniss rmm acusromer into ms personal! account which he mmseu ackncwtedged was a breach o1elmcs.NodoubLlM Appllcanland Ille customer had their own version as to what transpired but the LC did rmi amepl their version and round mu they wnlradlcled each other. I am certainly not praparsd io uweriere mm such a ﬁnding of (.551 made upon seeing and hearing ﬁvsthand the rasumony DI the wilnenes. They syw marxH.icE=RvDmiK5Q me n at :4 ma s.n.i n-nhnrwiii be used M van; .. nﬂginniily sum. dun-mm wa nFiuNG wrui were in my vuw rial aesuiripuetis but ﬁndlngs arid irilerences made on lne avai able evidence [30] me Applieanl tnen raises tlie issue ltiai be tied no eapeeily la mnuenoe tne loan pmoassing ofﬁoer and tliat using the wow syslem, it was impossible «or tiim lo nave any impact on me lean applicalidn Trial being the case, in my view, it still begs tne question at wny did be even recelved ltie nionies in me nrst pleoe. The Applicants imdding appears to be two facts in lliat the monies were reoeived long befova me loan was even applled lor and/or appmved lwliicn was nol even approved in Ihe end) as well as me Applkzrlfs tesiimdny inat he wilndiew tne sums immediately and handed me same to his wife and mat lie nnly ietumed ltre monies in May 2020 vmicln was lndlcallve Ihal ne riad used ii and tied msulricient mods In return it earlier. The bptiem line was met tie received monies liom an axlslmg elienl who tied a pending app Inn, Thus, in my Vlew, me nndings cl tne LC cannot be sad in be a conclusion reached inzlmnally paeed en the evidenee adduced. [31] I also note that me Appllcanl nitpicks an the deliberation cutie GSC meelmg c1 14'" May znza which deeded to dismiss lne Applicant. especially concemlng ttieir lailuie to interview tne oualonier end lo oonerder lhe Applicant‘: impeccable reperds etc Even assuming trial iriere were some deiems, ll is «me law met me same is cured by ttie lndustnel coun proceedings [see lrie Federal court one of woiig vuen nocti v. syei-nut Hang Lepnp Auurenee sun and Am! Anmtiu Appeal [lass] : cm :44]. sin ioeinllceenvvtdixse 71:: u or)! -use s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll be used M van; me nﬂglrullly Mlhls daa.i.i. wa nFluNG wnxl [32] [33] [34] SW lﬂEIxHJCEeRypL¢K5Q ‘Nata Sunni In-vlhnrwm is used M van; me nnglrullly mt. dun-mm w. nFluNG wnxl vlntrr trte greatest pr vesped to learned counsel tor trte Applicant, this appltcaliprt appears \|n have been proceeded with on me basts Ihall am rteartrtg ll at ﬁrsl irtstarroe or as trtt is an appeal Whilst trte law ofjudlclal review has indeed progressed in reoenttrrrres tpallow a more rubus1 apprpaerr lo lnquinrlg imp ttre rrlems at a aeotsprr by a reviewing court, I am still mindful mat mere strll rem ' rurmarrrertlal jlmslll: tlritarenoe between an appeal and a judicial review‘ The Cowl srrpuld llteretpre be rrrrrtdlul rlD1lD lrarlsgress me ltrre petweerrtrte Iwc delineated by trre Iesls ollllsgallty, trraltprralrry, prooedural lmpmprlefy and prpppruorramy [seetne OoW!ofAppea\ case pl sarrr Maark vorelr v. nano' binal Ab Ahmad 1. are [2022] 3 cu 661] I am not persuaded trial are LC rras oorrtrrrrrtea any at llraae errors. sa were is no ttouor trtat me merges levelled agarrtst me Applicant were selnl~4:rllnlrlal in nature. Thertpplluant at all malerlalllmes was lully aware oltrre allegalrprrs against him. It is open to lhe employer la ltrslrly its aeotsrprr in Ins lrrausrrral Conn wrterepy rrre lrtausrrtal Cowl IS mandalad by S-cllon 30(5) Of [hi Indunrinl Rnlninns Act 1957 In acl in accordance with equlﬁy and good conscience wttrtout regard to legal lecnrrtcaltrtes. The duty or the Industrial Calm is In Idludbcale on me tustritoatiprr lpr suerr dismissal aria such enquiry ﬂoss not have In he Wﬂh the Vull Izapplngs ale criminal UOUI1 mil [See lhe decision 07 the High Calm lrl llzlnynvmtn Shll arm v Mnlld Vuwf Bln Ahu a-liar a. Anor[l9$4]1 MLJ ts] The Applicanl trier. wrllends mal rrra LC latlea in pprrsmer malarial rrrapnelstarrues In the wtlrtese slatemerrls M cow—l amt cow»: Ind me statement In Reply aria tnal lrte LC up not amva at a wall vagusatu sin mElxH.lCEaFYDLlﬂK5Q -nae s.n.i In-vlhnrwm re used M yaw Des nﬂmrieﬂly MIME dnunvilnl wa eFluNG WM! lounded decision ll does appear iriai mere are some discrepancies in ralaliori we lrie dales in lnel references were made id dlﬂerent years as highlighted ai paragraph 55 pi lrie Applicant’: wrillen supniissrdns. whilsl rid allerrlpl was rriade id amend lhe Slalarnent in Renly to amend any inaeeui-acias, rnis iri rriyvrew does not affecl lrie iiiiegrrry dllhe said Award wariiariliiig rne same in be quashed in my view, me panies were al all nines dognisaril 01 the liriieliries involved wiln me dates me Applicanl repeived the monies‘ lire Inlen/ISWS‘ lhe charge sneel eve arid rrre dismissal dale [35] The Appllmnl also raises ma iacl lhanne bank did nui produce one Ms siiddhai whp had iriilially made me doniplairil on 19* February 2019 based dn whal she was laid wnich lhen slarled me invesiigalion pmmss and nlgnlignls lnal her doniplairil was orie- sided and not aeiairale. In my view, mere was rid need we produce Mssirdchal as Enak Azwan Falruz Em Ranini niniselileslilied as cow—1 and gave evidence as lo how he had ddirirriuniealed wiln me cuslorrierrirsl siniilarly, lhe ddrilenlidn now in ralaliori in edelay ollne oorriplairii and irriresrrgazidri is in my view wilhpiir mam. whilsl it is indeed lriie lnal emplvyers snpvld acl expediiipiisly pa doniplairila. I canrial conclude lnal mere was an ineidinale delay in lrils case. The Appllcanl was interviewed al the end 04 February 2020. me shim cause lelier and reply \|u lhe same in March 2o2u end lna dismissal in rrird-Mey 2020 which cannot ha eoriierided In be lanai In me bank's case In ad lar as me oomplalnl lnal Nalniuddin who wnducleﬂ irie irilerview wilh me Appllearrl on 25'“ February 2020 also did no: lesllly. l again lirid inei iris was iipl dalnmenhl as me imervlew lranscrlpls were produced arid no aeripiis issuers were raised in relaiipn lp rne accuracy or IL: eonlenle. r... m am I. MALAVAN BANKING BERNAD 2. MAHKAMAH FERUSANAAN MALAYSIA ...RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] Pursuant \|o Weave granted on13"Man:h 2023, thus rs ma Appncanrs subslamwe applicauon pursuant lo ord-r 53 cf mo Rules of Court 2012 lor an order :71 oemoran lo quash \|m1us\|na\ Courl Award No.252s of 2022 dated 29'" November 2022 more-naner referred \|o as the ‘sand Award‘) The Aupvicant awsc seeks an order of rnarmar-nus ramming the manner (0 ano\|he( chainnan w renear and demo [2] Vida me sand Award, me Learned cnawuan (hereinafter referred In as ‘LC') had wnnruaed that the Aapnranrs dismissal imm emproymenr by me 1-! Respondent bank was with ,usr cause or exwse The Apphmnt has In the Orderﬁl rule my Rules olccurt 2012 Statement as wan as in ms amuavrcs rarsea vanous oomenuons In supporl o1 his apphcahun and submits mar ermts at sru ./na:xwcEaRybLq£K5Q File a 1:121 uua Sum IHIVVDIY Mu be used m mm are nvVmruH\|y mm; dun-mm vn mum Wm sw rdatxwczeﬁvnmwsa -rue sarm n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms pr1mrr.HIy mums dun-mm vu anurm pm [35] Finally‘ the Applicant now cmllsrids mar mare was bad farm on me DEI1 of the bank as 11 had Needed that 11 kick mm account the prsvrous warnrrrps mar wers rssuad in rrre pas1 ro rrra Appheanl. Thrs appears In be a vronrar aIlad< on me sard Award in rerarrorr in me rssue or prpponrorrarrry and wrrerrrer rrre disrmssz\ order was wan-amed. 11 is rrrgrrlrghred mar Ina Applrcarrx had an rrrrpeocable record vf 39 years v1 servroe wrlh the bank Frrsr and foremost‘ I natelhallhe LC whﬂsl making revererroem me bank's p\eaded case on are prevrous warnrnps elc. 3! paragraph 12 onrre sard Award, or: nor make any ﬁnding on in. 1n «on, she oorrealy referved ro me daorsrorrs rrr Norlzarr bin sakar v Fannnn Enrerprise sdn Bhd para] 5 MLJ ans [on «re appllca rry 01 me prindple or pmpumanahly orpurrrsrrrrrerru and Room 11 v ECM ubra Avenue soourmn Sdn and [2013] 1 \|LR112 wnron drcraoed a rrrgrrerdrrry on employass rn me rrnarroe rrrdusrry. The LC drd rrr fac1 uorrsrderar paragraph 52 at me Sam Award mat the Applicant had served hr 344 years bur nomrmslandrng, found lhal drsrrrrssal was warranted. wrrrlsr it may at vrrsr blush appear a punrshrrrenl man was harsh, wrrerr corrsidarrrrg an raas as preserrred ro ma LC, and rrr pamculnr, rrre lac! mar we are dearrng with a bank errrproyee wrrp raceived money from a ouarornar mm Ms persona» awounl and ms reason lur domg so axprassry daoarravad arrd repaored, 1 cannm conclude mar me LC‘s oorrrlusrprr rrrax dism1ssa\ was warranted an rrrauorrar H3 man a court can rnrervane rt one. I rrava ham rrr previous dad me pumshmenl ul dIsmIssa\ -prrrxod the censdanne or me Conn". on nrre vacvs a! we case, I cannot say mar I\| does [see me High coun case or Rolmlwall M Iarrr-n v Plrruk Eolkuua mar-ma Mljlll aondmya Pulnu Huang 3. Anor [2022] IIILJIJ an] 1-21: u an- [35] wnrisi II ' srn maIxH.IcE-Ryoiooxsq “Nair s.r.I n-vihnrwm s. LAIQ4 M may I... nﬂginnﬂly sun. dun-mm VII sFIuNG pans! conclusion [37] In Ino upsholr oasme laamed counssi Ior Ins Aopiicani raising vanous grounds In his snonior Io psrsuads ms in qussn Ins sand Awaror wllh reaped, having axnminad Ins smsncs law! as wsii as Ins sarwsnra oflha saia Award. I Im not so persuaded In my VIEW, Ins LC Iuiiy appreslalad Ins isssss before nor. in my opinion, nsr asosions sno conclusions arrived Ial wsrs prsaorninaniiy roasnso upon s scruiiny oi ms duwmen\|s and more nnpcnaniry Ins orai Issnrrrany oi the wiinassss II II Inc. In that such ﬁndings of fact uughl nm In be rnisrisraa wnn unisss osrvsrso in Insi may wsro wrongly arrived at. I cannot conclude as web on Ins Isms ano sviasnos oi Inis case ' deed unianurraia Inn Ina Apnircsnrs services were tarrnimalad ansr :Ia ysars oi saivios. I am siram Inai i\| aooaars Inn he is Ins sinnoroi his win rnisionurrs He acknowledge: that he was in breach o1 Ins bank‘: sinics when ns raoelved Ins nroniss inio his psrsonnl bank aocouni He snouic not have done so and ms ransom Ior doing so were Mienad by me LG I see no basis Io iniarisrs wrin sucn a ﬁnding and Irrs unirnsu conclusion Inai his dismissal was warranted was In my View no( Inisoiao by any error 01 Irw. use 22 al 10 [391 As such, this applmahon Is disrmssed with cases of RM2500 no subiecl In allncalor Dale: 27'” November 2023 ANAND PONNUDURAI Jung: Hugh Cam Georgetown Pulau Pmang _C_¢_umL$.L Mr Arjan AIL Pursumax and Mr. Vasdmr <3 Baksham from Messrs. Vasdev Baksham&Assoc (Kuz\a Lumpurﬂorlhe Applicant. Mr Sivabalah Nadaraiah and Ms. Reena Enbasegalam from Messrs. Shaam Delamona A on. (or me 1' Respundenr. Akrrn Sales 5. Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Nadiah Z59 bmlxiullah and another apps;/(201312 MLJ 537 Fans: Group v v.M Rafa Mohal Bm Raja Zains( Abadin {Usu/ Pemula No R2-2555-96) syn maIxH.AcEaRypLw<5q la‘: n .c 2. mm smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! Ms/syawala S!ssIBhd V Mam: YusofBin Abu Baker .2 Am)! (1994) 2 ML.I 15 Nonzsn bm Bakar V Panzana Enterprise Sdn BM [2013] 6 ML! 605 Pnovan Smnasamy & Anal v Malayxran Amine System Berhad 1201412 LNS was Rzmjit Kaur a/p s Gaps! srngh v Hotel Exce/sror (M) sun EIu1[2D09] 5 MLJ no Robert T: V ecu Libra Avenue Semrmas Sdn Ehd[2OV3]1 /LR 112 Rosmawan bl Ismail v Pihak Bwkuasa Tatatenib Majlrs Eands/aye Fulau Huang 5. Ana (20221 MLJU 2962 R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court ufMalaysia & Ana (19971 1 ML./ 145 Sam Maark Velak v. Dam‘ Zaina/Abrdin Ahmad a. Ors (202213 Cu 661 Syarikat Kenderaan Me/ayu Ke/amen Bhd v Tmnspon Workers Union [1995] 1 MLRA 263; [V995] 2 cm 743,- [1995] ZAMR 16D1:[1995]2 ML! 317 Vﬂllram Jacks .2 Co (Al) sun am: y s Belssmgam /2000] 7 ML./ 1, /1997} 3 AMR 2565 Wong Yuan Hock v SyaI1kaIHnng Lsong Assurance Sdn Bhd And Anolnsr Appeal [1995] 3 cu 344 Leglslallons ml: red to: mduszma: Relallons Act war; Sscbon 20, 30(5) sw ma:xH.AcE=RvnLm<5Q an :4 and um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm law were eornrnmed by me LC wirranhng ma rsananee avoenidrarr \|a qunsh (ha sara Award. Thsempbyer bank as me 1-‘ Resoonﬂenl, as expecvad, onncsea (hrs avuhcaﬁon on (he aaars that no erwr of Vaw was mmmmed by me LC rn amvmg al are various oomzmsinns and Ihe sard Award [31 As such. it rs naw rncurnbenr an me to set ou\| me backgmund lads and me evidence rad belore ma lnduslnal Caurl as weﬂ as rn eansrder ma ﬁndmgs made and to proceed tn analyse ma vanous aamenuans of me parties to determine rvennrs of law were rndeed odrnnrmed by the LC In arrivmg more said Award [41 Selma x proceed. 1 do not inland lo set out at rengm wnar Is non mre law wnuemlng rudrcral revum applicanans. Learned Counsel are mm In agveemem on me aapwcame waw m mar n rs now me mat are reviewing Cour! rs n0\ ]us1 Vrmned lo examinmg lhe deusion- making process but may also examine me subsvance M ore dearsron nsema ascenarn rt an error or baw was wmmmed. In ms regard. ’ ‘ mm settled mar Inlervenuan may be warranned rt me uecisrsn oi me Tnhunm Is rnraerad ay Allegalrly, rnauonamy, pmosdural rrnprdpnary, and a passrave lnurlh gruund av prdpdnranamy [see cases 01R R-nu Chlndrnn v Tho Indnamal coun M Ma yara A Anor [mm 1 MLJ 145; Akin s a. Sonnul (M) sdn Ehd v mdmr Zn In Abdul n and anaur r nppull [mm] 2 nu 537 and Rlnjll Kaur -/p s sopal Slngh v Haul Excolslor (In) sun Bhd [nos] 5 nu 11a]. The nraanrng or an error of law was and Mghllgmed m are Cnurl cl Appeal case :11 syarrkar Kandman Ma yu x. nun and vTrInIporl Wurkus an ./r:aIxH.AcEaRyDLw<5Q PIKE A ar )4 -we s.rr.r nu-uhnv M“ r. used m mm as nvwhraﬂly mm; dun-mm vn anurm Wm Unlm [M511 MLRA zu; [Inns] 2 cu m; [1w5] ZAMR lool; 119951 2 MLJ an where n was he\d as lollcm "ln mymdgmsnt, the me principle may be stated as (allows. An mfsnbl fnblmal or olhel decislon makmg aurlmmy, whether exerclsmy a 0I.las¢-/ud»'cl‘a/ fllncﬁorl or pure/y an adminisvatlvs luncmn has no /unsdicliolv la commit sn error 0/ law. Hsnoelonn, /I IS no longer ofnoncem whslhar the error of law Is junsdrcflonal a. not ll an r'rlferior1rlbuna/ or other pubhc mlsmn Iaksl does make such an em. men he exceeds his /urisdlction So loo l'sjllnsdfc1iaIv exceeded where resort 75 had to an unlail rlnwedure (see Raja Abdul Malek v Setlsusshs Suruhanjaya Pasukan Rm: [1995] 1 ML] 303), or whale me declslon leached VS unreasonable, in the sense that no reasonable tribunal siml/arty cmrumslanoed would have am»/ed at me impugned declsian. It IS nellhel leasrme nor desllsbls to azrempr an exhauslive deﬁnition ol what amounts 10 an am of law lorlhe calegones olsuclv an anal are not closed Eu! ltmay be safely s8)d [7151 an emu 0/ mill would be disclosed l (Ila declsloll-maker asks Illmsell me wrong qussllurl or lakes mm sccounl I"!/BVIIII consrdelallorls 0! OM17: (0 like V7720 zllrcolml relevant conslderuliolvs rwnal may be convemently mud an Anlslmrm: error) ol line rmsoonlruss ma larms u/any relevant stumls, av mlsapplras O7 mlmslales a prmclpls of me gerleml /aw Since an inlanol lrlblmﬂl has nojullsdlcllon lo make an Elm!‘ OI /EV/. II: decisions WM not D9 lmmunlzsd from judlclal rawsw by an mm dause mmmr widely druﬂa-1 " sw 1nEIxH.lCE=FYDLﬂK5Q us» 5 at )4 mm smm ...m.mm be used M mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm Tli hack mind has of 0: lieuiirs Issuing lo vils mriilnnlon. {5} his Appllcam wmmemxd anialoyniarii wiiri ilia ziaiilr in was as a lo in and manms clerk and uppaars lo have been pmmnlad savaral limes ovar ins yams. As at 2020, me Aaplicarii was an exaculiva wiin iiia [Illa al Raiiiliiarica Ofﬁcar al liia Nlbong Taaal aruncn WHY! is \|as\| drawn salary of Rmuvom par monin [6] ma Alznliuni had pleaded in "19 Industrial coun iiiai nu had a ﬂood track record al a\|mos\| 38 years 0! enwymani Wllh nini having mcelved venous carulicaiaa aria accolades over iris yaais aria inai na nas served loyally wilnoui any iswes raise on ma iriiagrily Th! bank, on ina oliherharld, wniiai nai uispiiiinginayaars of games and ma issuance of oartiﬁcalas elc. over me years. nas pleaded previous records of verbal caullnrls and laiiars ol warning in uia years 1993,2002 and 2019. m rnings Ihen ioolr a him in early 2020. on 25* Febmary 2020. lna Applicant was asked in attend an lnvesligalion Interview wmi one Naimudﬂlrl WNd’I he duly aiieriued in the morning and men again in the allarrioen olzsll February 2020 The rlexl day. iris Applicant was suspended on ins basis inai a report had aeaii rsoeived mai ma Appllcaiii allegedly ournmiiied serious rriisouriaiicl. [6] Maxi caiiiea snaw muse letter dated 2" Marcli 2020 wliidi levelled two allsgaitioiis against me Auplicani As the crux olllie Appllcanfs submission are lounded on ltie actual wording: vf the mo sin lnElxHJCE=F‘IDLﬂK5Q mu all: was Smal In-vlhnrwlll be used M mm as nﬂnlnnllly MIME dun-vlnril via nFluNG Wﬂxl allegations, n I! Impnnanl to set them mil In verbalim and they read as lduaws: 1 You had, izatwaan as/07/2019 and 09/12/2ov9 received/accepted a nzlal of RM7_7oa Via 5 cash depoen transaarons deposned intu your Acwunl No. 7059199650 with C/ME Bank, as detailed rn Table 1 above from EIIEIK Munnaran Koliskavandan, a custorneroithe bank nurportedty to pay for the valualian report and iagaiiaas contrary to what the customer told Encik Azwan Fauuz Bin Rshim Omar, the Branch‘: CSE durrng their vonvalsalion an 31/1/2020 that the said monies were pvocessmg fee for his loo-up ioan application: and 2. You had, rn your capaoityas (he Remittance Ofﬁcer afhiipong Tehai Branch and an employee ol the Maybank Group violated Part 2 who Future Ready Code alE1hics & conduci Policy on “Misuse oi Position" when you soiicned a Iolal nf RM7, 700 via 5 deposit uansaotrarrs deposited inio your Account No. m599t9965n with OMB Bank, as detaiied in rabia 1 above tmrn Enctk Munnaran Koliekavandan, a customer oi the Bank and another sum ol RM3,so0 upon approval of the loan." [9] The bank had provided a nave wnn delails oi the transacuons and payment: Into the Applicant's permrul mount. As requesled, ma Apphcanl rephed la the show cause letter was me latter dated 9“ March 2020 SN lﬂElxHJCEeRypLwK5Q r... 7 and we s.n.t tunharwm be used m yam .. mn.u.y aw. dun-mm VIZ mum win! nio In ll rial [1o]T>ia monies su deposiied were supseduariuy reiurried try me Appiicanc In iris cus1omer in May 2020. [11] The Bank, not being saiis1ied with ma Appiicanrs reply, decided to dismiss ine Appiicaiii and did so vide its letter daied «am May mm The Applicant appeaied aga¥r\|S\| Ihe said decision vide ieiier daied i-uiine 2020. Such appeai was accompanied by a ienerdaied 30'" May 2020 irpin me cus1umer cpnpemad. II was die Applicant’: piisiiidn at me iinie that me said sum was indeed received by iiiin puucririe purpose Mcovering siairipingrees, iiaiuaiicn ieesas well as icgai iees «or a lop-up icaii Ihal iiad been appiied rdr by me cusicmer. sdcri appeal was we [121 via Appiicaiii men ﬁled a reprsseniaiiiiii to pc icinsiaied piiisuani In section 20 of [hi lndualrlul Rulltlons Act 1957 on uie pasis lhal he considered riimseli to pave been dismissed wimcin just cause crexcuccwim aucii naprsseniaiipn being irieri referred Iolhe indusinai ocun ipr an Award. Prnclldlrl II A [13] Puisiiani in irieir respective pieediixgs being ﬁled, a iull trial was conducicd at me indusiriai scan with the hﬂnk producing iwd wﬂnesses nnmciy one Encik Azwari Fairuz pin Rariiin and ma cuisi- paing Iheir Head oIGmup IR at me iiinc i.e.. cne Mr. Lpoi Heong Mang. nia Appiicani iasimad as CLW—2 aiiar irie cusiciner Mr. Muiiioiarari iesimed as CLW—1 wniian siminissicns rpiiowed and me said Award No 2525 ci 2022 was inan handed down dlsmllsmg SIN idaiiwcaaaypinixse Page a all! we s.n.i In-vihnrwm be ﬂied M van; was nﬂgiruﬂly MVMS ﬂan-mm via .riiiiia Wm! Iha Aauhcanrs clmm. A perusal :11 lbs said Award wuu re»/ea! the Ihoughl process and ma ::onc\usIuns made by Ihe LC to he as (ouawsz a she starts of by samng am the various cause papers she has consmerea as well as me am background facts, :2. she men at paragrauhs 5-11 01 me said Award accurately sans oul ma Cliwmanfs case and conlenlions and thrs Is smulariy loucwed by samng auHl1e company's case and eomenmns at paragraphs 12-13 07 the said Award; c she men. quite cmrectiy .n my view, sets out he apphcable law relating to the Courfs lundmn wmch \s to consider no me bank has discharged K5 burden of pmving on 3 balance of probe .. was man we mwsoonduct onmpulmed of was esvaunsnea and N50, whelher .1 oomliluled just cause for me dnsmlssali a. she men pmeeeas to «answer if there was a Iennmanon by me bank and mat is easilyand corlealy corlcluded m the amnname at paragraph 27 oi the said Award: a me cnucal part L)! me said Award mmmanoes at paragraph 23 where ms LC cansidets whemer me dismIssa\ was mm pm cause er excuse In «ms regard, sue predamlnanlly mars \|o me vanous documents/Iellars and mu oral xasmnany 04 me wunams and am consvdanng Lhe claimanrs urmvspunaa oanducl of receiving me said monies, she wndudas at paragraph an nllhe sad Award mm the an al rueewmy me we sw ma:xwcE=RvnL¢K5Q -an s M u "Nuns sum n-nhnrwm as used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm vu mum puns! monies was neon a sendus rmsconduct She proceeds to also conclude at oaragraon an dune said Award mac nne C\aIman\|‘s uonducl oreaened rlam 1 2 of me banks Arm-Bnpery and corruouon Policy and Pan 2 or me panics code of anus and conduct Pohcy the LC than pmceeds to consider me Claimant’: versrdn of events and hrs defence m the allegations. As nignligmed above, the Claimant did not drspute reeewing the monies butcunlended that it was as an advann: payment by me cuswmerforvamalvon and stamping and that he did not soueu me same but i\| was me eus1erner who insrs1ed and asked fora Iavdur wmch be obliged. In «ms regard, the LC eonsrderstnese mailers but oorlcmdes at paragraph 42 onne sand Award mat are reasons were Irrelevant as mere was srrnpry no neoessny tonne memes to have been deposited mm the claimants persona! amount; . m solar as me C\a\man\|‘s exphanalion thal payments were made as me eusmrner was relaxed to hrrn, me LC at paragraphs 4347 of Ihe sam Award ﬁnds thal ms Chlmant and me cuswmefs evrdende oonzradrcued eaan other and enan Vn any event, wnemer may were mated or run was rneweuanr as monies snould ml have been deoosned rrno me C\aImun('s persona! aooounr \n ma ﬁrs! place, . agam. aner eonamenng KM ewdenoe and Iﬁhmony n1 me wnneesas, me LC men concludes It paragraph 47 av me sad Award that me miewnu was man ms monies were paid as a pusrnes: lmnsacuon and nm as a lavuur. srn 1daIxH.AcEaRypL¢K5q Page no am we a.n.r I-nhnrwm be used a van; me nr1g\nnHIy sun. dun-nun! wa mum perm	3,083	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-23NCvC-7-02/2023	PLAINTIF 1. ) YAP TEAK SING 2. ) SHAIFUL HIZAM BIN HUSIN 3. ) IOANNIS KOROMILAS DEFENDAN 1. ) HIEW FOOK SANG @ FOOK HIEW SANG 2. ) WONG CHONG CHE 3. ) SIEH KOK JIUN	Statements in the Notice[On the question of whether the statements in the Notice refers to the Plaintiffs in their individual capacity or as the previous PPSS (previous management committee), this Court finds that the statements in the Notice refers to the previous PPSS as it was pertaining to the transanctions and conduct of the previous PPSS. Reference is made to the case of Govindaraji Rajaram v Wong Chew Fatt [2017] 4 MLJ 397 where the Appeal Court held- “[3] Can it be said that the defamatory statements found in the impugned statement refer to the Plaintiffs in their individual capacity or the sting against the Joint Management Committee (JMC). The JMC is a creature of statute having the legal capacity to sue and be sued and so the only body that can be defamed is the JMC and not the individual members of the same.”.In Govindaraji Rajaram (supra) the issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the impugned letter, refers to the management corporation (the Joint Management Commitee (JMC), in that case), or to the individual members of the JMC. Further, Govindaraji Rajaram (supra) held-“In this case, the Plaintiffs' attack on defamation is based on an impugned letter relating to their exercise of the statutory duties and not an attack against the Plaintiffs in their personal capacity. In our view therefore, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain a claim for defamation.”.It is obvious that the statements in the Notice referred to the transactions and conduct of the previous PPSS. Therefore, based on Govindaraji Rajaram (supra) it should have been the previous PPSS to file for this suit and not the Plaintiffs.In regards to the claim against D1, this Court finds that the Notice was issued by PPSS and D1 signed the Notice in his capacity as the Chairman of PPSS. There was also no reference to the names of the Plaintiffs in the Notice.Based on this, this Court finds that the claim is vexatious and an abuse of the process of court.CONCLUSIONTherefore, enclosure 18 is allowed with cost.	01/12/2023	YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ca235444-c13c-428c-87ed-4b8457895ed0&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO. : WA-23NCVC-7-02/2023 BETWEEN 1. YAP TEAK SING (NO. K/P : 660511-10-7007) 2. SHAIFUL HIZAM BIN HUSIN (NO. K/P : 680110-11-5979) 3. IOANNIS KOROMILAS (NO. PASPORT GREEK AT 1911893) ... PLAINTIFFS AND 1. HIEW FOOK SANG @ FOOK HIEW SANG (NO. K/P : 570209-05-5059) 2. WONG CHONG CHE (NO. K/P : 540227-08-5545) 3. SIEH KOK JIUN (NO. K/P : 470705-10-5555) … DEFENDANTS 01/12/2023 08:42:43 WA-23NCvC-7-02/2023 Kand. 45 S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (ENCLOSURE 18) INTRODUCTION [1] The First Defendant (D1) in this case filed an application to strike out the Plaintiffs’ claim against him under Order 18 Rule 19 (1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court (ROC) 2012 (Enclosure 18). [2] This Court allowed Enclosure 18 for the reasons set out in this judgment. BRIEF FACTS [3] The Plaintiffs were previous members of the Suria Stonor Management Committee known as Perbadanan Pengurusan Suria Stonor (PPSS) of Suria Stonor Condominium (Condominium) for the year 2019/2020 and 2020/2021. [4] The Defendants were committee members of PPSS elected on 17-12- 2022 in which D1 was elected as the Chairman of PPSS. S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [5] The Plaintiffs’ claims revolve on a notice published by PPSS on 20-1- 2023 ‘to address the issues and provide clarity’ pertaining to a petition that has been circulated to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting which was issued to all the proprietors of the Condominium (Notice). [6] At paragraph 15 of the Statement of Claim (SOC), the Plaintiffs pleaded that in the Notice, D1 ‘has stated the list of offences and non compliance committed by the Plaintiffs’ - “...List of Wrongdoings and non-compliant actions that are under further investigation including but not limited:- a. Great expense of engaging a forensic consultant to produce a rather bias report based on the information provided by “a few individuals” with no justifiable reasons and benefits to Suria Stonor, an act of abuse of power. b. Giving go-head on a great expenditure exceeding RM100,000.00 without the proprietors’ approval at AGM/EGM. c. Contravene Suria Stonor by-law for commencing legal action against proprietors without exhausting all avenues for remedial action and negotiation.” [7] Further at paragraph 16 of the SOC, the Plaintiffs pleaded that the Second Defendant (D2) and the Third Defendant (D3) had given D1 ‘false information and incited and/or caused the issuance and/or publication of the Notice to defame the Plaintiffs.’. The details were as pleaded in the SOC. S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [8] Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ claims against the Defendants, jointly and severably for the following reliefs: (1) general damages of RM27million; (2) aggravated and exemplary damages; and (3) injunction to restrain the Defendants from defaming the Plaintiffs. [9] The Plaintiffs then amended the Writ and SOC in regards to the special damages of RM27million without leave of the Court. The Defendants, on the other hand, contended that the amendment was defective as leave of Court was not obtained. [10] The amendments in the Writ and SOC (in red) were- “(a) Gantirugi Am Khas sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Dua Puluh Tujuh Juta (RM27,000,000.00); (b) Gantirugi Am dan/atau Teruk dan/atau Gantirugi Teladan;”. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CONTENTION [11] The Plaintiffs pleaded that certain statements in the Notice were defamatory. S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [12] The Plaintiffs contented that the Writ of Summons and SOC were amended pursuant to the Court's direction given during the Case Management on 15-2-2023 where the Senior Assistant Registrar directed the Plaintiffs to file the amendments under Order 20 Rule 1 and Rule 3 of ROC as follows:- “Ambil maklum. Plaintif untuk failkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan Terpinda untuk jelaskan berkenaan gantirugi tersebut. Boleh teruskan pindaan di bawah Aturan 20 Kaedah 1 dan Kaedah 3.” THE FIRST DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION [13] D1 contended that he did not make the Notice in his personal capacity. The Notice was published by PPSS and he signed it in his capacity as Chairman of PPSS. It was not directed to any specific persons nor on the Plaintiffs in their personal capacity. There was no reference to the Plaintiffs as the Notice refers strictly to transactions and not to specific persons and that the Notice was directed to a Management Committee Meeting on 22 October 2021. [14] It was further contended that the amended Writ of Summons and amended SOC were made without leave of the Court and contains reliefs that S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal are not supported by the Pleadings. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Amendment of the Writ and SOC without leave of the Court [15] Order 20 Rule 1(1) of ROC provides- “(1) Subject to paragraph (3), the plaintiff may, without the leave of the court, amend the writ once at any time before the pleadings in the action begun by the writ are deemed to be closed.”. and Order 20 Rule 1(3) of ROC provides- “(3) This rule shall not apply in relation to an amendment which consists of: (a) the addition, omission or substitution of a party to the action or an alteration of the capacity in which a party to the action sues or is sued; (b) the addition or substitution of a new cause of action; or (c) without prejudice to rule 3(1), an amendment of the statement of claim, if any, endorsed on the writ, unless the amendment is made before the service of the writ on any party to the action.”. [16] It is apparent that Order 20 Rule 1 of ROC allows a Plaintiff to amend the Writ without leave of the Court. However, the amendment is subject to S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Order 20 Rule 1(3) ROC. In this regard, O 20 Rule 1(3) of ROC is mandatory as the amendment without leave shall not apply in relation to an amendment which consists of amendment in the SOC endorsed on the Writ unless the amendment is made before service of the writ on the other party. This is the factual situation in this matter. This Court finds that the Writ and SOC were amended without compliance of Order 20 Rule 1(3) and thus is irregular. [17] Further, in the amended SOC, the Plaintiffs claim for special damages of RM27million is not specifically pleaded and particularised. [18] In the case of Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1983] 1 MLRA 154; [1983] 2 MLJ 324; [1983] CL (Rep) 300 the Federal Court held- "It is a well-established principle that special damages in contrast to general damages, have to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. They are recoverable only where they can be included in the proper measure of damages and are not too remote (see Halsbury's Laws of England 4th edition, volume 11 p 218 para 386). That in our view is the cardinal principle adopted by all courts both in England and this country. The same principle was adopted by Ong Hock Thye, F.J. (as he then was) in Yee Hup Transport & Co and Anor v. Wong Kong [1967] 1 MLRA 247; [1967] 2 MLJ 93 which was an appeal on quantum of damages. Quoting an excerpt from the judgment of Wilmer L.J. in Ilkiw v. Samuels [1963] 1 WLR 991; [1963] 2 All ER 879 he held that the general damages should not be awarded as though they were special damages properly pleaded and S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal proved. Similarly Chang Min Tat, F.J.(as he then was) in Murtadza bin Mohamed Hassan v. Chong Swee Pian [1979] 1 MLRA 307; [1980] 1 MLJ 216 applied the principle in Ilkiw v. Samuels (supra) that special damages if pleaded as in that case could be recovered. The principle was also adopted by Mohamed Azmi, J. (as he then was) in Sam Wun Hoong v. Kader Ibramshah [1980] 1 MLRA 712; [1981] 1 MLJ 295 in the Federal Court." [19] Also in the case of Lee Tai Kau & Anor v. Rajanderan Manickam & Anor [1995] 3 MLRH 64; [1995] 4 MLJ 163; [1995] 4 CLJ 521, it was held- "Special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved and it was not enough for the plaintiff to simply write down the particulars and throw it to the court to decide. The exact loss must be pleaded as it had become clear that it could be measured with certainty and with complete accuracy. In this way, the defendants would not be put off guard and they would know what they had to meet when the case came up for trial." [20] As the Amended Writ and SOC were irregular, the original Writ and SOC stand. However, this Court finds that the claim of RM27million as general damages is a non-compliance to Order 18 Rule 12 (1A) of ROC which provides that “No party shall quantify any claim or counterclaim for general damages”. [21] This Court finds that the Senior Assistant Registrar's directions is not a directive but rather to inform the Plaintiffs that in order to comply with Order S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Rule 12 (1A) of ROC, the Writ has to be amended as it is a non-compliance of the ROC. Based on the Case Management on 15-2-2023 it was minuted by the Senior Assistant Registrar that the Plaintiffs to amend the Writ and SOC under Order 20 Rule 1(1) and (3) of the ROC. Statements in the Notice [22] On the question of whether the statements in the Notice refers to the Plaintiffs in their individual capacity or as the previous PPSS (previous management committee), this Court finds that the statements in the Notice refers to the previous PPSS as it was pertaining to the transanctions and conduct of the previous PPSS. [23] Reference is made to the case of Govindaraji Rajaram v Wong Chew Fatt [2017] 4 MLJ 397 where the Appeal Court held- “[3] Can it be said that the defamatory statements found in the impugned statement refer to the Plaintiffs in their individual capacity or the sting against the Joint Management Committee (JMC). The JMC is a creature of statute having the legal capacity to sue and be sued and so the only body that can be defamed is the JMC and not the individual members of the same.”. [24] In Govindaraji Rajaram (supra) the issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the impugned letter, refers to the management corporation (the S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Joint Management Commitee (JMC), in that case), or to the individual members of the JMC. [25] Further, Govindaraji Rajaram (supra) held- “In this case, the Plaintiffs' attack on defamation is based on an impugned letter relating to their exercise of the statutory duties and not an attack against the Plaintiffs in their personal capacity. In our view therefore, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain a claim for defamation.”. [26] It is obvious that the statements in the Notice referred to the transactions and conduct of the previous PPSS. Therefore, based on Govindaraji Rajaram (supra) it should have been the previous PPSS to file for this suit and not the Plaintiffs. [27] In regards to the claim against D1, this Court finds that the Notice was issued by PPSS and D1 signed the Notice in his capacity as the Chairman of PPSS. There was also no reference to the names of the Plaintiffs in the Notice. [28] Based on this, this Court finds that the claim is vexatious and an abuse of the process of court. S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal CONCLUSION [29] Therefore, enclosure 18 is allowed with cost. (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER NCVC 1 KUALA LUMPUR HIGH COURT Dated: 30 November 2023 S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal COUNSELS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS Messrs. Nandrajog 3-9-9, Tower 3, UOA Business Park. No. 1, Jalan Pengaturcara U1/51A, Section U1, 40150 Shah Alam,Selangor. FOR THE DEFENDANTS Messrs. SK Chong Level 23, NU Tower 2, KL Sentral, Jalan Tun Sambanthan, 50470 Kuala Lumpur. S/N RFQjyjzBjEKH7UuEV4le0A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	13,431	Tika 2.6.0
02(f)-39-05/2022(A)	PERAYU MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA RESPONDEN 1. ) Syed Ahmad Imdadz Bin Said Abas 2. ) IMEJ MUHIBAH SDN. BHD.	(i) Whether an advocate and solicitor needs to be given the opportunity to be heard under Section 103D (4) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (LPA) when the Disciplinary Board (DB) has already reduced his penalty or punishment; and(ii) Whether the word “adverse” under Section 103D (4) of the LPA should be read in the context of “greater or lesser” under Section 103D (2) of the LPA.	01/12/2023	YA Dato' Sri Hasnah binti Dato' Mohammed HashimKorumYAA Tan Sri Abdul Rahman bin SebliYA Dato' Zabariah Binti Mohd YusofYA Dato' Sri Hasnah binti Dato' Mohammed Hashim	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=32047c38-714c-4a77-8c50-1472ffef5f0f&Inline=true	01/12/2023 11:28:18 02(f)-39-05/2022(A) Kand. 35 S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OHwEMkxxd0qMUBRy/9fDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal n2(£)—39—o5/2022 (A) Kand. 35 a,/I2/mu ,1v2§ 124 DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTIJAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAVA (BIDANGKUASA RAVUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL N 01 sun: A ANTARA MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA PERAVU DAN 1. svED AHMAD IMDADz E. SAID ABAS 2. IMEJ MUHIBAH sun. EHD. RESPCINDEN-RESPONDEN DaIam Ferkara Rsyuan Sw Nu Ayn no/2u21) DALAM MAHKAMAH RAVUAN MALAVSIA DI PUTRAJAVA ANTARA MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA . PERAYU AND 1 SVED AHMAD IMDADZ B SAID ABAS 2 IMEJ MUHIBAH sow BHD RESF’ONDEN—RESF’ONDEN I I » . 5 r sw unwimxxxanumuaﬁymrmu mm Sum IHIWDIY WW be HSQG M mm u. mwmu-y mm; mm. VII .;Im WMI mpumsxan oxen Mahkamah Rayuan pads 04 04 2u22 1Dalam perkara USU‘ Pemula No A/\—17A—1—O8/2019 dl Mahkamah Tmggi Malaya an Vpuh) Dalim Perkara Mengenai Aduan met! me; Muhlbah Sdn and Na Arman DC/16/G781 dv hadapan Lembaga Talalemb Peguamreguam terhadap Syed Ahmad lmdadz (2. Abs: Sam. Dan Da\am Perkara mengenaw nomkasu berlankh 01 7 2019 berkenaan Penman berlarikh 2162019 oleh Lembaga Talatemb Peguam-Fegusm dx bawah Seksyen 103D ma Profesyen Undang— Um1ang1976 Dan Dalam Perkava mengenal rayuan Perayu m bawah Seksyen was Akla Frolasyen Undang-Undang 1976 Dan Dalam Perkava mengenal Aluran 55 Kaedah-Kaeﬂah Mahkamah 2012 I 1 v a a . IN L:MwEMxxxanuMuaﬁym\7w -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm lb) - nollce lnvillns; the aauocale and solrcnor eoneemed. wrlmn such period belng not less man leuneen days as ma; be specmau In me name - (i) so give In one Disciplinary Commlltee any wrmen explanallon he may wlsh lo oller wnierr may be aeamanal in any pmvluus wrmen axplanalren he may have pralcarea under eacnan «an: and (H) In advlse me Disciphnary Committee a he wrsnes to be heard by me Dlscipllnary Camrnmee (5) The Drsclplrnary commmee shall allow thetlme spsclﬁed rn lne nanea to elapse and give we advocate and sollcnor oancsmed reaanrlabla upponunny to be heard ll he so desires and shall glve due censlaarallan to any explananan he may make [15] Upon eemplellng me lnqulry me DC shall aetarrnlna and make recommerldaliorlslo the DB as requnea under secilon mac nHhe LPA whlelr reads as lallows: (1) Upon conclusion of me rnqulry, a Drserplrnary cornmmee shall record ll; nndrngs m nelallon to ma lama anha case Ind 11 I w r a s W emmraaanamuaayrmnw «ma Smnl ...n.ran be used m mm a. nﬂnlnnllly MIN: dun-mm wa nFluNG v-mxl aeeurdirig to inose rains shall delermlne arid make any one or iris renewing reearririrendeuaris tn ine Disciplinary Eaard (ii) that no Cause lor disciplinary amen exists and that the eppiieaiion or corririieirii be dismissedi (:2) mai cause for aieeiprinery action exieie but 15 not at Sumcieﬂl gravity IO warrant any punishment n\|her than a reprimand or censure ur criei me eireurnsiarices are such me: me advoclle erid saiieicer srieuid only be reprimanded ar censured‘ or (e) inei cause «or disciplinary mien exisis iirid is at surﬁcieni gvavily ti: warrant me advucals and soiiciiorio be subiem lo one or more of via renewing penames ur punishments: ii) reprimand or censure. (ii) iriiposniari of a nrie not exceeding my inuusand ringgiz, (IH) sueperisien 91 me advocate and iioiiciior from practice, or in me case 0! a mreign lawyer, recommendation to me Ear councii for suspension M legistraticn, ier eueri period not exceeding live years as me Disciplinary cornrninee deeins EPDIDDIHIIE in me Clrcumslanoesr or ulvage (Iv) smkmg me advocate and sorrcrcor on one Ron or In me case or a «orergn rawyer. recommendzmon (0 me Bar Council «or revacauon onne ragrstr-amn of me Ioreign lawyer, (2) The Drsorprmary commmee may In apnronrraxe cases in addnion in Rs reeommendahun of an sppruprlals penalty or pdnisnrnem recommend that me maorplrnary Board make an order or reemdaon by me advocate and soriomor M me wmp\ainanI’s monies if :1 rs eslabhshed ma: sucn monies were or are neld by the advocate and sorroreor m me prufesslonal capaeny and me oemprarnanc rs enmled to me return n1 sdcn monres or parl meredv [1 7} Upon recer rlsl me reporr onne mquxry conducted bylhs no me DE will then delrberale and consmel the repun am!‘ make Ihe necessary urder as n deems m. sdosecrron man (1) 0! me LPA states that aner eonsrderrng me no repon, me us must me: make an order to amrm or rereot me ﬁndmg or reeommenoauon onne Dc, and In me eventlhe DE so rejects ercner cne ﬁndmg or recommendation, me as snan reeord the reason tor the said rereenon H DE deardes lo amrrn both nndmgs and reoomrnendacrons, the responsroilmes ov the DE ceases a\| «nan juncture [Ia] secaron man onhe LPA reads as follows ii I v a a . rn uMwEMxxxandMuaﬁymDw -nae s.n.r nnuhnrwm be da... m mm a. aﬂmrraﬂly mm: dun-mm wa .rrunc wrm (1)Af1sv cnnsruemrrrrrr ai me report M the Drmpnnary Commmee me Dxsmphnary Board may make an order ammung ar rqecimg the ﬁndmg or vecommendzmon of the Dlsclplmary Cummmee and r the nrsuplmsry Eaard rejects meﬂnding or recummerrdarrarr aims Discipﬁnary Commmee‘ (he nrsupnrrary Beard shau record the reason lar the rqectuon 12)The Dlscinﬁnary Board may m appreprrare cases Impose a greater or lesser penaky or punishment than that rawmmended by me nrscrplrrrary cummmee (3; Where «he nrscrpwrary Board does run agree wnh \|he crrrarrrg or recomrrrarraarron omre urscrpurnary camrrmae. (he urscrpxrrrary Board ska}! make such other order as m deems Just 14) Bslurathe Dlsciphnary Board maxes an urder that rs likely lo be aaverse agamsl an advocate and soncnur under subsection (2) or (3), rr shall rmmy ms advocale and smrcrmr of us rruermon in da so and give him a reasarrame opponumry to be heard (5) Where the Drs4:rp4mary aosm makes an order mat the sdvocale and sohcnor should make resmuuun to the uomD\amanI, M may supume the lime within which such resmuuon uugm co be made. 14 1 v a 3 . IN uMwEMxxxanaMuaﬁyrmmu -um Snr1n\n-nhnrwmbe used m mm r.. mtmmuly mm: dun-mm VI] .nuNG Wm! (S)A sum urdered by me Dlsmpllnary Eoard under subsecuon (5)11: be resumed may be recuverable by1ne ocmmamam as a cm! depn. Our necmon [19] Tne Apue<1an1 subrmlled that mere aubeavs to be mu amerenc approaches 17: me inleqarelanan or aecmn man (4) LPA 1n Jaswindar Klur Gurbacahn sinpn y momar Singh Lal sinpn; ulajlia Peguanr Malaysia (lnlervener) [21317] 1 LNS me High cam look me mew that mere re no neea var me DB 11: gwe any name aa1ne DB ma nm nnppee any order mac Is lukely to he amerea aga.ne1 me advocate and suhcllor wmcn rs grea1er man man recommended by me on. In Jaswmdar (sums) 1ne DB conﬁrrnad me DC‘: reeammandaupn to acrike Jaswmder oﬂ 1ne Rene o1 Advocate and Snhmtors m] In nmnan Sinnh Khllra v. Zulkelll Hnhlm; Mama Paguam Malaysiu (\|lIIerv2ner)[2D1B] 1 ms 1934 [2015] MLJU 2191 me 1-ugh Conn look a dwierenl appreaen wnere 11 was held lhatwhere me DB aoee not agree wnn me ﬁnding or me DC arm seeks to Impose a greater or Vesser Denaky men, me DB1: reqmred to naufy zne advocate and solicnor concerned. we was 1a1er amrmea py 1ne Court afAppea\| through me ludgmenl pmzrzan Nawawr. JCA .5 1 M K. rn Lwwimxxxanumuaﬁymrmu -nae s.n.1 In-uhnv M“ be .15.. m mm a. nvVﬂ\ruH\|Y mm; dun-mm VI] .mm mm [321 Under subsecnan 103D(4),me oa re required In numy “we advocate and eanercar of res mrencron tn make an order Iha\| rs uxeryro be adverse agams! mm undersubsect\on103D(2)or13) aaa give mm a reasonable Dpponumty ra be rreem Subsecmns 1D3D(Z)& (3) rs appneama where are me does not agree war. the ﬁndmgs ur recummendalmns of me DC and seeks! ' pose a greater nr lesser penalty or punishment than (V131 recommended by the DC. Therelore, me requremenr of gmag a reasonable opnonumry to be neara m the appeuam before me as makes a decision re when the [)5 does not agree wam me ﬁndmgs and recommendalvons cl me DC [21] It was lunher argued by wearnea caunse\ (or me AppeHanIlI1a( (ha DB is onxy reqmred lo amm Syed a reasnname opporlumly to be heard when me DE enhanca me penaxry or pumshmsnt recommended by the DC The DC had recommended a pumshmem M suspensrorr 0! two years wmcn was nan amnnea by the us but Instead rmposea a ﬁne 0! man mm which Is nbvmusly a lesser purusnmem orpenaky The ma was 01 the mew that me DC's recommended pumshment of me Iwu-year auepensran was con harsh and Qhal a ﬁne oi RMJQOW would be just and approprlale [211 Learned counsel «or me Appeuam posited that Syed as an advocate and sanoaor is omy entitled to a reasonable upponunny m be 15 I r- A g . IN uMwEMxxxanuMuaﬁymDw we a.a.r n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nrW\ruH\|:I mm: dun-mm Va .nuae Wm neard rt me DE nad me\|ed em a pumshmenl that rs greater man that vecnmmended by me DC and not other-Mse It was subrnined me: me ngm at me dpponunny rd be neard rs dependent updn me punishment recommended by me DC and the ngm to be neard will amy anse re the DB mtends to enhance the nurnshmenx than mar recommended by the DC Funhevmorer (here is nd sxamcery redurremanuenne DB ed gwelhe Appeuanc an dppormnny to be heard to mmgate on me sentence [231 Mar stating me reason «or me rejactiun on record‘ «he DE is required by nmre of sdbseardn man (3) LPAIO make any dcner order dn (he nndrng or recdrnrnendanon or both, wmch rs deemed just and it necessary vary the Dc's reearnmendanen by rnrposrng ellher a grealer or Vessel lmm or penarty or pumshmenl Pndr to any order made under subsecnon 103012) or (3). the DB srran ndury me intention to make an order that us hke\y ID be adverse against me eeneerned advdcare and sullutor and give mm a reasonable Uppununﬂy to be neard as s1am\|un\y required under subsecuon 1o3D14)onrre LPA. [241 The Appeuam argued nnaune mandatory reqwemsnl rerrne ma to rlmlfy me advocate and salrcrmr of rls mtenlran and tn award mm/her a reasonable apnonunuy to be heard onw aliilhgs :1 me punlshmem rs likely to be an adverse order. wrrn reaped‘ we do no: agree [251 The term “adveIse" as raund m semen 1030 LPA revere rd e decrsren, punrsnrnern or penexry mar enecre rne advacale and sdndrrar m e negarrve way The Cambndge Advanced Learners nrcrrunary er Thesaurus© Cambndge unrversrrv Press derrrree ‘advevsa‘ as havmg a negative or rrarrnnrl ewecr wrrernera aunrennrenr rs hkely to be adverse or emerwrse re very euarecrrve A mmor pumshmem of a one-day suspension dr a nomIna\ nne can be donsrdered as berng adverse Any lorm ol punrsnrnenr wiH neve en rmpacr an me repmerion M an advocaxe and eencrrar and harm ms credlbmly and srandrng Hence, even me DB deardesra rrnpese vvnar re may deem \|0 he a hgmev penerrv dr pdnisnrnern Kha\| rs Vess harsh than that recdrnrnended Dy me DC, me decrsran M our view, qualiﬁes as bemg adverse, mggenng me neoesslly lcr a reasonable apporlumly rd be heard my Section rear) (4; at me LFA rs \|he ﬁnal rrer lor the alfecled advocate and sohcrrorzo defend rrrrnseriar rrersen bedars me «new order rs rrnadsed upon mm by rrre DB. wrne DB earrgrrr In Impose a punishment dr penany drwerenr (mm the recornrnendauon M me DC, whether adverse xo syed or not, men rr errauld have named mm at we rnremran rd do so and grven mm a reasdname oppartumty to be heard rrrespemve oi wtremer n is cl a greerer or Vesser penaky or punishment or mar re \\|ke\y \|u be u I r ,1 r e rn L:MwEMxxxdndMuaﬁy!mDw -nae s.n.r n-nhnrwm re used m mm ms nrW\ruH\|:I mm: dun-mm wa anum wrm adverse On me issue ai ‘lesser or graaler‘ piinishrrieni‘ «he learned High courr Judge amoulalsd In his grduridii of iiidgrrieni ihai ii is dimculc lo conclude as to which is a greater or lesser piiriishriieriz The High Cmlfl ruled which we agreed ihai beioie ihe DE iriiends id impose any piiriishrherii, ll dughi ID have giuari ihe advaeaie and smlcllnr Concerned‘ in this case‘ syed, a reasdriahle appdniiniry id be heard The learned Jiidgeiri paragvaph 57 av his iiidgrrierii rriade leielencsta criminal law and ruled ihaiihe smears and saliciidr dughi id be given an Oppommlly id be heard ar in iriiligaie before any puriishriieni ls meted out (iii) In Ma//is Peguam y. cacil Wl/bsn Mohanarsj Ahrariarn [2019] 5 cm 129, a earriplaini agarrisi cedil Abraham, an advocate and sullclmr, Var pmfessrunzl mIsuunduc\| was lndged by me Her council dl Malaysia Balasublamanlam all Perumal ("aala") who was a prdsecuiion vniriess iri ihe riiurder irial M Aliariluya Shaanbu had‘ on 1 July zonal signed a slaiiulary declarallun ("sow where he had irileralra implicaled Daluk seri Nayil; Tun Razak in a relalidnshrp wnh Allaniuya hiii on 4 July zoos Bala signed ariarher srariiiory daclarairan diasuswing his entire cnrilenis or his earlier so alleging II was signed urider duress However, aala in a ihree-pan video alleged he signed the laierso In relracr his earlier sn under duress. The edrnplaini oi prolessidnsl riiiseariduin against Tan Sri Cecil Abraham was to call upon me us to inveshgale whelher he was «he advocaie arid snllcnor wha was responsible ldr or iriuoluad in draliing ihe laiar so It was lound «her his euideriee was rim sumaenr lo zllvzte IN DMwEMkxxdﬂ~:MUEﬁyMDu -use Sunni In-vlhnrwm re used m mm ms nﬂnlhnﬂly MIME dun-vlnrrl wa nFluNG WM! make aui a case ior disciphnary aclian against Tan sri Cecil Abraham and (he Federal Court hem that (2) The siandard of proor in discrpiinary matters beiure me so (sin) is one in beyond reasnnable doubt siniiiar tdinat at a criminal proceeding. Trie respondent, iixe an accused in a criminal triai, was iuiiy eninled to call updn ms arrneury :4 defense available in law to protect nirriseii against ttie aiiegatidns made iernpnasis Idded) (N) If an accused iacinp a criniinai charge is round guilty‘ tie is erititiea In piead in mitigation and in true regard‘ save rdraiienaes itiai carry a rriandaidry punisnrrieni Ilke idr eg, capitaii punlshrrlenl, all accused are aiiawed to mitigate, sae Zaidon Sharvllv PF [1 99614 cm 441 where Augustine Paul J new that A riirtigatian piea should nar‘ be [reared as a ntuaiisiic step to be summsn/y rejected tne rncrrierit it IS made it rs a constituent aiernent ortne sentencing process /I rnarrrs due consideration In iigrii aims racts areacti case, and mare so when II is iioccoriiradicted bylhe prosecution as in cnis case (emphasis added) iv) vvnererorei similar In tnat ciaii adcuaed in a cr-iniinai triai ine advncale and sdiiciidr augni id be given an opportunity In be heard or to mitigate beiore any punishment is rneied cm drice me DB accepts trie ririeing ol iiaaiiity by ttie DC (vii in keeping witri criminal law, ii itiere is any amaiguny in me eonstructian ml s I03D(4) ei tria LPA, any arnaiguny niust be resolved in favour aﬂhs advocate and snlicitnr and this will mean ml a a r . in uMwEMxxxanaMuaﬁyimDu -nae s.n.i In-vihnrvrm re used a mm he aniii.iiry MIME dnunvilnl ta nFiuNG Wm! ANTARA SVED AHMAD IMDADZ B SAID ABAS PERAVU DAN MAJLVS FEGUAM MALAVSIA RESPONDEN DAN IMEJ MUHIBAH SDN EHD . PENCELAH) CORAM ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI, CJSS ZABARIAH MOHD vusoF, FCJ HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM. F0.) [11 The appeal belona us eemres an the avnhcalinn niSect\on103D Of the Legal Profession AC1 1976 (LFA)‘ that us, whether an advocate and solicitor shauld be gwen me oppummny to be heard before me Discwphnaly Board (DB) makes an order that Is Ilkely to be adverse against mm me DB menus in Impose a gremer ur lesser penalty av punlshmenl than that recommended by the Dwsmphnary cammmae (DC) 2 I n .1 .¢ sw an Mxxxanqmuawymrmu um Sum ...m.. WW be .15.. m van; M m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! that the edvacaie aria saiicitiar must be given a reasunabie eppnrmnity to be heard In PP v Sa'ari ./usL7h (20071 2 cm 197 so at para [6], tne iaie Augustine Paul FCJ speaking ierttie Federal coun held tnat tiie coun of Appeai was rignt in saying that a pens! statute must be stricliy canstiued and‘ there Is a Mia 01 oonstrummn met when itiere is an ambiguﬂy or doub\| in the meaning ova word in a penai statute it must be resolvad in favour oi tne subjed (W) Further, witn respect, ii Panianiem ineant var sucti a rigni to he neard to be uniy avaiiabie il «tie DB were In inipuse a punisnnient greater than tnat recommended by the not it could have eaeiiy said an in s I(l3D(4) when it introduced the wards "or Vassar‘ by way of arnenuinent iosutas 1o3ni2) of the LPA which came IND eﬂecl an 3 June 2014 Pariianieni did not, [21] The court nlAppeal in orig Kah Keong V. Lembaga Tnlaterllb Peguzm-Peguam [20211] 10 cu 151 explained witn clamy tne intent oi seeiian 1030 (4) LPA [52] Pursuant to s 1030(4) oi ttie LPA 1976, n was Pariiainents intention ttiat an advacale and eeiieiiei be given the light to make a repreeenianen before the oieeipiinary Board sucti representation stiouid nave been taken inm account beioie ttie Dmcedure tor punishment is rinaiiaea, arm it is oniy at me and at tnie praeees tiiatine Diseipiinary Board must make a declslan witn respect \|u ine nature 010:: punishment to be Imposed 11 i D a a e in DMwEMxxxdﬂuMUEﬁy!WDu 'NnI2 a.ii.i In-vihnrwﬂi be used a mm i.. nﬂﬂiruﬂly MW: dun-vinril VI] nF1uNG WM! [251 It seems rather mcredmous (or me Makaysian Bar Councﬂ. an anmy advocating rusnee wrmoue tear or vavaur and a ecauncn pmponent cl ma pnnerpuee oi me rules at nalural ruscrce to deny Ils own members cne very basic cm nonemexess impennnx nghfolhearmg and due proeeaa That. Indeed would be a uavesxy of ruacree wruen shomd not be counlananosd [291 It is spprupriibe it «me Junolure In ramma ourselves a! me princrmes at natural rueuee as amculated by Rare Az\an snan FJ (as His Ma.es\y men was) in Kolua Pengaran Kumn v. Ho Kwan Sun; [1977] 2 MLJ 152: The principles of nature! wsllce Ihal nu man may be judge m rue own cause and that no man may be oandemnad unheard today may avery pmmlnantrme m sdnuruslrstwe law, pameuxany since we House of Lords rnvrgaratea them by a strong decrsran m Rwdge v. Baldwin [1954] AC 40 Tne second pnnclme rs me Me raqmring atarr heanng me is ofcemral rrnpenanee because u can be used In conslrue a wnme code at admwmslratwe pmoedural nghls, The pvinclme nas e ‘Lang mstory. one M the mwst rarnous cases rs Bem\ay’s case In 1723, m wmch n was new met me unwersrcy M Cambndge mum not depnve mat great but rebelhous schmav cl ms degrees wmram hearing ms excuses fov ms misconduct see R v Umverslfy 0! Cambridge U723», 1 Sir 557 In Cooper V Wandswanh Board 0\| Works [1863], 14 n u » ar. . rn ememmanemuaeyrmm -use s.n.r n-nhnrwm be used a mm ms mn.uu mm: dun-mm wa mum Wm CENS lan damages vvere awarded agalnsl a lpcal aumpnly wnlcn demolished a building erepled w-ll-our due nollﬁcallarx although lney aid only wnallhe slarule Said lnauney rnigln do in such umumstances The esaarloe al this and many other‘ such cases ls lhal drasllc statutory powers carvmt be intended tn be exercised unlalrly. and lliar lalrness demands al Ieasl the oppprlunlty ola nearing The wurrs clung lo lnis pnnelple as are power: pl governmenl expanded, and applied ll nequemly In many nelus such as housing law, compulsory purcnase at land and dlsmlssal (mm public olﬂoes In one case the Cum! 0' Appeal lies made ll clear lnal me npnl to a lair nearing applies generally in licensing cases and in panlclllarto an appllcallon lar a licence far a gaming club sse R v Gaining spam lar Great larilain, ex parle Eenalm and Khalda [law] 2 as M7. in lnaz case lne licensing aulnpriry had a legal duty anslng purely from lnlpllcatlon of law, to explain in ms appllcanls wnal oplecnpns lhey had m meet and la glVe lnem a lair apparlunlty to meet lhem Tne cas ee snpw lnac a lair nearing ls required as a “rule pl universal annllcallorl", "launued on me plairlest principles pl jusllcs -‘ in pameular, lne silence nf me statute alronls no argument lor excllldlng lne rule‘ lorlne "lustloe ollne common law will supply lne pmlsslpn pllneleplslalure “These quamlnns are derived lrarn me case al Cooper v wanclawenn Board ol wprlrs, supra, which lies several limes recenlly been approved by the House of Lords as exllresslng me principle in its lull wldln. see Ridge v. Baldwin. supra wlselnan v. Bornenian [1571] AC 257 23 I D a r e in L:MwEM>urxanaMuaRyll1lmu we s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll be used m mm ms nﬂnlnallly MVMS dun-vlnnl VI] nFluNG wnxl In my aplnrdn. tna rule cf natural luslloe that no men may be candanmed unheard anoulcl apply to every case were an rndryrdual rs adversely aﬂscled by an admlnlslrallve acllon, no matter wnetner lt ls labelled ‘]udlc‘lal', 'quIsi-Judicial‘, or 'adrninistratlve‘ er whether or not the enabllng sfaxula nrakaa pmvlslon ldr a naanng Em tne heanng may take many ldnna and slrlct lnslstence upon an lnexorable rlgnl to me lradlllonal coumwm procedure can lead te a vlnual adrnlnlstratlue breslkduwrl Tnat ls because a tunnel naarrng ls loo slow, (on tecnnlaal and too costly Ldrd Shaw; caveal on admlnlstratlxle adludlcatlorl tnat ']udlcla\ rnetndds may be enllrely unsullatzle and produce delays. expenses‘ and public and prlvate iruury‘ is too well-known to be slde-slapped see Local Govsmmsnr Board v AI1rl1gs[\|915] AC lzu. taa ln tne last analyare, rt depends on lne sdtareannratter The great need ls to deal emerently and larrly, ralner man ta preserve all the aaaautrernenta ol the adurtreonr, lhe conslderallans 94 basic talrneas are pararneunl no] Havlng carelully cansidered the submlsslans 0! all pames we agreed wnn tne dearsldna ol tne Hlgh court and tne cdun o(Appsal For me ldreaolng reasons, cluestidn 1 Is answered In tne amrrnati-re ln that an advocate and sullcllar should be given tne opporllmlly to be heard under sectlan1B3D(4)aHhe LPA deldre as makes an order wnelnar to lrnpdse a greater ar leaser penalty or punrsnrnent tnan wnet ls recommended by me DC oueetmn 2 ls also answered ln tne amrmatwa rn tnat ll \|he DE 2: I n 1 a . IN DMwEMkxxdﬂuMUEﬁyMDu -nae s.n.l In-vlhnrwﬂl be used a yaw has nﬂmnallly MIN: dun-mm vta mane wnxl Inlends to wmpose any punishment wt must gwe lhe advocate and solncnor a reasoname opnommily to be heard Irvespeclive w It \s ukely to be adverse or amemse hefnrs >mpe5\|ng a grealer or a lesser pumsnmem Conclusion [:1] Based on me aforementioned remm. and m the light ai ms above semen pnnmmes we lmmd no menls m lhe lssues raised by me Appeuam and unammously msrmssea the appeaw wi\|h no order as to cosls The demslnns uf me Hugh Cam‘! and the Court ai Appea\ are amrmea [H NAH MOHAMMED NASHIM] Judge Federal caun o1 Malaysxa Pmraiava Date 5 November2U23 2s I n a s . IN L:MwEMxxxanuMuaﬁym\7w -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm Counscl var Avncllunv. Robin um Fang Say Tetusn Chan & Associates Nu 1‘1"F\|cor mm Tun Sambanlhan aoooo lpoh Perak Darul Rldzuan Counnl lortllo Runoudwnl 1 Ahmad Yani bin Ammuddm Mwor Muhammad Fadllh Tetuan NLIVU‘ Fadhh Kn Partners No 9. Jalan Meru sum. 4 Tamar: Mam Suns 30020 lpoh Perak Dam! Rldzuan Counsel tonne Reapomiem 2 Ranjan N Chandran Vwmlha Laksmy Teman Hakem Arabl & Assacxales Menara Mulxara Eangsar Suite No 545-2 15'“ Flow!‘ Jalan Rlong 0f1Ja\an Law, Eangsav 59100 Kum Lumpur xi \ n 4 x ! IN L:MwEMxxxanuMuaﬁymm -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm [2] The ques1Ions or law for our deterrn-nation are as vduuws (I) whetner the Frrst Respondent (Syed) needs to be grven the cppommnly to be neard under sectton man (4; M the LPA when me me has already reduced nrs penany or pumshment. and (H) wnetnertne word ‘adverse’ under Sechon man (4) dune LPA showd be read m the context ul ‘greater or Vessef under semen 1030 (2) onne LPA [3] On to A 2023 alter navmg neard and wnstdered me subrmssidns oi the respecuve counsel fur the games, we drsrnissed the appear we now gwe our reasons Flctnnl a-ekqround {4} The vans are not dteputed The factual background to tnrs dispute was set nut tn the tudges dear and cornprenensrve tudgmem. The 2" Respondent, a developer, oornptarned to tne us that Syed, an advocate and sdtrcrtarpraetrerng as a sore propnelor rn me arm or Messrs syed Anuar a. Associates rn upon. Persk, nad acted in a ednmet oi rntereet somenme In August 20(2‘ me 2-“ Respondent was engaged In a rdrnt venture agreement (JV/\)w\|\|h PrntarAs-arrras sdn and (me Landowner) The 2"“ Respondent and Landowner agreed to devemp La! 40451‘ Muxnn : r w 3 2 K’ rn L:MwEMxxxdnuMuaﬁy!mmu -roe s.n.r n-nhnrwm be n... m mm r.. mrmu-y mm: dun-mm wa nnutm Wm! Hutu Kmla, Daerah Ktnla. The 11 acres at land were alienated by the state Government o1 Perek to devetcp a housmg echeme wrth H5 terrace housing lots [51 Syed was appothled as the advncate and matter and wilnevssed the execution ol the JVA between the panta as well as the Fewer at AI1nrney1PA)gramad by the Landowner In the 2"‘ Respondent. By a letter dated 17 3 2014‘ the Landawrter unllaterstly termmaled the JVA This ferrntrtation was dtspuled by me 2"‘ Respondent clatmmg that It was able and wrutng tc perterrn the abltgaliorts to devetpp the htnd Is! The 2"‘ Respondent subsequently dtscovered that the Landowner whe had agreed under the terms at the NA nut to sen the land to any Hurd party had M tact entered Into e sate and purchase agreement 1SFA)dated 9 to 2013 to sell the land to Ken Han sun and Tms was in canlradtclton wtm the otzhgehen cf the Landowner under the terms 04 the JVA which pruhtbtted any sale, translen and conveyance enhe land when the JVA sun subsisxs The 5315 SPA was pvepaved by syedsrtrm and Syed hrrnsew had wttnessed the exectmen at the agreement. m Syed oenleo no neo acted for any party to he JVA and clelmea that he was not even prlvy to the terms at the AVA Hle role eccomlnp lo hlm was merely to wltness and alias! to me execullon olthe JVA and PA [I] Unhappy mm the r:l:lrlduc1 or syeo lne 2"’ Respondent lodged a dlsclpllnarv complolm mm the DC on 4 lo ms The 2"“ Reeponoent alleged that Syed had acted in a oontlict oi lrlleves1 and consumed to oelrallo the 2"“ Reeponoenl by pveparlrlg bath the JVA and SPA conoemlng the same place ol land wnen tne SPA was prepared‘ me we was ellll vello and subsisting [9] The DC oonollcteo an lnolllry on 21 2 2015 ee rsqulreo under me LPA. ln to report deteo 25 3.2019‘ tne DC louno Syed gllllty ol havlng eoteo WI 3 oonnlol ol lnterest in the olsollerge ol me prolseelonal olltles as an Advocate and Sullatcr and made a ﬁndlng on Vlablllty Syed had lndeed played a lnelor role tn the preperetlon ol the WA Therefore‘ any alman on the pan: Msyed ln me dlsposal ottne leno lnvolved e sbgnlﬁmm rlek ol oonlllot ol Irllevesl and any attempt to cover up the oonlllcl ttuns ll mu) mlscunducl on lne part ol Syed as me eolloltot The no Vlswsd that sacvlllclng Ihe lnleresz at one‘: ollenl lot se\|1—beneﬁ\| or lot me henefli or otners IS a oonouct moet unoellttlng ol en advocate and solicitor Tnlls, Syed owed a duly of care \D1he 2'" Respondent The DC VI lls report s I v a x . IN DMwEMxxxdﬂaMuaﬁylmDu -one s.n.l In-vlhnrwm be tn... m valw ms nrwlruﬂly MIN: dun-mm VI] .nune Wm! recommended la \|he DB that Syed be sumad lo secllnrl I0311)(l:)(IIl)o1 lhe LPA and be suspended lrom praclrce lpr a perlpd or 2 years. [10] In exerclse dune powers conferred under section man LPA, lhe DB amrrned me ﬁndlng or llaprllly but subsmuled the punierlrnem recommended by the DC and ordered that syed pay a ﬁne nl RM30,0GD no payable lo lhe Drsclpllne Fund wnnln erle (1) mmllh lrorn me dile onne order and In delaun, lne pmvlsmns pl sectlon loan and 1D3(1)aHhe LFA srrall apply [11] Unhappy wilrr me DB's deuslprl syed appealed agalrrsl lhe order or me DE \|o \|he Hrgn Conn The Hlgh court allowed me appeal malmalnlng me DC‘; ﬂndlng el llaplllly and ordered as lallows - re) The llne al RM30,UDO ou ls sel aslae, and (p) lrre mailer be remllted tr: me DB an me gruurlds mar syed pe glven a reasonable oppumrnny to he heard pelare an order mar is llxely re ba adverse agalnsr Syed is made by the DB. [12] Mgneved by the declslprl of the Hrgrr cdun ppm me Appellant and Syed appealed to me Calm pl Appeal rne Appeliam appealed agamst met pan at the aecrararr oﬂhe Hrgtr Caun ttrst urderad the ﬁns ta be set asrae and mat Syed be gwen the right to be heard Syed appealed sgsmst tne aecvsrorr otttre High Cum on the trrrdrrrg otlrabmty The court at Appeal affirmed the decrsmn 0! me man court and unammously arsmrssea me appeal wrth rm order es lo costs The court o1Appea\ was cf the View that even Wlhe ﬁne of RMSUDDU 00 may be legardad as a teaser punrsnment or penalty. n rs sun In urdermat Is adverse to syed A lesser pumshmantt does not mean rt rs not aaverse agarnet the aavocste Ind SOVICHOF cuncemed and therefore must be grven the nght to mtllgafe balnre the DB Lugislntive Framework [13] aetora addressing the vinous quesuons raised In me submissions rt rs necessary In cansmar the retevant statutory prnvrstens which are VI issue in true appeal before us [141 Seclion 94(2) of the LPA provides '(2)AHy advocate and solicitorwtro has been gunty of any misconduct shav be Mable ta one 0! more of he lultawlng nerrsmes or vunrsrrments (at to be smtck aﬂlhe Ran; (b) in besuspended rrom precnoe roreriy period not exoeeuing iive years. (oi to be ordered io pay a iine not exoeeping tiny thousand rmggil; or ((1) ie be reprimanded or oensured” [15] When (here are oompiainis againei an auypoaie and soliciluvthe DC WIII caridum en Inquiry as plavided under seclian was mine LPA in Trie Discipiinary corriminee shalli wiiriin one monm oi its appolnlmarlii eairimenee its inquiry into me wnllen appiieeiion or complaml and sneii make [(3 iinuings expediueusly (1A) Trie Disciplinary Committee sriaii keep a nine oi me pmceedings oi ihe inquiry and eimniii the ﬁnainga and me iioies or me pmceedlngs in me Dlsclplmaly Euard (2) For the Duvposes oi any inquiry under subsection (1) me Discipiinery commmee may» (a) require me propucriori ior inspmman by me Disciplinary cemniinee e1 any bank, doeuniern or paper which may relate In or be eenneciea wmi me subject nieiier oi «vie inquiry and may requive any person io give iritprmaiion in reieiion to such book, oeeunieni or paper‘ 9 I v r r e in mMwEMxxxnﬂqMuaﬁyimDw “Nuns a.n.i nnvihnrwm .. used m yaw n. nrwirinﬂly MIME dun-mm n. nFiuNG WM! (b) requrre such person cnnoemed re grve an inlnrmallon m reranen to any such bank. documemcr paper which may be reasonably required by me msapurnary conrnnnea am (:2) requrra any peraen whom rt ennsrders necessary to appear were u to we oral eyraenea raraung to or cnnnecled wrm the subject rnaner or me mqmry. (3) Any- (a) advocala and solrcnor or any other person who, wnneux raasnname excuse, refuses or fails Io produce to me mscrpnnary Commmae lor inquiry any hunk‘ document or paper or falls to 9019 any such rnlerrnauon relaung xherexe under paragraph (zxa) or (:2), and my person who, wnneur reaaonaple excuse. refuses or falls \|o appear lo we oral eyraenee under paragraph 2(c), snau be gunry or an ewenee and shaH, on eanyrmron‘ be name re a ﬁne nax exeeearng two thousand nnggm or to a term or impnsnnmenl nat exaeedmg mree mcmhs or «a bath (4) severe the Draerplrnary Camrmttee cornrnenoes rca heanng In respect orany mailer, me Disetpllnary cernrnmee snnu post or deliver nu ma advocate and sallcrtar concerned- (a) a my or any wrmen appnearran or complaint and or any svaxurury declarauon er amaayrc mar has been made In auppan oi the wnmen appncauen or mrnprarrn, ana “Naps Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used a van; was nrimrrnuly mums dun-mm van .nuue am	3,390	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-22IP-38-07/2023	PLAINTIF TECK HUAT (K.L) COMPANY SDN BHD DEFENDAN CHERN YIE TRADING SDN. BHD.	Plaintiff's application for summary judgment against the Defendant for its action for trademark infringement, passing off and unlawful interference with trade. Application allowed.	01/12/2023	YA Tuan Azlan bin Sulaiman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a2be3c65-3ab5-43cd-b443-34e141e91958&Inline=true	01/12/2023 09:49:47 WA-22IP-38-07/2023 Kand. 32 S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ZTyorU6zUO0QzThQekZWA *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—22IP—3E—D7/2023 Kand. 32 n1/I2I2o23 news-:17 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAVA IN DI KUALA LUMPUR cIvI n BETWEEN TECK HUAT (K.L) COMPANY sun BHD ...PLAINTIFF AND CHERN YIE TRADING SDN. BHD. ...DEFENDAN'T JugsuI§N_I ( jg) A Introduction 1 ms Is me PIaIIIIII+“s appIIcaIIorI for summary Iudgmam agamsl lhe Da¢erInanI fnv NS ac14cn [or Irademark Invringemenn, passmg cu and unlawful Imertsrence mm II1de(‘Ihe Flam I s AppIIcaIIorI“) 5. Sali-nI law 2 This achon Invulvss a pmducx known as Sahed Cumd Prune me Product’). wIII.:>I Is manufactured by a company in Taiwan cauea Sun Funds IndusIrIaI company Limited 1-sun Foods’). 3 smog from mum I970, Ina PIaInII« has been Sun Fonds‘ sale and/or exclusive dis\|rIbuIor Ia manuals. dlslnbula and/or sen Ihe Produm Pig: 1 at 15 SN ZYyuMnzuL:nuznII)uxzwA ‘Nata s.II.I n-nhnrwm be ﬂied M mm .. mII.II-I mm: dun-mm VI] nF\uNG WM! Pursuant tn \|haI appornrrnenr, m 2013 me Plamliff apphed tor and suooassluny registered trademark No 2013014594 in crass 29 var me Pruducl (“the Plaunmrs Trademark‘) The Plarrws Trademark remarns in (ores and exprres an 23 I0 2033. and Voaks Irke mus. In ur amdnd Mlrch 2e23, ma Puannm gn\| wmd mar nne Dsrandann was also saurng slusd aurad prunes In pack.ag\ng beanng ma Trademark rme nsvandanrs Product‘) Jusl to be sure. on 24.3 2023, an pracod an order 701 one canon 0! Inc Datendanrs Product, and us lens and susprcmns wars conﬁrmed. The Datandanns Product was mdead sanad cured prunes. and us packaging Vndeed unaulhorizedly bore me Plarnms trademark In ﬁrs! bnngvng up Iha maﬂar war: we aumormes, me Plammv men Vadged - repon wwh Ihe reievaru Mrnrsrry, who man raided me uevendanrs premises on 155.2023. man rard resungd In me seizure of 22 carwns of ms Davandanrs Product cmsrsung of around 1.1 00 packs heanng \|ha Wannlxﬂs Trademark. r... 2 m as 24 I ﬁnd that, by the tollawrng lactors. the Plarntrlv has est.-rbtrshed at geodwrll or reputatron in the Product (it it has been sun Foods’ sole endlor exelusrve dlstnhulor to promote, drstntrute and/or sell Product stnoa the ms, (H) the Plarntrtrs Trademark has been regrstered tor ten years} (mt ll has a lrst at almost 500 cuslomets/relallers, who elther oonsume the Product themselves or relall them to the general puhllc That wide and exlertsrve ungorng network at drstrltrutren necessanly means that the Ptarntrlt would have establrshed a goodwrll cr reputatron lrl relaten to the Pmduct; and tru) the Detendant has not adduced any eutdence to challenge or negate the Plarntrrvs a gcodwrll or reoutatron in the Pmducl tn tact, the Derendants adrnrsaron that rt had sold the oetendancs Product coupled wllh lls allegallurts that the Product ts being sold ortllrte by other panres attests lo pupularlty or the Product and In the Plairtttffs cenespandrng goodwrll and repula\|ion in the Product M sreoreeenla gn 25 I and that the Defendant‘: ccnduct rn selltng and lmendtng to sell (evrdenoed lay the 22 canons at the Detendants Product consistrng at around 1\‘0u packs beartng the Plarntrffs Trademark that were selzed at the ratd on as prennses on 156.2023) wrts\|I\|uIe a P41 )1 el 15 ru zryerunzuot'luzl'ht3ukzwA «mt. s.n.r In-vlhnrwm be tr... ta my t... ortnlnallly Mthln dun-vlnrrt VII muuc v-mat misreprssenvauon by the Defendant nkely \|o lead the public In behave lhal (he goods m provides are these or the P\a\|nnﬁ's. 25. The Defendanfs blatant candun of using me Plaimrws Trademark on me Defendanra Pmdm:1 cnmd nnly have been calcmaled w misread me public at Varge came beheflhal the Ddendanrs Product are amuaued. assocwaled and/or re\|a\|ed to me P\amM ama H bscausedb menu 27 Vn Yong sze Fun. Abdul Maluk lshak JCA swd (m paragraph 240 a! me Judymenl): ‘m w r: semod Aclull damage new not be mm. H .5 swam in awe pl-uoabonty afdamagu In mrs rugarﬂ. In: case ofNF' B1/Vmer my and Slvawevmgs Ltd -/JEoHmgerSA and Cnarvmagne Lanmn pm El FM; [1973] we 79 mvmed»a1e«7 oumus to me Iorefvont Them Euddey mm W: In ssyzllp use/me man u 1; mu mm may - pllmmlm mmg :>Il-mm am not am lapmvn mm ha Ms aaualty sulloo-ed damage Wm nfbusmasx arm any mm way A puzbalxmyaldamagets emugn bmme acme! arpmoam. damage musl be damnga In M. m ms (rad: or names: that u m say, dnmuge to N5 noovwi/I VI mm ..m..m or mm.“ ‘5audml!‘ is . ward 54 man mvpﬂﬂ ‘ assm 25. Eased on me evudence, I merebra ﬁm1lha\|lhe P\am\|\|ﬂ has mdeed astablisned a case for summary gudgrnenl or as clarmlor passing oft. Vzu u .v :5 sm ZYyuMnzUonOzmDnzWA mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! F. Unlawful inllrhnnce with trade 29 In N & R Johnson (Mahysia) and v H 5 R Johnson mes Limiled 4 Anal [I995] 2 CLJ 551 Zakana Yallm J (as be men was) Sald '11 one person dellberalely mlerltris wml me have at Dllstnesx of another, and does so by unlawful means, Mat 15, by an act wmcll my Is not al llbeny In commll men he VS acnng unlawfully, em. mougll ne dossnol Dvucme armﬂuzu anylclua/Dream aiwnhacl 7an)uayHolel Co ua v Comm: a on [mm cn we, 139 pen ma Denrmlg MR 30 In we own cl Appeal declsxm In the Skywurld mvoloonunc son and v Skyworld Holding: sun Ehd 5 on man] 3 ML! In Kamalumn Md Said JCA Sald we sgmad wllll mu plamns lubmlsslarl mat am am, pnnmns nm vstabllshed (hen clam/:7 furlrada marklrlirlngsmsnl and/nrpassmg all n 15 a na!um/ consequence ms: the am at nnlawml /rllcrisrevlcs mm nana wlll also be made out [Haw cnal Senq Illa Perllland Tradlng Co) VMLIDDIVC lrltsoraled System san End 5 Allov/Zﬂﬂj 7 MLJ 1 all) 15 mars 55)) ' aw ln vlew ol my nndlngs lnal me Plalmlﬂs have sslahhshad me oelenaanrs llablllly lo l\| (or Ilademam lnlrlngemenl and passlng all l ﬁnd lnal \|he F-lalnwrs claim agalnsl the Dalenaanl lor me lon ol unlawful lnlmfevsnoe wllh lrade IS also made cal 32 I also llnd \|rlat rlellher me Delenoe nor the AWldzvl\| lne Delendaru ﬁled lo oppose me Plalnllfrs Appllcallurl raise any lrlable lssue lo wananl me alsmlssal ol me Plalnws Appllcallon vaxe ls .l I5 sm ZYyuMnzuol'luzl'huukzwA 3 “Nair s.n.l n-vlhnrwm s. LAIQ4 M mm .. nﬂglnnllly sun. dun-mm VII .mm mm F. Canclusion 33. I aommmgxy auawed me Plilnlvlfs Applucalmn m the extent of me relief sought m paragraphs 144 of Ihe P\|ainl\ﬂ‘s Application. WNCH mirrored the raw me P\aInm7 snugm in i\s sxatemem olC!a\|m. 34 As (or crisis I ordered me Demdanx lo pay me Plaimm oasis of RM5.ooo 00. sumem lo anocamr Daled me 1‘ day at November 2023 K Ia Lumpm Hlgh coun Ouunl Knzy Chun Hxan (Messrs Koay Partnership) tor Plamhﬂ Anoop Smgh [Messrs Anocp & See) my Delenﬂam Logislnluu Mama: OIder14 m\e< 01 me Rmes o1Cuun 2012 secuan 54 orrraaamam Am 2019 cases rlhrud: Bmarlang commumcamons Sdn Bhd v LN? Inderawasm Jaya Sdn and [zuoo] 3 Mu 321 Fabrique Ebel soaete Annnyme v Syankal Fermagaan Tukang Jam cny Fan 4. or: [1955] 1 MLJ was v... 1. at Is Ha Tack Sven 5. Dis v Rana Research Labmalurium s p A & Anur [2012] 3 CLJ 645 (CA) H 3 R ./ahnson (Ma/aysra) Bird v H a. R Johnson mes Lmmsd 5 Ana: [1995] 2 cm 531 Luw cm Yong (Va Reynox Femchem Industries) v Low cm Hong A Anor (201911 Mu 175 Nalvonm Company Fov Foreugn Trade v Kayu Raya sun BM [1954] 2 Mu am Drlus Expert wme Sdn Ehd v Nor Vanm :2: Mom A Anor [2022] 2 MLJ 57 (FC) Reckill and Colman Products Ltd v Borden lncand omers. [1990] 1 All ER an Skyworld Development Sdn Ehd v Skywoﬂd Hmdxngs Sdn Bhd & ors [2020] 3 MLJ 294 skywuna Homwngs Sdn Ehd 3. Or: v Skywoﬂd Development Sdn Em: A. Aner 120221 5 cm 74 (FC) The Ccmmlsswuners ov Vnland Revenue v Mune: a. Ca‘s Margarine‘ Lmmea (19011 AC 217 Vong sze Fun 5. Anor (Va Penndustrlan Makanan 3. Mlnuman Layang. Layangl v Syankal Zamam H; Tanun Sdn End 5. Anur [2012] 1 MLJ 555 v... .5 n! 15 IN Zfyurt/nzuonuu'huukzWA «me smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm in me Piainrin men men one aciion on 25 7.2023 and. upon me Delendaril niing its appearance and ueienoe, applied «or summary judgment. some basic principlos (or summary iudgrnervt I wouid nrst nne that me Piamiiii nes iiiimiea trie uiree oasio requirements oi Order to nine I of me Rules of conri 2012 as spell on! by me Federet com in national company For Foreign trade v Kayu Ruya Sdn Bhd[1DB4]2 MLJ sno ior eppiyirig tor summary iudgrrierit. They are (i) tiie Deienuant riauing entered an apnearancet (ii) me Deiendant riaving been served wiiri a siacerrient or ciairri; and tiny ine Plaintiffs amoevit in support in trie Aopiioaiion oornplying wiiri the requirements oi rule 2 cf irie order 14 As irie Federal Court Saldi once saiisiying triese three basic requirements, trie oiainiin will have eslabiished a oniriii iaoie case and he becomes entitied to judgmerll Trie burden men snirts to me deienitani to satisiy the court why iuctgirieni siiouiit not be given against riim Page seiis sin ZYyuMnzL1Dnuzi'hDukzWA ‘Nata s.n.i In-rihnrwiii i. used m vaiw i.. nﬂniruiily mi. dun-vinrrl n. aFiuNG Wﬂxi 11 On me manerome Plammrs cxann a\so mcludmq an appncauon for an iruummon against me Defendant, m Fabrique Ebol socnm Anonymu v Syarlkat Pemiauaan Tukang Jam cny Port A 0!: [1 sun] 1 ML! us‘ Zakaria J (as he men was) new lhat, when muse three conﬂiuurvs had been Mﬁlled, (here .s no restriction in law to prevent a p\amMV lmm proceeding to ob'am uuuncuve renal xn summary judgment proceedings On «ms case, see also Binariang Communications Sdn Ehd v L&P lndenwasih Jay: sun and man] 3 MU 321. a. Summary judgment forlrzdamark infringlmnnl 12. semen 54 M Trndumirkl Am mm (“the Au ). se\s out the ms wrncn Dnnslllule mlnngemsnl Ma regwslered trademark. ll prewdes: ‘Acts ammmhng lo mmngem-m drsylstsmd trademark m A pevsan Anlrrngzs 5 rcgrstsrsd vadsmarkﬂhe usesa sagn mum 3 rdmmca! mm the Imdemark m mum. :0 good: or ssrvvcs: mum are .m:.c.u wan moss 1.» mm M 1: ragnslemd, yn m. course of mm. wmmut Ma wlvunl DI the rlgrstarsd pmnnetor I2) A person m/rmges a regvsturvd Iradcmanz N. wnhaul me mm: al m. pmmemuume trademark, he uses m m. course o/trade a man- (n) ma: >5 /denlmal wrllv me lrademuk and rs usud m Matron to good: or «mass smulnr in may for wmm m. trademark rs rvgm ad 0! y-.....us 3 Nuns smm IIIVVDIVWW be used m mm .. nnnmuuy mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 1»; mar As smile! to me lmdcmark and Is used m refamwv ta good: ursglvlcas menace: mthol mmvlar lo mas: Ior Much me nooemam rs mgnsma, rusullmg In ms I/kelmood or wnmuon on ma non eimouubnc 4:; Farm: purpalwsollms xmon, . man uaua a saw! Mm- Ia) apohes n to quads or rm pacmmv. my oﬂsls or expose: goods for sale unau mo sun It) puts guods on ma market under the syn,‘ (AI mm goods undo! me ogn for the purpose ol allarvng or oxpoung mam far no». at olpultmy mum an m. mum to: offal: orsupphu snrvrcls undurllll ogn M mums asxpous gum undsrme non (.7) was me sign on an rm/note, calabgue busmen letter Dusmesx 939% me Am nr Diner wmmemw docunlerm mcludmg any won doamvenl In any mechum,‘ Dr M; ms ma non». an-tverlutrvg 44; A pmon who- 4-; apphvs a regislemd hadunlarx to my marmn um at mrendedtaba Ilsedfollabelhngarpackagmg goods, at ya; um 5 non /n advemsng at on any aomnenvoasumoa /rv Iwlgww mm aha//be mm: as a party was was the manual wmch mlvmaus me regtsleved trademark nr «non ha appm me nnaaomam. ne hvswavnadleasontobelnevalhall/7: apphwnun olmevadamark was not du/y aumorrzed by me negmaoo pmpuelnv u/ mo hademan or a lrcensec - >...s.u; sm zrywunzuonuzn»anzwA «wn. Snr1\|\nmhnrw\HI>e med w my on nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum v-max 13 In Low cm vong («Ia Rsynox Fanichom Industries) 11 Low cm Hang & Anor [2013] 1 MLJ 175‘ me Federa\ coun hem lhah for \|rademarkIrv1nngemenI,\he piaxrmﬂ has m prove max — (up he owns a vahd (rademark, (H) the trademark was used in the same of trade wnnam mnsenc, and (MD the unlawful usage ufmelrademark owned by mm had caused dsoephon / cunluslun among me prospective cusmmem 14 I ﬁnd 013! the Plalnllﬂ has successiuﬂy eslahlxshed trademark mfnngement by me Delendanm1a\|\|he Defendant has not raised any defence lo Ifle PIam\|m‘s claim for llademark mlrlngemenl. and that me praumw is enmled to summary wdgmenl Iur nus dalm, In summary, the mamm has the P\a1n\\ﬁ's Trademark (won the Defendant never cnanengea me validity of). me packagvng [or the Devenaanrs Product bore the P\|ain\iﬂ‘s Tmuemark, and there was no evidence whalsnever that me Delendant had me Wannuffs consent in dn SD 15 Funnermow m m pa.-agmpn 14(c\| oi ils De4anee. me Defendant pbaded 'De!sm1an lrdak vveruual Assam Dov yang drdakwa wen Pram (smpas rm “amm bot Ievsebuf) Se/sk we/2023. “ vursous on m paragraphs 7 and Eta) or I\|s Amdzvrmpposrng the Plarnnws Apphcanorr, the Deaenaaru admitted knowing of the Pvalnuffs Trademark and men said met me nevmdanrs Product ‘hanya ssoahagran kecrl smrs dun ups yang mruar orsrr Defevvrlan In my view, mesa statements consmule an aamrssron by me Ddendanl mal u had smd (he Delenuanrs Products which bore the F\a>rmﬂ‘s Trademark 16. Even N n .s true mat the nevenaam had ceased seumg the Devenaanrs Fmducllvam we s.2o23 (wmch 45 me day aﬂer me laid by the aulrmnhes)‘ that does not Donsmule a defence hi the Plaintiffs dam! Tm trademark mlrlngamentr but may he a faaov WV me assessment of damages [or commission of Ihat infringement And‘ Lmderthe renevsougm by the Plamlm‘ m me sraremem o1C\aAm. damages are to be assessed 17 I mereiore ﬁnd than me Wannliﬂ has rndeed eslabhshed a case ror summary judgmem al Is claim in! trademark Inlnngemenl E. Summary judgment for passing on 18. In Rankin and Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc and others. men] 1 All ER 373, Loni olweramyirnenon sad: “The law oi passrng of! can be summansed In one short gerIera/ pvaposmon, no man may pass aims goods as mass or anolhel r... rm: More Jpecnicaﬂy, u maybe expnmed.n mums ofme element: wmclv mg plammlln such an aclran has In pvaw wv amend succeed These are lnrao m number rm, he mus! eslsmvsn . goadwm or mwtatmn mmd m IM 9:20:13 :7 Iarvrcos mum ho suppuesm m. mmd om. pdmmmg P1715110 by nxmcuzlnon wllh rho ndunlrfymg ‘gut-an’ (mom u txmsrsls svmp/v on brand nlnw W a trade dslmplron, or me mdvvndual mums ul/abs/ling or packaging] undcr wmch ms pammrar wads or sen/rues an crflwsd 10 me punno gm that the gown rs recognised by me pub/M: as rlnslmmve spsancswy dune plamnlfs genus or sow-ass smond, he must demonslrale 3 nusvupvvscntanon bylhe defendant Ia m. public (whatnot m rm! maonuonor; landing at mry to lead ms public 1.; mm mu goods or son/rm: alhmd by hlm In In: good: or own“ 5/ Inc plammr Whsthsr me yubm: r. uwul or ma plamtvlfr mnmy tax the manululumr or supplvsr or the good: a svrvvbzx rs Immatvnal as long as they are Identiﬁed mm a pamou/or source winch IS m fact are damn Fm smmpia me moo .5 acutsramed in ruby on a psllrcu/albrand name ». purchasing yoods ofa pamcu/ar descrlybon, n manor: not at m that mom /5 lime or no mum nwamncs: at me ndormly Mme Dinhnuturalmu Dmnd Mme mm, no must damonslnta Ina! no mm at, m . mm! Irmvlacltorv ma! M: It Mary 10 Aufhrdamags Dy mason or me emmeau: bsbsf zngnnrland ny ma omndam mvsrepveservlsbarv mar ma saume Mme delbndanfs goods :1! services rs the same as me mun» arms: oﬁsmd by me pIamml' 19. These sialemens havelound !avounn Hu Tack sien L Ors v Rom Research Lnbnmonum s.p.A 5. MM [2012] 5 CLJ 645 (CA)‘ onus aponwhlte Sdn and v Nor vunnl M Mom 5 Anar[2\|l22] 1 MLJ 51 (FC) and Skyworld Naldlngs Sdn End .1 cars v Skyvmrld Developmnnt Sdn and A Anur [2022] 5 CLJ 74 (Fe). v... Inns sm ZYyuMnzL1onuu'huukzwA _ mm. smm ...o.mm .. med m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum vmm 20 Thus, to prove passmg off, me Plamm must‘ m eslabhsh a gocdwm or reputation In the goods or semoes m provides‘ (xi) demonstrate mxsrepresaamalwantsl by me Devendam wmch us hke\y to Vead me publvc \u belueve than the goods yr pmvndes are muse onhe PIam1m's:ana (m) es\ablIsh mat damage has ur mu nkewy be caused. §oodwIH or Regmauon 21. In Vang sxe Fun 3. Anor we Pmnauurian Makanzn a. Minuman Laynng-Laying) v syarnm Dmlni Hi Tamil: sun Elud & Anav[201Z] 1 MLJ 535, me coun av Aupea\ rzfened in The commission-rs av Inland Rannuu v Mu -r u. we Marllrinn L ited [1901] AC 217 m wmch Lord MzcNagh\en deﬁned 'guudw\\|\|' m «ms way: ‘What 75 goo-mu» n .5 a my my easy m dexcnbe, vary mm» Ia mime rt /5 me nenem and advarvlsgn 91' ms ma name repualron and mlmccborl Ma Dusmess 1: ya me smartly: tome wmcn mm m custom u r: Illa we hung wmm drstmgurslves ... ah: eslamtshed has/Ives: Imm . new Dusrnnss .: us rm nan ms goo-rmu a.‘ a Dusmnss mus! amunalu «mm H pnmcular cum or some. ‘ Pue s M :5 22. Abdul Mallk lshak JCA. who aelwemd the wdgment of the Court, then said: ‘Fvur dlsuammg feature: ofgmdmrl maybv /mam (a; mat gaortwtﬁ IS the bvmant added m the husmeu through oxtens/vs mmg apemhans wmm am-ac1s custom, (:21 that am mark at gut up u Ma bndpl .»ama.c;- tn-1 sq»-rm‘ Andrcltis and »dsnn'ﬁe.1 mo mom: and in: buwvstt. m that gooawill rs nrealedmvuugh and by means allmdmg aenwm, and on ma! (no more mm». (ms Irnd/Hg aclrvrms are, men mus! n-mu:-wy mdudn sum undpmlumm 1». mm. mm mu would be anxmcdmtnaqoodwill - 23 In onus whne, supra, Zahariah Mohd FCJ said: "Goo:-lwvll of a Dusvmss IS us esrabnslred Iepulahon wind! rs regarded as a quanlrﬁsb/2 assefand ralcu/ated as pat our: value when me buwvlss rs we: Goodmll .5 smelled m a trade or a pamcwhv trade It IS rvgardnd as pmueny ngm Lmd Lmmey w my commssvonus 17/ Inland Rwurmc v mm 5. Gas Margavlns Llm!tud[V9l71]AC 21731;: 225 gsvl 5 dluvlplrovv or Goodwill u -eooammeyaneaawupsrrmas no moamng except m connenvaon mm some trade‘ bmnam ovmmng /rv mat wmmon r unaemm m. wordlo M60119 vmalzvw Adds um. 10 abusnessbyriason of mummn, rum: rm rlpulllmn cmmeclmn rnl/oducnon lo we mm»: .»-.1 .9:--:1 mum Imm mmw. or any 6! mm mm, and me maybe ollvwx Wm Ha not ozcu 10 me “ Fin n av 1; sm zfywMnzuonozn»anzwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm!	1,990	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-23NCvC-22-06/2020	PLAINTIF 1. ) JAHIT BIN RAHMAT 2. ) Yusli Bin Ismail DEFENDAN 1. ) Ng Kim Chooi 2. ) Mohamad Bin Sidin 3. ) Majlis Perbandaran Klang 4. ) PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH KLANG	Wrongful and illegal partition of alienated land; sections 141 - 144 National Land Code 1965; fraudulent and falsified pre-computation plan and Borang 9B; exemplary damages against Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang	01/12/2023	YA Dato' Faizah Binti Jamaludin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5a311fb4-6176-4a28-8422-f3098527877e&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 ANTARA 1. JAHIT BIN RAHMAT (NO. K/P: 510131-10-5671) 2. YUSLI BIN ISMAIL (NO. K/P: 681227-10-5023) (Membawa tindakan ini dibawah Seksyen 8 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956, sebagai waris yang sah kepada Nabiba binti Amam (NO. K.P: 390916-10-5424), si mati) PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN 1. NG KIM CHOOI (NO. K/P: 481223-10-5855) 2. MOHAMAD BIN SIDIN (NO. K/P: 541001-06-5167) (Berniaga di bawah nama dan gaya MHS SURVEY CONSULTANT (No. Pendaftaran Syarikat: 002105460-H)) 3. MAJLIS PERBANDARAN KLANG 4. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH KLANG DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an action by the plaintiffs against the defendants for, what they claim, was the wrongful and illegal partition by the Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang (“D4”) of the land held under title Geran Mukim 6048, Lot 2558, Mukim Kapar, 5th Mile Sungei Binjai Road, Daerah Klang, Selangor 01/12/2023 11:40:48 BA-23NCvC-22-06/2020 Kand. 136 S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 2 (the “Original Land”) into two portions held under the following separate titles: (i) Suratan Hakmilik HS(M) 39940, PT 66484, Mukim Kapar, 5th Mile Sungei Binjai Road, Daerah Klang, Selangor (the “1st Partitioned Portion”); and (ii) Suratan Hakmilik HS(M) 39941, PT 66485, Mukim Kapar, 5th Mile, Sungei Binjai Road, Daerah Klang, Selangor (the “2nd Partitioned Portion”). [2] The plaintiffs’ case is that the application for the partition of the Original Land was made fraudulently and that the signatures of the first plaintiff (“P1”) and Nabiba bt Amam (“the Deceased”) on the documents relating to the application, including the pre-computation plan and the Borang 9B, were forged. It is an undisputed fact that the Deceased had passed away in 2003 — six years before the application for the partition was made by D2 to D4. [3] The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion are null and void. They also sought for injunctions restraining the eviction of the plaintiffs and their extended families from the 2nd Partitioned Portion and the demolition of their homes located on the said 2nd Partitioned Portion. Additionally, they sought for orders that D4 cancel the titles for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion, and for D4 to reissue a new title for the said 2nd Partitioned Portion, where the position of the plaintiffs’ and their extended families’ homes on the 2nd Partitioned Portion remains the same as they were on the title for the Original Land prior to the partition. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 3 [4] After full trial, this Court made findings of fact based on the evidence produced that there were both fraud and forgery in the application for the partition of the Original Land, and that the first defendant (“D1”) and the second defendant (“D2”) were jointly and/or severally involved in the fraud and forgery of the documents in respect of the application for the partition of the Original Land. [5] This Court also found that D2 and D4 were negligent in discharging their respective responsibilities, duties of care and statutory duties in respect of the application for the partition of the Original Land and the issuance of the separate titles for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion. [6] This Court further found that D4, as the district land administrator who has jurisdiction over lands situated in the district of Klang, had caused injury to the plaintiffs by reason of its lackadaisical and arbitrary approach in discharging its statutory duties under the National Land Code 1965 (“NLC”), in the manner that it had processed and approved the application for the partition of the Original Land, and in issuing the separate titles for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion. This Court found that D4 had acted with contumelious disregard for the plaintiffs’ rights. [7] For this reason, this Court awarded exemplary damages in the sum of RM1,000,000.00 against D4 to signify this Court’s disapproval, condemnation, and denunciation of D4’s lackadaisical and arbitrary manner in which it had discharged its statutory duties under the NLC and for its contumelious disregard of the plaintiffs’ rights. [8] The full reasons for my decision are set out in this Judgment. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 4 Material Facts [9] The first plaintiff, Jahit bin Rahmat (“P1”), Nabiba binti Amam (“the Deceased”) and Mohd Mokhtar bin Zakarsi, Mohd Mosly bin Zakarsi, Nasrudin bin Zakarsi, Rihanah binti Zakarsi, Saada binti Zakarsi and Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan (the “Other Co-Owners”) were the co- proprietors of the Original Land in the portions listed next to their respective names in the table below. NAME PORTIONS Jahit bin Rahmat “P1” 1/6 Nabiba binti Amam “The Deceased” 1/12 Mohd Mokhtar bin Zakarsi “The Other Co- Owners” 1/10 Mohd Mosly bin Zakarsi 1/10 Nasrudin bin Zakarsi 1/10 Rihanah binti Zakarsi 1/10 Saada binti Zakarsi 1/10 Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan 1/4 [10] P1, the Deceased and their extended families have lived in houses built on the Original Land since 1965. [11] The second plaintiff, Yusli bin Ismail (“P2”) is the natural-born son and the legal heir of the Deceased. The Deceased had passed away on 14.06.2003. [12] The second defendant, Mohammad bin Sidin (“D2”) is a licensed land surveyor trading under the name and style of MHS Survey Consultant (Registration No: 002105460-H) (“MHS”). S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 5 [13] The third defendant, Majlis Perbandaran Klang (“D3”) is the city council under the Local Government Act 1976 (Act 171) (“LGA 1976”). It is the local authority for the area where the Original Land is situated under LGA 1976. It is also the local planning authority for the said area pursuant to section 5 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172) (“TCPA 1976”). [14] D4 is the district land administrator with jurisdiction over the district of Klang where the Original Land is situated. It is empowered under the NLC to approve applications to partition by proprietors of alienated land. [15] On 17.09.2009, MHS submitted 17 copies of pre-computation plan (pelan pra hitungan) (Ruj: MHS/GMS/0965-PH(01)) dated 25.10.2009 (“the impugned plan)(exhibit “P1”) to D3 for approval for purposes of an application under sections 140 to 144 of the NLC for the partition of the Original Land into two separate portions to be held under separate titles. [16] D3 approved the impugned plan and registered it as a partition plan (pelan pecah bahagian) Majlis bil. MPK/KU/PBHG/26/2009. It returned 12 copies of the impugned plan to D2 under the cover of its letter dated 30.10.2009. [17] On 12.02.2010, D2 applied to D4 to partition the Original Land. Under the cover of its letter dated 12.02.2010 (exhibit “P2”), D2 submitted, among others: (a) 12 copies of the impugned plan — purportedly signed by P1 and the Deceased; S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 6 (b) 3 copies of Borang 9B dated 10.03.2010 — Permohonan Untuk Memecahkan Bahagian Tanah purportedly signed by P1 and the Deceased; and (c) copies of P1, the Deceased and the Other Owners’ identity cards (“NRICs”) [18] D2’s letter to D4 is reproduced below. Rujukan Kami: MHS/GMS/0965(2) Rujukan Tuan: Tarikh: 12 Februari 2010 Tuan Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang, Pejabat Tanah/Daerah Klang, 41902 Klang Tuan, Permohonan Untuk Memecahkan Bahagian Tanah Dibawah Seksyen 140 Hingga 144, KTN, Bagi Hakmilik GM6048 Lot 2558, Mukim Kapar, Daerah Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan Untuk Menjadi Dua Hakmilik Berasingan Perkara di atas adalah dengan hormatnya dirujuk. Kami telah dilantik oleh tuan tanah iaitu En Jahit Bin Rahmat & Rakan-rakan untuk mengemukakan permohonan seperti yang tersebut di atas untuk pertimbangan dan kelulusan pihak tuan. Untuk menyempurnakan tujuan tersebut disertakan bersama ini dokumen-dokumen berikut:- 1. 12 salinan Pelan Pra hitungan ruj: MHS/GMS/0965-PH(01) 2. 3 Salinan Borang 9B 3. Wang Tunai sebanyak RM100.00 sebagai bayaran pendaftaran 4. Satu Salinan Sijil Carian Rasmi bagi Hakmilik GM 6048 5. Satu salinan penyata Cukai Tanah 2010 6. Satu salinan Hakmilik GM 6048 7. 8 salinan Kad Pengenalan Pemilik Tanah 8. Surat Kelulusan daripada Majlis Perbandaran Klang (MPK) Kami berharap dokumen seperti yang terlampir di dalam keadaan teratur dan pohon kelulusan dari pihak tuan. Sekian, Terima kasih. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 7 Yang benar, MHS Survey Consultant tt Hi Jaafar Idris sk: Jahit bin Rahmat No. 76, batu 53/4 Jalan Meru 41050 Klang, Selangor [19] On 14.04.2010, D4 approved the application to partition the Original Land. In a letter dated 15.04.2010 signed by Sazatul Faeza Binti Alias (“DW4”), who at the material time was the Penolong Pegawai Daerah (Pembangunan Tanah), DW4 stated that D4 had approved the application for the partition of the Original Land and that two separate titles will be issued (“Approval Letter”). [20] D4’s Approval Letter was addressed to P1 at the address stated in D2’s application letter, which is not P1’s address. D4’s records show that the Approval Letter was not delivered to P1. Instead, it was given to D2’s representative, Hj. Jaafar bin Idris, on 20.04.2010. [21] Under the cover of a letter dated 10.06.2010 signed by Mohammad Ghazali bin Abu (“DW2”) (exhibit “P7”), D2 wrote to D4 asking for new PT Nos. for the partitioned portions of the Original Land to enable it to prepare the sketch plan (pelan lakar). [22] On 08.12.2010 to D4, a law firm Messrs. Salva & Co, informed D4 that it had authorised its representative, Mohd Janurudin bin Talib, to collect the issue of documents of title for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion. D4 delivered the issue documents of title to Messrs. Salva & Co’s representative, even though the law firm did not S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 8 state in its letter who it was representing and why it had the right to the said issue documents of title. [23] P1 said that he discovered the sale of the land in 2019 when he and his family asked Mohd. Mokhtar bin Zakarsi to borrow the issue document of title of the Original Land. He discovered that the Other Co-Owners of the Original Land had sold their share of the land to D1. P1’s sister, Ramlah binti Rahmat, then went to D4’s office to seek confirmation as to where the issue document of title for the Original Land is located. She was informed by D4 that the Owner Co-Owners had sold their share in the land to D1. [24] On 02.03.2019, P1, P2 and their family members went to see D1. They were informed by D1 that the Original Land had been partitioned into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion. And that the 2nd Partitioned Portion was located next to the main road, and the 1st Partitioned Portion was located behind the 2nd Partitioned Portion. The contemporaneous minutes of the meeting are reproduced below: Haribulan: 2.3.2019 (Sabtu) Masa: Lebih kurang 11.00 pagi hingga 12.00 tengahari Tempat: Ban Hooi Tayar S/B Batu 1, Jalan Kapar 41400 Klang. Tel: 03-3342314 H/P: 016-2627258 Hadir: En. Ng Kim Chooi (Pembeli) Jahit bin Rahmat (Penama di Grant) Yusli bin Ismail (Anak) (Nabiba binti Amam – deceased) Nor Izar bin Rahmat Supaat bin Sharif Zaidah bt Rahmat Rugayah bt Romlah bt Rahmat S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 9 Perkara: Berkenalan dengan Pembeli sebahagian Tanah Lot 2558 dari pemilik lama dan meminjam Grant Asal untuk Penukaran nama Hakmilik Setibanya kami di bilik Mr. Ng Kim Chooi, kami memperkenalkan diri dan mengatakan bahawa kami adalah penghuni tapak sebahagian hadapan Lot 2558 yang mana kami dapat tahu Mr. Ng sudah beli sebelah tapak yang kami duduki sekarang. Tujuan kami berjumpa Mr. Ng adalah hendak meminjam grant asal untuk menukar nama Hakmilik sekarang (Jahit & Nabiba (simati) kepada salah sa- orang dari adik beradik kami memandangkan Jahit sudah berpindah rumah lain dan Nabiba sudah meninggal dunia. Mr. Ng setuju untuk meminjamkan grant tersebut. Apabila Mr. Ng menghulurkan kepada kami, alangkah terkejutnya, kami dapati kedudukan tanah kami berpindah ke bahagian belakang lot 2558. Mr. Ng menerangkan kepada kami bahawa grant lama telah dipecahkan kepada dua grant, satu atas nama Jahit, Nabiba & Ng Kim Chooi dan yang satu lagi atas nama Ng Kim Chooi sahaja. Kami menyatakan kepada Mr. Ng bahawa perbuatan pemindahan kedudukan tanah kami tidak kami ketahui hingga hari itu. Mr. Ng juga menyatakan bahawa pemindahan itu pun ia tidak tahu, lebih lanjut boleh rujuk pada peguamnya, Puan Kamalia. Akhirnya tiada penyelesaian perbincangan kami dan Mr. Ng meminjamkan grant asal tersebut ditandatangani oleh Ramlah bt Rahmat untuk tindakan selanjutnya. Mr. Ng beri beberapa cadangan untuk kami berpindah, kami tidak setuju (eg. Duduk sementara dalam masa 4/5 tahun baru pindah ke bahagian belakang lot 2558 atau Mr Ng beli tanah bahagian kami atau ganti dengan tanahnya yang lain kepunyaan Mr. Ng) memandangkan Mr. Ng sudah banyak keluar duit atas pembelian tanah tersebut. [25] On 11.03.2019, P1 and P2 wrote to D3 asking for confirmation whether there was an application to partition the Original Land and a copy of the partition plan. [26] On 25.03.2019, D3 replied P1 and P2’s letter informing them there was an application for the partition of the Original Land on 17.02.2009. It S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 10 referred to D4’s letter bil. PDTK/T/PT/800-5/1/6/2010 (11) dated 15.04.2010 and asked the plaintiffs to check the matter with D4. [27] Upon receipt of D3’s confirmation, P1 on 27.03.2019 filed a police report (No. Repot: Bandar Baru Klang/003804/19) stating that ¾ of his land had been moved to the back and that he suspected that the title of the land had been amended without his approval as the registered landowner. [28] On 28.03.2019, P1 wrote to D4 stating that the position of land on the land title had been moved to the back without his knowledge and that he suspected that unscrupulous individuals had changed the position of the land for their interest. He informed D4 that he had filed a police report on the matter and asked D4 to check how the position of the land had been moved to the back. [29] On 08.04.2019, P1 and P1 filed a report to the Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM) that they suspected that the application for partition and change of name of the Original Land did not comply with established procedures, where there had been a breach of trust and use of forged documents. [30] On 10.04.2019, D4 replied P1’s letter of 28.03.2019. It informed P1 that upon reviewing the application for the partition of the Original Land, D4 found the application received was complete and complied with regulations as stipulated in the check list (senarai semak) and the application letter from MHS dated 12.02.2010. It went on to state that accordingly, pursuant to section 140 to 142 of the NLC, the District Land Administrator had considered and approved the application for the S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 11 partition of the land dated 14.04.2010. D4’s letter to P1 is reproduced below: Ruj. Kami: PDTK/PT/800-5/1/6/2010 (17) Tarikh: 10 April 2019 Encik Jahit bin Rahmat d/a Lot 2558, Batu 5 ¾, Jalan Meru 41050 Klang Selangor Tuan, MOHON SEMAK SEMULA KE ATAS PECAH BAHAGIAN YANG TELAH DI UBAH KE BELAKANG Dengan hormatnya saya diarah merujuk surat tuan bertarikh 28 Mac 2019 berhubung perkara di atas. 2. Adalah dimaklumkan, setelah semakan di buat berhubung dengan perkara di atas, pentadbiran ini mendapati permohonan yang diterima adalah lengkap dan telah mematuhi peraturan-peraturan seperti yang ditetapkan dalam senarai semak dan surat permohonan daripada Jurukur, Tetuan MHS Consultant bertarikh 12 Februari 2010. 3. Selaras dengan peruntukan di bawah Seksyen 140-142 Kanun Tanah Negara, Pentadbir Tanah Daerah telah menimbang dan meluluskan permohonan pecah bahagian tanah bertarikh 14 April 2010. Sekian, harap maklum. Terima kasih. Saya yang menjalankan amanah, t.t. (AHMAD FITRI BIN AHMAD) Penolong Pegawai Daerah (Pembangunan Tanah) b.p. Pegawai Daerah Klang [31] On 14.05.2019, the plaintiffs wrote to D3 asking for confirmation of the partition of the Original Land. They requested from D3 for copies of the pre-computation plan, MHS’ letter of application and D3’s approval letter to MHS and D4’s approval letter of 14.10.2010. D3 received the letter on 24.05.2019. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 12 [32] On 04.06.2019, D3 forwarded a copy of the pre-computation plan to P2. [33] On 09.07.2019, P1 and P2 filed separate police reports, where they reported to the police that P1’s and the Deceased’s signatures were forged on the application form for the partition of the Original Land. They then filed this writ action against the defendants in June 2020. The Issues [34] The issues for the Court’s determination are: (a) whether the P2 has the power to act on behalf of the Deceased in this action; (b) whether there was fraud and forgery in the application for the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion; (c) whether the application for the partition of the Original Land was null and void at law because of the fraud and forgery in the application; (d) whether D1 and/or D2 separately and/or jointly were involved in the forgery of the application for the partition; (e) whether the registration of the names of P1, the Deceased and D1 on the title of the 1st Partitioned Portion, and D1 on the title of the 2nd Partitioned Portion are null and void at law; (f) whether D2 failed, refused and/or was negligent in discharging his responsibility and duty of care as a licensed land surveyor under Lembaga Jurukur Tanah Malaysia; S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 13 (g) whether D3 failed and/or negligent in discharging its responsibility and duty of care in providing the pre-computation plan (plan pra-hitungan) for the application for the partition; and (h) whether D4 failed, refused and/or was negligent in discharging its responsibility and duty of care as Land Administrator in the application for the partition and/or the registration of the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion? Issue (a): Does P2 have the power to act on behalf of the Deceased’s estate in this action? [35] P2 is the natural-born son and the legal heir of the deceased. D1, D2 and D4 contend that P2 does not have locus standi to act on behalf of the Deceased’s estate because it is still unadministered — no letters of administration or grant of probate have been issued in respect the estate. [36] In Ooi Jim & Anor v. Ai Eit & Ors. [1974] 1 LNS 108; [1977] 2 MLJ 105 (“Ooi Jim”), the Federal Court held that the question of taking out letters of administration would only arise when it became necessary for the beneficiary to claim her share in the estate of the intestate. It held that it was not necessary for the first appellant, in that case, to take out letters of administration to bring the action, as it was primarily an action for a declaration as to the status of her husband. [37] The Federal Court in Al Rashidy bin Kassim & Ors v Rosman bin Roslan [2007] 4 MLJ 297; [2007] 3 CLJ 361; [2007] 3 AMR 341 (“Al Rashidy”) had to decide on the following question of law: (1) whether the beneficiaries of the deceased person without first obtaining the Letters of Administration have a locus standi to commence an action to protect and to regain the land which has been fraudulently obtained by an outsider? S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 14 [38] Following its earlier decision in Ooi Jim, the Federal Court in Al- Rashidy held that the beneficiaries of a deceased person, without first obtaining a letter of administration of the deceased’s estate, do have locus standi to commence an action to protect and regain the estate’s land that had been fraudulently obtained by an outsider. It held that the beneficiaries of a deceased person have locus standi to protect and preserve the assets of the deceased’s estate even though they have yet to obtain the grant of a letter of administration of the deceased’s estate. The Court cited with approval the Singapore case of Omar Ali bin Mohd. & Ors v Syed Jajaral Sadeq bin Abdulkadir Alhadad & Ors [1995] 3 SLR 388, where the Singapore High Court held that the plaintiffs were suing in their own capacity as beneficiaries of the estate for a declaration to protect the property of the estate, which they had locus standi to do as they had at least equity in the estate of the intestate. It also cited with approval the decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Wong Moy (Administratrix of the Estate of Theng Chee Khim, (deceased) v Soo Ah Choy [1996] 3 SLR 398, where the Court held, inter alia, that (i) a beneficiary of an estate which was unadministered may institute an action to recover the assets of the estate where special circumstances could be shown to exist, and (ii) special circumstances were not confined solely to cases where the personal representative had defaulted in acting to recover the property; that all circumstances of the case should be considered. [39] Arifin Zakaria FCJ (as he then was) delivering the Federal Court’s judgment in Al-Rashidy held: [18] We agree with the view expressed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in that the special circumstances should not be confined solely to cases where the personal representative had defaulted in recovering the property of the estate. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 15 We are of the view that all the circumstances of the case ought to be considered by the court in arriving at a just result. Secondly, following Re Atkinson and Omar Ali bin Mohd., we think the beneficiary has at least an equity in the estate of the deceased to entitle the beneficiary to seek on behalf of the estate the remedy of a declaratory judgment. …………….. [20] Thus, the appellants have had to act fast in order to protect and preserve the estate of the deceased. Therefore, on the facts of this case, we find, there exist special circumstances for the beneficiaries to commence legal action against the respondent qua beneficiaries for the purpose of protecting and preserving the asset of the estate. Quite apart from that we also hold that the beneficiaries in the present case have at least an equity in the estate of the deceased to entitle them to seek a declaratory judgment. Thus, on the above grounds are agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants in this case had the locus standi to commence this action at least for the limited purpose of protecting and preserving the asset of the estate. [Emphasis added] Findings on issue (a) [40] In this instant case, P2 is a beneficiary of the Deceased’s estate has equity in the estate. [41] Following the Federal Court’s decision in Ooi Jim, the question of P2 taking out letters of administration would only arise when P2 and the other beneficiaries of the Deceased’s claim their share in the estate. P2, in this action, is seeking a declaratory order that the partition of the Original Land to the 1st Partitioned Portion and 2nd Partitioned Portion is null and void, and injunctions to preserve and protect the houses situated on the lands from being demolished, and from him and his family from being evicted from the lands. He is not claiming a share in the Deceased’s estate in this action. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 16 [42] The Federal Court in Al Rashidy held that where there exist special circumstances for a beneficiary of an estate to act to preserve and protect the asset of an estate, the beneficiary is entitled to commence legal action against the respondent qua beneficiary for the purpose of protecting and preserving the asset of the estate. [43] It is evident from the facts of this case that P2 had to act in filing this action against the defendants to protect and preserve the estate of the Deceased and to restrain D1 and/or D3 from demolishing the Deceased’s home and that of her extended family on the 2nd Partitioned Portion. [44] Accordingly, for these reasons, I find that there exist special circumstances for P2 as a beneficiary of the Deceased’s estate to bring this action against the defendants qua beneficiary for the purpose of protecting and preserving the assets of the estate. As held by the Federal Court in Al Rashidy, it is not necessary for a beneficiary to take out letters of administration to preserve and protect a deceased’s estate. [45] Therefore, I find that P2 has locus standi to commence this action on behalf of the estate for the limited purpose of protecting and preserving the asset of the Deceased’s estate and to seek declaratory orders and injunctions against the defendants. Issue (b): whether there was fraud and forgery in the application for the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion? [46] The instruments which are in dispute in respect of the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion are (i) the impugned plan; and (ii) the Borang 9B. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 17 [47] D2’s application letter to D4 for the partition of the Original Land was purportedly copied to P1. However, as the evidence shows, the address in the “sk” on the letter was not P1’s. During the trial, P1 confirmed that the address on D2’s application letter was not his and that he had never received a copy of the said letter. [48] Both the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were purportedly signed by P1 and the Deceased. P1 denied that he had appointed D2 to apply for the partition of the Original Land. He also denied signing either the impugned plan or the Borang 9B. [49] The plaintiffs’ case is that as the Deceased had died on 14.06.2003, it would have been impossible for the Deceased to have appointed D2 to apply to partition the Original Land, or for her to have signed the impugned plan on 25.10.2009 and the Borang 9B on 10.03.2010. [50] It is D1 and D2’s case that D2 was appointed to make the application for the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion; and that the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were signed by P1, the Deceased and the Other Co-Owners of the Original Land. In his written submission, learned counsel for D1 and D2 submitted: 5. Defendan Kedua berhujah bahawa selaku perunding jurukur tanah yang telah dilantik untuk membuat permohonan pecah bahagian bagi Hartanah Terdahulu kepada Hartanah Pertama dan Hartanah Kedua telah menyempurnakan proses pecah bahagian tersebut dengan baik dan teratur. 6. Defendan Kedua juga berhujah bahawa setiap proses yang dilakukan oleh Defendan Kedua adalah di dalam pengetahuan dan persetujuan pemilik-pemilik berdaftar Hartanah Terdahulu berdasarkan pelan P1 dan Borang 9B yang telah ditandatangani oleh kesemua pemilik-pemilik berdaftar Hartanah Terdahulu. [Emphasis added] S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 18 [51] The standard of proof for fraud in civil actions is on a balance of probabilities. The Federal Court in Sinnaiyah v Damai Setia [2015] 5 MLJ 1; [2015] 7 CLJ 584; [2015] 5 AMR 497 held that there are only two standards of proof, namely (i) beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, and (ii) on a balance of probabilities in civil cases. It held that the standard of proof of fraud in a civil case is on a balance of probabilities. [52] The plaintiffs desire that this Court give judgment to them and declare that the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion is null and void because of the fraud and forgery in the application for the partition. Thus, pursuant to section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 (“EA”), the legal burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to establish their case that there was fraud and forgery in the application for the partition of the Original Land. [53] Nonetheless, the legal burden of proof (the burden of establishing a case) should not be confused with the evidential burden of proof (the burden of introducing evidence). The Federal Court in International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86; [1980] 1 LNS 31, explained the distinction between the legal burden of proof and evidential burden of proof, per Salleh Abas FCJ (as he then was) as follows: “For the purpose of this appeal it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the two senses in which the expressions burden of proof and onus of proof are used ( Nanji & Co v Jatashankar Dossa & Ors AIR 1961 SC 1474 1478 and Raghavamma v Chenchamma AIR 1964 SC 136 143). The first sense, signified by the expression burden of proof such as referred to in section 101 of the Evidence Act is the burden of establishing a case and this rests throughout the trial on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. …………….. The second sense referred to as onus of proof, on the other hand, relates to the responsibility of adducing evidence in order to discharge the burden of proof. The onus as opposed to burden is not stable S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 19 and constantly shifts during the trial from one side to the other according to the scale of evidence and other preponderates. Such shifting is one continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. According to section 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act, if the party with whom this onus lies whether initially or subsequently as a result of its shifting does not give any or further evidence or gives evidence which is not sufficient, such party must fail. It is this onus that we are concerned with in the present appeal. [Emphasis added] [54] The Federal Court held that whilst the legal burden of proof lies with the party seeking judgment throughout the trial, the evidential burden of proof shifts from one side to the other during the trial. [55] Section 103 of the EA states that the burden of proof of a particular fact lies with the person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence. Section 103 reads: 103. Burden of proof as to particular fact The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A prosecutes B for theft and wishes the court to believe that B admitted the theft to C. A must prove the admission. (b) B wishes the court to believe that at the time in question he was elsewhere. He must prove it. [56] Pursuant to section 106 of the EA, the burden of proving a fact within the knowledge of a person, is with that person. Section 106 reads: 106. Burden of Proving fact especially within knowledge When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. ILLUSTRATIONS S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 20 (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. [57] D2 wishes this Court to believe that D2 was appointed by the registered owners of the Original Land, including P1 and the Deceased, to apply for the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion. He also wishes this Court to believe that P1 and the Deceased had signed the impugned plan and the Borang 9B. [58] Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103 and 106 of the EA, the burden of proof is on D2 to prove on a balance of probabilities that: (a) D2 was appointed by P1 and the Deceased to make the application for the partition of the Original Land; and (b) P1 and the Deceased had signed the impugned plan and the Borang 9B. This is because both these particular facts are within D2’s knowledge. (i) Did D2 prove that he was appointed by P1 and the Deceased to make the application for the partition? [59] D1 and D2 plead in para. 14 of their statement of defence that D2 was appointed by the registered owners of the Original Land to make the application for the partition of the land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion. Para. 14 of the defence is reproduced below: 14. ……….. Defendan Kedua menyatakan bahawa Defendan Kedua telah dilantik oleh pemilik-pemilik berdaftar asal bagi Hakmilik terdahulu untuk S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 21 membuat permohonan pecah bahagian tanah kepada Hartanah Pertama dan Hartanah Kedua. [60] Encik Mohammad Ghazali Bin Abu, a manager at MHS Survey Consultant (“DW2”) was called as a witness by the defendants at the trial. Under cross-examination, DW2 admitted that D2 was not appointed by registered owners of the Original Land to make the application for the subdivision and partition. DW2 said that D2 was instructed to make the application by an unknown Malay man whose name DW2 claims he cannot remember. Additionally, DW2 confirmed that the Malay man who instructed him was not P1. DW2’s testimony on this issue is reproduced below: Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Boleh En. Ghazali beritahu kepada Mahkamah siapa yang mengarahkan Defendan ke-2 untuk P1 ini, Pelan Tapak ini disediakan? Siapa yang beri arahan? DW2: Saya …. tentang arahan ini saya tak ingat daripada saya tapi seorang Melayu. Saya dihubungi melalui telefon dan first appointment saya di Pejabat Tanah. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Sekali lagi? Tak jelas, tak dengar. DW2: Saya tak dapat menjelaskan ini particular siapa yang ….. cuma saya boleh ingat masa itu saya buka fail ini atas nama Jahit. Tapi ….. Judge: Encik apa? DW2: Jahit. Yang ada nama penama ni. Sebab urusan tanah ini selalunya …. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Sekejap. Sekejap. Encik kata Encik dapat arahan melalui telepon oleh seorang lelaki Melayu? DW2: Ya, betul. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Lelaki Melayu itu bukan Jahit? S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 22 DW2: Bukan Jahit tapi saya tak boleh ingat siapa. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Tak ingat siapa tetapi Encik letakkan nama orang itu yang memohon ini untuk pecah bahagian seorang …. Encik letakkan nama Jahit. Betul? DW2: Betul. Saya namakan kes ini, kes yang saya ambil sebagai Jahit. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Apa? DW2: Fail saya, saya namakan sebagai Jahit. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Okay. Saya katakan En. Jahit tidak pernah melantik Defendan Ke-2 untuk membuat pecah bahagin pada geran asal ini, Lot 2558. Setuju dengan saya. DW2: Ulang balik? Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Encik kata Encik letak nama fail ini fail Jahait DW2: Mmm. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Saya kata En. Jahit tidak pernah melantik Defendan ke-2 ini atau Mohamad bin Sidin atau pun Encik ke untuk buat pelan pecah bahagian ini, tanah Lot 2558 ini. Dia tidak pernah lantik. Setuju dengan saya? DW2: Setuju. [Emphasis added] [61] By reason of DW2’s admission that D2 was not appointed by P1 to make the application for the partition and the fact that the Deceased had died more than six years before the date of the application, I find that D2 had failed to prove that he was appointed by P1 and the Deceased to make the application to partition the Original Land. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 23 (ii) Did D2 prove that the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were signed by P1 and the Deceased? [62] How is a signature on a document proved? Section 67 of the EA states that if a document is alleged to be signed by a person, the signature of that person must be proved. Section 67 reads: 67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting shall be proved to be in his handwriting. [63] Pursuant to section 103 and 106 of the EA, D2 must prove that the signatures on the impugned plan and Borang 9B were those of P1, the Deceased and the Other Co-Owners. [64] Augustine Paul FCJ in Evidence: Practice and Procedure (4th Ed, LexisNexis) at p 667, citing Sarkaria J's judgment in State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram AIR [1979] SC 14, stated that similar to the Indian Evidence Act and English Law, our EA recognises two direct methods of proving a person's signature or handwriting, which are: (a) the admission of the person who wrote the signature or writing; or (b) the evidence of a witness who saw the person sign or write the document. [65] His Lordship went on to state that a person’s signature or handwriting may also be proved by: (c) by the evidence of a handwriting expert: section 45 of the EA; S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 24 (d) by the evidence of a witness acquainted with the handwriting of the person with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to have been written or signed: section 47 of the EA; (e) opinion formed by the court on the comparison made by itself: section 73 of the EA; and (f) by circumstantial evidence: per Abdoolcader FJ in Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] CLJ Rep 101; [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] 2 MLJ 232, FC. [66] In this instant case, did D2 prove P1’s and the Deceased’s signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B? Going through all the six methods of proving a person’s signature as stated by Augustine Paul FCJ, I find that the answer is in the negative. My reasons for this finding are as follows: (a) D2 did not obtain the admission of P1 or the Deceased that they had signed both the impugned plan and the Borang PB. P1 did not admit that he had signed both documents. And D2 could not procure an admission from the Deceased since she had died more than six years prior to the date of her purported signatures on both documents; (b) D2 did not adduce any evidence of a witness who saw P1 or the Deceased signing either document; (c) D2 did not adduce the evidence of a handwriting expert that the signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B are P1’s and the Deceased’s. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 25 i. The handwriting expert, Encik Muhammad Rafiuddin bin Jailani, who is a Document Examiner with the Jabatan Kimia Malaysia (“PW3”) examined P1’s purported signature on the impugned plan by comparing it against P1’s specimen signatures. ii. In his report dated 18.10.2019, PW3 concluded that upon comparing P1’s specimen signatures, P1’s purported signature on the impugned plan was most probably not written by P1. iii. Learned counsel for D4, during her cross-examination of PW3 suggested to him that there is a probability that the signature on the impugned plan could be P1’s. Although PW3 agreed with the suggestion, he said that the probability that the signature on the impugned plan was P1’s was less than fifty percent (50%); (d) D2 did not adduce any evidence of any witness who is acquainted with P1 and the Deceased’s signatures; (e) this Court did not form an opinion on a comparison of P1’s and the Deceased’s signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B, with any other signatures of theirs; and (f) D2 did not adduce any circumstantial evidence to prove that the signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were P1’s and the Deceased’s. [67] Moreover, DW2 affirmatively stated under cross-examination that he had never met with any of the registered owners of Original Land and that S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 26 he did not witness any of the signatures on the impugned plan. He said that he had, instead, given the impugned plan to the same Malay man whose name he cannot remember to procure the signatures of the co- owners of the Original Land. He also confirmed that the Malay man to whom he gave the impugned plan was not P1. [68] DW2 further confirmed that he did not know when the purported signatures were made on the impugned plan, or that the Deceased had died. DW2’s testimony on this issue is reproduced below: Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Siapa yang dapatkan tandatangan 8 orang ini? DW2: Apabila persetujuan untuk plot A, plot B …… Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Tak. Soalan saya senang saja. Siapa yang dapatkan tandatangan? Sebab tadi En. Ghazali setuju dengan saya ada 8 tandatangan. DW2: Betul, saya serah …… Judge: Soalan saya, siapa yang dapatkan tandatangan ini? DW2: Saya serahkan kepada orang yang sama, orang yang pertama saya jumpa itu. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Kepada siapa? DW2: Orang yang saya berjumpa kali pertama untuk kes ini? Plaintiffs’ Counsel “Orang yang saya jumpa kali pertama”. Dan orang kali pertama itu bukan En. Jahit. Setuju dengan saya? DW2: Setuju Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Setuju? DW2: Setuju. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 27 Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Encik tahu bilakah tandatangan ini diturunkan oleh kelapan-lapan orang ini? DW2: Ada jangka masa tapi saya tak tahu berapa lama? Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Tidak tahu? DW2: Tidak tahu. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Boleh saya katakan Encik tidak menyaksikan tandatangan ini dibuat? DW2: Setuju. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Encik tengok nombor 3 itu, Nabiba Bt Amam, 1/12 bahagian. Encik tahu Nabiba Amam ini telah meninggal dunia? DW2: Tidak tahu. [Emphasis added] Findings on issue (b) [69] For these reasons, I find that D2 had failed to discharge his burden of proof that the purported signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were made by P1 and the Deceased. [70] I am satisfied that based on the facts of this instant case, P1’s and the Deceased’s signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were forged. [71] Accordingly, I find that there was fraud and forgery in the application for the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 28 Issue (c): whether the application for the partition of the Original Land was null and void at law because of the fraud and forgery in the application? [72] The partition of alienated lands is governed by Chapter 2 of Part Nine, sections 140 to 145 of the NLC. [73] Pursuant to section 140(1) of the NLC, any alienated land held by co-proprietors may be partitioned by (i) the agreement between the co- proprietors and (ii) the approval of the State Director (for land held under Registry title) or the Land Administrator (for land held Land Office title). Section 140(1) reads: 140. Powers of co-proprietors to partition with approval of State Director or Land Administrator (1) Any alienated land which is held under Registry or Land Office title by two or more persons as co-proprietors may, by agreement between those persons and with the approval under this Chapter of the State Director or Land Administrator, as provided by sub-section (2), be partitioned- (a) so as to vest in each of them, under a separate title, a portion of the land of an area proportionate as nearly as may be to his undivided share in the whole; or (b) where two or more of them are to continue as co-proprietors, so as to vest- (i) in the remaining co-proprietor or, as the case may be, each of such co-proprietors, under a separate title, a portion of the land of an area proportionate as nearly as may be to his undivided share in the whole; and (ii) in the continuing co-proprietors the remainder of the land under a separate title. [74] Section 141(1)(a) states that no partition shall be approved by the State Director or the Land Administrator unless each of the co-proprietors has either joined in, or consented to making the application for its approval. Section 141(1)(a) reads: S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 29 141. Conditions for approval of partition (1) No partition shall be approved by the State Director or, as the case may be, Land Administrator unless- (a) each of the co-proprietors has either joined in, or consented to the making of, the application for its approval; [75] Notwithstanding the provisions in sections 140 and 141, section 141A of the NLC states that any co-proprietor can make the application for approval to partition a land, where the other co-proprietors do not join in or consent in the making of the application. Section 141A reads: 141A. Application for partition by any co-proprietors Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 140 and 141, any co-proprietors neither join in nor consent to the making of the application may apply for approval to the land. [76] Learned counsel for D1 and D2 submits that the process for the partition of the Original Land was in order and valid because section 141A of the NLC allows the other co-proprietors of the Original Land to apply for the partition of the land. [77] With regards to the partition of the Original Land, pursuant to sections 103 and 106 of the EA, the evidential burden is on D1 and D2 to prove that any of the co-proprietors of the Original Land (defined above as “the Other Co-Owners”) had consented to the application for the partition of the said land. [78] Similarly, as D1 and D2 are relying on section 141A of the NLC that the Other Co-Owners had consented to the application for the partition of the Original Land, the evidential burden is on D1 and D2: see Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 5 MLJ 136; [2007] 4 CLJ 526; [2007] 4 AMR 546, CA (“Au Meng Nam”). The Court of Appeal in Au Meng Nam held that as the first defendant, in that case, relied on the S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 30 proviso in section 340(3) of the NLC that he was a bona fide purchaser for value, the evidential burden was on him. [79] D1 and D2 did not call any of the Other Co-Owners as witnesses during the trial. Without the testimony of any of the Other Co-Owners, both D1 and D2 failed to prove that their case that the Other Co-Owners had consented to the making of the application for the partition of the Original Land. They also did not produce any evidence to discharge their evidential burden that D2 was instructed by at least one of the Other Co-Owners to apply for the partition. DW2’s evidence was that he was instructed through the telephone by a Malay man whose name he claims he cannot remember. DW2 did not say that the Malay man was one of the Other Co- Owners. It follows, therefore, that D1 and D2 failed to prove that any of the Other Co-Owners had instructed D2 to apply for the partition of the land. [80] Furthermore, as discussed in Issue (d) below, D1’s evidence is that he did not meet any of the co-owners of the Original Land prior to the partition of the Original Land: see D1’s testimony reproduced in para. [93] below. He only dealt with a broker. Like DW2, D1 testified that the broker was a Malay man whose name he cannot remember. D1 said that he only met with the sellers of the land after the partition of the Original Land, when he was going to cross out (potong) the details of the Original Land and replace it with the details of the 1st Partitioned Portion on the Borang 14A. Findings on issue (c) [81] For the reasons above, both D1 and D2 failed to prove that D2 was appointed by P1 and the Deceased, or by any other the Other Co-Owners of the Original Land for the application for the partition of the land. They S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 31 also failed to prove that any of the Other Co-Owners of the Original Land had made and/or agreed to D2 making the application of the partition of the title of the Original Land. [82] Accordingly, this Court finds that the application for the partition of the Original Land did not comply with either section 140 or section 141A of the NLC. The application for the partition is accordingly null and void for this reason. [83] Additionally, this Court has found for the reasons stated in Issue (b) above that there was forgery of the impugned plan and the Borang 9B. In Boonsom Boonyanit v Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ 17; [1997] 2 MLJ 62; [1997] 2 AMR 1813, the Court of Appeal, per Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) held: Third, it is axiomatic that a forged instrument is null and void and of no effect. (See, Kreditbank Cassel G.M.B.H. v. Schenkers Ltd. [1927] 1 KB 826, at p. 834, per Bankes LJ). It is not merely voidable. [Emphasis added] [84] The English Court of Appeal in Kreditbank Cassel G.M.B.H. v. Schenkers Ltd. [1927] 1 KB 826, held that because the bills of exchange, in that case, were forgeries, applying Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated [1906] A. C. 439, the plaintiffs could not, in any event, invoke the principle that they were not bound to inquire into the indoor management of the defendant company. It cited the decision of the House of Lords in Ruben v Great Fingall Consolidated, where Lord Loreburn L.C. said as follows in relation to forged documents: I cannot see upon what principle your Lordships can hold that the defendants are liable in this action. The forged certificate is a pure nullity. It is quite true that persons dealing with limited liability companies are not bound to inquire into their indoor management, and will not be affected by irregularities of which they had S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 32 no notice. But this doctrine, which is well established, applies only to irregularities that otherwise might affect a genuine transaction. It cannot apply to a forgery. {Emphasis added] [85] Accordingly, as the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were forged documents, based on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Boonsom Boonyanit v Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd; and the English cases of Ruben v Great Fingall Consolidated and Kreditbank Cassel G.M.B.H. v. Schenkers Ltd., this Court finds that the application for the partition of the Original Land was null and void. Issue (d): whether D1 and/or D2 separately and/or jointly were involved in the fraud and forgery of the application for the partition? ▪ D1 [86] The evidence shows that D1, when he wanted to buy the land, knew that the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion were originally one piece of land — the Original Land — held under one title. D1’s testimony on this issue is reproduced below: Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Saya masih lagi dalam S&J4, Yang Arif. Mr. Ng, pada masa Mr. Ng mahu beli itu tanah 2010, Mr. Ng kata 2010, kan? D1: Ya. Plaintiffs’ nsel: Itu jam, 2 geran belum lagi ada. Setuju dengan saya? D1: Betul. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Mesti ada 1 geran sahaja? D1: 1 geran sahaja. [Emphasis added] S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 33 [87] During the trial, D1 was shown the impugned plan (exhibit “P1”) that was submitted by D2 in the application for the partition of the Original Land. On the impugned plan, the Original Land (Lot 2558) was drawn into Plot B (facing the main road) and Plot A (behind Plot B). After the partition was approved by D4, Plot A was held under the title for the 1st Partitioned Portion and Plot B was held under the title for the 2nd Partitioned Portion. Below is the image of the part of the impugned plan showing the main road, Lot 2558 and Plots A and B: [88] D1’s testimony shows that he knew, before the application for the partition was made by D2, the location of Plot A and Plot B of the Original Land, which were subsequently held after the partition under two separate titles. The excerpt of his testimony is reproduced below: Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Yang Arif, saya akan merujuk SD1 kepada P1 di dalam m/s 1 bundle C, Yang Arif. Mr. Ng, itu depan ada ini, C. Yang nipis, m/s 1. Mr. Ng tengok m/s 1 ada ini pelan. Depan sekali, paling depan, paling awal. Ya, itu. Betul. Mr. Ng Nampak itu ada Plot A, Plot B dekat itu pelan? Ada Nampak? Boleh tengok ke? S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 34 D1: Boleh. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Mr. Ng beli plot mana? D1: Ha? Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Yang mana satu Mr. Ng sudah beli? Itu tanah Mr. Ng beli Plot B, betul? D1: Plot B, betul. Itu besar punya. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Mr. Ng beli semua itu Plot B, betul? D1: Betul. Betul Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Plot A Mr Ng beli, ada bahagian yang Mr. Ng. beli. Tidak semua. Betul? D1: Betul. [Emphasis added] [89] D1 said that he did not meet the registered owners of the Original Land before deciding to buy the land. Instead, he had met with a broker — a Malay man whose name he claims he cannot remember. D1 said that the broker told him that the land was for sale. [90] Under cross-examination, D1 testified that on the recommendation of his lawyer, he had appointed D2 to make the application for the partition of the Original Land. He said that he had paid D2’s fees in making the application. D1 said he had also paid D3’s and D4’s fees for the application. [91] After the partition of the Original Land, one of the Other Co-Owners of the Original Land, Mohd. Mokhtar bin Zakarsi transferred his portion of the Land to D1 for the sum of RM100,000.00: see the memorandum of transfer (Borang 14A) dated 12.05.2010 (exhibit “P11”). And the rest of the Other Co-Owners — Mohd Mosly bin Zakasi, Nasrudin bin Jarkasi, S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 35 Rihanah binti Jarkasi, Saada binti Jarkasi and Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan — transferred to D1 all the portions of land held under HS(M) 39941, PT 66485, Mukim Kapar (i.e., the 2nd Partitioned Portion) for the sum of RM650,000.00: see memorandum of transfer (Borang 14A) dated 12.05.2010 (exhibit “P13”). [92] The Jadual Tanah dan Kepentingan on the Borang 14A (exhibit “P11”) shows the portion and details of the land transferred by Mohd. Mokhtar bin Zakarsi to D1 was 1/10 share in Geran Mukim 6048, Lot 2558, Mukim Kapar (i.e., the Original Land). However, the details were crossed out and replaced with 2/7 portion and that of HSM 39940, PT 66484, Mukim Kapar (i.e., the 1st Partitioned Portion). This can be seen in the image of the 2nd page of exhibit “P11” shown below: [93] D1 said that before he crossed out (potong) the details of the Original Land on the Borang 14A (exhibit “P11”) and replaced it with the details of the 1st Partitioned Portion, he met all the sellers of the land. He said that he only viewed the land from the main road; and did not view the S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 36 land together with the sellers. D1 also said that when viewing the land from the main road, he could see that there were houses on the said land. However, he did not ask the broker or the sellers whose houses were on the said land. The excerpt of his testimony is reproduced below: Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Mr. Ng tengok ada jawapan No. 4 “4.J”. Mr. Ng kata: “Pada sekitar tahun 2010 saya telah bersetuju untuk membeli 2/7 bahagian tanah milik Mohd Mokhtar Bin Zakarsi atas hakmilik HSM39940, PT 66484, Mukim Kapar (Hartanah Pertama) dengan harga RM100,000.00 serta kesemua bahagian tanah milik Mohd Mosly Bin Zakasi, Nasrudin Bin Jarkasi, Rihanah Binti Jarkasi, Saada Binti Jarkasi dan Zohdi Bin Hj Abd Manan atas hakmilik HSM 39941, PT 66485, Mukim Kapar (Hartanah Kedua) dengan harga RM650,000.” Mr. Ng, saya mahu tanya, ada jumpa penjual tak pada tahun 2010 ini? D1: Apa itu? Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Mr. Ng, setuju jumpa, kan? Tadi ada broker? D1: Ya. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Ada jumpa ini semua penjual yang Mr. Ng mahu beli dia punya tanah? D1: Bila saya mahu potong ……. pindah itu …. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Pindah nama? D1: Pindah itu 14A, itu ada jumpa. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Mr. Ng, sebelum Mr. potong itu 14A, sign itu 14A, ada pergi ini tanah tak, tengok sama-sama dengan penjual? Ada pergi tengok? D1: Tak ada. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Tak pernah pergi tengok tanah? D1: Ada tengok di jalan besar. Tengok saja. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 37 Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Dari jalan besar, tengok saja itu tanah? D1: Dia cakap ini tanah nak jual. Itu saja. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Itu saja? D1: Ya. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Itu jam masa Mr. Ng tengok tanah dari jalan besar, ini kawasan, kawasan depan ini ada rumah sudah, itu tanah ada rumah. Tahu? D1: Ada Nampak. Depan pun ada. Ada Nampak. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Mr. Ng ada tanya tak itu penjual ke, itu broker ke, “itu rumah siapa”? Ada tanya? D1: (inaudible 00.42.31) Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Tak ada tanya? Jawab Mr. Ng, ada ke tak ada? D1: Tak ada. [Emphasis added] [94] D1 as the purchaser of the land should have conducted the relevant investigation on the land prior to his purchase of the land. The Court of Appeal in Yap Ham Seow v Fatimawati Bt Ismail & Ors and Another Appeal [2013] 9 CLJ 577; [2014] 1 MLJ 645; [2014] 2 AMR 301 (“Yap Ham Seow”) held that a purchaser is clearly obligated to investigate properly all matters relating to the sale of the land. [95] The Court of Appeal found the third defendant, who was the purchaser in that case, was a negligent purchaser because he had concluded the sale without any proper investigation into the title or the persons who were the actual proprietors of the land. It held that a negligent purchaser could not be accorded protection of the Court because a purchaser in good faith does not include a purchaser who had been S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 38 negligent or kept his eyes shut. Raus Sharif PCA (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, held: [102] Premised on the above, we are convinced that the third defendant had concluded the sale without any proper investigation into the title or the persons who are the actual proprietors. ………. The third defendant in the conveyance of the land was under obligation to investigate properly all matters relating to the sale of the land. Clearly based on the facts and circumstances of the case the third defendant was negligent in not doing so. In our considered view a negligent purchaser cannot be accorded the protection of this court because a purchaser in good faith does not include a purchaser who has been negligent or who had kept his eyes shut (Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 5 MLJ 136 (Au Meng Nam). This court in Au Meng Nam had held that the purchaser is under the obligation to investigate properly all matters relating to the sale and not just blindly accept what was claimed by the vendor as correct and genuine. The purchaser in that case clearly disregarded his obligations to investigate the alleged proprietors and the genuineness of the documents. Hence, when a purchaser failed to take ordinary precautions which ought to have been taken in such a matter, he is not entitled to the protection of the court. [Emphasis added] [96] In the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors (supra), Raus Sharif JCA (as he then was) held: [44] ……… The first defendant is under the obligation to investigate properly all matters relating to the sale of the said land and not to just blindly accept what was claimed by the 'vendors' as correct and genuine. When he failed to take the ordinary precautions which ought to be taken in such a matter he is not entitled to the protection of the court. And Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) said: "………. To me, the 1st defendant had acted hastily. He concluded the sale without any proper investigation into the title or the persons claiming to be proprietors. No doubt he had every right to take advantage of the low price that was offered to him but he took the risk. When he embarked into such risk, it cannot be at the expense of the plaintiffs. This is because while he had a choice, S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 39 the plaintiffs had none. In fact, the plaintiffs were helpless. The plaintiffs could not do anything to prevent the fraud. Even locking the title in a safe would not had help the plaintiffs. In such circumstances the court must not favour the 1st defendant, over the plaintiffs. To do so would be doing injustice to the plaintiffs." [Emphasis added] [97] By his own admission, D1 had failed to make any inquiries as to who were the co-owners of the Original Land and whether they agreed to the land to be partitioned. He also failed to make any enquiries as to existing houses that were on the said land and its owners and occupants. He relied on the broker completely. The Chancery Court of England and Wales in Oliver v Hinton [1899] 2 Ch 264 found that a purchaser to be grossly negligent in failing to make any inquiry as to the title and relied on his agent completely. The Court found that although there was no fraud in fact by the purchaser, but the purchaser’s failure to make any inquiry as to the title was negligence so gross that led the Court to impute fraud on the purchaser. Linley MR held: “In the present case there has been no fraud on the part of the defendant; there has only been gross negligence in the ordinary sense of words. … negligence so gross as would justify the Court of Chancery in concluding that there had been fraud in an artificial sense of the word — such gross negligence, for instance as omitting to make any inquiry as to the title of the property. In that sense of the word, I think, there has been in the present case on the part of the defendant negligence so gross as would have led the Court of Chancery to impute fraud of that kind to her. I do not mean to suggest that there was any fraud in fact.” [Emphasis added] [98] The principles promulgated in Oliver v Hinton (“the Oliver v Hinton principles”) was applied by the Court of Appeal in Au Meng Nam and Yap Ham Seow. Raus Sharif PCA (as he then was) in Yap Ham Seow said: S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 40 [103] The case of Au Meng Nam reiterated the governing principles as propounded by Linley MR in Oliver v Hinton [1899] 2 Ch 264. The Chancery Court in Oliver v Hinton found the purchaser to be grossly negligent in failing to make inquires as to the title and relied on his agent completely. [Emphasis added] [99] Based on the facts and circumstances of this instant case, I find that D1 was grossly negligent in failing to make any inquiries as to the title of the Original Land and the co-proprietors of the said land. As held by the Court of Appeal in Yap Ham Seow, D1 as the purchaser of the land was under an obligation to investigate properly all matters relating to the sale of land, including the title of the land and actual proprietors of the land. D1 by his own admission, did not do so. Paraphrasing the words of Raus Sharif PCA in Yap Ham Seow, by failing to conduct the necessary investigation, D1 clearly disregarded his obligation to make enquiries as to the title and closed his eyes as to whether the co-proprietors of the Original Land had agreed or consented to the partition of the said land, and whether D2 had made the application to partition the land on the instructions of any of the co-proprietors. [100] D1’s gross negligence had resulted in the Original Land being partitioned without P1 and the Deceased’s consent and the houses owned by the plaintiffs’ and their extended families on the 2nd Partitioned Portion at risk of being demolished and those occupying the houses at risk of being evicted from the land. [101] For this reason, pursuant to the Oliver v Hinton principles, I find D1’s negligence so gross as to impute fraud on D1. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 41 ▪ D2 [102] Under section 5 of the NLC, a pre-computation plan must be prepared either by the Director of Survey and Mapping or a licensed land surveyor showing the intended new boundaries and areas of the lots based on computation from existing survey data or other relevant data, where the linear misclosure of the computation is not less than one part in four thousand. “Pre-computation plan” is defined in section 5 of the NLC as: “a plan of the layout of lots prepared by Director of Survey and Mapping or licensed land surveyor showing the intended new boundaries and areas of those lots which are based on computation from existing survey data and other relevant data, where the linear misclosure of the computation is not less than one part in four thousand.” [Emphasis added] [103] “Licensed land surveyor” is defined in section 5 of the NLC as a surveyor licensed to practise under the Licensed Land Surveyors Act, 1958 (the “1958 Act”). D2 is a licensed land surveyor – he is licensed to practice under the 1958 Act. [104] DW2 is employed as a Pembantu Jurukur at D2’s firm, MHS. Under cross-examination, DW2 confirmed that he is not a licensed land surveyor: he is not licensed to practice under the 1958 Act. [105] DW2 also confirmed that impugned plan was not prepared by D2. He testified that the impugned plan was prepared by a person named Liza, who is a “pelukis plan” employed at MHS and that DW2 had reviewed the impugned plan prior to submission to D3. [106] Additionally, DW2 confirmed that neither he nor Liza went to the site of the Original Land nor did they measure the said land in preparing S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 42 the impugned plan. He said that the plan was prepared based on what the Malay man whose name he cannot remember, told him. It was not prepared based on computation from existing survey data and other relevant data as required under section 5 of the NLC. Accordingly, the impugned plan did not fall within the definition of a “pre-computation plan” under the NLC. [107] Despite the impugned plan not being a pre-computation plan, D2’s firm MHS in its letter of 17.09.2009 to D3 stated that it was a pre- computation plan and submitted 17 copies of the plan for D3’s approval. [108] MHS had also stated in its application letter of 12.02.2010 to D4 that it was appointed by landowner “En Jahit Bin Rahmat & rakan-rakan” to subdivide the Original Land. From DW2’s testimony, we know this statement was not true — DW2 under cross-examination confirmed that P1 did not appoint D2 or MHS. DW2 also confirmed that he did not witness P1 and the Other Co-Owners signing the impugned plan, and that he was not aware that the Deceased was dead at the time she had purportedly signed the impugned plan. [109] Accordingly, based on these facts, I find that D2 was in fact involved in the fraud and forgery of the application for the partition of the Original Land. Findings on issue (d) [110] For all the reasons above, I find that D1 and D2 were separately and/or jointly involved in and/or privy to the fraud and forgery of the application for the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 43 Issue (e): whether the registration of the names of P1, the Deceased and D1 on the title of the 1st Partitioned Portion, and D1 on the title of the 2nd Partitioned Portion is null and void at law? [111] This Court had found for the reasons discussed in Issue (c) above that the application for the partition Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion was null and void. [112] Additionally, this Court had found for the reasons discussed in Issue (d) above that D1 and D2 were separately and/or jointly involved in and/or privy to the fraud and forgery of the application for the partition of the Original Land. [113] As both the partition and the titles for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion were obtained through fraud and forgery, they are null and void at law. It follows, therefore, that the transfer and registration of the new co-proprietors on the title of the 1st Partitioned Portion and the name of D1 on the title of the 2nd Partitioned Portion, was also null and void. Findings on issue (e) [114] The partition of the Original Land and the issuance by D4 of the titles for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion were null and void because of the forged documents. Accordingly, I find that the registration of the names of P1, the Deceased and D1 on the title of the 1st Partitioned Portion, and D1 on the title of the 2nd Partitioned Portion are null and void at law. [115] Section 340(2) of the NLC states that the title or interest of a person of any land is not indefeasible in the following situations: S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 44 (a) in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or (b) where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or (c) where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law. [116] This Court has found that both D1 and D2 were party and/or privy to the fraud and forgery relating to the application for the partition of the Original Land. The titles to the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion were obtained by means of fraud and forged instruments. [117] It follows, therefore, that the registration of the P1, the Deceased and D1’s names on the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion are defeasible pursuant to section 340(2)(a) and (b) of the NLC and should, accordingly, be set aside. Issue (f): whether D2 failed, refused and/or was negligent in discharging his responsibility and duty of care as a licensed land surveyor under Lembaga Jurukur Tanah Malaysia; [118] D2 is a land surveyor, licensed under Licensed Land Surveyors Act 1958 (Act 458) (“the 1958 Act”). As a licensed land surveyor, D2 is obliged to comply with the Licensed Land Surveyors Regulations 2011 (the “2011 Regulations”). Sub-regulation 29(1) of the 2011 Regulations sets out the code of professional conduct of licensed land surveyors. It reads: 29 Code of professional conduct (1) Every licensed land surveyor shall: (a) comply with the provisions of the National Land Code 1965, the Act, any rules and regulations made thereunder and any other written laws in force related to his professional duties; S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 45 ……………… (e) not be dishonest or fraudulent in discharging of his professional duties; ……………… (h) not certify, affix or put his signature to drawings or plans which are not prepared by him or under his supervision for the purpose of obtaining approval from any authority; [119] Pursuant to the 1958 Act, every licensed land surveyor must comply with all the provisions in sub-regulation 29(1) of the 2011 Regulations. Pursuant to regulation 31(b) of the 2011 Regulations, non- compliance with any provision of the code of professional conduct under sub-regulation 29(1) is a professional misconduct. [120] As discussed in paragraph [102] above, pursuant to section 5 of the NLC, a pre-computation plan must be prepared either by the Director of Survey and Mapping or a licensed land surveyor. Under sub-regulation 29(1)(h) of the 2011 Regulations, D2, as a licensed land surveyor, is prohibited to certify, affix or put his signature to drawings or plans that were not prepared by him or under the supervision to obtain approval from the authority. [121] However, the evidence shows that the impugned plan was not prepared by D2 or under his supervision. The impugned plan was instead prepared by Liza, a “pelukis plan” under the supervision of DW2, who is a “pembantu jurukur” and not a licensed land surveyor. [122] Under section 5 of the NLC, a pre-computation plan must show the intended new boundaries and areas of the lots based on computation from existing survey data or other relevant data. However, in this instant case, the impugned plan submitted to D3 and D4 was not prepared based on computation from existing survey data or any other relevant data. Neither S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 46 DW2 nor Liza had visited the Original Land prior to drawing the impugned plan: DW2 admitted under cross-examination that he and Liza had not gone to the site of the Original Land to take measurements of the land. Instead, the plan was prepared based on information provided by the Malay man, whose name DW2 claims he cannot remember. It follows, therefore, that the impugned plan was not a “pre-computation plan” as defined under the NLC. [123] Additionally, D2, in breach of sub-regulation 29(1)(h) of the 2011 Regulations, had affixed his signature on the impugned plan, even though he had not prepared the plan and the plan was not prepared under his supervision – the facts show that the plan was drawn by Liza and reviewed by DW2. [124] Nonetheless, D2 had represented to D3 in MHS’ letter of 17.09.2009 that the impugned plan was a “pre-computation plan” and had requested D3 to approve the plan. In doing so, D2 was dishonest and/or fraudulent in discharging his professional duties and was in breach of the code of professional conduct in sub-regulations 29(1)(a), (e) and (h) of the 2011 Regulations. [125] Furthermore, D2 had failed to prove that he was instructed by P1 and any of the other co-proprietors of the Original Land to submit copies of the impugned plan to D3 and to make the application for the partition of the Original Land to D4. DW2 had confirmed during the trial that D2 was not appointed by P1. [126] Accordingly, based on these facts, I find that D2 had failed to comply with the provisions of the NLC in making the application for the S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 47 partition of the Original Land. He had also breached the 1958 Act and sub- regulations 29(1)(a), (e) and (h) of the 2011 Regulations. [127] Further, I find that D2 was also dishonest and/or fraudulent when he informed D4 in his application letter of 12.10.2010 that the impugned plan he had submitted was a “pre-computation plan” and that he was appointed by the owners of the Original Land “En. Jahit Bin Rahmat & Rakan-Rakan” to submit the application for the subdivision and partition of the Original Land. [128] In addition to his statutory duty to comply with the provisions of the NLC, the 1958 Act and the code of professional conduct in the 2011 Regulations, D2, as a licensed land surveyor also owed P1 and the Deceased as co-proprietors of the Original Land, a duty of care to ensure that he did not apply to partition their land without their approval or that of the Other Co-Owners. He also had a duty not to act dishonestly or fraudulently. [129] By (i) making the application to D3 for the approval of the forged impugned plan; (ii) making the application to D4 for the partition of the Original Land; (iii) by dishonestly and/or fraudulently representing to the authorities that he acted for “Encik Jahit bin Rahmat dan rakan-rakan”; and (iv) by using forged documents in making the application, D2 had breached his duty of care to P1 and the Deceased. The evidence shows that D2’s breach of the duty of care, had caused damage to P1 and the Deceased’s estate— their houses on the land are at risk of being demolished and they at risk of being evicted from the land on which they and/or members of their family have lived on since 1965. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 48 Findings on issue (f) [130] Accordingly, for these reasons, I find that D2 had breached his statutory duties and duty of care as a licensed land surveyor. Issue (g): Whether D3 had failed and/or was negligent in discharging its responsibility and duty of care in providing the pre-computation plan (plan pra-hitungan) for the application for the partition? [131] The Plaintiffs’ pleadings did not disclose a cause of action for negligence against D3 — they did not plead the particulars of D3’s negligence. They also did not plead that D3 was negligent in approving the impugned plan as a “pre-computation plan”. In their prayers, the Plaintiffs had prayed against D3 for an injunction restraining D3 from demolishing the houses of Plaintiffs and their extended families. They also sought for an interim injunction pending the disposal of this action to restrain D3 from evicting the Plaintiffs from the 2nd Partitioned Portion. [132] It is trite law that parties are bound by their pleadings. The Federal Court in Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Berhad [2015] 6 MLJ 1; [2015] 8 CLJ 944; [2018] 3 AMR 259 held that it is a cardinal rule in civil litigation that parties are bound by their pleadings: they are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded. The Court of Appeal in Aseambankers Malaysia Bhd & Ors v Shen Court Sdn Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 619; [2014] 2 CLJ 773; [2014] AMEJ 0069 held that a Court is not entitled to decide a suit on a matter that is not pleaded. [133] Although in this instant case, the plaintiffs had raised the issue of negligence against D3 in the issues to be tried, the fact remains that they did not plead negligence against D3 in their statement of claim. The Court of Appeal in Tan Keng Yong @ Tan Keng Hong & Anor v Tan Hwa Ling S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 49 @ Tan Siew ling @ Ors [2022] 2 MLJ 805; [2022] 2 AMR 557; [2022] 3 CLJ 274 held that parties could not rely on the agreed issues to be tried to establish or prove their case if the matter had not been pleaded. Findings on issue (g) [134] It follows, therefore, this Court cannot make a finding of negligence against D3 for approving the impugned plan as a pre-computation plan since it was not pleaded by the plaintiffs against D3. Issue (h): whether D4 failed, refused and/or was negligent in discharging its responsibility and duty of care as Land Administrator in the application for the partition and/or the registration of title of the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion? [135] The Plaintiffs’ case against D4 is that as the Land Administrator, D4 has the duty to ensure that the partition of the Original Land and/or the registration of the titles for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion were not in contravention with any written law. [136] D4’s defence is seven-fold. The learned Selangor State assistant legal advisor (“ALA”) argued the following in D4’s defence: 1) D4 had acted legally and in order in accordance with the applicable law at the material time in processing the application for the partition of the Original Land; 2) As the original issue document of title for the Original Land had been delivered to D4 in the application for the partition, D4 had no reason to suspect any suspicious circumstances in the application and had proceeded to process the application; 3) The plaintiffs failed to inform D4 of the Deceased’s death; S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 50 4) D4 does not have the responsibility to investigate behind the Borang 9B and to ensure that the parties named in the Borang 9B were the correct parties; 5) The identity card for the Deceased was still a valid and could be accepted for the application for the subdivision and partition of the Original Land pursuant to Regulation 2 of the National Registration Regulations 1990 (“NR Regulations 1990”); 6) D4 is entitled to avail itself to the statutory protection of officers under section 22 of the NLC; and 7) The plaintiffs failed to prove all the elements of the tort of negligence against D4. [137] D4, in paragraphs 6(d), (g) and (h) of its statement of defence, pleaded that upon checking and examining the application, in particular the impugned plan and the Borang 9B submitted by D2, it found that: (a) both the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were signed by all the co-proprietors of the Original Land, including P1: para. 6(d); (b) it was satisfied that all the co-proprietors of the Original Land including P1, had given their written consent for the said application and that the Borang 9B was an instrument that qualified for registration: para. 6(g); and (c) at the material time, D4 did not suspect any suspicious circumstances as regards the documents presented including the impugned plan and the Borang 9B, and in good faith accepted that S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 51 all the signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B were the signatures of the co-proprietors of the Original Land. [138] D4, however, did not plead that it had examined the copies of co- proprietors’ identity cards that were submitted by D2 with the application. [139] D4’s witness, Sazatul Faeza binti Alias (“DW4”) was the officer who had processed the application in the partition of the Original Land in 2010. She held the position of Penolong Pegawai Daerah (Pembangunan Tanah) di Pejabat Daerah/Tanah Klang from 05.02.2007 until 15.03.2015. DW4 in her answer to QA4 in her witness statement, stated that she had received the following documents from D2 in relation to the application: (a) 12 salinan pelan pra hitungan ruj: MHS/GMS/0965-PH(01)(“Pelan”); (b) 3 salinan Borang 9B (Permohonan untuk Memecahkan Bahagian Tanah)(“Borang 9B”); (c) Wang tunai sebanyak RM100.00 sebagai bayaran pendaftaran; (d) 1 salinan sijil carian rasmi bagi hakmilik Hartanah Terdahulu; (e) 1 salinan penyata cukai tanah 2010; (f) 1 salinan hakmilik Hartanah Terdahulu; (g) 8 salinan kad pengenalan pemilik-pemilik Hartanah Terdahulu; dan (h) Surat kelulusan daripada Majlis Perbandaran Klang. [140] D4’s case is that it had acted in good faith and there was no reason for DW4 who was D4’s officer who had processed the application for the partition, to suspect any suspicious circumstances in the application. [141] For the reasons discussed below, this Court is unable to agree with D4 that it had acted in good faith in discharging its duty under the NLC in processing and approving the application and that there were no suspicious circumstances in respect of the application. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 52 (i) The Co-Proprietors’ Identity Cards [142] I found DW4 to be a less than candid witness — she was defensive and evasive. As is apparent from the notes of proceedings of the trial, under cross-examination by the plaintiffs’ counsel, DW4 resolutely refused to answer whether she had examined the copies of the co-proprietors’ identity cards submitted with the application. [143] DW4’s answers to the Plaintiff’s counsels’ questions on whether she had examined the copy of the Deceased’s identity card were either “mungkin” and “kurang pasti”. Even when asked the simple question by the plaintiff’s counsel of whether she had examined the copies of the identity cards, she answered “kurang pasti”. I then asked DW4, when she answered “kurang pasti” did she mean she was unsure whether she had checked the copies of the identity cards, she refused to answer my question but instead claimed that she was confused by the question! When Plaintiffs’ counsel rephrased the question to suggest that she did not examine the identity cards, DW4 disagreed with the suggestion. This can be seen in the excerpt below of DW4’s answers during cross- examination: Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Puan tak semak kad pengenalan tersebut yang tadi Puan kata dokumen yang wajib untuk dikemukakan? DW4: Kurang pasti. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Saya juga mencadangkan …….. Judge: Maaf. Maknanya Puan kurang pasti sama ada Puan semak atau tidak? Adakah itu jawapan Puan? DW4: Saya keliru dengan soalan sebenarnya. Judge: Okay. Tolong tanya semula. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 53 Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Baik. Yang Arif. Puan kata dekat situ [answer to QA5 in DW4’s witness statement] “Saya tidak mengesyaki sebarang perkara yang mencurigakan” dan Puan kata kerana Puan kata pemilik hartanah terdahulu pada pelan dan Borang 9B adalah sama? Betul? DW4: Betul. Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Maksudnya, setuju dengan saya bila Puan tulis jawapan begini Puan tidak semak pun kad pengenalan tadi yang saya soal di awal tadi? Setuju? DW4: Tidak sebab ……. tidak. [144] Despite resolutely refusing to answer Plaintiff’s counsel’s questions during cross-examination as to whether she had examined the copies of P1’s, the Deceased’s and the Other Co-Owners’ identity cards, D4 during re-examination by the ALA said that she had examined the copies of identity cards. [145] Nonetheless, what is evident from D4’s answer to the ALA during re-examination is that all she did was compare that the details (butiran) on the copies of identity cards were the same as that on the impugned plan, the Borang 9B and the issue document of title of the Original Land. DW4 told this Court that to her, in an application for partition of land, what is important is the signature of the owners — in that the signature of the landowners were on the Borang 9B and the impugned plan submitted by D2. The excerpt of DW4’s testimony is reproduced below: D4’s Counsel: Tadi peguam ada cadangkan bahawa dalam permohonan pecah bahagian ini Puan hanya merujuk kepada …… hanya menyemak kepada pelan dan Borang 9B sahaja tetapi tidak menyemak kad pengenalan tadi Puan jawab tidak setuju. Boleh jelaskan kenapa tak setuju? S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 54 DW4: Kerana kita telah ….. saya telah menyemak salinan-salinan kad pengenalan tersebut. Cuma yang kita telah pastikan pada salinan tersebut adalah butirannya sama denga nama yang ternyata dalam permohonan. Maksudnya yang sama di atas Borang 9B dan juga butiran tersebut adalah sama di atas pelan yang telah ditandatangani dan butiran- butiran pemilik tanah tersebut juga adalah sama seperti yang dinyatakan dalam geran tanah asal. D4’s Counsel: Peguam juga ada cadangkan oleh kerana Puan tidak menyoal tentang kad pengenalan Nabiba tersebut yang berbeza dengan kad pengenalan pemilik tanah yang lain Puan tidak menjalankan tugas administrative dengan betul. Puan jawab tidak bersetuju. Boleh jelaskan kenapa tak setuju? DW4: Saya tidak setuju kerana untuk permohonan pecah bahagian tanah apa yang penting …….. yang penting mesti ada adalah tandatangan pemohon, tandatangan pemilik tanah di mana tandatangan pemilik tanah telah pun ada pada Borang 9B dan juga pada pelan tanah tersebut yang telah dikemukakan oleh MHS Consultant kepada kita. [Emphasis added] [146] In my view, if indeed DW4 had checked the details on the copies of the identity cards as she told the ALA during re-examination, she would have noticed the following: (a) On the impugned plan (exhibit “P1”), the Deceased’s identity card number was not stated. The “No.KP” under the Deceased’s name was left blank. The identity card numbers for Saada binti Jarkasi and Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan were left blank too; and (b) On the Borang 9B (exhibit “D3”), the identity card numbers for the Deceased, Saada binti Jarkasi and Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan were also left blank. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 55 [147] D4 would also have noticed that copy of the Deceased’ identity card (unlike the copies of P1’s and the Other Co-Owners’ identity cards) was the old identity card. It was not the new identity card (the MyKad), and it did not contain all the particulars made compulsory by NR Regulations 1990 with effect from 1.11.2000. [148] The learned ALA argued that the Deceased’s identity card was still valid and could be used in the application to partition the Original Land based on Reg. 2 of the NR Regulations 1990. With respect to the ALA, I am unable to agree with her that the Deceased’s identity card was still valid when the application was made in 2010. In making that argument, the learned ALA had ignored the amendments to the NR Regulations 1990 as amended by the National Registration (Amendment) Regulations 2000 (PU(A) 70/2000)(the “NR (Amendment) Regulations 2000”) and National Registration (Amendment) Regulations 2001 (PU(A) 232/2001)(the “NR (Amendment) Regulations 2001”). [149] “Identity card” is defined in Reg. 2 of the NR Regulations 1990 as follows: "identity card" means an identity card or a Government multipurpose card issued under subregulation 5(1), any temporary identity document issued under subregulation 5(5) and paragraph 7(3)(b), and includes any replacement identity card issued under regulation 13, 14, 15 or 18, as the case may be, and any identity card issued before the operation of these Regulations; [150] Reg. 5(2) of the NR Regulations 1990, as amended by NR (Amendment) Regulations 2000 and the NR (Amendment) Regulations 2001 reads: (2) An identity card shall contain the particulars as prescribed in the First Schedule or Schedule 1A, as the case may be, and such other particulars as may be necessary for the identification of the person to whom it is issued. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 56 [Emphasis added] [151] The particulars that must be contained in an identity card are set out in the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990 as below: First Schedule (Regulation 5(2)) FORM OF IDENTITY CARD An identity card shall contain the following particulars: Obverse: Identity Card Number Name Residential Address Date of Issuance of Identity Card/Expiry Date for Replacement Identity Card Old Identity Card Number, if any Identity Code for Native of the State of Sabah or Sarawak Citizenship or Residential Status Religion (only for Muslims) Holder's Photograph Reverse: Signature of Director General of National Registration Left Thumb Impression Right Thumb Impression Holder's former name, if any, shall be as registered in the Birth Certificate issued under the law relating to the registration of births and deaths or in an Adoption Certificate issued to a child or a person so adopted under the law relating to the registration of adoption or in the Citizenship Certificate issued under Part III of the Federal Constitution, but the manner in which the name is to be printed on the identity card shall be as determined by the Director General. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 57 [152] The amendments to the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990 by the NR (Amendment) Regulations 2000 came into effect on 1.10.1999 and by NR (Amendment) Regulations 2001 came into effect on 1.11.2000. The Deceased died in 2003 i.e., after the amendments to the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990 came into effect. Accordingly, the Deceased’s identity card must contain the particulars set out in the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990, listed in para. [151] above. Below is an image of the copy of the Deceased identity card that was submitted to D4 by D2 in March 2010: [153] Regulation 5(2) of the NR Regulations 1990 states that an identity card “shall contain the particulars as prescribed in the First Schedule or Schedule 1A, as the case may be ……..”. And the First Schedule states “An identity card shall contain the following particulars:……….”. [154] It is trite law that the word “shall” means “must” and is mandatory. In Dato’ Dr Zambry bin Abd Kadir v Dato’ Seri Ir Hj Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin (Attorney General of Malaysia, intervener) [2009] 5 S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 58 MLJ 464; [2009] 4 AMR 569; [2009] 5 CLJ 265, CA, Raus Sharif JCA (as he then was) held: [44] The word 'shall' in art XVI (6) of the Perak State Constitution must be interpreted as being 'mandatory'. Any other meaning would create an absurdity to parliamentary democracy …” [155] In Junaidi Berimang v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2022] MLJU 453; [2022] 1 LNS 522, the Court of Appeal, per Lee Swee Seng JCA held: “[17] Parliament is familiar with the use of the word “shall” to make a matter, factor, condition or circumstance to be considered a mandatory one and indeed in some cases, to avoid any doubts and to remove all traces of it, it has not hesitated to use the word “must.” [18] ……….. The word “must” entertains no room for discretion and must be mandatorily followed and complied with; it is the language of strict demand. It is at the extreme end of a continuum of degree of obligation signifying no room for discretion. [156] Zabariah Yusof FCJ delivering the Federal Court’s judgment in Benjamin William Hawkes v Public Prosecutor [2020] 5 MLJ 417, [2020] 6 AMR 749; [2020] 8 CLJ 267, quoting from Cheong Seok Leng v Public Prosecutor [1988] 2 MLJ 481; [1988] 1 LNS 39 (ACRJ Singapore) said: “[46] Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) explained the relevant rules of interpretation to be given to the word ‘shall’ which appears in legislations as follows: … The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus: when a statute uses the word ‘shall’, prima facie it is mandatory, but the court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute.” [157] Looking at the whole of the NR Regulations 1990 and the word “shall” in Regulation 5(2) and the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990, the real intention of legislature is that the requirement that S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 59 Malaysian identity cards contain the particulars prescribed in the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990 is mandatory. [158] Therefore, after 1.11.2000, Malaysian identity cards must contain all the particulars prescribed in the First Schedule of NR Regulations 1990. In this instant case, it is plainly obvious that all the copies of the identity cards of the co-proprietors of the Original Land, except for the Deceased’s, contained all the particulars stipulated in the First Schedule of the NR Regulations. [159] Based on the provisions in Regulation 5(2) and the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990, with respect to the learned ALA, I am unable to agree with her argument that the Deceased’s identity card was valid and can be accepted for purposes of the application for the subdivision and the partition of land. [160] Against the very clear provisions of the NR Regulations 1990 that from 1.11.2000, all Malaysian identity cards must contain the particulars prescribed in the First Schedule of NR Regulations 1990, I am curious why the learned ALA had invited this Court to make a finding of adverse inference against the plaintiffs under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 for not calling a witness from the Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara (JPN) to testify that the old version of the identity card is no longer valid. [161] With respect to the learned ALA, it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to call a witness from JPN to testify as to what are the statutory requirements of a Malaysian identity card because just by reading the provisions of NR Regulations 1990 as amended by the NR (Amendment) Regulations 2000 and the NR (Amendment) Regulations 2001, one can ascertain that the copy of the Deceased’ identity card submitted with D2’s S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 60 application in 2010 was no longer a valid identity card under law as it did not contain the particulars stipulated in the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990. [162] It is patently clear from the image in paragraph [152] above that the copy of the Deceased’s identity card submitted to D4 does not contain the details stipulated in the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990. Additionally, the number of the Deceased’s identity card is described in the First Schedule of the NR Regulations 1990 as “Old Identity Card Number”. [163] As discussed above, DW4 under cross-examination had resolutely refused to answer whether she had checked the copies of the co- proprietors’ identity cards submitted with the application. It was only during re-examination when asked by the ALA whether she checked the copies of the identity cards, she said that she did. She told the ALA that she had compared that the details (butiran) on the copies of identity cards were the same as those on the impugned plan. [164] However, if what DW4 said was true, she would have noticed that the identity card numbers of the Deceased, Saada binti Jarkasi and Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan were not on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B. To my mind, even if DW4 had cursorily glanced at the copies of the identity cards, she could see the copy of the Deceased’s identity card was the old identity card and is different from that of the other co-proprietors. And if she had indeed checked the details of the identity cards against the details of the identity cards on the impugned plan as she claimed, she would have noticed that the details (butiran) were not the same since the identity card S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 61 numbers of the Deceased, Saada binti Jarkasi and Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan were left blank on the impugned plan. [165] These discrepancies would have triggered DW4 to question or ask for a copy of the Deceased’s new identity card i.e. her identity card with the particulars required under the NR Regulations 1990, and she would have also asked why the identity card numbers for the Deceased, Saada binti Jarkasi and Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan were not written on the impugned plan. [166] If DW4 had asked these questions of D2 before forwarding the application to the District Officer /District Land Administrator Klang for approval, DW4 would have found out that the Deceased had passed away in 2003, and it would have been impossible for her to have signed the impugned plan and the Borang 9B in 2010. (ii) The Co-Proprietors Signatures [167] Another glaring discrepancy that should have triggered DW4’s suspicion if she had, in good faith, examined the application for the partition, were the co-proprietors purported “signatures” on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B. [168] DW4 testified that D4’s procedure in processing an application for the partition of land is to check that the names of the co-proprietors on the title of the land are the same as the names of the co-proprietors on both the pre-computation plan and the Borang 9B. In doing so, did she close her eyes to the glaring and obvious differences between the “signatures” on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B? S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 62 Image of Co-Proprietors’ “Signatures” on the Impugned Plan Image of Co-Proprietors’ “Signatures” on the Borang 9B [169] As can be seen from the images of the impugned plan and the Borang 9B reproduced above, even to the naked eye, none of the “signatures” of the co-proprietors on the impugned plan are the same as their “signatures” on the Borang 9B. The forger did not even try to make the “signatures” on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B look the same! S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 63 [170] The learned ALA had submitted that as the original issue document of title for the Original Land had been delivered to D4 in the application for the subdivision and partition of the land, D4 had no reason to suspect any suspicious circumstances in the application and had proceeded to process and approve the application. To support D4’s case, the ALA cited the case of Supreme Tribute Sdn Bhd v Dato Mohd Amin Ahmad Yahya & Ors [2018] 1 LNS 1006; [2018] AMEJ 0826; [2018] MLJU 984 (“Supreme Tribute”), where the Court of Appeal held that the appellant in that case could not blame the 5th to 8th defendants (the Land Administrator Hulu Langat, the Selangor State government, the Assistant District Office Hulu Langat, and the Director of Land and Mines Selangor) for the fraudulent transfer of land as it was a result of the appellant’s own solicitor’s act of using forged documents that led to the transfer of the land and that it was the appellant who had stood to gain from the whole fraudulent exercise. She also cited Leelawathy Ratnam & Ors v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Selangor & Anor [2010] 1 LNS 1185; [2010] AMEJ 0351, where the High Court held: In the absence of suspicion that documents were forged, both Defendants were under no duty to inquire into the veracity of the documents presented to them particularly when the application was accompanied by the required documents. [171] I find that the facts in this case can be distinguished from those in Supreme Tribute. In this instant case, the forged documents were used by D2, whose fees were paid by D1, to make the application for the partition. D1 said that he had also paid the requisite fees to D3 and D4 for the application to partition the Original Land. D1 had benefited from the whole fraudulent exercise. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 64 [172] As regards the case of Leelawathy Ratnam, the High Court held in the absence of suspicion that the documents were forged, the defendants in that case (the Director of Land and Mines Selangor and the Land Administrator Daerah Petaling) did not have the duty to inquire into the veracity of the documents presented to them. The decision in Leelawathy Ratnam can be distinguished from the facts of this instant case, where from the images of the co-proprietors’ “signatures” on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B reproduced in paragraph [146] above, it is obvious that there are suspicious circumstances since the purported “signatures” of the co-proprietors on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B are glaringly different. [173] In its statement of defence, D4 pleaded that it did not suspect any suspicious circumstances as regards the documents presented including the impugned plan and the Borang 9B, and in good faith accepted that all the signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B was the signatures of the co-proprietors of the Original Land. I find it astonishing that the glaring and obvious difference between the co-proprietors’ “signatures” on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B did not raise any red flags or suspicions with DW4 or D4 who had approved the application. [174] The learned ALA had further submitted based on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Negeri Selangor v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2016] 3 CLJ 851 (“Bank Pertanian Malaysia”) that D4 does not have the responsibility to investigate behind the Borang 9B and to ensure that the parties named in the Borang 9B were the correct parties. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 65 [175] But what about a duty to investigate the face of the Borang 9B itself? In view of (i) the obvious and glaring differences between the co- proprietors’ “signatures” on the Borang 9B and their “signatures” on the impugned plan, and (ii) the absence of the identity card numbers for the Deceased, Saada binti Jarkasi and Zohdi bin Haji Abdul Manan on the Borang 9B, does D4 not have the responsibility to question whether the signatures on the Borang 9B were indeed that of the co-proprietors of the land and why were the identity card numbers of the three co-proprietors not written on the Borang 9B? [176] In my considered view, the answer is in the affirmative. D4, as the body entrusted under the NLC to process and approve the application the partition in good faith, does have the responsibility, at the very least, to ask the person who had submitted the application — in this case, D2 — to explain why there is such an obvious discrepancy between the co- proprietors’ signatures on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B and for D2 to confirm that the signatures on the said documents were indeed that of the co-proprietors of land and they had consented to the partition of the land. She should have also asked him about the missing identity card numbers on the Borang 9B, before the submitting the application to D4 for approval. [177] Another example of D4’s lack of good faith and lackadaisical attitude is its action in giving the issue documents of title for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion to the representative of the law firm Salva & Co, even though the law firm in their letter dated 08.12.2010 to D4 (marked exhibit “P8”) did not inform D4 who it was acting for or that it was acting for the proprietors of the lands (see DW4’s answer in QA7 of her witness statement). All the law firm stated in the lettere was S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 66 that it allowed their representative, a Mohd Januruddin bin Talib, to collect the issue documents of title. Do the plaintiffs have the responsibility to inform D4 that the Deceased has died? [178] The learned ALA in defence of D4 submitted that the plaintiffs, in particular P1, had the responsibility to inform D4 that the Deceased had passed away based on the provisions in sections 346, 378 and 379 of the NLC. Sections 346(1), 378 and 379 of the NLC are reproduced below: Section 346: Registration of personal representatives (1) The personal representative or representatives of any deceased person may apply to the Registrar under this section to be registered as such in respect of any land, or share or interest in land, forming part of that person's estate; and the Registrar, if satisfied that any estate duty due in respect of the estate has been paid, or a postponement of payment allowed in respect of the land, share or interest in question, shall give effect to the application in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4). ………… Section 378: Changes of name by proprietors, etc (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Registrar may, upon the production to him of evidence (whether in the form of a deed poll, official certificate, statutory declaration or otherwise) from which he is satisfied of a change of name on the part of any person or body in whom any alienated land or interest is for the time being vested, or at whose instance a caveat has been entered in respect of any land or interest, make a memorial of the change in the relevant register document of title and in any issue document of title or other instrument relating to the said land or interest. (2) In the case of a natural person, such change may also refer to the description of his citizenship or the number of identity card issued to him under the National Registration Act 1959 [Act 78] or, where no such identity card has been issued to him, the number appearing in his passport or any other official document of identity. …………… S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 67 Section 379: Change of address by proprietors, etc 1) Any person or body in whom any alienated land or interest is for the time being vested, or at whose instance a caveat has been entered in respect of any land or interest, shall within the prescribed time notify the Registrar in Form 26A of a change of his address, and the Registrar shall make an appropriate record thereof. (2) Where the new address notified under sub-section (1) is an address outside the Federation, the notification shall specify also an address within the Federation, for the service on the person or body in question of notices under this Act. (3) Any address for the service of notices supplied to the Registrar pursuant to sub-section (2) or any other provision of this Act may, by notification to the Registrar, be changed at any time to another address within the Federation, and the Registrar shall make an appropriate record of the change. [179] With respect to the learned ALA, I cannot see how any of the provisions in 346, 378 and 379 of the NLC can be interpreted to mean that the plaintiffs, in particular P1, have the responsibility to inform D4 that the Deceased had passed away. Section 346 (1) of the NLC states, “the personal representative or representatives of any deceased person may apply to the Registrar under this section to be registered as such in respect of any land, or share or interest in land, forming part of that person's estate.” [180] The Court of Appeal in Junaidi Berimang v Public Prosecutor and another appeal (supra) held that the word “may” conveys “consideration” or “discretion”. The Federal Court in The Government of Malaysia & Anor v Aminah Ahmad [2023] 5 MLJ 32 [2023] 8 CLJ 1; [2023] 6 AMR 102 agreed with the Court of Appeal that the word “may” in is merely permissive and does not impose any obligation to act. Zabidin Mohd Diah CJ (Malaya) delivering the judgment of the Federal Court held: S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 68 [41] Now the issue before us as well as before the courts below is, does the amended s. 3(2) of the PAA 1980 ensure that the constitutional guarantee in art. 147 of the Federal Constitution is preserved? The COA did not think so. The COA expressed its reasons as follows: ………….. [30] It is plainly obvious that the term "may", in s. 3(2) of the PAA 1980 as amended, imposes no obligation to act. "May" is merely permissive (see Datuk Raja Ahmad Zainuddin bin Raja Omar v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Iktisad Negeri Kelantan [2016] 6 MLJevi 66 at para 14). In context, it simply cannot be read as "shall" and there is also no submission by the respondents to this effect. It is evident that the word "may" is here used in contradistinction to the word "shall". This is not a case that admits of more than one possible interpretation. Thus, what would have been an adjustment that would have occurred as of right under the PAA 1980 before its amendment, is, by reason of the 2013 Amendment Act, reduced to something that may be acted upon in the manner provided by the amendments. ………. [42] After careful reading of the amended sections, we with respect, are in agreement with the COA that with the word "may", being used as the mechanism built into s. 3(2) to address a less favourable situation, should it arise, is merely permissive. The amended s. 3(2) of the PAA 1980 does not ensure that art. 147 of the Federal Constitution is not contravened. [Emphasis added] [181] For this reason and based on the decisions of the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal, I am unable to agree with the ALA’s submission that the plaintiffs, in particular P1, had the responsibility to inform D4 that the Deceased had died. To agree with her would result in an absurdity in the interpretation of the provisions of the NLC and the normal and ordinary meaning of the word “may”. It would go against the interpretation of the word “may” by the Federal Court and the Court Appeal, which pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court is bound. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 69 Can D4 rely on the protection of section 22 of the NLC? [182] The ALA argued that D4 could rely on the protection provided under section 22 of the NLC. Section 22 reads: 22. Protection of Officers No officer appointed under this Part shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for any act or matter done, or ordered to be done or omitted to be done, by him in good faith and in the intended exercise of any power, or performance of any duty, conferred or imposed on him by or under this Act. [183] The appellate courts have time and again held that the protection of officers under section 22 of the NLC is not absolute. The Court of Appeal in Bank Pertanian Malaysia (supra) held that the Director of Land Mines Selangor and the Land Administrator cannot avail themselves to section 22 of the NLC as there has been a glaring absence of good faith by reason of its failure to keep accurate particulars in the land registry. The High Court in Hartalega Sdn Bhd & Anor v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors [2022] 12 MLJ 513; [2022] 7 CLJ 735; [2022] AMEJ 0681 listed some of the cases where the Court of Appeal had held that officers cannot avail themselves to the protection under section 22 of the NLC: [40] Notwithstanding s. 22 of NLC, there are decided cases of the appellate courts which held that the land office, Land Administrator and the Registrar of Titles have statutory duties and owe certain duty of care to landowners in some exceptional situations. This means that the protection of officers under s. 22 of NLC is not comprehensive or absolute even in situation where the officers have acted in good faith. [41] From the decided authorities, it has been held that the land office owes a duty of care to landowners which includes taking reasonable steps to adequately protect the land owner's rights. This principle was decided by appellate courts in cases including: (i) Court of Appeal in Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Selangor & Ors v. Shaifulizam Mohd Saleh & Anor And Another Appeal [2020] 5 CLJ 595; [2020] MLJU 276 in S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 70 which the Court of Appeal confirmed the negligence on the part of the land office as follows: [38] Such acts and omissions on the part of the Land Office amount to improper conduct and these improper conducts of the Land Office reflect bad faith on their part which, in our view, clearly show negligence on their part. Further, the non-compliance of the NLC shows a breach of their statutory duty which is equally a breach of a common law duty of care. The Land Office has failed in our view to properly keep land title details and land titles secure in the manner required by the NLC. In Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Pendaftaran Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor v. Poh Yang Hong [2016] 9 CLJ 297, the Federal Court had inter alia held that the administrative shortcoming on the part of the Land Administrator or Registry amounts to negligence. (ii) Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Selangor v. Caesius Development Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Appeal [2020] 3 CLJ 327 where the Court of Appeal stated the land office's duty of care as follows: [39] As a keeper of all land titles, for a particular State (in this case Selangor) it is reasonable to impose upon the land office, including the seventh defendant, a duty of care towards all land owners, to ensure that the landowners' interests are well protected and safeguarded. The land office, including the 7th defendant, has to ensure that the law and proceedings are followed strictly, failing which it can cause the landowners losing their lands. (iii) In Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Selangor & Ors v. Shaifulizam Mohd Saleh & Anor And Another Appeal [2020] 5 CLJ 595 [2020] 5 CLJ 595; [2020] MLJU 276; the Court of Appeal held that the Land Administrator has a specific statutory duty to serve Form 5F (notice to collect the issue document of title) upon the landowner. The Court of Appeal held that failure on the part of the Land Administrator to serve the statutory notice was a breach of statutory duty which rendered him liable to the landowner. (see paras. [31] to [36] of the judgment). [184] I find that based on the facts narrated above, D4 had not acted in good faith in the manner in which it had processed the application for the subdivision and the partition of the Original Land and its action of partitioning the Original Land in breach of the provisions of the NLC. I find that DW4 had failed to exercise due diligence and care in the manner she carried out her responsibility in processing the application for the partition S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 71 of the Original Land, which has resulted in the plaintiffs and their extended families being in danger of having their houses of the said land demolished and them being evicted from the said land — land on which they and their families have lived for nearly 60 years since 1965. [185] Accordingly, I find that D4 cannot avail itself of the protection accorded under section 22 of the NLC. Findings on issue (h) [186] For the reasons discussed above, I find that D4 had breached the NLC and was negligent in discharging its responsibility and duty of care to the plaintiffs in approving the application for the partition of the Original Land. Damages [187] The plaintiffs plead that they had suffered loss and damage as a result of the partition of the Original Land by D4, whereby P1’s and the Deceased’s ownership of the Original Land were moved to the 1st Partitioned Portion, which is situated at the back of the 2nd Partitioned Portion, away from the main road. They are also in danger of having their family homes and those of their extended families located on the 2nd Partitioned Portion demolished by D1 and/or D3. As shown in the minutes of the meeting on 02.03.2019 between the plaintiffs together with some of their family members and D1 (reproduced in paragraph [24] above), D1 had suggested that they move to the 1st Partitioned Portion or he buys P1’s and the Deceased’s share in the 1st Partitioned Portion or replace it with one of his other lands — which suggestions the plaintiffs and their families refused. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 72 [188] D4’s partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion is null and void under the NLC since D2 was not appointed by P1, the Deceased or any of the Other Co-Owners to make the application and because it was made based on forged documents. [189] As the facts show, the partition of the Original Land was made without P1’s and the Deceased’s knowledge or approval. Additionally, D1 and D2 could not prove that any of the Other Co-Owners had appointed D2 to make the application on his/her behalf. The facts also show that the purported “pre-completion plan” that D2 had submitted to D3 and D4 was not in fact a pre-completion plan. And the signatures of P1 and the Deceased on the said plan and the Borang 9B were forged. Because the impugned plan and the Borang 9B are forged, both these documents are null and void. [190] P1 and the Deceased’s estate were unlawfully deprived of their property by reason of the unlawful partition of the Original Land. The harm they suffered in not quantifiable. [191] In Laksamana Realty Sdn. Bhd. v. Goh Eng Hwa and Another Appeal [2005] 4 CLJ 871; [2006] 1 MLJ 675, CA, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) said “General damages are awarded for harm that is not quantifiable”. [192] The Court of Appeal in Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors and another appeal [2018] 1 MLJ 784; [2017] 1 LNS 500; [2018] 4 AMR 745 held: [14] It is trite that a person injured by another’s wrong is entitled to general damages for non-pecuniary such as his pain and suffering, hardship, discomfort, S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 73 mental distress and loss of amenities of life. There is no standard rule to measure the damage in such cases. The courts usually determine the amount based on a fair and reasonable standards, free from sentimental or fanciful standards, and based upon evidence adduced. ………… [193] Having considered the plaintiffs’ pain and suffering, hardship and mental distress caused by the loss of their property (the Original Land) and the danger of having their houses located on 2nd Partitioned Portion demolished because of D1, D2 and D4’s actions, I find that the sum of RM200,000.00 a fair and reasonable sum of general damages, in the circumstances, payable to the plaintiffs by D1, D2 and D4 jointly and severally. Exemplary Damages [194] The plaintiffs had also prayed for exemplary damages. [195] In Rookes v. Barnard (No 1) [1964] AC 1129, the House of Lords held that exemplary damages may be awarded in three categories, namely: (i) where the plaintiff is injured by the oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the Executive or the servant of the Government; (ii) the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; or (iii) where a statute has expressly authorised the award of exemplary damages. [196] The principle in Rookes v. Barnard (No 1) has been accepted and applied by our courts. In Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Evergrowth Aquaculture Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2021] 9 CLJ 179; [2021] 5 MLJ 937; [2021] 7 AMR 857, the Federal Court held: As laid down in Rookes (supra), exemplary damages is to be awarded in three categories of cases, to wit, when it is statutorily provided for, when the loss is S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 74 occasioned by the oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct of government servants and when the defendant's conduct was profit-orientated. [197] The Court of Appeal in Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors and another appeal (supra) held: [33] The exemplary damages or punitive damages - the two terms now regarded as interchangeable - are additional damages awarded with reference to the conduct of the defendant, to signify disapproval, condemnation or denunciation of the defendant's tortious act, and to punish the defendant. Exemplary damages may be awarded where the defendant has acted with vindictiveness or malice, or where he has acted with a "contumelious disregard" for the right to the plaintiff. The primary purpose of an award of exemplary damages may be deterrent, or punitive and retributory, and the award may also have an important function in vindicating the rights of the plaintiff. (See Rookes v. Barnard [1964] 1 All E R 347; A B v. Southwest Water Services [1993] All E R 609; Broome v. Cassell & Co [1971] 2 Q B 354, Laksamana Realty Sdn. Bhd. v. Goh Eng Hwa and Another Appeal [2005] 4 CLJ 871; [2006] 1 MLJ 675). [Emphasis added] [198] I find D4’s approach in processing and approving the application for the partition of the Original Land to be lackadaisical and arbitrary. As discussed above, the evidence shows that notwithstanding the obvious and glaring differences between the purported “signatures” of the co- proprietors of the Original Land on the impugned plan and the Borang 9B submitted to D4, and the fact that the copy of the Deceased’s identity card was the old identity card, which did not contain all the information which are mandatory under the NR Regulations 1990, D4 did not take any action to question the discrepancies in the “signatures” and the Deceased’s identity card before approving the application. [199] It is not evident whether D4, as the authority entrusted under the NLC to approve applications for the partition of land in the district of Klang, S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 75 has standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) for processing applications for the partition of land since none was produced in Court during the trial. [200] The Court of Appeal in Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Selangor v. Caesius Development Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Appeal [2020] 3 CLJ 327; [2020] MLJU 25 (“Caesius Development”) held there is a need for a flowchart at the Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Selangor (“PHNS”) as an administrative guide to work process. It also held that PHNS’ officers “are not robots and therefore they need to apply their minds and attention in processing every application”. Zaleha Yusof JCA (as she then was) held: [38] With due respect to the learned ALA, we find the argument put forward is a hollow one and does not hold water. We cannot expect the Legislature to specifically list down all the documents required under s. 378 as every application is distinct, hence its requirement differs. Hence the need for an office flowchart as an administrative guide to the work process. It did exist in the seventh defendant's office but the learned High Court Judge found it had not been adhered to by PW4. Officers of the seventh defendant are not robots and therefore they need to apply their minds and attention in processing every such application, which the learned High Court Judge found they had failed to do so. [39] As a keeper of all land titles, for a particular State (in this case Selangor) it is reasonable to impose upon the land office, including the seventh defendant, a duty of care towards all landowners, to ensure that the landowners' interests are well protected and safeguarded. The land office, including the seventh defendant, has to ensure that the law and proceedings are followed strictly, failing which it can cause the landowners losing their lands. [Emphasis added] [201] Even if D4 does have SOPs, from the facts of this case and DW4’s testimony, there does not appear to be any process or procedures in D4’s SOPs to ensure that the signatures of the pre-computation plan and the Borang 9B are indeed that of the co-proprietors of the land before it proceeds to approve an application for the partition of land. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 76 [202] Furthermore, based on the manner DW4 had processed the application and D4’s approval of the application, it appears that D4 also does not have a process in place that requires its officers — in situations where the owners’ signatures on the pre-computation plan and the Borang 9B obviously differ — to seek further clarification or to question the veracity of those signatures before approving an application for partition of land. As held by the Court of Appeal in Caesius Development, DW4 should have applied her mind and attention in processing the application for the partition of the Original Land. [203] D4 also does not appear to have a process to ensure that the identity card numbers of all the co-proprietors of land are stated on the pre-computation plan and the Borang 9B submitted in an application for a partition of land. It also does not have a process in place that requires copies of identity cards submitted after 1.11.2000 to have all the information statutorily required by the NR Regulations 1990. [204] From DW4’s testimony, it can be concluded that D4’s procedure is that as long as the names of the co-proprietors on the pre-computation plan and the Borang 9B, are the same as the names of the co-proprietors on the title of the land, and there is some form of scribble by the names of the co-proprietors, D4’s officer who is processing the application will take it that those scribbles are the “signatures” of the co-proprietors — even though the scribbles on the plan and the Borang 9B are obviously different to anyone looking at the scribbles — just as DW4 did in this instant case. Also, as this instant case shows, it matters not to D4 that some of the identity card numbers of the co-proprietors of land are not written under their names on the pre-computation plan and the Borang 9B in an S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 77 application for the partition of the land. Notwithstanding the missing identity card numbers, D4 would still approve the application. [205] D4, as the District Land Administrator of Klang, is empowered to approve an application for the partition of land under section 141 of the NLC only where each of the co-proprietors has either joined in or consented to making of the application for the partition. However, D4 does not have any process or procedure in place to verify that an application for the partition of land by a licensed land surveyor was made on the instructions of a co-proprietor of land (under section 141A of the NLC) or with the consent of all the co-proprietors of the land. This is evident from the testimony of the defendant’s fifth witness, Ahmad Fitri bin Ahmad (“DW5”), the officer currently in charge of processing applications for partition of land at D4. [206] Although DW5 was not the person who had examined and processed the application for partition of the Original Land in 2010, his testimony is relevant as regards D4’s procedure in respect of processing applications for partition of land. DW5 informed the Court that in an application for the partition of land, D4 does not require to see an appointment letter from the co-proprietors of the land or any of the co- proprietors of the land confirming that they had appointed the licensed land surveyor to make the application for partition on their behalf. This is even though section 141(1)(a) of the NLC expressly states that: “No partition shall be approved by the State Director or, as the case may be, Land Administrator unless each of the co-proprietors has either joined in, or consented to the making of, the application for its approval”. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 78 [207] In addition to the above, other instances of D4’s arbitrary approach and disregard of the rights of the co-proprietors of the Original Land in the application for the partition are: (a) D4’s approval letter for the partition, which was addressed to P1, was not posted or delivered to P1. Instead, it was given by D4 to D2; and (b) D4 delivered the issue documents of title for the partitioned lands to a representative of the law firm, Messrs. Salva & Co, even though the law firm did not state in its letter to D4 who it was representing and why it had the right to the said issue documents of title. [208] The Court of Appeal in Caesius Development (supra) had held that the land office must ensure that it strictly follows the law because its failure to do so could result in landowners losing their land. It also held that the Selangor Registrar of Title must have a flowchart as an administrative guide to its work process, and their officers “should apply their minds and attention” in processing every application. [209] In this instant case, DW4’s lackadaisical approach in the manner she had examined and processed the documents submitted for the application for the partition, coupled with D4’s lack of SOPs in processing applications for partition of land, had resulted in P1 and the Deceased losing their co-ownership of the Original Land, their homes in danger of being demolished and their families evicted from the land. [210] D4’s lack of SOPs has enabled its officers processing the applications for the partition of land and the District Land Administrator S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 79 approving the applications to take whatever arbitrary approach they choose without any regard to the provisions in the NLC and the rights of landowners. DW4’s conduct and DW5’s testimony show that there are no safeguards in D4’s process and procedures to ensure that in all applications for partition of land, the applications are made either by the co-proprietors of the land or by a licensed land surveyor who was appointed by the co-proprietors of the land. [211] In this instant case, DW2 said that he had left D2’s business card at the land office, and the Malay man, whose name he and D1 claim they cannot remember, had called him and instructed him on the phone to apply to partition the Original Land. It is frightening that based on this telephone call alone, D2 was able set the wheels in motion for his fraudulent application for the partition of the Original Land based on the forged documents, and for the application to be approved by D4. [212] What this case shows is that D4’s lack of procedures, guidelines and safeguards has enabled brokers and/or persons who are not registered owners of a land, to engage unscrupulous licensed land surveyors to apply for the partition of land, without the knowledge or consent of the registered landowner. It also shows D4’s contumelious disregard for the rights of landowners, its lack of good faith in carrying out its duties as the District Land Administrator of Klang, as well as its blatant disregard for its statutory duties and the trust accorded to it by Parliament in the NLC. D4 did not carry out its duties “in good faith and in the intended exercise of any power, or performance of any duty, conferred or imposed on him” by or under the NLC. It follows, therefore, that D4 cannot hide behind the protection provided in section 22 of the NLC. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 80 [213] A person’s right to property is a fundamental right protected by the Federal Constitution. Article 13(1) of the Federal Constitution states: (1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law. [214] D4 is a servant of the Government. Its unlawful partition of the Original Land was unconstitutional as it was not in accordance with the provision of the NLC and had caused P1 and the Deceased’s estate to be deprived of their property. [215] Accordingly, for all these reasons, I am of the view, based on the 1st limb of the criteria specified in Rookes v Barnard (No. 1), exemplary damages should be awarded against D4, in the sum of RM1,000,000.00. [216] This sum of RM1,000,000.00 is not intended to enrich the plaintiffs. Instead, it is to signify to D4 and its officers of this Court’s disapproval, condemnation, and denunciation of D4’s unconstitutional action, their lackadaisical and arbitrary approach in processing the application for the partition of the Original Land, their contumelious disregard of the rights of P1 and the Deceased as registered owners of the land, as well as their disregard of D4’s statutory duties and the powers entrusted to it by Parliament under the NLC. [217] Further, it is hoped by reason of the relatively large amount of exemplary damages awarded, D4 will be galvanised to take the necessary action to install the requisite SOPs and safeguards, and provide the necessary education and training to its officers to ensure that they carry out their statutory duties and obligations under the NLC in accordance with the law and in good faith. S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 81 Decision [218] Accordingly, for all the reasons above, this Court gives judgment to the plaintiffs and makes the following orders: (a) A declaration that the partition of the Original Land into the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion is null and void; (b) An injunction restraining D1, D2 and D3 from demolishing the plaintiffs’ houses and the houses of their extended families located on the 2nd Partitioned Portion and built prior to the issuance of the title of the 2nd Partitioned Portion; (c) An injunction restraining D1, D2 and D3 from evicting the plaintiffs and their families from the 2nd Partitioned Portion; (d) D4 is ordered to cancel the title for the 1st Partitioned Portion and the 2nd Partitioned Portion; (e) D4 is ordered to issue a geran baharu hakmilik sambungan for the Original Land with the record of the ownership that is the same as Suratan Hakmilik No. GM 6048, Lot 2558, Mukim Kapar, 5th Mile, Sungai Binjai Road, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor; (f) D1, D2 and D4 are ordered to pay general damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of RM200,000.00; (g) D4 is ordered to pay exemplary damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of RM1,000,000.00; (h) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum is payable on the general damages from the date of judgment until full settlement; S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 82 (i) D1, D2 and D4 are ordered to pay costs of this action to the plaintiffs in the sum of RM50,000.00 subject to the allocatur fee. Dated: November 28, 2023 FAIZAH JAMALUDIN JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-23NCVC-22-06/2020 JUDGMENT Jahit bin Rahmat & Anor v Ng Kim Chooi & Ors 83 COUNSELS: For the Plaintiff: Dato’ Hjh Hazizah binti Kassim (Fatimah Azzahrah binti Rumaizi with her) Messrs Hazizah & Co Lot 2.01 (Off 4), Tingkat 2, Kompleks Pkns Bangi, Persiaran Bangi, Bandar Baru Bangi 43650 Bangi, Selangor For the 1st and 2nd Defendants: Norasidi bin Nadziruddin (Imran bin Kamaruddin with him) Messrs Jailani Zubir & Partners 258A, Jalan Batu Unjur 7, Taman Bayu Perdana, 42000 Pelabuhan Klang, Selangor For the 3rd Defendant: Heidi Saw Ching Ying Messrs Fernandez & Selvarajah 12B, 2nd & 3rd Floor, Jalan Yong Shook Lin 46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor For the 4th Defendant: Puan Husna binti Abdul Halim Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 4, Podium Utara, Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah, 40512 Shah Alam, Selangor S/N tB8xWnZhKEqEIvMJhSeHfg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	153,437	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22IP-48-11/2022	PLAINTIF 1. ) AQUA ECOTECH SDN BHD 2. ) ANDREW LIEW SHUN BIN DEFENDAN 1. ) GENIUS VENTURE WORLDWIDE LIMITED 2. ) SHAHRAM BAHR 3. ) LAI WOOI GIAP	Application to amend defences - (i) judicial assignment of GVW’s Patent to the Plaintiffs and/or Tay under Section 19 of the Patents Act 1983 (“the Act”);(ii) alternatively, for a declaration that GVW’s Patent is wrongly made and an order for it to be expunged from the Register of Patents pursuant to s. 33C of the Act;(iii) further and/or alternatively, for a declaration that GVW’s Patent is invalid and an Order for it to be invalidated and removed from the Register pursuant to s. 56 of the Act;(iv) alternatively, an order to amend GVW’s Patent to exclude the features claimed by Aqua Ecotech’s Patents. Application allowed.	01/12/2023	YA Tuan Azlan bin Sulaiman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e491c5c3-52ac-4127-9788-c258e10dfb21&Inline=true	01/12/2023 09:57:51 WA-22IP-48-11/2022 Kand. 67 S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N w8WR5KxSJ0GXiMJY4Q37IQ *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal vm—22n>—¢a—11/2022 Kand. 57 2,/mznn co 5‘ 2; IN THE HIGH couRT or MALAVA AT KIIALA LIAMPUR cm I, surr N9 WA ZZIP-48 1/2012 BETWEEN AQUA ECOTECH sDN BHD 2, ANDREW LIEw sHuN BIN PLAINTIFFS AND GENIUS VENTURE WORLDWIDE LIMITED SHANRAM EANR LAI wool GIAP DEFEMDANTS [IN YHE MAIN ORIGINAL suI11 BETWEEN GENIUS VENTURE woRLDwIDE LIMITED PLAINTIFF AND 1. AQUA ECDYECH sDN EHD 2. ANDREW LIEw SHUN BIN DEFENDANTS [av wAv or couNTERcLAwI] JUDGMENT IDEFENDANYS‘ umcmou To AMEND nEFENI;Es] Pngz 1 D4 11 sw wswR5K:_s.Ius>uwv4I2:I7ID 'NDl2 Sum M... WW be used M mm I. DIWIMIVIY mm; “Mm. VII muna VWLII lulrnducllun 1 Refarenoe to Plainlrﬁs and Defendants in this Judgment is \|o lhe panies in the main onginai suit. 2. The M Fiainim. Aqua Eouiaan Sdn Bhd. (“Aqua Eociecn“) is regislersd as ma owner of Mo patents in Maiaysaa. nan-ary Paieni Nu MY154813-A (-Paieni ma‘). and Paiani Na MV—15604BA (‘Patent 043") (collectively, ‘Aqua Eoi:\|ech‘s Patents"). Aqua Eca\|ech‘s Paiems am in ruspecl of a fmraiiuri sysism intended is effeﬂively mower residue 0 Vi raw siudge and thereby reduce mi Yoss during me process oioii axiraaimn In on mills (‘Che lnven\|ion'\| 3. The 2”’ Pluimiﬂ claims to be (he omnvenior at me inveniian. mgemer win» one Tay Swen Hong (“Tay). The Piamiiiis pisaa max me 2" Piaini-ii and Tay had assigned ma Paiervts ia Aqua Eoaiech on 23.7.2015. which was iusl a week ursn aaima Tay passed away on 5.3.2015 4 The 1“ Defendant. Genius vaniure Wuridwlde (“G\/W‘), is vagisleled as the owner oi one pain: In Malaysia, nameiy Paieni No MY190/163-A(“GVW‘s Paienr) T7192“ and 3'6 Deianaanii. are namad In the Raglsler oi Patents, Maiaysia ma aegisiar) as me mveruors of GVW‘s Patent. 5 The Plainiinsmed «his adlon againsi me Deiendanisnn17.11.2u22 io chaiienga GVW‘s Paieni Aparl imm damages, inlnresl and casls, Ins Plaintiffs am seeking ma Inllawing ma: lmm ma Deiendnnis. P5941011! IN wswR5K:.s.insxiwvAq:i7In “Nair s.n.i ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he nﬂmnaﬂly mm: ﬂan-mm VII .mm mm 27 As we Defendants’ Apphcalmn had appropnaxsvy sougm an order fur costs to be in the cause, I lunnercmerea mat. Daxed me 20 day av October 2n23 cuunsn - sn Rlchgcplnalh (Messrs Joel & Mar) cur \|he Plainhﬁ Leon Tan together wwth Lee Ghee Vang (Messrs Leon Law Associates) for me Delendams Lnguumon: secnans 19. 3ac.s6, 57 Falerus M11983 cuso Yamaha Molar Co Ltd v Yamaha Ma\ays\a Sdn Bhd s Ors [1933] 1 MLJ 213 mg n m 11 IN wswR5K:.s.msx4wvAq:7In -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ti) iudicial assignmem nf Gvw's Patent to the Plaintitvs and/or Tiy under section ts ofthe Patents Ac119B3(“lhe Act‘), (It) altemaltvelyi lora declaiation that GVW's Patenl is wrongly made and an arderlor it to be expunged tiorn lhe Register o1Palenls pursuant to s. 330 of tne M tut-trier and/or allsmallvelyi tor a declaration that GVW‘s Patent is invalid and an order tor it to be invalidated and removed lrmn me Register pursuant to e. 56 altne Act; tn) alternatively, an order to amend Gvws Patent to exclude the teatures claimed by Aqua Ecotecns Patents 6 evw and the 2"" and am Defendants separately mad tneir uelenoes on 2032023 Save tor one major dillerenoe, their delences Io tne Plalnllﬂs‘ claims are the same Tnat drtteieiiee is that GVW runner included a oounteictaim to Invalldile Aqua Eeoteews Falenls under $5 56 and 57 eltne Ad. 7. Al tne l=re—Tnal Case Management on 29.3.2lJ23t trial dates weie tixed. fol iour days In March 2024 9 Al tne next Prenial case Management an 15.5 2023. Learned counsel tor the Delendante alerted tnie court to me passioi Ily Iha\| the Dalendants may wish to amend tnetr Delenoeis They indeed did apply to do eo in one app\|tca\|it)n med on 25.7 202:3, seeking approval or several proposed amendments (“the Delendants Application"). Pagelrtﬂ IN wtWR5K:.S.lnGXtMlVAQ:l7ID «ma s.n.i In-vlharwﬂl a. u... a mm i... nﬂmnallly MVMI dun-mm VII eFluNG Wﬂxl 9 The Piarntrit opposes the Defendants‘ Appiieation only on one proposed amendment that is similarly pieaded in paragraph tn of GVW's Detence and paragraph 20 ot the 2" and 3'" Detendanrs Detence thne Disputed Amendment’). The Piaintitrs poieotrpns to the Disputed Amendment can he summarized as follows‘ (i) The Disputed Amendment is not bone We as it is an atterthought designed to deteei the P\|atn(iRs' wrtlartliun in paragraph 33 5 at the statement at claim at iraud on the Registry by the Defendants in the registration or the Disputed Patent, iii) Ey the Disputed Amendment, the Datendanis are reheating an admission (I The Disputed Amendment wauid change the character oi the Deienpes trom one chareaer \|o another at e drtterent and inconsistent character: and (iv) The Disputed Amendment would cause preiudrpe to the Pier 5 which could not be oompeneeted with oosls 1D Ey advancing those reasons, the F\|atn\|tWcleai1y reters to and relies on varrrnhp Molar Co Ltd V verriene M-Inym sun Em! A on [twin] 1 MLJ 213 in wh ch Mohamed Azmt FJ said ‘Tits psnerai pmioipie V! mar in. court wt/Vailaw sum amendment: as wiii reuse no /rI)tIs!»¢e lo the olhevpamis Puuzlmﬂ IN wswR5K:.s.insxiMtvAn:t7In “Nair s.i.i n-vihnrwiii r. u... M my r... nﬂninaiily MIMI ﬂnunvilnl VII aFit.ING WM! ma» naac aaearspne enema pa arvsmumd ra amrrrunr wnamar myus1n.1 would or wvwd not result 11; whethevlhe aanhcstian 1: bone Me, :2) whether we prejudice czussd lo the other we can be wmpcnsalsd by was and (J! wnemer me anlendmelvts would noun a/rm rum me am! from one maraaar mm a m or armtnev and mcarmstanl arrarum, [Sal Mama supreme Com! mam page :42} um. lnswunllumma amrmem. an eppmrpn raranunarnanr shoaki pe a/lawn-1 at any seep. ulmv procvszimgs parrrrmany beknre Mal, even 4 me evreer cf ma amsndrmrv! wuuld be to add at subsmute a new cauw ulacllanr pmwded me new muse afacffon Enses am or me same nus or wbslarmalfy me same raaxa a: a muse Dlamnn In mspocl my mum reuer has many baon mlnm In me ongma! stvmmnt erererrn - Thu Dup-ma Amonﬂmult 1: As I had pomlau out eamer, me Dxspulad Amermrnem Is In paragraph 10 a! ma 1" uevermanrs nevenpe and paragraph 20 at me 2"“ and 3"‘ Devermnca Derenee. in mpse paragraphs, are Defendlnls had responded so paragrapn an 0! me Shlamenl of Clam: 12. To understand the nrspuxee Amerrurrrenu and me r=\|arnmve' nbjscliuns In men, me ﬁrs! step may at ﬁrs! inslance appear to be to look It man paragraph so at me Statement ol clarrrr Huwevar. 35 wru become apparenl, we would first need up look at what we marrmw had pweaaeu about a company called Enwo Falrnrecn scmuans sun sna [“Env\|m'), which Is mennonea rn that paragraph 30. P191 5 at 4: am wsvvnsxxsmsxrwwqavlu “Nana Snr1n\nuuhnrwH\I>e p... w my r... nrW\nnH\|:I am. dnuumnl VII .mm v-max ta A summary of what the Pleintllls had pleaded about Ellvlro in the statement of claim is es lptlows: (i) sometime in 201 2. the 2-"1 Pleintitr and Tph had invented the lnverillon and. apen lrom submitting applications to patent it in 2013, were further desirous ol exploring ways lo eernrnercially exploit it: (i) In late 2012, they met with the 2"‘ Delendant who introduced tliem to one Ng Shu wah (“Ng“) who said he would assist them in ﬁnding customers tor the invention. The W Plairlltffi the 2"”Deferidanl and Mg then set up Erwlm an at 122012 in which the shareholding was as loilews. 2"" Plaintrlv . 511% 2"“ Defendant. 25% Mg: 25% (iii) when nothing materialized through Enwo. the 2"“ Plaintitt and Tsy decided to seek euslomdrs lor the tnvenlron without Envirp, the 2"-1 Dalendant and Mg on 1o.4.2n15t they assigned the awnershlp oflhe Aqua Eeuleeh Patents te the P‘ Pl-inliiv 14 Then Domes paragraph :0 ol the statement of claim, in whrch the Plaintiffs had axpreesly pleaded Fngelnlil rn wtWR5K:.S.inGXiMNAQ:l7ID “Nair s.n.i nnvlhnrwlﬂ .. ti... M may i... nﬂmhellly MVMI mm. VII nFlt.ING WM! ‘linen Vlmhsr mvestrqaﬂon me Plammfx «mm mm m. ongmar zpplvcanl alLheMW63 PulInI(sc, svws Patent) was Em/Im when wt was ﬁled on 29 012015 Howevel. 3 rzquvst wu subrmlrsd nomebme m eavry2l717loamIm1 me name aim: sum/camnomsnm 1.: me :- Defendant on me gmund Ins! (H: awmarsnwm and ms 1-r Delsmanl rs the same pevsan nnd m-I whan ma lppllclhovv wu /mm, m was mad under the wrong npmcarvl Nnwawr m. 2-4 wmmm, Is 50% shamhoklel rn Erwm, u nol me shavuholdu m ms 1- Dulsrrdant and IS not awim or any sum Bnmy. and was nevcv nolvﬁad 0/ me aapmzlron under Enwu Ur rim wbwquervt amendment Ia change the applscanl mm. Enwm mm vs Dellsndarvl 15 In paragvaph 10 ollne 1-I Defendanfs Defence and pavagraph 20 ov me 2» and 3'“ Defendant‘: Deience, me Delendanls had expressly pleadad ‘The 1:4 Dafondnrvl mu 2'-v Defendant and 34 Delendanu Iunhsr wntund mat PM AW 45;! plhrvl wnx mndvuﬂsnl/y ma m In many name 0! Em/to Pnlmrtch Samhonx Sun and »n.I1o\|d 0! mu 1- Deiurnizmlduc Iomscommumcarinn between the v- Delandam mm. patsnt agent as me v- Dcfsrldarvlarrv Em/om Pafmtach Solubwls Sdn sou ma (be same dueanrs at m nnnerrar rm - 15. By use Delandanls‘ Applucauon, me Delendzims now seeklo amend mat Io: 'The 1:4 Defendant [me 2» Dclemlant 5011 am Deiundaml Mme! mnllnd mm: lly Mad-4»-ﬂu-wrung um Dlénwu puppy. Soinoovsavr am ....4..¢_u_m 1- -mmamm !’ h som.o.us« . . mg. 1 M 1: sm wsvvR5Kxs.Ansx.wvAq37!a «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Lat gatevvt sag;-vl me Egg ﬁgrv had and an ayzlrcahcm to anwmi me ggyrtznl nmv 453 Imm Enwm Pa/mlzch Solubwvs Sdn and (‘Envlm In Me 1“ Dsfumianl asllvs vv Del-mvtarrl and sum had me am. aneams at me mnlalw mm and 191 ta (Ea mg yr ammn: had blcomn Inn ggrggg Mega: r line In er 7 P n ml Pl 2015700206 andMYl63Palenton1§ 5 2:715 “ 17 I will now wnstderwhelher tne Disputed Amendment vﬂends the pnnctptes rm amendment of pleadings In the Vamaha Molors case. whether Disputed Amendmant Is not born Ma and an afterthought 15 Tne Detendants conlend tnat the utsputed Amendmenlts bans ﬁds and Is not an anermought as Enwn was dissolved In 2017; that when the netenoes were med tney am ml have me Ml mtonuatmn \|o ecmplehenstvely respond Io me Plammfs anegattms In the statement at Claim: and mat the substance or me Dnsputed Amendments was omy discovered In June 2023. 19 The PVEIVIUW contends that \|he Dtspuled Amendment Is not bans We as n V5 now seeking to euege a purpnrleﬂ assignment ef me svw Patent as an ahertlmught, to overcome or woe the Platrmﬂs‘ atlegalnctn of fraud by lhe Delendanvs Pnue n nl u N wswR5K:.s.tnsxtMIvAq:I7In «me s.n.t n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VII muttc vlmxt 20 However, this own is net in a nasﬂion Io adjudge in a summary manner when dealing wilh tne t>etendants' Aupﬁcalion wnat lhe neteneants knew when ttie Defenses were med and wrist they may have found ou\| sutisequentiy, and wnetner tne purported assIgnmen\ is neat, oaneected arari aixeitneugnt Thus, narcan ttiis Court decide wnettier tne amendment is tmna ﬁds OV rtt1l wtietnet or no\| there was many an asstgnmenl ottne GVW Patent can dniy be decided at me triali 21 The question then arises as to wtiem is likely lﬂ suvter more prejudice ittne Disputed Amendment is allowed tar reﬂused on that some in my Vlﬁwy ttie balance or iusttce lies in atiewing the Disputed Amendment. Ttie Detendants wtti stilt nave to Draw what they naw say in the Disputed Amendment. and under the process at nleadingl. ttie Plamliﬂ stitt ties tne opportunity to ﬁle its Reply lo it, inciuding In stilt aiiege hand by tne Detendants Canvaruiy. n the Oispmed Amendment is mfused. tne Defendanls may be deprived at e cructat aseect M their defence. or at ieast tne epportunity lo venIiII\|e it. WhuIMr ttie nefendents an mnetine en Idmlulon 22 in my view, the Disputed Amendment does net inveive any ietreetidn 0! an admission eimpty because tne enginai paragraphs to and 20 of [hair raspecliva oeiences did not contain any admission ta any 0! tne aiieeetione in aaragrepn an at me statement t11C\|atm that may went reepending to. pagnettt IN wswR5K:.s.tnsxtMIvAn:I7In “Nair a.i.i In-vthnrvim be it... ta mm i... nﬂﬂirinﬂly MVMI m.i.i. y.. nFit.ING WM! wnelrm uispul-d Anlundmont crumun charmer of me Dom-on 23 The nlspuled Amsrldmen\| relalrls menlmn of Ihe alleged mlscommunxzllon between me 1=* Delendanl and me aalenlagenc and men pleads Ihe apphcallon In amend the name vflheapplicarll lmm Envira to me 1* Delenaanl. ll lnen adds when lne Dele:-dams assen la be lhe legal eﬁecl of lhal change. 24. cnnsequenlly, VII my view‘ me Dispuled Amendmenl does nol change me charecler or lne Delences lrom one charader lo anomer ol a dlﬂererll and mconslslenl cnaracler, aul aaae aecllllonul lacla ov laoe\|s la lune same aelences wnemer Dlwutod Ame-mmenl puiudleu me Plninllll: 25 In my vlew loo, me Dlspulad Amendmenldoes nol cause pleludlce me Plamlms whlch could nul be wmpensaled wllh wsls. The Delenaanls slﬂl have Io plove me subslance el (he Dlspuled Amendmenl and, under lhe proaess ol pleamngs, me Plaml-fl sllll has me uppommlly lo ﬁle lls amandud Reply la ll Conclusion 26 II V5 in: me above reasons max I allow lhe Devenaanls‘ Apphcallon lo amend lllelr respectlve Delencae w¥\|h a fmlrther an omer Ihal me Plalnllﬁ be glven leave la amend Its Reply la lhnsa nelences Fngellloﬂl m wtwR5K:.S.lnSXlMNAQ:I7ID «we. s.n.l ...m.mm be LAIQ4 m yaw he emu-y mm: dun-mm VII nFluNG pm	1,493	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BB-A52NCvC-187-10/2022	PLAINTIF 1. ) HO SZE KEEN 2. ) TOH OOI PENG DEFENDAN ARA HILL JOINT MANAGEMENT BODY	ATURAN 18 KAEDAH 19 - SAMADA PLAINTIF BERHAK MENUNTUT APA YANG TELAH DIPUTUSKAN OLEH TRIBUNAL PENGURUSAN STRATA DI MAHKAMAH - PLAINTIF TELAH TERLEPAS PELUANG UNTUK SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN- ADAKAH RELIF YANG DIPOHON BOLEH DIPUTUSKAN DI MAHKAMAH INI	01/12/2023	Puan Sazlina binti Safie	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0e5fb2f9-bf02-4363-99fe-53fd5725c342&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - BB-A52NCvC-187-10-2022-O.18 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN PETALING JAYA DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN WRIT SAMAN NO – BB-A52NCvC-187-10/2022 ANTARA HO SZE KEEN [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 600104086443] TOH OOI PENG [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 621226108682] [TETUAN V L DECRUZ & CO] …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN ARA HILL JOINT MANAGEMENT BODY [Others: 0282] [TETUAN JOSEPHINE, L K CHOW & CO.] …DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (RAYUAN INTERLOKUTORI) LATARBELAKANG KES Ini adalah rayuan Perayu-Perayu/Plaintif-Plaintif yang dinamakan di atas, HO SZE KEEN dan TOH OOI PENG, melalui Notis Rayuan di Lampiran 01/12/2023 09:55:54 BB-A52NCvC-187-10/2022 Kand. 43 S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 39 terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini bertarikh 11/10/2023 yang memutuskan bahawa permohonan Responden/Defendan yang dinamakan di atas untuk membatalkan tuntutan Perayu-Perayu/Plantif- Plaintif terhadap Responden/Defendan melalui Notis Permohonan bertarikh 7 haribulan Ogos 2023 (Kandungan 28) dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM3,000.00 (tidak termasuk disbursement) dibayar oleh Perayu-Perayu/Plaintif-Plaintif kepada Responden/Defendan. KEPUTUSAN DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [1] Mahkamah telah meneliti Notis Permohonan, Afidavit-afidavit, hujahan bertulis dan otoriti kedua-dua pihak. Notis Permohonan Lampiran 28 adalah permohonan Plaintif di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1)(a) dan/atau (b) dan/atau (c) dan/atau (d) Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan/atau Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan/atau di bawah bidang kuasa sedia ada Mahkamah untuk perintah-perintah berikut:- 1. Bahawa Writ Saman Terpinda Plaintif-Plaintif bertarikh 25.10.2022 dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif bertarikh 14.10.2022 (“Writ Saman Terpinda dan Pernyataan Tuntutan tersebut”) di dalam tindakan ini dibatalkan secara keseluruhannya terhadap Defendan atas alasan berikut:- S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (a) tindakan ini gagal mendedahkan kausa tindakan yang munasabah; (b) tindakan ini bersifat mengaibkan, remeh dan/atau menyusahkan; (c) tindakan ini menjejaskan, menghalang dan/atau melengahkan perbicaraan tindakan dengan adil; dan/atau (d) tindakan ini merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. 2. Bahawa kesemua prosiding lanjut di dalam tindakan ini digantung sehingga pelupusan penuh permohonan ini; 3. Bahawa kos bagi permohonan ini dibayar oleh Plaintif-Plaintif kepada Defendan; dan 4. Apa-apa perintah atau relif selanjutnya yang mana Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini anggap sesuai dan wajar diberikan. [2] Alasan permohonan Plaintif adalah dinyatakan dalam affidavit sokongan yang mana antara lain menyatakan bahawa: 1) Plaintif-Plaintif adalah pemilik berdaftar parcel Vila Unit No: C1-1-3A dan C1-2-3A dalam Ara Condominium. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 2) Defendan adalah Badan Pengurusan Bersama Ara Condominium. 3) Pada 14/10/2022, Plaintif-Plaintif telah memfailkan satu tindakan terhadap Defendan (“Tindakan Utama”). 4) Tuntutan tersebut adalah berhubung dakwaan Plaintif-Plaintif bahawa Defendan telah gagal mematuhi Award bertarikh 30/3/2021 (“Award Tersebut”) yang diberikan oleh Tribunal Pengurusan Strata melalui Tuntutan Tribunal No: TPS/B- 3335-10/2019 sebagaimana di eksibit “SYS-1”. 5) Ini adalah percubaan kali ketiga Plaintif-Plaintif untuk membatalkan “Award Tersebut” kerana Plaintif-Plaintif tidak berpuashati dengan “Award Tersebut” dan juga telah terlepas peluang untuk merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk semakan kehakiman selepas keputusan Tribunal tersebut. 6) Fakta material bagi kes ini adalah: a) Pada 16/10/2019, Plaintif-Plaintif telah memfailkan satu tuntutan di Tribunal Pengurusan Strata (No:3335) untuk perintah deklarasi bahawa caj penyelenggaraan dan caruman kepada kumpulan wang penjelas yang dikutip oleh Defendan sebelum 1/12/2018 adalah tidak sah. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 7) Selepas perbicaraan, Tribunal telah memberikan Award bertarikh 30/3/2021 yang memerintahkan bahawa kiraan Defendan adalah tidak sah di sisi undang-undang dan Defendan diperuntukkan untuk membuat kiraan semula dan membayar atau mengutip balik jumlah perbezaan tersebut dalam masa yang diperuntukkan. 8) Defendan telah serta merta menyediakan kiraan semula dan pada12/4/2021 menyerahkannya kepada Tribunal dan mengkreditkan jumlah berlebihan sebanyak RM12,548.58 ke Penyata Akaun Plaintif bagi C1-1-3A dan RM63,539.98 bagi Plaintif di unit C1-2-3A sebagaimana dieksbit “SYS-3”. 9) Plaintif-Plaintif tidak berpuashati dengan Award dan pengiraan semula tersebut dan telah menulis kepada Tribunal Pengurusan Strata untuk menetapkan satu tarikh pendengaran untuk bantahan mereka tetapi Tribunal Pengurusan Strata telah pada 27/10/2021 melalui email memaklumkan Plaintif Pertama bahawa Award tersebut adalah muktamad dan mengikat pihak-pihak. E-mail dieksibitkan sebagai "SYS-4". 10) Plaintif-Plaintif kemudiannya pada 17/12/2021 memfailkan permohonan kebenaran bagi Semakan Kehakiman di S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur No:WA-25-404-12/2021 tetapi permohonan kebenaran tersebut telah ditolak pada 14/7/2022 atas kelewatan memfailkan permohonan dan kegagalan Plaintif-Plaintif mendapatkan lanjutan masa. Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi adalah seperti di eksibit “SYS-5”. 11) Plaintif-Plaintif telah kemudiannya memfailkan tindakan di sini terhadap Defendan. 12) Relif yang dipohon oleh Plaintif-Plaintif dalam tindakan di sini adalah untuk: a) satu deklarasi bahawa pengiraan semula caj penyelenggaraan dan caruman kepada wang penjelas untuk parcel kepunyaan Plaintif-Plaintif bagi tempoh masa sebelum 1/12/2018 adalah terbatal dan tidak sah; b) Perintah bahawa Defendan memulangkan jumlah RM130,690.40 kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dengan serta merta; c) Perintah bahawa Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif- Plaintif faedah pad akadar 8% setahun atas jumlah RM130,690.40 dikira secara bulanan daripada 28/6/2021 sehingga bayaran balik penuh jumlah dalam perenggan (b) di atas dibuat oleh Defendan; S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 13) Defendan percaya kesemua persoalan yang dibangkitkan jelas tidak berasas, tidak bermerit, memprejudiskan, memalukan dan menghalang Defendan dari melaksanakan Award Tersebut. [3] Plaintif-Plaintif telah memfailkan affidavit jawapan yang mana antaranya menyatakan seperti berikut: 1) Defendan sengaja meninggalkan perkataan penting dalam Award Tersebut iaitu "2. Bahawa pengiraan semula caj penyenggaraan dan caruman kepada kumpulan wang penjelas sebelum 1.12.2018 hendaklah dikira semula mengikut peruntukkan Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 dalam masa 90 hari dari tarikh award ini;" 2) Tindakan ini bukan percubaan Plaintif-Plaintif untuk mengatasi dan/atau membatalkan Awad tersebut seperti yang didakwa oleh Defendan, malah adalah bertujuan untuk memastikan pengiraan semula yang dikendalikan oleh Defendan adalah mengikut peruntukkan Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 ("Akta tersebut") dan dapat dimuktamadkan selaras dengan Awad tersebut. 3) Berdasarkan Awad tersebut, Defendan diperuntukkan untuk membuat pengiraan semula bagi caj penyelenggaraan dan S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 caruman kepada kumpulan wang penjelas sahaja bagi tempoh sebelum 1.12.2018 mengikut peruntukan Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 dalam masa 90 hari dari tarikh Awad tersebut. Saya sesungguhnya percaya bahawa segala pembayaran atau pengutipan jumlah perbezaan hanya boleh dilakukan selepas pengiraan semula oleh Defendan dimuktamadkan selaras dengan peruntukan Akta tersebut. 4) Pengiraan semula yang kononnya disediakan oleh Defendan bertarikh 12.4.2021 ("Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan") adalah terbatal, tidak sah, dan/atau tidak tidak boleh digunakan atas alasan-alasan seperti berikut: - (a) Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan menggunakan kadar RM3.05 bagi caj penyelenggaraan dan kadar RM0.31 bagi caruman kepada kumpulan wang penjelas namun kadar tersebut belum pernah dibentangkan atau diluluskan dalam mana-mana mesyuarat agung tahunan atau mesyuarat agung luar biasa iaitu bertentangan dengan peruntukan-peruntukan Akta tersebut dan oleh itu, tidak selaras dengan Awad tersebut, Isu ini patut dibicarakan dengan saksi-saksi atas kesahan kadar RM3.05 bagi caj penyelenggaraan dan kadar RM0.31 bagi caruman kepada kumpulan wang penjelas dan S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 tindakan ini bukanlah suatu tindakan yang jelas dan ternyata untuk dibatalkan secara terus.; Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan ditandakan sebagai Eksibit "HSZ-2". (b) Jumlah syer unit yang digunakan dalam Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan adalah 78,858 yang sudah dinyatakan sebagai jumlah syer unit yang tidak tepat dan salah dalam Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan Defendan Ke7 yang diadakan pada 11.1.2020 ("AGM Ke-7"). Jumlah syer unit yang tidak tepat mengakibatkan jumlah syer unit yang diumpukkan bagi parselparsel Plaintif-Plaintif salah dan/atau tidak tepat dan oleh itu, Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan turut tidak tepat dan/atau salah Ini adalah suatu isu yang perlu dibicarakan sama ada jumlah 78,858 adalah jumlah syer unit yang tepat dan ini bukanlah suatu tindakan yang jelas dan ternyata untuk dibatalkan secara terus.; (c) Dalam Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan, Defendan telah mengambil kira caj-caj yang tidak berkenaan iaitu cukai tanah tahunan, insurans tahunan, surat tuntutan, dan faedah pembayaran lewat iaitu bertentangan dengan Awad tersebut yang memperuntukkan pengiraan semula bagi caj penyelenggaraan dan caruman kepada kumpulan wang S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 penjelas sahaja. Oleh itu, Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan adalah bertentangan dengan Awad tersebut. Ini merupakan suatu isu untuk dibicarakan sama ada caj-caj selain caj penyelenggaraan dan caruman kepada kumpulan wang penjelas boleh merangkumi pengiraan semula dan ini bukanlah suatu tindakan yang jelas dan ternyata untuk dibatalkan secara terus.; (d) Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan telah mengambil kira kos pembelanjaan bagi penyelenggaraan dan pengurusan kawasan di luar harta bersama Projek tersebut yang mengakibatkan Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan tidak tepat dan/atau salah dan bertentangan dengan peruntukkan Akta tersebut iaitu bertentangan dengan Awad tersebut. Ini merupakan suatu isu untuk dibicarakan sama ada kawasan di luar Projek tersebut telah diselenggara oleh Defendan dengan kos perbelanjaan penyelenggaraan dan ini bukanlah suatu tindakan yang jelas dan ternyata untuk dibatalkan secara terus.; (e) Dalam Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan, Defendan telah dengan sewenang-wenangnya mengenakan faedah pembayaran lewat bagi Parsel C1-2-3A namun tidak S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 mengenakan faedah pembayaran lewat bagi Parsel C1-1-3A iaitu bertentangan dengan Awad tersebut yang memperuntukkan pengiraan semula bagi caj penyelenggaraan dan caruman kepada kumpulan wang penjelas sahaja dan juga adalah tidak konsisten, tidak tepat, berat sebelah dan mengingkari Awad tersebut secara nyata. Ini merupakan suatu isu untuk dibicarakan sama ada faedah pembayaran lewat boleh dikenakan apabila pengiraan baru dibuat (yang dinafikan) selepas Awad diberi dan dengan itu, tiada kelewatan bayaran dan ini bukanlah suatu tindakan yang jelas dan ternyata untuk dibatalkan secara terus.; (f) Dalam Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan, Defendan telah membuat pengiraan semula bagi tempoh 1.7.2013 sehingga 30.11.2018 namun Akta tersebut hanya berkuatkuasa semenjak 1.6.2015. Oleh itu, pengiraan semula yang merangkumi jangka masa sebelum 1.6.2015 adalah tidak sah dan salah di sisi Akta tersebut dan dengan itu, tidak selaras dengan Awad tersebut. Ini adalah suatu isu undang- undang yang perlu pertimbangan matang dan dengan itu, tindakan ini bukanlah suatu tindakan yang jelas dan ternyata untuk dibatalkan secara terus.; S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (g) Defendan sendiri dalam perenggan 11(g), 16 dan 19 Pembelaan tersebut telah mengakui secara nyata bahawa Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan tersebut adalah tidak tepat, tidak terpakai dan tidak dilaksanakan serta bahawa pengiraan semula hanya dimuktamadkan pada 1.2.2023. Ini merupakan suatu pengakuan terhadap kausa tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif dan dengan itu, tindakan ini bukanlah suatu tindakan yang jelas dan ternyata untuk dibatalkan secara terus. Selebih daripada itu, Plaintif-Plaintif sesungguhnya percaya bahawa pengiraan semula setakat 1.2.2023 juga adalah tidak tepat dan Defendan perlu membuktikannya melalui keterangan-keterangan saksi.; 5) Defendan sendiri dalam perenggan 11(e) dan 11(f) Pembelaan tersebut telah mengakui secara nyata bahawa Defendan hanya memuktamadkan pengiraan semula dan mengkreditkan jumlah berlebihan dan mencajkan jumlah perbezaan ke dalam Penyata Akaun-Penyata Akuan Plaintif- Plaintif pada 1.2.2023. Plaintif-Plaintif sesungguhnya pecaya bahawa Defendan telah gagal mengemukakan bukti pengkreditan jumlah berlebihan dan menafikan pengiraan semula ini adalah sah. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 6) Plaintif-Plaintif tidak nafikan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah membantah kepada Pengiraan Semula Pertama Defendan dan telah memohon untuk tarikh pendengaran baru oleh Tribunal melalui surat bertarikh 26.4.2022 namun begitu, pada 20.10.2021, Tribunal telah memaklumkan Plaintif-Plaintif, melalui emel, bahawa Awad tersebut adalah muktamad dan mengikat dan jika tidak berpuas hati boleh memfailkan permohonan semakan kehakiman di Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil atas Awad tersebut. 7) Plaintif -Plaintif tidak nafikan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk lanjutan masa untuk semakan kehakiman di Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur melalui Permohonan untuk Semakan Kehakiman No. WA-25- 404-12/2021 pada 17.12.2021 ("Semakan Kehakiman tersebut") untuk mencabar Awad tersebut. Namun begitu, Mahkamah Tinggi telah, pada 14.7.2022, menolak kebenaran untuk lanjutan masa untuk memfailkan Semakan Kehakiman tersebut. 8) Semakan Kehakiman tersebut tidak pernah diteruskan kerana lanjutan masa tidak dibenarkan untuk memfailkan prosiding S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 semakan kehakiman dan oleh itu, Semakan Kehakiman tersebut tidak pernah didengar di atas merit. 9) Semakan Kehakiman tersebut adalah tidak relevan dan tidak mempunyai kaitan dengan tindakan di sini. Plaintif-Plaintif adalah berhak untuk membawa tindakan ini. 10) Tindakan ini adalah berasas kepada kausa tindakan yang munasabah, tidak bersifat mengaibkan, remeh, dan/atau menyusahkan dan prinsip res judicata adalah tidak terpakai dalam tindakan ini. 11) Terdapat persoalan undang-undang yang kompleks dan rumit untuk dibicarakan yang memerlukan testimoni saksi dan keterangan viva voce di perbicaraan kelak. Plaintif-Plaintif mempunyai kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Defendan dan tindakan di sini bukan jelas tidak boleh dipertahankan (obviously unsustainable) dan bukan kes yang jelas dan ternyata (plain and obvious) untuk dibatalkan dengan serta merta. [4] Dalam mempertimbangkan Notis Permohonan Defendan ini, Mahkamah merujuk kembali kepada peruntukan undang-undang yang dimohon iaitu Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1)(a) dan/atau (b) dan/atau (c) dan/atau (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan/atau Aturan S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan/atau di bawah bidang kuasa sedia ada Mahkamah. [5] Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 memperuntukkan: Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18, r. 19) 19. (1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that— (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case maybe; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be. [6] Mahkamah merujuk kes BANDAR BUILDER SDN BHD & ORS v. UNITED MALAYAN BANKING CORPORATION BHD, SUPREME COURT, IPOH [1993] 4 CLJ 7 yang mana diputuskan: S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [1] The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) Rules of the High Court 1980 are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule. This summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it obviously unsustainable. [2] So long as the pleadings disclose some course of action or raise some question fit to be decided by the Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out. [7] Mahkamah merujuk kembali kepada Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap Defendan. Asas tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif di sini adalah untuk satu perintah deklarasi bahawa pengiraan semula yang disediakan oleh Defendan adalah tidak sah dan terbatal. [8] Plaintif-Plaintif tidak pernah menafikan bahawa kausa tindakan ini adalah sama sebagaimana dirujuk ke Tribunal Pengurusan Strata. Plaintif-Plaintif juga tidak pernah menafikan bahawa pihak Tribunal Pengurusan Strata telah memberikan Award sebagaimana “Award Tersebut” yang bertarikh 30/3/2021. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [9] Plaintif-Plaintif juga mengakui bahawa mereka telah merujuk semula perkara ini kepada pihak Tribunal Pengurusan Strata bagi mendapatkan penjelasan dan membantah kiraan semula oleh Defendan selepas Award Tersebut memperuntukkan sedemikian. [10] Dalam masa sama, Plaintif-Plaintif sendiri dalam affidavit mereka mengeksibitkan email dari Tribunal Pengurusan Strata menyatakan bahawa jika ada perkara berbangkit, ia bolehlah dirujuk kepada Mahkamah kerana keputusan Tribunal Pengurusan Strata adalah muktamad. [11] Mahkamah merujuk kepada peruntukan yang terpakai dalam perkara ini. STRATA MANAGEMENT ACT 2013 ACT 757 117 Awards of the Tribunal (3) In making an award under subsection (1), the Tribunal may make one or more of the orders specified in Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule, and may include in the award such stipulations and conditions as it thinks fit and just. [12] Dalam affidavit Plaintif-Plaintif khususnya melalui Lampiran 30 di perenggan 11.3 (f), perenggan 18 sehingga perenggan 25, Plaintif- S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Plaintif menyatakan terdapat isu undang-undang yang perlu diputuskan. [13] Dari semakan Mahkamah, isu-isu berbangkit adalah isu-isu yang dirujuk ketika di perbicaraan Tribunal Pengurusan Strata. Jika terdapat isu undang-undang atau prosedur yang tidak mematuhi Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013, pihak Tribunal semestinya mempunyai budibicara untuk merujuk perkara tersebut ke Mahkamah Tinggi atau mempunyai kuasa untuk memutuskan perkara tersebut sebagaimana diperuntukkan: 118 References to a Judge of the High Court on a question of law (1) Before the Tribunal makes an award under section 117, it may, in its discretion, refer to a Judge of the High Court a question of law- (a) which arose in the course of the proceedings; (b) which, in the opinion of the Tribunal, is of sufficient importance to merit such reference; or (c) the determination of which by the Tribunal raises, in the opinion of the Tribunal, sufficient doubt to merit such reference. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (2) If the Tribunal refers to any question of law under subsection (1) for the decision of a Judge of the High Court, it shall make its award in conformity with such decision. (3) For the purposes of this section, a Federal Counsel authorized by the Attorney General may appear on behalf of the Tribunal in any proceedings before a Judge of the High Court. [14] Walaupun begitu, daripada apa yang dikemukakan oleh kdua-dua pihak, perjalanan kes ini di Tribunal Pengurusan Strata telah tamat dan pihak Tribunal Pengurusan Strata telah membuat keputusan mereka. Keputusan Tribunal Pengurusan Strata adalah muktamad dan mengikat pihak-pihak. [15] Mahkamah merujuk: 120 Decisions of Tribunal to be final (1) An award made under subsection 112(3) or section 117 shall- (a) subject to section 121, be final and binding on all parties to the proceedings; and (b) be deemed to be an order of a court and be enforced accordingly by any party to the proceedings. (2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(b), in the case where the award made by the Tribunal has not been complied with, the S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Secretary shall send a copy of the award made by the Tribunal to the court having jurisdiction in the place to which the award relates or in the place where the award was made, and the court shall cause the copy of the award to be recorded. [16] Plaintif-Plaintif sendiri telah dimaklumkan oleh Tribunal Pengurusan Strata bahawa jika Plaintif-Plaintif tidak berpuashati dengan “Award Tersebut”, Plaintif-Plaintif boleh memfailkan permohonan Semakan kehakiman di Mahkamah Tinggi. Ini diperuntukkan di bawah peruntukan berikut: 121 Challenging the award on ground of serious irregularity (1) A party to the proceedings of the Tribunal may, upon notice to the other party and to the Tribunal, apply to the High Court challenging an award in the proceedings on the ground of serious irregularity affecting the awards. (2) If there is shown to be serious irregularity affecting the award, the High Court may- (a) remit the award to the Tribunal, in whole or in part, for reconsideration; or (b) set the award aside in whole or in part. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (3) For the purpose of this section, "serious irregularity" means an irregularity of one or more of the following kinds which the court considers has caused substantial injustice to the applicant: (a) failure by the Tribunal to comply with section 113; (b) failure of the Tribunal to deal with all the relevant issues that were put to it; or (c) uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award. [17] Plaintif-Plaintif telah merujuk perkara ini ke Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. Oleh itu, Plaintif-Plaintif akur bahawa isu ini adalah untuk disemak melalui semakan kehakiman tetapi pihak Plaintif-Plaintif telah terlepas peluang untuk berbuat demikian atas kegagalan mereka sendiri. [18] Mahkamah ingin merujuk kepada peruntukan di bawah Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 berhubung prosiding Semakan Kehakiman seperti berikut: ORDER 53 APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW Application for judicial review (O. 53, r. 1) S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 1. (1) This Order shall govern all applications seeking the relief specified in paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and for the purposes therein specified. Applications (O. 53, r. 2) (4) Any person who is adversely affected by the decision of any public authority shall be entitled to make the application. (6) An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant. (7) The Court may, upon an application, extend the time specified in rule 4(1) and if it considers that there is a good reason for doing so. [19] Kegagalan atau kelewatan Plaintif-Plaintif dalam membuat permohonan Semakan Kehakiman ini telah membuatkan mereka terlepas peluang untuk menyemak keputusan Tribunal Pengurusan Strata. Samada semakan bermerit atau sebaliknya, ia adalah bukan lagi isu material sebagaimana diputuskan oleh kes di bawah: NILIMA ISLAM v. KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN IMIGRESEN MALAYSIA & ORS [2023] 1 LNS 2014 Decision of the court S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [10] The law on extension of time with regard to an application under O. 53 r. 3(7) of the Rules of Court 2012 was settled by the Federal Court in Wong Kin Hoong & Anor (suing for themselves and on behalf of all the occupants of Kampung Koman, Raub, Pahang v. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 CLJ 193; [2013] 4 MLJ 161; in the following words: [30] In conclusion, we are of the view that the time frame in applying for judicial review prescribed by the Rules is fundamental. It goes to jurisdiction and once the trial judge had rejected the explanation for the delay for extension of time to apply for judicial review, it follows that the court no longer has the jurisdiction to hear the application for leave for judicial review. Whether the application has merits or not, is irrelevant. Conclusion [23] The application for leave was clearly filed out of time. It is settled law that failure to comply with the time period prescribed in O. 53 r. 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 goes to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear the application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings. In such circumstances, the application for leave would be dismissed unless the applicant has provided a good reason to extend time. In this case, the applicant has not shown any good S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 reason at all for time to be extended even from 30th August 2022. Since time cannot be extended, the only order I can make is to dismiss the instant application for judicial review. [20] Begitu juga diputuskan dalam kes KIJAL RESORT SDN BHD v. PENTADBIR TANAH KEMAMAN & ANOR, FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA [2015] 3 CLJ 861 di mana YAA menyatakan: (4) An application for leave for judicial review made under O. 53 r. 3(6) of the RHC challenging the decision of the State Authority declaring that the land is to be acquired under the LAA, must be filed within 40 days from the date when the decision was first communicated to the appellant ie, on the date when the notice of enquiry in Form E which appended a copy of the schedule to Form D was served pursuant to s. 10 of the LAA on the registered proprietor or occupier of the land pursuant to ss. 11, 52, 53 and 54 of the LAA. Herein, Form E was served on the appellant on 7 March 2006. Application for leave for judicial review was filed on 6 January 2008 ie, almost 22 months after the decision to acquire the land in question was first communicated to the appellant. This was clearly beyond the 40 days time frame as stipulated in O. 53 r. 3(6) of the RHC. There had been an inordinate delay on the part of the appellant in filing for judicial review. There was no indication to show that the S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 appellant had applied for an extension of time. Thus, the High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appellant's application for judicial review on the ground that the time frame under O. 53 r. 3(6) had not been complied with. On this ground alone, the respondent's first preliminary objection must be upheld and the judicial review application by the appellant ought to be dismissed in limine. In view of this, there was no necessity for this court to consider the second objection that the proper party was not named as the first respondent. (paras 116-117 & 123-124). [21] Dalam kes ini, pihak Plaintif-Plaintif tidak merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur atau membuat apa-apa tindakan lanjut berhubung keputusan tersebut. [22] Sebaliknya, Plaintif-Plaintif telah memulakan tindakan di Mahkamah ini dengan memfailkan Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan dengan memplidkan kausa tindakan dan relief yang sama sebagaimana di bangkitkan di Tribunal Pengurusan Strata terdahulu. [23] Mahkamah ingin membawa perhatian kepada satu kes yang diputuskan di Mahkamah Tinggi iaitu kes REAL BIG VENTURES SDN. BHD lwn. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH PETALING (PTD PETALING) SELANGOR & ORS [2023] 1 LNS 2019 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Latar belakang Kes [2] Plaintif pernah memfailkan Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam No. BA-25-101-09/2019 yang didengar di hadapan Yang Arif Shahnaz binti Sulaiman. Pihak-pihak dalam Semakan Kehakiman tersebut adalah sama seperti dalam tindakan ini. Malahan kandungan afidavit sokongan dalam Semakan Kehakiman juga adalah sama. [3] Fakta-fakta dan isu-isu tuntutan Plaintif dalam tindakan ini juga telah dibangkitkan dalam permohonan Semakan Kehakiman tersebut. Permohonan tersebut telah didengar pada 22.3.2022 dan pada 25.4.2022, Yang Arif telah menolak permohonan tersebut. Plaintif telah merayu terhadap keputusan tersebut terhadap Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 di Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu No. Kes B-01(A)- 368-05/2022. Namun Rayuan tersebut telah dibatalkan pada 7.11.2022. Plaintif tidak merayu keputusan Semakan Kehakiman tersebut terhadap Defendan 5. [4] Fakta-fakta dan isu-isu dalam Semakan Kehakiman dan dalam tindakan ini adalah mengenai kerja-kerja penyelenggaraan kolam yang telah diberikan kelulusan kepada Plaintif oleh Defendan 4. Plaintif telah melantik Defendan 5 untuk perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan Skim Perlombongan. Defendan 1 adalah pemberi Permit. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Defendan 4 telah mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah melanggar syarat- syarat berkenaan kerja-kerja penyelenggaraan kolam tersebut. Seterusnya Defendan 1 telah menolak permohonan pembaharuan permit Plaintif melalui Surat bertarikh 6.8.2019. [5] Oleh itu Plaintif telah membuat tuntutan bahawa Defendan 1, 3, 4 dan 5 telah bersubahat dan membuat konspirasi untuk menjejaskan Plaintif. Dalam tindakan di Mahkamah ini juga, Plaintif menuntut gantirugi. Defendan-defendan pula menyatakan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif dalam tindakan ini adalah res judicata dan dihalang oleh estopel. Analisis Mahkamah 1. Isu menqenai res judicata [7] Mahkamah telah meneliti tuntutan Plaintif dalam tindakan ini dan mendapati bahawa fakta-fakta dan isu-isu dalam tuntutan ini telah dibangkitkan dalam Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam No. BA-25-101-09/2019. [8] Didapati bahawa perkara-perkara yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 7 hingga 86 Penyata Tuntutan Terpinda Plaintif adalah satu salinan semula ("reproduce") perenggan-perenggan 12 hingga 98 affidavit sokongan Semakan Kehakiman tersebut. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [9] Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman untuk kes Semakan Kehakiman ini telah menolak permohonan tersebut pada 25.04.2022. Selanjutnya Plaintif telah memfailkan rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu No. B-01(A)- 368-05/2022, namun rayuan tersebut telah dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan pada 7.11.2022. [10] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu, National Feedlot Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Public Bank [2023] 10 CLJ 427; [2023] 1 LNS 1802:- [51] For completeness, on the issue of res judicata and/or issue estoppel raised by D4, it would be instructive to refer to the judgment in the landmark case of Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Hartela Contractors Ltd [1997] 2 CLJ 104; [1996] 2 MLJ 57, at pp. 113 to 114 (CLJ); pp. 65 to 66 (MLJ) (Court of Appeal). ... Although that was a decision made on an interlocutory matter which was purely procedural in nature it was nevertheless binding on the court and on all parties to the suit until its reversal on appeal. In our judgment the decision of the learned judge overruling the respondent's preliminary objection rendered the point taken res judicata. ... S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 We cannot over emphasize the proposition that once a judge makes a ruling, substantive or procedural, final or interlocutory, it must be adhered to and may not be reopened willy-nilly... [11] Berdasarkan kepada kes tersebut, adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah dalam kes Semakan Kehakiman tersebut telah memberikan keputusan yang muktamad. Malahan rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan juga telah dibatalkan. [12] Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini tidak boleh mendengarnya semula dan pihak-pihak perlu mematuhi keputusan yang telah diberikan.” [24] Walaupun kes ini dapat dibezakan dengan kes dihadapan kita sekarang, isu dan fakta yang dibangkitkan adalah sama sebagaimana dibicarakan dalam prosiding Tribunal. Prosedur sepatutnya telah digariskan dan apabila Plaintif-Plaintif melepaskan hak mereka untuk membawa ketidakpuasan hati terhadap keputusan “Award Tersebut” melalui Semakan Kehakiman, samada bermerit atau sebaliknya, Plaintif-Plaintif telah terlepas peluang mereka untuk membangkitkan semula perkara yang sama. [25] Tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif dengan memfailkan semula tindakan ini di Mahkamah ini untuk diputuskan oleh Korum yang berbeza adalah tidak tepat. Ini juga dikatakan sebagai satu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah dan akan memprejudiskan pihak-pihak memandangkan S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 kedua-dua pihak sebelum ini sudah terikat dengan “Award Tersebut”. [26] Apa yang lebih menarik, pihak Defendan telah melaksanakan perintah melalui “Award Tersebut” dengan membuat kiraan semula dalam tempoh masa yang ditetapkan dan telah memulangkan lebihan kutipan ke akaun Plaintif-Plaintif sebagaimana diarahkan dalam “Award Tersebut”. [27] Pihak Plaintif-Plaintif dalam hujahan mereka ada membangkitkan bahawa Mahkamah perlu menilai isu keesahan pengiraan Defendan melalui “Award Tersebut” sebagaimana dinyatakan “Therefore, it is submitted that the validity and/or effectiveness of the Defendant's 1st Re-Calculation is a material and relevant issue that must be ventilated in order to determine whether or not the said Award was validly complied with by the Defendant within the 90-day time-frame from the date of said Award.” [28] Pada dapatan Mahkamah ini, pertikaian berhubung isu ini telah tamat. Dalam kes TAN SRI MUSA BIN HJ AMAN v. TUN DATUK SERI PANGLIMA HJ JUHAR HJ MAHIRUDDIN & ANOR AND ANOTHER APPEAL [2020] 3 MLJ 46 Mahkamah memetik antara lain: S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 “The court will not make a declaratory judgment when the issue in dispute is purely academic. The court should not be required to answer academic question or issue which is no longer a live issue.” [29] Tambahan pula, selepas Award Tersebut diberikan, pihak Defendan telah mengambil langkah sewajarnya dengan mengadakan satu EGM Defendan pada 1/7/2023 di mana Defendan telah melaksanakan pengiraan semula (berdasarkan unit syer) dan ‘memuktamadkan’ pengiraan semula tersebut ke atas kesemua unit di Ara Hill Condominium pada 1/2/2023 (‘Pengiraan Semula Defendan 2023’), dan selanjutnya mengkreditkan jumlah berlebihan dan mencajkan jumlah perbezaan ke dalam Penyata-Penyata Akaun pemilik-pemilik (termasuk Plaintif-Plaintif) pada hari yang sama. Ini dapat dilihat daripada affidavit yang difailkan. [30] Oleh itu, jika sekiranya Plaintif-Plaintif masih tidak berpuashati dengan pengiraan terkini selepas EGM, ini mungkin menjadi isu baru untuk dipertikaikan tetapi bukan perkiraan sebelum itu yang mana telah diputuskan sebelum ini dalam “Award Tersebut”. [31] Akhirnya, Mahkamah ingin merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan MIDDY INDUSTRIES SDN BHD & ORS v. ARENSI-MARLEY (M) SDN BHD [2013] 3 MLJ 511 yang memutuskan: S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [7] ... The words 'frivolous or vexatious' generally refer to a groundless action or statement with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. In considering whether any proceedings were vexatious or frivolous, one is entitled to and ought to look at the whole history of the matter and it is not to be determined by whether the pleading discloses a cause of action or not (see Attorney General of Duchy of Lancaster v London & North Western Railway Co [1892] 3 Ch 274; and Re Vernazza [1959] 2 All ER 200). [32] Oleh demikian, Notis Permohonan bertarikh 7 haribulan Ogos 2023 (Kandungan 28) dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM3,000.00 (tidak termasuk disbursement) dibayar oleh Plaintif-Plaintif kepada Defendan. Sekian untuk pertimbangan YAH. S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Disediakan oleh: Sazlina Safie ………………… Sazlina Bt Safie Hakim Sesyen, Mahkamah Sesyen 3 Sivil, Mahkamah Sesyen Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Tarikh :1/12/2023 PEGUAMCARA PLAINTIF: EN. DE CRUZ, VIOLA LETTICE [TETUAN V L DECRUZ & CO] PEGUAMCARA DEFENDAN: EN. TEH I-VERN [TETUAN JOSEPHINE, L K CHOW & CO.] S/N bJfDgK/Y0OZ/lP9VyXDQg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	40,523	Tika 2.6.0
BA-22NCvC-171-06/2020	PLAINTIF 1. ) INDRAN A/L KARUPPIAH 2. ) CHITRA SELVI A/P S VELLASAMY DEFENDAN 1. ) RHB BANK BERHAD 2. ) POUN KOK HING 3. ) PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH HULU LANGAT	Wrongful foreclosure of property by chargee bank. Arrears demanded in Form 16D settled 7 months prior to grant of Order for Sale by Land Administrator. Chargee bank did not inform Land Administrator at 2nd and 3rd inquiries that chargor had settled arrears and regularised loan account after 1st inquiry.	01/12/2023	YA Dato' Faizah Binti Jamaludin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e8104a6c-3431-4d87-bf11-b9c3040e54b2&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO. BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 BETWEEN 1. INDRAN A/L KARUPPIAH (NO. K/P: 580808-10-6267) 2. CHITRA SELVI A/P S VELLASAMY (NO. K/P: 720419-14-5440) PLAINTIFFS AND 1. RHB BANK BERHAD (6171-M) 2. POUN KOK HING (NO. K/P: 910525-10-5167) 3. PENTADBIR TANAH HULU LANGAT DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The plaintiffs are the registered and beneficial owners of the property held under the title PM 2629, No. Lot 32224, Tempat Batu 12, Jalan Balakong, Sg Besi, Pekan Kajang Daerah Hulu Langat, Selangor Darul Ehsan together with the two-storey terrace house at the address No. 2, Jalan Resak, Taman Impian Ehsan, 43300 Balakong, Selangor Darul Ehsan (“the Property”). [2] The Property was charged to the first defendant bank (“RHB”) as security for a housing loan granted to the plaintiffs by RHB. 01/12/2023 11:54:21 BA-22NCvC-171-06/2020 Kand. 107 S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 2 [3] The plaintiffs’ case is that RHB had wrongfully sold the Property by public auction and that the public auction of the Property was wrong at law and void. The plaintiffs filed this action against the RHB, the 2nd defendant (“D2”) and the 3rd defendant (“D3”), seeking declaratory orders that public auction was wrong at law and is void. They also seek damages against RHB. D2 did not enter any appearance. Judgment in default was entered against him. The action against D3 was struck out pursuant to an order of this Court dated 05.08.2021. [4] As for the plaintiffs’ action against RHB, I gave judgment for the plaintiffs after full trial. I had also awarded exemplary damages in the sum of RM200,000.00 against RHB for their contumelious disregard of the plaintiffs’ rights in continuing to foreclose on the plaintiffs’ property even though the plaintiffs had settled the amount in arrears demanded in the Form 16D and for the misrepresentation by their lawyers to D3 during the 2nd Inquiry and 3rd Inquiry (both defined below), which resulted in the wrongful grant of the order of sale by D3 and wrongful auction of the plaintiffs’ Property pursuant to the said order for sale. [5] The full reasons for my decision are set out in this judgment. Material Facts [6] When the plaintiffs defaulted on their loan repayment, RHB served the plaintiffs a statutory notice of default in respect of the charge (“Form 16D’’) dated 25.05.2016 under section 254 of the National Land Code (“NLC”). On 10.08.2016, RHB applied for an order for sale of the Property from D3 in a Form 16G under section 260(2) of the NLC. RHB stated on the Form 16G that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the notice in the Form 16D. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 3 [7] On 22.09.2016, the 1st plaintiff (“P1”) attended the first inquiry held by D3 at the Hulu Langat Land Office (the “1st Inquiry”). The plaintiffs pleaded in para. 9 of their statement of claim that P1 had informed D3 and RHB’s lawyer at the 1st Inquiry that the plaintiffs have changed their residential and delivery address to Block F-7-8, Kuarters Kerajaan DBKL, Batu 2 ½, Warisan Cityview, Jalan 3/93A, 5600 Cheras, Kuala Lumpur. [8] Inexplicably, in para. 5 of its statement of defence, RHB denied para. 9 of the statement of claim but went on to state that P1 had informed RHB’s lawyer of the plaintiffs’ change of address at the 1st Inquiry – which was exactly what the plaintiffs had pleaded! Para. 5 of RHB’s statement of defence is reproduced below: 5. Perenggan 9 Penyataan Tuntutan tersebut dirujuk dan Defendan Pertama menafikannya kerana Plaintiff Pertama hanya memberitahu perubahan alamat tersebut kepada peguamcara Defendan Pertama sewaktu Defendan Pertama hadir pada siasatan kali pertama iaitu pada 22.9.2016 di pejabat Hulu Langat.” [9] P1 had told D3 and RHB at the 1st Inquiry that he was in the process of selling the Property and that he had appointed a real estate agent to help find him a buyer. This is reflected in D3’s notes at the 1st Inquiry (at bundle B/pg. 37), the image of which is reproduced below. D3 had ticked item 6(iii) “Penggadai dalam proses penjualan hartanah”. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 4 [10] RHB’s Statement of Account of the plaintiffs’ account no. 71220000022520 (131) as at 22.09.2016 (at bundle B/pg 46) prepared by RHB for the 1st Inquiry shows that the amount in arrears as at 22.09.2016 was RM8,420.23 and the amount of interest per day was RM101.93. [11] After the 1st Inquiry, the plaintiffs remedied the default stated in the Form 16D. They paid RHB the amount in arrears as of 27.10.2016 in the sum of RM10,500.00. The plaintiffs’ payment of the sum of RM10,500.00 on 27.10.2016 was shown on the plaintiffs’ loan statement account with RHB for the period 01.07.2016 to 31.12.2016 (at bundle B/pg.62). The payment was also recorded on RHB’s Digital Credit Management System (“DCM System”), where it was noted that the “account has been regularised” on 27.10.2016 and that it had been “submitted for approval to withdraw legal action”. The relevant excerpt recorded on RHB Bank’s DCM System (marked as exhibit “D2”) is reproduced below: No. Notes Date User 17 Submitted for approval to withdraw legal action & close file. To reduce the int rate to BLR+1.00% or whichever is higher as per LO. Acc has been regularised 27-Oct-2016 Wan Asniza Wan Asri [12] The user who had recorded the payment on RHB’s DCM System was Wan Azniza Wan Asri — RHB’s first witness during the trial (“DW1”). [13] However, RHB did not withdraw its legal action against the plaintiffs after they had settled the amount in arrears. Instead, RHB continued its foreclosure proceedings against the Property. It also did not inform D3 at the second inquiry held on 15.12.2016 (the “2nd Inquiry”) that the plaintiffs had remedied the default stated in the Form 16D. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 5 [14] Ms. Ng Mang Yi (“DW2”) who is RHB’s Head of Litigation agreed under cross-examination that by reason of the plaintiffs’ payment of the sum of RM10,500.00 on 27.10.2016, the breach stated in the Form 16D had been regularised by the plaintiffs. DW2 also agreed the plaintiffs had complied with the Form 16D when they settled the outstanding amount. During re-examination, DW2 confirmed that based on the plaintiffs’ payment of the sum of RM10,500.00 and the RHB’s DCM System, the plaintiffs’ account had been regularised. She also confirmed that the plaintiffs’ loan statement account for the period 01.07.2016 to 31.12.2016 shows that the plaintiffs had paid the sum of RM10,500.00. [15] DW2 explained that RHB’s litigation department will not know about the payment of any arrears by a chargor and the regularisation of their loan account at the bank, if the department is not instructed to stop the legal action against the said chargor. This is even though the payment is recorded in RHB’s DCM System and on the chargor’s loan account statement issued by the bank, and the litigation department has access to the DCM System. DW2 confirmed that the litigation department has access the DCM System. [16] Furthermore, although P1 had notified both D3 and RHB’s lawyers of his change of residential and delivery address at the 1st Inquiry, D3 had sent the summons served on the chargor (under section 261 of the NLC) dated 10.11.2016 for the 2nd Inquiry to the plaintiffs’ old residential and delivery addresses at No.11-13.09, Sri Selangor, Flats Jalan San Peng, 52200 Kuala Lumpur and no. 2 Jalan Resak, Taman Impian Ehsan, 43300 Balakong, Selangor. Similarly, the notice dated 29.03.2019 for the 3rd inquiry was issued by D3 to the plaintiffs’ old addresses. The 3rd inquiry was held on 20.04.2017. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 6 [17] Notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ payment of the arrears, RHB continued with its foreclosure proceedings against the Property. It did not tell D3 at the 3rd Inquiry that the Plaintiffs had settled the amount in arrears on 27.10.2016. D3’s notes of the 3rd Inquiry show that RHB’s lawyers had misrepresented to D3 that the plaintiffs had failed to make payment of the amount in arrears demanded in its first letter of demand dated 24.03.2016. D3’s notes of the 3rd Inquiry (Bundle B/pg. 51) are reproduced below: KETERANGAN PEMEGANG GADAIAN 1. Penggadai telah gagal membuat pembayaran dan surat tuntutan pertama dikeluarkan 24.03.2016. Tiada susulan dalam bentuk bayaran dibuat. [18] The information given by RHB’s lawyer to D3 at the 3rd Inquiry was clearly wrong and untrue since the plaintiffs had settled the arrears six months earlier on 27.10.2016. Based on this misrepresentation by RHB’s lawyer, D3 issued an order for sale at the 3rd Inquiry for the Property to be sold by public auction on 25.05.2017 at the reserved price of RM430,000.00. [19] The Property was sold to D2 at a public auction held on 25.05.2017 pursuant to the order for sale at the reserved price. [20] Prior to the public auction, the plaintiffs, through their estate agent, DF Realty Sdn Bhd, managed to find a purchaser for the Property. He was D2 — the man who had later bought the Property at the public auction. The plaintiffs and D2 had on 09.05.2017 signed a document entitled Letter of Confirmation (Sale), where D2 agreed to purchase the Property for the sum of RM470,000.00 and gave a cheque for the sum of RM9,400.00 made in the name of DF Realty Sdn Bhd, as an earnest deposit towards the purchase of the Property. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 7 [21] The plaintiffs say that they found out about the order for sale on 09.05.2017. On 16.05.2017, the plaintiffs, their estate agent and D2 went to RHB’s office at Capital Square on 16.05.2017 to enquire about the amount of arrears that was outstanding on his housing loan account. P1 said that on that day, he met with RHB’s officer, DW1, where she had told him that the amount in arrears on his housing loan account was RM14,389.01. He said that he was informed by DW1 that the arrears must be paid by 17.05.2017 in order to stop the auction. She also told him that the payment can be made at any RHB branch. P1 said that DW1 had written on a piece of paper the amount he had to pay to settle the arrears — the copy of the piece of paper is exhibited in bundle B/pg. 170. [22] P1 said that the next day, on 17.05.2017 at around 3.30pm, he went to RHB’s branch at Pandan Indah with RM14,400.00 in cash to settle the arrears on his housing loan account. The counter clerk at the branch accepted the RM14,400.00 cash from P1 and asked him to wait. The bank-in slip for the payment of the RM14,400.00 and the RHB ticket with the waiting no. 1118 issued on 17.05.2017 to the 1st plaintiff at the RHB’s Pandan Indah branch are exhibited in bundle B/pg. 168-169. [23] P1 said after waiting for about an hour, he was told by the clerk that RHB cannot accept the payment because the plaintiffs’ loan account had been frozen by the bank and that the time to settle the arrears had ended. P1 said that he did not know what to do when RHB refused to accept his payment of RM14,400.00 to settle the amount in arrears. He said he called DW1 several times, but she refused to talk to him, and he also tried to talk to other officers of RHB, but they also refused to talk to him. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 8 [24] On 24.05.2017, P1 filed a police report and gave a copy of the police report to the land office. He also went to the land office on 25.05.2017 to try to stop the auction but the Property had already been auctioned at the price of RM430,000.00. He said to his surprise he found that the successful bidder was D2. [25] In its pleadings, RHB denied that P1 had met with DW1 at its office at Capital Square on 16.05.2017. However, under cross-examination, DW1 admitted that she did in fact meet with P1 on 16.05.2017. DW1 also admitted that she had given him the document in bundle B/pg.170 and that she had written the total amount outstanding and late payment charges. DW1 said that she had written up to the words “03-2610426 (direct line)” on the document but not the words “Pejabat Tanah RM300” below the words “03-2610426 (direct line)”. The image of the document that DW1 gave the 1st plaintiff at the meeting on 16.05.2017 is reproduced in the left column of the table in paragraph [29] below. [26] Initially, DW1 denied P1 had gone to RHB’s branch at Pandan Indah on 17.05.2017 to make payment of the outstanding sum. However, after she was shown by the plaintiffs’ counsel the RHB ticket issued to P1 at the RHB Pandan Indah branch on 17.05.2017 at 15.57pm, DW1 changed her testimony — she agreed that P1 went to RHB’s branch on 17.05.2017. She also admitted that P1 had paid the RM14,400.00. When asked by RHB’s counsel during re-examination, DW1 said that she did not agree that the 1st plaintiff went to RHB’s Pandan Indah branch on 17.05.2017 because she did not know what time the 1st plaintiff went to the branch. DW1 said she only knew that 1st plaintiff went to the branch when she was informed by an officer at the branch. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 9 [27] I find that DW1 to be a less than truthful witness. If indeed she only found out from the officer at RHB’s Pandan branch that P1 had gone to the branch, it still does not explain why she chose to deny that P1 went to RHB’s Pandan Indah branch on 17.05.2017, only to change her testimony when she was shown the RHB ticket. Furthermore, even though the DW1 was the person who had made the entry on RHB’s DCM system that the plaintiffs’ loan account had been regularized on 27.10.2016 (marked as “D2” and reproduced in para. [11] above), when asked during cross- examination about the entry, DW1 replied “saya tak pasti”. [28] In addition, I find that the document marked “ID-D1” tendered by RHB in “Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Defendan Pertama”, which DW1 said is a photocopy of the original document shown in bundle B/pg.170 she had given to P1 on 16.05.2017, to be a fabricated document. For this reason, the document was not admitted as evidence during the trial — it remained as a Part C document. [29] I arrived at this conclusion because the words “03-2610426 (direct line)” on the document in bundle B/pg 170, which DW1 had earlier admitted that she had written and given to the 1st plaintiff when he met her on 16.05.2017, was not on the document marked as “ID-D1” — which DW1 claimed to be a copy of the document in bundle B/pg 170. Instead, the words “3000 – Bendahari Negeri Selangor” were in its place. During re-examination, DW1 had said that she had written “3000–Bendahari Negeri Selangor”. However, the words “3000–Bendahari Negeri Selangor” on ID-D1 were not on the document in Bundle B/pg 170. This difference can be clearly seen in the image of the document in bundle B/pg 170 shown in in the left column in comparison to the document marked as “ID- D1” in the right column of the table below. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 10 Image of bundle B/pg 170 Image of “ID-D1” Analysis [30] The order for sale was issued by D3 based on the misrepresentation by RHB’s lawyer to D3 at the 2nd and 3rd Inquiries that the plaintiffs had not settled the amount in arrears demanded in the Form 16D, when RHB’s own DCM System and the plaintiffs’ statement of account show that the they had paid the arrears on 27.10.2016. [31] The plaintiffs had paid the amount in arrears after the 1st Inquiry and before the 2nd Inquiry. Therefore, RHB as chargee had no right under the NLC to continue with its foreclosure of the Property and apply from D3 for an order for sale of the Property once the plaintiffs had paid the amount in arrears demanded in the Form 16D. It should have stopped the foreclosure proceedings as soon as the payment was made. Section 254(3) of the NLC states that a chargee may only apply for an order for sale under the NLC if the breach stated in the Form 16D has not been remedied. In this instant case, the breach was remedied prior to the 2nd Inquiry. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 11 [32] It was wrong at law for RHB to have misrepresented to D3 at the 2nd and 3rd Inquiries that the plaintiffs had not paid the amount in arrears and to obtain the order for sale of the Property based on this misrepresentation. [33] A chargee’s right to foreclosure proceedings is statute based. It is derived from the NLC. It requires full compliance with the statutory provisions, including all the relevant procedures stipulated in Chapter 3 of the NLC. The issuance of a notice of default in Form 16D forms part of the statutory procedures necessary for a chargee to exercise its rights to foreclosure: see Southern Bank Bhd v Chuah Beng Hock [1999] 5 CLJ 620; [1999] 2 AMR 1826; [1999] MLJU 1, HC. [34] The Federal Court in Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 2 CLJ 36 held, in respect of an application to Court for an order for sale under section 256 of the NLC, a chargor may show “cause to the contrary” under section 256(3) of the NLC by demonstrating any of the following: (i) that the charge is defeasible upon one or more of the grounds specified under subsections (2) and (4)(b) of section 256 of the NLC; (ii) that the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale, such as failure to make a demand or service of a notice in Form 16D, or that the notice demands sums not lawfully due from the charge; (iii) that the grant of the order for sale would be contrary to some rule of law or equity. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 12 [35] In this instant case, RHB had applied for the order for sale from D3 as the Land Administrator under section 260 of the NLC. Nonetheless the same principles as regards the issuance of the order for sale applies — a chargor may show cause as to the existence of “cause to the contrary” as to why the order for sale should not be issued by the Land Administrator. Section 263 of the NLC states: (1) At the conclusion of any enquiry under section 261, the Land Administrator shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge in question relates unless he is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary. [36] The plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to attend the 2nd and 3rd Inquiries before D3 because the Summons to Chargor to attend the inquiries were sent to their old addresses. If the Summons had been issued to their current address, they would have been able to attend the Inquiries and inform D3 that there was a “cause to the contrary” as to why he should not grant RHB the order for sale. The “cause to the contrary” is that they had already paid the amount in arrears to RHB demanded under the Form 16D. [37] Even if the plaintiffs after remedying the breach stated in the Form 16D, subsequently defaults on the repayment of the housing loan, RHB cannot rely on the Form 16D dated 25.05.2016 to obtain an order for sale, once the amount of arrears, for which the Form 16D was issued, had been settled by the plaintiffs. RHB must issue a notice of default in another Form 16D for any subsequent default before taking foreclosure proceedings by reason of that subsequent default. [38] It is clear from the Permohonan Perintah Jual dated 20.04.2017 that RHB’s application for order for sale was based on the plaintiffs’ default S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 13 stated in the Form 16D dated 25.05.2016 and the Form 16G dated 10.8.2016. [39] As the very foundation of the order of sale i.e. the amount demanded under the Form 16D dated 25.05.2016 was no longer in existence on the date of the grant of the order for sale by D3, the order for sale was null and void. It follows therefore that the public auction of the Property was also null and void. FINDINGS [40] For all the reasons above, I find that RHB was wrong at law to have continued with the foreclosure proceedings after the plaintiffs had settled the amount in arrears after the 1st Inquiry and to have misrepresented to D3 at the 2nd and 3rd Inquiries that the plaintiffs had not paid the amount of arrears outstanding in their loan account with RHB in the Form 16D. As the plaintiffs’ breach demanded in the Form 16D had been regularised prior to the date of the grant of the order for sale by D3, I find that the order for sale was null and void. [41] For this reason, I find that the public auction of the Plaintiff’s Property pursuant to the said order for sale was wrong at law and was null and void. [42] Additionally, prior to the date of the public auction, the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement for the sale of the Property with D2 for the sum of RM470,000. By reason of the wrongful public auction of the Property, D2 was able to purchase the Property at the lesser price of RM430,000.00. The plaintiffs accordingly lost the sum of RM40,000.00 which was the difference between the sale price of RM470,000 agreed S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 14 between the plaintiffs and D2, and the price at which D2 purchased the Property at the public auction. [43] RHB is a financial institution licensed under the Financial Services Act 2013 (“FSA”) to carry on banking business, which under section 2 of the FSA includes “the provision of finance”. It is indeed astonishing to discover from the facts of this instant case that RHB, as a licensed bank, does not appear to have any procedure in its standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) to safeguard against the wrongful foreclosure of its customers’ properties charged to the bank as security for any financing facilities extended by the bank to the said customers. [44] From the facts of this instant case, it appears there is nothing in RHB’s SOPs that ensures that its litigation department is notified once arrears in loan accounts are settled and the account has been regularised so that its litigation department will stop or discontinue any foreclosure proceedings taken by the bank against any property charged as security under the said loan account. From DW2’s testimony, as the Head of RHB’s litigation department, it appears that even though the plaintiffs’ settlement of the arrears and the regularisation of their loan account had been recorded on the bank’s DCM System and reflected on the plaintiffs’ statement of account, there is nothing to automatically notify or trigger RHB’s litigation department to discontinue the foreclosure proceedings against the plaintiffs’ Property, which resulted in the said Property being wrongfully auctioned pursuant to an order for sale illegally obtained by RHB in breach of the NLC. [45] Also, there appears to be nothing in RHB’s SOPs that requires its litigation department to check the DCM System or the chargor’s loan S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 15 account to ascertain whether the amount in arrears had been settled and the loan account regularised prior to any inquiry before the Land Administrator after the issuance of Form 16D, Form 16G and prior to proceeding with its application for an order for sale. [46] In this instant case, RHB had compounded its wrongful act and lack of necessary safeguards and procedures in its SOPs, by DW1’s less than candid testimony during the trial and its tendering of the document (“ID- DW1”), which for the reasons discussed above this Court has found to have been clearly falsified. [47] In my view, RHB’s conduct and the conduct of its employees reveals a lackadaisical and cavalier approach and a contumelious disregard for its own customers’ rights. [48] The Court of Appeal in Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors and another appeal [2018] 1 MLJ 784; [2018] 4 AMR 745; [2017] 1 LNS 500 held: [33] The exemplary damages or punitive damages - the two terms now regarded as interchangeable - are additional damages awarded with reference to the conduct of the defendant, to signify disapproval, condemnation or denunciation of the defendant's tortious act, and to punish the defendant. Exemplary damages may be awarded where the defendant has acted with vindictiveness or malice, or where he has acted with a "contumelious disregard" for the right to the plaintiff. The primary purpose of an award of exemplary damages may be deterrent, or punitive and retributory, and the award may also have an important function in vindicating the rights of the plaintiff. …………….. [Emphasis added] [49] To signify this Court’s disapproval, condemnation and denunciation of RHB’s conduct in this case and its contumelious disregard of the S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 16 plaintiffs’ rights and to incentivise it to put in the necessary safeguards and procedures in its SOPs so that it does not wrongfully foreclose any of its customers’ properties again in the future, I have decided to award the sum of RM200,000.00 in exemplary damages against RHB. DECISION [50] Accordingly, the Court gives judgment for the plaintiffs and makes the following Orders: a. A declaration that the public auction of the Property on 25.05.2017 at the Pejabat Tanah dan Daerah Hulu Langat was wrong at law and is null and void. b. A declaration that the 1st plaintiff is the legal owner of ½ of the Property. c. A declaration that the 2nd plaintiff is the legal owner of ½ of the Property. d. Special damages in the sum of RM40,000.00 is awarded to the plaintiffs against RHB. e. General damages in the sum of RM50,000.00 is awarded to the plaintiffs against RHB. f. Exemplary damages in the sum of RM200,000.00 is awarded against RHB. g. Judgment in default of appearance is entered against the 2nd defendant; h. Cost in sum of RM20,000.00 is awarded against RHB. S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 17 Dated: November 29, 2023 FAIZAH JAMALUDIN Judge High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-171-06/2020 JUDGMENT Indran Karuppiah & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad & Ors 18 COUNSELS: For the Plaintiffs: Rehvathi a/p Krishnasamy Messrs Teh Soon Kee & Partners 2556, 1st Floor, Persiaran Raja Muda Musa, 41100 Klang, Selangor For the Defendant: Ain Farhani Adnan Messrs Zahrin Emrad & Sujaihah Suite 9.05, 9th Floor, Bangunan Lee Yan Lian, Jalan Tun Perak 50050 Kuala Lumpur S/N bEoQ6DE0h02/EbnDBA5Usg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	30,153	Tika 2.6.0
WA-23CY-9-02/2019	PLAINTIF ABIRAMEE A/P RAMALINGAN DEFENDAN 1. ) NUR ISABELLA BINTI ABDULLAH 2. ) SERI BINTI ISMAIL 3. ) Nur Isabella Binti Abdullah 4. ) Seri Binti Ismail 5. ) SKIN MASTER VENTURES SDN BHD	1. P is seeking damages for libel, conspiracy to defame, and other prayers against the Ds grounded on several alleged defamatory statements by the Ds that had allegedly hurt and harmed the reputation of the P her business. 2. D1 denies the allegations, filed a counterclaim against the P for the botched Botox filler injection that had injured her face. 3. D3, D4 and D5:, deies the P’s action, pleaded the defence of fair comment.4 On 03.10.2023, I find the P has failed to prove her case and dismissed it with costs and D1’s counterclaim is allowed.	01/12/2023	YA Puan Hayatul Akmal binti Abdul Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=59e31396-2fa9-4390-9f35-88d63de47833&Inline=true	WA-23CY-9-02/2019 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR 5 DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: WA-23CY-9-02/2019 ANTARA 10 ABIRAMEE A/P RAMALINGAM (No. K/P: 830126-07-5386) Berniaga atas nama POSH MEDISPA (Pendaftaran No.: 002813212-X) …PLAINTIF 15 DAN 1. NUR ISABELLA BINTI ABDULLAH 2. SERI BINTI ISMAIL 20 3. SKIN MASTER VENTURES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: - 1206174-X) 4. RAVINPREET KAUR A/P NERENDER PAL SINGH 5. NASHAYINEE A/P PALANISAMY …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 25 JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) 30 INTRODUCTION [1] The parties are as follows: (a) The plaintiff (P) is a qualified medical doctor practising in an aesthetic clinic as the sole proprietor of Posh Medispa. (b) The first defendant (D1) and the second defendant (D2) are 35 private individuals. (c) The third defendant (D3) is a Malaysian company with the fourth defendant (D4) as its director. (d) The fifth defendant (D5) is an individual working for D3. All defendants will be referred to as the Ds collectively. 40 01/12/2023 16:38:09 WA-23CY-9-02/2019 Kand. 149 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 2 [2] In this suit: 2.1 The P is seeking damages for libel, conspiracy to defame, aggravated damages, public apology, interest, and costs against the Ds grounded on several alleged publications of defamatory 45 statements by the Ds that had allegedly hurt and harmed the reputation of the P (t/a Posh Medispa) and her business in the aesthetic services in Cyberjaya, Selangor. 2.2 D1 denies: 50 (a) The allegations in her statement of defence. (b) She also filed a counterclaim against the P for the botched Botox filler injection that had injured her face and needed medical treatment to address the infection. (c) P is alleged to have been negligent in carrying out the 55 procedure that had caused pain and suffering. (d) D1 is seeking special damages of RM4,774.00. Damages for pain and suffering are to be assessed, as well as aggravated damages, interest, and costs. 60 2.3 D3, D4 and D5: (a) Denies the P’s action. (b) They put the P on strict proof. (c) In their defence, D4 and D5 rely on s.8 of the Defamation Act 1957, that in the circumstances of the facts of this case, the 65 statements constitute fair comments. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 3 [3] On 03.10.2023: 70 In my judgment: (a) On the balance of probabilities, I find the P has failed to prove her case and that there are no merits in the P’s case. (b) I dismissed the present suit with costs to the Ds payable within 60 days. 75 (c) D1’s counterclaim is allowed. [4] My orders are as follows: 4.1 Against D1: As a medical practitioner/professional, I find that the P owes a duty 80 of care. There is compelling evidence to conclude that P had breached that duty. Therefore, in the circumstances, I am allowing the counterclaim and order as follows: (a) Special damages of RM4,774.00 (b) Damages for pain and suffering are to be assessed. 85 (c) Interest of 5% from the action date until full realisation. (d) Costs to be paid within 60 days from the date hereof. The global cost of RM80,000.00 is to be paid within 60 days from the date of this order. 4.2 As against D2, taken from the CMS, after the filing of the affidavit of 90 service by the P on 19.09.2019 (enclosure 26), nothing further was done. Apart from this, grounded on my findings on the P’s action, the claim against D2 is similarly dismissed. 4.3 Against D3, D4, and D5, global costs of RM60,000.00 are to be paid within 60 days from the date of this order. 95 4.4 Aggrieved, the P filed this appeal against my decision, and my reasons are as follows: S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 4 [5] The witnesses at the trial are as follows: - (a) Plaintiffs’ witnesses: PW1: Abiramee a/p Ramalingam (the P) 100 PW2: Lilian Sharmini A/P Kesavamani (P’s customer) PW3: Kautaman A/L Mani (P’s customer) PW4: Vicneswary A/P Batumalai (P’s customer) PW5: Kavin Mithra a/p Ravi (P’s customer) 105 (b) Defendants’ witnesses: DW1: Nur Isabella Binti Abdullah @ Eileen Stone (D1) DW2: Dr. Lee Kim Siea (a medical practitioner) DW3: Dr Norain Binti Md Diah (a medical practitioner) DW4: Ravinpreet Kaur A/P Nerender Pal Singh (D4) 110 DW5: Nashayinee A/P Palanisamy (D5) BRIEF FACTS [6] Parties have filed agreed facts (encl.75), and in narrating the brief 115 facts, I will also refer to a series of correspondences and documents available before me. 6.1 The plaintiff (P) is a qualified medical doctor practising in an aesthetic clinic as the sole proprietor of Posh Medispa. 120 6.2 On 14.04.2018, at her aesthetic clinic at SA-18-06, Menara Paragon, Persiaran Bestari, Cyber 11, Cyberjaya, P gave an aesthetic treatment to D1/Bella by injecting Botox fillers in both of D1’s cheeks who had paid RM900.00 for the said treatment. 125 6.3 After the said treatment: (a) D1 suffered pain and swelling in the cheeks. (b) She informed P, who had advised her to put ice on the swollen area and to take painkillers. 130 (c) D1 did not see P after the said treatment. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 5 6.4 As the infection got worse: (a) D1 sought treatment from a clinic in Kuantan (DW3/Dr Norain) for swelling and infection. (b) She went to a Penang clinic specialising in aesthetic medicine 135 (DW2/Dr Lee) to remove the fillers. 6.5 The P alleged that: 1st alleged defamation (D1 & D2). (a) D1 and D2 had (01.05.2018) allegedly conspired by maliciously 140 publishing in the Instagram account of D2 a picture of D1/Bella's face with the caption, "If you pay peanuts, you get monkey lah", cautioning the public against seeking aesthetic services with P: “...gambar seekor monyet yang sedang makan kacang tanah dengan tajuk ""If u pay peanut you get monkeylah..." serta amaran Defendan Kedua kepada 145 pengikut Defendan Kedua Be careful guys Bila Nak repair Muka inject Sana Cucuk sini dgn so called "Clinic Bertauliah" di media social ni.. Mmg dia charge Murah Gila konon Katanya Dia bukan tamak.. Tup tup Muka client jadi rosak Oleh sebab jarum yg Dia pakai tak Bersih.. Surat Dari doctor ada mengesahkannya... "Clinic Bertauliah ni sedang viral di insta.. tunggu next saya 150 keluarkan Gambar bukti Gambar sebelum Dan Selepas SERTA Surat Dari doctor.. This thing happen to my dearest friend.. saya Nak viral cos dia tak pro Lansung.. Siap blok. Kalau tak Salah Kenapa nak blok oii MS Doc @poshmedispa". 155 (i) P supposedly uses unclean equipment (syringes). (ii) Confirmed by another medical doctor. (iii) The supposed defamatory statement is claimed to have hurt P's image and reputation by imputing adverse inferences on her qualifications and competency in running her supposedly unlicensed 160 aesthetic clinic. D1 and D2 refuse to take corrective action to address the alleged defamatory issue, though demanded by P. 165 2nd alleged defamation (D1 & D2). (b) D1 and D2 had (08.05.2018) allegedly conspired to defame P further by publishing on D2's Instagram account a picture of the S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 6 swollen cheek of D1/Bella caused by being treated by P, who had marketed herself to offer cheap beauty treatment: 170 “gambar yang menunjukkan pipi Defendan Pertama yang meradang dengan menyatakan bahawa "Rentetan.. Kisah clinic kecantikan Murah VIRAL di instagram. Nak Murah.. lni yg kita dapat.. Yg bestnya Doc buat bagi Muka patient rosak..Dia pulak yang Nak buat report polis...Bengong... Hari Ni Cucuk di KL.. Esok balik... bengkak.. Siap clinic lain dah 175 confirmkan jangkitan Kuman jarum kotor.. so moral of the story... Jgn ambik pot lah sangat Bila Ada clinic kecantikan yg buat filler segala Dia bukan Jenis Doc yg pandang duit.. Dia yg Jenis Baik Hati... Nah.. Ambik Muka rosak.. Dia Senyap.. Sentap Lari blok Sana sini ...Duit abis terlebih repair Muka". 180 # fillermurahlahsangat # konondocxpandangduit # poshmedispa 185 The allegations in those postings are malicious lies intended to harm P's credibility, competency, and standing, which P had suffered. 3rd alleged defamation (D1 & D2). 190 (c) D1 and D2 had (05.06.2018) allegedly conspired by publishing a photograph captioned with a threat that if P kept ignoring D1, the matter would be escalated to KPDNKK. A police report had been lodged against the P, and a medical doctor in Kuantan had allegedly confirmed that the cause of inflammation of the cheek 195 was caused by an infection brought about by the botched Botox filler injections: "Hai if you keep ignoring Bella we will proceed to kpdnkk and tribunal pengguna (as per advice from the police department). Pis take responsibility of your damaged to your customer. We have Doc that 200 willing to testify.."; “Aduan Polis oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa "Pada 14/04/2018 jam lebih kurang 1500HRS saya telah membuat rawatan kecantikan di Posh Medispa beralamat SA-18-06 Paragon Pan Gaea Persiaran Bestari 63000 205 Cyberjaya KL dan bayaran yang dicaj adalah sebanyak RM900//= Rawatan Kecantikan yang dilakukan oleh saya adalah bernama filler botox iaitu suntikan pada pipi untuk menghilangkan parut dan menegangkan S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 7 muka selepas rawatan lebih kurang 2 jam saya mula rasa sakit di bahagian pipi dan saya bertanya dengan doctor yang merawat saya 210 dimana saya diarahkan untuk meletakkan ais batu di bahagian pipi serta makan panadol pada 15/04/2018 jam 0730HRS saya bangun dari tidur dapati pipi saya telah bengkak dan saya menghubungi doctor dan beliau minta saya meletakkan ais batu di pipi serta makan panadol kerana ia adalah symptom biasa selepas keadaan bertambah teruk dan saya 215 mendapatkan rawatan di sebuah klinik di Kuantan Pahang. Saya diberitahu oleh doctor yang merawat saya di Kuantan Pahang bahawa punca keiadian adalah iangkitan kuman dari suntikan filler botox dan sehingga ke hari ini saya telah mendapat 8 kali rawatan dengan caj rawatan sebanyak RM880//+ Tujuan saya membuat laporan 220 untuk tindakan Mahkamah dan untuk rujukan pihak berkenaan." "Hai LA doc Dah buat Salah ngaku je lah... Kau Cucuk filler basi kot ..pastu Siap suruh org call gertak mau Angkat Kalau viral #poshmedispa"; 225 “gambar menunjukkan pipi Defenden Pertama yang meradang “On behalf of my friend.. Would like to thanks #poshmedispa for the “EXCELLENT” job on her face after doing filler treatment from this place not only she’s getting scar, she get bonuses where she was block from wassup 230 and get phone call treathen her mau Angkat complain Banyak.. Viral.. Thanks for the excellent job Doc.. Very pleased with your moto ‘helping poor people cos u r poor too’ Hahahhahah lawak siot!” 4th alleged defamation (D1 & D2). 235 (d) D1 and D2 had (05.06.2018) allegedly conspired by uploading and publishing a letter from Dr Norain Binti Mohd Diah (DW3) from Klinik Putra Medic Kuantan on the Facebook Account of D1 that had narrated the supposed botched Botox filler injections. P claimed that the contents of the said letter were defamatory of 240 her in imputing P’s incompetency in carrying out the procedure: "cco 58/mH. Rt cheek swelling + pain x1/52. h/o rt cheek injection for cosmetic x 2152 @ KL already on T Unasyn x 5 days. + aspirate 1 c.c. pus for 3 times 2214/18, 2314/18, 2414/18 but the swelling T size pt claim drug procedure injection to cosmetic there was broken 245 needle ? still inside the cheek o/b: rt cheek swelling 1cm x 1cm, fluctuate ime: rt cheek abscess? FB in abscess Kindly refer her to do full xray. Thanku 250 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 8 5th alleged defamation (D1 & D2). (e) D1 and D2 had (15.06.2018) allegedly conspired by publishing several photographs with defamatory remarks against P on the Instagram account. The pictures showed the alleged injury/infection from the botched Botox filler injections. The 255 photos were accompanied by allegedly derogatory and defamatory remarks against P, who had changed her practice name to Posh Organic Enterprise to avoid adverse publicity. The P claimed to have suffered consequently: Gambar INSTAGRAM Posh Organics Enterprise 260 Gambar pipi Defendan Pertama yang berdarah dengan komen Defendan Kedua Remember the clinic yang I post dulu Pasal rosakkan Muka client Dia see pic yag atas… Yg bawah tu nama baru pulakkk… Haaaa tukar nama lagi…Cos tuuuuutttt Tukar lah Apa yang patut… Should tukar your attitude 265 doc!! #poshmedispa. 6th alleged defamation (D1 & D2). (f) D1 and D2 had (15.06.2018) allegedly conspired by publishing 270 on D2's Instagram account a picture captioned that the P was not a qualified aesthetic medical practitioner, with several other defamatory remarks on the position of the P: "Beware. Next kita nak report tribunal. Doc in doc perubatan... Bukan aestethic jadi ni doc kecantikan x Bertauliah...dia base di kl..hq dia 275 kl...Kenapa nak private kalau bisness... Hsaaaa sebab dia tau org dok complain viral pasal dia buat taik "; Muatnaik gambar Posh Organics Enterprise post; muatnaik dan konqsi komen Awie Mas (suami Defendan Pertama} dalam muka bukanya: "Ni Dr abi buat procedure Kat org. Muka customer dia jdi sakit.. 280 Customer tu hbs duit byk kena repair. Ni org Dr a langsung tak perduli kat patient dia. Tak refund Biaq kat patient macm tu. Skg patient ada parut besaq. Muka dia da rosak hbs. (Angrey Face sign). Saya doa company nijdi muflis sebelum dia rosak kan org lain"; dan tag # poshmedicspa dengan komen; "kan org nak up kat fb... Account 285 biz di private.. I Smell fish... You pay peanut you get money.. U rosakkan muka org Pastu blok... What kind of doc r u.. Scammer eh". S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 9 7th alleged defamation (D1 & D2). (g) D1 and D2 had (06.07.2018) allegedly conspired on 06.07.2018 290 to publish on D2's Facebook account a photo and defamatory remarks on the P: Muatnaik muka buku Posh Medispa's post yang telah mempunyai 2,469 pengikut dan 665 yang sedang mengikut post poshmedicspa pada masa tersebut; 295 "Please Share!!!!? .... saya pernah up post ni kat insta.. Dia block client kat insta dan wassup... Becarefull.. Jumpa pakar bertauliah... Dia guna taktik ckp murah sebab nak bantu... Police report.. Surat pengesahan doctor berkenaan jangkitan kuman kerana jarum 300 semua ada.. Gambar before and after pun ada..p/s share friends... Becarefull... Next kita nak report Tribunal.. Doc ni doc perubatan... Bukan aestethic jadi ni doc kecantikan x Bertauliah...dia base di kl.. lni one of the outlet... Doc tu nama DR ABI ....hq dia kl... Fb dia tutup.. Buat insta saja.. Siap privatekan... Kenapa nak private 305 kalau bisness... Hsaaaa sebab dia tau org dok complain viral pasal dia buat taik..." telah kongsi serta terbit dan menyiarkan comment Awie Mas dalam muka buku yang menerbitkan dan menyiarkan – 310 "Ni Dr abi buat procedure Kat org. Muka customer dia jdi sakit.. Customer tu hbs duit byk kena repair. Ni org Dr A langsung tak perduli kat patient dia. Tak refund... Biaq kat patient macm tu. Skg patient ada parut besaq. Muka dia da rosak hbs. (Angrey 315 Face sign). Saya doa company ni idi muflis sebelum dia rosak kan org lain" . 8th alleged defamation (D3). 320 (h) On 15.05.2018, D3 (who is in the same aesthetic business), referring to the forgoing alleged defamatory publications on the P, had allegedly published on its Instagram account defamatory statements on the suspected low-quality and cheap apparatus reportedly used by the P as compared to D3 in giving aesthetic 325 treatment to patient/client. The P claimed to have suffered consequently thereof: S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 10 So remember you guys!! Medical devices are not to be bought from LAZADA: 330 The next time you want to get a PRP done, demand the doctor/ aesthetician to show you the process/blood tube/the machine; After all, you are paying! You deserve to know what's being done is a genuine procedure; Many of you has asked us on why our Vampire facial @ PRP is more 335 pricey compared to other medispa??; Stay tuned to the next stories as we explain on the benefits of Prp and why it's important to choose a highly professional Vampire facial, and not just any regular Prp; Guys, if you see your doctor/beautician doing a vampire facial @ prp 340 using a machine bought from LAZADA, you can imagine the results that will be obtained; Anybody can 'learn' the basics of medical procedures just by even watching another person; Cheap doesn't mean it's good;We believe in quality! Trust us, it 345 matters;You do not want to ruin your face Cz it's 'cheap'; Vampire facial treatment is a procedure that requires us to withdraw one's blood and centrifuging it to separate the red blood cells and the plasma (which contains platelets and growth factors); 350 This separated plasma is then carefully withdrawn and injected/ microneedled onto one's face. The techniques on how it's done may vary, but the concept is to infiltrate your own plasma into the skin; It may sound simple, but every step is crucial, and ever device/ 355 apparatus used matters; dan So what does a PRP do !??. D3 then allegedly further published on its Instagram account a photograph of the PRP machine (skinmasterkl) purportedly used by P to compare it with the device used by D3 accompanied by 360 allegedly defamatory statements. The P claimed to have suffered consequently thereof: Prp kit that's used in SKIN MASTER Neogenesis PRP -- zero contamination, - tightly sealed - no manual withdrawal of the plasma from the tube - Our Centrifuging machine,the PRM matters (the 365 spinning speed) It provides the concentration of the plasma derived highter the concentration, better the result; Whyyyysooo cheap one ah???- Dr, I saw another medispa giving Prp only for RM3xx; Maybe I will go for the PRP there, Cz it's within my budge; After the 'affordable Prp.......l didn't see no difference dr! thought 370 PRP would fix my skin; Whyyyy??? Because the quality of the apparatus used matters. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 11 9th alleged defamation (D4). (i) On 16.07.2018 and 06.09.2018, D4 (who is in the same aesthetic business), referring to the forgoing defamatory 375 publications on the P, had published in her Instagram account a photograph and repeated the defamatory remarks on the P. The P claimed to have suffered consequently thereof: ..CHECK OUT@IRESAMS/ POST ON A CERTAIN MEDISPA THAT RUINED HER FRIEND’S FACE”; 380 “A wrong decision could cause you a lifetime scar”; sticker gambar “tomato merah” yang senyum dengan perkataan “Stay Posh”; “On behalf of my friend.. Would like to thanks #poshmedispa for the “EXCELLENT” job on her face after doing filler treatment from this place not only she’s getting scar, she get bonuses where she 385 was block from wassup and get phone call treathen her mau Angkat if complain Banyak.. Viral.. Thanks for the excellent job Doc.. Very pleased with your motto ‘helping poor people cos u r poor too’ Hahahhahah lawak siot!” 390 10th alleged defamation (D5). (j) On 16.07.2018, D5, allegedly referring to the defamatory publications on the P, had repeated and published photographs with defamatory remarks on her Instagram account. The P claimed to have suffered consequently thereof: 395 gambar seekor monyet yang sedang makan kacang tanah dengan tajuk ""If u pay peanut you get monkeylah. .." serta amaran Defendan Kedua kepada pengikut Defendan Kedua telah Be careful guys Bila Nak repair Muka inject SanaCucuk sini dgn so called "Clinic Bertauliah" di media social ni.. Mmg dia charge Murah Gila konon Katanya Dia bukan tamak.. Tup tup 400 Muka client jadi rosak Oleh sebab jarum yg Dia pakai tak Bersih.. Surat Dari doctor ada mengesahkannya... "Clinic Berlauliah ni sedang viral di insta.. tunggu next saya keluarkan Gambar bukti Gambar sebelum Dan Selepas SERTA Surat Dari doctor.. This thing happen to my dearest friend.. saya Nak viral cos dia tak pro Lansung.. Siap blok. 405 Kalau tak • Salah Kenapa nak blok oii MS Doc @poshmedispa". D5 then further published a photograph on her Instagram account accompanied by allegedly defamatory statements. The S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 12 P claimed to have suffered consequently thereof: 410 " Don't want to spread hatred, but some ppl really need to mind their own f"ckin business" "See miss #notsoposh we aren't on the same league, so please kindly compete with ur own kind. You are waaayy out of our league" "I would have tagged her but I've been blocked. Hope your minions would 415 deliver the message to you. Good day!" P.s we know you f"cked up. Royally''. 11th alleged defamation (D4). (k) On 06.09.2018, D4 allegedly published photographs on her 420 Instagram account accompanied by defamatory remarks on the P. The P claimed to have suffered consequently thereof: "Hai if you keep ignoring Bella we will proceed to kpdnkk and tribunal pengguna (as per advice from the police department). Pls take responsibility of your damaged to your customer. We have Doc 425 that willing to testify"; turunmaut Aduan Polis yang telah diadu oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa "Pada 14/04/2018 jam lebih kurang 1500HRS saya telah membuat rawatan kecantikan di Posh Medispa beralamat SA-18-06 430 Paragon Pan Gaea Persiaran Bestari 63000 Cyberjaya KL; dan bayaran yang dicaj adalah sebanyak RM900/I= Rawatan Kecantikan yang dilakukan oleh saya adalah bernama filler botox iaitu suntikan pada pipi untuk menghilangkan parut dan menegangkan muka selepas rawatan lebih kurang 2 jam saya mula rasa sakit di 435 bahagian pipi dan saya bertanya dengan doctor yang merawat saya dimana saya diarahkan untuk meletakkan ais batu di bahagian pipi serta makan panadol pada 15/04/2018 jam 0730HRS saya bangun dari tidur dapati pipi saya telah bengkak dan saya menghubungi doctor dan beliau minta saya meletakkan ais batu 440 di pipi serta makan panadol kerana ia adalah symptom biasa selepas keadaan bertambah teruk dan saya mendapatkan rawatan di sebuah klinik di Kuantan Pahang. Saya diberitahu oleh doctor yang merawat saya di Kuantan Pahang bahawa punca kejadian adalah jangkitan kuman dari suntikan filler botox 445 dan sehingga ke hari ini saya telah mendapat 8 kali rawatan dengan caj rawatan sebanyak RM800/+- Tujuan saya membuat laporan untuk tindakan Mahkamah dan untuk rujukan pihak berkenaan." ; 450 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 13 "Hai LA doc Dah buat Salah ngakuje lah... Kau Cucuk filler basi kot ..pastu Siap suruh org call gertak mau Angkat Kalau viral #poshmedispa" ; gambar yang menunjukkan pipi Defendan Pertama yang 455 meradang "On behalf of my friend.. Would like to thanks #poshmedispa for the "EXCELLENT" job on her face after doing filler treatment from this place not only she's getting scar, she get bonuses where she was block from wassup and get phone call treathen her mau Angkat if complain Banyak.. Viral.. Thanks 460 for the excellent job Doc.. Very pleased with your motto 'helping poor people cos u r poor too' Hahahhahah lawak siot!”; "Rentetan.. Kisah clinic kecantikan Murah VIRAL di instagram. Nak Murah.. lni yg kita dapat.. Yg bestnya Doc buat bagi Muka 465 patient rosak..Dia pulak yang Nak buat report polis...Bengong... Hari Ni Cucuk di KL.. Esok balik... bengkak.. Siap clinic lain dah confirmkan jangkitan Kuman jarum kotor.. so moral of the story... Jgn ambik pot lah sangat Bila Ada clinic kecantikan yg buat filler segala Dia bukan Jenis Doc yg pandang duit.. Dia yg Jenis Baik 470 Hati... Nah.. Ambik Muka rosak.. Dia Senyap.. Sentap Lari blok Sana sini ...Duit abis terlebih repair Muka". # fillermurahlahsangat # konondocxpandangduit # poshmedispa 475 comment :allinafuad: oh my, terrible clinic (symbol marah) iresamsi@allinafuad : Sar I rasa Dia dah tukar nama..Tengok Permainan dia...Tak Salah Kalau pasal Nak takut kaaann 480 I know about this medispa. Located in cyber Jaya right?" Veetha_0309 "Yes it is" "My Friend went there for some treatment this lady dr took something look like water (she said it's like spray gun) and spray on the face and use good morning towel to wipe off the face from tap water, not 485 even serum ..this is so stupid.like the dr was using tap water Veetha_0309 And her place is like some house not proper medispa or clinic.. Oh my, this lady Dr dunno what's she doing lah. 490 The P claims that D4 had allegedly “hashtagged” the following accounts, inviting them to read the defamatory postings: S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 14 #p;oshmedispa, #kkm, #aestheticmalaysia, #mmc, #malaysianmedicalcouncil, #fillers, #tomaglo, #cyberjaya, #kementerial kesihatanmalaysia, #majlisperubatanmalaysia, #sebarfaktabukandusta, 495 #carbonpeelaser, #breastfillers, #skin, #kl, #lipfillers, #carbonfillers, #dentalveneers, #breastfiller, #thread comment dari Radiantclinique : "Hi, we get this picture from this account 500 Jawapan dari Veetha_0309: "good Morning" "Thank you for responding" Setelah membawa kenyataan-kenyataan yang berunsur fitnah dan tidak benar ke atas Plaintif yang telah diterbitkan dalam akaun instagram "Veeta_0309", Radiantclinique telah menghantar semula gambar-gambar 505 serta kenyataan kenyataan yang tersebut kepada akaun instagram "Veetha_0309": 6.6 The 1st -11th alleged acts of defamation are set out in paragraphs 7 - 48 of the SoC (enclosure 2). 510 I had considered at the trial: (i) The Ds rightly pointed out that fundamental evidential materials on the defamatory allegations by P set out in paragraphs 7 - 48 of the SoC (enclosure 2) are listed in Part C documents (where the authenticity and 515 contents are disputed) under O.34 r.2 (2) (e) (ii) RC 2012. (ii) While Part B documents (O.34 r.2(2)(e)(i) RC2012) do not require the maker to be called at the trial (Mohd Nazari bin Ab. Majid v Tan Ken Hock & Anor [1999] 1 CLJ 601, HC), nevertheless the contents has not been accepted where a witness with a direct knowledge of the contents is 520 required to establish its veracity. Part C documents, however, require the maker to be called and the primary documents produced to attest to its authenticity and accuracy (Sri Pandi Restaurant & Anor v Saraswathy a/p Kesavan & Anor [2019] 1 LNS 754, HC). (iii) P’s documents in Part C are marked during the trial as IDP1-IDP4 and 525 IDP6-IDP18, while some documents related to the claim in Part C are not even marked. (iv) The list of P’s documents in Part C has been appropriately captured in D1 submissions (enclosure 129, para 42-45). (v) It is irrefutable at the trial that P makes no effort to tender the original 530 documents with the maker's presence to offer evidence on the said documents (section 73A Evidence Act 1950) and to be cross-examined on the evidence. The impugned IDPs remained untested and unadmitted as exhibits. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 15 (vi) Without being formally tested and converted as exhibits at the trial, it 535 carries no probative value to support the P’s case and is without a lawful foundation. The Ds correctly cited Damansara Realty(Pahang) Sdn Bhd v Om Cahaya Asia Berhad [2020] MLJU 2515, CA, which had observed that Part C documents are disputed as to their authenticity, existence and contents. The original documents must be produced and marked as “ID” 540 and later converted to exhibits. The process requires the maker to be called to establish the authenticity and contents of the documents. (vii) In the present case, this was evidently not done by the P to establish her claim. The P is duty-bound to prove her claim by doing whatever is legally necessary to achieve that goal. It is not for the Court to conduct the P’s 545 case. As a party fundamentally anchoring her claim on Part C Documents, the P must fulfil two conditions: (1) the maker of the document must be called as a witness, and (2) primary evidence of the document must be adduced in court to be tested at the trial: KTL Sdn Bhd v Leong Oow Lai [2014] AMEJ 1458; [2014] MLJU 1405 at [34]–[36], HC see also Sri 550 Paandi Restaurant & Anor v Saraswathy a/p Kesavan & Anor [2019] AMEJ 0540; [2019] 1 LNS 754, HC at para [23]. (viii) Failure to comply or observe the foregoing legal evidential requirements would, in the circumstances, effectively render the P’s claim without a valid foundation to stand on and remain unproven. Consequently, it must fail for 555 want of compelling evidence, justifying the dismissal of the whole action on this issue alone. (ix) The P’s silence on this crucial issue is indefensible. (x) However, for completeness, I would also consider the merits of the parties’ arguments in their respective submissions. 560 6.7 P cited her compliance with O.78 r.3 RC 2012 on the obligations to give particulars in defamatory actions. In this regard, the law is trite: (a) In a suit for defamation, all required elements to prove the tort must be pleaded and established at the stage of the plaintiff’s 565 case. It is only upon the elements having been established and/or proved that the defendant’s obligation to demonstrate a viable defense will arise (see Dato’ Abd Halim Ali v Sun Media Corp Sdn Bhd [2015] 4 CLJ 928; Mak Khuin Weng v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 AMR 115; [2016] 5 MLJ 570 314; Abu Hassan bin Hasbullah v Zukeri bin Ibrahim [2017] AMEJ 1321; [2018] 6 MLJ 396, CA). S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 16 (b) Once the plaintiff has successfully established that the defendant has published words defamatory of the plaintiff to third parties, the burden of proving any of the defences shifts to 575 the defendant. The alleged defamatory words as uttered must be reproduced verbatim in the statement of claim, and a certified translation in the National Language must also be tendered. To merely describe the substance, purpose or effect of the words is not sufficient: 580 Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Liong Sik [1997] 5 MLJ 523, HC; see also Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 AMR 481; [2017] 6 CLJ 129; [2016] 1 LNS 1502, CA; and Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) v Hue 585 Shieh Lee [2019] 2 AMR 525; [2019] 3 MLJ 720, FC. 6.8 P claimed that despite repeated demands for the Ds to cease and remedy the alleged offences, the Ds failed to apologise and compensate P. Consequently, P seeks damages for conspiracy to 590 defame and exemplary damages, RM5M in compensation against the Ds individually, interest and costs. 6.9 Apart from denying the allegations by P, D1 filed a counterclaim against P for the botched Botox filler injection that had injured her 595 face, and she needed medical treatment to address the infection. P is alleged to have been negligent in carrying out the procedure that had caused pain and suffering. D1 is seeking special damages of RM4,774.00. Damages for pain and suffering are to be assessed, as are aggravated damages. Interest of 5% from the date of the action 600 until full realisation. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 17 6.10 D3, D4 and D5 deny P’s action. The P's is put to strict proof thereof. In their defense, D4 and D5 rely on s.8 and s.9 of the Defamation Act 605 1957, that in the circumstances of the facts of this case, the statements constitute justification and fair comments. 6.11 As against D2, taken from the CMS, an affidavit of service was filed on 17.09.2019 (L.26), and nothing further was done by P. As I have 610 stated at para 4.2 above, the claim against D2 is similarly dismissed. [7] THE PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSIONS I observed P in canvassing for her claim & defence in denying the counterclaim by D1 as follows: 615 7.1 P argued that she had been a registered medical doctor since 2010 and set up Posh Medispa in 2018: (a) D1 had requested on 14.04.2018 for the Botox filler injections in her cheeks. (b) D1 informed P that her face was swollen shortly after the 620 procedure. P advised her to apply an ice pack every four hours. (c) On 17.04.2018, ie 3 days later, D1 complained of throbbing pain in her right cheek. (d) P advised D1 to seek medical treatment at the nearby clinic where D1 was (Kuantan, Pahang) and monitored her condition 625 via WhatsApp chat. (e) P claimed that during this time, D1 was in contact with D2 and conspired to publish seven defamatory postings of P in the social media accounts of D2. (f) This was followed by D3, D4, and D5. 630 (g) P’s case, that the Ds conspired to defame and hurt the reputation of P by the 1st-11th alleged defamation set out in the SoC. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 18 7.2 D1 Counterclaim (a) P argued that D1 did not file any civil suit against P for the alleged negligence at the time of the alleged botched Botox 635 injection procedure. D1 only made her claim in her Statement of Defence and Counterclaim over this alleged incident that took place a year before, claiming pain and suffering because of the filler injections in her right cheek. The condition that allegedly required medical intervention: 640 (i) In her evidence at the trial, D1 admitted she tended to develop boils, although it is not caused by any aesthetic treatments. She would usually get antibiotics for treatment. (ii) D1 also admitted that her right cheek appeared sunken and had a slight scar due to the occurrence of the boils, and that was why she 645 asked for the filler injections. (iii) D1 had a fracture across her right cheek occasioned by domestic violence and had undergone reconstructive surgery in the early 90s, where a clip was inserted in her cheek. (iv) D1 had undergone several Botox filler injections to fill up the hollow 650 part of her cheek. (v) DW3, who carried out a blood test of D1, confirmed no infection in her blood. Therefore, it was argued that there is no issue of negligence on the part of P as alleged. 655 I had duly considered the foregoing evidence: (i) I cannot find any plausible grounds in the foregoing evidence at the trial that could support P’s case and her defence. 660 (ii) Any purported attempt by P to use that evidence to support her argument in drawing away attention from the actual cause of the injury in the right cheek of D1 is unconvincing and irrelevant. (b) Even DW2/Dr Lee’s medical report (25.07.2019) tendered 665 through D1’s counsel is one year and three months after the incident, where the contents are an afterthought. At this juncture, I find that Dr Lee was merely relating what D1 complained to him and that he had treated D1 for the abscess S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 19 on 07.05.2018 for incision, drainage, dressing and antibiotics. 670 (c) P took issue with the date of the treatment while at the same time, on the same date, Dr Lee had issued an official receipt (RM2,800.00) for the treatment of Botulinum Toxin Type A, full face for D1, but did not issue the receipt for the treatment for the swelling and abscess above. P claimed that on the premise, the 675 claim for RM4,000.00 for Botulinum Toxin Type A is far-fetched. I had considered the evidence: (i) Regardless of the position taken by P, it cannot be denied from the evidence that P carried out the procedure, (1) at an unsanctioned premise. 680 Any aesthetic medical treatment must be done in a clinic duly registered under the Private Healthcare Acts and Regulations. There is no evidence adduced by P that the premise where she carried out the procedure on D1’s cheeks is registered, (2) evidentially P was not fully qualified at the time to carry out the procedure on D1, (3) she admitted to not having met the 685 conditions required in the Ministry of Health Guidelines for medical doctors wanting to practice in aesthetic medicine, and (4) the certificates of attendance to specific courses that she tendered are not the ones required under the Ministry of Health Guidelines for medical GPs wanting to practice aesthetic medicine. 690 (ii) The requirement to be fully competent would create a duty of care on P to ensure that she was fully qualified within the context of the MOH Guidelines before practicing aesthetic medicine on clients/patients such as D1. (iii) Her Posh Medispa is not a sanctioned premise to carry out an aesthetic procedure that requires a registered clinic under the Act and Guidelines. 695 (iv) That, in my considered judgment, constitutes negligence and breach of duty of care on the part of P at the material time. (v) In the circumstances, I accept the evidence, that DW2/Dr Lee took a sample of the abscess for a culture test, which showed the presence of the bacteria called Pseudomonas Aeruginosa (exh. D34). The evidence of Dr 700 Lee is that it is a common bacteria found everywhere that is harmless to humans unless it is directly introduced into the body by, amongst others, contaminated injection, or a break in the skin. (vi) There is no evidence by P before me to definitively say otherwise. (vii) In the circumstances and on the totality of the evidence at the trial, I am 705 inclined to a finding of negligence by P for her conduct. 7.3 The 1st -11th alleged conspiracy and defamation. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 20 (a) P argues that since D1 is in communication with D2, who was in 710 the UK at the time, over the Botox filler treatment, it is postulated by her that this is evidence of a conspiracy between the two. (b) P further argued that the WhatsApp chats between her and D2 on 26.04.2018 asked P to remove the pictures of D1 from P’s 715 Instagram account with the remark “scary jarum patah” is evidence of a conspiracy between D1 and D2. It shows that they have been in communication even though D1, in her evidence, denied having knowledge and/or consented to D2’s impugned defamatory postings. 720 I observed the evidence: In making her arguments, P constantly referred to Part C documents to support her case but made no effort to have them converted to exhibits. For that fundamental failure at the trial, I am constrained to exclude the P’s Part C 725 documents. The law is trite that unadmitted documents, as in Part C, have no probative value, rendering her arguments unsupported. The duty is on the P to conduct her case appropriately. (c) P alleged that D1 was extorting money from her by sending P 730 details of D1’s banking details via a WhatsApp chat and asking for the cost of treatment because of the infection from the Botox filler injections estimated to be RM3,500.00 I considered the evidence: 735 (i) D1 denied such an assertion. (ii) D1 was merely asking for a refund of the cost (RM900.00) of the botched Botox filler injections. The same amount is reflected in the counterclaim. (iii) I find no basis for the allegation of extortion by P and the evidence does not support the assertion. 740 (iv) I also observed at the trial, and as rightly pointed out by the Ds: (1) The foregoing (bare and speculative assertions) is the extent of her evidence to establish the tort of conspiracy to injure via the 1st-11th S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 21 alleged defamatory postings. (2) It would hardly satisfy the legal requirements for the tort of conspiracy 745 to injure. (3) An allegation of conspiracy requires the strictest pleading and must be supported by full particulars. Allegation of such an act of conspiracy must be pleaded, and must not be disjointed. (4) Therefore, the bare allegation of conspiracy against the Ds is frivolous 750 and vexatious. A sweeping and general allegation of the alleged conspiracy without going into particulars is insufficient: Dato’ Shun Leong Kwang v Toh May Fook & Ors [2021] MLJU 2422; Santamil Selvi Alau Malay & Ors v. Dato’ Seri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak & Ors [2015] 4 CU 1035. 755 (5) The Court of Appeal made it clear in Cubic Electronic Sdn Bhd v MKC Corporate & Business Advisory Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2016] 3 MLJ 797, CA in observing four essential conditions to be met for conspiracy to injure: (a) An agreement between two or more individuals. 760 (b) A shared intent to injure (c) With that intent, certain acts were carried out, and (d) Causing loss or damage to the claimant. (6) The evidence at the trial shows the foregoing conditions had not been established. What is before me is just speculative and suggestive 765 assertions of such a conspiracy. It is not good enough. Therefore, I believe that P failed to establish the tort of conspiracy as alleged. (7) I find no evidence from P other than a suggestion that D1 knew and/or consented to D2’s alleged 1st-7th impugned defamatory postings. (8) With P’s Part C documents concerning the 1st-11th impugned 770 defamatory statements not admitted as exhibits at the trial, P’s assertions have no foundation to stand on. Therefore, the claim against D1 and D2 is dismissed for want of evidence. 7.4 P has failed to make any effort to convert and admit the P’s Part C 775 documents (IDP1-IDP4 and IDP6-IDP18, while some documents directly related to the claim in Part C are not even marked) concerning the 1st-11th alleged defamation by the Ds as exhibits during the trial, which to mind is fatal to her claim. 780 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 22 In continuing her submissions, I observed that: (a) P references Part C documents to anchor her arguments on D4 (9th allegation of defamation) in paragraph 6.5(i) herein. 785 Considering her arguments: (i) I find no merit in it. D4 argued that the impugned publication does not expressly refer to P; therefore, by law, special facts or knowledge are required to make that connection. Those special facts and knowledge 790 must be pleaded explicitly in the pleadings. P’s failed to do so, and she is bound to her pleadings. (ii) The allegation by P of D4’s purported republication of alleged defamatory material by sharing a hyperlink to D2’s Instagram account is not sustainable. D4 correctly cited Crookes v Wikimedia 795 Foundation Inc., 2008 BCSC 1424, SC Canada, which observed that the purpose of a hyperlink is to direct the reader to additional material from a different source. It provides immediate access to material published on another website but does not amount to the republication of the content on the originating site. This is especially 800 so that a reader may or may not follow the hyperlinks provided. I find that in the circumstances of the case, D4 in the alternative had succeeded in establishing the defence of justification under 805 section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957. I also hold that D4 is entitled to the defence of fair comment under section 9 of the same Act, where the defence will not fail only because the truth in every allegation has not been proven. The 810 contents of the alleged posting are true or substantially true and afford a complete defence. (b) P references Part C documents to anchor her arguments on D4 (11th allegation of defamation) in paragraph 6.5(k) herein. 815 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 23 Considering her arguments: (i) I find it was established at the trial that no convincing evidence was adduced by P to prove that D4 had published the impugned 820 publication. (ii) This claim must be dismissed for want of compelling evidence. I agree with the position taken by D4 that a party’s case must be expressly put to his opponent’s material witness when they 825 are under cross-examination. A failure to do so may be treated as an abandonment of the pleaded case. Consequently, this claim by P is also dismissed. (c) P references Part C documents to anchor her arguments on 830 D5 (10th allegation of defamation) in paragraph 6.5(j) herein. Considering her arguments: (i) I agree with D5 that P (1) failed to sufficiently plead the meanings of the alleged impugned statements by D5, and (2) D5 has successfully proven justification and fair comments as a complete 835 defence. (ii) The claim against D5 is evidently flawed when P did not ascribe the meaning to the alleged Impugned Statements complained of, thereby prejudicing D5. (iii) It creates difficulty for D5 to ascertain the meaning P intended to 840 ascribe to it and deny them accordingly. That is a fatal flaw in the pleadings. I hold in the circumstances that D5 is entitled to the defence of justification, who had adopted and repeated the position taken on justification and fair comments (D4) as reflected in 845 paragraphs 9.6(d) and (e) below. Reliance is placed on Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 242, that justification affords a complete defence against defamation. D5 relies on the following facts: 850 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 24 (i) On or about 14/04/2018, P performed a facial treatment known as Filler Injection Treatment on D1 on both cheeks. (ii) As a result of the said facial treatment, D1 experienced pain, high fever and swelling on her right cheek because of infection, puss, and abscess at the location where P had injected D1’s right cheek. 855 (iii) D1 had to undergo medical treatment at other clinics to treat the said infection, puss, and abscess on her right cheek. (iv) As a result of the said facial treatment, a scar was left on the right cheek of D1, and this caused damage and disfigurement to D1’s face and D1 had to undergo further medical treatment at another 860 clinic to repair the scar and damage on her right cheek. D5 also relied on the fact that the comments are based on facts, thereby the legal requirements in Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’Kub v Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 865 393, HC had been met: (i) D1 had indeed suffered from P’s facial treatment. As a result of infection, puss and abscess on her right cheek. (ii) D1 had to undergo medical treatment at other clinics to treat the said infection, puss, and abscess. 870 (iii) D1 had a scar on her right cheek after undergoing facial treatment at P’s Medispa and had to seek further medical treatment to repair the damage caused on her right cheek. (d) P references Part C documents to anchor her arguments on D3 875 (8th allegation of defamation) in paragraph 6.5(h) herein. Considering her arguments: I agree with D3 that the impugned statement does not explicitly refer to P. The burden is on P to provide compelling evidence and not suggestive 880 assertions to connect the libel to her. (i) In the premise, P’s pleadings need to plead the special facts to establish that connection, failing which the claim must fail. (ii) The pleading did not connect the dots, and the P is bound to her pleadings. Relying on customers' special knowledge or facts (PW2 885 and PW3) to link it will not do. (iii) In its proper context, the impugned publication is critical of the machine and not P. The impugned publication is clearly on the machines' performances and does not purport to link and defame P. 890 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 25 I find the impugned statement by D3 constitutes a fair comment on the facts in comparing different machines' performances. There is no issue of defamation in the circumstances. In the circumstances, P prays for order in terms of her prayers in the 895 SoC. [8] THE FIRST DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS I observed D1 canvassing for her defence & counterclaim as follows: 900 8.1 The P accused D1 of conspiring with D2 in publishing libelous remarks/statements on D2's social media accounts, as set out in the SoC, thereby defaming the P in allegedly seven defamatory postings (paragraphs 6.5 (a)-(g) herein) as seen in the SoC. In denying the 905 allegations and in her defence, D1 claims that: (a) She did not post or consent to any of those seven allegedly defamatory postings. (b) She did not conspire with D2 on posting the seven alleged libelous postings. 910 (c) She has no control over the social media accounts of D2. (d) The seven alleged libelous postings do not carry any defamatory overtones or undertones as alleged. The postings are accurate in substance. (e) D1 merely shared or confided with D2 (a friend) on the quality of 915 her beauty treatment, which constitutes a fair comment. (f) D1 also relies on qualified privilege, and (g) P had failed to prove her claim as legally required. 920 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 26 I have considered the evidence: (i) It is proven that other than P's speculative assertions, no compelling evidence was produced to establish the tort of conspiracy by the Ds in the present suit. (ii) With the exclusion of P’s Part C documents concerning the 1st-11th 925 allegations of defamation by the Ds, P’s case becomes speculative and unsupported, which warrants a dismissal for want of compelling evidence. 8.2 Conspiracy is an act of two or more persons to (1) carry out an unlawful act and (2) by unlawful means to injure another person 930 causing damage. In support, D1 cited, Wu Yang Construction Group Ltd v Zheijang Jinyi Group Co. Ltd & Ors [2006] 4 SLR 451, Lonrho plc v Fayed & Ors [1991] 3 All ER 303, Tiarasetia Sdn Bhd v Yayasan Selangor & Anor [2009] MLJU 1602, SCK Group Bhd & Anor v Sunny Liew Siew Pang & Anor [2011] 4 MLJ 935 393, and Deepak Jaikishan a/l Rewachand & Anor v Intrared Sdn Bhd & Anor [2013] 7 MLJ 437. In relying on the authorities, it was argued that: (a) The P’s action on conspiracy is grounded on simple conspiracy to injure without any pleadings on the unlawful aspect of it. 940 (b) The predominant purpose must be to cause loss to the P for there to be a conspiracy. (c) If the predominant purpose is to protect the Ds, it is not unlawful, and there is no conspiracy, though the P may suffer incidental loss consequently. 945 (d) An allegation of conspiracy requires the strictest pleading and must be supported by full particulars: Dato’ Shun Leong Kwang v Toh May Fook & Ors [2021] MLJU 2422; Santamil Selvi Alau Malay & Ors v. Dato’ Seri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak & Ors [2015] 4 CU 1035: Allegation of such an act of conspiracy 950 must be pleaded and the overt acts must not be disjointed. Therefore, the bare allegation of conspiracy against the S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 27 defendants is frivolous and vexatious. A sweeping and general allegation of the alleged conspiracy without going into particulars is insufficient. 955 (e) There are no compelling materials adduced by the P that: (i) There is an agreement of a conspiracy to injure between D1 and D2. (ii) That such an agreement, if it exists, had crystallized before the alleged act was carried out. (iii) The injury suffered by the P. 960 (iv) The foregoing omissions are evident in the P’s SoC, and she is bound by her pleadings. I have considered the evidence: (i) The P had failed to go into the required particulars to establish the alleged 965 agreement to injure in her SoC. What is available is merely a sweeping and general statement on the alleged tort of conspiracy. As rightly pointed out, the P is bound by her pleadings. (ii) In the circumstances, the allegation of conspiracy to injure the P between D1 and D2 had failed to be established as required by law. 970 (iii) There are no compelling evidential materials save for the P’s bare assertions which is simply unsustainable evidence in law. (iv) The alleged conspiracy unproven, coupled with no evidential materials after the exclusion of Part C documents, would rightly cause the demise of the P’s claim on 7 alleged libelous postings in her SoC against the D1 and D2. 975 (v) As I had observed in paragraphs 6.6(a) and (b) above, all required elements to prove the tort must be pleaded and established at the stage of the plaintiff’s case. Only upon the elements having been established and/or proved will the defendant’s obligation to demonstrate a viable defence arise, not before. 980 (vi) As a result of this failure by P to prove his case, the burden of proving any of the defences does not shift to the Ds. 8.3 D1 cited Chong Swee Huat & Anor v Lim Shian Ghee [2009] 3 MLJ 665, CA that observed in a defamatory suit, the Court would 985 only be concerned with the natural and ordinary meaning of the words claimed to be defamatory. 8.4 That is the meaning that an ordinary, reasonable person (without any special knowledge of that which is known to ordinary people 990 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 28 generally) would comprehend from the statement in its literal meaning. However, D1 argues: (a) There is no evidence before the Court of the alleged defamatory statements admitted into as evidence at the trial. Without the evidential materials, the claim by the P must necessarily fail. 995 (b) The materials to support the alleged claim of defamation by the P are all listed in Part C of the Bundles of Documents (O.34 r.2(2)(e)(ii) RC 2012, which had been marked as “ID” only, while there are some that had not been marked. Formal proof of those documents is legally required before they can be converted into 1000 exhibits (section 73A Evidence Act 1950). (c) D1 cited Damansara Realty (Pahang) Sdn Bhd v Om Cahaya Asia Berhad [2020] MLJU 2515, CA, which had observed that Part C documents are disputed as to their authenticity, existence and contents and listed the impugned documents in Part C. 1005 (d) Without evidential materials to support P’s claim, it must fail since the elements of defamation cannot be established at the trial against D1. Without these impugned documents, the element of publication cannot be proven in Court, especially when D1, in her evidence, vehemently denies making any 1010 request or consenting to any publication of the alleged seven libelous postings by D2 which is an essential element in the tort of defamation. (e) There is sufficient evidence that the P herself acknowledged that D1 is not responsible for such an alleged posting (BOD B, Part B 1015 pg.69, 73, 75, 90). (f) D1 cited Tan Keng Yong @ Tan Keng Hong & Anor v Tan Hwa Ling @ Tan Siew Leng & Ors [2022] 2MLJ 805 that the S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 29 plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove the claim. The burden rests on the plaintiff throughout the proceeding. Only after the 1020 burden has been discharged is it moved to the defendant to disprove the plaintiff’s claim. (g) With P unable to prove or associate the alleged seven libelous postings by D2, the claim against D1 must fail. None of P’s witnesses (PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5) provided evidence 1025 concerning the alleged seven libelous postings by D2. Consequently, P failed to prove her case and must be dismissed. 8.5 The P failed to provide compelling evidence of the damage she had suffered from the alleged defamatory postings. PW2-PW5 all gave 1030 evidence that they had gone to seek treatment from the P and continued to do so since 2018. PW2 and PW5 even went on to say that their perception and trust in P have not changed. 8.6 If the Court is not with her on the foregoing, D1, in her defence, 1035 claimed: (a) Justification under section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957, that in an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only the truth of every charge 1040 is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges. All that is needed to be proven is that the impugned defamatory statements are true or substantially true (see Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Sistem 1045 Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 242). Justification affords a complete defence against defamation. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 30 Sufficient contemporaneous documents had been adduced to establish the same. (b) D1 argued that the postings are essentially true or substantially 1050 true concerning the botched beauty treatment she received from P. The P could not prove at the trial that she had procured all the relevant certificates or had undergone all the required training under the Guidelines as of April 2018. She was not fully qualified at the time of conducting the procedure on D1’s face: 1055 (i) Any aesthetic medical treatment must be done in a clinic duly registered under the Private Healthcare Acts and regulations. There is no evidence adduced by P that the premises where she carried out the procedure on D1’s cheeks are so registered. (ii) The cheek of D1 suffered from abscess and infection caused by the 1060 procedure conducted by P. D1 suffered pain and swelling. (iii) The P, knowing the condition faced by D1, took no steps to pursue D1 to treat or address the swelling and infection. (iv) D1 did indeed suffer scarring on her cheek, consequently thereof. 1065 (c) D1 also claims the defence of fair comment citing the elements required from Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli [2022] 3 MLJ 75, HC: (i) The words complained of are comments. (ii) The comments are on a matter of public interest or where it 1070 will affect the public so that they may be legitimately interested in it. (iii) The comments are based on true facts, and (iv) The comments are ones that a fair-minded person can honestly make based on the facts. 1075 In defence of fair comment, if the primary facts are true, in the absence of malice and/or falsehood, fair comment should succeed: Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli v Dato Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor [2019] 6 MLJ 587, CA. 1080 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 31 (d) D1 also claimed qualified privilege as a defence, where the impugned statements were published pursuant to a discharge of legal, social, or moral duty with no ill will or malicious intent. The recipient of the statements had a corresponding interest in 1085 receiving them. The impugned statements constitute fair comments and are covered under qualified privilege. There is no evidence by P to show any malice on the part of D1. 8.7 Concerning her counterclaim against the P, D1 argued: 1090 (a) P had been negligent and breached her duty of care in carrying out the beauty treatment, resulting in injury and pain to the right cheek of D1. D1 cited the Court of Appeal in Sri Inai (Pulau Pinang) Sdn Bhd v Yong Yit Swee & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 273, CA, that ruled the law of tort imposes a duty of care on a 1095 defendant who assumes responsibility to perform professional or quasi-professional services to a plaintiff who relies on such services. (b) P had conducted a procedure which she was not qualified to perform. A medical practitioner owes a duty in tort to his patient 1100 regardless of any contract between them: Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, pg.302. The P cannot claim otherwise. P did not obtain all the necessary certificates and training before conducting the procedure on D1’s face. Without completing the relevant training and the issuance of all the relevant certificates of training, P will 1105 not be issued with the LCP issued by the Medical Practice Division. It is a mandatory requirement under the Guidelines to qualify as a general practitioner practising aesthetic medical treatments (Guidelines on Aesthetic Medical Practice for Registered Medical Practitioners, issued by the Ministry of 1110 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 32 Health, Bundle B, pp.121-167, enclosure 78). The P admitted that at the time, she did not have the relevant certificate of training as required under the Guidelines. (c) The aesthetic procedure: (i) That P conducted was beyond the scope of services 1115 permitted by Posh Medispa. A beauty spa and not a duly registered clinic as required under the statute, in breach of the Ministry of Health Guidelines on the practice of aesthetic medicine. (ii) A premise not duly registered under the Private Healthcare 1120 Acts and Regulations. (iii) It is not a clinic registered with the DG of Health of Malaysia under sections 4, 27 and 28 of the Act. (iv) This default is admitted to by the P during trial. (v) P’s annual practising certificate for the year 2018 listed 1125 Poliklinik Damai, Jakel Square, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 WO and Poliklinik Damai 24 Jam, Jalan Kesuma, Bandar Tasik Kesuma, 43700 Selangor as the place of practice. Posh Medispa is not listed in P’s practising certificate. 1130 (d) Because of the P’s breach of duty, D1 suffered infection and scarring on her right cheek, which the P failed to take the appropriate steps to diagnose and treat the injury, forcing D1 to seek medical intervention/treatment for the abscess and infection from a medical doctor: 1135 (i) P did not exercise due care and skill in performing the Botox filler injections. (ii) The P conducted the procedure at an unauthorized premise, contravening the Private Healthcare Act and regulations. (iii) P was careless and negligent in discharging her duty to D1. She did 1140 not thoroughly examine the D1 before proceeding with the procedure on the third visit by D1. (iv) The botched Botox filler injection caused pain and swelling on the face S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 33 of D1. (vi) She took no steps to diagnose and treat the injury. 1145 (vii) Injury seen in exhibits D19, D20, D27, D-39(A)-D39(I), D36, D37(A)- D37(B), D24. (viii) Dr Norain’s (DW3) evidence on the infection, abscess and swelling in the right cheek of D1 can be seen in exhibits D22, D24, D26, D28, D30(a)-D30(e). Her medical report is on pg.83, Part C, enclosure 79, 1150 pp.16-24. (ix) Dr Lee’s (DW2) evidence on draining the abscess in D1’s right cheek is found in NOP 18.4.2023, pg.776/PDF pg.12, enclosure 127. The medical report can be seen on pp.100-101, Part C, enclosure 79, exhibit D33, pg.106, Part C, exhibit D 34. 1155 (x) After the abscess persisted in the right cheek of D1, though medically treated with antibiotics. A blood test showed no anomalies by DW3; D1 consulted DW2, who confirmed an infection in the right cheek. Dr Lee took a sample of the abscess for a culture test, and it showed the presence of the bacteria Pseudomonas Aeruginosa (exhibit D34). It is 1160 a common bacteria found everywhere that is harmless to humans unless it is directly introduced into the body by, amongst others, contaminated injection, or a break in the skin. After further treatment at a local clinic, the infection gradually cleared. (e) The abscess and infection caused her right cheek to appear 1165 lopsided and more sunken, needing a corrective procedure at another clinic. (f) DW2 injected fillers to fill the hollowed right cheek costing RM3,000.00 (exhibit D38). (g) D1 suffered mental distress, pain and suffering, and costs and 1170 expenses. She claims special damages (RM4,774.00), general damages for pain and suffering, and aggravated damages. In the circumstances, D1 prays that the suit by the P is dismissed with costs and her counterclaim is allowed with costs. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 34 [9] THE THIRD, FOURTH AND FIFTH DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSIONS 1175 I had observed D3, D4 & D5 canvassing for their defence as follows: 9.1 D3, D4, & D5 cited Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 MLJ 720, FC where it was observed that in defamation, three elements must be established: (1) the impugned 1180 statement has defamatory imputations, (2) the impugned defamatory statement refers to the plaintiff, and (3) the impugned statement have been published to third parties. A defamatory imputation in the impugned statement must tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of others, expose him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, injure his 1185 reputation in his office, trade, or profession, or injure his financial standing/credit. An imputation need not have an actual adverse impact on a person’s reputation since the law looks to the tendency to it. 1190 9.2 D3, D4, & D5 cited section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 that provides for justification as a complete defence in an action grounded in defamation. They cited Chong Swee Hust & Anor v Lim Shee Ghee (T/A L&G Consultants & Education Services) [2009] 3 MLJ 665 that when a defence of justification is to be upheld, it is not necessary 1195 to prove the truth of every word in the statement said to be defamatory. What is relevant is the truth of the imputation of the overall statement. It follows, therefore, that the identity of the maker of the statement is immaterial to the defence of justification. Section 8 says: 1200 In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fall by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges. 1205 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 35 9.3 D3, D4, & D5 also cited section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957, which provides for the defence of fair comment. Section 9 says: In an action for libel or slander in respect of words consisting partly of allegations 1210 of fact and partly of expression of opinion, a defence of fair comment shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every allegation of fact is not proved if the expression of opinion is fair comment having regard to such of the facts alleged or referred to in the words complained of as are established. 1215 They cited in support Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’Kub v Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 393, HC that held for fair comment to succeed, (1) the words complained of are comments, though they may consist of or include inference of facts, (2) the comments are on a matter of public interest, and (3) the comments 1220 are based on facts, truly stated. They must also be fair, which a fair- minded person can honestly make on the facts proved. 9.4 D3, D4, & D5 shared a similar view of D1 that all alleged defamatory materials by P are in Part C documents marked as “ID” that had not 1225 been tested and converted as exhibits at the trial. The exclusion by the Court of Part C documents of P’s case, would collapse the entire claim in the present suit. 9.5 The 8th allegation of defamation in paragraph 6.5(h) herein is 1230 directed only to D3. P had not established at the trial that the alleged impugned statements (1) refer to her and (2) the impugned statements are defamatory. It has been proven at the trial that the impugned statements constitute fair comment: 1235 (a) The impugned statement does not refer to P. Self-identification by the P cannot be a basis for defamation. They cited Wong S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 36 Yoke Kong & Ors v Azmi M Anshar & Ors [2003] 4 MLJ that held that the alleged offensive sentence does not ex-facie refer to the plaintiff. Evidence must be given to connect the libel to the 1240 plaintiff. The onus is on the plaintiff; if he fails to discharge it, he has no cause of action. (b) Nothing in the impugned statement in the 8th allegation of defamation makes any reference to P. The pleading must plead the special facts to establish that nexus, failing which the claim 1245 must fail. There is none in the present case. They cited Gately on Libel and Slander (12th Edition), on the need for P to clarify in his pleadings the basis on which he claims to have been identified as the subject of the words complained. P must provide the connecting facts to establish the nexus, or the claim would 1250 be struck out. (c) The photograph of the machine allegedly used by P to connect the dots is insufficient, as no evidence has been tendered to establish that (1) the machine belongs to P, (2) it was at P’s clinic, (3) the photograph of the machine used was a cropped 1255 image taken from the P’s clinic. P was merely relying on the special facts or knowledge of her customers (PW2 and PW3) to link her to the impugned statements by D3. P failed to plead the special facts in her pleadings to provide the required nexus. Parties are bound to their pleadings (See Leong Chye @ Sze 1260 Leong Chye & Anor v United Overseas Bank Bhd and another appeal [2019] 1 MLJ 23, FC), and in the circumstances, the claim on the 8th alleged defamation against D3, must fail. P also failed to establish that the alleged impugned statements by D3 are objectively capable of bearing defamatory 1265 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 37 meanings as pleaded. The natural, ordinary meaning of alleged defamatory words is a question of law to be determined by the Court. If having decided that the words complained of can bear a defamatory meaning, the Court must ascertain whether the words are, in fact, defamatory: Chok Foo @ Chok Kee Lian v 1270 The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371, CA. (d) In its proper context, the impugned publication is critical of the machine and not P. The sting of the publication is that a generic PRP machine with fewer revolutions per minute (RPM) yields inferior results. D3 was merely promoting its own business by 1275 making comparisons of the PRP machine that has a higher RPM to yield better results. The impugned publication is clearly on the performances of the machines compared and does not purport to link and defame P (Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 MLJ 720, FC). 1280 (e) The impugned statement by D3 in the 8th alleged defamation constitutes fair comment, where it expresses an opinion on a matter of public interests: Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’Kub v Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 393, HC. D3 submitted that, as a matter of law, what is considered an issue of 1285 public interest is a category that is not closed. The courts have noted that what constitutes public interest could be anything that may interest the public or even a segment of the public interested in the publication's subject matter. 9.6 The 9th allegation of defamation in paragraph 6.5(i) herein is 1290 directed only to D4. D4 argues that P failed to establish that (1) the impugned publication refers to P and (2) that the impugned statements were published. D4 submitted that it is trite law that S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 38 where the impugned publication does not expressly refer to the claiming party, special facts or knowledge is required to make that 1295 conclusion, then those special facts and knowledge must be specifically pleaded. It is here that the Plaintiff’s claim has failed: (a) The impugned publication does not explicitly refer to P. (b) The sticker “stay posh” on D4’s publication does not refer to P nor P’s Posh Medispa. The phrase “a certain Medispa” 1300 cannot be taken to refer to P. The general reader must be acquainted with special knowledge or facts to link it to P. P does not plead the special knowledge or facts in her claim against D4. Readers of the impugned publication cannot make the connection to P by only relying on the “stay posh 1305 stickers”. (c) There is no publication of any defamatory materials by republication of postings on @iresamsi’s Instagram account. D4 merely shared a hyperlink to D2’s Instagram account page. It does not direct anyone to the alleged impugned 1310 statements by D2. This position was acknowledged by P in her evidence in court. D4 cited Crookes v Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2008 BCSC 1424, SC Canada, which observed that the purpose of a hyperlink is to direct the reader to additional material from a different source. It provides 1315 immediate access to material published on another website but does not amount to the republication of the content on the originating site. This is especially so that a reader may or may not follow the hyperlinks provided. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 39 (d) In the event the Court finds the impugned publication by D4 1320 defamatory, reliance is placed on section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 on justification. The statements are true or substantially true. D4 cited Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 242, that justification affords a complete 1325 defence against defamation. D4 relies on the following facts: (i) On or about 14/04/2018, P performed a facial treatment known as Filler Injection Treatment on D1 on both cheeks. (ii) As a result of the said facial treatment, D1 experienced pain, high fever and swelling on her right cheek because of infection, puss, 1330 and abscess at the location where P had injected D1’s right cheek. (iii) D1 had to undergo medical treatment at other clinics to treat the said infection, puss, and abscess on her right cheek. (iv) As a result of the said facial treatment, a scar was left on the right cheek of D1, and this caused damage and disfigurement to D1’s 1335 face and (v) D1 had to undergo further medical treatment at another clinic to repair the scar and damage on her right cheek. In establishing justification, D4 submits the evidence of DW1, 1340 DW2, and DW3, which sufficiently corroborates the facts. (e) D4 also relies on the fair comment as a defence and cites section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957, which states that fair comment shall not fail by reason, only that the truth of every 1345 allegation of fact is not proved. In support, D4 cited Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli [2022] 3 MLJ 758, that to raise fair comment as a defence, it must be established (1) a sufficient fact upon which the inference is drawn, and (2) those comments made, 1350 or inferences drawn are true so that readers may form their own opinion. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 40 The facts as they are stated must not be untruly stated sufficiently if the subject is of public importance and is sufficiently and not incorrectly or untruthfully stated. A 1355 comment based on untrue facts cannot be fairly made. D4 argued that the legal requirements in Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’Kub v Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 393, HC had been met: (i) D1 had indeed suffered from P’s facial treatment. As a result of 1360 infection, puss and abscess formed when. (ii) D1 had to undergo medical treatment at other clinics to treat the said infection, puss, and abscess in her right cheek. (iii) D1 had a scar on her right cheek after undergoing facial treatment at P’s Medispa and had to seek further medical treatment to repair 1365 the damage caused on her right cheek. The issues are of public interest. D4, who also owns Medispa, has a right to comment freely on the impugned issues. In her evidence, P admitted that the issue with the facial treatment of D1 had 1370 become a big issue even before the impugned publication by D4. 9.7 The 10th allegation of defamation in paragraph 6.5(j) herein is directed only to D5. It must fail because P (1) failed to sufficiently plead the meanings of the alleged impugned statements by D5, 1375 and (2) D5 has successfully proven justification and fair comments as a complete defence: (a) The claim against D5 is evidently flawed when P did not ascribe the meaning to the alleged Impugned Statements complained of, thereby prejudicing D5. It creates difficulty for 1380 D5 to ascertain the meaning that P intended to ascribe to it and to deny them accordingly. Gately on Libel and Slander S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 41 (12th Edition), in paragraph 26.26, clarified the need for P to set out the basis on which he claims to have been defamed in his pleadings. 1385 (b) That notwithstanding, D5 claims she is entitled to the defence of justification, adopts and repeats the position taken on justification and fair comments as reflected in paragraph 9.6(d) and (e) above. 1390 9.8 The 11th allegation of defamation in paragraph 6.5(j) herein is directed only to D4. It must also fail because P failed to prove that D4 published it: (a) No cogent evidence was adduced by P to show that D4 published the impugned statement. 1395 (b) Since no evidence tendered to establish this allegation, it must be dismissed for want of compelling evidence. (c) D4 cited Small Medium Enterprise Development Bank Malaysia v Lim Woon Katt [2016] 5 MLJ 220, CA, where it referred to and followed Browne v Dunn 918930 6 R 67 that 1400 a party’s case must be expressly put to his opponent’s material witness when they are under cross-examination. A failure to do so may be treated as an abandonment of the pleaded case. 1405 9.9 D3, D4, & D5 argued that there is no reasonable cause of action based on conspiracy to defame P by the Ds. P had not met the legal requirements: S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 42 (a) They cited Cubic Electronic Sdn Bhd v MKC Corporate & Business Advisory Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2016] 3 1410 MLJ 797, CA that observed four essential conditions to be met for conspiracy to injure: (i) An agreement between two or more individuals. (ii) A shared intent to injure (iii) With that intent, certain acts were carried out, and 1415 (iv) Causing loss or damage to the claimant. (b) They also cited Gasing Heights Sdn Bhd v Alayah bt. Abd Rahman & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 259, HC that held in a claim for the tort of conspiracy, the SoC must plead with great 1420 particularity all the elements that make up the alleged tortious wrong. A bare assertion on the allegation of the tort conspiracy will not do. (c) This position was restated by the Court of Appeal in Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor and other appeals 1425 [2010] 5 MLJ 394, CA when it said that there was no cause of action in the tort of conspiracy when the SoC failed to plead the agreement between the defendants to conspire and state precisely what was the purpose or what were the objects of the alleged conspiracy. It was also found that the SoC failed 1430 to accurately clarify the overt acts alleged to have been done by each of the alleged conspirators in pursuance and in furtherance of the conspiracy. (d) Nowhere in the SoC of P has this been done as the law 1435 requires. P failed to establish her claim herein. Procedural requirements in such matters require strict compliance with procedural law: Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Chang S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 43 Ching Chuen Ors and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 770, CA. 1440 In the circumstances, D3, D4, & D5 pray that P’s claim in the SoC is dismissed with cost. THE LAW [10] A defamatory statement: 1445 10.1 Is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule (see Ummi Hafilda Bte Ali v Ketua Setiausaha Parti Islam (PAS) [2006] 4 MLJ 761 at p.770 per Gill FCJ citing Sim v 1450 Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237). 10.2 Or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business (see section 5- Defamation Act 1957). 10.3 What may lead to a tendency to lower a person’s reputation in the 1455 eye of the public depends largely on the facts and circumstances in each case. 10.4 Mere hurt feelings are insufficient for the award of damages under defamation. The interest to be protected by this tort is a person’s good name and reputation. The law on defamation in Malaysia is 1460 primarily anchored on the English common law principles except as far as it had been modified by the Act, which is in pari materia with the English Defamation Act 1952 (see Soh Chun Seng v CTOS-EMR Sdn Bhd [2004] 5 CLJ 46). S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 44 10.5 Defamation is committed when the defendant publishes words or 1465 matters containing untrue imputations against the plaintiff's reputation to a third person. 10.6 Liability for defamation is divided into two categories: libel and slander. If the publication is made in a permanent form, broadcast, or part of a theatrical performance, it is libel. It is slander if it is in 1470 some transient form or is conveyed by spoken words or gestures. [11] The civil law of defamation is primarily based on case law. Although the Act does not define defamatory matters, it has given some well-known common law principles statutory force. Libel or published 1475 defamation, for example, a newspaper article, television broadcast, pictures, and words, can be defamatory (see Civil Trial Guidebook by Marsden Law Book). [12] In Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Berhad 1480 [2002] 7 CLJ 32 Ramly Ali J (at that time) said: “In a tort of defamation, the plaintiff must prove three elements, namely the statement must bear defamatory imputations, must refer to the plaintiff’s reputation and must have been published to a third person by the defendant”. 1485 (See also Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152) [13] In Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v Haji Hasan Bin Hamzah & Ors (1995] 1 MLJ 39, it was held that it is a question of law for the court to decide whether the natural and ordinary meaning of the words 1490 used in the articles were capable of conveying a defamatory meaning of and concerning the plaintiff. Libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer. Still, on defamation, it was irrelevant to consider the meaning S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 45 the writer and publisher intended to convey. The question is to be determined by an objective test. 1495 [14] Therefore, based on the above authorities, the plaintiff has to prove the following: (a) the statement was defamatory. (b) it referred to her and 1500 (c) it was published, that is communicated to a third party Once proven, the onus then shifted to the defendants to prove any of the defences: (a) justification or, in other words, the truth of the utterance. 1505 (b) fair comment on a matter of public interest or (c) that it was made on a privileged occasion. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [15] I have examined all-cause papers, the evidence at the trial, and the 1510 parties' respective submissions. Considering the totality of the evidence and my observations in paragraph [6] 6.6, and the parties' respective arguments in paragraphs [7] 7.1-7.4, [8] 8.1-8.7, and [9] 9.1-9.9 hereof, and in addition, it is my considered determination that: 1515 15.1 In line with the principles stated by the Federal Court in Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v Haji Hasan Bin Hamzah & Ors (1995] 1 MLJ 39, it is for the Court to determine the question of law whether the P’s 1st-11th allegation of defamation was capable of conveying a defamatory meaning within the context that it was published and 1520 understood within that context: Sivananthan v Abdullah Bin Dato Abdul Rahman [1984] 1 MLJ 62, HC. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 46 15.2 In Field v Davis [1955] CLY 1543, cited in Makresinis & Deakin’s Tort Law, 8th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2019, p.639), the 1525 Court held that when the defendant called a married woman a tramp, it was not defamatory, because it was uttered by the defendant in a fit of temper and were understood by those around as being mere vulgar abuse. 1530 15.3 The Court of Appeal in Abu Hassan Hasbullah v Zukeri Ibrahim [2018] 3 CLJ 726, CA reiterated the basic principles that (1) is the impugned statement defamatory in nature, (2) does the impugned statement refer to the plaintiff, and (3) has the statement been published to third parties. It must be in the affirmative on all three. 1535 In construing the impugned statement, it is necessary to consider the actual words used and the context in which it was issued, whether it was libelous premised on the foregoing factual matrix of this case. Looking at the background and complete facts of the present case, I am unconvinced by the suggestive evidence of P. 1540 She produced speculations that did not fit the claim during the trial. 15.4 P’s difficulty establishing her case gets compounded when crucial evidential materials on the 1st-11th allegation of defamation In Part C were not admitted and marked as exhibits during the trial (IDP1-1545 IDP4 and IDP6-IDP18, while some documents related to the claim in Part C are not even marked). They are excluded as a consequence. The burden lies on the P to appropriately conduct its case and ensure that the tendered documents are admitted as exhibits; in the present case, this was not done. 1550 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 47 15.5 It is trite that Part C documents (relating to the alleged defamatory postings herein) require their existence, authenticity, and contents to be proven. The procedure required for the admission of such documents evidently had not been complied with (amongst others, 1555 the failure to call the maker and to tender the originals), rendering the impugned evidential materials worthless for consideration in the present case. Without the P’s Part C documents, her claim has no lawful foundation to rest on. The allegation becomes unproven. 1560 15.6 In clearly failing to prove its claim, I would like to borrow what was said by the Court of Appeal in Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253, 254, CA that where the plaintiff fails to prove his case, it will not avail him to turn around and say that the defendant has not established his. The defendant can say it is wholly immaterial 1565 whether I prove my case or not. You have not proved yours. I would also like to reiterate what was said in Johara Bi bt. Abdul Kadir Marican v. Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anor [1981] 1 MLJ 139, that it was all a matter of proof and that until and unless the plaintiff has discharged the onus to prove his case on a balance of 1570 probabilities, the burden did not shift to the defendant, no matter how unbelievable the defence might be. The claim against the defendant must, in these circumstances, be dismissed. The legal burden lies on the plaintiff throughout the proceedings to prove its case, in which case the plaintiff herein had failed: Yui Chin Song & 1575 Ors v Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 417. It is not for the Ds to establish their defence in such a circumstance: Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253. 1580 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 48 [16] In light of the foregoing: 16.1 Against D1 & D2: I agree with the counsel for D1 that the P has not successfully established the allegation of conspiracy to injure (D1 and D2). Mere conjectures, bare assertions, and sweeping and general allegations 1585 cannot meet the legal requirements to prove conspiracy. There is no material particularity in the pleadings. I cannot find compelling materials to sustain the accusations by the P. The standard of proof required is high and must be commensurate with the severity of the charge. 1590 16.2 In failing to provide compelling evidence that D1 is complicit with D2 in the posting of alleged defamatory materials by D1, the claim by P is rendered unsustainable. 1595 16.3 In addition, I find she has substantially proven the alleged postings to be true, and therefore, justification applies, which is a complete defence for defamation. P fails to refute the arguments by D1 successfully. 1600 16.4 Similarly with D2, though she is absent from this proceeding, with the exclusion of the crucial P’s Part C documents, the case against D2 will have a similar fate to D1. It cannot be established for want of cogent evidence. In such circumstances, it would be in error to record judgment in default against her when P’s claim cannot be 1605 established. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 49 16.5 Against D3, D4, and D5: 1610 Fundamentally, it is my considered judgment that with the exclusion of the Part C documents relating to the alleged defamatory postings for statutory and procedural incompliance, as explained in the foregoing, there is no foundation for P's action herein. It will have no leg to stand on, rendering the P's arguments mere conjectures. To 1615 reiterate what was said earlier, the procedure required for the admission of such documents evidently had not been complied with (amongst others, the failure to call the maker and to tender the originals), rendering the impugned evidential materials worthless for consideration in the present case. 1620 16.6 I would also like to reiterate what was said in Johara Bi bt. Abdul Kadir Marican v. Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anor [1981] 1 MLJ 139, that it was all a matter of proof and that until and unless the plaintiff has discharged the onus to prove his case on a balance of 1625 probabilities, the burden did not shift to the defendant, no matter how unbelievable the defence might be. The claim against the defendant must, in these circumstances, be dismissed. Similarly, the legal burden lies on the plaintiff throughout the proceedings to prove its case, in which case the plaintiff herein had failed. It is not 1630 for the Ds to establish their defence in such a circumstance: Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253. CONCLUSION [17] After considering the facts, all evidence adduced at the trial and the 1635 lack of it, and the parties' respective arguments: 17.1 I found no merits in the P's suit against the Ds. S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 50 17.2 I dismissed it against all Ds with a global cost of RM60,000.00 payable to D3, D4, and D5 within 60 days from the date hereof. 17.3 D1's Counterclaim: 1640 It is my considered judgment that I find for D1. As a medical practitioner/professional, the P owes a duty of care. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the P had breached that duty. Therefore, in the circumstances, I am allowing the counterclaim: (a) Special damages of RM4,774.00, proven as follows: 1645 -RM3000.00 fillers – exh 38, -RM900, refund from P, -receipt M Clinic RM500 – exh D26, -receipts/costs from other clinics RM374 – exh D5, D28, D29, D30(A-E) and D43. 1650 (b) Damages for pain and suffering are to be assessed. (c) Interest of 5% from the date of the action until full realisation. (d) A global cost of RM80,000.00 is ordered against P to be paid within 60 days from the date hereof. 1655 Dated 01.12.2023. 1660 HAYATUL AKMAL ABDUL AZIZ JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR 1665 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-9-02/2019 51 Counsels: Ms. M.Kamalam together with Ms. Selva Barathy Messrs. Kamalam & Associates 1670 Counsels for the plaintiff Ms. Goh Hui Ring together with Ms. Danielle Heng See Xin Messrs. Goh Partnership Counsels for the first defendant. 1675 Mr. Chetan Jethwani Messrs. Chetan Jethwani & Company Counsel for the third, fourth and fifth defendant 1680 S/N lhPjWakvkEOfNYjWPeR4Mw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	100,276	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22NCC-622-12/2020	PLAINTIF Westford Limited DEFENDAN Archipelago Insurance Limited	INSURANCE: Utmost good faith - Duty of disclosure - Pre-policy material facts disclosure - Materiality - Influence on prudent insurer - Underwriting decisions - Non-disclosure – Misrepresentation – Avoidance - Function misrepresentations - Underwriting risk assessments - Coverage decision implications - Inducement factors - Proposal form constraints - Limited descriptor options - Intent considerations - Course of conduct - Prior awareness - Specificity demands - Trade insurance - Supplier legitimacy questions - Ownership capabilities - Transfer of title - Arms-length transaction - Independent dealings - Commercial realities - Profit margin - Presumed motivations - Commercial viability - Waiver & estoppel - Insurer representations - Subsequent denial of liability – Reliance – Prejudice - Prior knowledge - Acknowledgement emails - Extension grants - Confirmed coverage - Burden & standard of proof - Burden on party alleging breach of good faith or fraud - Ownership documents - Transaction legitimacy - Liquidator reports - Allegation substantiation - Evidentiary thresholds - Trial evidenceOngoing disclosures - Last minute documents - Expert evidence weight - Industry expert opinion - Prudent insurer standards - Late premium payment acceptance - Prudent insurer duties - Endorsement non-issuance - Premium rejection - Bad faith claim handling - Swift denial - Investigation into claims legitimacy - Post-rejection justifications and defence shifting - Investigation obstruction and preclusion - New exclusion allegations - Investigative discoveries - Late surfacing facts - Fair & reasonable claim handling - Impartial assessment – Evidence basis - Result predetermination - Selective scrutiny of evidence - Differential treatment - Trial surprise mitigation - Gradual information revelation - Insurance contract interpretation - Purposive approach - Objective assessment - Industry norms - Reasonable expectations - Scope of cover - Destination relevance - Approved countries - Distributor or financier - Genuine authenticity - Corporate guarantee - Interpretation of policy terms - Scope of cover and exclusions - Whether shipment is title transfer or physical delivery - Coverage representations - Email impersonation - Spoofed email - Imposter deception - Fraudulent domain - Phishing attack indicators - Modified bank details - Requests for payments - Information security duties - Data protection obligation - System safeguards - Cyber fraud red flags - Syntax discrepancies - Timestamp mismatches - Electronic communication verification - Multi-channel validation - Change authentication - Payment audit controls & tracking - Receipt record checks - Premium status monitoring - It policy standards - Staff education - Incident escalation protocols - Contributory negligence - Verification duty - Reasonable wariness	01/12/2023	YA Tuan Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1f161dfb-56f9-4ee8-a9ae-7638f3f85072&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT NO.: WA-22NCC-622-12/2020 Between Westford Limited (Hong Kong Company No.:1333544) …. Plaintiff And Archipelago Insurance Limited (Labuan Company No: LI09355) ...Defendant JUDGMENT [1] When a Hong Kong commodities trader came calling to a Labuan insurer seeking protection against buyer nonpayment, neither could have predicted the complex dispute their relationship would yield. Yet the trader's denied USD 4.5 million claim became a legal conflict spanning multiple countries and raising questions of computer fraud, questionable documentation, and clashing legal duties. At its core, the case probes whether insurance companies still enjoy refuge within policy text when situations grow complicated, or whether legal and ethical duties require a more flexible stance. How courts ultimately resolve such competing questions around claim denials may have far-reaching influence over parties in insurance transactions worldwide. 01/12/2023 12:26:25 WA-22NCC-622-12/2020 Kand. 199 S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 BACKGROUND FACTS [2] The Plaintiff, Westford Limited (“Westford”) is a Hong Kong-based commodity trader and supply chain manager providing trade financing solutions to facilitate cross-border commodity trades for its clients. Westford belongs to an international group of logistics and commodity trading companies known as the Westford Group. [3] On 17.5.2019, the Defendant, Archipelago Insurance Limited (“Archipelago”), a Labuan offshore general insurer, issued Trade Credit Insurance Policy No. AG1220190008 (“the Policy”) to Westford for an initial coverage period of 12 months from 15.5.2019 to 14.5.2020. [4] The Policy insured Westford’s commodity trades concluded within this period against the risk of non-payment of insured debts, due to insolvency or protracted default of the named insured buyer Phoenix Global DMCC (“Phoenix”), an international commodities trading firm based in Dubai. [5] The approved destination countries specified in the Policy are Hong Kong, Turkey and Dubai U.A.E. As loss payee, Archipelago would indemnify Westford’s trade financier Bank GPB International S.A. (“BGIS”) up to 90% of the insured debt. The initial policy limit/maximum credit liability was USD 2.5 million. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [6] On 9.10.2019, to accommodate additional trades, Westford requested Archipelago to increase the policy limit by USD 2.5 million to USD 5 million. Archipelago agreed, subject to additional premiums of USD 35,671.23 (“Additional Premium”). [7] Archipelago informed Westford that a corresponding endorsement and invoice for the Additional Premium would be issued. However, this did not eventuate. Instead, on 10.10.2019, Westford received copy Endorsement No. 0004/2019 (“Endorsement No. 4”) from an imposter posing as an Archipelago officer (“the Imposter”). [8] Believing this to be legitimate, Westford on 4.11.2019 received copy invoice for Additional Premium from the Imposter with fraudulent bank details and paid the Additional Premium on 6.11.2019. Unbeknownst to Westford, Archipelago was similarly misled by the Imposter into sending Endorsement No. 4 and invoice to the Imposter rather than Westford. [9] Throughout this period, in various email correspondence from 9.10.2019 to 2.4.2020, Archipelago expressly acknowledged and confirmed coverage under Endorsement No. 4 for Westford’s new trades with Phoenix through Phoenix Order No. 11892 for USD 2.473 million to Ivory Coast (“Phoenix Order 11892”) and Phoenix Order No. 11895 for USD 2.487 million to Senegal (“Phoenix Order S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 11895”). Both Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 are referred to together as “the Phoenix Orders.” [10] In early 2020, amidst the developing COVID-19 pandemic, Phoenix accumulated substantial payment arrears and eventually entered liquidation on 9.6.2020. On 27.5.2020, Westford submitted a Trade Credit Insurance Claim under the Policy to Archipelago's loss adjustor Crawford & Company Adjusters (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (“Crawford”) for Phoenix’s outstanding debts under the Phoenix Orders totaling USD 4.96 million. [11] On 12.6.2020 however, Archipelago rejected Westford’s Claim (“Claim Rejection”) whilst the claim assessment by Crawford was still ongoing. Archipelago cited non- compliance with “Approved Countries” clause and voidance of Endorsement No. 4 due to non-payment of Additional Premium as grounds for rejection. [12] Westford commenced legal action against Archipelago on 22.12.2020. In its Writ and Statement Claim, subsequently amended, it sought the following reliefs: “(a) A declaration that Endorsement No. 4 is valid and that the Policy Limit for Phoenix amounts to USD5,000,000.00; (b) A declaration that the Claim is covered under the Policy and Endorsement No. 4; (c) A declaration that the Claim Rejection Letter is invalid and in breach of the Policy and Endorsement No. 4; S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (d) An order that Archipelago pay BGIS the following – (i) USD 2,226,460.50 (equivalent to RM 9,702,914.86 if converted at an exchange rate of 4.3580 [as at 27.5.2020]), representing the amount due to BGIS under the Policy in respect of Phoenix Order 11892, i.e. 90% of the total value of Phoenix Order 11892, being USD 2,473,845; (ii) USD 2,238,093.00 (equivalent to RM9,753,609.29 if converted at an exchange rate of 4.3580 [as at 27.5.2020]), representing the amount due to BGIS under the Policy in respect of Phoenix Order 11895, i.e. 90% of the total value of Phoenix Order 11895, being USD 2,486,770.00; (e) In the alternative, an order for specific performance to compel Archipelago to comply with the terms of the Policy and Endorsement No. 4, and to pay the insurance proceeds stated in paragraphs 64(d)(i) and 64(d)(ii) of the Amended Statement of Claim to BGIS; (f) General damages; (g) Aggravated and exemplary damages; (h) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on paragraphs 64(d), 64(e), 64(f) and 64(g) of the Amended Statement of Claim from the date of the Claim Rejection Letter until the date of full realisation; (i) Costs; (j) Such further or other relief that this Honourable Court deems just and fit.” [13] After Westford commenced legal action in December 2020, Archipelago in its Amended Defence dated 5.3.2021, pleaded additional grounds for rejection of Westford’s claim being misrepresentation, sham trades, fraudulent non- S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 disclosure and lack of insurable interest to justify its Claim Rejection. SUMMARY OF WESTFORD’S CASE [14] In summary, Westford’s case is that Archipelago had wrongfully and in bad faith rejected its insurance claim under the Policy. [15] Westford contends that the Policy, along with Endorsement No. 4 which increased the coverage limit, provides protection against losses arising from the non-payment of insured debts under two sales contracts, the Phoenix Ordders, with its customer Phoenix. [16] It is Westford's position that the insurer Archipelago had issued repeated acknowledgements confirming coverage for the Phoenix Orders, granted extensions of time for payment under the same contracts, and confirmed just prior to the claim submission that coverage remained in place with premiums paid. [17] As such, Westford contends that Archipelago is estopped from denying coverage on technical grounds, waived certain policy conditions through its conduct, and failed to act fairly or in good faith in swiftly rejecting the insurance claim on dubious grounds not raised earlier. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [18] Westford also alleges negligent misstatements were made by Archipelago regarding coverage which led to the losses suffered, and that Archipelago had breached statutory duties by violating standards of integrity, fair dealing, and competence owed under regulations applicable to its insurance business. [19] In light of the above, Westford contends that the rejection of its insurance claim constituted a breach of contract and breach of duties under tort law and statute, warranting payment of the insurance proceeds outstanding or damages resulting from Archipelago's actions and inactions. SUMMARY OF ARCHIPELAGO’S CASE [20] In summary, Archipelago's case is that it was justified in rejecting Westford's insurance claim as there were various breaches of policy terms and misrepresentations that invalidate coverage under the Policy. [21] Archipelago alleges that Westford made material misrepresentations regarding the nature of its business in the insurance proposal form and failed to disclose its true involvement as a financing intermediary in the transactions. [22] It is also Archipelago's position that the policy limit remained at USD 2.5 million as the Additional Premium to increase coverage was never paid to it but wrongly paid to a S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 fraudster, and that shipments to Ivory Coast and Senegal fall outside approved countries per policy terms. [23] Additionally, Archipelago contends that the sales contracts, the Phoenix Orders, underlying the insurance claim were sham transactions and disguised financing arrangements, not legitimate arms-length commodity trades, hence rendering the claim outside the scope of policy coverage with no insurable interest established. [24] Archipelago further contends that various policy and statutory breaches on Westford's part would disentitle any right to relief. This includes alleged dishonesty, lack of utmost good faith, and contributing negligence that should substantially reduce liability even if the court finds in favour of Westford's claim. [25] As such, the overarching position taken by Archipelago is that Westford's case is meritless, and the insurance claim was rightly rejected in line with the policy provisions, authorised regulations, and governing legal principles. WITNESSES [26] Westford called five witnesses whose witness statements are marked “WS-PW1” to “WS-PW5” as follows: a) PW1 is Nuray Hayal Erdinc (“Nuray Erdinc”), the Head of Operations at the Istanbul Representative S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Office of Global Trade Solutions Ltd. Her evidence was on Commercial Invoice No. 13182 dated 16.10.2019 in respect of Phoenix Order 11892 and Commercial Invoice No. 13183 dated 16.10.2019 in respect of Phoenix Order 11895. Her Witness Statement is marked as “WS-PW1”. b) PW2 is Arzu Tanriverdi (“Arzu Tanriverdi”), the Trade Credit Insurance Director of Westford. Her evidence was on the pre-policy negotiations, terms, and operations of the insurance policy with Archipelago. Her evidence covered Westford's transactions with Phoenix, payment of additional premiums, communications about overdue payments, and Archipelago's confirmations of coverage. She also discussed Westford's rejected insurance claim against Archipelago. Her Witness Statement is referred to as “WS-PW2”. c) PW3 is Hande Elmener (“Hande Elmener”), the Chief Executive Officer of Westford. Her evidence was on Westford's role as a trade finance intermediary and its past transactions with Phoenix, including Orders 11892 and 11895. She discussed choosing Archipelago for insurance, coverage confirmations, Phoenix's liquidation, Westford's debt recovery efforts, the insurance claim filing, premium payment issues, the Claim Rejection and fraud allegations, and the rejection's impact on Westford's S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 business. Her Witness Statement is marked as “WS- PW3”. d) PW4 is Bernard Henri Léon Sauvage (“Bernard Sauvage”). He is a trade credit insurance expert. His evidence was on his expert opinion that Westford is covered under the insurance policy and Endorsement No. 4 with respect to Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895, that Archipelago's grounds for rejecting Westford's insurance claim are baseless, that the trades between Westford and Phoenix (Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895) appeared to be authentic, and that Archipelago is not entitled to rely on any allegation of fraud on the part of Phoenix to repudiate Westford's insurance claim. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-PW4”. e) PW5 is Fong Choong Fook (“Fong”), a cyber security consultant and trainer with LE Global Services Sdn Bhd. His evidence was on his expert investigation and analysis of the emails provided by Westford, including the spoofed emails purportedly from Archipelago, to determine if Westford's computer systems had been compromised. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-PW5”. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [27] Archipelago called nine witnesses whose witness statements are marked “WS-DW1” to “WS-DW9” as follows: a) DW1 is Ian Lim Teck Soon (“Ian Lim”), the Principal Officer and Group Chief of Archipelago. He testified on Westford's introduction to Archipelago, underwriting processes, policy terms, endorsements, and handling of Westford's claim after Phoenix's liquidation. He explained the claim rejection reasons, including non-compliant shipments, policy limit concerns, ownership questions, disclosure breaches, Westford's insurable interest, and absence of debt confirmation from the Phoenix Liquidator. His Witness Statements are marked as “WS-DW1” and “WS-DW1A.” b) DW2 is Ng Jook Yew (“Nicholas Ng”), Head of Underwriting at Archipelago. He provided evidence on underwriting processes for Westford's policy, policy endorsements, trade declarations under the policy, reasons for excluding Ivory Coast and Senegal trades, and Archipelago's stance on Westford's non-disclosure of material facts about its dealings with Phoenix. His Witness Statement is marked “WS-DW2.” c) DW3 is Goh Ah Hong, shareholder and director in Archipelago Insurance Limited and the CEO of Accura International Limited Labuan. His evidence S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 was on the circumstances of his meeting with Arzu Tanriverdi (PW2) when she was introduced to him briefly by Nicholas Ng (DW2), that she informed him that her business was looking for credit insurance but they did not discuss details of her business as he had to leave shortly for another appointment. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-DW3”. d) DW4 is Tay Boon Rong, Group Chief Operating Officer for Malayan Holdings Limited and formerly the Group Compliance Officer for the Archipelago Group of Companies. His evidence was on a January 2020 cyber fraud attempt where someone impersonated Archipelago in an email to Deloitte, and Archipelago's subsequent police report filing. He noted Archipelago did not report the Westford-related cyber fraud due to its discovery during lockdown, mentioned Archipelago's lack of financial loss from such incidents, and stated Westford was the only known client to lose money in such frauds. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-DW4”. e) DW5 is P A Kanes Naidu a/l Athinaidu (“Kanes”), the Technical Advisor at Archipelago Insurance Limited and formerly the Deputy Group Chief Underwriter. His evidence was on the Imposter's use of spoof email addresses in correspondence with Westford, timestamp discrepancies indicating email tampering, incomplete email content from the Imposter, requests S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 for payments to a new US bank account, Westford's failure to verify these discrepancies and changed bank details per its policy, and absence of original documents and endorsements in transactions between Archipelago and Westford. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-DW5”. f) DW6 is Huang Zhiang (“Huang”), the Director at CRM Claims Consultants Pte Ltd. His evidence was on CRM's investigations for Archipelago into transactions involving Genuine Pte Ltd and rice shipments to Ivory Coast and Senegal. Initially, his 7.8.2020 reports concluded that the cargoes were delivered as per documentation, but he later revised this after reviewing liquidators' documents, finding the trades were directly between Vietnamese shippers and Phoenix group companies, with no involvement from Genuine Pte Ltd or Westford. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-DW6”. g) DW7 is David Ng Siong Yee (“David Ng”), the Manager at Crawford & Company Adjusters (M) Sdn Bhd. His evidence was on his role in investigating Westford's insurance claim for Archipelago. He reviewed the insurance policy and claim documents, requested specific documents from Westford to assess the claim and trade authenticity, and followed up for clarifications. Based on the information received, albeit incomplete, he prepared a S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 preliminary loss advice report dated 15.5.2020. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-DW7”. h) DW8 is Lim Hon Min (“Hon Min”), an associate director specialising in trade credit at Accura International Limited. His evidence was on Archipelago's assessment of Westford's insurance claim. He opined that the Ivory Coast and Senegal trades were not covered under the policy, appeared to be duplicate transactions used for financing, and were not actual trades. He also stated that Westford could not be seen as a trade finance intermediary for these transactions based on new documents showing the real trades. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-DW8”. i) DW9 is Lim Boon Ing (“Boon Ing”), the Group Chief Operating Officer at Archipelago Insurance Limited. His evidence was on overseeing the oversaw the assessment and rejection of Westford's insurance claim. He cited reasons for rejection, including the alleged fraudulent nature of the trades, Westford's breach of disclosure about its business, prior financings, and dubious ownership of traded goods. Further, he referred to additional evidence from Phoenix liquidation reports, which indicated that Westford's claimed trades were sham transactions without actual transfer of goods ownership. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-DW9”. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 ISSUES [28] After considering the facts of the case and the defences relied on by Archipelago, the court frames the following issues for deliberation which this court considers pivotal to the resolution of this case: a) Whether Westford had breached its duty of utmost good faith and/or duty of disclosure and committed material, dishonest and/or fraudulent misrepresentations; b) Whether the Phoenix Orders are instruments and/or trades that fall within the ambit of the Policy; c) Whether Westford does have an insurable interest within the meaning of the Policy; d) Whether the Phoenix Orders do not constitute shipments to an Insured Buyer in an Approved Country; e) Whether the Policy Limit is only USD 2.5 million due to the non-payment of Additional Premium; f) Whether Archipelago is precluded from raising other grounds of rejection; S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 g) Whether adverse inference should be drawn against Westford; and h) Whether Westford breached its duty of good faith and showed fraudulent intent. [29] In the ensuing part of this judgment, this court will structure its deliberations around the issues above. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT Whether Westford had breached its duty of utmost good faith and/or duty of disclosure and committed material, dishonest and/or fraudulent misrepresentations [30] Archipelago asserts that Westford breached its duty of utmost good faith and duty of disclosure by misrepresenting themselves as merely a distributor of commodities. Archipelago contends that Westford actually functioned as financiers for its buyers, a crucial detail omitted in its proposal form and other pre-contractual documents. It argues that the sales contracts central to this claim were disguised financing agreements, not genuine trades, as evidenced by unusually low profit margins. Archipelago further alleges that Westford failed to disclose a significant Corporate Guarantee, which misrepresented its potential financial exposure. Based on these assertions, Archipelago believes it is entitled to void the policy, citing the breach of S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 the principle of utmost good faith and Westford's alleged dishonest or fraudulent misrepresentations. [31] Westford submits that it has been wrongly accused by Archipelago of misrepresentation and breach of duty of disclosure, emphasising its legitimate role as a ‘distributor of commodities’ backed by detailed transactional evidence. It contends that the allegations regarding the misrepresentation of suppliers and functioning through a broker are baseless, as supported by a plethora of authenticating documents. Westford maintains that its comprehensive disclosures in the Proposal Form and supporting documents negate Archipelago's claims of non- disclosure. It further asserts that Archipelago's reliance on speculative reports and conjectures lacks evidentiary support, particularly regarding the alleged disguised financing agreements. Finally, Westford argues that Archipelago's accusations are unfounded and should not result in the avoidance of the policy, as it has fulfilled all disclosure obligations in good faith. [32] Having thoroughly considered the submissions presented by both Westford and Archipelago, I now proceed to articulate my findings on the matters at issue. 'Distributor of various commodities', not 'financier' [33] Archipelago alleges that Westford is not genuinely a 'distributor of various commodities' as claimed but rather S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 acts as a 'financier' under the guise of trading. This assertion is based on the premise that the Phoenix Orders were not genuine trades but 'disguised financing agreements'. However, Archipelago's claim lacks substantiation; it has failed to provide concrete particulars or evidence illustrating such disguised agreements. The absence of specific details or examples of alleged undisclosed financing arrangements critically weakens Archipelago’s position. [34] Conversely, Westford's evidence robustly supports its stance as a commodities distributor. This evidence is anchored in the transactions involving rice, purchased from Genuine and sold to Phoenix. Key documents substantiate this process: a) Certificates of Origin issued by the Chamber of Commercial & Industry of Vietnam, dated for both orders, confirming the origin and shipment details of the rice. b) Purchase Contracts between Westford and Genuine, specifying the quantity (in metric tonnes) and value (in USD) of the rice. c) Commercial Invoices from Genuine to Westford, dated respectively for each order, demanding payment for the rice. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 d) Bank SWIFT receipts showing payment for the commodities by BGIS, Westford’s financiers. e) Bills of Lading accompanying Genuine’s letter to Westford, evidencing the shipment of the commodities. [35] Following the acquisition of these commodities, Westford engaged in a back-to-back sale to Phoenix, evidenced by: a) Sales Contracts between Westford and Phoenix, detailing the particulars of the rice sold. b) Commercial Invoices from Westford to Phoenix, indicating the amounts due. c) Documents evidencing the transfer of bills of lading to Phoenix. d) Phoenix’s acknowledgments of both receipt of the commodities and the debt owing to Westford. [36] Furthermore, the 120-day open account term in the Sales Contracts and the eventual sale of the commodities by Phoenix to end buyers in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and Dakar, Senegal, are consistent with standard commodity trading practices. The alignment of destinations in all transactional documents, including certificates of origin and bills of lading, reinforces Westford's claim. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [37] Additionally, Phoenix’s execution of Extension Agreements and issuance of debt acknowledgment, none of which reference any form of loan or financial aid from Westford, further corroborate the nature of these transactions as commercial sales. [38] In contrast, Archipelago's officers, during trial, acknowledged the commercial nature of the debt between Phoenix and Westford and the existence and successful delivery of the commodities, without providing any evidence to the contrary. [39] Given the detailed and consistent documentary evidence provided by Westford, and the lack of substantial contrary evidence from Archipelago, it is clear that Westford operated as a distributor of commodities. The evidence does not support the claim that Westford was acting as a financier in the guise of a distributor. In this respect, the legal principle that the onus of proving misrepresentation and non-disclosure of a material fact rests with the insurer applies (see Malcome A. Clarke in the Law of Insurance Contracts, 3rd Edition, 1997) and as such, Westford, the insured, is afforded the benefit of any doubt. [40] Further, Archipelago has not provided a clear definition or concrete evidence to support its assertion that Westford acted as a ‘financier’. Nor has it elucidated what constitutes a ‘disguised financing agreement’ or how these terms apply to the Phoenix Orders. The documentary evidence S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 presented, including invoices and sales contracts related to these orders, distinctly points to legitimate sales of commodities, devoid of any indication of financing arrangements by Westford towards Phoenix. [41] Archipelago’s supporting arguments, which include reference to news articles from the year 2021, do not convincingly bolster its case. It submits that Westford was transacting at a loss and hence must have been deriving undisclosed profits from these transactions. However, this line of argument was not pursued during the trial through the cross-examination of Westford’s witnesses, thereby violating the principle of Browne v Dunn [1893] 6 R. 67, H.L. which necessitates that any factual disputes be presented to the opposing witnesses for rebuttal. [42] Westford’s approach to these transactions demonstrates its commitment to due diligence and proper risk assessment. For instance, in evaluating its supplier, Genuine, Westford obtained a Certificate of Incorporation from the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) and a Credit Report from Worldbox Business Intelligence, confirming Genuine’s status as a legitimate entity with a sound financial standing. Additionally, Westford’s comprehensive review of transactional documents like Certificates of Origin, Bills of Lading, and Sales and Purchase contracts underscores its thorough understanding of the trades involved. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [43] Regarding the allegation of ‘reverse factoring,’ Archipelago has not presented any substantial evidence to validate this claim. Furthermore, its reliance on a Wikipedia article as evidence is notably weak, given the open-edit nature of such a source. This reliance calls into question the validity of its argument and its understanding of the matter at hand. Representation that suppliers are ‘Mills, wholesalers’ [44] Archipelago alleges that Westford misrepresented the nature of its relationship with its supplier, Genuine, in response to Question 14 of the Proposal Form. The question inquired, “Who are your suppliers?” to which Westford answered, “Mills, wholesalers.” Archipelago contends that this response was misleading, positing that Genuine, Westford's supplier, lacked authenticity and the capacity to own the commodities in question. [45] To substantiate its claim, Archipelago relies primarily on two sources: reports by CRM Claims Consultants Pte Ltd (“CRM”), conducted post-facto on 29.5.2020, and a Credit Report on Genuine, indicating a credit limit of SGD 200,000. However, the reliability and relevance of these sources are questionable. [46] The CRM investigation, initiated seven months following the Phoenix Orders in October 2019, lacks temporal relevance to the transactions in question. CRM's speculative findings, including suggestions that Genuine's office address might S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 be used merely for registration and doubts about the active role of Genuine's company secretary, are conjectural at best. This is compounded by the uncertainty expressed by CRM’s representative, Huang (DW6), during cross- examination, who admitted to either lacking personal knowledge or being uncertain about his findings. Furthermore, CRM’s omission of a Singapore High Court judgment dated 10.4.2021 filed as Suit 700 of 2020 between Genuine (as plaintiff) and HSBC Bank Middle East Ltd, Dubai undermines the relevancy of its investigation. This judgment, affirming Genuine as a legitimate entity and appellant, renders CRM’s findings peripheral. [47] The process of appointing CRM itself raises concerns. Archipelago's decision to suspend its original loss adjusters, Crawford, and prevent it from completing its investigation, instead opting for CRM’s services under the counsel of its lawyers, suggests a potential bias in the investigation process. The implication is that Archipelago might have sought to influence the outcome of the investigation to align with its interests. [48] Regarding the Credit Report, the emphasis on Genuine's credit limit is misplaced. A credit limit primarily reflects an entity's borrowing capacity, not its ownership or trading capabilities. Significantly, Archipelago overlooks Genuine's reported revenue of USD 8.5 million in 2017 and total assets worth USD 4.6 million, as indicated in the report by Worldbox Business Intelligence. This oversight casts doubt S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 on Archipelago's interpretation of Genuine's financial standing. [49] The longstanding relationship between Westford and Genuine, established since March 2019 with a cumulative turnover of approximately USD 44 million, further evidences the legitimacy of their commercial interactions. Notably, this relationship has been devoid of disputes or issues. [50] Supporting evidence of Genuine’s legitimacy includes: a) Certificate of Incorporation issued by the ACRA, dated 18.2.2016. b) Certificate of Good Standing from ACRA, dated 4.6.2020. c) Business Profile from ACRA, dated 22.3.2021, detailing Genuine’s company structure, officers, and shareholding. d) Credit Report from Worldbox Business Intelligence, dated 15.1.2019, affirming Genuine’s sound financial situation. [51] Contrasting this evidence with Archipelago's reliance on speculative CRM reports and the misinterpretation of the Credit Report, it is evident that Archipelago's allegations lack substantive backing. The comprehensive S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 documentation provided by Westford firmly establishes the authenticity of Genuine as a legitimate supplier. [52] In light of the evidence presented, the court finds Archipelago’s claim of misrepresentation by Westford concerning its supplier, Genuine, to be without merit. Westford's representation of functioning on its own [53] Archipelago claims that Westford misrepresented its operational mode in response to Question 10 of the Proposal Form. Archipelago contends that contrary to Westford's assertion of functioning independently, Westford in fact operated through Phoenix as a broker. This alleged misrepresentation is critical, as Archipelago argues that knowledge of such an arrangement would have influenced its decision to accept the risk. [54] The court notes significant inconsistencies in the testimony of Archipelago’s officers regarding who acted as a broker in the transactions involving Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895. This inconsistency is particularly evident in the changing narratives presented by Archipelago’s Principal Officer, Ian Lim (DW1), and its Group Chief Operating Officer, Boon Ing (DW9). [55] Ian Lim initially identified Phoenix as the broker in these transactions. However, during cross-examination, he reversed this assertion, ultimately acknowledging the S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 absence of a broker between Westford and Phoenix. This shift in stance during the critical phase of cross-examination is pivotal, as it undermines the credibility of Archipelago's claim. [56] Similarly, the testimony of Boon Ing was marked by vacillations. Initially claiming Westford to be an intermediary, he later altered his statement under cross- examination, suggesting that Westford was involved in 'disguised financing' as an intermediary. Such inconsistencies during cross-examination point to a lack of definitive evidence on Archipelago’s part regarding the alleged broker role. [57] The lack of a consistent and clear identification of a broker, even during trial proceedings, notably weakens Archipelago's position. The court finds it telling that Archipelago could not definitively establish the existence or identity of a broker, a central element of its allegation. [58] Moreover, an examination of the transactional documents related to Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 above reveals no evidence of a broker's involvement. These documents clearly demonstrate that Westford was acting independently as a seller of commodities, with direct knowledge of the trade specifics, such as qualities, quantities, and values of the commodities involved. Phoenix’s role in these transactions is clearly that of a buyer, with no intermediary or broker evident in the transactional process. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [59] This assessment is further supported by the testimony of Archipelago’s Principal Officer Ian Lim during cross- examination, where he conceded that there was no broker between Westford and Phoenix. His admission that the dealings were direct between the two parties significantly undermines the allegation of a broker’s involvement. [60] Given these observations, the court finds that Archipelago’s allegation of misrepresentation by Westford regarding its operational independence lacks substantiation. The evidence, coupled with the testimonies, does not support the claim of a broker's involvement as alleged by Archipelago. Archipelago’s burden to prove breach of duty of disclosure not met [61] Archipelago contends that Westford failed to disclose critical information: firstly, its role as a trade finance intermediary, and secondly, the existence of a Corporate Guarantee dated 24.12.2019, obtained from Phoenix Commodities Pvt Ltd (“PCPL”), Phoenix’s parent company. [62] To establish a breach of duty of disclosure, Archipelago, as the insurer, bears the burden of proof. It must convincingly demonstrate that the information allegedly withheld was material to a prudent underwriter and that this omission influenced its decision to incept the Policy. Archipelago’s officers have characterised Trade Credit Insurance Policies S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 as highly specialised and complex, thereby setting a high bar for materiality and inducement. [63] Despite the specialised nature of these policies, Archipelago has not presented any independent or expert evidence to support its claim of non-disclosure. Notably, it did not call upon any expert in the field of trade credit insurance to testify about the materiality of the purportedly undisclosed information. Additionally, there is a lack of evidence demonstrating that the alleged non-disclosure was a decisive factor in its decision to underwrite the policy. [64] The evidence from Archipelago’s underwriters is insufficient and lacks the necessary reliability. This approach echoes the caution advised in Synergy Health (UK) Ltd v CGU Insurance plc [2010] EWHC 2583, which underscores the hypothetical nature of underwriters' evidence and the need for it to be rigorously tested against logical consistency and independent evidence. [65] On the other hand, Westford’s defence includes the testimony of an expert witness, Bernard Sauvage (PW4), who brings over 30 years of experience in both underwriting and management in the Trade Credit Insurance industry. Bernard Sauvage’s testimony highlighted the comprehensiveness of Westford’s proposal form and Know Your Customer (KYC) documents, submitted to Archipelago, and noted that such thoroughness is rarely seen in the industry. He concluded that Westford had S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 shown utmost good faith and fully disclosed all necessary information, which was subsequently validated by Archipelago’s actions in granting an insurance line, incepting the policy, and confirming acceptance of Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895. [66] Considering these aspects, the court finds that Archipelago has not successfully established the elements of non- disclosure. The lack of independent evidence from Archipelago, contrasted with the persuasive and expert testimony provided by Westford, leads to the conclusion that the allegation of non-disclosure is unfounded. [67] Moreover, the evidence presented in court indicates that Westford has met its duty of disclosure both legally and factually. The detailed documentation provided by Westford, coupled with Archipelago’s decision to proceed with the policy, strongly suggests compliance with disclosure obligations. Westford’s role as ‘trade finance intermediary’ [68] The next issue pertains to whether Westford adequately disclosed its role as a trade finance intermediary. [69] Westford's disclosures in the Proposal Form and supporting documents, including the Company Overview 2018 and Audited Financial Statements, explicitly outlined its business operations. It revealed its role in trading commodities on S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 open account terms (120 days from invoice date), specialising in supply chain management, and providing structured trade solutions, including back-to-back trading. This was further corroborated by information on Westford's website. [70] In the specific instance of Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895, Westford's operational methods closely mirrored these disclosures. It engaged in negotiations and pre-sales of commodities between Genuine and Phoenix and subsequently sold these commodities to Phoenix on a back- to-back basis with open account terms. This operational model was consistently communicated to Archipelago, evident from a meeting held on 3.4.2019 and the terms of the Sales Contracts related to the Phoenix Orders. [71] During the trial, Westford’s witnesses contended that Archipelago’s fixation on the term ‘trade finance intermediary’ was a mere semantic issue. It argued that Westford’s role, irrespective of the terminology used, remained that of a commodity trader engaging in purchases for customers and reselling these on open account terms for a margin. This operational model, as articulated by Westford’s witnesses, was consistent with the information previously disclosed to Archipelago. [72] Archipelago's awareness and acknowledgment of Westford's business model were further demonstrated through various communications. Notably, this includes the S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 explicit acknowledgment of the terms in the Sales Contracts for Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895, as well as an email from Archipelago’s Head of Underwriting, Nicholas Ng, dated 15.1.2020, confirming the insurance policy’s coverage of Westford’s trade financing activities. [73] Given this background, the court finds Archipelago's claim of non-disclosure by Westford to be unsupported. The evidence presented, particularly Archipelago's repeated acknowledgments, contradicts its current stance of unawareness regarding Westford's business operations. [74] Additionally, even if there was non-disclosure by Westford, Archipelago is precluded from making such a claim due to its non-compliance with specific clauses of the Policy. The Subjectivities Clause required Archipelago to conduct site visits to understand Westford and Phoenix's trade models. The Subjectivities Clause in the Policy provides: “SUBJECTIVITIES: ……. 2. Satisfactory site visit, review of credit checkings and background review on Insured and all insured buyer by Insurer” [75] Its failure to perform these visits prevents it from claiming ignorance of Westford’s operations. Moreover, Archipelago’s failure to adhere to Clause 5.13 of the Policy, which mandates the return of premiums upon avoiding the Policy, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 further disqualifies it from benefiting from its own non- compliance. “5.13 Breaches By The Insured Breach by fraud or dishonesty If the Insured or anyone acting on its behalf breaches this condition (whether at inception or otherwise) by fraud or dishonest act or omission, the Insurer may: (a) avoid this Policy from inception; or (b) impose such terms, conditions and/or additional premium as the Insurer may in its sole discretion determine; and from any such fraud or dishonest act or omission must immediately be repaid to the Insurer. Breach by non-disclosure, misrepresentation (other than fraudulent or dishonest) If the insured or anyone acting on its behalf breaches this condition (other than by fraudulent or dishonest means), the Insurer may: (a) impose such terms and conditions (effective at inception or otherwise) as the Insurer would have imposed in the absence of such breach; and/or (b) charge such additional premium (effective at inception or otherwise) as the Insurer would have required in the absence of the breach; and (c) notified apply such applicable additional premium, amended terms and conditions or both to any claim or potential claim; and the Insurer will promptly within thirty (30) calendar days give the Insured written notice of any applicable additional premium, amended terms and conditions or both. Within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of such notice, the insured will give the Insurer written confirmation of: S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 (a) acceptance of and a promise to pay the applicable additional premium in accordance with the terms of trade applying to this insurance; or (b) the Insured's acceptance of the amended terms and conditions; or both as applicable. If the Insurer can show to the Insured's reasonable satisfaction that the Insurer would have declined to enter into this insurance at inception or to accept the proposed amendment to this insurance during the Policy Period on any terms, the Insurer may avoid this Policy from inception and, if no claims have been paid or accepted under this Policy, the Insurer will promptly return to the Insured all premiums received by the Insurer at the date of breach; and, if the Insurer has paid claims monies under this Policy, the Insured must promptly within seven (07) calendar days repay all such claims monies to the Insurer.” (emphasis added) [76] In conclusion, the court finds that the comprehensive disclosures by Westford, coupled with Archipelago's acknowledgments and actions, clearly indicate that Archipelago was adequately informed of Westford's business model, negating any claim of breach of duty of disclosure. Corporate Guarantee non-disclosure [77] This court now turns its attention to the issue of the Corporate Guarantee. Archipelago argues that Westford failed to disclose a Corporate Guarantee issued by PCPL, intended to secure sums due from Phoenix to Westford. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 [78] Upon examination of the timeline and relevant legal principles, the court finds Archipelago’s contention to be without foundation. The critical point of consideration is the timing of the Corporate Guarantee relative to the completion of the Proposal Form and the inception of the insurance policy. The Corporate Guarantee in question was dated 24.12.2019. However, Westford completed the Proposal Form on 14.3.2019 and the insurance policy was incepted on 17.5.2019. Given these dates, it is evident that at the time of completing the Proposal Form and at the inception of the policy, the Corporate Guarantee did not yet exist. The legal principle articulated in Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2 KB 863 underscores that disclosure obligations are contingent on the knowledge held at the time. As such, Westford could not have disclosed the Corporate Guarantee as it was not aware of it during the material times. [79] Furthermore, the existence of the Corporate Guarantee from PCPL does not automatically imply material information about Phoenix’s financial standing that would necessitate disclosure under the policy terms. The guarantee itself does not inherently reveal any specifics regarding Phoenix's financial health. [80] Even if the Corporate Guarantee were to be interpreted as indicative of Phoenix’s financial position, which is contested, it would likely have no bearing on the policy coverage. This assertion is supported by the admission of Archipelago’s S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 Principal Officer, Ian Lim, during the trial, acknowledging that a Corporate Guarantee adds an extra layer of security against non-payment risks for insurers. This aligns with the legal perspective presented in General Insurance Law by Dr Poh Chu Chai, which posits that the duty of disclosure does not extend to information that diminishes the insured risk or is commonly known. [81] Additionally, Archipelago has not presented any expert testimony or evidence to substantiate that the Corporate Guarantee was a material factor that would have influenced a prudent insurer’s decision. The absence of such evidence significantly weakens Archipelago’s argument regarding the need for disclosure of the Corporate Guarantee. [82] Archipelago alleges that the Corporate Guarantee, amounting to USD 25 million per annum, exceeded the 'aggregate exposure' Westford declared in its Proposal Form, which Archipelago asserts was USD 12 million. However, upon careful examination of the material and arguments presented, this court finds Archipelago's contention to be baseless. [83] Firstly, it is crucial to note the actual figures declared by Westford in the Proposal Form. Contrary to Archipelago’s claim, Westford declared an annual exposure of USD 30 million, not USD 12 million as suggested by Archipelago. The amount guaranteed under the Corporate Guarantee, being USD 25 million per annum, therefore does not exceed S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 Westford's declared annual exposure. This fundamental discrepancy undermines the credibility of Archipelago’s argument regarding the alleged non-disclosure. [84] Moreover, Archipelago's position on the matter of Westford's 'aggregate exposure' under the policy has been inconsistent. During the proceedings, Archipelago’s Principal Officer, Ian Lim, initially testified that the exposure was USD 12 million and later amended his testimony to USD 10 million. This inconsistency and the lack of a coherent explanation for the discrepancy further weaken Archipelago's stance. It appears that Archipelago has overlooked or disregarded the actual annual exposure figure of USD 30 million declared by Westford in the Proposal Form. [85] In conclusion, considering the timing of the events, the nature of the Corporate Guarantee, and the lack of substantial evidence from Archipelago, the court finds the claim of non-disclosure concerning the Corporate Guarantee to be unfounded. Westford had no obligation to disclose the Corporate Guarantee at the material times, and even if it did, it would not have materially impacted the policy coverage. Westford ‘stepping into pre-arranged trades’ [86] Archipelago claims that Westford, contrary to its statements in the Proposal Form completed on 14.3.2019, did not S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 operate independently but rather participated in trades pre- arranged by Phoenix and Genuine. This, Archipelago argues, constitutes a breach of duty of disclosure and/or misrepresentation on Westford's part. However, upon thorough examination, this court finds Archipelago's claim to be unfounded. [87] Westford’s disclosures, specifically in its Proposal Form and subsequent business communications, consistently portrayed it as an independent commodities trader. This is evident from its explicit description in the Proposal Form, where it identified themselves as a “Distributor of various commodities,” and noted that its contracts are “invited/negotiated between buyer and seller.” Further, in Westford’s Company Overview 2018, it stated that it engages in “back-to-back” trading, ensuring that goods are “presold or hedged.” [88] The court takes note of the meeting between Arzu Tanriverdi, Westford’s Trade Credit Insurance Director, and Archipelago in Kuala Lumpur on 3.4.2019. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss Westford’s business operations and its relationship with Archipelago. It is reasonable to conclude from this meeting that Archipelago had a clear understanding of Westford’s business model. [89] Additionally, Westford, on three specific occasions – 9.10.2019, 10.10.2019, and 15.10.2019 – forwarded Sales Contracts related to the Phoenix Orders to Archipelago, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 requesting coverage under the insurance policy. These contracts contained explicit terms defining Westford's role in the transactions, which Archipelago subsequently acknowledged without raising any concerns, thereby indicating its acceptance and understanding of Westford’s role. [90] The contention of Archipelago that Westford’s failure to use the specific phrase 'stepped into pre-arranged trades' in the Proposal Form amounts to a breach of duty or misrepresentation is not supported by the evidence. Archipelago has not satisfactorily demonstrated how the absence of this phrase materially influenced its judgment as a prudent insurer or induced it to underwrite the risk. Contrarily, Westford’s comprehensive due diligence on Genuine, including obtaining a Certificate of Incorporation from ACRA and a Credit Report from Worldbox Business Intelligence, affirms its thorough assessment of the supplier’s legitimacy. Moreover, Westford’s evaluation of Certificates of Origin, Bills of Lading, and Sales and Purchase contracts prior to engaging in the trades substantiates its thorough understanding and direct knowledge of these transactions. Court’s evaluation of evidence [91] In addition to the documentation furnished supporting Westford's legitimate business activities, the court also considered several other factors tipping the evidentiary S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 scale further in Westford's favour while concurrently eroding the integrity of Archipelago's allegations of concealment. Archipelago Insurance's conduct and approach to both the Policy terms and assessing this claim raise doubts regarding the merits of its non-disclosure contentions against Westford when viewed holistically with other germane circumstances elucidated below. [92] In its defence, Westford provided expert testimony from a professional with extensive experience in the Trade Credit Insurance industry, Bernard Sauvage. This expert, after reviewing the documents filed in court, concluded that there was no evidence of non-disclosure or misrepresentation on the part of Westford. This assessment is significant, especially when contrasted with Archipelago's approach that predominantly relied on testimonies from its own officers and employees. [93] It is also noted that neither Crawford, the loss adjusters, nor CRM, the Claim Consultant appointed by Archipelago, supported the varied descriptions Archipelago used for Westford’s trading activities. Furthermore, the interruption of Crawford's assessment and the absence of its final report on the matter, especially when it had not accused Westford of non-disclosure or misrepresentation, are factors this court has considered in its evaluation. [94] Archipelago’s adherence to the Subjectivities Clause of the Policy is also a point of consideration. The failure to conduct S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 site visits to Westford and Phoenix, as stipulated in the Policy has been taken into account. [95] Additionally, the constraints of the Proposal Form, which limited Westford’s business description options to manufacturer, distributor, agent, or merchant, led to Westford's selection of ‘distributor’. This selection, made from the limited options provided, undermines Archipelago's contention that Westford should have described its business differently. [96] Further, Archipelago’s actions in relation to Clause 5.13 of the Policy, specifically its attempt to avoid the Policy without returning premiums to Westford, are noted. This action not only contravenes the terms of the Policy but also reflects poorly on Archipelago's integrity in handling the claim. [97] In summary, while acknowledging Archipelago's concerns, the court concludes that its allegations against Westford lack the necessary evidentiary support. The court therefore rules in favour of Westford, finding that the evidence does not support Archipelago's claims of non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Whether Phoenix Orders are not instruments and/or trades that fall within the ambit of the Policy [98] Archipelago contends that Phoenix Orders No. 11892 and No. 11895 do not qualify under its insurance policy as it S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 lacks evidence of genuine underlying trades. It argues that Genuine, the supposed supplier, was unreachable and lacked the financial capacity for the transactions in question, raising doubts about the legitimacy of the trades. Archipelago highlights discrepancies in shipping documents and the absence of credible evidence linking Genuine to the transactions, suggesting the deals were disguised financing agreements. It also questions the authenticity of late- emerging documents from Westford, implying fabrication. Ultimately, Archipelago asserts these transactions were financial arrangements rather than legitimate trades, rendering them ineligible for policy coverage. [99] Westford submits that the Phoenix Orders are legitimate trades, not sham transactions, with substantial evidence establishing ownership and title of goods. It maintains that these orders were conducted at arms-length, supported by adequate documentary proof and witness testimonies. Westford contends that the new documents, materials introduced by Archipelago during the trial, purportedly obtained through pre-litigation discovery, which it claims show that the Phoenix Orders are sham trades, lack credibility and do not demonstrate the alleged sham nature of the orders. Furthermore, it highlights Archipelago's inconsistent and biased evaluation of evidence, emphasising its own transparency and cooperation throughout the claim process. Ultimately, Westford asserts that even if fraud by Phoenix existed, it does not implicate it or invalidate its claim under the Policy. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 [100] Having duly considered the submissions of both Westford and Archipelago, the court will now proceed to deliver its findings on the matters at issue. Chain of ownership/title to goods sufficiently established [101] Archipelago alleges that the transactions under Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895, declared in October 2019, are sham trades, and that Westford was not a commodities distributor as claimed but rather acted as a financier. This contention, according to Archipelago, constitutes a breach of the policy terms. [102] Upon detailed examination of the evidence and submissions, the court finds Archipelago's allegations to be unfounded. Westford, as the insured party, has robustly demonstrated its ownership and title to the goods involved in the Phoenix Orders. The key transactional documents, detailed above, exhibit a clear and legally sound chain of ownership transfer from its supplier Genuine to Westford, and thereafter to Phoenix. This chain is supported by testimonies from Archipelago’s own witnesses during the trial, notably David Ng (DW7), Huang and Hon Min (DW8). These witnesses, upon reviewing the documents presented by Westford, acknowledged the legitimacy of the transactions and the transfer of ownership/title to the goods. [103] Archipelago's refusal to accept the validity of these documents and its insistence that Westford did not possess S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 ownership/title to the goods hinge on speculative and unsubstantiated claims. It bases its argument on the assertion that Genuine did not have ownership of the goods, a lack of correspondence between Genuine and its supplier, and the absence of endorsements on the first page of the bills of lading. However, Westford has sufficiently countered these points. Archipelago’s demand for correspondence between Genuine and its supplier is unreasonable considering that they are commercially sensitive and extraneous to the policy’s coverage, which is concerned with the transaction between Westford and Phoenix, not the supplier’s supplier. [104] Moreover, the court notes that Archipelago's emphasis on the first page of the bills of lading is not a requisite under the policy. The policy stipulates the issuance and detailing of the bills of lading in the Quarterly Declaration Bordereaux, which Westford complied with. The relevant bills of lading for the Phoenix Orders were sent to Archipelago in October 2019, with no objections raised at that time. It is only in its Amended Defence, filed in March 2021, that Archipelago raised this issue, suggesting a lack of initial concern or relevance. Phoenix Orders conducted at arms-length [105] Archipelago posits that the Phoenix Orders were not conducted at arm's length, suggesting that the trades were sham transactions and thus outside the policy's coverage. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 Archipelago alleges that the Phoenix Orders are not genuine trades but disguised financing agreements, suggesting a lack of true ownership of goods by Westford. It specifically refers to the Schedule of the Policy, which mandates that all trades be based on a commercial, arms- length, willing buyer, and willing seller basis. In the Policy Schedule, the relevant clause provides: “Contract Description All trades shall be on the basis of a commercial arms length willing buyer willing seller but each trade shall be subject to issuance of Purchase Contracts, Invoices and Bill of Lading as and when the transactions are executed." [106] Archipelago asserts that the trades were pre-arranged by Phoenix for financing purposes, and all documentation, including sales contracts between Westford and Genuine, were facilitated through Phoenix, implying no real involvement of Genuine in the trades. [107] Upon thorough examination of the evidence and legal definitions, the court finds Archipelago's assertions to be without foundation. An 'arm's length' transaction, as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), refers to dealings between two parties who are not related or closely associated and who possess roughly equal bargaining power. In the case of the Phoenix Orders, Archipelago has not presented any substantive evidence to demonstrate that the transactions between Genuine, Westford, and Phoenix were not conducted at arm's length. Specifically, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 Archipelago has not shown any connection between these entities, such as shared directorship or ownership, nor evidence suggesting that Westford and Phoenix were not willing participants in the transactions, or that any of the parties were compelled to accept terms against its interests. [108] On the contrary, evidence presented indicates that Westford actively protected its interests against potential default by Phoenix. This is exemplified by the actions of Westford’s Trade Credit Director and its solicitors, who formally demanded payments from Phoenix and threatened legal proceedings in the event of continued non-payment. Such actions are indicative of a party acting in its own interest, consistent with the practices of an arm's length transaction. [109] Westford further supports its position with substantial documentary evidence, including Certificates of Origin issued by the Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Vietnam, Purchase Contracts between Westford and Genuine, and commercial invoices, which collectively demonstrate Westford’s role as a legitimate distributor of commodities. These documents substantiate that Westford purchased commodities from Genuine and executed a back-to-back sale to Phoenix. [110] Furthermore, Westford differentiates its case from the precedent of BSNC Leasing Sdn Bhd v Sabah Shipyard Sdn Bhd & Ors & Another Appeal [2000] 2 CLJ 197 (Court of Appeal) cited by Archipelago. In this case, a Malaysian S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 company entered into a hire purchase agreement with a financing company to raise funds using a turbine as security. When defaults happened and the High Court ruled that the agreement merely disguised a loan without transferring turbine ownership, the financing firm still illegally pursued the customer in Ecuador; the court thus granted an anti-suit injunction while directing that the improper seizure of assets abroad be reversed. [111] Westford argues that the instant case involves clear evidence of genuine sales transactions, unlike the cloaked loan agreement in BSNC Leasing. It cites evidence such as the transfer of Bills of Lading from Genuine to Westford, and from Westford to Phoenix, along with acknowledgments of debt and acceptance from Phoenix, as part of its comprehensive submissions. [112] In light of this evidence, the court finds Westford’s arguments convincing and the claims by Archipelago unsubstantiated. The transactions in question, notably the Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895, appear to be legitimate commercial activities, conducted at arms-length, with proper ownership and transfer of goods. Phoenix Orders are not disguised financing agreements [113] Archipelago contends that the Phoenix Orders are not genuine trades but rather 'disguised financing agreements', insinuating that Westford's role is not that of a commodities S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 distributor but of a financier. This accusation, however, is not supported by the evidence. As discussed above, Westford has presented a comprehensive array of documentary evidence, including certificates of origin, purchase contracts, commercial invoices, and bills of lading, which collectively demonstrate legitimate transactions involving the purchase of commodities from Genuine and its subsequent sale to Phoenix. These documents unequivocally establish that Westford operated as a distributor of commodities, effectively overseeing the transfer of goods from Genuine to Phoenix, culminating in the delivery of these goods to the end buyers located in Africa. [114] The evidence clearly indicates that the indebtedness of Phoenix to Westford arose from bona fide commercial transactions involving the non-payment of invoices related to the trades of goods. Archipelago, on its part, has not provided any concrete evidence to counter this narrative or to substantiate its claim that these trades were disguised financing agreements. The lack of evidence from Archipelago to support its contention significantly undermines its defence. [115] Archipelago points to various news articles and Creditors’ Reports as evidence of alleged sham trades. [116] Upon scrutinising the evidence, the court finds Archipelago’s reliance on these news articles and Creditors’ S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 Reports to be unsubstantiated and insufficient to support its claims. During the trial, it was noted that Archipelago’s own witnesses, Hon Min and Boon Ing, when cross-examined, conceded that neither the Creditors’ Reports nor the news articles made any specific references to the Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 as sham or fraudulent trades. Furthermore, these documents did not contain any mention of the trade between Westford and Phoenix. While the Creditors’ Reports indicated some mismanagement on the part of Phoenix, it did not implicate Westford in any fraudulent activities. [117] The court also considers the legal precedent set in the case of Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Lorrain Esme Osman [1996] 4 MLJ 656 (High Court), which underscores that news articles alone are insufficient to conclusively establish the fact of sham trades without corroborating documents or sources. As such, the court deems Archipelago's reliance on these articles to be inadequate in proving its case. Westford’s rejection of Archipelago’s request for sharing information [118] One particular aspect of Archipelago's defence is its claim that Westford’s refusal to consent to an investigation into the Phoenix Orders by the liquidators suggests that these transactions were ‘sham trades.’ S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 [119] Upon careful evaluation, the court finds Archipelago’s position on this matter to be without merit. The sequence of events and the context of the requests made by Archipelago for investigation are crucial to this determination. The first request from Archipelago came on 15.6.2021, a significant time after it had already rejected the claim on 12.6.2020, and after legal proceedings had been initiated in December 2020. Westford’s decision to decline this request is understandable, given the timing and the apparent insincerity of Archipelago’s sudden interest in sharing investigation costs. [120] The second request by Archipelago, made on 17.9.2021, occurred well into the legal proceedings, and at a point when Archipelago had maintained its rejection of the claim for over a year. Westford’s response, indicating a willingness to engage should Archipelago reconsider its rejection of the claim, was reasonable under the circumstances. [121] The final request, made on 20.10.2021, included a threat to invoke adverse inference against Westford under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. This approach by Archipelago, rather than demonstrating an intent to engage in good faith, further strained the relationship between the parties. Westford’s rejection of this request is seen as a reasonable stance, considering Archipelago's refusal to revisit its initial rejection of the claim and its threat to invoke adverse inference. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 [122] In light of the above, the court finds that Westford's refusal to consent to Archipelago's requests for investigation was justified and reasonable. Archipelago's delay in seeking an investigation, coupled with its steadfast stance on the claim rejection, undermines the credibility of its contention that the Phoenix Orders were sham trades. Furthermore, the mere inference drawn from Westford’s refusal to consent is not sufficient to establish the existence of sham trades. Archipelago bears the burden of proof to substantiate its claim, which it has failed to meet. “New Documents” [123] Archipelago introduced new documents during the trial (“New Documents”), alleging that these documents establish the Phoenix Orders as 'sham trades'. These documents were obtained through a 'pre-litigation discovery' process initiated by Archipelago in Dubai, as evidenced by a letter from the Phoenix Liquidator dated 10.4.2022. Archipelago's failure to inform Westford or the court about this discovery process raises significant questions about the integrity and transparency of its actions. [124] Upon detailed analysis of the evidence, the court finds Archipelago’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. The New Documents, introduced during the trial, were obtained through a 'pre-litigation discovery' process in Dubai. However, the probative value of these documents is questionable due to several reasons: S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 a) Lack of Disclosure and Completeness: Archipelago did not fully disclose the nature and scope of its 'pre- litigation discovery', casting doubt on the impartiality and completeness of the discovery action. The absence of such critical information renders these documents less reliable. b) Absence of Expert Report: The failure of Archipelago to produce a related expert report from the discovery process, despite referencing it, is suspicious and undermines the credibility of its claim. c) Incomplete Phoenix Records: The New Documents, as per the Phoenix Liquidator’s acknowledgment, were reconstructed from limited sources and do not represent the complete set of Phoenix records. This incompleteness further diminishes their evidential weight. d) Veracity of Internal Correspondence: The documents include internal correspondence of Phoenix employees, none of whom testified in court, thus the veracity of the information contained within cannot be ascertained. e) Testimony of the liquidators: The liquidators did not testify regarding these documents, and the last- minute request by Archipelago to testify further S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 questions the significance of these documents in the matter. [125] Despite these concerns, Archipelago asserts that these documents reveal 'real trades' distinct from those reported by Westford in the Phoenix Orders. Specifically, it claims that for Phoenix Order 11892, goods were sold directly by shippers to Phoenix Pte Ltd, a Singapore-based company within the Phoenix Group, and then to Agriex Cote D'Ivoire, excluding Genuine and Westford (Transaction A). For Phoenix Order 11895, it alleges a direct sale by shippers to Phoenix, with the goods then sold to an end buyer in Dakar, Senegal, again bypassing Genuine and Westford (Transaction B). However, the court finds these claims unsupported by concrete evidence, as the email correspondences, invoices, and bills of lading cited do not conclusively support these alleged transactions. Crucial elements such as sale and purchase contracts, proof of payment, and transfer of bills of lading for these 'real trades' are conspicuously absent. [126] The court observes that Westford, in contrast, has provided requisite documents under the Policy, validating its trades. The lack of objection from the liquidators to the legitimacy of the Phoenix Orders further undermines Archipelago's stance. The court is also cognisant of Archipelago's approach to the new evidence, which seems to affirm a preconceived decision to reject Westford's claim, irrespective of the evidence produced. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 [127] Archipelago in arguing against the legitimacy of the Phoenix Orders heavily emphasise documentation from the Phoenix Liquidator. It references specific documents, including invoices dated 24.9.2019 between Vietnamese shippers and Phoenix Pte. Ltd., and invoices dated 24.9.2019 between Phoenix Pte Ltd and Agriex CI. Additionally, it cites emails from the liquidators’ records that show bills of lading for Bills of Lading No.s IVC-13, IVC-14, IVC-15, IVC-16, IVC-17, and IVC-18 were sent to Rabo Bank in Holland and a claim on a marine policy on behalf of Phoenix Pte. Ltd for loss of cargo around 4.11.2019. Archipelago argues that these documents demonstrate that Genuine and Westford were not involved in the transactions, thus excluding these trades from policy coverage. [128] Westford, in response, challenges Archipelago's conclusions. It disputes the authenticity and relevance of the invoices and bills of lading, contending there is no proof that these documents were paid or genuinely issued. It also questions the claim on the marine policy, arguing that the correspondence merely shows communication about the discharge of goods in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, with no detailed claim found in the marine policy. [129] Westford further highlights that Archipelago applied a double standard in evidence evaluation, accepting documents pertaining to Transactions A and B without similar scrutiny applied to Westford’s documentation. It argues that Archipelago is unduly sceptical of the S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 documents produced by Westford, yet displays overcredulousness towards the documents it refers to as evidence of the 'real trades'. Westford points out inconsistencies in Archipelago's approach, such as accepting invoices for Transactions A and B as paid without proof and not questioning the delivery of Bills of Lading or the authenticity of the New Documents. [130] Upon examination of the evidence and arguments presented, it appears that Archipelago has not sufficiently demonstrated that the Phoenix Orders are outside the ambit of the policy. The evidence cited by Archipelago, while suggestive of direct trades between Vietnamese shippers and other entities, does not irrefutably establish the exclusion of Genuine and Westford from these transactions. [131] Furthermore, the court notes the inconsistency in Archipelago's scrutiny of evidence, as highlighted by Westford. The lack of a consistent and objective approach in evaluating the evidence undermines the reliability of Archipelago's contentions. [132] In light of these observations, the court considers Westford's refusal to consent to Archipelago's investigation requests as reasonable, especially given the timing and circumstances of these requests. The court is also mindful of the burden of proof on Archipelago to establish the existence of 'sham trades', a burden it has not satisfactorily met. The absence of the Dubai expert report, which S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 Archipelago claims is pivotal to its case, further weakens its position. The court opines that the failure to produce this report warrants an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, suggesting that its contents would not favour Archipelago's case. [133] Considering the totality of the evidence and submissions, this court finds in favour of the Westford. The Phoenix Orders, as argued by Westford, appear to be legitimate trades that replaced the purported Transactions A and B. Therefore, these orders should fall within the coverage of the insurance policy held with Archipelago. Archipelago's arguments and evidence are insufficient to discount the validity of the Phoenix Orders conclusively. CRM Reports [134] Archipelago questions the legitimacy of Genuine as a business entity and relied heavily on CRM reports to assert that Genuine was not a legitimate business. However, this claim is significantly weakened by several key factors. The CRM investigation, conducted on 29.5.2020, occurred seven months after the Phoenix Orders in October 2019. This delay renders the findings of the investigation irrelevant to assessing Genuine's capability to own and transfer commodities at the time of the transactions. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 [135] During the trial, Huang, Director at CRM, admitted that its reports did not conclusively prove that Genuine did not exist. Furthermore, upon reviewing the documents presented in court, Huang confirmed that the ownership of goods was transferred from Genuine to Westford, validating Genuine's role as a legitimate seller in these transactions. [136] The investigation conducted by CRM took place at an incorrect address, not matching the one mentioned in the Singapore High Court judgment dated 10.4.2021, where Genuine was an appellant. This discrepancy raises questions about the accuracy of CRM's findings. Genuine's active participation in the court proceedings, as evidenced by the Singapore High Court judgment, contradicts Archipelago's claim that Genuine lacked personnel. [137] Moreover, Archipelago's insurance policy does not specifically mention suppliers or impose explicit obligations regarding them. The policy does not set out express conditions on the transfer of title in the underlying trade transactions, further weakening Archipelago's focus on the operational status of Genuine. [138] In light of these considerations, the court finds Archipelago's defences to be unsubstantiated. The evidence, especially regarding the limitations and discrepancies in the CRM reports, fails to support Archipelago's claims about the authenticity of Genuine or the character of the Phoenix Orders. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 Credit limit of Genuine [139] Archipelago questions Genuine’s financial standing, relying on the 'maximum credit' stipulated in the Credit Report to assert Genuine's incapability to own the goods is not persuasive. The credit limit mentioned in the report does not inherently reflect Genuine's ability to own the goods. This point was further reinforced during the trial when Archipelago’s Chief Operating Officer, Boon Ing, conceded that the credit limit alone does not conclusively demonstrate Genuine's lack of ownership of the goods. Such an admission significantly undermines Archipelago's argument. [140] Moreover, Archipelago did not present any financial documents, like financial statements of Genuine, to substantiate its claim regarding Genuine's weak financial standing. This lack of concrete financial evidence weakens its position. On the contrary, Westford presented a report from Worldbox Business Intelligence, a reputable and independent international business intelligence company. This report highlighted Genuine’s substantial revenue of USD 8.5 million and assets worth USD 4.6 million. The report also stated that Genuine’s financial situation was 'in order,' which contradicts Archipelago's assertions about Genuine's financial incapacity. [141] Given the lack of conclusive evidence from Archipelago and the substantial counter-evidence provided by Westford, the court is inclined to favour Westford's position. The findings S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 and admissions during the trial, coupled with the Worldbox Business Intelligence report, suggest that Genuine had both the financial capacity and the operational legitimacy to engage in the transactions in question. Lack of correspondence [142] Archipelago's contention that there is no evidence of correspondence between Genuine and Westford is found to be unsubstantiated when examined against the documentary evidence presented. Notably, a letter from Genuine to Westford, dated 15.10.2019, enclosing Bills of Lading, confirms the completion of a transaction following the receipt of the purchase price from Westford’s financier, BGIS. Additionally, the existence of duly signed Purchase Contracts and commercial invoices issued by Genuine to Westford, which detail the particulars and value of the commodities sold, firmly establish a business link between these two entities. [143] The argument from Archipelago concerning the lack of direct email communication between Genuine and Westford is deemed inconsequential. Genuine and Westford have engaged in direct trading since March 2019, accumulating a significant total turnover of approximately USD 44 million. This long-standing business relationship, coupled with Westford's involvement in the trades initiated by Phoenix, suggests that the mode of communication, including the S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 absence of direct email exchanges for the specific trades in question, does not inherently imply illegitimacy. [144] Moreover, the transactional documents executed by Genuine, essential for the sales of goods, are indicative of a legitimate business transaction. The court recognises that in commodity trading, contractual agreements often supersede the need for email communications. Westford's reliance on these executed documents is justifiable and typical in the industry, as corroborated by its insurance expert Bernard Sauvage, who notes that such arrangements are not unusual in commodity trading. [145] Taking these factors into account, the court concludes that Archipelago's claims regarding Genuine's involvement and the alleged lack of direct email communication between Genuine and Westford lack merit. The extensive documentary evidence, which includes signed contracts, invoices, and letters accompanying Bills of Lading, convincingly demonstrates the business transactions between Genuine and Westford, thereby affirming the legitimacy of the Phoenix Orders and Westford's insurable interest under the Policy. Proof of payment suggests title transfer [146] Archipelago argues that Westford's proof of payment to Genuine does not equate to proof of title transfer. This is found to be fundamentally flawed upon close examination of S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 the transactional dynamics and the nature of the contractual agreements involved. [147] At the heart of any sale and purchase transaction lies the exchange of value, typically represented by the purchase price of the goods in question. In transactions necessitating cash payments, such as those between Genuine and Westford, the payment of the goods is integral to the transfer of title. Westford's payment to Genuine signifies the fulfillment of its contractual obligation, effectively transferring the ownership of the goods to Westford. This transfer of ownership, or title, is a critical component of the sale and is substantiated by Westford's performance in settling the purchase price. [148] Following the payment, Genuine facilitated the transfer of title to Westford. This is evidenced by Genuine forwarding the Bills of Lading to Westford. The Bills of Lading are not merely shipping documents; they serve as pivotal instruments in the transfer of title, particularly in international trade transactions. By providing these documents to Westford, Genuine effectively enabled Westford to assert its rights over the goods, either by taking possession themselves or facilitating further transfer to buyers in cases of resale. [149] The argument posited by Archipelago overlooks the intrinsic link between the payment of goods and the transfer of title in commercial transactions. The evidence clearly S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 61 demonstrates that Westford, upon settling the purchase price with Genuine, acquired the title to the goods. This transactional process, well-documented and substantiated by contractual agreements and corroborative documents such as the Bills of Lading, convincingly refutes Archipelago's contention. [150] Therefore, the court finds that the payment made by Westford to Genuine, as evidenced by the transactional records, constitutes a valid transfer of title. This transfer of title is a fundamental aspect of the sale and purchase agreement between Genuine and Westford, aligning with established commercial practices. Allegation of sham documents [151] Archipelago accuses Westford of fabricating documents, specifically a letter from Genuine dated 15.10.2019 and a subsequent letter from Westford to Phoenix dated 21.10.2019, for the purposes of this trial. Archipelago contends that these documents are sham and asserts a lack of evidence linking Genuine to the trades in question. [152] Upon careful consideration, the claim by Archipelago that the letters in question (“the Letters”) were created solely for the trial appears unsubstantiated. The primary argument of Archipelago hinges on the premise that these Letters were suspiciously absent during the Summary Judgment stage. However, this argument is flawed for several reasons. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 62 Firstly, Westford's application for Summary Judgment was predicated on the successful delivery of goods, a fact confirmed by Archipelago at the time, rendering the production of the Letters seemingly unnecessary. Secondly, it is a common practice in litigation for parties to introduce more comprehensive evidence in preparation for a full trial, as opposed to interlocutory proceedings. Therefore, the decision of Westford not to include these documents earlier cannot be construed as evidence of fabrication. [153] Further, Archipelago's claim that there is no evidence of the Letters' origin from the server and the absence of testimony from those handling the Bills of Lading is misconceived. The Letters were scanned into Westford's system and, being documents made in the ordinary course of business for the transfer of Bills of Lading, are admissible under Section 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act 1950, without requiring the makers to testify. Archipelago has failed to provide concrete evidence to support its claim of fabrication; its allegations are grounded in mere suspicion and conjecture, which cannot suffice as proof of such a serious wrongdoing. [154] Moreover, the allegation by Archipelago that Westford fabricated documents appears to be raised in bad faith. Archipelago demonstrates a starkly contrasting approach to the scrutiny of documentation, being unreasonably strict with Westford's documentation while showing leniency towards the New Documents produced by the liquidators. The inconsistency in Archipelago's stance is evident in its S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 63 rejection of the Genuine trades and its acceptance of Transactions A and B as legitimate, despite a lack of comparable documentation or proof of receipt for these transactions. [155] In light of the evidence presented, it is apparent that the sale and purchase of goods have taken place, with proper transfer of title and ownership. This is corroborated by Westford's disclosure to Archipelago that it often purchases goods in transit, a practice Archipelago did not previously dispute. In cross-border trades, where physical possession of goods is not feasible, transactions are substantiated through invoices and transactional documents. This principle is supported by the New South Wales Supreme Court in Thera Agri Capital No 2 Pty Ltd v BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd t/aa The Bond & Credit Co [2022] NSWSC 669, referencing MGICA Ltd v United City Merchants (Australia) Limited [1986] 4 ANZ Ins Cas 60-729. The court recognised that in the context of such trades, the reliance on invoices and documents is essential, given the impracticality of scrutinising every underlying transaction. [156] In conclusion, the allegations by Archipelago regarding the fabrication of documents by Westford are not supported by the evidence. The Letters in question are admissible and credible as part of the ordinary course of business, and Archipelago's claims are founded on mere speculation rather than concrete proof. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 64 Westford’s knowledge on encumbrance and finance of goods [157] Archipelago has raised concerns regarding the knowledge of Westford about the encumbrance and financing of goods involved in its transactions with Phoenix. In Westford's response to a query during the claims stage it stated its inability to confirm if the goods were unencumbered or financed by another party, asserting that its transactions were based on long-standing relationships and good faith. [158] Westford's reply to question 15 by the Adjuster Crawford explicitly states: “We have no way of knowing this, but we have had a long-lasting relationship and trade experience with both the supplier and Phoenix, and all trade was conducted based on this experience and good faith.” This response, while candid about the limitations in its knowledge regarding the encumbrance or financing of the goods, also underscores the reliance on established business relationships and trust, which are not uncommon in commercial dealings. [159] Furthermore, Archipelago's contention that Westford's inability to confirm the unencumbered nature of the goods is problematic lacks substantial grounding. The court accepts that in commercial practices, particularly in international trade, it is often impractical for traders to have absolute knowledge about every aspect of its supply chain, including the financial arrangements of its suppliers. The reliance on long-standing relationships and good faith, as articulated by S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 65 Westford, is a pragmatic approach in such business contexts. This approach is not inherently flawed or indicative of negligence, especially when all transactional documents are in order and duly executed. [160] The acceptance of this practice was further affirmed during the trial by Archipelago’s Chief Operating Officer, Boon Ing. When questioned about the appropriateness of conducting business based on experience and good faith, as Westford did with Phoenix, Boon Ing agreed that there was nothing wrong with this approach. This acknowledgment by a high- ranking official of Archipelago lends weight to the argument that Westford's conduct, in relying on established business relationships and good faith, was reasonable and in line with common commercial practices. [161] The court finds that Westford's approach to the transactions in question, although lacking in absolute certainty regarding the encumbrance or financing of the goods, was conducted in a manner consistent with reasonable commercial practices. Its reliance on long-standing relationships and good faith, coupled with the proper execution of all relevant transactional documents, does not constitute a failing on its part. Complete Bills of Lading [162] Archipelago, raises concerns regarding Westford’s inability to produce complete Bills of Lading for a consignment. This S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 66 issue is centered around an email response from Westford, dated 16.6.2020, addressed to Archipelago’s adjusters, Crawford. In this correspondence, Westford explains the non-availability of the complete Bills of Lading due to a technical issue – the crashing of an account officer's inbox at Phoenix, the company handling the transaction. Additionally, Westford indicates that its funding bank, BGIS, did not require this specific documentation, and consequently, its finance team was not in possession of it. Westford further notes that as Gazprom, the intended recipient of the originals, waived the requirement against an assignment from Phoenix, there was no need to retain these documents. [163] Archipelago contends that Westford’s inability to produce these documents, is highly suspicious. However, Westford challenges this assertion, arguing that there is no inherent suspicion in its inability to provide the complete Bills of Lading. It points out that despite receiving an 'incomplete' set of these documents in October 2019, Archipelago did not request the complete documents at that juncture. The request for the complete documents was made much later, specifically in Archipelago’s Affidavit in Reply dated 19.4.2021, as part of Westford’s Summary Judgment application. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 67 [164] During the trial, evidence emerged suggesting that Archipelago initially did not consider the complete Bills of Lading crucial. Testimonies from Archipelago’s Head of Underwriting, Niholas Ng, and its broker, Hon Min, revealed that Archipelago did not initially demand these documents from Westford. This revelation came through an exchange where Nicholas Ng confirmed that he did not request the first page of the Bill of Lading from Westford, as it was not deemed important. Similarly, Hon Min when questioned, admitted a lack of awareness regarding any request made to Westford for the first page and did not assert its importance. [165] Given these circumstances, the court finds Westford’s explanation for the absence of the complete Bills of Lading to be a plausible response to an administrative oversight compounded by technical issues, rather than an indicator of any suspicious activity. The fact that Archipelago initially did not emphasise the importance of these documents, and only later raised concerns, diminishes the weight of its suspicion. [166] Therefore, considering the totality of evidence and submissions, this court concludes that Westford's inability to produce the complete Bills of Lading, under the specific circumstances detailed in its correspondence and the trial testimony, does not warrant the suspicion cast by Archipelago. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 68 Creditors’ Reports and Liquidator’s letter [167] Archipelago submits that the Phoenix Orders are not legitimate trades covered under its insurance policy, based on evidence from creditor reports and a liquidators’ letter, which highlight investigative difficulties and lack of evidence supporting Phoenix's recorded trade receivables. This is anchored on a series of documents, notably a report to Phoenix's creditors authored by Deloitte, dated 8.2.2021. This report highlights investigative challenges due to non- cooperation from former company officers of Phoenix and the absence of evidence supporting substantial sums of recorded trade receivables. It also references difficulties experienced by creditors in collecting outstanding receivables, often due to denial of trading by counter- parties, some of whom are suggested to be connected to Phoenix and/or its former directors. Furthermore, the report mentions the possibility of multiple financing against some of Phoenix’s invoices. A critical letter from the Phoenix Liquidator, dated 10.4.2022 is also cited. This letter notes the lack of correspondence directly linking Westford to the transactions in question, except for a few emails from May 2020 inquiring about payments. [168] Westford counters these points by arguing that the Creditors’ Reports and the liquidators’ letter do not definitively disprove the existence of trades underlying the insurance policy. It asserts that the documentary evidence it presented shows that Phoenix's indebtedness to Westford S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 69 was a result of genuine trade transactions, an assertion not effectively contradicted by Archipelago. Additionally, Westford highlights its active and transparent role in the claims assessment process, evidenced by its forwarding of the Creditors’ Reports to Archipelago and/or its loss adjuster, signifying a display of good faith and cooperation. Regarding the liquidators’ letter dated 10.4.2022, Westford notes that it does not explicitly invalidate the Phoenix Orders. It references an email from the liquidators to Archipelago’s solicitors dated 15.6.2020, which describes the new documents as presenting 'impartial facts.' The liquidators also maintained Westford on the list of creditors without any indication of intending to remove it in the future. [169] Upon detailed evaluation of the evidence and arguments, the court concludes that Archipelago's assertions and documentation do not sufficiently establish that the Phoenix Orders are outside the insurance policy's scope or that Westford lacks an insurable interest. While the Creditors’ Reports and the liquidators’ letter raise general concerns about Phoenix's broader trading activities, they do not specifically implicate the Phoenix Orders as illegitimate. Moreover, the absence of direct correspondence between Westford and Phoenix or Genuine, in the context of the liquidators' neutral approach and Westford's demonstrated openness, does not conclusively negate the presence of legitimate trades covered under the policy. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 70 No proof of fraud [170] Westford submits that there is no evidence of its involvement in any fraudulent activities related to the Phoenix Orders, as alleged by Archipelago. Westford asserts that while Archipelago acknowledges the standard of proof for fraud in civil cases as being on the balance of probabilities, it has failed to demonstrate any fraudulent conduct by Westford or the non-existence of legitimate trades underlying the Policy. [171] Westford further argues that even if fraud or wrongdoing by Phoenix were established, Archipelago has not proven Westford’s involvement or complicity in such actions. It refers to Clause 5.13 of the Policy, which addresses breaches by fraud or dishonesty, noting that without evidence of such misconduct by Westford, Archipelago is not entitled to avoid the Policy. This position is irrespective of whether Phoenix committed any fraud or dishonest act. [172] Supporting its stance, Westford cites the Thera Agri and MGICA cases. In both cases, the court ruled in favour of the insured despite undisputed fraud by the Insured Buyer. The Thera Agri case concerned whether an insured financier was entitled to indemnity under a trade credit insurance policy when its client defaulted, even though the financing arrangements did not strictly comply with sharia law principles and aspects of the transactions were fraudulent. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 71 [173] The court found that the policy did not exclude indemnity in the event of fraudulent, dishonest, or criminal acts by the Counter-Party or Guarantor, reinforcing the insured's entitlement to indemnity for loss arising from such events. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held: “[194] What did make a difference to the insurer’s risk was that the commodities did not in fact exist and the documents proffered by the Company in support of the drawdown request were shams. But clause 2.3 does not exclude indemnity in the event of the material default or the fraudulent, dishonest or criminal acts of the Counter-Party or Guarantor. This is consistent with a construction of the policy entitling the insured to indemnity for Loss arising from such an event. Loss caused by the material default or fraudulent, dishonest or criminal acts of the Counter-Party or Guarantor falls within the insuring clause.” [174] Westford contends that even if Phoenix had committed fraud, which is not evidenced the impact on the Policy should remain the same, as demonstrated in the cited cases. [175] Upon reviewing the submissions and the cited legal precedents, it is clear that Archipelago has not provided sufficient proof to implicate Westford in any fraudulent activities related to the Phoenix Orders. The lack of evidence to support claims of Westford’s involvement in fraudulent dealings, coupled with the legal principles established in the cited cases, leads to the conclusion that Westford is entitled to the protection offered by the Policy. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 72 Whether Westford does not have an insurable interest within the meaning of the Policy [176] Archipelago contends that Westford lacks an insurable interest in the goods subject to the Phoenix Orders, thereby questioning the validity of its claim under the Policy. It also asserts that the Phoenix Orders do not fall within the ambit of the Policy, claiming they are either 'disguised financing agreements' or not made at 'arms-length'. These arguments, however, are not substantiated by the evidence presented. [177] Westford has demonstrably established its ownership and title of the goods involved in the Phoenix Orders, as outlined above. The evidence includes Certificates of Origin issued by the Chamber of Commercial & Industry of Vietnam, Purchase Contracts between Westford and Genuine, Genuine’s commercial invoices to Westford, Bank SWIFT receipts showing payment for the commodities, and Bills of Lading that detail the shipment particulars. These documents unequivocally affirm that Westford acquired the commodities from Genuine and subsequently engaged in a back-to-back sale to Phoenix. [178] Regarding the arm's length nature of the transactions, Archipelago has failed to provide any evidence to suggest that the dealings between Genuine, Westford, and Phoenix were otherwise. The absence of any connection between these entities, be it through directorship or shareholding, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 73 and the lack of compulsion in accepting trading terms, as confirmed by Archipelago’s own officers at trial, further support this conclusion. Westford's actions to protect its position against Phoenix’s default, including formal demands for payment and threats of legal proceedings, are indicative of transactions conducted at arm's length. [179] Moreover, the court finds the claim that the Phoenix Orders are 'disguised financing agreements' to be without merit. Archipelago has not presented any substantial particulars or evidence to support this allegation. In contrast, Westford’s documentation for the Phoenix Orders, which includes sales contracts, commercial invoices, and acknowledgments of debt and acceptance, evidences legitimate trade transactions. [180] Given the totality of the evidence, this court finds that Westford does indeed have an insurable interest in the goods as per the Policy. Whether the Phoenix Orders do not constitute shipments to an Insured Buyer in an Approved Country [181] Archipelago submits that Westford's claim does not fall within the Policy cover as the shipments under Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 were not to an insured buyer in an approved country, as required by the policy. It is maintained by Archipelago that Clause 2.1 of the Policy explicitly states coverage is only for shipments made to approved countries, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 74 which include Hong Kong, Turkey, and Dubai, U.A.E, but not Ivory Coast and Senegal, the destinations in question. [182] Clause 2.1 provides: “Trade credit cover Subject to the terms of this Policy, this insurance provides cover to the insured for the stated Insured Percentage of Insured loss subject to the Coinsurance Clause and Deductible Clause arising from a Claimable Event of Insolvency and/or Protracted Default of the Insured Buyer(s) provided that each Insured Debt arises from Shipments made during the Policy Period shown in the Schedule: (a) to Insured Buyers In Approved Countries; (b) made in the course of the Insured's business specified in the Schedule and in accordance with the Credit Management Procedures; and (c) that are invoiced to the Insured Buyer within the Maximum Invoicing Period.” [183] The Policy Schedule states: “APPROVED COUNTRIES: Hong Kong, Turkey and Dubai, U.A.E.” [184] Archipelago contends that, per Clause 3.1(e), shipments outside these approved countries are excluded from coverage. Furthermore, Archipelago argues that any necessary enlargement of cover to include other countries would require an official endorsement, which was not sought or obtained by Westford. Lastly, Archipelago asserts that Westford was aware of this stipulation, as indicated by S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 75 testimony, but failed to take the requisite steps for coverage enlargement. [185] Westford submits that Archipelago's rejection of its claim based on the Approved Countries Clause and Clauses 2.1 and 3.1(e) of the Policy is a misinterpretation, especially regarding the term 'Shipment'. [186] Clause 3.1(e) provides: “Excluded Shipments in respect of Shipments made in one or more of the following circumstances: (a) to an Insured Buyer who is insolvent; (b) to an Insured Buyer whose debt to the Insured or any part thereof is overdue beyond the specified Maximum Extension Period for any reason other than a legitimate dispute in which case the provisions of the Disputed Indebtedness limitation and exclusion clause will apply. (c) after the applicable Permitted Credit Limit has been cancelled or reduced, and as a result is no longer available; (d) outside the Approved Countries; (e) where the Insured is aware or ought in the ordinary course of business to be aware of a Notifiable Event in respect of the Insured Buyer;” [187] It is maintained by Westford that the title transfer, which constitutes a 'Shipment', occurred in Dubai, an approved country, thus fulfilling the policy coverage requirements. Westford contends that Archipelago is estopped from denying coverage due to its prior acknowledgments and S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 76 confirmations of coverage for the Phoenix Orders. Furthermore, Westford argues that the issue of 'Approved Countries' was raised in bad faith by Archipelago, pointing to its failure to monitor policy coverage and inform Westford of necessary endorsements. Finally, Westford asserts that Archipelago's conduct in handling the claim demonstrates a lack of the requisite good faith expected of an insurer. [188] Having appraised the comprehensive submissions tendered by learned counsel for Westford and Archipelago respectively, I now deliver my deliberated findings on the salient matters in dispute. [189] In assessing the dispute between Westford and Archipelago concerning the coverage of Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 under the insurance policy, the court carefully examines the pertinent provisions of the policy. Archipelago's rejection of Westford’s claim is grounded in its interpretation of specific clauses within the policy, particularly the Approved Countries Clause and Clauses 2.1 and 3.1(e). The Approved Countries Clause explicitly specifies Hong Kong, Turkey, and Dubai as the regions where the policy is applicable. Clause 2.1 of the policy, titled “Trade Credit Cover”, provides coverage for a certain percentage of the insured loss, subject to the Coinsurance Clause and Deductible Clause, for claimable events of insolvency and/or protracted default of the insured buyer(s), provided the insured debt arises from shipments made during the policy period to insured buyers in approved S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 77 countries, conducted in the insured’s specified business and invoiced within the Maximum Invoicing Period. Additionally, Clause 3.1(e), under the heading “Excluded Shipments”, delineates circumstances under which certain shipments are excluded from policy coverage, including shipments to insured buyers in approved countries under specific conditions and shipments made outside the approved countries. [190] Archipelago contends that, based on these clauses, Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 are not covered because the shipments were made to Ivory Coast and Senegal, which are not listed among the approved countries. Conversely, Westford argues that Archipelago's contention is a misinterpretation of the policy provisions and should be dismissed on the grounds that Archipelago has misunderstood the Policy, is estopped from denying coverage due to its previous acknowledgments, and has not acted in good faith in its dealings. The court now proceeds to evaluate these submissions and the application of the policy clauses to determine the validity of Archipelago's grounds for rejecting Westford's claim. Interpretation of the Policy [191] The key issue here revolves around whether the shipments under Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 fall within the coverage of the insurance policy held between Westford and Archipelago. The court has thoroughly examined the S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 78 provisions of the policy, particularly focusing on Clauses 2.1 and 3.1(e) (see above), and the definition of 'Shipment' as outlined in Clause 6.39. [192] Clause 6.39 provides: “Shipped and Shipment Shipped and Shipment means: (a) in respect of goods: (i) if an Insured Buyer is located in the same country as the Insured, the time (which must be within the Policy Period) at which the goods physically pass from the Insured into the exclusive physical control of the Insured Buyer or the Insured Buyer's agent or the title transfer of the goods from the Insured to the Insured Buyer; or (ii) if an Insured Buyer is not located in the same country as the Insured, the time (which must be within the Policy Period) at which the goods pass to the first independent carrier in the process of being carried to the place where the insured Buyer or its agent is required to accept them or the title transfer of the goods from the Insured to the Insured Buyer (b) in respect of services, the time (which must be within the Policy Period) when the service has been rendered to the Insured Buyer provided that the Insured has invoiced the Insured Buyer within the Maximum Invoicing Period after the work has been completed or services have been rendered. Notwithstanding subparagraph (a) (ii) above, goods will not have been Shipped in circumstances where it is both legally and practically possible for the Insured, using reasonable means, to stop carriage of the goods before they leave the country of the Insured or the country from which they are being exported.” S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 79 [193] Archipelago, rejected the claim on the basis that these shipments were not to an insured buyer in an approved country. However, the court finds that Archipelago’s interpretation of the term 'Shipment' as being synonymous with the 'ultimate destination of cargoes' is a misreading of the policy. The correct interpretation, as per Clause 6.39, indicates that 'Shipment' occurs either when goods are physically handed over to the first independent carrier or when the title of the goods is transferred from the insured to the insured buyer. In the case of Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895, the court finds that the title transfer took place when Westford provided the bills of lading to Phoenix in Dubai on 21.10.2019. This transfer of title in Dubai, which is an approved country as per the policy, constitutes 'Shipment' under the terms of the policy. [194] Furthermore, the court observes that the policy in question is a Trade Credit Insurance Policy, focusing on the risk of non-payment by the insured buyer, rather than the physical delivery of goods. This perspective is substantiated by the testimony of Westford’s Trade Credit Insurance Expert, Bernard Sauvage, who highlighted that the central insured risk is Phoenix’s financial ability to make payment, not the geographical location of the cargo delivery. This view is corroborated by admissions from Archipelago’s Principal Officer, Ian Lim and Nicholas Ng of the Underwriting Committee, who acknowledged the non-relevance of the cargo's destination in relation to the policy coverage. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 80 [195] In light of these findings, the court concludes that the shipments under Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895, as demonstrated by the transfer of title in Dubai, an approved country, are indeed covered under the policy. Therefore, the court finds that Archipelago's rejection of the claim on the basis of the shipments not being to an insured buyer in an approved country is unfounded. Estoppel operates against Archipelago [196] The court carefully considers the second argument put forth by Westford, centered on the principle of estoppel, against Archipelago's claim that Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 were not 'Shipments' made in approved countries. This argument is grounded in the legal principles of estoppel as established in the case of Snair v Halifax insurance Nationale Nederlanden North America Corp [1995] N.S.J No. 424. According to this case, for estoppel to apply, the following conditions must be met: the insurer must have knowledge of facts indicating a lack of coverage; there must be a course of conduct by the insurer upon which the insured relied; and the insured must have suffered prejudice due to this reliance. It was observed by the court: “In order for estoppel to apply: 1) there must be knowledge on the part of the insurer of the facts which indicate a lack of coverage; 2) there must be a course of conduct by the insurer upon which the insured relied; and 3) the insured must have been prejudiced as a result of his reliance on the insurer's course of conduct." S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 81 [197] Westford's communication with Archipelago, specifically through emails dated 9.10.2019, 10.10.2019, and 15.10.2019, clearly stated the commercial terms of the Phoenix Orders, including the delivery of goods to Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and Dakar, Senegal. Despite this information, Archipelago acknowledged and confirmed coverage for these orders on several occasions without raising any objections related to the delivery destinations. Notably, on 9.10.2019, 11.10.2019, and 16.10.2019, Archipelago recognised these orders as being covered under the Policy. This acknowledgment was further reinforced when Archipelago granted extensions for these orders on 12.3.2020 and 2.4.2020. [198] The most critical acknowledgment came on 2.4.2020, where Archipelago explicitly confirmed that coverage for the Phoenix Orders remained in place. This confirmation was conveyed in an email where Archipelago referenced the specific Policy and the Phoenix Orders, assuring that “cover remains in place, the premiums are paid.” This communication, along with other correspondences, formed the basis upon which Westford entered into the Phoenix Orders, leading to its subsequent loss. [199] The court notes that all the elements of estoppel as outlined in the Snair case are met in this instance. Archipelago was aware of the potential non-compliance with the Approved Countries clause yet engaged in a consistent course of conduct affirming coverage. Westford relied on these S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 82 assurances, leading to a prejudicial situation where, had it been informed of the non-coverage, it would have either refrained from entering into the transactions or sought alternative insurance coverage. Archipelago’s failure to raise any objections or clarify the terms at the appropriate junctures, despite being explicitly informed of the destinations of the shipments, demonstrates a departure from the standard of good faith expected in insurance dealings. [200] In light of these findings, the court concludes that Archipelago is estopped from denying coverage for the Phoenix Orders. Its conduct, evidenced through explicit acknowledgments of coverage and the lack of objection to the shipment destinations, misled Westford and prejudiced its position. Therefore, the application of estoppel in this case is warranted to preclude Archipelago from retracting its coverage confirmation for these orders, given the substantial reliance and subsequent detriment faced by Westford. Issue of ‘Approved Countries’ not raised in good faith [201] Tthe court now delves into the third argument raised by Westford, pertaining to Archipelago's handling of the 'Approved Countries' clause within the Policy. Westford contends that Archipelago’s invocation of this clause to deny coverage post-claim submission lacks good faith and is indicative of an attempt to shirk liability. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 83 [202] The court notes that during the trial, key admissions were made by Archipelago’s officers that are critical to this analysis. Firstly, it was acknowledged that Archipelago does not maintain a system to actively monitor the coverage under the policy, the details of the trades, or the insured risks involved. This was highlighted in statements from Archipelago's officers during trial. Secondly, it came to light that Archipelago did not verify whether the trades under Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 were covered under the policy before issuing confirmatory communications to Westford. These confirmations were sent through emails on dates such as 9.10.2019, 11.10.2019, and 16.10.2019, in which Archipelago affirmed the coverage of the said orders under the policy. [203] Furthermore, the court observes that Archipelago did not scrutinise the documents attached to Westford’s emails, which detailed the shipment terms, including the delivery to Ivory Coast and Senegal, countries not listed as approved under the policy. Despite this oversight, Archipelago did not communicate any potential coverage issues to Westford. This is a departure from the reasonable expectations of communication and transparency in insurance dealings. [204] Significantly, Archipelago’s officers, in their testimonies, portrayed a stance that Westford, as the insured party, bore the onus to determine the applicability of its trades under the policy. This position included the implication that it was Westford’s responsibility to seek an endorsement for S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 84 coverage extension under the 'Approved Countries' clause. This approach by Archipelago, particularly its stance on endorsements, further indicates a lack of proactive engagement with the insured party, Westford, regarding the terms and conditions of the policy. [205] The court finds that Archipelago’s conduct, particularly post- submission of the claim by Westford, was marked by a notable shift in its stance. The prior acknowledgments and confirmations of coverage were seemingly disregarded, and Archipelago resorted to technicalities within the policy to evade liability. This shift in approach, notably absent in the period leading up to the claim submission, suggests an opportunistic and retrospective attempt by Archipelago to mitigate its liability under the policy. [206] In light of these findings, the court concludes that Archipelago’s management of the issue pertaining to 'Approved Countries' in relation to Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 was not executed in good faith. The actions of Archipelago demonstrate an attempt to retroactively avoid liability rather than a fair and just assessment of the claim as mandated by the principles of insurance law. Requirement for endorsement [207] Another critical aspect is the question of endorsement related to the Phoenix Orders, specifically Orders 11892 and 11895. The timeline and conduct of Archipelago S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 85 regarding these orders are pivotal in understanding the legitimacy of its later insistence on endorsement. [208] Westford declared the Phoenix Orders to be included under its policy with Archipelago in October 2019. Subsequent to these declarations, Archipelago acknowledged the inclusion of these orders on three distinct occasions: 9.10.2019, 11.10.2019, and 16.10.2019. These acknowledgments were given without any stipulation or mention of the need for an additional endorsement to the existing policy. [209] However, Archipelago’s stance altered around nine months later, in July 2020, when it contended that the orders required an endorsement for coverage. This sudden shift, in contrast to its previous unqualified acknowledgments, raises questions about the consistency and good faith of Archipelago's practices. [210] The perspective of the trade credit insurance expert from Westford, Bernard Sauvage, consulted in this matter, underscores a critical industry norm: it is the insurer's responsibility to issue endorsements when necessary. Archipelago’s failure to provide such an endorsement at the appropriate time cannot retroactively justify a claim rejection. This is further corroborated by the testimony of Archipelago’s Broker, Hon Min, who admitted that he would have informed Westford about the need for an endorsement, had he been in Archipelago's position. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 86 [211] The reliance on formal endorsements by Archipelago is further complicated by its inconsistent application of policy procedures. Notably, it granted extensions via email on two occasions (12.3.2020 and 2.4.2020) concerning the 'Maximum Extension Period' under the policy without formal endorsements. This selective application of requirements suggests an opportunistic approach that deviates from standard insurance practices. [212] Archipelago's emphasis on endorsement, particularly its timing and inconsistent application, contrasts sharply with the principle that substance should take precedence over form, as highlighted in the High Court case of Ter Thian Tin vs Ter Wei Hong & 5 Ors [2021] 1 LNS 172. This principle asserts the importance of the substantive content of communications over the technicality of formal endorsements. [213] In conclusion, considering the initial acknowledgment of the Phoenix Orders by Archipelago, its subsequent inconsistent demand for an endorsement, and its selective adherence to policy protocols, it becomes evident that Archipelago's approach lacks the consistency and good faith required in insurance dealings. Thus, the court concludes that the Phoenix Orders were indeed covered under the policy without the necessity for a late endorsement. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 87 Whether the Policy Limit is only USD 2.5 million due to the non-payment of Additional Premium [214] Archipelago, Archipelago, argues that the Policy limit remains at USD 2.5 million only, as Westford failed to pay the additional premium by the due date, 24.10.2019. It states that Westford had requested an increase in the credit limit under the Policy, which Archipelago agreed to, subject to an additional premium. However, due to a fraudulent impersonation, Archipelago mistakenly corresponded with an imposter instead of Westford and, believing it was in communication with Westford, sent the endorsement and invoice for the additional premium to the Imposter. Archipelago contends that it never received the additional premium from Westford and hence, the endorsement automatically became void. Additionally, Archipelago asserts that Westford, aware of such scams, failed to verify the change in banking details and made payment to a fraudulent account. It also argues that any negligence on its part is negated by Westford’s own contributory negligence in failing to verify the changed account details and in not seeking a fresh endorsement after the expiry of the original one. Archipelago cites the case of The Malacca Mercantile Cooperative Thrift & Loan Society Ltd v The Attorney General [1939] 8 MLJ (SSR) 201 emphasising the importance of due vigilance to avoid fraud. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 88 [215] Westford submits that Archipelago's rejection of the claim based on non-payment of the Additional Premium by the due date is unjustified, as it failed to send the necessary Endorsement No. 4 and invoice. It is maintained by Westford that this oversight by Archipelago renders the Premium Due Date irrelevant, drawing on the precedent set in the Singapore case of Lim Kitt Ping Lynne v People’s Insurance Co Ltd & Anor [1997] 3 SLR 1018 where the insurer's delay led to a waiver of the premium warranty clause. Westford contends that, in good faith, it offered to pay the Additional Premium late upon discovering the fraud, an action that a prudent insurer should accept under the circumstances. Furthermore, Westford argues that Archipelago's claim of contributory negligence is baseless, emphasising that the root cause of the incident was Archipelago's own failure to maintain its computer system. In conclusion, Westford asserts that Archipelago's refusal to accept the late payment and insistence on “cash before cover” is done in bad faith and is legally untenable. [216] Having carefully considered the extensive evidence and submissions put forth by counsels representing both Westford and Archipelago in this matter, I will now set out my deliberated findings and conclusions on the key issues in dispute. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 89 The Premium Due Date has become at large [217] The next issue is on whether Archipelago's failure to send the necessary Endorsement No. 4 and corresponding invoice to Westford has effectively rendered the Premium Due Date 'at large', obliging Archipelago to accept a subsequent offer of payment from Westford. [218] The facts, as agreed upon by both parties, are that Archipelago had agreed to increase the Policy Limit to USD 5 million, contingent upon the Additional Premium being paid by Westford before the Premium Due Date. However, crucial to this dispute is that Archipelago did not fulfil its obligation to send Endorsement No. 4 and the corresponding invoice to Westford. This failure occurred because Archipelago was misled by an Imposter, who inserted himself between the amails between Westford and Archipelago and directed the documents to himself instead of Westford. The absence of these documents made it impossible for Westford to effect payment by the Premium Due Date. [219] Westford cites the Singaporean case of Lim Kitt Ping Lynne v People’s Insurance Co Ltd & Anor as a precedent. The facts of this case, as summarised, reveal that Westford insured had taken out a policy for her new car, with a clause stipulating payment of premium within 60 days from the inception of the insurance period. The insurer, however, issued the debit note for premium payment out of time, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 90 beyond the 60-day window. Subsequent to a car accident, when the insured sought to claim under the policy, the insurer denied liability, citing non-compliance with the premium warranty clause. However, the court held that the insurer's delay in issuing the debit note made compliance with the premium warranty clause impossible, inferring that the insurer had waived compliance with this clause. [220] This principle was further applied by the High Court in Malaysia in Perusahaan Sinar Jaya Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Insurance Bhd [2013] 8 MLJ 317) reinforcing the position that an insurer’s failure to act in a timely manner can constitute a waiver of compliance by the insured. [221] Applying these principles to the case at hand, it becomes evident that Archipelago's failure to send the Endorsement and invoice to Westford rendered compliance with the Premium Due Date impossible. Therefore, the time for payment of the Additional Premium has become indeterminate, and Westford is no longer bound by a specific deadline for this payment. [222] Westford, upon realising the involvement of the Imposter, offered to pay the Additional Premium on 27.5.2020. Given Archipelago's agreement to increase the Policy Limit and the absence of a deadline for the Additional Premium payment due to Archipelago's own failure, Westford’s offer should have been accepted by Archipelago. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 91 [223] Archipelago’s refusal to accept the Additional Premium, despite Westford's good faith effort to rectify the situation, is not legally justifiable. As clearly stated in “The Law of Insurance Contracts” by Malcolm Alistair Clarke, Julian M. Burling, and Robert L. Purves (2002), an insurer's wrongful refusal to accept proper payment of premium cannot be used as a basis to repudiate liability: “In the event of a wrongful refusal by the insurer to accept or retain proper payment of premium, the insurer cannot repudiate liability on the basis of non-payment of premium: that would be to allow him to take advantage of his own wrong.” [224] In light of these considerations, this court finds that Archipelago's failure to provide the necessary Endorsement and invoice, prerequisites for the payment of the Additional Premium, has indeed rendered the Premium Due Date at large. Archipelago is therefore legally bound to accept the late payment offered by Westford and cannot repudiate liability on the grounds of non-payment of the Additional Premium. The failure to provide these crucial documents constitutes a waiver of the original terms of the agreement by Archipelago, and it cannot now claim that Endorsement No. 4 is void due to Westford’s non-payment. Archipelago’s duty of good faith to accept the Additional Premium [225] In the present matter Westford, contends that Archipelago has a duty of good faith to accept the Additional Premium, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 92 given the sequence of events and misunderstandings surrounding Endorsement No. 4. The crux of this argument is grounded in the principles of fairness and good faith that are incumbent upon insurers in its dealings with policyholders. [226] Westford submits that a prudent insurer, acting in the spirit of good faith, would have accepted its offer to pay the Additional Premium. This position is underpinned by several notable occurrences. [227] Firstly, it is not contested that Archipelago failed to send the critical Endorsement No. 4 and the corresponding invoice to Westford. This omission is central to the dispute, as it precipitated a chain of events leading to the non-payment of the Additional Premium. Further, there was no follow-up by Archipelago to ascertain the payment status, and it was only in May 2020, significantly later than the Premium Due Date of 24.10.2019, that Westford was informed about the non- receipt of the Additional Premium. [228] The involvement of an Imposter further complicates this situation. Posing as a Westford officer, the Imposter successfully misled Archipelago into sending the Endorsement and invoice to him. Archipelago only became aware of this deception when Westford submitted its claims, revealing a concerning lapse in communication and verification protocols. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 93 [229] Throughout the policy period, Archipelago acknowledged the coverage for both Phoenix Orders, with a total value of USD 4,464,553.50, surpassing the original Limit of USD 2.5 million. It granted extensions and confirmed the policy's good standing. These actions led Westford to believe that the Additional Premium had been duly paid. The difficulty in distinguishing the email addresses of the Archipelago officer ([email protected]) and the Imposter ([email protected]), along with the Imposter's use of Archipelago’s letterhead and signatures, added layers of authenticity to the fraudulent communications. [230] The duty of good faith, as expounded in the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Ontario Inc. v Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's of London [2000] O.J. No. 866, obliges an insurer to deal with its insured’s claims fairly, characterised by impartiality, honesty, and freedom from self-interest or prejudice. In the context of this case, a prudent insurer would have recognised the impracticality of insisting on the payment of the Additional Premium before the Premium Due Date, especially in the absence of the necessary documentation and follow-up. [231] The testimony of credit insurance expert Bernard Sauvage reinforces this stance. He noted that in situations of potential financial difficulties or uncertainties regarding premium payments, an insurer ought to exercise greater caution. Moreover, he criticised Archipelago's decision not S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 94 to accept Westford’s offer to pay the premium late after the fraud was uncovered. [232] Given these circumstances, Westford argues that both parties were victims of the Imposter's fraud. However, unlike Westford, Archipelago failed to exercise due diligence in managing the Endorsement No. 4 premium payment. In light of this, and considering the overall conduct and the duty of good faith, Westford submits that Archipelago should accept the late payment of the Additional Premium. This acceptance would not only reflect a commitment to good faith and fairness but also recognise the extenuating and unprecedented circumstances stemming from a sophisticated fraud that impaired Westford’s ability to adhere to the original terms of the policy. Rejection of Additional Premium not in good faith [233] Westford challenges Archipelago's rejection of the Additional Premium as being not in good faith. Archipelago's rejection of Westford’s offer of Additional Premium was premised on three primary arguments: Westford’s purported negligence in erroneously transferring the Additional Premium to a fraudulent account; the lapse of Endorsement No. 4, which was issued on a “cash before cover” basis; and Archipelago’s loss of reinsurance coverage at the time Westford tendered the Additional Premium. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 95 [234] The first point of contention surrounds Westford's transfer of funds to an illegitimate bank account. This occurred in a context where Archipelago was also deceived by the same Imposter. Archipelago's failure to inform Westford of the non-payment is critical. Furthermore, Archipelago acknowledged coverage under Endorsement No. 4 and treated the Additional Premium as paid, leading Westford to believe it had fulfilled its financial obligations. This scenario mirrors the precedent set in Roberts v Security Co Ltd [1895-99] ALL ER Rep 1177 decided by the English Court of Appeal, which articulates that an insurer cannot rely on the non-payment of a premium to deny coverage if it has previously treated it as paid. Archipelago's actions effectively constitute a waiver of the requirement for the prepayment of the Additional Premium. [235] The reliance by Archipelago on the “cash before cover” principle is problematic. The principle, as elucidated in the case Lim Kitt Ping Lynette v People’s Insurance Co Ltd & Anor, does not apply in situations where the insurer's conduct contributed to the non-payment of the premium. In this case, Archipelago's failure to send the necessary Endorsement and invoice, and its subsequent treatment of the policy as valid, directly contributed to the non-payment, rendering its reliance on this principle opportunistic and invalid. [236] Concerning the third ground for rejection, the loss of reinsurance coverage by Archipelago does not pertain to S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 96 Westford or the terms of the Policy. The status of Archipelago’s reinsurance is not a legitimate ground to reject the claim under the original policy agreement with Westford. [237] During the trial, further evidence emerged pointing to Archipelago’s mismanagement in relation to Endorsement No. 4. The Principal Officer of Archipelago, Ian Lim, admitted that despite its failure to send the invoice to Westford, it insisted on the necessity of payment before the Premium Due Date. Additionally, Archipelago’s Head of Underwriting, Nicholas Ng, confirmed that he did not verify the premium payment records before affirming coverage to Westford, indicating a significant lack of due diligence. This is compounded by the admission that Archipelago does not maintain a system to record the payment of premiums under an Endorsement. [238] Moreover, the repeated phishing scams within Archipelago's system and the absence of any substantive investigation to identify the root cause further undermine its stance. The Group Compliance Officer, Tay Boon Rong (DW4), of Archipelago confessed to having no knowledge of potential data leaks, despite these incidents. [239] In conclusion, this court finds that Archipelago's grounds for rejecting the Additional Premium are untenable and demonstrate a breach of the duty of good faith required in insurance contracts. The conduct of Archipelago, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 97 characterised by significant mismanagement and a failure to adhere to the principles of good faith, invalidates its position. Therefore, this court rules in favour of Westford, holding that Archipelago's rejection of the Additional Premium was not executed in good faith. Endorsement No. 4 is not void [240] Archipelago, posits that the Policy Limit should remain at USD 2.5 million, asserting non-compliance by Westford with the payment terms of the Additional Premium by the stipulated Premium Due Date of 24.10.2019. Conversely, Westford argues that Endorsement No. 4 should not be considered void, citing Archipelago's failure to issue the necessary Endorsement and invoice and other subsequent conduct. [241] Archipelago's stance is predicated on several points. It highlights that Westford's request for a USD 2.5 million increase in the credit limit under the policy was communicated on 9.10.2019 and that Archipelago agreed to this increase, subject to an additional premium of USD 35,671.23. Archipelago asserts that due to deception by an Imposter, who intervened in the email communications impersonating Arzu Tanriverdi of Westford, the necessary documents were erroneously sent to the Imposter. Archipelago contends that despite this error, the terms of the Endorsement, specifically the “cash before cover” clause, remained binding and that the non-payment of the S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 98 Additional Premium by 24.10.2019 rendered Endorsement No. 4 void. [242] Westford's rebuttal focuses on the impossibility of compliance due to Archipelago's failure to issue the Endorsement and invoice directly to it. It asserts that this oversight by Archipelago made it unfeasible for it to meet the Premium Due Date, thus invalidating Archipelago's claim of non-compliance. Westford also challenges Archipelago's emphasis on its alleged awareness of such scams and the non-request for an extension to pay the Endorsement as irrelevant distractions from the central issue of Archipelago’s failure to provide the necessary documents. Furthermore, Westford argues that the issue of Archipelago's reinsurance coverage is extraneous to the terms of the Policy agreement and does not influence the validity of Endorsement No. 4. [243] Upon careful consideration, this court finds the arguments presented by Westford to be more compelling. The crux of the matter hinges on the principle of contractual impossibility. Archipelago's failure to directly provide Westford with the Endorsement and corresponding invoice is a critical oversight that obstructed Westford’s ability to fulfill the payment terms by the Premium Due Date. This aligns with established legal principles which stipulate that non-compliance with contract terms cannot be penalised if such compliance is rendered impossible by the action or inaction of the other contracting party. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 99 [244] The additional arguments by Archipelago concerning Westford's supposed awareness of such scams and its failure to request an extension for payment are not material enough to counter the primary issue. The onus was on Archipelago to ensure the correct issuance of crucial documents to Westford. Furthermore, the matter of Archipelago's reinsurance coverage is a separate concern and does not directly bear upon the enforceability of the Endorsement with respect to Westford. [245] In light of these considerations, this court concludes that Endorsement No. 4 is not void. Archipelago's oversight in issuing the necessary documentation led to the impossibility of Westford’s compliance with the Premium Due Date, obligating Archipelago to accept the late payment offered by Westford. No contributory negligence of Westford [246] Archipelago contends that Westford should be held liable for contributory negligence in relation to the fraudulent diversion of the Additional Premium payment. Archipelago’s argument hinges on the assertion that Westford's response to the fraudster and failure to verify the change in banking details with Archipelago constitute negligence contributing to its loss. Archipelago draws upon the principles elucidated in the case of The Malacca Mercantile Cooperative Thrift & Loan Society Ltd v The Attorney General [supra] to assert that negligence on the part of a management committee or S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 100 auditors in failing to detect fraud can be deemed the real and operative cause of a loss. [247] Westford denies any form of contributory negligence on its part, arguing that the root cause of the incident was the failure of Archipelago’s computer systems, which allowed the Imposter to infiltrate the email chain. Westford further contends that there is no stipulation within the Policy that required it to verify changes in payment details with Archipelago or to request a receipt for the payment. Additionally, Westford points out that even Archipelago’s own Head of Underwriting, Nicholas Ng, and Technical Advisor, Kanes (DW5), could not discern the fraudulent invoice from a legitimate one, as evidenced by the email correspondence. [248] Upon careful consideration of the submissions and evidence presented, this court finds Westford’s arguments to be more compelling. The concept of contributory negligence presupposes a shared fault that materially contributes to the incurred loss. However, in this case, Westford's actions do not demonstrate a level of negligence sufficient to contribute materially to the loss. The communication with the Imposter, facilitated by the deceptive similarities between the fraudulent and genuine invoices, does not constitute negligence on Westford's part. The expectation that Westford should have independently verified the change in payment details is not grounded in any explicit policy requirement or standard practice, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 101 especially given Archipelago's own conduct in acknowledging the validity of Endorsement No. 4 and confirming coverage. [249] Furthermore, the legal principle that contributory negligence could wholly extinguish another party's negligence is not supported in this context. Contributory negligence, when applicable, is intended to apportion liability rather than absolve one party entirely of fault. The case of The Malacca Mercantile Cooperative Thrift & Loan Society Ltd v The Attorney General, invoked by Archipelago, does not offer a directly comparable scenario to the present case, given the differences in the context and nature of the alleged negligence. [250] In conclusion, this court finds that the claim of contributory negligence against Westford is without merit. The primary cause of the loss appears to be the fraudulent intervention by the Imposter, an external factor beyond Westford's reasonable control. As such, the court rejects Archipelago's contention of contributory negligence. Whether Archipelago is precluded from raising other grounds of rejection [251] Archipelago submits that its ability to raise new defences post-issuance of the repudiation letter dated 12.6.2020 is justified, as crucial information emerged after this date, particularly following Westford's response on 16.6.2020. It is S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 102 maintained by Archipelago that this new evidence, which included the nature of sales contracts and issues concerning Westford's title to goods, was not known at the time of the initial repudiation. Archipelago contends, referencing the case of Jan De Nul (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Berjaya Sompo Insurance Berhad [2019] 1 LNS 516, that it is entitled to defend based on issues that surfaced after studying the plaintiff's additional documents. Furthermore, Archipelago points out that it reserved its rights in the initial rejection letter to rely on subsequent grounds of repudiation. Lastly, Archipelago argues that there is no prejudice to Westford, as it was informed of these additional concerns through subsequent correspondence from Messrs Murali B. Pillai And Associates, Archipelago’s solicitors. [252] Westford submits that Archipelago’s contention of not being precluded from raising new grounds of rejection post- issuance of the initial repudiation letter is baseless and indicative of bad faith. It is maintained by Westford that Archipelago’s pattern of introducing new grounds at various stages, especially during trial, is not justified simply because it reserved its rights in the initial rejection letter. Westford contends that this approach shows a lack of adherence to the principle of good faith, as demonstrated by Archipelago's inconsistent conduct following the claim submission. Furthermore, Westford argues that Archipelago's hasty rejection of the claim and subsequent introduction of new grounds of rejection highlight a desperate attempt to justify its actions, deviating from the S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 103 root cause of the dispute – Archipelago's mismanagement of the claim. Lastly, Westford asserts that the testimony of Archipelago’s witnesses should be approached with skepticism, given its pattern of conduct throughout the trial. [253] Having carefully considered the extensive submissions on this issue by learned counsel for both Westford and Archipelago, and having evaluated the evidence adduced by both sides, I now set out my reasoned findings. [254] The court acknowledges the contention of Archipelago that it is not legally precluded from introducing new grounds for the repudiation of the claim subsequent to its initial Claim Rejection Letter dated 12.6.2020. This position is supported by the case law cited, specifically Jan De Nul (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Berjaya Sompo Insurance Berhad, which permits the introduction of new defences upon the discovery of new information. Archipelago asserts that critical information, impacting the nature of the sales contracts and Westford’s title to goods, only came to light after further correspondence with Westford dated 16.6.2020, and during the progression of the trial, notably with the emergence of the Phoenix Liquidator’s documents. [255] However, the court also recognises the concerns raised by Westford, regarding the manner and timing of Archipelago’s introduction of these new grounds. Westford’s submissions provide a detailed timeline of events, suggesting that Archipelago’s approach in continuously adding new S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 104 grounds could be indicative of an attempt to unduly extend the litigation process and to obscure the core issues at hand. This pattern, especially the introduction of new defences and documents mid-trial, raises questions about Archipelago’s adherence to the principle of good faith in claim handling. [256] While the court is not inclined to entirely restrict Archipelago from raising new defences as they emerge, it is imperative to note that the introduction of such defences at a late stage in the proceedings must be scrutinised with greater circumspection and some degree of skepticism. The timing and manner of introducing these new grounds, particularly after the initial rejection of the claim and during ongoing legal proceedings, suggest a potential strategy by Archipelago to deflect from the original grounds of repudiation. This tactic, while not illegal, does not align with the expected standards of straightforward and consistent claim processing by an insurer. [257] The court, therefore, while allowing Archipelago the legal latitude to introduce new grounds for repudiation, will critically examine these grounds in light of the overarching duty of good faith that governs insurance claim handling. This approach takes into consideration the need for fairness and transparency in the resolution of insurance disputes, ensuring that the introduction of new defences is not used as a tool to unfairly disadvantage the claimant or to prolong litigation unduly. Consequently, while Archipelago is not S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 105 precluded from raising new defences, the court assesses these defences with a heightened level of scrutiny to safeguard the interests of justice and the integrity of the claims process. Whether adverse inference should be drawn against Westford [258] Archipelago submits that adverse inferences should be drawn against Westford under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 for its failure to provide crucial evidence. It is maintained by Archipelago that Westford's non- production of the liquidators’ response to Westford’s solicitor in Dubai, Messrs Holman Fenwick Willan’s (“HFW”) letter and its refusal to allow the Phoenix Liquidator to investigate and share findings raise significant concerns. Archipelago contends that the absence of testimony from key individuals like Ms. Joanna Durlach and Mr. Qasim Zia, integral to the case, further supports its position. Additionally, the failure of Westford to recall Mr. Bernard Sauvage for his expert opinion on documents from the Phoenix Liquidator is highlighted as a critical omission. Therefore, Archipelago asserts that these gaps in evidence presentation justify the court drawing adverse conclusions against Westford. [259] Westford submits that no adverse inferences should be drawn against Westford in this case. It is maintained by Westford that the refusal to produce certain documents and witnesses, including the liquidators’ reply and the testimony S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 106 of Joanna Durlach and Qasim Zia, was justified and explained satisfactorily in court. Westford contends that the late introduction of new documents by Archipelago and its failure to prove the contents of these documents warrant adverse inferences against it, not Westford. Furthermore, Westford argues that the burden of proof lies with Archipelago and that its attempts to shift this burden represent a lack of good faith. It is asserted by Westford that despite these challenges, Westford has demonstrated cooperation throughout the trial, accommodating the late submission of new evidence by Archipelago. [260] With due regard to the particular arguments set forth by counsel regarding this issue, I set down my findings on this aspect of contention between the parties. [261] In addressing the submissions advanced by Archipelago, under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, this court closely examines the necessity of drawing adverse inferences against Westford, as proposed. Archipelago's argument is anchored on several alleged shortcomings by Westford, specifically the failure to produce certain documents and witness testimonies. However, upon careful consideration of the presented material and surrounding circumstances, the court finds Archipelago's position to be untenable. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 107 [262] Firstly, in regard to the non-disclosure of the liquidators’ reply to the letter dated 2.3.2022 by Messrs HFW, Westford's counsel has articulated that this document contained confidential information pertaining to unrelated dealings. It is crucial to note that Archipelago had access to relevant documents directly from the liquidators through discovery proceedings in Dubai, thereby alleviating any perceived detriment from Westford's non-disclosure. [263] Secondly, concerning Westford's refusal to consent to Archipelago's proposed investigation, this stance appears justifiable in light of the timing and nature of Archipelago's requests. The court considers these investigative requests, notably detailed in letters from Messrs Jasper Hee Partnership dated 29.6.2021, 23.9.2021 and 9.3.2022 to be unreasonably belated. [264] In relation to the absence of Ms. Joanna Durlach, previously overseeing the Phoenix account at Westford, and Mr. Qasim Zia, alleged to have delivered Bills of Lading to Phoenix, the court accepts Westford's justifications. Ms. Durlach’s departure from the company and relocation to Poland, as substantiated by Westford's witness at trial, negates any grounds for adverse inference. Furthermore, the decision not to call Mr. Qasim Zia is deemed rational since Hande Elmener (PW3), the creator of the critical letter dated 21.10.2019, had already provided testimony. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 108 [265] Moreover, the court finds no basis for adverse inference against Westford for not recalling Bernard Sauvage for testimony on the New Documents. The onus to substantiate the contents of these documents lies squarely with Archipelago. Archipelago's failure to summon the liquidators and its Dubai Expert to testify reflects inadequacies in its own evidentiary efforts. The logistical challenges and financial implications of recalling Bernard Sauvage, including costs related to his travel from France to a location from which he can give remote evidence in Messrs HFW’s office in Monaco and legal supervision, further mitigate against drawing such inferences. [266] In sum, this court concludes that Archipelago's request for adverse inferences to be drawn against Westford is without merit. The principle of burden of proof, as upheld in Perwira Habib Bank (M) Bhd v Wong Keng Fatt [2015] 1 CLJ 659, is a pertinent consideration. Consequently, the court rejects Archipelago's assertion that adverse inferences against Westford are warranted under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. Whether Westford breached its duty of good faith and showed fraudulent intent [267] Archipelago submits that Westford Limited has breached its duty of utmost good faith in litigating its claim, as evidenced by Westford's refusal to address queries raised in letters dated 15.7.2020 and 24.7.2020. It is maintained by S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 109 Archipelago that Westford’s conditional cooperation, tied to the withdrawal of Archipelago's claim rejection, and repeated refusals to extend cooperation to the liquidators, demonstrate an attempt to gain an unfair advantage. Archipelago contends that Westford’s actions, including writing to the Phoenix Liquidator referencing alleged confirmations of debt and the non-production of crucial documents, suggest bad faith and a lack of genuine response. Furthermore, Archipelago highlights the absence of evidence of courier or proof of receipt of the bills of lading and alleges fabrication of letters to support its claim, actions it argues point to fraudulent intent. Based on these assertions, Archipelago argues for the dismissal of Westford’s claim, citing the necessity of good faith in insurance contracts as per legal precedents. [268] Westford submits that Archipelago's actions constituted a breach of its implied duty of good faith and violated statutory duties as outlined in the Labuan Financial Services and Securities Act 2010 (“the Act”) and its guidelines, titled “Guidelines on Market Conduct for Labuan Insurance and Insurance-Related Companies” (“the Guidelines”). It is maintained by Westford that Archipelago's inconsistent conduct, particularly its acknowledgment and subsequent renegation of coverage for Phoenix Orders, exemplifies a lack of due diligence and care. Westford contends that the timeline of events, including Archipelago’s introduction of new defences and failure to properly assess key documents, underscores this bad faith. Furthermore, S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 110 Westford argues that Archipelago's approach, as evidenced by its Principal Officer’s testimony, blatantly disregards the insurer's duty of utmost good faith. In summary, Westford asserts that Archipelago’s mismanagement and subsequent cover-up attempts through invalid claim rejections demonstrate a clear violation of its statutory and common law duties. [269] Having duly considered the submissions presented by Westford and Archipelago this court will now proceed to state its findings on the matters in contention. [270] The court finds that Archipelago, has significantly breached the implied duty of good faith and contravened the provisions of Section 116(1)(a) of the Act, along with the guidelines therein. The Act and the Guidelines impose specific obligations on Archipelago, including conducting business with due diligence and care, acting competently and diligently in transactions with customers, adhering to high standards of integrity and fair dealing, and avoiding the prioritisation of its interests over those of its customers. [271] Section 116(a) of the Labuan Financial Services and Securities Act 2010 provides: "Conduct of business 116. (1) Every Labuan insurer shall— S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 111 (a) conduct its business with due diligence and care in accordance with sound insurance principles;” [272] Para 5 of the Guidelines states: “5. Skills, Care and Diligence 5.1 Labuan insurance and insurance-related companies should operate with due skills, care and diligence in conducting their business activities. 5.2 They have a duty to act competently and diligently in regard to all transactions between themselves and their customers. 5.3 Where they are responsible for providing advice or exercising discretion for or in relation to customers, they must be able to demonstrate that the advice, or exercise of discretion, are appropriate for the customers.” [273] The sequence of events, beginning on 9.10.2019 and extending through to June 2022, reveals a pattern of conduct by Archipelago that deviates from these duties. Notably, Archipelago initially acknowledged and confirmed coverage for Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 on 9.10.2019 and 16.10.2019, respectively. Subsequent extensions granted for these orders on 13.3.2020 and 1.4.2020, and the confirmation of coverage and premium payment on 2.4.2020, further affirmed its commitment. However, this commitment faltered with the premature rejection of the claim on 12.6.2020, prior to the completion of the assessment by Crawford, which was abruptly halted. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 112 [274] This sudden shift in Archipelago's stance, coupled with its ensuing conduct, notably raising new defences mid-trial and introducing new documents from the liquidators after Westford had closed its case, signifies a departure from the required standards of diligence and good faith. Particularly striking is the request for the liquidators to attend the trial made on 15.6.2022, merely two days before the last witness was scheduled to stand. This manoeuvre, alongside the Principal Officer of Archipelago’s court admission, which seemingly dismisses the principle of utmost good faith in insurance transactions, underscores a deliberate strategy to obscure the original mismanagement of the claim. [275] In conclusion, Archipelago's inconsistent handling of Westford's claim, marked by a shift from initial acknowledgment to subsequent denial and the introduction of new defences, demonstrates a breach of the duty of good faith and statutory obligations as outlined in the Act and its guidelines. [276] I now turn to specific issues raised by Archipelago below. Offer to discuss the Policy cover [277] Archipelago's assertions, centered around Westford's alleged bad faith, are grounded in several key points. It argues that Westford's lack of response to inquiries detailed in letters dated 15.7.2020 and 24.7.2020, its refusal to allow liquidators to share investigation findings, and peculiar S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 113 communication practices, notably the use of a general email address instead of a direct contact (as highlighted in a letter dated 2.3.2022 to [email protected]), signal a breach of good faith. These actions, according to Archipelago, warrant the drawing of adverse inferences under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. [278] In contrast, Westford's narrative, as outlined in its submissions and particularly in the solicitor's letter dated 21.7.2020, presents a different picture. It contends that its response to Archipelago's 15.7.2020 inquiry was not an outright refusal to engage but a conditional offer to discuss policy cover, contingent upon Archipelago revisiting its claim rejection dated 12.6.2020. This approach, from Westford’s perspective, was a reasonable response to what it perceived as an unjust rejection of its claim. [279] Scrutinising these submissions, the court observes that while Westford's approach may appear strategic and protective, it does not unequivocally amount to bad faith. The conditional offer to engage, as evidenced in its 21.7.2020 correspondence, seems more like an attempt to navigate a complex dispute than a willful act of non- cooperation. [280] Regarding the accusation of document fabrication, particularly concerning the bills of lading and communication with liquidators, the court notes a lack of conclusive evidence. The mere absence of testimony from S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 114 individuals purportedly handling these documents is insufficient to establish a definitive case of fabrication or fraud. [281] The court also takes into consideration the duties imposed upon insurers like Archipelago under the Act and its guidelines. These duties emphasise diligence, care, competence, integrity, and fair dealing. The chronological sequence of events – starting with Archipelago’s initial confirmation of coverage for Westford's Phoenix Orders on 9.10.2019 and 16.10.2019, followed by a rejection of the claim on 12.6.2020, and the eventual introduction of new defences – raises questions about Archipelago's compliance with these statutory and common law obligations. [282] In conclusion, after careful consideration of the evidence, specific correspondences (such as the letters from 15.7.2020, 24.7.2020, and 21.7.2020), and the legal duties incumbent upon insurers, the court finds the balance of probabilities to favour Westford. While Westford's conduct may warrant scrutiny, it falls short of constituting bad faith or fraudulent misrepresentation. Reasonable rejection of proposed investigation [283] Archipelago's contention, primarily based on communications dated 15.7.2020 and 24.7.2020, posits that Westford's lack of response and conditional cooperation S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 115 regarding an investigation tied to the reversal of the claim rejection dated 12.6.2020 was unreasonable. This stance, it argues, necessitated its pursuit of discovery proceedings in Dubai, initiated notably close to trial commencement, two months prior. [284] Westford's counterarguments, substantiated by evidence presented, articulate a stance of good faith. It asserts that rejecting Archipelago's investigation proposals, given the context and timing, was reasonable. Westford highlights the belatedness of Archipelago's investigative actions as indicative not of necessity but of tactical manoeuvreing. Furthermore, Westford’s submissions, supported by transactional evidence and corroborated by testimonies of Archipelago’s witnesses (including David Ng and Hon Min), demonstrate legitimate ownership and title transfer of goods from Genuine to Phoenix. The arm's-length nature of these transactions is also emphasised, refuting Archipelago's claims of disguised financing agreements. [285] Westford challenges Archipelago's reliance on external sources, such as news articles and creditor reports, as baseless and irrelevant to the specific Phoenix Orders in question. Westford underscores the lack of specificity in these documents to its case, dismissing it as insufficient to establish the alleged sham trades. It also emphasises the unreasonableness of Archipelago's investigation demands, especially considering the ongoing claim rejection and the S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 116 absence of any direct benefit to Westford as the insured party. [286] Upon careful examination of the evidence and arguments, this court finds Westford's submissions more credible and persuasive. The documented chain of ownership and business transactions between Genuine and Phoenix, corroborated by Archipelago's own witnesses, establishes the legitimacy of the trades in question. The manner and timing of Archipelago's investigation requests, particularly post-litigation commencement, suggest a tactical rather than a substantive approach, aimed more at fortifying its defence than reassessing the claim objectively. [287] Therefore, the court that Westford's rejection of Archipelago's investigative requests was justified under the circumstances. Westford’s letter to liquidators [288] Archipelago contends that Westford's action of writing to the Phoenix Liquidator on 2.3.2022, evidenced in the email chain raises serious questions. It argues this act is contradictory to Westford's earlier refusals to permit the liquidators to share investigation findings with Archipelago. Archipelago specifically questions Westford's choice of email address ([email protected]) over [email protected], the address previously advised in a letter dated 9.11.2020. Archipelago interprets S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 117 this as Westford’s lack of genuine interest in receiving a response, further supported by Hande Elmener’s testimony that a response was received from the liquidators but not produced in court. [289] Conversely, Westford's response argues for the legitimacy and good faith behind its communication with the liquidators. Westford clarifies that the purpose of its letter dated 2.3.2022 was to ascertain the location of the original Bills of Lading, countering Archipelago's classification of these in Part C of the Common Bundle of Documents. Westford maintains that its refusal to consent to Archipelago's requests for investigations was reasonable, considering the already extensive documentary evidence supporting the Phoenix Orders. It also addresses the selection of the email address, indicating it adhered to the liquidators' established procedure, as detailed in the liquidators' report to the creditors. [290] Upon detailed review of the submissions and evidence, it is evident that Westford's interactions with the liquidators were conducted in a manner typical of a party actively seeking to clarify and substantiate its position amidst disputed claims. The communication, especially the letter dated 2.3.2022, appears to be a logical step for gathering additional evidence to reinforce Westford’s stance, rather than an attempt to evade or mislead, as suggested by Archipelago. The email address discrepancy, while noted, does not S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 118 substantially undermine Westford’s position, especially in light of the liquidators' established communication protocol. [291] Thus, the court finds Westford’s approach in dealing with the Phoenix Liquidator to be a reasonable and proactive measure within the context of the ongoing litigation. It does not warrant drawing adverse inferences against Westford. The court, therefore, accepts Westford's explanations and evidence as more credible and consistent with the actions of a party earnestly engaging in the legal process. Archipelago's assertions, while noted, are not found sufficient to discount the validity of Westford's actions in this regard. No email to the Vietnam Shippers [292] Archipelago questions the actions of Arzu Tanriverdi for Westford regarding her efforts to track down the bills of lading by contacting the shipping company. Archipelago criticises Westford for not extending this inquiry to the Vietnamese shippers of the goods, insinuating a potential oversight or lack of thoroughness in Westford's investigation. [293] Conversely, Westford provides a considered rationale for its approach. It asserts that the goods for Phoenix Orders were discharged at ports in Ivory Coast and Senegal, leading to the transfer of the bills of lading to buyers in these respective countries. Therefore, as per Westford's S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 119 argument, any attempt to contact the Vietnamese shippers would have been redundant, as these entities would no longer be in possession of the original bills of lading once the goods were delivered. [294] Upon evaluating the arguments, the court finds Westford's explanation to be substantiated and in alignment with common international trade practices. The transfer of bills of lading to buyers upon the discharge of goods is a standard procedure in global shipping. In this context, the Vietnamese shippers would not retain these documents following the successful delivery of the goods. [295] Therefore, the court accepts and acknowledges Westford's decision not to contact the Vietnamese shippers as pragmatic and informed, aligning with standard shipping operations and demonstrating due diligence in its claim's substantiation. Allegation of fabrication of letters [296] Archipelago alleges that Westford, fabricated critical documents, namely letters dated 15.10.2019 and 21.10.2019. These letters reportedly pertain to the transfer and receipt of original bills of lading in Dubai. Archipelago supports this allegation with emails from the liquidators indicating that some of these bills of lading were dispatched to RaboBank in Holland and Credit Suisse (SA) in Switzerland, thereby questioning Westford's narrative. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 120 [297] Upon examination of the evidence, the court finds Archipelago's allegations of document fabrication by Westford to be unsubstantiated. The court notes that while Archipelago casts doubt on the authenticity of Westford's documents, it demonstrates a markedly uncritical acceptance of the New Documents provided by the liquidators. This disparity in scrutiny applied to the documentary evidence presented by Westford as opposed to that by the liquidators is both notable and concerning. [298] The court concludes that Archipelago's allegations against Westford regarding the fabrication of documents are not proven on the balance of probabilities. Evidence of courier or proof of receipt of the Bills of Lading [299] Archipelago’s submits that the absence of courier proof or direct receipt evidence of the Bills of Lading by Westford, raises questions about the veracity of Westford's conduct. It underscores the point that none of Westford’s staff, who should have managed these critical documents, were produced as witnesses. The implication here is that this omission might suggest an intentional concealment or misrepresentation by Westford. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 121 [300] Westford counters this narrative by asserting the successful delivery of the goods to the designated locations, Ivory Coast and Senegal, as a clear indication that the Bills of Lading were effectively received and managed. It further highlights the impracticality of the CEO or other high-level executives personally overseeing the physical documentation for every transaction, especially in a large- scale operation. Joanna Durlach, the employee previously responsible for such documents, had left Westford, further complicating direct testimony. [301] Evaluating these positions, the court notes the successful delivery of goods, corroborated by Archipelago’s Claims Consultant, suggests the proper handling and receipt of the necessary Bills of Lading. The absence of direct evidence like courier proofs, while noted, does not conclusively indicate deceit or fraudulent intent by Westford. It is not uncommon in large organisations for such documents to be handled by various staff members, and the direct involvement of top executives in every transactional detail is not a standard practice. [302] The court dismisses Archipelago's contention that Westford acted in bad faith regarding the bills of lading since the successful delivery of goods supports appropriate document handling, considering constraints, while Archipelago's contention lacked substantiation. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 122 Credibilty of witnesses [303] In evaluating the credibility of Archipelago’s witnesses, the court has adopted a stance of heightened scrutiny and caution, guided significantly by the detailed analysis provided by Westford’s counsel. This analysis highlighted several inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of Archipelago’s witnesses, which are crucial in determining their reliability. [304] Firstly, there were stark contradictions among Archipelago’s witnesses on vital issues such as enquiries into Westford’s trade with its supplier. For example, while Principal Officer Ian Lim and Head of Underwriting Nicholas Ng both denied making enquiries about Westford’s trade with its supplier, Technical Advisor Kanes confirmed that such questions were asked. This discrepancy on a fundamental aspect of the case raises serious concerns about the coherence and consistency of their evidence. [305] Additionally, the testimonies of Archipelago’s officers displayed inconsistency regarding their system to record premium payments. Ian Lim stated that no such system existed, whereas Nicholas Ng affirmed its presence, demonstrating a concerning lack of uniform understanding within Archipelago. [306] The divergence in testimonies was also evident in their interpretation of Westford’s role and actions in the transactions with Phoenix, as seen in the conflicting S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 123 responses of Ian Lim and Group Chief Operating Officer Boon Ing. Further, there was evident equivocation in their responses, such as the fluctuating answers of Ian Lim regarding Westford’s exposure vis-à-vis the Corporate Guarantee. [307] A notable lack of personal knowledge on key evidence was evident, particularly in the admissions of Ian Lim and Claims Consultant Huang, who acknowledged basing parts of their reports on speculation and lacking firsthand knowledge of crucial documents. [308] It is important to note that while Westford’s counsel provided the court with this helpful analysis, highlighting the credibility issues of Archipelago’s witnesses, there was no corresponding scrutiny or analysis presented by Archipelago regarding the credibility of Westford’s witnesses. This lack of counter-analysis from Archipelago is a significant factor in the court’s assessment. [309] Given these considerations, the court has treated the testimonies of Archipelago’s witnesses with caution. The inconsistencies, lack of direct knowledge, and equivocations in their statements necessitate a careful and measured approach to evaluating their evidence, ensuring that the judgment is based on a comprehensive and balanced assessment of all testimonies. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 124 CAUSES OF ACTION [310] I will now address the causes of action presented by Westford against the Archipelago. In doing so, I will first outline and then examine each of these causes as pleaded by Westford. This analysis aims to determine whether Westford has proven each cause of action. I shall begin by identifying and briefly discussing the four specific causes of action in question. [311] The first cause of action pertains to the alleged breach of the insurance policy and/or Endorsement No. 4 by Archipelago. The evidence has been reviewed to assess the contractual obligations and conduct of the parties. My findings will determine whether Archipelago's rejection of Westford's claim and its treatment of the additional premium constituted a breach of the contractual terms. [312] Regarding the claim of negligent misstatement, the focus is on whether Archipelago, in its role as an insurer, had a duty of care towards Westford in providing accurate information, and if so, whether there was a breach of this duty that led to Westford's losses. This aspect involves a critical examination of the instances where Archipelago's communications regarding policy coverage are alleged to have been misleading or false, weighed against the legal principles of negligent misstatement. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 125 [313] The third cause of action centers on negligence related to a data breach relating to the Imposter. This part of the judgment examines Archipelago's responsibility to maintain secure computer systems and whether its failure in this regard amounted to a breach of duty causing loss to Westford. Key to this assessment has been the investigation and findings of the Cyber Expert, Fong (PW5), alongside the notable absence of a rebuttal expert testimony from Archipelago. [314] Finally, the claim of bad faith and breach of statutory duties is considered. This involves scrutinising Archipelago's adherence to the duty of good faith, a cornerstone in insurance contracts, and its compliance with the Section 116(1)(a) of the LFSSA. The sequence of events, particularly those following the submission and rejection of the claim, along with Archipelago's overall business conduct with Westford, have been closely examined to ascertain if there was a breach of these duties. Breach of Policy and/or Endorsement No. 4 [315] On breach of policy and Endorsement No. 4, the weight of evidence from Westford detailing the transactions, together with Archipelago's premature and seemingly pre- determined rejection of the insurance claim, point to a breach of contractual obligations owed under the Policy. This cause of action has been sufficiently proven on a S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 126 balance of probabilities based on the documentation and sequence of events. [316] The core coverage dispute turns on whether the commodity sale transactions between Westford and the insured buyer, Phoenix, were legitimate trades entitled to protection against Phoenix's non-payment under the Trade Credit Insurance Policy and expanded Endorsement No.4. [317] On this issue, Westford has marshalled extensive contemporaneous documentation detailing the trades in question under Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895. These include executed purchase contracts dated 15.10.2019 showing the initial acquisition of 25,000 metric tons of rice from supplier Genuine Pte Ltd, corresponding commercial invoices dated 15.10.2019, proof of payment, and bills of lading demonstrating passage of title and risk. Westford further produced Phoenix's acknowledgments of the deals and acceptance of goods, establishing its insured debt claim. [318] Set against this formidable paper trail validating the transactions, Archipelago's swift 12.6.2020 outright denial of Westford's ensuing credit insurance claim following Phoenix's insolvency denotes a premature rejection seemingly grounded on pre-determined motives rather than an impartial, evidence-based assessment. I note particularly the failure to await the adjusting investigation report, the hue of shifting justifications for denial over time, and refusal S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 127 to reconsider the additional proof tendered in the face of reasonable explanations by the insured. [319] These facets, gauged against the Policy coverage terms and Endorsement No. 4 limits expanded by mutual consent, point to a breach of Archipelago’s contractual obligations as the credit insurer. The insured Westford had put forward all necessary documentation attesting to the legitimacy of its beneficial trades, triggering the agreed protections upon the defined risk materialising through Phoenix’s inability to pay. As such, I find the breach of policy/Endorsement No. 4 cause of action to be sufficiently proven on a balance of probabilities based on the weight and credibility of evidence regarding the transactions, assessed holistically against the unwarranted denial of coverage. Negligent misstatement [320] In reviewing the cause of action for negligent misstatement as presented by Westford against Archipelago, it is determined that a separate ruling in favour of Westford on this specific cause is not required. This conclusion is drawn from several key observations. Firstly, Westford's primary allegation of loss due to Archipelago’s refusal to provide cover for the Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 does not directly translate into a financial detriment for Westford itself. It was BGIS, the trade financier and loss payee, who was not compensated by Archipelago under the insurance policy. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 128 [321] Moreover, the court has already established a breach of the insurance policy and/or Endorsement No. 4 by Archipelago, which will lead to an order for Archipelago to compensate BGIS with specific amounts corresponding to the values of Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895 which will be explained below. This action effectively remedies the financial implications of the non-coverage under the insurance policy, thus rendering a separate finding on the negligent misstatement claim redundant. The compensation ensures that BGIS, and indirectly Westford, are restored to a position similar to that which would have prevailed if the wrongful act of non-coverage had not occurred. [322] Additionally, in accordance with the principle of restitution in tort, as articulated by Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co. [1880] 5 App. Cas. 25, 29, the aim in tort law is to restore the injured party to the position he would have been in had the wrongful act not been committed. The compensation ordered for the breach of the insurance policy fulfills this objective by addressing the financial impact of the non-coverage, which is at the heart of the negligent misstatement claim. [323] Therefore, in light of these considerations, the court finds that a separate ruling on the cause of action for negligent misstatement is redundant. The compensation ordered for the breach of the insurance policy sufficiently addresses the financial repercussions at the core of the negligent misstatement claim, leading to the conclusion that this claim S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 129 by Westford against Archipelago is effectively resolved in conjunction with the breach of the insurance policy. Negligence causing data breach [324] In examining the cause of action for negligence causing data breach as presented by Westford against Archipelago, the court finds parallels with the previous ruling on negligent misstatement. The essence of both causes of action revolves around the principle of restoring the injured party to the position he would have been in, had the wrongful act not been committed, as stated in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co. [325] In this instance, Westford claims that Archipelago's negligence in maintaining its computer systems led to a data breach, which in turn caused Westford to mistakenly pay the additional premium to the Imposter, believing it to be Archipelago. This mispayment resulted in the rejection of Westford's claim under the insurance policy and consequently, BGIS, Westford’s trade financier, was not compensated by Archipelago as the loss payee. [326] However, similar to the cause of action for negligent misstatement, the court has found that Archipelago breached the insurance policy and/or Endorsement No. 4. Consequently, Archipelago has been ordered to compensate BGIS for the amounts due under the policy in respect of Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895. This S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 130 compensation effectively places Westford, and by extension BGIS, in the same position it would have been had the data breach, leading to the mispayment, not occurred. [327] Given this restitution, a separate finding on the negligence cause of action for the data breach becomes redundant. The court's order for compensation due to the breach of the insurance policy addresses the financial impact caused by the data breach. Therefore, it is unnecessary to adjudicate separately on the negligence claim as the principle of restitution in tort has already been fulfilled. [328] In light of these considerations, the court concludes that the negligence cause of action for the data breach, akin to the negligent misstatement claim, is effectively resolved through the compensation ordered for the breach of the insurance policy, thereby rendering a separate ruling on this cause of action unnecessary as the compensation adequately addresses the financial repercussions central to the negligence claim. Bad Faith & Breach of Statutory Duties [329] In considering the cause of action for Bad Faith & Breach of Statutory Duties as brought forward by Westford against Archipelago, the court recognises the implications of a potential breach of Section 116 of the Act. Such a breach by a Labuan insurer, like Archipelago, could lead to regulatory actions by the Labuan Financial Services Authority S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 131 (“LFSSA”). These actions may include imposing additional license conditions, suspension, revocation of license, or fines, under the broad administration and enforcement powers of the LFSSA as delineated in sections 3, 167, 168, and 193 of the Act. Additionally, fines can be imposed under the general penalty provisions in section 187 of the Act, where, for a violation of Section 116, the insurer may be liable for fines up to RM 3 million. [330] However, it is crucial to recognise that although these potential consequences carry weight from a regulatory perspective, it does not intrinsically establish a basis for a legal claim by any party adversely affected by the breach, such as Westford in this case. The Act primarily serves as a regulatory and administrative framework, not as a basis for private civil claims. [331] Drawing on the principles established in cases like Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 456 and Melton Medes Ltd v Securities and Investments Board [1995] 3 All ER 880, it is evident that where legislation imposes an obligation and specifies the manner of enforcement, such performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. This principle suggests that if a statute, like the Act, provides specific remedies or enforcement mechanisms for a breach (such as regulatory action or criminal prosecution), it precludes the possibility of a private law right or remedy. This view is further reinforced by decisions in cases like Tuan Hj Zulkifli bin Hj Hussain & Ors S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 132 v iOi Corp Bhd & Ors [2012] 7 MLJ 215, where the court emphasised that statutory duties with specified enforcement mechanisms do not give rise to private law actions. [332] The Act, like the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Rules 1959 referenced in Tan Chye Choo v Chong Kew Moi [1966] 2 MLJ 4, imposes certain duties and corresponding offences but does not explicitly provide for civil liability or a private claim for damages. This lack of provision suggests that a breach of such statutory duties does not inherently give rise to a civil/private claim for damages. [333] Moreover, the court has already addressed the primary contention of Westford through the determination of a breach of the insurance policy and/or Endorsement No. 4 by Archipelago, ordering substantial compensation to BGIS, Westford’s trade financier. This compensation aligns with the principle stated by Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co., placing Westford in the position it would have been in if the wrongful act had not occurred. Consequently, a separate ruling on Bad Faith & Breach of Statutory Duties is rendered redundant, as the financial impact of the alleged bad faith and statutory breach has been adequately addressed. [334] Therefore, in light of these considerations, the court finds that Westford's claim for Bad Faith & Breach of Statutory Duties against Archipelago is not substantiated. The legal framework of the Act does not support a private right of S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 133 action for its breach, and the compensatory measures already ordered for the breach of the insurance policy sufficiently address the concerns raised in this cause of action. RELIEFS [335] In this case, Westford has sought various reliefs against Archipelago, and the court has carefully considered the submissions, evidence, and relevant legal principles to make the following determinations. [336] On the issue of liability, the court has found that Westford has proven the breach of the insurance policy and Endorsement No. 4 by Archipelago. Consequently, due to Archipelago's failure to provide coverage, the court orders Archipelago to compensate BGIS, the loss payee, with amounts due under the Policy for Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895, totaling USD 2,226,460.50 and USD 2,238,093.00, respectively. These payments are in line with the exchange rate as of 27.5.2020 as prayed, and are meant to rectify the financial loss due to the breach. [337] Regarding general damages, the court does not award these to Westford. The evidence presented does not indicate that Westford suffered losses beyond those compensated by the payments to BGIS. Westford's claim for general damages lacks substantiation, both in evidence and legal submissions. S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 134 [338] The court also does not grant aggravated and exemplary damages. According to the legal principles outlined in cases like Kerajaan Malaysia v Ambiga Sreenevasan & Ors [2016] 5 MLJ 721 (Court of Appeal) and Cheong Fatt Tze Mansion Sdn Bhd v Hotel Continental Sdn Bhd; Hong Hing Thai Enterpise Sdn Bhd (Third Party) [2011] 4 MLJ 354, aggravated damages are awarded for high-handed or insulting behavior that exacerbates the plaintiff’s suffering. In this case, Westford has not provided evidence of such behavior by Archipelago. Exemplary damages, as explained in as set out in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 and reiterated in Teh Yet Poh v Teh Ming Choo [2020] MLRHU 1187, are applicable under specific circumstances involving oppressive action by the government or conduct calculated to profit the defendant, none of which are applicable here based on the evidence presented. CONCLUSION [339] In view of the court’s findings above, Westford’s claim is allowed as follows: a) A declaration is given that Endorsement 0004/2019 dated 10 October 2019 (“Endorsement No. 4 “) is valid and that the trade credit limit for Trade Credit Insurance Policy No. AG1220190008 (“Policy”) is USD 5,000,000.00; S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 135 b) A declaration is given that Westford’s Orders with Phoenix Global DMCC (i.e. Phoenix Orders 11892 and 11895) are covered under the Policy and Endorsement No. 4; c) A declaration is given that the Claim Rejection Letter dated 12 June 2020 from Archipelago to Westford is invalid and in breach of the Policy and Endorsement No. 4; d) An order is given that Archipelago pay Bank GPB International S.A. (“BGIS”) the following - (i) USD 2,226,460.50 (equivalent to RM9,702,914.86 if converted at an exchange rate of 4.3580 [as at 27 May 2020]), representing the amount due to BGIS under the Policy and/or Endorsement No. 4 in respect of Phoenix Order 11892, i.e. 90% from the total value of Phoenix Order 11892, being USD 2,473,845.00; (ii) USD 2,238,093.00 (equivalent to RM9,753,609.29 if converted at an exchange rate of 4.3580 [as at 27 May 2020]), representing the amount due to BGIS under the Policy and/or Endorsement No. 4 in respect of Phoenix Order 11895, i.e. 90% of S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 136 the total value of Phoenix Orders 11895, being USD 2,486,770.00; e) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum is allowed on the amounts stated in paragraphs (d)(i) and (d)(ii) above from 12.6.2020 (which is the date of the Claim Rejection Letter) until the date of full realisation by Archipelago to BGIS; f) Cost of RM200,000.00 be paid by Archipelago to Westford. 1 December 2023 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Wee Hee & Jasper Tan Li Jen (Messrs Jasper Hee Partnership) For the Defendant: Chrishanthini A.R. A/P Sebasttiampillai (Messrs. Murali B. Pillai & Associates) S/N x0WH/lW6E6prnY48/hQcg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	211,181	Tika 2.6.0
WA-44-14-02/2023	PEMOHON MUHAMMAD ASYRAF BIN ABDUL KADIR RESPONDEN 1. ) TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA 2. ) PENGUASA KANAN PUSAT PEMULIHAN AKHLAK SIMPANG RENGGAM, JOHOR 3. ) KETUA POLIS NEGARA	This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus against the legality of the detention order (“the DO”) - under s.6 (1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive Measures Act) 1985 (“the Act”)	30/11/2023	YA Datuk Noorin binti Badaruddin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f68cbcc7-facd-42e9-87a7-38b54bcbc2e6&Inline=true	30/11/2023 16:00:46 WA-44-14-02/2023 Kand. 42 S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—u—u—o2/2023 Kand. 42 an/mznu 15:02-as DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMFUR DALAM NEGERI WILAVAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR HNOW oavam Femsrs Permehonan Habeas Camus selaras dengan Ban xxxvc Kenun Iatamva Jena‘/an (Aha 59:) Dan mam Perum 5 an m Fenemnagaan Farwkulunn Dan Dawn Petkam vamomnan m Bawah Sake‘/an ass (11 (:2) Kamm Yatacara Jenayzh Dan Dam Fevkava MUHAMMAD ASVRAF aw ABDUL mum (Na xv 99012170: 57217 yang dllahan a. bawah Sukswn s m An. Daﬂzh B-mahaya (Lannkah.Lanakah Pencegahan ms) was ANTARA MUHAMMAD ASVRAF BIN ABDUL KADIR FEMOHON DAN 1. TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAVSIA 2. PENGUASA KANAN PUSAT PEMULIHAN AKHLAK SIMPANG RENGGAM. JOHOR 1. KETUA POLIS NEGARA RESPONDEN - RESPONDEN m x7yMIs3uwKHpznsavG5q 1 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum Wm! JUDGMENT [11 ms Is an apphcaliarl tor a wnt of habeas corpus against ttte legalny ofthe detention order l“lhI DO") issued by me 1“ Respondent under 5.6 (1) ol the Dangerous Dtugs A51 tspeaat Preventive Measures Ac1) was (“me 1421"} directing trtat the applicant be detained tor a period of Mo (2) years eetnrnenctng item 22 9 2022 at the Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak Simpang Renggam. Johor(PPA). sat nt rm: [2] The appircant was arrested under s. 3(1) at the Act on 5 a 2022 [3] On 1132022, Assistant Cam ‘ssinner of Ponce Shahlﬂi Bin Abdullah tvxcp Shahldl Bin Aeetuttaniit, trta Deputy nrrector 0! me Narcotic Cnmlnai Investigation Department, Pahoe Headquarters Eukit Aman received the reporl teiatirtg to the apphcartls arrest and detention from Deputy supenntenaent Ponce Mispani Bin Hamdan \|“DSP Mllplnl Eln Hartman") [4] A report reiattng lolhe aupttcantsartest and detention was prepared by ACP snatnar Bin Atmuuatt and terwarded to the Depuly Minister pursuant to s 3(2t (c)t11\|heAcI an 17 n 2022. [5] on 3. 2022 the inspect/ar Morrd Fadiy atn Shamusin("\|n:pIt:1ov Mom: Fadly Ein Shlmsudin") ttte tnuesttgattng omcertrotn the Natwtic cntntnai lrtveslig on Departtnent, Police Headquarters District Jasin. Meiaka rtad recorded ttte apptrcants sXa\|emertl pursuant Ia 5.4 oItneAct. IN xvymsxuwwpzttsaucsg 2 «mm. s.n.t nuvthnrwm be u... m mm r... nngtrtnﬂly mt. dnuuvtnrtl VII muue amt [5] Tire mvesligallﬂn reveals that me appiicarii was irmiired WIU1 irie aciivi s in ireireiririg dangerous dmgs Meiriarripiieiamirie lislad urieer me First soriediiie. Pan III ("me x schedule"; [71 on 29.5 2022, me inquiry ameer oi iiie Ministry pi Harrie Affairs. AsriwiriiA/Pnnaiesemy received (heluii Invssllgahon report reiaiirig io me apnricani is] on i 9 2e22, irie irrouiry eineereerieueied e pnyeioei irivesiigoriori to me applicant [9] on a 9 2023. me iriouiry omcer soorriiiied her repori io me uepuiy Mimsler pureuarii to s siai onrie Act. no] Having received and perused me reppris «rein me Investigating arid the Wzuiry ofﬁcers. Data‘ sri Dr Hiji isrrieii airi Haii Mohamed Said, me Deputy MIFIISKBV issued me deoeriiion order egairrsi me appiicerit under 5 am of me Acl iere perioo of «we 12) years eorrirrierreiiig 22 9 2:122 [11] On 22 92022. inspector Tuan Ariﬁ Em Tuan Abduilah had served on the eppiicani inree original copies of me detenliun order, aiiegaiier. of «acts aria iriree eepies pi Form 1 for me purpese ol irie aopiioerirs represenieiieri ie me Advisory Board i--«ii. Sand") [12] on 23 9 2022, me applicam was admitted io irie PPA on me seine day, Mahadevan A/L Karupan, being ihe oiricer in charge more PPA (min oIc"i had funrier explained to tire applicant iris eeierriion omen alienation in {am} me grounds at aeieriiiori and irie eppiieerire rigrii \|L7 rneke renreseriieiiorr io irre Board IN x71/M9sZIl£UKHu2i1Ss~4G5§ 3 “Nair Smli luvihnrwm .. UIQG a may i... nﬂninuﬂly MIMI m.i.r. vn nFiuNﬂ Wm! [13] On 12102022, Mahadevan had served a noxiee of neanng ol represenlalmn to me appmant. [M] on 19.10.2022, the Board convened and had Instructed Sergeant vrnualan A/L Sekemn (0 assist the apphcamdunng ma represenvauon The applicant was not represented [15] Ana: havmg oonsideved the represencacran made by me applicant, the Board submnted ms recomrnendamn to the Vang D\|»Partuan Agong an 1910 2022. The Board‘: recomrnendaupn was assented to by the Vang D\|—Pertuan Ageng on 25 10 22 lssuus Raisnd by me An am [15] Yhree xssues were rawsed by the applicant herein and they are as faHaws: r The apphcant was deprived of ms tundamental right to cunsul! his counsel upun his arrest may the AOL u. The applicant was unrepresented by a counsel al his rspresenmron heavmg were me Apnea! seam, and H1 The applwcanrs detention for more than 30 days at the Palms lockup .n {PD Jasm Memka was unlawful [17] Learned Counsel at me s\|arImg anne neanng ohms appncamn has Informed the court that they win not proeeed mm me first two issues as these rssues have peen venmaled rn other applrcauens before me Federa\ com and mrs Conn was Inlmmad that me Federal Cmmwas not w ngreemenxwmn the submissions bythe Ipphcants on the same ﬁvsl Iwo rssues harem m the olherapplicaunns r~ x7ymsJntwKHpzr1savc5g A «mm. sarm mmhnrwm .. HIGH m M», r... nrtmnlﬂly mm: m.r.n VI mum Mr he] Leamed ::ounse\ then seek to proceed mn only the «mm wssue ie we Vegallty onne awhcanl s delenuon cor morelhan so days at me Ponce lodvuv vn IPD Jasnn Me\aka Fin us on the Yhird lssut: ‘ - ' an :1: al the Police lock-ug In um Juln Mom- [19] The lhird wssue raised by me apphcanl nas been venmaled Debra lhrs Cuurl m a recent case, Farhun bin Maham-d Fanmy v Timbalnn M-nlul nnlnm Nlaorl, Mallvilu dnn 2 Lu! (Permohonan Jena)/Eh No. wma-59416/2023) on 30.10 2023. me appllcallon «or s Wri\ ol Haheas Corpus in mac case was dusmnssd vnler aha an we grcunds than the Issue an the Vegalmy of me appucanrs delenlxon var more man so days ax me My Dang Wangw Kuela Lumpur lockup ws wnnduc mam. [20] As me same argumenl m Farnan bin Mohamnd Fahmy v Tlmbllan Monmi Dalnrn Nounri, Malaysia can 2 lagi (supra) ws pmwered by lhe awucan: une applncanl in Fnmnn bin Mahamcd Fahmy v Ylmbllln Monurl an m N-mi (sunra) nrso was represented by me same legal ﬁrm nareun), «nus coun addsus and apply the same reasoning hevain and lhey are as vouzm. [21] l\| is contended by me apphcantlhat ms delermun for more man 30 days it me IPD Jasm Me\aka Pohoe lock-up -s unlawfw as me said \ock— up ws not gushed In accordance with s. 7 mna Pnwn M11995 (MI537) [22] s 7mand S1 7('A)uUwl 537 Wuvndsz '(1) /vshall be lawful lo! the Munster. by nollllcaltan rn me Gazette, to appoint lock-ups at such pence stamens and m x7yM9s3uwKHpznss~4G5q s “Nana s.nn nmhnrwm .. med n may n. mn.u-y mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mnna Wm! eoun houses as may be specrﬁsd rn ms nolrﬁcaﬁon to be places for ms conﬂnemenl of person, remanded or sentenced to such terms 01 rrnpnsonmenn nor sxossurng one rnonzn, as may be specmeu rn each case mu rn suurnon, rv snarr be lawful tor the rnrrrisrer, by nonncanon rn me Gszsus, Io appoml rock-ups at such pa/ice szarrons and mun nousss as nrsy us spscr/rsurn rne nozmcsuon to be p/aces for the conrrnernen: of persons under the Prevention orcrrnrs Ac! 1957 (An! 297) and mo Prevention o1 Tsrmrrsm Act 2015 (Act 759) ‘ [23] u rs clearlhal unders Mm 537‘ me gazene made pursuanl memo rs only applrcabxe In the ro4Iov-nng categories o1 person. a person remanded generany under s 117 M me Crimina\ Pmceduve code, and rr a person sentenced by me Coon wrcn an mIpnsorvnen\| oi not more than one month [za] Vn aodnron Ihe new msamon of s. 7 (1A) Act 537 applies omy Io person de\|ained under me Plevermon of Cnme Act 1959 (Am 297) and Prevermon uH’enunsm Act 2015 (Act 769) [251 The apphcanl mired on me decnsran by the Hrgn Cuurl In Alaknun all Siva gum wnnmalan Mom ' nalam Nognrl ulnlaysia dan Salu L-ui [2023] 1 LNS am: In Ihal case, me learned Juorcral comrnrssioner [as Hrs Lnrdship men was) was onne urew manna pmvmon rn 5 3(4) or «he Act must be reaa harmoniously wi\h Am 537 The Veamed Judrcial commrssroner sxanea further ru x7yM9s:II£UKHpzr1Ss~4C5g 5 «mm. s.n.r nmhnrwm .. u... u M, .. mrn.rr., mm: dnuamnl VI mum Mr 730) Mahkamah mr berparvdangan ada/ah naak (anal darn vfdak munasabah hujshan pihak Rssponden bahawa orsng Iahanan dr bewah Am lerssbuv Doleh drlahan di marva~ mans bahagran :5:-Mam Esra. Pans Frasa ayal 7n anypalice szarmn 'da/am seksyen 3(4) bukanlah bsvmakna susoranq zananan be/en ditahan alau dizempaman dalam manawbana kawasan dalam sssuatu ca/ai puns. Semesrinya msmsriukan suam tampaf yang khas bagr penshsnan mane-mane orang zananan (31) Selzagai a/rsmam, Mahkamah mr bsrpandapsl me/nandangkan pslumukan seksyen rm) Akta Pen/are 1995 hdsk msrsngkumksn um sexeorang zahanan an hawah Akla Dadah Berbshaya (Lsngknh-Lsngkah Psncegahsn Knss; V995, Memen boleh msmben kuasa faumorizahon) same ads pembenan kuasa sscsra umum azau sacara khusus ks ates manawvsna lampal (Iermasuk Vokap polls) ssbagat temps! lahanan .11 bawah ma tsrsabul (in any am: place aulhanzsd gsmrva//y or spaczsrry by (he Mimsrsr) Walau bagafmanapun‘ nihak Responder! ,uga gagul msrnbuklikan ssbarsng pembenan kuasa a/eh Menlen Dag: maksud lsrssbul " [26] Wwlh an due resaed‘ «ms Ocurl lakes a ammm mew u must be borne m mind that the applmam herein Is detamed undev 5 3(1) anne AM u I: clear man me appneam does not lull under any 0! lhe calegories rnermaned m the above. The Ipphcanl therefore can; under the ueusrmon power pulsuam \u 5. 3(2) and 5 3(4) Mme Ac! whvch slate: -3(2) Any person arrested and dslamad under rm 5 may be named Ill po//cv custody for u penod not exceudmg m x7yms:mmKHpmsa~4c5g 7 «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIGH m my .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl y. mum pom! my day: wuhodv sn crdev or delenfion having been made m respect of!-um under subs. 5(1): Frovrdsd lhaf— (a) he She/I not be detamsd for more men twenty lourhours exeeo: wim me aulhonty ala polrce omcar olur above me rank of /Ivspecror, (D) he shall not be dimmed for more than forty eight hours excepx with me authovily of a ponce afﬁcer 0/ or above me rank of/Issrsran! Supennfendent af Po/Ice, (c) he shall not be deramed for more men fourteen days un/ass e pa/we olfcer or or anode me rank of Deputy Supermlendsnf has ISDOHGH M16 ct/cumslanoes of the arrest and detention to [I18 Inspector Geneva! orlo a police aﬂicer desrgnazod by me Inspector General m that beha/I and me Inspaclal General or peace after so designared by him, as the case may he‘ shall {Dd/1w/Ih ND091 the same '0 the Minister (3) The police office! making an fnvssligarron pa/‘Ia/nmg to a person anesxed and dezarned under ms s shall cause a copy oi the complete report oi ms fnvesltgslron to be sL/Dmrttsd— fa] to an /nqurry Oﬁcersppomlsd under subs 5(1), and (o; in the Minister, wrlhm such period as may be prescnbed by (he Iwmsrsr by regu/shuns made under this Act (3) (33) (A) Any poison dltlinnd undo! thl pownrs confomd by this 5. shall [75 d: mod lo 1:. in Ilwful custody, Ind m xvymszmwkupmsswcsg x «mm. sow ...m.mm .. med m M, .. mm., mm: dnuamnl VI nF\uNQ pom! rnay ha doliinod in any prison, or in any police amlon, or in any other plans alnhoriud nulurzlly or specially by the Ministu. Enrnination of persons acquaintad wlilr inc locus and clrcunlshncts of case" [Enipiiasis aaoeo] [27] subs, 3(4) cl lne Acl is a deeming provision wliicli apnroves oeienrion ol me apolicanl in any prison or in any police station or in any place aucnorisec generally or specially oy lne lllinisier As such «lie place ol delenlion pursuant lo silos 3(4) of me Acl calvlal be siioiecleo lo irie requirement ol a gazeue under s 7 Am 537 Tnis courr is ol lne consioerea vim xnai lne iespcnoeriis are enmleo to rely on me oeeniing provision in suoa. SKA" wnicli elleciively means «rial me aoplicani was oeemeo lo ca in lawful cuslpoy al all material hmzs (see' snaririzal bin Abdullah V nmbalari Mcnml D-lam Nogurl. Mnlaynla A On [2021] 1 ms 19421 [28] Inc nalural meaning oline ceeniing nmvlslan urioer subs 3(4) oi the AC\| allows the applicant at all rnaterlal lime‘ \|0 be In legal or aulhorlsed cusludy and I0 be delalned at any pohce slalinn including (ha ‘PD Jaslrl Malaki Pallca Lock-Up There is no ieouirenieni under me Ac1\naI\|na place ol oeleniion lcr purpose cl invesiigalion made inereurioer to ac speciﬁcally gazslted wneri mere is no such requlremanl ll lollows that more is no procedural non-compliance arising iieiein. As slalad oy Apoiil Hamid Moriairiao FCJ (as he then was) in Lu Kulw Sung V Tilnbalan lllsnm DI m Nogl Millaylll a. On [1005] 3 cu 914 ’/I is not far the courfs to meals procedural requirements because I1 15 not the fullclian of [he court: to make MW 0! (was “ IN x7yM9sZll£LlKHpzl1S!VC5g 9 “Nair s.ii.i lnvlhnrwm be ii... a vuny i... nngllullly MIMI dnuunlnl VI nFluNQ mi Conclusion [29] Prermsed on me aluvesavd. nus com ﬁnds that the rspundents were awe to meet mew burden to satisfy [ms com mat the and rsquuremems oi the Vaw were met, The apphcan\'s delenhcn was Vawfm am ms application (or a wax cl habeas corpus was lherefme demed INOORIN mn EADARUDDIN] Judge Hugh Conn :11 Ma\aya Kua\a Lumpur Counnl for ma Apnlicnnt Norsanqka mun Norman Messrs. Ha\ka\ &Co (Jahnrﬁahrv) mm: Counsel (FC) Nuur Izham hm Vsmaxl m xvyuiszuuxwznsaucsg w «W. Snr1n\nunhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum pom!	1,363	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-45A-56-07/2021	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] TERTUDUH WONG WENG HENG	The accused was charged with 2 charges - trafficking in dangerous drugs to wit, 63.9g of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) - 203.6g of Methamphetamine - s. 39B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (“the Act”) - one charge for possession of 149.7g of Etizolan under s.30 (3) of the Poisons Act 1952 (“Act 366”)	30/11/2023	YA Datuk Noorin binti Badaruddin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=17773556-d8a3-45f9-9cdf-48c7aef3dda7&Inline=true	30/11/2023 14:51:40 WA-45A-56-07/2021 Kand. 71 S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VjV3F6PYUWc30jHrvPdpw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal w.\—A5A»56»o7/2021 Kand. 71 awn/znu 14:51-Au DALAM MANKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM W\|LAVAH PERSEKLITUAN, MALAYSIA PENDAKWA RAVA Lwu wom: WENG HENG JUDGMENT [11 The accused. Wong Wang Hang was charged wnh 2 charge: or traiﬁcking m dangsmus drugs \|n wil 6399 ml 3.4. Malhylanadwaxymemamphelamme (MDMA) and 203 6g of Melhzmphalamma Lmdar s 295 of cm Dangaruus Drugs Act 1952 (“lbs Act") respecmwy and one charge for possassxon of 149 7;. of Euzolan under 5 3013)oHhe Pmsons Am 1952 (um 3w). [2] The charges an: as rouows. Flntclurgo “Bshawa ksmu pads s Jarmun 2021[amIsI7m kurang 4 so palang benarnpa! m kawssan /along belakang bangumln HSEC Bank, Jalan Metro Perdana 7. Kapong, d1 aaram daerah senmr dalam vwlayan Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur lslah mangsdsr danish barbahaya farm 5:: a gram 3,4. Memylsnadmxymalhamphslalmne (MDMA) wen yang asmkran xamu lslah merakukan xeulanan ctr‘ bswah seksyen 395 (11 (H) Akra Datlsh Bsrbahaya 1952 den bolah dfhukum m bawsh seksysn 395 (2; Akla yang sama " sm ViVJFnwvuwc:w:HwPxsvw “Nair Snr1\|\nuuhnrw\HI>e med In mm :2. mm-y um. dnuumnl Vﬂ muwa p-um Sucond Churio: 'Bahawa kamu Pads 8 Januan 2o21iem /ebm kmang 4 30 pezang bensmpal .1. kawasan (along balaknng bengunan HSBC Bank‘ Jalan Mam Psrdana 7, KEPOIW, dl da/am daerah Ssnlul dalam b/Wayah Pelsakulusn Kuals Lumpur rslah Inengsdal dadah berbahaya rsftu 203.5gram Memamnhsramme. men ysny aemuaan kamu (elah mslakuksn kesalahan .11 bswah seksyen 393 (1) (a) Am Dadah Earbahaya 1952 darn harsh dihukum .11 bswah seksyen 395 (2) Akta yang same “ Third Chlrio ‘Bahawa kamu pad: 3 January 2021 /am /emh kurang 4 30 petang bsnempal .1. Kswssen /orong be/aka/1g bangurvsn HSBC Bank, Jalan Metro Psrdana 7. Kaponv. a. dulam dasvah Sent!/I ds/am VW/syah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur rslah ads da/am my/rkin kamu ranu 149. 7 gram Enzolsm den dsngsn ilu ksmu lelalv me/skukan maranan .11 Dawah ssksyarv so (3) Akta Racun dun bo/ah dmukum .11 bawah saksyen so (5) AH: yang sama ' Nnrrnm oi the Proucmlon Cu. [3] Five (5; wmnesses were caHed on laslrfy «a support me pmsecuhcn case and may am. Kopml Mend No! Fudll bln Mums. (PW1) Pholoszravhsr (cnme scan!) M-dun Chem: Lu Kon (Pwz) The accused‘: mmnerma I:arowneralTwo!I Vms wuu 313 sm wwFnPvuwc3o:HnPx1vw «w... smm .......wm .. .1... m may .. .111...‘-y am. 1..."... VI mum Wm! me accused to prove ms mneeenes one calla psmcularwnness to sumxm ms defence 1see.Tan Foo Su v Public Proncutor[19u7] 2 MLJ 19: Sandri Margin! Birch v Public Prusccutor [1915] 1 ML: 12». Jawn has been arrested and inve gated by me pence H \s uflhe considered mew man havmg aH me pamculars remxng to Jason, If Is mcumbenl on me pmseeuuen \|o can evidence In rabul me aecuesws dsvenea which ws maxenax and rewsvam 1 s. max me accused has no cusmdy and eonxmx or possessm enhe tmpugned drugs under the law as he was just a dispamh employed by Jason and he has no mans res xnewieege 01 (he same [30] In Andy bin Osman v Public Pronculor [1013] Supp ML] 353, the rawdlng omoarlherein Carried (ml the raid somewhere In Ku\a\ Johore on the same day and was relaled to me appeuanvs case. we raxdmg ofﬂoev however nesmed \|heI he could not remember the name of the Derscn anested and ausagreea lhanhe person was me reaV Irafﬁcker That case aeeemmg to me arreshng ofﬁcer was zmesuganeu by another mvasmgacmg Mﬁcnr The Federa\ com through me judgment of James Fnonn rod (as he men was) slated‘ 722] From me aumonnss med Dy me appellant s nouns-M n is incumbom upon lhn prosaculian tn nu Ividlncn to rvbul any c/Ilm wmcn Is rw/Ivan! Ind maurlal by tho dtftncc In tho cauln of cmuqxamln-non of Mo pmucmion wilnunu than n't-king mammal or in clsl Iar wm or proof. In Public Prosecutor v Iskarvdar cm Mohamed vusol 12006) 5 ML./ 559: [2006] 5 CLJ 379, Chow Kok Keanv ‘v Pub/rc Prosecutor [1998] 2 ML./ 337, Yes wen Chm V Pub/rc Prosecutor [mac] 6 MLJ 222‘ 12005] 5 cu 773‘ it was held lhar it more is uvidnnct sm wwFnPvuwc:w:HnPdvw «mm. smm nmhnrwm s. HIGH s may .. mmuny gm. dnuamnl VI mum v-ma! ndducod to demonstrate that somlonl alsu rather lhtln tits lccund has the real iranick-r. tit-n tn. trial judge should qlvl duo consideration to this bolore arriving at: decisiarl to convict the accused‘ [31] it ts at the consldered vtew that the court would be tn a better oosttton to make a lust and lstr dectston tl Jason ts oetng called to testtty to conﬁrm or reout ttte evtdande already ptoiteteo by the accused as early as 3 days aﬂer hts anesl vla hts statement under st 12 oltne CFC. Thus the non—cal\lrlg ot Jason as a witness has daonved this court of such postlton. The nan-calling and non-orlenng ol Jason as witness at tttts stage too has deprlvsd the accused the ogportuntty to oolstn the tttllest passlble access to the tests relevant and goes to the crux or the rnattert e to show that he did not have the knowledge or the contents or the paper oag he canted lt ts ot the considered View that the norl~4:alIlrlg and non-cffenng or Jason as a wttness are tneuraole as tt has created a loophole tn the prvsecullods case lt ts tneretore tdstmable tor the deienoe to tnvtte this Court to lnvoke adverse tnterenoe under sun to) at the Evidence Act 1950 agatnst the orosecutton case (see. cttsn King vu v Puttlio Fvonculor [2009] 1 MLJ 457) [32] contatntng any dangerous drugs alone ts tnsumetent to estaoltsh ll is trtte law that custody or oonlrol over attythtng whatsoever possession The physical act or custody ntust be aooornpanted with evlderlce that the acwsed had knuwiedge oi the sad drugs and tn the absence of any statutory presttrrtptton. knowledge has to be proved etthet by dtreot evtdenee or ctreuntstanttal evtdance. Mere knowledge alone without exclusivlly ot etlner physlcal custody or oorllrol or halh is tnsulnoient tn law to onrls\|Ilule possesston In order to oonstttute mans tea SIN VWJFnPvLiWc:wlHwPl1vW tz “Nair s.tt.t inmhnrwm be tn... a vuny t... nﬂglruﬂly MIMI dnuuvlml VI nFluNQ amt pbssesspn, me accused mus1 be snbwn «d have known me na\ure buns cnntenls m the paper bag he was cam/mg The accused must have m him a power or disposal over the drugs m me paper bag and man he rs consuaus 01 me drugs m the paper bag. [331 seven of me ev-dance from Jason who is a malenal witness‘ his cum nnds \hat the Dhvsiceﬂ a\ernan\| and rnenm ewernenz where both emments mun be presenx beforu Dossaessxan under me law can be escapnsned, has rm\| been made DUI agains1 me accused. The pmsecumn nas lai\ed to show that the accused had \he ammus pdssidendn lhe mlemiun a1 deahng wan lhe danperpus drugs in the paper bag as N n belonged to hum snamd he see any occasron lo do so (see cnnn Pun Loon v PP [W53] 1 MLJ :31) [34] The Invesuganng Oﬁcer. PW5 leslrﬁed mat nne accuud adrnmed 0: newng knamedge of me amps and ne rened an me accueeds ecaxemenc under s 112 cpc (“accunzfs nu unenn (ms; Havmg askad m crass exammalinn where rn ma accuseds slztemenl such adrnrssrcn was made‘ FW5 mlerred no page 3 lmes I, 5 and 5 dune accuseds s1a«ernenc wrncn slates “semasa seya sedang banalerr di zepr /3/an nak hantar berang kapads cuszarnar" ’Lsp-as nu, po/is arnbil beg kenas yang saye bawak den Pwrksa da/arn beg mu ads dadan. Dadan nu Dakar! say: yang punya zapr Jason yang punysr [35] However, at page 4 Mn: 5 at me aacusads slaiemanl, them was a queslmn as to man \|he uccusod knew 0! ma drugs In me paper bag ; srn \4wrdPvuwc30:HnPdvw 3‘ «mm. s.n.r nmhnrwm be met! a my r... MWHIVVIY .3 r. ﬂnuamnl VI .nune war ‘er/a kamu (aim di uaram beg ksnas mu eds dadafﬂ The accused answered- S5/apes pohs psrrksa beg kanas rtu dan hagttau saw. [36] Then, in cross-exammaﬁon PW5 answered as Mews “s .- Jsd: stasetan Kamu sehmgga ks nan rm kamu dalang Mahkamah berassskan anggapan bahawa on mengakuf yang dra [aim ads da:1aIv7 A Belul VA‘ [371 n 15 me ﬁndmg cums CuImIha\ me mvesligalmn conducted by PW5 was prermsed upon a rmsiaken beliefor presumplian that the accused was cramcnong m dangerous drugs due lo Ihe lac1\ha\ he was sending a bag \|L7Jsson's customer and lhat he knewlhe paper bag conlameu dangerous drugs The prosecuuon cannm rely on ems ewdence m prove me element of knawledqs on me pan ov me accused. pa} A\misiunc1urei\|Is muslbe noted max Pw5 xeshﬁed mat ne behaved H59 accused was pan 0! a synd\ca\e logelher Vvilh Jason and Wong Zhl Hua um PW5 cans In shew or mvesugaua me extent or the accused‘: mvolvamenl mm Jason. Wang zm Hua or any syndwcale. It is the duly of PW5 as the mvesligaling ofﬁoer to disclose unvarmshed IHJVI and H0! (0 mere\y biﬂsler the Case for the pmseculion wllhnul any m/xdenee I0 SUDDOH his Ieswnuny (seer Ghlum Gllirlxadllltlllrbilni HIIIIII V ‘ sm xqwrnwvuwczom-«Pawn 1: «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. HIGH m M», .. nrigmlﬂly mum: dnuamnl VI mum pom! Public Prosu:nlw[2ﬂ1A]5 Mm 433; The apeueea cannot be penanrsea (or me tenure to mvesligme by the panes. [391 Further and In regards to knumedge en the pan or me accused. me pmsecutvon agam renea on the evidence or PW5. PW5 lesliﬁsd that me accused ought up have seen me Guan vrn Wang (ea pap m me paper bag wmch was unsealed Aoootdmq la PW5, the accused Ought to know that Guan Vm Wang tea bag mntained drugs Alxerdmg m PW5‘ the police and olhev law anfnrcemenl agencles ma press conferences nap awed on some! and owner mass media disclosing that all Guan Vm Wang tea bags serzed upon arres1 oonlameu drugs. In reexarmnauon. PW5 stated as Mews: “J . Unluk makluman VA, ksrras paper bag yang bsrwama clan darv punh dzalarn keadaarv Ierbuka yang ilu tidak msrnpunyai zrp alau seba/any rape 45.111 burvgkusan yang lerdapal dz/am paper pagzersebur, bertulfs Gusn Y/rv Wang yang berwsma nyaur yang xrra sedia mak/um drdalam msdra rnsssa, rnedra bemeiak dan medra seen-r ml adalsh bungkussn yang rnenganaungr dadah Jam mus1am/ Degr 51 yang berfrzrkal umur sihaf mempunyar perrngaran baik ridak lahu yang barang nu adalah daden aiaupun mencur/gar barsng fsrssbut VA. Jadr ma rnernpunyar hsk ulvtuk msmavfksa baralvg lsrssbu.‘ wa/aupun arahan danpads Jason Iidak membenarkan bsliau urvtuk mernerfksa kandungnn paperbaglsrsebul, VA “ ; sm xqwrnwvuwczownvdvw :5 “Nana s.n.r lunhnrwm p. p... w my r... pnmnumy mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum vmm [am Thls Caurl agrees man we learned oounsels submlsslon that PW5‘s lesnnrony as slaled in me above and reled upon by me prosecunon la Drove knowledge on the pan onne acwsed was bordednu aosurdlty one cannot assume or enlllled lo aesurna lnel every rnan rnusl know or be aware elany qpa ol packaglng such as me Guan wn Wang (ea hags used lo lralnc drugs Common knowledge arnongsune enloroemenl agenoes carlnm he nnposed and/or assumed to be known by lay persons Tne accused la a lay bersan because more ls no euldenea to shew man he ls lalnlliar wrln drug lralflcklng soene In Malaysla [411 Funner, nus Calm oosewes ma: lne lnree indlvldual packets (cue (1) Guam V171 Wang lea bag and Mo (2) blown paper packe\|s) corltalning me lmpugrled drugs Vl the paper bag are opaque and sealed The lnree Dacke\|s needed to be opened in older to see the conlenls \helelrl ll rnusl be noted as well lnal PW5 had conducted ﬁrlcerDrm\| arlalysls on me three packels corllalrlirlq me lmpugned drugs am no ﬁngerprints ollhe accused were laund wnlon lends credence lo lne aocuaecrs ue-slon lnal ne dud nel know 0! me ecnlenm ol me lnraa oackele he named W one paper bag. [42] The vrosecullon funher relied on me men an or ounducl cl me aocused wnere ne was sald to have ac1ed aggressively upon being aocosled by the police ms ooun ls remlrlded lune and lime agaln that even acl on me pan ol me accused does nol aulornallcnlly eonnole max was accused nan knowledge of ma lmpugned drugs (sae‘ Public Pmiaculor v Yay an Slug mm MLJU 10) The even aol must be looked at agalrlsl the en\|ile lens or background or one case and non ln lsulacion lsee Ibrahim Munurnnd A Anor v Public Presooulor [2011] MLJU14D1 Fc) srn wwFdPvuwc:lolHnPdvw is «we. a.n.l luvlhnrwm a. met! a may he urwlrullly em. dnuavlml vn mung WVM [431 rtrstty and as stateo earner, the accused hso gtven hts caulton statement under s.tt2 at the ct=<:, 3 days atter tns arrest and had axulamed as to why he had acteo aggressruety. The accused enptarnso ‘Semasa saya sadang tzertatan or rap: iatan nak nantar tzarang Irépada customer Jason yang saya Iidak kertal slapa deka! bslakang HSBC Bank rtba-ttba ads bebsrapa oreng tetakr tehan says can says cuba urttuk /art" kerana saya ingat‘ msreka mahu melompak saya Lepas saya kerta gart ham saya Iahu merska pa/ts ssbab ttu mula-mule says rrtelawan“ [441 The tects and evntence show that at the ttnte at the ambusht Ihe accused was wattnng through a back tanetattey The ritdmg team were tn ctvtttan ctothes ano carrying ttreanne at tna Itrlla of the ambush Taktng tnto account an these (acts and evtdencs mts court ttnos there ts nolhmg unreasonacte about the exptanattcn grven by the accused as to his overt an Any person who 15 suooenty ambushed by a group or men carrymg weapons would have acted tn a stntttar way Again, \hIs ev enoe cannot be rehed upon by the prosecution to prove knowteoge on lhe pan ot the accused [451 Al the tuncture it IS appusﬂe to state that the accused cannot be sent to he wtllully blind The taus reveal that the accuseo was wattung through a lanelatley oehthu HSBC He was not makmg any oettysry at the tune he was ambushed. The tune at arresl was apnroxtmalely A on pm ounng the day Jason was hrs ernotoyer ano tt is theretora uhviaus that he had to tottow Inslrucltons trorn Jason The aowsed was warned not to inspect the contents of the paper oag ano tl re the ﬁnding ot the court that at the htohesttne accuseo can only be sato to oe a temporary custootan ottne ; srw \4WFnPwwt:30tHwPt1vW 17 «war. s.n.t luvthnrwm as u... a vsﬂy r... annn.tn MIMI ﬂnunmnl y. artuha p-nut Bauer bag. The accused had nicked up the paper bag at 3 00 um on the date oﬁ arrest which means that he had only about an hour with the paper bag belore he was anested The accused had wertted wllh Jason for merely 4 days beldre he was arrested and as such it cannot be gainsaid that it was long enough tor the accused to bemme aware at the nature di the deliverres he was rnaltrng The prcsecuttons witness, PW5 had agreed that the accused worked as a despalch and there is nothing inherently incredible or overtly susnlcrous tor the acwsed working as a despatch to make delrvenes in a oummerclal area during the day. it must be stressed upon that the tact that the accused was ws1worklrlg 4 art: days with Jason belore he was arrested was ocrlﬁnrled by PW2. the accused's mother and PW2‘s testimony was never challenged by the prosecution [45] The evidence again was led by the prosecution where Pwt the polrce photographer had disclosed that he had talten Mo (2) photographs at a cctv cameras which were placed lacing the exact location at where the ambush teak place However, the t:c1v photographs were notdlselosed to the delenpe under s 51A of the CPC The cctv cameras apparently were attached at the back at the HSBC banlt building l=w5 upon laernd turther crossexamined had admitted that he did not lnvesllgale the cclv although initially he claimed that he had checked the <;<1\/and the cult was not wdrktng PWSS admission came later aiter being cross-examined to reveal the ac1lans he had taken to investigate the cclv and he was unable to explain it is at the considered view that the nonnnvestrgatron and nan» production ot the octv rewrdlngs has prevented this court to evaluate the version given by the accused and to see what actually transpired during the ambush such as whether the police had indeed ldentmed themselves as they approached the accused or only alter apprehending the accused and whether the accused was trying to has due to his kndwledpe or the ‘ SIN lﬁwfnvvuwrazolwwvtivw it “Nair a.n.r luvlhnrwm a. tr... e vsﬂy r... phmhullly MIMI dnuavlml v. mum Wrul drugs in in. paper bag he was carrying or we to me rear (hal he was being rubbed [47] The gaps in the prosecution case as nulllned above has resulled In me prasecrmon iarlrng 10 prove me essenlial rngremenl or possession and knowledgeon rne pan oﬂhe accused wneneverlrre accused successiully pul oral/all Vlimselllo the npponurllry (0 pIA\| his essential and malarial case in eras:-examination and when (here is no ra—:xamina\|l0n In challenge the accused 5 case‘ lliollwws lhal We \|rulh oflhe prosecution Case Is dnuh\|ed. [A8] The accused had suceasslully raised reasonable dmlbl an \|he prosecution case lnal he had knowledge of lha lmuugnsd drugs in lhs paper bag lie was carryrng al lma prlma lecre siege. Even if lhe aroseculren ls enmled la rely on ma preaurnplian a1nnssession.1hls Court lrnaa lnal lne accused has suocesslully rebut me presrrnrpnan on a balance at Drobabllilles ea ne had aiaalaae er me very early arage 01 me rnvearrgelron mar na are nar know wfla\| was WV \|he paper bag he was carrying on the day ne was arreared [49] In ma a Elvira Plnlo Exaaara v Publlc Pro eulor [mo] 3 MLJ 21, lhe Fedeml Calm (hrough lhe ludgmenl av Tengku Marmrrn ca rn ECQUMIYVH Ihe BPDBHBHI lheleln had slated. ‘[571 Having mqlrd to via her mar tho app-//anr dlsclaud htr daranaa nonrumporlnooluly wlm rm dlscovny of ma drug: Ind in tho llglrr al Mr unit ‘on Is to new 01: earn. to earn porilsslun nl the drugs, wa rerrrra ma: rm laamaa/rraga wl: rrgm In eerrelrralng lhll ma appa/lanrs daranea nad ‘ am lawrnwvuwczownvlivw “Nnln aanal luvlhnrwm be met! In mm he analnallrr Jill. dnuavlnnl VI aFluNa Wrul succnsslully nhmlcd the pnsumptian nl rnmcmng undo: s :7 (:1) um. um and raised a reasonable dam on me prosecution's case. ma Iumadiudgs wu rignl in holding that the apps/Ian: was an rnmmnz curior ' [Emphasis added] [sn] Learned oaunsev forth: accused bmugm to we Com 5 anenuon In me Fademl cows decismn in Glnaplnly all Runuisarny v Public Pronculor[\|9981 2 MLJ 577, Wham the cams 01 me case are swnna: \|a the mslanl case. In that case. (he Federa¥ com nau acquilled me appenanndespne Ina appellanfs physxcal possession dune bag contamlng the dangerous drugs. Tne appellant lherem was arresled oonnng om at a Vane Mme noldmg a dark maruun bag wnlammg me dangerous drugs undev ms armpm The appenann leslmed that me bag was given by ms empxoyer and that he had no know1edge of the dangeruus drugs round m lhe maroon bag Stemming lvom the appeuanrs arrest, ms employer was amsoad far a drug owence In a dwferenn case. In quashmg me appeuanrs oonwcx-on, the Federar coun hexa- ' V! m cm consrdarsd fmdmg Ihal on me Kata/rly oi the case. me apps!/am‘ nes rebuffed me pnasumpnon under s 37 (:1) nf me Act, on a ba/ancs of yrcbabtlmss The apps//amhax ssrazmneurnar even though he had custody arvdpamaps conlmlo/the bag and [Hereby had passessmn of n, at me me of ms arrest ne had no knomsdge whatsoamsr of as rxzntenfs “ ‘ sm \qwrnPwwc:w.HnPdpn ,9 «mm. smuw ...n.mn .. HIGH e M», .. mummy mum: mmn VI mum pans! n Sjn Munua Niun bin Minhaj (PW!) Fhmographer (drugs exhihﬂs and ﬁrigerpvms dusting] w ASP wan Mahanud Fauxie bin wan nnud (Fwd) Anesung amcer v Innpmor Muhammad Hilm Irwesugeung Mﬁoev [41 on 312021 at awroxrrnaieiy no pm achng on -nicrmahen rcoeruedr PW4 and me ieem dressed IVI civilian cunning and canyrng ﬁrearms conducted surveillance lor accui an rninuies ar Ja\an Me\|m Perdiina 7, Kenang, Kuala Lumpuv where «hey saw the accused wa\king in me Vane behind Hssc: Bank holding a whue and erange paper bag (“tin plpnr nap") (P13) [51 The accused was then arnpushed by »=w4 and his ieam. Aeperdmg to PW4r updn being acccsied. the accused had dropped me paper bag and reacted aggreaaweiy The accused was \a\|er apprehended. [6] FW4 rnspecned me paper bag and «cum: one Guan vin Wang tea bag (P15) and Mo brown paper bags aH d: which were sealed (P14(-) and i>14(a)) These mice bags oorniined ihe unpupned dnigs forming the subled rnaner pi the three charges umﬁeied again! we accused. Fmncution'I Conhntion [7] on pehau dnhe proseculmm the iearned Deputy Pupnc Prvseculor subrnds “hat the prosecui-on has succeeded V‘ prdwng a prime race one adarnsi the accused on 3!! me charges premised on direct endence of iramck-rig under a 2 at me Act and the presumphcn under a 37 my ci ihe ‘ am \4wFnPwwc:I0:HnPdvw H; “Nana an.‘ navihnrwm a. met! a may r... MEVHIHIY . dnuamnl VI .nuuc WM [51] It is the ﬁnding or this court that there is no possession. enher through direct evidence or through the application or the presumption under s 31 (t4) of the Act herein The Third Ingreoientmatmehittg [52] As possession is the gravanien oi Vamckiﬂﬂ (to which prosecuaon has taiieo to ruovati it totlows that the prosecution has tailed to Wave that the accused was tratﬁokin ' the impugned dangerous drugs. [53] The aoouseo acouoeo his eetence ot innooent oarrier and had identmeo Jason as the rear tramcker. in appiying the Radhl direction tsee- Muhlrmnld tudttt v Public Prou:tnor[WD1]3 MLJ 199), this court units that Jason is a rear person ano not a ngnient aha his strut coupled with the seizure ot iarge sutri at rnonies ant: the thugs similar to the ones ieuno with the aoouaeo hereirri it is clear that it is entirety posaieie that Jason was the aetuai tvaﬁcker and the drugs serzeo trorri the accusett belonged to Jason Fwai the arresting omoer tor that matter has teetiﬁad that Jason was likely the Iraiﬁcker arid this makes the aoousetrs detenee credible. [54] there is oiterwhetrning evidence herein to reout the charge at tremotnng on the pen on the accused ant: in tact. the presumption et tramoking under a 37 (da) at the Act cannot he trtvokai cunctu-ion [55] upon cpneucting a maximum evaluation at the prosecution evittenoe, this oourt ﬁnds that the prusecuhun has varied to prove a pnrna lacte case against the accused. Yhe aocuseo was acquitted and etsohergeo without calling tor hint to enter his oetenee ; srn \4‘ﬂFnPVUWc30tHr-4PdVW “Nair s.n.i luvthnrwm be UIQG a vsﬂy t... tntinniit .%r‘ti. ﬂnuavtlnl VI .ritiuo wrist [N Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumvur BINTI BADARUDDIN] D-puw “uh no Prvsaculav Tuan Nwk Mohd Faun bin Dalo Nik Azlan Cnunnll for tho accuud Grace Naman cogemer wan Daluk N swananman Messrs Grace 5 Nalhan (Penavmg Jays) sm VWJFnwvuwc:w:HmPdw 22 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! ACI vmerem. the accused Is sand to have had Dossssslnn and the Nﬁulslle kncwiedge under me law 0! me lmpugrled drugs summary of netence [B] on behalf dune accused, ll ls sucrnmed lhel me rlcn—caHIng or a material wllness nas created a lacuna ln lhe prusecumrl case were not only mens rea on me pen at me eedused lalled la be woven cul nas debunked me elelnenl aflrafﬁcklng ln dangamus drugs by the accused Analysis and Fin mu: [9] Anchored on lrlelundarnenlal rule ofcnmlnel law and pursuanno s. «so dune cnnunel Procedure cede (“CPC‘). ll IS me duly of me coun es : me! cl lecl lo scmllnlse the euldenee adduced by me pmsecundn on e maxlmum yartlsllck lo delemnne whether lne strands cl evldence sallsfy lhe legal requlremenls ld suppan e ﬁndmg of a prima lacle case we Court musl declde whether lne pmsecullan nes adduced cledlcle evldence pralllng eacn lngredlenls dune dllenoe whlch r1 ulvehuned or unexplalned wduld wavranl a ccnvlcncn II ls lnstructlve upon me coun la consider me gaps and inferences lnal arose lmrn lne circums1anIla\| ellldence ln accordance wnn pnnclples cl law on the Iolallty of me evldence adduced hy the prosacullon. me could muel xnen ask whether il would be prepared In canvlcl Ihe accused .1 it were Io dedde lo call uuon me edcueed \|o enler ms defence and «me aowsed ned elecled \|o remaln eilenl lune answer lo lhal ques1 d s n lne negame, lnen no prima lacle case would have been made out and he accused would be enmled In an acuumal (see Lool Kow cl-al v PP [zoos] I cu 1:4 and Ealachandun v FF mus] I CLJ as). am wwFdPvuwc:I0lHr4PdvW 4 “Nair Sum! luvlhnrwm be u..a a may he nﬂmruﬂly -mm: dnuavlml VI arlum Wm! [10] M lnls srage, me prosecution has to prove me lcllcwing essential ingredients Vi order lo prove me oilence in me charges under sec1lon 393 I1) cl ins Ad l lne drugs are dangerous drugs lrsred WI me Frrsl Schedule cl me Acl wllh net wergm as speciﬁed in me charge. H me drugs was ill me possession cl accused al lire relevarll lime, and Hi the accused cornrnllled the act of lrallicking at lire relevanl time [11] in regards lo me orlerice under s an (aim 366‘ me prcseculron nas to wave mal r elizclan lcund is poiscn under Am 366 H il was lcuna in Dossssslan at me accused al me rslevanl lrrne The First Ingredlenh The Identity of me nrusrs [12] in regards to the ﬂrsl elemerrl or me charge, apan lrcm mere being no challenge by me accused, «ms com is sallsﬁed ml rlolhlrlg is inherently Incredible in respect or me cnemrsls evidence relating to me idem, cl me drugs slated In me charges that they are dangerous dmgs and person under Itle Schedules mine Acl and Acl see accordingly Tl» Socond lngrodlenh Possession and knowledun [13] To prove possession‘ me prosecution musl ﬁrs! eslahlrsn Ihat me accused had cuslody or ccnlrcl cl me impugned drugs lmmd wiln me accused once custody and control is proven, me prusecmlcn may rely sm V7VJFnwvuwr::wlHruPxivw “Nana sml nuvlhnrwm rs. med M vuw me anrln.llry slim. dnumlml VI .r-ma p-mi on the prssoruvtron or poseeesron under s. 37 to) ot the Act. Seoondlyr tne nrosecutron must also nrcrve knowiedge Mme exrstanoe oi the drugs on me part aﬂhe accused [141 It rs wrtnout dnubl Ihal me accused was lound carrvmg tne paper bag where the tmpugned drugs were lound therein The quesﬁun Io be determined is whether he has custody and comm} and the mens F63 possesston (Wilh knowledge) ofthe tmpugned dvugs as rsqulrld bylaw [15] It must be home In rnrno met at me Dnrna taste sli-19e.1he accused most out up hrs oetence through the cross exarnin n 0! tna prosecutions witnesses VI aids! to prevent from bemg Iahelled as attertnoogrrt. Tna accused osrsnce rs lha\| ne rs en rnnooent eerrrar at the paper bag oorrtairnno rn pugned drugs [15] Ftrsﬂy, trrrpugn crass-examtnattnn, rt was rareeo met me accused reacted lhe way he oro dunng his arrest as ns bahevad tnat ne was bemg robbed at trre ttrrre This win be elaborated later [171 §econdIy. the accusod has rendered his stacernsrn under s 112 at me (:99 whemtn ne dtsclosed tnat he nao wontoo tore cnrrrase man, one Yen Wan vu or knawn as Jason whom no met at a snooker eamre stx (6) rnontns prior to rns arresl and nao wnrksd vcr Jason as a oespatorr nder tor aboul 4 to 5 days belore tno arrss1 Aopororrtsto me accuseo, Jason nao asked mm to dehver packagus tor a toe and trust Jason was explictt tn teurng Iwn not to check me contents ot Ihe bags oetrvereo as rt was «or Jason’: customer ‘ srn \4wrnPvuwc30:>tr~4Pt1vw 5 “None sntn luvthnrwm .. .r.... In my r... oﬂmnuﬂly mum: dnuamnl VI mum v-mat [15] According tome accused vunnen ne naa made one delwery pnono his avres1 and had not ueen pan: and when me accused uroacned upon the wane cumming. Jason us said lo have threatened \|o harm mm and ms remuy [19] u ws no\| mspulad and n nas been esxabnshea that me accused had led PWA and ms team \|o the mad in hunt n1Amenn Resnsence Perslalin Vmpxan lndah, Taman Imp-an Vndah. A3300 sen Kembanaan. selangan wnere Jason was aneaxeu wnn one Wong zrn Hue Rm 1000 cash was seized hum Wang Zhi Hues person. Upon search conducted on Jason’: can Toyota Es a war. me vegislralmn number vrr sees‘ PW4 and ms team seized RM94,1se m the sand vehlde [20] n 13 But vn ewdmca and mu demed by the prusecuuon wnnesses (ha! Jason enu Wong zm Hua than Lea ma pence to thew reswdence in week A-2143 Manena Swmforw Ja\an smuom 2 Balakong 433m) sen Kernhengan, sevangor where me ronowmg drugs wan \|he appmxin-me weugms were sevzed (sea Dolnee recon marked as D30) 482509 01 Eremm 5; 3,7109 5! Ecstasy. 21,2109 0! MDMA; sag av cennems: aszug of Ketamme, and 3309 or Memampemamine 9099?» [211 It Is chwouslhal ma drugs seized mm Jason and Wong Z1Hua are menumx to me dmgs seized dram the accused ‘ sm \4wrnPvuwc:w:HnPx4vw 7 «we. saw nmhnrwm a. u... a my a. mn.u-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum we [22] A further sum M RM53,BDD In cash was also seized flom their residence bvingmg me grand total of monies seized from Jason and Wong Zi Hua ID abom RM16D,Ol)0.(]\|) much then become the subject maner to a ierieuure prooeedinos under me Dangerous Drugs qrorvenure UV Progeny) Act was (see Exhibits D31 and D32) [23] Jason was ininauy onarged wilh me aoouead lor the drugs forming the suoiem nianer onne ins\|an( mama! in the Magistrate coun. However. no sanonon was Issued against Jason by the prosecullon and aooerdingiy his case was ml Iranslsrred Ia \|hs High ooun [24] nrerelore, VI admillmg me exisxenoe oi Jason and Wong zrn Hua and the contemporaneous evants max isd la ineir arres\|s consequent to the accuseds arrest‘ \he oroseauuons evidence gives nse io rnore man one inlerence It musl be rernernnered man when the pNseculiun‘s evidence gives rise to more than one inference, me inierence wnian benems the accused must be adorned by me caun (see PP v Mom! Rndxi bln Abu Blkav [2005] 6 MLJ 393) [25] n I5 oemnani io noie (hat me aocused nad given his version of s(cry on 11 112u21.‘hM days aner his arrest when his statement under s.112 01 the cue was reoorded. The accused's version summarily are as iouows: r that Jason and the accused both mel six inonihs prior in me daie onhe eoouseds arresir ii that Jason nad einpioyed ma accused to work as a despalch nder, in that the accused nad oniy svaned working «or Jason (our days oerore ms arrest: ‘ srn \qwFdPvuwc3o.Hu-«Papa a “None s.nn luvihnrwm be u... a navy r... nﬂginliily mini: dnuavinnl VI mum perm W. ihzl ine aaeused had run received any payment vrdni Jason before he was anesied. v ihai lhe accused ined to start working (to wnion this eviﬂsrioe was oonnnned by me adouseds molhev PW2H1uiJason ihreaiened xo nann me adcuseds iarniiy, that lhe accused asked Jason wnai me curilellls or me paper bag were and Jason «and ine accused me: he was no: amnoneed id ineaeci me paper bag as me items were Vor the customer‘ and vn \ha\ the aocused dd not know lhe contents enne paper bad he was oarryirm [26] This coun nnde inn Jason is a malanil wilnass ma evidence relating id Jason and ms role as disclosed WI ma accused's extensive aiaiemeni under 5.112 or me CPC and «he aciien iaxen againsi Jason suaeequani id ina aocueeda aneei ieading id ma seizure cf a lame amnunl didniga and monies. reveal that me police was very much aware oi Jasnn's signrﬂcaril mia rmin me aeginning of me invaeiigaiion. [21] The accused is emailed io a ran Irial and whilst the prosaculion has me discmion io decide on whom to an as Ihelr wilnesscs id esiabiisn their case‘ such discretion music be exercised mm due regard In fairness and gadd rann The amseemian has a duiyia make Jason available in «his case as ne can eonrinn ar deny the aecuseds version/delence mere 15 no expianauon as in why Jason was no: caiied nor eiiered to me deienoe ai me close 01 me amaeeuiion case on ma VSSUB, ine Federai ceun in Rosli bin VHIM v Public Proucumr [2021] 4 MLJ 41:, viewed as follows ; em \4wrnPwwc:I0iHnPdvw If “Nana s.n.i luvihnrwm a. d... a my a. anain.u-y IN: ﬂnuaviml VI aFi\|.INQ Wm! 740] /n our vrsw me ob/some on fair trial :-quires the prosacular to call tne lrrasluas or at me my Ins! Kamarul Hisham and lhc Thai nllionll Is wimassas unloss tnmls sumo good masan not to do The proseculnon ma ncrpwiler any explalvamzn In! one nomcamng of these wnnsssss nun wttnassas in plrsans who had b an amastad cantnmponrmou: or in mximity to an amstoflnt appellant and pursuant la thu sam- investigation " [Empnas-s added] [23] me Vacl \|ha\| Jasun VS a ma\|ena\ wvlness Is oonﬁrrned by Pws, me lnveshgaling omcet PW5 revealed that he had mvesugated bum Ihs aocused and Jason and had made reoammendahons to «he prusecuuon that the accused be charged togemermn Jason In crossexaminalwcn. PW5 stated as inﬂows’ ‘S ' Dan ssbervamya van Wen Yujuga ls/ah diruduh dl Mahkamah Majrsbsl bersama OKI bslul Berw VA OK, so Yul! Wen ‘/A4 rm karvm slasat hem? Batu] VA Kamu [uga mdangkan bel/au drmduh, new Beta! VA Ea/eh saw cadangkan Jason ads/an sslu saksr pent/ng Ya, YA" » m >mbm » [29] Tms court re1eC\|s me explanaucn gwen by PW5 that Jason‘s case Is dnsnncl irom me accused's case H vs mle law Ina! n is nol me duly 0! sm VWJFnwvuwc:w:HmPdw to «mm. amt nmhnrwm .. HIGH m mm .. mn.u.y mm: dnuumnl VI mum pom!	2,878	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
NA-21NCvC-4-03/2020	PLAINTIF 1. ) VIMALA DEVY A/P MARIAPPAN 2. ) THUSATARAN A/L M. SEGAR DEFENDAN 1. ) Mohd Rozek Bin Azmi 2. ) Ketua Polis Daerah Port Dickson 3. ) Ketua Polis Balai IPD Port Dickson 4. ) KETUA POLIS NEGERI SEMBILAN 5. ) KETUA POLIS NEGARA, MALAYSIA 6. ) Kerajaan Malaysia	Ini adalah notis rayuan yang telah difailkan oleh pihak Defendan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini bertarikh 17/8/2023 yang memutuskan bahawa permohonan pihak Plaintif di Lampiran 55 untuk meminda Writ Saman dan Penyataan Tuntutan sebagaimana cadangan pindaan yang dilampirkan dibenarkan. Kos permohonan adalah ditanggung oleh pihak Plaintif.	30/11/2023	YA Puan Wan Fadhilah Nor Wan Idris	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6843d8cd-b0ba-42ee-bc08-758139f441f1&Inline=true	30/11/2023 15:27:16 NA-21NCvC-4-03/2020 Kand. 85 S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zdhDaLqw7kK8CHWBOfRB8Q *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—21ucvc—4—u3/2u2u Kand. 55 2.111/2;:a,:.;‘,a DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI SEREMBAN mum NEGERI SEMEILAN DARUI. KHLISUS‘ MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL Mo‘ : NA.21Ncvc-4.a3I2a2u 5 ANTARA 1. vwuun new AIP MARIAPPAN (N0. KIP : 76010:-1:1-5313) (lnnn y-nu uh Inendikwa aehagal tlnggungan m Kopud: M. sow A/I. Mahllingam, 31 mm) 2. musavmuu AIL MSEGAR (NO. KIF : ua1noc.as-M43) (Anak yang uh mendakwa ubagan unggunyan Kupadl M. 5InarA/L Mallalmgam, SI Mall) .5 PLAINTIFJLAINTIF DAN IIOND ROZEK em Azuu KEYIJA POLIS DAERAH PORY DICKSON KETUA POLIS BALAI IPD PORT mcxsou KETUA POLIS NEGERI SEMBILAN KEYUA POLIS MEGARA, MALAVSIA KERAJAAN MALAYSIA 15 MDEFENDAN-DEFENDAN m snsr-.>.v.~.— ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN sw zunun wvmacnwaavﬁasa ‘Nata s.u.?M.... WW be used M M, M nHWuH\|Y mm; mm. VII muna W 147 35 os so PEMGENALAN 1 In: auauan mus rayuan yang man mvauuan (ﬁsh pmak Deqenaan zemaaap kepuluszn Mankamah Im benankh 17/3/2023 yang memuluskan bahawa Demmhanan pihzk Pnnmw dr Lsmplran ss umuk metmnda wm saman aan Panyacaan Tunlman sebagavmana cadangan plndaan yang auampmxan dlbenzrkan Kn: parmohonin idalah annnggung uleh pmak Hamill. FAKTA KES 2 Dalam mnunan ml. P!a\nm»P\amlﬁ adalah man man anak yang sah yang mendakwa senaga. Ianggungan kspada M $egarAIL Mananngam Asiman) nnuakan Plamm-Havnlﬂ adalah berdasarkan kepada kemlharl M SegarA/L Mahahngam, tsnnaa) yang (elem menlnggal duma pads: 18/4121117 samasa behau dnahzn dalam lahanan reman kuan: dlsyakkv melzkukan kesalahzn a. bawah Seskyen 15 m (3) Akla Dadah Belbahay/a1952 3 Damn mnmannya. P\anmi1 mendakwa hanawa kemanan 5! Man aaaran di Ibalkin aleh Delendawuafendan yang dengan sengaja den secara max 53!: wan me\akukan serangan can serzng semuh ke alas 5. Man semasa sf Man berada an ﬂalam (ahanan pans sehmggz menyehahkan kamauanrvyu 4 Pmak Delendan—Defandin menaﬁkan dakwaan tersabut aan menyalakan nanawa kemahan sx Man admah msebanxan nleh kecederain Iuaran dan kelnkaan yang matamu uleh :1 Man sebemm man dllangkap pads wmzavv lni mpewkunxan aengan fakla nanawa 1 N ma. wmacnwaonaw Mme s..n?ﬁ...n...an.w..aan,..aannmunanm..n.nn..n_.na W 290 155 am ans am 215 ’whsre mo proposed amendments do rm! change the character 0/ (he urspma sndara Dona Me and cause nopnannixce to me npposns party which aamd not be campenuw mm costs, ma mum would auow me poslparlemenr". 23 sacemsnya. Mahkamah Rayuan an aavan. ks: yang szma Auga mamutuskan ‘Further, the man may In ns discretion i/)ow ms Amendment 1/ such In amendment does not add a Ivsw cause araamn" 1Dalo‘ Tan Hang Chew v Tan mm Mar [2009] 5 ML!‘ CA. 24 d\ am, dapal drrumuskan bahawa permahanan umuk pinﬂaan boleh dnbennrkan sekwanya . Berdasarkan pnnswpaannswp yang mpuluskin dalam enomwnunu 1 pevmuhonan ada¥ah bane Me‘ n max msvrlwéjudwskan pvhak lawen yang max wan mpampas dengan Kat‘ ui man mengubah karekler Iumutan (arsenal, N Wdak akan mennmbah szlu Kauai lmdzkan yung ham 25 Menquk kepada psrrnnhonan .1. hzdapan Mahkamah‘ pmﬂain yang mpunon ulah pmak planmv zdalan untuk menukar kavasm P\aInM perlama Dw dalam lindakan asal. Plzmlw pedama membawa lmdakzn Im da\am kapasmnya sebagal Ashen yang sah yang mnndakwa sabagal langgungan ram: :4 Man 26 Memm permahonin dx Lampnan 55‘ F\am\|Wmgm memmda kapasm Iersebul kepada kapasm yang barn warm sebagax penladblr nana pusaxa man, sakaris dangan pemnlukan an bawan seksyen seksyen 7 den 3 u N mu. wmmcnwaotwaw Nuns s.n?‘...n..Mn.,.ns....aan...nnmnywnm..n.nn..n_.nn W Am Undang—UndarIg swu 1956 Asas kepada pmdaan vm aﬂalah kerana Fhlnufpenama man mlanllk aabaga. Penladbiresletsx Man mahvun Smal m Kuna Manlaﬂhw yang dikehlarksn pada 23 Ma! 2023 Aaaxan meruaul hujahin pmak Pwamm bihaway pmdaan W axan meogukunkan lag! keduduknn Plamaf peﬂama sehagm pnhak yang membual mmman lemaday deiendan-daiendzn 115 27 Sehagaumana prlnsip-pnlmpundang yzngmgansk:ndiavss,da\:m memuluskan peunananan ml, Mahkamah inlara lam hendaklah melmal aaaxan uma ada plndaan Im berpulensl unluk mamprenmxan pihak uavenaan-aeaanaan no 25 Menelm lakIs—fakva yang dwkemukakany auaxan menmdlpandangan Mahkamah hahawa pmdzan yang mcadangkan ml um akan nuumnlewdiskan pmak ﬂeﬁendanrdelendan rn. adalah kerana, seam asasnyay pindaan yang dicadangkan Iersebul max akan mangubah kavsmer lumulan Am dan aam Iunlularl kenada mnmvan yang Vam alzu us menyebabkan benambahny: salu kausa lmdakzn yang Dam 29 Mankamzh ml .uga mendapalv dakwaan dsfendan-delendan banawa pennohonan W (Idak “bone Vida“ dan mempakan sam bemuk “lachcal maImeuvra"sebaguI wax berasas Im aaaxan kerana cadangan no pmdian W adalah berdasalkzn Kepada fakla-(aha yang wan berada da\am pengetahuan defandarvdelendsn se;ak dan awax Fakla bahawa plzlnlif penama adalah Aswan yang san kepada 5! man Ie\ah dlphdkzn dangan was ualam Pemyalaan Tunmhn us an sebaga xslen yang san dan wans kapada 51 Man F\amM Denama man dunrlxan hzk amawan Am Undang—Unﬂang swu 1956 unluk ,, W. wvnxacnwaomaw ﬂ W membawa lunlulan Ierhadap Delandan—Delendan, sehagaw pmak yang amakwu (elah menyebabkan xarnanan lvepada suurmnya am,-Ax ssksyun 14:) Akla Undang»Undang SMI1956) 350 :1 Pada maaa yang sama, Seksysn 7m Akia yang sama Juga membenarkan Wamlﬂ paﬂama membawi Iunlulan lemadap naoenaawetanaan dalam kapasmnya sehagav Fenladbw kepada estel sAMa\|1 355 :2 Mahkamah percaya bahawa an dalam kel mi. pmak p\a\|nIII Ielah memlhh unmk memulskan lindakan um dalam kapasmnya sebagal Isten yang sah ﬂan nanggungan an man dam bukan dalam kapasmnya sebagai Penlad karana Dada rnasa \|un\|uvan Im awankan an Mahkimah. Surat asa Kuasa Memadbn unluk estzt 51 Man, suzmmya bslum dlpermem 3: Memandangksn pada keuka pannnnonan Lampnan 55 m dxfaﬂkan. Sum! Kuasz Msnladblr ks avas nana pusaka 51 Man telah aupemlarn, Mahkamah berpanﬂangan bahawa Plmnhf panama wayar dibenalkan ass unluk menunm lerhadap De6endan—Deienﬂ\|n a\|as napasm yang yuga Vayik nagmya mam undang—undang. 34 Mehkamah hdak nampak hahawa nadangan pmdaan Im, Ma dlbenarkan akan nmmpmyumsxan alau mengaknbalkan kenaakaanan nu kepadi Delendan-Delsndan kerana, sememmgnya pads kapasm asalnya, Plamlif panama mzhpun mampunyal ﬂak yang sama unluk membawa lmdakan nemauap Delendan-Deiendan 35 sna ruiuk kepada mga (3; peranggan aklw m bzwah Ssksyen my 275 Akla Undang—Undang SMI1956 ylng manyalakan » ., W. wvnxacnwaomaw ﬂ W and evaly acbon so to be bmugm shill be far Ms beneﬁt al me same person ammo»: and man be suapa m ms um. nmcsdura as many as may be as an was Druughlby the executor“ gun as Salevusnya‘ Mahkamah wga berpegzng ksuada prmsvp untang- undang yang ‘alas bahawa dilam memhenarkan permolmnan mann- mana pmak un\|uk rneminda kapasm mereka. Mlhkamah hendaklah Dernuashali bihawa pmak Ievsehul «swan sqak dz" awal mempunyau us kapasm berkenaan unmk membawa (mdakan (erhzdap pmak Vawan (rujuk Aluran 2n xsm KKM dan kas Bowler v Juhn Mmem 5 Co 11954] 1 wuz ms :1 Olen nu. memandangkan Plainm panama aaxam kapasin asalnya 392 sebagai Aslen den Ianggungan sl Min bnleh membzwa Imdakan xemadap Defender:-Defendan, man, Mahkamah berpandangan banawa cadangan pmdzan lm adalah wmardtbenankan Semanmah lam dalam kapasmnya sebagai Penladbiv yang Isiah dnlamik, Kedudukan F\am\|ﬂ Panama daiam membawa nndakan mu temadap Decenuamnecenaan 395 akan Vemh was den kukuh as Mahkamih memjuk kspada kas Bumlpulrarcornmerce Bank and 0:5 v awn Wama mean Sdn an [2904] 4 CLJ 552, di mana dvpumskan - [21 The as/enaanrs pmpma amended defence am not mesa anymmg H151 was d/amemcsﬂy mam: Irnm me ongmal aerem I.‘ ma not seek lo vary ms ongmr dsfsnce but merely to amp/ny n Imam, ma plopossd amsnoedvelance was not an ansnnougn: .. . IW cnwaomaw ﬂ nu us no us an but was pm‘ lmwald upon me counsel of the as/anuanrs new so/Icltols who has just taken over mu conduct of me use Ibrlhe dslelvdarvt, it was mtsnded to :9! form me res! auesmns in ccnlruverxy be/on; ma caun‘ " KELEWATAN MEMFAILKAN PERMONONAN 39 max dmaﬂkan bahawa oemapac kesilapan yang ‘alas unnnak Pvmnm-P\ain(Il apzbila nanya mengemukaksn pammhnnan im padz g maran pamxzraall selesal duavankan penngkat akmr pros aagannanapun adalsh menjadx prinslp undangmndang bahawa. Iaklar Kelawalan main man mjamkan saurssmmyz alasan unluk memﬂak permahonan uruuk pnmaan 40. Mahknmah memmk kepada kes use Bank Malaysia and v Macquane Technobgles (M) sun and [2004] 4 Mu sea yang menyalakan I ' 15 on me quasnon aide/ay, :1 rs wmmy arnara Ihal delay alone rs not a ground to refuse an snpncanan roneavs Ia amend /rv Wnghl Norms aln 5191hs I:ouIlhs)d. Winle the ma av man an amanamnz rs made »s a Is/svsn! consideration, 1115 not necesssnly decisive. Delay per so does no: equal pls/udrcs or in/usvce We do not mmk ma: any rigid Ms should or can be lead down on ms" nu secemsnyan Mahkamah [uga maruplk kepadz pnnswppnnslp yang mpunusxan dalam kes Dale‘ ran Heng Chew vTan Kvm H07 [2003] 7 MLJ 1&4 yang anlara Vim memuluskan nanawa .— :5 . . W waotwaw s.::.;=.;:'.::rn .. ﬂied m van; .. n,n.ny mm: dun-mm VI] mum W as am us :50 Ass no ‘no matter how late the umsndmunns scugnl to be made, whether sum or at or after me ma! ar mm allel mgmnr or am?! an appeal, 11 shomd be albwed pnmaea :2 wm not cause me opoosne parry Io mow some rluury or be prejudtved. such plsjudloe new such ma: cannot be nompanssled to: by cash or omerwrse 42 Memwk kapadz permuhonan Vamplran 55 um, Mahkamah belpandangan mum kelewalzn Aersebm max memprejumskan aarenaan-newsman Pmdaan m. Indak menyabahkan karaklev Iunlman berubah amu man memasukkan sum kausa Imdakan yang ham Mam pmdaan ml zuga hdak mengganggu psqalanan prosiumg ﬁndakan ml msmandangkan perblcaman telah ﬂuaiznkan sebagivmana yang dﬂadualkan as Alasan Vain yang cmnxan aleh Delemian dalam membantah pevmomnan mi adalah xewewaran dalam pelmnhunzn pindaan Im Ialzh menaﬁkan hak uevenaarmenenuau umuk menyoa\ba\as Saks»-saksx pnamm Dalam hal ml. Mahkamah \|eIah menyalakan banawa, cadangan pmdaan vu yakvrznya dlbenarkan lidzk akan mamasukkan iehavang kausalmdakan aiau Lsu yang ham dalam Iunmhn my oven \Iu,MahkamaI1 berpandangan bahawa llada keperiuan Immk aefandarmelendan menyoalbalas samsaxs. glam kerana cadangzn pmmn lersahumdzk membawa sebarang perubahan Keyzda mnlman pihak pnamm .5 N mu. wmmcnwaomzw Nuns s.n?‘...u..Mm.w....nmy..mmmm..u.m..n_.m W KONKLUSI .5; 44 N55 anumaxasan an alas‘ Mahkamah my memmuskan bihawa permuhonan Pnauuiwlamac ﬂllampwan 55 max msrmnda penyala mnmannya sebagalmana cadangan pmaaan dlsenakan dubenarkzn aonarikn : 10 NOVEMBER m: w F NILAH on BINY ANIDRIS PESURLIHJAYA KENAKIMAN MAHKAMAM YINGGI SEREMBAN 475 NEGERI SEMBILAN DARUL KHUSUS BAG! FINAK FLAINYIF: Teluzn Haresh Mahadevan 1. Co Aw Peguambela darn Peguamcara Na :9. Tmgkal szm. Jalan Yam Tuan. 70000 Seremban, NSDK us EAGI PIHAK nzrsunm: Tn Shah wwa bmAbdu\ Nzhm Peguam Kanan Persekmuan can 17 sw znnuawwvxxacnwaomaw -ms Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm m xn as a. man \|emha\| dangan kemalingan planraya semasa menam mamrslkal dengan membawa «angga (step wander) pad: 11 04 2017 KRONOLOGI xss 5 Perbkzrazn Ksrs ml lalah berrnma pea. 2911 2:122 dzn lelah ammp pads 29032023 sewepas keuemua samsaxsx menu’ membenkan kelerangan Mahkamah Ielah memenmahkzn keausmua pmak umuk memvankan penghugahan barlulls dan sexsrusnya Ielzh msnelapkan unkn unmk kepmusan pad: 31.05 2023 s aagmmanapn, pada 23 as 2023, Plam\|i1—P\amm Ielah memfaﬂkan pernlnhunan mrampvan 55 unluk meminda penyitaan \|urImtan bedwuan unluk mammda kzpasm Plalnmpenamz 7 P\am\ﬂ panama «swan memulakan lmdakan mu‘ atas kapasﬂlnya sebagal men yang San ﬂan ranqgungzn kepada 5‘ Mam sebagzvuana yang dlpenmlukkan an bawah seksyen 1(3) Akla unaangunuang smx I556‘ dzn hukan me\aIuI kapzsnmya sebagan peniadblr kepada eslel :- Mal! sebaganmana dlhawah seksyen n2) Akla yang sama. 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Wmmw ﬂ W , . . wvkxacnwaotﬁaw ﬂ FINDAAN TERHADAP KAPASI11 PLAINYIF PERYAMA zu Undang-nndang yang mengawex telia seburang permahonan unluk pmdlan pﬁdmg adalah sebegalmana perunlukan Aluran 2a Kaedih 5 135 Kaedarrxaedah Mankemen 2012 (KMT)yang berbunyl . ‘Amendment olwmarpmsdmg wrm leave (0 20, r 5;, m Sub/sc! to Order 15 rules 5, 5.4, 7 and a and me ianewmg provisions olfhu rule‘ (he Cnunmayal snystege aflhe proceeding: nu allow me plainnlf to amend his wnz, or any puny In amend ms pleading, on such terms 5: to costs oromelwiss as may beiu5!arvd In such . mannen many, as u may am: (2; Where an spplmzmn to the Cam‘! Io! 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Issue ofms w/ifonhe makmg olms cuumsm/aim, is the use may be, He mrght hm/a sued. (5) An amendment my be a/laws-1 under paragraph (2; namwmanmng that me elfocf of me amsndmenl WIN be to ma av smnms s new cause o/man yr the new cause armon arises out 0/ the same [acts or sumunnsrry [be same Isms as 5 PU (A) 92 cam 41! acmn m Isspecl al winch raltef has slmady been claimed m the actron by me party applying an leave (0 make me amqmilnent " Analah memadl pnnsvu undang yang mlnlzp bahawa dmam membenarkan sesuzlu permohonan umuk plndaan, plndian yang dlnadingkan lewabul mk akan mengakmankan kendakadilan ksuada pmak Iawan Mahkimah Pevsekuluan dalam kes Yamaha Molar Cn mu v Yamaha Malaysxa San am 5. O5 [1953] 1 MLJ 213 \|elah memberikan 3 guns panduan unluk dnklm bagi mempasnkan sehirang pumanonan pmdaan yang dwbenalkan hdak akan menyehabkan keﬂdakadvlan Iawlu - 22 re) Whether the app/matron rs Dona rm‘ [D)Whsth9I ma pm/udice caused to (he urns: side can be compensated by costs, and (c)w»emu me amendment would not m errccz mm me Sm! [mm was character In mo 5 sun of anomer and Imzonsxstenl chamctcv Prinsvp lm lurutdigunapakal dalam kes U-Meng Holdings Sdn arm v Tan Sri Daluk mramm Mohamed Ambank (M) am: (Tlmd Party) lama) MLJU H61‘ [mm] 9 cu‘ Halum Mahkarnsh Rayuan Abdul Mahk Ishak JCAmemuluskan bahawa - m . . wvkxacnwaomzw S1.,'§.n?‘...u..Mm.w....,:n..~,..m,m.u.y.«m. m.m.v...n_.m W	2,260	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-23CY-64-12/2020	PLAINTIF AU KOK HUEI DEFENDAN 1. ) FATT KEE ROAST FISH SDN. BHD. 2. ) CHENG SOON FATTBUKAN PIHAK-PIHAKTETUAN RICHARD TEE & CHIN	1. The Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm Tetuan Richard Tee & Chin (“the firm”) applied to discharge itself from representing the Plaintiff under Order 64 Rule 5 Rules of Court 2012 (“the Rules”).2. Order 64 Rule 5 of the Rules stipulates as follows:5. Application by solicitor that he has ceased to act (O. 64 r. 5)(1) Where a solicitor who has acted for a party in a cause or matter has ceased so to act and the party has not given a notice of change in accordance with rule 1, or a notice of intention to act in person in accordance with rule 3, the solicitor may apply to the Court for an order declaring that the solicitor has ceased to be the solicitor acting for the party in the cause or matter, and the Court or the Court of Appeal or Federal Court, as the case may be, may make an order accordingly, but unless and until the solicitor serves on every party to the cause or matter (not being a party in default as to entry of appearance) a copy of the order, he shall, subject to the foregoing provisions of this Order, be considered the solicitor of the party till the final conclusion of the cause or matter, whether in the Court or the Court of Appeal or Federal Court.(2) An application for an order under this rule shall be made by a notice of application in Form 140 or, in the case of an application to the Court of Appeal or Federal Court, by motion, and the notice of application or notice of motion shall, unless the Court or the Court of Appeal or Federal Court, as the case may be, otherwise directs, be served on the party for whom the solicitor acted. The application shall be supported by an affidavit stating the grounds of the application.(3) An order in Form 141 made under this rule shall not affect the rights of the solicitor and the party for whom he acted as between themselves.(4) Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (1), where the legal aid certificate of an assisted person within the meaning of the Legal Aid Act 1971 [Act 26] is revoked or discharged, the solicitor who acted for the assisted person shall cease to be the solicitor acting in the cause or matter, and if the assisted person whose certificate has been revoked or discharged desires to proceed with the cause or matter without legal aid and appoints that solicitor or another solicitor to act on his behalf, rule 2 shall apply as if that party had previously sued or defended in personGoing by the Rules the Court has been empowered to “make an order accordingly” for an application under Order 64 Rule 5 of the RulesIn this case as the trial has not commenced and the Plaintiff has already paid a part of the agreed fees in lieu of the full trial, the Court allowed the firm’s application to cease to act for the Plaintiff but to refund the RM50,000 already paid. This would be fair to the Plaintiff who would have to engage a new lawyer for the full trial.	30/11/2023	YA Dato' Haji Akhtar Bin Tahir	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b0a4484b-510e-449a-8444-49336eb7e116&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - Alasan Au Kok huei edited.docx DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA BAHAGIAN SIVIL NO. GUAMAN SIVIL : WA-23CY-64-12/2020 ANTARA AU KOK HUEI (NO. K/P: 710716-10-5243) …PLAINTIF DAN 1. FATT KEE ROAST FISH SDN. BHD (NO. PENDAFTARAN: 201601042942 (1213884-X)) 2. CHENG SOON FATT (NO. K/P: 780628-14-5951) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN JUDGMENT Introduction 1. The Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm Tetuan Richard Tee & Chin (“the firm”) applied to discharge itself from representing the Plaintiff under Order 64 Rule 5 Rules of Court 2012 (“the Rules”). 30/11/2023 14:45:22 WA-23CY-64-12/2020 Kand. 62 S/N S0iksA5RmkSEREkzbrfhFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2. Order 64 Rule 5 of the Rules stipulates as follows: 5. Application by solicitor that he has ceased to act (O. 64 r. 5) (1) Where a solicitor who has acted for a party in a cause or matter has ceased so to act and the party has not given a notice of change in accordance with rule 1, or a notice of intention to act in person in accordance with rule 3, the solicitor may apply to the Court for an order declaring that the solicitor has ceased to be the solicitor acting for the party in the cause or matter, and the Court or the Court of Appeal or Federal Court, as the case may be, may make an order accordingly, but unless and until the solicitor serves on every party to the cause or matter (not being a party in default as to entry of appearance) a copy of the order, he shall, subject to the foregoing provisions of this Order, be considered the solicitor of the party till the final conclusion of the cause or matter, whether in the Court or the Court of Appeal or Federal Court. (2) An application for an order under this rule shall be made by a notice of application in Form 140 or, in the case of an application to the Court of Appeal or Federal Court, by motion, and the notice of application or notice of motion shall, unless the Court or the Court of Appeal or Federal Court, as the S/N S0iksA5RmkSEREkzbrfhFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal case may be, otherwise directs, be served on the party for whom the solicitor acted. The application shall be supported by an affidavit stating the grounds of the application. (3) An order in Form 141 made under this rule shall not affect the rights of the solicitor and the party for whom he acted as between themselves. (4) Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (1), where the legal aid certificate of an assisted person within the meaning of the Legal Aid Act 1971 [Act 26] is revoked or discharged, the solicitor who acted for the assisted person shall cease to be the solicitor acting in the cause or matter, and if the assisted person whose certificate has been revoked or discharged desires to proceed with the cause or matter without legal aid and appoints that solicitor or another solicitor to act on his behalf, rule 2 shall apply as if that party had previously sued or defended in person Factors leading to the application 3. The Court determined that the main factor leading to this Application as is stated in the Application itself is fall out between the Plaintiff and the counsels representing him. This stemmed from the fact that the counsels from the firm failed to appear at a mediation session to resolve the dispute which was fixed by the High Court. S/N S0iksA5RmkSEREkzbrfhFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4. The Plaintiff felt that the counsels were malingering when giving excuse for their non-appearance at the mediation session leading the Plaintiff making disparaging remarks against the firm. 5. At the hearing of the application the Plaintiff appeared in person and informed the Court that he had paid all the legal fees of the firm for the close of the pleadings and the case management stage. 6. For the full trial the agreed fees with the firm was RM150,000 of which the Plaintiff had already paid RM50,000. The full trial had yet to be commenced. Decision on the application 7. Going by the Rules the Court has been empowered to “make an order accordingly” for an application under Order 64 Rule 5 of the Rules 8. In this case as the trial has not commenced and the Plaintiff has already paid a part of the agreed fees in lieu of the full trial, the Court allowed the firm’s application to cease to act for the Plaintiff but to refund the RM50,000 already paid. This would be fair to the Plaintiff who would have to engage a new lawyer for the full trial. S/N S0iksA5RmkSEREkzbrfhFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Dated: 29.11.2023 sgd DATO’ HAJI AKHTAR BIN TAHIR Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur S/N S0iksA5RmkSEREkzbrfhFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PARTIES For the Plaintiff: Nama Peguamcara: Richard Tee; Caryn Shua Tetuan Richard Tee & Chin, Suite 5-2, Tingkat 2, Jalan 5/76B, Desa Pandan, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. For the Defendant: Nama Peguamcara: Foo Wen Cong Tetuan Foo & Chan S-15-13, Wisma YNH, Kiara 163, No. 8, Jalan Kiara, Mont Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur S/N S0iksA5RmkSEREkzbrfhFg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—23CY—6l—l2/202D Kano. 52 :«n,1_,:nn. 14 2:“ DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAVAH PERSEKIJTUAN MALAYSIA BAHAGIAN SIVIL NO. GUAMAN SIVIL wA-21cv-s4-12/2n2o ANTARA AU KOK HUEN (NO KIP 71o71e—1a—5243) PU-\lNT\F DAN 1 FATT KEE ROAST FVSH SDN EHD (NO PENDAI-‘FARAN. 2u1eo1u42942 (1213as4—x)) 2 CHENG soon FATT (NO KIP 7aos2a—14—5951) DEFENDANVDEFENDAN JUDGMENT lnlroduclion 1 The P\a\|n\|1ﬂ‘s cuunsra\'s mm Teman Rmnam Tee & cmn “me ﬁrm") apphed 11: discharge 1tse\f «mm represenhng the P\a\|nm under omerea Runs 5 Rules 0! Cuurl 2012 (‘me was’) sw sa1xsA5RmxsEREv.zmnFg 5, ‘Nat! s:.1.1M.1..m. 15.4 11 MW 1.. nVW\ruU\|Y m 111; nnmmgnl M munc Vin! 2 orderea Rule 5 dime Rules snpulales as lulluws 5. Applicaliun by solicilorlhzl ne nas ceased in act (0. 64 r. 5) (1) where a solicilpr wllu nas acted for a pariy in a cause or rnaller has ceased so in acl and me pariv has nol given a notice ulchange in accnrdance with rule 1. or a notice oi inlenlion In an in perspn in accordance wilh rule 3, one s r may apply lo ine Cuurﬂur an order declaring marine sn ior has ceased (0 be me so Dr acting lur lne party in me cause ur rnaner, and me courr or me courr oi Appeal in Federal court, as me case may he, may make an uvderaccuvdingly. but unless and unlil me so lor serves an every parly in me cause Dr rnaner lnol being a parry delault as in entry pl appearance) a copy dune order, he snail. supiecnp lne loregoine prov ns oi lnis order, he or oi lne parly Kill me nnal con ered ine s conclus on oi me cause or manner. wneiner in me coun or me Cuurl oi Appeal ur Federal Cnurl. (2) An applicaiion for an aide! under Ihis rule shall he made by a nolice oi applicalion in Forrn 140 or, n lne case oi an app calinn (0 me Cnurl pl Appeal ur Federal Cuurl. by rnolion. and me nolice oi applicaliun Dr notice pl mulinn snall, unless me coun urine Cuurl nfAppea\| ur Federal Cuurl. as me N saw.sA5RmxsEREv.zlmnFg New sen -nlhelwlll nausea Inve'WI-enllvlrullryu1vvlsnnm'll:nlv::FlLlNG Parul case may be, uirierwise directs. be served on me pariy lor wripiri irie spi siiaii be supporied by air amdavil siariiip irie r acied. nie ap greurids omie appiicariori. in) Ari order in Farm 141 rriade urider iriis ruie siiaii llul aneci are rigllls oi irie sulicilnr arid irie pariy ior wripiri he acted as becweeri lhemselves. (4) Nulwilllslalldillg ariyxriirig in paragraph (1). where nieiegai are mean llg uf irie Legal Aid Acl1!71 A912 cerimcaie ei an assisied perseri w s revuked or discharged. the so or who acted ipr me assisied perspri sriaii cease to be me s acling in me cause or rriaiier. and if me ass ied perspri wriose cerlﬂcale iias been revoked or charged de es in proceed wilh me cause or irianer without legal a d arid appoiriis mar so r In aci pri iiis peiiaii. rule 2 sria r erariorriers apply as ii rriar pariy riad previously sued or deieiided in person 3 Trie ceurideierrriiried rriai irie main iacior ieadirig no rriis Appiicaiiori as is siaied V7 irie Appiicaiiori iiseii is «an oui uerweeri me Piainim and me oeuriseis represeriririg riirri This sierrirried irorri me iaci ma: me oeuriseis from we iirrri iaiied in appear at a rriediaiiori session in reseive me dispure wriicri was ﬁxed by me Higri coun N $iksA.5RmkSEREkzDrV1FE we s.ii.i -my M“ as use: M mw r-. DVWVHMVIY m VH5 um”. V1 mum: Parui 4. The P\a\|n\|\|W «en mar me cdunsexs were mahngenng when gwrng excuse «er merr ndnappearance al \|he medlamm sessren Veadmg me P\am\|\|H makmg drsparagrng remarks agams\| me ﬁrm. 5. A\| me nearrng of me applrcanrdn \|he Plamml appeared m person and mfnrmed me com mar he had pard aH me Vega! lees do me nrm lur me close cf me meadmgs and me case management stage 6. For me mu max me agreed lees wrm me ﬁrm was RMI50,00D pi wmch me Plarrrmv had aheady pard RM5(l,000 The mu me! had ye\| ta be commenced n on me applicalion 7. Gumg py me Rmes me Cuun has been empewered up “make an order accord g " for an applrcaudn under order s4 R112 5 Mme Rmes a. In ums case as me man has not oummenced and me P\am\|\|H has aheady pard a pan OHHE agreed fees In men o1\|hefulHnal,1he com auewed me ﬁrm’: apphcamn re cease rd act lur me Plarnm em up remnd me RM5(l,00D already pard. 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P-02(NCvC)(W)-134-01/2020	PERAYU KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD RESPONDEN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD	mandatory injunction - caveat – remove of caveat - Specific Performance – fraud - beneficial and registered owner - Private Caveat - Memorandum of Transfer - limitation period under Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities and Protection Act 1948 (‘Act 198’) - doctrine of laches - limitation period under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘Act 254’) - statutory duties -“Nor Further Action/NFA” -section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 - Section 17 of the Contract Act 1950 - rightful owner – of the land - bankruptcy order)- of indoor management rule/ Turquand’s rule – declaratory - an indefeasible title under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code - purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration.	30/11/2023	YA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamKorumYA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin Abdullah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=05dda3cf-e880-4ab8-af6c-0d8858190934&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-39-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU (NO. SYARIKAT :11580 – P) DAN 1. PENGARAH PEJABAT TANAH DAN GALIAN PULAU PINANG 2. NG SEAH HUNG (NO. K/P:431206-07-5193) 3. NG SEAH HOCK (NP. K/P: 540808-07-5003) 4. SWISS LEISURE PRODUCTS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 178923-V) 5. LEOW TEOW HONG (NO. K/P: 521015-07-5069) 6. LIM TIAN HUAT 7. B. RAJADURAI 8. KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN INSOLVENSI MALAYSIA 30/11/2023 15:04:40 P-02(NCvC)(W)-134-01/2020 Kand. 157 S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 9. CARAWAN VENTURE SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT : 300744-U) 10. GEENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 869514-U) 11. YAP MOH YIN (NO. K/P: 5485519) 12. CHEN YEN MOOI (NO. K/P: 5485519) 13. KERK CHIN LIONG (NO. K/P: 8163803) 14. NG YIM KONG (LS 00088343)(NO. K/P: 490424-08-5883) … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-134-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 DAN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD … RESPONDEN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-135-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU DAN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD … RESPONDEN CORUM YAACOB HAJI MD SAM, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IBRAHIM, JCA AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH, JCA S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are three (3) related appeals before us which are as follows: i. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC)(W) - 39 - 01/2020 (“Appeal 39”); ii. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC(W)) - 134 - 01/2020 (“Appeal 134” ); and iii. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC)(W) - 135 – 1/2020 (“Appeal 135”). Appeal 39 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in dismissing the Appellant’s claim against the 1st Respondent, 2nd Respondent; 3rd Respondent, 4th Respondent, 5th Respondent, 6th Respondent, 7th Respondent, 9th Respondent, 8th Respondent, 10th Respondent, 11th Respondent, 12th Respondent, 13th Respondent and 14th Respondent and awarding costs of RM60,000.00 each to be paid by the Appellant to the respective R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R8, R13 and R14 herein. Appeal 134 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in allowing Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd (10th Respondent)’s claim against the Appellant with costs. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Appeal 135 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in allowing Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd (10th Respondent)’s claim against the Appellant with a total costs of RM80,000.00. Background facts [2] The Appellant (plaintiff) is a family-owned company incorporated by one, Ng Boon Kow, and after his demise on 31.5.1979, the following persons were the directors of the Appellant and remained as such until 30.05.1992: (a) Madam Tan Soo Lang @ Tan Choon Lian; (b) Ng Seah Hung (‘R2’); (c) Ng Seah Hock (‘R3’); (d) Ng Seah Kang; (e) Ng Seah Kheng; (f) Ng Seah Theam; (g) Ng Seah Hai (PW1); and (h) Oi Siah Cheng [3] Meanwhile, the Respondents in this case, can be identified as follows: Respondents/Defendants Remarks 1. Pengarah, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Pulau Pinang (‘D1’) (‘R1’) D1 is the Director of Land Mining Pulau Pinang. 2. Ng Seah Hung (‘D2’) (‘R2’) D2 is the former director of the plaintiff and was adjudgedbankrupt on 26.05.1989 . 3. Ng Seah Hock (‘D3’) (‘R3’) D3 is the former director of the plaintiff and was adjudged bankrupt on 10.03.1993. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 4. Syarikat Leisure Product Sdn. Bhd. “ (‘D4’) (‘R4’) D4 is a private limited company. 5. Leow Teow Hong (‘D5’) (‘R5’) 1. D5 is the Director of D4 and at all material times dealt with D2, D3, D6, D7, and D8. 2. D5 is also a shareholder in Powerama Holdings Sdn. Bhd, a shareholder of D4. 6. Lim Tian Huat (‘D6’) (‘R6’) 1. D6 is a Receiver and Manager of D4 and is also the Chairman of CLRC, Companies Commission of Malaysia; and 2. D6 was appointed as the Receiver and Manager of D4 on 16.04.1992. 7. B Rajadurai (‘D7’) (‘R7’) 1. D7 is an advocate and solicitor, practicing as such previously at Messrs. Durai & Associates, KL; 2. D7 was adjudged a bankrupt vide Adjudicating and Receiving Order dated 25.11.1999; and 3. The plaintiff had obtained the leave of Court vide Order of Court dated 09.03.2013 to bring and continue this action against D7. 8. Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Malaysia (D8)(‘R8’) 1. D8 is the Director General of the Department of Insolvency of Malaysia in Pulau Pinang, vested with the estates of D2 and D3; 2. D8’s officer having conduct of D2 and D3 estate was one N. Dharmasegaran. 9. Cerawan Venture Sdn. Bhd. (‘D9’)(‘R9’) 1. D9 is a private limited company; 2. The directors for D9 include Mr.Kalaiselvam a/l Suppiah and Philip a/l Eridianathan. Both were appointed as D9 directors on 07.03.2011; 3. Unfortunately, Kalaiselvan died on 05.03.2012. 10. Greentech Industries Sdn. Bhd. (‘D10’) (‘R10’) D10 is a private limited company. 11. Kerk Chin Leong (‘D13’) (‘R13’ D13 is the director of D4 appointed on/before 21.04.1990. D13 is also a shareholder of D4. 12. Ng Yim Kong (‘D14’) (‘R14’) 1. D14 was the former company secretary to the Plaintiff, appointed on 18.08.1995. 2. D14 was also the company secretary to D4, appointed on 28.11.1991. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [4] The subject matter in dispute, in this case, refers to the 2/3 portion of the land that belongs to the plaintiff which was transferred to R4 and subsequently transferred to R10. The title of the land has been changed several times as follows: (a) The land was held under Temporary Title No. H.S (D) 120, Mukim 14, Daerah Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang. was registered on 30.06.1978 under the plaintiff's name (‘HSD 120’); (b) HSD 120 subsequently became known as HS(D) 296 Mukim 14 Daerah Seberang Perai, Negeri Pulau Pinang, and the date of the issuance of this title is 11.06.1990 (‘HSD 296’); (c) Thereafter, HSD 296 became known as Title No. 1487 (Plot 7) Seksyen 3, Bandar Butterworth, Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang, Mak Mandin Industrial Estate Mukim 14 Daerah Seberang Perai (‘Lot 1487’); (d) Later, Lot 1487 was subdivided/partitioned and further issued under the separate document title as follows: PN 6708 Lot 6147 (2/3 portion of the land (‘Lot 6147’) registered under the name of D4 and after that D10); and PN 6709 Lot 6148 (1/3 portion of the land registered under the plaintiff) (‘Lot 6148’). S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (e) Subsequently, there was a further subdivision of Lot 6147 into six (6) Lots by D10 (Lot 10000, Lot 10001, Lot 10002, Lot 10004, Lot 10005 and Lot 10006). (The subject matter in dispute, in this case will be used interchangeably as 8.5 acres of the land or 2/3 portion of the land or Lot 6147) The Appeals The Appellant’s case [5] After the demised of Ng Boon Kow, R2 and R3 controlled and managed the Appellant. [6] Based on Clause 87 (b) of the Appellant's Article of Associations, a member of the board of directors ceases to hold office if he becomes bankrupt or is legally deprived of the administration of his estate. [7] R2 & R3 have been adjudged bankrupts on 26.05.1989 and 10.03.1993 respectively. [8] However, R2 as bankrupt has acted for the Appellant in the following matters: (a) on 26.09.1989, R2 entered into a sale and purchase agreement dated 26.09.1989 (‘S&P dated 26.09.1986’) (see pp. 142-155 of Ikatan Teras 1 of R6) with R4 for the sale of 8.5 acres of the land for the amount of RM 7.5 million; and (b) on 24.10.1989, R2 executed a memorandum of transfer Form 14A (‘MOT dated 24.10.1989') (see pp. 158-159 Ikatan S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Teras 1 of R6) for the Appellant to transfer 8.5 acres of the land to D4 (Swiss Leasure Products Sdn Bhd). The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was registered on 11.05.1990. [9] Appellant’s further alleged that on 30.05.1992, R2 had removed four of the Appellant’s directors which are Ng Seah Kang, Ng Seah Theam, Ng Seah Keng and Ng Seah Hai without their knowledge. R2 then appointed his wife and his daughter as the Appellant’s directors. [10] On 12.02.1994, R2, his wife, his daughter and one Gopalakrishnan entered into agreement with Merge Port (M) Sdn. Bhd. (‘Merge Port’), to sell another portion of the land to Merge Port for purchase price of RM24 million. This caused, the late Tan Soo Lang, the Appellant's director entered a caveat on the land on 08.07.1994. [11] On 14.09.1994, Tan Soo Lang also filed a motion No.: 25-57-94 against Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah Pulau Pinang and Merge Port, for an order that the registration of transfer executed in favour of Merge Port be cancelled and alternatively be declared as null and void. On 17.10.1994, the High Court allowed the said application. [12] The Appellant also commenced four (4) other lawsuits against R2 and R3 in 1994 and onwards. Appellant alleged that N. Dharmasegaran from R8 knew the lawsuits commenced by the Appellant against R2 and R3 because he appeared for R2 in all of the proceedings. [13] On 03.11.1994, Ng Seah Kheng lodged a police report alleging that his signature in the MOT dated 24.10.1989 was forged. (‘Police Report dated 03.11.1994’). S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [14] On 20.06.2001, the Appellant was wound up vide Court’s Order dated 20.06.2001. The Appellant’s solicitor had sent documents including the land titles, being assets of the Appellant to the Insolvency Officer. On 12.11.2010, the Appellant was released of its wound-up status vide Order of Court dated 12.11.2010. [15] On 04.07.2011, R10 filed Originating Summon No.: 24-1263-2011 against the Appellant for an order of mandatory injunction, that is to order the Appellant to remove all buildings, toilets and lamp posts, gates, and all erections on Lot 6147, (‘OS 1’). [16] As a result, the Appellant entered a caveat on Lot 6147 on 13.11.2011 (‘caveat dated 13.11.2011’). [17] Later, R10 filed another OS No. 24-118-01/2012 on 20.01.2012 to remove Appellant’s caveat dated 13.11.2011. R10 further claimed that he has purchased Lot 6147 (the 2/3 portion) through to Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 14.10.2009 executed between R10 and R9 (‘S&P dated 14.10.2009’)(‘OS2’). [18] The Appellant stated that upon perusing the cause papers of OS1 and OS2 filed by R10, the Appellant discovered the following: (a) The S&P dated 14.10.2009 made an express reference to the High Court of Penang Suit No. 22-783-2005 (‘Suit 783’) between R4, R5 and R13 through R6, who is appointed as Receiver and Manager of R4 according to the Deed of Debenture dated 22.09.1989(‘DOD dated 22.09.1989’) and R9; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (b) The Appellant later conducts a file search on Suit 783 and discovered that there was a court order dated 14.07.1999 for Specific Performance of the S&P dated 26.09.1989 obtained against the Appellant vide Originating Summons No. (MT4)-24- 1318-1998 (‘Suit 1318’) (‘Order dated 14.07.1999’) by R4 through R6. However, it was claimed that Order dated 14.07.199 was not served to the Appellant and the Appellant had no knowledge of such suit. (c) The Appellant later discovered that Suit 1318 was served to the Appellant through the substituted service to the address at 22nd Floor, Bangunan Peransang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur which is not the Appellant’s registered address at that material time; (d) Order dated 14.07.1999 also provides that all documents for the application to partition/subdivide the land shall be signed by the Senior Assistant Registrar if the Appellant failed to sign and hand over those documents within 30 days from the date of the order. However, the land was subdivided to Lot 6148 and Lot 6147 only on 25.02.2009 which is approximately 10 years after the date of the Order dated 14.07.1999; (e) Further, Order dated 14.07.1999 clearly stated that R4 was only entitled to 8.5 acres of the land but the title of Lot 6147 issued by D1 showed that 2/3 portion of the land is measured more than 8.5 acres; and S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (f) The Appellant also discovered that the whole land was mentioned as a fixed asset of R4 in the DOD dated 22.09.1989 in the event that the S&P dated 26.09.1986 was executed four (4) days after that. [19] Upon looking at all of the documents through a file search conducted in court, the Appellant stated that they only knew about the fraudulent transferred of their land and subdivision sometime in 2011. Thus, they alleged that fraud had been committed by all of the Respondents either by themselves alone or that they had conspired with other Respondents to defraud the Appellant which had caused the 2/3 of the portion of the land was fraudulently transferred to R4 and subsequently to R10 by R9. [20] As a result, the Appellant filed Civil Suit No. 21NCVC-13-03/2012 (Civil Suit 1) against all of the Respondents on 20.03.2012, primarily to recover 2/3 of the land which the Appellant alleged that had fraudulently transferred to R4 and subsequently to R10. [21] The Appellant claims that all of the Respondents have fraudulently and/or unlawfully conspired to defraud and injure the Appellant as the beneficial and registered owner of 2/3 portion of the land. [22] Wherefore, the Appellant seeks for the following declarations and reliefs (see paragraph 60 Amended Statement of Claim): (a) that the Appellant is the legal and beneficial owner of the 2/3 portions of the land formerly held under Lot 6147 and later subdivided into Lots No. 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (b) the Order of Court dated 14.7.1999 obtained by R4 in the High Court of Penang Originating Summons No. (MT4)-24-1318- 1998 be declared null and void and/or set aside; (c) that the R1 be ordered to do the necessary acts to put the Appellant as the registered owner of the 2/3 portion of land formerly held under Lot 6147; (d) that all subdivision of the land from Lot 6147 to Lots 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005 to be called and Lot 6147 to be reinstated with the Appellant as the registered owner; (e) that the Private Caveat Presentation Number 0799B201101293 dated 13.9.2011 lodged by the Appellant on Lots 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005 shall remain until the disposal of this matter; (f) the 10th Respondent be restrained by themselves and/or through their agents and/or employees and/or other from dealing with the said land in any manner whatsoever until disposal of this suit; (g) the R1 to R14 pay the Appellant damages for fraud and/or damages for conspiracy to defraud the Appellant; (h) The 10th Respondent rebuild and restore all buildings, toilet and lampposts and gates and all erections on the said land which S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 were demolished by the 10th Respondent and/or pay the equivalent value of the demolished buildings to the Appellant; (i) Damages for loss of use of land; (j) Costs; (k) Any other relief which this Honourable Court deems fit and proper. The Respondents’ case [23] In 1988, the Appellant was facing financial difficulties as its onion business was falling. Bangkok Bank notified the Appellant that if the Appellant failed to repay its outstanding loans, they will take legal action to enforce its securities under a Deed of Debenture and charges to impose the assets of the Appellant. [24] As a result, the Appellant’s directors and shareholders agreed to sell the entire land to one Ng Kok Lian, the Appellant’s closed relative (cousin) at the purchase price of RM 5,600,000.00, to repay the Appellant's loan with Bangkok Bank. [25] On the other side, Leow Teow Hong (‘R5/D5’ - shareholder in Powerama Holdings Sdn. Bhd) also shareholder of D4 was approached by Michael Cheong, Joachim Binder (‘Binder’) and Thomas Peter Polasek (‘Thomas’), whereby Thomas informed R5 of his intention to sell off and relocate plants and machinery from his company known as Royal Plastic SA in Switzerland into Malaysia and to explore the business opportunity in S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Malaysia. Thomas requested R5, Michael Cheong, and Binder's help to find a place or factory to operate a business. In consideration of that, Thomas had promised three of them the sum of money as a commission. Given that D4 was formed on 21.02.1989. [26] Somewhere in early 1989, R5 was introduced to Ng Kok Lian by Ng Kuang Boo, a bank officer at Chung Khiaw Bank. Ng Kok Lian informed R5 that the Appellant wanted to sell its land at a certain price. R5 however resigned from R4 on 05.06.1989. [27] Ng Kok Lian later informed the Appellant that R4 was interested to purchase the 2/3 portion of the land for the sum of RM 7,500,000.00 to be paid by way of the issuance of 1,000,000.00 shares of RM 1.00 each at par credit as fully in R4 and the balance of RM 6,500,000.00 to be paid vide Messrs. Durai & Associates. [28] As a result, R2 who is bankrupt acting on the advise of R7 (solicitors in Messrs. Durai & Associate) executed the S&P dated 26.09.1989 for the plaintiff with R4. According to R2, he had disclosed his status as a bankrupt to R7 and R3 and the S&P was executed for the benefit of the Appellant. [29] According to the S&P dated 29.09.1989, the Appellant is required to apply for the partition of the land and to obtain a separate document title to the 2/3 portion of the land. If the Appellant failed to do so, the whole land will be charged for the financing of the purchase of the property by R4. The Appellant had failed to apply for a separate title. [30] By a Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989 (‘Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989’), the lending banks agreed to grant R4 the term loan S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 facilities amounting to RM24,000,000.00 to finance D4’s purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land from the Appellant. As security for the repayment of facilities, R4 entered into a Deed of Debenture dated 22.09.1989 (‘DOD dated 22.09.1989’), whereby all of R4’s assets and properties, including the land were charged and/or pledge for a sum of RM 24,000,000.00. [31] On 11.10.1989, the 1st draw on the facilities for RM 17,100,000.00 was released by the lending banks to R4. R4 later paid the purchase price of 2/3 portion of the land to the Appellant in the manner as agreed by the parties. [32] On 13.10.1989, Messrs. Durai & Associates paid RM 5,600,000.00 to Bangkok Bank, the redemption sum for the land that was placed as securities by the Appellant. According to such redemption, Bangkok Bank charges over the entire land were discharged on 20.11.1989. The remaining purchase price was paid to Ng Kok Lian as a commission and the Appellant's shareholders accordingly. [33] R2 & R3 then executed MOT dated 24.10.1989 for the plaintiff to transfer 2/3 portion of the land to R4 and 1/3 portion of land back to the Appellant. The transfer was registered on 11.05.1990. [34] Under the terms of the Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989 and S&P, R4 and the Appellant created a charge dated 31.07.1990 over the land in favour of OBB and UAB which was registered on 01.08.1990, pending the partition of the land (‘Charge dated 31.07.1990’). [35] On 06.04.1990, R2 filed his statement of affairs to R8 (Insolvency Department). R3 also filed his statement of affairs with R8 on 12.01.1994. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [36] On 16.04.1992, D6 was appointed by the OBB as the Receiver and Manager (‘R&M’) of assets and properties of R4 under DOD dated 26.09.1989. Since his appointment, R6 had several times attempted to sell 2/3 portion of the land but the sales did not materialise since the land was not partitioned by the Appellant. [37] As a result, R4 through R6 commenced Suit 1318 against the Appellant for an order for Specific Performance. R4 through R6 tried to serve the cause papers of Suit 1318 to the Appellant by hand, but the Appellant’s registered address was changed. Therefore, R4 through R6 served the cause papers of Suit 1318 to the Appellant through a substituted service. An affidavit of service of the cause papers was filed to court by R4. R4 through R6 later obtained the Order dated 14.07.1999 which was also served to the Appellant’s registered address via substituted service. R4 did not proceed to execute the Court's Order dated 14.07.1999 because R4 was under receivership and it was not cost-effective for R4 to incur the considerable costs and expenses of partitioning the land when 2/3 of the portion was intended to be sold and realised. However, the attainment of the Court's order dated 14.07.1999 enable any prospective purchaser to undertake the obligation of applying for partition of the land. [38] R4 through R6 executed the Principal Agreement dated 11.11.2003, which was subsequently varied by the Supplemental Agreement dated 22.05.2005 with R9, for the sale of 2/3 of the land for a sum of RM 6,000,000.00. A dispute arose between R4 and R9 which resulted in the termination of the Principal Agreement dated 11.11.2003. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [39] The dispute between R4 and R9 was finally resolved. R4 and R9 later executed the S&P dated 05.10.2009 for the sale of 2/3 portion of the land for a sum of RM 6,000,000.00. [40] Under the S&P dated 05.10.2009, R9 undertakes the obligation to apply for the partition of the land. Following such an application, the 2/3 of land was partitioned into Lot 6147 and Lot 6148. [41] Later, R4 through R6 executed the Memorandum of Transfer dated 15.12.2009 (‘MOT dated 15.12.2009’) to transfer Lot 6147 to R10 as the nominee of R9 following the terms and conditions of the S&P dated 05.10.2009 and R9’s letter dated 03.11.2009. [42] On 04.07.2011, R10 as the registered owner of Lot 6147 filed OS1 against the Appellant for the trespass action. [43] On 26.07.2011, R10 subdivided Lot 6147 into six (6) Lots (Lot 10000 - Lot 10005). Subdivided titles were issued on 26.07.2011. R10 also transferred five (5) out of 6 Lots to the various purchasers. However, the transfer was not successful because of the private caveat dated 3.11.2011 entered by the Appellant [44] As a result, R10 filed OS2 against the Appellant for the removal of the caveat dated 13.11.2011. [45] On 18.05.2012, R10 obtained leave from the High Court for OS2 to be converted to writ action and known as Civil Suit 2. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [46] On 14.08.2012, R10 also obtained leave from the High Court for the OS1 to be converted to writ action and was known as Civil Suit 3. [47] It is the contentions of the Respondents that the Appellant’s claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13, and R14 is barred by the doctrine of laches and the limitation period of Section 2(a) of Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (PAPA) and under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1956 (Act 254). [48] The Respondents also contended that the Appellant had failed to prove the element of fraud or conspiracy to defraud against all of the Respondents and Lot 6147 of the land was not fraudulently transferred to R10, therefore, R10 is a bona fide purchaser and is protected with indefeasible title under Section 340 of the National Land Code. The High Court’s Proceeding [49] The High Court directed that, the Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3 be consolidated and be heard together with Civil Suit 1 and be determined accordingly. [50] On 20.12.2019, the learned High Court Judge allowed the R10’s claim against the Plaintiff for Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3. On the contrary, the High Court dismissed the Appellant’s claim against all of Respondents for Civil Suit 1. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Findings of the learned High Court Judge A. Civil Suit 1 [51] The learned Judge of the High Court (‘LJ’) dismissed the Appellant’s claim against all of the Respondents in Civil Suit 1 based on the following reason(s), inter alia: (a) The Appellant’s claim against R4, R7, and R9 was dismissed by the High Court with no order as to costs because: (i) the Appellant did not enter a judgment in default against D4 although D4 has never entered an appearance for the claim filed by the plaintiff. Although the Court has the discretion to hear the matter in the absence of D4, the plaintiff still carries a burden to prove the alleged fraud against D4. However, the plaintiff failed to do so (see paragraphs 200-208 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (ii) the Appellant is unable to pursue their claims against R7 because R7 is an undischarged bankrupt and received no sanction from the Director of Insolvency under Section 38 (1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 to defend himself against the action filed by the Appellant (see paragraphs 354-357 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); and S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (iii) the R9’s Statement of Defence was struck out by the High Court through the Court's Order dated 23.01.2017. However, the Appellant still carries a burden to prove the alleged fraud against R9, but the Appellant failed to do (see paragraphs 412 and 419 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment) (b) The Appellant, having known about the alleged fraud of S&P dated 26.09.1989 since 1994, that was when Tan Soo Lang entered a private caveat on 2/3 portion of the land, let 17 years pass by without initiating any legal steps (see paragraphs 124-129 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment). This caused: i. The Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the limitation period under Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities and Protection Act 1948 (‘Act 198’)(see paragraphs 131,138- 139,386,391 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); ii. The Appellant's claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14 is barred by the doctrine of laches and the limitation period under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘Act 254’) (see paragraphs 139,240,325-330, 391,455-459 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment) iii. Learned High Court judge hold that based on this ground alone, the Appellant’s claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14 is liable to be dismissed. However, for the sake of completeness, the learned High Court judge also discussed S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 the Appellant’s allegation of fraud and conspiracy to defraud against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14. (c) The Appellant failed to prove the element of fraud or conspiracy to defraud against all of the Respondents. The learned High Court judge held that: i. R1 was merely carrying out its statutory duties in registering the transactions and instruments presented before him. R1 also complied with its statutory duties in registering the application for subdivision and partition of the land. Moreover, the transactions and instruments presented by the respective parties before R1 for registration were complete and proper under the law. R1 has no duty under the law to investigate every detail of the documents presented before him for registration (see paragraphs 106, 115-119 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); ii. The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was signed, witnessed, and sealed by the Appellant when it was presented before R1 for registration (see paragraphs 106, and 107 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iii. The Appellant failed to prove the signature of Ng Seah Kheng in the MOT dated 24.10.1989 was forged (see paragraphs 527-531 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment): S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 a) Ng Seah Khung was not called as a witness before the court, thus adverse inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Appellant was invoked; b) No handwriting expert was called to give evidence on the signature of Ng Seah Kheng; and c) Ng Seah Kheng had withdrew his police report dated 03.11.1994 on 02.09.2006 and the matter was “Nor Further Action/NFA” by the police. iv. The Appellant had received the full payment of the sale of 2/3 portion of the land from R4 (see paragraph 522-526 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); v. The S&P dated 26.09.1989 executed by R2 on behalf of the Appellant is valid and enforceable because Section 127 of the Companies Act 1965 (‘Act 125’) does not prohibit a bankrupt to enter a contract on behalf of the company (see paragraphs 277-279 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); vi. R2, having known he was a bankrupt, had consulted and acted upon the advised of R7 when he executed S&P dated 26.09.1989 and MOT dated 24.10.1989. R2 also had obtained the consent of all the Appellant's directors to sell 8.5 acres of land to D4 to settle the Appellant's outstanding loan/debt amounting to RM 5.6 million with the Bangkok Bank. No evidence that the Appellant still owing the bank under the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 facilities obtained (see paragraphs 163 and 166 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); vii. R3, acting on the advised of R7 had executed both MOT dated 24.10.1989 and charge dated 31.07.1990 for the sole purpose of obtaining an amount of money to settle the Appellant’s outstanding loan/debt with Bangkok Bank and had no intention to cheat or defraud the plaintiff (see paragraphs 190-191 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); viii. Nothing stated in S&P dated 26.09.1986 that 2/3 portion of the land was lent to R4 to enable R4 to procure the loan facility amounting to RM 24,000.000 (see paragraph 537 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); ix. R5 was not involved in S&P dated 26.09.1989, MOT dated 24.10.1989, and charge dated 31.07.1989. The involvement of R5 was only to introduce R2 to Thomas. R5 resigned from his position as the R4’s director on 05.06.1989 (see paragraphs 253, 255, 273, and 275 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); x. Based on the evidence tendered before the High Court, the service of the Court’s Order dated 14.07.1999 by R4 through R6 was regular and duly served at the registered address of the plaintiff (see the paragraphs 343 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 xi. No document shows that R8 has knowledge of the S&P dated 26.09.1989, MOT dated 24.10.1989, and charge dated 31.07.1990. Based on Section 8 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, R8 shall be constituted as the receiver of the properties and assets of R2 and R3 and had nothing to do with the land which belongs to the Appellant (see paragraphs 398,400-403 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (d) Based on the evidence tendered, it was proven that the registered address of the Appellant was never changed by R14. The learned High Court reasonings are as follows: i. The address at Lot 102-3, 1st Floor Kompleks Antarabangsa, Jalan Sultan Ismail 50250 is the address of Signet & Co. Sdn. Bhd., a company secretarial firm wherein R14 was employed and not the Appellant’s registered address (see paragraph 564 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment; case Summit Co (M) Sdn Bhd v Nikko Products (M) Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 68 FC); ii. During the tenure of R14 with the plaintiff from 04.09.1995 until 12.08.2011, the registered address of the Appellant remained on the 22nd Floor, Bangunan Perangsang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur (see paragraph 561 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iii. The Appellant’s registered address at 22nd Floor, Bangunan Perangsang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur remains unchanged until the lodgment of the Notice S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 in Form 44 made on 12.08.2011 by the Appellant’s new secretary, notifying the Registrar of Companies that the Appellant’s registered address was changed to No. 40-B, 2nd Floor, Jalan Lumut, Damai Kompleks, Kuala Lumpur (see paragraph 562 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); and iv. It is a settled law that the effective date of change of the registered address of a company is the date of lodgment of the notice in Form 44 to the Registrars of the Company. However, there was nothing in the bundles placed before the High Court which showed that R14 signed Form 44 affecting a change of the Appellant’s registered address (see paragraphs 565-567 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (e) Lot 6147 was not fraudulently transferred to R10, therefore, R10 is a bona fide purchaser of Lot 6147 and is protected with indefeasible title under Section 340 of the National Land Code. The learned High Court judge held that: i. The Appellant failed to prove that Lot 6147 was fraudulently transferred from R4 through R6 to R10; ii. D10 had purchased Lot 6147 at the market value fixed by the valuer (‘SD13’) appointed by the OCBC Bank; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 iii. The Appellant also failed to prove that D10 had fraudulently subdivided Lot 6147 (see paragraphs 468-473 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iv. As of 25.02.2009, Lot 6147 was registered under R4 not R10 as alleged by the Appellant (see paragraphs 477-478 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment). B. Civil Suit 2 & Civil Suit 3 [52] Meanwhile, the basis for the learned High Court judge allowed R10’s claim against the Appellant in Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3 are as follows: (a) since the land belongs to R10, the plaintiff has no caveatable interest in the land. As a such the entry of caveat by the Appellant on Lot 6147 is improper and ought to be struck out (see paragraphs 491-492 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (b) given that the registered owner of Lot 6147 is R10, the Appellant's action of erecting constructions on the land is considered a trespass on R10 rights over the land (see paragraphs 405-498 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment). S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 The Appeal [53] Aggrieved with the decision, on 17.01.2020, the Appellant filed notices of appeal to this Court against the whole decision of the High Court dated 20.12.2019. This Court directed for these three appeals be heard and determined together. [54] Essentially, there were six main grounds of appeal listed by the Appellant in Memorandum of Appeal dated 17 March 2020 and Supplementary Memorandum of Appeal dated 25 July 2020: (a) the learned High Court Judge erred in law and in finding of fact in holding that there is no fraud or conspiracy to defraud by the Respondents against the Appellant; (b) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim is barred by Limitation Act 1953; (c) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948; (d) the learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents is barred by laches; (e) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 is applicable against the Appellant and that the 2/3 portion of the land has been purchased for valuable consideration and in good faith; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (f) whether based on the facts and evidence, the decision of the High Court is correct in law. Our findings (a) The learned High Court Judge erred in law and in finding of fact in holding that there is no fraud or conspiracy to defraud by the Respondents against the Appellant [55] The law on fraud and conspiracy to defraud is trite. [56] Section 17 of the Contract Act 1950 stipulates that: “Fraud” includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of any fact by one can having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to fraudulent. Explanation – Mere silence as to the facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.” [57] In PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136 the Federal Court held: “Whether fraud exists is a question of fact, to be decided upon the circumstances of each particular case. Decided cases are only illustrative of fraud. Fraud must mean “actual fraud, i.e. dishonesty of some sort” for which the registered proprietor is party or privy. “Fraud is the same in all courts, but such expressions as ‘constructive fraud’ are…inaccurate;” but “fraud”…implies a willful act, on the part of one, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by unjustifiable means, of what he is entitled.” (per Romily M.R. in Green v Nixon (1857) 23 Beav 530 535 53 ER 208). Thus in Waimiha Sawmilling Co Ltd v Walone Timber Co Ltd [1926] AC 101 & 106 it was said that “if the designed object of a transfer be to cheat a man of a known existing right, that is fraudulent…”. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [58] In CIMB Bank Bhd v Veeran a/l Ayasamy [2015] 7 CLJ 289 the Court of Appeal held as follows: “The element of fraud and/or conspiracy must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. There must be something more than mere failure or an omission on the part of the third defendant. There can never be fraud and/or conspiracy cannot exist, where the intent to deceive does not exist.” [59] Thus, it is trite law the burden of proving a claim of conspiracy to defraud the Appellant against the Respondents remained at all time on the Appellant (see S. 101 Evidence Act 1950, Tow Kong Liang & Yang lain v Fbo Land (Setapak) Sdn Bhd [2018] 1 LNS 243 CA). [60] On elements of tort of conspiracy, the Court of Appeal in Renault Sa v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Appeals [2015] 5 CLJ 32 stated as follows: “In regard to the tort of conspiracy, the following need to be satisfied at the interlocutory stage: (a) an agreement between two or more persons (that is an agreement between Tan Chong and others); (b) an agreement for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 (c) that acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to Inokom and Quasar; (d) damage is essential element and where damage is not pleaded in the Statement of Claim may be struck out (see Yap JH v Tan Sri Loh Boon Siew & Ors [1991] 3 CLJ 2960; [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 243).” [61] In SCK Group Bhd & Anor v Sunny Siew Pang & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 389, [2011] 4 MLJ 393, the Court of Appeal stated that: “The tort of conspiracy was not constituted by conspiratorial agreement alone. For conspiracy to take place, there must also be an unlawful object, or if not in itself unlawful, it must be brought by unlawful means : See Davies v Thomas [1920] 2 Ch 189 per Warrington LJ, and Seah Siang Mong v Ong Ban Chai & Another Case [1998] 1 CLJ Supp 295 per Ghazali J (now FCJ). There must be a co-existence of an agreement with an over act causing damage to the plaintiffs. Hence, the tort is complete only if the agreement is carried into effect, thereby causing damage to the plaintiff. On order to succeed in a claim based on tort of conspiracy, the plaintiffs must establish: (a) an agreement between two or more persons; (b) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff; and (c) acts done in the execution of that agreement resulted in damage to the plaintiff: Marrinan v Vibart [1962] 1 All ER 869 at p. 871 per Salmon J; and Halsbury’s Law England (4th Ed) Vol 45 at p 271, as applied by Ghazali (now FCJ) in Seah Siang Mong.” S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [62] Guided by the clear settled principle of law enunciated in those authorities, the conspiracy must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that: (a) there is an agreement between any of the Respondent or between all the Respondents; (b) the predominant purpose of the agreement being for the purpose of injuring the Appellant; and (c) the fraudulent acts were committed in executing the agreement for the purpose of injuring the Appellant. [63] In Sinnayah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584 the Federal Court explained the standard of proof for fraud in a civil claim as follows: “As the correct principle to apply…where it was stipulated that at law, there are only two standard of proof, namely beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases and on the balance of probabilities for a civil cases. As such, even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. There is no third standard. Therefore, it is up to the presiding judge, after hearing and considering the evidence adduced as being done in any other civil claim, to find whether the standard of proof has been attained. The criminal aspect of the allegation of fraud and the standard of proof required is irrelevant in the deliberation.” S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 [64] Coming back to this case. The pivotal issue in this case concerns the validity of the S & P dated 26.9.1989 executed for the Appellant with R4 by R2 who was a bankrupt. Also on the validity of the MOT executed by R2 and R3 on 24.10.1989 (‘MOT dated 24.10.1989') for the Appellant to transfer 8.5 acres of the land to R4. The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was registered on 11.05.1990. Appellant also contended that the S&P and MOT were executed without the Appellant’s knowledge and approval. [65] R2 was the Managing Director and Director in the Appellant until he was declared bankrupt on 26.5.1989. R2 is the second largest shareholder in the Appellant. It was contended by the Appellant that Article 87(b) Article of Association of the Appellant disqualify any director from continuing holding the position as director in the Appellant once he is adjudged as a bankrupt. Thus, it was argued by the Appellant that R2 has no capacity or authorization and acted under fraud in signing the S & P on behalf of the Appellant after he was declared as a bankrupt. It is not in dispute that all the Appellant’s directors appointed in 1979, including R2 remained as such until 1995 when new directors appointed to take charge of the Appellant. [66] R3 was a director of the Appellant from 1979 to 1996. The second MOT for Lot 6148 was executed on 24.10.1990 by R3 together with one Ng Seah Keng who is also the Appellant’s director. R3 was declared bankrupt on 10.3.1993. He was discharged from bankrupt on 28.6.2010. [67] It is not in dispute that R2 and R3 managed and controlled the business of the Appellant since 31.5.1979 and made all decisions for the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 Appellant. This practice was accepted without protest by the rest of the directors and shareholder of the Appellant. This was admitted by Ng Seah Hai (PW1), the sole witness of the Appellant under cross-examination by R6’s counsel – “DC6 : Now you also testified that D2 (R2) and D3 (R3) manage and make all decisions for the Plaintiff (Appellant) from 1979 without consulting or informing the rest of the directors or shareholders. You agree? PW1 : Yes. DC6 : Therefore, these decisions were made unilaterally by D2 and D3 without consultation, without resolution? PW1 : Yes.” [68] It is also not in disputed that the Appellant’s land was subject to legal charges in favour Bangkok Bank, registered vide Presentation No. 6426/78 Jil 127 Folio 127, Presentation No. 5304/83 Jil 267 Folio 52 and Presentation No. 5305/83 Jil 267 Folio 53, as security for the facilities obtained by the Appellant. In 1988 the Appellant was facing financial difficulties as its onion business was failing and the Appellant defaulting its loans. Bangkok Bank notified the Appellant that if the Appellant fails to repay its outstanding loans, the bank will take legal action to enforce its securities under the Deed of Debenture and to foreclose the charged lands. To avoid the risk of losing the lands, the directors and shareholders agreed to sell the land to their close relative Ng Kok Lian at a price of RM5.6 million, as to repay Appellant’s outstanding loans with Bangkok Bank. Following that, Ng Kok Lian then informed the Appellant that R4 had offered to buy the land at a purchase price of RM7.5 million to be paid S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 by way of the issuance of 1,000,000 shares of RM1.00 each at par to the Appellant and the balance purchase price to be paid to Messrs Durai & Associates. On 26.9.1989, the Appellant and R4 entered the S&P for the sale of the 2/3 portion of the land for purchase price of RM7.5 million. [69] It is to be noted that clause 3.03(a) of the S & P requires the Appellant to apply for partition of the land but in the event the Appellant is unable to procure a separate document of title to the 2/3 portion of the land, the whole of the title will be charged for the financing of the purchase by R4. In such instance, R4 shall be authorized to sign all documents for partitioning and surrender the title to the issuing authority for a new document of title for the 2/3 portion of the land. [70] On 13.10.1989, Messrs Durai & Associates issued a letter to Bangkok Bank forwarding the redemption sum payment. Pursuant to the redemption payment, Bangkok Bank charges over the land were discharged on 20.11.1989. This was acknowledged by the Appellant vide its letter dated 6.6.1990 to Messrs. Durai & Associates. On 19.1.1994, Messrs. Durai & Associates conforming the Appellant on the due completion of payment of purchase price. The learned High Court judge accepted that there was evidence of payment of the purchase price by R4 for the purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land (see paras 21-22, 150, 168 Grounds of Judgment). [71] The Appellant’s cause of action is premised on the underlying assumption that the Appellant is the rightful owner of the 2/3 portion of the land known as Lot 1487. The Appellant’s case is that the S & P dated S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 26.9.1989 entered for the Appellant by R2 who was a bankrupt, with R4 was without Appellant’s resolution to sell the 2/3 portion of the land and without the knowledge of the rest of the directors of the Appellant. The Appellant further alleged that the 2/3 portion of the land that was transferred to R4 and subsequently by R6 (the Manager and Receiver of R4) to R9 and later by R9 to R10 were procured fraudulently. It was contended by the Appellant that R4 and R5 had conspired with R2, R3, and R7 to fraudulently enter into the S & P dated 26.9.1989. Several authorities were cited to support the Appellant’s argument: PJTB Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136, CIMB Bank Berhad v Abdul Rafi a/l Abdul Razak & Ors [2012] MLJU 804, Yap Sau Choon @ Yap Bee Yong & Anor v Cheong Hong Mun & Ors [2016] MLJU 1203. Appellant had relied heavily on the evidence of PW1 (Ng Seah Hai) as its main witness. However, PW1 admitted that he had no personal knowledge over the S & P, MOT and the chargers and only averred relating the fraud or conspiracy based on what he heard from his mother and his brother Ng Seah Kheng. As such, the evidence of PW1 (Ng Seah Hai) are at best, hearsay and we find that that learned High Court judge was correct in not giving such evidence any weight. [72] Coming back to the position of R2, any party dealing with the Appellant, including R4, the OBB (bank) as chargee, R6, R9 and R10 could not have known that R2 had ceased to be a director of the Appellant with effect from 26.5.1989 (bankruptcy order) and were entitled to assume that R2 had the apparent or ostensible authority to execute the S&P, MOT and charge on behalf of the Appellant. R2 was allowed to continue remain in control of the management and affairs of the Appellant until 1995 without any protest of the Appellant or any other directors of the Appellant. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 The Appellant ought to be estopped from now suggesting that R2 lacks of authority to act for the Appellant. The learned High Court judge held, and we agree, that by virtue of indoor management rule/ Turquand’s rule, and as enshrined under sections 20(1) and 127 of the Companies Act 1965 (now repealed by Companies Act 2016), the act of R2, in realizing the charged dan selling the 2/3 portion of the land to settle the Appellant’s outstanding loan arrears with Bangkok Bank was valid (see Grounds of Judgment paras 335 – 337). On the facts of this case, we find that Turquand rule as decided in Royal British Bank v Turquand [1843-60] All EE 435, applies: “Persons dealing with the company were bound to make themselves acquainted with the statute and the deed of settlement of the company, but they were not bound to do more; a person, on reading the deed of settlement, would find, not a prohibition against borrowing, but a permission to borrow on certain conditions, and, learning that the authority might be made complete by a resolution, he would have right to infer the fact of a resolution authorizing that which on the fact of the document appeared to be legitimately done; and therefore, the company was liable whether or not a resolution had been passed.” [See also Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 465 FC]. [73] On the issue of authority or lack thereof of the R2, we can do no better than to reproduce the following excerpt from the judgment in Phang S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 Tat Meng t/a Tat Meng Company v Reka Cipta Solusi Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 LNS 88, the court held: “35. On the facts herein, the Defendants pointed that the fraud alleged by the Plaintiff is plainly answered by s. 127 of the Company Act 1965 which reads: ‘127. Validity of acts of directors and officers The acts of director or manager or secretary shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification.’ 36. Reading ss 125(1) and s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 together, I am of the view that the statute contemplates only a penalty to be imposed on undischarged bankrupt who has acted on behalf of the company but the statute does not avoid contracts entered into by him on behalf of the company such as the case of the Consent Judgment herein. (para 77 GOJ). 37. Accordingly, provision in s.127 of the Companies Act 1965 is my view sufficient to negate the fraud argument raised by the Plaintiff in attempt to set aside the Consent Judgment. It is plain and obvious to me that the Plaintiff’s action is hence unsustainable. Be that it may, the Plaintiff has also not adduced any evidence in the affidavits to illustrate how the Plaintiff was prejudiced or unduly influenced by the alleged fraud by deception through the non revelation or concealment of his S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 bankruptcy by the bankrupt director. It must be borne in my mind that the First Defendant as a company is a separate legal entity from its directors and shareholders. 38. For completeness, I further hold that s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 herein override the common law specie of fraud due to concealment of material …”. [74] In Stem Resources Sdn Bhd v Kekal Lestari Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi [2013] 10 CLJ the court held- “(1) Perbuatan SP2 menandatangani perjanjian tersebut tidak menjejaskan kesahan dan kesahihan perjanjian tersebut menurut kuasa peruntukan s. 127 Akta Syarikat 1965 (Akta 125). Seksyen 127 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan apa-apa perbuatan seseorang pengarah, pengurus atau setiausaha walaupun kemudiannya didapati ada kecacatan pada pelantikan atau kelayakannya. Seksyen 127 terpakai apabila terdapat pelantikan yang defektif seperti yang berlaku dalam hal pelantikan SP2 melalui resolusi bertarikh 15 Jun 2004. D1 dan D2 tidak boleh menyatakan perjanjian tersebut terbatal kerana s. 127 Akta 125 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan perbuatan SP2 menandatatangani perjanjan tersebut dan dengan perjanjian itu, perjanjian yang ditandatangani adalah sah dan mengikat defendan (see para 278 GOJ).” (See also Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Choo Meng Chong & Anor [1999] 7 CLJ 300, Re Chua Tin Hong Ex Parte Castrol (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 174). S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 [75] Learned counsel for the Appellant was unable to cite any authority, on the contrary, to support her arguments that the S & P is invalid due R2’s lack of authority to act for the Appellant. Thus, it is our considered view that the learned High Court judge did not erred in holding that the S & P dated 26.9.1989 is a valid and enforceable agreement. [76] R6 particularly was appointed as Receiver & Manager (R&M) of R4 on 16.4.1992. The Facility Agreement, S & P, Deed of Debenture and Charge had all been entered into and executed by the Appellant with R4 prior to the appointment of R6. R4 was no longer the registered or beneficial owner of the 2/3 portion of the land with effect from 5.12.2009 following the transfer of ownership to R10. R6 ceased to be the R&M of the R4 on 27.12.2010. The subdivision of Lot 6147 which led to the issuance of titles Lot 10001 – Lot 10005 was applied by R10, and after R6 had ceased his responsibilities and duties as R&M of R4 with effect from 27.12.2010. [77] In RHB Bank Berhad v Ali bin Abdul Kadir and Anor [2005] 1 LNS 391, the court held that the 2nd defendant-bank had no cause of action against the receiver and managers whose duty is limited to enforcing the security and the subject contract for sale of goods was entered into prior the appointment of the receiver and managers, no liability can be attached to receiver and managers by virtue section 183 of the Companies Act. [78] Coming back to this case, the learned High Court judge held that R6 cannot be found guilty or liable to the Appellant for exercising his duties in good faith by enforcing the security in favour of OBB, which includes the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 sale and transfer of the 2/3 portion of the land and well supported by section 183(1) of the Companies Act (see para 345-346 of Grounds of Judgment). Thus, it is impossible for R6 to be said that have been involved in any fraud or conspiracy to defraud the Appellant. The learned High Court judge held, and we agree, that the Appellant was not even able to establish that R6 knew the other Respondents, let alone that any agreement was reached between them to defraud and injure the Appellant (see paras 338-339 Grounds of Judgment). [79] The learned High Court judge held that the Appellant had failed to discharge its burden of proving, on a balance probabilities, the basic element of a claim for fraud or conspiracy to defraud and injure the Appellant. Having considered the evidence in totality, the learned High Court judge made the following findings : “485. Daripada apa yang dinyatakan, Mahkamah dapati bahawa elemen-elemen frod tidak dipatuhi oleh Plaintif, begitu juga dengan kospirasi seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. 486. Mahkamah dapati dari segi frod dan/atau kospirasi untuk memfrodkan Plaintif, Plaintif gagal membuktikannya atas imbangan kebarangkalian. 487. Dalam tindakan ini Mahkamah dapati Plaintiff gagal membuktikan frod dan/atau kospirasi memfrodkan ke atas Plaintif, maka dengan transaksi-transaksi untuk pindahmilik tanah tersebut merupakan transaksi yang bebas dari isu frod seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. Defendan Kesepuluh telah S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 memberi balasan memberi balasan yang sepenuhnya kepada Defendan Kesembilan. 488. Maka dengan itu, Defendan Kesepuluh di dalam tindakan ini merupakan pembeli bona fide ke atas tanah tersebut daripada Defendan Kesembilan.” [80] The learned High Court judge found no credible evidence that there was in existence of fraud or conspiracy to defraud by any of the Respondents on the Appellant. Her Ladyship had considered the testimonies, the contemporaneous documents and the whole circumstances and probabilities of the case (Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229). We had carefully perused the grounds of judgment of the learned High Court judge. We find that there is no appealable error to warrant any appellate interference on the findings. (b) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim is barred by Limitation Act 1953 [81] Respondents had expressly pleaded that they were relying on the Limitation Act and laches as a defence (paragraph 42 p. 462 6th Respondent’ Core Bundle of Documents (Vol.1)(Encl. 203 o Appeal Records)). For any action that is based upon fraud or conspiracy to defraud of the defendant or his agent, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant discovered the actual fraud in 2012 after the Appellant saw the Deed of Debenture dated S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 22.9.1889 and the High Court Order dated 14.9.1999 for Specific Performance of the S & P dated 26.9.1989. Thus, the Appellant’s claim is not barred by Limitation Act 1953 or laches. PW1, the Appellant’s sole witness admitted that the directors and shareholders of the Appellant first knew or discovered the alleged fraud in relation to the sale and purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4 since 8.7.1994 when Tan Soo Lang entered a private caveat on the 2/3 portion of the land. [82] The learned High Court judge in her grounds of judgment had considered this issue and made the following findings: “380. Alasan permohonan Tan Soo Lang untuk memasukkan kaveat persendirian (Ikatan B3 muka surat 574 – D264) dengan alasan seperti berikut” “alasan-alasan tuntutan saya atas tanah/kepentingan itu ialah berdasarkan tanah itu adalah kepunyaan syarikat Kim Guan Choong Sdn. Bhd. Dan sebahagian tanah itu sedang dijual secara frod dan sebahagian lagi telah dijual secara frod. 381. Menurut Surat Akuan dari Tan Soo Lang di dalam permohonan untuk kemasukan kaveat persendirian beliau, beliau mengaku bahawa kaveat tersebut dimasukkan bagi pihak Plaintif. Beliau merupakan pemegang saham dan Pengarah asal Syarikat Plaintif tersebut. 382. Jadi dari keterangan yang dikemukakan, saya dapati kali pertama Plaintif ketahui yang penjualan 2/3 bahagian Lot 1487 S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 yang dikatakan dilakukan secara frod itu telah diketahui oleh Plaintif sejak 8.7.1994 lagi.” (emphasis added) [83] PW1 further admitted that despite the alleged fraud in 1994, there is no legal action taken by the Appellant to recover or challenge the validity of the S&P, MOT and the creation and registration of the charge and the transfer of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4 until this action was filed by the Appellant against all the Respondents. [84] The Appellant’s action herein was filed in March 2012, which is more than 18 years from the first discovery of the alleged fraud. As such, it is clearly that the Appellant’s claim for the discovery of the 2/3 portion of the land is barred by limitation pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953 and section 29 of the Act. [85] Section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 stipulates that- “9(1) No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him, or if it first accrued to some person through whom he claim, to that person.” [86] Section 29 of the Act provides postponement of limitation period in case of fraud or mistake, as follows- S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 “29. Where, in case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either- (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims as aforesaid; or (b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the case may be, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it: Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any action to be brought to recover, or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which- (i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that any fraud had been committed; or (ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration, subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made, by S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 a person who did not know or have reason to believe that mistake had been made.” [87] The learned High Court judge held that the Appellant’s action is barred by section 9 read and section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953. Her Ladyship held as follows: “237. Mahkamah ini dapati tarikh 8.7.1994 (sic) inilah Plaintif ketahui tentang frod yang didakwa oleh Plaintif dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam penjualan 2/3 bahagian tanah tersebut kepada Defendan Keempat. 238. Tindakan ini difailkan pada bulan Mac 2012. 239. Manakala kali pertama Plaintif tahu tentang apa yang dikatakan frod dilakukan terhadap Plaintif adalah pada 8.7.1994. Ini bermakna selepas 18 tahun lebih Plaintif mendapat tahu tentang frod barulah Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan Kelima. Ini adalah jelas menujukkan yang Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa 12 tahun dari tarikh 8.7.1994 untuk Plaintif menuntut terhadap Defendan Kelima. Jadi, Mahkamah dapati atas isu had masa ini Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa untuk menuntut terhadap Defendan Kelima. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 240. Dengan itu, Mahkamah dapati tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kelima telah dihalang oleh had masa mengikut Seksyen 9 dan Seksyen 29 Akta Had Masa 1953 dan dengan itu tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kelima ditolak dengan kos.” [88] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on this issue, we find that the learned High Court judge is perfectly correct in holding that the Appellant’s action against the Respondents, likewise, is barred pursuant to section 9 and section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953 (see Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32 FC, Nadefinco Ltd v Kevin Corporation Sdn Bhd [1978] 2 MLJ 59 FC, Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409). We find no appealable error of law or fact in the findings of the learned judge which was based on evidence. (c) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 [89] It was contended by R1 and R8 that the Appellant’s action against R1 and R8 is barred pursuant to section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Act 198). For the Appellant, it was argued that R1 has statutory power to investigate the validity of the MOT and the application for subdivision of Lot 1487 and should not allowed the applications pending their investigation. The case of Goh Seng Chue & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Hulu Selangor and Ors [2017] MLJU 1390 was cited to support the argument. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 [90] We reproduce Section 2 of the Act which provides as follows- “Where, after the doming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuant or execution or intended execution of any written law on of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provision shall have affect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuation of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof.” [91] Section 38 of the Act provides- “Limitation of actions Any written law relating to the limitation of time for bringing proceedings against public authorities may be relied upon by the Government as a defence in any civil proceedings against the Government.” [92] In Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409, the court held – S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 “The limitation law is promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiffs from sleeping on their actions and more importantly to have a definite end to litigation. The rationale of the limitation law should be appreciated and enforced by the Courts.” [93] In Selvarajoo Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor [2006] 2 CLJ, the Court of Appeal held- “The provision of s. 2(a) PAPA 1948 and very clear and do not provide for any court discretion as they are mandatory in name.” [94] In Tasja Sdn Bhd v Golden Approach Sdn Bhd [2011] 3 CLJ 751, the Federal Court held- “If it is based on Section 2(a) of the Public Protection Act 1948 or Section 7(5) of the Civil Law Act 1956, where the period of limitation is absolute then in a clear and obvious case such application should be granted without having to plead such a defence. However, in a situation where limitation is not absolute, like in a case under the Limitation Act, such application for striking out should not be allowed until and unless limitation is pleaded as required under section 4 of the Limitation Act 1953.” [95] The Appellant’s action herein was filed in March 2012, which is more than 18 years from the first discovery of the alleged fraud. As such, it is clearly that the Appellant’s action against R1 and R8 being a public S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 authorities and acted in the performance of its public duty i.e. accepted and registered the MOT dated 24.10. 1989 and the Specific Performance Order dated 14.7.1999 for the subdivision of Lot 1487, is barred by limitation pursuant to section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Act 198)(Revised 1978). We agree with the learned High Court judge that R1 has no duty to enquire further on Form 14A that is fit for registration pursuant to section 301 of the National Land Code (Hamdan bin Jaafar & Ors v Osman bin Mohamed & Ors [2012] 1 LNS 1108). [96] We also agree with the learned judge on her findings that the Appellant’s action on R1 and R8 is barred pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953. (d) The learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents is barred by laches [97] The doctrine of laches was succinctly explained by His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd [1989] 2 MLJ 202 as follows: “Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a claim. A court of equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by laches. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches the court considers whether there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part and any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant. The doctrine of laches rests on the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 consideration that it is unjust to give a plaintiff a remedy where he has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though not waiving the remedy put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if remedy were afterwards to be asserted : 14 Halsbury’s Law of England (3rd Ed) paras 1181, 1182. Laches has been succinctly described as ‘in action with one’s eyes open’.” [98] Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 provides as follow- “Nothing in this Act shall effect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence laches or otherwise.” [99] Despite being aware since July 1994 of the sale of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4, the Appellant did not take any timely action to recover the 2/3 portion of the land or set aside R4’s registered ownership of the 2/3 portion of the land or the charge created in favour of OBB over the land. There is undue delay of more than 18 years on the part of the Appellant in filing this action. During the period of delay, R6 had in his capacity as R&M and agent of R4 and in the believe that the Appellant did not intend to make any claim in respect of the 2/3 portion of the land, altered the position of R4 to its detriment by selling the 2/3 portion of the land to R9, paying the redemption sum to OUB, as registered charge, for the discharge of the charge registered and transferred the 2/3 portion of the land into the name of R9’s nominee, R10. The issue of laches was raised by R10 in their defence to the Appellant’s claim. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 [100] In Faber Merlin (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Lye This Sang & Anor and Tan Kim Chua Realty (M) Sdn Bhd v Lye Thai sang & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 380, the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of laches and found that the plaintiffs were estopped because they were guilty of laches in that since 1978, although the plaintiffs knew that the acts of the defendant were contrary to the agreement, no action had been taken against the defendant until 23 May 1983 where the plaintiff filed an originating summons against the defendant praying to declaratory judgment. The court refused to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief on the grounds that there was evidence of “laches, acquiescence and delay.” (see also: Wu Shu Chen (Sole Executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased) & Anor v Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Hussin [1997] 2 MLJ 487; Soon Poy Yong @ Soon Puey Yong v Westport Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 1 MLJ 196). [101] The learned High Court judge had addressed on the issue of laches and made the following findings- “459. Di dalam kes semasa ini, pihak Plaintif setelah apa yang didakwa sebagai pindahmilik 2/3 bahagian Lot 1487 dikatakan dibuat secara frod telah diketahui oleh Plaintif sejak tahun 1994 lagi, maka kegagalan Plaintif untuk mendakwa atas perlakuan frod itu setelah lebih kurang 18 tahun telah berlalu dari tarikh Plaintif mengetahui tentang apa yang dikatakan perlakuan frod itu menjadikan tuntutan ini tertakluk kepada doktrin kelewatan yang tidak munasabah. Maka Seksyen 32, Akta Had Masa 1953 akan S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 terpakai disini dan Mahkamah atas isu ini sahaja boleh menolak tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kesepuluh.” [102] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on the issue, we find that the learned High Court judge is perfectly correct in holding that the Appellant’s action is barred pursuant to doctrine of laches to defeat the Appellant’s declaratory relief (which is an equitable remedy) to recover the 2/3 portion of the land. We therefore find no basis to conclude that the judge was plainly wrong on the issue of laches. (e) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 is applicable against the Appellant and that the 2/3 portion of the land has been purchased for valuable consideration and in good faith by R4, R9 and R10. [103] Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the title registered under R4 and subsequently R10 was obtained by fraud and therefore defeasible and the proviso under section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 does not apply. Several authorities were cited to support the argument: Tan Yin Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 [2010] MLJU 10 FC, Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 4 CLJ 626 CA. The learned High Court judge held that R10 (subsequent purchaser) who had purchase the 2/3 portion of the land Lot 6147 from R9 (immediate purchaser) in good faith and for valuable consideration of RM8.5 million has acquired an indefeasible title under the provision of section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 and therefore the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 Appellant is precluded from seeking recovery of the 2/3 portion of the land from R10. [104] In this respect, the Federal Court decision in Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 is instructive. In departing from Adorna Properties, the Federal Court held that the rights and title of a subsequent purchaser who acquires a title in good faith and for valuable consideration from the purchaser, is indefeasible pursuant to the proviso under section 340(3) of the National Land Code (see also: Yap Ham Seow v Fatimawati Ismail & Ors and Another Appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 645). [105] In this respect, the learned High Court judge held- “488. Di dalam tindakan ini Mahkamah dapati Plaintif gagal membuktikan frod dan/atau konspirasi menfrod ke atas Plaintif, maka dengan itu transaksi-transaksi untuk pindahmilik tanah tersebut merupakan transaksi yang bebas dari isu frod seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. Defendan Kesepuluh telah memberi balasan yang sepenuhnya kepada Defendan Kesembilan. 489. Maka dengan itu, Defendan Kesepuluh di dalam tindakan ini merupakan pembeli bona fide ke atas tanah tersebut daripada Defendan Kesembilan.” S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 [106] We agree with the learned High Court that R10 being a subsequent purchaser who had purchased the 2/3 portion of the land from R9 and R9 who had purchased the same 2/3 portion of the land from R4 had obtained an indefeasible title under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code as it has proven that they were a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. We also agree with findings of the learned High Court judge that the Appellant had failed to rebut the evidence that R10 had purchased the 2/3 portion of the land from R9 in good faith and for valuable consideration of RM8,200,000.00 without any notice of the Appellant’s purported interest or rights in the 2/3 portion of the land. The findings are not perverse. [107] We agree that the learned High Court judge did not erred in law and in fact in allowing R10’s claims against the Appellant for the removal of private caveat entered by the Appellant and for the acts of trespass onto the 2/3 portion of the land that is registered under R10’s as the proprietor. Conclusion [108] Quite clearly the outcome of this case turned primarily on findings of fact. In our view, based on the evidence led during the trial, it cannot be said that the learned trial judge’s conclusion upon the evidence was plainly wrong. We need only refer to the reminder by the Federal Court in Ng Hooi Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased& Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 FC; [2010] 10 CLJ CA: S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 “As long as the trial judge’s conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts.” [109] In light of all the above, we unanimously find that there is no appealable error to warrant any appellate interference in this case. We accordingly dismiss Appeal 39, Appeal 134 and Appeal 135 with costs of RM5,000 to Respondent 1, RM5,000 to Respondent 2, RM1,000 to Respondent 3, RM5,000 to Respondent 5, RM15,000 to Respondent 6, RM5,000 to Respondent 8, RM15,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 39, RM5,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 134, RM5,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 135, RM5,000 to Respondent 13 and RM5,000 to Respondent 14. All costs given be subject to allocator except on Respondent 1 and Respondent 8. t.t (YAACOB HAJI MD SAM) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Dated 01 November 2023 S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 Counsels/Solicitors For the Appellant: Sharon Shakila Gabriel Venkateswari a/p P. Alagendra (Tetuan N. Saraswathy Devi) For the Respondents: First Respondent (R1): Siti Hafiza Jaafar (Penang ALA) (Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pulau Pinang) Second Respondent (R2): Datuk V.M. Ravindran (Tetuan V. M. Ravi & Associates) Third Respondent (R3): (In person) Fourth Respondent (R4): (Not represented) Fifth Respondent (R5): Alan Chua Hock Kwang Shreena Kaur Sidhu (Tetuan Alan Chua & Co) S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 Sixth Respondent (R6): Datin Jeyanthini Sathya Kumardas Sharon Kaur Jessy (Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co) Seventh Repondent (R7): (Not represented) Eight Respondent: Uma Devi a/p Balasubramaniam (SFC) Hafizah Johor binti Arif Johor (Jabatah Insolvensi Malaysia) Nineth Respondent (R9): (Not represented) Tenth Respondent (R10): Andrian Lee Yung Khin Hanis Hazidi (Tetuan Maxwell Kenion Cowdy & Jones) Thirteenth Respondent (R13): Chong Choon Choy (Tetuan C.C. Chong & Associates) S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 Twelfth Respondent (R14): Subath a/p Sathinathan S. Vasanthi (Tetuan Cheah Teh & Su) S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	87,914	Tika 2.6.0
WA-33-478-11/2020	PEMPETISYEN A C H RESPONDEN P A Y	Family law - Spousal Maintenance – Cause of the breakdown of the marriage as well as the contributory factors of such breakdown - Whether the Petitioner had fulfilled the ‘means and needs’ assessment. Family law - Aspects relating to the Child - Guardianship - Whether guardianship should be joint as the Petitioner insisted on sole guardianship - Whether Respondent was obliged to maintain the Child, and what amount would be appropriate - Whether Respondent should have access to the Child, and on what termsFamily law - Whether Petitioner was entitled to a division of all the matrimonial assets, and what portion would be equitable.	30/11/2023	YA Puan Evrol Mariette Peters	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e9aa8f0c-ac26-4f6f-8624-0b1a6e83a8b2&Inline=true	WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA DIVORCE PETITION NO: WA-33-478-11/2020 Dalam perkara mengenai seksyen-seksyen 53, 54(1)(b), 76, 77, 88, 89 dan 93 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976 Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai KEY (No. Sijil Kelahiran: **) BETWEEN ACH …PETITIONER AND PAY …RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 30/11/2023 08:30:18 WA-33-478-11/2020 Kand. 60 S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 Introduction [1] These were the divorce petition filed by the Petitioner wife and cross- petition filed by the Respondent husband. Whilst the parties had agreed that the custody care and control of the child of the marriage would be with the Petitioner, they had disputed issues pertaining to guardianship, spousal maintenance, child maintenance, access to the child, and division of assets. [2] In the interest of privacy of the parties concerned, and sensitivity of the issues in these proceedings, the Petitioner and Respondent and their child have been anonymised in this judgment as ACH, PAY, and KEY respectively. The factual background [3] The Petitioner and Respondent (collectively, “the Parties”), were both insurance agents, aged 38 years at the time of the hearing. They registered their marriage in October 2014, and thereafter resided in Cheras (“the Matrimonial Home”). In June 2016, the Parties were blessed with a son (“the Child”). [4] Over time, the marriage gradually deteriorated, marked by frequent arguments and conflicts. The culmination of these issues led to a significant turning point in October 2019, when the Petitioner and the Child departed from the Matrimonial Home. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 [5] Subsequently, in October 2020, the Petitioner commenced divorce proceedings by filing a divorce petition (“the Divorce Petition”). In response, the Respondent filed a cross-petition (“the Cross-Petition”) in December 2020. [6] I allowed the Petition and Cross-Petition partially, which included joint guardianship, a structured plan for gradual access to the Child by the Respondent, child maintenance obligations imposed on the Respondent, and equitable division of matrimonial assets. The following are my reasons. The issues [7] The issues that had to be addressed by this Court were as follows: (a) Spousal Maintenance – In the deliberation of whether spousal maintenance should be awarded, the following issues were imperative to consider, namely, (i) the cause of the breakdown of the marriage as well as the contributory factors of such breakdown; and (ii) whether the Petitioner had fulfilled the ‘means and needs’ assessment; (b) The Child – With regard to the Child, the issues were (i) whether guardianship should be joint as the Petitioner insisted on sole guardianship; (ii) whether the Respondent was obliged to maintain the Child, and what amount would be appropriate; and (iii) whether the Respondent should have access to the Child, and on what terms; S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 (c) The Assets – With regard to the assets, the issue was whether the Petitioner was entitled to a division of all the matrimonial assets, and what portion would be equitable. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Spousal Maintenance [8] With regard to spousal maintenance, at the outset I found the Petitioner’s claim to be somewhat unclear. Whilst she had specified a one-time lump sum payment of MYR750,000 in her pleadings, she claimed an additional MYR750,000 in her witness statement. This suggested a dual claim, encompassing maintenance arrears and future support. Simultaneously, the Petitioner submitted a comprehensive list enumerating various items along with their associated monthly costs, asserting their indispensable nature for her well-being. [9] I took the position that the Respondent was not under any obligation to make any form of maintenance payment to the Petitioner, whether in arrears or in the future, and the rationale for this stance is outlined below. [10] In delving into the intricacies of the maintenance issue, particular attention was directed to section 77(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act “), which reads: S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 Section 77 – Power of court to order maintenance of spouse (1) The court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife: (a) during the course of any matrimonial proceedings; (b) when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree of divorce or judicial separation; (c) if, after a decree declaring her presumed to be dead, she is found to be alive. [Emphasis added.] [11] A careful examination of section 77(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act reveals the deliberate use of the term ‘may', underscoring the Court’s discretionary power in adjudicating the validity of the Petitioner’s claim for spousal maintenance. As such, there exists no inherent entitlement for a wife to receive spousal maintenance from her husband, particularly when she possesses the capacity to generate her own income and sustain an independent livelihood. The Court’s analysis hinges on a thorough evaluation of various factors, collectively influencing the Court’s determination regarding the justification for maintenance from the Respondent. [12] It is incumbent upon me to assert that the bygone era, wherein married women relied on their husbands for financial support and marriage was predominantly seen as an arrangement for a woman’s financial care, has evolved. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 [13] Contemporary marriage, however, is a partnership, albeit with varying degrees of equality, where both parties commonly contribute financially. This is especially evident in today’s societal landscape, which strives to eliminate gender discrimination. In alignment with this pursuit of gender equality, compelling a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife solely based on his gender, contradicts the principles of gender equality, particularly when both Parties are financially independent individuals. [14] Notably, while a man is obligated to maintain his wife or former wife, section 77(2) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act specifies that a woman is obligated to maintain her husband or former husband only if he is incapacitated, wholly or partially, from earning a livelihood by reason of mental or physical injury or ill-health. This underscores the view that section 77 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act perpetuates gender inequality within the context of marriage. [15] Consequently, the Court must exercise caution in awarding maintenance to a wife or former wife, particularly when she possesses the means to generate income. Despite the discretionary power held by the Court in handling maintenance claims by a wife, the Court is guided by the degree of responsibility assigned to each party for the breakdown, and the 'means and needs' test, outlined by section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 78 – Assessment of maintenance In determining the amount of any maintenance to be paid by a man to his wife or former wife or by a woman to her husband or former husband, the court shall base its assessment primarily on the means and needs of the S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 parties, regardless of the proportion such maintenance bears to the income of the husband or wife as the case may be, but shall have regard to the degree of responsibility which the court apportions to each party for the breakdown of the marriage. [Emphasis added.] [16] In my evaluation of whether the Petitioner was deserving of maintenance, I found guidance in established legal precedents, specifically the cases of Dr Shameni Pillai PB Rajedran v Dr S Arulselvam Sanggilly & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 782, and V Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Velentine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474. These cases underscore the importance of considering several key factors, such as the following: (a) the income, earning capacity, property, or financial resources that each party presently possesses or is likely to possess in the foreseeable future; (b) the financial needs, obligations, and responsibilities that each party currently or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; (c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family prior to the breakdown of the marriage; (d) the age of each party and the duration of their marriage; (e) any existing health, physical, or mental disability of the parties; (f) the respective contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family; and S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 (g) the duration of the marriage. Cause of breakdown of the marriage [17] Given the Petitioner’s claim for maintenance, the next issue before the Court was to determine the degree of responsibility each party bore for the breakdown of the marriage, as outlined in section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act. [18] In presenting their respective cases, both Parties invoked section 54(1)(b) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, alleging that the other had behaved unreasonably, making it impracticable for them to cohabit. The relevant provision reads: Section 54 – Proof of breakdown (1) In its inquiry into the facts and circumstances alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage, the court shall have regard to one or more of the following facts, that is to say- … (b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. … (2) In considering whether it would be just and reasonable to make a decree the court shall consider all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties and how the interests of any child or children of the marriage or of either party may be affected if the marriage is dissolved and it may make a decree nisi subject to such terms and conditions as the court may think fit to attach, but if it should appear to the court that in all the circumstances it would be wrong to dissolve the marriage it shall dismiss the petition. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 [Emphasis added.] [19] In seeking to persuade this Court that the breakdown of the marriage was solely attributable to the conduct of the Respondent, the Petitioner levied numerous accusations against him. She alleged that he contributed to the demise of the marriage by spending time with other women, ordering her to obtain a loan to help with household expenses, compelling her to work excessively to support his insurance agency, taking holidays with individuals other than her, returning home late from work, engaging in prolonged movie and computer game sessions into the late hours, and allowing her to endure postpartum hemorrhage without adequate support. [20] Significantly, the Petitioner did not furnish any documentary evidence to support the aforementioned allegations; her testimony stood as the sole foundation for these assertions. Given the absence of corroborating documentation, the only evidence that the Court could consider was the Petitioner’s oral evidence, which in my assessment was not credible, for the following reasons. [21] The Petitioner’s assertions were exaggerated and magnified. While she contended that the Respondent engaged in extramarital affairs, she could not produce concrete evidence to support this claim, aside from a shirtless selfie of him. It defied the bounds of imagination to deduce infidelity from such a photograph. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 [22] Her complaint about the Respondent returning home late at night was countered by his explanation that it was a consequence of his work nature, often requiring outstation trips. Moreover, an inconsistency arose as the Petitioner simultaneously alleged that the Respondent spent extended hours playing computer games in his room at night, undermining her contention of his involvement with other women. [23] Considering that the Petitioner herself works as an insurance agent, one would expect her to comprehend the demands and interactions inherent in the Respondent’s profession. [24] Indeed, during cross-examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that the commissions derived from her role as an insurance agent with the Respondent were deposited directly into her personal account. This again contradicted the Petitioner’s oral evidence that she was made to slog for the Respondent. [25] The Petitioner also went as far as uploading a video containing disparaging remarks about the Respondent, fully aware that such actions would tarnish his image and reputation. Adding to the distress, she shared the video not only with her agents but also with customers, further escalating the animosity between the Parties. [26] The pivotal moment in the marriage occurred in October 2019 when, in the absence of the Respondent who was travelling, the Petitioner not only vandalised the Matrimonial Home, but also departed with the Child. This marked the point of no return in the marriage. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 [27] It became evident that the Petitioner harboured unrealistic expectations of marriage, particularly in her continuous expression of dissatisfaction with the Respondent’s perceived prioritisation of work over their relationship. [28] The reality is that, once the honeymoon phase concludes, married couples must discard their rose-tinted glasses and confront the daily challenges, such as financial responsibilities, interactions with extended family, and caring for children once they enter the picture. [29] The Petitioner anticipated that the ‘honeymoon’ would be an enduring idyll. However, when its bliss proved transient, disillusionment settled in. The Petitioner’s discontent and disappointment with the Respondent and the marriage escalated over time. Even during the proceedings of the Divorce Petition and Cross-Petition, her testimony was marked by her cantankerous demeanour, manifesting anger and frustration as she repeatedly lashed out at the Respondent. [30] Except for the display of her own misery and frustration, the Petitioner had failed to produce any tangible evidence substantiating the Respondent’s alleged neglect of both her and the Child. Conversely, the Respondent contended that the Petitioner was chronically discontented and driven by greed, making it impossible to satisfy her. As such, as the Petitioner’s dissatisfaction intensified, the Respondent gradually distanced himself leading to an inevitable estrangement between Parties. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 [31] Consequently, my conclusion was that the Petitioner's behaviour was unreasonable and that the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage was due to her actions. Whether Petitioner had fulfilled the ‘means and needs’ assessment [32] It was crucial to underscore that the determination of spousal maintenance, as outlined in section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, places substantial emphasis on evaluating the ‘means and needs’ of both parties involved. This provision necessitates a thorough examination not only of the Respondent’s means, but also of the Petitioner’s. [33] The Petitioner presented an extensive list of the claimed essentials to the Court. However, the absence of receipts to substantiate the actual costs, coupled with my assessment, reveals that many of these items appear to be unnecessary. Moreover, even if these items were deemed essential, the associated costs seemed inflated. [34] The Respondent rightly pointed out that the Petitioner did not pursue interim maintenance, despite a separation spanning over four years. The failure to seek interim maintenance raised questions about the immediacy and urgency of the Petitioner’s financial needs. Applying for interim maintenance would have mandated both Parties to disclose their income to the Court. [35] However, the only evidence adduced during the hearing of the Divorce Petition and Cross-Petition regarding the Petitioner’s salary was limited S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 to Form CP58 for the year 2020, which indicated that her salary was MYR5,232. It was essential to note that Form CP58 serves as an income statement rather than a comprehensive tax filing form. This document primarily outlines incentives, allowances, bonuses, etc. for agents, dealers, and distributors, akin to the EA form received by employees. In my view, relying on Form CP58 may not present an accurate reflection of the Petitioner’s financial status. A more convincing portrayal would have been her current tax filing forms, which were not adduced. [36] It was my finding, therefore, that the Petitioner has the ability to earn an income sufficient to cater to her means. She is only 38 years old, possesses a Bachelor of Science in Industrial Mechanical Design from University Technology Malaysia, and is currently working as an insurance agent. She is also the registered proprietor of a property in Taman Vista Jaya. [37] The significance of the potential earning capacity of a spouse claiming maintenance was underscored in the case of Choong Yee Fong v. Ooi Seng Keat; Chua Chong Hong (Joint Respondent) [2006] 5 CLJ 144, where Faiza Thamby Chik J, in referring to the earlier case of Thevathasan v. Thevathasan [1960] 1 LNS 153, had stated: It may be summed up that s. 78 of the Act requires this court to assess the means and the needs of both the petitioner and the respondent and also their respective conduct which contributed to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, in coming to a decision if the petitioner is entitled to a maintenance at all and if so, the amount to be awarded. In first assessing the means of the petitioner, attention is drawn to the petitioner's affidavit at para. 9 (encl. 76). … S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 The petitioner is not in a situation where she is incapable of supporting herself but rather a case where there is an able-bodied petitioner who refuses to seek employment in order to claim for maintenance from the respondent. This refusal to be self-supportive is further proven by the petitioner herself whereby despite of her alleged tight financial situation, the petitioner has shown total lack of initiative in mitigating her financial woes but has instead went on a spending spree as evidenced by her indiscriminate use of credit cards facilities which according to the petitioner's averment at para. 12(a) and (b) of encl. 76 amounts to a total sum of RM114,668.64. The potential earning power of the claimant must also be considered. … Therefore, applying the principle enunciated by the cases cited above, to the facts before me, it can be established that the petitioner who is 41 years of age, able bodied and until 2001 was earning a salary of RM1,800 per month certainly has earning potential with relevant past working experience which help enhances her earning power in the market work force. The petitioner has in her own affidavit at para. 13 and 14 of encl. 76 admits to renting out on the asset, namely the apartment at RM620 per month (with a market potential rental rate of RM700 per month see exh. CYF at encl. 79) whilst the instalment payment to the bank is RM470. This indicates that the petitioner earns an income of RM150 per month from the apartment. In gist, the petitioner has the means within the contemplation of s. 78 of the Act, to be self-sufficient and self-reliant. It must be emphasised that the marriage though registered in 1984, has lasted for less than 10 years and with no children. Although the parties have since lived separately in 1994, the marriage, for all intents and purposes, has broken down irretrievably even before the physical separation in 1994. The petitioner who was 31 years of age in 1994 was working and self-supportive until her alleged unemployment in 2001. [Emphasis added] [38] I also had to consider that the marriage lasted only five years before it eventually broke down. It would, therefore, be unjust for the Respondent to bear the burden of a perpetual monthly spousal maintenance, extending potentially throughout the entirety of the S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 Petitioner’s life or until she remarries or ‘lives in adultery’ with another man, as stipulated in section 82 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act. [39] I, therefore, took the position that the Petitioner ought to try to regain self-sufficiency, ‘as an order of maintenance is not intended to create life-long dependency by the former wife on the former husband’: Quek Lee Tiam v Ho Kim Swee (alias Ho Kian Guan) [1995] SGHC 23. Rather, the focus should be on encouraging the Petitioner to strive toward regaining self-sufficiency. This perspective acknowledges that spousal maintenance is not intended to perpetuate an enduring financial reliance by the former wife. The Child Whether Respondent was obliged to maintain the Child [40] It is trite law, pursuant to section 92 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, that every parent has the duty to maintain his or her child, regardless of who has custody. The provision reads: Section 92 – Duty to maintain children Except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides, it shall be the duty of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his or her children, whether they are in his or her custody or the custody of any other person, either by providing them with such accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable having regard to his or her means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof. [Emphasis added.] S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 [41] Section 93 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act takes an even more comprehensive stance by expressly articulating the responsibility of a man to provide maintenance for the betterment of his child. The provision reads: Section 93 – Power for court to order maintenance for children (1) The court may at any time order a man to pay maintenance for the benefit of his child- (a) if he has refused or neglected reasonably to provide for the child; (b) if he has deserted his wife and the child is in her charge; (c) during the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings; or (d) when making or subsequent to the making of an order placing the child in the custody of any other person. … [Emphasis added.] [42] With regard to maintenance for the Child, the Respondent had consistently been disbursing MYR2,000 monthly to the Petitioner. However, the Petitioner sought either a one-time lump sum payment of MYR1.8 million or, as an alternative, a monthly amount of MYR15,100. This relief was based on the following breakdown she provided, enumerating the following: S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 No. Monthly expenses of the said Child MYR i. Tuition for computer class 1,000 ii. Tuition for music class 500 iii School Registration fees Daycare Co-curricular activities 300 450 900 400 iv. Maid 1,500 v. Apparel & shoes 500 vi. Toys 700 vii. Child’s Pet 500 viii. Outdoor activities – playland and food 600 ix. Holiday expenses 1,500 x. Parties and gifts 1,300 xi. Ipad & laptop 500 xii. Educational tools 200 xiii. Science experiments 500 xiv. Stationeries 550 Total: 15,100 S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 [43] In my view, providing a singular lump sum payment for the Child was not appropriate, given the myriad of factors that may arise throughout the Child’s lifetime, that could render such a payment impractical. Hence, after thorough deliberation, my decision was to order the Respondent to provide the Petitioner with a monthly child maintenance of MYR3,000. Additionally, the Respondent is obligated to share equally in the costs related to the Child’s health and education, encompassing school fees and associated activities. The rationale for this decision is outlined below. [44] In my view, the Petitioner’s presented expenses for raising the Child were inflated and exaggerated. A critical concern was the absence of receipts to substantiate that the listed items accurately reflected the genuine costs incurred. [45] While the Petitioner referenced the case of CSM v TCC [2023] 3 CLJ 403, as precedent justifying the lack of receipts, it was crucial to note that that case pertained to children studying abroad at the tertiary level. In the present case, the Child just turned seven years old at the time of the hearing, and several items on the list were unnecessary or exhibited inflated costs. [46] Notably, expenses such as computer and music classes were discretionary, and lacking proof to justify their purported costs. The monthly allocation of MYR1,500 for holidays and MYR1,300 for parties and gifts for a seven-year-old was exaggerated. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 [47] Furthermore, it was imperative to recognise that, as a gainfully employed mother, the Petitioner should share the financial responsibility for the Child’s upkeep, in accordance with section 93(2) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 93 – Power for court to order maintenance for children … (2) The court shall have the corresponding power to order a woman to pay or contribute towards the maintenance of her child where it is satisfied that having regard to her means it is reasonable so to order. … [Emphasis added.] [48] In our present-day society, it is crucial to recognise that mothers who are endowed with the ability to generate income, should actively participate in sharing the financial responsibility of providing for their children. This perspective advocates for a more equitable distribution of financial burdens, moving away from the traditional tendency to place the entirety of this responsibility on fathers. To reinforce this standpoint, I found guidance in the wisdom of Hamzah JC (now JCA) as expressed in the case of Lim Eng Kuan v Julie Tay Suan Sim [2014] 7 MLJ 778. Whether Parties should have joint guardianship of the Child [49] Given that the Child was only seven years old at the time of the hearing, the Respondent did not significantly challenge the issue of S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 20 custody, care, and control. In any event, I took the view that the doctrine of tender years as outlined in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, applied. The provision reads: Section 88 – Power for court to make order for custody … (3) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of a child below the age of seven years to be with his or her mother but in deciding whether that presumption applies to the facts of any particular case, the court shall have regard to the undesirability of disturbing the life of a child by changes of custody. [Emphasis added] [50] It was noteworthy that despite the separation of the Parties, the Child had continuously resided with the Petitioner. This underscores the undeniable reality that the Child remains reliant on the Petitioner for his physical, emotional, and mental development. Consequently, uprooting the Child from his current environment would not align with the best interest of his welfare. Numerous legal precedents, including cases like K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135, Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 LNS 440, and Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234, support the notion that, particularly when dealing with a very young child, it is in their best interest to remain with his or her mother. In Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong, Raja Azlan Shah FCJ (as he then was) eloquently explained the significance of the relationship between a young child and his mother, in the following passage: S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 21 The youngest child, Bernard, is of tender years. In my opinion, his place right now is with the mother. "No thing, and no person," said Sir John Romilly MR, in the case of Austin v. Austin [1865] 35 Beav 259 263 "and no combination of them, can, in my opinion, with regard to a child of tender years, supply the place of a mother, and the welfare of the child is so intimately connected with its being under the care of the mother, that no extent of kindness on the part of any other person can supply that place.." This view has found judicial favour in many jurisdictions: in Australia, for example, in Kades v. Kades,(4) the High Court, in a joint judgment stated: "What is left is the strong presumption which is not one of law but is founded on experience and upon the nature of ordinary human relationships, that a young girl, should have the love, care and attention of the child's mother and that her upbringing should be the responsibility of her mother, if it is not possible to have the responsibility of both parents living together." In Canada, Muloch CJ in Re Orr [1973] 2 DLR 77 commented that, "In the case of a father and mother living apart and each claiming the custody of a child, the general rule is that the mother, other things being equal, is entitled to the custody and care of a child during what is called the period of nurture, namely, until it attains about seven years of age, the time during which it needs the care of the mother more than that of the father... [Emphasis added.] [51] Consequently, the onus rested on the Respondent to rebut the presumption favouring the Petitioner, essentially requiring a demonstration of the Petitioner’s unsuitability as a mother. In the absence of any evidence indicating neglect, abuse, or any other form of unfitness on the part of the Petitioner, my decision was to grant sole custody, care, and control of the Child to the Petitioner. [52] Nevertheless, the Respondent persisted in seeking joint guardianship of the Child, invoking section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 (“Guardianship of Infants Act”), which reads: S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 22 Section 5 - Equality of parental rights (1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of an infant or the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant or the application of the income of any such property, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal. (2) The mother of an infant shall have the like powers of applying to the Court in respect of any matter affecting the infant as are possessed by the father. [Emphasis added.] [53] In accordance with section 3 (Duties of guardian of person) of the Guardianship of Infants Act, both parents share equal responsibilities for the Child's comprehensive welfare, encompassing health, education, religion, and general support. A fundamental tenet of these responsibilities is the Child’s inherent right – to nurture meaningful connections with both parents. [54] The Petitioner asserted that joint guardianship would be challenging due to lingering acrimony between her and the Respondent. I took the view that such an excuse was insufficient to deny the Respondent joint guardianship, especially considering the evidence indicating the Petitioner’s consistent dissatisfaction with the marriage. It was, therefore, only fair that the Petitioner put aside her differences with the Respondent for the sake of co-parenting. [55] I was also guided by the decision of Tan Sherry (P) v Soo Sheng Fatt (L) [2016] MLJU 1264, whereby Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera J (as he then was) acknowledged that in a family setting, the general rule of S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 23 raising the children has to be a joint cooperative enterprise of the parents: Even when the marriage breaks down, instead of being at war with each other as husband and wife, both should put aside their personal differences, to jointly decide on what would be best for the child. This would entail them to communicate with each other in a civil and courteous manner for the sake of their child's upbringing and development. This would to some extent constrain and require both to discuss with each other on all matters relating to the child such that neither should make unilateral decisions to the exclusion of the other. See the application of that principle by Lee Swee Seng J in CY v. CC [2015] MLJU 930 HC. [Emphasis added.] [56] Upon a thorough examination of the evidence adduced, I found no compelling reason to deny the Respondent guardianship. It was imperative to underscore that the Child possesses the right to maintain a consistent and valuable relationship with both parents. While the Child’s primary residence is with the Petitioner, as stipulated by section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, neither parent holds superiority over the other. Recognising the distinct dynamics of a child’s relationship with both parents is pivotal as reiterated in the Singapore case of CX v. CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR 690, where the Court of Appeal of Singapore upheld the importance of joint parenting as the preferred approach. [57] Both Parties must bear in mind that the Respondent had been ordered to provide monthly child maintenance in the amount of MYR3,000. It was imperative to acknowledge that a father’s role extends beyond S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 24 financial support; active participation in the Child’s upbringing and engagement in his growth and development is equally vital. [58] Hence, my decision was for both Parties to have joint guardianship. This arrangement underscores the significance of collaborative decision-making concerning the Child’s health, education, religion, and general support. Whether Respondent should have access to the Child [59] Given that the Petitioner had sole custody, care, and control of the Child, it was only just and equitable that the Respondent be granted access. [60] The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent’s access to the Child should be supervised continuously, citing the Respondent’s current status as a stranger to the Child. [61] I was unable to agree with the Petitioner for several reasons. Firstly, it was the Petitioner who had caused the estrangement by removing the Child from the Respondent’s presence. Consequently, I could not allow her to rely on her own unjustifiable actions to impose restrictions or limitations on the Respondent’s access to the Child. [62] Secondly, it was crucial to underscore the pivotal role that a father plays in fostering a nurturing environment for his child. This significance was notably highlighted in the Singapore case of APE v. APF [2015] SGHC 17, where Tan Siong Thye J referenced the enlightening article titled Contact and Domestic Violence – The S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 25 Experts ' Court Report [2000] Fam Law 615, authored by Claire, Sturge, and Danya Glaser. This expert report illuminated the profound impact that a father can have on his child’s life, emphasising the essential role a father plays in promoting the child’s overall well-being and holistic development. [63] In fact, both parents assume indispensable roles in a child’s life, each offering distinct, invaluable, and irreplaceable contributions. It was also my view that access to the Child should be recognised as an inherent right belonging to the child rather than solely the parents. Therefore, any attempt to restrict the Respondent’s access to the Child would inherently constitute a violation of the Child’s rights. [64] The legal precedent set forth in Chow Sook Pheng v. Wong Maun Hoong [2011] 1 LNS 260 underscores the paramount importance of preserving the father-child bond. In that case, the court acknowledged that the child’s welfare and holistic development are best served when the child has a meaningful connection with his father. Depriving a child of the opportunity to establish and nurture such a relationship can potentially have adverse consequences for his emotional and psychological well-being, as eloquently elaborated upon by Yeoh Wee Siam JC (as she then was), in the subsequent passage: In my opinion, it is for the welfare and in the best interests of the children that they spend as much time as possible with not only their mother but also their father. Just because the parents' marriage has broken down, it does not mean that the 3 children should be alienated from either parent. I believe a child would develop better if he or she spends as much time as possible with both parents. What if, at the end of the case, the Respondent Husband is given custody of the 3 children? By then the damage would have been caused if, in the interim, the Respondent Husband was denied of access to S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 26 the 3 children resulting in their estrangement and discomfort with each other. This would not be for the welfare of the children. [Emphasis added.] [65] Moreover, this Court possesses the power to establish specific terms and conditions within a custody order, as conferred by the provisions outlined in section 89 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 89 - Orders subject to conditions (1) An order for custody may be made subject to such conditions as the court may think fit to impose, and subject to such conditions, if any, as may from time to time apply, shall entitle the person given custody to decide all questions relating to the upbringing and education of the child. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an order for custody may- (a) contain conditions as to the place where the child is to reside, as to the manner of his or her education, and as to the religion in which he or she is to be brought up; (b) provide for the child to be temporarily in the care and control of some person other than the person given custody; (c)provide for the child to visit a parent deprived of custody or any member of the family of a parent who is dead or has been deprived of custody at such times and for such periods as the court may consider reasonable; (d)give a parent deprived of custody or any member of the family of a parent who is dead or has been deprived of custody the right of access to the child at such times and with such frequency as the court may consider reasonable; or (e) prohibit the person given custody from taking the child out of Malaysia. [Emphasis added.] S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 27 [66] It was also essential to recognise that supervised access is not intended as a permanent arrangement. Instead, it serves as a transitional arrangement to establish familiarity between the child and the parent when such connection is lacking. [67] Taking into consideration the Petitioner’s concerns regarding the suitability of unsupervised and overnight access due to the Child’s current estrangement from the Respondent, I opted to adopt a phased access strategy. This approach was designed to facilitate a gradual and supportive reconnection between the Child and the Respondent. Consequently, the terms of access granted to the Respondent to the Child were as follows: a) Online/ virtual access to the Child for a duration of up to 30 minutes, anytime between 7 pm and 8 pm on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and it would be the Petitioner’s responsibility to facilitate this access without interruption, interference, or any attempt to frustrate it; b) With effect of the date of delivery of this decision until 10 December 2023, access by the Respondent to the Child shall be granted every Saturday from 10 am to 3 pm, at a mutually agreed-upon location, under the supervision of the Petitioner exclusively. c) Commencing 11 December 2023, the Respondent shall enjoy unsupervised access to the Child on alternate Saturdays and Sundays from 11 am to 7 pm. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 28 d) For Chinese New Year 2024, the Respondent shall have access to the Child from 11 am on the eve of Chinese New Year until 8 pm on the fourth day of Chinese New Year. For the subsequent year 2025, the Respondent shall have access to the Child from 11 am on the fifth day of Chinese New Year, until 9 pm on the ninth day of Chinese New Year. This arrangement would continue on an alternate-year basis. e) With effect from Chinese New Year 2024, the Respondent shall enjoy unsupervised access to the Child from 7 pm on Fridays until 7 pm on Sundays. Father’s Day and Mother’s Day shall be carved out for the relevant parent. f) With effect from Chinese New Year 2024, the Respondent shall also enjoy unsupervised access to the Child on the Child's birthday on alternate years, from 5 pm to 8 pm, if it is a school day. However, if it is a holiday, then the access to the Child will begin from 7 pm on the eve of the birthday until 8 pm on the birthday itself. The Assets Whether Petitioner was entitled to division of assets [68] At the outset, with regard to the Matrimonial Home, both Parties had informed the Court that they would mutually agree to hold it in trust for the benefit of the Child. The understanding was to facilitate the transfer of the Matrimonial Home to the Child upon reaching the age of 21. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 29 [69] The matrimonial assets that were contested were as follows: (i) Property known as Taman Vista Jaya Property; (ii) Property known as Kuala Ampang Property; (iii) Property known as Pandan Terrace Property; and (iv) Shares in Super Group Resources Sdn Bhd. [70] The task of dividing matrimonial assets is prescribed by section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 76 - Power of court to order division of matrimonial assets (1) The court shall have power, when granting a decree of divorce or judicial separation, to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired by them during the marriage or the sale of any such assets and the division between the parties of the proceeds of sale. (2) In exercising the power conferred by subs. (1) the court shall have regard to: (a) the extent of the contributions made by each party in money, property, or work towards the acquiring of the assets or payment of expenses for the benefit of the family; (aa) the extent of the contributions made by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looking after the home or caring for the family; (b) any debts owing by either party which were contracted for their joint benefit; (c) the needs of the minor children, if any, of the marriage; (d) the duration of the marriage; S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 30 and subject to those considerations, the court shall incline towards equality of division. (5) For the purposes of this section, references to assets acquired during a marriage include assets owned before the marriage by one party which have been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by their joint efforts. [Emphasis added.] [71] With regard to the disputed properties, the Petitioner sought for them to be sold by the Respondent (with the Respondent to bear all the costs of the sale) and for the Petitioner to receive half the proceeds from such sale. [72] Concerning the Taman Vista Jaya Property, I had decided that the Petitioner had no entitlement to it. This was based on the undisputed fact that she owned a property at Taman Vista Jaya as well, which she was unwilling to share with the Respondent. [73] At this juncture, it was incumbent on me to state that divorce proceedings should not be converted into a revenue-generating exercise. The outcome of divorce must always be for parties to have sufficient resources to move on in life as painlessly as possible. Consequently, I took the view that it would be fair and reasonable for each Party to retain their respective properties in Taman Vista Jaya. [74] In respect of the Kuala Ampang Property, the Respondent claimed that he owned it with two friends, How Lim Leong and Tan Kian Teck, and that he was holding it in trust for them. The Respondent further S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 31 asserted that associated costs and instalments were paid by him and the two friends. [75] With regard to the Pandan Terrace Property, the Respondent asserted co-ownership with Tan Kian Teck. The Respondent contended that he held the Pandan Terrace Property in trust for Tan Kian Teck with all associated costs and instalments being jointly covered by the two of them. [76] I disagreed with the Respondent’s account of both the Kuala Ampang and Pandan Terrace properties, as the Respondent had failed to provide any substantiating evidence for his claim that the properties were held in trust by him for his friends. It was important to note by virtue of section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950, the legal burden rested on the Respondent to establish the genuine ownership of the Kuala Ampang and Pandan Terrace properties. In my view, the Respondent fell short of adducing any documentary evidence or summoning the purported friends in question who, according to him, were beneficiaries of the trust. [77] Consequently, I concluded that the Respondent was the sole owner of both the Kuala Ampang and Pandan Terrace properties. Considering that such properties were acquired during the course of the marriage, it followed that these properties qualified as matrimonial assets. Hence, the issue was how such properties were to be divided. [78] While it was undisputed that the Petitioner did not make monetary contributions to the Kuala Ampang and Pandan Terrace properties, I S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 32 found it necessary to consider her significant non-financial contribution to the family’s well-being as the primary caregiver for the Child. However, acknowledging the relatively short duration of the marriage, which lasted only five years before the Petitioner relocated from the Matrimonial Home, I opted to grant the Petitioner 25% only of the realisable value of both the Kuala Ampang and Pandan Terrace properties. The realisable value in this context refers to the difference between the market value of the properties and the remaining balance on any loans against them. This award is to be fulfilled within six months from the date of the decision. [79] In respect of the Respondent’s shares in Super Group Resources Sdn Bhd, the Petitioner’s prayer was for the complete transfer of these shares to her. I found this to be unreasonable, given the undisputed fact that the Petitioner had made no financial contributions toward the acquisition of the company shares. [80] Moreover, considering the fact that the Respondent was ordered to fulfill his financial responsibilities, including child maintenance and the division of two properties, I deemed it fair and equitable for the Respondent to retain ownership of the shares in Super Group Resources Sdn Bhd. This decision regarding the shares was aimed at balancing the financial obligations imposed on the Respondent while acknowledging the lack of contribution from the Petitioner towards the acquisition or growth of the shares in question. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 33 Conclusion [81] In conclusion, drawing upon the aforementioned rationales and having undertaken a thorough examination and discerning evaluation of the comprehensive evidence before this Court, in conjunction with the submissions put forth by both Parties, the Petition and Cross-Petition were granted only to the following extent: (a) Divorce was granted, and the decree nisi was ordered to be made absolute immediately; (b) Joint guardianship of the Child was granted to both Parties; (c) Sole custody, care, and control of the Child was given to the Petitioner; (d) The Respondent was granted access in accordance with the terms previously referenced in this judgment; (e) The Respondent was ordered to deposit monthly child maintenance of MYR3,000 into the Petitioner’s bank account by the seventh day of each month; (f) The Matrimonial Home to be held by both Parties in trust for the Child, as agreed upon by them; (g) The contested matrimonial assets were divided according to the terms referenced in this judgment, with the Petitioner awarded 25% of the realisable value of the Kuala Ampang Property and Pandan Terrace Property; and S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 34 (h) Costs to be borne by the individual Parties. Dated: 30 November 2023 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Petitioner – Devinder Kaur, AS Dhaliwal and Vimalan Ramanathan; Messrs Edorra Arfah Khandhar For the Respondent – Kelvinder Singh, WK Wong, and HS Tan; Messrs WK Wong & Co Cases referred to: ➢ APE v. APF [2015] SGHC 17 ➢ Choong Yee Fong v. Ooi Seng Keat; Chua Chong Hong (Joint Respondent) [2006] 5 CLJ 144 S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-33-478-11/2020 30 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 35 ➢ Chow Sook Pheng v. Wong Maun Hoong [2011] 1 LNS 260 ➢ CSM v TCC [2023] 3 CLJ 403 ➢ CX v. CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR 690 ➢ Dr Shameni Pillai PB Rajedran v Dr S Arulselvam Sanggilly & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 782 ➢ Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 LNS 440 ➢ K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135 ➢ Lim Eng Kuan v Julie Tay Suan Sim [2014] 7 MLJ 778. ➢ Quek Lee Tiam v Ho Kim Swee (alias Ho Kian Guan) [1995] SGHC 23 ➢ Tan Sherry (P) v Soo Sheng Fatt (L) [2016] MLJU 1264 ➢ Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234, ➢ Thevathasan v. Thevathasan [1960] 1 LNS 153 ➢ V Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Velentine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474 Legislation referred to: ➢ Evidence Act 1950 – section 103 ➢ Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 – sections 3, 5 ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – sections 54, 76, 77, 78, 82, 88, 89, 92, 93 Other sources referred to: ➢ Contact and Domestic Violence – The Experts ' Court Report [2000] Fam Law 615, authored by Claire, Sturge, and Danya Glaser. S/N DIq6Sasb0GJAsaboOosg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	59,811	Tika 2.6.0
AA-44-25-05/2023	PEMOHON LINGESWARAN A/L RAJANDRAN RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	PERMOHONAN JENAYAH: Pemohonan Habeas Corpus - terhadap Perintah Tahanan- Seksyen 6 (1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) (LLPK)1985 [Akta 316]- Perkara 5, 149,151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan- Perlanggaran terhadap Perlembagaan Persekutuan- Ketidakpatuhan prosedur (non-compliance) di dalam penggunaan undang-undang di bawah seksyen 11C(1) Akta 316- Perintah tersebut adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan - Perintah Tahanan bertarikh 22.04.2022 adalah bercanggah dengan Akta Fungsi-fungsi Menteri 1969 - Kegagalan pihak Lembaga Penasihat untuk mengemukakan Nota Prosiding.	30/11/2023	YA Dato' Abdul Wahab Bin Mohamed	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7a6eb145-3d08-4987-80f7-ca72072abdd4&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - AP Lingeswaran v. TMDN.docx 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI IPOH DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN PERMOHONAN JENAYAH NO: AA-44-25-05/2023 Dalam Perkara Permohonan HABEAS CORPUS selaras dengan BAB XXXVI Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (Akta 593) DAN Dalam Perkara Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah- Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 DAN Dalam Perkara, PERKARA 5 & 151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan DAN Dalam Perkara Permohonan Di Bawah Seksyen 365(1)(b) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah DAN Dalam Perkara LINGESWARAN A/L RAJANDRAN [No. KP: 940826-10-5539] yang ditahan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 30/11/2023 15:27:33 AA-44-25-05/2023 Kand. 21 S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA LINGESWARAN A/L RAJANDRAN [NO. KP: 940826-10-5539] …PEMOHON DAN 1. TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI, MALAYSIA 2. PENGUASA, PUSAT PEMULIHAN AKHLAK SIMPANG RENGGAM, JOHOR 3. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN PENGHAKIMAN S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Pengenalan [1] Permohonan Notis Usul ini difailkan oleh Lingeswaran a/l Rajandran [No. K/P: 940826-10-5539] (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Pemohon”) bagi mendapatkan perintah “habeas corpus”. Fakta Ringkas [2] Pemohon kini sedang ditahan di bawah satu Perintah Tahanan (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Perintah bertarikh 22-04-2022 tersebut”) yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “TMDN”) di bawah peruntukan seksyen 6(1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta 316”). Berdasarkan kepada Perintah tersebut, Pemohon telah diperintahkan untuk ditahan mulai 22-04-2022 di Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “PPA”), Simpang Renggam, Johor. Isu-isu yang dibangkitkan [3] Berdasarkan makluman peguam Pemohon semasa Pengurusan Kes bertarikh 25-07-2023, terdapat tiga (3) isu yang hendak dibangkitkan oleh peguam Pemohon iaitu:- a) Perintah tersebut adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan; b) Perintah Tahanan bertarikh 22.04.2022 adalah bercanggah dengan Akta Fungsi-fungsi Menteri 1969; dan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 c) Kegagalan pihak Lembaga Penasihat untuk mengemukakan Nota Prosiding. Prinsip Undang-Undang [4] Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan “habeas corpus” adalah mantap dimana writ “habeas corpus” hendaklah dikeluarkan sekiranya Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Pemohon telah ditahan secara salah (illegally detained) dan bukanlah suatu kuasa budibicara Mahkamah (discretionary power) sepertimana yang diputuskan di dalam kes Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia [1975] 2 MLJ 279. [5] Tindakan Pemohon mencabar perintah tahanannya sebagai salah dan tidak sah menjadikan beban pembuktian terletak di atas bahu pihak Responden-Responden untuk membuktikan bahawa tahanan tersebut adalah sah di sisi undang-undang sepertimana yang diputuskan dalam kes SK Takaliswaran Krishnan v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [2010] 1 MLJ 149, Gopal Sri Ram FCJ memutuskan:- “[5]…It is settled law that on an application of "habeas corpus" the burden satisfying the court that the detention is lawful lies through on the detaining authority. See, Chng Suan Tze v The Minister of Home Affairs & Ors and Other Appeals [1988] 1 LNS 162. In Mohinuddin v District Magistrate, Beed AIR [1987] SC 1977, the Supreme Court of India observed as follows in the context of art. 22 of the Indian Constitution from which is draw our art. 151: S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 It is enough for the detenu to say that he is under wrongful detention, and the burden lies on the detaining authority to satisfy the Court that the detention is not illegal or wrongful and that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief claimed. This court on more occasions that one has dealt with the question and it is now well settled that it is incumbent on the state of satisfy the court that the detention of the petitioner / detenu was legal and in conformity not only the mandatory provisions of the Act but also strictly in accord with the constitutional safeguards embodies in Ar. 22(5)”. Isu (a): Perintah tersebut adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. [6] Peguam Pemohon mendakwa wujudnya ketidakpatuhan terhadap prosedur mandatori apabila Perintah Tahanan yang dikeluarkan terhadap Pemohon telah gagal menunjukkan Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang telah terlibat dalam aktiviti pengedaran dadah. Peguam Pemohon telah membuat rujukan terhadap kes Selva Vinayam Sures v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 2 CLJ 29] seperti berikut: “[44]…In the light of the foregoing, we think that the phrase ‘a substantial body of persons’ refer to a large number of individuals acting in concert or working together for a common purpose. In the context of Act 316, we think that it refers to action which is prejudicial to public order which has been taken or is S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 being threatened by a large number of individuals acting together in the trafficking in dangerous drugs. [45] Notably, sub-s. 6(1) refers to two factors – (i) authorises the Minister to exercise his power to make a detention order if he is satisfied that such person is involved in illicit drug trafficking activities and that (ii) it is necessary in the interest of public order to make the detention order. What is significant is the omission to refer to the involvement of ‘a substantial body of persons’ in relation to the public order element; which scope is clearly stated in the preamble as ‘action which is prejudicial to public order…has been taken…by a substantial body of persons…” [7] Dalam penghakiman yang sama dapatlah diamati panduan yang diberikan adalah bilangan individu yang menjalankan aktiviti pengedaran dadah perlulah lebih daripada satu (1) orang, jika diperhatikan seperti berikut: “[50] We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the fact of the appellant acting alone cannot be deemed to fall within the ambit and scope of scrutiny under Act 316; which scope is explicitly confined to a substantial body of persons...” [8] Peguam Persekutuan yang mewakili Responden-Responden berhujah balas bersandarkan kes Selva Vinayagam Sures v Timbalan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [supra] yang telah diputuskan oleh YA Datuk Vernon Ong Lam Kiat HMP di perenggan [(5)] di muka surat 34, Menteri mempunyai kuasa untuk menahan subjek di bawah Seksyen 6(1) Akta tersebut sekiranya tiga (3) elemen utama seperti yang berikut telah dipatuhi:- i) Bahawa aktiviti yang telah diambil atau diancam oleh sekumpulan atau berhubungan atau melibatkan pengedaran dadah berbahaya; ii) Bahawa orang yang ditahan adalah ahli kumpulan; dan iii) Bahawa Menteri berpuas hati terdapat keperluan dalam kepentingan ketenteraman awam bahawa orang yang ditahan tertakluk pada penahanan pencegahan. [9] Dalam kes Pemohon ini, pihak Responden-Responden menghujahkan bahawa ketiga-tiga elemen yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Selva Vinayagam (supra) telah dipatuhi dengan sempurna dengan membuat rujukan ke atas Afidavit Jawapan Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail bin Haji Mohamed Said yang merupakan Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri (selepas ini dikenali sebagai TMDN) yang bertanggungjawab mengeluarkan Perintah tersebut. [10] Berkenaan isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kedudukan terkini atas isu ini yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Muhammad Redzuan Bin Omar v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & 1 Lagi (2022) 1 LNS 880 di mana penghakiman Majoriti oleh S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 YA Zabariah Mohd Yusof dan YA Hasnah Mohammed Hashim HMP, isu serupa telah dibangkitkan dan diputuskan seperti berikut: "[30] We agree with the rationale in Selva Vinayagam (supra). However, having regard to the issues argued before us it is opportune to distinguish Selva Vinayagam (supra) and this appeal on the facts and the law. Careful scrutiny of the facts and the documentary evidence of this appeal shows that it is distinguishable from Selva Vinayagam (supra). The most obvious distinguishing fact is that in this appeal there are expressed statement that the Appellant was not acting alone. This is reflected in paragraph 22 of the Afidavit in Reply of the Deputy Minister [31] The Deputy Minister in the Statement of Facts in this appeal had stated the following• [32] The Statement of Facts in Selva Vinayagam (supra), however, is devoid of any facts stating that he was acting in association with a substantial body of persons• [33] In this appeal, the three (3) ingredients as laid out by Justice Vernon Ong in Selva Vinayagam (supra) have been fulfilled. The Appellant had carried out the illegal activity, namely, the trafficking of dangerous drugs in association with a substantial body of persons. Secondly, the Appellant is a member of a substantial body of S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 persons. Thirdly and most importantly, the Minister is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of public order that the Appellant be subject to preventive detention. On the facts in this appeal, there is clear evidence that the Appellant was not acting alone in the illegal activity of drug trafficking as averred in the afidavits. [34] Hence, to apply the rationale enunciated in Selva Vinayaqam (supra) to determine whether the procedures have been complied with by the authorities the courts must examine the affidavits and the Statement of Facts with great scrutiny which will reveal whether the appellant was acting alone or in association with a substantial bodv of persons. (penekanan diberikan) [11] Bersandarkan dengan prinsip undang-undang di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah meneliti afidavit jawapan deponen-deponen Responden-Responden terutamanya bermula dari Pegawai Penyiasat, Pegawai Inkuiri dan TMDN terutamanya berkaitan dengan kepuasan hati TMDN mengenai penglibatan Pemohon dengan aktiviti pengedaran dadah Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang. [12] Inspektor Polis Arjit bin Ab Ghani yang merupakan pegawai penyiasat mengatakan seperti berikut: “Hasil daripada penyiasatan terhadap Pemohon, saksi- saksi, pengumpulan keterangan dan rakaman percakapan serta dokumen-dokumen yang berkaitan dengan aktiviti- S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 aktiviti Pemohon tersebut, pihak polis mempunyai keterangan yang mencukupi bahawa Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang pernah ada kaitan dengan apa- apa aktiviti yang berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan dengan pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234] iaitu mengedar dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seperti yang tersenarai di bawah Jadual Pertama, Bahagian III, Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234]. Hasil siasatan saya juga mendapati bahawa Pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang telah mengendalikan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya dengan menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 0.5 gram) dengan harga RM50.00 sepeket. Selanjutnya, Pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang didapati telah membeli bekalan dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 5.0 gram) berharga RM250.00 sepeket dan membuat pembungkusan semula ke dalam bentuk peket kecil bagi tujuan pengedaran. Saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa berdasarkan siasatan tersebut, saya juga telah berpuas hati bahawa Pemohon tidak bertindak secara bersendirian dalam aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya. Peranan serta kegiatan Pemohon tersebut telah menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon dengan sekumpulan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 besar orang dalam menjalankan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang diperuntukan oleh Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Mukadimah Akta tersebut.” [13] Mohd Syahrun Nizam Bin Mohd Misan yang merupakan Pegawai Inkuiri yang dilantik di bawah seksyen 5 Akta 316 mengatakan seperti berikut: “Setelah meneliti hasil siasatan yang telah dijalankan terhadap Pemohon serta meneliti dan mempertimbangkan keterangan Pemohon dan saksi-saksi dalam laporan lengkap penyiasatan di bawah Seksyen 393) Akta tersebut yang dikemukakan oleh INSPEKTOR POLIS ARJIT BIN AB GHANI berkaitan dengan aktiviti-aktiviti Pemohon yang berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan pengedaran dadah berbahaya, saya kemudiannya telah menyediakan satu laporan bertulis terhadap Pemohon untuk dikemukakan kepada Menteri Dalam Negeri di bawah Seksyen 5(4) Akta tersebut. Saya telah berpuas hati bahawa terdapat alasan-alasan yang munasabah untuk mempercayai bahawa Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang pernah ada kaitan dengan apa-apa aktiviti yang berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan dengan pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234] iaitu mengedar dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seperti yang tersenarai di bawah Jadual Pertama, Bahagian III, Akta S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234]. Berdasarkan siasatan yang telah saya jalankan ke atas Pemohon, saya telah berpuas hati bahawa Pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang telah mengendalikan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya dengan menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 0.5 gram) dengan harga RM50.00 sepeket. Selanjutnya, pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang didapati telah membeli bekalan dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 5.0 gram) berharga RM250.00 sepeket dan membuat pembungkusan semula ke dalam bentuk peket kecil bagi tujuan pengedaran. Peranan serta kegiatan Pemohon tersebut telah menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon dengan sekumpulan besar orang dalam menjalankan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Mukadimah Akta tersebut”. [14] Seterusnya TMDN menegaskan seperti berikut: “Setelah meneliti dan mempertimbangkan kedua-dua laporan tersebut saya telah berpuas hati bahawa terdapat alasan-alasan yang munasabah untuk mempercayai bahawa Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang pernah ada kaitan dengan apa-apa aktiviti yang S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan dengan pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234] iaitu mengedar dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seperti yang tersenarai di bawah Jadual Pertama, Bahagian III, Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234]. Berdasarkan siasatan yang telah saya jalankan ke atas Pemohon, saya telah berpuas hati bahawa Pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang telah mengendalikan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya dengan menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 0.5 gram) dengan harga RM50.00 sepeket. Selanjutnya, pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang didapati telah membeli bekalan dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 5.0 gram) berharga RM250.00 sepeket dan membuat pembungkusan semula ke dalam bentuk peket kecil bagi tujuan pengedaran. Peranan serta kegiatan Pemohon tersebut telah menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon dengan sekumpulan besar orang dalam menjalankan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Mukadimah Akta tersebut. Sehubungan dengan itu, saya telah berpuas hati bahawa penglibatan Pemohon ini sesungguhnya telah S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 memudaratkan ketenteraman awam dan tindakan di bawah Akta tersebut perlu diambil ke atas Pemohon.” [15] Selanjutnya, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan kes terkini Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Peter Chang Nyuk Ming v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2023] 7 CLJ 521 secara khususnya di perenggan 29, muka surat 13 seperti berikut:- “[29] There are no specifications of the presence of a substantial body of persons, be it in the detention order or the grounds of detention, as is required under the terms of art. 149 of the Federal Constitution under which Act 316 was enacted. The stark absence of this requisite renders the detention of the appellant invalid.” [Penekanan diberikan] [16] Mahkamah ini berpandangan adalah wajar dibentangkan Alasan- Alasan Yang Atasnya Perintah Itu Dibuat dan Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta seperti berikut: AKTA DADAH BERBAHAYA (LANGKAH-LANGKAH PENCEGAHAN KHAS) 1985 NAMA ORANG TAHANAN : LINGESWARAN A/L RAJANDRAN NO. KAD PENGENALAN : 940626-10-5539 ALASAN-ALASAN YANG ATASNYA PERINTAH ITU DIBUAT: Bahawa kamu bersama sekumpulan besar orang pernah ada kaitan dengan apa-apa aktiviti yang berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan dengan pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta 234) iaitu mengedar dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seperti yang tersenarai dibawah Jadual Pertama, Bahagian III, Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta 234). Oleh itu, tindakan kamu telah memudaratkan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 ketenteraman awam dan tindakan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 perlu diambil ke atas kamu. PENGATAAN-PENGATAAN FAKTA YANG ATASNYA PERINTAH ITU DIASASKAN: 1. Bahawa kamu didapati terlibat dengan aktiviti pengedaran dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine sejak awal tahun 2010 sehingga 2 Mac 2022 secara tidak berterusan di sekitar kawasan rumah beralamat No. 1, Jalan Meranti 3A/19, Bandar Baru, Batangk Kali, Selangor, di kawasan tepi jalan, berhampiran Padang Bola Sepak Liga Mas, Bandar Baru Batang Kali, Selangor dan di sekitar kawasan belakang Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Bandar Baru Batang Kali, Selangor. 2. Bahawa kamu didapati menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 0.5 gram) dengan harga RM50.00 sepaket. 3. Bahawa kamu didapati menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 5.0 gram) berharga RM250.00 sepeket daripada rakan sejenayah dan membuat pembungkusan semula ke dalam bentuk peket kecil bagi tujuan pengedaran. Dengan Arahan, Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri (AZIZ BIN ABDUL NASIR) Penolong Setiausaha (ADB – 4/2/7933) Kementerian Dalam Negeri [17] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa di bahagian Alasan-Alasan Yang Atasnya Perintah Itu Dibuat, tindakan pengedaran dadah oleh Pemohon adalah dijalankan oleh Pemohon bersama-sama dengan sekumpulan besar orang. Malah, bagi menyokong alasan tersebut, jelas dalam Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta menyatakan bahawa Pemohon ini terlibat dengan aktiviti dadah berbahaya sejak awal tahun 2019 hingga 2 Mac 2022 (tempoh sekitar tiga (3) tahun). Pemohon didapati berperanan dalam menjual dadah berbahaya dan dalam masa yang sama, Pemohon ini juga berperanan dalam membeli bekalan dadah berbahaya daripada rakan sejenayah dan membungkus semula dalam bentuk paket bagi S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 tujuan pengedaran. Berdasarkan pembacaan Alasan yang terang lagi jelas mempunyai perkataan “kamu bersama sekumpulan besar orang” serta Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta ini telah jelas menunjukkan sekumpulan besar orang bersama-sama Pemohon iaitu penglibatan individu lain yang merupakan rakan sejenayah (“accomplice”) dan sekaligus membawa maksud bahawa Pemohon tidak bertindak secara bersendirian. [18] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan pendirian pihak Responden bahawa rantaian tindakan dan kegiatan Pemohon dengan rakan sejenayah ini telah menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon adalah dengan sekumpulan orang yang menjalankan kegiatan pengedaran dadah dan tindakan perlu diambil di bawah Akta 316 kerana telah memudaratkan ketenteraman awam. Alasan dan Pengataan Fakta Pemohon jelas menunjukkan Pemohon tidak bertindak berseorangan kerana sekiranya Pemohon ditarik keluar daripada memainkan peranan Pemohon, ianya sudah tentu akan melumpuhkan rantaian tersebut. Justeru, elemen kedua tersebut juga telah dipenuhi. Selanjutnya, Alasan dan Pengataan Fakta kes Selva Vinayagam (supra) tersebut boleh dibezakan dengan kes semasa di mana adalah jelas Alasan dan Pengataan Fakta kes Selva Vinayagam (supra) tersebut langsung tidak menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon bersama-sama sekumpulan besar orang. [19] Berdasarkan alasan penghakiman kes Peter Chang (supra) tersebut, adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa terdapat ketidakpatuhan prosedur apabila perkataan “sekumpulan besar orang” tidak dinyatakan sama ada di Perintah Tahanan itu sendiri (di muka surat pertama Perintah Tahanan) ataupun di Alasan-Alasan Yang Atasnya Perintah Itu Dibuat. Hal ini boleh S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 dibezakan dengan kes semasa kerana dalam kes semasa ini, di bahagian Alasan-Alasan yang atasnya Perintah itu dibuat telah dengan jelas dan khusus mengandungi perkataan “sekumpulan besar orang”. [20] Oleh yang demikian, memandangkan ketiga-tiga elemen telahpun dipatuhi dengan ketat oleh pihak Responden-Respnden maka Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa Perintah Tahanan Pemohon telah mematuhi kehendak Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dibaca bersama- sama dengan Mukadimah Akta tersebut. Isu (b): Perintah Tahanan bertarikh 22.04.2022 adalah bercanggah dengan Akta Fungsi-fungsi Menteri 1969; dan [20] Berkenaan isu ini, pihak Pemohon berhujah bahawa Perintah tersebut bertarikh 22-4-2022 menunjukkan bahawa ianya ditandatangani oleh TImbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia iaitu Dato’ Sri Dr. Haji Ismail bin Haji Mohamed Said. Sehubungan dengan itu, Perintah tersebut tidak ditandatangani berdasarkan gelaran dan jawatan yang diberikan kepada Timbalan Menteri berdasarkan kepada seksyen 2 Akta Fungsi- Fungsi Menteri yang berbunyi seperti berikut: “(1) The yang Di-Pertuan Agong may be order notify in the Gazette- (a) that the Minister has been conferred with any functions or has been charged with any responsibility in respect of a particular department or subject or that S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 any transfer, to any other Minister, of any of the functions or responsibility referred to has been made; (b) that any style or title has been assigned to any Minister (except the Prime Minister) or that any change in any style and title referred to has been made. (2) An order made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under this section- (a) may provide for the transfer of any property, rights or liabilities held, enjoyed or incurred by any Minister in connection with any functions conferred or transferred; and (b) may contain such other provisions as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the order.” (penekanan diberikan) [22] Gelaran dan jawatan yang diberikan kepada Dato’ Sri Dr. Haji Ismail bin Haji Mohamed Said adalah Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri I dan bukannya sekadar Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri. Sehubungan dengan itu, ianya bercangah dengan Akta Fungsi-Fungsi Menteri 1969 dan mengakibatkan Perintah tersebut cacat dan tidak dapat dipulihkan. S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [23] Manakala Peguam Pesekutuan bagi pihak Responden-Responden berhujah bahawa untuk suatu permohonan “Habeas Corpus”, Pemohon hanya boleh mencabar terhadap isu ketidakpatuhan prosedur sahaja sebagaimana yang digariskan di bawah Seksyen 11C Akta 316 dan apabila isu yang dibangkitkan bukanlah sebahagian daripada kehendak prosedur, ianya tidak boleh dicabar sebagaimana yang diputuskan di dalam kes Lee Kew Sang v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914 [24] Selanjutnya, pihak Responden menegaskan bahawa orang yang menandatangani Perintah Tahanan Pemohon adalah Dato’ Sri Dr. Haji Ismail bin Haji Mohamed Said yang memegang jawatan sebagai TMDN pada masa material dan bukannya merujuk kepada orang lain. [25] Berkaitan dengan isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada Perintah Tahanan terhadap Pemohon, kehendak prosedur Akta 316 yang mana menurut Seksyen 6(1) Akta tersebut telah menggariskan prosedur untuk TMDN menimbangkan kedua-dua laporan yang diterima di bawah Seksyen 3(3) dan Seksyen 5(4) Akta 316 sebelum mengeluarkan Perintah tersebut ke atas Pemohon. Segala kehendak prosedur telahpun dipatuhi oleh pihak Responden dengan ketat apabila TMDN telah menimbangkan kedua-dua laporan di bawah Akta 316 dan seterusnya berpuas hati bahawa Pemohon adalah terlibat dengan aktiviti pengedaran dadah bersama sekumpulan besar orang dan telah memudaratkan ketenteraman awam, maka tindakan penahanan diambil terhadap Pemohon. [26] Pemerhatian Mahkamah adalah selari dengan pendirian pihak Responden-Responden bahawa tidak timbul isu ketidakpatuhan terhadap S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Seksyen 2 Akta Fungsi-Fungsi Menteri 1969 berasaskan kepada dua (2) alasan seperti yang berikut: a) Orang yang menandatangani perintah-perintah tersebut adalah Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Mohamed Said yang memegang jawatan sebagai TMDN pada masa material dan bukannya merujuk kepada orang lain; dan b) Perintah Tahanan yang dikenakan ke atas Pemohon bukanlah suatu borang statutori. [27] Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Mohamed Said selaku orang yang memegang jawatan TMDN pada masa yang material juga telah menjelaskan bahawa beliau merupakan TMDN pada masa yang material (rujukan dibuat terhadap perenggan 2 di muka surat 2 dan perenggan 4 di muka surat 2 dan 3 dalam Kand. 8). Selain daripada itu, Pemohon hanya boleh dikatakan telah diprejudiskan sekiranya orang yang menandatangani Perintah Tahanan Pemohon merupakan individu lain selain daripada orang yang memegang jawatan TMDN pada masa yang material dengan merujuk kepada Seksyen 4 Akta Fungsi-Fungsi Menteri 1969 di mana dalam kes Pemohon ini, Perintah Tahanan Pemohon sememangnya telah ditandantangani oleh Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Mohamed Said setelah beliau berpuas hati untuk mengeluarkan Perintah Tahanan ke atas Pemohon sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan menurut kehendak Akta 316. [28] Isu yang dibangkitkan oleh peguam Pemohon ini adalah rentetan daripada ketiadaan perkataan “I” di Perintah Tahanan selepas perkataan TMDN. Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa ketiadaan perkataan “I” S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 selepas perkataan TMDN dalam Perintah Tahanan Pemohon tidak terjumlah sebagai suatu tindakan yang menyebabkan Perintah Tahanan sebagai tidak sah memandangkan Perintah Tahanan bukanlah suatu borang statutori dan ketiadaan perkataan “I” tersebut tidak mengubah intipati (substance) dan objektif pengeluaran Perintah Tahanan Pemohon. [29] Rujukan dibuat kepada Seksyen 62 Akta Tafsiran 1947 & 1958 yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “Section 62 Deviation from forms Any written law prescribing a form shall be deemed to provide that an instrument or other document purporting to be in that form shall not be invalidated by reason of any deviation from the form if the deviation has no substantial effect and is not calculated to mislead.”. (penekanan diberikan) [30] Berpaksikan kepada seksyen 62 Akta Tafsiran 1947 & 1958, Mahkamah berpendirian bahawa ketiadaan perkataan “I” selepas perkatan “TMDN” dalam Perintah Tahanan Pemohon tidak menyebabkan pelencongan intipati dan objektif pengeluaran Perintah Tahanan Pemohon. [31] Berdasarkan kepada kes Pemohon ini, Perintah Tahanan Pemohon bukanlah suatu “prescribed form”, sebaliknya hanya suatu notis pemakluman. Sekiranya terdapat ketinggalan perkatan tersebut S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 dikatakan sebagai suatu pelencongan, pelencongan tersebut tidak menyebabkan ia terpesong daripada tujuan pengeluaran Perintah Tahanan kepada Pemohon. Pemohon tidak dalam apa keadaan sekalipun terkeliru dangan maklumat-maklumat yang terkandung dalam Perintah Tahanan Pemohon yang boleh mengakibatkan Perintah Tahanan Pemohon menjadi tidak sah ataupun cacat walaupun terdapat ketiadaan perkataan “I” selepas perkataan “TMDN”. [32] Maka jelas kepada Mahkamah bahawa Perintah Tahanan Pemohon sememangnya ditandatangani oleh TMDN dan bukannya Timbalan Menteri yang lain selain daripada Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Mohamed Said yang merupakan TMDN. [33] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah berpendapat tiada sebarang isu ketidakpatuhan prosedur dan tidak timbul isu percanggahan terhadap Akta Fungsi-Fungsi Menteri 1969. Justeru, isu kedua yang dibangkitkan oleh Pemohon ini adalah tidak bermerit dan sewajarnya ditolak (rujuk kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan: Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor v Awang Sari bin Lasikan [05(HC)-69- 04/2021(B)]). Isu (c) Kegagalan pihak Lembaga Penasihat untuk mengemukakan Nota Prosiding. [34] Berasaskan kepada isu di atas, Peguam Pemohon mengatakan bahawa tiada Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta dibacakan kepada Pemohon dan Pemohon tidak membuat sebarang pengakuan ketika persidangan representasi di hadapan Lembaga Penasihat (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “LP”). Pemohon telah mengatakan bahawa beliau tidak dimaklumkan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 akan prosedur yang membolehkan beliau memanggil Pegawai Penyiasat sebagai saksi dan menyangka bahawa Pegawai Penyisat akan hadir sendiri untuk memberi keterangan. Pemohon juga mengatakan bahawa bahawa proses representasi di hadapan LP amat singkat di mana seorang anggota polis berbangsa India yang berpakaian biasa telah menyuruh Pemohon membuat rayuan dan Pemohon perlu memohon maaf dan mengaku ke atas segala tuduhan. Seterusnya, Pemohon mengatakan bahawa Responden bertanggungjawab untuk membuktikan bahawa segala hak asasi Pemohon terutamanya pendengaran representasi yang adil dan saksama perlu diberikan kepada Pemohon. [35] Peguam Pemohon berhujah bahawa Pengerusi LP telah menafikan segala kenyataan Pemohon di atas, maka untuk memastikan kebenaran Pemohon atau Pengerusi LP maka Nota Prosiding representasi Pemohon perlu dibekalkan kepada Pemohon apabila Peguam Pemohon membuat permohonan ke atas Nota Prosiding representasi tersebut. Seksyen 14 Akta 316 secara nyata tidak mengklasifikasikan Nota Prosiding tersebut sebagai rahsia atau sulit. Kegagalan Responden membekalkan Nota Prosiding representasi telah menyebabkan satu penafian hak asasi Pemohon dan boleh menyebabkan Perintah Tahanan cacat. [36] Kegagalan dan keengganan pihak Responden mengemukaan Nota Prosiding tersebut telah menyebabkan keterpakaian seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 ke atas Responden kerana Nota Prosiding tersebut merupakan bukti dokumentari penting yang dapat membuktikan sama ada Pengerusi LP telah menjalankan persidangan representasi yang S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 lengkap dan terperinci ke atas kes Pemohon atau tidak. Malah, keengganan Responden mengemukakan Nota Prosiding tersebut membuktikan dokumen tersebut sekiranya dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah akan memihak kepada pihak Pemohon dan akan meruntuhkan kes pihak Responden dengan merujuk kepada kes Mohammad Azanul Haqimi Tuan Ahmad Azahari v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 8 CLJ 465 [37] Peguam Persekutuan yang mewakili pihak Responden-Responden menegaskan bahawa kesemua kehendak prosedur yang melibatkan sesi representasi Pemohon telahpun dipatuhi dengan ketat apabila Afidavit Jawapan pihak Responden-Responden dibaca secara keseluruhan. Pemohon sememangnya telah hadir ke sesi representasi Pemohon, diberikan hak untuk diwakili peguam dan telah memanggil saksi serta tidak memohon apa-apa penangguhan (rujukan dibuat terhadap perenggan 7, muka surat 5 dan 6 dalam Kand. 4). Oleh yang demikian, tiada sebarang ketidakpatuhan prosedur. [38] LP telah memberikan syor dan diperkenankan oleh Yang di-Pertuan Agong berkenaan representasi Pemohon tersebut iaitu Perintah Tahanan diteruskan dengan merujuk kepada peruntukan subseksyen 10(2) dan seksyen 11C(1) Akta 316 berkaitan isu pengemukaan Nota Prosiding LP yang dibangkitkan oleh Peguam Pemohon. Peruntukan kedua-dua seksyen tersebut dinyatakan semula seperti yang berikut: “Report of Advisory Board 10. (1) … S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 (2) Upon considering the recommendations of the Advisory Board under this section, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may give the Minister such directions, if any, as he shall think fit regarding the order made by the Minister and every decision of the Yang di- Pertuan Agong shall, subject to section 11, be final and shall not be called into question in any court. “Judicial review of act or decision of Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Minister 11C. (1) There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or finding or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision.” [39] Berlandaskan kepada hujahan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah berpendirian adalah wajar untuk diteliti dan diperhalusi afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan oleh deponent-deponen Responden terutamanya afidavit Pengerusi LP antara lain beliau telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak dapat mengemukakan Nota Prosiding kerana beliau berpendapat sekiranya dikemukakan ia boleh menjejaskan kepentingan Negara sepertimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 14 Akta 316 serta Perkara 151 (3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan beliau memohon perlindungan kedua-dua peruntukan tersebut. [40] Mahkamah merujuk kepada Seksyen 9 Akta 316 dibaca bersama- sama Perkara 151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, yang mana kehendak prosedur Akta tersebut bagi tujuan representasi adalah seperti yang berikut:- S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 a) Pemohon hendaklah diberikan hak untuk membuat representasi dalam tempoh tiga (3) bulan; b) Pemohon hendaklah diberikan hak untuk diwakili peguam ketika sesi representasi Pemohon; dan c) Pemohon hendaklah diberikan hak untuk memanggil saksi ketika sesi representasi Pemohon. [41] Semua afidavit deponen-deponen telah di teliti dan diperhalusi terutamanya afidavit yang difailkan oleh Pengerusi LP di mana kehendak- kehendak prosedur yang dinyatakan di atas telah dipatuhi dengan ketat. Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa semua afidavit deponen-deponen Responden adalah konsisten dan tidak terdapat percanggahan antara satu sama lain. Mahkamah berpendapat adalah wajar diperturunkan bahagian penting kenyataan Pengerusi LP di dalam afidavit beliau seperti berikut: “Sebelum persidangan representasi Pemohon dimulakan, saya menyatakan bahawa Pemohon telah dimaklumkan, diberikan dan diterangkan berhubung hak saksi-saksi Pemohon serta tatacara untuk memanggil saksi-saksi Pemohon yang Pemohon berkehendak untuk memanggil bagi tujuan persidangan representasi Pemohon di hadapan Lembaga Penasihat. Lembaga Penasihat juga telah mengarahkan SARJAN VIMALAN A/L SEKERAN untuk bertindak sebagai Jurubahasa Tamil untuk S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 menterjemahkan kepada Pemohon berkenaan dengan hak Pemohon serta tatacara prosiding representasi tersebut ke dalam Bahasa Tamil dan untuk membantu Pemohon sepanjang persidangan representasi pemohon tersebut berlangsung serta untuk menterjemahkan semula apa-apa prosiding representasi yang tidak difahami oleh Pemohon. Seterusnya alasan-alasan penahanan dan pengataan-pengataan fakta kepada Perintah Tahanan Pemohon (“Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta tersebut”) telah dibacakan dan diterangkan kepada Pemohon dalam Bahasa Tamil oleh SARJAN VIMALAN A/L SEKERAN. Pemohon mengakui faham dan alasan-alasan penahanan dan pengataan-pengataan fakta yang telah dibacakan dan diterjemahkan kepada Pemohon. Semasa persidangan tersebut, Pemohon tidak mengaku salah terhadap semua Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta tersebut. Saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa Pemohon telah diberikan hak untuk membuat representasi di hadapan Lembaga Penasihat. Peluang reprsentasi tersebut juga telah digunakan sepenuhnya oleh Pemohon serta telah dijalankan dengan sempurna pada 22.06.2022. Saya juga mengesahkan bahawa Lembaga Penasihat telah menimbangkan representasi Pemohon dan telah membuat syor berkenaan reprsentasi Pemohon tersebut. Seterusnya pada 05.07.2022, Lembaga Penasihat telah mengemukakan syor kepada Yang di-Pertuan Agong pada 06.07.2022. Saya tidak dapat menzahirkan dokumen berkaitan syor tersebut kerana dokumen tersebut S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 diklasifikasikan sebagai “Rahsia” dan tidak boleh didedahkan sewenang-wenangnya disebabkan penzahirannya boleh menjejaskan kepentingan negara sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 14 Akta tersebut dan Perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Oleh yang demikian, saya menuntut keistimewaan dan perlindungan di bawah peruntukkan undang-undang tersebut. ……………… saya mengulangi semula keseluruhan perenggan di atas dan menegaskan bahawa saya tidak dapat mengemukakan dan menzahirkan Nota Prosiding, laporan-laporan dan dokumen-dokumen dalam fail kes yang berkaitan dengan Pemohon kerana saya berpendapat penzahiran dan pengemukaan dokumen- dokumen tersebut boleh menjejaskan kepentingan negara sepertimana diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 14 Akta tersebut dan Perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Saya percaya bahawa tiada keperluan prosedur untuk Nota Prosiding Lembaga Penasihat dikemukakan dan sekali lagi menegaskan bahawa Nota Prosiding bukanlah dokumen yang boleh dikemukakan atas sebab yang telah dijelaskan di atas. Saya menegaskan bahawa prosiding pendengaran representasi Pemohon telah diberi pertimbangan secara adil dan saksama berdasarkan undang-undang dan tiada tanggapan negative di bawah undang-undang yang boleh digunapakai akibat ketidakupayaan Lembaga Penasihat untuk menzahirkan Nota Prosiding di dalam Permohonan ini. Semua dakwaan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Pemohon telah disangkal dan dijelaskan oleh pihak Lembaga Penasihat secara konsistent dan benar. Justeru, segala dakwaan Pemohon adalah tidak benar dan tidak berasas. [42] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah ini berpendirian bahawa rujukan Pemohon terhadap kes Azanul Haqimi (supra) tersebut adalah tidak bertepatan dengan fakta permohonan ini memandangkan fakta kes semasa boleh dibezakan dengan kes Azanul Haqimi (supra). Dalam kes Azanul Haqimi (supra), isu kegagalan pengemukaan Nota Prosiding telah berbangkit dan diputuskan bermerit kerana terdapat percanggahan diantara afidavit yang difailkan oleh deponen-deponen Responden- Responden sendiri berhubung hak Pemohon diwakili peguam. [43] Berbeza dengan kes semasa ini, langsung tidak timbul percanggahan afidavit di antara afidavit deponen-deponen Responden- Responden sendiri. Namun, apa yang berlaku berdasarkan afidavit Pemohon adalah Pemohon mendakwa bahawa terdapatnya penafian hak-hak Pemohon yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta 316 tanpa sebarang percanggahan afidavit-afidavit Responden-Responden sendiri dan oleh yang demikian, dikatakan Nota Prosiding perlu dikemukakan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Rosli Ani V. Pengerusi, Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah & Ors [2021] 1 LNS 676 yang telah membincangkan soal percanggahan diantara afidavit Pemohon dan afidavit Responden seperti yang berikut:- “[42] It is natural that there will always be a conflict of evidence between an applicant who seeks to secure his release from detention and the detaining authority in S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 respect of material facts. See Su Yu Min v. Ketua Polis Negara & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 875. [43] In Mohammad Azanul Haqimi, the contradiction stemmed from the afidavit of the respondent itself and unless the notes of proceedings are produced for inspection, that conflict cannot be resolved. Since the notes of proceedings were not produced, the Federal Court held that the adverse presumption should apply against the respondent. [44] I therefore find that the case of Mohammad Azanul Haqimi Tuan Ahmad Azahari v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors (supra) does not apply to the instant case on the facts and that no adverse presumption is invoked against the Respondents for failure to supply the notes of proceedings. [45] Consequently, there was no procedural non- compliance for failure to supply the notes of proceedings of the Advisory Board.” [Penekanan diberikan] [44] Sekiranya terdapat percanggahan sekalipun, percanggahan yang berlaku adalah diantara afidavit Pemohon dengan dakwaan Pemohon sendiri dan afidavit deponen-deponen Responden-Responden. Dalam hal yang sedemikian. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa keterangan pihak Responden yang hanya menjalankan amanah yang S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 dipertanggungjawabkan kepada dirinya dan tidak mempunyai sebarang kepentingan terhadap kes Pemohon wajarnya dipercayai. [45] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah berpendapat tidak timbul sebarang ketidakpatuhan prosedur dan percanggahan keterangan afidavit deponen-deponen Responden sehingga menyebabkan Nota Prosiding perlu dikemukakan. Oleh itu isu ketiga ini ditolak. Kesimpulan [46] Permohonan “Habeas Corpus” Pemohon adalah tidak bermerit kerana Pemohon telah gagal menunjukkan berlakunya ketidakpatuhan prosedur (non-compliance) oleh pihak Responden-Responden dalam kes ini seperti diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 11C(1) Akta 316 dan kesemua isu yang diketengahkan tidak terjumlah kepada ketidakpatuhan prosedur (rujuk kes Lee Kew Sang v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 clj 914 dan kes Chua Kian Voon v. Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2020] 1 CLJ 747]. Oleh yang demikian, permohonan Pemohon melalui Lampiran 1 ditolak. Tarikh: 28.11.2023 t.t (ABDUL WAHAB BIN MOHAMED) S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA IPOH, PERAK S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Pihak-pihak Tetuan M. Thanakumaran & Shan bagi pihak Perayu. Peguamcara dan Peguambela Laguna Merbok Business Park, No. 9A, Lorong BLM 1/6, Bandar Laguna Merbuok 08000 Sungai Petani Kedah Tel: 04.4400914 Faks: 04.4400633 Emel: [email protected] Peguamcara: Encik Surendran a/l Arunagiri Peguam Persekutuan bagi pihak Responden Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Kementerian Dalam Negeri Aras 5, Setia Perkasa 1, Kompleks Setia Perkasa Pusat Pentadbiran Kerajaan Persekutuan 62546 Wilayah Persekutuan, Putrajaya S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	47,954	Tika 2.6.0
P-02(NCvC)(W)-134-01/2020	PERAYU KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD RESPONDEN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD	mandatory injunction - caveat – remove of caveat - Specific Performance – fraud - beneficial and registered owner - Private Caveat - Memorandum of Transfer - limitation period under Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities and Protection Act 1948 (‘Act 198’) - doctrine of laches - limitation period under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘Act 254’) - statutory duties -“Nor Further Action/NFA” -section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 - Section 17 of the Contract Act 1950 - rightful owner – of the land - bankruptcy order)- of indoor management rule/ Turquand’s rule – declaratory - an indefeasible title under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code - purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration.	30/11/2023	YA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamKorumYA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin Abdullah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=05dda3cf-e880-4ab8-af6c-0d8858190934&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-39-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU (NO. SYARIKAT :11580 – P) DAN 1. PENGARAH PEJABAT TANAH DAN GALIAN PULAU PINANG 2. NG SEAH HUNG (NO. K/P:431206-07-5193) 3. NG SEAH HOCK (NP. K/P: 540808-07-5003) 4. SWISS LEISURE PRODUCTS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 178923-V) 5. LEOW TEOW HONG (NO. K/P: 521015-07-5069) 6. LIM TIAN HUAT 7. B. RAJADURAI 8. KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN INSOLVENSI MALAYSIA 30/11/2023 15:04:40 P-02(NCvC)(W)-134-01/2020 Kand. 157 S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 9. CARAWAN VENTURE SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT : 300744-U) 10. GEENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 869514-U) 11. YAP MOH YIN (NO. K/P: 5485519) 12. CHEN YEN MOOI (NO. K/P: 5485519) 13. KERK CHIN LIONG (NO. K/P: 8163803) 14. NG YIM KONG (LS 00088343)(NO. K/P: 490424-08-5883) … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-134-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 DAN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD … RESPONDEN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-135-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU DAN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD … RESPONDEN CORUM YAACOB HAJI MD SAM, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IBRAHIM, JCA AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH, JCA S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are three (3) related appeals before us which are as follows: i. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC)(W) - 39 - 01/2020 (“Appeal 39”); ii. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC(W)) - 134 - 01/2020 (“Appeal 134” ); and iii. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC)(W) - 135 – 1/2020 (“Appeal 135”). Appeal 39 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in dismissing the Appellant’s claim against the 1st Respondent, 2nd Respondent; 3rd Respondent, 4th Respondent, 5th Respondent, 6th Respondent, 7th Respondent, 9th Respondent, 8th Respondent, 10th Respondent, 11th Respondent, 12th Respondent, 13th Respondent and 14th Respondent and awarding costs of RM60,000.00 each to be paid by the Appellant to the respective R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R8, R13 and R14 herein. Appeal 134 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in allowing Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd (10th Respondent)’s claim against the Appellant with costs. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Appeal 135 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in allowing Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd (10th Respondent)’s claim against the Appellant with a total costs of RM80,000.00. Background facts [2] The Appellant (plaintiff) is a family-owned company incorporated by one, Ng Boon Kow, and after his demise on 31.5.1979, the following persons were the directors of the Appellant and remained as such until 30.05.1992: (a) Madam Tan Soo Lang @ Tan Choon Lian; (b) Ng Seah Hung (‘R2’); (c) Ng Seah Hock (‘R3’); (d) Ng Seah Kang; (e) Ng Seah Kheng; (f) Ng Seah Theam; (g) Ng Seah Hai (PW1); and (h) Oi Siah Cheng [3] Meanwhile, the Respondents in this case, can be identified as follows: Respondents/Defendants Remarks 1. Pengarah, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Pulau Pinang (‘D1’) (‘R1’) D1 is the Director of Land Mining Pulau Pinang. 2. Ng Seah Hung (‘D2’) (‘R2’) D2 is the former director of the plaintiff and was adjudgedbankrupt on 26.05.1989 . 3. Ng Seah Hock (‘D3’) (‘R3’) D3 is the former director of the plaintiff and was adjudged bankrupt on 10.03.1993. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 4. Syarikat Leisure Product Sdn. Bhd. “ (‘D4’) (‘R4’) D4 is a private limited company. 5. Leow Teow Hong (‘D5’) (‘R5’) 1. D5 is the Director of D4 and at all material times dealt with D2, D3, D6, D7, and D8. 2. D5 is also a shareholder in Powerama Holdings Sdn. Bhd, a shareholder of D4. 6. Lim Tian Huat (‘D6’) (‘R6’) 1. D6 is a Receiver and Manager of D4 and is also the Chairman of CLRC, Companies Commission of Malaysia; and 2. D6 was appointed as the Receiver and Manager of D4 on 16.04.1992. 7. B Rajadurai (‘D7’) (‘R7’) 1. D7 is an advocate and solicitor, practicing as such previously at Messrs. Durai & Associates, KL; 2. D7 was adjudged a bankrupt vide Adjudicating and Receiving Order dated 25.11.1999; and 3. The plaintiff had obtained the leave of Court vide Order of Court dated 09.03.2013 to bring and continue this action against D7. 8. Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Malaysia (D8)(‘R8’) 1. D8 is the Director General of the Department of Insolvency of Malaysia in Pulau Pinang, vested with the estates of D2 and D3; 2. D8’s officer having conduct of D2 and D3 estate was one N. Dharmasegaran. 9. Cerawan Venture Sdn. Bhd. (‘D9’)(‘R9’) 1. D9 is a private limited company; 2. The directors for D9 include Mr.Kalaiselvam a/l Suppiah and Philip a/l Eridianathan. Both were appointed as D9 directors on 07.03.2011; 3. Unfortunately, Kalaiselvan died on 05.03.2012. 10. Greentech Industries Sdn. Bhd. (‘D10’) (‘R10’) D10 is a private limited company. 11. Kerk Chin Leong (‘D13’) (‘R13’ D13 is the director of D4 appointed on/before 21.04.1990. D13 is also a shareholder of D4. 12. Ng Yim Kong (‘D14’) (‘R14’) 1. D14 was the former company secretary to the Plaintiff, appointed on 18.08.1995. 2. D14 was also the company secretary to D4, appointed on 28.11.1991. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [4] The subject matter in dispute, in this case, refers to the 2/3 portion of the land that belongs to the plaintiff which was transferred to R4 and subsequently transferred to R10. The title of the land has been changed several times as follows: (a) The land was held under Temporary Title No. H.S (D) 120, Mukim 14, Daerah Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang. was registered on 30.06.1978 under the plaintiff's name (‘HSD 120’); (b) HSD 120 subsequently became known as HS(D) 296 Mukim 14 Daerah Seberang Perai, Negeri Pulau Pinang, and the date of the issuance of this title is 11.06.1990 (‘HSD 296’); (c) Thereafter, HSD 296 became known as Title No. 1487 (Plot 7) Seksyen 3, Bandar Butterworth, Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang, Mak Mandin Industrial Estate Mukim 14 Daerah Seberang Perai (‘Lot 1487’); (d) Later, Lot 1487 was subdivided/partitioned and further issued under the separate document title as follows: PN 6708 Lot 6147 (2/3 portion of the land (‘Lot 6147’) registered under the name of D4 and after that D10); and PN 6709 Lot 6148 (1/3 portion of the land registered under the plaintiff) (‘Lot 6148’). S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (e) Subsequently, there was a further subdivision of Lot 6147 into six (6) Lots by D10 (Lot 10000, Lot 10001, Lot 10002, Lot 10004, Lot 10005 and Lot 10006). (The subject matter in dispute, in this case will be used interchangeably as 8.5 acres of the land or 2/3 portion of the land or Lot 6147) The Appeals The Appellant’s case [5] After the demised of Ng Boon Kow, R2 and R3 controlled and managed the Appellant. [6] Based on Clause 87 (b) of the Appellant's Article of Associations, a member of the board of directors ceases to hold office if he becomes bankrupt or is legally deprived of the administration of his estate. [7] R2 & R3 have been adjudged bankrupts on 26.05.1989 and 10.03.1993 respectively. [8] However, R2 as bankrupt has acted for the Appellant in the following matters: (a) on 26.09.1989, R2 entered into a sale and purchase agreement dated 26.09.1989 (‘S&P dated 26.09.1986’) (see pp. 142-155 of Ikatan Teras 1 of R6) with R4 for the sale of 8.5 acres of the land for the amount of RM 7.5 million; and (b) on 24.10.1989, R2 executed a memorandum of transfer Form 14A (‘MOT dated 24.10.1989') (see pp. 158-159 Ikatan S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Teras 1 of R6) for the Appellant to transfer 8.5 acres of the land to D4 (Swiss Leasure Products Sdn Bhd). The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was registered on 11.05.1990. [9] Appellant’s further alleged that on 30.05.1992, R2 had removed four of the Appellant’s directors which are Ng Seah Kang, Ng Seah Theam, Ng Seah Keng and Ng Seah Hai without their knowledge. R2 then appointed his wife and his daughter as the Appellant’s directors. [10] On 12.02.1994, R2, his wife, his daughter and one Gopalakrishnan entered into agreement with Merge Port (M) Sdn. Bhd. (‘Merge Port’), to sell another portion of the land to Merge Port for purchase price of RM24 million. This caused, the late Tan Soo Lang, the Appellant's director entered a caveat on the land on 08.07.1994. [11] On 14.09.1994, Tan Soo Lang also filed a motion No.: 25-57-94 against Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah Pulau Pinang and Merge Port, for an order that the registration of transfer executed in favour of Merge Port be cancelled and alternatively be declared as null and void. On 17.10.1994, the High Court allowed the said application. [12] The Appellant also commenced four (4) other lawsuits against R2 and R3 in 1994 and onwards. Appellant alleged that N. Dharmasegaran from R8 knew the lawsuits commenced by the Appellant against R2 and R3 because he appeared for R2 in all of the proceedings. [13] On 03.11.1994, Ng Seah Kheng lodged a police report alleging that his signature in the MOT dated 24.10.1989 was forged. (‘Police Report dated 03.11.1994’). S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [14] On 20.06.2001, the Appellant was wound up vide Court’s Order dated 20.06.2001. The Appellant’s solicitor had sent documents including the land titles, being assets of the Appellant to the Insolvency Officer. On 12.11.2010, the Appellant was released of its wound-up status vide Order of Court dated 12.11.2010. [15] On 04.07.2011, R10 filed Originating Summon No.: 24-1263-2011 against the Appellant for an order of mandatory injunction, that is to order the Appellant to remove all buildings, toilets and lamp posts, gates, and all erections on Lot 6147, (‘OS 1’). [16] As a result, the Appellant entered a caveat on Lot 6147 on 13.11.2011 (‘caveat dated 13.11.2011’). [17] Later, R10 filed another OS No. 24-118-01/2012 on 20.01.2012 to remove Appellant’s caveat dated 13.11.2011. R10 further claimed that he has purchased Lot 6147 (the 2/3 portion) through to Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 14.10.2009 executed between R10 and R9 (‘S&P dated 14.10.2009’)(‘OS2’). [18] The Appellant stated that upon perusing the cause papers of OS1 and OS2 filed by R10, the Appellant discovered the following: (a) The S&P dated 14.10.2009 made an express reference to the High Court of Penang Suit No. 22-783-2005 (‘Suit 783’) between R4, R5 and R13 through R6, who is appointed as Receiver and Manager of R4 according to the Deed of Debenture dated 22.09.1989(‘DOD dated 22.09.1989’) and R9; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (b) The Appellant later conducts a file search on Suit 783 and discovered that there was a court order dated 14.07.1999 for Specific Performance of the S&P dated 26.09.1989 obtained against the Appellant vide Originating Summons No. (MT4)-24- 1318-1998 (‘Suit 1318’) (‘Order dated 14.07.1999’) by R4 through R6. However, it was claimed that Order dated 14.07.199 was not served to the Appellant and the Appellant had no knowledge of such suit. (c) The Appellant later discovered that Suit 1318 was served to the Appellant through the substituted service to the address at 22nd Floor, Bangunan Peransang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur which is not the Appellant’s registered address at that material time; (d) Order dated 14.07.1999 also provides that all documents for the application to partition/subdivide the land shall be signed by the Senior Assistant Registrar if the Appellant failed to sign and hand over those documents within 30 days from the date of the order. However, the land was subdivided to Lot 6148 and Lot 6147 only on 25.02.2009 which is approximately 10 years after the date of the Order dated 14.07.1999; (e) Further, Order dated 14.07.1999 clearly stated that R4 was only entitled to 8.5 acres of the land but the title of Lot 6147 issued by D1 showed that 2/3 portion of the land is measured more than 8.5 acres; and S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (f) The Appellant also discovered that the whole land was mentioned as a fixed asset of R4 in the DOD dated 22.09.1989 in the event that the S&P dated 26.09.1986 was executed four (4) days after that. [19] Upon looking at all of the documents through a file search conducted in court, the Appellant stated that they only knew about the fraudulent transferred of their land and subdivision sometime in 2011. Thus, they alleged that fraud had been committed by all of the Respondents either by themselves alone or that they had conspired with other Respondents to defraud the Appellant which had caused the 2/3 of the portion of the land was fraudulently transferred to R4 and subsequently to R10 by R9. [20] As a result, the Appellant filed Civil Suit No. 21NCVC-13-03/2012 (Civil Suit 1) against all of the Respondents on 20.03.2012, primarily to recover 2/3 of the land which the Appellant alleged that had fraudulently transferred to R4 and subsequently to R10. [21] The Appellant claims that all of the Respondents have fraudulently and/or unlawfully conspired to defraud and injure the Appellant as the beneficial and registered owner of 2/3 portion of the land. [22] Wherefore, the Appellant seeks for the following declarations and reliefs (see paragraph 60 Amended Statement of Claim): (a) that the Appellant is the legal and beneficial owner of the 2/3 portions of the land formerly held under Lot 6147 and later subdivided into Lots No. 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (b) the Order of Court dated 14.7.1999 obtained by R4 in the High Court of Penang Originating Summons No. (MT4)-24-1318- 1998 be declared null and void and/or set aside; (c) that the R1 be ordered to do the necessary acts to put the Appellant as the registered owner of the 2/3 portion of land formerly held under Lot 6147; (d) that all subdivision of the land from Lot 6147 to Lots 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005 to be called and Lot 6147 to be reinstated with the Appellant as the registered owner; (e) that the Private Caveat Presentation Number 0799B201101293 dated 13.9.2011 lodged by the Appellant on Lots 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005 shall remain until the disposal of this matter; (f) the 10th Respondent be restrained by themselves and/or through their agents and/or employees and/or other from dealing with the said land in any manner whatsoever until disposal of this suit; (g) the R1 to R14 pay the Appellant damages for fraud and/or damages for conspiracy to defraud the Appellant; (h) The 10th Respondent rebuild and restore all buildings, toilet and lampposts and gates and all erections on the said land which S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 were demolished by the 10th Respondent and/or pay the equivalent value of the demolished buildings to the Appellant; (i) Damages for loss of use of land; (j) Costs; (k) Any other relief which this Honourable Court deems fit and proper. The Respondents’ case [23] In 1988, the Appellant was facing financial difficulties as its onion business was falling. Bangkok Bank notified the Appellant that if the Appellant failed to repay its outstanding loans, they will take legal action to enforce its securities under a Deed of Debenture and charges to impose the assets of the Appellant. [24] As a result, the Appellant’s directors and shareholders agreed to sell the entire land to one Ng Kok Lian, the Appellant’s closed relative (cousin) at the purchase price of RM 5,600,000.00, to repay the Appellant's loan with Bangkok Bank. [25] On the other side, Leow Teow Hong (‘R5/D5’ - shareholder in Powerama Holdings Sdn. Bhd) also shareholder of D4 was approached by Michael Cheong, Joachim Binder (‘Binder’) and Thomas Peter Polasek (‘Thomas’), whereby Thomas informed R5 of his intention to sell off and relocate plants and machinery from his company known as Royal Plastic SA in Switzerland into Malaysia and to explore the business opportunity in S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Malaysia. Thomas requested R5, Michael Cheong, and Binder's help to find a place or factory to operate a business. In consideration of that, Thomas had promised three of them the sum of money as a commission. Given that D4 was formed on 21.02.1989. [26] Somewhere in early 1989, R5 was introduced to Ng Kok Lian by Ng Kuang Boo, a bank officer at Chung Khiaw Bank. Ng Kok Lian informed R5 that the Appellant wanted to sell its land at a certain price. R5 however resigned from R4 on 05.06.1989. [27] Ng Kok Lian later informed the Appellant that R4 was interested to purchase the 2/3 portion of the land for the sum of RM 7,500,000.00 to be paid by way of the issuance of 1,000,000.00 shares of RM 1.00 each at par credit as fully in R4 and the balance of RM 6,500,000.00 to be paid vide Messrs. Durai & Associates. [28] As a result, R2 who is bankrupt acting on the advise of R7 (solicitors in Messrs. Durai & Associate) executed the S&P dated 26.09.1989 for the plaintiff with R4. According to R2, he had disclosed his status as a bankrupt to R7 and R3 and the S&P was executed for the benefit of the Appellant. [29] According to the S&P dated 29.09.1989, the Appellant is required to apply for the partition of the land and to obtain a separate document title to the 2/3 portion of the land. If the Appellant failed to do so, the whole land will be charged for the financing of the purchase of the property by R4. The Appellant had failed to apply for a separate title. [30] By a Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989 (‘Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989’), the lending banks agreed to grant R4 the term loan S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 facilities amounting to RM24,000,000.00 to finance D4’s purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land from the Appellant. As security for the repayment of facilities, R4 entered into a Deed of Debenture dated 22.09.1989 (‘DOD dated 22.09.1989’), whereby all of R4’s assets and properties, including the land were charged and/or pledge for a sum of RM 24,000,000.00. [31] On 11.10.1989, the 1st draw on the facilities for RM 17,100,000.00 was released by the lending banks to R4. R4 later paid the purchase price of 2/3 portion of the land to the Appellant in the manner as agreed by the parties. [32] On 13.10.1989, Messrs. Durai & Associates paid RM 5,600,000.00 to Bangkok Bank, the redemption sum for the land that was placed as securities by the Appellant. According to such redemption, Bangkok Bank charges over the entire land were discharged on 20.11.1989. The remaining purchase price was paid to Ng Kok Lian as a commission and the Appellant's shareholders accordingly. [33] R2 & R3 then executed MOT dated 24.10.1989 for the plaintiff to transfer 2/3 portion of the land to R4 and 1/3 portion of land back to the Appellant. The transfer was registered on 11.05.1990. [34] Under the terms of the Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989 and S&P, R4 and the Appellant created a charge dated 31.07.1990 over the land in favour of OBB and UAB which was registered on 01.08.1990, pending the partition of the land (‘Charge dated 31.07.1990’). [35] On 06.04.1990, R2 filed his statement of affairs to R8 (Insolvency Department). R3 also filed his statement of affairs with R8 on 12.01.1994. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [36] On 16.04.1992, D6 was appointed by the OBB as the Receiver and Manager (‘R&M’) of assets and properties of R4 under DOD dated 26.09.1989. Since his appointment, R6 had several times attempted to sell 2/3 portion of the land but the sales did not materialise since the land was not partitioned by the Appellant. [37] As a result, R4 through R6 commenced Suit 1318 against the Appellant for an order for Specific Performance. R4 through R6 tried to serve the cause papers of Suit 1318 to the Appellant by hand, but the Appellant’s registered address was changed. Therefore, R4 through R6 served the cause papers of Suit 1318 to the Appellant through a substituted service. An affidavit of service of the cause papers was filed to court by R4. R4 through R6 later obtained the Order dated 14.07.1999 which was also served to the Appellant’s registered address via substituted service. R4 did not proceed to execute the Court's Order dated 14.07.1999 because R4 was under receivership and it was not cost-effective for R4 to incur the considerable costs and expenses of partitioning the land when 2/3 of the portion was intended to be sold and realised. However, the attainment of the Court's order dated 14.07.1999 enable any prospective purchaser to undertake the obligation of applying for partition of the land. [38] R4 through R6 executed the Principal Agreement dated 11.11.2003, which was subsequently varied by the Supplemental Agreement dated 22.05.2005 with R9, for the sale of 2/3 of the land for a sum of RM 6,000,000.00. A dispute arose between R4 and R9 which resulted in the termination of the Principal Agreement dated 11.11.2003. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [39] The dispute between R4 and R9 was finally resolved. R4 and R9 later executed the S&P dated 05.10.2009 for the sale of 2/3 portion of the land for a sum of RM 6,000,000.00. [40] Under the S&P dated 05.10.2009, R9 undertakes the obligation to apply for the partition of the land. Following such an application, the 2/3 of land was partitioned into Lot 6147 and Lot 6148. [41] Later, R4 through R6 executed the Memorandum of Transfer dated 15.12.2009 (‘MOT dated 15.12.2009’) to transfer Lot 6147 to R10 as the nominee of R9 following the terms and conditions of the S&P dated 05.10.2009 and R9’s letter dated 03.11.2009. [42] On 04.07.2011, R10 as the registered owner of Lot 6147 filed OS1 against the Appellant for the trespass action. [43] On 26.07.2011, R10 subdivided Lot 6147 into six (6) Lots (Lot 10000 - Lot 10005). Subdivided titles were issued on 26.07.2011. R10 also transferred five (5) out of 6 Lots to the various purchasers. However, the transfer was not successful because of the private caveat dated 3.11.2011 entered by the Appellant [44] As a result, R10 filed OS2 against the Appellant for the removal of the caveat dated 13.11.2011. [45] On 18.05.2012, R10 obtained leave from the High Court for OS2 to be converted to writ action and known as Civil Suit 2. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [46] On 14.08.2012, R10 also obtained leave from the High Court for the OS1 to be converted to writ action and was known as Civil Suit 3. [47] It is the contentions of the Respondents that the Appellant’s claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13, and R14 is barred by the doctrine of laches and the limitation period of Section 2(a) of Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (PAPA) and under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1956 (Act 254). [48] The Respondents also contended that the Appellant had failed to prove the element of fraud or conspiracy to defraud against all of the Respondents and Lot 6147 of the land was not fraudulently transferred to R10, therefore, R10 is a bona fide purchaser and is protected with indefeasible title under Section 340 of the National Land Code. The High Court’s Proceeding [49] The High Court directed that, the Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3 be consolidated and be heard together with Civil Suit 1 and be determined accordingly. [50] On 20.12.2019, the learned High Court Judge allowed the R10’s claim against the Plaintiff for Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3. On the contrary, the High Court dismissed the Appellant’s claim against all of Respondents for Civil Suit 1. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Findings of the learned High Court Judge A. Civil Suit 1 [51] The learned Judge of the High Court (‘LJ’) dismissed the Appellant’s claim against all of the Respondents in Civil Suit 1 based on the following reason(s), inter alia: (a) The Appellant’s claim against R4, R7, and R9 was dismissed by the High Court with no order as to costs because: (i) the Appellant did not enter a judgment in default against D4 although D4 has never entered an appearance for the claim filed by the plaintiff. Although the Court has the discretion to hear the matter in the absence of D4, the plaintiff still carries a burden to prove the alleged fraud against D4. However, the plaintiff failed to do so (see paragraphs 200-208 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (ii) the Appellant is unable to pursue their claims against R7 because R7 is an undischarged bankrupt and received no sanction from the Director of Insolvency under Section 38 (1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 to defend himself against the action filed by the Appellant (see paragraphs 354-357 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); and S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (iii) the R9’s Statement of Defence was struck out by the High Court through the Court's Order dated 23.01.2017. However, the Appellant still carries a burden to prove the alleged fraud against R9, but the Appellant failed to do (see paragraphs 412 and 419 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment) (b) The Appellant, having known about the alleged fraud of S&P dated 26.09.1989 since 1994, that was when Tan Soo Lang entered a private caveat on 2/3 portion of the land, let 17 years pass by without initiating any legal steps (see paragraphs 124-129 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment). This caused: i. The Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the limitation period under Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities and Protection Act 1948 (‘Act 198’)(see paragraphs 131,138- 139,386,391 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); ii. The Appellant's claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14 is barred by the doctrine of laches and the limitation period under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘Act 254’) (see paragraphs 139,240,325-330, 391,455-459 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment) iii. Learned High Court judge hold that based on this ground alone, the Appellant’s claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14 is liable to be dismissed. However, for the sake of completeness, the learned High Court judge also discussed S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 the Appellant’s allegation of fraud and conspiracy to defraud against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14. (c) The Appellant failed to prove the element of fraud or conspiracy to defraud against all of the Respondents. The learned High Court judge held that: i. R1 was merely carrying out its statutory duties in registering the transactions and instruments presented before him. R1 also complied with its statutory duties in registering the application for subdivision and partition of the land. Moreover, the transactions and instruments presented by the respective parties before R1 for registration were complete and proper under the law. R1 has no duty under the law to investigate every detail of the documents presented before him for registration (see paragraphs 106, 115-119 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); ii. The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was signed, witnessed, and sealed by the Appellant when it was presented before R1 for registration (see paragraphs 106, and 107 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iii. The Appellant failed to prove the signature of Ng Seah Kheng in the MOT dated 24.10.1989 was forged (see paragraphs 527-531 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment): S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 a) Ng Seah Khung was not called as a witness before the court, thus adverse inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Appellant was invoked; b) No handwriting expert was called to give evidence on the signature of Ng Seah Kheng; and c) Ng Seah Kheng had withdrew his police report dated 03.11.1994 on 02.09.2006 and the matter was “Nor Further Action/NFA” by the police. iv. The Appellant had received the full payment of the sale of 2/3 portion of the land from R4 (see paragraph 522-526 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); v. The S&P dated 26.09.1989 executed by R2 on behalf of the Appellant is valid and enforceable because Section 127 of the Companies Act 1965 (‘Act 125’) does not prohibit a bankrupt to enter a contract on behalf of the company (see paragraphs 277-279 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); vi. R2, having known he was a bankrupt, had consulted and acted upon the advised of R7 when he executed S&P dated 26.09.1989 and MOT dated 24.10.1989. R2 also had obtained the consent of all the Appellant's directors to sell 8.5 acres of land to D4 to settle the Appellant's outstanding loan/debt amounting to RM 5.6 million with the Bangkok Bank. No evidence that the Appellant still owing the bank under the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 facilities obtained (see paragraphs 163 and 166 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); vii. R3, acting on the advised of R7 had executed both MOT dated 24.10.1989 and charge dated 31.07.1990 for the sole purpose of obtaining an amount of money to settle the Appellant’s outstanding loan/debt with Bangkok Bank and had no intention to cheat or defraud the plaintiff (see paragraphs 190-191 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); viii. Nothing stated in S&P dated 26.09.1986 that 2/3 portion of the land was lent to R4 to enable R4 to procure the loan facility amounting to RM 24,000.000 (see paragraph 537 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); ix. R5 was not involved in S&P dated 26.09.1989, MOT dated 24.10.1989, and charge dated 31.07.1989. The involvement of R5 was only to introduce R2 to Thomas. R5 resigned from his position as the R4’s director on 05.06.1989 (see paragraphs 253, 255, 273, and 275 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); x. Based on the evidence tendered before the High Court, the service of the Court’s Order dated 14.07.1999 by R4 through R6 was regular and duly served at the registered address of the plaintiff (see the paragraphs 343 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 xi. No document shows that R8 has knowledge of the S&P dated 26.09.1989, MOT dated 24.10.1989, and charge dated 31.07.1990. Based on Section 8 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, R8 shall be constituted as the receiver of the properties and assets of R2 and R3 and had nothing to do with the land which belongs to the Appellant (see paragraphs 398,400-403 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (d) Based on the evidence tendered, it was proven that the registered address of the Appellant was never changed by R14. The learned High Court reasonings are as follows: i. The address at Lot 102-3, 1st Floor Kompleks Antarabangsa, Jalan Sultan Ismail 50250 is the address of Signet & Co. Sdn. Bhd., a company secretarial firm wherein R14 was employed and not the Appellant’s registered address (see paragraph 564 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment; case Summit Co (M) Sdn Bhd v Nikko Products (M) Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 68 FC); ii. During the tenure of R14 with the plaintiff from 04.09.1995 until 12.08.2011, the registered address of the Appellant remained on the 22nd Floor, Bangunan Perangsang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur (see paragraph 561 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iii. The Appellant’s registered address at 22nd Floor, Bangunan Perangsang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur remains unchanged until the lodgment of the Notice S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 in Form 44 made on 12.08.2011 by the Appellant’s new secretary, notifying the Registrar of Companies that the Appellant’s registered address was changed to No. 40-B, 2nd Floor, Jalan Lumut, Damai Kompleks, Kuala Lumpur (see paragraph 562 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); and iv. It is a settled law that the effective date of change of the registered address of a company is the date of lodgment of the notice in Form 44 to the Registrars of the Company. However, there was nothing in the bundles placed before the High Court which showed that R14 signed Form 44 affecting a change of the Appellant’s registered address (see paragraphs 565-567 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (e) Lot 6147 was not fraudulently transferred to R10, therefore, R10 is a bona fide purchaser of Lot 6147 and is protected with indefeasible title under Section 340 of the National Land Code. The learned High Court judge held that: i. The Appellant failed to prove that Lot 6147 was fraudulently transferred from R4 through R6 to R10; ii. D10 had purchased Lot 6147 at the market value fixed by the valuer (‘SD13’) appointed by the OCBC Bank; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 iii. The Appellant also failed to prove that D10 had fraudulently subdivided Lot 6147 (see paragraphs 468-473 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iv. As of 25.02.2009, Lot 6147 was registered under R4 not R10 as alleged by the Appellant (see paragraphs 477-478 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment). B. Civil Suit 2 & Civil Suit 3 [52] Meanwhile, the basis for the learned High Court judge allowed R10’s claim against the Appellant in Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3 are as follows: (a) since the land belongs to R10, the plaintiff has no caveatable interest in the land. As a such the entry of caveat by the Appellant on Lot 6147 is improper and ought to be struck out (see paragraphs 491-492 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (b) given that the registered owner of Lot 6147 is R10, the Appellant's action of erecting constructions on the land is considered a trespass on R10 rights over the land (see paragraphs 405-498 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment). S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 The Appeal [53] Aggrieved with the decision, on 17.01.2020, the Appellant filed notices of appeal to this Court against the whole decision of the High Court dated 20.12.2019. This Court directed for these three appeals be heard and determined together. [54] Essentially, there were six main grounds of appeal listed by the Appellant in Memorandum of Appeal dated 17 March 2020 and Supplementary Memorandum of Appeal dated 25 July 2020: (a) the learned High Court Judge erred in law and in finding of fact in holding that there is no fraud or conspiracy to defraud by the Respondents against the Appellant; (b) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim is barred by Limitation Act 1953; (c) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948; (d) the learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents is barred by laches; (e) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 is applicable against the Appellant and that the 2/3 portion of the land has been purchased for valuable consideration and in good faith; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (f) whether based on the facts and evidence, the decision of the High Court is correct in law. Our findings (a) The learned High Court Judge erred in law and in finding of fact in holding that there is no fraud or conspiracy to defraud by the Respondents against the Appellant [55] The law on fraud and conspiracy to defraud is trite. [56] Section 17 of the Contract Act 1950 stipulates that: “Fraud” includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of any fact by one can having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to fraudulent. Explanation – Mere silence as to the facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.” [57] In PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136 the Federal Court held: “Whether fraud exists is a question of fact, to be decided upon the circumstances of each particular case. Decided cases are only illustrative of fraud. Fraud must mean “actual fraud, i.e. dishonesty of some sort” for which the registered proprietor is party or privy. “Fraud is the same in all courts, but such expressions as ‘constructive fraud’ are…inaccurate;” but “fraud”…implies a willful act, on the part of one, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by unjustifiable means, of what he is entitled.” (per Romily M.R. in Green v Nixon (1857) 23 Beav 530 535 53 ER 208). Thus in Waimiha Sawmilling Co Ltd v Walone Timber Co Ltd [1926] AC 101 & 106 it was said that “if the designed object of a transfer be to cheat a man of a known existing right, that is fraudulent…”. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [58] In CIMB Bank Bhd v Veeran a/l Ayasamy [2015] 7 CLJ 289 the Court of Appeal held as follows: “The element of fraud and/or conspiracy must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. There must be something more than mere failure or an omission on the part of the third defendant. There can never be fraud and/or conspiracy cannot exist, where the intent to deceive does not exist.” [59] Thus, it is trite law the burden of proving a claim of conspiracy to defraud the Appellant against the Respondents remained at all time on the Appellant (see S. 101 Evidence Act 1950, Tow Kong Liang & Yang lain v Fbo Land (Setapak) Sdn Bhd [2018] 1 LNS 243 CA). [60] On elements of tort of conspiracy, the Court of Appeal in Renault Sa v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Appeals [2015] 5 CLJ 32 stated as follows: “In regard to the tort of conspiracy, the following need to be satisfied at the interlocutory stage: (a) an agreement between two or more persons (that is an agreement between Tan Chong and others); (b) an agreement for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar; S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 (c) that acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to Inokom and Quasar; (d) damage is essential element and where damage is not pleaded in the Statement of Claim may be struck out (see Yap JH v Tan Sri Loh Boon Siew & Ors [1991] 3 CLJ 2960; [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 243).” [61] In SCK Group Bhd & Anor v Sunny Siew Pang & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 389, [2011] 4 MLJ 393, the Court of Appeal stated that: “The tort of conspiracy was not constituted by conspiratorial agreement alone. For conspiracy to take place, there must also be an unlawful object, or if not in itself unlawful, it must be brought by unlawful means : See Davies v Thomas [1920] 2 Ch 189 per Warrington LJ, and Seah Siang Mong v Ong Ban Chai & Another Case [1998] 1 CLJ Supp 295 per Ghazali J (now FCJ). There must be a co-existence of an agreement with an over act causing damage to the plaintiffs. Hence, the tort is complete only if the agreement is carried into effect, thereby causing damage to the plaintiff. On order to succeed in a claim based on tort of conspiracy, the plaintiffs must establish: (a) an agreement between two or more persons; (b) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff; and (c) acts done in the execution of that agreement resulted in damage to the plaintiff: Marrinan v Vibart [1962] 1 All ER 869 at p. 871 per Salmon J; and Halsbury’s Law England (4th Ed) Vol 45 at p 271, as applied by Ghazali (now FCJ) in Seah Siang Mong.” S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [62] Guided by the clear settled principle of law enunciated in those authorities, the conspiracy must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that: (a) there is an agreement between any of the Respondent or between all the Respondents; (b) the predominant purpose of the agreement being for the purpose of injuring the Appellant; and (c) the fraudulent acts were committed in executing the agreement for the purpose of injuring the Appellant. [63] In Sinnayah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584 the Federal Court explained the standard of proof for fraud in a civil claim as follows: “As the correct principle to apply…where it was stipulated that at law, there are only two standard of proof, namely beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases and on the balance of probabilities for a civil cases. As such, even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. There is no third standard. Therefore, it is up to the presiding judge, after hearing and considering the evidence adduced as being done in any other civil claim, to find whether the standard of proof has been attained. The criminal aspect of the allegation of fraud and the standard of proof required is irrelevant in the deliberation.” S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 [64] Coming back to this case. The pivotal issue in this case concerns the validity of the S & P dated 26.9.1989 executed for the Appellant with R4 by R2 who was a bankrupt. Also on the validity of the MOT executed by R2 and R3 on 24.10.1989 (‘MOT dated 24.10.1989') for the Appellant to transfer 8.5 acres of the land to R4. The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was registered on 11.05.1990. Appellant also contended that the S&P and MOT were executed without the Appellant’s knowledge and approval. [65] R2 was the Managing Director and Director in the Appellant until he was declared bankrupt on 26.5.1989. R2 is the second largest shareholder in the Appellant. It was contended by the Appellant that Article 87(b) Article of Association of the Appellant disqualify any director from continuing holding the position as director in the Appellant once he is adjudged as a bankrupt. Thus, it was argued by the Appellant that R2 has no capacity or authorization and acted under fraud in signing the S & P on behalf of the Appellant after he was declared as a bankrupt. It is not in dispute that all the Appellant’s directors appointed in 1979, including R2 remained as such until 1995 when new directors appointed to take charge of the Appellant. [66] R3 was a director of the Appellant from 1979 to 1996. The second MOT for Lot 6148 was executed on 24.10.1990 by R3 together with one Ng Seah Keng who is also the Appellant’s director. R3 was declared bankrupt on 10.3.1993. He was discharged from bankrupt on 28.6.2010. [67] It is not in dispute that R2 and R3 managed and controlled the business of the Appellant since 31.5.1979 and made all decisions for the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 Appellant. This practice was accepted without protest by the rest of the directors and shareholder of the Appellant. This was admitted by Ng Seah Hai (PW1), the sole witness of the Appellant under cross-examination by R6’s counsel – “DC6 : Now you also testified that D2 (R2) and D3 (R3) manage and make all decisions for the Plaintiff (Appellant) from 1979 without consulting or informing the rest of the directors or shareholders. You agree? PW1 : Yes. DC6 : Therefore, these decisions were made unilaterally by D2 and D3 without consultation, without resolution? PW1 : Yes.” [68] It is also not in disputed that the Appellant’s land was subject to legal charges in favour Bangkok Bank, registered vide Presentation No. 6426/78 Jil 127 Folio 127, Presentation No. 5304/83 Jil 267 Folio 52 and Presentation No. 5305/83 Jil 267 Folio 53, as security for the facilities obtained by the Appellant. In 1988 the Appellant was facing financial difficulties as its onion business was failing and the Appellant defaulting its loans. Bangkok Bank notified the Appellant that if the Appellant fails to repay its outstanding loans, the bank will take legal action to enforce its securities under the Deed of Debenture and to foreclose the charged lands. To avoid the risk of losing the lands, the directors and shareholders agreed to sell the land to their close relative Ng Kok Lian at a price of RM5.6 million, as to repay Appellant’s outstanding loans with Bangkok Bank. Following that, Ng Kok Lian then informed the Appellant that R4 had offered to buy the land at a purchase price of RM7.5 million to be paid S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 by way of the issuance of 1,000,000 shares of RM1.00 each at par to the Appellant and the balance purchase price to be paid to Messrs Durai & Associates. On 26.9.1989, the Appellant and R4 entered the S&P for the sale of the 2/3 portion of the land for purchase price of RM7.5 million. [69] It is to be noted that clause 3.03(a) of the S & P requires the Appellant to apply for partition of the land but in the event the Appellant is unable to procure a separate document of title to the 2/3 portion of the land, the whole of the title will be charged for the financing of the purchase by R4. In such instance, R4 shall be authorized to sign all documents for partitioning and surrender the title to the issuing authority for a new document of title for the 2/3 portion of the land. [70] On 13.10.1989, Messrs Durai & Associates issued a letter to Bangkok Bank forwarding the redemption sum payment. Pursuant to the redemption payment, Bangkok Bank charges over the land were discharged on 20.11.1989. This was acknowledged by the Appellant vide its letter dated 6.6.1990 to Messrs. Durai & Associates. On 19.1.1994, Messrs. Durai & Associates conforming the Appellant on the due completion of payment of purchase price. The learned High Court judge accepted that there was evidence of payment of the purchase price by R4 for the purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land (see paras 21-22, 150, 168 Grounds of Judgment). [71] The Appellant’s cause of action is premised on the underlying assumption that the Appellant is the rightful owner of the 2/3 portion of the land known as Lot 1487. The Appellant’s case is that the S & P dated S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 26.9.1989 entered for the Appellant by R2 who was a bankrupt, with R4 was without Appellant’s resolution to sell the 2/3 portion of the land and without the knowledge of the rest of the directors of the Appellant. The Appellant further alleged that the 2/3 portion of the land that was transferred to R4 and subsequently by R6 (the Manager and Receiver of R4) to R9 and later by R9 to R10 were procured fraudulently. It was contended by the Appellant that R4 and R5 had conspired with R2, R3, and R7 to fraudulently enter into the S & P dated 26.9.1989. Several authorities were cited to support the Appellant’s argument: PJTB Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136, CIMB Bank Berhad v Abdul Rafi a/l Abdul Razak & Ors [2012] MLJU 804, Yap Sau Choon @ Yap Bee Yong & Anor v Cheong Hong Mun & Ors [2016] MLJU 1203. Appellant had relied heavily on the evidence of PW1 (Ng Seah Hai) as its main witness. However, PW1 admitted that he had no personal knowledge over the S & P, MOT and the chargers and only averred relating the fraud or conspiracy based on what he heard from his mother and his brother Ng Seah Kheng. As such, the evidence of PW1 (Ng Seah Hai) are at best, hearsay and we find that that learned High Court judge was correct in not giving such evidence any weight. [72] Coming back to the position of R2, any party dealing with the Appellant, including R4, the OBB (bank) as chargee, R6, R9 and R10 could not have known that R2 had ceased to be a director of the Appellant with effect from 26.5.1989 (bankruptcy order) and were entitled to assume that R2 had the apparent or ostensible authority to execute the S&P, MOT and charge on behalf of the Appellant. R2 was allowed to continue remain in control of the management and affairs of the Appellant until 1995 without any protest of the Appellant or any other directors of the Appellant. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 The Appellant ought to be estopped from now suggesting that R2 lacks of authority to act for the Appellant. The learned High Court judge held, and we agree, that by virtue of indoor management rule/ Turquand’s rule, and as enshrined under sections 20(1) and 127 of the Companies Act 1965 (now repealed by Companies Act 2016), the act of R2, in realizing the charged dan selling the 2/3 portion of the land to settle the Appellant’s outstanding loan arrears with Bangkok Bank was valid (see Grounds of Judgment paras 335 – 337). On the facts of this case, we find that Turquand rule as decided in Royal British Bank v Turquand [1843-60] All EE 435, applies: “Persons dealing with the company were bound to make themselves acquainted with the statute and the deed of settlement of the company, but they were not bound to do more; a person, on reading the deed of settlement, would find, not a prohibition against borrowing, but a permission to borrow on certain conditions, and, learning that the authority might be made complete by a resolution, he would have right to infer the fact of a resolution authorizing that which on the fact of the document appeared to be legitimately done; and therefore, the company was liable whether or not a resolution had been passed.” [See also Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 465 FC]. [73] On the issue of authority or lack thereof of the R2, we can do no better than to reproduce the following excerpt from the judgment in Phang S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 Tat Meng t/a Tat Meng Company v Reka Cipta Solusi Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 LNS 88, the court held: “35. On the facts herein, the Defendants pointed that the fraud alleged by the Plaintiff is plainly answered by s. 127 of the Company Act 1965 which reads: ‘127. Validity of acts of directors and officers The acts of director or manager or secretary shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification.’ 36. Reading ss 125(1) and s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 together, I am of the view that the statute contemplates only a penalty to be imposed on undischarged bankrupt who has acted on behalf of the company but the statute does not avoid contracts entered into by him on behalf of the company such as the case of the Consent Judgment herein. (para 77 GOJ). 37. Accordingly, provision in s.127 of the Companies Act 1965 is my view sufficient to negate the fraud argument raised by the Plaintiff in attempt to set aside the Consent Judgment. It is plain and obvious to me that the Plaintiff’s action is hence unsustainable. Be that it may, the Plaintiff has also not adduced any evidence in the affidavits to illustrate how the Plaintiff was prejudiced or unduly influenced by the alleged fraud by deception through the non revelation or concealment of his S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 bankruptcy by the bankrupt director. It must be borne in my mind that the First Defendant as a company is a separate legal entity from its directors and shareholders. 38. For completeness, I further hold that s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 herein override the common law specie of fraud due to concealment of material …”. [74] In Stem Resources Sdn Bhd v Kekal Lestari Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi [2013] 10 CLJ the court held- “(1) Perbuatan SP2 menandatangani perjanjian tersebut tidak menjejaskan kesahan dan kesahihan perjanjian tersebut menurut kuasa peruntukan s. 127 Akta Syarikat 1965 (Akta 125). Seksyen 127 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan apa-apa perbuatan seseorang pengarah, pengurus atau setiausaha walaupun kemudiannya didapati ada kecacatan pada pelantikan atau kelayakannya. Seksyen 127 terpakai apabila terdapat pelantikan yang defektif seperti yang berlaku dalam hal pelantikan SP2 melalui resolusi bertarikh 15 Jun 2004. D1 dan D2 tidak boleh menyatakan perjanjian tersebut terbatal kerana s. 127 Akta 125 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan perbuatan SP2 menandatatangani perjanjan tersebut dan dengan perjanjian itu, perjanjian yang ditandatangani adalah sah dan mengikat defendan (see para 278 GOJ).” (See also Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Choo Meng Chong & Anor [1999] 7 CLJ 300, Re Chua Tin Hong Ex Parte Castrol (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 174). S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 [75] Learned counsel for the Appellant was unable to cite any authority, on the contrary, to support her arguments that the S & P is invalid due R2’s lack of authority to act for the Appellant. Thus, it is our considered view that the learned High Court judge did not erred in holding that the S & P dated 26.9.1989 is a valid and enforceable agreement. [76] R6 particularly was appointed as Receiver & Manager (R&M) of R4 on 16.4.1992. The Facility Agreement, S & P, Deed of Debenture and Charge had all been entered into and executed by the Appellant with R4 prior to the appointment of R6. R4 was no longer the registered or beneficial owner of the 2/3 portion of the land with effect from 5.12.2009 following the transfer of ownership to R10. R6 ceased to be the R&M of the R4 on 27.12.2010. The subdivision of Lot 6147 which led to the issuance of titles Lot 10001 – Lot 10005 was applied by R10, and after R6 had ceased his responsibilities and duties as R&M of R4 with effect from 27.12.2010. [77] In RHB Bank Berhad v Ali bin Abdul Kadir and Anor [2005] 1 LNS 391, the court held that the 2nd defendant-bank had no cause of action against the receiver and managers whose duty is limited to enforcing the security and the subject contract for sale of goods was entered into prior the appointment of the receiver and managers, no liability can be attached to receiver and managers by virtue section 183 of the Companies Act. [78] Coming back to this case, the learned High Court judge held that R6 cannot be found guilty or liable to the Appellant for exercising his duties in good faith by enforcing the security in favour of OBB, which includes the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 sale and transfer of the 2/3 portion of the land and well supported by section 183(1) of the Companies Act (see para 345-346 of Grounds of Judgment). Thus, it is impossible for R6 to be said that have been involved in any fraud or conspiracy to defraud the Appellant. The learned High Court judge held, and we agree, that the Appellant was not even able to establish that R6 knew the other Respondents, let alone that any agreement was reached between them to defraud and injure the Appellant (see paras 338-339 Grounds of Judgment). [79] The learned High Court judge held that the Appellant had failed to discharge its burden of proving, on a balance probabilities, the basic element of a claim for fraud or conspiracy to defraud and injure the Appellant. Having considered the evidence in totality, the learned High Court judge made the following findings : “485. Daripada apa yang dinyatakan, Mahkamah dapati bahawa elemen-elemen frod tidak dipatuhi oleh Plaintif, begitu juga dengan kospirasi seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. 486. Mahkamah dapati dari segi frod dan/atau kospirasi untuk memfrodkan Plaintif, Plaintif gagal membuktikannya atas imbangan kebarangkalian. 487. Dalam tindakan ini Mahkamah dapati Plaintiff gagal membuktikan frod dan/atau kospirasi memfrodkan ke atas Plaintif, maka dengan transaksi-transaksi untuk pindahmilik tanah tersebut merupakan transaksi yang bebas dari isu frod seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. Defendan Kesepuluh telah S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 memberi balasan memberi balasan yang sepenuhnya kepada Defendan Kesembilan. 488. Maka dengan itu, Defendan Kesepuluh di dalam tindakan ini merupakan pembeli bona fide ke atas tanah tersebut daripada Defendan Kesembilan.” [80] The learned High Court judge found no credible evidence that there was in existence of fraud or conspiracy to defraud by any of the Respondents on the Appellant. Her Ladyship had considered the testimonies, the contemporaneous documents and the whole circumstances and probabilities of the case (Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229). We had carefully perused the grounds of judgment of the learned High Court judge. We find that there is no appealable error to warrant any appellate interference on the findings. (b) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim is barred by Limitation Act 1953 [81] Respondents had expressly pleaded that they were relying on the Limitation Act and laches as a defence (paragraph 42 p. 462 6th Respondent’ Core Bundle of Documents (Vol.1)(Encl. 203 o Appeal Records)). For any action that is based upon fraud or conspiracy to defraud of the defendant or his agent, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant discovered the actual fraud in 2012 after the Appellant saw the Deed of Debenture dated S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 22.9.1889 and the High Court Order dated 14.9.1999 for Specific Performance of the S & P dated 26.9.1989. Thus, the Appellant’s claim is not barred by Limitation Act 1953 or laches. PW1, the Appellant’s sole witness admitted that the directors and shareholders of the Appellant first knew or discovered the alleged fraud in relation to the sale and purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4 since 8.7.1994 when Tan Soo Lang entered a private caveat on the 2/3 portion of the land. [82] The learned High Court judge in her grounds of judgment had considered this issue and made the following findings: “380. Alasan permohonan Tan Soo Lang untuk memasukkan kaveat persendirian (Ikatan B3 muka surat 574 – D264) dengan alasan seperti berikut” “alasan-alasan tuntutan saya atas tanah/kepentingan itu ialah berdasarkan tanah itu adalah kepunyaan syarikat Kim Guan Choong Sdn. Bhd. Dan sebahagian tanah itu sedang dijual secara frod dan sebahagian lagi telah dijual secara frod. 381. Menurut Surat Akuan dari Tan Soo Lang di dalam permohonan untuk kemasukan kaveat persendirian beliau, beliau mengaku bahawa kaveat tersebut dimasukkan bagi pihak Plaintif. Beliau merupakan pemegang saham dan Pengarah asal Syarikat Plaintif tersebut. 382. Jadi dari keterangan yang dikemukakan, saya dapati kali pertama Plaintif ketahui yang penjualan 2/3 bahagian Lot 1487 S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 yang dikatakan dilakukan secara frod itu telah diketahui oleh Plaintif sejak 8.7.1994 lagi.” (emphasis added) [83] PW1 further admitted that despite the alleged fraud in 1994, there is no legal action taken by the Appellant to recover or challenge the validity of the S&P, MOT and the creation and registration of the charge and the transfer of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4 until this action was filed by the Appellant against all the Respondents. [84] The Appellant’s action herein was filed in March 2012, which is more than 18 years from the first discovery of the alleged fraud. As such, it is clearly that the Appellant’s claim for the discovery of the 2/3 portion of the land is barred by limitation pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953 and section 29 of the Act. [85] Section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 stipulates that- “9(1) No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him, or if it first accrued to some person through whom he claim, to that person.” [86] Section 29 of the Act provides postponement of limitation period in case of fraud or mistake, as follows- S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 “29. Where, in case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either- (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims as aforesaid; or (b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the case may be, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it: Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any action to be brought to recover, or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which- (i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that any fraud had been committed; or (ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration, subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made, by S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 a person who did not know or have reason to believe that mistake had been made.” [87] The learned High Court judge held that the Appellant’s action is barred by section 9 read and section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953. Her Ladyship held as follows: “237. Mahkamah ini dapati tarikh 8.7.1994 (sic) inilah Plaintif ketahui tentang frod yang didakwa oleh Plaintif dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam penjualan 2/3 bahagian tanah tersebut kepada Defendan Keempat. 238. Tindakan ini difailkan pada bulan Mac 2012. 239. Manakala kali pertama Plaintif tahu tentang apa yang dikatakan frod dilakukan terhadap Plaintif adalah pada 8.7.1994. Ini bermakna selepas 18 tahun lebih Plaintif mendapat tahu tentang frod barulah Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan Kelima. Ini adalah jelas menujukkan yang Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa 12 tahun dari tarikh 8.7.1994 untuk Plaintif menuntut terhadap Defendan Kelima. Jadi, Mahkamah dapati atas isu had masa ini Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa untuk menuntut terhadap Defendan Kelima. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 240. Dengan itu, Mahkamah dapati tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kelima telah dihalang oleh had masa mengikut Seksyen 9 dan Seksyen 29 Akta Had Masa 1953 dan dengan itu tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kelima ditolak dengan kos.” [88] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on this issue, we find that the learned High Court judge is perfectly correct in holding that the Appellant’s action against the Respondents, likewise, is barred pursuant to section 9 and section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953 (see Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32 FC, Nadefinco Ltd v Kevin Corporation Sdn Bhd [1978] 2 MLJ 59 FC, Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409). We find no appealable error of law or fact in the findings of the learned judge which was based on evidence. (c) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 [89] It was contended by R1 and R8 that the Appellant’s action against R1 and R8 is barred pursuant to section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Act 198). For the Appellant, it was argued that R1 has statutory power to investigate the validity of the MOT and the application for subdivision of Lot 1487 and should not allowed the applications pending their investigation. The case of Goh Seng Chue & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Hulu Selangor and Ors [2017] MLJU 1390 was cited to support the argument. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 [90] We reproduce Section 2 of the Act which provides as follows- “Where, after the doming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuant or execution or intended execution of any written law on of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provision shall have affect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuation of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof.” [91] Section 38 of the Act provides- “Limitation of actions Any written law relating to the limitation of time for bringing proceedings against public authorities may be relied upon by the Government as a defence in any civil proceedings against the Government.” [92] In Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409, the court held – S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 “The limitation law is promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiffs from sleeping on their actions and more importantly to have a definite end to litigation. The rationale of the limitation law should be appreciated and enforced by the Courts.” [93] In Selvarajoo Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor [2006] 2 CLJ, the Court of Appeal held- “The provision of s. 2(a) PAPA 1948 and very clear and do not provide for any court discretion as they are mandatory in name.” [94] In Tasja Sdn Bhd v Golden Approach Sdn Bhd [2011] 3 CLJ 751, the Federal Court held- “If it is based on Section 2(a) of the Public Protection Act 1948 or Section 7(5) of the Civil Law Act 1956, where the period of limitation is absolute then in a clear and obvious case such application should be granted without having to plead such a defence. However, in a situation where limitation is not absolute, like in a case under the Limitation Act, such application for striking out should not be allowed until and unless limitation is pleaded as required under section 4 of the Limitation Act 1953.” [95] The Appellant’s action herein was filed in March 2012, which is more than 18 years from the first discovery of the alleged fraud. As such, it is clearly that the Appellant’s action against R1 and R8 being a public S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 authorities and acted in the performance of its public duty i.e. accepted and registered the MOT dated 24.10. 1989 and the Specific Performance Order dated 14.7.1999 for the subdivision of Lot 1487, is barred by limitation pursuant to section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Act 198)(Revised 1978). We agree with the learned High Court judge that R1 has no duty to enquire further on Form 14A that is fit for registration pursuant to section 301 of the National Land Code (Hamdan bin Jaafar & Ors v Osman bin Mohamed & Ors [2012] 1 LNS 1108). [96] We also agree with the learned judge on her findings that the Appellant’s action on R1 and R8 is barred pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953. (d) The learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents is barred by laches [97] The doctrine of laches was succinctly explained by His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd [1989] 2 MLJ 202 as follows: “Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a claim. A court of equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by laches. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches the court considers whether there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part and any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant. The doctrine of laches rests on the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 consideration that it is unjust to give a plaintiff a remedy where he has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though not waiving the remedy put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if remedy were afterwards to be asserted : 14 Halsbury’s Law of England (3rd Ed) paras 1181, 1182. Laches has been succinctly described as ‘in action with one’s eyes open’.” [98] Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 provides as follow- “Nothing in this Act shall effect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence laches or otherwise.” [99] Despite being aware since July 1994 of the sale of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4, the Appellant did not take any timely action to recover the 2/3 portion of the land or set aside R4’s registered ownership of the 2/3 portion of the land or the charge created in favour of OBB over the land. There is undue delay of more than 18 years on the part of the Appellant in filing this action. During the period of delay, R6 had in his capacity as R&M and agent of R4 and in the believe that the Appellant did not intend to make any claim in respect of the 2/3 portion of the land, altered the position of R4 to its detriment by selling the 2/3 portion of the land to R9, paying the redemption sum to OUB, as registered charge, for the discharge of the charge registered and transferred the 2/3 portion of the land into the name of R9’s nominee, R10. The issue of laches was raised by R10 in their defence to the Appellant’s claim. S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 [100] In Faber Merlin (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Lye This Sang & Anor and Tan Kim Chua Realty (M) Sdn Bhd v Lye Thai sang & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 380, the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of laches and found that the plaintiffs were estopped because they were guilty of laches in that since 1978, although the plaintiffs knew that the acts of the defendant were contrary to the agreement, no action had been taken against the defendant until 23 May 1983 where the plaintiff filed an originating summons against the defendant praying to declaratory judgment. The court refused to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief on the grounds that there was evidence of “laches, acquiescence and delay.” (see also: Wu Shu Chen (Sole Executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased) & Anor v Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Hussin [1997] 2 MLJ 487; Soon Poy Yong @ Soon Puey Yong v Westport Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 1 MLJ 196). [101] The learned High Court judge had addressed on the issue of laches and made the following findings- “459. Di dalam kes semasa ini, pihak Plaintif setelah apa yang didakwa sebagai pindahmilik 2/3 bahagian Lot 1487 dikatakan dibuat secara frod telah diketahui oleh Plaintif sejak tahun 1994 lagi, maka kegagalan Plaintif untuk mendakwa atas perlakuan frod itu setelah lebih kurang 18 tahun telah berlalu dari tarikh Plaintif mengetahui tentang apa yang dikatakan perlakuan frod itu menjadikan tuntutan ini tertakluk kepada doktrin kelewatan yang tidak munasabah. Maka Seksyen 32, Akta Had Masa 1953 akan S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 terpakai disini dan Mahkamah atas isu ini sahaja boleh menolak tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kesepuluh.” [102] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on the issue, we find that the learned High Court judge is perfectly correct in holding that the Appellant’s action is barred pursuant to doctrine of laches to defeat the Appellant’s declaratory relief (which is an equitable remedy) to recover the 2/3 portion of the land. We therefore find no basis to conclude that the judge was plainly wrong on the issue of laches. (e) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 is applicable against the Appellant and that the 2/3 portion of the land has been purchased for valuable consideration and in good faith by R4, R9 and R10. [103] Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the title registered under R4 and subsequently R10 was obtained by fraud and therefore defeasible and the proviso under section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 does not apply. Several authorities were cited to support the argument: Tan Yin Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 [2010] MLJU 10 FC, Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 4 CLJ 626 CA. The learned High Court judge held that R10 (subsequent purchaser) who had purchase the 2/3 portion of the land Lot 6147 from R9 (immediate purchaser) in good faith and for valuable consideration of RM8.5 million has acquired an indefeasible title under the provision of section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 and therefore the S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 Appellant is precluded from seeking recovery of the 2/3 portion of the land from R10. [104] In this respect, the Federal Court decision in Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 is instructive. In departing from Adorna Properties, the Federal Court held that the rights and title of a subsequent purchaser who acquires a title in good faith and for valuable consideration from the purchaser, is indefeasible pursuant to the proviso under section 340(3) of the National Land Code (see also: Yap Ham Seow v Fatimawati Ismail & Ors and Another Appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 645). [105] In this respect, the learned High Court judge held- “488. Di dalam tindakan ini Mahkamah dapati Plaintif gagal membuktikan frod dan/atau konspirasi menfrod ke atas Plaintif, maka dengan itu transaksi-transaksi untuk pindahmilik tanah tersebut merupakan transaksi yang bebas dari isu frod seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. Defendan Kesepuluh telah memberi balasan yang sepenuhnya kepada Defendan Kesembilan. 489. Maka dengan itu, Defendan Kesepuluh di dalam tindakan ini merupakan pembeli bona fide ke atas tanah tersebut daripada Defendan Kesembilan.” S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 [106] We agree with the learned High Court that R10 being a subsequent purchaser who had purchased the 2/3 portion of the land from R9 and R9 who had purchased the same 2/3 portion of the land from R4 had obtained an indefeasible title under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code as it has proven that they were a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. We also agree with findings of the learned High Court judge that the Appellant had failed to rebut the evidence that R10 had purchased the 2/3 portion of the land from R9 in good faith and for valuable consideration of RM8,200,000.00 without any notice of the Appellant’s purported interest or rights in the 2/3 portion of the land. The findings are not perverse. [107] We agree that the learned High Court judge did not erred in law and in fact in allowing R10’s claims against the Appellant for the removal of private caveat entered by the Appellant and for the acts of trespass onto the 2/3 portion of the land that is registered under R10’s as the proprietor. Conclusion [108] Quite clearly the outcome of this case turned primarily on findings of fact. In our view, based on the evidence led during the trial, it cannot be said that the learned trial judge’s conclusion upon the evidence was plainly wrong. We need only refer to the reminder by the Federal Court in Ng Hooi Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased& Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 FC; [2010] 10 CLJ CA: S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 “As long as the trial judge’s conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts.” [109] In light of all the above, we unanimously find that there is no appealable error to warrant any appellate interference in this case. We accordingly dismiss Appeal 39, Appeal 134 and Appeal 135 with costs of RM5,000 to Respondent 1, RM5,000 to Respondent 2, RM1,000 to Respondent 3, RM5,000 to Respondent 5, RM15,000 to Respondent 6, RM5,000 to Respondent 8, RM15,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 39, RM5,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 134, RM5,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 135, RM5,000 to Respondent 13 and RM5,000 to Respondent 14. All costs given be subject to allocator except on Respondent 1 and Respondent 8. t.t (YAACOB HAJI MD SAM) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Dated 01 November 2023 S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 Counsels/Solicitors For the Appellant: Sharon Shakila Gabriel Venkateswari a/p P. Alagendra (Tetuan N. Saraswathy Devi) For the Respondents: First Respondent (R1): Siti Hafiza Jaafar (Penang ALA) (Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pulau Pinang) Second Respondent (R2): Datuk V.M. Ravindran (Tetuan V. M. Ravi & Associates) Third Respondent (R3): (In person) Fourth Respondent (R4): (Not represented) Fifth Respondent (R5): Alan Chua Hock Kwang Shreena Kaur Sidhu (Tetuan Alan Chua & Co) S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 Sixth Respondent (R6): Datin Jeyanthini Sathya Kumardas Sharon Kaur Jessy (Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co) Seventh Repondent (R7): (Not represented) Eight Respondent: Uma Devi a/p Balasubramaniam (SFC) Hafizah Johor binti Arif Johor (Jabatah Insolvensi Malaysia) Nineth Respondent (R9): (Not represented) Tenth Respondent (R10): Andrian Lee Yung Khin Hanis Hazidi (Tetuan Maxwell Kenion Cowdy & Jones) Thirteenth Respondent (R13): Chong Choon Choy (Tetuan C.C. Chong & Associates) S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 Twelfth Respondent (R14): Subath a/p Sathinathan S. Vasanthi (Tetuan Cheah Teh & Su) S/N z6PdBYDouEqvbA2IWBkJNA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	87,914	Tika 2.6.0
AA-44-25-05/2023	PEMOHON LINGESWARAN A/L RAJANDRAN RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	PERMOHONAN JENAYAH: Pemohonan Habeas Corpus - terhadap Perintah Tahanan- Seksyen 6 (1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) (LLPK)1985 [Akta 316]- Perkara 5, 149,151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan- Perlanggaran terhadap Perlembagaan Persekutuan- Ketidakpatuhan prosedur (non-compliance) di dalam penggunaan undang-undang di bawah seksyen 11C(1) Akta 316- Perintah tersebut adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan - Perintah Tahanan bertarikh 22.04.2022 adalah bercanggah dengan Akta Fungsi-fungsi Menteri 1969 - Kegagalan pihak Lembaga Penasihat untuk mengemukakan Nota Prosiding.	30/11/2023	YA Dato' Abdul Wahab Bin Mohamed	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7a6eb145-3d08-4987-80f7-ca72072abdd4&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - AP Lingeswaran v. TMDN.docx 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI IPOH DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN PERMOHONAN JENAYAH NO: AA-44-25-05/2023 Dalam Perkara Permohonan HABEAS CORPUS selaras dengan BAB XXXVI Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (Akta 593) DAN Dalam Perkara Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah- Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 DAN Dalam Perkara, PERKARA 5 & 151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan DAN Dalam Perkara Permohonan Di Bawah Seksyen 365(1)(b) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah DAN Dalam Perkara LINGESWARAN A/L RAJANDRAN [No. KP: 940826-10-5539] yang ditahan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 30/11/2023 15:27:33 AA-44-25-05/2023 Kand. 21 S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA LINGESWARAN A/L RAJANDRAN [NO. KP: 940826-10-5539] …PEMOHON DAN 1. TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI, MALAYSIA 2. PENGUASA, PUSAT PEMULIHAN AKHLAK SIMPANG RENGGAM, JOHOR 3. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN PENGHAKIMAN S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Pengenalan [1] Permohonan Notis Usul ini difailkan oleh Lingeswaran a/l Rajandran [No. K/P: 940826-10-5539] (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Pemohon”) bagi mendapatkan perintah “habeas corpus”. Fakta Ringkas [2] Pemohon kini sedang ditahan di bawah satu Perintah Tahanan (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Perintah bertarikh 22-04-2022 tersebut”) yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “TMDN”) di bawah peruntukan seksyen 6(1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta 316”). Berdasarkan kepada Perintah tersebut, Pemohon telah diperintahkan untuk ditahan mulai 22-04-2022 di Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “PPA”), Simpang Renggam, Johor. Isu-isu yang dibangkitkan [3] Berdasarkan makluman peguam Pemohon semasa Pengurusan Kes bertarikh 25-07-2023, terdapat tiga (3) isu yang hendak dibangkitkan oleh peguam Pemohon iaitu:- a) Perintah tersebut adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan; b) Perintah Tahanan bertarikh 22.04.2022 adalah bercanggah dengan Akta Fungsi-fungsi Menteri 1969; dan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 c) Kegagalan pihak Lembaga Penasihat untuk mengemukakan Nota Prosiding. Prinsip Undang-Undang [4] Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan “habeas corpus” adalah mantap dimana writ “habeas corpus” hendaklah dikeluarkan sekiranya Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Pemohon telah ditahan secara salah (illegally detained) dan bukanlah suatu kuasa budibicara Mahkamah (discretionary power) sepertimana yang diputuskan di dalam kes Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia [1975] 2 MLJ 279. [5] Tindakan Pemohon mencabar perintah tahanannya sebagai salah dan tidak sah menjadikan beban pembuktian terletak di atas bahu pihak Responden-Responden untuk membuktikan bahawa tahanan tersebut adalah sah di sisi undang-undang sepertimana yang diputuskan dalam kes SK Takaliswaran Krishnan v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [2010] 1 MLJ 149, Gopal Sri Ram FCJ memutuskan:- “[5]…It is settled law that on an application of "habeas corpus" the burden satisfying the court that the detention is lawful lies through on the detaining authority. See, Chng Suan Tze v The Minister of Home Affairs & Ors and Other Appeals [1988] 1 LNS 162. In Mohinuddin v District Magistrate, Beed AIR [1987] SC 1977, the Supreme Court of India observed as follows in the context of art. 22 of the Indian Constitution from which is draw our art. 151: S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 It is enough for the detenu to say that he is under wrongful detention, and the burden lies on the detaining authority to satisfy the Court that the detention is not illegal or wrongful and that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief claimed. This court on more occasions that one has dealt with the question and it is now well settled that it is incumbent on the state of satisfy the court that the detention of the petitioner / detenu was legal and in conformity not only the mandatory provisions of the Act but also strictly in accord with the constitutional safeguards embodies in Ar. 22(5)”. Isu (a): Perintah tersebut adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. [6] Peguam Pemohon mendakwa wujudnya ketidakpatuhan terhadap prosedur mandatori apabila Perintah Tahanan yang dikeluarkan terhadap Pemohon telah gagal menunjukkan Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang telah terlibat dalam aktiviti pengedaran dadah. Peguam Pemohon telah membuat rujukan terhadap kes Selva Vinayam Sures v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 2 CLJ 29] seperti berikut: “[44]…In the light of the foregoing, we think that the phrase ‘a substantial body of persons’ refer to a large number of individuals acting in concert or working together for a common purpose. In the context of Act 316, we think that it refers to action which is prejudicial to public order which has been taken or is S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 being threatened by a large number of individuals acting together in the trafficking in dangerous drugs. [45] Notably, sub-s. 6(1) refers to two factors – (i) authorises the Minister to exercise his power to make a detention order if he is satisfied that such person is involved in illicit drug trafficking activities and that (ii) it is necessary in the interest of public order to make the detention order. What is significant is the omission to refer to the involvement of ‘a substantial body of persons’ in relation to the public order element; which scope is clearly stated in the preamble as ‘action which is prejudicial to public order…has been taken…by a substantial body of persons…” [7] Dalam penghakiman yang sama dapatlah diamati panduan yang diberikan adalah bilangan individu yang menjalankan aktiviti pengedaran dadah perlulah lebih daripada satu (1) orang, jika diperhatikan seperti berikut: “[50] We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the fact of the appellant acting alone cannot be deemed to fall within the ambit and scope of scrutiny under Act 316; which scope is explicitly confined to a substantial body of persons...” [8] Peguam Persekutuan yang mewakili Responden-Responden berhujah balas bersandarkan kes Selva Vinayagam Sures v Timbalan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [supra] yang telah diputuskan oleh YA Datuk Vernon Ong Lam Kiat HMP di perenggan [(5)] di muka surat 34, Menteri mempunyai kuasa untuk menahan subjek di bawah Seksyen 6(1) Akta tersebut sekiranya tiga (3) elemen utama seperti yang berikut telah dipatuhi:- i) Bahawa aktiviti yang telah diambil atau diancam oleh sekumpulan atau berhubungan atau melibatkan pengedaran dadah berbahaya; ii) Bahawa orang yang ditahan adalah ahli kumpulan; dan iii) Bahawa Menteri berpuas hati terdapat keperluan dalam kepentingan ketenteraman awam bahawa orang yang ditahan tertakluk pada penahanan pencegahan. [9] Dalam kes Pemohon ini, pihak Responden-Responden menghujahkan bahawa ketiga-tiga elemen yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Selva Vinayagam (supra) telah dipatuhi dengan sempurna dengan membuat rujukan ke atas Afidavit Jawapan Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail bin Haji Mohamed Said yang merupakan Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri (selepas ini dikenali sebagai TMDN) yang bertanggungjawab mengeluarkan Perintah tersebut. [10] Berkenaan isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kedudukan terkini atas isu ini yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Muhammad Redzuan Bin Omar v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & 1 Lagi (2022) 1 LNS 880 di mana penghakiman Majoriti oleh S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 YA Zabariah Mohd Yusof dan YA Hasnah Mohammed Hashim HMP, isu serupa telah dibangkitkan dan diputuskan seperti berikut: "[30] We agree with the rationale in Selva Vinayagam (supra). However, having regard to the issues argued before us it is opportune to distinguish Selva Vinayagam (supra) and this appeal on the facts and the law. Careful scrutiny of the facts and the documentary evidence of this appeal shows that it is distinguishable from Selva Vinayagam (supra). The most obvious distinguishing fact is that in this appeal there are expressed statement that the Appellant was not acting alone. This is reflected in paragraph 22 of the Afidavit in Reply of the Deputy Minister [31] The Deputy Minister in the Statement of Facts in this appeal had stated the following• [32] The Statement of Facts in Selva Vinayagam (supra), however, is devoid of any facts stating that he was acting in association with a substantial body of persons• [33] In this appeal, the three (3) ingredients as laid out by Justice Vernon Ong in Selva Vinayagam (supra) have been fulfilled. The Appellant had carried out the illegal activity, namely, the trafficking of dangerous drugs in association with a substantial body of persons. Secondly, the Appellant is a member of a substantial body of S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 persons. Thirdly and most importantly, the Minister is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of public order that the Appellant be subject to preventive detention. On the facts in this appeal, there is clear evidence that the Appellant was not acting alone in the illegal activity of drug trafficking as averred in the afidavits. [34] Hence, to apply the rationale enunciated in Selva Vinayaqam (supra) to determine whether the procedures have been complied with by the authorities the courts must examine the affidavits and the Statement of Facts with great scrutiny which will reveal whether the appellant was acting alone or in association with a substantial bodv of persons. (penekanan diberikan) [11] Bersandarkan dengan prinsip undang-undang di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah meneliti afidavit jawapan deponen-deponen Responden-Responden terutamanya bermula dari Pegawai Penyiasat, Pegawai Inkuiri dan TMDN terutamanya berkaitan dengan kepuasan hati TMDN mengenai penglibatan Pemohon dengan aktiviti pengedaran dadah Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang. [12] Inspektor Polis Arjit bin Ab Ghani yang merupakan pegawai penyiasat mengatakan seperti berikut: “Hasil daripada penyiasatan terhadap Pemohon, saksi- saksi, pengumpulan keterangan dan rakaman percakapan serta dokumen-dokumen yang berkaitan dengan aktiviti- S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 aktiviti Pemohon tersebut, pihak polis mempunyai keterangan yang mencukupi bahawa Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang pernah ada kaitan dengan apa- apa aktiviti yang berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan dengan pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234] iaitu mengedar dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seperti yang tersenarai di bawah Jadual Pertama, Bahagian III, Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234]. Hasil siasatan saya juga mendapati bahawa Pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang telah mengendalikan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya dengan menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 0.5 gram) dengan harga RM50.00 sepeket. Selanjutnya, Pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang didapati telah membeli bekalan dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 5.0 gram) berharga RM250.00 sepeket dan membuat pembungkusan semula ke dalam bentuk peket kecil bagi tujuan pengedaran. Saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa berdasarkan siasatan tersebut, saya juga telah berpuas hati bahawa Pemohon tidak bertindak secara bersendirian dalam aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya. Peranan serta kegiatan Pemohon tersebut telah menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon dengan sekumpulan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 besar orang dalam menjalankan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang diperuntukan oleh Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Mukadimah Akta tersebut.” [13] Mohd Syahrun Nizam Bin Mohd Misan yang merupakan Pegawai Inkuiri yang dilantik di bawah seksyen 5 Akta 316 mengatakan seperti berikut: “Setelah meneliti hasil siasatan yang telah dijalankan terhadap Pemohon serta meneliti dan mempertimbangkan keterangan Pemohon dan saksi-saksi dalam laporan lengkap penyiasatan di bawah Seksyen 393) Akta tersebut yang dikemukakan oleh INSPEKTOR POLIS ARJIT BIN AB GHANI berkaitan dengan aktiviti-aktiviti Pemohon yang berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan pengedaran dadah berbahaya, saya kemudiannya telah menyediakan satu laporan bertulis terhadap Pemohon untuk dikemukakan kepada Menteri Dalam Negeri di bawah Seksyen 5(4) Akta tersebut. Saya telah berpuas hati bahawa terdapat alasan-alasan yang munasabah untuk mempercayai bahawa Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang pernah ada kaitan dengan apa-apa aktiviti yang berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan dengan pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234] iaitu mengedar dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seperti yang tersenarai di bawah Jadual Pertama, Bahagian III, Akta S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234]. Berdasarkan siasatan yang telah saya jalankan ke atas Pemohon, saya telah berpuas hati bahawa Pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang telah mengendalikan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya dengan menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 0.5 gram) dengan harga RM50.00 sepeket. Selanjutnya, pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang didapati telah membeli bekalan dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 5.0 gram) berharga RM250.00 sepeket dan membuat pembungkusan semula ke dalam bentuk peket kecil bagi tujuan pengedaran. Peranan serta kegiatan Pemohon tersebut telah menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon dengan sekumpulan besar orang dalam menjalankan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Mukadimah Akta tersebut”. [14] Seterusnya TMDN menegaskan seperti berikut: “Setelah meneliti dan mempertimbangkan kedua-dua laporan tersebut saya telah berpuas hati bahawa terdapat alasan-alasan yang munasabah untuk mempercayai bahawa Pemohon bersama sekumpulan besar orang pernah ada kaitan dengan apa-apa aktiviti yang S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan dengan pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234] iaitu mengedar dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seperti yang tersenarai di bawah Jadual Pertama, Bahagian III, Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234]. Berdasarkan siasatan yang telah saya jalankan ke atas Pemohon, saya telah berpuas hati bahawa Pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang telah mengendalikan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya dengan menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 0.5 gram) dengan harga RM50.00 sepeket. Selanjutnya, pemohon yang merupakan sebahagian dari sekumpulan besar orang didapati telah membeli bekalan dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 5.0 gram) berharga RM250.00 sepeket dan membuat pembungkusan semula ke dalam bentuk peket kecil bagi tujuan pengedaran. Peranan serta kegiatan Pemohon tersebut telah menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon dengan sekumpulan besar orang dalam menjalankan aktiviti pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Mukadimah Akta tersebut. Sehubungan dengan itu, saya telah berpuas hati bahawa penglibatan Pemohon ini sesungguhnya telah S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 memudaratkan ketenteraman awam dan tindakan di bawah Akta tersebut perlu diambil ke atas Pemohon.” [15] Selanjutnya, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan kes terkini Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Peter Chang Nyuk Ming v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2023] 7 CLJ 521 secara khususnya di perenggan 29, muka surat 13 seperti berikut:- “[29] There are no specifications of the presence of a substantial body of persons, be it in the detention order or the grounds of detention, as is required under the terms of art. 149 of the Federal Constitution under which Act 316 was enacted. The stark absence of this requisite renders the detention of the appellant invalid.” [Penekanan diberikan] [16] Mahkamah ini berpandangan adalah wajar dibentangkan Alasan- Alasan Yang Atasnya Perintah Itu Dibuat dan Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta seperti berikut: AKTA DADAH BERBAHAYA (LANGKAH-LANGKAH PENCEGAHAN KHAS) 1985 NAMA ORANG TAHANAN : LINGESWARAN A/L RAJANDRAN NO. KAD PENGENALAN : 940626-10-5539 ALASAN-ALASAN YANG ATASNYA PERINTAH ITU DIBUAT: Bahawa kamu bersama sekumpulan besar orang pernah ada kaitan dengan apa-apa aktiviti yang berhubungan dengan atau yang melibatkan dengan pengedaran dadah berbahaya seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta 234) iaitu mengedar dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seperti yang tersenarai dibawah Jadual Pertama, Bahagian III, Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta 234). Oleh itu, tindakan kamu telah memudaratkan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 ketenteraman awam dan tindakan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 perlu diambil ke atas kamu. PENGATAAN-PENGATAAN FAKTA YANG ATASNYA PERINTAH ITU DIASASKAN: 1. Bahawa kamu didapati terlibat dengan aktiviti pengedaran dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine sejak awal tahun 2010 sehingga 2 Mac 2022 secara tidak berterusan di sekitar kawasan rumah beralamat No. 1, Jalan Meranti 3A/19, Bandar Baru, Batangk Kali, Selangor, di kawasan tepi jalan, berhampiran Padang Bola Sepak Liga Mas, Bandar Baru Batang Kali, Selangor dan di sekitar kawasan belakang Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Bandar Baru Batang Kali, Selangor. 2. Bahawa kamu didapati menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 0.5 gram) dengan harga RM50.00 sepaket. 3. Bahawa kamu didapati menjual dadah jenis Syabu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dalam bentuk peket (anggaran berat 5.0 gram) berharga RM250.00 sepeket daripada rakan sejenayah dan membuat pembungkusan semula ke dalam bentuk peket kecil bagi tujuan pengedaran. Dengan Arahan, Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri (AZIZ BIN ABDUL NASIR) Penolong Setiausaha (ADB – 4/2/7933) Kementerian Dalam Negeri [17] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa di bahagian Alasan-Alasan Yang Atasnya Perintah Itu Dibuat, tindakan pengedaran dadah oleh Pemohon adalah dijalankan oleh Pemohon bersama-sama dengan sekumpulan besar orang. Malah, bagi menyokong alasan tersebut, jelas dalam Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta menyatakan bahawa Pemohon ini terlibat dengan aktiviti dadah berbahaya sejak awal tahun 2019 hingga 2 Mac 2022 (tempoh sekitar tiga (3) tahun). Pemohon didapati berperanan dalam menjual dadah berbahaya dan dalam masa yang sama, Pemohon ini juga berperanan dalam membeli bekalan dadah berbahaya daripada rakan sejenayah dan membungkus semula dalam bentuk paket bagi S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 tujuan pengedaran. Berdasarkan pembacaan Alasan yang terang lagi jelas mempunyai perkataan “kamu bersama sekumpulan besar orang” serta Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta ini telah jelas menunjukkan sekumpulan besar orang bersama-sama Pemohon iaitu penglibatan individu lain yang merupakan rakan sejenayah (“accomplice”) dan sekaligus membawa maksud bahawa Pemohon tidak bertindak secara bersendirian. [18] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan pendirian pihak Responden bahawa rantaian tindakan dan kegiatan Pemohon dengan rakan sejenayah ini telah menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon adalah dengan sekumpulan orang yang menjalankan kegiatan pengedaran dadah dan tindakan perlu diambil di bawah Akta 316 kerana telah memudaratkan ketenteraman awam. Alasan dan Pengataan Fakta Pemohon jelas menunjukkan Pemohon tidak bertindak berseorangan kerana sekiranya Pemohon ditarik keluar daripada memainkan peranan Pemohon, ianya sudah tentu akan melumpuhkan rantaian tersebut. Justeru, elemen kedua tersebut juga telah dipenuhi. Selanjutnya, Alasan dan Pengataan Fakta kes Selva Vinayagam (supra) tersebut boleh dibezakan dengan kes semasa di mana adalah jelas Alasan dan Pengataan Fakta kes Selva Vinayagam (supra) tersebut langsung tidak menunjukkan penglibatan Pemohon bersama-sama sekumpulan besar orang. [19] Berdasarkan alasan penghakiman kes Peter Chang (supra) tersebut, adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa terdapat ketidakpatuhan prosedur apabila perkataan “sekumpulan besar orang” tidak dinyatakan sama ada di Perintah Tahanan itu sendiri (di muka surat pertama Perintah Tahanan) ataupun di Alasan-Alasan Yang Atasnya Perintah Itu Dibuat. Hal ini boleh S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 dibezakan dengan kes semasa kerana dalam kes semasa ini, di bahagian Alasan-Alasan yang atasnya Perintah itu dibuat telah dengan jelas dan khusus mengandungi perkataan “sekumpulan besar orang”. [20] Oleh yang demikian, memandangkan ketiga-tiga elemen telahpun dipatuhi dengan ketat oleh pihak Responden-Respnden maka Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa Perintah Tahanan Pemohon telah mematuhi kehendak Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dibaca bersama- sama dengan Mukadimah Akta tersebut. Isu (b): Perintah Tahanan bertarikh 22.04.2022 adalah bercanggah dengan Akta Fungsi-fungsi Menteri 1969; dan [20] Berkenaan isu ini, pihak Pemohon berhujah bahawa Perintah tersebut bertarikh 22-4-2022 menunjukkan bahawa ianya ditandatangani oleh TImbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia iaitu Dato’ Sri Dr. Haji Ismail bin Haji Mohamed Said. Sehubungan dengan itu, Perintah tersebut tidak ditandatangani berdasarkan gelaran dan jawatan yang diberikan kepada Timbalan Menteri berdasarkan kepada seksyen 2 Akta Fungsi- Fungsi Menteri yang berbunyi seperti berikut: “(1) The yang Di-Pertuan Agong may be order notify in the Gazette- (a) that the Minister has been conferred with any functions or has been charged with any responsibility in respect of a particular department or subject or that S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 any transfer, to any other Minister, of any of the functions or responsibility referred to has been made; (b) that any style or title has been assigned to any Minister (except the Prime Minister) or that any change in any style and title referred to has been made. (2) An order made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under this section- (a) may provide for the transfer of any property, rights or liabilities held, enjoyed or incurred by any Minister in connection with any functions conferred or transferred; and (b) may contain such other provisions as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the order.” (penekanan diberikan) [22] Gelaran dan jawatan yang diberikan kepada Dato’ Sri Dr. Haji Ismail bin Haji Mohamed Said adalah Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri I dan bukannya sekadar Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri. Sehubungan dengan itu, ianya bercangah dengan Akta Fungsi-Fungsi Menteri 1969 dan mengakibatkan Perintah tersebut cacat dan tidak dapat dipulihkan. S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [23] Manakala Peguam Pesekutuan bagi pihak Responden-Responden berhujah bahawa untuk suatu permohonan “Habeas Corpus”, Pemohon hanya boleh mencabar terhadap isu ketidakpatuhan prosedur sahaja sebagaimana yang digariskan di bawah Seksyen 11C Akta 316 dan apabila isu yang dibangkitkan bukanlah sebahagian daripada kehendak prosedur, ianya tidak boleh dicabar sebagaimana yang diputuskan di dalam kes Lee Kew Sang v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914 [24] Selanjutnya, pihak Responden menegaskan bahawa orang yang menandatangani Perintah Tahanan Pemohon adalah Dato’ Sri Dr. Haji Ismail bin Haji Mohamed Said yang memegang jawatan sebagai TMDN pada masa material dan bukannya merujuk kepada orang lain. [25] Berkaitan dengan isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada Perintah Tahanan terhadap Pemohon, kehendak prosedur Akta 316 yang mana menurut Seksyen 6(1) Akta tersebut telah menggariskan prosedur untuk TMDN menimbangkan kedua-dua laporan yang diterima di bawah Seksyen 3(3) dan Seksyen 5(4) Akta 316 sebelum mengeluarkan Perintah tersebut ke atas Pemohon. Segala kehendak prosedur telahpun dipatuhi oleh pihak Responden dengan ketat apabila TMDN telah menimbangkan kedua-dua laporan di bawah Akta 316 dan seterusnya berpuas hati bahawa Pemohon adalah terlibat dengan aktiviti pengedaran dadah bersama sekumpulan besar orang dan telah memudaratkan ketenteraman awam, maka tindakan penahanan diambil terhadap Pemohon. [26] Pemerhatian Mahkamah adalah selari dengan pendirian pihak Responden-Responden bahawa tidak timbul isu ketidakpatuhan terhadap S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Seksyen 2 Akta Fungsi-Fungsi Menteri 1969 berasaskan kepada dua (2) alasan seperti yang berikut: a) Orang yang menandatangani perintah-perintah tersebut adalah Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Mohamed Said yang memegang jawatan sebagai TMDN pada masa material dan bukannya merujuk kepada orang lain; dan b) Perintah Tahanan yang dikenakan ke atas Pemohon bukanlah suatu borang statutori. [27] Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Mohamed Said selaku orang yang memegang jawatan TMDN pada masa yang material juga telah menjelaskan bahawa beliau merupakan TMDN pada masa yang material (rujukan dibuat terhadap perenggan 2 di muka surat 2 dan perenggan 4 di muka surat 2 dan 3 dalam Kand. 8). Selain daripada itu, Pemohon hanya boleh dikatakan telah diprejudiskan sekiranya orang yang menandatangani Perintah Tahanan Pemohon merupakan individu lain selain daripada orang yang memegang jawatan TMDN pada masa yang material dengan merujuk kepada Seksyen 4 Akta Fungsi-Fungsi Menteri 1969 di mana dalam kes Pemohon ini, Perintah Tahanan Pemohon sememangnya telah ditandantangani oleh Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Mohamed Said setelah beliau berpuas hati untuk mengeluarkan Perintah Tahanan ke atas Pemohon sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan menurut kehendak Akta 316. [28] Isu yang dibangkitkan oleh peguam Pemohon ini adalah rentetan daripada ketiadaan perkataan “I” di Perintah Tahanan selepas perkataan TMDN. Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa ketiadaan perkataan “I” S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 selepas perkataan TMDN dalam Perintah Tahanan Pemohon tidak terjumlah sebagai suatu tindakan yang menyebabkan Perintah Tahanan sebagai tidak sah memandangkan Perintah Tahanan bukanlah suatu borang statutori dan ketiadaan perkataan “I” tersebut tidak mengubah intipati (substance) dan objektif pengeluaran Perintah Tahanan Pemohon. [29] Rujukan dibuat kepada Seksyen 62 Akta Tafsiran 1947 & 1958 yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “Section 62 Deviation from forms Any written law prescribing a form shall be deemed to provide that an instrument or other document purporting to be in that form shall not be invalidated by reason of any deviation from the form if the deviation has no substantial effect and is not calculated to mislead.”. (penekanan diberikan) [30] Berpaksikan kepada seksyen 62 Akta Tafsiran 1947 & 1958, Mahkamah berpendirian bahawa ketiadaan perkataan “I” selepas perkatan “TMDN” dalam Perintah Tahanan Pemohon tidak menyebabkan pelencongan intipati dan objektif pengeluaran Perintah Tahanan Pemohon. [31] Berdasarkan kepada kes Pemohon ini, Perintah Tahanan Pemohon bukanlah suatu “prescribed form”, sebaliknya hanya suatu notis pemakluman. Sekiranya terdapat ketinggalan perkatan tersebut S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 dikatakan sebagai suatu pelencongan, pelencongan tersebut tidak menyebabkan ia terpesong daripada tujuan pengeluaran Perintah Tahanan kepada Pemohon. Pemohon tidak dalam apa keadaan sekalipun terkeliru dangan maklumat-maklumat yang terkandung dalam Perintah Tahanan Pemohon yang boleh mengakibatkan Perintah Tahanan Pemohon menjadi tidak sah ataupun cacat walaupun terdapat ketiadaan perkataan “I” selepas perkataan “TMDN”. [32] Maka jelas kepada Mahkamah bahawa Perintah Tahanan Pemohon sememangnya ditandatangani oleh TMDN dan bukannya Timbalan Menteri yang lain selain daripada Dato’ Sri Haji Ismail Bin Haji Mohamed Said yang merupakan TMDN. [33] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah berpendapat tiada sebarang isu ketidakpatuhan prosedur dan tidak timbul isu percanggahan terhadap Akta Fungsi-Fungsi Menteri 1969. Justeru, isu kedua yang dibangkitkan oleh Pemohon ini adalah tidak bermerit dan sewajarnya ditolak (rujuk kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan: Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor v Awang Sari bin Lasikan [05(HC)-69- 04/2021(B)]). Isu (c) Kegagalan pihak Lembaga Penasihat untuk mengemukakan Nota Prosiding. [34] Berasaskan kepada isu di atas, Peguam Pemohon mengatakan bahawa tiada Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta dibacakan kepada Pemohon dan Pemohon tidak membuat sebarang pengakuan ketika persidangan representasi di hadapan Lembaga Penasihat (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “LP”). Pemohon telah mengatakan bahawa beliau tidak dimaklumkan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 akan prosedur yang membolehkan beliau memanggil Pegawai Penyiasat sebagai saksi dan menyangka bahawa Pegawai Penyisat akan hadir sendiri untuk memberi keterangan. Pemohon juga mengatakan bahawa bahawa proses representasi di hadapan LP amat singkat di mana seorang anggota polis berbangsa India yang berpakaian biasa telah menyuruh Pemohon membuat rayuan dan Pemohon perlu memohon maaf dan mengaku ke atas segala tuduhan. Seterusnya, Pemohon mengatakan bahawa Responden bertanggungjawab untuk membuktikan bahawa segala hak asasi Pemohon terutamanya pendengaran representasi yang adil dan saksama perlu diberikan kepada Pemohon. [35] Peguam Pemohon berhujah bahawa Pengerusi LP telah menafikan segala kenyataan Pemohon di atas, maka untuk memastikan kebenaran Pemohon atau Pengerusi LP maka Nota Prosiding representasi Pemohon perlu dibekalkan kepada Pemohon apabila Peguam Pemohon membuat permohonan ke atas Nota Prosiding representasi tersebut. Seksyen 14 Akta 316 secara nyata tidak mengklasifikasikan Nota Prosiding tersebut sebagai rahsia atau sulit. Kegagalan Responden membekalkan Nota Prosiding representasi telah menyebabkan satu penafian hak asasi Pemohon dan boleh menyebabkan Perintah Tahanan cacat. [36] Kegagalan dan keengganan pihak Responden mengemukaan Nota Prosiding tersebut telah menyebabkan keterpakaian seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 ke atas Responden kerana Nota Prosiding tersebut merupakan bukti dokumentari penting yang dapat membuktikan sama ada Pengerusi LP telah menjalankan persidangan representasi yang S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 lengkap dan terperinci ke atas kes Pemohon atau tidak. Malah, keengganan Responden mengemukakan Nota Prosiding tersebut membuktikan dokumen tersebut sekiranya dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah akan memihak kepada pihak Pemohon dan akan meruntuhkan kes pihak Responden dengan merujuk kepada kes Mohammad Azanul Haqimi Tuan Ahmad Azahari v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 8 CLJ 465 [37] Peguam Persekutuan yang mewakili pihak Responden-Responden menegaskan bahawa kesemua kehendak prosedur yang melibatkan sesi representasi Pemohon telahpun dipatuhi dengan ketat apabila Afidavit Jawapan pihak Responden-Responden dibaca secara keseluruhan. Pemohon sememangnya telah hadir ke sesi representasi Pemohon, diberikan hak untuk diwakili peguam dan telah memanggil saksi serta tidak memohon apa-apa penangguhan (rujukan dibuat terhadap perenggan 7, muka surat 5 dan 6 dalam Kand. 4). Oleh yang demikian, tiada sebarang ketidakpatuhan prosedur. [38] LP telah memberikan syor dan diperkenankan oleh Yang di-Pertuan Agong berkenaan representasi Pemohon tersebut iaitu Perintah Tahanan diteruskan dengan merujuk kepada peruntukan subseksyen 10(2) dan seksyen 11C(1) Akta 316 berkaitan isu pengemukaan Nota Prosiding LP yang dibangkitkan oleh Peguam Pemohon. Peruntukan kedua-dua seksyen tersebut dinyatakan semula seperti yang berikut: “Report of Advisory Board 10. (1) … S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 (2) Upon considering the recommendations of the Advisory Board under this section, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may give the Minister such directions, if any, as he shall think fit regarding the order made by the Minister and every decision of the Yang di- Pertuan Agong shall, subject to section 11, be final and shall not be called into question in any court. “Judicial review of act or decision of Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Minister 11C. (1) There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or finding or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision.” [39] Berlandaskan kepada hujahan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah berpendirian adalah wajar untuk diteliti dan diperhalusi afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan oleh deponent-deponen Responden terutamanya afidavit Pengerusi LP antara lain beliau telah menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak dapat mengemukakan Nota Prosiding kerana beliau berpendapat sekiranya dikemukakan ia boleh menjejaskan kepentingan Negara sepertimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 14 Akta 316 serta Perkara 151 (3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan beliau memohon perlindungan kedua-dua peruntukan tersebut. [40] Mahkamah merujuk kepada Seksyen 9 Akta 316 dibaca bersama- sama Perkara 151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, yang mana kehendak prosedur Akta tersebut bagi tujuan representasi adalah seperti yang berikut:- S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 a) Pemohon hendaklah diberikan hak untuk membuat representasi dalam tempoh tiga (3) bulan; b) Pemohon hendaklah diberikan hak untuk diwakili peguam ketika sesi representasi Pemohon; dan c) Pemohon hendaklah diberikan hak untuk memanggil saksi ketika sesi representasi Pemohon. [41] Semua afidavit deponen-deponen telah di teliti dan diperhalusi terutamanya afidavit yang difailkan oleh Pengerusi LP di mana kehendak- kehendak prosedur yang dinyatakan di atas telah dipatuhi dengan ketat. Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa semua afidavit deponen-deponen Responden adalah konsisten dan tidak terdapat percanggahan antara satu sama lain. Mahkamah berpendapat adalah wajar diperturunkan bahagian penting kenyataan Pengerusi LP di dalam afidavit beliau seperti berikut: “Sebelum persidangan representasi Pemohon dimulakan, saya menyatakan bahawa Pemohon telah dimaklumkan, diberikan dan diterangkan berhubung hak saksi-saksi Pemohon serta tatacara untuk memanggil saksi-saksi Pemohon yang Pemohon berkehendak untuk memanggil bagi tujuan persidangan representasi Pemohon di hadapan Lembaga Penasihat. Lembaga Penasihat juga telah mengarahkan SARJAN VIMALAN A/L SEKERAN untuk bertindak sebagai Jurubahasa Tamil untuk S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 menterjemahkan kepada Pemohon berkenaan dengan hak Pemohon serta tatacara prosiding representasi tersebut ke dalam Bahasa Tamil dan untuk membantu Pemohon sepanjang persidangan representasi pemohon tersebut berlangsung serta untuk menterjemahkan semula apa-apa prosiding representasi yang tidak difahami oleh Pemohon. Seterusnya alasan-alasan penahanan dan pengataan-pengataan fakta kepada Perintah Tahanan Pemohon (“Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta tersebut”) telah dibacakan dan diterangkan kepada Pemohon dalam Bahasa Tamil oleh SARJAN VIMALAN A/L SEKERAN. Pemohon mengakui faham dan alasan-alasan penahanan dan pengataan-pengataan fakta yang telah dibacakan dan diterjemahkan kepada Pemohon. Semasa persidangan tersebut, Pemohon tidak mengaku salah terhadap semua Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta tersebut. Saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa Pemohon telah diberikan hak untuk membuat representasi di hadapan Lembaga Penasihat. Peluang reprsentasi tersebut juga telah digunakan sepenuhnya oleh Pemohon serta telah dijalankan dengan sempurna pada 22.06.2022. Saya juga mengesahkan bahawa Lembaga Penasihat telah menimbangkan representasi Pemohon dan telah membuat syor berkenaan reprsentasi Pemohon tersebut. Seterusnya pada 05.07.2022, Lembaga Penasihat telah mengemukakan syor kepada Yang di-Pertuan Agong pada 06.07.2022. Saya tidak dapat menzahirkan dokumen berkaitan syor tersebut kerana dokumen tersebut S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 diklasifikasikan sebagai “Rahsia” dan tidak boleh didedahkan sewenang-wenangnya disebabkan penzahirannya boleh menjejaskan kepentingan negara sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 14 Akta tersebut dan Perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Oleh yang demikian, saya menuntut keistimewaan dan perlindungan di bawah peruntukkan undang-undang tersebut. ……………… saya mengulangi semula keseluruhan perenggan di atas dan menegaskan bahawa saya tidak dapat mengemukakan dan menzahirkan Nota Prosiding, laporan-laporan dan dokumen-dokumen dalam fail kes yang berkaitan dengan Pemohon kerana saya berpendapat penzahiran dan pengemukaan dokumen- dokumen tersebut boleh menjejaskan kepentingan negara sepertimana diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 14 Akta tersebut dan Perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Saya percaya bahawa tiada keperluan prosedur untuk Nota Prosiding Lembaga Penasihat dikemukakan dan sekali lagi menegaskan bahawa Nota Prosiding bukanlah dokumen yang boleh dikemukakan atas sebab yang telah dijelaskan di atas. Saya menegaskan bahawa prosiding pendengaran representasi Pemohon telah diberi pertimbangan secara adil dan saksama berdasarkan undang-undang dan tiada tanggapan negative di bawah undang-undang yang boleh digunapakai akibat ketidakupayaan Lembaga Penasihat untuk menzahirkan Nota Prosiding di dalam Permohonan ini. Semua dakwaan S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Pemohon telah disangkal dan dijelaskan oleh pihak Lembaga Penasihat secara konsistent dan benar. Justeru, segala dakwaan Pemohon adalah tidak benar dan tidak berasas. [42] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah ini berpendirian bahawa rujukan Pemohon terhadap kes Azanul Haqimi (supra) tersebut adalah tidak bertepatan dengan fakta permohonan ini memandangkan fakta kes semasa boleh dibezakan dengan kes Azanul Haqimi (supra). Dalam kes Azanul Haqimi (supra), isu kegagalan pengemukaan Nota Prosiding telah berbangkit dan diputuskan bermerit kerana terdapat percanggahan diantara afidavit yang difailkan oleh deponen-deponen Responden- Responden sendiri berhubung hak Pemohon diwakili peguam. [43] Berbeza dengan kes semasa ini, langsung tidak timbul percanggahan afidavit di antara afidavit deponen-deponen Responden- Responden sendiri. Namun, apa yang berlaku berdasarkan afidavit Pemohon adalah Pemohon mendakwa bahawa terdapatnya penafian hak-hak Pemohon yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta 316 tanpa sebarang percanggahan afidavit-afidavit Responden-Responden sendiri dan oleh yang demikian, dikatakan Nota Prosiding perlu dikemukakan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Rosli Ani V. Pengerusi, Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah & Ors [2021] 1 LNS 676 yang telah membincangkan soal percanggahan diantara afidavit Pemohon dan afidavit Responden seperti yang berikut:- “[42] It is natural that there will always be a conflict of evidence between an applicant who seeks to secure his release from detention and the detaining authority in S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 respect of material facts. See Su Yu Min v. Ketua Polis Negara & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 875. [43] In Mohammad Azanul Haqimi, the contradiction stemmed from the afidavit of the respondent itself and unless the notes of proceedings are produced for inspection, that conflict cannot be resolved. Since the notes of proceedings were not produced, the Federal Court held that the adverse presumption should apply against the respondent. [44] I therefore find that the case of Mohammad Azanul Haqimi Tuan Ahmad Azahari v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors (supra) does not apply to the instant case on the facts and that no adverse presumption is invoked against the Respondents for failure to supply the notes of proceedings. [45] Consequently, there was no procedural non- compliance for failure to supply the notes of proceedings of the Advisory Board.” [Penekanan diberikan] [44] Sekiranya terdapat percanggahan sekalipun, percanggahan yang berlaku adalah diantara afidavit Pemohon dengan dakwaan Pemohon sendiri dan afidavit deponen-deponen Responden-Responden. Dalam hal yang sedemikian. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa keterangan pihak Responden yang hanya menjalankan amanah yang S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 dipertanggungjawabkan kepada dirinya dan tidak mempunyai sebarang kepentingan terhadap kes Pemohon wajarnya dipercayai. [45] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah berpendapat tidak timbul sebarang ketidakpatuhan prosedur dan percanggahan keterangan afidavit deponen-deponen Responden sehingga menyebabkan Nota Prosiding perlu dikemukakan. Oleh itu isu ketiga ini ditolak. Kesimpulan [46] Permohonan “Habeas Corpus” Pemohon adalah tidak bermerit kerana Pemohon telah gagal menunjukkan berlakunya ketidakpatuhan prosedur (non-compliance) oleh pihak Responden-Responden dalam kes ini seperti diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 11C(1) Akta 316 dan kesemua isu yang diketengahkan tidak terjumlah kepada ketidakpatuhan prosedur (rujuk kes Lee Kew Sang v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 clj 914 dan kes Chua Kian Voon v. Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2020] 1 CLJ 747]. Oleh yang demikian, permohonan Pemohon melalui Lampiran 1 ditolak. Tarikh: 28.11.2023 t.t (ABDUL WAHAB BIN MOHAMED) S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA IPOH, PERAK S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Pihak-pihak Tetuan M. Thanakumaran & Shan bagi pihak Perayu. Peguamcara dan Peguambela Laguna Merbok Business Park, No. 9A, Lorong BLM 1/6, Bandar Laguna Merbuok 08000 Sungai Petani Kedah Tel: 04.4400914 Faks: 04.4400633 Emel: [email protected] Peguamcara: Encik Surendran a/l Arunagiri Peguam Persekutuan bagi pihak Responden Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Kementerian Dalam Negeri Aras 5, Setia Perkasa 1, Kompleks Setia Perkasa Pusat Pentadbiran Kerajaan Persekutuan 62546 Wilayah Persekutuan, Putrajaya S/N RbFuegg9h0mA98pyByq91A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	47,954	Tika 2.6.0
BA-24NCC-5-01/2023	PEMOHON SHOON WUI CHIN RESPONDEN 1. ) CHAN KIEN WOH 2. ) SANJUNG CEKAP SDN. BHD.	LEGAL PROFESSION: Practice of law- Practice and etiquette- Recusal and/or disqualification of solicitors – Allegation that 1st defendant’s counsel previously acted for a 2nd defendant (a company) in which the plaintiff and the 1st defendant are the shareholders and directors– Counsel a potential witness in upcoming derivative action- Conflict of interest-Perception of general public –Right of a litigant to appoint an advocate and solicitor of his choice- Whether right absolute-Inherent power of Court-Legal Profession (Practice & Etiquette) Rules 1978, r.28, r,29, r.4 and r.5. CIVIL PROCEDURE: Solicitor - Application to recuse and/or disqualify solicitor from representing a client-Conflict of interest	30/11/2023	YA Puan Jamhirah binti Ali	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6b45f75e-b5ca-4339-a7e3-58c6ca9cfd51&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DI DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24NCC-5-01/2023 Dalam perkara Sanjung Cekap Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 200901030375 (873481-K)]; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 5, Aturan 7 Kaedah 2, Aturan 28, Aturan 88 Kaedah 2 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 213(1), 345, 347, 348, 350 dan 351 Akta Syarikat 2016. ANTARA SHOON WUI CHIN (NO. K/P: 720802-08-5348) ...PLAINTIF DAN 30/11/2023 15:25:46 BA-24NCC-5-01/2023 Kand. 52 S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 1. CHAN KIEN WOH (NO. K/P: 621220-10-7857) 2. SANJUNG CEKAP SDN BHD [No. Syarikat: 200901030375 (873481-K)] ... DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT INTRODUCTION 1. The Plaintiff, in enclosure 6, seeks to recuse and/or disqualify the 1st Defendant’s solicitor, Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or any other solicitors in the firm of Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates from further representing the 1st Defendant in this action. 2. The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, both shareholders and directors of the 2nd Defendant, the Company, each hold an equal share. 3. In the Originating Summons in Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff is seeking leave to initiate derivative proceedings against the 1st Defendant on behalf of the 2nd Defendant. This legal action pertains to the alleged wrongdoing and breaches of fiduciary duties committed by the 1st Defendant against the 2nd Defendant. THE PLAINTIFF’S GROUNDS FOR RECUSAL 4. The Plaintiff’s application is premised on the following grounds: S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 a. Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates were appointed as legal advisors to the 2nd Defendant; b. There exists a conspiracy between Mr. Siew Pak Thai and the 1st Defendant; c. If the leave application is granted, Mr. Siew Pak Thai will be named as a Defendant and could potentially serve as a witness in the derivative proceedings; d. The Plaintiff filed a complaint against Mr. Siew Pak Thai with the Disciplinary Board; e. Allowing Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates to continue representing the 1st Defendant would create a conflict of interest, contravening rule 28(a) and rule 29 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 (LPPE Rules 1978); f. Continuing Mr. Siew Pak Thai's representation of the 1st Defendant, given the circumstances and facts of this matter, would bring disrepute to the legal profession and jeopardize the clients' interests. CONTENTION, EVALUATION AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT 5. Upon perusal of the cause papers filed herein and having considered the written and oral submissions presented by both S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 parties, I allowed the Plaintiff’s application in enclosure 6. My reasons are stated below. 6. The Plaintiff contended that it would be improper and pose a conflict for Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates to represent the 1st Defendant in this suit. This contention arises from their prior appointment as legal advisors for the 2nd Defendant approximately in 2018. Furthermore, Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates were involved in various internal matters of the 2nd Defendant. 7. The Plaintiff asserted that Mr. Siew Pak Thai represented a company named R.N. Const & Dev JV Sanjung Cekap in an arbitration against SPP Development Sdn. Bhd. In this arbitration, R.N. Const & Dev JV Sanjung Cekap, a Joint Venture Company of the 2nd Defendant, received a total Arbitration Award of RM2,642,923.72. 8. This Arbitration Award was paid in two instalments. The first payment of RM1,480,975.23 was correctly transferred to the 2nd Defendant's account. However, the second instalment of RM1,161,948.49 was erroneously transferred to the 1st Defendant's account, constituting an unauthorised transaction. 9. Consequently, the Plaintiff alleged that the 1st Defendant wrongfully transferred the balance of the arbitration award, totaling RM1,186,000.00, to the 1st Defendant's personal account instead of directing it to the 2nd Defendant's Company. S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 10. The Plaintiff contended that this unauthorised transaction by the 1st Defendant constitutes a crucial ground and wrongdoing, leading to the initiation of the current leave application for derivative proceedings against the 1st Defendant. 11. The Plaintiff further alleged that Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates conspired with the 1st Defendant to unlawfully and illegally execute the unauthorised transaction that was intended for the 2nd Defendant’s account. 12. Consequently, the Plaintiff asserted that Mr. Siew Pak Thai's testimony is pivotal and relevant to the derivative action, specifically regarding the unauthorised transaction by the 1st Defendant, as Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates served as solicitors for R.N. Const & Dev JV Sanjung Cekap and were the stakeholders for the monies received. 13. Despite Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates denying representation for the 2nd Defendant in the arbitration case against SPP Development Sdn. Bhd., the Plaintiff argued that Exhibit A-4, the payment vouchers, demonstrates that legal fees for the matter were paid by the 2nd Defendant. 14. The Plaintiff further contended that, even if legal fees were subsequently reimbursed by R.N. Const & Dev JV Sanjung Cekap, the initial payment originated from the 2nd Defendant. 15. Moreover, the fact that the 2nd Defendant paid legal fees to Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates indicates a S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 business relationship between the 2nd Defendant and R.N. Const & Dev JV Sanjung Cekap. 16. Therefore, the Plaintiff asserted that, if leave is granted, Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates will be named as Defendants in the derivative proceedings initiated by the 2nd Defendant's company, with Mr. Siew Pak Thai potentially serving as a witness regarding the unauthorised transaction of RM1,186,000.00 belonging to the 2nd Defendant. 17. Subsequent to the aforementioned incident, the Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Disciplinary Board (the Complaint) against Mr. Siew Pak Thai. This complaint, rooted in the facts and events of the current Originating Summons, alleges that Mr. Siew Pak Thai engaged in various conflicts involving the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant, and the 2nd Defendant. The Complaint was also based on the grounds that Mr. Siew Pak Thai failed to act in the best interests of the 2nd Defendant, as per rule 16 of the LPPE Rules 1978. The Complaint is currently pending a hearing before the Disciplinary Committee. 18. Hence, the Plaintiff contended that Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates should be recused and/or disqualified from further representing the 1st Defendant, given the interconnected nature of the issues raised in the Complaint and the complaints against the 1st Defendant herein. 19. Furthermore, Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates have previously represented the 2nd Defendant in other S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 legal matters and were directly involved in various internal matters of the 2nd Defendant. Therefore, it is deemed improper for Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates, possessing knowledge of all information and internal matters of the 2nd Defendant, to represent the 1st Defendant in the present suit, which is a leave application followed by a derivative action on behalf of the 2nd Defendant. 20. Additionally, acting as the legal advisor of the 2nd Defendant, it is deemed inappropriate for Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates to take a one-sided stance in favour of the 1st Defendant and involve themselves in disputes between the directors of the 2nd Defendant. 21. The Plaintiff contended that the Plaintiff’s solicitors, via a letter dated 08.03.2023, communicated the aforementioned information to Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates. In this correspondence, the Plaintiff's solicitors requested, among other things, that Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates recuse themselves from representing the 1st Defendant. However, Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates refused and/or failed to comply with the said requests. Consequently, the Plaintiff filed this application as per enclosure 6. 22. The 1st Defendant opposed the Plaintiff’s application in enclosure 6, asserting that the reasons for the recusal of Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates, as alleged by the Plaintiff, are untrue, lack basis, and are not justifiable or cogent. S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 23. I refer to rules 4, 5, 28(a), and 29 of the LPPE Rules 1978. It is trite that advocates and solicitors shall not act for a client and/or accept a brief that would embarrass him or that he has a personal relationship with a party or will be a witness of the said proceeding. 24. The right of counsel to appear in court is not absolute. Balia Yusof Wahi J (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Perbadanan Pembangunan Pulau Pinang v Tropiland Sdn. Bhd. [2010] 2 CLJ 1061, stated as follows: “Foremost, it is trite that the right of counsel to appear in court is not absolute. Their conduct on legal proceedings which may affect the administration of justice is subject to the court’s supervisionary jurisdiction. Kayla Beverly Hills (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor v. Quantum Far East Ltd & Ors: Uma Devi R. Balakrishnan (third party) [2003] 4 CLJ 587, RS Muthiah v. Pembinaan Fiba Sdn. Bhd. [2004] 2 CLJ 917. The court has the right and duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors and the court would be failing in its duty if it fails to do this supervisory power. Similarly, a solicitor owes a duty to the court to conduct litigation with due propriety and to assist in promoting in his own sphere, the cause of justice. (Yee Chang & Co. Ltd v. NV Koninklijke Paketvaart Maarschappij [1985] MLJ 131). The court has an inherent jurisdiction to ensure the due administration of justice and to protect the integrity of the judicial process and as part of that jurisdiction, to prevent a member of counsel appearing for a particular party in order that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done (Grimwade v. Meagher & Ors. [1995] Victorian Reports Vol. 1, 446)”. [emphasis added] S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 25. It was further expounded in the case of Perbadanan Pembangunan Pulau Pinang v Tropiland Sdn. Bhd. (supra) that in justifying the disqualification of an advocate and solicitor, the test to be applied in deciding whether there was a conflict of interest is not whether there is actual conflict but it depends on the perception of the public, of the existence of such conflict. The objective test has to be applied to the facts of the particular case to determine whether the appearance of conflict has been sufficiently made out. The Court stated that: “[6] … What is “incompatible with the best interest of the administration of justice” is a question of fact to be decided on the merits of each case. Speaking of conflict, the objective test to be applied is not whether there is actual conflict but that there be no appearance of conflict. It has also been said that it is the appearance of fairness in the eyes of the public that is fundamentally important. Sopinka J in the case of Martin v. Gray 77 DLR (4th) 249 stated that the sina qua non of the justice system is that there be an unqualified perception of its fairness in the eyes of the general public. There is first of all the concern to maintain the high standard of the legal profession and the integrity of our system of justice, and to achieve this, a strict test ought to be observed in ensuring that not only there be no actual conflict but there be no appearance of conflict. The family court of Australia in Thevenaz and Thevenaz [1986] FLC 91-748 said: It is of utmost importance that justice should not only be done but should appear to be done. In the circumstances of the present case, there is a risk S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 which may well be merely theoretical but still exists, that justice might not appear to be done. [8] On the power and the role of the court, Mandie J in Martin v. Gray (supra) referred to the position in Canada and set out the following passages from a decision of the full court of the Ontario Divisional Court in Everingham v. Ontario [1992] 88 DLR (4ht) 755 at pp. 761-762: It is within the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court to deny the right of audience to counsel when the interests of justice so require by reason of conflict or otherwise. This power does not depend on the rules of professional conduct made by the legal profession and is not limited to cases where the rules are breached. The issue here is not whether or not the rule was breached, or whether the solicitor worked for the government. Nor is it solely whether the patient lost confidence in the process. The issues is whether a fair-minded reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the administration of justice required the removal of the solicitor ... The public interest in the administration of justice requires an unqualified perception of its fairness in the eyes of the general public ... The goal is not just to protect the interests of the individual litigant but even more importantly to protect public confidence in the administration of justice ...” [emphasis added] S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 26. The nub of the Plaintiff’s argument, in this case, was that a conflict of interest arose in the representation by Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates due to their involvement in the 2nd Defendant’s internal matters and legal affairs and they are potential witnesses in the derivative action if leave is granted. This contravenes rules 28(a) and 29 of the LPPE Rules 1978. 27. To substantiate the Plaintiff’s argument, reference was made to rules 4, 5, 16, 28, and 29 of the LPPE Rules 1978, which the Plaintiff asserted were violated by Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates. 28. Rules 28 and 29 of the LPPE Rules 1978 state as follows:- “28. Advocate and solicitor not to appear in a case where he is a witness (a) An advocate and solicitor shall not appear in Court or in chambers in any case in which he has reason to believe that he will be a witness in respect of a material and disputed question of fact, and if while appearing in a case it becomes apparent that he will be such a witness, he shall not continue to appear if he can retire without jeopardising his client’s interests. (b) An advocate and solicitor shall not appear before an appellate tribunal if in the case under appeal he has been a witness on a material and disputed question of fact in the Court below. S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (c) This rule does not prevent an advocate and solicitor from swearing or affirming an affidavit as to formal or undisputed facts in matters in which he acts or appears. 29. Advocate and solicitor not to testify on behalf of client Except when essential to the ends of justice or as to merely formal matters, an advocate and solicitor appearing in any cause shall not testify in Court on behalf of his client only in that cause.” [emphasis added] 29. In explaining the rationale for rule 28(a), I refer to the case of Kasturi Nambiar Krishnan v Steven Sebastian; Sivasankar Mohanadass, (party cited) [2023] 1 LNS 875; [2023] 7 CLJ 448, the High Court stated: “[21] The rationale for r. 28(a) was explained by Beaumont CJ in Emperor v. Dadu Ramu, AIR 1939 Bom 150, where His Lordship stated in the oft-quoted passage: Generally, if an advocate is called as a witness by the other side, it can safely be left to the good sense of the advocate to determine whether he can continue to appear as an advocate, or whether by so doing he will embarrass the court or the client. If a court comes to the conclusion that a trial will be embarrassed by the appearance of an advocate, who has been called as a witness by the other side, and if, notwithstanding the S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 court's expression of its opinion, the advocate refuses to withdraw, in my opinion in such a case the court has inherent jurisdiction to require the advocate to withdraw. An advocate cannot cross-examine himself, nor can he usefully address the court as to the credibility of his own testimony, and a court may well feel that justice will not be done if the advocate continues to appear. But, in my opinion, the prosecution in such a case must establish to the satisfaction of the court that the trial will be materially embarrassed, if the advocate continues to appear for the defence.” [emphasis added] 30. When a solicitor is a possible witness for the case, the solicitor should be dismissed or recused from representing the client. In the case of Perak Hanjoong Simen Sdn. Bhd. v Perindustrian Tenaga Mix Sdn. Bhd. [2008] 8 MLJ 567, Rohana Yusuf J (as Her Ladyship then was) held that: “In my view, Encik Tee’s role in the settlement agreement would in all probability potentially make him a witness of material and disputed question of facts. I would rely on the first limb of r 28(a) to say that, given the circumstances of the present case, I find that this is a case in which an advocate and solicitor has reason to believe that he will be a witness in respect of a material and disputed question of fact. I would pose that same question as Abdul Malik Ishak J did in Syarikat Pengangkutan Sakti and Lim Beng Choon J in Public Prosecutor v Vengadalasam & Ors that is; in the event Encik Tee has to testify, who would cross-examine S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 him on behalf of his client. Quite obviously Encik Tee should have reasons to believe that he will be a material witness as envisaged under r 28(a). For this reason alone, I would allow the objection of the plaintiff.” [emphasis added] 31. In my considered view, Mr. Siew Pak Thai's testimony is crucial and pertinent to the subject matter of the forthcoming derivative action concerning the unauthorised transaction carried out by the 1st Defendant. This transaction involved Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates, who served as the solicitor for R.N. Const & Dev JV Sanjung Cekap. 32. While Mr. Siew Pak Thai refuted representing the 2nd Defendant in the mentioned arbitration case against SPP Development Sdn. Bhd., the Plaintiff's presented payment voucher indicates that the legal fees for this arbitration were paid by the 2nd Defendant. Although R.N. Const & Dev JV Sanjung Cekap later reimbursed these fees to the 2nd Defendant, the initial payment source was not contested. This underscores a clear business relationship between the 2nd Defendant and R.N. Const & Dev JV Sanjung Cekap. 33. Additionally, it is not denied that the first instalment of the arbitration award was paid to the 2nd Defendant, while the second instalment was deposited into the 1st Defendant's personal account. The Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Siew Pak Thai, as the solicitor overseeing the arbitration case and as the stakeholder for the monies received, colluded with the 1st Defendant for the unauthorised transaction of the second instalment. Given these circumstances, it is evident that S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Mr. Siew Pak Thai would be a necessary witness to address the accusations against him and his legal firm. In fact, the Plaintiff has asserted that Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates could potentially become defendants in the Plaintiff’s forthcoming derivative action if leave is granted. 34. In the case of Kasturi Nambiar Krishnan v Steven Sebastian; Sivasankar Mohanadass, (party cited) (supra), the High Court held: “[24] In referring to several cases such as Abdul Halim Abdul Hanan & Ors v. Pengarah Penjara, Taiping & Ors [1996] 1 LNS 67; 4 MLJ 54, Wee Choo Keong v. PP [1990] 1 CLJ 1015; [1990] 3 CLJ (Rep) 346 and Sykt Pengangkutan Sakti Sdn Bhd v. Tan Joo Khing t/a Bengkel Sen Tak [1997] 3 CLJ 754, the bar against a solicitor appearing based on the likelihood that he would be a witness in the case was explained in Quah Poh Keat & Ors v. Ranjit Singh Taram Singh, by Suriyadi Halim Omar JCA in an enlightening passage: The highly pertinent question that must necessarily follow in its wake is, why the bar from appearing in such circumstances? The obvious answer, without the need for intensive judicial activism, is that in order to avoid any conflict of interest or embarrassing ethical issues, Parliament found the promulgation of this provision necessary. Imagine a situation where a solicitor might find himself in a sticky situation of being a potential witness in a legal tussle, by virtue of his previous professional duties. He is supposed to be at the forefront to plead justice S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 fearlessly, when representing the cause of his client, yet with such an inhibition being present he might not do justice to his client. At first blush, this provision leaves it to the good sense of the solicitor to decide whether he will be called as a witness, in respect of a material and disputed question of fact and refrain from representing a client. Despite that statement we are of the view that a judge pursuant to his inherent jurisdiction has the power to disqualify him if all the statutory preconditions have been complied with. Surely to avoid unnecessary problems prevention is better than cure in that, in such a scenario, an advocate and solicitor must be restrained at the outset.” [emphasis added] 35. Further, in the case of Syarikat Pengangkutan Sakti Sdn Bhd v Tan Joo Khing t/a Bengkel Sen Tak [1997] 5 MLJ 705 Abdul Malik Ishak J (as His Lordship then was) in delivering his judgement held as follows: - “By virtue of r 28(a) of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978, Mr Gana Muthusamy should be barred from representing the plaintiff be it in open court or in chambers. There are no concessions to be offered. The rules must be complied with for an orderly conduct of litigation and to maintain and observe the standard of conduct required of members of this august profession. The courts have an inherent power and authority to refuse to permit a particular advocate and solicitor from appearing on behalf of a particular individual in a particular case. Faced with this sanction, it would be a gross misconduct on the part of that particular advocate and S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 solicitor to so appear. The right of a particular individual to be represented by an advocate and solicitor of his own choice is not absolute. It is the court that will determine that right. There is a passage appearing in the judgment of Humphreys J in R v Secretary of State for India in Council & Ors, ex p Ezekiel [1941] KB D 546 that merits reproduction. It is this: “There is a short observation which the other members of the court desire me to make and with which I agree. It has been brought to the attention of the court that, on the hearing at Bow Street, junior counsel on one side was called as a witness to prove certain aspects of Indian law and continued thereafter to act as counsel in the case. No objection was taken to this by counsel on the other side. We think it right to point out that this was irregular and contrary to practice. A barrister may be briefed as counsel in a case or he may be a witness in a case. He should not act as both counsel and witness in the same case.” [emphasis added] 36. Consequently, I find that a conflict of interest has been convincingly demonstrated based on the presented facts. To protect public confidence in the administration of justice and to avoid embarrassing ethical issues, it is imperative that Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates be disqualified and/or recused from representing the 1st Defendant. 37. Further, I concur with the Plaintiff's argument that it would also create a conflict of interest for Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Siew & Associates to represent the 1st Defendant in the current lawsuit because the Plaintiff has filed a Complaint with the Disciplinary Board against Mr. Siew Pak Thai, alleging his involvement in various conflicts among the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant, and the 2nd Defendant. The Complaint is based on Mr. Siew Pak Thai's purported failure to act in the best interest of the 2nd Defendant, as per rule 16 of the LPPE Rules 1978. Importantly, the issues raised in the Complaint are closely tied to the facts and events in the present case, and the Complaint is currently awaiting a hearing before the Disciplinary Board. 38. Furthermore, given that Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates served as legal advisors to the 2nd Defendant, it would be inappropriate for them to assume representation of the 1st Defendant. Such a move could potentially lead to a one-sided stance and involvement in the dispute among the directors of the 2nd Defendant. 39. Considering the aforementioned circumstances, a conspicuous conflict of interest emerges, posing a threat to transparency and hindering the just and fair resolution of these proceedings. Consequently, it is imperative to bar Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates from representing the 1st Defendant in both the current lawsuit and the derivative proceedings. This prohibition aligns with the guidelines established in rules 4 and 5 of the LPPE Rules 1978, which mandate the recusal of an advocate and solicitor in the presence of a conflict of interest. These rules stipulate the following: S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 “4. No advocate and solicitor to accept brief if professional conduct likely to be impugned No advocate and solicitor shall accept a brief in a case where he knows or has reason to believe that his own professional conduct is likely to be impugned. 5. No advocate and solicitor to accept brief if difficult to maintain professional independence (a) No advocate and solicitor shall accept a brief if such acceptance renders or would render it difficult for him to maintain his professional independence or is incompatible with the best interest of the administration of justice. (b) (i) An advocate and solicitor who has at any time advised or drawn pleadings or acted for a party in connection with the institution or prosecution or defence of any suit, appeal or other proceedings shall not act, appear or plead for the opposite party in that suit, appeal or other proceedings. (c) (ii) An advocate and solicitor shall not act unless the consent of the first party for whom the advocate and solicitor acted is obtained in writing and the advocate and solicitor is not embarrassed by so acting.” 40. Further, I drew guidance from the decision in the case of Wong Sin Chong & Anor v Bhagwan Singh & Anor [1993] 1 MLRA 519, where the Supreme Court stated that: - S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “…The question whether the court has jurisdiction to forbid an advocate to appear in a particular case involves the consideration of conflicting principles. On the one hand, an accused person is entitled to select the advocate whom he desires to appear for him, and certainly the prosecution cannot fetter that choice merely by serving a subpoena on the advocate to appear as a witness. On the other hand, the court is bound to see that the due administration of justice is not in any way embarrassed. Generally, if an advocate is called as a witness by the other side, it can safely be left to the good sense of the advocate to determine whether he can continue to appear as an advocate, or whether by so doing he will embarrass the court or the client. If a court comes to the conclusion that a trial will be embarrassed by the appearance of an advocate, who has been called as a witness by the other side, and if, notwithstanding the court's expression of its opinion, the advocate refuses to withdraw, in my opinion in such a case the court has inherent jurisdiction to require the advocate to withdraw. An advocate cannot cross- examine himself, nor can he usefully address the court as to the credibility of his own testimony, and a court may well feel that justice will not be done if the advocate continues to appear. But, in my opinion, the prosecution in such a case must establish to the satisfaction of the court that the trial will be materially embarrassed, if the advocate continues to appear for the defence.” [emphasis added] 41. Based on the facts and circumstances stated above and aided by the authorities cited, it is my considered view that Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates’ conduct in representing the 1st Defendant as the solicitor and counsel in this proceeding would S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 be in breach of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978. 42. For the reasons stated above, I, therefore, ordered Mr. Siew Pak Thai and/or Messrs P.T. Siew & Associates to be recused and/or disqualified from acting and/or representing the 1st Defendant in this proceeding. Hence, accordingly, I ordered that enclosure 6 be allowed with costs of RM5000.00. Dated: 30 November 2023 -sgd- JAMHIRAH ALI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam (NCVC 1) To the parties’ solicitors: For the Plaintiff : Dato’ Jasbeer Singh together with Jeyshini Naidu and Ainur Afiqah (PDK) (Messrs. Jasbeer Nur & Lee) For the 1st Defendant : Siew Pak Thai (Messrs. Justin Wee) S/N XvdFa8q1OUOn41jGypz9UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	33,289	Tika 2.6.0
WA-44-14-02/2023	PEMOHON MUHAMMAD ASYRAF BIN ABDUL KADIR RESPONDEN 1. ) TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA 2. ) PENGUASA KANAN PUSAT PEMULIHAN AKHLAK SIMPANG RENGGAM, JOHOR 3. ) KETUA POLIS NEGARA	This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus against the legality of the detention order (“the DO”) - under s.6 (1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive Measures Act) 1985 (“the Act”)	30/11/2023	YA Datuk Noorin binti Badaruddin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f68cbcc7-facd-42e9-87a7-38b54bcbc2e6&Inline=true	30/11/2023 16:00:46 WA-44-14-02/2023 Kand. 42 S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x7yM9s366UKHpzi1S8vC5g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—u—u—o2/2023 Kand. 42 an/mznu 15:02-as DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMFUR DALAM NEGERI WILAVAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR HNOW oavam Femsrs Permehonan Habeas Camus selaras dengan Ban xxxvc Kenun Iatamva Jena‘/an (Aha 59:) Dan mam Perum 5 an m Fenemnagaan Farwkulunn Dan Dawn Petkam vamomnan m Bawah Sake‘/an ass (11 (:2) Kamm Yatacara Jenayzh Dan Dam Fevkava MUHAMMAD ASVRAF aw ABDUL mum (Na xv 99012170: 57217 yang dllahan a. bawah Sukswn s m An. Daﬂzh B-mahaya (Lannkah.Lanakah Pencegahan ms) was ANTARA MUHAMMAD ASVRAF BIN ABDUL KADIR FEMOHON DAN 1. TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAVSIA 2. PENGUASA KANAN PUSAT PEMULIHAN AKHLAK SIMPANG RENGGAM. JOHOR 1. KETUA POLIS NEGARA RESPONDEN - RESPONDEN m x7yMIs3uwKHpznsavG5q 1 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum Wm! JUDGMENT [11 ms Is an apphcaliarl tor a wnt of habeas corpus against ttte legalny ofthe detention order l“lhI DO") issued by me 1“ Respondent under 5.6 (1) ol the Dangerous Dtugs A51 tspeaat Preventive Measures Ac1) was (“me 1421"} directing trtat the applicant be detained tor a period of Mo (2) years eetnrnenctng item 22 9 2022 at the Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak Simpang Renggam. Johor(PPA). sat nt rm: [2] The appircant was arrested under s. 3(1) at the Act on 5 a 2022 [3] On 1132022, Assistant Cam ‘ssinner of Ponce Shahlﬂi Bin Abdullah tvxcp Shahldl Bin Aeetuttaniit, trta Deputy nrrector 0! me Narcotic Cnmlnai Investigation Department, Pahoe Headquarters Eukit Aman received the reporl teiatirtg to the apphcartls arrest and detention from Deputy supenntenaent Ponce Mispani Bin Hamdan \|“DSP Mllplnl Eln Hartman") [4] A report reiattng lolhe aupttcantsartest and detention was prepared by ACP snatnar Bin Atmuuatt and terwarded to the Depuly Minister pursuant to s 3(2t (c)t11\|heAcI an 17 n 2022. [5] on 3. 2022 the inspect/ar Morrd Fadiy atn Shamusin("\|n:pIt:1ov Mom: Fadly Ein Shlmsudin") ttte tnuesttgattng omcertrotn the Natwtic cntntnai lrtveslig on Departtnent, Police Headquarters District Jasin. Meiaka rtad recorded ttte apptrcants sXa\|emertl pursuant Ia 5.4 oItneAct. IN xvymsxuwwpzttsaucsg 2 «mm. s.n.t nuvthnrwm be u... m mm r... nngtrtnﬂly mt. dnuuvtnrtl VII muue amt [5] Tire mvesligallﬂn reveals that me appiicarii was irmiired WIU1 irie aciivi s in ireireiririg dangerous dmgs Meiriarripiieiamirie lislad urieer me First soriediiie. Pan III ("me x schedule"; [71 on 29.5 2022, me inquiry ameer oi iiie Ministry pi Harrie Affairs. AsriwiriiA/Pnnaiesemy received (heluii Invssllgahon report reiaiirig io me apnricani is] on i 9 2e22, irie irrouiry eineereerieueied e pnyeioei irivesiigoriori to me applicant [9] on a 9 2023. me iriouiry omcer soorriiiied her repori io me uepuiy Mimsler pureuarii to s siai onrie Act. no] Having received and perused me reppris «rein me Investigating arid the Wzuiry ofﬁcers. Data‘ sri Dr Hiji isrrieii airi Haii Mohamed Said, me Deputy MIFIISKBV issued me deoeriiion order egairrsi me appiicerit under 5 am of me Acl iere perioo of «we 12) years eorrirrierreiiig 22 9 2:122 [11] On 22 92022. inspector Tuan Ariﬁ Em Tuan Abduilah had served on the eppiicani inree original copies of me detenliun order, aiiegaiier. of «acts aria iriree eepies pi Form 1 for me purpese ol irie aopiioerirs represenieiieri ie me Advisory Board i--«ii. Sand") [12] on 23 9 2022, me applicam was admitted io irie PPA on me seine day, Mahadevan A/L Karupan, being ihe oiricer in charge more PPA (min oIc"i had funrier explained to tire applicant iris eeierriion omen alienation in {am} me grounds at aeieriiiori and irie eppiieerire rigrii \|L7 rneke renreseriieiiorr io irre Board IN x71/M9sZIl£UKHu2i1Ss~4G5§ 3 “Nair Smli luvihnrwm .. UIQG a may i... nﬂninuﬂly MIMI m.i.r. vn nFiuNﬂ Wm! [13] On 12102022, Mahadevan had served a noxiee of neanng ol represenlalmn to me appmant. [M] on 19.10.2022, the Board convened and had Instructed Sergeant vrnualan A/L Sekemn (0 assist the apphcamdunng ma represenvauon The applicant was not represented [15] Ana: havmg oonsideved the represencacran made by me applicant, the Board submnted ms recomrnendamn to the Vang D\|»Partuan Agong an 1910 2022. The Board‘: recomrnendaupn was assented to by the Vang D\|—Pertuan Ageng on 25 10 22 lssuus Raisnd by me An am [15] Yhree xssues were rawsed by the applicant herein and they are as faHaws: r The apphcant was deprived of ms tundamental right to cunsul! his counsel upun his arrest may the AOL u. The applicant was unrepresented by a counsel al his rspresenmron heavmg were me Apnea! seam, and H1 The applwcanrs detention for more than 30 days at the Palms lockup .n {PD Jasm Memka was unlawful [17] Learned Counsel at me s\|arImg anne neanng ohms appncamn has Informed the court that they win not proeeed mm me first two issues as these rssues have peen venmaled rn other applrcauens before me Federa\ com and mrs Conn was Inlmmad that me Federal Cmmwas not w ngreemenxwmn the submissions bythe Ipphcants on the same ﬁvsl Iwo rssues harem m the olherapplicaunns r~ x7ymsJntwKHpzr1savc5g A «mm. sarm mmhnrwm .. HIGH m M», r... nrtmnlﬂly mm: m.r.n VI mum Mr he] Leamed ::ounse\ then seek to proceed mn only the «mm wssue ie we Vegallty onne awhcanl s delenuon cor morelhan so days at me Ponce lodvuv vn IPD Jasnn Me\aka Fin us on the Yhird lssut: ‘ - ' an :1: al the Police lock-ug In um Juln Mom- [19] The lhird wssue raised by me apphcanl nas been venmaled Debra lhrs Cuurl m a recent case, Farhun bin Maham-d Fanmy v Timbalnn M-nlul nnlnm Nlaorl, Mallvilu dnn 2 Lu! (Permohonan Jena)/Eh No. wma-59416/2023) on 30.10 2023. me appllcallon «or s Wri\ ol Haheas Corpus in mac case was dusmnssd vnler aha an we grcunds than the Issue an the Vegalmy of me appucanrs delenlxon var more man so days ax me My Dang Wangw Kuela Lumpur lockup ws wnnduc mam. [20] As me same argumenl m Farnan bin Mohamnd Fahmy v Tlmbllan Monmi Dalnrn Nounri, Malaysia can 2 lagi (supra) ws pmwered by lhe awucan: une applncanl in Fnmnn bin Mahamcd Fahmy v Ylmbllln Monurl an m N-mi (sunra) nrso was represented by me same legal ﬁrm nareun), «nus coun addsus and apply the same reasoning hevain and lhey are as vouzm. [21] l\| is contended by me apphcantlhat ms delermun for more man 30 days it me IPD Jasm Me\aka Pohoe lock-up -s unlawfw as me said \ock— up ws not gushed In accordance with s. 7 mna Pnwn M11995 (MI537) [22] s 7mand S1 7('A)uUwl 537 Wuvndsz '(1) /vshall be lawful lo! the Munster. by nollllcaltan rn me Gazette, to appoint lock-ups at such pence stamens and m x7yM9s3uwKHpznss~4G5q s “Nana s.nn nmhnrwm .. med n may n. mn.u-y mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mnna Wm! eoun houses as may be specrﬁsd rn ms nolrﬁcaﬁon to be places for ms conﬂnemenl of person, remanded or sentenced to such terms 01 rrnpnsonmenn nor sxossurng one rnonzn, as may be specmeu rn each case mu rn suurnon, rv snarr be lawful tor the rnrrrisrer, by nonncanon rn me Gszsus, Io appoml rock-ups at such pa/ice szarrons and mun nousss as nrsy us spscr/rsurn rne nozmcsuon to be p/aces for the conrrnernen: of persons under the Prevention orcrrnrs Ac! 1957 (An! 297) and mo Prevention o1 Tsrmrrsm Act 2015 (Act 759) ‘ [23] u rs clearlhal unders Mm 537‘ me gazene made pursuanl memo rs only applrcabxe In the ro4Iov-nng categories o1 person. a person remanded generany under s 117 M me Crimina\ Pmceduve code, and rr a person sentenced by me Coon wrcn an mIpnsorvnen\| oi not more than one month [za] Vn aodnron Ihe new msamon of s. 7 (1A) Act 537 applies omy Io person de\|ained under me Plevermon of Cnme Act 1959 (Am 297) and Prevermon uH’enunsm Act 2015 (Act 769) [251 The apphcanl mired on me decnsran by the Hrgn Cuurl In Alaknun all Siva gum wnnmalan Mom ' nalam Nognrl ulnlaysia dan Salu L-ui [2023] 1 LNS am: In Ihal case, me learned Juorcral comrnrssioner [as Hrs Lnrdship men was) was onne urew manna pmvmon rn 5 3(4) or «he Act must be reaa harmoniously wi\h Am 537 The Veamed Judrcial commrssroner sxanea further ru x7yM9s:II£UKHpzr1Ss~4C5g 5 «mm. s.n.r nmhnrwm .. u... u M, .. mrn.rr., mm: dnuamnl VI mum Mr 730) Mahkamah mr berparvdangan ada/ah naak (anal darn vfdak munasabah hujshan pihak Rssponden bahawa orsng Iahanan dr bewah Am lerssbuv Doleh drlahan di marva~ mans bahagran :5:-Mam Esra. Pans Frasa ayal 7n anypalice szarmn 'da/am seksyen 3(4) bukanlah bsvmakna susoranq zananan be/en ditahan alau dizempaman dalam manawbana kawasan dalam sssuatu ca/ai puns. Semesrinya msmsriukan suam tampaf yang khas bagr penshsnan mane-mane orang zananan (31) Selzagai a/rsmam, Mahkamah mr bsrpandapsl me/nandangkan pslumukan seksyen rm) Akta Pen/are 1995 hdsk msrsngkumksn um sexeorang zahanan an hawah Akla Dadah Berbshaya (Lsngknh-Lsngkah Psncegahsn Knss; V995, Memen boleh msmben kuasa faumorizahon) same ads pembenan kuasa sscsra umum azau sacara khusus ks ates manawvsna lampal (Iermasuk Vokap polls) ssbagat temps! lahanan .11 bawah ma tsrsabul (in any am: place aulhanzsd gsmrva//y or spaczsrry by (he Mimsrsr) Walau bagafmanapun‘ nihak Responder! ,uga gagul msrnbuklikan ssbarsng pembenan kuasa a/eh Menlen Dag: maksud lsrssbul " [26] Wwlh an due resaed‘ «ms Ocurl lakes a ammm mew u must be borne m mind that the applmam herein Is detamed undev 5 3(1) anne AM u I: clear man me appneam does not lull under any 0! lhe calegories rnermaned m the above. The Ipphcanl therefore can; under the ueusrmon power pulsuam \u 5. 3(2) and 5 3(4) Mme Ac! whvch slate: -3(2) Any person arrested and dslamad under rm 5 may be named Ill po//cv custody for u penod not exceudmg m x7yms:mmKHpmsa~4c5g 7 «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIGH m my .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl y. mum pom! my day: wuhodv sn crdev or delenfion having been made m respect of!-um under subs. 5(1): Frovrdsd lhaf— (a) he She/I not be detamsd for more men twenty lourhours exeeo: wim me aulhonty ala polrce omcar olur above me rank of /Ivspecror, (D) he shall not be dimmed for more than forty eight hours excepx with me authovily of a ponce afﬁcer 0/ or above me rank of/Issrsran! Supennfendent af Po/Ice, (c) he shall not be deramed for more men fourteen days un/ass e pa/we olfcer or or anode me rank of Deputy Supermlendsnf has ISDOHGH M16 ct/cumslanoes of the arrest and detention to [I18 Inspector Geneva! orlo a police aﬂicer desrgnazod by me Inspector General m that beha/I and me Inspaclal General or peace after so designared by him, as the case may he‘ shall {Dd/1w/Ih ND091 the same '0 the Minister (3) The police office! making an fnvssligarron pa/‘Ia/nmg to a person anesxed and dezarned under ms s shall cause a copy oi the complete report oi ms fnvesltgslron to be sL/Dmrttsd— fa] to an /nqurry Oﬁcersppomlsd under subs 5(1), and (o; in the Minister, wrlhm such period as may be prescnbed by (he Iwmsrsr by regu/shuns made under this Act (3) (33) (A) Any poison dltlinnd undo! thl pownrs confomd by this 5. shall [75 d: mod lo 1:. in Ilwful custody, Ind m xvymszmwkupmsswcsg x «mm. sow ...m.mm .. med m M, .. mm., mm: dnuamnl VI nF\uNQ pom! rnay ha doliinod in any prison, or in any police amlon, or in any other plans alnhoriud nulurzlly or specially by the Ministu. Enrnination of persons acquaintad wlilr inc locus and clrcunlshncts of case" [Enipiiasis aaoeo] [27] subs, 3(4) cl lne Acl is a deeming provision wliicli apnroves oeienrion ol me apolicanl in any prison or in any police station or in any place aucnorisec generally or specially oy lne lllinisier As such «lie place ol delenlion pursuant lo silos 3(4) of me Acl calvlal be siioiecleo lo irie requirement ol a gazeue under s 7 Am 537 Tnis courr is ol lne consioerea vim xnai lne iespcnoeriis are enmleo to rely on me oeeniing provision in suoa. SKA" wnicli elleciively means «rial me aoplicani was oeemeo lo ca in lawful cuslpoy al all material hmzs (see' snaririzal bin Abdullah V nmbalari Mcnml D-lam Nogurl. Mnlaynla A On [2021] 1 ms 19421 [28] Inc nalural meaning oline ceeniing nmvlslan urioer subs 3(4) oi the AC\| allows the applicant at all rnaterlal lime‘ \|0 be In legal or aulhorlsed cusludy and I0 be delalned at any pohce slalinn including (ha ‘PD Jaslrl Malaki Pallca Lock-Up There is no ieouirenieni under me Ac1\naI\|na place ol oeleniion lcr purpose cl invesiigalion made inereurioer to ac speciﬁcally gazslted wneri mere is no such requlremanl ll lollows that more is no procedural non-compliance arising iieiein. As slalad oy Apoiil Hamid Moriairiao FCJ (as he then was) in Lu Kulw Sung V Tilnbalan lllsnm DI m Nogl Millaylll a. On [1005] 3 cu 914 ’/I is not far the courfs to meals procedural requirements because I1 15 not the fullclian of [he court: to make MW 0! (was “ IN x7yM9sZll£LlKHpzl1S!VC5g 9 “Nair s.ii.i lnvlhnrwm be ii... a vuny i... nngllullly MIMI dnuunlnl VI nFluNQ mi Conclusion [29] Prermsed on me aluvesavd. nus com ﬁnds that the rspundents were awe to meet mew burden to satisfy [ms com mat the and rsquuremems oi the Vaw were met, The apphcan\'s delenhcn was Vawfm am ms application (or a wax cl habeas corpus was lherefme demed INOORIN mn EADARUDDIN] Judge Hugh Conn :11 Ma\aya Kua\a Lumpur Counnl for ma Apnlicnnt Norsanqka mun Norman Messrs. Ha\ka\ &Co (Jahnrﬁahrv) mm: Counsel (FC) Nuur Izham hm Vsmaxl m xvyuiszuuxwznsaucsg w «W. Snr1n\nunhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum pom!	1,363	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-64-32-02/2023	PEMOHON Pendakwa Raya RESPONDEN IZWAN BIN MASHURI	Permohonan pelucuthakkan harta alih - s 41(1) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 (Akta 694) - tiada pendakwaan dibuat - bantahan awal penerimaan Afidavit Pembetulan selepas tarikh hujahan ditetapkan - bantahan awal ditolak - semua pihak perlu diberi peluang membuat penzahiran penuh (full disclosure) segala fakta matan - money trail wang rasuah telah dibuktikan oleh pihak pemohon - isu penurunan kuasa kepada responden tidak material - pelucuthakkan harta alih action in rem - tiada isu percampuran wang rasuah dan wang hasil lain	30/11/2023	Puan Azura Binti Alwi	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=263fb8ad-3c33-4e5a-ae78-4d99337276c0&Inline=true	30/11/2023 12:48:31 WA-64-32-02/2023 Kand. 30 S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rbg/JjM8Wk6ueE2ZM3J2wA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal u .5 m 25 wA—sa—32—o2/2023 Kand. an/mznu 12:42-2; DALAM MAHKAMAH sssvsu KUALA LUMPUR WILAVM PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR KES FERMOMONAN No: WA 64-32-0212023 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA PEMOHON DAN VZWAN aw MASHUR! . RESPONDEN ALASAN Pgusl-MKIMAN P-nduhnluln 1 Rayuan Am \|e!ah drkemukakan nlsh pmak Responden ksrana \|idak belpuas hau dengan kspulusan Mankaman Dada 6 Seplember 2023 yang «em. msmbsnavkan permohonan pmak Pendakwaan ssbzgal Pemohon unluk mehmulhak hana aﬁh pmak Responden menumx subseksyen 41(1) Am Suruharuaya Penceganan Rasuah Malaysxa ISFRM) zone sepem d. dalam Nnlis Pavmuhunan (Kandungan 1). AVWA so 32.91/znzz run IN my/.qMawwmEzzM1IzwA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm s Pmnonnnan mucum-klun Hlru Am: 2 Permohonan pmak Pendakman ssbagai Femohun sebaganmana av dslam Mm’: Ferrnchonan (Kamungan n adalah sspertn yang benkul ») banawa nana am. berupa sebuah kerela penis Toyota as hemomlmr pendaﬂaran vn as dllucnlhak kepada Kerqaan Malaysia ﬂan 10 drdaﬂarkan hak mnlik alas nama Kama Pesuruhiaya. Suruhanjaya Penceganan Rasuah, in) unluk d iarkan dalam wana di bawah subseksyen 4142) Am Surunaruaya Fencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 (Akla 594) memanggil mans-mane avang yang menunlul nahawa ma mempunyai as kepennngan lerhadap haﬂa nun lersshul na :1: nadapan Mahkamah pada larikh yang dmyalakan da\am nous unluk menunjukkan sebab mengapa hana n ' ak pmuldlluwlhakkan dan seaemsnya mamahen Mahksmah yang muha mu melucumakkan hana \|erssbuI di bawah subseksyen 4I(3)AkIa yang sama; dun sebarzng pennlah mm alau Vanjul yang umxuxan adil. pann dan sesual aleh Mahkaman vang Muha Am. 3. Alasamalasan bagr pemmhnnan lensebul man dinya\|akan melmul Aﬁdavul Nuru! Allqah mnu Mohamad Anas (Kandungan 2) yang dnlvarkan 1; pada 2w Februaﬂ 2:123 dan Aﬁdavﬂ Mahd Akram hm Warn (Kandungan :4) yang mga dnikrarkan pads 21 Fehruzri 2023 A. Sesnhnan Nolis Permuhnnnn Gan amavn—anuavin lersehut man mmahkan secara (angan kepada Respcnden sendin dw Pepbal SFRM an Kuala Lumpur pad: 3 Mac 2023 Jam Iebih kurang m an pagr. Responden npwu» 21 uz/ma Page 2 m mg/.A‘Mawkm:EzzM1IzwA «man my n-nhnrwm be mad m mm he mm-y am. dun-mm y.. muNG v-max m is m an selamunnya, Respomen mm menegaskan bahawa beH.!u lelah manggumlkan Wang mu walnn mm rzya oxen islarinya pada Iahun 2020 se.-muan RM27.UOD.G0 (Eksrunu IBMJ) bagi \|uJuan membayav asposu unmk pembellan kama Toyma as Ieaebul. Wzlau bagmmunapun, Responder: mangakul Ialah marvysvallkan Rmzmuu on lunar kupada Zwakhulnq pad: saknar Jlnuari 2n2« kerana neriau Ielah mennwarkan amnya unluk membanm Rsspondan ham membayar deposit Iarsahul kemna Responder: udak mempunyax mass unluk mum dspuul lersebul 31 Reimnden mm manegaskan bahau harkemampuan Imluk mambeﬂ kerula Toyota as lersebul kerann man membual pimnmln dlngan pmak Muybnnk ﬂan msmbual pembaysun bulnnan danpsdi gay man ynng dxkredilkan ks dalum aklun Muyhank (Ekshibﬂ IBM-5 xmaunaan 14) Responusn mga manyalakan man mampunyal sumbav pendapulan dnnpada sewaan rumah dengan kadar RMIZDD on Isbulan (Eksmbul IBM-7 Kandungan 5). 32 Melalm Mum Jawapan Rlspanden (Kanuungan 17) Raspondan mensgaskan naham segala pengataanZIakhshq ma1a\uiPernyn\|iarIdalIm Pemenksaan a. bawah subseksyun 30(3) ma SPRM may (Eksh ' M/«wmv Kandungan ay adalah (idsk may, hernia! iuhal dan palsu Iemadap Raspcnden Sehuhungan dengan nu, Respondan lelah membuil sam Iaporan Pans berkailan perksra (arsshut melami Liporan Palis No Repon Prssinl 7/006910/23 benzrikh 21 12023 (Ekshibil IBM-10 Kan-1ungan17> jjjj APW V5; 7 z/zr-13 FAX!’ 11 m my/.A‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 33 Respunaen Iurm me\ampIH<an Sural Akuan sumpan (Eksmbn IEM41 Kundung:n17)As(annya,Fnrah Syuhada emu Mohd vumnzagi menyacakan n rasll jualin kum rays Islevinya Isiah dnkemukakan memlui apllkasi Whiﬂsapp kapada Psglwm SFRM namun, lidak drsiasal laruul oleh pihak SPRM ass‘ Alnun Malllumlh bcriunln llu amunm Awnl plhlk Ruponaon bukllun pomnu-n Alldnvll Pomlnlnlln (K-ndunnbn 3) 34 Mahkamah mm membanarkan pmsk-pmak berhwah man hsrkenaan isu bnnlehan awal (arsabul Mlhkamah man membsnavkan Anaavu Farnbehllan (Kandungln a) talsshm dilemma mas-Ax dun Mahkamsh lalah membenarkan pmak Respandan urI\|uk mammuan emu“ , wapan meraka Kemadau amuavn Kmnungan e Iersebul Mamandnngkan lankh pendengaran parmohnnan Kindungln 1 mgr: lalah dilulapkun paua menu bamahan awal didenqar darn mnamzmak (elah rnemfiﬂkzrv hujuhln berluhs masmw-maxing, Mahkamah was man memnenaman pihalvpihak un\|uk memlanlkan huiahan lambihan masmg-misinq dan selarwlnya lerikh ksyutusan man mcangguhkan ke s 9 2023 as Mahkamah bersetuiu dengan huyahan pihak Pemohon yang meruiuk keneda kepumsan Mahkamah Rayuan dawn kes PF v Kuala Dvmensx Sdn Ehd a. Ors r2o1a]s MLJ 37, “Held, dfslrussmglhs appea/: (4) me Hrgh com judge had erred m nmmg ma PP's mvsshvatmg olrcer gmlly of any supprassron nfsvidenos. Howevsr, (hers was an apparent non-lﬁsdosurs affacls on ms pad. Such non-d1sc.bsurs was lalal la the PP‘: case sine: :1 is We law lhal {arms on the pan ollhe j APW »M» 7 (H123 mm m my/.A‘MawknnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 10 I5 appellant to pm me lull msclosure aoouz me entirety ov ceriam msnm would be /5154 to me» can.‘ as. Walaupun uauam has levsebm konlsks agak berbeza kerana manbslkan kemakzamran [non-drsc/usury] lakla oleh psgawa. penykasal, Mlhkamah mangambd maklum bahawa semua pmax nanman amen palueng umuk mamhual penzahiran pemm (mu mscrosum) Ienlang segala mus mulan blgi permnhonan um Mahkamah Auga mendapali hal \|eIsehul mran suu\|u Vsu lsknikul dan \|idzk akin mempvajudkan mnna-man: pihak Mnka, Mahkemah membenarkin AIv.1avx(FambeKuIIn (Kznaungan a; wink dllanma pakm namun, pmak Respanaen iuga dihanarknn unluk rnaniawab kspada Aﬁdavil Kandungan s lerwhu! dun pmak-pmak iuga mnanarxan unluk msmlallkan huiahan Iambehan btlikulan haw (arsehm Alaun Mnhklmzll Mlmlnnlrlun Punnoholun Plluculllllun Hm. Allh 37 Pmak Femohun dun pihak Resvunden xevan mom bertuhs maswngmasxng sebegalmana dalam Kimiungan ID‘ 11. 14. 15. 21. 22 dan 23. In hujahan 35. Permohanan pihak Pemamn adalah manumc seksyen 41 Akta SPRM sepem yang bevvkul. 'Sekxyen 4\|. Paluclnhakan hunu Jlka Nada pemiakwuun bagl mumu kuulahan. j_ APW ,5; 7 mm .-...c n m my/.A‘MawknnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 5 (I y Jika berkenuan asngan apu-apa hana yang tﬁxiiu di hawah Am iiada Dendakwuun avau sanwan was man: kemmhan di bawah Ana mi. Penoakwa Raye boleh, senemm vamav lempoh Iapan belas bulan aan oauikh penyuaan nu. memohon kepada xeovang Hakim Mahkamoh Sesyen unluk mendapavkan w perinlah bagi pemcuvhakan hana wu ikc duo berpva: nan bahawa nana ivu vewan diperoleh hasil dcnpudc: atau berkawan dengan sualu kesdchcn av bawah Akoa ini. [2] Hakim yang kepadanya pelmohonun dibual aw bawuh subseksyen (1 p hendaldah menyebubkun sumu noﬁs siavkan 1; dakzm wana memcnggﬂ mcmo—manu ovang yang membuav vunvuvan bahawa aia mempunyci kepenﬁngan dalam ham: ivu supaya haair di hcdapan Mahkumah puda suaou rarkn yang ainyavakon dalarn nous nu. unouk menumukkan xeaub mengapa hanu nu ﬁdak pom dﬂucumukkan. 1:7 (3) Jika Hakim yang kepadunyc permohonan cnbuav di bawah subseksven [I J berpua: hali- (a; bahawa harva ‘wu Icﬂah hul pevkava cnau velah dxgunckan comm memkukun xesucnu kesuluhcn oi bawoh Aldo . dan lbjliada pembehan xuci hali dengan baloxan bemovga :5 berkenrmn aengan nana ilu, am hendakrah membuui perinlah bag! pemculhclkan havlc mu. (4) Huvln yang bevkenaan dengannyc hcda permohonan dibual dx buwah subseksyen m henduldoh, apabura vamav pm 1» m mg/.A,MawmnEzzM1IzwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! m 15 m iempoh Vapan belas baron dun Vankh penywaunnyo, dvlepaskan kepudc orang yang duvrpaaanya harla nu disna. “ 39 Maka, berdasarkan subseksyen may \|2rsebu\| Mahkamsh wm nenaaman msmbua! pennum unluk peluculhakln harla alih hanya selelah Mzhkaman nerpuas ham baruwa hana ahh yang memadi sabiek perkara Ielah mgunakan unluk msiakukan kesalahin dw bawah Akla swam Gan bahawa um pembenan sue: hali dengan balasan bemarga berkenaan nana alih bulksnaan. no Manxamn bevaaluiu dangan nwahan pmak Pemohon banawa aaram nan Wm beben yang Imiellk kepada pmak Pemohon adalah aces uasar mmangan ksbarangkallan. Kes PP v Awalluddin Sham Bnkharl (201512 MLJ M71 ymg mpuluskan nleh Mehkemah Favsakuluan dan diru]uk men plhak Femuhan zdalnh barkuﬂan dengan beban pembuk\|Inn nu wllaupun la berkawan iubsaksyan 56(I)Ak1a Fanoegahan Fanggubuhan Wang Haram den Pencagahan Pammay-an Ksgnnasan 2uo1 namun. in amp: amgan subssksyen 4111) Akla swam 2009 luculhak lanpa pendikwaan. yang memmkan parmnhnnan M Semniuinya‘ pmak P21-nnhon ma manuuk kepadu km Mnhd Am Ab Rahman v PP [2021] 1 cm 703 yang YA Noonn Badamddm HMT memmuskan sepen: yang benkm 'p2} Since the seven m Iurteuurs proceedmgs under the AC! mm: to senor: m ram and man is no pmsecultan or L'onvic1ron /or an oifencu Ihs slandnm ofpmofm be applied by Ms court in aevenmnmg wneum ma pvupelties c/amlsd are me subject mmrsr of or was used In me mm M :2 nz/znzz nu is m my/.A‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! m Is m 25 commission of an silence and more Is no parnhssa In good (sun /0: vnluahls cons/deratmn in Iupacl ollhe propsmes :5 on ma balance of pmoanrmiss. ' 42 cmumnuan kuass berkanaan dengan Pmjek Pmyerenggaraan cemn lenebul rnaka, halnau man mempunym kuasa dan n-aux holeh dwkailkan Peguam Responder: msngmanxan bshawa Responder: lidak pemah dengnn panyalahgunann kuasa msmmls den menenma Iasuah. Walau nagaimanapun, Mahkamah mnndapau hal mrsebul buklnlah azm alemen yang perm dibuklikan dalsm uannahannn pemwmakan Am. 43 Mahkamah berseluw dengnn hujahan pmax Pemohon hahawa saksyen 41 Ana spam (arsebu\| marupakan sumu ﬁndakan bsmubung aengan hana. darn bukunlah barhuhung dsngln pandukwaln mans-mana orang karana saksysn msamnzaxas memperun\|ukknn n-many Daluculhakan hens pk: had: sebamg pcndakwaan mm: Maka‘ zdahah mun mﬂarisl ixkahun Responaen ﬁdak msmpunyai sabarang kuasa bcrkluan prmek tevsebul bagx membclehkin beliau merakukm yabalanw saran guns kuasa dan selaniulnya manuma darn menenma msuah Isu ﬂorcngan hukanlah e\emerI yang perm dibukukan dalam peanamnan pehmulhakan um Wilau bagaxmznapun. tenianel cam yang menuruukkun Respcnden mum mempunyai hubungkaul dsnuan projek msenuc malah Rasponden Inga ada mempengertlswkan mesyuaral bsrkawan Pmjsk Fenyelsnogaraan Cemn lsrsebul (Eksh n MAWAJB Kandungan 9 dirmuk) dan van: menunjukknn Syarikal MSB sememangnyi Ks\ah dilanuk sebagai pembekal bahan mckfa/I netting kepada Syankal PUSB sqsk tahun 2013 Perkara ilu helah dapac dibukllkan men pmak Pemehon melalul aﬁdavilaﬂdavxt merek _ APW , ,3: umuzz Page 1:. m /J MawmnEzzM1IzwA «m.T“s£n.‘ nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum W 44. ak Responden selanjulnya msnegaskan bahawa wung RM2:s,uoo,ou yang dlhayar sebagan aupnsu kereu Toyota as Ilu adalsh sebahaglan daﬂpada nusu perquman lempahan kum rays clan man ballau Pihak Pemohnn mempemkaikan kesahman lu:i\|(Eksh\b1t VBM-3 Kandungan 5; yang mun: langan nan trad: parinclan pembualnya Sena wslarl aauponaen um mandepos sabarang smdawl mengenalnya Responder: iuga manegaskan ugnla kelsrangan zuaunauq kspada pxhak SPRM aaalan bavnlm mac, mm mum dipalclyei darn sualu pengimayaan (emaﬂap Rsspendan Sehubungun dangan nu, Rewcnaen adu membual Lapnvan Pans berkenaan Ziakhal\q1EkshIb:l\|BM—I0 Kandungan m. 45 Pnhak Pemohun melalui aifvdavﬂ-aﬁduvnl mereka muuunanyu anuam. aﬁdavul Pegawal Penyiam kas‘ Mohd Akrim hm wan. Anunr mun membenkan peniaiasan berkmsn penylasalan pmak SFRM (amadap Responder: darn Zmkhaluq kerana disyakl -nenenrns suapan wung aanpnaa Eng T19 Km yang merupakln Genaval Manager Sales and Malkahng Syanksl MSE [Aﬁdav\( Peaawai Penyiasax ocanaungan 3) pelenuqan 4 ningga 2s, Anaavn Pemhelulun Pemohon (Kandunam 3) nuvenugan 3 hmgqa 5, Amavn Balasan (Kandungan 9\| paranggin 3 hingga 9 din Aﬁdavil Ba¥asan (Kandungan my peranman 5 adalah dimiuk] 46 Pegawai Fenylasal zuga uuux menmkrirkln a. dalam ammu- amavnnya cenuang has?! suasacan Iamhmarvya yang ielah mbenkan men Z1akhaIwq.Zwau¥had\,Fand Din Hussem (Pegiwai Opsrasi FUSE), Eng Tze Klal (General Manager Sales and Mavkeﬁng Syankal MSB), lsmaﬂ hm Ahmad (pemwhk BSGV)‘ Mohd Nuns bln ALH. Wong Sim Pah (Pengums Kedai CF lmpml Aulo Sdn andman k bank PAxe 17 m my/.qMawmnEzzM1IzwA mu. s.nn nmhnrwm .. u... m may he nrW\ruH\|Y mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-ma! Is 10 15 47. Pmak Pemahon melalun Human Pemohnn ylng Ielah dnfallkan sehagai Kandungan 11 man menyeﬂiakan sualu cans amen hagw manumukkun manoy ball lersebul (ml: :6 Hanna" Pamohnn Kzmdungan m Pnhak Responden yuga zda manyedvakan Carla aumn mereka sepem m pavenggan 19 darn 22 nuyanen Raspnndan (Kandungan 21) as Mahkamah mendapali kelarangan am huku yang auumukam oleh pihak Pemohan adalah lebih barkamungkunan (pmnaore) manunjukknn monny Irarl dunpsda mina wang RM23,0UD.0D Iarsahm mperoxon Esvdasnrkln hlsv! slzsalan dan aﬁduvilalwdnvn yang lelah dnfullkun Muhkamah memapan wardens! money trad y-lug ‘alas hagl menumukkan bahawa wing aM2a,oon DD(1ai(u nmzaoo no mbnyarsebagei booking fees pad: 25.1.2021 din RM21mo an yang man V2Z\|721j yang halah dwgunikan ulah Raspondan bIgA mambayar deposil bagi uembehan kerels Tuyala as An man dlnsmleh danpidi man suapan wang lunav RM55.noo no nanpaaa Syariknl MSB rnalalm Eng Tu Kin. Mahkamah selervsnya msndapuu parcampunn RM23,0D0 on Iersehul dungan wang hasvl lain sebagaimana yang mlegaskan den amuyankan ulell pmak Respunden‘ unluk ya! paﬂa nsda Isu wang 49 Mahkamah juga mendapah kelavangan Zrakhahq samasa siasalnn adaran kansmen dsngan katerangan saks' saksl lain dan jugs segala keterangan dokumeman yang man dueksmbixkan. Mahkamah mendapau max mmbul 1su kelerangan lambnhan Zxakhaliq yang drrekodkan pada 10.6.2023 adalah suauu psmlkiran terkemudnan (anenhougm) ksrana sebelum dam lankh lsrsehul law dan sepaniang slisalan Zxakhalwq Ielah APwA5¢1z«n/2023 mu» m m.u.mwm..zzzM:.m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! m 15 in 15 m manyalakan wang RM23,00D no yang diambil daripada akaun - . nya, Znlumadl ada\ah wnng rasuah daripada Eng Tze Km so Selmqulnya. Muhkamah mendapuh dmam ha! in: plhak Resnonden le\ah gagal unluk membukliksn ballawa pembnyaran wang daposﬂ kevala Toyota as nammuamuamangnn sum ham dengan hmasan bemarga. Dalam nal ini Mahkamah memapau ﬂkapun berm (erdupm wang nasn aanpuaa penjualan mm mya Aarnbuh pthak Ruponden masm gagal umuk mamhukukin bshawa wang Xarsebul xelln digunakan unluk membaysr deposﬂ karaha Toyota as teraebut. 51 Tiada amsan kukuh dinyalakan nlah Respundln kenaua bahau sanum Iidak boleh Dank-In depcsil kerena xepaaa vihak CF Impon Auk: sen and‘ me\amkIn menyaiskun blhau lidzk mempunyax mlla unluk benlom Mahkamah bersempu zsangan hujahln pihak Pamnhnn anlara lainnys bahawa agak ﬁdak munasaban unluk Responden menuma salu pihak Vain membuat pembayaran bagx pmaknya ala: alasan Respnnden bdik mempunym masa Mahksmsh Dercayz dan menalmbﬂ maklum hahawa urusan pelbankan atas lalian pads mass kim adalah amu\| mudsh unluk dilskuken dan mak akan mengambil masa Sehubungan dsngan ilu‘ pernyalian bahawa Zxakhaliq bermal;aI1a\|dan membual pengalain pabu dsngan menyuluh Zwaurhadi yang melakukan pembayaran adalah plda henna! Mahkamah im ndak berasas. 52. Esrdasarkan segala aﬁdavil hasn swasalan dan termasuklah pemyataarwsmyavaan panama-panama berkenaan kepadn plhak SPRM. Mahkamah mendapau pmak Pemnhon lelah beuaya membu um mm/zm m my/.A‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! m 1; m 15 mvhangan Kebarangkalian hahnwa wang bevkenaan aa-Ian hana am. mg xeran dlnarzﬂeh hull dsripada alau berkanlan dengan sualu ketalahan memlnla den mensnma rasuah‘ mu suam kesalahan di bawah seksyen16 ma span 2009 warsebul dan Had: sebavang pembellnn sue» mu dengan balasan bemarga \|:lah amuen berkanan kerels Toyota ea Ievsebul. 53. Plhak Pemohon man melahﬂ Wana Karajazn Persekuluan hemomhm 9991 berllrikh mm: April 2:123 menylaman Nolis kapada Orang yang Earkapermngan, saiaras dangnn pemnlukan suhssksyen 4112) Ak\|a spam zone Nermm. Mada pihak barkepenlmgun yang hum! bag: msnumul mahupun memiailkan ans-apa mam 54 aemasaman alasan»a\asan yang lslah dirvyatakan kspulusan Mahkamah membenarkan permohonan pihak Pzndakwaan un\|uk peluwlhakan harlz allh kereia Toynlz as lensehul nemasarkan suhseksyen 41(3) Am spam 2009 Iersebul adalah am den wajar. Esrlarikh 29 Novamberzoza «ﬂ ,. <»@;:Lm~W ‘ Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Mahkamah Sesyen (Jenayah 9\| Kuah Lumpur u: w.\ wsz an/202: Vine as: m my/.A‘MawknnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! w is m 15 Panyampalan Isiah dilanlkan sebngal Kandungan 5 Pmak Pemohon kemudiannya lelah memlauikan Aﬁdavn Pembelulan (Knndunmn a) ham mambe1u\ksn parenggan 25, 27 ﬂan za Aﬂdavlt Sakongan Fegawai Fanyizsal (Kandungan 3;. Peguam Rnpmuan tsiah mambArIgki\|kan bnnlnhan Iwel leniang panenmaan Kandungan a lersebul Ksdun-dua pmak man bemujan secara hsan Mahkamah in: telah mermlak banlahan awal peguum Raspundan am man mambaﬂ pelunng kapade pmak Raspundan un\|uk menjawab kapada Kandungan A nmehm damn kaamxan kapada mm pihak Pmlk Femohon Jugu msmlavlkan Ana.»/1\| Baluan (Kandungan 9) Dam menjawnh kepaﬂa Aﬂdavil Jawupan Raipundsn (Kandungan 5). e. Bardasarkan Kandurvgan 3 siasalan mendapan bahawa Kamanlerian Kewangin Manaysia Ielah melantik Syar1'ka( Pmms Ulama Sdn and (selapas 1m mnuuk sebagw ‘PUSB') xehagar syarikll kanseu atan kanlrukwr mama bagi Prozek Penyelanggaraan Oerun d1Ja!an Persekuluan dan Ja\an Negsri Semenaniung Maruysu melalui Knmrak Janaka Masa Paniang mu\aI(ahur1 2017 (selepas ini diruiuk sebagal ‘Prnpek Fenyelanggarain csmnw PUSE le\ah dlawadkan Fmjak Penyelenggaraan Cerun Ievsebu\| mulm 1 11 2017 semngga cempah Iambuhan lamat pada 11 1.2023 susanan iuga mendapall ballawa Syarikal Maoca1erri(Ma\ays\|a)Sdr1 Bhd(se\|epasm1dnnquk sebagai ‘M551 adalah mempakan pemheka! pwduk-produk penoeganan oerun rumuh Yang Iennas-man pmduk rackfall neumg baa: Prmek Ini sejak tahun 2on3. APWAM uuz/zm »-...2 m my/.A‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. s.n.1...m.m111... LAIQ4 w my .. mmuy mm: dnuumnl VII .mm v-max 5 may pmsk Psndakwaan — Fn Nurul Auqah hirm Muhammad Ahas, Tunbalan Pendakwa Rays. Eahagnan Pzrundangan dan Pendskwaan, Suruhaniaya Fenoegahan Rzsuah, Wﬂayah Persakuluan Puuqaya. Bag! pmak Responder: — En Mahd Azah hm xoramm (Daldsuhanm bin 19 Immm bevsamanya) danpada T9\|uan Hamdan Fania 5 AssocIa\|es, Damansara Damai. Palahng, sewangor nwu. azoz/zuzx x>.u.zu sm mg/.A‘MawknnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 5 m 15 25 7. Snasalan selaruulnyn mendapall oanawa Responder: mempakan pegawax Jurulera Awem Grad JA48 dim benugas Senegal Kelua unnm Uni\| Panama, Eahagwan Kzselumman Cerun‘ lbupejahat JKR mulal FeI7mar\ zozn mngga Jun 2021 Respundan Iarlibal am damn penuaian anallsa 1\| ko camn uan Iurul barparanan ssnagai Pengemsl bag! mesyuaral Fembenlingan Rakabenluk Knnsep Pembalknn Cerun bagi manenlukan konsap den kuedsh pambawkan oenm berkauan Fmek ml. Mohd Zwakhahq bm Mohd Zamam pm: msmpakan pegawll Jurulam Awam area JAM an urul ynng uama dengun Ruponden (121: (mm dnambH luelevangannya alah p Ik spam 5. Pamnhon was menyulakun bahawa m masalun memks msndapali cemap-x D-ersaiujuun secara um anlara Eng Yzu Km (General Mnnngar Sales and Marketing Syinkzl Msapae-mu Responden dnn Mona Zxakhaliq umuk Eng Tze Kla\| member! rasuah kapada Ruspnndan dun Mend zaunavq dengan kadar Ma: rasuah time on ham semap main! Derscg: produk rockfellneﬂmv yang pemah dtbekalkin olsh MSE kspadl FUSE xahalum mi supiya MSB kekm memam pembekil produk Iersehu\| Bervasirkan keierangin Kelua Psgawai Opnfasv FUSE‘ Fand bin Hussein mangesahkan baham Responder: Isiah manuarahknn PUSB melammya umuk mombeﬁ produk rockiaﬂ netting hanys danpada MSB berkenan Pmjak Rekubenluk Knnsep Pen-baman Cemn hersebul. 9 MSE Ialah membekalkan proﬂuk mckfa//nemrry kepads PUSB dalzm (ahun 2n2u belkailan due Amhan Keri: IAKKDKC JKRICKC/B27/202U/117 & JKRICKC/szmnzo/5) dan Cawangan Keselamanan cemn, Vhupejabal JKR bag: Prujek lsosehul MSB kemumannya cerah menyeuuakan dua Tax /\I>w,\.s: :2 oz/mu mu m my/.A‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! m 1: 10 15 Irwarco benarikh 8.12 2020 Bag pembekalan mcH5// nenmg yang masing- masmg barjumlah RM285‘ODI 20 can RM194. 31900 (Ekmim MAWA-3 dun MAWA-4 dalam Knnaungen 9) Slasalan juga unendnpan pmauk lersabm dmekalkan bagi Rock srapo Protect/on at Laluan FTUJ6 Seksyen 75 555 Jelan Anng-Tasik KenyIv—KuaIa Jsnens, Daerah Hulu Tersrvgganu, Telengganu dan mpengamsiknn oleh Respcnden dalzm Mesyunral Fembantangun Rekabamuk Knnsap Fsmb an Cenm bersama PLISB (Ekshihil MAWA-13, Kandungan 9) 10 Zrakhullq unluk mancan salu aksun bank yang mien menempﬂknn mm penmyavan msuah dnnplde Eng Tze Knn. Zlakhallq kamudilnnya leiah memin!akawannya,No1is burn an urvtuk membanken mlk\|uma( ukuun Bank Islam mi syarikal a.1 Gelrulang venwre(a1svnnagnu.unn unebux. Nuris lelah membenkan numbnr akaun Eank mam 09010010081253 kepndi Zuakhaluq. Berdlsarkan kalarlngan zuaknnnq‘ Rasponden man mermnla 11. Snasatan pmnk Pemonon mendapilv Eng Tze Kiac \|elan menerima psmbayaran dlnuada FUSE dan Eng T12 Kial (elah memasukkan wanq seiunﬂah RM55‘500.00 danpada akaun Maynank m k MSB ks nkaun Bank \|5\am mink EJGV pada 11122020 (Eksnmu MAwA—7. Kandungan 3). Terdapal Juga sa\|u Invuis BJGV keoaa: MSE hagi manunnu bayaran ‘la prawde site Iechmcal ass/stance at F155 Seksyen 101 B80’ dun ‘lo pmvids srta tscnnica/assystance a1 Frose Saksyun 75 568' beriumlah RM55,ooo.o0 dan RMaa,nuo no maxing-maswg \|Ekshvb\l MAWA-5, Kandungan 3;. jn _. AYWA— V32 rn/znzz Van-S m my/.qMawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. snnnw ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w my n. .mmn.u-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 12. wa1au 1>aga.-nanapun, nasn slnsalan msndapali ausv dan MSE sabennmya xidak psmah mempunyai sebarang ummlega kzagi pmjek 534311-vk\an Kelerangln daripada Eng Tze 1<.a1 dan lsmall n1n Ahrnad (pemwik hmggal mew mengesahkan bahawa Eksmbn MAWA-5 uecah dmsdmkan ouen Eng Tze KIa\| bagi membolahkan pmses psmbuyaran wang rawah danpudn MSE kepada Raspandan malalm mun syanka\| mIHk IsmIH 15110 nkaun Eank man. bemombar 0901001005125: Eng Tza Klal \|elah mamparollh mIkl1m1aIEJGV Gan number akaun mev ﬂanpadi Ziakhaliq. 13 Slasman pmak Psnmnon mg: mandzpaln wsng RM5§.§0D 00 mevuvakan wung rauulh kspada Responden nun Zmkhahq malalul akaun bank BJGV blvdalarkan perklrasn bulir meta! penegw ranu 2250 ma\|er penegi(Eksh1bn MAWA-3) dan bum 3300 metnv parsagi(Eksh1b\lMAWA- 4) maslng-«lasing dldarzb dengln RM1o.0o mater peuew. 14 Selaniulrvyi. berdasarkun kalcrangzn Maris darn lsma1I. pihak Pemohan msndapali paaa 14.122020 Nuns lalsh mengavahkan lsrvlaﬂ unhlk mengs1uur1<:n dua nek mum am nama Zu\krf\|1 b1n An-ma (oak no. 972955 berjwnan RM 27,750.00 dan cek no 972957 tmjumlan RM27,750 00) Ksdua cek 1e1ah ﬂllunllkan uleh Zulkilli dun warvg lunai RM55,5o0 00 man dlsershkan kepada Non: d1 rumahnyz 15 Padz 16.12.2020 Ziakllahq lelah mengarahkan Noris umuk rnemasukkan wang RMSDODDU ks damn aknun Maynank bemombor 162254797659 mmk adiknya. Mohd Znsulhadi bm Muhd zamam maulnadi) Nons celan mendahulukan wsng RM50oo.ou lersebul danpada skaunnya send akaun Hong Lecng Bank nu 110010113502) ks akaun aulnam _ A1>w 76; V /2011 Pans m my/.1‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. s.n.1...n.m111... 0... 1. my 1... 01111.11-y mm: dnuumnl VII .r1uNG M1 m 15 m 15 secara anlma Iranslar [3365 mm yang sama (sannan penyala akaun Hang Leong mmx Non: — Emma MAWA-VD‘ Ksndungan 3 dnujuk) 15 Kemudlarmya paua 21.2021 mengaaankan harmwa Nari; man mengarahkan zumm unluk memasukkan Wang \|unaI Rmzomo on kc auun Maynank mmx Zuulhadn yang sama uan teluh dilakukun secure Cash Dopastt Machms sabanyak um knh uanaaks. sebenyak nmsoun nu. maaoo no den Rwzoa on sebagalmana Emmi: MAWA-9, Kandungan 3 kanarangan Mons ﬂan zmkim 17 Berdaaerkan kderangan Zlakhaﬁq. bellau xe\ah mangalahkan Zllulhadv unluk memlndahkan nmsaou on (Ekth MAWA-10 Kandungen 3) darlpadu akiun Ziaulhndl kn akaun man zmkmnq, Darwa Abdollah dangan sebngai ‘yuran ukmah‘ Ztakhllwa mengesahkan Darwani Aqwlm «swan mengeluarkan wan; (unai msooo an den menyerahkan RM35l)U.00 kanadanyi qwun nun a-cavankan 13. Pads 251 2021 Responder: aan zmknaliq (e\ah perm ks may CF rmpurmmo Sdn and m’ LOMDZ, 5 V. Milcs‘ Ja\an Kelnng Lama‘ saouo Kua\a Lumpur dan Responder: Ie\ah berseluju umuk msmbeh sabuah karaca Tnynta as dengan havga iuaxan sebanyak RM17l),0ﬂ0 no Panwms kedal lenssbul Wang Sim Pan menyataksn RM2DDO on peﬂu dnbayar sebagai bookfny fees. ziakhaliqcexan membayariumlah RM2nu0 no lersebutsecara lunax danpada jumlah RM35D0O0 yang Ielah msershkan kspadanya lerdahulu. Sesalinan o/rem Receipt danpsda cs Vmpcrl mkemukakan sehagaw Ekshlbn MAWM2 Kandunqan a mu mz In/znzz mu m my/.A‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. saw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-max 5 n 15 10 25 19 Memuut kslevangan Wang stm Pan‘ Respartden perm membayar deposll sehanyak RM17,ooo no tattu 10% danpada RMWL1000 on hzrga jualan kerela Toyota Bﬁlersabuldan baktnya akan dlbayar matatui ptrusman bank watau blgstmanapunt Rasportdsn hanya neqaya mendapalkelulusart pmtaman hank sehanyak nMt47,non.au mska, partu mentbayar deposi\| sehartyak RM23,0D0.D0 212. Bertkulan ttu, peas 1 2 21:21 Rssponden Ialah rnangarahkart Ztakhalvq unluk mamnsukkan RM21,ncu 00 ka uatam akaun Public Bunk Eamad na 3195479909 rmltk cr Import Auto San arm. Fads hari yang samit Ziakhahq tatart mengarshkan Ziaulhadi ttn\|uk memasukkan RM21,oon.oo kn akaun or Import Auto sun BM 21. Si:sa\|an pthnk Plmuhon mendnpiﬂ Zilulhadt tarah memtndahkan RM11,nao no kc aatam akaurt Publtc Bank aamad nllhk CF Auto Import Sdn aha tenamtt [13:13 1 2 202\|1s9saItnart Psrtyali Msybank samaa alas mm: Muhd Ziaulhadt mu Mnhd Zamani berfartkh 31.3 2021 — Exsntbn MAWA-11 Kandungan 3 diruiuk) Selerusrtyat ziautnam lelah memhua1\|uiuh(nInsskst numtan RM1o.onn no juga pads 1.2 2021 (iattu 6 lransakst pengeluaran nmai nequmtart Rmtsoo no ssﬁap satu dart 1 Ivansaksl pengetuaran hmm benumlah Rwoao out (Ekshtbtt MAWA-13 Ksndungan 3) nsngeluaran secara tu 22 setanjttznya stasa1an pthak Pemcnnn mendapan ztaumaat telah memasukkan setumlah Rmsoo an den RM5.5oc D0 semra Cash Deposrt Machine ks dalam akaun Public Bank Eemad m tk or Auto Import Sdn Bhd lersebut pada hari yang same, 1 2 2o21(Eksn bn MAWA A Kanaungan 3 AF WA usz M/201: Pan R m my/.ttMaWh1smEzzM1IzwA «mu 5.1.1 nuvthnrwm .. u... m my 1... 11111.1-1 mm: dnuuvtnnl VII mum v-mat s m :5 23 Plhak cr Auto lmpcrlsdn am mun mengelualkan salu mu bevkaﬂan pamblyavan Rmzmou no WU kapada Responder: pada 9 2 202: sesaunan penynla Public Bank aemau no 3193479905 alas nama cs Autu Vmpon Sdn Bhd bertankh 2s.2.2u2c dun 0lIlcIalRtcerpl Na 4215 aunpaaa or auto Impon Sdn Bhd hennrikh 9.2.2021 \|elah dlkemukakan sebagal eusmcn MAWA-I4 Kendungan 3 24 sewanmnya, slasalan pmak Pamnhnn mendapam kemla puns Toyota as bemnmbor psndlﬂarzn \/FT as xelan amanaman Silil Farvulnkan Kundevaan a\|a: name Rsspondan. Sasallnnu sun Pemi kan Kandsraan JPJ (arsabu\|, Parakusn Saksyen 9uA Akla Ka\|erangnn 1950 dan Mak\uma\| Tlrperm endeman can Insuvlns hag: knula Iersebm (alah mkamuxakm sahagal Eknhum MAWA-I5 Kundungen 3. 25. Hasll suaulan pmak Pamahcn manaapani Wang Iunai RMZDUO so darn RM21‘UDU oa yang celan dvbayar kanada pmak CF Import Auln Sdn arm psda 251 2022 dsn 1 2 mn uembux ada\ah dlpercleh duripada peammaan Rsspanden dan pemberian rasuah danpada Eng Tza Kxa\| 25 Bcrlamulan daripada nu. pan: 8.2 2n22 sus\|u penywaan hana alih d1 bawah seksysn :3 ma SFRM 2009 \|eIah di\|aksanakan\|em.Idapkem1eraan Toyooa as bemcrnhor pervdaﬂavan VFT B6 «ersemn Sesalinan Pannlah Fenyilaan Hana Alih dx bamh seksyen 33 Am SPRM 2009 Ieiah dvkemukakan sebagax Eksnim MAWA-16 dalam Kandungan 3. 27 Setelah menelm kertas siasalan pmawemohon memuluskan bahawa nada Dendakwaan mbuat (emadap Respcnﬂen alas mana mana kesalahan j_jj: nw , —3z mm: Page? m my/.A‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! In 1; 15 3:1 m bawah Ana SPRM 2009 bemubung dengan hsna alm yang lelah aims. Walau uagaxmunupun, pmak Pervdakwazn berpuas nan bahawa nasu slasauan mendapall nnna sum yang d\sﬂa Ielih dipemleh hasll daﬂpada alau berkaﬂan dengan suam kesuuman di bawah seksyan 15 Am SPRM 2009. .1-w-pan plhak Rnponacn 2a (Ksndungan 5) untuk marqawab permohonan pmak Femohon yang Pmnk Rupnndan wan memlsnlkan Amavw Jswap-an Responder! dukrarﬁan cleh Raspanﬂen, rzwan an Masmm yang dukrarkan pnda 9.5 2:123. Sehnwlnys. mepas Mahklmeh mannluk oanvahan awal pihak Rasponden berkallan Aﬁdavul Kandungan 9, pmak Raspnnden leleh memiailkan Aﬁdsvil Juwavan Rssponden (Kandungnn 11) yang lelah dhkrarkun pad: 5 s 202:: 29 Memui Kandungan 6 Responder: sacara dlsamya manaﬁluan segala pervgalaan dan ankw.-an dx damm aﬁdavil uihak Psmehon Reswrmen menaﬁkan penghbalannya dalum Fvqsk Fenyelonggavaan Cenm yang lenebut Respanaen msnagaskan penurunan kuasa sebngal Pangamm hagi Mesyuaral Pumbenlenaan Rakabenluk Komep Pambaikan Csnm hanya mbenkan kepada Kama Bahngxan Kawe\ama\|an cemn, En Hahm bin Mad Daud R=spanden was \|s\aVI diarahkan membua\| sura\| berkenaan penggunaan bahan binaan bukanlah hanya daripada Syankat M55 sahais dan syarikal periulah Dsrdaﬂar denuan Road Matenal Approved List 1Els>ubil VBM-2. Kandlmgan 6). Bahan mnaan yang handak mgunakan iuqa perm mendapal kelulusan danpada Pm/scf nmru mm Pengarah Cawangan Kemrulerzan Cerun. Tn M? w 54-32-an/2nz3 Page m m my/.A‘MawmnEzzM1IzwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm!	2,771	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
22NCVC-60-10/2016	PLAINTIF GEONEX (M) SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) BAYU MINING SDN BHD 2. ) OTHAMAN BIN ABDUL RAHMAN 3. ) MOHD SABRI BIN AZIZ	The Plaintiffs in this suit has filed Enclosure 1 and the Court allowed the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants for the specific performance of the said implied contract between the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant with cost amounting to RM150,000.00. Though there is no written contract between Plaintiff and D1, this court agrees that there is an implied contract between them. The presence of the implied contract was also further confirmed by the admission of the Defendants themselves in their Defence and Counterclaim. The Defendants are not simple Kampung folks. They understood the terms and agreement in the implied contract thus they should be held legally binding over the contract. Thus, the court has ordered for the specific performance of the implied contract.	30/11/2023	YA Dato' Haji Zainal Azman Bin Ab. Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=820736de-861d-4e7b-9772-1eba49c30f1f&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUANTAN IN THE STATE OF PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR CIVIL SUIT NO: 22NCVC-60-10/2016 BETWEEN GEONEX (M) SDN BHD …PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO : 965183-H) AND 1. BAYU MINING SDN BHD (COMPANY NO :921300-H) 2. OTHAMAN BIN ABDUL RAHMAN (NRIC NO : 721027-06-5075) 3. MOHD SABRI BIN AZIZ (NRIC NO : 650420-06-5455) …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT INTRODUCTION 1. The Plaintiffs in this suit has filed Enclosure 1. This Court allowed the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants for the specific 2 performance of the said implied contract between the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant with cost amounting to RM150,000.00. MATERIAL FACT OF THE CASE 2. The Plaintiff in this suit is a private limited company. The 1st Defendant (D1) is also a private limited company, the 2nd Defendant (D2) and the 3rd Defendant (D3) are the directors of D1. 3. Sometime in 2007, the State Government of Pahang issued a Prospecting License over a mining land (“The Mining Land”) vide a license dated 12.4.2007 to 3 individuals namely D2 and D3 and Mat Nawi Bin Hamat. 4. Via a contract dated 30.11.2010, D2 and D3 entered into a Mining Agreement (“agreement dated 30.11.2010”) with a company known as Cheroh Mining Sdn Bhd (“Cheroh Mining”). It was mentioned in the agreement that D1 would be the Licensee of the mining lease and a Power of Attorney dated 30.11.2010 was issued by D1 in favour of Cheroh Mining. 3 5. Vide letter dated 17.1.2011, Messrs. Sharif Ridzuan & Co was appointed by D2 and D3 to receive on behalf and pay the tributes in equal sum of 25% to D2, D3, Zainab Binti Jusoh and Mahmud Bin Abd Rahman. 6. On 18.10.2012, Plaintiff was appointed by Cheroh Mining to be the miners of the said Mining Land provided that Plaintiff pays RM275,000.00 as booking fee. On 8.10.2012, Plaintiff paid the sum of RM275,000.00 to Cheroh Mining. On 7.12.2012, the Plaintiff’s then solicitors Messrs Fatin & Zaharman paid the sum of RM825,000.00 to Cheroh Mining as a deposit upon completion of the feasibility study. 7. Cheroh Mining then entered into a mining agreement with the Plaintiff in which D1 endorsed its consent on the same. There is a Power of Attorney dated 13.12.2012 (“the Mining Agreement”) from Cheroh Mining in favour of the Plaintiff. 8. In order to assist the Defendants towards the issuance of the Mining License, it was impliedly agreed by the Plaintiff and D1 on a certain term (“the said contract”). Some of the terms agreed 4 upon is that in consideration of the Plaintiff paying agreed tribute sums to the D1, through the D1 solicitors, Messrs. Sharif Ridzuan & Co, the D1 would appoint the Plaintiff to carry out its mining activity as a miner, lawfully on the mining land including but not limited to setting up a plant, work on the mine, extract and sell the iron ore. 9. On 9.6.2014 and 29.8.2014 both the Mining License (“ML”) and Operating Mining Scheme (“OMS”) were issued respectively on the favor of the D1. 10. The Plaintiff in reliance to the said contract, has made payments of tributes to the D1 through Messrs. Sharif Ridzuan & Co, even though no sale of any mineral from the mining land has been made. 11. The Plaintiff in this suit claims that they have made a payment for the total sum of RM6,125,000.00 between 8.10.2012 and July 2016 to Cheroh Mining and the D1 via the solicitors Messrs. Sharif Ridzuan & Co. 5 12. The Plaintiff has proceeded to organize the mining area, set up the plant and equipment needed to carry out the mining work of extracting and processing the iron ore for sale. All ores mined and processed were kept as a stockpile because the Plaintiff was unable to market it until the ML was renewed and the Form 13D was issued by the appropriate authority. 13. On 21.9.2016 and 28.9.2016, D1 and D2 trough their firm of solicitors known as Messrs. Andrew David Wong & Ong sent letters terminating the agreement with Cheroh Mining thus the agreement between Plaintiff and Cheroh Mining dated 31.12.2012 is also terminated. D1 has also demanded that the Plaintiff handover vacant possession of the mining area. 14. The Plaintiff in this suit contended that there was an independent contract between the Plaintiff and D1 i.e. the said contract, which arises after the contract dated 31.12.2012. The Plaintiff also contends that they had complied with covenants and obligations thus they would not vacate the mining area. 6 15. Plaintiff has pleaded that D1 has done anticipatory breach to the said contract when on several occasions D1 has tried to prohibit Plaintiff from entering the mining land by lodging a police report against Plaintiff and has changing the padlocks to the mining area to prevent Plaintiff from entering. D1 still insisted to not continue with the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff was asked to vacate the mining land. Thus, this suit was filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendants to seek reliefs from the Defendants. MAIN ISSUES TO BE TRIED Is there a contract between the Plaintiff and D1? 16. The main issue that must be determined forehand is whether is there is a contract between Plaintiff and D1. Though there is no written contract between Plaintiff and D1, this court agrees that there is an implied contract between them. 17. This is because, Plaintiff has acted upon reliance to the terms in the implied contract. Plaintiff have set up a plant, and has also worked on the mine to extract tons of iron ore to be marketed. 7 18. The presence of the implied contract was also further confirmed by the admission of the Defendants themselves in their Defence and Counterclaim. Whereby on several paragraphs the Defendants has pleaded the presence of an implied agreement which is the said contract. 19. Since is a common rule that parties are bound by their pleadings, therefore it is not a doubt anymore that the said contract is present and binds both the Plaintiff and D1. 20. When there is a legally binding implied agreement between the parties, this court has a duty to uphold the terms that has been agreed upon. Whether there is tribute sum paid by the Plaintiff to D1 in accordance to the said contract? Has Plaintiff breached any terms of the contract that causes it to be terminated? 21. This court is of the view that at all material times the Plaintiff have worked on their end to perform the obligation under the said contract. Whereby the Plaintiff have started to work on the mining land after tributes relevant tributes were paid to D1. 8 22. It is submitted via letter dated 17.2.2011 that D2 and D3 has irrevocably appointed Messrs. Sharif Ridzuan & Co to receive the tributes and pay the same equal 25% to all the directors of D1, SP2 has confirmed this by saying that his firm received the payment of the tributes from the Plaintiff and SP2 also confirmed that all the directors of D1 has received the monies paid by Plaintiff. 23. This court is of the view that, all the parties in this suit are aware that Plaintiff have forwarded a certain amount of tribute as per agreed although no iron ore that was mine has been sold till date. 24. If the Defendants did not receive any sum of tribute, it is absurd that the Plaintiff was given the vacant possession for several years to do the mining work without anything in return. 25. This this court is of the view that the Plaintiff in this suit has complied to the said agreement by forwarding the agreed tributes and at the same time has done all the mining work in the mining land. 9 26. The Defendants on their end has sent two letters to terminate their Mining Agreement with Cheroh Mining consequently the Mining Agreement dated 13.12.2012 shall cease to have effect and Plaintiff to give vacant possession of the mining land. 27. The basis of the termination letter that was the Defendants did not receive RM440,000.00 advance payment and the monthly tribute of RM75,000.00 as per the Mining Agreement. 28. This court is agreeable with the Plaintiff’s view that as per the agreement dated 30.11.2010, the payments of the tribute as per clause 6.1 are supposedly to be only paid on 12.1.2015. 29. But the D1’s directors have already received the sum of RM2,417,200.00 in advance which is inconsistent to the payment terms of the Mining Agreement. The Defendants also admitted that the Directors of D1 received the tribute beginning in Year 2011. 30. If the Defendants are insisting that the payment terms should follow the terms agreed upon in the Mining Agreement, the Defendants should not have received the monies paid by the 10 Plaintiff since 2011. By way of conduct of the parties, it is clear that the parties have elected to not follow the payment terms stated under the Mining Agreement. 31. It is unfair to the Plaintiff, if the Defendant later on issue termination notices to Plaintiff and Cheroh Mining because the payments terms in the Mining Agreement are not followed when they themselves have acted outside of the agreed payment terms. Thus, it could be concluded that the termination notice itself was invalid. 32. This Court is of the view that, the Plaintiff in this suit has been able to proof to this court on the balance of probabilities that the D1 and D2’s termination notice of the Mining Agreement is indeed invalid and wrongful. This is because, the Defendant’s based their termination notices on clauses which they themselves has failed to follow. The Plaintiff has also been able to proof to this court that tributes has been paid and the Defendants has also admitted to this fact (paragraph 16(d) of Defence and Counterclaim. 11 33. This court believes that there is no breach of the Mining Agreement by the Plaintiff that would cause the Defendants to terminate the Agreement. 34. Since the Plaintiff did not breach any apparent terms in the Mining Agreement, the act of the Defendants disallowing the Plaintiff to occupy the mining land and work on the mine definitely unjust. 35. After receiving the advanced tribute by the Plaintiff and later stopping the Plaintiff from continuing the works in the mining land is a clear and unjust enrichment to the Defendants. Does the Defendants have a valid defence and counterclaim? 36. Throughout the trial process of this case, the Defence counsel have tried to portray D2 and D3 as simple Kampung Folks thus all the payments and accounts are made through their former lawyer Messrs. Sharif Ridzuan & Co and not directly to them. 37. This Court is of the view that both D2 and D3 are not simple kampong folks because both of them are educated and holds high positions in career wise. It is impossible for a simple kampong folk 12 to be able to understand how mining business works and what deals shall be made to obtain profits. 38. Furthermore, D2 is a village head and the late Mat Nawi was a Deputy District Officer and D3 is an officer in the Home Ministry. During the trial D2 himself has stated that they applied for the Mining License with the aid of YB Dato’ Menawar Abdul Jalil. A simple kampong folk would not have the capabilities to get direct aid from well known people. 39. This court is of the view that the Defendants are trying to portray D2 and D3 as simple kampong folks to wiggle their way out from this suit that has been filed against them. 40. The D2 and D3 being a simple kampong folk or not, they still understood the agreement that they entered with the Plaintiff and Cheroh Mining. As a result, they have tried to enforce their rights under the Mining Agreement. It clearly shows that at all material times they were aware of the transactions and agreements that they have entered. 13 41. This Court is convinced by the witness Mr. Sivakumar that the payments of tributes are clearly made to Dato’ Ridzuan from Messrs. Sharif Ridzuan & Co. This was further confirmed when Dato’ Ridzuan gave evidence that the Plaintiff has indeed paid the requisite tributes as per the agreement to him. He also admitted that he paid the monies received from the Plaintiff to the respective Directors of D1. 42. The issue, whether the tributes was or was not received by the directors of D1 shall not be directed to the Plaintiff, as the Plaintiff has clearly obliged to the terms in the Mining Agreement by paying advance tributes. 43. Besides that, the Defendants in this suit has also failed to adduce strong evidence to proof to this court that their have a valid counterclaim against the Plaintiff. 44. Their defence is almost like an afterthought because it was not supported by strong evidence and the witnesses themselves have failed to convince this court on the basis of their counterclaim. This court agrees with the Plaintiff that, the Defendants had 14 contradictions in their Defence and counterclaim which is clearly very ambiguous to this court. CONCLUSION 45. Thus, this Court has decided for the specific performance of the said contract between Plaintiff and D1. -signed- ZAINAL AZMAN BIN AB AZIZ JUDGE HIGH COURT MALAYA OF KUANTAN PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR DATED : 30 NOVEMBER 2023 Plaintiff Solicitors: Mr. S. Ravichandran together with Mrs Elina Teng Tetuan Seah Balan Ravi & Co Unit A, 3rd Floor, Wisma 1 Alliance No. 1 Lorong Kasawari 4B Taman Eng Ann, 41150 Klang, Selangor Ref. : SBR/28522/22-04/SR(KS) Emel : [email protected] 15 Defendant’s Solicitors: Dato’ RK Nathan together with Mr. Toh Hong Seng (Pupils in Chamber) Tetuan Vinod Kamalanathan & Associates Suite 501, 5th Floor, Loke Yew Building 4 Jalan Mahkamah Persekutuan 50500 Kuala Lumpur Ref. : VKA/L/2029/BAYUMINING/2016/es Emel : [email protected]	14,341	Tika 2.6.0
22NCVC-510-07/2013	PLAINTIF PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN 3 TWO SQUARE DEFENDAN 3 TWO SQUARE SDN BHD	Claim for Maintenance and Sinking Fund Charges - Is the car park business being operated by the Defendant on accessory parcels, illegal pursuant to Sections 4, 34 (2) and 69 of the Strata Titles Act, 1985? - Did the Defendant breach the planning permission granted by MBPJ when it had accessorized all the car parks in 3 TWO SQUARE SDN BHD to the Penthouse? - Did the Defendant breach the planning permission granted by MBPJ when it did not provide visitor car parks at 3 TWO SQUARE SDN BHD? - Does it make a difference to the application of Sections 4, 34(2) and 69 of the Strata Titles Act, 1985 that 3 TWO SQUARE SDN BHD is a commercial development? - The Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs - The Defendant’s counter-claim is allowed with costs.	30/11/2023	YA Dato' Gunalan A/L Muniandy	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=55eaff11-f808-47fd-8841-c76f3dabb2ee&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO.: 22NCVC-510-07/2013 CONSOLIDATED WITH CIVIL SUIT NO.: 22NCVC-516-07/2013 BETWEEN PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN 3 TWO SQUARE …APPELLANT AND 3 TWO SQUARE SDN BHD (Company No. 617273-X) …RESPONDENT JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] The Plaintiff commenced its action in the High Court Shah Alam [‘HCSA’] which heard and determined its claim for Maintenance and Sinking Fund Charges [‘M and S/F’] against the Defendant. Being dissatisfied with the HC decision, the Plaintiff lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal [‘COA’]. [2] On 20.09.2017, the HC dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim for RM1,739,712.00 whereas the Defendant’s counter-claim for refund of M and S/F charges amounting to RM432,853.96 was allowed. 30/11/2023 08:03:55 22NCVC-510-07/2013 Kand. 253 S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [3] A further appeal to the Federal Court [‘FC’] followed. Upon hearing the appeal, the FC ordered, inter alia, that: In relation to the present suit [‘Suit 516’] the Respondent [Plaintiff]’s claim be remitted to the HC to hear and decide whether there was contravention of sections 4, 34 and 69 of the Strata Titles Act, 1985 [‘STA’]. In this context, the parties are at liberty to amend their pleadings to enable this issue to be fully decided by the same HC Judge who had originally heard and decided the Plaintiff’s claim in the HC. Both the orders of the HC and the COA were, consequently, set aside. [4] Hence, the further trial of the same claim remitted to the HC on the limited question posed by the FC. Agreed Issues To Be Tried: (a) Is the car park business being operated by the Defendant on accessory parcels, illegal pursuant to Sections 4, 34 (2) and 69 of the STA? (b) Did the Defendant breach the planning permission granted by MBPJ when it had accessorized all the car parks in 32Square to the Penthouse? S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (c) Did the Defendant breach the planning permission granted by MBPJ when it did not provide visitor car parks at 32Square? (d) In the event the car park business is deemed illegal, should the relevant provisions in the sale and purchase agreements between the purchasers and the Defendant, to the effect that the car parks are owned by the Defendant be declared null and void? (e) If the car park business and excessive allocation of the Car Parks as accessory parcels to the Penthouse is deemed illegal, can the Defendant remain as proprietor of the Car Parks? (f) If the car park business is deemed illegal, should the business proceeds of the Car Parks be remitted to the Plaintiff? (g) If the car park business is deemed illegal, will this illegality affect the Plaintiff’s claim for maintenance and sinking fund charges levied on the Car Parks? (h) Is the Plaintiff entitled to its claim for RM1,739,712.00, being maintenance and sinking fund charges for the Car Parks notwithstanding that such charges were levied on the basis of square feet as opposed to share unit? S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (i) Did the Defendant absorb the construction costs of the Car Parks? (j) Does it make a difference to the application of Sections 4, 34(2) and 69 of the STA that 32Square is a commercial development? [4] Analysis and Finding It is, at the outset, crucial to note what is being sought by the Plaintiff pursuant to the FC order that I have alluded to. [5] As summarised in the Defendant’s Executive Summary, the Plaintiff’s present claim as per the Amended Pleadings adopts a two- pronged approach as follows: 1) The Plaintiff MC is alleging that the Defendant had “taken ownership” (‘mengambil alih’) over all the carpark parcels in 3 Two Square to carry out a commercial business and not to use the same as accessory parcels to support the use of the main parcel, i.e. the Penthouse. The alleged illegality/prohibition is premised on sections 34 and 69 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 [‘STA’]. 2) The relief that is presently sought by the Plaintiff MC in this present case is to impugn the subdivision of titles in 3 Two Square. The MC is even asking for new strata plans to be reissued with the carpark parcels to be reclassified as common property. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [6] In contrast, the Defendant’s position is essentially that the Plaintiff’s present claim is legally unsustainable on the following grounds: 1) It is undisputed that the Defendant had never “taken ownership” of the carpark parcels. The land upon which the carpark parcels stood belonged, and still belongs to the Defendant. What the Defendant did was merely to retain ownership of part of its own land and made an application to subdivide its own land and thus, cannot be said to be a dealing. The Plaintiff MC’s pleaded case is, therefore, legally unconnected to, and/or incongruent, with Sections 34 and 69 of the STA. 2) The relief that is presently sought by the Plaintiff MC in this present case is to impugn the subdivision of titles in 3 Two Square. Consequentially, for new strata plans to be reissued with the carpark parcels to be reclassified as common property under the MC’s management. The language of section 9 of the STA is framed in the negative-“the Director shall not approve” – meaning that if the Director is not satisfied that the abovementioned conditions are fulfilled, then the Director of Lands and Mines has the discretion to reject the application for subdivision by the original proprietor of the land, i.e., the Defendant. The primary relief sought by the Plaintiff MC is to invalidate the subdivision and to reclassify the strata plan. The Plaintiff MC’s pleaded case seeks to unravel the entire statutory process encapsulated in sections 9 to 14 of the STA. [7] It was also contended that the relief sought by the Plaintiff can only be obtained via judicial review proceedings against the decisions of the S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Director of Lands and Mines and the Director of Survey. Any possible cause of action to challenge the decision to sub-divide by way of judicial review is time-barred by statute by virtue of section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1948. [8] The context under which the FC made the present order is all- important. In respect of Suit 516, it arose upon the Defendant’s appeal against the COA’s decision which was in the Plaintiff’s favour as regards the claim for M&S/F charges for the car parks which the HC held to be accessory parcels. However, on appeal by the Respondent to the COA, this decision by the HC was reversed by the COA. For convenience, I reproduce the relevant passage from the judgment of the COA in respect of Suit 516 as follows: “In Suit 516, the plaintiff claimed for the shortfall of management fees and sinking fund charges for the car park owned by the defendant in Block F. The JMB had resolved that the management fees and sinking fund for the car park was RM0.20 per square feet from 2.8.2008 until 15.1.2010. From this date (15.1.2010), the plaintiff had resolved that the said charge would be RM0.30 per square feet. However, the defendant had only been paying RM0.05 per square feet. Hence, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the additional sum of RM1,739,712.00 for management fees and sinking fund charges for the said car parks at the two (2) levels of the basement. On the other hand, the defendant had counterclaimed for the refund of maintenance fees and sinking fund charges in the sum of RM432,853.86 (RM143,971.62 + RM288,822.24) that were S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 imposed on the defendant’s car parks, which the defend claimed to be the accessory parcels to the Penthouse. However, the learned Judge had dismissed plaintiff’s claim, premised on sections 34(2) and 69 of the STA, that the plaintiff cannot levy additional charges on the defendant for the car park, which is an accessory to the defendant’s Penthouse. In paragraph of the Judgement, the learned Judge held that: “[44] Considering the provisions of sections 34(2) and 69 of the STA which expressly prohibit any accessory parcel or any share or interest therein from being dealt with independently of the parcel, I concur with the contention that the plaintiff’s action in charging maintenance and sinking fund charges, on the basis of square footage (sq. ft.) in respect of defendant’s car parks is clearly prohibited in law as such action by the plaintiff amount to treating the defendant’s accessory parcels and its interest therein independently of the parcel to which it was made appurtenant.” The relevant provisions, sections 34(2) and 69 of the STA read as follows: “34 Rights of proprietor in his parcel and common property (1) ….. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (2) No rights in an accessory parcel shall be dealt with or disposed of independently of the parcel to which such accessory parcel has been made appurtenant.” “69 No dealing in accessory parcel independent of a parcel No accessory parcel or any share or interests therein shall be dealt with independently of the parcel to which such accessory parcel has been made appurtenant as shown on the approved strata plan.” Hence, the issue is whether the defendant’s car park serves as an accessory parcel to the defendant’s Penthouse in Block F. Under section 4 of the STA, accessory parcel means a parcel shown in a strata plan as an accessory parcel which is used or intended to be used in conjunction with a parcel. Therefore the word ‘accessory’ simply means that the usage of the accessory carpark is attached to, connected or dependent on and/or used or intended to be used with the main parcel, the Penthouse. It is not independent on its own. In the present appeal, the ‘accessory parcel’ are the car parks at the two (2) levels of basement of Block F, which according to the defendant is an accessory parcel which is used or intended to be used in conjunction with the Penthouse. It is not in dispute that the defendant is renting out the car park parcels and that these car park parcels are being utilized for commercial purposes, a car park business, to generate an S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 income to the defendant. The said car parks were used for the car park business, which is independent of the Penthouse. Thus, all the said car parks cannot be said to be used in conjunction with the Penthouse. Therefore, the usage of these car park parcels were not used or intended to be used in conjunction with the Penthouse. As such, the car parks do not fall within the definition of ‘accessory parcel’ under section 4 of the STA. Consequently, the charging of the maintenance fees and sinking fund charges are not prohibited by sections 34(2) and 69 of the STA. (see Ideal Advantage Sdn Bhd v Perbadanan Pengurusan Palm Spring @ Damansara & Another Appeal [2019] 1 LNS 894). In the premise, there is no legal prohibition for the plaintiff to claim for the management fees and sinking fund charges for the car park owned by the defendant. We therefore find that the learned trial Judge fell into error in his interpretation of the application of sections 34(2) and 36 of the STA to the factual matrix of the case.” [9] It would be plainly apparent that the COA in its concluding remarks made reference to sections 34(2) and 69 of the STA as applied in Ideal Advantage Sdn Bhd [‘COA’] in arriving at its decision which was confined to the charging of M & S/F fees/charges for car parks which do not fall within the meaning of accessory parcels. It was this decision against which the Defendant appealed to the FC resulting in the present order on the illegality issue which stemmed from the COA’s reference to Ideal Advantage in regard to sections 34(1) and 36 of the STA. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [10] In view of the COA’s decision on the main suit, the HC’s decision on the Defendant’s counter-claim for refund of M&S/F charges for the car parks was also accordingly set aside. [11] An important question arose in this trial as to whether Ideal Advantage could be distinguished from the instant facts rendering it not wholly applicable to the present dispute on the issue of illegality. According to the Defendant, the Court in Ideal Advantage examined the evidence and found that the whole intention and purpose of Ideal Advantage in its purchase of 439 carparks from the developer was not to use these car parks in conjunction with the 45 units of residential condominium parcels but to deal with the additional carparks independently and separately by renting them out to different individuals: “From the evidence, the 45 parcel units were purchased by D1 together with the 439 accessory car park parcels and the evidence also shows that the whole intention and purpose of D1 purchasing 439 car parks from D2 was not to use these car parks in conjunction with 45 units of parcel condominiums respectively but to deal with the additional car parks independently and separately by renting it out to different individuals. There is no denial by D1 that they are renting out the car park parcels and that these car park parcels are being utilised for commercial purposes to generate a substantial income to D1. Clearly, the intention of D1 at the time of the purchase of the 439 accessory parcels together with the 45 units of condominium was to run a car park business at Palm Spring Condominium. It is never disputed that each of the condominium unit which is about 1,000 sqft at most, would S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 only require one or two car parks. Clearly, the remaining car parks attached to the particular unit were meant for D1’s car park rental business. The same argument applies to the other condominium units which have between 8–15 accessory car park parcels attached. Therefore, the usage of these car park parcels, namely the excessive car parks, constituted a breach of ss 34(2) and 69 of the STA 1985, namely that the accessory car park parcels is used or intended to be used not in conjunction with a parcel unit and the same was dealt with, independently of the main parcel unit to which such accessory parcel has been made appurtenant thereof.” [12] In support of the Defendant’s position that Ideal Advantage is distinguishable on the facts, it was contended that: i) In that case, the main parcel was a residential unit meant for residence and inhabitation of the residents. ii) In the instant case however, the Penthouse has a commercial title and is meant to be used for commercial purpose. The Defendant is a licensed carpark operator. [13] The Plaintiff brought to my attention that both the High Court and Court of Appeal found Ideal Advantage to have committed an illegality by breaching Sections 4, 34 (2) and 69 of the STA in operating a carpark business and treating accessory parcels independently of the main parcels. In connection thereto, the relevant portions of the judgment in IDEAL ADVANTAGE (COA), against which leave to appeal to the Federal Court, was dismissed is reproduced herein as follows: - S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 “[40] A harmonious reading of the aforesaid provisions of STA 1985, shows that any accessory parcel to the main parcel of the condominium is not to be dealt with “independently” or “separately” from the main parcel and must be used in conjunction with the main parcel. These “accessory parcels” are parcels shown in an approved strata plan as an accessory parcel which is used or intended to be used in conjunction with a parcel. The plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the relevant provisions reflects the true intent and purport of Parliament in legislating the STA 1985. … [42] D1’s position has always been that they bought the 45 units together with the 439 accessory car park parcels and there is no legal restriction for an owner of one unit of condominium to purchase more than one accessory car park parcel. We agree that there is no legal restriction for an owner of a condominium to purchase more than one accessory car park parcel, so long as it is used in conjunction with the main parcel unit. From the evidence, the 45 parcel units were purchased by D1 together with the 439 accessory car park parcels and the evidence also shows that the whole intention and purpose of D1 purchasing 439 car parks from D2 was not to use these car parks in conjunction with 45 units of parcel condominiums respectively but to deal with the additional car parks independently and separately by renting it out to different individuals. There is no denial by D1 that they are renting out the car park parcels and that these car park parcels are being utilized for commercial purposes to generate a substantial income to D1. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Clearly, the intention of D1 at the time of the purchase of the 439 accessory parcels together with the 45 units of condominium was to run a car park business at Palm Spring Condominium. It is never disputed that each of the condominium unit which is about 1000 square feet at most, would only require one or two car parks. Clearly, the remaining car parks attached to the particular unit were meant for D1’s car park rental business. The same argument applies to the other condominium units which have between 8-15 accessory car park parcels attached. Therefore, the usage of these car park parcels, namely the excessive car parks, constituted a breach of sections 34 (2) and 69 of the STA 1985, namely that the accessory car park parcels is used or intended to be used not in conjunction with a parcel unit and the same was dealt with, independently of the main parcel unit to which such accessory parcel has been made appurtenant thereof. … [44] The purpose, object and restriction in sections 34 (2) and 69 of the STA 1985 prohibits the dealing/transfer of the accessory parcels separately or independently of the main parcel, as was done by D1 and D2. These car parks were transferred in bulk to D1 by D2. The Hansard of the parliamentary debate in the Senate during the tabling of the STA 1985 is testimony to this, which reads…” [14] On the above reasoning, the COA concluded that the 1st Defendant [‘D.1’]’s purpose and intent clearly constituted a breach of sections 4, 34(2) and 69 of the STA 1985 which led to an illegality. Hence, that the S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 trial judge had not erred in finding the agreements for the purchase of the accessory parcels to be illegal under section 24 of the Contracts Act, 1950 and ought to be struck down as being void. [15] By reliance on Ideal Advantage, the Plaintiff contended that the fact of the Defendant being in possession of a valid licence from the Petaling Jaya City Council [‘MBPJ’] to operate the car park business which meant that the local authority [‘MBPJ’] had sanctioned the business did not exonerate them from the illegality of the said business. Also, that the ownership of the car park lots was not within the purview of the functions and powers of the MBPJ Licensing Department. [16] Essentially, the Plaintiff’s principal argument was that the issuance of licence by MBPJ cannot override the COA decision in IDEAL ADVANTAGE pertaining the interpretation of Sections 4, 34(2) and 69 of the STA. In any event, should MBPJ discover any illegality in respect of the Defendant’s car park business, MBPJ can revoke or suspend the said licence pursuant to Section 6 of Licensing of Private Car Parks (Petaling Jaya Municipal Council) By-Laws 2005. In effect that the licences issued by the MBPJ were inconsequential to the issues that arose for resolution in this trial emanating from the FC order. [17] The Defendant, on the contrary, contended that Ideal Advantage, on the facts, could be distinguished because the car park business being operated by the Defendant is not illegal simply because the usage of the Car Parks is in conjunction with its main parcel, which is the Penthouse which is indisputably a carpark management office, and therefore, justifies the usage factor in Sections 4, 34(2) and 69 of the STA. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [18] Hence, the determination of the central issue in this trial revolved around the question whether the usage of the Defendant’s car park accessory parcels had been conjunction with its main parcel, i.e., the PH. In essence, the Defendant’s main premise was that the PH and the car parks were involved in a common car park business. However, the Plaintiff’s response was that this line of argument was plainly illogical and ran counter to the purpose and intention of accessory parcels as defined in the STA under the 3 sections that I have alluded to. These sections apparently do not refer to the business being conducted in the main parcel to justify a finding that the accessory parcels were being used in conjunction with the main parcel. As such, the Court should rightly find that the car park business was being illegally perpetrated by the Defendant. [19] On this pivotal issue, it was also incumbent to give due consideration to the Defendant’s position on the burden of proof borne by the Plaintiff MC to prove its case. In this regard, it was submitted that the evidence led by the Plaintiff fell short of establishing the very premise of the Plaintiff’s pleaded claim, namely, that there was contravention of sections 4, 34 and 69 of the STA. It was because: i) PW-1’s evidence fails to show how the business in the Penthouse is disjunct from the carpark business. ii) PW-1 admitted that whilst he could identify that the office in LG2 was used to run the carpark business, he could not verify how the Penthouse was used, whether it was in fact used to operate the carpark business or not. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [20] Reference was also made to the evidence of DW.2 (manager of Defendant’s car park business) which disclosed that the integral part of this business was at all material times and was currently run from the Penthouse [‘PH’]. It was highlighted that the fact that there is a carpark office at LG2 to facilitate carpark users and customer service does not mean that the entire carpark business is run from the carpark office where customers could see the personnel stationed there. [21] It was highlighted that DW.2’s evidence that the car parks business was operated from the PH remained unchallenged in cross- examination. The challenge mounted by the Plaintiff on this point was that the parent company of the Defendant [‘Crest Builders’] also operated its business from the PH and that DW.2’s evidence contradicted with that of another witness given at the previous trial. [22] On the 1st aspect of the challenge the Defendant’s response was that the Plaintiff’s case taken at its highest was that it merely shows that the PH is also used for the business of Crest Builders Sdn Bhd. It does not however prove the converse – that the PH was, and is, not used for the carpark business. [23] It was submitted that the fact that the main parcel is not used solely for the purpose of the carpark business does not mean that the use of the PH is independent from the use of the accessory carpark parcels as they are in fact used in conjunction with the carpark business. In other words, the usage was appurtenant to the main parcel. [24] On the contrary, that the PH was in fact the backbone of the entire carpark business operated by the Defendant as a licensed private S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 carpark operator sanctioned under the MBPJ by laws. Importantly that factually this case differed greatly from Ideal Advantage where the purpose and intention of the purchase of the car parks was not for use in conjunction with the residential unit which was for inhabitation and not for commercial activity as in the instant case. [25] On the alleged contradiction in the evidence, the Defendant submitted that the witnesses concerned gave evidence on different issues and there was no inconsistency in the evidence on the issue presently in dispute. Importantly, both the witnesses testified that the carpark office on the LG was used for customer service while the witness at the previous trial never testified that the PH was not used to operate the carpark business. [26] By reference to contemporaneous communication between the Plaintiff MC and the Defendant’s staff in relation to issues involving the carpark, the Defendant’s proposition was that the relevant contemporaneous evidence ought to take precedence over the Plaintiff MC’s bare averment that the carpark business was not run from the PH. It was stressed that the burden of proof rested with the Plaintiff to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the PH and the 1370 carpark parcels are used independently of each other. [27] Next for consideration is the second part of the contravention Issue as pleaded by the Plaintiff MC, the point of contention being that the Defendant’s act of accessorising all 1370 carpark parcels to the PH is a breach of the planning permission granted by MBPJ. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [28] As summarised by the Defendant, the Plaintiff [‘MC’] was essentially building a case that since the floor area of the Penthouse is only 169,728 square feet, to accessorise 1370 carparks to the Penthouse is in breach of the said planning permission on that basis that the Plaintiff MC alleges that there has been a contravention of section 9(1)(d) of the STA and section 20 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976. [29] However, the Appellant raised a preliminary objection that this contention goes beyond the order of the Federal Court [‘FC’] dated 7.11.2022 that ought to be strictly adhered to. It was reemphasised that this is not a retrial, and the ambit of the trial must be limited to the specific issue and provisions identified by the FC, and nothing beyond. According to the Defendant if the Court was to consider this contention, it would mean that the High Court was making a determination on an issue that went beyond and in excess of, the specific jurisdiction as directed by the FC. [30] It was reiterated that the issue as identified by the FC to be tried is limited only to any potential contravention with regard to sections 4, 34 and 69 of the STA. [31] I would state my view on the above PO in relation to breach of the Planning Permission at the summing up stage of this judgment on the principal issue as to whether the accessary parcels should be declared common properties. [32] I will proceed to deliberate on the core issue pertaining to the liability of the Defendant to pay M & S/F charges for the car parks parcels. In essence, the contention of a Plaintiff is this: S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 “When the Defendant chose to treat the car parks independently of the main parcel, the car parks can no longer be considered as accessory parcels as they fail to come within the ambit of section 4, 34(2) and 69 STA. As a result, the car parks were treated as parcels and would lose the protection of section 4, 34(2) and 69 STA, hence, susceptible to maintenance and sinking fund charges as per normal parcels. The maintenance and sinking fund charges for parcels have already been fixed in numerous prior AGMs since the JMB period.” [33] As such, the determinative question in this trial is simply whether the Defendant had acted in contravention of sections 4, 34(2) and 69, STA by treating the car parks independently of the main parcel, i.e., PH. This is indisputably a factual question. Basically, on this vital issue the position of the Defendant was that the car Parks are being used in conjunction to the main parcel because both the car Parks and the PH are involved in the same car park business. [34] The Plaintiff’s contrary position was that merely because the PH is allegedly a carpark management office, and thus, the Defendant is allowed to use the car parks to run a carpark business, is completely illogical and defeats the purpose and intention of accessory parcels as defined in the STA considering that Sections 4, 34(2) and 69 of the STA do not refer to the business being operated in the main parcel to justify whether the accessory parcels are being used in conjunction to the main parcel. [35] On the basis that the Defendant’s interpretation of the said provisions of the STA was illogical and untenable as to the nature of the S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 business conducted in the main parcel being the main criterion for accessorising car park parcels, the Plaintiff urged the Court to conclude that the said business did not in law determine the allocation of accessory parcels. Amongst others, because the demarcation of a car park parcels must strictly be pursuant to the requirements of the Planning Permission and Guidelines of the local authority. As such, that the car park business was an illegally perpetrated by the Defendant entitling the Plaintiff to the declaratory order sought to declare the sub-division as done in this case null and void following the decision in Ideal Advantage. [36] The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had breached the PP granted by MBPJ when it had accessorised all the car parks in 3TS to the PH. It was submitted that the Defendant does not have a free hand in determining the number of car parks to be provided for the development nor the amount of car parks that can be accessorized to a single unit because the planning stage of the development the Defendant will have to comply with the requirements of the local authority which is MBPJ, in respect of the minimum amount of car parks that should be provided for the development and the number of car parks that can be allocated as accessory parcels to the various parcels. [37] It emanates from the fact that in Selangor, the approval for any given development including 32Square comes in the form of Planning Permission [‘PP’] which is approved and granted by MBPJ pursuant to the Sections 19 and 22 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (TCPA). It is the PP as represented by the Approved Layout Plan [‘Ex P.2’] will contain the conditions upon which approval for the development is given by MBPJ. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [38] I have adverted to the Defendant’s contention that the alleged breach of the PP and TCPA is outside the purview and ambit of the FC order and as such, this Court would exceed its jurisdiction if a determination is made on the issue of illegality in respect of this breach. I would state my view of this contention at the conclusion of this judgment. For the record, the Plaintiff did not dispute that the Defendant by providing 1,370 car parks was more than the minimum requirement under the Layout Plan and MBPJ Guidelines. However, the Plaintiff’s position was that the carparks were not provided in the best interest of the development and parcel owners but was intentionally done to run a car park business wholly for profit. [39] I will now proceed to the crucial ownership issue of the car park parcels arising from the alleged illegality of the car park business run from the PH by the Plaintiff. In the event that the Court finds that there was contravention of sections 4, 34 and 69 of the STA and/or the planning permission the Plaintiff submitted that the Plaintiff MC must further prove that the 1370 carpark parcels belong to the MC as common property; and are not the property of the Defendant. Reference was made to the constitutional guarantee that no person can be deprived of his sacrosanct constitutional right to property guaranteed under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution save in accordance with the process designated by law. [40] It is important to note thrust of the Plaintiff’s ownership claim, which was that as the Defendant had used or intended to use the accessory parcels independently of the main parcel and had as well contravened the PP, its property was liable to be forfeited and strikingly, the ownership S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 of almost all its car parks had to be gifted to the Plaintiff MC as common properties. [41] The Defendant pointed out that it was the Defendant which was the original proprietor of land upon which 3 Two Square [‘3TS’] stood. The Defendant constructed the development, consisting of parcels, accessory parcels and common property out of which most of parcels were sold to new strata proprietors while some were not. Not only the car park parcels but all the corporate offices in the development were not sold by the Defendant but retained as its investment property. In effect, the Plaintiff MC’s proposition was said to be a usurpation of another person’s property and as such the claim for another person’s property must be supported by sufficient particulars which must be proved to sustain such a fur-reaching claim. [42] Instead, the averments in the Plaintiff’s pleadings were pointed out to be only these: (a) There were contraventions by the Defendant of the law; (b) Losses suffered by the Plaintiff and other parcel owners were the charges levied on them for usage of the car parks. (c) By using the carpark parcels for business since 2007 it had made unlawful profits. (d) Losses resulted to the Plaintiff because of the Defendant’s unfair profit. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [43] In recent COA decision Sri Keladi Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) v Bukit OUG Condominium Joint Management Body [2023] 1 MLJ 34 where a distinction between residential and commercial developments was recognised, it was held that: “There was no dispute by the respondent that ownership of the car parks should be determined by the SPAs as they were binding contracts between the developer and purchasers or parcel owners. Therefore, the determination of whether the car parks should be considered as common property depended on the terms of the SPA (see paras 31–33). The definition of ‘common property’ in cl 31(c) of the SPA was not intended to include the ‘additional’ 149 car parks as they were in excess of what was already catered for the parcel owners and therefore could not and must not be enjoyed by parcel owners as common property. In respect of the SPA for commercial units, the provisions differed from the Schedule H, particularly cl 32 where it clearly provided that the appellant shall retain the ownership of the car parks as the word ‘vendor’ referred to the appellant. Further, in reference to cl 31(c) read with the Second Schedule of Schedule H of the SPA and cl 32 read with the Fifth Schedule, it became clearer that they were not intended to form part of common property under the SPA since the unaccounted car parks were not listed as ‘common facilities’ (see paras 36, 39 & 42–53). The High Court judge failed to properly evaluate the respondent’s own testimony as the witness testified that the ownership of surplus car parks belonged to the appellant vis a vis the Second Schedule of Schedule H of SPA and cl 32 of SPA for commercial units.” S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [44] Further, as regards the SPAs being binding on the parties, it was emphasized that: “Besides, the SPAs are binding contracts between the developer and purchasers or parcel owners. The Court of Appeal case of Perantara Properties Sdn Bhd v JMC-Kelana Square & another appeal [2016] MLJU 1598; [2016] 5 CLJ 367 is relevant in this regard. This case is also a dispute about car parks and whether the same should be considered as forming part of the common property. The SPA is also referred to in this case. The relevant excerpt of this case states: [15] The effect of the learned judge’s construction of s 44 read with the definition of ‘common properties’ in s 2 of the BCPA 2007 is a blatant amendment to the terms and conditions of the 1995 sales and purchase agreements. That said, His Lordship’s view on face value can be said to have merit as s 44 of the BCPA 2007 does contain the words ‘shall cease to have effect’, giving rise to a reasonable inference that the BCPA 2007 is a retrospective legislation to eradicate the practise of developers like the appellant from retaining car parks as common properties. … [18] Further it is significant that the 1995 sales and purchase agreements at that particular time were perfectly legal agreements. There were no common law or statute law which prohibited the same. Hence when the purchasers and the S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 appellant entered into those agreements they were exercising their rights pursuant to the concept of ‘freedom of contract’ as submitted by learned counsel. These rights are fundamental rights and the courts must presume that the Parliament would not invade such rights unless clear words are used. We find no such clear words in the BCPA 2007. The parties knew exactly what the bargains were when they entered into the 1995 sales and purchase agreements and it is trite law the courts cannot rewrite contracts when they are freely entered into.” [45] Reverting to Ideal Advantage, the COA in coming to a determination whether the carparks had in fact become common property within the meaning S.4 of the STA held the view that the determinative plan was the strata plan. It was identified as a vital consideration and factor as follows: “In pith and substance, the claim by the plaintiff vis a vis 394 car parks is a claim for the recovery of ownership of car parks as ‘common property’. Section 4 of the STA 1985 define ‘common property’ as: ‘common property’ means so much of the lot as is not comprised in any parcel (including any accessory parcel), or any provisional block as shown in a certified strata plan. Therefore, ‘car parks which are indicated on an approved strata plan as accessory parcels will not be common property. Also, such car parks which would have been made S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 appurtenant to the respective parcels shown on the approved strata plan cannot be dealt with independently of such parcels. Where they are not so indicated on the approved strata plan, they would form part of the common property’ (Strata Title in Singapore and Malaysia (4th Ed) by Teo Keang Sood, at p 158).” [46] In essence, on the ownership issue, I uphold the Defendant’s contention that in Ideal Advantage, the COA arrived at its decision as to the 394 carparks being common property based on the view that the strata plan was conclusive. If it is so indicated in the strata plan that a particular property is a parcel or accessory parcel, then it would be a common property under the ownership of the MC. [47] It was apparent that in Ideal Advantage, in the absence of the strata plan which would conclusively prove the contrary, the carparks were regarded in law as “unsold property” pursuant to the operation of the STA 1985, i.e. by operation of law as the developer was unable to prove that it was retained as its own property by virtue of the strata plan. [48] As pointed out by the Defendant, a converse situation applied in our case where all the carpark parcels were identified by parcel numbers as necessary parcels under the ownership of the Developer. [49] The Defendant also sought support from another COA case, Perantara Properties Sdn Bhd v JMC - Kelana Square & Another Appeal [2016] 5 CLJ 367 where the JMB challenged the Developer’s contractual right to retain its beneficial interest in the carparks. The purchasers gave no consideration for the purchase of the carparks as in S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 this instance. In its judgment, the COA stressed the constitutional right to property under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution and held: “Upon the forming of the respondent, the appellant handed over to the same various facilities of the development to the respondent save and except the car parks. The reason for the exclusion of the car parks was that they had been excluded from the common property through the sales and purchase agreements of the commercial units in Kelana Square entered between the purchasers and the appellant around 1995. The appellant was then able to rent the car parks out back to the purchasers or third parties for a fee… …[18] Further it is significant that the 1995 sales and purchase agreements at that particular time were perfectly legal agreements. There were no common law or statute law which prohibited the same. Hence when the purchasers and the appellant entered into those agreements they were exercising their rights pursuant to the concept of "freedom of contract" as submitted by learned counsel. These rights are fundamental rights and the courts must presume that Parliament would not invade such rights unless clear words are used. We find no such clear words in BCPA 2007. The parties knew exactly what the bargains were when they entered into the 1995 sales and purchase agreements and it is trite law the courts cannot rewrite contracts when they are freely entered into. [19] There is no doubt that should we sustain the respondent's contention, we would be taking away the proprietary rights in the car parks of the appellant. Could this be done by an Act of S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Parliament? It must not be forgotten that we have a democratic system where the Federal Constitution is supreme as opposed to Parliamentary democracy where Parliament is supreme. Hence in construing provisions of statute regard must be given to the Federal Constitution. The relevant presumption here is simply that Parliament did not intend to invade the rights accorded in the Federal Constitution. The relevant article in the Federal Constitution here is art. 13 which reads as follows: (1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law.” [50] Importantly, the COA in Perantara Properties drew a distinction between a residential development and a commercial development, which the present development undoubtedly is. Amongst others, a residential development which was the case in Ideal Advantage, is governed under the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 [‘HDA’]. It is a statute enacted to protect the interest of house purchasers and matters connected to the same. Even more vital for consideration in the present context is the concept of freedom of contract and the principle governing the fundamental right not to be deprived of one’s property save in accordance with law. [51] I would conclude my deliberation on the 2nd core issue for determination, i.e. the claim for ownership of the properties by the Plaintiff, namely, the car parks, by stating my considered view to be that it be traverses beyond the original claim which was restricted to M & S/F charges. It clearly has no connection with the claim for ownership. More importantly, it does not relate to the new issue of law identified by the FC. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Clearly, in my judgment, this claim of ownership has gone beyond the scope of the FC order which binds this trial. This trial was patently not meant for the dispute or claim to be heard afresh or relitigated but for the same Court to make a determination on a specific issue as identified. [52] In my view, the Plaintiff in misconstruing the purport and intention of the FC order, in particular, the terms of reference, had vide its Amended Statement of Claim [‘SOC’] made extensive inappropriate amendments in respect of its original cause of action for M & S/F, particularly, in seeking ownership of the accessory parcels to be transferred to the MC from the registered proprietor. Undeniably, an amendment to this extent went beyond the scope of the FC order and the new reliefs therein were not open for consideration under the limited jurisdiction provided by the order. [53] It is also important to take note that what the Plaintiff is effectively challenging is the process of law governing an application for sub- division. It is within the discretionary powers of the Director of Land and Mines [‘DLM’] under the NLC. The discretion to grant approval is to be exercised subject to fulfilment of conditions prescribed in several provisions of the STA, the details of which I do not propose to go into. There are express requirements under the law that must be complied with which the DLM must consider in the process of making his decision whether to grant the approval. So must he consider the restrictions imposed as authorised by law to the sub-division applied for. [54] On this point, it would be useful to refer for guidance to an authoritative textbook on the subject at hand, Strata Title in Singapore and Malaysia, 6th Edition, Teo Keang Sood, p.59 [2.81], where the S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 learned author commented on the same provisions in section 10 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (post-2015) as follows: “4. Conditions for sub-division approval and related matters [2.81] Where an application for sub-division of any building or land into parcels has been made to the Land Administrator in Form 1, it will only be approved by the Director if the following conditions are satisfied: - (1) The Director of Survey has issued the certificate of proposed strata plan as discussed above, (2) The sub-division would not contravene any condition or restriction in interest to which the land comprised in that lot is for the time being subject. For example, proprietors of buildings erected on the land maybe prohibited from sub- diving them because of planning restrictions: (3) The sub-division would not be contrary to the provisions of any written law for the time being in force and that any requirements imposed with respect thereto by or under any such written law have been complied with. Examples of such written laws are the Town and Country Planning Act 1976, the Street Drainage and Building Act 1974 and the Federal Territory (Planning) Act, 1982.” [55] These restrictions would include potential planning restrictions imposed by the local authority under planning laws such as the Town and Country Planning Act, 1971. It was correct in law for the Defendant to S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 contend that for the Plaintiff to succeed in its claim that sub-division in this instance was unlawful, it must support its claim with sufficient particulars to the Court’s satisfaction that the decision made by 2 public officers, the Director of Lands and Mines and the Director of Survey was wrong in law and fact warranting the Court’s intervention. This is the burden of proof that has to be discharged by the Plaintiff that the sub- division was in non-compliance with the conditions prescribed in S.9 of the STA. It is my considered view that for the decision and/or action 2 abovenamed Directors to be impugned, they should necessarily have been brought as parties to this action for a proper determination to be made judicially whether the application for sub-division was approved in accordance with law. [56] In the above circumstances, the Plaintiff’s claim for ownership of the car park parcels to vest in the MC based on its challenge to the process of sub-division of the 3TS development and reclassification of the strata plan should be put to rest essentially because of failure to discharge its burden of proof. CONCLUSION [57] Having made my finding on the core issue of ownership of the subject properties, I would proceed to state the Court’s view on the primary core issue identified in the FC’s order, namely, the contravention of the STA by the Defendant arising from assuming ownership of the car park parcels pursuant to the SPA and Deeds of Mutual Covenants [‘DMC’] with the unit owners, particularly SS.4, 34 and 69 of the STA. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [58] It is first and foremost crucial in this regard to scrutinise the Plaintiff’s pleaded cause of action in the Amended SOC. An analysis of the peculiar factual matrix of the instant case is called for and application of the principles enunciated in several authorities cited by both parties to the Court, in particular, Ideal Advantage, Perantara Properties and Sri Keladi. As stressed by counsel for the Plaintiff, the lynchpin of its Amended Claim is the decision, reasoning and orders made in Ideal Advantage. [59] The substratum of the Appellant/Defendant’s in opposition to the Amended Claim was that the claim was legally unsustainable because the very basis of the Plaintiff’s cause of action was erroneous in that the Plaintiff’s allegation was that the Defendant had “taken ownership” (mengambil milik) over all the carpark parcels in 3 Two Square to carry out a commercial business and not to use the same as accessory parcels to support the use of the main parcel, i.e., the PH or appurtenant to the latter. [60] It is expressly pleaded in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Amended SOC that the Defendant’s wrongful act and/or contravention on of the provisions of the STA 1985 in relation to the car park accessory parcels in the 3TS development was the taking ownership and control of all the said parcels to carry out a commercial business and not as parcels appurtenant to the use and purpose of the main parcel. It was further pleaded that the commercial business suffered from illegality due to contravention of strata law under the STA 1985. S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [61] It was indisputable that the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff arose primarily from the complaint that the Defendant had ‘taken ownership’ of the carpark parcels. On that score it was sought that the sub-division by the local authorities and causing all the carpark parcels to be accessorised to the PH be declared null and void. Plainly, the alleged illegality could only have occurred at the sub-division stage at which point the Defendant had allegedly taken ownership of the carpark parcels. [62] For a plain reading of the Plaintiff’s own pleadings, the Defendant’s alleged illegality was at the sub-division stage arising from its wrongful act of taking ownership of the carpark parcels. It was the act of sub- dividing and accessorising the carpark to the PH, that allegedly constituted the contravention of sections 34 and 39 of the STA, 1985. [63] To my mind, in the final analysis, the determinative question boiled down to whether the Defendant had as alleged in the Amended SOC ‘taken ownership’ of the carpark parcels. It was a crucial consideration that the land upon which the carpark parcels stood at all material times belonged, and still belongs to the Defendant, or in other words, the Defendant had always retained ownership of the carpark parcels. Upon retaining ownership, all that the Defendant did was to apply to the authorities for sub-division of its own land and not to take ownership of properties belonging to parcel owners in the development. An accessory parcel is made appurtenant to the main parcel and is prohibited from being dealt with or disposed of independently of the main parcel [‘Sections 34 and 69, STA’]. [64] As the declaration sought against the Defendant is against its act in sub-dividing its own land in contravention of sections 34 and 69 of the S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 STA, the question ultimately was whether it was a ‘dealing’ within the meaning of the said section. [65] Bearing in mind that the present claim was reliant on the judgment in Ideal Advantage, it would be instructive to consider how the COA interpreted ‘dealt with’ by reference to SS.5 and 205 of the National Land Code [‘NLC’] as follows: “The interpretation of the word ‘dealt with’ in the context of section 34(2) and section 69 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 [47] D1 and D2 alleged that the learned trial judge erred in law and fact when he failed to appreciate the words ‘dealing’ and ‘dealt with’ in the NLC and ss 34(2) and 69 of the STA 1985 do not include ‘tenancy’ which cannot be registered. [48] On this issue, we refer to the provisions of s 5 of the NLC which defines ‘dealing’ as follows: ‘dealing’ means any transaction with respect to alienated land effected under the powers conferred by Division IV, and any like transaction effected under the provisions of any previous land law, but does not include any caveat or prohibitory order; Section 205 of the NLC provides that: (1)The dealings capable of being ‘effected’ (as opposed to ‘registered') under this Act with respect to S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 alienated lands and interests therein shall be those specified in Parts Fourteen to Seventeen, and no others. A transaction under 'Division IV' of the NLC includes Part 15 of the same which has provisions on ‘Tenancy’ under ss 223– 224. Part 14 of the NLC also deals with ‘transfer exempt tenancies’ pursuant to s 220 of the same.” [66] It was amply clear to me that in Ideal Advantage the Court had to decide a different and distinct legal issue on facts that are distinguishable from the present, namely, whether the act of operating a carpark business within a residential condominium, by way of “tenancy” to a 3rd party constitutes a “dealing”. Section 5 of the NLC defines “dealing” as any transaction with respect to alienated land effected under powers conferred by Division IV of the NLC. [67] It is beyond dispute that the act of sub-dividing concerns creation and registration of title. It has no connection with dealing with the rights of alienated land under an existing title. On the same issue, another important distinguishing factor between the instant case was that in Ideal Advantage, the pleaded case of the MC was to impugn an unlawful transfer with the intention to let out for rent the car park parcels, both transactions being ‘dealings’ under Division IV, NLC, whereas in the instant case the claim was to essentially to impugn the Defendant’s act of sub-dividing its own property. The said act cannot from a plain reading of the NLC be construed as a ‘dealing’ within the meaning of Division IV of the NLC. A proper perusal of the Plaintiff’s pleaded case would S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 disclose that it is primarily unconnected with any contravention of SS.34 and 69 of the STA, 1985. [68] In reliance on the principle adopted in Ideal Advantage in relation to the registration of the carparks in the strata titles having been irregularly obtained under the NLC 1965 for non-compliance with statutory provisions, the Plaintiff contended that the application for sub- division was via Form 9A, which is declared as an instrument under S.207(1), NLC. As it was a void instrument for contravention of SS.4, 34 and 69, STA, the Defendant’s title to the carparks purportedly lost its indefeasibility and is void by operation of law by virtue of section 24 of the Contracts Act, 1950. I concur with the Defendant’s proposition that what rendered Ideal Advantage’s title defeasible was not the fact that its title has excessive carparks or how the carparks were being used. The Court of Appeal did not cancel the registration because Ideal Advantage used the accessory carpark parcels for a carpark business. Rather, what the Court of Appeal set aside was the instrument of dealing that culminated in Ideal Advantage’s proprietary rights via the SPA between Ideal Advantage and Muafakat Kekal becoming defeasible. As such section 340(2)(b) of the NLC is applicable to cancel Ideal Advantage’s title over the excessive carparks. What Section 340(2)(b) of the NLC cancels is a dealing that culminates in registration of title. It does not cancel the registration. [69] As my view is that that the Defendant’s title to the ownership of the carparks is not open to challenge based on the Plaintiff’s pleaded claim and the specific issue of law referred to this Court for determination, the above contention does not merit further consideration in this trial, S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 [70] In the final analysis, for the aforesaid reasons and under the circumstances adverted to, in my judgment, the Plaintiff’s pleaded case has not been proved on a balance of probabilities and is legally unsustainable. The Plaintiff’s claim is, therefore, dismissed with costs. [71] Based on the same grounds, the Defendant’s counter-claim for the relevant reliefs as pronounced at the conclusion of the trial has to be allowed and accordingly, it is so ordered with costs. Dated: 22 November 2023 - sgd - GUNALAN A/L MUNIANDY Judge High Court COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: David Samuel (Together with L.S.Leonard and Sheena Stephanie Sebastian [Messrs Chambers of Firdaus] COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Dato' Gurdial Singh Nijar (Together with Raymond Mah, Abraham Au Tian Hui, Raymond Mah, Daphne Rethual and Tharani Kunasekaran (Pdk)) [Messrs Mah Weng Kwai & Associates] S/N Ef/qVQj4/UeIQcdvPauy7g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	62,607	Tika 2.6.0
P-01(NCvC)(W)-39-01/2020	PERAYU KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD RESPONDEN 1. ) Pengarah Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Pulau Pinang 2. ) Ng Seah Hung 3. ) Ng Seah Hock 4. ) Syarikat Leisure Products Sdn Bhd 5. ) Leow Teow Hong 6. ) Lim Tian Huat 7. ) B. Rajadurai 8. ) Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Malaysia 9. ) Carawan Venture Sdn Bhd 10. ) Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd11. ) Kerk Chin Liong1 2. ) Ng Yim Kong	mandatory injunction - caveat – remove of caveat - Specific Performance – fraud - beneficial and registered owner - Private Caveat - Memorandum of Transfer - limitation period under Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities and Protection Act 1948 (‘Act 198’) - doctrine of laches - limitation period under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘Act 254’) - statutory duties -“Nor Further Action/NFA” -section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 - Section 17 of the Contract Act 1950 - rightful owner – of the land - bankruptcy order)- of indoor management rule/ Turquand’s rule – declaratory - an indefeasible title under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code - purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration.	30/11/2023	YA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamKorumYA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin Abdullah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=46f29ee3-621b-4938-8263-53b1bb341dbf&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-39-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU (NO. SYARIKAT :11580 – P) DAN 1. PENGARAH PEJABAT TANAH DAN GALIAN PULAU PINANG 2. NG SEAH HUNG (NO. K/P:431206-07-5193) 3. NG SEAH HOCK (NP. K/P: 540808-07-5003) 4. SWISS LEISURE PRODUCTS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 178923-V) 5. LEOW TEOW HONG (NO. K/P: 521015-07-5069) 6. LIM TIAN HUAT 7. B. RAJADURAI 8. KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN INSOLVENSI MALAYSIA 30/11/2023 14:51:28 P-01(NCvC)(W)-39-01/2020 Kand. 225 S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 9. CARAWAN VENTURE SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT : 300744-U) 10. GEENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 869514-U) 11. YAP MOH YIN (NO. K/P: 5485519) 12. CHEN YEN MOOI (NO. K/P: 5485519) 13. KERK CHIN LIONG (NO. K/P: 8163803) 14. NG YIM KONG (LS 00088343)(NO. K/P: 490424-08-5883) … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-134-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 DAN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD … RESPONDEN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-135-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU DAN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD … RESPONDEN CORUM YAACOB HAJI MD SAM, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IBRAHIM, JCA AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH, JCA S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are three (3) related appeals before us which are as follows: i. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC)(W) - 39 - 01/2020 (“Appeal 39”); ii. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC(W)) - 134 - 01/2020 (“Appeal 134” ); and iii. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC)(W) - 135 – 1/2020 (“Appeal 135”). Appeal 39 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in dismissing the Appellant’s claim against the 1st Respondent, 2nd Respondent; 3rd Respondent, 4th Respondent, 5th Respondent, 6th Respondent, 7th Respondent, 9th Respondent, 8th Respondent, 10th Respondent, 11th Respondent, 12th Respondent, 13th Respondent and 14th Respondent and awarding costs of RM60,000.00 each to be paid by the Appellant to the respective R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R8, R13 and R14 herein. Appeal 134 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in allowing Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd (10th Respondent)’s claim against the Appellant with costs. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Appeal 135 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in allowing Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd (10th Respondent)’s claim against the Appellant with a total costs of RM80,000.00. Background facts [2] The Appellant (plaintiff) is a family-owned company incorporated by one, Ng Boon Kow, and after his demise on 31.5.1979, the following persons were the directors of the Appellant and remained as such until 30.05.1992: (a) Madam Tan Soo Lang @ Tan Choon Lian; (b) Ng Seah Hung (‘R2’); (c) Ng Seah Hock (‘R3’); (d) Ng Seah Kang; (e) Ng Seah Kheng; (f) Ng Seah Theam; (g) Ng Seah Hai (PW1); and (h) Oi Siah Cheng [3] Meanwhile, the Respondents in this case, can be identified as follows: Respondents/Defendants Remarks 1. Pengarah, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Pulau Pinang (‘D1’) (‘R1’) D1 is the Director of Land Mining Pulau Pinang. 2. Ng Seah Hung (‘D2’) (‘R2’) D2 is the former director of the plaintiff and was adjudgedbankrupt on 26.05.1989 . 3. Ng Seah Hock (‘D3’) (‘R3’) D3 is the former director of the plaintiff and was adjudged bankrupt on 10.03.1993. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 4. Syarikat Leisure Product Sdn. Bhd. “ (‘D4’) (‘R4’) D4 is a private limited company. 5. Leow Teow Hong (‘D5’) (‘R5’) 1. D5 is the Director of D4 and at all material times dealt with D2, D3, D6, D7, and D8. 2. D5 is also a shareholder in Powerama Holdings Sdn. Bhd, a shareholder of D4. 6. Lim Tian Huat (‘D6’) (‘R6’) 1. D6 is a Receiver and Manager of D4 and is also the Chairman of CLRC, Companies Commission of Malaysia; and 2. D6 was appointed as the Receiver and Manager of D4 on 16.04.1992. 7. B Rajadurai (‘D7’) (‘R7’) 1. D7 is an advocate and solicitor, practicing as such previously at Messrs. Durai & Associates, KL; 2. D7 was adjudged a bankrupt vide Adjudicating and Receiving Order dated 25.11.1999; and 3. The plaintiff had obtained the leave of Court vide Order of Court dated 09.03.2013 to bring and continue this action against D7. 8. Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Malaysia (D8)(‘R8’) 1. D8 is the Director General of the Department of Insolvency of Malaysia in Pulau Pinang, vested with the estates of D2 and D3; 2. D8’s officer having conduct of D2 and D3 estate was one N. Dharmasegaran. 9. Cerawan Venture Sdn. Bhd. (‘D9’)(‘R9’) 1. D9 is a private limited company; 2. The directors for D9 include Mr.Kalaiselvam a/l Suppiah and Philip a/l Eridianathan. Both were appointed as D9 directors on 07.03.2011; 3. Unfortunately, Kalaiselvan died on 05.03.2012. 10. Greentech Industries Sdn. Bhd. (‘D10’) (‘R10’) D10 is a private limited company. 11. Kerk Chin Leong (‘D13’) (‘R13’ D13 is the director of D4 appointed on/before 21.04.1990. D13 is also a shareholder of D4. 12. Ng Yim Kong (‘D14’) (‘R14’) 1. D14 was the former company secretary to the Plaintiff, appointed on 18.08.1995. 2. D14 was also the company secretary to D4, appointed on 28.11.1991. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [4] The subject matter in dispute, in this case, refers to the 2/3 portion of the land that belongs to the plaintiff which was transferred to R4 and subsequently transferred to R10. The title of the land has been changed several times as follows: (a) The land was held under Temporary Title No. H.S (D) 120, Mukim 14, Daerah Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang. was registered on 30.06.1978 under the plaintiff's name (‘HSD 120’); (b) HSD 120 subsequently became known as HS(D) 296 Mukim 14 Daerah Seberang Perai, Negeri Pulau Pinang, and the date of the issuance of this title is 11.06.1990 (‘HSD 296’); (c) Thereafter, HSD 296 became known as Title No. 1487 (Plot 7) Seksyen 3, Bandar Butterworth, Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang, Mak Mandin Industrial Estate Mukim 14 Daerah Seberang Perai (‘Lot 1487’); (d) Later, Lot 1487 was subdivided/partitioned and further issued under the separate document title as follows: PN 6708 Lot 6147 (2/3 portion of the land (‘Lot 6147’) registered under the name of D4 and after that D10); and PN 6709 Lot 6148 (1/3 portion of the land registered under the plaintiff) (‘Lot 6148’). S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (e) Subsequently, there was a further subdivision of Lot 6147 into six (6) Lots by D10 (Lot 10000, Lot 10001, Lot 10002, Lot 10004, Lot 10005 and Lot 10006). (The subject matter in dispute, in this case will be used interchangeably as 8.5 acres of the land or 2/3 portion of the land or Lot 6147) The Appeals The Appellant’s case [5] After the demised of Ng Boon Kow, R2 and R3 controlled and managed the Appellant. [6] Based on Clause 87 (b) of the Appellant's Article of Associations, a member of the board of directors ceases to hold office if he becomes bankrupt or is legally deprived of the administration of his estate. [7] R2 & R3 have been adjudged bankrupts on 26.05.1989 and 10.03.1993 respectively. [8] However, R2 as bankrupt has acted for the Appellant in the following matters: (a) on 26.09.1989, R2 entered into a sale and purchase agreement dated 26.09.1989 (‘S&P dated 26.09.1986’) (see pp. 142-155 of Ikatan Teras 1 of R6) with R4 for the sale of 8.5 acres of the land for the amount of RM 7.5 million; and (b) on 24.10.1989, R2 executed a memorandum of transfer Form 14A (‘MOT dated 24.10.1989') (see pp. 158-159 Ikatan S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Teras 1 of R6) for the Appellant to transfer 8.5 acres of the land to D4 (Swiss Leasure Products Sdn Bhd). The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was registered on 11.05.1990. [9] Appellant’s further alleged that on 30.05.1992, R2 had removed four of the Appellant’s directors which are Ng Seah Kang, Ng Seah Theam, Ng Seah Keng and Ng Seah Hai without their knowledge. R2 then appointed his wife and his daughter as the Appellant’s directors. [10] On 12.02.1994, R2, his wife, his daughter and one Gopalakrishnan entered into agreement with Merge Port (M) Sdn. Bhd. (‘Merge Port’), to sell another portion of the land to Merge Port for purchase price of RM24 million. This caused, the late Tan Soo Lang, the Appellant's director entered a caveat on the land on 08.07.1994. [11] On 14.09.1994, Tan Soo Lang also filed a motion No.: 25-57-94 against Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah Pulau Pinang and Merge Port, for an order that the registration of transfer executed in favour of Merge Port be cancelled and alternatively be declared as null and void. On 17.10.1994, the High Court allowed the said application. [12] The Appellant also commenced four (4) other lawsuits against R2 and R3 in 1994 and onwards. Appellant alleged that N. Dharmasegaran from R8 knew the lawsuits commenced by the Appellant against R2 and R3 because he appeared for R2 in all of the proceedings. [13] On 03.11.1994, Ng Seah Kheng lodged a police report alleging that his signature in the MOT dated 24.10.1989 was forged. (‘Police Report dated 03.11.1994’). S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [14] On 20.06.2001, the Appellant was wound up vide Court’s Order dated 20.06.2001. The Appellant’s solicitor had sent documents including the land titles, being assets of the Appellant to the Insolvency Officer. On 12.11.2010, the Appellant was released of its wound-up status vide Order of Court dated 12.11.2010. [15] On 04.07.2011, R10 filed Originating Summon No.: 24-1263-2011 against the Appellant for an order of mandatory injunction, that is to order the Appellant to remove all buildings, toilets and lamp posts, gates, and all erections on Lot 6147, (‘OS 1’). [16] As a result, the Appellant entered a caveat on Lot 6147 on 13.11.2011 (‘caveat dated 13.11.2011’). [17] Later, R10 filed another OS No. 24-118-01/2012 on 20.01.2012 to remove Appellant’s caveat dated 13.11.2011. R10 further claimed that he has purchased Lot 6147 (the 2/3 portion) through to Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 14.10.2009 executed between R10 and R9 (‘S&P dated 14.10.2009’)(‘OS2’). [18] The Appellant stated that upon perusing the cause papers of OS1 and OS2 filed by R10, the Appellant discovered the following: (a) The S&P dated 14.10.2009 made an express reference to the High Court of Penang Suit No. 22-783-2005 (‘Suit 783’) between R4, R5 and R13 through R6, who is appointed as Receiver and Manager of R4 according to the Deed of Debenture dated 22.09.1989(‘DOD dated 22.09.1989’) and R9; S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (b) The Appellant later conducts a file search on Suit 783 and discovered that there was a court order dated 14.07.1999 for Specific Performance of the S&P dated 26.09.1989 obtained against the Appellant vide Originating Summons No. (MT4)-24- 1318-1998 (‘Suit 1318’) (‘Order dated 14.07.1999’) by R4 through R6. However, it was claimed that Order dated 14.07.199 was not served to the Appellant and the Appellant had no knowledge of such suit. (c) The Appellant later discovered that Suit 1318 was served to the Appellant through the substituted service to the address at 22nd Floor, Bangunan Peransang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur which is not the Appellant’s registered address at that material time; (d) Order dated 14.07.1999 also provides that all documents for the application to partition/subdivide the land shall be signed by the Senior Assistant Registrar if the Appellant failed to sign and hand over those documents within 30 days from the date of the order. However, the land was subdivided to Lot 6148 and Lot 6147 only on 25.02.2009 which is approximately 10 years after the date of the Order dated 14.07.1999; (e) Further, Order dated 14.07.1999 clearly stated that R4 was only entitled to 8.5 acres of the land but the title of Lot 6147 issued by D1 showed that 2/3 portion of the land is measured more than 8.5 acres; and S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (f) The Appellant also discovered that the whole land was mentioned as a fixed asset of R4 in the DOD dated 22.09.1989 in the event that the S&P dated 26.09.1986 was executed four (4) days after that. [19] Upon looking at all of the documents through a file search conducted in court, the Appellant stated that they only knew about the fraudulent transferred of their land and subdivision sometime in 2011. Thus, they alleged that fraud had been committed by all of the Respondents either by themselves alone or that they had conspired with other Respondents to defraud the Appellant which had caused the 2/3 of the portion of the land was fraudulently transferred to R4 and subsequently to R10 by R9. [20] As a result, the Appellant filed Civil Suit No. 21NCVC-13-03/2012 (Civil Suit 1) against all of the Respondents on 20.03.2012, primarily to recover 2/3 of the land which the Appellant alleged that had fraudulently transferred to R4 and subsequently to R10. [21] The Appellant claims that all of the Respondents have fraudulently and/or unlawfully conspired to defraud and injure the Appellant as the beneficial and registered owner of 2/3 portion of the land. [22] Wherefore, the Appellant seeks for the following declarations and reliefs (see paragraph 60 Amended Statement of Claim): (a) that the Appellant is the legal and beneficial owner of the 2/3 portions of the land formerly held under Lot 6147 and later subdivided into Lots No. 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005; S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (b) the Order of Court dated 14.7.1999 obtained by R4 in the High Court of Penang Originating Summons No. (MT4)-24-1318- 1998 be declared null and void and/or set aside; (c) that the R1 be ordered to do the necessary acts to put the Appellant as the registered owner of the 2/3 portion of land formerly held under Lot 6147; (d) that all subdivision of the land from Lot 6147 to Lots 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005 to be called and Lot 6147 to be reinstated with the Appellant as the registered owner; (e) that the Private Caveat Presentation Number 0799B201101293 dated 13.9.2011 lodged by the Appellant on Lots 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005 shall remain until the disposal of this matter; (f) the 10th Respondent be restrained by themselves and/or through their agents and/or employees and/or other from dealing with the said land in any manner whatsoever until disposal of this suit; (g) the R1 to R14 pay the Appellant damages for fraud and/or damages for conspiracy to defraud the Appellant; (h) The 10th Respondent rebuild and restore all buildings, toilet and lampposts and gates and all erections on the said land which S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 were demolished by the 10th Respondent and/or pay the equivalent value of the demolished buildings to the Appellant; (i) Damages for loss of use of land; (j) Costs; (k) Any other relief which this Honourable Court deems fit and proper. The Respondents’ case [23] In 1988, the Appellant was facing financial difficulties as its onion business was falling. Bangkok Bank notified the Appellant that if the Appellant failed to repay its outstanding loans, they will take legal action to enforce its securities under a Deed of Debenture and charges to impose the assets of the Appellant. [24] As a result, the Appellant’s directors and shareholders agreed to sell the entire land to one Ng Kok Lian, the Appellant’s closed relative (cousin) at the purchase price of RM 5,600,000.00, to repay the Appellant's loan with Bangkok Bank. [25] On the other side, Leow Teow Hong (‘R5/D5’ - shareholder in Powerama Holdings Sdn. Bhd) also shareholder of D4 was approached by Michael Cheong, Joachim Binder (‘Binder’) and Thomas Peter Polasek (‘Thomas’), whereby Thomas informed R5 of his intention to sell off and relocate plants and machinery from his company known as Royal Plastic SA in Switzerland into Malaysia and to explore the business opportunity in S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Malaysia. Thomas requested R5, Michael Cheong, and Binder's help to find a place or factory to operate a business. In consideration of that, Thomas had promised three of them the sum of money as a commission. Given that D4 was formed on 21.02.1989. [26] Somewhere in early 1989, R5 was introduced to Ng Kok Lian by Ng Kuang Boo, a bank officer at Chung Khiaw Bank. Ng Kok Lian informed R5 that the Appellant wanted to sell its land at a certain price. R5 however resigned from R4 on 05.06.1989. [27] Ng Kok Lian later informed the Appellant that R4 was interested to purchase the 2/3 portion of the land for the sum of RM 7,500,000.00 to be paid by way of the issuance of 1,000,000.00 shares of RM 1.00 each at par credit as fully in R4 and the balance of RM 6,500,000.00 to be paid vide Messrs. Durai & Associates. [28] As a result, R2 who is bankrupt acting on the advise of R7 (solicitors in Messrs. Durai & Associate) executed the S&P dated 26.09.1989 for the plaintiff with R4. According to R2, he had disclosed his status as a bankrupt to R7 and R3 and the S&P was executed for the benefit of the Appellant. [29] According to the S&P dated 29.09.1989, the Appellant is required to apply for the partition of the land and to obtain a separate document title to the 2/3 portion of the land. If the Appellant failed to do so, the whole land will be charged for the financing of the purchase of the property by R4. The Appellant had failed to apply for a separate title. [30] By a Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989 (‘Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989’), the lending banks agreed to grant R4 the term loan S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 facilities amounting to RM24,000,000.00 to finance D4’s purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land from the Appellant. As security for the repayment of facilities, R4 entered into a Deed of Debenture dated 22.09.1989 (‘DOD dated 22.09.1989’), whereby all of R4’s assets and properties, including the land were charged and/or pledge for a sum of RM 24,000,000.00. [31] On 11.10.1989, the 1st draw on the facilities for RM 17,100,000.00 was released by the lending banks to R4. R4 later paid the purchase price of 2/3 portion of the land to the Appellant in the manner as agreed by the parties. [32] On 13.10.1989, Messrs. Durai & Associates paid RM 5,600,000.00 to Bangkok Bank, the redemption sum for the land that was placed as securities by the Appellant. According to such redemption, Bangkok Bank charges over the entire land were discharged on 20.11.1989. The remaining purchase price was paid to Ng Kok Lian as a commission and the Appellant's shareholders accordingly. [33] R2 & R3 then executed MOT dated 24.10.1989 for the plaintiff to transfer 2/3 portion of the land to R4 and 1/3 portion of land back to the Appellant. The transfer was registered on 11.05.1990. [34] Under the terms of the Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989 and S&P, R4 and the Appellant created a charge dated 31.07.1990 over the land in favour of OBB and UAB which was registered on 01.08.1990, pending the partition of the land (‘Charge dated 31.07.1990’). [35] On 06.04.1990, R2 filed his statement of affairs to R8 (Insolvency Department). R3 also filed his statement of affairs with R8 on 12.01.1994. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [36] On 16.04.1992, D6 was appointed by the OBB as the Receiver and Manager (‘R&M’) of assets and properties of R4 under DOD dated 26.09.1989. Since his appointment, R6 had several times attempted to sell 2/3 portion of the land but the sales did not materialise since the land was not partitioned by the Appellant. [37] As a result, R4 through R6 commenced Suit 1318 against the Appellant for an order for Specific Performance. R4 through R6 tried to serve the cause papers of Suit 1318 to the Appellant by hand, but the Appellant’s registered address was changed. Therefore, R4 through R6 served the cause papers of Suit 1318 to the Appellant through a substituted service. An affidavit of service of the cause papers was filed to court by R4. R4 through R6 later obtained the Order dated 14.07.1999 which was also served to the Appellant’s registered address via substituted service. R4 did not proceed to execute the Court's Order dated 14.07.1999 because R4 was under receivership and it was not cost-effective for R4 to incur the considerable costs and expenses of partitioning the land when 2/3 of the portion was intended to be sold and realised. However, the attainment of the Court's order dated 14.07.1999 enable any prospective purchaser to undertake the obligation of applying for partition of the land. [38] R4 through R6 executed the Principal Agreement dated 11.11.2003, which was subsequently varied by the Supplemental Agreement dated 22.05.2005 with R9, for the sale of 2/3 of the land for a sum of RM 6,000,000.00. A dispute arose between R4 and R9 which resulted in the termination of the Principal Agreement dated 11.11.2003. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [39] The dispute between R4 and R9 was finally resolved. R4 and R9 later executed the S&P dated 05.10.2009 for the sale of 2/3 portion of the land for a sum of RM 6,000,000.00. [40] Under the S&P dated 05.10.2009, R9 undertakes the obligation to apply for the partition of the land. Following such an application, the 2/3 of land was partitioned into Lot 6147 and Lot 6148. [41] Later, R4 through R6 executed the Memorandum of Transfer dated 15.12.2009 (‘MOT dated 15.12.2009’) to transfer Lot 6147 to R10 as the nominee of R9 following the terms and conditions of the S&P dated 05.10.2009 and R9’s letter dated 03.11.2009. [42] On 04.07.2011, R10 as the registered owner of Lot 6147 filed OS1 against the Appellant for the trespass action. [43] On 26.07.2011, R10 subdivided Lot 6147 into six (6) Lots (Lot 10000 - Lot 10005). Subdivided titles were issued on 26.07.2011. R10 also transferred five (5) out of 6 Lots to the various purchasers. However, the transfer was not successful because of the private caveat dated 3.11.2011 entered by the Appellant [44] As a result, R10 filed OS2 against the Appellant for the removal of the caveat dated 13.11.2011. [45] On 18.05.2012, R10 obtained leave from the High Court for OS2 to be converted to writ action and known as Civil Suit 2. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [46] On 14.08.2012, R10 also obtained leave from the High Court for the OS1 to be converted to writ action and was known as Civil Suit 3. [47] It is the contentions of the Respondents that the Appellant’s claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13, and R14 is barred by the doctrine of laches and the limitation period of Section 2(a) of Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (PAPA) and under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1956 (Act 254). [48] The Respondents also contended that the Appellant had failed to prove the element of fraud or conspiracy to defraud against all of the Respondents and Lot 6147 of the land was not fraudulently transferred to R10, therefore, R10 is a bona fide purchaser and is protected with indefeasible title under Section 340 of the National Land Code. The High Court’s Proceeding [49] The High Court directed that, the Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3 be consolidated and be heard together with Civil Suit 1 and be determined accordingly. [50] On 20.12.2019, the learned High Court Judge allowed the R10’s claim against the Plaintiff for Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3. On the contrary, the High Court dismissed the Appellant’s claim against all of Respondents for Civil Suit 1. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Findings of the learned High Court Judge A. Civil Suit 1 [51] The learned Judge of the High Court (‘LJ’) dismissed the Appellant’s claim against all of the Respondents in Civil Suit 1 based on the following reason(s), inter alia: (a) The Appellant’s claim against R4, R7, and R9 was dismissed by the High Court with no order as to costs because: (i) the Appellant did not enter a judgment in default against D4 although D4 has never entered an appearance for the claim filed by the plaintiff. Although the Court has the discretion to hear the matter in the absence of D4, the plaintiff still carries a burden to prove the alleged fraud against D4. However, the plaintiff failed to do so (see paragraphs 200-208 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (ii) the Appellant is unable to pursue their claims against R7 because R7 is an undischarged bankrupt and received no sanction from the Director of Insolvency under Section 38 (1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 to defend himself against the action filed by the Appellant (see paragraphs 354-357 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); and S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (iii) the R9’s Statement of Defence was struck out by the High Court through the Court's Order dated 23.01.2017. However, the Appellant still carries a burden to prove the alleged fraud against R9, but the Appellant failed to do (see paragraphs 412 and 419 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment) (b) The Appellant, having known about the alleged fraud of S&P dated 26.09.1989 since 1994, that was when Tan Soo Lang entered a private caveat on 2/3 portion of the land, let 17 years pass by without initiating any legal steps (see paragraphs 124-129 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment). This caused: i. The Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the limitation period under Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities and Protection Act 1948 (‘Act 198’)(see paragraphs 131,138- 139,386,391 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); ii. The Appellant's claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14 is barred by the doctrine of laches and the limitation period under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘Act 254’) (see paragraphs 139,240,325-330, 391,455-459 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment) iii. Learned High Court judge hold that based on this ground alone, the Appellant’s claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14 is liable to be dismissed. However, for the sake of completeness, the learned High Court judge also discussed S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 the Appellant’s allegation of fraud and conspiracy to defraud against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14. (c) The Appellant failed to prove the element of fraud or conspiracy to defraud against all of the Respondents. The learned High Court judge held that: i. R1 was merely carrying out its statutory duties in registering the transactions and instruments presented before him. R1 also complied with its statutory duties in registering the application for subdivision and partition of the land. Moreover, the transactions and instruments presented by the respective parties before R1 for registration were complete and proper under the law. R1 has no duty under the law to investigate every detail of the documents presented before him for registration (see paragraphs 106, 115-119 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); ii. The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was signed, witnessed, and sealed by the Appellant when it was presented before R1 for registration (see paragraphs 106, and 107 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iii. The Appellant failed to prove the signature of Ng Seah Kheng in the MOT dated 24.10.1989 was forged (see paragraphs 527-531 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment): S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 a) Ng Seah Khung was not called as a witness before the court, thus adverse inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Appellant was invoked; b) No handwriting expert was called to give evidence on the signature of Ng Seah Kheng; and c) Ng Seah Kheng had withdrew his police report dated 03.11.1994 on 02.09.2006 and the matter was “Nor Further Action/NFA” by the police. iv. The Appellant had received the full payment of the sale of 2/3 portion of the land from R4 (see paragraph 522-526 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); v. The S&P dated 26.09.1989 executed by R2 on behalf of the Appellant is valid and enforceable because Section 127 of the Companies Act 1965 (‘Act 125’) does not prohibit a bankrupt to enter a contract on behalf of the company (see paragraphs 277-279 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); vi. R2, having known he was a bankrupt, had consulted and acted upon the advised of R7 when he executed S&P dated 26.09.1989 and MOT dated 24.10.1989. R2 also had obtained the consent of all the Appellant's directors to sell 8.5 acres of land to D4 to settle the Appellant's outstanding loan/debt amounting to RM 5.6 million with the Bangkok Bank. No evidence that the Appellant still owing the bank under the S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 facilities obtained (see paragraphs 163 and 166 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); vii. R3, acting on the advised of R7 had executed both MOT dated 24.10.1989 and charge dated 31.07.1990 for the sole purpose of obtaining an amount of money to settle the Appellant’s outstanding loan/debt with Bangkok Bank and had no intention to cheat or defraud the plaintiff (see paragraphs 190-191 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); viii. Nothing stated in S&P dated 26.09.1986 that 2/3 portion of the land was lent to R4 to enable R4 to procure the loan facility amounting to RM 24,000.000 (see paragraph 537 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); ix. R5 was not involved in S&P dated 26.09.1989, MOT dated 24.10.1989, and charge dated 31.07.1989. The involvement of R5 was only to introduce R2 to Thomas. R5 resigned from his position as the R4’s director on 05.06.1989 (see paragraphs 253, 255, 273, and 275 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); x. Based on the evidence tendered before the High Court, the service of the Court’s Order dated 14.07.1999 by R4 through R6 was regular and duly served at the registered address of the plaintiff (see the paragraphs 343 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 xi. No document shows that R8 has knowledge of the S&P dated 26.09.1989, MOT dated 24.10.1989, and charge dated 31.07.1990. Based on Section 8 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, R8 shall be constituted as the receiver of the properties and assets of R2 and R3 and had nothing to do with the land which belongs to the Appellant (see paragraphs 398,400-403 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (d) Based on the evidence tendered, it was proven that the registered address of the Appellant was never changed by R14. The learned High Court reasonings are as follows: i. The address at Lot 102-3, 1st Floor Kompleks Antarabangsa, Jalan Sultan Ismail 50250 is the address of Signet & Co. Sdn. Bhd., a company secretarial firm wherein R14 was employed and not the Appellant’s registered address (see paragraph 564 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment; case Summit Co (M) Sdn Bhd v Nikko Products (M) Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 68 FC); ii. During the tenure of R14 with the plaintiff from 04.09.1995 until 12.08.2011, the registered address of the Appellant remained on the 22nd Floor, Bangunan Perangsang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur (see paragraph 561 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iii. The Appellant’s registered address at 22nd Floor, Bangunan Perangsang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur remains unchanged until the lodgment of the Notice S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 in Form 44 made on 12.08.2011 by the Appellant’s new secretary, notifying the Registrar of Companies that the Appellant’s registered address was changed to No. 40-B, 2nd Floor, Jalan Lumut, Damai Kompleks, Kuala Lumpur (see paragraph 562 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); and iv. It is a settled law that the effective date of change of the registered address of a company is the date of lodgment of the notice in Form 44 to the Registrars of the Company. However, there was nothing in the bundles placed before the High Court which showed that R14 signed Form 44 affecting a change of the Appellant’s registered address (see paragraphs 565-567 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (e) Lot 6147 was not fraudulently transferred to R10, therefore, R10 is a bona fide purchaser of Lot 6147 and is protected with indefeasible title under Section 340 of the National Land Code. The learned High Court judge held that: i. The Appellant failed to prove that Lot 6147 was fraudulently transferred from R4 through R6 to R10; ii. D10 had purchased Lot 6147 at the market value fixed by the valuer (‘SD13’) appointed by the OCBC Bank; S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 iii. The Appellant also failed to prove that D10 had fraudulently subdivided Lot 6147 (see paragraphs 468-473 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iv. As of 25.02.2009, Lot 6147 was registered under R4 not R10 as alleged by the Appellant (see paragraphs 477-478 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment). B. Civil Suit 2 & Civil Suit 3 [52] Meanwhile, the basis for the learned High Court judge allowed R10’s claim against the Appellant in Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3 are as follows: (a) since the land belongs to R10, the plaintiff has no caveatable interest in the land. As a such the entry of caveat by the Appellant on Lot 6147 is improper and ought to be struck out (see paragraphs 491-492 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (b) given that the registered owner of Lot 6147 is R10, the Appellant's action of erecting constructions on the land is considered a trespass on R10 rights over the land (see paragraphs 405-498 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment). S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 The Appeal [53] Aggrieved with the decision, on 17.01.2020, the Appellant filed notices of appeal to this Court against the whole decision of the High Court dated 20.12.2019. This Court directed for these three appeals be heard and determined together. [54] Essentially, there were six main grounds of appeal listed by the Appellant in Memorandum of Appeal dated 17 March 2020 and Supplementary Memorandum of Appeal dated 25 July 2020: (a) the learned High Court Judge erred in law and in finding of fact in holding that there is no fraud or conspiracy to defraud by the Respondents against the Appellant; (b) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim is barred by Limitation Act 1953; (c) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948; (d) the learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents is barred by laches; (e) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 is applicable against the Appellant and that the 2/3 portion of the land has been purchased for valuable consideration and in good faith; S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (f) whether based on the facts and evidence, the decision of the High Court is correct in law. Our findings (a) The learned High Court Judge erred in law and in finding of fact in holding that there is no fraud or conspiracy to defraud by the Respondents against the Appellant [55] The law on fraud and conspiracy to defraud is trite. [56] Section 17 of the Contract Act 1950 stipulates that: “Fraud” includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of any fact by one can having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to fraudulent. Explanation – Mere silence as to the facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.” [57] In PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136 the Federal Court held: “Whether fraud exists is a question of fact, to be decided upon the circumstances of each particular case. Decided cases are only illustrative of fraud. Fraud must mean “actual fraud, i.e. dishonesty of some sort” for which the registered proprietor is party or privy. “Fraud is the same in all courts, but such expressions as ‘constructive fraud’ are…inaccurate;” but “fraud”…implies a willful act, on the part of one, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by unjustifiable means, of what he is entitled.” (per Romily M.R. in Green v Nixon (1857) 23 Beav 530 535 53 ER 208). Thus in Waimiha Sawmilling Co Ltd v Walone Timber Co Ltd [1926] AC 101 & 106 it was said that “if the designed object of a transfer be to cheat a man of a known existing right, that is fraudulent…”. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [58] In CIMB Bank Bhd v Veeran a/l Ayasamy [2015] 7 CLJ 289 the Court of Appeal held as follows: “The element of fraud and/or conspiracy must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. There must be something more than mere failure or an omission on the part of the third defendant. There can never be fraud and/or conspiracy cannot exist, where the intent to deceive does not exist.” [59] Thus, it is trite law the burden of proving a claim of conspiracy to defraud the Appellant against the Respondents remained at all time on the Appellant (see S. 101 Evidence Act 1950, Tow Kong Liang & Yang lain v Fbo Land (Setapak) Sdn Bhd [2018] 1 LNS 243 CA). [60] On elements of tort of conspiracy, the Court of Appeal in Renault Sa v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Appeals [2015] 5 CLJ 32 stated as follows: “In regard to the tort of conspiracy, the following need to be satisfied at the interlocutory stage: (a) an agreement between two or more persons (that is an agreement between Tan Chong and others); (b) an agreement for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar; S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 (c) that acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to Inokom and Quasar; (d) damage is essential element and where damage is not pleaded in the Statement of Claim may be struck out (see Yap JH v Tan Sri Loh Boon Siew & Ors [1991] 3 CLJ 2960; [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 243).” [61] In SCK Group Bhd & Anor v Sunny Siew Pang & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 389, [2011] 4 MLJ 393, the Court of Appeal stated that: “The tort of conspiracy was not constituted by conspiratorial agreement alone. For conspiracy to take place, there must also be an unlawful object, or if not in itself unlawful, it must be brought by unlawful means : See Davies v Thomas [1920] 2 Ch 189 per Warrington LJ, and Seah Siang Mong v Ong Ban Chai & Another Case [1998] 1 CLJ Supp 295 per Ghazali J (now FCJ). There must be a co-existence of an agreement with an over act causing damage to the plaintiffs. Hence, the tort is complete only if the agreement is carried into effect, thereby causing damage to the plaintiff. On order to succeed in a claim based on tort of conspiracy, the plaintiffs must establish: (a) an agreement between two or more persons; (b) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff; and (c) acts done in the execution of that agreement resulted in damage to the plaintiff: Marrinan v Vibart [1962] 1 All ER 869 at p. 871 per Salmon J; and Halsbury’s Law England (4th Ed) Vol 45 at p 271, as applied by Ghazali (now FCJ) in Seah Siang Mong.” S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [62] Guided by the clear settled principle of law enunciated in those authorities, the conspiracy must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that: (a) there is an agreement between any of the Respondent or between all the Respondents; (b) the predominant purpose of the agreement being for the purpose of injuring the Appellant; and (c) the fraudulent acts were committed in executing the agreement for the purpose of injuring the Appellant. [63] In Sinnayah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584 the Federal Court explained the standard of proof for fraud in a civil claim as follows: “As the correct principle to apply…where it was stipulated that at law, there are only two standard of proof, namely beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases and on the balance of probabilities for a civil cases. As such, even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. There is no third standard. Therefore, it is up to the presiding judge, after hearing and considering the evidence adduced as being done in any other civil claim, to find whether the standard of proof has been attained. The criminal aspect of the allegation of fraud and the standard of proof required is irrelevant in the deliberation.” S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 [64] Coming back to this case. The pivotal issue in this case concerns the validity of the S & P dated 26.9.1989 executed for the Appellant with R4 by R2 who was a bankrupt. Also on the validity of the MOT executed by R2 and R3 on 24.10.1989 (‘MOT dated 24.10.1989') for the Appellant to transfer 8.5 acres of the land to R4. The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was registered on 11.05.1990. Appellant also contended that the S&P and MOT were executed without the Appellant’s knowledge and approval. [65] R2 was the Managing Director and Director in the Appellant until he was declared bankrupt on 26.5.1989. R2 is the second largest shareholder in the Appellant. It was contended by the Appellant that Article 87(b) Article of Association of the Appellant disqualify any director from continuing holding the position as director in the Appellant once he is adjudged as a bankrupt. Thus, it was argued by the Appellant that R2 has no capacity or authorization and acted under fraud in signing the S & P on behalf of the Appellant after he was declared as a bankrupt. It is not in dispute that all the Appellant’s directors appointed in 1979, including R2 remained as such until 1995 when new directors appointed to take charge of the Appellant. [66] R3 was a director of the Appellant from 1979 to 1996. The second MOT for Lot 6148 was executed on 24.10.1990 by R3 together with one Ng Seah Keng who is also the Appellant’s director. R3 was declared bankrupt on 10.3.1993. He was discharged from bankrupt on 28.6.2010. [67] It is not in dispute that R2 and R3 managed and controlled the business of the Appellant since 31.5.1979 and made all decisions for the S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 Appellant. This practice was accepted without protest by the rest of the directors and shareholder of the Appellant. This was admitted by Ng Seah Hai (PW1), the sole witness of the Appellant under cross-examination by R6’s counsel – “DC6 : Now you also testified that D2 (R2) and D3 (R3) manage and make all decisions for the Plaintiff (Appellant) from 1979 without consulting or informing the rest of the directors or shareholders. You agree? PW1 : Yes. DC6 : Therefore, these decisions were made unilaterally by D2 and D3 without consultation, without resolution? PW1 : Yes.” [68] It is also not in disputed that the Appellant’s land was subject to legal charges in favour Bangkok Bank, registered vide Presentation No. 6426/78 Jil 127 Folio 127, Presentation No. 5304/83 Jil 267 Folio 52 and Presentation No. 5305/83 Jil 267 Folio 53, as security for the facilities obtained by the Appellant. In 1988 the Appellant was facing financial difficulties as its onion business was failing and the Appellant defaulting its loans. Bangkok Bank notified the Appellant that if the Appellant fails to repay its outstanding loans, the bank will take legal action to enforce its securities under the Deed of Debenture and to foreclose the charged lands. To avoid the risk of losing the lands, the directors and shareholders agreed to sell the land to their close relative Ng Kok Lian at a price of RM5.6 million, as to repay Appellant’s outstanding loans with Bangkok Bank. Following that, Ng Kok Lian then informed the Appellant that R4 had offered to buy the land at a purchase price of RM7.5 million to be paid S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 by way of the issuance of 1,000,000 shares of RM1.00 each at par to the Appellant and the balance purchase price to be paid to Messrs Durai & Associates. On 26.9.1989, the Appellant and R4 entered the S&P for the sale of the 2/3 portion of the land for purchase price of RM7.5 million. [69] It is to be noted that clause 3.03(a) of the S & P requires the Appellant to apply for partition of the land but in the event the Appellant is unable to procure a separate document of title to the 2/3 portion of the land, the whole of the title will be charged for the financing of the purchase by R4. In such instance, R4 shall be authorized to sign all documents for partitioning and surrender the title to the issuing authority for a new document of title for the 2/3 portion of the land. [70] On 13.10.1989, Messrs Durai & Associates issued a letter to Bangkok Bank forwarding the redemption sum payment. Pursuant to the redemption payment, Bangkok Bank charges over the land were discharged on 20.11.1989. This was acknowledged by the Appellant vide its letter dated 6.6.1990 to Messrs. Durai & Associates. On 19.1.1994, Messrs. Durai & Associates conforming the Appellant on the due completion of payment of purchase price. The learned High Court judge accepted that there was evidence of payment of the purchase price by R4 for the purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land (see paras 21-22, 150, 168 Grounds of Judgment). [71] The Appellant’s cause of action is premised on the underlying assumption that the Appellant is the rightful owner of the 2/3 portion of the land known as Lot 1487. The Appellant’s case is that the S & P dated S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 26.9.1989 entered for the Appellant by R2 who was a bankrupt, with R4 was without Appellant’s resolution to sell the 2/3 portion of the land and without the knowledge of the rest of the directors of the Appellant. The Appellant further alleged that the 2/3 portion of the land that was transferred to R4 and subsequently by R6 (the Manager and Receiver of R4) to R9 and later by R9 to R10 were procured fraudulently. It was contended by the Appellant that R4 and R5 had conspired with R2, R3, and R7 to fraudulently enter into the S & P dated 26.9.1989. Several authorities were cited to support the Appellant’s argument: PJTB Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136, CIMB Bank Berhad v Abdul Rafi a/l Abdul Razak & Ors [2012] MLJU 804, Yap Sau Choon @ Yap Bee Yong & Anor v Cheong Hong Mun & Ors [2016] MLJU 1203. Appellant had relied heavily on the evidence of PW1 (Ng Seah Hai) as its main witness. However, PW1 admitted that he had no personal knowledge over the S & P, MOT and the chargers and only averred relating the fraud or conspiracy based on what he heard from his mother and his brother Ng Seah Kheng. As such, the evidence of PW1 (Ng Seah Hai) are at best, hearsay and we find that that learned High Court judge was correct in not giving such evidence any weight. [72] Coming back to the position of R2, any party dealing with the Appellant, including R4, the OBB (bank) as chargee, R6, R9 and R10 could not have known that R2 had ceased to be a director of the Appellant with effect from 26.5.1989 (bankruptcy order) and were entitled to assume that R2 had the apparent or ostensible authority to execute the S&P, MOT and charge on behalf of the Appellant. R2 was allowed to continue remain in control of the management and affairs of the Appellant until 1995 without any protest of the Appellant or any other directors of the Appellant. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 The Appellant ought to be estopped from now suggesting that R2 lacks of authority to act for the Appellant. The learned High Court judge held, and we agree, that by virtue of indoor management rule/ Turquand’s rule, and as enshrined under sections 20(1) and 127 of the Companies Act 1965 (now repealed by Companies Act 2016), the act of R2, in realizing the charged dan selling the 2/3 portion of the land to settle the Appellant’s outstanding loan arrears with Bangkok Bank was valid (see Grounds of Judgment paras 335 – 337). On the facts of this case, we find that Turquand rule as decided in Royal British Bank v Turquand [1843-60] All EE 435, applies: “Persons dealing with the company were bound to make themselves acquainted with the statute and the deed of settlement of the company, but they were not bound to do more; a person, on reading the deed of settlement, would find, not a prohibition against borrowing, but a permission to borrow on certain conditions, and, learning that the authority might be made complete by a resolution, he would have right to infer the fact of a resolution authorizing that which on the fact of the document appeared to be legitimately done; and therefore, the company was liable whether or not a resolution had been passed.” [See also Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 465 FC]. [73] On the issue of authority or lack thereof of the R2, we can do no better than to reproduce the following excerpt from the judgment in Phang S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 Tat Meng t/a Tat Meng Company v Reka Cipta Solusi Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 LNS 88, the court held: “35. On the facts herein, the Defendants pointed that the fraud alleged by the Plaintiff is plainly answered by s. 127 of the Company Act 1965 which reads: ‘127. Validity of acts of directors and officers The acts of director or manager or secretary shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification.’ 36. Reading ss 125(1) and s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 together, I am of the view that the statute contemplates only a penalty to be imposed on undischarged bankrupt who has acted on behalf of the company but the statute does not avoid contracts entered into by him on behalf of the company such as the case of the Consent Judgment herein. (para 77 GOJ). 37. Accordingly, provision in s.127 of the Companies Act 1965 is my view sufficient to negate the fraud argument raised by the Plaintiff in attempt to set aside the Consent Judgment. It is plain and obvious to me that the Plaintiff’s action is hence unsustainable. Be that it may, the Plaintiff has also not adduced any evidence in the affidavits to illustrate how the Plaintiff was prejudiced or unduly influenced by the alleged fraud by deception through the non revelation or concealment of his S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 bankruptcy by the bankrupt director. It must be borne in my mind that the First Defendant as a company is a separate legal entity from its directors and shareholders. 38. For completeness, I further hold that s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 herein override the common law specie of fraud due to concealment of material …”. [74] In Stem Resources Sdn Bhd v Kekal Lestari Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi [2013] 10 CLJ the court held- “(1) Perbuatan SP2 menandatangani perjanjian tersebut tidak menjejaskan kesahan dan kesahihan perjanjian tersebut menurut kuasa peruntukan s. 127 Akta Syarikat 1965 (Akta 125). Seksyen 127 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan apa-apa perbuatan seseorang pengarah, pengurus atau setiausaha walaupun kemudiannya didapati ada kecacatan pada pelantikan atau kelayakannya. Seksyen 127 terpakai apabila terdapat pelantikan yang defektif seperti yang berlaku dalam hal pelantikan SP2 melalui resolusi bertarikh 15 Jun 2004. D1 dan D2 tidak boleh menyatakan perjanjian tersebut terbatal kerana s. 127 Akta 125 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan perbuatan SP2 menandatatangani perjanjan tersebut dan dengan perjanjian itu, perjanjian yang ditandatangani adalah sah dan mengikat defendan (see para 278 GOJ).” (See also Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Choo Meng Chong & Anor [1999] 7 CLJ 300, Re Chua Tin Hong Ex Parte Castrol (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 174). S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 [75] Learned counsel for the Appellant was unable to cite any authority, on the contrary, to support her arguments that the S & P is invalid due R2’s lack of authority to act for the Appellant. Thus, it is our considered view that the learned High Court judge did not erred in holding that the S & P dated 26.9.1989 is a valid and enforceable agreement. [76] R6 particularly was appointed as Receiver & Manager (R&M) of R4 on 16.4.1992. The Facility Agreement, S & P, Deed of Debenture and Charge had all been entered into and executed by the Appellant with R4 prior to the appointment of R6. R4 was no longer the registered or beneficial owner of the 2/3 portion of the land with effect from 5.12.2009 following the transfer of ownership to R10. R6 ceased to be the R&M of the R4 on 27.12.2010. The subdivision of Lot 6147 which led to the issuance of titles Lot 10001 – Lot 10005 was applied by R10, and after R6 had ceased his responsibilities and duties as R&M of R4 with effect from 27.12.2010. [77] In RHB Bank Berhad v Ali bin Abdul Kadir and Anor [2005] 1 LNS 391, the court held that the 2nd defendant-bank had no cause of action against the receiver and managers whose duty is limited to enforcing the security and the subject contract for sale of goods was entered into prior the appointment of the receiver and managers, no liability can be attached to receiver and managers by virtue section 183 of the Companies Act. [78] Coming back to this case, the learned High Court judge held that R6 cannot be found guilty or liable to the Appellant for exercising his duties in good faith by enforcing the security in favour of OBB, which includes the S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 sale and transfer of the 2/3 portion of the land and well supported by section 183(1) of the Companies Act (see para 345-346 of Grounds of Judgment). Thus, it is impossible for R6 to be said that have been involved in any fraud or conspiracy to defraud the Appellant. The learned High Court judge held, and we agree, that the Appellant was not even able to establish that R6 knew the other Respondents, let alone that any agreement was reached between them to defraud and injure the Appellant (see paras 338-339 Grounds of Judgment). [79] The learned High Court judge held that the Appellant had failed to discharge its burden of proving, on a balance probabilities, the basic element of a claim for fraud or conspiracy to defraud and injure the Appellant. Having considered the evidence in totality, the learned High Court judge made the following findings : “485. Daripada apa yang dinyatakan, Mahkamah dapati bahawa elemen-elemen frod tidak dipatuhi oleh Plaintif, begitu juga dengan kospirasi seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. 486. Mahkamah dapati dari segi frod dan/atau kospirasi untuk memfrodkan Plaintif, Plaintif gagal membuktikannya atas imbangan kebarangkalian. 487. Dalam tindakan ini Mahkamah dapati Plaintiff gagal membuktikan frod dan/atau kospirasi memfrodkan ke atas Plaintif, maka dengan transaksi-transaksi untuk pindahmilik tanah tersebut merupakan transaksi yang bebas dari isu frod seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. Defendan Kesepuluh telah S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 memberi balasan memberi balasan yang sepenuhnya kepada Defendan Kesembilan. 488. Maka dengan itu, Defendan Kesepuluh di dalam tindakan ini merupakan pembeli bona fide ke atas tanah tersebut daripada Defendan Kesembilan.” [80] The learned High Court judge found no credible evidence that there was in existence of fraud or conspiracy to defraud by any of the Respondents on the Appellant. Her Ladyship had considered the testimonies, the contemporaneous documents and the whole circumstances and probabilities of the case (Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229). We had carefully perused the grounds of judgment of the learned High Court judge. We find that there is no appealable error to warrant any appellate interference on the findings. (b) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim is barred by Limitation Act 1953 [81] Respondents had expressly pleaded that they were relying on the Limitation Act and laches as a defence (paragraph 42 p. 462 6th Respondent’ Core Bundle of Documents (Vol.1)(Encl. 203 o Appeal Records)). For any action that is based upon fraud or conspiracy to defraud of the defendant or his agent, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant discovered the actual fraud in 2012 after the Appellant saw the Deed of Debenture dated S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 22.9.1889 and the High Court Order dated 14.9.1999 for Specific Performance of the S & P dated 26.9.1989. Thus, the Appellant’s claim is not barred by Limitation Act 1953 or laches. PW1, the Appellant’s sole witness admitted that the directors and shareholders of the Appellant first knew or discovered the alleged fraud in relation to the sale and purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4 since 8.7.1994 when Tan Soo Lang entered a private caveat on the 2/3 portion of the land. [82] The learned High Court judge in her grounds of judgment had considered this issue and made the following findings: “380. Alasan permohonan Tan Soo Lang untuk memasukkan kaveat persendirian (Ikatan B3 muka surat 574 – D264) dengan alasan seperti berikut” “alasan-alasan tuntutan saya atas tanah/kepentingan itu ialah berdasarkan tanah itu adalah kepunyaan syarikat Kim Guan Choong Sdn. Bhd. Dan sebahagian tanah itu sedang dijual secara frod dan sebahagian lagi telah dijual secara frod. 381. Menurut Surat Akuan dari Tan Soo Lang di dalam permohonan untuk kemasukan kaveat persendirian beliau, beliau mengaku bahawa kaveat tersebut dimasukkan bagi pihak Plaintif. Beliau merupakan pemegang saham dan Pengarah asal Syarikat Plaintif tersebut. 382. Jadi dari keterangan yang dikemukakan, saya dapati kali pertama Plaintif ketahui yang penjualan 2/3 bahagian Lot 1487 S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 yang dikatakan dilakukan secara frod itu telah diketahui oleh Plaintif sejak 8.7.1994 lagi.” (emphasis added) [83] PW1 further admitted that despite the alleged fraud in 1994, there is no legal action taken by the Appellant to recover or challenge the validity of the S&P, MOT and the creation and registration of the charge and the transfer of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4 until this action was filed by the Appellant against all the Respondents. [84] The Appellant’s action herein was filed in March 2012, which is more than 18 years from the first discovery of the alleged fraud. As such, it is clearly that the Appellant’s claim for the discovery of the 2/3 portion of the land is barred by limitation pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953 and section 29 of the Act. [85] Section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 stipulates that- “9(1) No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him, or if it first accrued to some person through whom he claim, to that person.” [86] Section 29 of the Act provides postponement of limitation period in case of fraud or mistake, as follows- S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 “29. Where, in case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either- (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims as aforesaid; or (b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the case may be, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it: Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any action to be brought to recover, or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which- (i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that any fraud had been committed; or (ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration, subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made, by S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 a person who did not know or have reason to believe that mistake had been made.” [87] The learned High Court judge held that the Appellant’s action is barred by section 9 read and section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953. Her Ladyship held as follows: “237. Mahkamah ini dapati tarikh 8.7.1994 (sic) inilah Plaintif ketahui tentang frod yang didakwa oleh Plaintif dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam penjualan 2/3 bahagian tanah tersebut kepada Defendan Keempat. 238. Tindakan ini difailkan pada bulan Mac 2012. 239. Manakala kali pertama Plaintif tahu tentang apa yang dikatakan frod dilakukan terhadap Plaintif adalah pada 8.7.1994. Ini bermakna selepas 18 tahun lebih Plaintif mendapat tahu tentang frod barulah Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan Kelima. Ini adalah jelas menujukkan yang Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa 12 tahun dari tarikh 8.7.1994 untuk Plaintif menuntut terhadap Defendan Kelima. Jadi, Mahkamah dapati atas isu had masa ini Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa untuk menuntut terhadap Defendan Kelima. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 240. Dengan itu, Mahkamah dapati tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kelima telah dihalang oleh had masa mengikut Seksyen 9 dan Seksyen 29 Akta Had Masa 1953 dan dengan itu tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kelima ditolak dengan kos.” [88] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on this issue, we find that the learned High Court judge is perfectly correct in holding that the Appellant’s action against the Respondents, likewise, is barred pursuant to section 9 and section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953 (see Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32 FC, Nadefinco Ltd v Kevin Corporation Sdn Bhd [1978] 2 MLJ 59 FC, Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409). We find no appealable error of law or fact in the findings of the learned judge which was based on evidence. (c) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 [89] It was contended by R1 and R8 that the Appellant’s action against R1 and R8 is barred pursuant to section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Act 198). For the Appellant, it was argued that R1 has statutory power to investigate the validity of the MOT and the application for subdivision of Lot 1487 and should not allowed the applications pending their investigation. The case of Goh Seng Chue & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Hulu Selangor and Ors [2017] MLJU 1390 was cited to support the argument. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 [90] We reproduce Section 2 of the Act which provides as follows- “Where, after the doming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuant or execution or intended execution of any written law on of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provision shall have affect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuation of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof.” [91] Section 38 of the Act provides- “Limitation of actions Any written law relating to the limitation of time for bringing proceedings against public authorities may be relied upon by the Government as a defence in any civil proceedings against the Government.” [92] In Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409, the court held – S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 “The limitation law is promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiffs from sleeping on their actions and more importantly to have a definite end to litigation. The rationale of the limitation law should be appreciated and enforced by the Courts.” [93] In Selvarajoo Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor [2006] 2 CLJ, the Court of Appeal held- “The provision of s. 2(a) PAPA 1948 and very clear and do not provide for any court discretion as they are mandatory in name.” [94] In Tasja Sdn Bhd v Golden Approach Sdn Bhd [2011] 3 CLJ 751, the Federal Court held- “If it is based on Section 2(a) of the Public Protection Act 1948 or Section 7(5) of the Civil Law Act 1956, where the period of limitation is absolute then in a clear and obvious case such application should be granted without having to plead such a defence. However, in a situation where limitation is not absolute, like in a case under the Limitation Act, such application for striking out should not be allowed until and unless limitation is pleaded as required under section 4 of the Limitation Act 1953.” [95] The Appellant’s action herein was filed in March 2012, which is more than 18 years from the first discovery of the alleged fraud. As such, it is clearly that the Appellant’s action against R1 and R8 being a public S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 authorities and acted in the performance of its public duty i.e. accepted and registered the MOT dated 24.10. 1989 and the Specific Performance Order dated 14.7.1999 for the subdivision of Lot 1487, is barred by limitation pursuant to section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Act 198)(Revised 1978). We agree with the learned High Court judge that R1 has no duty to enquire further on Form 14A that is fit for registration pursuant to section 301 of the National Land Code (Hamdan bin Jaafar & Ors v Osman bin Mohamed & Ors [2012] 1 LNS 1108). [96] We also agree with the learned judge on her findings that the Appellant’s action on R1 and R8 is barred pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953. (d) The learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents is barred by laches [97] The doctrine of laches was succinctly explained by His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd [1989] 2 MLJ 202 as follows: “Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a claim. A court of equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by laches. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches the court considers whether there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part and any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant. The doctrine of laches rests on the S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 consideration that it is unjust to give a plaintiff a remedy where he has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though not waiving the remedy put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if remedy were afterwards to be asserted : 14 Halsbury’s Law of England (3rd Ed) paras 1181, 1182. Laches has been succinctly described as ‘in action with one’s eyes open’.” [98] Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 provides as follow- “Nothing in this Act shall effect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence laches or otherwise.” [99] Despite being aware since July 1994 of the sale of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4, the Appellant did not take any timely action to recover the 2/3 portion of the land or set aside R4’s registered ownership of the 2/3 portion of the land or the charge created in favour of OBB over the land. There is undue delay of more than 18 years on the part of the Appellant in filing this action. During the period of delay, R6 had in his capacity as R&M and agent of R4 and in the believe that the Appellant did not intend to make any claim in respect of the 2/3 portion of the land, altered the position of R4 to its detriment by selling the 2/3 portion of the land to R9, paying the redemption sum to OUB, as registered charge, for the discharge of the charge registered and transferred the 2/3 portion of the land into the name of R9’s nominee, R10. The issue of laches was raised by R10 in their defence to the Appellant’s claim. S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 [100] In Faber Merlin (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Lye This Sang & Anor and Tan Kim Chua Realty (M) Sdn Bhd v Lye Thai sang & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 380, the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of laches and found that the plaintiffs were estopped because they were guilty of laches in that since 1978, although the plaintiffs knew that the acts of the defendant were contrary to the agreement, no action had been taken against the defendant until 23 May 1983 where the plaintiff filed an originating summons against the defendant praying to declaratory judgment. The court refused to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief on the grounds that there was evidence of “laches, acquiescence and delay.” (see also: Wu Shu Chen (Sole Executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased) & Anor v Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Hussin [1997] 2 MLJ 487; Soon Poy Yong @ Soon Puey Yong v Westport Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 1 MLJ 196). [101] The learned High Court judge had addressed on the issue of laches and made the following findings- “459. Di dalam kes semasa ini, pihak Plaintif setelah apa yang didakwa sebagai pindahmilik 2/3 bahagian Lot 1487 dikatakan dibuat secara frod telah diketahui oleh Plaintif sejak tahun 1994 lagi, maka kegagalan Plaintif untuk mendakwa atas perlakuan frod itu setelah lebih kurang 18 tahun telah berlalu dari tarikh Plaintif mengetahui tentang apa yang dikatakan perlakuan frod itu menjadikan tuntutan ini tertakluk kepada doktrin kelewatan yang tidak munasabah. Maka Seksyen 32, Akta Had Masa 1953 akan S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 terpakai disini dan Mahkamah atas isu ini sahaja boleh menolak tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kesepuluh.” [102] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on the issue, we find that the learned High Court judge is perfectly correct in holding that the Appellant’s action is barred pursuant to doctrine of laches to defeat the Appellant’s declaratory relief (which is an equitable remedy) to recover the 2/3 portion of the land. We therefore find no basis to conclude that the judge was plainly wrong on the issue of laches. (e) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 is applicable against the Appellant and that the 2/3 portion of the land has been purchased for valuable consideration and in good faith by R4, R9 and R10. [103] Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the title registered under R4 and subsequently R10 was obtained by fraud and therefore defeasible and the proviso under section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 does not apply. Several authorities were cited to support the argument: Tan Yin Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 [2010] MLJU 10 FC, Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 4 CLJ 626 CA. The learned High Court judge held that R10 (subsequent purchaser) who had purchase the 2/3 portion of the land Lot 6147 from R9 (immediate purchaser) in good faith and for valuable consideration of RM8.5 million has acquired an indefeasible title under the provision of section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 and therefore the S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 Appellant is precluded from seeking recovery of the 2/3 portion of the land from R10. [104] In this respect, the Federal Court decision in Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 is instructive. In departing from Adorna Properties, the Federal Court held that the rights and title of a subsequent purchaser who acquires a title in good faith and for valuable consideration from the purchaser, is indefeasible pursuant to the proviso under section 340(3) of the National Land Code (see also: Yap Ham Seow v Fatimawati Ismail & Ors and Another Appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 645). [105] In this respect, the learned High Court judge held- “488. Di dalam tindakan ini Mahkamah dapati Plaintif gagal membuktikan frod dan/atau konspirasi menfrod ke atas Plaintif, maka dengan itu transaksi-transaksi untuk pindahmilik tanah tersebut merupakan transaksi yang bebas dari isu frod seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. Defendan Kesepuluh telah memberi balasan yang sepenuhnya kepada Defendan Kesembilan. 489. Maka dengan itu, Defendan Kesepuluh di dalam tindakan ini merupakan pembeli bona fide ke atas tanah tersebut daripada Defendan Kesembilan.” S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 [106] We agree with the learned High Court that R10 being a subsequent purchaser who had purchased the 2/3 portion of the land from R9 and R9 who had purchased the same 2/3 portion of the land from R4 had obtained an indefeasible title under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code as it has proven that they were a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. We also agree with findings of the learned High Court judge that the Appellant had failed to rebut the evidence that R10 had purchased the 2/3 portion of the land from R9 in good faith and for valuable consideration of RM8,200,000.00 without any notice of the Appellant’s purported interest or rights in the 2/3 portion of the land. The findings are not perverse. [107] We agree that the learned High Court judge did not erred in law and in fact in allowing R10’s claims against the Appellant for the removal of private caveat entered by the Appellant and for the acts of trespass onto the 2/3 portion of the land that is registered under R10’s as the proprietor. Conclusion [108] Quite clearly the outcome of this case turned primarily on findings of fact. In our view, based on the evidence led during the trial, it cannot be said that the learned trial judge’s conclusion upon the evidence was plainly wrong. We need only refer to the reminder by the Federal Court in Ng Hooi Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased& Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 FC; [2010] 10 CLJ CA: S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 “As long as the trial judge’s conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts.” [109] In light of all the above, we unanimously find that there is no appealable error to warrant any appellate interference in this case. We accordingly dismiss Appeal 39, Appeal 134 and Appeal 135 with costs of RM5,000 to Respondent 1, RM5,000 to Respondent 2, RM1,000 to Respondent 3, RM5,000 to Respondent 5, RM15,000 to Respondent 6, RM5,000 to Respondent 8, RM15,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 39, RM5,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 134, RM5,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 135, RM5,000 to Respondent 13 and RM5,000 to Respondent 14. All costs given be subject to allocator except on Respondent 1 and Respondent 8. t.t (YAACOB HAJI MD SAM) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Dated 01 November 2023 S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 Counsels/Solicitors For the Appellant: Sharon Shakila Gabriel Venkateswari a/p P. Alagendra (Tetuan N. Saraswathy Devi) For the Respondents: First Respondent (R1): Siti Hafiza Jaafar (Penang ALA) (Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pulau Pinang) Second Respondent (R2): Datuk V.M. Ravindran (Tetuan V. M. Ravi & Associates) Third Respondent (R3): (In person) Fourth Respondent (R4): (Not represented) Fifth Respondent (R5): Alan Chua Hock Kwang Shreena Kaur Sidhu (Tetuan Alan Chua & Co) S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 Sixth Respondent (R6): Datin Jeyanthini Sathya Kumardas Sharon Kaur Jessy (Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co) Seventh Repondent (R7): (Not represented) Eight Respondent: Uma Devi a/p Balasubramaniam (SFC) Hafizah Johor binti Arif Johor (Jabatah Insolvensi Malaysia) Nineth Respondent (R9): (Not represented) Tenth Respondent (R10): Andrian Lee Yung Khin Hanis Hazidi (Tetuan Maxwell Kenion Cowdy & Jones) Thirteenth Respondent (R13): Chong Choon Choy (Tetuan C.C. Chong & Associates) S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 Twelfth Respondent (R14): Subath a/p Sathinathan S. Vasanthi (Tetuan Cheah Teh & Su) S/N 457yRhtiOEmCY1OxuzQdvw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	87,913	Tika 2.6.0
P-02(NCvC)(W)-135-01/2020	PERAYU KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD RESPONDEN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD	mandatory injunction - caveat – remove of caveat - Specific Performance – fraud - beneficial and registered owner - Private Caveat - Memorandum of Transfer - limitation period under Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities and Protection Act 1948 (‘Act 198’) - doctrine of laches - limitation period under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘Act 254’) - statutory duties -“Nor Further Action/NFA” -section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 - Section 17 of the Contract Act 1950 - rightful owner – of the land - bankruptcy order)- of indoor management rule/ Turquand’s rule – declaratory - an indefeasible title under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code - purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration.	30/11/2023	YA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamKorumYA Datuk Yaacob Bin Haji Md SamYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin Abdullah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=02025678-83bd-4a16-a591-c389554247ac&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-39-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU (NO. SYARIKAT :11580 – P) DAN 1. PENGARAH PEJABAT TANAH DAN GALIAN PULAU PINANG 2. NG SEAH HUNG (NO. K/P:431206-07-5193) 3. NG SEAH HOCK (NP. K/P: 540808-07-5003) 4. SWISS LEISURE PRODUCTS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 178923-V) 5. LEOW TEOW HONG (NO. K/P: 521015-07-5069) 6. LIM TIAN HUAT 7. B. RAJADURAI 8. KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN INSOLVENSI MALAYSIA 30/11/2023 15:21:01 P-02(NCvC)(W)-135-01/2020 Kand. 187 S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 9. CARAWAN VENTURE SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT : 300744-U) 10. GEENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 869514-U) 11. YAP MOH YIN (NO. K/P: 5485519) 12. CHEN YEN MOOI (NO. K/P: 5485519) 13. KERK CHIN LIONG (NO. K/P: 8163803) 14. NG YIM KONG (LS 00088343)(NO. K/P: 490424-08-5883) … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-134-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 DAN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD … RESPONDEN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN SIVIL) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(NCVC)(W)-135-01/2020 ANTARA KIM GUAN CHOONG SDN BHD … PERAYU DAN GREENTECH INDUSTRIES SDN BHD … RESPONDEN CORUM YAACOB HAJI MD SAM, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IBRAHIM, JCA AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH, JCA S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are three (3) related appeals before us which are as follows: i. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC)(W) - 39 - 01/2020 (“Appeal 39”); ii. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC(W)) - 134 - 01/2020 (“Appeal 134” ); and iii. Civil Appeal No. P-01(NCVC)(W) - 135 – 1/2020 (“Appeal 135”). Appeal 39 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in dismissing the Appellant’s claim against the 1st Respondent, 2nd Respondent; 3rd Respondent, 4th Respondent, 5th Respondent, 6th Respondent, 7th Respondent, 9th Respondent, 8th Respondent, 10th Respondent, 11th Respondent, 12th Respondent, 13th Respondent and 14th Respondent and awarding costs of RM60,000.00 each to be paid by the Appellant to the respective R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R8, R13 and R14 herein. Appeal 134 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in allowing Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd (10th Respondent)’s claim against the Appellant with costs. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Appeal 135 is the Appellant Kim Guan Choong Sdn Bhd’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Malaya, Penang in allowing Greentech Industries Sdn Bhd (10th Respondent)’s claim against the Appellant with a total costs of RM80,000.00. Background facts [2] The Appellant (plaintiff) is a family-owned company incorporated by one, Ng Boon Kow, and after his demise on 31.5.1979, the following persons were the directors of the Appellant and remained as such until 30.05.1992: (a) Madam Tan Soo Lang @ Tan Choon Lian; (b) Ng Seah Hung (‘R2’); (c) Ng Seah Hock (‘R3’); (d) Ng Seah Kang; (e) Ng Seah Kheng; (f) Ng Seah Theam; (g) Ng Seah Hai (PW1); and (h) Oi Siah Cheng [3] Meanwhile, the Respondents in this case, can be identified as follows: Respondents/Defendants Remarks 1. Pengarah, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Pulau Pinang (‘D1’) (‘R1’) D1 is the Director of Land Mining Pulau Pinang. 2. Ng Seah Hung (‘D2’) (‘R2’) D2 is the former director of the plaintiff and was adjudgedbankrupt on 26.05.1989 . 3. Ng Seah Hock (‘D3’) (‘R3’) D3 is the former director of the plaintiff and was adjudged bankrupt on 10.03.1993. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 4. Syarikat Leisure Product Sdn. Bhd. “ (‘D4’) (‘R4’) D4 is a private limited company. 5. Leow Teow Hong (‘D5’) (‘R5’) 1. D5 is the Director of D4 and at all material times dealt with D2, D3, D6, D7, and D8. 2. D5 is also a shareholder in Powerama Holdings Sdn. Bhd, a shareholder of D4. 6. Lim Tian Huat (‘D6’) (‘R6’) 1. D6 is a Receiver and Manager of D4 and is also the Chairman of CLRC, Companies Commission of Malaysia; and 2. D6 was appointed as the Receiver and Manager of D4 on 16.04.1992. 7. B Rajadurai (‘D7’) (‘R7’) 1. D7 is an advocate and solicitor, practicing as such previously at Messrs. Durai & Associates, KL; 2. D7 was adjudged a bankrupt vide Adjudicating and Receiving Order dated 25.11.1999; and 3. The plaintiff had obtained the leave of Court vide Order of Court dated 09.03.2013 to bring and continue this action against D7. 8. Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Malaysia (D8)(‘R8’) 1. D8 is the Director General of the Department of Insolvency of Malaysia in Pulau Pinang, vested with the estates of D2 and D3; 2. D8’s officer having conduct of D2 and D3 estate was one N. Dharmasegaran. 9. Cerawan Venture Sdn. Bhd. (‘D9’)(‘R9’) 1. D9 is a private limited company; 2. The directors for D9 include Mr.Kalaiselvam a/l Suppiah and Philip a/l Eridianathan. Both were appointed as D9 directors on 07.03.2011; 3. Unfortunately, Kalaiselvan died on 05.03.2012. 10. Greentech Industries Sdn. Bhd. (‘D10’) (‘R10’) D10 is a private limited company. 11. Kerk Chin Leong (‘D13’) (‘R13’ D13 is the director of D4 appointed on/before 21.04.1990. D13 is also a shareholder of D4. 12. Ng Yim Kong (‘D14’) (‘R14’) 1. D14 was the former company secretary to the Plaintiff, appointed on 18.08.1995. 2. D14 was also the company secretary to D4, appointed on 28.11.1991. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [4] The subject matter in dispute, in this case, refers to the 2/3 portion of the land that belongs to the plaintiff which was transferred to R4 and subsequently transferred to R10. The title of the land has been changed several times as follows: (a) The land was held under Temporary Title No. H.S (D) 120, Mukim 14, Daerah Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang. was registered on 30.06.1978 under the plaintiff's name (‘HSD 120’); (b) HSD 120 subsequently became known as HS(D) 296 Mukim 14 Daerah Seberang Perai, Negeri Pulau Pinang, and the date of the issuance of this title is 11.06.1990 (‘HSD 296’); (c) Thereafter, HSD 296 became known as Title No. 1487 (Plot 7) Seksyen 3, Bandar Butterworth, Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang, Mak Mandin Industrial Estate Mukim 14 Daerah Seberang Perai (‘Lot 1487’); (d) Later, Lot 1487 was subdivided/partitioned and further issued under the separate document title as follows: PN 6708 Lot 6147 (2/3 portion of the land (‘Lot 6147’) registered under the name of D4 and after that D10); and PN 6709 Lot 6148 (1/3 portion of the land registered under the plaintiff) (‘Lot 6148’). S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (e) Subsequently, there was a further subdivision of Lot 6147 into six (6) Lots by D10 (Lot 10000, Lot 10001, Lot 10002, Lot 10004, Lot 10005 and Lot 10006). (The subject matter in dispute, in this case will be used interchangeably as 8.5 acres of the land or 2/3 portion of the land or Lot 6147) The Appeals The Appellant’s case [5] After the demised of Ng Boon Kow, R2 and R3 controlled and managed the Appellant. [6] Based on Clause 87 (b) of the Appellant's Article of Associations, a member of the board of directors ceases to hold office if he becomes bankrupt or is legally deprived of the administration of his estate. [7] R2 & R3 have been adjudged bankrupts on 26.05.1989 and 10.03.1993 respectively. [8] However, R2 as bankrupt has acted for the Appellant in the following matters: (a) on 26.09.1989, R2 entered into a sale and purchase agreement dated 26.09.1989 (‘S&P dated 26.09.1986’) (see pp. 142-155 of Ikatan Teras 1 of R6) with R4 for the sale of 8.5 acres of the land for the amount of RM 7.5 million; and (b) on 24.10.1989, R2 executed a memorandum of transfer Form 14A (‘MOT dated 24.10.1989') (see pp. 158-159 Ikatan S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Teras 1 of R6) for the Appellant to transfer 8.5 acres of the land to D4 (Swiss Leasure Products Sdn Bhd). The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was registered on 11.05.1990. [9] Appellant’s further alleged that on 30.05.1992, R2 had removed four of the Appellant’s directors which are Ng Seah Kang, Ng Seah Theam, Ng Seah Keng and Ng Seah Hai without their knowledge. R2 then appointed his wife and his daughter as the Appellant’s directors. [10] On 12.02.1994, R2, his wife, his daughter and one Gopalakrishnan entered into agreement with Merge Port (M) Sdn. Bhd. (‘Merge Port’), to sell another portion of the land to Merge Port for purchase price of RM24 million. This caused, the late Tan Soo Lang, the Appellant's director entered a caveat on the land on 08.07.1994. [11] On 14.09.1994, Tan Soo Lang also filed a motion No.: 25-57-94 against Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah Pulau Pinang and Merge Port, for an order that the registration of transfer executed in favour of Merge Port be cancelled and alternatively be declared as null and void. On 17.10.1994, the High Court allowed the said application. [12] The Appellant also commenced four (4) other lawsuits against R2 and R3 in 1994 and onwards. Appellant alleged that N. Dharmasegaran from R8 knew the lawsuits commenced by the Appellant against R2 and R3 because he appeared for R2 in all of the proceedings. [13] On 03.11.1994, Ng Seah Kheng lodged a police report alleging that his signature in the MOT dated 24.10.1989 was forged. (‘Police Report dated 03.11.1994’). S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [14] On 20.06.2001, the Appellant was wound up vide Court’s Order dated 20.06.2001. The Appellant’s solicitor had sent documents including the land titles, being assets of the Appellant to the Insolvency Officer. On 12.11.2010, the Appellant was released of its wound-up status vide Order of Court dated 12.11.2010. [15] On 04.07.2011, R10 filed Originating Summon No.: 24-1263-2011 against the Appellant for an order of mandatory injunction, that is to order the Appellant to remove all buildings, toilets and lamp posts, gates, and all erections on Lot 6147, (‘OS 1’). [16] As a result, the Appellant entered a caveat on Lot 6147 on 13.11.2011 (‘caveat dated 13.11.2011’). [17] Later, R10 filed another OS No. 24-118-01/2012 on 20.01.2012 to remove Appellant’s caveat dated 13.11.2011. R10 further claimed that he has purchased Lot 6147 (the 2/3 portion) through to Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 14.10.2009 executed between R10 and R9 (‘S&P dated 14.10.2009’)(‘OS2’). [18] The Appellant stated that upon perusing the cause papers of OS1 and OS2 filed by R10, the Appellant discovered the following: (a) The S&P dated 14.10.2009 made an express reference to the High Court of Penang Suit No. 22-783-2005 (‘Suit 783’) between R4, R5 and R13 through R6, who is appointed as Receiver and Manager of R4 according to the Deed of Debenture dated 22.09.1989(‘DOD dated 22.09.1989’) and R9; S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (b) The Appellant later conducts a file search on Suit 783 and discovered that there was a court order dated 14.07.1999 for Specific Performance of the S&P dated 26.09.1989 obtained against the Appellant vide Originating Summons No. (MT4)-24- 1318-1998 (‘Suit 1318’) (‘Order dated 14.07.1999’) by R4 through R6. However, it was claimed that Order dated 14.07.199 was not served to the Appellant and the Appellant had no knowledge of such suit. (c) The Appellant later discovered that Suit 1318 was served to the Appellant through the substituted service to the address at 22nd Floor, Bangunan Peransang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur which is not the Appellant’s registered address at that material time; (d) Order dated 14.07.1999 also provides that all documents for the application to partition/subdivide the land shall be signed by the Senior Assistant Registrar if the Appellant failed to sign and hand over those documents within 30 days from the date of the order. However, the land was subdivided to Lot 6148 and Lot 6147 only on 25.02.2009 which is approximately 10 years after the date of the Order dated 14.07.1999; (e) Further, Order dated 14.07.1999 clearly stated that R4 was only entitled to 8.5 acres of the land but the title of Lot 6147 issued by D1 showed that 2/3 portion of the land is measured more than 8.5 acres; and S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (f) The Appellant also discovered that the whole land was mentioned as a fixed asset of R4 in the DOD dated 22.09.1989 in the event that the S&P dated 26.09.1986 was executed four (4) days after that. [19] Upon looking at all of the documents through a file search conducted in court, the Appellant stated that they only knew about the fraudulent transferred of their land and subdivision sometime in 2011. Thus, they alleged that fraud had been committed by all of the Respondents either by themselves alone or that they had conspired with other Respondents to defraud the Appellant which had caused the 2/3 of the portion of the land was fraudulently transferred to R4 and subsequently to R10 by R9. [20] As a result, the Appellant filed Civil Suit No. 21NCVC-13-03/2012 (Civil Suit 1) against all of the Respondents on 20.03.2012, primarily to recover 2/3 of the land which the Appellant alleged that had fraudulently transferred to R4 and subsequently to R10. [21] The Appellant claims that all of the Respondents have fraudulently and/or unlawfully conspired to defraud and injure the Appellant as the beneficial and registered owner of 2/3 portion of the land. [22] Wherefore, the Appellant seeks for the following declarations and reliefs (see paragraph 60 Amended Statement of Claim): (a) that the Appellant is the legal and beneficial owner of the 2/3 portions of the land formerly held under Lot 6147 and later subdivided into Lots No. 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005; S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (b) the Order of Court dated 14.7.1999 obtained by R4 in the High Court of Penang Originating Summons No. (MT4)-24-1318- 1998 be declared null and void and/or set aside; (c) that the R1 be ordered to do the necessary acts to put the Appellant as the registered owner of the 2/3 portion of land formerly held under Lot 6147; (d) that all subdivision of the land from Lot 6147 to Lots 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005 to be called and Lot 6147 to be reinstated with the Appellant as the registered owner; (e) that the Private Caveat Presentation Number 0799B201101293 dated 13.9.2011 lodged by the Appellant on Lots 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004 and 10005 shall remain until the disposal of this matter; (f) the 10th Respondent be restrained by themselves and/or through their agents and/or employees and/or other from dealing with the said land in any manner whatsoever until disposal of this suit; (g) the R1 to R14 pay the Appellant damages for fraud and/or damages for conspiracy to defraud the Appellant; (h) The 10th Respondent rebuild and restore all buildings, toilet and lampposts and gates and all erections on the said land which S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 were demolished by the 10th Respondent and/or pay the equivalent value of the demolished buildings to the Appellant; (i) Damages for loss of use of land; (j) Costs; (k) Any other relief which this Honourable Court deems fit and proper. The Respondents’ case [23] In 1988, the Appellant was facing financial difficulties as its onion business was falling. Bangkok Bank notified the Appellant that if the Appellant failed to repay its outstanding loans, they will take legal action to enforce its securities under a Deed of Debenture and charges to impose the assets of the Appellant. [24] As a result, the Appellant’s directors and shareholders agreed to sell the entire land to one Ng Kok Lian, the Appellant’s closed relative (cousin) at the purchase price of RM 5,600,000.00, to repay the Appellant's loan with Bangkok Bank. [25] On the other side, Leow Teow Hong (‘R5/D5’ - shareholder in Powerama Holdings Sdn. Bhd) also shareholder of D4 was approached by Michael Cheong, Joachim Binder (‘Binder’) and Thomas Peter Polasek (‘Thomas’), whereby Thomas informed R5 of his intention to sell off and relocate plants and machinery from his company known as Royal Plastic SA in Switzerland into Malaysia and to explore the business opportunity in S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Malaysia. Thomas requested R5, Michael Cheong, and Binder's help to find a place or factory to operate a business. In consideration of that, Thomas had promised three of them the sum of money as a commission. Given that D4 was formed on 21.02.1989. [26] Somewhere in early 1989, R5 was introduced to Ng Kok Lian by Ng Kuang Boo, a bank officer at Chung Khiaw Bank. Ng Kok Lian informed R5 that the Appellant wanted to sell its land at a certain price. R5 however resigned from R4 on 05.06.1989. [27] Ng Kok Lian later informed the Appellant that R4 was interested to purchase the 2/3 portion of the land for the sum of RM 7,500,000.00 to be paid by way of the issuance of 1,000,000.00 shares of RM 1.00 each at par credit as fully in R4 and the balance of RM 6,500,000.00 to be paid vide Messrs. Durai & Associates. [28] As a result, R2 who is bankrupt acting on the advise of R7 (solicitors in Messrs. Durai & Associate) executed the S&P dated 26.09.1989 for the plaintiff with R4. According to R2, he had disclosed his status as a bankrupt to R7 and R3 and the S&P was executed for the benefit of the Appellant. [29] According to the S&P dated 29.09.1989, the Appellant is required to apply for the partition of the land and to obtain a separate document title to the 2/3 portion of the land. If the Appellant failed to do so, the whole land will be charged for the financing of the purchase of the property by R4. The Appellant had failed to apply for a separate title. [30] By a Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989 (‘Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989’), the lending banks agreed to grant R4 the term loan S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 facilities amounting to RM24,000,000.00 to finance D4’s purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land from the Appellant. As security for the repayment of facilities, R4 entered into a Deed of Debenture dated 22.09.1989 (‘DOD dated 22.09.1989’), whereby all of R4’s assets and properties, including the land were charged and/or pledge for a sum of RM 24,000,000.00. [31] On 11.10.1989, the 1st draw on the facilities for RM 17,100,000.00 was released by the lending banks to R4. R4 later paid the purchase price of 2/3 portion of the land to the Appellant in the manner as agreed by the parties. [32] On 13.10.1989, Messrs. Durai & Associates paid RM 5,600,000.00 to Bangkok Bank, the redemption sum for the land that was placed as securities by the Appellant. According to such redemption, Bangkok Bank charges over the entire land were discharged on 20.11.1989. The remaining purchase price was paid to Ng Kok Lian as a commission and the Appellant's shareholders accordingly. [33] R2 & R3 then executed MOT dated 24.10.1989 for the plaintiff to transfer 2/3 portion of the land to R4 and 1/3 portion of land back to the Appellant. The transfer was registered on 11.05.1990. [34] Under the terms of the Facility Agreement dated 22.09.1989 and S&P, R4 and the Appellant created a charge dated 31.07.1990 over the land in favour of OBB and UAB which was registered on 01.08.1990, pending the partition of the land (‘Charge dated 31.07.1990’). [35] On 06.04.1990, R2 filed his statement of affairs to R8 (Insolvency Department). R3 also filed his statement of affairs with R8 on 12.01.1994. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [36] On 16.04.1992, D6 was appointed by the OBB as the Receiver and Manager (‘R&M’) of assets and properties of R4 under DOD dated 26.09.1989. Since his appointment, R6 had several times attempted to sell 2/3 portion of the land but the sales did not materialise since the land was not partitioned by the Appellant. [37] As a result, R4 through R6 commenced Suit 1318 against the Appellant for an order for Specific Performance. R4 through R6 tried to serve the cause papers of Suit 1318 to the Appellant by hand, but the Appellant’s registered address was changed. Therefore, R4 through R6 served the cause papers of Suit 1318 to the Appellant through a substituted service. An affidavit of service of the cause papers was filed to court by R4. R4 through R6 later obtained the Order dated 14.07.1999 which was also served to the Appellant’s registered address via substituted service. R4 did not proceed to execute the Court's Order dated 14.07.1999 because R4 was under receivership and it was not cost-effective for R4 to incur the considerable costs and expenses of partitioning the land when 2/3 of the portion was intended to be sold and realised. However, the attainment of the Court's order dated 14.07.1999 enable any prospective purchaser to undertake the obligation of applying for partition of the land. [38] R4 through R6 executed the Principal Agreement dated 11.11.2003, which was subsequently varied by the Supplemental Agreement dated 22.05.2005 with R9, for the sale of 2/3 of the land for a sum of RM 6,000,000.00. A dispute arose between R4 and R9 which resulted in the termination of the Principal Agreement dated 11.11.2003. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [39] The dispute between R4 and R9 was finally resolved. R4 and R9 later executed the S&P dated 05.10.2009 for the sale of 2/3 portion of the land for a sum of RM 6,000,000.00. [40] Under the S&P dated 05.10.2009, R9 undertakes the obligation to apply for the partition of the land. Following such an application, the 2/3 of land was partitioned into Lot 6147 and Lot 6148. [41] Later, R4 through R6 executed the Memorandum of Transfer dated 15.12.2009 (‘MOT dated 15.12.2009’) to transfer Lot 6147 to R10 as the nominee of R9 following the terms and conditions of the S&P dated 05.10.2009 and R9’s letter dated 03.11.2009. [42] On 04.07.2011, R10 as the registered owner of Lot 6147 filed OS1 against the Appellant for the trespass action. [43] On 26.07.2011, R10 subdivided Lot 6147 into six (6) Lots (Lot 10000 - Lot 10005). Subdivided titles were issued on 26.07.2011. R10 also transferred five (5) out of 6 Lots to the various purchasers. However, the transfer was not successful because of the private caveat dated 3.11.2011 entered by the Appellant [44] As a result, R10 filed OS2 against the Appellant for the removal of the caveat dated 13.11.2011. [45] On 18.05.2012, R10 obtained leave from the High Court for OS2 to be converted to writ action and known as Civil Suit 2. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [46] On 14.08.2012, R10 also obtained leave from the High Court for the OS1 to be converted to writ action and was known as Civil Suit 3. [47] It is the contentions of the Respondents that the Appellant’s claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13, and R14 is barred by the doctrine of laches and the limitation period of Section 2(a) of Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (PAPA) and under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1956 (Act 254). [48] The Respondents also contended that the Appellant had failed to prove the element of fraud or conspiracy to defraud against all of the Respondents and Lot 6147 of the land was not fraudulently transferred to R10, therefore, R10 is a bona fide purchaser and is protected with indefeasible title under Section 340 of the National Land Code. The High Court’s Proceeding [49] The High Court directed that, the Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3 be consolidated and be heard together with Civil Suit 1 and be determined accordingly. [50] On 20.12.2019, the learned High Court Judge allowed the R10’s claim against the Plaintiff for Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3. On the contrary, the High Court dismissed the Appellant’s claim against all of Respondents for Civil Suit 1. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Findings of the learned High Court Judge A. Civil Suit 1 [51] The learned Judge of the High Court (‘LJ’) dismissed the Appellant’s claim against all of the Respondents in Civil Suit 1 based on the following reason(s), inter alia: (a) The Appellant’s claim against R4, R7, and R9 was dismissed by the High Court with no order as to costs because: (i) the Appellant did not enter a judgment in default against D4 although D4 has never entered an appearance for the claim filed by the plaintiff. Although the Court has the discretion to hear the matter in the absence of D4, the plaintiff still carries a burden to prove the alleged fraud against D4. However, the plaintiff failed to do so (see paragraphs 200-208 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (ii) the Appellant is unable to pursue their claims against R7 because R7 is an undischarged bankrupt and received no sanction from the Director of Insolvency under Section 38 (1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 to defend himself against the action filed by the Appellant (see paragraphs 354-357 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); and S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (iii) the R9’s Statement of Defence was struck out by the High Court through the Court's Order dated 23.01.2017. However, the Appellant still carries a burden to prove the alleged fraud against R9, but the Appellant failed to do (see paragraphs 412 and 419 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment) (b) The Appellant, having known about the alleged fraud of S&P dated 26.09.1989 since 1994, that was when Tan Soo Lang entered a private caveat on 2/3 portion of the land, let 17 years pass by without initiating any legal steps (see paragraphs 124-129 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment). This caused: i. The Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the limitation period under Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities and Protection Act 1948 (‘Act 198’)(see paragraphs 131,138- 139,386,391 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); ii. The Appellant's claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14 is barred by the doctrine of laches and the limitation period under Section 9 read with Section 29 and Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘Act 254’) (see paragraphs 139,240,325-330, 391,455-459 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment) iii. Learned High Court judge hold that based on this ground alone, the Appellant’s claim against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14 is liable to be dismissed. However, for the sake of completeness, the learned High Court judge also discussed S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 the Appellant’s allegation of fraud and conspiracy to defraud against R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R13 and R14. (c) The Appellant failed to prove the element of fraud or conspiracy to defraud against all of the Respondents. The learned High Court judge held that: i. R1 was merely carrying out its statutory duties in registering the transactions and instruments presented before him. R1 also complied with its statutory duties in registering the application for subdivision and partition of the land. Moreover, the transactions and instruments presented by the respective parties before R1 for registration were complete and proper under the law. R1 has no duty under the law to investigate every detail of the documents presented before him for registration (see paragraphs 106, 115-119 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); ii. The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was signed, witnessed, and sealed by the Appellant when it was presented before R1 for registration (see paragraphs 106, and 107 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iii. The Appellant failed to prove the signature of Ng Seah Kheng in the MOT dated 24.10.1989 was forged (see paragraphs 527-531 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment): S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 a) Ng Seah Khung was not called as a witness before the court, thus adverse inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Appellant was invoked; b) No handwriting expert was called to give evidence on the signature of Ng Seah Kheng; and c) Ng Seah Kheng had withdrew his police report dated 03.11.1994 on 02.09.2006 and the matter was “Nor Further Action/NFA” by the police. iv. The Appellant had received the full payment of the sale of 2/3 portion of the land from R4 (see paragraph 522-526 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); v. The S&P dated 26.09.1989 executed by R2 on behalf of the Appellant is valid and enforceable because Section 127 of the Companies Act 1965 (‘Act 125’) does not prohibit a bankrupt to enter a contract on behalf of the company (see paragraphs 277-279 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); vi. R2, having known he was a bankrupt, had consulted and acted upon the advised of R7 when he executed S&P dated 26.09.1989 and MOT dated 24.10.1989. R2 also had obtained the consent of all the Appellant's directors to sell 8.5 acres of land to D4 to settle the Appellant's outstanding loan/debt amounting to RM 5.6 million with the Bangkok Bank. No evidence that the Appellant still owing the bank under the S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 facilities obtained (see paragraphs 163 and 166 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); vii. R3, acting on the advised of R7 had executed both MOT dated 24.10.1989 and charge dated 31.07.1990 for the sole purpose of obtaining an amount of money to settle the Appellant’s outstanding loan/debt with Bangkok Bank and had no intention to cheat or defraud the plaintiff (see paragraphs 190-191 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); viii. Nothing stated in S&P dated 26.09.1986 that 2/3 portion of the land was lent to R4 to enable R4 to procure the loan facility amounting to RM 24,000.000 (see paragraph 537 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); ix. R5 was not involved in S&P dated 26.09.1989, MOT dated 24.10.1989, and charge dated 31.07.1989. The involvement of R5 was only to introduce R2 to Thomas. R5 resigned from his position as the R4’s director on 05.06.1989 (see paragraphs 253, 255, 273, and 275 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); x. Based on the evidence tendered before the High Court, the service of the Court’s Order dated 14.07.1999 by R4 through R6 was regular and duly served at the registered address of the plaintiff (see the paragraphs 343 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 xi. No document shows that R8 has knowledge of the S&P dated 26.09.1989, MOT dated 24.10.1989, and charge dated 31.07.1990. Based on Section 8 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, R8 shall be constituted as the receiver of the properties and assets of R2 and R3 and had nothing to do with the land which belongs to the Appellant (see paragraphs 398,400-403 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (d) Based on the evidence tendered, it was proven that the registered address of the Appellant was never changed by R14. The learned High Court reasonings are as follows: i. The address at Lot 102-3, 1st Floor Kompleks Antarabangsa, Jalan Sultan Ismail 50250 is the address of Signet & Co. Sdn. Bhd., a company secretarial firm wherein R14 was employed and not the Appellant’s registered address (see paragraph 564 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment; case Summit Co (M) Sdn Bhd v Nikko Products (M) Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 68 FC); ii. During the tenure of R14 with the plaintiff from 04.09.1995 until 12.08.2011, the registered address of the Appellant remained on the 22nd Floor, Bangunan Perangsang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur (see paragraph 561 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iii. The Appellant’s registered address at 22nd Floor, Bangunan Perangsang Segamat, 69 Jalan Kampung Attap, 50460 Kuala Lumpur remains unchanged until the lodgment of the Notice S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 in Form 44 made on 12.08.2011 by the Appellant’s new secretary, notifying the Registrar of Companies that the Appellant’s registered address was changed to No. 40-B, 2nd Floor, Jalan Lumut, Damai Kompleks, Kuala Lumpur (see paragraph 562 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment); and iv. It is a settled law that the effective date of change of the registered address of a company is the date of lodgment of the notice in Form 44 to the Registrars of the Company. However, there was nothing in the bundles placed before the High Court which showed that R14 signed Form 44 affecting a change of the Appellant’s registered address (see paragraphs 565-567 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (e) Lot 6147 was not fraudulently transferred to R10, therefore, R10 is a bona fide purchaser of Lot 6147 and is protected with indefeasible title under Section 340 of the National Land Code. The learned High Court judge held that: i. The Appellant failed to prove that Lot 6147 was fraudulently transferred from R4 through R6 to R10; ii. D10 had purchased Lot 6147 at the market value fixed by the valuer (‘SD13’) appointed by the OCBC Bank; S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 iii. The Appellant also failed to prove that D10 had fraudulently subdivided Lot 6147 (see paragraphs 468-473 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); iv. As of 25.02.2009, Lot 6147 was registered under R4 not R10 as alleged by the Appellant (see paragraphs 477-478 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment). B. Civil Suit 2 & Civil Suit 3 [52] Meanwhile, the basis for the learned High Court judge allowed R10’s claim against the Appellant in Civil Suit 2 and Civil Suit 3 are as follows: (a) since the land belongs to R10, the plaintiff has no caveatable interest in the land. As a such the entry of caveat by the Appellant on Lot 6147 is improper and ought to be struck out (see paragraphs 491-492 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment); (b) given that the registered owner of Lot 6147 is R10, the Appellant's action of erecting constructions on the land is considered a trespass on R10 rights over the land (see paragraphs 405-498 of the High Court's Grounds of Judgment). S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 The Appeal [53] Aggrieved with the decision, on 17.01.2020, the Appellant filed notices of appeal to this Court against the whole decision of the High Court dated 20.12.2019. This Court directed for these three appeals be heard and determined together. [54] Essentially, there were six main grounds of appeal listed by the Appellant in Memorandum of Appeal dated 17 March 2020 and Supplementary Memorandum of Appeal dated 25 July 2020: (a) the learned High Court Judge erred in law and in finding of fact in holding that there is no fraud or conspiracy to defraud by the Respondents against the Appellant; (b) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim is barred by Limitation Act 1953; (c) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948; (d) the learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents is barred by laches; (e) the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 is applicable against the Appellant and that the 2/3 portion of the land has been purchased for valuable consideration and in good faith; S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (f) whether based on the facts and evidence, the decision of the High Court is correct in law. Our findings (a) The learned High Court Judge erred in law and in finding of fact in holding that there is no fraud or conspiracy to defraud by the Respondents against the Appellant [55] The law on fraud and conspiracy to defraud is trite. [56] Section 17 of the Contract Act 1950 stipulates that: “Fraud” includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of any fact by one can having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to fraudulent. Explanation – Mere silence as to the facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.” [57] In PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136 the Federal Court held: “Whether fraud exists is a question of fact, to be decided upon the circumstances of each particular case. Decided cases are only illustrative of fraud. Fraud must mean “actual fraud, i.e. dishonesty of some sort” for which the registered proprietor is party or privy. “Fraud is the same in all courts, but such expressions as ‘constructive fraud’ are…inaccurate;” but “fraud”…implies a willful act, on the part of one, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by unjustifiable means, of what he is entitled.” (per Romily M.R. in Green v Nixon (1857) 23 Beav 530 535 53 ER 208). Thus in Waimiha Sawmilling Co Ltd v Walone Timber Co Ltd [1926] AC 101 & 106 it was said that “if the designed object of a transfer be to cheat a man of a known existing right, that is fraudulent…”. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [58] In CIMB Bank Bhd v Veeran a/l Ayasamy [2015] 7 CLJ 289 the Court of Appeal held as follows: “The element of fraud and/or conspiracy must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. There must be something more than mere failure or an omission on the part of the third defendant. There can never be fraud and/or conspiracy cannot exist, where the intent to deceive does not exist.” [59] Thus, it is trite law the burden of proving a claim of conspiracy to defraud the Appellant against the Respondents remained at all time on the Appellant (see S. 101 Evidence Act 1950, Tow Kong Liang & Yang lain v Fbo Land (Setapak) Sdn Bhd [2018] 1 LNS 243 CA). [60] On elements of tort of conspiracy, the Court of Appeal in Renault Sa v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Appeals [2015] 5 CLJ 32 stated as follows: “In regard to the tort of conspiracy, the following need to be satisfied at the interlocutory stage: (a) an agreement between two or more persons (that is an agreement between Tan Chong and others); (b) an agreement for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar; S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 (c) that acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to Inokom and Quasar; (d) damage is essential element and where damage is not pleaded in the Statement of Claim may be struck out (see Yap JH v Tan Sri Loh Boon Siew & Ors [1991] 3 CLJ 2960; [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 243).” [61] In SCK Group Bhd & Anor v Sunny Siew Pang & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 389, [2011] 4 MLJ 393, the Court of Appeal stated that: “The tort of conspiracy was not constituted by conspiratorial agreement alone. For conspiracy to take place, there must also be an unlawful object, or if not in itself unlawful, it must be brought by unlawful means : See Davies v Thomas [1920] 2 Ch 189 per Warrington LJ, and Seah Siang Mong v Ong Ban Chai & Another Case [1998] 1 CLJ Supp 295 per Ghazali J (now FCJ). There must be a co-existence of an agreement with an over act causing damage to the plaintiffs. Hence, the tort is complete only if the agreement is carried into effect, thereby causing damage to the plaintiff. On order to succeed in a claim based on tort of conspiracy, the plaintiffs must establish: (a) an agreement between two or more persons; (b) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff; and (c) acts done in the execution of that agreement resulted in damage to the plaintiff: Marrinan v Vibart [1962] 1 All ER 869 at p. 871 per Salmon J; and Halsbury’s Law England (4th Ed) Vol 45 at p 271, as applied by Ghazali (now FCJ) in Seah Siang Mong.” S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [62] Guided by the clear settled principle of law enunciated in those authorities, the conspiracy must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that: (a) there is an agreement between any of the Respondent or between all the Respondents; (b) the predominant purpose of the agreement being for the purpose of injuring the Appellant; and (c) the fraudulent acts were committed in executing the agreement for the purpose of injuring the Appellant. [63] In Sinnayah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584 the Federal Court explained the standard of proof for fraud in a civil claim as follows: “As the correct principle to apply…where it was stipulated that at law, there are only two standard of proof, namely beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases and on the balance of probabilities for a civil cases. As such, even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. There is no third standard. Therefore, it is up to the presiding judge, after hearing and considering the evidence adduced as being done in any other civil claim, to find whether the standard of proof has been attained. The criminal aspect of the allegation of fraud and the standard of proof required is irrelevant in the deliberation.” S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 [64] Coming back to this case. The pivotal issue in this case concerns the validity of the S & P dated 26.9.1989 executed for the Appellant with R4 by R2 who was a bankrupt. Also on the validity of the MOT executed by R2 and R3 on 24.10.1989 (‘MOT dated 24.10.1989') for the Appellant to transfer 8.5 acres of the land to R4. The MOT dated 24.10.1989 was registered on 11.05.1990. Appellant also contended that the S&P and MOT were executed without the Appellant’s knowledge and approval. [65] R2 was the Managing Director and Director in the Appellant until he was declared bankrupt on 26.5.1989. R2 is the second largest shareholder in the Appellant. It was contended by the Appellant that Article 87(b) Article of Association of the Appellant disqualify any director from continuing holding the position as director in the Appellant once he is adjudged as a bankrupt. Thus, it was argued by the Appellant that R2 has no capacity or authorization and acted under fraud in signing the S & P on behalf of the Appellant after he was declared as a bankrupt. It is not in dispute that all the Appellant’s directors appointed in 1979, including R2 remained as such until 1995 when new directors appointed to take charge of the Appellant. [66] R3 was a director of the Appellant from 1979 to 1996. The second MOT for Lot 6148 was executed on 24.10.1990 by R3 together with one Ng Seah Keng who is also the Appellant’s director. R3 was declared bankrupt on 10.3.1993. He was discharged from bankrupt on 28.6.2010. [67] It is not in dispute that R2 and R3 managed and controlled the business of the Appellant since 31.5.1979 and made all decisions for the S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 Appellant. This practice was accepted without protest by the rest of the directors and shareholder of the Appellant. This was admitted by Ng Seah Hai (PW1), the sole witness of the Appellant under cross-examination by R6’s counsel – “DC6 : Now you also testified that D2 (R2) and D3 (R3) manage and make all decisions for the Plaintiff (Appellant) from 1979 without consulting or informing the rest of the directors or shareholders. You agree? PW1 : Yes. DC6 : Therefore, these decisions were made unilaterally by D2 and D3 without consultation, without resolution? PW1 : Yes.” [68] It is also not in disputed that the Appellant’s land was subject to legal charges in favour Bangkok Bank, registered vide Presentation No. 6426/78 Jil 127 Folio 127, Presentation No. 5304/83 Jil 267 Folio 52 and Presentation No. 5305/83 Jil 267 Folio 53, as security for the facilities obtained by the Appellant. In 1988 the Appellant was facing financial difficulties as its onion business was failing and the Appellant defaulting its loans. Bangkok Bank notified the Appellant that if the Appellant fails to repay its outstanding loans, the bank will take legal action to enforce its securities under the Deed of Debenture and to foreclose the charged lands. To avoid the risk of losing the lands, the directors and shareholders agreed to sell the land to their close relative Ng Kok Lian at a price of RM5.6 million, as to repay Appellant’s outstanding loans with Bangkok Bank. Following that, Ng Kok Lian then informed the Appellant that R4 had offered to buy the land at a purchase price of RM7.5 million to be paid S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 by way of the issuance of 1,000,000 shares of RM1.00 each at par to the Appellant and the balance purchase price to be paid to Messrs Durai & Associates. On 26.9.1989, the Appellant and R4 entered the S&P for the sale of the 2/3 portion of the land for purchase price of RM7.5 million. [69] It is to be noted that clause 3.03(a) of the S & P requires the Appellant to apply for partition of the land but in the event the Appellant is unable to procure a separate document of title to the 2/3 portion of the land, the whole of the title will be charged for the financing of the purchase by R4. In such instance, R4 shall be authorized to sign all documents for partitioning and surrender the title to the issuing authority for a new document of title for the 2/3 portion of the land. [70] On 13.10.1989, Messrs Durai & Associates issued a letter to Bangkok Bank forwarding the redemption sum payment. Pursuant to the redemption payment, Bangkok Bank charges over the land were discharged on 20.11.1989. This was acknowledged by the Appellant vide its letter dated 6.6.1990 to Messrs. Durai & Associates. On 19.1.1994, Messrs. Durai & Associates conforming the Appellant on the due completion of payment of purchase price. The learned High Court judge accepted that there was evidence of payment of the purchase price by R4 for the purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land (see paras 21-22, 150, 168 Grounds of Judgment). [71] The Appellant’s cause of action is premised on the underlying assumption that the Appellant is the rightful owner of the 2/3 portion of the land known as Lot 1487. The Appellant’s case is that the S & P dated S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 26.9.1989 entered for the Appellant by R2 who was a bankrupt, with R4 was without Appellant’s resolution to sell the 2/3 portion of the land and without the knowledge of the rest of the directors of the Appellant. The Appellant further alleged that the 2/3 portion of the land that was transferred to R4 and subsequently by R6 (the Manager and Receiver of R4) to R9 and later by R9 to R10 were procured fraudulently. It was contended by the Appellant that R4 and R5 had conspired with R2, R3, and R7 to fraudulently enter into the S & P dated 26.9.1989. Several authorities were cited to support the Appellant’s argument: PJTB Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136, CIMB Bank Berhad v Abdul Rafi a/l Abdul Razak & Ors [2012] MLJU 804, Yap Sau Choon @ Yap Bee Yong & Anor v Cheong Hong Mun & Ors [2016] MLJU 1203. Appellant had relied heavily on the evidence of PW1 (Ng Seah Hai) as its main witness. However, PW1 admitted that he had no personal knowledge over the S & P, MOT and the chargers and only averred relating the fraud or conspiracy based on what he heard from his mother and his brother Ng Seah Kheng. As such, the evidence of PW1 (Ng Seah Hai) are at best, hearsay and we find that that learned High Court judge was correct in not giving such evidence any weight. [72] Coming back to the position of R2, any party dealing with the Appellant, including R4, the OBB (bank) as chargee, R6, R9 and R10 could not have known that R2 had ceased to be a director of the Appellant with effect from 26.5.1989 (bankruptcy order) and were entitled to assume that R2 had the apparent or ostensible authority to execute the S&P, MOT and charge on behalf of the Appellant. R2 was allowed to continue remain in control of the management and affairs of the Appellant until 1995 without any protest of the Appellant or any other directors of the Appellant. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 The Appellant ought to be estopped from now suggesting that R2 lacks of authority to act for the Appellant. The learned High Court judge held, and we agree, that by virtue of indoor management rule/ Turquand’s rule, and as enshrined under sections 20(1) and 127 of the Companies Act 1965 (now repealed by Companies Act 2016), the act of R2, in realizing the charged dan selling the 2/3 portion of the land to settle the Appellant’s outstanding loan arrears with Bangkok Bank was valid (see Grounds of Judgment paras 335 – 337). On the facts of this case, we find that Turquand rule as decided in Royal British Bank v Turquand [1843-60] All EE 435, applies: “Persons dealing with the company were bound to make themselves acquainted with the statute and the deed of settlement of the company, but they were not bound to do more; a person, on reading the deed of settlement, would find, not a prohibition against borrowing, but a permission to borrow on certain conditions, and, learning that the authority might be made complete by a resolution, he would have right to infer the fact of a resolution authorizing that which on the fact of the document appeared to be legitimately done; and therefore, the company was liable whether or not a resolution had been passed.” [See also Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 465 FC]. [73] On the issue of authority or lack thereof of the R2, we can do no better than to reproduce the following excerpt from the judgment in Phang S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 Tat Meng t/a Tat Meng Company v Reka Cipta Solusi Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 LNS 88, the court held: “35. On the facts herein, the Defendants pointed that the fraud alleged by the Plaintiff is plainly answered by s. 127 of the Company Act 1965 which reads: ‘127. Validity of acts of directors and officers The acts of director or manager or secretary shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification.’ 36. Reading ss 125(1) and s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 together, I am of the view that the statute contemplates only a penalty to be imposed on undischarged bankrupt who has acted on behalf of the company but the statute does not avoid contracts entered into by him on behalf of the company such as the case of the Consent Judgment herein. (para 77 GOJ). 37. Accordingly, provision in s.127 of the Companies Act 1965 is my view sufficient to negate the fraud argument raised by the Plaintiff in attempt to set aside the Consent Judgment. It is plain and obvious to me that the Plaintiff’s action is hence unsustainable. Be that it may, the Plaintiff has also not adduced any evidence in the affidavits to illustrate how the Plaintiff was prejudiced or unduly influenced by the alleged fraud by deception through the non revelation or concealment of his S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 bankruptcy by the bankrupt director. It must be borne in my mind that the First Defendant as a company is a separate legal entity from its directors and shareholders. 38. For completeness, I further hold that s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 herein override the common law specie of fraud due to concealment of material …”. [74] In Stem Resources Sdn Bhd v Kekal Lestari Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi [2013] 10 CLJ the court held- “(1) Perbuatan SP2 menandatangani perjanjian tersebut tidak menjejaskan kesahan dan kesahihan perjanjian tersebut menurut kuasa peruntukan s. 127 Akta Syarikat 1965 (Akta 125). Seksyen 127 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan apa-apa perbuatan seseorang pengarah, pengurus atau setiausaha walaupun kemudiannya didapati ada kecacatan pada pelantikan atau kelayakannya. Seksyen 127 terpakai apabila terdapat pelantikan yang defektif seperti yang berlaku dalam hal pelantikan SP2 melalui resolusi bertarikh 15 Jun 2004. D1 dan D2 tidak boleh menyatakan perjanjian tersebut terbatal kerana s. 127 Akta 125 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan perbuatan SP2 menandatatangani perjanjan tersebut dan dengan perjanjian itu, perjanjian yang ditandatangani adalah sah dan mengikat defendan (see para 278 GOJ).” (See also Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Choo Meng Chong & Anor [1999] 7 CLJ 300, Re Chua Tin Hong Ex Parte Castrol (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 174). S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 [75] Learned counsel for the Appellant was unable to cite any authority, on the contrary, to support her arguments that the S & P is invalid due R2’s lack of authority to act for the Appellant. Thus, it is our considered view that the learned High Court judge did not erred in holding that the S & P dated 26.9.1989 is a valid and enforceable agreement. [76] R6 particularly was appointed as Receiver & Manager (R&M) of R4 on 16.4.1992. The Facility Agreement, S & P, Deed of Debenture and Charge had all been entered into and executed by the Appellant with R4 prior to the appointment of R6. R4 was no longer the registered or beneficial owner of the 2/3 portion of the land with effect from 5.12.2009 following the transfer of ownership to R10. R6 ceased to be the R&M of the R4 on 27.12.2010. The subdivision of Lot 6147 which led to the issuance of titles Lot 10001 – Lot 10005 was applied by R10, and after R6 had ceased his responsibilities and duties as R&M of R4 with effect from 27.12.2010. [77] In RHB Bank Berhad v Ali bin Abdul Kadir and Anor [2005] 1 LNS 391, the court held that the 2nd defendant-bank had no cause of action against the receiver and managers whose duty is limited to enforcing the security and the subject contract for sale of goods was entered into prior the appointment of the receiver and managers, no liability can be attached to receiver and managers by virtue section 183 of the Companies Act. [78] Coming back to this case, the learned High Court judge held that R6 cannot be found guilty or liable to the Appellant for exercising his duties in good faith by enforcing the security in favour of OBB, which includes the S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 sale and transfer of the 2/3 portion of the land and well supported by section 183(1) of the Companies Act (see para 345-346 of Grounds of Judgment). Thus, it is impossible for R6 to be said that have been involved in any fraud or conspiracy to defraud the Appellant. The learned High Court judge held, and we agree, that the Appellant was not even able to establish that R6 knew the other Respondents, let alone that any agreement was reached between them to defraud and injure the Appellant (see paras 338-339 Grounds of Judgment). [79] The learned High Court judge held that the Appellant had failed to discharge its burden of proving, on a balance probabilities, the basic element of a claim for fraud or conspiracy to defraud and injure the Appellant. Having considered the evidence in totality, the learned High Court judge made the following findings : “485. Daripada apa yang dinyatakan, Mahkamah dapati bahawa elemen-elemen frod tidak dipatuhi oleh Plaintif, begitu juga dengan kospirasi seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. 486. Mahkamah dapati dari segi frod dan/atau kospirasi untuk memfrodkan Plaintif, Plaintif gagal membuktikannya atas imbangan kebarangkalian. 487. Dalam tindakan ini Mahkamah dapati Plaintiff gagal membuktikan frod dan/atau kospirasi memfrodkan ke atas Plaintif, maka dengan transaksi-transaksi untuk pindahmilik tanah tersebut merupakan transaksi yang bebas dari isu frod seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. Defendan Kesepuluh telah S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 memberi balasan memberi balasan yang sepenuhnya kepada Defendan Kesembilan. 488. Maka dengan itu, Defendan Kesepuluh di dalam tindakan ini merupakan pembeli bona fide ke atas tanah tersebut daripada Defendan Kesembilan.” [80] The learned High Court judge found no credible evidence that there was in existence of fraud or conspiracy to defraud by any of the Respondents on the Appellant. Her Ladyship had considered the testimonies, the contemporaneous documents and the whole circumstances and probabilities of the case (Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229). We had carefully perused the grounds of judgment of the learned High Court judge. We find that there is no appealable error to warrant any appellate interference on the findings. (b) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim is barred by Limitation Act 1953 [81] Respondents had expressly pleaded that they were relying on the Limitation Act and laches as a defence (paragraph 42 p. 462 6th Respondent’ Core Bundle of Documents (Vol.1)(Encl. 203 o Appeal Records)). For any action that is based upon fraud or conspiracy to defraud of the defendant or his agent, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant discovered the actual fraud in 2012 after the Appellant saw the Deed of Debenture dated S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 22.9.1889 and the High Court Order dated 14.9.1999 for Specific Performance of the S & P dated 26.9.1989. Thus, the Appellant’s claim is not barred by Limitation Act 1953 or laches. PW1, the Appellant’s sole witness admitted that the directors and shareholders of the Appellant first knew or discovered the alleged fraud in relation to the sale and purchase of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4 since 8.7.1994 when Tan Soo Lang entered a private caveat on the 2/3 portion of the land. [82] The learned High Court judge in her grounds of judgment had considered this issue and made the following findings: “380. Alasan permohonan Tan Soo Lang untuk memasukkan kaveat persendirian (Ikatan B3 muka surat 574 – D264) dengan alasan seperti berikut” “alasan-alasan tuntutan saya atas tanah/kepentingan itu ialah berdasarkan tanah itu adalah kepunyaan syarikat Kim Guan Choong Sdn. Bhd. Dan sebahagian tanah itu sedang dijual secara frod dan sebahagian lagi telah dijual secara frod. 381. Menurut Surat Akuan dari Tan Soo Lang di dalam permohonan untuk kemasukan kaveat persendirian beliau, beliau mengaku bahawa kaveat tersebut dimasukkan bagi pihak Plaintif. Beliau merupakan pemegang saham dan Pengarah asal Syarikat Plaintif tersebut. 382. Jadi dari keterangan yang dikemukakan, saya dapati kali pertama Plaintif ketahui yang penjualan 2/3 bahagian Lot 1487 S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 yang dikatakan dilakukan secara frod itu telah diketahui oleh Plaintif sejak 8.7.1994 lagi.” (emphasis added) [83] PW1 further admitted that despite the alleged fraud in 1994, there is no legal action taken by the Appellant to recover or challenge the validity of the S&P, MOT and the creation and registration of the charge and the transfer of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4 until this action was filed by the Appellant against all the Respondents. [84] The Appellant’s action herein was filed in March 2012, which is more than 18 years from the first discovery of the alleged fraud. As such, it is clearly that the Appellant’s claim for the discovery of the 2/3 portion of the land is barred by limitation pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953 and section 29 of the Act. [85] Section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 stipulates that- “9(1) No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him, or if it first accrued to some person through whom he claim, to that person.” [86] Section 29 of the Act provides postponement of limitation period in case of fraud or mistake, as follows- S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 “29. Where, in case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either- (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims as aforesaid; or (b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the case may be, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it: Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any action to be brought to recover, or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which- (i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that any fraud had been committed; or (ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration, subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made, by S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 a person who did not know or have reason to believe that mistake had been made.” [87] The learned High Court judge held that the Appellant’s action is barred by section 9 read and section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953. Her Ladyship held as follows: “237. Mahkamah ini dapati tarikh 8.7.1994 (sic) inilah Plaintif ketahui tentang frod yang didakwa oleh Plaintif dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam penjualan 2/3 bahagian tanah tersebut kepada Defendan Keempat. 238. Tindakan ini difailkan pada bulan Mac 2012. 239. Manakala kali pertama Plaintif tahu tentang apa yang dikatakan frod dilakukan terhadap Plaintif adalah pada 8.7.1994. Ini bermakna selepas 18 tahun lebih Plaintif mendapat tahu tentang frod barulah Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan Kelima. Ini adalah jelas menujukkan yang Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa 12 tahun dari tarikh 8.7.1994 untuk Plaintif menuntut terhadap Defendan Kelima. Jadi, Mahkamah dapati atas isu had masa ini Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa untuk menuntut terhadap Defendan Kelima. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 240. Dengan itu, Mahkamah dapati tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kelima telah dihalang oleh had masa mengikut Seksyen 9 dan Seksyen 29 Akta Had Masa 1953 dan dengan itu tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kelima ditolak dengan kos.” [88] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on this issue, we find that the learned High Court judge is perfectly correct in holding that the Appellant’s action against the Respondents, likewise, is barred pursuant to section 9 and section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953 (see Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32 FC, Nadefinco Ltd v Kevin Corporation Sdn Bhd [1978] 2 MLJ 59 FC, Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409). We find no appealable error of law or fact in the findings of the learned judge which was based on evidence. (c) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against R1 and R8 is barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 [89] It was contended by R1 and R8 that the Appellant’s action against R1 and R8 is barred pursuant to section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Act 198). For the Appellant, it was argued that R1 has statutory power to investigate the validity of the MOT and the application for subdivision of Lot 1487 and should not allowed the applications pending their investigation. The case of Goh Seng Chue & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Hulu Selangor and Ors [2017] MLJU 1390 was cited to support the argument. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 [90] We reproduce Section 2 of the Act which provides as follows- “Where, after the doming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuant or execution or intended execution of any written law on of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provision shall have affect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuation of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof.” [91] Section 38 of the Act provides- “Limitation of actions Any written law relating to the limitation of time for bringing proceedings against public authorities may be relied upon by the Government as a defence in any civil proceedings against the Government.” [92] In Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409, the court held – S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 “The limitation law is promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiffs from sleeping on their actions and more importantly to have a definite end to litigation. The rationale of the limitation law should be appreciated and enforced by the Courts.” [93] In Selvarajoo Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor [2006] 2 CLJ, the Court of Appeal held- “The provision of s. 2(a) PAPA 1948 and very clear and do not provide for any court discretion as they are mandatory in name.” [94] In Tasja Sdn Bhd v Golden Approach Sdn Bhd [2011] 3 CLJ 751, the Federal Court held- “If it is based on Section 2(a) of the Public Protection Act 1948 or Section 7(5) of the Civil Law Act 1956, where the period of limitation is absolute then in a clear and obvious case such application should be granted without having to plead such a defence. However, in a situation where limitation is not absolute, like in a case under the Limitation Act, such application for striking out should not be allowed until and unless limitation is pleaded as required under section 4 of the Limitation Act 1953.” [95] The Appellant’s action herein was filed in March 2012, which is more than 18 years from the first discovery of the alleged fraud. As such, it is clearly that the Appellant’s action against R1 and R8 being a public S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 authorities and acted in the performance of its public duty i.e. accepted and registered the MOT dated 24.10. 1989 and the Specific Performance Order dated 14.7.1999 for the subdivision of Lot 1487, is barred by limitation pursuant to section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Act 198)(Revised 1978). We agree with the learned High Court judge that R1 has no duty to enquire further on Form 14A that is fit for registration pursuant to section 301 of the National Land Code (Hamdan bin Jaafar & Ors v Osman bin Mohamed & Ors [2012] 1 LNS 1108). [96] We also agree with the learned judge on her findings that the Appellant’s action on R1 and R8 is barred pursuant to section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953. (d) The learned High Court judge erred in law in holding that the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents is barred by laches [97] The doctrine of laches was succinctly explained by His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd [1989] 2 MLJ 202 as follows: “Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a claim. A court of equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by laches. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches the court considers whether there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part and any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant. The doctrine of laches rests on the S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 consideration that it is unjust to give a plaintiff a remedy where he has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though not waiving the remedy put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if remedy were afterwards to be asserted : 14 Halsbury’s Law of England (3rd Ed) paras 1181, 1182. Laches has been succinctly described as ‘in action with one’s eyes open’.” [98] Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1953 provides as follow- “Nothing in this Act shall effect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence laches or otherwise.” [99] Despite being aware since July 1994 of the sale of the 2/3 portion of the land to R4, the Appellant did not take any timely action to recover the 2/3 portion of the land or set aside R4’s registered ownership of the 2/3 portion of the land or the charge created in favour of OBB over the land. There is undue delay of more than 18 years on the part of the Appellant in filing this action. During the period of delay, R6 had in his capacity as R&M and agent of R4 and in the believe that the Appellant did not intend to make any claim in respect of the 2/3 portion of the land, altered the position of R4 to its detriment by selling the 2/3 portion of the land to R9, paying the redemption sum to OUB, as registered charge, for the discharge of the charge registered and transferred the 2/3 portion of the land into the name of R9’s nominee, R10. The issue of laches was raised by R10 in their defence to the Appellant’s claim. S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 [100] In Faber Merlin (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Lye This Sang & Anor and Tan Kim Chua Realty (M) Sdn Bhd v Lye Thai sang & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 380, the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of laches and found that the plaintiffs were estopped because they were guilty of laches in that since 1978, although the plaintiffs knew that the acts of the defendant were contrary to the agreement, no action had been taken against the defendant until 23 May 1983 where the plaintiff filed an originating summons against the defendant praying to declaratory judgment. The court refused to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief on the grounds that there was evidence of “laches, acquiescence and delay.” (see also: Wu Shu Chen (Sole Executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased) & Anor v Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Hussin [1997] 2 MLJ 487; Soon Poy Yong @ Soon Puey Yong v Westport Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 1 MLJ 196). [101] The learned High Court judge had addressed on the issue of laches and made the following findings- “459. Di dalam kes semasa ini, pihak Plaintif setelah apa yang didakwa sebagai pindahmilik 2/3 bahagian Lot 1487 dikatakan dibuat secara frod telah diketahui oleh Plaintif sejak tahun 1994 lagi, maka kegagalan Plaintif untuk mendakwa atas perlakuan frod itu setelah lebih kurang 18 tahun telah berlalu dari tarikh Plaintif mengetahui tentang apa yang dikatakan perlakuan frod itu menjadikan tuntutan ini tertakluk kepada doktrin kelewatan yang tidak munasabah. Maka Seksyen 32, Akta Had Masa 1953 akan S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 terpakai disini dan Mahkamah atas isu ini sahaja boleh menolak tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kesepuluh.” [102] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on the issue, we find that the learned High Court judge is perfectly correct in holding that the Appellant’s action is barred pursuant to doctrine of laches to defeat the Appellant’s declaratory relief (which is an equitable remedy) to recover the 2/3 portion of the land. We therefore find no basis to conclude that the judge was plainly wrong on the issue of laches. (e) The learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 is applicable against the Appellant and that the 2/3 portion of the land has been purchased for valuable consideration and in good faith by R4, R9 and R10. [103] Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the title registered under R4 and subsequently R10 was obtained by fraud and therefore defeasible and the proviso under section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 does not apply. Several authorities were cited to support the argument: Tan Yin Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 [2010] MLJU 10 FC, Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 4 CLJ 626 CA. The learned High Court judge held that R10 (subsequent purchaser) who had purchase the 2/3 portion of the land Lot 6147 from R9 (immediate purchaser) in good faith and for valuable consideration of RM8.5 million has acquired an indefeasible title under the provision of section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965 and therefore the S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 Appellant is precluded from seeking recovery of the 2/3 portion of the land from R10. [104] In this respect, the Federal Court decision in Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 is instructive. In departing from Adorna Properties, the Federal Court held that the rights and title of a subsequent purchaser who acquires a title in good faith and for valuable consideration from the purchaser, is indefeasible pursuant to the proviso under section 340(3) of the National Land Code (see also: Yap Ham Seow v Fatimawati Ismail & Ors and Another Appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 645). [105] In this respect, the learned High Court judge held- “488. Di dalam tindakan ini Mahkamah dapati Plaintif gagal membuktikan frod dan/atau konspirasi menfrod ke atas Plaintif, maka dengan itu transaksi-transaksi untuk pindahmilik tanah tersebut merupakan transaksi yang bebas dari isu frod seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. Defendan Kesepuluh telah memberi balasan yang sepenuhnya kepada Defendan Kesembilan. 489. Maka dengan itu, Defendan Kesepuluh di dalam tindakan ini merupakan pembeli bona fide ke atas tanah tersebut daripada Defendan Kesembilan.” S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 [106] We agree with the learned High Court that R10 being a subsequent purchaser who had purchased the 2/3 portion of the land from R9 and R9 who had purchased the same 2/3 portion of the land from R4 had obtained an indefeasible title under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code as it has proven that they were a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. We also agree with findings of the learned High Court judge that the Appellant had failed to rebut the evidence that R10 had purchased the 2/3 portion of the land from R9 in good faith and for valuable consideration of RM8,200,000.00 without any notice of the Appellant’s purported interest or rights in the 2/3 portion of the land. The findings are not perverse. [107] We agree that the learned High Court judge did not erred in law and in fact in allowing R10’s claims against the Appellant for the removal of private caveat entered by the Appellant and for the acts of trespass onto the 2/3 portion of the land that is registered under R10’s as the proprietor. Conclusion [108] Quite clearly the outcome of this case turned primarily on findings of fact. In our view, based on the evidence led during the trial, it cannot be said that the learned trial judge’s conclusion upon the evidence was plainly wrong. We need only refer to the reminder by the Federal Court in Ng Hooi Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased& Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 FC; [2010] 10 CLJ CA: S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 “As long as the trial judge’s conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts.” [109] In light of all the above, we unanimously find that there is no appealable error to warrant any appellate interference in this case. We accordingly dismiss Appeal 39, Appeal 134 and Appeal 135 with costs of RM5,000 to Respondent 1, RM5,000 to Respondent 2, RM1,000 to Respondent 3, RM5,000 to Respondent 5, RM15,000 to Respondent 6, RM5,000 to Respondent 8, RM15,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 39, RM5,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 134, RM5,000 to Respondent 10 on Appeal 135, RM5,000 to Respondent 13 and RM5,000 to Respondent 14. All costs given be subject to allocator except on Respondent 1 and Respondent 8. t.t (YAACOB HAJI MD SAM) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Dated 01 November 2023 S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 Counsels/Solicitors For the Appellant: Sharon Shakila Gabriel Venkateswari a/p P. Alagendra (Tetuan N. Saraswathy Devi) For the Respondents: First Respondent (R1): Siti Hafiza Jaafar (Penang ALA) (Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pulau Pinang) Second Respondent (R2): Datuk V.M. Ravindran (Tetuan V. M. Ravi & Associates) Third Respondent (R3): (In person) Fourth Respondent (R4): (Not represented) Fifth Respondent (R5): Alan Chua Hock Kwang Shreena Kaur Sidhu (Tetuan Alan Chua & Co) S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 Sixth Respondent (R6): Datin Jeyanthini Sathya Kumardas Sharon Kaur Jessy (Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co) Seventh Repondent (R7): (Not represented) Eight Respondent: Uma Devi a/p Balasubramaniam (SFC) Hafizah Johor binti Arif Johor (Jabatah Insolvensi Malaysia) Nineth Respondent (R9): (Not represented) Tenth Respondent (R10): Andrian Lee Yung Khin Hanis Hazidi (Tetuan Maxwell Kenion Cowdy & Jones) Thirteenth Respondent (R13): Chong Choon Choy (Tetuan C.C. Chong & Associates) S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 Twelfth Respondent (R14): Subath a/p Sathinathan S. Vasanthi (Tetuan Cheah Teh & Su) S/N eFYCAr2DFkqlkcOJVUJHrA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	87,914	Tika 2.6.0
B-01(NCvC)(W)-238-05/2021	PERAYU 1. ) FAISAL @ IBRAHIM BIN HAJI SIRAJ. 2. ) MAHANI @ SHAMSIAH BINTI ABDUL AZIZ RESPONDEN 1. ) PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH HULU LANGAT 2. ) PENGARAH, JABATAN TANAH DAN GALIAN NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN. 3. ) Kerajaan Negeri Selangor 4. ) Mohd Shukor Bin Omar	Land dispute – Two issued documents of title issued for the same plot of land – Whether a title or interest in land was defeasible or indefeasible – Error made during registration of the title – The status quo should remainThere was a fundamental lapse in the judicial evaluative process. The status quo of Lot 5633 should remain with the Plaintiffs. It is difficult to accept the Seventh Defendant’s proposition as how they acquired Lot 5663 in the event that Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat, who is the one who in charge of the registration, had admitted their mistake. Thus, if the keeper of the register admitted that there is a mistake, it is our firm believe that such mistake should be rectified so as to ensure the registration is kept correctly. The Appeal is allowed and the cross appeal by the Seventh Defendant is dismissed.	30/11/2023	YA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahKorumYA Datuk Ravinthran a/l ParamaguruYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' Lim Chong Fong	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0268d76a-bf03-4552-b05f-f14b07accefd&Inline=true	30/11/2023 16:03:12 B-01(NCvC)(W)-238-05/2021 Kand. 61 S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N atdoAgO/UkWwX/FLB6zO/Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal a—o1(m:vc) (w)—23a—n5/2021 Kand. 51 zzm/ma ,5 22 1; IN THE COURY or APPEAL MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL N n1 Ncvc Ll!) /2n21 BETWEEN 1. FAISAL@IBRANlM BIN HAJI SIRAJ (No. K/P: 450911411-5015) 2. MAHANI @ SHAMSIAH BINTI ABDUL Azlz (NO. KIF: 180520-n:-5000] APPELLANTS AND I. PENTADEIR YANAH DAERAH HULU LANGA1 2. PENGARAI-I, JABATAN TANAH DAN GALIAN NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EIISAN 3. KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN 4. MOHD SHUKOR BIN OMAR (NO. K/F: 510321-n1-5213) RESPONDENTS [In the Maner olthe Hlgh cmm av MaIaya a\ Shah Alan: W me state at Selangon Manaysra 1 FaIsaI @ Ibrahim hm Hap Slraj (Nu K/P 450917-01-5oI90) 2 Maham @ Shamsmh bmll Abdul AzIz (Na K/P 45052003-5000) Plaumffs 1 sw aImAaD/uwvwx/FI_mzuIx2 Nat! Sum IHIWDIY M“ be HSQG M van; M nﬂgvuuly mm; mm. VII muua pm And I Ahmad Zakx Sendirian Bemad (81250-W) 2 EKVE Sandman Bemad(794911»W) :9 Lembaga Lebunraya Mawaysua A Penladbir Tanah Daerah Huh: Langat 5 Pengarah‘ Jabatan Tanah Dan Gahan Negen Se\angcr Darul Ehsan 5 Keralaan Neszen sewangor Darul Ehsan 7 Mahd Shuknr Em Omar (Nu KI?’ 51o327rm—s2<a) Defendants CORAM: RAVINTHRAN A/L N. PARAMAGURU, JCA AZMAN am ABDULLAH. JCA LIM cnom; sous. .IcA JUDGMENT gr THE cogkl lnlmduclion [1] ms >5 an appeal by the Appellants(P\|a\rmffs)agaIns1Qhe decismn nlthe High Court dated 09 04 2021 m wmch the epicentre ufme magmas bemeen the Plauntrﬂ and the RespnndenlsIDe1endants ws evnlvlng around the wand held under GM 5026, Lm ssaa, Negen selangar, Daerah Hulu Langar, Mukwm Hulu Langar (‘Lot 5633") whereby (here are two issued documents efmle Issued cur me same Blot oi wand 2 IN anmnaumxvmx/nnnzurn -ms Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm me court The com: relied on documents m Pan A of the Common Eumﬂe Based on «ms admlssvun ome au4nanmcy and carrecmess of the me man alone, D7‘s ngms and emmemem over the Land naa been mmsputalﬂy proven (a) The courl a\so acoemed me name wnllen by uses: Mohd bm Kevim dated 25 09.1952 as ewdence which showed that LL:\ 5633 has been sold to D7 \n 1982 even though the maker was not called an The learned JC was ansu onne mew, smce D4 had issued new um ohm seas In D7 on Fehruary 2D15,lhus D4 has no power (0 make further amendment to that and Issue the new IDT to lhe Plainliﬂs The learned JC rehed an the Ease of Tin Clliw Thou v Tao Kim may [1991] 1 cu 541 and me case av Chuong war xwan v Penradbir Tanah Penaling [2019] 1 LNS136 In Iunherancs, D4 to D6 were estopped «mm saymg that sssuanae of um of Lot 5533 to D7 was an error and (or the DLIVDOISE ofcurrecllng {he error, such VDT has to be revoked and new rm (0 be Issued Ia me Plamms (c) The Veamed JC went mnner by stated met m «ms case, no lraud vms pleaded agamst D7 because D7 amam me me by valid mstrumenls and also nu fraud was Meaded agamsl D4 Io D6 (.1) The Veamed JC also new tha\| D410 D6 were not w breach at mew slatmory dunes or me pravismns 0! Federal canamuuon and were not naghgenl which shauld be penalwzed m costs and w mmagomkvmx/Fwamrq “ -we Snr1n\nnnhnrw\HI>e used m vs-W ms DVWVMHIY mm: dun-mm wa anum pm damages However, the mun used as discrexronary power under order 92 rule 4 er‘ the Rules or Cowl 2012 lo order D4 \|u D610 pay mrnimal sum or RM5.000 00 re D7. No order to rnrunn D4 lo B5 was given by me noun but D4 and us are obliged to ensure manna court's omens duly enforced Thu Annual [24] The graunds orappear as pernre Memorandum a1Appea\|s\|a1ed as fnlrows Yam? Ant Hakim Mahkrsmah W799! lsrkmlal den 59¢! undnng-unaang a... (ma mm; mumlzsnlrkalr tumulan be/I: R5SPWVdsIr Kiampﬂl farm sum Pwnlih PaI\|9l£VWV5IarI bahaws smslsn rrmrrr drpagnng alnh Per-ayu-Parayu ram srrsozs, Lot 553:: Mukrm rrur. Langal, amn Hum Lanqsl, Nsgarv Sslzngar (Hakrmlrk September zorsr adarah max 557: than Ismalz! ram): nrﬁmvﬁﬂrmbungkun buhswa Pemru-Periyll merllﬂdkan msnrmrry. dsn beninllar den bsrraﬁsrnl ~.r..rrr.r sspoerrrnar am lersvbul rm. xemua mass m.r,...r 2 Yam! An! Hakrm Manrrarr-arr rrnggr Isrkmlal dan sea’ urrdlrwwndaﬁg den ram vpsbrla mambonamlrv perrrrrsrr pwvyrsylrhann bmwa Hakmﬂfk Sgpinmbsf am yang avpegany man Ferlyu-Psrayu mrarr um um don rammr taupe mengnmbrl rm /am bahawa Rsxpandem Responder: Panama, Kedua dun xerrga membua! srarmrr alas Haﬂanaﬂ Isrsabul den rerun pm 2504 2015 rrremrrmkan bahews Bemmk senanar begr Hmnurk ssprsrrrner zors Isrssmll msrllliakm Paravursmyu aarr rmarrrrw Flspondarv Kunliuh. 3 Sahubungan dsngsn rrrr, Yang An! Nakrm Mnhksmnh mggr Ierirhrlaldan segl undunq-undang um rem epabrla momhanarksn salu Pam-rrah Pangmrraran bahawa ramlah Demneasn RM1 301520 on yang maaysr mac. Reswndsn Keemras: Edalan son asrr arramarr morvurut ma Pervaambrlan nrrrrrr raw ms srmn Ra-IPOWM Kesmpal rrrorupmrr munmmya beniallar dan benelrsm Hmanah tamahuz mnpa mempeﬂrmbangkan bahaws Rzrxuamien Panama Jahmggu Kenya daram msayusrar‘ srn mmauomkwwx/nnszom " “Nana s.r.r rurrhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mmrrnuly mm: dun-mm vu nrrurm Wm! pm zsaume Iulan memmumn Danawa [um/an pampssurv yang dmsyar kepadu Rnxpnnoirv Kesmpnt we/vb drksmhs/[Kan kspads perm/vk ssbsnnr Harhvvnlv lerssbu! mu Pemywemyu 4 vsng AnfHakvm Mahlqmall mgguuga lsridvrlefdan sew umwunaang d-an Iikln upabfla membcnarklrv salu per-mlah ms.“ Nakmflrk Saplamhar 2:715 yang drdakarknndlbawah mama Ferayu—Pamyu dtmnhkan o/zlv Perayu-Perayu kepada Responder! Penema aaram myuh (1; Ivan den Iarkﬂ Dsrvvhaktman unluk Dsmhalslan den mm In/unksr mamialnn balvawa Rsspondsrv Panama senmygs Resvnnden Kelrya saws belsima atau berasmqan msngambrl sagiu larlgkah yang mpsnuxsn dun msmbusl memollalyang mencmm,» unluk msngyemn pcmbslalan Halamhk Ssplember 2015 den msngslakknn Ivskmtllkarl Hannah kersem/I Dsrpvhak kepsda Raspnnden Koempal menum! Nakmwk Fsbruan 2015 Ianpa msngamml We raxtamia balvawa Psrayursrayu ms/Ixlzakan Dsmmk bards/tar dalv bsmﬁsrul bay! Hskmmk ssptumoew 2016 5 om. rm, Yang An! Nukrm Mahkuma/'1 rmggn./an tsmlulal ﬂan segr undany-w-Adana I15" /am spam/.9 memhenarkun sen/psmvlah bahawa Psray\|rF\arayu menysmhkau mm»... kusong Harmnah tsrssbul mans Reslmndsn xesmpe: uaram Mun (7) nan dun tankh permlvakrmarv Mahkamalv rmgm Imssaul ‘ Submissions [25] On appeal‘ me pames‘ suhmwsswon are summansed as luﬂows Submission Plaintiffs The Pkaxnhffs submmed man me Veamed JC has ¢a\|[en ‘ mlu erro . ‘ (a) when she assumed that the D7 had indeed ‘ ‘purchased Lot 5533. 1; 5w anmnuu/uwvwx/nmxzurn ms Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm s. mm.“-y mm; mm. VII nF\uNG pm when she used we defeaslblllw test on wnelner a We had rndeed been lssued lpr Lot 5533 correctly; ‘ an and (c) waa ana used the hon: ﬁde pumhaser test In‘ declde who had been vealed wllh proper mla for} Larsen j ll was contended by me Plalrrmlslrral in D7‘: document ol Form 14A(aI page 39-42 0! Enclosure 9; whlch he was purpdmng ta be transferee dl m 1952, clearly snown lhal me miss lncluded ln the lransler are L01 B43 (EMR 5620) and Lot 2671 IEMR 5619). There Is no mentlon cl Lat 5633 Easldes‘ EMR 5620 whron was subsequently rerssued as GM566 actually relales In Lo! 54:. The last lnar Lot 843 ls a drllerenl plot pl land man Lot 5633 was not dispuled by D7 To add lunher‘ the Plalntlﬂs also aupmrnnal D7 hlmseli rn an ar.1lDn to remove a caveat has alalea an oath (by way dl an allrdavil lrled lor muse purpcss) mat he ls the owner or ml 34: and not Lol 5633 as shown al page 72 cf Enclosure 10 Hls me la me sald Lul 543 was exhlbllad lo lrre sand alﬁdavrl al pages 75 la 79 ar Enclosure lo. Trrerelore, accordrng la the Plalnnﬂs. there Is no svldarlce ro show that D7 ever purchased Lal 5533 ll: rn annpago/ukvvwx/Fwlszulq 1' «ma s.a.r n-vlhnrwm be used a mm r.. mrmrrry MIN: dun-vlnrrl vu .rruua v-mal 1953 Tne anly reasnn D7 has been able lo allege his ownership cf Lat 5533 is bamuee ol lna mm L)! lne Lend Omoe m lssulng an lssue document ol «me In \| ‘ replace EM 5620, Lol 543 la Lul 5633 Thus ermr had been conceded by the Land Ofﬁce. as D4 It was argued by me Flamtlfls that the Pla\|nMs' We and (he D7's hlle are dlfferenl lilies Accardlng tn the Plalnliﬂs. Lat 55:: was previously known as Lot 1327"! which at the (me Flalmiﬂs purchased the land. lt was GM471, Lot 1327 vlde a Form MA dated 02 04.1955 as an pages 54 lo 57 of Enclosure 9 Lcl 1327 was subsequently became Lot 5633 when a uanlon M l( was prevlously eequiree for a mad reserve. ms hcl 15 not puted and m fact eeeepleu by lne Respondent‘: counsel in his cross examlnatlun of wnnesees frum lne Lana Ofﬁce This fan was also reﬂecled In lne survey map as at page 53 al Enclosure merecore, accardmg la the Pleunnm, lney are me ‘ legislated owner 0\| LL7\| 5633 since D2 D4 1985 D4‘: 1 actlan (D lnauue Lo! 5633 We GM566 belonglng to D7 I 15 clearly untenable because Lol 5633 was vegIs1ered VI ‘ ‘me Pliirlmls‘ names Such 'transler' to D7 ls clearly mm lo: insuﬂlclenl lnslmnlenl under salmon 34:; at me NLC slnoe no Farm ma nas been snawn Icr such a '(vansfer“ 15 -we s.n.l ...m.mn be used m van; .. nﬂglnnllly sun. dun-mm VII arlum am IN nlmagolukwwx/Flsﬁzulq II is the submission M the Flallmffs mat the learned JC had referred to Form 14/K (lhe mam documem relied by my but the Veamed Jr: are: net seem to appreciates mar me Form MA does nu! oonlam me sad Lat seas mr was pvevious aesrgnanmr La! 1327) Thus, .1 was suhmmed I by me Plainms mat D7 has aclusny (sued In prove ms ngh\| to lhe remedies much was wrungmuy allowed by me learned JC D4 — D5 summarily, the learned counsel for D410 D6 submwiled than me learned JC erred when she Iehed co Form MA to prove me transfer ai Lol sea: to D7 In ms regara, aoaumrng lo D4 to D6. mat Form 14A daaﬂy shows the translerfrom Zawlah hum Hap Zakana (0 D7 pertalrwlg to two Ins much is Lot 343 and Lo\| 2671 Lu! as was ‘ ongmaled [mm EMR 5620 andlhus aecordmg to D4 re was nu! related re La! 5633 (mm me vary beginmng D7 had falfed (0 wave (hat La! 5633 was Indeed belongs to mm (mm 2312 5952 because none Lot 843 er Lal 2571: are mated to La: 5533 which was claimed by D7 ‘ n was submitted mar me Veamad JC was lack of ‘mucus! appreciation of the evmenue when she hem that D7 hnldl inveasmmry ur men over m 5633 whereby me‘ purchased nllhe Land by D7 was vahd and D715 a bone ﬂde purchaser lar value without notice. The learned JC had velted on Land PVEVI dated 29 4 2002‘ wrthout taking me account other cnntempnraneaus documems‘ IN -nmnuo/ukwwx/nmszurn -um smm nnuhnrwm .. used m mm r.. mmuly mm: dun-mm VII muNG v-max namely P1 dated 2312 1592 P5 datm ls oi 1935 am PS dated 05 02.1983. D4 had oondumed Ihell invauguuan and had made a leper! on we It lsme ﬁndlng v1lhelnvesugaIlunIhalLal 5533 IS actually belongs to the Plelnlms 04 had admllled that may had mlslakenly reglslered Lul 5633 under D7‘s name D4 had look e slap In rectlfy me mlslake and a mesung was conducted 25.04 2016 an wmcll the resull of me maellng was Ior me mnacﬁon to be dune. The learned caunael lor D4 lo D6 alsu submllted that all ‘mew acmons was made In good (am: and pmleclea by law pursuant on secllon 22 ollhe NLC ln lms regam, the learned JC was rlghl ln her declsinn mac there was nu bleach ol slalulmy duiy and/or me dlliy ol care cl D4 la D6 On the Issue as 10 whether D410 D6 should compensate and/er lndemrllfy :31 over me losses, il was submilled lhat D7 was rlal prelualeea and had not slﬂleled any loss as a result el the acllens at D410 us The counsel relenea \|o me case of Peuaanar Hakm k Meqzri Sellngor v. cusius Development sun Ehd A. Ors And Another Appul [mo] 3 CLJ 321 m which the clalms lor damages should am he allowed as D7 lallea to pmve ms claims There IS no evldence to prove the ‘lass he suﬁered M71643 whlcn belorrgsm D7 was never affected by «re land aoqulsllron Besides, considerlng lnal “Lot 5633' wnlcn clalrned lo be owned by the D7 is aczually, reler la Lot 343 and lnara us. no damage 1 occurred an Lot B43. than me lssue of vralandn o1D7‘s ‘ aanslrlmrarral ngms In own and ernoy nrs land Is also nut applrcalrle Itwas also suarnlrleu thallhe Plalmﬂfs also do nc\| errmle to any rndernnlry for one reason me: me Plnirltlffs only demand lav a dounlerclerrrr cl D7 IS drsrnrssed wllrr cosle and ma Plalnliﬂs‘ ngnl and lllle auar GM 5025 are malnvtalned and aannrrned by me Court The plarmrllsl are also not enmledlo dlalrn lur any damages relaung Io rne losses arrslng irurnlne renlal agreerrlenrenlered o l laerween me Plalrlllﬂs and L’-Moblle sdn Bhd dared 12 lo zmo Tne reason being, such agreernenl was VI‘ contlavy la me (we ol land usage that IS "Agrlcullure" as slaled ln mle documenl (“D25') al pages 51-52 cl Enclosure 9 and lrr fact we Frrsr Flalnlm rnrnsell admllled me during craeaexarnrnalrarr Furlherlhal znal, rrwas also submmed that D7 could nul rely an ma omnibus prayer n ma aleadlngs In jus1lfy me clalms that were nor pleaded because me claims are substanllal dalms which must he pleaded and proven speclﬁcally ru nlmﬂaulukwwx/Flsazuln «me s.n.r In-vlhnrwm re used M mm me nrwlrrallly MIN: dun-vlnrrl VII .nuue v-mxl I Lasuy. D4 and us argued lhal me waarnad JC nadﬁcf Mn auowing mandatory iruuncﬁnn order against D4 ca us. D7 The learned courlserfor D7 on ma dtner hand submmed that me reamed JC nad oanaxdered an awdanca at man ‘ and was correct wn auowmg me declaraﬁun that me We ‘ neld bythe Pramuﬂa was mega: and vnid D7 was a burial ‘ ﬁde purchaser lemme wllhcul name, and had ngnrfuuy aaqunad mdereasmle one arma Lat 5633 in pnamy over me Plzmmrs n was awad submmed mac me reamed JC dud nm erred ‘ rn cansmerlng a hand wrmen name or Uslaz Mnhd Em ‘ Kanm dated 25 91932 wnucn provides evrdence mau 01‘ ‘ nad Indeed purcnaaa me me 5633 In 1952. 1 ‘ \Counse\ (or B7 went mnna« In ms suhmrssron that me learned JC had considered SH ewdenoe wnh regards tn the mvesligannn conducted by DA and r\|erdIr1a(D4tu as nad sued In breach 0! man statutory dunes. in breach of the Federal Conslkulion, and also were ‘ grossly negngem, and therefore should be penahxad in was and damages ! Aocnrdmg to D7‘ D4 cannot re-alienate the same La! 5633 to the Apparlant in September we unueaa ma land is ravenad lo the State The purpuned vssuance cl Illle In September 2016lalr1e Praunurfs was therefore a _ T; 19 IN nmnﬂaﬂlukwwx/FLB§zU!G «ma am.‘ n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. mn.u-y mm: dun-mm wa mum v-mm nuurry By reoogmzmg max vie Plamm as ma ngmm uwner a! Lot 5633 and rssumg the September zmsmle to thereto was sand to be not unly An ultra vires of D4 cm as powers but also allow «ham to appvobals and \ leprobale at Ila whims and lame: ’ x I u was aVsn contended mac me learned .10 was currea in \ mama max smoe B7 was the uwner or me Lo! 5523. men rc laﬂowa that an ngme and benems derived (mm are property‘ must nghtluﬂy be accorded cm or vvum regavd lo we cross appeal m Endosure 11, uwas submllled that the learned JC had erred in fact and] or In law after faulmg to conswdev that the rehe!s lor 3 ‘ I dsclaratlon agamst me Appeuarrcs (or ancvoammenl 01 me Land and damages maram was a namrax consequence anar having found \|ha\| D7 was ma ragracsraa and neneneran owner 01 La! 5533 In Ihus regard the learned JC has HIE power (0 order that D410 us being me veal wrangdaer in we cass. do Andemmfy me F\a1nlINs car an losses and damages awarded to D7 arising eumnms case Thus, D1 prayed lurlhe lollawmg pumlwa casts! exemplary damages lo be paid to D7 agamsf D4 Io D6 (3) Exemmsry damages m me sum u1RM45,DOD.DD; la} rw mmnuumkwwx/Fwbzurn 2“ «ma sum n-nhnrwm be used a mm .. mrmw mums dun-mm wn mum v-mm [21 The Hvgh Court had dismissed ma P\amWs' dalm and auoweu me counter-charm a! mm Responaenl (Seventh Defendant) and ordered as IOHOWS’ -Mm adnlan dlpennlzhkan bahnwa (unhnlan ham delendan kstuiuh gum um...am.n ueveru mm 1 Sntupevvmxh pengmnmn hahawa hananamersebulmailh new-mu deﬂendan kenuwh 2 Sam penguyhhamn be)-wzwa suntan mx mlhk kepunyltn swam; um. aerenaan kelmuh uanu am 566, L01 5633 Negev: Sehngar. Diem: Hu\u Lanna! “Hahn x FlhrnIr\|2015" adahh an m swsl unaanwmang, 3 Sun pengisylmamn hnhawa suraun hak rmhk kauurwaan ulpeaaru man p:.mm.pmnm mm em snzs, Lat seas, Nsgsu s-Ia-non Daarah umu Lanuac ‘ﬂnkmlllk Slpkmblr mu" adalah lidak ssh .1. gm undang mm. 4 Saw pa-mun cam. Hakmlhk Sapvambev zme yang dldanarkan ar hlwnh n-ma plmnm-nlzinﬁf dsteuhksn ubh p\|IImW—p\amlﬂ mm wman keemvat dalam mun m hen ﬂan mun Denghnk\|mnn\|nIunl1bk Dernbrmrnn 5 sm. wqunksx mandllnn bihawa daiundammiendln kesmxzat -enwuqa keenam‘ secnm bersnmn emu bernsingnn mengxmhwl sag)‘: llngkah yang mpemxan ﬂan membuat memmx yang mevwcukupl unluk mengeiekkan Dambawan nakmnlk September zms Gan mengefekkin nakmlmkan hananah Ismebutbulmhak ktnada dafandan kemluh menuml Hakrmlwk Febman 2016‘ 5 Sam psiinuh psngmytihamn mm; mun plmpimn Rm,an7.a2a no yang dibnyarkzpada deﬂendan kenuuh admahsah dan mlakukan manumx ma Pennamhuanﬁnah was karana wanaan ksmjun merupakan luau Dunya berdalhv din blnsﬁud mum tansbllf. 7 Sam usnmzh hnhzwa plnlmt-p\nlnI1I menyerahknn mﬂikan kmong n.n.n..n iersehm kspada delendan «gum dulnm masn m nan dun mm pemaman m sm mmuuumkwwx/nnbzurn . mm. smm IIIVVDIVWW be LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm ‘ ‘ ts; Damagea tar ms af iteaiings and Heprwation oi‘ ‘ land in the sum of Rivitao 000,00, 1 (ct Reimbursement ior legal tees ineurrea by D7 an a salicilut-clisnl basis, in the sum at RM2DU,0UD on and the service tax payable an this amount, (at D4 to D5 In pay on an tneei-nnity basis, an i damages aria coats ordered ta be paid by “us Heneitrabie court i-mm the Piaintms to D7, i including damages tar encroachment oi Land, and coats our Doclslon [26] Aﬁer carelui considemlion and an evaiua\Iun ol the IGEIM 01 me evidence were this Court, we are or the opinion that the status qua 0! Let 5533 sriouirt remain with the Piairiiitte ii is uimeiiit In aooepl Dre propoaninn as how they acquired Let 5663 in the evem that D4, who is the one who in charge 0! the regislraunn had admllted their mistake Jeraid Gomez, in an article entitied ‘Section 340 at the Narionai Land Code, secure and Atter Bourisum Baoriyanil’ as published in [zoom 1 MLJ Ixxii, said that “The register IS meant to be the mirror 01 the Illle deeds, cantaining an the inierrnaiion one needs to know on a particular pleoe ol ianttnz Thus. it the keeper 0! the register admilted that there is a mistake, it is our ﬁrm beiieive tiiat such mistake sheuid be reaiﬁed so as to ensure the regisuatitm Is kept correctly 21 IN amnﬂaﬂlukwwx/Ft.B£zUiQ -iiua a.ii.i n-vihnrwm be used m mm he nﬂﬂinnﬂly MIN: dun-mm VI] nFiuNG wnxi 1271 we are also or the vlew me: the hlslory el lhe reglslered «me lo we land m qussllnn. Lm 5633. should be carefully examlned and lnlhls mgem, we depart mm the ﬁndlngs ul [he learned JC we have palnmlly corlsldered thls lssue em we ﬁnd that n ls ln evlderlcs and Imdlspuled facl IhatForm14A prnduced by D710 pluve ms clalms nnly shows lnenaneler from Zawlih mull Hall Zakarla to D7 only peﬂalrllng to we Vols whlch are Lo! ﬂ43 and Lat 2671 According I0 D4‘ EMR 5620 whlch later changed :9 sun 565 was psnainlng to Lot ans EMR 5620/GMSBG 15 ml relaxed lo Lol 5533 (mm me very beglnnlng [2431 rnerelore, we hnd than me srgumem me: he had bought wee 13; plants 07 land Wllh 3 total 07 RMESDDU 00 through a brnker whlch are L0! 543,Lal2E71andlm:ludlng Lot 5633 ls not sustainable and does not new waler Even though there are hand wrlllsrl notes‘ we could not accept It as an evldenoa whlch supports D7‘s clalms aver Lat 55:: The reason belng, ln Form 14A, the «reneler wag. «mm Zawlah mun Hall Zakarla to m and not (mm Uslaz Mahd hln Kanm (who wrule the males and slated that he had sold Lo! E43‘ Lol 2571 and L0! 5633 to D7 for an amounl 09 RMB5,00D 00) To add Miller, nothing lrl (I18 evldenoe pmved that L0! 5633 or lls prevlous designallurl Lot 1327 was transferred lrom Uslaz Mend mu Karlm in m [29] Furlhemlorel as submltted by D7 (hat he had Vlslled the lands lur law \|lmes and even and had lnstrucled lhe land surveyor to measure \|he lands and obtain the topographlcal detalls or me lands, we ﬁnd lhal l1 Lol 5533 belongs to mm‘ he should reallze the Plammls‘ oocupallnn over me land The Plalnlllls not only aocupied me land bul also had tenanled uul pan :71 me send L01 5533 lo a lelscuml-nurllcatlons company, UMubl'\|e Sdn Bhd, Io mllla atelecommumcallonlowersinee11101010 Imlll April 2016 21 IN mmnuumkvmx/Flnazuln we Smnl ...m.mm be ﬂied m mm me mm-y MIN: dun-mm VI] nFluNG pm Therelere, the Issue of lrespass should exxsl befnre lhs land was acqmred my a mgnway concesswnaue mm me oampensauan of RM1‘907‘620.00 come IMO mature [30] We agree wmh the Plamtlﬂs man they had purchased the land in 1935 when Lot 5633 was a pin 0! Lo! 1327 held under SM 471 The mammvs argumems was veﬂected m ms wssue document ol me dated 13.04 1954 as axrubned at pages 47 » 50 0! Enclosure 9 (pages 34.37 or Record 07 Appeal Fan C‘ Vol 1) ll lollcvws that he Demlled Plan by the Survey Department alsu shnws lhill L0! 1327 amer havmg been IESWVE‘/ed for an acquisition of read reserve‘ was renumbered Lnt 5533 as exhibned at page 5: ol Enclosure 9 (page 40 gr Record av Appeal Pan 0, Vol 1) [31] Tnerevore, we ave at ma mnsmarsa vlew that me Plaxnliﬂs ave me ﬁrs! who obtained Issue document nf we 0! Lot 1327 much later snoum be renumbered as Lot seas as ms was the ugh: «mug to do by 04 after may we the mistake [321 As deemed by the Federal com vn me case a1SeeLeong Chyc @ Sza Loony Cllye .5 Anor v unnea Overseas Bank (M) Blvd and another appeal [2021] 5 ML! 759 me uueslinn of whether a tale or imeresl m land was ueveasime or mdeleasmle was a quesman ol mixed Veal and law ln our present appeal‘ we (hmk that II is the type error that had actually affect the whale mung This error‘ even though, not as serious as lraud, should be snowed m be recliﬁed and me Flalrmlvs be gwen thew nghts. ms »s remedlable pursuant to ssctiun 340(2)(c)o1me NLC 13 IN mmuuomkwwx/nnazurn -ma saw In-nhnrwlll be used a mm ms mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG wrm [331 we make msunecion wan rsgam In our present appeal with other rand mspme casa pemeinrng to the dereasrblhly at mdeleaslbmly or We because In (hrs appeal. there Is no elemem oilrauds n 15 a M31 a typo error cummmed by Di hack rn 1986 whId\ onry reahzed by the names In 2015. We lhrnk that M sun not too late (0 correct the errar and bnrlg back the status qua prlor to me land acquxsmen [341 We are minded at me Federal Coun decrsmn m me case or Pendrflnl Hlkmillk Negeri Stranger v Cnslu: Devalopment Sdn End 5 Dr: and anulhal appeal [2020] Muu 25 which held as vounwe. “As a keeper of an rand «mean my 2 pamcular Slate nn W: can serangor) It Is reasanabre m rmnme upnn lha land umce, mulumng me 7“ aevenannn, e aury or care umme eu rana awnen. m snsuve um me randawners‘ mbevests am wan pmlaclsﬂ and rafsguamed “ [35] However, .n our present appear, mere is no eumenee that D4 to De nan been neghgenl m nananng ma lransrar Mme lands The my mistake occurred al me lime they are changing me registration from EMR to mm In which «ms cnengmg pracess was done m accordance In me Laws [351 we arse agree wnh me submission of the learned counsel or D4 to D6 that D7 is not anmre co any damages or campensa\|Iun because he was not deprived of ms Iltle and/nr m\eres1s over VH5 awn lands (L01 B43 and Lot 2671 ) wmch uriginaﬂy nansvenea from Zswrah mnu Hap Zakana D4 surrered no loss at no: havmg eampensauon cl RM1,ao7,s2o ao necauee Lo! 5663 um um bercng in mm from me very beglnmng The oumpensatron wrll fulluw the righifur mine! of L0! 5563‘ which we held to be me Flainlrﬂs. 24 IN anmnuolukwwx/nmxzurn -uue sane! n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nrwrruﬂly MW: dun-mm VI] muue pm conclusion [371 In reaching our conclusion, we were mindful anne Iactlhat Ieamed JC Had me audm/wsual savaruaga wmcn ms court rs depvived 0! we are however satisﬁed mat mere was a lundamemal lapse m the rumors: euaruauva process Eased on me avoresaid reasons, we anew [ms appea\ by me Pvarnms and merevore sel aside me deuaran M the learned JC dated as 04202:. We make the orders pursuanl in semen 6515) Lynne Courts av Jumcature AI:t19S4 as (snows (a) a dedarallon that the Plarrraﬁs rsma nghlful uwner anme held under GM 6025, Lo! 5533. (b) a dedaralxon that Iarrdmle he\d by D7 under GM 555, L01 5533 rs mm and vmd, and (c) D7 rs in pay costs 01 RM70,0D(J 00 here and bekvw to me P\amWs sumect m auacanar [331 sirrcewe have aHuwed mis appeal bylhe Plamhﬂs, me cmss appea\ by D7 Is now marmssea wnh no order as to costs (AZMAN AEDULLAH) age court of Appea\ Malaysra Pulralaya 15 ru anmuuulukwwx/nmxzurn -we ssrm n-nhnrwm be used m mm r.. mrmu-y mm: dun-mm VI] .nuNG Wm Data or D Ground: Iuuud Lagal Repmnnudan For an Appellants For ene rim Respondent Io Third Raslwndunl For the Fourth Respondenl sw anmnuu/uwvwx/nmxzurn ' on :22 Novamhsrzoza : 23 Novumhur 2023 Selva Kumavan AIL Kamawanaznan (together mn Emeka lsma Dameal hm Kaswadvb [Messrs Ruse Hussm] Khawrm Nlzam bln Abu Eakar twqszner mm Husna blrm Abdul Hahm) [Pembal Penasmal undang-undang Nsgen salangor] Keuy Khan Sen Ju (mgether wm. Qamanna Aqnam [Messrs Mahs 8. Knocl 25 -ms Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. mm.“-y mm; dun-mm VII mum pm a Kns sebanynk RM4D.DW no dlbayarmeh y\a\mN—p\|iInMkepada daﬂandan kaluJuh:dan 9 K0: ssbanyak RM5.DW nu dmeyar ulen delenrlnn-dnfandin xeempm sehmggl kaenam kspadz delendan keluiuh ‘ [3] The Plamms are aggrieved by the declsvon and nenee eppeax egemsn Faurth to Seventh Defendants The sevenm Defendant also med cross appeal aﬂer bemg drssausﬁed mm the damsmn 0! me Vaamed Judimal Cnmmisioner and applves to this court (0 vary me decxsxan efme High ceun The Rehels sougm by the Seventh Deﬁendant agsmst me AppeHams as m Endosuve 11 are Mlaws‘ re) Dsdaralmn order re\aCed to trespass In land (encreeenmenu and (I2) Damages as e ream: ol trespass to land (encroachment) (er an amount at RMIA5,5J000 or whicnever amount us esseeeed by ms cum [4] we heard me appeal on m 09.2023 and new gwe our decxsxon on 22 11 2023 Having duly eonsmeree the appea\ rewvds and submvsslons of cuunset we unammuusw decided Io anew the Plemms‘ appeal and msmxss me Seventh Defendanfs cross app9a\ our reasons var allowmg me aweal new vonow [5] For convenience, we sneu reler to me names by the «cues essignee to them in the High Court The Appeuancs shall be referred \|a caHec(Ive\y as “F\|ainIiffs". Tne Respondents shall be relerred as vuuuws. IN enennuo/ukvvwx/nmzuru we saw ...m.mn be used m mm the mm-y mm: dun-nun! VI] nnum wrm ' ’WnJ i..aa..d.'.n 1 \ Conn 1 Penudanranen Dnarah Hum Langal ‘ Founh nevendam (‘no 2 Panda-an, Jabalarﬂanalv Dan Gahan Fm nerandanc 1*u5'T 7 Nsgan Sahngur Dlml Ehxan '3‘ Ke_v5\|ian Neaen Sehamlurﬂ uléhsan sum Defendant 0:15") Mnhd Shukm Em Omav Seventh um? 07"» Background Fads [51 By way ol summary. pan of Sam La! 5633 has been requiud «er aedmemdn Ior me purpases at me H1ghway Prqeci East Krang vaway (EKVE) Hum Langal neum, Selangar .n ma» me meat nwa1ves me Federal Government through me Deparlment dune Dweclor senerax ui Lands and Mmes (Federal) S\a1e oi Selangcr 1"JKF'TG“) on or am: January 2015 D4 had received a newer lvom JKFVTG asking «or me status av Lot 5633 because aﬂsr nend search was conduexed, La! 5633 does nut ems! and is reulaced DY another Vat M land [71 Subsequent in that 1e«er, D4 was approached by me D7 wm: said (hat he .s me regeeered owner af Lot 5533, and he1ns1sted mate decision be made on the status Lot 5633 and Its nwnersmp [51 vnereame, en 03 02.2016, a rneeung was he1d «u discuss ems maner wvlh me attendance or Mﬁcer from D4, JKPTG, D7 and his lawyer In me mscueeuon, D7 submmed a me donumem as n Form so » seran Mukmu on/uses, Lo! 5631 Batu 15 =/. Dusun Tua which was regecared on 161 19561"? ), 1n nmnﬂaﬂlukwwx/FLB§zU!G we Snr1n\n-vwhnrwmlxe used m mm 1.. mn.1-y MW: dun-mm wa nﬂuNG v-mm rs] Aner examining me we oocument and companng ttwttn the reaoros kept in Hulu Langat Land canoe and anar eonstaanng that mere Is no ctarm made by annlher party on Lot 5533 at that tune, D4 was satisﬁed that me such Iilfe document was Issued by (he Hum Langal Land OM09 and ooncmaedtnattnere was evruv VI swna Iesumng In reeoros ragarmng Lot 5633 nonexistent [10] It is therefore, on we 02 2016, tn pursuam Io secnon 390 :2! me Na(Iona\ Land Codes (Revised—2U2U) [Act 8281 (“me NLC”), D4 nae made ourreouan by estabrismng Ine uwnersnip o1 Lot 5633 in SPTE and issued a new tune aacumem (or Lot 5633 to D7 Subsequent to that D7 submllled Form P9 to JKPTG ano requested vor tne release M oornpensation for land aequtsdvon of Lot 5633 on 05 012016, D7 had rscewed compensauan luv the amount mi RMl,907,620 00 [11] Be that as rt may‘ ammo Apm 2015‘ D4 ahmplly reserved a ountplaintvrom me Frrst P\aInlIf1 wtto ctarmeo mat Lot 5633 which belnngs to him was Irespassed due to me z:ons\ruc'uon or EKVE Since mere were two claims ol awnersmp over me same Lot 5633, D4 nad cunauoteo nwestrgaoon to mentify wno Is me real owner Di Lot 553: [12] upon the tnvesttgattnn 04 found that the Fvst Plaimm and me secono Ptatnttﬁ are tne res! owners at Lot 5633. Mis1ake occurred during tne replacement prooees Irum Entry tn tne Muktrn Regrster (“EMR”) to Geran Mukim (“G ') araund 1983 Al mat ﬂme‘ (mass which belongs to D7 was nnstaxenly regtsteteu over La: 5533, lcr wntcn GM566 shomd have been regtstered ovar tne Lot 843 Due to ma! rntstake, D7 was regtstered as the land owner 0! Lot 5633 at tnat ttnte IN anmnuo/ukvvwx/Ftmzurn we s.n.t n-nhnrwm be as... m mm s. nﬂmnaﬂly sun. dun-mm wa .nuNG wnxt [13] Fullowtng Ihal, a meeting was new on 25 B42016 at the Hutu Langst Land cmtoe which aimed \|a dtscuss tne tssue M Le\| 5533 he moeI\|ng') The rneanng was attended by, among others. representative tram JKPTG, the Frrst Ptatntift and the We tewyer It was the dechston rn the rneetrng that (a) D7 sneu return the oompensatton that he reserved over the tend acqutsttton and to be patd to the reat owner JKPTG shown mommr Ims ana using the prmltstuns under semiun 36 ot the Land Acquisition Act 1954: lo recaver compensatton lram D7 and (in) D4 shalt make oorrecttone under aectron 380 at the NLC wrth trnrnearete ettect an GM 566 from Lot 5533 to Lot 543 which trnuatty betungs to D7 Therernre D7 must return the angrnat we at Lot 5633 and VI return, ne wru receive new aoeurnent IIUE M Lat 54:. [141 D4 and JKPTG had named out the aecteten otthe rneenng However, D7, Instead uf retummg the compensanen to mews, had sent tetterto D4 daled 25.06 2016 dtsputmg the declston 0' the meeimg Up to (his date‘ the compensation money Is sml wtlh D7. [15] That was the ganests of Ptatntt«s' elanns at shah Alarn High court agatnet the named Defendants ﬁrslly vme ongrnaong Summons but then changed to the Wnl and statement of Claim da\|ed 25.01 2019 upon the tmler otthe High court IN mmagomkwwx/Fwazutq we s.n.r ...n.mn be used m van; ..e mn.u.y mums dun-mm VIZ mum war [16] on 17.12 2019, me Hlgh Courl had suuck mlllhe Plalmilrs clalms on are reason that me Plelnlill had lerled lo comply mm lrre cdurvs rnslrueuene lo me the cause papers requlved lor man, i a ma Bundle ol Agreed Dacumems, me Agreed Facis and lssueele belrrea Dresausned, lhe Flelnlllrs rndved an appeal to me cuurl of Appeal In C II Appeal No la-ol(lMl(Ncvcl~35—l7ll2u2o The appeal ‘was smlck our on osov 2020 mm an award lur cost cl RM3,0D0 on In lavaur dl D7 in which «he coun of Appeal had allawed me Raspondentsla slrlks aumre appeal based an me reasdrr that me Plelrrlllls had wranglully appealed agalnsl such order, we Plelnlms shauld irrsl apply In the Hlgh court in aeeardarrce In Order 34 rule 2(4) of llre Rules cf com 2012 [17] The Hlgh caun had Ihen proceeded In hear 07's caunlenclalrrrs agarnst the Plalnflﬂsu D4, D5 and D5 lrr wrllch me wunlerclalms ware allowed and B7 was awarded with cosls of RMAQDOD 00 on 09 04.2021. [18] Based on the Amended slalemenl of nelense arm Caumerclaim, D7 clalms that orl and about 25 09 1982, D7 had Dough! three (3) plats 0\| larm Wllh a lrytal el RMa5,ooo an Illrwgh a braker The mree place of land ave L01 B43‘ La: 2571 and lncludlng Lot 5633 The lands rrad been charged In Bank perlarrran lvlalaysla on or around 07 02 1933 as collalelal 'DT the lnan and was released on or about 2706 1995 It was also submmed by D7 that he had vlsiled the lands for few llmes and even and had lrlslructed me larm surveyor lo measure me lands and Dblaln me lopographlcal details ofllle lands [19] The Plalntllfs‘ on me other hand. had submltted mal they nan purchasad me same ln 1935 when Lal 5633 was a pan dl Lat 1327 held under SM 471 as can be seen ln me Issue document uf mle dated ru anmago/ukvvwx/nmzulq 5 -uua Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be used m my .. nﬂnlrrnllly Mlhls dnunvlnnl VIZ muue mu 13041954 (“ms Plaimilfs’ IDT“) as exnmilaa at pages 47 — so of Enclosure 9 (pages 3447 o(Recurd n(Appaa\|Fal1 cl Val 1) The cenmed Plan by the Survey Depanmem men anaws mat Lot 1327 after having been resurveyed for an aoqulsllicm LIV road vaerve‘ was renumbered L0! 5633 as exhibited al page 53 cf Enclusule 9 (pages 40 or Reeera ol Appeal Pan cl Vol 1) in was oamerlded by me l=lainmls that ms claim on Lot 5533 ansea «am an issue aseumenl cl‘ mle Issued on 16 01 less (“D7's lDT“l, however. it is to be noted that me Plainlms‘ IDT was issued pnans D7's VDT in van, lne Plaintiffs had also Ierlanled out pan alme said La! 5533 In B lelecommurlicallnrls company, UMDhi\|s Sdn BN1‘ to build a Ielsoommunicatlorl lower on the said land since 12 10 2010 urih] April 2015 when the land was acquired (or a highway concessiorlaire [201 in lnis case, bath Plainlms and D7 appear to have been ignorenl of each smers “awnershlp' until an acquisition sl pan onne said land was undertaken by a nlgnwey onrloesslonaire In wnisn D7 was («st in appwacn D4 to clalm his ownership and me conipensalion for ma asamsilisn was Bald to him Follawung man, D4 had issued a new (eonipulenzea) lssusdocumenl olnlle aalea 16 02 2016 lo D7 leremssei Lot5633 ueclslan at the High Conn [21] From me grounds onne learned Judlclal Cnmmlssmnef ollne Hign Court Mm learned Jew the essence of her decision was of who acqulred gaodtllle over Lo! 5633 Tne learned Jr) was oflhe View max me dispute was over lne same lana, wnlcn is Lot 5633 wnicn sne uuuled me evidence by Rasian bin Omar [SF1)who is «he olﬁoer from JUFEM in almﬂuulukvvwx/Fl.MzUiG -use a.n.i n-vlhnrwiii as used m mm s. nﬂninnilly sun. dun-mm VI] arlum Wﬂxi 1221 we learned JC made herﬁndmg by comparing ms Im nfGM56$. 1.015633 whrch allegedly purchased on 23.12 19:32 am Zawiah mm Han zakana against ma Flalnliﬂs‘ um cf GM471‘ Lul 1327 wmch was purchased by the Plaurmﬂs from Ke\sum binli Gamek darn Halimah me Hey Khallb on 24101934 [231 The learned JC wrme allawmg D7‘a aoumemawms, new mac (a) D7 ham mreasmmty ovmrad over Lm 55:: whereby me Court was ollhe wewlhanhe purchased umua ram by D7 was vahd and D715 a bona ﬁds purchaser lorvame wmhoul notice The regxstraluon was completed by D4 in 1992 easidsa, m preceded the ma-nms m terms of (me Fe dunng the uwnershm nrIgini\|Hy m 1932 and also m February 2016 lor Lana aoquusmon. (b) The Veamed JC also look mm accounlthaklhe warn of Lo(5E33 was Included m ms Pan A M me Gammon Emma and concluded that as such, ma names had agreed on me aulhenlluty and the somams 0! document m wmch smsss, Lot 5633 belongs to D7 1:) Even though D4 Submmed that D‘/'5 mle In LB! 5533 \s defeasmle based on the reason that Farm 14A and Form 15/1 shuwed that L015-633 did not bebngs to D7 "7 csez as well as 1953 and thus, ms ownership can be darned pursuant ta aacnon 340(2) 01 me NLC (rsgxstmlwan was naaaa an Vnsummenl msxmmemsh. nevenhaless the learned JG held that D7 had proved ms dalms based on Ihe dommentsmed before 10 IN a1mAuDIukwwx/nmxzurn Nuns saw n-nhnrwm as used m mm s. nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm wa anum pm	3,416	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
CA-A73KJ-253-09/2021	PLAINTIF 1. ) AQIM SHAHFIEZUL BIN AZMAN 2. ) MOHD ASRAF BIN IBRAHIM DEFENDAN ASMIZAM BIN MOKHTAR	KES KEMALANGAN JALAN RAYA - Defendan mengemukakan tiada kes untuk dijawab - Samada terdapat percanggahan fakta - Samada keterangan senyap menyokong kes Plaintif - Samada kenyataan Plaintif yang pengsan selepas kejadian boleh diterima pakai	30/11/2023	Puan Nor Izzati binti Zakaria	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c6f54f94-10d6-43d1-b19c-12b15f0a3a63&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN 1 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG GUAMAN SIVIL: CA-A73KJ-253-09/2021 ANTARA AQIM SHAHFIEZUL BIN AZMAN [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 960305-06-5947] MOHD ASRAF BIN IBRAHIM [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 960926-06-5325] ... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN ASMIZAM BIN MOKHTAR [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 810903-11-5349] …DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah rayuan Defendan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini yang telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif sebanyak RM20,715- 00. Kes ini didengar secara bicara penuh di mana Plaintif-Plaintif telah memanggil 3 orang saksi manakala Defendan menghujahkan tiada kes untuk dijawab. Atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah memutuskan untuk membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif. Alasan adalah seperti mana dirungkaikan seperti berikut. 05/12/2023 12:08:15 CA-A73KJ-253-09/2021 Kand. 56 S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Latar Belakang Kes [2] Plaintif Pertama merupakan penunggang motorsikal No. CCP 9033 manakala Plaintif Kedua merupakan pemilik berdaftar motorsikal No. CCP 9033 pada sepanjang masa kemalangan yang berkenaan dan kedua-duanya beralamat penyampaian di No. 15 Tingkat Bawah, Jalan Haji Junid, 25200 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [3] Defendan merupakan pemilik berdaftar motorsikal No. WKN 8725 pada sepanjang masa kemalangan yang berkenaan dan beralamat di No. 12 Lorong Pandan Makmur 3, Taman Greenlast Makmur 2, Kuantan Bypass, 25150 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [4] Pada 9/12/2018 lebih kurang jam 2.00 petang, terdapat satu kemalangan di antara Plaintif Pertama yang sedang memandu motorsikal No. CCP 9033 dengan Defendan yang sedang memandu motorsikal No. WKN 8725. Versi Plaintif [5] Pada 9/12/2018 lebih kurang jam 2.00 petang, Plaintif Pertama sedang menunggang motorsikal No. CCP 9033 dari Lorong Seri Teruntum 16 menuju ke Pasaraya Giant. Apabila sampai di Jalan Seri Teruntum 1, tiba-tiba sebuah motorsikal No. WKN 8725 yang ditunggang dengan begitu cuai dan laju tanpa sebarang isyarat atau tanda amaran telah melanggar motorsikal Plaintif Pertama dari arah belakang sehingga mengakitbatkan kemalangan dengan motorsikal No. CCP 9033. S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [6] Kemalangan tersebut, adalah disebabkan oleh kecuaian penunggangnya sebagai ejen dan/atau wakil kepada Defendan dalam pengendalian motorsikal No. WKN 8725 dan Defendan selaku pemilik adalah bertanggungjawab secara ‘vicarous’ atas kecuaian yang dilakukan oleh penunggangnya. [7] Akibat dari kecuaian Defendan yang tersebut di atas, Plaintif-Plaintif telah mengalami kesakitan, kecederaan, kecacatan, kehilangan dan menanggung kerugian perbelanjaan. Versi Defendan [8] Defendan di dalam kes ini menafikan bertanggungjawab terhadap kemalangan yang berlaku dan menegaskan bahawa Defendan telah menunggang motorsikalnya pada masa material dengan mematuhi semua undang-undang di bawah Akta Pegangkutan Jalan 1987. Dapatan Mahkamah [9] Mahkamah merujuk kepada Seksyen 101 (1) Akta Keterangan 1950, beban pembuktian sesuatu kes sepanjang perbicaraan terletak di atas bahu Plaintif dan akan berpindah kepada Defendan selepas beban tersebut dilepaskan. Seksyen 101 (1) Akta Keterangan 1950 menyatakan seperti berikut: “(1) Sesiapa yang berhasrat supaya mana-mana mahkamah memberikan penghakiman tentang apa-apa hak atau tanggungan S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 di sisi undang-undang, dengan bergantung kepada kewujudan fakta yang ditegaskan olehnya, mestilah membuktikan bahawa fakta itu wujud. (2) Apabila seseorang terikat untuk membuktikan kewujudan apa- apa fakta, dikatakan bahawa beban membuktikan terletak pada orang itu.” [10] Di dalam kes di Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu WONG THIN YIT V. MOHAMED ALI [1971] 1 LNS 151; [1971] 2 MLJ 175, Mahkamah telah menyatakan seperti berikut: "In a negligence action the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence. The plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the defendant's negligence. Evidence is the foundation of proof, with which it must not be confounded. Proof is that which leads to a conclusion as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts which are the subject of inquiry. Evidence, if accepted and believed, may result in proof, but it is not necessarily proof of itself. "; see 15 Halsbury (3rd Edn.) p. 260." [11] Selain itu juga, Mahkamah ini adalah terikat untuk mengaplikasi prinsip yang telah dinyatakan di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu HONG YIK TRADING v. LIZIZ PLANTATION SDN BHD [2017] 8 CLJ 491 yang telah menggariskan pemakaian Seksyen 101 (1) Akta Keterangan 1950 seperti berikut: S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [12] It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party who asserts that the facts exist (s. 101 of the Evidence Act 1950). Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies has discharged that burden, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party. However, if the party on whom the burden of proof lies fails to discharge it, the other party need not call any evidence. This is highlighted in the case of Selvaduray v. Chinniah [1939] 1 LNS 107; [1939] 1 MLJ 253 where Terrell, Ag CJ stated: ... it is clear that the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his case. After the conclusion of the whole case, there must be some preponderance in his favour. It may be true that the plaintiff established a prima facie case, but at the conclusion of the trial, the learned Judge has found that the position was exactly even, i.e. that any preponderance in the plaintiff's favour had disappeared. That being the case, the plaintiff must necessarily fail, as he has not discharged the onus which is upon him. No doubt the defendant would equally have failed if he had been the claimant and had tried to establish, as a substantive part of his case, the alternative version which he tried to prove in answer to that of the plaintiff. [12] Justeru, berdasarkan prinsip ini, Mahkamah ini perlu membuat penelitian dan analisa samada Plaintif-Plaintif telah melepaskan beban pembuktian yang membuktikan bahawa kemalangan berlaku atas kecuaian Defendan atas imbangan kebarangkalian. S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 ISU LIABILITI [13] Di dalam kes ini Defendan telah menghujahkan tiada kes untuk dijawab. Walaupun Defendan tidak memberi keterangan semasa perbicaraan, Plaintif-Plaintif masih perlu melepaskan beban pembuktian yang membuktikan bahawa kemalangan berlaku atas kecuaian Defendan atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada prinsip di dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi iaitu CHE PAH ITAM V. CHANG BEK LEE [1998] 4 CLJ 517 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Although the defendant had not adduced any evidence he had nevertheless filed his statement of defence denying any liability whatsoever for the said accident. In the absence of the defendant's evidence is the court compelled to accept in toto the plaintiff's version? It is trite law that the onus of proving negligence lies on the plaintiff. In Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamed Ali [1971] 1 LNS 151 Ong CJ (as he then was) held: In a negligence action the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence. The plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of defendant's negligence.” S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 i) Keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat (SP1) [14] SP1 di dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa dalam siasatannya, kemalangan berlaku di laluan A1-A2 yang terdapat bonggol jalan di hadapan tanda D dan garisan kuning untuk memperlahankan kenderaan di tanda E. Keputusan siasatan yang diputuskan oleh SP1 bagi kemalangan ini adalah kes disiasat di bawah Rule 10 iaitu langgar belakang yang mana hasil siasatan awal yang dijalankan mendapati terdapat kecuaian pada penunggang motorsikal WKN 8725. [15] SP1 dalam keterangannya juga telah menjelaskan bahawa walaupun hanya satu laporan sahaja yang dibuat iaitu oleh SP2, laporan polis SP2 telah mengatakan bahawa SP2 telah terlibat kemalangan dengan sebuah motorsikal No. WKN 8725 yang ditunggang oleh seorang lelaki berbangsa Rohingnya. Seterusnya, SP1 turut memberi keterangan bahawa berdasarkan siasatannya, terdapat bukti pengesahan bahawa motorsikal No. WKN 8725 terlibat dalam kemalangan tersebut apabila SP1 telah berhubung dengan pemilik motorsikal No. WKN 8075 berdasarkan maklumat JPJ, dan pemilik telah menjelaskan bahawa motorsikal tersebut telah dijualkan kepada adiknya tanpa ditukarmilik dan adiknya telah meminjamkan kepada kawannya seorang lelaki Rohingnya. [16] Selain itu, SP1 turut menyatakan berdasarkan siasatannya bahawa SP2 mengesahkan bahawa motorsikal No. WKN 8075 terlibat dalam kemalangan tersebut apabila SP2 ada mengambil no plat motorsikal dan mengesahkan bangsa Rohingnya. Di dalam menentukan samada kenyataan daripada SP1 boleh digunapakai atau tidak, Mahkamah ini S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 merujuk kepada 1 kes di Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes PP V. MOHAMED ALI [1962] 1 LNS 129 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: ".....When a Police witness says something that is not inherently improbable his evidence must be in the first instance be accepted. If he says he saw a cow jumping over the moon his evidence is, of course, not to be accepted, but if he says he saw a cow wandering along one of the main streets of Kuala Lumpur (the sort of thing we all see every day of our lives) there is not the slightest justification for refusing to believe him. Of course if his evidence is contradicted by other evidence or is shaken by cross examination then it becomes the business of the Magistrate to decide whether or not it should be accepted. In the absence of any element of inherent improbability the evidence of any witnesses whether a Police or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted. (emphasized by Court)” [17] Justeru, menggunakanpakai prinsip ini, Mahkamah memutuskan untuk menerimapakai keterangan yang telah diberikan oleh SP1 bahawa kemalangan memang berlaku di antara Plaintif Pertama dan motorsikal No. WKN 8725, milik Defendan yang ditunggang oleh seorang lelaki berbangsa Rohingnya di mana motorsikal WKN 8725 telah melanggar motorsikal Plaintif Pertama dari arah belakang yang mana konsisten dengan kerosakan motorsikal Plaintif Kedua yang rosak di bahagian belakang. S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 ii) Keterangan (SP2) [18] SP2 telah menyatakan bahawa ketika dia sedang menunggang motorsikal dan sampai di Jalan Seri Teruntum 1, SP2 membrek kerana terdapat bonggol di hadapan, motorsikalnya telah dilanggar dari belakang oleh motorsikal No. WKN 9725. SP2 seterusnya mengesahkan lelaki Rohingya yang terlibat dalam kemalangan tersebut apabila lelaki Rohingnya tersebut datang mengambil motorsikalnya yang ditinggal di tempat kemalangan. [19] Defendan mengatakan bahawa keterangan SP2 tidak boleh digunapakai kerana ianya tidak konsisten dengan keterangan SP1. SP2 telah menyatakan di dalam keterangannya bahawa terdapat saksi bebas yang menyaksikan kemalangan ini. Semasa sesi pemeriksaan balas SP1 telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “Soalan: Ada saksi bebas? Jawapan: Saksi bebas tiada. Soalan: Setuju kawasan ini sibuk? Jawapan: Ya. Soalan: Ada tanya Plaintif ada sesiapa nampak kemalangan ini berlaku? Jawapan: Tak pasti Plaintif cakap ada orang nampak accident.” S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [20] Berdasarkan keterangan ini, Mahkamah mendapati tiada percanggahan keterangan antara SP1 & SP2. SP1 menyatakan “tak pasti” yang menunjukkan kemungkinan terdapat saksi bebas yang melihat kemalangan tersebut. Defendan juga berhujah bahawa keterangan SP1 berkenaan dengan ketiadaan saksi bebas haruslah lebih dipercayai berbanding dengan keterangan SP2 yang menyatakan sebaliknya, bermakna keterangan SP1 berkenaan kemalangan telah berlaku juga haruslah dipercayai memandangkan Defendan mengakui keterangan SP1 adalah credible. [21] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif-Plaintif yang menyatakan bahawa Defendan hanya menafikan motorsikal Defendan tidak terlibat dalam kemalangan tersebut dan tidak mencadangkan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif yang cuai atau motorsikal Defendan tidak sesekali cuai sehingga melibatkan kemalangan. Di dalam menyokong hujahan tersebut, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi iaitu MOHAMAD SUFIAN SALAM & SATU LAGI lwn. MOHD KAMAL IBRAHIM & SATU LAGI [2019] 1 LNS 1495 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “[45] Adalah ketara bahawa "line of defence" nya adalah penafian iaitu Defendan Pertama tidak terlibat langsung dan beliau bukan punca kepada kemalangan yang berlaku ini. Namun ianya tidak dicadangkan secara spesifik kepada Plaintif-Plaintif. S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [46] Semasa soal balas terhadap Plaintif Kedua/Responden, Peguam Defendan sekali lagi telah tidak mencadangkan secara spesifik terhadap Plaintif Kedua/Responden bahawa Defendan Pertama tidak sekali-kali menggesel motorsikal yang ditunggang oleh Plaintif Pertama yang menyebabkan Plaintif Pertama (SP1) hilang kawalan dan melanggar Plaintif Kedua/Responden (SP3). [47] Mahkamah berpendapat ini adalah terjumlah kepada pihak Defendan bersetuju dengan versi Plaintif.” [22] Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ini mendapati Defendan hanya menafikan keterlibatan mereka di dalam kemalangan tersebut dengan tidak memanggi saksi mahu pun mengemukakan apa-apa versi mereka kepada Mahkamah. Maka, oleh itu adalah wajar apabila Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa naratif Plaintif-Plaintif adalah wajar diambilkira dan Defendan bersetuju dengan versi Plaintif-Plaintif. iii) Keterangan (SP3) [23] SP3 adalah saksi kemalangan yang hadir di Mahkamah ini dan memberi keterangan menyatakan bahawa dia ada menyaksikan satu kemalangan jalan raya berlaku di Medan Warisan yang mana ketika itu SP3 sedang berada di kedai makan di jalan tersebut pada tahun 2018. SP3 dalam keterangannya juga telah menyatakan bahawa kemalangan berlaku di antara motorsikal dengan motorsikal yang mana motorsikal No. WKN 8075 setelah keluar dari Jalan Besar telah melanggar motorsikal S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 SP2. [24] Defendan berhujah bahawa terdapat percanggahan fakta yang diceritakan oleh SP2 dan SP3 iaitu SP2 mendakwa dia pengsan selepas kemalangan dan sedar di hospital tetapi SP3 mendakwa SP2 ada mengalami kecederaan dan dibawa balik ke rumah terlebih dahulu. Pada hemat Mahkamah ini, tiada percanggahan fakta berkenaan dengan hal ini. SP2 ada memberitahu Mahkamah bahawa dia pengsan selepas kemalangan berlaku, jadi adalah munasabah sekiranya SP2 tidak ingat apa yang sebenarnya terjadi selepas kemalangan tersebut berlaku. [25] Mahkamah ini sekali lagi merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi iaitu MOHAMAD SUFIAN SALAM & SATU LAGI lwn. MOHD KAMAL IBRAHIM & SATU LAGI [2019] 1 LNS 1495 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “[29] Mahkamah telah meneliti Rekod Rayuan yang meliputi Nota Keterangan dan mendapati Responden/Plaintif Kedua telah datang memberi keterangan di Mahkamah. Walaupun ingatannya tidak beberapa stabil dan kebanyakan jawapannya adalah "tidak ingat" namun, beliau masih ingat terhadap fakta-fakta yang ketara iaitu beliau dilanggar di tempat kejadian oleh Plaintif Pertama. [30] Keterangannya adalah konsisten dengan Laporan Polisnya (P6) yang dibuatnya dengan dibantu ahli keluarga S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 pada 14 Mei 2013, dua bulan selepas kemalangan, seperti di muka surat 70 Rekod Rayuan seperti berikut…” [26] Pada hemat Mahkamah ini, memandangkan Defendan tidak dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan berkenaan dengan kemalangan ini, maka Mahkamah memutuskan untuk menerima keterangan daripada SP2 dan SP3 ini. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berjaya membuktikan bahawa kemalangan tersebut telah berlaku dan Plaintif Pertama telah mengalami kecederaannya seperti yang terkandung di dalam laporan perubatan di P5 & P6 di mana ianya tidak sesekali dipertikaikan oleh Defendan. [27] Maka berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan seperti di atas, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa Defendan adalah bertanggungan sebanyak 100% kecuaian terhadap kemalangan yang berlaku. ISU QUANTUM [28] Di dalam mentaksirkan nilai ganti rugi, Mahkamah mestilah memberikan award pampasan yang adil berdasarkan bukti yang kukuh. Di dalam kes di Mahkamah Persekutuan INAS FAIQAH MOHD HELMI (A CHILD SUING THROUGH HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND; MOHD HELMI ABDUL AZIZ) V. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA & ORS [2016] 2 CLJ 885, Abdull Hamid Embong HMP menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah: S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “(1) Adalah undang-undang matan bahawa ganti rugi bertindak sebagai pampasan, bukan ganjaran dan hukuman. Dalam mentaksirkan ganti rugi, mahkamah tidak patut didorong oleh simpati dan memberikan award pampasan yang adil berdasarkan bukti yang kukuh. Mahkamah tidak boleh mengamalkan spekulasi. Penilaian keterangan yang membentukkan dasar risiko kerugian masa hadapan harus dilaksanakan. Hakim bicara hanya boleh menilaikan keterangan sedemikian berasaskan standard imbangan kebarangkalian yang telah diiktirafkan, tetapi dengan satu tahap ketentuan lebih rendah berkenaan kejadian kehilangan atau kerugian masa hadapan. Tahap lebih rendah yang dipakai itu adalah sesuai diistilahkan dengan perkataan 'possibility', 'chance', 'risk', 'danger' atau 'likelihood', tetapi, walau apa pun perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan dan semantiknya, mereka mestilah pada dasarnya bersifat substantif dan bukan spekulatif.” [29] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes DATUK MOHD ALI HJ ABDUL MAJID & ANOR V. PUBLIC BANK BHD [2014] 6 CLJ 269 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “[31] The object of an award of damages is to give the claimant compensation for the damage, loss or injury he has suffered. The general principle governing the measure of damages has its origin in the words of Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co [1880] 5 App Cas 25 where he said: S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 ... that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation. [32] It is trite law that a claimant claiming damages must prove that he has suffered the damage. The claimant has the burden of proving both liability and quantum of damages, before he can recover the sum claimed. This follows from the general rule that the burden of proving a fact is upon him who alleges it and not upon him who denies it, so that where a particular allegation forms an essential part of a person's case, the proof of such allegation falls on him. (See s. 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). If he fails to prove both the liability and the quantum of damages, he loses the action. [33] Therefore, in a claim for damages, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to merely state the amount of damages that he is claiming, he must prove the damage that he had in fact suffered to the satisfaction of the court. This principle is borne out in the case of Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel [1948] 64 TLR 177 where Lord Goddard CJ observed: Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 the head of the court, saying: 'This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages'. They have to prove it. This statement was cited with approval by Edgar Joseph JR FCJ in Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 15; [1994] 3 MLJ 777.” GANTI RUGI AM [30] Memandangkan laporan perubatan tidak dipertikaikan oleh Defendan, Mahkamah ini mentaksirkan ganti rugi berlandaskan kepada Laporan Perubatan dari Hospital Tengku Ampuan Afzan oleh Dr Yuen Jin Chuan P5 (A-B) Laporan Perubatan dari Hospital Tengku Ampuan Afzan oleh Dr Lee Chin Yen P6 (A-B). i) Cerebral concussion – RM5,000-00; [31] Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memohon sejumlah RM6,000- 00 manakala Defendan telah memohon sejumlah RM5,000-00. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards (2018) menyatakan bahawa bagi kecederaan ini, jumlah yang dicadangkan adalah RM6,000. Di dalam kes MUHAMMAD FAIZAL ZUHAIRI & SATU LAGI lwn. NAGARAJAH PARMASIVAM & SATU LAGI [2023] PILRU 19, Mahkamah telah mengawadkan sebanyak RM6,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. [32] Justeru itu, sejumlah RM5,000-00 adalah munasabah dan sesuai. S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 ii) Multiple deep laceration wounds – RM10,000-00; dan [33] Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memohon sejumlah RM15,000- 00 manakala Defendan telah memohon sejumlah RM10,000-00. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards (2018) menyatakan bahawa bagi kecederaan ini, jumlah yang dicadangkan adalah RM2,500-RM9,500-00. [34] Di dalam kes HARNEK SINGH ARGIT SINNGH LWN. KOFMEHL ROLF HUGO (WAKIL DIRI KEPADA HARTA PUSAKA) & ANOR [2017] MLRSU 158, Mahkamah telah mengawadkan sebanyak RM12,000.00 bagi kecederaan extensor tendon cut. Manakala, Di dalam kes MOHD ANUAR AURTHER B ABDULLAH V MATHEW MUMIM AK NYALU ANOR [2013] 1 PIR [21], Mahkamah telah mengawadkan sebanyak RM10,000.00 bagi kecederaan three deep lacerations wounds over both legs at the anterior side. [35] Oleh itu, pada hemat Mahkamah, sejumlah RM10,000-00 adalah munasabah dan sesuai. iii) Multiple abrasion wound – RM5,000-00 [36] Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memohon sejumlah RM7,000- 00 manakala Defendan telah memohon sejumlah RM3,000-00. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards (2018) menyatakan bahawa bagi kecederaan ini, jumlah yang S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 dicadangkan adalah RM1,300-RM5,000-00. Merujuk kepada kes MUHAMMAD ASYRAF DAIYAN MOHD SHAZWAN lwn. MUHAMMAD NURHALIM ABDULLAH [2021] PILRU 40, Mahkamah telah mengawadkan sebanyak RM7,000.00 bagi kecederaan multiple abrasionwounds. [37] Maka, pada hemat Mahkamah, sejumlah RM5,000-00 adalah munasabah dan sesuai. GANTI RUGI KHAS [38] Di dalam menentukan jumlah yang patut diberikan, Mahkamah ini menggunakan prinsip yang diketengahkan di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu NGOOI KU SIONG & ANOR V. AIDIL ABDULLAH [1984] 1 CLJ REP 294; [1984] 1 MLRA 200, Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan, Syed Agil Barakbah telah menyatakan seperti berikut: - "Special damages on the other hand have to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. They refer to past expenses and loss of earnings. The exact loss must be pleaded where the precise amount of item has become clear before the trial. Loss of future earnings or post-trial loss differs from pre-trial loss which comes under special damages. The reason that special damages have to be specifically pleaded is in order to comply with its object which is to crystallize the issue and to put the defendants on their guard and tell them what they have to meet when the case comes on trial…" S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 i) Cabutan butir-butir insurans kenderaan No. WKN 8725 – RM10-00; [39] Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memohon RM10-00 manakala tidak mengemukakan apa-apa hujahan berkenaan item ini di dalam hujahan bertulis. Maka, Mahkamah ini membenarkan item ini. (Rujuk Ikatan B mukasurat 4) ii) Kos laporan perubatan HTAA – RM80-00; [40] Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memohon RM80-00 manakala tidak mengemukakan apa-apa hujahan berkenaan item ini di dalam hujahan bertulis. Maka, Mahkamah ini membenarkan item ini. (Ikatan C mukasurat 19 dan 20) iii) Kos bil perubatan HTAA – RM58-00; [41] Memandangkan Defendan tiada bantahan terhadap jumlah ini, Maka Mahkamah membenarkan sejumlah RM58-00. (Ikatan C mukasurat 17 dan 18) iv) Kos perjalanan temujanji – RM100-00; [42] Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memohon sejumlah RM300-00 manakala Defendan telah memohon sejumlah RM3-99. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam CHAN KIM HEE V. S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 KARAM SINGH & ANOR [1980] 1 LNS 112; [1981] 2 MLJ 273, Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: "The court was of the view that the taxi fare to and from Malacca General Hospital was about $20... The plaintiff was treated as an outpatient at the Orthopaedic Outpatient Department of the General Hospital Malacca. The court was satisfied that the plaintiff made 18 trips for this purpose and awarded a sum of $360 under this item. " [43] Berdasarkan prinsip yang dikemukakan, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati untuk mengawadkan sebanyak RM100-00 sebagai jumlah perjalanan temujanji sebanyak 3 kali. v) Kos kehilangan barangan peribadi – RM100-00; [44] Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memohon sejumlah RM150-00 manakala Defendan telah memohon supaya ianya ditolak atau secara alternatif hanya sejumlah RM100-00 dibenarkan. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes MOHD FADZIL SAADON & SATU LAGI LWN. MOHD IZAAT AZAMAN & SATU LAGI [2015] PILRU 40, Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan gantirugi kehilangan barangan peribadi sebanyak RM150-00 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Item (a): Gantirugi kehilangan barang-barang peribadi dibenarkan sebanyak RM150.00. Item ini tidak dipersetujui. Tiada sebarang keterangan dikemukakan. Walau bagaimanapun, saya S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 percaya di dalam kemalangan ini sudah tentu plaintif akan mengalami kerosakan pakaian, kasut dan sebagainya. Oleh yang demikian, saya berpendapat sejumlah RM150.00 adalah munasabah untuk kerosakan tersebut.” [45] Mahkamah ini berpuas hati untuk mengawadkan sebanyak RM100- 00 sebagai sebagai kos kehilangan barangan peribadi. vi) Kos membaiki motorsikal – RM 367-00 [46] Plaintif-Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memohon sejumlah RM367-00 manakala Defendan telah memohon supaya ianya ditolak. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada resit yang telah dikemukakan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif sebagai bukti pembayaran. Justeru itu, sejumlah RM367-00 dibenarkan memandangkan Plaintif-Plaintif telah mengemukakan resit pembayaran kepada Mahkamah. (Rujuk Ikatan C mukasurat 22) Kesimpulan [47] Setelah meneliti keterangan saksi-saksi, eksibit-eksibit dan mengambil kira hujahan-hujahan yang telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua pihak, maka atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah membenarkan Para 8 (a), (b), (c) dan (d) di Pernyataan Tuntutan seperti berikut: GANTI RUGI AM i) Cerebral concussion – RM5,000-00 S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 ii) Multiple deep laceration wounds – RM10,000-00 iii) Multiple abrasion wound – RM5,000-00 JUMLAH GANTI RUGI AM dibenarkan sebanyak RM20,000-00 GANTI RUGI KHAS i) Cabutan butir-butir insurans kenderaan No. WKN 8725 – RM10-00 ii) Kos laporan perubatan HTAA – RM80-00 iii) Kos bil perubatan HTAA – RM58-00 iv) Kos perjalanan temujanji – RM100-00 v) Kos kehilangan peribadi – RM100-00 vi) Kos membaiki motorsikal – RM 367-00 JUMLAH GANTI RUGI KHAS dibenarkan sebanyak RM715-00 Maka dengan ini, Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan seperti berikut: (a) Ganti Rugi Am sebanyak RM20,000-00; (b) Ganti Rugi Khas sebanyak RM715-00 (c) Faedah seperti berikut: (i) 4% setahun untuk Gantirugi Am mulai dari tarikh kemalangan sehingga tarikh Penghakiman ini. (ii) 4% setahun untuk Gantirugi Khas mulai dari tarikh kemalangan sehingga tarikh Penghakiman ini. S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 (iii) 5% setahun untuk jumlah penghakiman yang termasuk Ganti Rugi Khas serta kos tindakan ini mulai dari tarikh Penghakiman Ini sehingga tarikh pembayaran penuh (d) Kos bagi tindakan ini mengikut skala mengikut KKM 2012 BERTARIKH: 30HB NOVEMBER 2023 (NOR IZZATI BINTI ZAKARIA) Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Kuantan, Pahang Peguam: Plaintif: Farzana binti Alias daripada Tetuan Zurina Hafizah & Co. Defendan: Ghasidah binti Jusoh daripada Tetuan Othman Hashim & Co. Kes-kes yang dirujuk: 1) WONG THIN YIT V. MOHAMED ALI [1971] 1 LNS 151; [1971] 2 MLJ 175; 2) HONG YIK TRADING v. LIZIZ PLANTATION SDN BHD [2017] 8 CLJ 491; 3) CHE PAH ITAM V. CHANG BEK LEE [1998] 4 CLJ 517; 4) PP V. MOHAMED ALI [1962] 1 LNS 129; S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 5) MOHAMAD SUFIAN SALAM & SATU LAGI lwn. MOHD KAMAL IBRAHIM & SATU LAGI [2019] 1 LNS 1495; 6) MOHAMAD SUFIAN SALAM & SATU LAGI lwn. MOHD KAMAL IBRAHIM & SATU LAGI [2019] 1 LNS 1495; 7) INAS FAIQAH MOHD HELMI (A CHILD SUING THROUGH HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND; 8) MOHD HELMI ABDUL AZIZ) V. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA & ORS [2016] 2 CLJ 885; 9) DATUK MOHD ALI HJ ABDUL MAJID & ANOR V. PUBLIC BANK BHD [2014] 6 CLJ 269; 10) MUHAMMAD FAIZAL ZUHAIRI & SATU LAGI lwn. NAGARAJAH PARMASIVAM & SATU LAGI [2023] PILRU 19; 11) HARNEK SINGH ARGIT SINNGH LWN. KOFMEHL ROLF HUGO (WAKIL DIRI KEPADA HARTA PUSAKA) & ANOR [2017] MLRSU 158; 12) MOHD ANUAR AURTHER B ABDULLAH V MATHEW MUMIM AK NYALU ANOR [2013] 1 PIR [21]; 13) MUHAMMAD ASYRAF DAIYAN MOHD SHAZWAN lwn. MUHAMMAD NURHALIM ABDULLAH [2021] PILRU 40; 14) NGOOI KU SIONG & ANOR V. AIDIL ABDULLAH [1984] 1 CLJ REP 294; [1984] 1 MLRA 200; dan 15) CHAN KIM HEE V. KARAM SINGH & ANOR [1980] 1 LNS 112; [1981] 2 MLJ 273; dan 16) MOHD FADZIL SAADON & SATU LAGI LWN. MOHD IZAAT AZAMAN & SATU LAGI [2015] PILRU 40 Perundangan yang dirujuk: Seksyen 101 (1) Akta Keterangan 1950 S/N lE/1xtYQ0UOxnBKxXwo6Yw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	33,180	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22NCvC-174-03/2022	PLAINTIF 1. ) Ong Yew Long 2. ) Wong Swee Lee 3. ) Lee Hee Cheh 4. ) Patminderjit Singh A/l Mhan Singh 5. ) Hoh Yuen Fong 6. ) Ng Thin Poh 7. ) Ng Choon Hao 8. ) Subramaniam A/l Manivale 9. ) Lim Cau Ang 10. ) Keluan Singh A/l Bachan Singh 11. ) Prabhim Nair A/l Kesava Dass 1 2. ) Neshandth Nair A/l Kesava Dass1 3. ) Aswadil Azmir Bin Abdullah1 4. ) Che Wan Zaipah Binti Che Wan Dagang1 5. ) Afnan Zakwan Bin Aswadil Azmir1 6. ) Gan Tong Lai1 7. ) Gan Ser Kee 1 8. ) Gan Tong Lai (Mendakwa Sebagai Wakil Tan Ah Nee, Si Mati)1 9. ) Gan Tong Lai (Mendakwa Sebagai Wakil Gan Tong Yen, Si Mati)20. ) Pak Alex 21. ) Lee Kuan Yang 2 2. ) Tee Kwang Peng 2 3. ) Poon Keng Hoe DEFENDAN 1. ) MOHD FAIZAR BIN AZIZAN 2. ) MOHD KHAIRUL BIN MOHD SAID 3. ) PANDEYAN A/L MARUTHAMUTHU 4. ) VIKRAMAN A/L C. PANKUNY 5. ) GOUVRI A/P C PANKUNY 6. ) AMEER NORAIZEEDIN BIN ABDUL WAHAB 7. ) ANBARASY A/P THANNIMALAI 8. ) MOORTHY A/L BALAKRISHNAN 9. ) KAMALANATHAN A/L GUNABALLAN 10. ) KUGANASVARI A/P BALAKRISHNAN	Interest of 5% was imposed on the judgment sum from the date of the judgment until full and final settlement. The Plaintiffs were also awarded costs of RM40,000.	30/11/2023	YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=428a345f-0093-4c3d-b53f-90bed4fda718&Inline=true	30/11/2023 15:06:47 WA-22NCvC-174-03/2022 Kand. 84 S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N XzSKQpMAPUy1P5C1P2nGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—22NCvC—17l—03/2022 Kand. E4 an/mznu lizﬂb-I17 IN THE HIGH COLIRY IN MALAVA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORV MALAYSIA c VIL CASE NO. WA-22MCvC-174—03I2D22 BETWEEN 1. cm: vzw LONG [NRIC NO : a31ouo—ua-szns] 2. wom: swss LEE (NO. KIF: 72n21n.w5a2s) 3. LEE HEE CHEH mo. KIF: san91s—n7-523!) 4. ummnsnm swan A/L MHAN swan (N0. KIP: sanszwsssm) 5. non vueu FONS (MO. MP: s112u.1a.54u) a. N5 mm POH (N0. KIF: euz921-nu-5:45) 1. ms moo» mo (NO. mp: M0121-55-5211) a. suarmunumm A/L MANIVALE (N0. mp: annus1n.5cs1) 9. LIM CAU ANG [ND.KIP:93D726«1L«679ﬁ) 1D.KEL\|JAN smcn A/L sacrum smcu mo. KIF: s4n131-1a-5357) 11.FRABHlM um»: A/L KESAVA onss mo. KIF: usnsos-so-5719) 12.N:sHANn1H NAIR AIL KESAVA mss (no. K/P: 500501-an-5955) 1a.AswAnu. AZMIR am ABDULLAH (ND. K/P: 741u31-10-5929) 14.CHE wm ZAIPAH amn cu: WAN DAGANG (NO. K/P: 7m1a.11.sa42) 15.AFNAN ZAKWAN am ASWADIL AZMIR (NO. K/P: msna.1n.ssna) 1E.GAN mm: LAI mo. KIP: 5sn:n9.n1.5a49) 17.sAN SER KEE (No. KIP: sn1212-n1-sans! 13.5»: TONG LA: (No KIF: ssomm-sw) (mendakwa sehagal wakll TAN AH NEE (NO. KIF: s5n12w1 am), si mam 1mm TONG LAI (ND. mp; ssocws-421-sus) Amtndakwn magm wakll GAN mus van (no. K/F: 59:24:9--11. sam, u mnl) 2I).PAK ALEX (NO. KIP: aeneu5.oa.5aa2I 21.LEE KUAN YANG (Na KIP; 710205411-5457) 22.75: KWANG rem: (No‘ KIP: a1usn3—n1-54151) 1:«.PooN KENG no: (No. KW: E11119-1U-5694) PLAINYIFFS AND scheme wls new The Plainﬁﬁs were under me Impvessmn that me saname, represented and earned on] by Ina sum Defendanl and ms Omar Demaams wa FX Unrled Power Sdn Bhd m me style at FX umnau Exchange A Tradmg were hcensed The ewdanoe was that me namuns had oeuevea me represenlalnons made I: was amy when oaymemsanne ralums had stupped mallhey had reanseo max may were mxslad and man we scnema was a scam (23) on a babnoe cl prubabvmvss. [ms coon found ma: ms maimms monsylor investment uflhe smeme were pm Inlo FX Umled Power Sdn End, and n. through me Dsvenoanus had uperakad ma suueme usmg me unlme madurm In Ihe styie nl FX Unwed Tradmg a. Excnanoe FX u .1 Power Sdn and had smoe been wound up. There was no uogenx aersnce adduced \|o severe that «ea me defence ov me smn Delendam was considered The defence was angueoxo me not ms: rx Umled Power Sdn and ma not a named omnaanualmmng maul was ma pmperﬂelendant As notwnlanﬂad by me sum nsvsnaanu, Km: Coun accepts an s balance 01 pmnamnmas (ha! Fx unusa Pawn! son and win wound up [91 on a bananas of umnannmas, ems Court was sausaeo man we smn Delenﬂanl had VuH knowledge a\| all material urnss me oeuaus ul (he sanama He ran and operam me scnems He was me mam person m charge - me mad as MVE which ns laslmad mm m. omy om max new oosiuon In Malays. dunng Ina malanal Inna no] The smn oerenaanrs delence was assesseo ma Ims court found mm u was untenable to: me rouawung reasons sm xzsKGpMAFuyIP5cIPznGA «ma s.nn nmhnrwm a. met! a mm s. nrW\n\|U\|y mum: dnuamnl VI mum v-max . He aennaa nnan nl was a Form sanarna. cnannnad nnan n\| was Iradnrng In nmargn axmange wmch nrne n=narnnrnns could have done nn an nmnr own wnnhoullhe assisnanaa 04 mm as MIB or me omer uown-nnners below nnrn Hnlroduesr Bmkens — lB)) However‘ ma scheme was mnrmucad and operated by mm nnrough FX Unnlsd Exchange and Tradnrng vna www lxnmnled com‘ . He danmed man than are onnsr pnannorms Io trade nrn luvs/K an me mlemel ms coun are not nnnn nhan ranevann an all‘ . He nao ulsu cnanmee nhal nne Mk of nradnna nn norax was nrnlurmad in me Flznrnlnﬂs Is ma diwlanmur nn snnann pnnn was on me mmaaaa nn main reipechw warnans Than defence ns unnenamo as n was never eﬂvnsud such no me vnarnninns on me other nanu, ma Planmms wara uawned aver wan ms represenvannans nhan nhe swam: was nucranve wnm 12-V. nnannnry returns The wamnng man he rennec on In wash an an Inabnlmes ana responsnbnnnnnes nhanwere nn snna» print m the raspecnnva annnne wanes oinne Plannnlnlfs was noo lane nn me day Agreervnern has been entered and me Plznnoﬁs had already narnea wmn Ifnenrmnmeys \|c Invesl In me scheme‘ . He had renecreu nu me New Zealand negrsnrannon documem on Umled Global Lnmned hunhns coun chserved man n was me nanesn. masn rseent rnnorrnauon and man nndm non snana nnan was nnaersed lor such operannonns. . He dannad man he was auar nnvelveﬂ nne apsrannans an rx unm Exchange an Yridinq and Unnlad Global ms amountad to a have asnnal as he made zaarasernannans, ananngs, madshows. n1 snn xzsKGpwnFn1yIP5cnP2nGA «mu ssnan navnhnrwm be u... a my n... anmnauny mum: dnuavnml VI mum v-man curvdumed nremaws, answered me Flairmns‘ mum»: and updacea mm In ms cross-eumnnahm that he had conﬁrmed he was me Mu; lav FX Unned This Calm ansewea scmenmes ma names onus companies were used irnemhangsabm . He mnmr clawed that me appucaue laws are mm of New zeasana as per ma Aaenl Anmuxe Agreements. nu The other Defendants Such indmduals engage m lraudulanl acllvmes max narm mnocem vlcums and erude lmsl m nnanuax man<e«s, Omms play a crumal mle wn zﬂdrssmg lhese cases by nmamg wmngdoers acoaumama, snaking to mower funds luv mums, and aeuemng omen mm engagmg m wmlar1vaudu\an\|ccnduc1 Fraud [12] The Iegex sys(em employs venous mechanisms xo addless Pnnzl suhemas and ﬁnanmal hand, lncluamg cm and cmmnal actmns ms may mvmve pmmna uvﬂ xawauna la recoverfunds lovdefraudad mveuan, as wall As cnmmll pmeecuuone xo pumsh moan ueoonexua rm me «sun The law \a also mam «a employ magums In ndmimsler pushes Na! gust \|o unsure man ma wcllms ans oompanaanea, am nlsn la aaaanam Ihnl ma ﬂndmﬁ and ludumant are agzmll ma 1wrrac\| cwendara. The smn Dnfendim and his deianoa ma bsmnd me oervoraln ms or FX Uniloﬂ Pnwersdn and He evln camenaea Iha\| FX Unilld Exchanal a. mum: and Umled Global were not rum anu Iha\| he was not shalehmdar or auacm or any at mam n was ascenamed m ms cmsaexammamn Ihal FX Umled Trading 5. Exenawge had changad its name to Unwed Global. 13 am xzsKGpMAFuyIP5cIPznGA «mm. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e U... a may he mm-y MIMI ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! [13] He further clalmaa \|hz\ the moneys onna Plalnmfs‘ lnvsswlsm in ma sonema were not deposded lo mm or ms personal aooounl ln ms \|esllmony, no clalrrled ma: he ma nol have am: knawiedge whether unllao elooal was licensed (in crussexamlnanan] am he was fully oonvlnoea mal ll was (ln naaxalnlnallonl. ms Court loans: on a balance olpmnaollnles Iha\| me slxln Delendant was aware al all wnes me slams‘ an-golngs and uperallurls ol me scheme Nc\| only was he very much lnvolvsd ln conveying lne fraudulen\| mlsvepresemamns \|u lna Plalnlllls‘ he was also knowledge in Voraxlradlng whlch he was s\|lll molvoa wlm Tha\| maanl anal he was aware Ind underslood Ihe amounl 0! money ll enlalled, ano me rlsks attached lo ll val me lanar was nevev anelao am the 12-1.. mlnlmum monlnly mlums was Nghllgmsd ulosl lmpcnanlly lna rsnresenlallon thal evavylmng was legal. valid and mqulmnann ol lna law: had been mmpllad wlxh (whnlllar Malays. or New zaalanal max lncluded llosnoa (av such sonams When mnnays were pmcurad «mm lna Plalnlms lor Ihe pumos-s M inmunanl in the mean lnal as rsuresanlaa, he must be awounlaulo [141 ll WI: submmad for ma smn Dalanuanl lnal mars was nu Pnvlly ol corllrlct betwuen ma Sixth Defendant Ind ms Plalnmh Several amhnnhes were cllaa oy he smn Delemanrs counsel Io sllenglhen mo argumem mat ma wnlracl ma Plalnnﬂs sxemled wllh rx unnea Power son and could nol nnposa otllinanorlsorl Ihe 5Ix\|h ualanoanl lsuwlrl Sdn and v Govommont of KM sun of sum. [mun 1 ms 469‘ [2007] Muu $21. Badladdon Mohli Mlhhﬁn s Anor v Arlb M-lays-ran Finance and [1998] 2 cu 754199311 MLJ 393) ms Cowl louno lhnse an)umen\|s rnlsnlaoao The sum nalanaam was alzmumable because lms coun was sallsﬂed an a balance at Drobabllilles lnal me son» 14 am xzsKGpMu=uyIP5cIPznGA «mm. Sam luvlhnrwm .. met! a may he aﬂmnullly MIMI dnuavlml VI aFluNa Wm! Dtfendanl had mada muse ha-muram represenvanons lo ma Wannmfs u was based on Ihem that me Phxmxﬂs than had mvasnea mew! moneys m ma scheme [15] The smn Delenaanrs summed Iha\| ma Prainma had parled wnn their moneys vn\|un\|anIy and lhal n was their mace la invasn m ma schema Evidence hawevershmtlhal men decwsums were hsivvly nlaaed anu mnuencea by me rmslepresemalwons oflhe smn Delendam whxch was mud to be tmuauuem [16] ms Conn rlferrad to ma Cuurl av Appea\ 5 case m Manmood um oayua v Li com Launq um! om» nppcll [mo] 5 MLJ 755 where m us dsllbelahon an an appeal on whemer canvass enlsrad -mo by me pames were a sham to msauiae magax maneyiendmg \|mmacrmns to umumvenlstmrl pruwsnns nme Mor\ey1enders Ad 1951 naovoana that me contracts were lraudu\enl\y promvsd On hand, ms was aunssaered, «mm pee: ‘In Lclchumanarv cnemamlagaapan @ L A//agappan (as executor to SL A/ameloo Acm arraa Sana Lena A/ame/o Ache, deoeased) & Anal v Secure Pvamaoon Sdn EIvdl2!717] 1 ML} aonamey Tan sca had dealt wun me nefarvous mamhstalrons offraud as Inﬂows’ What amounts to lram1’7 '1: rs no! aasy la gwa a deﬁnmon 0/ what consmules Iraudirv ma axuanama agnmcanon m whrch Ina term I: unaemooa by Cu/ll Courts auasaca. ma courts haw always awarded hampor/ng themselves by dsﬁmng or /aymg down as a gmra: pmposrlmn what «nan :5 am xzsKGpMAFuyIP5cIPznGA «ma. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e met! a may a. aﬂmnnﬂly am. dnuamnl VI mum v-max constitute fraud Fraud 1.: mmre m varrely (Reddaway E Co and Anolhev v Banham 5 CaandArm1Ivsv[1896]AC 199 at p 221) The /Eﬁlllly olman s Invenhon m clevvsing new schemes orrraums so great, that me cams have always use/men to deﬁne n, or to define undue Inﬂuence, wmcn rs one of the many vanehes, mewrng lo Ihemssfves me /may m mm mm m umisl wnatever Iorm /1 may plesent /mm (A!Icarv.1 v Skmnsv(1B87) as on D 145 at p 153;, Fraud. m we contsmp/almn M 5 cm: Court of Justice, may he saw to mnlude properly all acts, omsms and ooncualnlervlx wmm mvotva . breach ol a )ega/ ov rqurtnbls duly‘ trust or conﬁdlnca, /uuly raposacl, and an mjunous m anothsn or w mm»: an undue or unmnscnenlmus advantage :5 taken of anolhur {Slam sq Jur 1571 An surpnxe‘ lnck, cunning, mmmmmg and olhanmfurr waylhatrs mm chnstlnyone rs consn1ar9divaud1Fmch 429) Flaudm all cases lmu/Ia: u wtliul aa on me pan orany one whereby another is saughf m be depm/ad by mega: or meqmzame means. ol whal ha rs enlmed to (Green v Nrxon (1557; 23 5931/ 530 at p 535;’ (Ken an Fraud and /mszake mn Ed) 51;: 1; The conospl oflrsudrs notoriously difficult m deﬁne (Can/ell usn Inc and anolhev v searon /nswancs company and sna!hsv[2009] EWCA Cw 13¢: pel Longmole LJ, MI./mmsry and Tou/son LJJ in agrssman!) We would no! hazard Ia deﬁne ‘frat/d‘, We would us! say ma: vmmr 1: a gsnenc term which also covers an manner alcneal Decor‘! and dishonesty sm xzsKGpMu=uyIP5cIP2nGA «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! In Dadaunan Gmup Imemazmal mo and others v Srmm: and others /2009] EWCA crv 159 Letty Justice Arden appreciates me need to maw relevant inferences offraud against me lola/rly oflhe evidence adduced as fullaws At me: he came class to suggsslmg mm mm nan only be established wneve there IS ma ewaence Irma: wevs me casu. law aueganans ofﬁaud -mum ever come to men Fraudslers rarely 541 mum and reduce men dishonest agmsmem Io wvmng.Fmm1sam commonly moved on the MM allrlvilmg me Incl-ﬁnds: to draw proper mlomncss /mm Ina pr/Inary laclx ukswtso m Yes Pol: Nyen v Ray om Kazan .5 Or: /2015) ML./U 1105 Tengku Malmun Jm (now (:4; Ivald that the law you not now. dome! man“, but mcagn/:95 mm fraud: am common/y pruvod on um mm of mwlmg Ins rm—nmar In draw may mrmnm mam primary hm. Nerladyshfp opmed as /‘:1/Iowr Fraud m mans aeekmg to affect a regmmu M/e mam nclual Vraudor dvslmnssly olsome mu andnol what 1; mm construclrve at launch): fraud (:9: Tar Lea Finance Co San am: V omcm Aurgrvss A 07311983] 1 ML! a1) whomorlraud mu m u qunticn 0! (Act which rs (0 be dstlnmned In me am of (ho facts and crrcumatanoes xurrnurldmg -am pamcursrmsa (see wrv Donson (M) sun and v Roxy (Malaysra) Sdn Bhd]1980] 2 ML./ 131 Surallmn Olhman v Vusof am a Ovs[1988] 2 cu suun x1 sm xzsKGpMu=uyIP5cIP2nGA «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! zeal. Fraudmayoccurwnerelhedeslgnedobjeclolalransler is to cheer .3 person of any sxrsling right m where by 5 de/lberale and dishonest act a person Is deprived of hrs sxlsling ngllt (see Daluk Jagmdar smgn & Dr: V Tara Raparalnam (199312 ML.l ml " ml The com at Appeal had reviewed the evldenoe m the appeal and found lnal. al peas ‘We new no doubt ma! ma lenders in all these lhrse appeals were In/mg a pull a ran one and 7! mm be. lo em pull me wool over Ills Ina! ludges’ eyes such that rrom me pure perspective cflookfrrg all me SPA: and the re/ated documents, the rrarlsacllons would at me blush appeal unasssllabla. These were usnlly and clamiaslmsly duslgnsd lo dscelve and ulslzanz so as to escape aeleulon of anylhlng srnrsler behlud the surface afrsspsclab ly ' [18] ms coun nela me slxm Delenaanl [and me char nelenaanlsl parsanally liable There was no lssue M plelclnu (he corporate vell. The court ol Aapsal in Orly Luong Chinu .: Anur v Keller (M) Sdn and 5. 0!: (202113 MLJ 622 aeclaea man once hand was low la have been pemelraled‘ that m nsell warvanled me allocallon M llab1\|l\|y lo me parpsllalon. and that here would be nu necesslty m me lnvacallcln ollne doctrlne ol nlercmg the cameras ve1l Thls Ccufl amovdlngly placed me Hahwly on me slxln nelenaanl and me omer Defendam m xzsKqpMAFuyIP5cIPznGA - “Nair ml ...m.mul .. U... m may he mm-y -mm: mm. VI nFluNa Wm! [191 m tn the tsstte at New zeatattd Vawst wnteh the stxth Delendants de4ertee contended were eppttcable, thts cgttrt dtd not agree Thts was run a ctatrrr corrcenttng the contractual agreements but a clatm based on trattd That trattd was agatttstthe Ptatntms that occurred here tn Mataysta under metttrtedtctten anhis cdttn [20] Prenttsad on the tihdtngs above, Ihis cottn etlawed the Plaintiffs’ ctatmed luv the whim tmhe moneys that they had tamed out and ptaced tn the ttchente The amount :71 usnasa 32:: was gtdered tn be returned and patd lo the Pvatnttrvs mt rhta cdtttt had atsg atderad tor exemplary damages agetrtst lhe Smlh nevettdant attd tne ether netertdants Exemplary damages, atsa known as Dumllve damages, are awarded trt etvtt cases In puntsh me wmnqdnsr and deter arthets tram engaging ttt strnttar rtanntut eondttct In Knarert om Awlnﬂ ts Ana: v Koperasi r-erttrrtartart Ktuartg HM and another appeal [2021] 5 ML! 435, me cettn gr Aepeat exerctsed rts eppenate tttterverttten and awarded exemplary damages that the tnat Cmlfl had net In addmon to the damages that he was attaady awarded At p548 “In respect of H79 c/atrrt Ior aggravated and exemptary damages tn toversum ofRMVm wrttch was dfsa/mwed by the trratrudge, our view rs mar tnterverertoe wrth me serd Iiemton ts not warranted. Aggravated damages are granted as addmcnat compensatrorr for srn Xz§KGDMAFUyIP5cIPzrGA “Nair s.n.t nnvthnrwm be tt..a a may t... tnttntttt MW: dnuamnl VI nF\uNﬂ mat Ihs lass smrared whereas exsnwharydamagssare purmrvs rrr nature and 1: mdoperrdarrr aim/my In SBMDWS Va//r B/p KR Pormusamy I/Daluk Bandy Kuala Lulrlpur 5 CI! and anorlm iﬂﬂsil [W18] 1 MLJ 784. this couﬂ said as «gums m resped olaggravalud damages Now aggrmmtdarrrayasara classmad Is a lpaclas ol comosnsalorydamayu winch are awardsd as addm'orra/ carnuansalron were more has boon mlunqrble rnmry to ma mlsms! Mpnsona/fry arms mama/r, and were vms wary has been caussdor sxacirbltsdby ma exraplionalconducl arms dslsndant The lcamad mar [udga exsmssd ms dlsclalmn not to award aggravated damages as he smd me: than was no evidence tn support ir We carmol say he was prsrnvy wmng as me pminm mad been compensated for pmvan mass m addman to me further wmpensatron ma: we are allow/ng m cm: appear In regard to exervw/ery damsgu me Cour! o/Appm m sambaga va//r a/p KR Pormusamy v Dsluk Banaar Kuara Lumpur a. or: and another appest aner having consmered the prmdp/es enuncraledm me class» case ofRookss I/Barnard (195411 A/I ER 367 andrecenl nsvelnpmerlts, sad as follows: am xzsKGrMu=uyIP5cIP2r1:A «mm. smuw nmhnrwm .. H... In my r... mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl vn mum WM 1. MDND mzm am AZIZAN mm NO: aonm415.51251 2. IIIOHD KNAIRUL am MOHD sun (N0. KIP: :5ns114a»5n59) 3. FANDEVAN A/\|. MARUTHAMUTHU (no. KI - 1n1nwua:5) 4. VIKRAMAN A/L c. PANKUNY (N0.KIF:591I716—04»5M§) 5. souvm NP c FANKIJNV mo. KlP:611DIJ5«04-5954) s. AMEER NDRAIZEEDIN am ABDULWAHAB (No. my m11—n1-5415) 7. ANBARASV A/P TNANNIMALAI mo. KIF: 7112nus»5114) a. MOORYHV A/L BALAKRISHNAN (NO. mp: mosoras-5125) 9. KAMALANAYHAN A/L GUNABALLAN (NO. x/ uosznuom m.KueANAsvARI NP EALAKRISNNAN (NO. Kl . ansm-on-5530) nsrsumms GROUNDS or JUDGMENT Inlmducllan [11 me wamuns launched a sun agamsl Ins Defenaanls lo! lraud u was (new: dmm mu m arty 2015 may had mvaslad oollochvaly a sum 0! Before departing, we would Ilka lo smphssrs again znm sxﬁmp/ivy damages are rm! mreo-ted In compensate me plain!/II and are not rewvsrab/9 as a maﬁa rd right The amount ol the exemp/ary damagss award rs Iell to Iha;udge's nﬁsoratron and is dstelmvned by consodelmg me character or me aeranuanrs mvsoonmmr, ma nature and exienstmv of me plamlllfs Injury and me mam arms dslandsm TM quantum olexemplavy damages to be awarded must as appvopvvala m m wrulvgdmrlg mlhcled to me pames mvalvsd. Exlmplsrydamagss must not he uncovvlroﬂed or nrburary, they must be or an amount that rs an. mmrmam nacesury (a mum their purpose In (ha conlnxl of the parlrcular cue Annougn, we mm the conduct of the msnaanzs was unacceptable In [ms case, the learned Mal padgo hm/mg consrdavad ma overall orcumslances andmn wmaansuban awardad, dsc/media make an award oraxsmp/my damayss w. sea no mason mu In am: la the exercise af mo drswvlton am. my judge /n rm mums, on Appeal in mm: of In» aggravated and sxampmy damngesi: dumvssed rn respect 0/ ms mm of RM3U,DI7L7 awarded to me plalrmflal mo and am»: ma/, since » was no! manifest/ytnadnqums. rmsrlerence mm me ducmlron ofma m.II1uA1ger.t not winsnled canuuslou In cnnduslon, the appeal oldelemiams ns who//y dtsrvussad ma aapeal alplalnllﬂts allowod /n purl Tm defenclnnls are ordsrecl to pay Iurlher damagaslo Ina plalnull In sum ol RM1,134,JF7 The 2. sm xzsKGpMu=uyIP5cIP2nGA «mm. Snr1I\nauhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmnuuly mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! oefenda/It rs amend to pay costs omM2o,uoa for Appeal 55-: and was om/w15,ooa for Appe~a/ 555.’ [221 ms Cnun was mmaau to award Ixemplary damages agamsc Ihs sum. Defendant and me L7\|her nerenaanzs The am: is (0 mm me punuc mam such hiudulsnl amines II was also serve no mamtxm Ihe m\|egrIly oHu1anc>a\|min<ersm ensure a remmdervms waved to aH lhose mvulved m Investment schames hke mesa mm mum hcensed and to be regulated In awzvdmg nmoonoc e)uamp\ary damage: In be nan mg each uespscxm Plammis. ms Court had consmerea: (a) Win wmngim cunduct and the wlllm man an (hi pan of Ihe Derenaams. (ha The reddess Indrﬂerenue k) In: Plalrmffs and other Investors: to) Flaudmenl m\|em an me pan at me Delendanls «a have represemea that Urmed Gmbal were ucenssa far my scheme and me allempis (0 ms-apply our Malaysian laws. my Signiﬁcant harm Wuslvawad by Ina mg scale mmugamn wqmraﬂ 7 um; casa mvclved nwamy-wee wuruassaa, ma Irwasunanl sum names «a usD3aa,a2a and me menm and emu\|\ona\ anguish suﬂerad by me mmnms; m Thu aelervenl mesﬂgmq m ma pun»: 2\| large and Dalermal wmngdoers rm amount munmeu Iha courts‘ emphasis an ansunng that Individuals who sngagu in lraudulsnl mamas 12 sm xzsKGpMu=uyIP5cIP2nGA «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! face avnvovnale censsquams iur thew am": The impam em me ma-ncenance oi nnanaaw sxammy mm a strong message lha\| nnanuax laud Is m1l\|c\|eraledm soo¢e\|y [23] Interest cc 5% was Imposed on use nmgment sum «mm me date of lha mdnmenl -mm MI and ﬁnal sememem we Plaimms war: a>so awarded costs at Rwauou DATED 1 NDVEMEER 2023 R02 MAWAR ROZNN JUDVCIAL COMMVSSWONER HIGH coum OF MALAYA KUALA LUMFUR Fol ms Flammvs Nam snrn Hm Iogsllvsv mm Ksvm Ngu Hang Xu T/n cmeng & Lum Associates For Dwlﬁndanls Zfrwsiul Hanan Abdul Rihmm roaellrer with Faklwul Aznlan Abu Husun T/n Azame & Fakhlul 1; sm xzsKGpMu=uyIP5cIP2nGA «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! usD3a4,a2n In e fmelgn axl:hanqa(fmex)t1adlnu senenre rn me eryle and name wi\|h FX Unlled Exchange as rreamg. They were made we believe lnal lne forex tzansachans were laaeed and conducted ln New Zealsnd and mat lne senenve were in eomnlranoe wim llre laws ln New zealarre me Plairmﬂs clalmed Ihal me repreeemalmn nlaae Kn mam that me aereme was managed by Umled Global Haldlngs Llmlled rn New Zealand wrm me ﬂnanclal service provider lurrnee elenall {2} Then In June 2015, a lew 01 me Plelnlrlve discovered mere were repons on several website: an me mlemel, In parlrwlar a warnlng elem an Urllled Global Hcldlngs Lunnea, Iradlrlg as FX Unlted Then webslles were pubhsned tor 4MDn'l'li(\|On: www hm eamrn and lxunlledpowerlnlernaliorral mm men were me webslle ane onlme plarrenn man the schema was uperalea on [3] The Plarnms men reallzea met me -epresemallone by me Delenuanls Dsflainlrlg me eelreme were nm we and Ihallhe scheme was rllegal The Deleneanls were sued lot lreua, me wlil and elalemem el clalm were ﬁled by me Plamlms an 30.3 2022. only me sum nelenuent med a memorandum oleppearame an 25 4 2022 He ﬁled ms oelenee on 24 5 2022 A ludgmenl In aelaulr or appearance was entered on a 5.2022 aqalnsl me Second, mm, rm and Sevarllh nelena-nu [4] me Cuurl (cum on a balance cl probablllllas lnal me Slxlh Defendant am: all me elner oelenaenls had conauelea enu operelee me scheme wim lne rnlenuen to delrzud and that me Pmlrmlls were eelreuaeu and ﬂecelvad inlo plecmg melr moneys lor rrwesunerue In 1112 scheme em xzsKGpMu=uyIP5clPzreGA “Nana Smnl luvlhnrwlll .. H... e may r... nﬂmnnllly -mm: dnuavlnnl vn .mva war Thu lraud was in me repn-anvauidns In ma Phmlms The varamouni mnresenm-an was on Ina Mun o1 hcenu ur-d Immv ofme mrmna [51 Tms coun dedamd so and ordered Ihal ususewazo placed by me Ptammvs In me scheme [78 Dam bad: by me navandarns ma Courl had awarded exempwy damages dv RM10U.O0O Der Hamliﬂ mm: of RM5‘/. an Ihe wdgmemsum «mm today unm um and ﬁnal setilemenl. Yhe Delendams ware also «dared \|n pay ddsna ol madden Finding oﬂacu I5] ourcouns generally take a dim new Mscammers and onsralors of Form schemes ms caums no excepudn The ewdence adduced al may was carevuuy considered The Plamlms had me (sshmomes ol Iwe wwlneses Ia suangmen melrcase — me rnmeemn 1PW2)and Ihe Twenty- F{\|sllP'\N1)F1axnlMx may mm \|esImsd on behalf I)! all the ulnar Flamlﬂfs -n nus case The sum Delsndsm (enmad vorme advance. These are W5 Cmm's ﬁndings‘ (a) All me P\amIMs lnvesved collzcﬂvely U$DJ64,B2U m me sdrrerne. (la) The scheme was undar (ha nama and sma d4 FX unnad Tndvna and Exchenue me reprosaruumona made mcluded: r~ xzsKGrMAFuyIP5cIPzr«aA - «ma saw nmhnrwm be H... a may r... nrW\ruU\|Y -mm: dnuamnl vn nF\uNa v-max (I) W) um (xv) M M) The mvescmenn was m farax mama and vi warsmned ruoracive relums The scheme was conducted using me sonware Cinital Gam Ame Trading (can), u was said to be base: In New zeawana and me vorex nramng was carried am there m New Zeabnd m was apersmd by United Glnasx Holdings Lxmusd (Company No 5247341 NZEN 9429uoI251uo3). a ﬁnancnal serwce pmmder mere — me rmana-an Serwoe Provider number was FSP 394567 (Unwed ennnau; rue schema ccnducled m New zearanu mm Umled sum: was Iamm auzovding lo me waws mere, Yhus, n ma nu\| require any licence m Malaysia, The mmal capnal nmssnmem mus! be deposited m me curvancy arms us Dollar orils equivalent m cash: That mmal capnal Inv2s1mem must be depaswt m any av ma Defendants‘ aocoum men will be crsmea m me IesD9¢"\/e Plammmnvescurs can account. That acouum was called ‘Waller nr ‘E—wauer: For me scherne, me Pkmnlms were raqmrsa Ia execute me -Lener oi Agreement‘ and ‘Trust Instrument‘ mm FX Umled Powerﬁdn mm In an as me uusleeln aecep\| all inveslmem rmm we Pblnnﬁs and Iranslev mew Inveslmenl me me Wallet‘ sm xzsKGpMAFuyIP5cIPznGA «mm. Snr1I\nauhnrw\HI>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Mu] OX7 (X) (xx) pm) The Prawns vmie awe In mommr men mvesnmem deposned m me WaHe\| and an prams accrues memo vide me onhne Walle\|: The moms on me nveslmanl aenemsa an me name: eicnange ra(e bul u antacled e mmumum 12-/.. manmly on \he \|otal mveslmem From that 12-/. cawmnauan, x-/. was we charge lav me opemhon cf can; me wntracl paw was Ior 355 days. me cawal lrwsslmenl oepnsul muld be wmwdrawn .x any Mme pnor sumed to :w. wnlmlrawal charge: me mums were mulled lo wumrew me Dmﬁls/rulums from his msnschvs amounts V me money: would be cudilad inlu the bank account as msnuctsu by the Pnammve: mu mveslmsnu and plvﬁls accrued m me wanna were guamnlesd fully pmecnea The Iecms and commons were sIa\|ed an me website www lxumted mm, and The ueienuems and me sum Delemanl as me Mas1er muoaucsr Broker \|M\B) were enmizd In Dcmlmssmn «mm me mvesunenls and pvuﬁls gamed which werelu be pa-a Vrom me can eceemus. sm xzsKGpMAPuyIP5cIPznGA «mm. smuw ...w.mm .. U... w may he mmuny mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! (9) The Lelters oi Aqreemem and me can amngsx others‘ exscuted by aH ma Plzxrmﬂs reﬂaclsd ma rewesanlalions made by me nerenuams and me Swxlh Dehnaanls‘ m The sum Defendamwas lhe MIBMK: had been appmmaa by FX Umlsd Exchange A Trading . had made me represeutahans abuve The sum Delendam haa, over and above ti) Prommed ma schema lo we Pnamuns, my Allended me pvevsew, roldshows and «mwons 0! FX Unnaﬂ mmughuul ms in 2015, (my Euen ma key person who had gmn spuecheu 3! me fI:nc1mrvs1ncIudIng dnslnbulxan alavams etc‘ M Featured m lhe vmos. M muoducad ma pamaulara a1meCGAT Wugram no PW1 In 2015); Duacunvolvemanmm FX unmad Pnwev Sdn and lmm me ansewanon and undsmandmg onne Plamuns: (vi) Posted on ms own soua1medIa(Facebook)lhaIhe was ma Mus m charge and ounlmlled Fx Unned (fan adduced during me orossexamunmnon av PW2) ms had lunhev wnvmoed ma Flslnhﬂa to mvesl in me schama am xzsKGpMAFuyIP5cIP2nGA «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm a. U... a may he mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-max (9) The Flamws were convmced anu persuaded mm the reprasannanons made by me svxm Defendant and had deeded to Invest m me schema They banked m men mves\|men\|Iu FX Umled Power Sdn and and men an awcunl <5 generated a e undev me sxyxe nf FX Unwed Trading :. Exmange Each Flamtiﬁ was gwsn mew own account and parlltzmars cl «ransacnons could D: vweweu onhne on me websne www mmnea co In Than in June mus‘ alew ulma Plzlnuffs d\|sc\1vsrsdIhzl\|hava were reruns on mean wsbutes on ma m\|emeL m pamcular a wammg alan an Llmled Global Holdings unnnea, Indmg as FX United Thaw wubsnes were punusnea Var mlormalmn which were www lxumlad com and fxumledpowarm\|arnnhon:\ com Publuhed m mu warning none: was ‘We have mcelvsd roporli that L/ruled Global Mommas Lmum, mcﬁw as FX Unired. has been lalsv/y claiming that the FMA has endorsed me company as be»-vg /egmmals and mgmmgulami We do me conﬁrm lsgmmacy oi endorse any enmy m ms manner We vawmmend NZ consumers exercise due salmon when ueanng wdh any Dusmsss c/aimmg mm endorsed bylhe FM ", (9) me witnesses fbr me Ptamms have teslrﬂed mac me alen an me meme and FX Umled was also published on om Bank Nageva Ms\ays\|a mum m n: F\nam:z\ ConsumevAlen FCA Us! whzreby (he Mu made up «mm me reponsd snlmes and schemts max u had earned out me necessary assessmsrms The FCA Llsl on In: website ml Bank Nagara Malaysla (sum) 9 sm xzsKGpMu=uyIP5cIP2nGA «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! (M (I) ns agmde no enhance awareness on ennmes or schemes wmcn may nave been wmngly pemelved av repvesemed as repvesenled as being Heernsed er regulated by BNM Though me Flannmfs had cnanrnea man me FDA us: had nncnuaed FX Umled Manaysna (myfxnmvnedj and FX Umled PSB In me nsn, nne nnnnaun tendered was non comnnene and did non cnnnae me Inst ae man as n may‘ «ms Court was sanusnea on a nanancson pmhabnlmes man may were as mete were newspapers repons an nnvesugaxion on me sand scheme operated by rx unnaa ms hacl. «ms Court also \|mzk judncnzl nulnce nnan mere ms nnvesngannnn an me scmme and Ex Umled mchndnng csnann nndnvlduals (lmae wnnn nne mics Datuk) behmd nnnam, ms caun nuned than me cross-examlnalnun on vwz. ma Faeanmk page man man mm Daluks nncludmg nm sum Defendant was Idducad nn snuwed nne Snxlh Delendurn. one on ma nmee Danuks. as me This earned run nnucn value as (ms Oourl had nremnssd nns daclsnon hasad on the vans nr-an showed man me Snxlh weneann was eernannny nnvanved and acled as MIB iorthls smeme. Tnnougn wnnncnnawan requests that can be seen capnured cmnne‘ me Pnanmnns naa men In wnnnaraw an Ihenr nnvssnnenn upan neamnng man me scheme was nuegal Du! wane nan sumsssful m Thns Cuun fuund on a balance of vmbabmnnes man were was «am and me Plannoﬂs were nn lad defmnded They wee represented me sm xzsKGrMAFn1yIP5cnPzm.:A “Nana smun ...n.mn a. med a may n... anmnuuly mm: dnunvnml VI .nuna v-man	3,009	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-A52NCC-571-12/2020	PLAINTIF SIDHU BROTHERS TRANSPORT SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN SIME DARBY AUTO CONNEXION SDN. BHD.	Sama ada pembayaran pre-booking fees bagi tempahan kereta adalah suatu kontrak yang mengikat - sekiranya pre-booking fees adalah suatu kontrak yang mengikat, adakah defendan telah memungkiri kontrak tersebut dengan menjual kenderaan yang ditempah kepada pihak ketiga - sama ada pihak Plaintif berhak melaksanakan pelaksanaan spesifik bagi kontrak ini.	29/11/2023	Puan Rafiqha Hanim binti Mohd Rosli	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ed89a16d-e833-408e-8d7d-c28fecc880a3&Inline=true	29/11/2023 16:10:25 BA-A52NCC-571-12/2020 Kand. 65 S/N baGJ7TPojkCNfcKP7MiAow Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N baGJ7TPojkCNfcKP7MiAow Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N baGJ7TPojkCNfcKP7MiAow Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N baGJ7TPojkCNfcKP7MiAow Note : Serial number will be used to 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baGJ7TPojkCNfcKP7MiAow *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Bk—A52NCC—571—12/2020 Kand. as 29/n/2023 15:10-23 mun MMKAMM szsvau on sum ALAM mun NEGERI ssuuson mam. znsm. muvsu § Aggy §ML Nu HA-AHMCC41 zmzu mum smnu anomzns nuusporu sou. awn. lcemnllvy No.1 zooaumovou reowwl ..s-unmr mu sm: mnsv mm cnuuaxmn sun. aun. lawn... mwmum. Mn. mmnnmu ma:-VI usssumu M§Aﬂi gm»; pznacuwu pzuun A. Pzumugmgu 1 lm mm sunm mmuun Mainnl ‘ling mumanuan lama Ida Iudlvnt kanlrdx ying mervmkal antzrz um Fhml/Y an ruhak Dsfeman hetkenaan duwan Dhmbumn dun kendeman bedenam: Few um aw mm at me Ranger 2 2 L Smgla Cab danguu nmuburperudiﬂmnn svr am ﬂan up Fmd EvaI:\|2 n amm devwan nomborvsndallzranvﬂl) 532 2 Sumwara den kenu Kansa ynnq mam dun yang lehh awaum. mm szrauu aa um». ‘ Vkavan mm Klamwan am. h m. — m. unluk mmmmn (lambwan 451 m Faku — tuna my dVDursa1u}m [lampwan :5), w lkzlan Dokumen Eanami Enhmian a (Lamm/an CH 1‘ N bamvrﬁolkcwvcxvimmaw I um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm V mm Dckuvum Serum: Bnhaghn c yin}: mm mm. x. Blhsuiu a (Limwﬂn say, vi. mam Dakumm Baum: ramwun aamw a (umwrm :5), vn Vkamn Dcmvnan Be/mama Tlmbehan Emugnan c yang «em dhwar kn Eahagxan a (LImp\vin sn- »-“. Vkmn Ddmmm Earsnma Tnmbanan nemean s-wan a 1Lampnn41j 1. Mlhlumah N9: mehluawada knumu kainlnoln “pm. .1. hawah mg ‘. Maumar s svanu am All Mamndav s (Junmy) (SM) n awn my up Mlmm1avS\|nah(SP~2) mm Smgh swam NL Jalwim swan (sway IV Runmsmgn All Jam Smgh 155147 sun Delendnn ‘ Kwan em San (Sand;/)(S\|)—Iy u Slzven Km Fan Seng(SDZ) 4 l5u—nsu unxuxamcaram 5621-7: serum ylng mam- ‘ same as: wumdnyx um D-vunimn merwwkal Flahmldin Deiuwnn mam mung» kenderaan roan runes»: 2.2L swans CA5 dan Kervduraan Foku svazssv 2 n ammo. dun u. seklmnyu Mankumah mwdipm blhawu herdlpal um ...y,.nm mtngfxnl pm. wax‘ same ads pumu: darn / man neaeman man mexanggar psqanpan Inmpahan kwdamin roan RANGER 22L was we ﬂan kendemln roan zvzazsv 2n auuaao mmman . mxmy. wenaan mlah mehnggar pqanjlan hmpihan mveoul, mam ﬂan wlvuah gm my unluk cihayar man Dmuudan mm. Fhmhl sm b:(iI7TPu;kcN!oKP7M\|Aaw : mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! .. W... ..........:y...o......4 .1... a........ ;..u...».... ..... .....4....,..4 .».. ............_ A... .....u >. .. ......v..... ......... w. .. .....u. .. .........». .. um W 1». ..... mm... .. .a.... M... .. .......... n.. .5... ...v-may...»-wear. ........:.<ovm.m.e...u........4......:....m. ..».......»....z.m...... buI4lIl0)l1(S«m:m.v¢HrvI2DxgiLvhv:-M :..,.».. mu: ;z.........; ., .9: ,..... mm M... ..m..... . Cronby mm 2 R; r. A» .2 2: LR .. ..... ...».. MIG ... W... my n... ,..1.........¢». mm». ...-.=.... by .5. ..»... Lvjuzh Ma Matern- ...:.w.... 1...-.»...... M...-.;xr.r......... we mam us umvswsm um emu; mug my arm v Inmu mm ggynug am. am mg; me. am mu... s.... »r. wumvcvoswmoz. M..mv...:... mu oa.....z. 1 I34! AAmll&w~.§ 9iV,d .1. .. ............ m. .. mm... wtﬂbr .......... a 4. rum 4.. .. .».. ..n...... . ma! WVHAWV .. .r.. 1.... ...u .. . . . . M. mm. .c.. ..-..... mm .. .. .o........ n.. ..L... .. .:.. ma... 4:/no Caurl 0/Appeal Ln H:/lerFacdormg1M).\'drI m . u...:... :..a........ M :4. EM nm; 3 cu; Wm ruled mm .. .......... ..... » alarmed duplh .. only ban: nigrwt by one pm ./mm .. rvldlncr u.... .». mu puny ~a.x.:.m.. .. o. M... by an ......... sm namnmkcnvakwmunaw H «w... 5.... ........m .. ...... .. mm .. .n....u-. mum: ........ .. nF\uNa pm... 2n camncrs ACT1a§lHACT1’.KB)mM\DmmIukk:n L 4%‘. g 34.51.: mrvlmnu ., rr«lIl!‘ “gm: p..pm....,.u u/n.m.a.n.,.u»/.w«>».az. W M. ,(_(..w« Elm Mmmﬁzamwmmmgmm Ivluybecfermiwtrha ,»..,..,..,: u Bl nzcrpfnnzv ammupm; 21 Damn kn cmnmzv GAADENPACIFICVVEWSDNAMD vmmnm gm W 2». plunlglhad alga .».,na..;..mm mu‘: mg m M-I om men by llw 44w:..m my on Auxvm 7 mm 1». mm“. KEY umd Hath 4.“ 1”... um um and M «pm Mmrui ma Hrglmrnl -nu-rmblt xlnm g Inn Vnw thnlwhlmuumlrulhndhunx .4 . ,1 u I than my My m.:m.: V0 >.v hmm .. ,..y »/.»m Ilmnlar ICA m mug Fae/arm: 04/ :4». mm 4/«may mm AM’ mm rmmg Mr: M » ﬂlclulm lmlnnnu M Sdn BMIl9.V5I 1441111351‘ uwsn cm 22 Bevsandar upaaa lama — laklz din um vans ammam um: um Fhlnlﬂ mmwanm hnhmm mo mo mempakan xalu ...,an,m. ynng m...g»m um — max 2: Plvmohmmn Dwllaman mx umuk mum-Inmkan kemudahan bank wan rﬂperxaluwi ndﬂah un\|ukmlnksarIai.ln em pihak Dafendln. wmu-m .a.:.n wplldkan men gum Dafuﬂln mm: maekiinhh mlmbuatpermomnandan mum mm lam «mu. ssleva: panamaan balis mun dldwlln hzmwn nevanean Varvawnu um mmmu: apa - area wmov-mu kepud: mam mlna mum kewnnuan umuk kecmdsharl mmman. Kclaurwin Sandy amqukdan ems-nun dmawa sm bamrrwalkcmokwmuaaw 11 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 5101:!/>w rm at we 2; you Jud hoe, A/you 1:: pampuph 2:, mmMmuJ‘idhuKmIkasunl\|Am:moho~P1’V1ﬂnwIvlr»ub¢lldrmpvda hm/rc aw. nae-xL<w ﬂank Aﬁvv um s..»....a Cnma’ J cmm ml: 50 yaw mbmlnui All: 7907! Iwpluadan. mu u mu you m Inynngcvnuﬂ J Cnnvtl ms Andmmmpamevlwl urea wvvvawlia 15.7, l87darv an nu ma, -an-~z—-mnx 5:-my mu. »......u..,..m am... ,,,...».uy.., pm-mm mm mm-9-a.<-u Vela) .....;:.u parmhmwa Mm ..m:..:. M. mm amt ..:.m.x...¢ M, W .m.»..x am swim. mm..,. II!!! 111 pmwn :4, Mr Jimmy m you ...y,...4.. ,.m« I mm. mm Al perv-IM :5. m Plendrd am Hi: mick Idrall Mg! and 1:1 pamgupﬁ 15 ....a 27 M mid mm, wok": no, Minn »...m..: hdullaan dun nun Ielah mam Ilndaruarlltndauarl Izutfmh J Cnnrcv sun nu .. wmuyolmrv wins saw an mm. why ,.n.....¢.me /can and .».... M ... mm am you an: .n Lb: ....m,....4m. M II»: um mug mu m a// mu ma M4 (ban Mm dmlak appear mm mm: nndiay-In mld .5» mmu. mm.» J Nallmu smcmw I n sm mc.:npa.xcmmM.m.. u «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! xtza rm sar-mm .a.m..: Merl .. my 2 rmmldlm M1.» 1. 1»: wk and mu an 1» auathmm. am you Mow m .0... .. ».. ta... npplu'alIWII1>rm7[marI A,,,.z.u....,,;.,,.,. 1 rm -mum/m u mg 1014: my W «van» -1.. [Mn sm Wlvchxalurudcr,’ J n.mxa.,......w.u. an an vsovvxumnd/ovwhan J r.n.a.mu.».a.y sm EuAdIaIunIaluavd(rI.vn‘HI7 J m :13) so: what u the loan ﬂwlmalwﬂ/Wm? J 1741: u m. 1...,» ,,.,.z.m.... /uml /5 m. are 5134 M. Mr: (F IPA: R7?) haw-<4Ifv:dMdSld?o1 Bmlhcrx, an '1uYYa4 m mm: “mm wnrv mm rm and .w.. M»... Ukllllpﬂﬂ. My .,u....,.. M M ... when n the lnan wmw.. /anal From ma.» Bmtlmx rNl41LIA5N‘d0M«'/WM m,m...: ... Ah: rm» J m.L.m.hm.»..,m::.z.n..nmm....,m,g.,yu..,»mg.,m. /m 1; ..mu m. Am mil, brmum W WM1 ﬁn. ms ‘Na nu rm you ...m».muupIc»mm ymt nmnlh: cunmltrlu mu. Ihralili/’\aIno«r?So uhnrvyuu urn aﬂmudnxwm-nlyw ..uz..:... mu Ahtlnm ... rm ./ We mbmu :5. loan/or mo “PD/rcvlron me *So mnyvuagu-t mm M: Ilnuyw rindmnvbnu any luau .,.,,:...m.. [rm] You ma V04 .un...: any 1.... appltcarlon /mv I Inc» am. mu nmm».m.;wm.,m/omv sm namnmkcmakwmunaw H «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! 1 mnolnlu s Soy«urauwarN,pa;z2larul[ngcZ2a/bvtndltﬂllﬁttbin I'PPh:vnort/am‘ (mm: J Yn nusmc sm FavSDACpag.rZlamIZ2a]l)ubundMlurhalnamwplkvlran/am. zvnrcﬂ J Gxvmzl sun New you mm mm Mn ,...mm .».. luau .....a II" /mu nmiyau Am»: Jubmllcd mu rzwrl culomev army wm u twbamvily m 5. 1» tom: apmlmm/mv / Conn! sm 5 You W. an D010" ..».. my my swam M 9.... Innn but [wen v.,«...:, zoned ar nan J cm" suz -mw, can ya» Maw nrmmv dacumzru .1, mu/m». ..u..,...( n,/N54 mm M .:q.,:....zu...m. In... hm hm. v.,.u.4v J 1141 not Ielnlmﬁ M mmu . sm No rm m. m qutmml mm. Mn you .».,w ... an mu 9' 0 niocururvr or a wmvpp rlcmtst wave: that In low: M km ..,24.4 all 1 1.2.. A... bar: A/)tmd7 Ihaw m<,ﬁun ». mp lvwn mu; um Hang mug Bank may mu bmw J Yw ......m.m....,......,... .. 1»... 1». b...n.g.,» y.. no-.14» um Myxmwawzmwnmﬁon sm namnmkcmakwmunaw ‘5 «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! 5741'!/aw smy, we M»: 1m um,» um mm“ tnnyau apt: mu. m that um u..u.m liar: u no ml/upovui:-vu-4 um“. W and IA: ammo»; umu: Yuan am 5... wmaz J lmnlﬂn-1 . s» Naw Samfr. yr-tun Inakﬂnvrarwv W. rmkm .»..,.u,. cm... are: mm rIIcSan0,I!u:lbn{:r1lM W: m,mm.:m......; WW, ummw. .....m.. 5...; m xhaw mu a/I : A»... hm buvIr(]«1lA7 J ya :14: N71» Sandy,/!r1(b/yak an um”, rlrz mun VHW Ahnlprugc 2: Ma 2: albwvdrc s, whvd) .. m...n, mg km E m 1.»... ,.;,.4.w.a.;.m Slzundfyyou aw Jayfngyau plmdmi M 9.. I5, 13 and m..:..; ma, #1: /9.». mu 10 bur: rt/xzlndh .1.‘ ma. hm y.:..;...:..m xhnw any mvrupand¢n¢vh¢Iv«nyou mm bunt wwhowdoyw mm» a- mu mun 14.5.1” tlmlyak have made m an u,.,,mv....=..~ I-low ,.,.. a.,,.m.. 1. bcllrva «M1;-an fldtlr n 19...; mm. dhlrubnm Illa /Mﬂfurxldhu ammm m Mumnwrar: not mm n .; ,. ..4,mw 4m....u Sandy, u u luau a,.,.:.a....,.. 1.... .. W ,,:«.:m. .um;..m:y W. m. ,,:....:..., M the 1...... ha; no. ,.,«u.:, Ilwv ....., 5. Ian: daavmcnl W mum: my M»o...o..v how Sandy. run you We mm me mm hmr wIul£adSM/Iu Bmthzrx :. bnlwvuhnv ,..., have made an appuuum 1». »....¢ 4.. uzmaljmym 4.4 rlmpul any amlrcaluul/anmv 1.“? J M. I haw sm Nrrw Sandy lpulmuyuu mm“ vlevarnadtaavly /can npphaulloil M n.mI/olmlw Bremen’ I M. I an mzmtvw 24. Dﬁmmn munpuam aw pnvlvwgan za dun 21 \|>umsa.n haham unfunny: 2—ux2u2a vvniam-n nunm mauh mm dlhluskan dun klmudtan mm mm mmnmkan kanduanrhkundaerlln mm: mam pm yung um .5 sm namnvrukcwmkwmunaw «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! WaInubagI\mnMp«\ iuhﬂa Ghee! bah: dlflzpaﬂ h-haw: kamuinn \|asebu\| mmun nun-1 uhdum Okmhsriﬂm Dlmjuk mamw. Sandy sus Nuwlrrfnymt W.g.zz.pmm;n zwmm Mm. mm. A. W m paragraph :7. ma .-. whatym» mum; okay, mm 2.4 -mm, no /can lvyw mld 11.. Mr m Jrdpurllu N.» mnyw null M .mw W»... WI‘?! Mu v.;...:. n¢meIUy bangmm, when wan they ncmally 1uld7 Wm u MM 2...: am" 2010 av nﬂzv October znm um .. my q.m...z anus.-r2010, you «ram Mw my Ally ..= loan hm b«vv approved terms!’ semmzulzlmz a... ,.,., an 0. awn. W. W. m mum 11:14!" zgmmmuuum 1 4,:.‘.a.m,...:..p.1... mubazvzv :10 mm 2 m 2011: Nu‘ maze am.:y.m4 mnvd’ I Coma: 5152 lZLubcﬂJv¢wum/<;Mrrd.Ivmmy W. nlnndynnldrhc Vthlcll LI7fV£l‘I J xmcm/d. M ualhald sus smcwu /A! vehicle »4.=..,.». wu?»nnul./wlmy. U-nun J Curvtcl 25 uuumn menyalakan mam kmerarvgan haham kmdaraan «am pm auuax belnpl sum: altos! bus: was msﬂblmkln sabnmnw dakuman mmmgan mm k-ndunnn mm mm pun aw nwpuxmenngan Sandy sm s Ytvu wld ... ,...: W. more 1.4 a/«mm 1020 the wﬁucle an ,.:y....:y wui J Camck xm Nova M you pmw-14 ... M... m.:.,.,. Mm. M. mum that ha whirl:a!lInd)unI4I7Sh0wlI)04¢n4pp0D‘(lHg4D(lM1:\|ClIOINOWMIIIIHK sm hamrrﬁupxcnmkwmunaw n «M. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIGH m M, .. mm., mm: dnuamnl VI mum pom! mm: away mini (0 AB 07 c mild 1. W ....a ..¢...a ﬂaw M. ...,,,..m:.gmm.n J (mum: A/lndanylwv/IMI-HIM bun-ire mo No my lhmwn m can W a.... wllh - M. ., no ﬂonmlml .¢m Arm >4». Murmur: Mere u no dvxvmtntm xfwwlhanhc mm. 1»: ma lialltvnrndfvcmxn ha: 5“. Voldlb n .n.y.4,...n,» I Y1; sun 27....» nu balm:-/umxhww, mrrurl 1 Correct mz am... 5...», .,u..,. .. ...m.m... Mr: 1., mm mm mm mm. haxbcmxoldmamrdparlyv ammo o.:.=wa«.v Huwmyuu 1,; m..v...« thcwun ma. 5. ‘.r.,c:.n..:.wy Men ..:.4 W snapnnw rm 1; ...m.,-, m u no ......1, ...m.. Alum .. My unmnrr wrwervnltarv, um. .; vu7tMVVK 1., mm Mat 1»: my. ;... M. 10111 m...:..,.:p«.»:y,mm.mmm.uum:,m»swm.:..nmagm W. .a w mud, am 11.. M K..." and M. Ford Evrrul M mm mm 55-46, .:m...w(....~~ I Nalagrrc 2e Phmnf annhh xanwun mmubelx kamevun Inehut aenpan Inna! ﬂan mm» In‘ mi. mnmbuil pamnuun sum-Iﬂva x-mm — kanclavlan Iuubm bammlagxdiud m gum." 1: oemynuan Iumulin mamm mun memnuum huhawa Dada sown mm, Plalnmuuw bIsId\|n,nnqqupdlnt:Iv\u.Iy1uMuk mlluxsauaiun ﬂan mavwﬂlvoumikan um. um pen:-am me man amass»: Iasebm am we roan svsnssr umnm 21. mam Feuyava Saks! sru um-m mm mlnynlxlunsapmﬁ huukur 1» Can V911 «mm m M KBIAVI W. [A 1.. m Me Al 0., mm: .. M -imam me m..«¢r away And: 0.. 1.. .a.Wu ngned m. no‘: and pvvmﬁvuz .n ». .a..w..m ,..,...,..1,«m W uppmml We ban, on M amwvd Ia/II;/2:711; M: Sarah mm (M sm h::;n1Pup<cNvcKP1MuAaw 1» «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 12¢/mam mu .. my Ml m....:.gs rm apphcuawui ha»: ha» ,.,m..: mid mm Ina mm mm»: and mm: cmuzsz V/1!" ammmraxa mmrllrrpurly A} nu was mm»; ncwx mm» breach o/me Kw mm mvcuz and!!!) mm £Vl;2f$Tb«auu rs. aynmnlll ,...,,.n...;.=.....a the Plamnlnemrﬂtvttrfﬁﬁﬂht Ma vehicle: In A. was 10 when AJ 1». any rvervt es. m.m.,7m .1...” ready In M... M L51 »..u..:. u~»a.....«pm. m «uh vhtrv/we ma xm Ofloan cvrmat B: awrmwi am am mu :1») I00! 1». .:.-,.....u,..:.-.: m ulm rvl .¢....4.¢ 44 Iinrrlalrullm/I rind: mm M: whnclcy em w».m.1..mn.- FIarnH)7p'W/’M muttanmvbla mm 4: m. Plmnnlnanu »..,.m..4. mm m.¢:..:m Mama, lapnmlwlt u.. mm by nu ma pawn: zx.. PIamIg7I: lhrre/M: pin;/Mg/or 0 dccIamnanlAalllI1RTﬂF0RD mane mwzmmleo EVER!lu ml! m/Admldmﬁwublt 42 m Plmnlﬂu pmm /w a .:.a,.m;.>w lhal 1». D:/rminuu haw brvorhadtlw um I-r)m)M.V6F,R and R7vFr>MI : mm. A3 7» pr. nlgﬂmpmyuagﬁzran «min D/Sptuﬂ. I'rv/vnvmvvcl .1». km mm: mwazn and no rum EVERSTM drlmauu m mu arm ». um — Inlmn Rm . RYD\|e1sabul ai pm-mun 3 ms venmmkm hum vumbsilsn secure Inna» xalapw aanpaa: msmbual mdanﬁan um knpada pluk Fhmm pm Dderlﬂan u-.4.» mcmﬂlh unluk um. muumkkevnda mm: mavuum waned: mmysvvu Mn u Tum: — lsvmi mo — Rm taerxebm a‘ Petenwan m nu. deuoln gun mmpmnuuman mm». Iahrxnyl sinr-any nuns pm «mm mnyn men dmanxar mum mm Plhik Defsmnn mmlpmvyxl knsmma mwnbm amen din emaﬂ pmik P\a\miI Wzhubamwnuninun Idah mamlhh unluk Imps sum-rm Mali: mevuumkan kmd-run Iuubut mac: pm me. sm mc.:npu.xcmxwzM.m :9 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 2a Dalam kn: wusmmva cgummzm 5 Egg; gPuEm§:m am: 5 yuan way uuag QM Mn AND moms» A5254; am my 1512 [H] m,,:...w: rilmzd .., an lnlmn Wm Com mum a/Jag-ﬂlh :...I« V .v.»mus.ny»/1992/1 scam 1/VV m..,y...u;;.,..- ,1 lKa/m: A4-L gm whkh mind my -24 When 1». p:...m7 by M‘ «mm lmr mad! smv/:cp:vra»u.« Impaulb/c .x« UNI 2: .9... IIIII .....:..: hm: :9 led .4,....m,« 1'hurpc-amen 1, wmnm m aoa.;¢qm_1a/u»«cm ; M um mm; W. 2r 9/ m.g.Jg»z.:.¢w 195: wvLnl mu V . :1 .. KIM . .m. u mm 2: ....u.. nmvﬂ ,.m.mg, m IsnI M. . 1. .....:...,= I 5 I 1». Vymkd m (‘Hurt 1...: Wu} V . 1. . 29 Damn kn ug mu Lug worm nu psvsnopusm sum mm mm uuu mu m; um. kc: WW1... :4» and V Nrwluu »e...m :4” uMpn1n/ 2 cu we pnmalamn «by... 1; Am x.:..1xm«m ma Lnl um dlrvyrlmkau xrpem mm ‘/1:'] A: rrsrvrvta lm‘ -1012/rcmren 0/‘A I5 0/up Srtnﬁc Helm/Au mm m. 517.: ml)“; .. M. LVAVIEVVAJAJ [M1 the mun grwllmg m. cm" hnr r/mpawrw auarddanlllgrl A/y. wﬂ a/we Wmmn marmmiygvunrung rhupm/iopcvlormvnm HIM ....4..,M. ,.. m zmullmlv . mm» m the »«..mum c/aw: sm hamrrwalkcmokwmuaaw 20 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! a. uwmm puurms 5 mam numvilun mm xynnm ylnq muuahnk/an pemagun Ian paraaanaunarv. m..x.x. n.¢.m.n mlmpakan mam synnha yrsni maniminkan pammgian manual den msngudlv kavmuaan bahalu mm Fun 5 an. aim: mm mmzn, wmnm mun-klumkan yang mm memcﬂuknll dun was uatdusan Izmbahan haw xeuumn Demxaalnn .1... ukllxnuxn kmtnn-gin PI-mm um um‘ s=:.m «am. msmbuat lampahan cu. unit kmdaraan an wman um wk mum» ‘ um un\I kuuilvaan roan mean 2 2L s\NeLE ma yang Ie\ah maanamenaan Jnbnla/I Pemarﬂmun Julanswelnm penluihn din mampunyal Nu vmageuun svr 565:9 [xahps rm dirwuk ssaoaai ‘kendeman roan RANGERms~bvf)‘ ﬂan sum uh“ kenderaan Font: svanzsv 2n ammaa yang tnlah a.n=n.m.n,;.n mum. Fanguvukmzn Jzhn xdnlum uuwalun ﬂan memrunyaw Na Pmdaﬂat vnn 3:2 (sakmu IN dnmmk ..n=g.x ‘kmdauan Font: Ex/9:251 ....em 7 Scum: dcngin Izmpﬁhm kemienaan roan RANGER tarsuwl, mamm mun membuamndakan mam m man . mamm man mammal blyarm :1-pan nblnyak RM suaoo mm Ddeudnn wads w/mo dun naaman (E4-7\| muvanmt dlpotll wbanyak RM son-no mu u Kzmudhnnva nus: we vnznzo, mamar ﬂan Delersdan ma» mnnuulu mm puj-mum Rein-V Ouslomev Old-rudoua Wm amu sewn ‘Rm FORD amesw umnur) mu memmmvm Mambo! .m 752:2: m mm \|erml . lama mmu man umyalakan dun d\peIse1uJul am Pmnmdan mm m Hume bdwun kendeman roan nmsza namm lamnuk dwuan bayaran szmwwgirv (on 0.. mad pnoa) adahh RM 1505154 w sm bamnﬁolkcwiokwmmaw ’ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm an mm m ggm Am my; my awn v cmux gang swuu my my I AM»? mu Muu Ina [ya] Seam: rum .1/u.¢s,.g.+;acn.u4m mo unpmwrx meow 1.. m..,m..m /4, :2 bvvnzh D/BOWLVBCI. .,. adlnmn m wdcvmg luprﬂnmmrme nmm.., .. 1». ;..u.m.., mu. ‘Any porau NW8/Hr 1):: 1124/1: per1m......« 2/.. mmm may aha mklur wmpwummrfnrm hrnlch ..n.,, ... addition w. W .-,. xubmmnnnﬁxr, .u,.¢.1m.am ' :1 seysanaamn kepnda «am . mu ylng dmyamkzn am am munli . owl!!! yung mkumnakan pwux mun bemujah mm x Dnfuudinlnlah mllanggar keduz due peqaI\imn me‘ u Snkvanyn Mnhkamah mg muua w mendaonli kzrvﬂuaan Iuuhu\| mm bedum an MA, v m mamnhun saw mum penaksanaan svenmc. mm m SIkvarIyIM:hkzmanyang Mlﬂwalmmundnpallkanduman knndavuan lersebul man nut mam mamuhcm Fvmtzh gam: mu ummy kapada Fhmw :2 Kawmn my mum nigh F\:mMam\zh' . Dan um Wm/znzo sehmgga 3e\I kn puﬂanggarin pajlnjxan Rm roan was lunbul, wamm Iapaksa menyewa saw kamavaan Dina-An emval mm mm R L K.) ENIERPRNSE pm ham] RM3,noo4w nhzp am.‘ H pemuzan hug: beﬁan dlanhr: keudsman ylng mlampah wlavu dengau nnvjamian RYO ram: mass»: dmgarv knmevsan Inm dupasavan yang mampuny1\speseﬂk\|s4 ynng slnu. m dad um warm sehmgga Adam sdnsaw mu paﬂiwaalin peﬂanymn Rm Fokn Evikisr mam‘ Plmmll Iavnku mervggunakan Iuendaim Imam Tﬁynh Camry (Nu Pudalusnin sm bamnﬁolkcwiokwmmaw 21 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! wnumcsp mum pmmnnyx hamaml msxszr swan smnu NLMSWNW 5\|NGN(JAS./EEY)Mgvkequruln Pvmhg:anP\avm1 om yang am. in Fhmlﬂ I-an n-mmu membiynr pampasan snhanynk RM 3,uou.oa Iabulan bewnma den wznz uunuy mm. «mm dmm mam. M5451;-r mu nwruymakxn kutxvyi Waiaubngalmanapun Dada Seplemhet 2922 um karma mm number putdlllamn No vcn um wan dmemun unluk k-gunaan En mm nu. mammaaaun Mnya Iwenunlm glnn mg! seblnyli. am apoooa nan m/mm mm: swtemn-12022. w nubauan hams beuan dmnim kmduann yang dilempiv mm dswan peqlnjlan Rm sown waxes-r Ihrvgln kmvderun um mpaiavan yang mampunyal sprasnﬁkaiw yum lam: V gig‘ mmmx kedur mu kendemxn lurulm 33 Saw Plamui su bun-V1: mmn sxmn AIL J-gn sum (Nnr: Nu somnsda-5649) awam phvyuu my \|e\:h msmhuikm ms--nan bcnkuun Q2 way...,w.»c.7..w¢ay' u : haw mnrrd "Q .m«, .5 Ihc Flaw!/fund I UM hen: m m my xvntzrkw 94 mm have any Aummu denhwgx W» m. :-:......./p 4: Yr; A2 1,. am», mm Mr Mnbwla »....: mm .. lu rwnl my rm". am 1. 1». p:...m,7 Vayeedln vwvl out my Ttryum rm... .5 ma Plablnl/34 M4 umaa W manlh ,.»......mg mm; mm A “W H/We ,m.,.m.. and 1» my Two!» pm... llzmng Reglnmllun Nu Mwauzmn b<l«nAu[mg¢41Il)7P 4: From am” 20111 am :5 Nuwmbqr 102/, Mm mm: my um mm in ma m..:.y r». M Avmmr my 1 mm am my Toyota mu M gdw 1.; AM m..:g7/W ,....,...,...: mm 0 Prmon m an sm hamrrwalkcmokwmuaaw 11 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! Wm u mil an um: um MW. 1»: mm! /m 1». mm W. m..,.......mr.us mm,,.,...,...» A W u/IA: ,q..»m» mu /4» my rm». xwsw Mwvg mm.../.9” Na K: um W. M urn ..: P"rr mun» A4 1 «fer w pager 1 .4 2 man» DOKUM5NBz«:AM.4 mar c; nrldpaga 3 .3: 1111? m: an: my ulvulcn .., ».. m...]......z ma ms Q! nmm bunpald m. rental/oryaur with mum» the mmm mm»mm mw +Mwm 34 Paul hm hm. psguam vmnmxemn memnmm umnumnan jawapan mm: as dl mas dbahlkm dun sw-A mumbankarv Kelnmngan Ilsa" mm; soahsn in! sunny.» mavnbedkan kuuimin mm seam mum Imluk msnpwub as an an 5 M ;a...,.. mu» ,0» Ann M.» manlh .. mul haw M rrnlrdyuw mm: m w, cuuyvu paw m the mvnfvvhowmny month .. W: W bavz m..m«.. mm. .. 1.. plamlvﬂ 1 may. /MluuII/, :: .m.u.. I have mued mm mm .., »..,.:m,y : hm» wm 1.. uhm’ I amt». mu m lmu ms nll MW .0 Mn month 1; My 3- I-{r7v¢yw betrvllmdtlnc war/Wm mm. "mm Mu plntnnﬂ‘ I um. bu-¢npmJ/Ir nmm. .,. Alatxum ./57 am. 1.» m.m:.. m another u wanna u due. Ih: mam 41,000 sm namnvrukcwmkwmunaw 13 «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 35 Sam m.musr—2 Gurlr1K.IurNP Mahmdar smvh dalim Der-nyah mm min mmum scum yanu bank»! 92 m»... ..,..,m..4. .. M4 p:...>..u,yc.,...,.a..,» ll mm: m-mmmuuam atlawnuand/bwl:am’Al:c¢v>WlP-all r:..p..m.; Wm Wm, H ,...,....K..: ;..,..».a mill Mr Mahnlar Mm blown .1. lunmyl am Wlarhviﬂprw Wlayau/avid nu! M «M loan wax ~/may u mu roam mm w p:..,...m.m.. ...,..., ....:/7 .m:.. A) Mym who u am bum. um!!! tin nmxa K.IL'mm7rLu mud on Invmly x ,.qu.ma dxvrnf 1.: givr ;... 1.2,“, m... .., u.. m....,y.‘ a mm A3 17.4 ru..,.um.m ., moan llnlux/Wm n .2 u :m,,... /HIM Dchbrr 2a:a.».:.us/u/2a21.,.m.. Plaumlrvnlcd .1 mm m SlII’f>vm x 4 u Enlsrpnnlwm mum: mm M... 1». ....,..my m.u.:.;ms mm A4 in mplmvwn mm m. Myumﬂnlnrnm mm. ..l,,..,,. 42 mm mm... Tmnbalnan mmy {tom and /A4 rvguuunuu mrvi rman m xvvmn Mnav amaze 4.: am ml Whaluwlhnr u.x.4....m;..,,..g.;s: mmul 9/rDn>7 A/. Ila: an r». hank .. mp, and I-dawn! pagu q/the m.u».n;7, ml m....m. bﬁvw m....nu-«I by the m.n1m x 5 K1 2..L.,,..;. 1.. M: Ioyam Hr/mum: mp W/wwetlnevzdacmncrlvllnrﬂsx-.v a mnum .4: 1»... m all 4.. nlvwvvx uxurd by me » 4 1://or /he Mala/I)/I111 Imam mm {Md Mr: PrwonX70 sw sm namnmkcmakwmunaw 1- mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! 36. 5...: P\linM swra bemaml Jame. smgh smm NL Juwurvl swvuh (Nu: Na'M0:I<11-I4—5m5)dn\:u pmylin saksi mam mmwm knumngan berikm. 94. Down know .5... 2 4 :u:.....,»...» Al y.. Ihrmnnihadan ws-.......d/->m;...z.. .2 av... ..... W .. .c.. 4...... a......... ....u.. .a.. M... n .4 u Enmpruc M-4 1:... given hm rm... nu... ... .:.. :—:......I... a rwual ....4:.....p..,....xm:uv 11.. ....m. m.».....n.uy mm A! m nan .. mu bemlur we .4.../.4 ... gt! .:.. ».n..4.. /vw. .».. p.;....a..... W. .....a .5. ......mm uM:sx..nAr17Au amem... mm m. mwyrn mum b......:.. as am. Lr .1... mm... .». Page x mm». pm... ;a......... mum... c: (um:/7 Al 21.. l'IalrvlL/fvtlildrev many N€hI:lLv[9r:Lrdayw~day .,........... A1 ;a..,..... .;.. n./....:..... ;..:.u...... .;.. ».r...r.. .. .».. Emmy/1, 1 5...: .. .... myP¢"!v>mz/ vehnele a r..,...... CHn\|ryImvmgr:g_\|VruIn7vK No nu m7a;.....,..,.....,u...... lwvuwhapwandllltmmpuny/\|aiAnApd7 2.22: ngm W can-pw.... ».. maomz-410 rtr M...» ....m.....-. 1/1/20): A! lmaM:-M » gm .. mm-» wlucl: Mly m. um... mu .. Mania lmvm! my-m...... N.» ma mm Al 17.. pm»;/1.... mm: .. m-we-me ... M Mme H mm c...-..-mg... //I/1021 ......r.v.,......:,.. um um... ....... b< .4...-...a mm. IA: De):m1..nI A5: nu mu pvwd u... 1... .. ». ......,............, u.. c...,...., . am .1 o.,....... 1.... pmnrd . ,....:.....>.. at m». A: Inn .. (‘mgr 3 [nmc/.1 ..... out oldie no...»-. my Aadugned mu rvwluvmn sm ..c..np....cmmM.m as «w... 5.... .......w... .. ...... .. mm .. ..«....u-. mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pm... :7. saw Pmnl/V sP-2 swim Kauv NP mum. smgn «mm penyam mu Ialah uuimumyn msvwlbakan new yam mm 9:: Whaxcktdayar nvlv min/avrnvhu um..m.m..n» .4: 4. mm a. n... In: min: 9/ m. Fmw Mmm «rd roan EV£n£:7 wu Ignwmrd by Dujrrldant Mn! W47! mm: M Lw-quay .¢n.::... and 9.. am.» 9/mg Plant;/[Mr /aw Slug‘! Slrlghs/JMA/LJa:wamSznghum rrqmrldtuulehkplvmnalvthnck ﬁwmmpﬂlly opm:.mm,..: malmx u ﬁn za Wu 2021 :5: Fhmlnﬂhad ngvnd la mmpennm III: mm. on». mmgru; mqm Smgh mgr. aw:-4 A//. /am... mm, nu 1,000-papa mu. m.......m llannar;/IDZI/av Iumghuptnmwl u-o/am»-my upfmﬂmu 4: m Mkcwroflha pz....4g7u,Jm.; nun ma mm/L lament Imgh mu anlypmvldad -«uh a mmpany Mu. .... oak. 102) 4:. 7):: Calvmnv And pArMaM4l M ,:...y..4.a M, mm Smgh Slrlgh Sdlm A/L Jnrwanl sm .. Mme mm. rqvlrunm Na me am; 1». mm. walpurdruxtduuh/nl mu an/mm AK A new V/Wt lrmplc:/321 pmm. am: mm. 4: am .. dip and mama». card ,¢m.Mm:.. mu 1.. Jean ,..m,., aw a/I122? An’ : wuh In mjarm rm Cum mm mu mm:/er nrmmmno .. M Imluadmrn may do»: by m.,mm...::, is same mum SP~l(J\|mmy) dahm paw. um tatah membuvlkzn kvlamngan mam yang mm; Q? Can W m... .. .5". mm mug, .. m. L"... me? u 1» any new Aha mm; NIL! .:mm nmtv 1., mull: out n. :.a:..m pun:A(\|rKpnI:£1'w mrh thus:/mt 4:. nary a/loan umnml be appvmvnd due: mumnkc W Kemw 7h:d«pnuIpuul Will ..r.., M mﬁmdul sm hamrrﬁupxcmakwmunaw 15 «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIGH m M», .. mm., mm: dnuamnl VI mum pom! .4. 11.. ».......a..... .....z. 5.... u.. ......;.. em mm .2. ;=:.....;1pr«.v/rum mu Humble cuurv Al’ 1-». Plalvvlllwwm mlmnhau rm a. vehicle: mama ...p-...»..... .v.. ...... by WI! mm payment 1». p:.....1.. Hurt/vwDW.vm1fF' . .:..m.... M... Rm rm:/2 RANGER amuzmranu cmm. ....:......:....z...;..ms.. .2. n. rwuyru prawn:/av .- dcdarulmn mu! m. D:/mic... Ann n.....;...: .c.. m mu; mvau ...... no rmw smw 4:. nerwrnmupmyrne/mm mama/Sp-a/cr.rm..... aim-Rm mun muasn 4...: km mm: Evzxxrov u.......,... .. 1.... ./.5. Al :1... .»... ...... .2/mxmrvko 1uM;£R.. ........;.s.p.......g;....: .. NM . vehuleﬁvm R 3 KJ L»--pm. 7». u... ......: .». .»z..».uI .. ..........v. 1... a/n.vJ,mI1—I1ﬂpcr no... r... .n.. n... .1. m.......y .. mmm. .w.........». 2/ W 1,/IM/Mr par monlh mmmrnc-ng ID/In/10.70 ......: 4.... .//um.../M m.. ...... n.. r........g,...,. .. Mu mam»: mumn >4 covtpwamiiardm 1.... 4; Du: .. .. ......... Mm rmw zvcnaw, gm. I/I/lull .....y oawzazz /29-....»..., ....m....,g«;.........r,..... 1...... Cam) y....... ..w..... ». .. am... 7.. p........p..... .. 9,... ;... .. mmtwuvvc m. ....a D/rum! m3,mun (XV ........r.. mu 2.. .z......7.»... .. .... Imvwnlde ...... .. ». .............:/.2. .... .... .5 5...... .:.. alum: 1 WLM .. ....z.r.... m. Deltrulanu 1.... ...u...« m. n.....,7 1.... 1... ...¢.......... ..... .p.. 4....» ..... .n.. ...4 m. »........ .. MRI! ..»...p....... n... .. wry ...x..-. ...4 .».. rum... ....:. .....,..u.... .......... um .. ....... 4....» .. ....-.-.»«....../4 be made ./ .5. n.;........ ....: .;.. .>........r. am ...y..,. ;. .m.zu.um.......u.»ta-..:...-.2... A7 D.:Dn1rn4lnnl;nLmpvnvl"nn!:r¢.unndc.»:I sm ..c..np...c.«.mM.m.. :1 «w... 5.... ........m .. ...... . my .. .n....u-. mum: ........ .. nF\\|.INQ pm... g u Enrlmyou mnluaud that Ila r.......ur.. Mn." .;......,.. .. p... .1 :‘p<uﬁcF1rfarmmI:! Caryn" u,.:....y:.».>..m m cm. wrap»... mm: Al 1;... .,.a..:............s...a.......:p.... .».. 1»/....a......, w. Aavclmww .»«rm.....»u...um .-/».»...u/my. tom:-whrc «Ln A) 11...... ,...........2,.... mmpnlzuu ma... mu .9 IA: smpmy — rm .;...w.m. 4. N0 72. 5.... .x v.‘ mu... mm mm m... 1...... A3 um I am Sa/:1 Cmwllam M. Alvm on He had was .. OW ......n.. HZW ......:.L. 01.». ....4 vcmclu mm M! .....:..b... H: Aim! Dhxrcrltdmtwcm nu ounmtlpdnratlarl .».... ..,...n:m....m... .....:,.......:.....A4..;.,.a,... ,......,...m...../mwoapn...~ouz mromnsuzm. »:m.»..:-.n.......4p»......:......u........,... 1 .1... W. . ,.n...g.,.:. .; M. .»....,..>.. M.» my pa... m p:...mg~.;». we .:...w....... (W?! b< Nth alpugt 4: (law: mm.” z.....s..».... pr....../nmrt At. m H!» mm; RANGER .1...» tab .. «mm. ... m vwmwand dmmxu .. 1.... m. .vr.......rpm. .. 2.. mmncnmkd an 99 wow m mm :4 = mzuun m A! n. VHW mm rmzzsz 2.2 mwmo .. mmlable ... nu saw: an and u...-.ag« n. rm. 1»: Phluuipmr .. 5. mm.” Rum9IMna4r—uMI7M1JIu—uMu2,474u :9 Dmam kn gmuﬁ mu 531532555 my pm v cnsvnou mmrsm LEJHELMLNJM I: .. Int: 1.... m... ,........,.. .. . 74 u/the Cnnlrrrclx AC1 mu, wrruunxanon/Dvlnrxardanagt/orbmzcﬂ -2/w..»..(.........rys. ..w...u.,a./.».. Inn Am IVIKIH ..........;, ... .5 ........g..., gm ,,, mmumm...._vm.m:.mm.mm Mum my M1. .5. sm mc..np...xcmw.M.m.. =1 «w... 5.... .......w... .. ...... .. may .. MEVHIHIY -mm: dnuamnl VI nF\uNa pm... wnlrau, M be llltly N .....n;..... .5. mm .,;.u...a».¢ lay: u not M mm or mm. an Dam xes anu Bub mu mu no camzr or man yr:/mm m m.vwANu»u/<ULLAII ms zmuusmuvnmzsxm .vAm.1I('A 1:4; 1». :....,m..... an L-\ 1." IA: 1.1.. .«..a.....,g.wm. ..m.un, amvrm m .m.:m»«yw»:x/rmm. um» am am 0/ IA: Gamma: Au mam rho: nm 1...» mm; m ,.:W...,y u nﬂawd In new 1-» mm mm any: MWA/y ﬁvm U1: ma. nmmm.m:»<.m...;..n... ,.mm,.. m.,.:.my.n. n . ul , I . H4 5; . lower mu .1. g.»..:,._. only am able m to an :....,.......::n 4; Dilim kes munm am nmm :. egg v men END 5 ass 21:10 I H.\|.L1\|Z! 11w mm ax davmgux mmvzmhll /4. Irvvmh a/ rvulmm xmolva Ah»: mruldamnml or. 74 mg» xubmmrvally mm. the (Mmm low ml: um ﬂmwt ... Hudlzy V lnumlull (M54; max us Ihmmmol law!-damlh¢n.vx«.vM¢nlv#dr1MI1:t'.\wmm> »/ M /wk Q. gm 1...» mm. awn ﬂuwxg Q My : ., mmm m uwml W :uI¢c¢nI:1A: Jamar: mu M. ,m.,. al ». W... .41». mm, 0; [M w..:,..,: my rmmvmbly M nu-mmv m ;.m m«Im4:luA«t m Mepwbab/o mun afllne n~u» bmu-In .gm...,..u the gum! nut u M m ggnrvnd gm ». M “mu, 1.. .. ...m:..: .. r«I7grL[H>m M: covtlrnnbvrakrﬁg 1:ccpdrw.v ma»; sm mc.:npu.xcmxwzM.m 19 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 42 cm... kas LEONARD uu uw cums v nmsmgg gr Aagng s s n muuc 1 /:71 A.....»...:......;,...;.......;.. Iizwwendedpmmmn am :3 9/the M. am. we Cum mm mm me 1950”) allwmrlha appluvmlladanm ..............,...:...m..m_;». mum . .....v zuum .. Mzkl .. 5.... . WV m » 1.. ml 2 d..........¢ M, ..[.mM .1 rrnlmg mm mm However mg anmuu .>.. .,...:...... zkzlmed u, . mm W... ....;.m Ihapphmm ‘. vsmck thalwm ..y....z.».....m vehkle rm... .. Miya Kain’, .. ......n.....:..... m. 5... .5. ..,.,..:.......;....:.......:.. m...:.A.....r . much my car, a. 5... ..:..,......v.mn-.pu-v I mu; ma apmz... ,».....u .m...u.m.....u..¢./».....nc/z..:..w»..2...m.,..=...a... »..... m... .. .. nzruiary .. m...p«....... the ..,...c...... /9. ...m........m.m>y.».. am... :. .n.......m.... m. a,..:.¢..... A... nut W... A. ..,/;....1 any fan mm M. mg . ..........m um. bung nbl: .. .... hu ........ mm. QIcrm.x;.:- an new kn 71mﬁ='e, mm the ............ .1 fW’KP1'muIlmx .. u.......g«. .;.....z.. b< ......,....:,.......m. .n.. purpau ......;.m.;.....»5 dug K ,. .,,.g_p_W . . . . >... ....m...... .».. W , ...:.m«.: .4» .n._.¢.;.gE . M. m..~uml;.....:....... vruzn ........r... 4. ...n.»........... urlol DVKV .. km..w .. .i4 c. mmum ngggugm 42 Bahawa En. rmueeo sirvwh ma». menwhubunﬁ mm. n.4....ua.. ma 22-seozc mda\u\ apmrzil Whnlaﬂap dlngan m-maldumkzn pad: sm Hm Kw... a... Sun qsamm. unlnk msugﬁuubunm sm mmy sum. u.......y._ kmna pilak Harwv sm mc..np....cma<w.M.m 3'1 “Nate 5.... .......w... .. ...... .. M». .. ..«....u-. -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum pm... u man amyalakan ﬂan dwsahkzn dawn Rro Fowl: nausea mum me am: sebelum awm an N n.4.m.n ..z.a.n munurima temnﬂhan W Gan muvusuki vﬁianhin R70 roan RANGER1uud7u\|. mu mnnanma dspwl nan Plamm dun Man mangauarm saw red mum benankh zmznm ylna m-mpunya nombaum 521456 Kamudlirmyl mm dnpusemlm behawa mm uaenaan1s.nay)<sm).m mammal nermovvonarv — psnnonom kamudahin pmlalmn an am 7 am cam um Pmnllfunluk mdenwkaphn Dembduan um Walaubamnrunavun um um slkﬂal Vu/10/2020 Ddmvaan (sandy) um mamakmmkln mm mama Ammyxssm nmwa mag. Fukn wwezn mum den kanderaan Fawn EVERESI (erssmn Man cum am dlmrxhkzn mm Dﬂmbdw yam: mm Psvbualan Delandan yana man rvxenjn/a\ kwderun roan amass: levsebul can mm... mm: svsnzsv :.mm mm mmk Ylng lam mm Penanwanan venannan Rm roan mesa mm: pwawlsn nan Rvo man avaassr l=r:mu\|Iermamanya m. dxmnna Pmwml tam xmmmu mm Karma 7 temtanyi ﬂan man mlmbuﬂ bard-‘an devuslx sehan‘/Bk am 1,6130-no am my devmkian new sum mnnunlul lunuﬂ Ddaksanaan spwﬁk mu szbaga ganuan (m my ramnm pmmun smmx‘ garmrugl an Pmd< Delaman Pmiseomi mma‘ PVETVIM ma: be/sad: sarvwun ﬂan necunlvi unluk msllksanakzn ﬂan manyemmmakan mu: due vwiinlhn mo ram: mum: Iznemx ﬂan RID roan svznzsv Iusebut sm bamnﬁolkcwiokwmmaw A «W. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm um muncnukln uhulh Inak yevam mam yaw aamum dz!-m m. 1. Burma ca. u Salevumya sun Man murghuhung s=« dn mun: merakz mgmamumm yang maeka harwwual -1-wan kenasman nu-man ylna muuu-«an prmgmma Fun! Ev-nﬂ um Pm: zamozu, Slndymah mlmalqsrngkzn knvau: sm beoe/ups mesa: metalm avhkzsl wnarsapn mesiﬁace sen; bnoerapa aimear bavkanaan dangln kanﬂaian yang mahu man. man wink Fmnhlxapammaru aw nu. 2 I Sﬁunﬂli :1 45 sewunmra baa: «maze, Jimmy man mulghantzr mass] cam aaumx wmmn senenimana n . 9 Bundln 01 dsngan memakmmkan keplﬂi Sandy mg marsh bummm unhtx mambdl m Fem Evmimderlxzan havgi mmmmmn am no me warm duﬂain mm. RMH,nou—00 46 Samba: llm may lush mamklumkan Dﬂﬂa sway ynnv Synnkm sum Bmhus mahu msnaapaman mruaman kuberaan Dial memb<aya\ kesamua kendzmian sewn aw nusderwun melakukan Derkamsewm m hlwih 1 “mam... alusun mm P\a'mhY sen. muvlaldumkan Dmak Syankat smnu Broth»: aﬂalah pm mummyivmng pandzhuluan suhanyak RM1,ooo4>o whens! DIe.pao¢1Im7 me: unlvk Fave Everest am Ford nangu summan msnur\ggA mm...“ mm am bag! pmjamnn aw am: n naval kendaman ymw divemeluim mm sepmi mm .; rum Evunnmmavga mnmun, at Fwd Rama bemavga RIn75.o57.s4. sm bamnﬁolkcwiokwmmaw 31 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 47 Av sn uambnr yang dhanqkap bag! 1- mm ousmmr Omou yarn kumudunny! um dmnm sensls pesznun WA n-an Hunozu uwmmms mamﬂlasﬂ :1 (arm mm. 752322 bag! bookmg form unluk Fun Evnvul, ﬂan b)iomv no 15232: bag! nnnmg farm unluk Inc Fund Ranger Esq! Iuiuan pumahonzn pcvmwayun kmdau m Sandyiawl memmon and: mm umuk menyvﬂhkzn Borani n, 2:, 44. 49 sepcmmana dalam um Sy-mun zm (lmvasuk has! Darvgmnlnn bngi kusamui penusmh Syurlkal am. amm. hsvuma denqin puma om mm cnam ¢s) [Man big! membolahkan nmu bnhau dapnl muublmu puma dnmm nenum um Iebanxnums yam: mnyamm dawn m 5 Hannah :21 Pmak syanknx Smhu Erolluere tehh kuvmdun muvussukkan RMv,nm>oa nu“. pmnnnmg lass bag: rum Evevssl din Ford Rangar slhzgalmana yang amyaum dalam m u Bunﬂll a sunny man kemuman mamanpngkzn 1- Ram Cuslamsr Gram he-unkh w1—2u2o kepad: Jimmy melamw WAnbaga:mana diam m .m Bundlu :1 Fade wrzm, may mam. mm Dﬁnﬁinhn melon pep-mum u! m 5 2o Bum‘: 51 mm memohou panda Sandy unmk rmnankkan hirga knduivdua kendnman umnnm bag! membrlehkan max Smhu amum menenma puqaman nammayaan kendernn yang mun am An: pavmuhunnn W. Sandy man mnmmda 1-4 Rita! cusmm Ordlrs a... kemudmmya muvtawknn Kaunas Flmnhl 2-1 mm Cummu cum snonnmminn d\ m.‘ 14 um 22 sum. 3 m«e\:M mm mm «vem m m 5 pm we nunnn. a duvgan mm: wand: scout: an nawan a) Rmu.a1:.a\| Bag: ma EvaaL am In) rumgn 1: hunk the Faro Ranger sm b:(1l7TPu;kCN!oKP'7M\|Aaw 32 mm. am I-nhnrwm n. n... m mm n. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! 52 55 ea sm bamnﬁolkcwiokwmmaw mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Namun‘ max smm. Emma: um mmpmm Iobarang umm Mm kaduxdua 1'RlII»1Cua1omlIOn1u:dan zv mm cwmwomm Sunwuhnnln pm Sylnkl\|Smhu Ermhmlwdnk mngmm sehalunglmdukan beg! kudua-dua v- R-run Cus1omurOvduri ﬂan me2"’RsIa«‘l Cuavnmsl ow: Sandy «sun maubamu syanm sum Bmlnan diam mendapllkm pannmuuan mama» puvumayaan kendeaan me4aHA hnnhhnnkm hawan .p Pubic am anm:d1'ruaII: Bunk‘ :2) Hang llung am a.m.a mm; Luann name); an n) Alﬁnﬂank B\|mad('Anln amry Akzn mp. pad: u.r.1.2u2o m.2u2n and 2u—:v2c, Sandy mm memaklumbun Jimmy mm kaaemua Dermclmnan (Man «max sum m n... 1: mm.1s,am.a:.m. may lalih ham ukah muwhan Dada Sandy mm membual psvmuhenan mm. nkm (clam kuurma nammuan jug: men dhuhak srepulimalu yang -ﬁnyalakan «am nu. as away. 51. Malt: satakal zrwarzozo, Dmak Syunkal Slﬂhu Brdmus wan gagal mendapalknn Dﬂlaman Damwyun kendem-n ﬂan ah: alasan rm Wink Dmevvdan komudlarv wan mmuax Kesemua kersdsviin lasabm pad: pmak ylrw mm W-M7 nmdahum-H p'e»buakmg rm hnrjumwt ssbinyik Rmuootwu Aslah dnpmalwkzrv kepaﬂi pm mum sum. Emma: m5\a\uI M5:rsA1\inACnsapq1IId\ms 11u:n1I,aundI-B Alas mama mendﬂnalkan mmaman dun mg: bid: mas: yang sans, max mam ndak pamah mwyalakan yang mumka Iakan Iwamhayav seam tuna: sepeﬂimnni yum; «mum m mm mm Ywhuwmld/)1: gamma: ma plaullgfnalwayv mm, M Mr um ha7nn(=pmchAve[>mr w ..... a/ cum’ ;.»m m 3: mm m M... .. .p.:..,.; 54». Ah: zvurl Iaday ;. mg.“ m my wepmpa-ea -»...,...u,w 1. buy wi- mm Jamil m 51. Kaswvg g Mgyusnsg conpsnuauoagmgggg y: 51 Mil: mevwyamknn man ax Nu us 122/ mu olv u//mm, m.y,»m.:m m m. Antcwdcdpurthnt lharz W. mm: 0/?!» am.’/; and .m.u rmd ma...m m L. /um//.4 mm 7 we: mpud » xrvtrul my adufrwtcnx and u A4: 54 W4 Mal me as/mm may .9. ant 0/Mm n mruw .. ..u H/hllﬂnllIﬁ()lIIlWlllﬂ'[A'll‘t!4lrIllIl(lEd5m ,.,.,m«... .. 13 mom 199:. 53 m mm. a Bundlo at, man nvuianarvgkan bsmuuazl dungan mmﬂuma new R5151! Customers mm swam m bnwan ~1maKI.~z: ms Arvn ntrurrr: I (.2; Upon Ihc I-'ur¢Muur'yHm-/'1 atwlnon a/m. . 1.; Scmrw Sdmiula undgr mg Malnxm :4... mm” Act 19.27 mu) ..mcmr.-4 m the DIV!”/7rIAn:uaIA~xﬂ1u1l»«x/Winn”, the rmnm»wm.a...::,..,m.:..c.».,...y «A. hunlmg/V: 9/»: JUN «.m:.,.: to out uerrml ma 9/M: a..,n..,n....: Pnz: ny appearing mz..y mm; my "M ﬂmhng Fee M: .a..m.u. pm p-mm ruwmiv m. Dtpmu 'E.Y Mmna/hr ae/Wm my». .1 [email protected] mm: g. m. 555 an. / rxhlﬂ .».... M Q3 aw. a.,n..,x..u».-u 1-aum.-tin; ntmgil 5 sm mc.:npa.xcma<m.m 14 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Mg; 5. .».,:..g., Ilu am: 1.. .5. gm, wk 5...; mmu m D<p«nl.\‘!ullHn.III:lAI4ulLrgvI.galramaunlAJMzBaxI:nKI-‘:4 ....: mg Oxularuinng paw.“ an n. c.m,...,.y rhaﬂrrﬁmd mm. ........,:..m. .....,,,u.m. am ./M. Rooﬁng r.. r'k¢m.r; Ln :h¢PumM.mVHnr:ryM:i‘uw¢)\|a.vrr/Iﬂmrxhall murl m. urdu am. vwd. am bilwln ». am...-./5.... nglv m hm-purrlmre agrvcmenl with IA: u...k~ as am dumkvan‘ wink nevmm aemnm. hamuph mum pamhayamn mg eennkeum cuu moon iablnyik «aw. can mm ksnderun alas man than Wm um: “um dinynv may mm Plzmw kiunn mnvdta wan gm menaaoanun pmjaman puvublarun kamman ahupm ma\a\u\ wang Iunm sgb-wmunl ynna ummaun amm Duwitnan am pm: aw an n yang mm mm man menrilakan «man was bahawa Dmbouk/W foe: bukavlah sunlu ﬂmv mm mm mam unluk membeh Fmﬂ Evavcsl Ind Fun‘! Ringer kerana mm P\a\rM pm mmapmn maman psvvmayian kendean bum memhmehknn kedul-nus keuaevun MV$EDtllI18Dl\|d7bS‘ am maveka mun dumiklan, la bukamalu xualu paflanjlan yang mwgwkal ksdnndus pm so Pan: 29-3-zmn din mmzuzo, sm man mauavamar sualu was kapadl Sendyszvom dlm.\|17d:n13 Bundle u: mean nteumnivksn makhnmnl am dukumIlvsu:Ilu!ymkzl\:rma 'PangmnkminLulIM$ sanana-nan mun swam Mex Esﬁdek sun aw seem a. m 19 .1... 2n emu. c bug! memhuﬂ p-mmmn Dmnmaynn pmwnin aw Ovahdanuku dawinpmqhnnlnmnmakhlulndxnnamapuvlnhovﬂaxnlldak bench awn sabaﬁal venumnan my mu memmamkan kaamm m.x.. mm in» mdvbnlkin mm pm xmuvmn R-I-av cmnm-v nu:-vs benkulan mamm m! 52 ssmumman dlngan pwm m abs. waxan mmjahkan am pm Deiemian hahma mink P1imM mink sums mm mm-mm Isbnvlng mug" mm sm bamrrﬁolkcmokwmumw 13 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! ea In Iidak membeh kande:1arv»karIuua:n as .... .1... lalarqulnyz ... .... klgzlgxhn pvmbwan .... yma n......n.....n mm max. lerpaksa mawwa kendevaan .... Dam... bamuph blluwl mink w.....m ....» mm mmxmuxan hahawa lardapal ke.;.......» ...... menyewa me...“ an R 1. KJ am-pm ma mava am... .................>.... ...... yang u.....x... ... ms: mm. 41 amu. n hanyalah dbenkarv idepupamhﬂan kn: .... pm: M2-2n2u 9...... Dada mas: yang ...... ...... :u....m mm... sm may. 3...... .........»...x... hahuwa R a. K. Enbupnu munpunyin was... unluk nnuvyvm kendluan ma x........a.. mu 4...... hanyﬂah a.qu...»..... ...... xegunaan p.....n.1.n.... an... yaw umvaukan 0‘ ....su...aua....a:.n sebagaumana .a..n.......m... ...... xessmui r....ar.a.. aw am. lunmun F\a\nul mum ...... bevasas .1... purlu auuam.» Mahknmuh ggg gg mu nnurm uuwuu.m< Mnhksmamafzh ....w.......... «.5... .........,.... .a..x........ ...... .....r.....nm ... .... .... n.....r..:...g... mm ruhak Pwntlf ...... gagan mumhukhkzn mmuvan muaka 2... .........u.. kahnmnqkalmn .1... menmnk .......L... ma.....v ......g... x... Rmzamo am.» baﬂanaaskan dapalan den anaisa sepuu .1. pm»- ... s...............u.. .... :1 ...”... m.....w .1... u.r...¢... I: . u nnunzn 2:. mg g ya .4... s.....z...... mun svaazsr 2.o anuxac .1... ..k..... . u\|.>.:...y..>. ......a. I n .. - .. .. .... m....m .1... r .u.. n.1...¢... ...... ...... ............ .x....:.e E 22. m .5 cm 4... x....1....u Egg; 5155551 2.»: anvxso .....u... .. .. ...... ik sw ..c..m....c.«a<wm...,.. as ...... 5.... ........m .. .... .. van; .. ......u.. ...... ...“... .. .n..m ...... av Hnsxl nnaﬂsa pad: mm... dnkumen ﬂan kewunuan m Mama/uh W. Mmkanuh .m ....m.,,.-. baluwl um. k..m.x,..., mInwk.I\|m:m:lnlngk:n mm rum hmyalah msmbayir Rmnuooc mam: premaww has yaw mini "mum .....».n ma lslandard mmm; mac‘ mamavuna mm M mahu membual mum mm." ax mum n.v.m.n «am. henna wwanan wplm nu an-n “Joanna ms AND nsmsm 1 oz; cm the nmu.,w/mm ..,m.,... n/Ml 1.; Second s¢..4..:. .,,..a., .5. mam. Iﬁre am... Au Inn mu; a1pVt[mndP.V/hcbnnl/ﬁnanela/Inm/uuau rum), 1». Am”./n.mm::,., In M. cmw ». Mmgﬁa am. mm tammlcvu m ml: mm me; am: I7»-Th-Mad pm a. appcrvrmg awrlm/(‘RA-Mung in; m s.,,»,., PM man mm!/lure pun pnzvmnz reward: Mt Dvpanr (nu hcvurm/rev a.ﬁ..d/ rm p....a..../nu... mu 2-, »..« DIM 4,..».4...; :. .1... @ . ; mu . . n'n .... ..m..u..z...;.¢c. .u:..u...n an W 71. D<,»mmmr1L<m. .....: a5...1..y. .......«u .7/mg u...»..,..; n. and m. ammmﬂngnamvrr «b; 71.: cam»; mt: «rm M. mu =qm..:.,.. u. mvrely pm." am DIM! Bw;¢tI}:Fyr('Ru/W14"!IomaPurb)uI.vcr/Iﬂrwy'lMPurtmtcr/Hlrcrxhnllloamd my: order o/the Vrlucla bu; 1../9.. .».. Purzhmzr/Hnnv Hgfll Mr Awvplmﬁnxr ..,,..,...m..mm s.. -‘ es Mahkamih m. menvunnvﬁkal Drln5\vIudlcv'aMaMcsba}\nwn Izmwtavma di am mum mm mm umum mm ktsumuz mum yang mzlmalkan pmguahn kutdulnn dixynrIkn\|ne1endnn ﬂan manarmana pambe4'yE\|\17 max mamvu mambo“ Kendevaan nun «mm was mam mmggunakan pwzman sm xs:m71Pap<cmoKP1MuAaw :7 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! pambdayaaﬂ Kendnrazn miamw wmmm kwangan psﬂv munhayar ave-zmxrng lee: mu menuemunkan mm vambeh mnzhm. Hanyn sand-H mm mm: mendasnlkzn usualu kululusan Nnjaman llu. mm mm mm: sexumu ham um um: dﬂunaikzn me\=M Dwlmnn yaw umemn ad! manurvuna lnsmwn klmangan yang man barsalugu mumb\ayu\ panbaﬂun kandunnn nerssmx xesemmm yang =1I1e\:ik:n dam kes rm nu M y ugnsg gasp mm mm : Mon ms : Mu m man rnenyulzkan swam m m 5 445 /1I]1'hauw[:ra]/ncslrcvrue!/.vh/-wcdlhalmvhc wm.:..«pm..m Aime WE'VE mm: mm dtmllr and mm mm mm...“ .. .5. iullllled amen « WW) calm-d ., uvcml nlharnddrwmav am! It In benumm-at mt dmmzm m rm! onroﬂlum ﬂu/umlbtuld mm :71. ,u4.M....a.........m..4.[..4., Ma...‘ ml mm 3; am .1. 1. :y.a..4. mm: “mm! ,...:..mm.; :3 am» m: as mam pea. mas: yang same, Mahkamzh nu mm Imdaken msmbanlu um Phmhl bag: msndnvaﬂxin uwqamnn Dﬁmlzayun kaudanan mm. balm mswanm seoaw vdwikuin kiwi: Walnm magax ampuwi yang emu man: k-munann-kumersan yang man dllump-h mlmxndangkzn pm». mama um. mavwbayav kawunllan nary: hagl kendaraan yang amps» luwbulsahngawmana mm Iamolama mm... mm" W m Namun, hemlurkan pm. keltvanian sen. dakumen av Mihkanuh‘ mamm bukan when men mendanllknn mam." pemmayun Kandaraan din m-ru-mun mmus. mam» mum nada mm kslzvilwnn dun mznrmlnl saxsx Plmrml aaupun kuarangan dokumvu yang myaum maveka iuzmnvnyn s-nuguv memhlyav kesemua iumlnh hang: kendemln (euaml “mm mm 11 Yamhahantusl‘ Mahkamah m. hernandlngan k-giylan unluk mendapalkln Ihnnmnrl Demhiayaan kemien-nan mm mammay Dmlbehm kzmtavun bukanhah «aneux nida Defandan maga. parvjuih Kenna maalm amalln sm batitvwopxcmokvlmuaaw 3» mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Mahvamah sekmnya mhak Pl:-nmberiayu ma\dlFiIkinD\rVlin\3nDEmbiﬂ19ﬂn taunhul ahu pun Danny: muubum hlyqun mum «W, mu puvmahan mum». kendssan uaak aknn \|mIbuL 12. on.» Ilu, adahh manjsm am-an Mahkam-h alas ugagaxm pm Plamln xsuem yang muennmn n .13., ms mm mg WlHlW\kJlM71lK'DW\|.lKhlEI munbolehkan whak P\amM awn mamm xumraan mmm ueigalmanl ynrvgdmvyuvaknndalnm ken we saw»: amx LTDV NAmwsAsnN man MD_A yang menrlhkin H;\|um Mankamah Puukulnun Malt mamulusknn -mm.., m cm, NI Cmmugu, Mm 54. mm; m 1 para 5:. , 44 “annmuplam:naﬁrmlnndunquult/ilduprummaf numr 1.; ma wnma/Maaﬂ:r" am, Mhzmlﬂtreplyuqnalxﬁcdor utlcmvk m»ury1huvmu 0/.m/mm mrrﬂwu mnawvlunu/In M M. mm mm m.......,a...m...,y..;. lllevvxudl arrulyunola .,.m...:muon or an uuwrarxw om may be H mm..,. mcarvwulncd hy a Mun/rrvyh M.» M: mm: nﬂemr can uxrpl 117 mm: mm: para: Sc; vi, up 445,71; - 73 mm pm mass yaw same‘ Mahkzmahlnuuga mehhalpanu umam Flaw! yzng x.m..m-m nemmnk mauussukkin Denama-Deruma um um Dembahnn kanderaarvkendusan wrsnbul snbowax sualu wmunwn yanv beﬂanan darn mil: butch dﬂumlankan mam: nemmhurun yum: Km. mum men P Msmehnm m1 mlmmdlnikan kaduadua syanuawamg amanvxan mlmpunyal mu ylng huvblza mm: «mm mmm u Samuulwau m.‘ Mahkamah .m woanaannan mm lawxmn mum tmax and my; «mama olsh pmax wman auuhh xamam tunmlovnsblt) miuandnnymn lmﬂapit lnwlmn mmn (county mm Imluk munggannkan Denamavenams new -mm ‘3y=nk:x moat-gkuzau Lon MS Sdn am can ‘syankalsmhu Milk EuadakSdn and‘ sauna; a‘ mg mnyaukan Inns. 1: din zn emu. c baa mm\|bua\| pumahonan nuumayaan sebuwaxmam-1 ynna dmumskan dalam kt: umuauunsns seam: v. nova bug; gnvggg sm batitvwopxcmokvlmuaaw H mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! gnu;-_u1_m_1g_;_¢gJg :1: m ; ass am am yung menyalakan sap-am an b-wah "ml Thu Me Mrmﬁmmn o/WW». may bccm\|vMcm44L1 . m.~...,. urn 'dnIvv.vmgMa ang:..,.za,1n- ﬂu nmmi: wvh I um um. can»-ms Act wd: r-«um aweruarlu m b: -«M4,. and ........,:.;..r 1,. Tan can u.,. a 4,... V nm:......z ;a...,,.o. mu} 2 cu um um] cu (Rip) 1022, /my 2 NUS] .5. “PP'I'rnnL\ mi»-My and-4:1" Wm, M, w.m..,u L54 NE!!! a. nahchuhiers" mu m. Wu. "An\wu 24.» um as Kunw” (In. mm. W. mlmmt/l.rw\|) .... nu nynd aaccplamx mpy ../,5. my m u wu: MM by m. pm Com ajimgqaorr M m. uppllmnn w:..mm-.4“ ammo!/‘mh K:/WI mu nnvunlzd ... .. mun!!!‘-I1I=r:haIwa.v not award by Ilia raponlau 1,. 1.“ Mg»... m. cm JM r: am: tho/9//owing ,...r...g. .. M I mubm Lawvv/b~1\|7a;.A Jrddn aux 75. 1" min 1. ..mm navptawzv Mranenl m um nrrmr ya» .47., mm be .:,,..:..m M: .....m:.,:..:. M. ancplanvt u cammloutt W any/ml: lam u .m.:..«.: by mp»-m. In M... M4 .1.’ u rvndr, hm LWVWAYOI n/mm.....u.... M .. wwlm um ». mm ,..,.m lo be nctcpudhy M: M9,. wdw M... .n. nngmal 1.1., M An .47.. .. W. Mly W 1». rul ﬂit m..w;.,, :. ma wmctlr¥m‘PV¢~muuuuAhtPWPv\nIIL.v1hoArIeoIAunL‘vr;p':r m “mam: putlwpluunlllun m.......a.»..m...¢.m....«.n Llrc mu/nun w.4,..m..... m.».m;W,,,,.u,,m4 .4./(..;..,..r. mm” Dr-lrh:ulaan:;l!a<w(mI.;pMPNal .m..;.m.:y.(..,..,« ... anirv .., mm .:.;.m.; with m 01%» 0,. ,,,,,,. ,,,.,,,,,,, m (M uuL.1nlm11M¢1Ilvrln!W'1 am»-rm am Wm: WHK M71 .m..., .. .. ..... znndtlmnal W m -ma-am-I uxrwis nu m news! M 17wvvmnb¢naargmmuhm:J :4 “...m.: van-man pg... 11.. dmyl ..,mm.., mm .x any Mb: .1 mm m..m.m.:.n.,.».»..u.».m h\1'nnCha:!1ou&Anar(murIII sm h::;n1Pup<cmr.KP1MuAaw to «M. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! :2 Pace Iliu mm In/znzn maunun 3:131:71 muvmlukan 2 kanduaan any ueaumn npermi dun munganm mm wnm mn mmmlnnh Zksndarumam-hmdanmhzkuufuud-rv rosmuz/psn-1; :3 $\nnl‘mW s-mu vBI1mInnn hsmms hcvialuk Reml Oaslamsv Omav ksakvnau .n annqun seamx ‘R10 roan mwesa luubul‘) yang m-mvunyi\ Nv sm mm um um Vnw Gbkumm new cum. Ordev isabhis mu dumluk snags! -am sown svsnssr uvumll‘) yang nmnnunyan No Sin 152322 ldah ammun dnndwnndaunanm slam PM DMandan[M/S9~1HkalsnB1} n Semis: denwan mo roan muss» mm: ﬂan Rm ram: zvenssr mum pmnm lash manhunt blynnu xslnnyxk nu «man (mama um saw an nuenaan man memuman rsnlrnml :1 Run Rami mo roan mass»: mun mum at nm xuvil 23 man a dumnna danyin tarann name ad: mauluk Kevan: No sn Rm Foku macaw am 15232: . mu Rnmv Rm roan zvznesr man mmnuk m muka :uv:\| 2: Vkslz/I a man: amen «sang wanri ad: muulxk kw:-u Ne sm am roan zvsnzsv mvlu 752322. a Pamkman mg d\DmI:u\kln disml ale?! mm Deimdan amen bahawn RYO roan muss: Inmmm n.n Rm roan zvszssr vacuum aaawan max mnamanonni alsh D\hakFIa\nI:Ynukal\dik:da bempehan ynnw am: 45 mnan manm bemw-h bahawa mu: — due RTO wsabun mun Iidak dam dxhndnunqalu mm mam kavlm mnyn maun Mnyl dmlnlar nuns pmak Ma-nm satay: and dan ‘any: mun mu Vungkzp aw mam bahawan yang wm dwzndnlanulnl rum Pllmlﬂ um maaam kquﬂi vmnm s.unun ual harm ssnahkan knonda Plalnm senara cuxmer welsh kedua —au. kmdamnn mam mu auuu sm bamnvolkcwiokwmmaw 5 mm. smm nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he nrW\nnU\|Y mm: dnuumnl VII munc Wm! ml sy Inuvdurmg 0.: ..... cl :4 we plwuuimu mﬂtcl ....m .. W....Mg.,. m...:.,mm.mu M1./M hung wemuomnzz qltmr n W111 M. 44..a..,.,~, ml! .m»..1.. W,» m mm rwbmul, mmllllmally ar nmam/clr If Mr Me/endnnr am In Hxvcpl W pwtnlufy m.m.»,.mm.r .. WOMH Ac . cwumu .. mm: r>iemIbrm¢p'nm1u7‘ A; m as/:..:..m 4.4..» ,.,,.,,m. zuwwnpmlmnl, 1: MM! M /uuglv hmmd by M: L07»: 9/!» mgtnaroler ' <I) :....m ......m .1... umm. mu mu Imluk army; glgn E_.5_n_;ug mmzmmm 75 Buvknnun d-‘gin Ian a. tin. mm.mngx.n pmak mamm mm gana\ mamhukukan nus-mbanvln ksbariﬂukahan berkanun wsu xzenamn dzn mm navum wdapac vluludnya mam mun ylng mmgwkal an in: pevkam vm pmak Deﬂsndan man mcﬂumknn mam lusehun maka mam nsenjnm danman Mahkamah bahlwa Iunlulan m blwah panaksarvaan spasm ma ma mum wan dmukllkan Ya Dupﬁlirv Mahlcamah um adalan wamnan pad: kasemul «mm mg dmanlanakan bedmhan Iunmlan xemgxan nanyilnh dvbaukan sahnzs ks: m. dW-Hkzn m Mzhkaman ‘nu slpam m h-mh . n:n4us\ Pmginah bug: Synnkll sum Bmmerf mam. pm 20.42021 aw nu. a lunﬂln 4:; dan . kassmm nembevamn a. n... :2 an-an 4: sum. n 77 Mnhkamah wn. berpandanuan hahawa nemman dokumsn ullpu «mm Wamm an-mun at Mahkznan m. um mun uummx km. (mndnuxlble) was damn seksyen mm Am Ketecansan 19W[Ak1n salmam m nam- "(1):Vu4hI/Agm ./..»m1...m../rm..m“mm......,..4m.u..y m:.,..m...:. 5, ,, pnxml ...,.,.m.:.1 a mu! Whﬂl pmcudvrw sm bamrrﬁolkcmokwmumw -x mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! .y...,.....:...,.....;.c.,...p..a mwlsmgzdupulumoany/nctwmzh Ahcywcmenvnlrghxltndmrxmbluh ' vs Pandaruqan Mankamah w juga beriamnfun plda kn mung; mousnuzs no v mvznu cumsm umgugmg us son um: um} ; M ,1 my yang man: Mahkamih nmx \e\nh mzrvunuskzn .14 m ; use dam amepem m hawah 24 W4 VWW aha! g:ncva/ panama When A ,.4m[;:a..u dnmagu 1,...” M4/uldanl n. An» 14, than Mm M: 1...; m I¢lpa.! 9/ mun: um danwga wnumucdby m Mr-v.....', wmng and uh» aw W dumugu MK nu! ma "M. a nu W.-mm. rm punclp/t u/wmolawu u/4mvu13t’ u 12 z.»....., ,m.,.x. »,,.¢/my mid Ihepnvldplu .,.,.«.mu. m cmmxmnd m..w..;.m mm‘ ~ m a Human: mm aplaInlglsukmgawmanrlnldumugzu hm lhl bunlen 0/Prwmx Am» wine! and Ah: (vmmml n/damagu below A. AIM Vl‘1‘IIV(V rm pmwu um.” lhelmron wlll[mIov mm be mmmly m/mam! riamagn WWI prud/D/Lb: zmruwwrvuon 4. ",1" -‘ vs Beam: M7. dahm kn: uul ssous canon ; am: y 3 sumumm ﬁw menyaiak-rvsspeal ' am 'Fallawuu; zv.,m. V umh [I974] : Lluydk Ktp m. I EM Jain‘/FM Aim! 1}): Lamrd »»a;mm.:. had {wed m M1 in nwardmg 15¢ [ﬂmnnﬂll mm [91 me dcpnccmnon Gmnml that the ,,ru..u.] mm mm ,...4., ;,m—...: .:mg./.» .:.........m.. .. vulur M m My upmmn u u axnnlml mm appwm .-mm. :.= mill! pg pvuvu .. - E Kzwuvuslw so Umum mengetxhln mm. blu manlwnana kn: um mnak yang mumnlut mumpulyaw man pembuktian unluk menyalakan mm xzsualu (unwun nu mean berlarﬂin bukannyn mm. suvmz-xamava w sum basand-rkln sm bamrrwalkcmokwmuaaw A: «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! pea: teksyen 151 um um Akin Keluingln 1950 [ma so] me wa- muvlpevunmkkin: mu ma. nanhnhrilan 41; swam mg bvrmurnl mpuzm Nlarrmnmmu mahlmnwh mzrwblrvlarlparuzhahman Irnlnngaymupa mama Aangguvlgun dlxuv undarygwnrialﬂgv lrrll-vv bcrnnwll -pua A.-wujul-n ,.n. ,a... an-..,...... ..:an,.,.., ....1.:. ......m..-a... ballmuftlu Int Wu (Z)Apab1l/I1l:mmn[l(nhutunIIkmlmbakllkankhlvudawupa-dpﬂ /aim dﬂamlau brrhamt NM» ncnbuklﬂum ltdmukpadn a.a.-W m Fold .1... krleluknyu btbuu mmluhﬂan ma» ..a.u..m... u... .....a... ........ nun ,,....-4... ..a...~,..4. aruaqylrq nu. ma: jllmlmd/1 and-apa lytraolgarv Vangxwg dAb¢rU14m atvh ﬂlanewmwa PM “ at Tamra Dﬂvlbukuan anahh am dasav m-mm kabaanuknlmn (mam of pmbawmell seuaammana yaw dmytllkan am. Mahkamih Pnrukuluzn aam km an snnuuumuavvug 1 gggmsmy s/0 nw Isiah mzmumxkan hzhlwn haban yang pm mouxum aaaxan dalnm maanaan Kehevenﬁkalnan -aw mamma kas sm: «ea ml was mm «mm. nbaguw pamuan «Vim xaa Mahkamah ﬁrvggw my gem»: M sun emu ags 1/. ma mr man was mom 1 ms 2:4 muvyntzkzn mm yang buluut /15] n, Ylmnlvﬁ W [hr 14...: Ma wndollml burden la pnaw W n A»/am u/ limbamlmtx ->1 .—mw-.».g n U... .,,..m IIA4 o<ymu..m. .r..-.,..,r...... ». mul by/mu mg Mm mm u. m u./(mm. la ....n,:..;. rhexr D</Enzv 1,. a». mvt 0/ mg §n4~M;Lq4~141g 4.41 v ;g5m4,u_q,m .:r1HAMM1u»! rILL.um97u (‘L1 151~[1997 : uu .51 n. rgg cm 544 sm aac.:naa.xcmamM.m '3 “Nair saw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: ﬂan-mm VII mum pm -sm...... nu, m2, lﬂiarldlﬂéa/AIv1Evrd<mx 4;, llilﬂdmlnnll .»..- burden oltwol Undcu :01,/mpmvm/nalwmmauvm Ally man W W Jmbmwul .. M W W: right ,., :.u».m,, um um Mu\1[ldILn'vl.l/nllrx tum »...a.. D[EruA7L"1A .... «.4 u .u.. um. 1. m the M4,. .w.,.;.. M W Emu.’ En HQLMA-.r:umu mmLqmm ...:u. 14 :. gmvilrd u. my my um 11.. gri1[i[lhal ;5..n.uu. .. .. mm: .0... . 5 . .,.-a.;.u..»....:.4 .... m.:..»..uo.., - rhunrl gamma.‘ Samrn dang-In kasuvlul kuemngin dukunusn um psmnmkan umarw-undiﬂﬁ sen: nulo/in mu awsuxan m nus‘ adulahmas my hersuhm Imhawa damn manaawana kg: m pm Fvmmn pm. «mum nmmu menaemukakm buku bay‘ mmyokuuv mnlulan mereka my man: mam mum ha.-x mu dmanum Nah mm Ymmlﬁ Smubunwn nu‘ Lamnwzn « nanauaxueom kc: sabanyak RMZIWDEI sw mc.nm.xcmomM.m u «M! smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm anus»: pssum: EEwAu.\|:\|&I1nE zucnx EKBAL swan smnuu vewm Azmu a co LKLANGD EM zucux wows cum rum: svsvzu mam NG mm W eucux TENGKU MOND nazwmmsvm aw T zummwm mum ARIFIN ; pmmzns (xmu LUMPUR7 sw bamvwolkcwvokwmmaw ‘5 «-um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm we Kauvanwn em (SP-2} vlnu {summing mm mm mm mu Ddamzn mm. dllluk. s New M: aw, .2»: .>..,.4a....y,m.u..: ». no. M by» my wt amrrfamnglo‘ Rmumclbm vhatywauluﬂpare wnzm dldyw r.=m.m1v/~... m. .4.7....;.,,.m 1 Ya lrrmlwriaﬂcr m M! Ma rm mu : .’v'm~, amen. b4/av: Hr: ulr wav MM, dxdwu Iuelwd any swam o/ m. nrw : lnscrwdmmtgh Faml s. .’v'nrw.lu1ywx)5nrh:R1U’ 1 No Canynunwlmwlolhetmaiwhyyuu wrma J m/um way IHLDNWGIK n xmmngaamrr.¢:~samnm:x:,mrw.m,.¢. :5 y... Iwwwlbrv-uznlnununwvnntr/7 J Yu so Sbactlgnedalmuﬂ‘ \mm.»...7 J Yu :7 Then only am .//..:y,.... srrvl M 5.4». Bruxhcn M Avlurlu/v1ur7 Cmrua xx m ....g..,.:...py -mm war .1» 2 DH 1h:/Dr, Mime m .s.,:;. :9 »nm.mu Wﬂ xulmnvyxmna/KDAC llAcAr¢arw(l7 I n. sm namnmkcmakwmunaw 6 «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! m ﬁnal mraruynu m ;...:....., .c.. ..e......r...... .......—..= J» m :11. You dninolglva .1». ....g-....z...,., .. mu 5...»... .. .1... ,...... .»... 1 Come; m Naw, 4am Hgvv: Mm .. .5... .. ..... ....y .y~... M. bmnm .:.,.......:;.. M4 xcwnu ..-... .. .. mm» rm. ncm 2 Agvvt 12......-a.4.J.....y...x........... sz: :. .;.u=./uu:... nco »....,.. .......: .. s..g..x...... .a..,.». ..g.. wull .. M... .o.. ...:..m/ar us-u..g w... .... :01/10 Gui/AA 1:...» ma wry Wzlyau uni u H-vlhoul .».. ..;......,...:.....n J y.. :23 NAIW. f... ......;.m..... »......u mu nca an.» em... Imam! 47... mm. Em/hers r«q.....;..u... m:,..... ..n. ma. an kco w..»..... m ...:...... .v.... ...-.m..»..»........-..m4...« »nm»w»eaua...m.-. .....g.. .:.. new J u.....v....,.....u..-..........»«........n.... :24 Snyw mu .»...m-.. «.1 ..... and than vo :/gl 2.. non mm, vfyvru 1.... at your W... ............ .. .,m..... 4 1.. ........... 4 mm‘! a ..a... ..a.... ..y...... you 1.... ..mu..... 4 my My e«...,.um=vpe .. mg. wmulmm .. at/“Flaw. .»..:....... 1...... ..:.. gust! Mag; my .. E ..u .». ..r....... ¢mmaw J M ,...,,...... ../.».. ..... ./ma... mm I Vﬂ<'¢Dt Mu ..,..... .¢y.....,..:. .... ...- 1 1.. :2: :0... um. mm M.» mm «A: sum umaa ... Jlgn m. aw I: run <:m.n»N J c... .... .5... sm ..c..npa..cm<wm.»... 7 «w... 5.... ........m .. ...... .. mm .. ..«.x..u-. mum: ........ .. mum Wm! m Nnw yrru mruaylhal llvun whnLyvtunayylrItLun)wlhHL 17wIrI:am, vuu an: M4 dawn!/00 by norgwmxsldhu mm .0 ngn ﬂu xcn. Wu aye: mm ...v I Saw some atom x27 Yum ye». mu! Lfmlpwl afmezub .: I0 gm M. Brown: .9 Jlgn AM act» I Va :15 Yauar:noMur¢’0knrvarMmd Nam mtomuwaxe Imam ../m. hm: a Dayna mg... 9... mm» J in m Canyauxrtp-1mz"'P"3WN" I Yu 517 Yu4:r2urpI4n7 1 Ya. 535 Down» Amw whom... .1 Jay’ I Tu m...:. »..m.».: wk 1». mgmazmw or». no my ox ..= mnyzlumvrrwxthuw .»...mr, ufavuufvl rhu :.um.m: me angina! raw 1.: ». Srdhu Brlulnarn’ J y.. 11 memngnn mu 2: : sow sway new GINM‘ fun mm mm. Sandy mambwltan kaluingan lnhawn I maavm. run mm. yum dukemnmm mm nmmm my. zam mnylhkan dmynn larang bahawn bayalan amuanroo man bag! -Boom! ‘Va. Vm sunw din 'Eonkmv Fasl fur swan ﬂan sm hamrrwalkcmokwimmaw I «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! u mm mm ml wan mkdurun om Duiuwlan mun bersangmtan dlnlalau man mm are roan nausea lu:.ebu\| No sm 152223 din ma man svanssr I-mum Nu am mm :40 01: mm mnyw mm,“-. 2; mm, unynuz-wlmn w my man ml 4; mm la:mM/ may 2: mm 1 n... ulhlnﬂiuulrrcanptwmnh ma. L1ﬂl¢Nl«€V[laIdﬂ)V m mm m 11.. 010 mum atmunl 50 Wt‘ haw m Inn! 1». .4na..: vamp! m lhl rumrwur :4: :. Mu the Mmm PM 1». Bantu»;/er and mm W Nlmd wx r¢t¢UM n ma wmw J Anypaymnn an ,.x :42 ok,.ws.m.um,,..yn.~.,;.,; J nu nay-nan: u funk: A: mvnuredw me mm, M M wrml .., 1...»./a. Mal :4: Sandy. you lo-A MI 1». duanmyrrl. mam .« .1.‘ ,......,u. (alarm, mm-4 mm: murrwhrrvu mm. Moe! mu m duzumavl, uprn ...;m« /. Y6.l’ItV‘¢rl¢Vk!1,h90’rvNE7€¢WKan5eV :44 no. ummnpagezz, wvwc/V I Yr: :4: 1. M. 24 ﬁurnrnpt .;;.m»...n Lu»; .. 1». “Wu J Brmkmgﬁtt/07 Emmi :55 may Can ya» 1.»; al mpm 2: Mama phdmg »....;y. 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N-02(NCvC)(W)-2386-12/2021	PERAYU Manjit Kaur a/p Pertap Singh RESPONDEN Dr Nagasparan a/l Natchappan	Professional Negligence -Emergency -Breathing Difficulties -Causation -Duty of CareIssue of whether the medication given to the appellant was the cause of the appellant’s misfortune was not canvassed at this appeal – the Court nevertheless agree that it had been factually established that the appellant was not allergic to any of the medications administered or consumed.Whether there is a link between the injury and the negligent act – whether the respondent had failed to have essential life-saving equipment, facilities and drugs and failing to attend to the appellant – the Court find no fault with the learned High Court Judge’s finding that there was no causal link - the appellant was not unconscious when she was in the clinic which would require the respondent to give emergency aid under the statutory requirements - the appellant decision to walk down the stairs had made her condition worsen.Conclusion - the Court held that the factual findings of the trial court should not be disturbed - the conclusions were based on the credibility of the witnesses - the impression formed by the trial judge who has seen them and judged their honesty and accuracy - there are no errors that warrant an appellate intervention - the appeal is dismissed with costs of RM20,000.00 to the respondent subject to allocator.	29/11/2023	YA Tuan Mohamed Zaini Bin MazlanKorumYA Dato' Hashim Bin HamzahYA Tuan Mohamed Zaini Bin MazlanYA Datuk Wong Kian Kheong	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=52bae593-b265-41e4-92fa-b98154e2df1e&Inline=true	29/11/2023 12:24:07 N-02(NCvC)(W)-2386-12/2021 Kand. 65 S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal N—u2(Ncvc) (w)—23as—12/2021 Kand. as any 29/11/mu IN THE coum’ OF APPEAL MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVILAPPEALN N-ozmcvmm aw-12/2021 BErwEEN mum nun NP PERTAP smau (sulnﬂ lhrounh nu son and litigation npusonllﬁvl Amm Pal Singh all Jngin slum APPELLANT AND Dr. NAGASFARAN NATCHAPPAN RESPDNDEN1 nn the High Conn of Ma\aya a\| Seremban Ch/vISuvlNa NA gugﬁ 3 2/2019 Belween Manjwt Kaur A/F Penap Smgh (swig through her son and Imgaﬁon represennauve Amnl Pal Smgh an Jagmder Smgh) Haimiﬂ And Dr. Nagasparan Natchappan Defendant] comm HASHIM BIN HAMZAH. .IcA MOHAMED zAINI MAZLAN, JCA WONG KIAN KHEONG. JCA sw kwsumwyszesvmavmww 1 Nat»! Sum M... M“ be used M mm u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; “Mm. VII muwa Wm 145193 11 ,[un§MENT Inlroducllon m we gave our decision earlier, wliere we ned, by majority, dismissed lne abbeelwiln doses My learned brdlner. Hashim bin Hemzari me, lies reed lliis iudgmenl in dran and agreed lo ll [21 Tne appellant‘ men 15 years nld.su1lered braln damage aller srie vlslled lne denusz, namely lne Iespcnderlt. She nas since remeined bedridden end dependent cri elners lor suslenence II was alleged lliel lne appellenrs eondillen was due to an anepnylaale shock caused by «lie respdndenvs negligence Tne Hign ceun dismissed lrie appellarlfs ulairn ellera lull trial. rienee lnis appeal FIC1: c to address [3] Trie eppellanl wenl la the respondent‘: denial a loolrieerie This cllnic was srlualed cri lne ﬁrsl llocr. It was agreed men one of her molars needed in be sxlractsd. The ' inld lne abbellariirs respondenl nad nrslly lnieeled Ligno gums le anaeslnelize il sne was men given some leblels of Amoxlcillin, Flagyl and pereselainel Ia mrlsums belcre lne exlreclicri she slmggled lo breeln seen eller Tne respondenl llien pervcnned the Heinilial manoeuvre on lne appellanl Tha\| seemed In nave relieved me ebbellanl Tne resedndenl neverlrieless proceeded In eell lor an ambulance. The lN kw£UmWy5EGSqmEv0LlMv ‘Nuns s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll be used m mm s. nﬂnlnnllly 1M5 dun-vlnril VII nFluNG Wﬂxl [20] The eppellenrs leanleo oounsels maln focus in this appeal I5 wnal lrensplreo after llle resoonoenl had done the Heimllch manoeuvre on lne appellant II was forcefully argued mat the respondent was negllgenl in not properly anenolng In lne appellant. Nol only nso ne lsllao to asoeneln the cause or ller oreellllng dlmcullles, oul ne also did lml lake marge of me snuallon, leaving the appellant and ner oaugnler ln a Iurchu ll was also contended that had the responoenl called en lnsleao cl calling me nospllal dlredly, lne snnoulsnoe would have amved muoll sooner. [211 The thrust elme appellanfs case lles wall the respenaenrs dental reoorus, which me latter had recorded on me day onne lrlcldenl uuon lelumirlg from one hospital. ll ls necessary lo reproduce llle relevant oonlenls ol me oenlel records as may are germane to lnls lssue. - Aner laklng me rnedleallon patlenl sudden/y nee orllleulnr in breathing. rnen gave 1” aid. sne was able to walk eno sn an zlle cnarr, rnen we call me emoulenoe but the response was Isle. so we decided to lake (he patialll 10 GH by car. Pazrenl was able to walk rlalr way down rne malls. Tnen sole nearly collapsed. we manage lo carry me pallsn! down eno look her lo [he GH. She was lmmsdlatsly stranded In by M9 doctors and CPR was given. They were able to get her rleenbeel back Then lcarne Io ellnle ~ [12] The eppellanrs leamsd oounsel suommeo lnal the respundenvs notes cuntradlcted me respondenrs losclnnony lN kwmmwysiesemavollw 1 -use s.n.l In-vlhnrwlll be used m Valli e. nlwlnallly 1M5 dun-vlnlll wa aFluNG Wml that the nppellant end her daughter had, on their own volition, chosen to leave the u when he was calling (or an ambulance. The respondents notes were eenetetent with the rerspnndenfs daughters testimony that the respondent did not advise them to slay and wait for the amhuiance. It was submitted that the learned tnei iudge had erreneeusty preterreu the arei testimonies oi the respondent and his stair when he sheuid have given more weight te the appalianfs daughtsfs testimony, whteh was eansistent with the contents at the respondents contemporaneous records. [231 we are, wllh respect, not persuaded The teamed trtei tudge had eensidered the testimonies of the appeitanrs daughter, the respondent and the lattafs statt and had set out the reasons tor his preierenee we epine that his conclusion was ra onai based on the evidence presented and not repugnant ta common sense This was the approach set out by the Fsderai Court in Na Hoo Km v wendy Tan Lee Peng [2020] 10 cu 1 (FC) when asssssing a mat isottrfs nndings. 124) The respondents version wns never ehaiienged based en the contents of ms dental records. The relevant parts of his t:mss— examine ten are as toiiawe so Now, for this test entry Ior 11.12 2015, when drd you wrrte these notes7 501 This Oriel wrote alts! I came back from the nospita/. in kW£UmWy5EGSqmEv0UMv 1 ‘Nate s.ri.i In-vihnrwm be used ta mm has arinr.ii-y VMS dun-vinnt VII nFiuNG Wmi so Doctor, this is the Dental Report that you prepared. Now, th/s ls your notes on the day and these are the notes in the medrcai Isplzn‘ rhere is more lnrorrnation here than in the medical report. Could you explain why thats the case? so: Because I wroleon in met, when l came back and wrote rt in inlet, But when llri wn'h'ng the report, I wrote about whatever happened and asked my stair because they were in the surgery with me, so whatever I rniseect outi asked them and than only I wrote everything rn detail [25] it was never pm in the resporidem that his notes wnlradiued his Iesllmunyr nor was it suggested «hat his notes accurately represented what happened. The respondents slaﬁ also \|esM'lsd that the appellant and her daughter had leit at lheir own volltlorl desplle her telling meni not In leave Her testimony, the, was not challenged dullng crossexarrilnatlon. ln glsl. the appellant did not put her case to the respondent. Her pleaded allegations remain unsumanliated [251 we would also add \|haHal\|Ing to challenge the versiurl put by respondent and his s1afV meant that the appellant had abandoned that part other pleaded case. A party‘: case must be expressly put to the opponent's witnesses under cmss~ examination as a tailure to do so would mean that he has taken to accent his dpponcrirs version and would also bat hini lrorn raising it in argument: See Aik Mmg (M) Sdn BM 5 ors v Chang ching chuen 5 arc and another appeal [1955] 3 CLJ in kw£L1rnWy5EGScniEv0LlMv 1 'NnI2 Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be used ta mm ms nﬂnlhallly lhls dun-vlnhl ta nFluNG Wﬂxl 539 (CA), and the House 01 Lord's decision in Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways co [1919] so ML) 35 [271 On ma oonlmry, me apparent mnlladwctiun ha in the appenanrs daughter‘: ta any. The appellant‘: daughter had‘ in her witness statement, S!a\|5d that she and the respundenl had earned the appeuam out of the ewe and mm me sum. Her (esﬂmony under cmss—9rammav.iI.>n was qmte amersm. The relevant pans 0! her Iesnmony are as inﬂows: SC 5:: you men helped your mother out me clmlc and dawn the sharrs? SP? ‘/93. so so you were no/ding new arm? SP2 ‘/95 SC And she started to walk down the stairs herself? SP2 No. so So how and you go down the slam? SP2 There was another man from me c/rm: who helped as we/I So we held mar under her arms and /iiesd her out. IN kwmmwyszesqmavouﬁv 1 Wu smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y 1M5 dun-mm VII mum pm [25] The wssmsa mar mags, m ms judgment, rsssonsmy held max aﬂhough he drd not behave the appellanfs daughter to he mtanlionally untrulrlful In her hesﬁmony, he lnund lha\| she must not have been anlwlyiocused and was m a state on high alarm at that me. We are lrlerefars resume that the reamed Inal judge’: ﬁndings were nm pxswy wrung and were indeed we“ supportsd by We evidence presented. We are hesrranl (D Inlerrere with me learned mags: ﬁndings or facts based an me credibility or the mnsssss, as me assessment or the wnnsssss rs well wllhm ms pumsw as me max Judge: Lmg Hock Ung V Ts: us" Land Deva/apmenl Co [zuosi 4 cu 396 (CA) [291 We mu new address me rssue orwhslher ms respondent had raﬂed ca comply mm some urine stammry reqmremenrs under Ihe AC1 and NS Regmalmns, rlamery failing to have essenhar \|We—savmg equipment‘ vs es and drugs and ramng Io altend to me appsnanc. The learned Ina! gauge, in ms judgment, am not address INS xssue al length and seemed \|o opins that the respondent dld not Dream (he relevam Slahﬂory pruvwsums Neverlheless, the learned trial judge Concluded that lhe need to perlurm CPR did not me as me appeﬂant am not uorrapse or V059 consciousness when she was m the clmic. Even W the respondenl had breached me rerevanx slaluwry requirernerllsr the breaches am not cause the misfortune mac fell on me appewam [so] We ﬁnd norsmmmnereamed,-«1ge's ﬁnding \|ha( there was no csusaw link as he had jummsuy appreu‘a\|ed Ihe svwaenoa, IN kwmmwyszcs-mavoUHu 1 Nuns Sum In-nhnv WW be used m mm me mmmu-y 1M5 dun-mm VII mum pm namely that the appeﬂant was not tmeansctaus when she was the clln emergency aid uneer me stetutery requiremems tr al at her eandtlton was made wnrse when she walked dawn the SIBWS, whtch, as we found earner, was a den on made by ner and wmcrt would require the respondent to gwe her dattghlev Conclusion {:1} The tecmet ﬁndings of the tnet court should not be atetumeu where me wndustons were, to a large extent, based en me creoibrlity or the witnesses ano tne impresston terrneo by the tnel Judge who has seen them and waged trretr nonesty and accuracy‘ Ohms Arrnnes Ltd v Maltran Arr corp. Sdn Brrd & enomer sppss/[1996] 3 cu 153. we are also ssltsﬂed met me taauet nndings oi the learned man page were not plainly wrong and that there are no errars met warrant an appellate in\|ervertIiort. The appeal ts tneretore dtsmtssed wtlh costs 01 Rmztmoanu to me respondent subjecl to euocatur. Dated. 3 November 2023. ‘/ta.»/:29-vf dye (MOHAMED IAINI MAZLAN) — JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL, MALAYSIA IN aweumwyszeemevotrna 13 «we. s.nn In-vthnrwm a. med e my r... annmun VMI dun-mm wa murtc vwut x Sasha" ms Vendargon, Manmohan s. DhIHen A Desmond Mun [Messrs P. s Ranjan A CD] CoI.mse\ «or (he Rasgondem G. K Ganesan, Mural] ma Plllax, K. N esema, Namayam Zalnudln‘ Amira Nazlha Zainal, T.Favaam 5. J. Lheela [Munah E Pu Associates] IN kwmmwyszcsqmavmwv 1 mm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny 1M5 dun-mm VII mum pm appsllanl and her daughler man made lheir way dawnslalrs eul oflhe clinic wnlle lne respondent was an me phone calling car an ambulance The respondent had callec lna hospllal lcr an ambulance but was laid lnal none was available. Tne appellanl and nsi daugnler man went la lhe nospllall lamsa by a good sainanlan. The respondent went II1 ms car. [41 The appellanl suﬂersd a cardiac arresl upcn arrlval at me ncsunars emergency deaarlmerll. she was successfully resuscilatad cm sulierac wnal ls known rnecrcallyaa Hypoxia lschemll: Encapnalcpalny, a lype cl hlaln damage. The allencing pnysician name in his records rnal llreappellanl had sunered a Poslcavdiac arrasl secondary to an anapnylaeiic shock. l-ler airways were not blocked wnen sne was lmucalec. Iii. Hlgh Court’: ﬂndlngs [5] The Higlr Court summarised ma allegalicns cl negligence against me respondent as lpllows: (l) Falllng Io diagnosslhe appellanllaasosnain wnetnersne was allergic in penlclllimbased medicines, wnicn in «ms case was Lignecaine and Amoxicllllrl: and (ll) Failing to have lne neaessary equipment lc slap e in. appellanrs ccncmcn or lc resuscnale ner and lo arrange and supervise ner lrarls1er lo ine riospnal properly. rn kwlmmwysiesqmavollw -was Smnl In-vlhnrwlll as used m mm ms nﬂnlnnllly 1M5 dun-mm vla mane Wml [5] ll] [91 ll was not dlspuled lnal lne respondenl, as a denllal, owed a duiy ol care lo lne appellant as nls pallenl. on me «rel lssua. the learned Hlgn ceurl judge neld lnal lne lnjury smlered by me apaellanl was not due to me medicallans me: me resnondenl gave. The learned judge‘s ﬁrldlllgs were based on several laclels. ollne medleellens glvarl le lhe appellanl, only two could nave caused an anaanylecllo snoek. Llgnacallleand Amaxlclllln Llgllocairle. wnlan ls used as a local anaaslllelle, was ruled cm as me nppellanl had previously been admlnlslered ll by the respondent when she well! for a (000! exllaclio in 2013 sne dld nol surlar any adverse raaollon then. Llgnocaine was also applled ldlne Ryles tube used on lne appellant when ene was nospllallsed wlthuut any adverse leacllnrls Arnoxlelllln was also ruled out. The learned judge camelo llns ﬂndlrlg as ll would reoulre al least lnlny nllnules «or me body lo absorb Arnoxlclllin aﬂer lngesliun before ll can take efiecl. The appellant rlad sullered breellllng dlllleullies about one lo laur nunules sller sne ned lexen ll The second lssue took up much of me learned judge‘s delloerallon. ll was oolllerldsd man we raspondenl was inepl auler lne anpellanl nad suvlered orealnlng dllﬂculliesj as re. . had lalled lo aaoenam Lhscause olnerureaming dllllounles. . dld nol lake charge of me sllualion, leavlrlg lne aooellsnl and her daugmel in a lurcn, . did not can 911 ioran amhulanoeand had instead called the hospital oiroctiy, and . aio not have iri place a proper system to deal with emergencies. it was also argued that the issporiaaiit shuuia have checked the aopeuahrs uitais aﬂar he had perlomied the Hairiiiiah manoeuvre. [10] The pivom! issue at the triai and this appsa whether the appeiiaht had walked out hohi the clinic without the resporiaehts khowiaoga or consenli prwhather she had done so at me resppriderirs behes\| It was submilled that the appellant's condition would riot have aetshoratsn had the raspohdent made her stay and waixad tor the ambuiarioe. mi The aopsiiarit ooritahttao that tha learned that wdge erred in praiariirig the respondent‘: version that me apoeiiaht and her daughter had. on their own vciitiaii, Ieit the ciihic ttaspite his adviw to wait for ah ariiouiarioe it was aiao auhiiiittsd that the ﬁnding was oornrary to whal the respcndenl had contemporaneously wrillen in NS dental records. The Ieamsd judge was satishoa that the respcndent had hrauy ahouiiatt with the appellant whether she tent better, which she answared In the amrriiatiira, aria that he had reasunabiy taken steps In oaiitotari amhuiance as he did riotdiscouritlhs poasihititythat sha might be sinrerihg tmrii other riietttoai prooiariia even though her airway was not iiihiattatt hy any totsign ahiocts, It was atso oonlended that tha taspanaarit had faiied to advise the appaiiaiit In ramairi at the cllmu aha aﬂend In her. ih kw£UmWy5EGSqmEv0LiMv 5 -was s.ii.i In-vihnrwiii as used M mm o. nﬂnihhiily Mimi dnunvinnl wa aFiuNG Wﬂxi [121 The ieamed judge aoeepted the respcndenfs version that the appeitants daughter had led her out ufme a whilst he was eating lor an ahrtbuiartce and that he had no eepertunity to attend to the eooeiiant The iearned tudge hetd that the respondents well-betrtg was no longer in the appeuants oontml as the appeiianrs daughter had decrded to take her own course cl action The teamed [udge also did not iatttt the vespondenl tor rtul being VI the some oar with the appettent when she was brougm to the hosortai by the good semantan, as the hospitai was mereiy ﬁve minutes away and that the good Samaritan had dnven at high speed wﬂhotli stopping a\| the heme lighls. [13] As hr the respondents ierture to can 911 and Instead oeiting the hospital direotiy, the iearrred Judge held that this was meet, as the appeitant had chosen to leave the at and that in any event, it made perfect sense In can the hospital direetiy given that the hcspttai was only We minutes away and that there weuid not have oeen any need te route the emergency c.aH by raining 911. 114) Tltsﬂna Issue was whether the respondent had failed to make ayaitehte trtesaving equipment and e weuasenned care system to provide emergency care srervioa under section as etthe Private r-teaitncare Facrirtresand Servioes Act was (‘the Ann and Its zoos Reguiatiarts (‘the Reguialiorts’), nanteiy Regulations 75(1), (3), (5) and sehedute 5, and laiiing to treat the appetiant at the cunt: IN hwtwmwysiesqmavotwv we sent I-vihnrwm re tn... m yaw has nﬂﬂihnﬂly 1M5 dun-right vta nFit.ING wrist [15] Section as of me not reads as renews Section :3. Emory-ncy rmtmnz And sum" (1) Every licensed and regrstslad pm/ate has/rhcare Iarvmy or ssrwce shall at 5/! trme: be capable alinsliluﬁng, and making available, ssssnllsl Ms saving measures and impvsmsnting smsrgsncy procedures on any person rsqurr-mg such zrsarmsrrz or services (2) The nature and scope 0/ such emergency measures, procedures and ssrwcas shall be prescribed. [1 a] Regmaucns 7511 ), tab‘ 15) and schedme 5 at the Regulamns are as lauaws 75. Basic Emovgoncy cm Sarvlcns (1) A/lplivals medical clinics orprrvare dental clinics shall have 5 we//-deﬁned care system far pmvidmg basic aulpaliem emergency care same; to any occasional emergency pallsn! who comes 0! is brought in ms pmrazs meurcar clrnics orprivsle denial c/uuzs by chance‘ (2) 1776 nature and scope or such emergency cars services shall be m accoldanw with a private msdrcal clinic’: or pnvsts dental clinic '5. IN kwmmwy5EGsqmav0UHy 7 Wu sum ...m.mm be used m mm u. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm (2) A/[pm/519 medical dmics orpm/ale denial clinics srreu pmv/ds /mmedrats emergency care services which include iiIe—sa»/ing procedures when life, organ of limb is in jeopardy and management 0/ smsrgsncy psychlamc cond/‘buns. (5) Policies and procedures gavcmrr-g me acceptance and care 0/ emergency penenzc my be established. Fmh Schaduln Enic Enlnmsney services. Equipmnm, Apparatus, Mnteriars And Pmnnauuucals 1, Prryers Medical Clinic Each pm/ate memcal c/Inlc shs/I umess otherwise speciﬁed by standards set for ma! private msdicai C/mic, provide 8! B rnrru-rnurn ihe Ialiawmg services and equrpmenl, both adult and paedrerric, to provide emergency care- (a) an emergency call system, ([2) oxygen. (0) yerm/eupn assrslancs squfpmsm, inc/ucmg airway: and manual breathing nag. id) mvsvenous mcrepy supplies necessary Icr me level of srsrwces Ia stabilize Ms patient as speuiiied by the person In charge, (9) e/ecrrocardiogram: (0 /slyngoscope and enuouscnsal tubes. :1 possible. IN kwaumwyszesemavmwv -we my n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. er«mr.u-y 1M5 ﬂan-mm y.. nF\uNG pm (9) suction eauipi-rierit. (rt) in dwelling urinary eetrielers and (i) drugs and other emergency medical equipment and supplies, necessary lur llie level ol services to stabilize the patient as speciﬁed by tire person in chalgei 2. Fvivete Dental clinic Each private dental clinic sliall unless otherwise specified oy standards set for trial private dental clinic, provide at a minimum tlie lollowing services and squirznient, botri adult and paediatric, to provide emergency care. (a) an emergency cell system; (b) vantllatien ass/stance squipmsrlt, (c) sucliori equipment; and rd) drugs and other emergency medical equipment and sulwlies, necessary lor llie Isval dl services to stabilize trie patient as speemed by me person in charge. [171 The teamed judge relied an the minutes tendered by me respondent at a meeting belween trie Malaysian Private Dental Practitioners Association and true Principal Director at Dental services ol trie Ministry oi Health in March 2021. rlie nilnutes show tnat it was decided that emergency drugs and oxygen \|aiIKs would only be req ed iia dental clinic periorrns a procedure ttiat requires sedation and that only an Atiltau Dag IS ottierwiee neeassary. The appellant argued tnatttie learned judge erred in velylng on me minutes as ttiey should not be used to interpret statutory regulations ttiet tied been in place since May 2003. The teamed iudge also ruled that tne in kwtttlrriwyszcsirrnavutlrtv 9 -use s.i.i luvlhnrwlll be used m mm s. nlwlriallly MIME dun-vlnril vta aFluNG Wﬂxl respendenn nad done me necessary by saving [or an ernaarenee and that mere was no need oer him to perform cardwopulrnansry resuscmﬂon a: the appenanl was H01 uneoneuous when she was m the were she was taken la the haspwlaly c cron the ground ﬂoor Flndlraga [co] To make a case for negngence, rc re vi(al 10 pnwa that the respondent's negngenee caused me injury and ma! [here must be a lmk between the mwry and me neglrgem act There may, huwsver, be more man one negngern ac1 Isadmg to me wuury. The supreme ceun rn werrg srew Vmg v Gunung nrngga/ Quarry & Construction [2011] 2 MLJ 1 held that there must be a link between me wmngdoing and me damage caused and mat me burden has on the {I ma prove :1. The apex com expounded that wnere Iwo ur rners (actors camd euncrinme \|O me damage, me erucrer rssue re wnemer any or these vectors had malsnally eonmumed m «he p\aInIm‘s njury, The com also hem that what is a ma\|ena\| eonmmmon is e quesnen cf degree luv une noun we decrde. [191 The rssue cl whether Ina nredreanon gyen lo the sppeuanx was the cause :1! me appsﬂanfs misfortune was not canvassed ex mis appeal we are nevenneness enne new that the Vearned Judge’: ﬁnmnge were mrrem, as i\ had been Iaauany es\|abhshsd lhal «no appeHanl was not ellergu: to any or the medications adlmmstered or oonsurned.	2,231	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
N-02(NCvC)(W)-2386-12/2021	PERAYU Manjit Kaur a/p Pertap Singh RESPONDEN Dr Nagasparan a/l Natchappan	Professional Negligence -Emergency -Breathing Difficulties -Causation -Duty of CareIssue of whether the medication given to the appellant was the cause of the appellant’s misfortune was not canvassed at this appeal – the Court nevertheless agree that it had been factually established that the appellant was not allergic to any of the medications administered or consumed.Whether there is a link between the injury and the negligent act – whether the respondent had failed to have essential life-saving equipment, facilities and drugs and failing to attend to the appellant – the Court find no fault with the learned High Court Judge’s finding that there was no causal link - the appellant was not unconscious when she was in the clinic which would require the respondent to give emergency aid under the statutory requirements - the appellant decision to walk down the stairs had made her condition worsen.Conclusion - the Court held that the factual findings of the trial court should not be disturbed - the conclusions were based on the credibility of the witnesses - the impression formed by the trial judge who has seen them and judged their honesty and accuracy - there are no errors that warrant an appellate intervention - the appeal is dismissed with costs of RM20,000.00 to the respondent subject to allocator.	29/11/2023	YA Tuan Mohamed Zaini Bin MazlanKorumYA Dato' Hashim Bin HamzahYA Tuan Mohamed Zaini Bin MazlanYA Datuk Wong Kian Kheong	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=52bae593-b265-41e4-92fa-b98154e2df1e&Inline=true	29/11/2023 12:24:07 N-02(NCvC)(W)-2386-12/2021 Kand. 65 S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N kW6UmWy5EGSrmBVOLfHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal N—u2(Ncvc) (w)—23as—12/2021 Kand. as any 29/11/mu IN THE coum’ OF APPEAL MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVILAPPEALN N-ozmcvmm aw-12/2021 BErwEEN mum nun NP PERTAP smau (sulnﬂ lhrounh nu son and litigation npusonllﬁvl Amm Pal Singh all Jngin slum APPELLANT AND Dr. NAGASFARAN NATCHAPPAN RESPDNDEN1 nn the High Conn of Ma\aya a\| Seremban Ch/vISuvlNa NA gugﬁ 3 2/2019 Belween Manjwt Kaur A/F Penap Smgh (swig through her son and Imgaﬁon represennauve Amnl Pal Smgh an Jagmder Smgh) Haimiﬂ And Dr. Nagasparan Natchappan Defendant] comm HASHIM BIN HAMZAH. .IcA MOHAMED zAINI MAZLAN, JCA WONG KIAN KHEONG. JCA sw kwsumwyszesvmavmww 1 Nat»! Sum M... M“ be used M mm u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; “Mm. VII muwa Wm 145193 11 ,[un§MENT Inlroducllon m we gave our decision earlier, wliere we ned, by majority, dismissed lne abbeelwiln doses My learned brdlner. Hashim bin Hemzari me, lies reed lliis iudgmenl in dran and agreed lo ll [21 Tne appellant‘ men 15 years nld.su1lered braln damage aller srie vlslled lne denusz, namely lne Iespcnderlt. She nas since remeined bedridden end dependent cri elners lor suslenence II was alleged lliel lne appellenrs eondillen was due to an anepnylaale shock caused by «lie respdndenvs negligence Tne Hign ceun dismissed lrie appellarlfs ulairn ellera lull trial. rienee lnis appeal FIC1: c to address [3] Trie eppellanl wenl la the respondent‘: denial a loolrieerie This cllnic was srlualed cri lne ﬁrsl llocr. It was agreed men one of her molars needed in be sxlractsd. The ' inld lne abbellariirs respondenl nad nrslly lnieeled Ligno gums le anaeslnelize il sne was men given some leblels of Amoxlcillin, Flagyl and pereselainel Ia mrlsums belcre lne exlreclicri she slmggled lo breeln seen eller Tne respondenl llien pervcnned the Heinilial manoeuvre on lne appellanl Tha\| seemed In nave relieved me ebbellanl Tne resedndenl neverlrieless proceeded In eell lor an ambulance. The lN kw£UmWy5EGSqmEv0LlMv ‘Nuns s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll be used m mm s. nﬂnlnnllly 1M5 dun-vlnril VII nFluNG Wﬂxl [20] The eppellenrs leanleo oounsels maln focus in this appeal I5 wnal lrensplreo after llle resoonoenl had done the Heimllch manoeuvre on lne appellant II was forcefully argued mat the respondent was negllgenl in not properly anenolng In lne appellant. Nol only nso ne lsllao to asoeneln the cause or ller oreellllng dlmcullles, oul ne also did lml lake marge of me snuallon, leaving the appellant and ner oaugnler ln a Iurchu ll was also contended that had the responoenl called en lnsleao cl calling me nospllal dlredly, lne snnoulsnoe would have amved muoll sooner. [211 The thrust elme appellanfs case lles wall the respenaenrs dental reoorus, which me latter had recorded on me day onne lrlcldenl uuon lelumirlg from one hospital. ll ls necessary lo reproduce llle relevant oonlenls ol me oenlel records as may are germane to lnls lssue. - Aner laklng me rnedleallon patlenl sudden/y nee orllleulnr in breathing. rnen gave 1” aid. sne was able to walk eno sn an zlle cnarr, rnen we call me emoulenoe but the response was Isle. so we decided to lake (he patialll 10 GH by car. Pazrenl was able to walk rlalr way down rne malls. Tnen sole nearly collapsed. we manage lo carry me pallsn! down eno look her lo [he GH. She was lmmsdlatsly stranded In by M9 doctors and CPR was given. They were able to get her rleenbeel back Then lcarne Io ellnle ~ [12] The eppellanrs leamsd oounsel suommeo lnal the respundenvs notes cuntradlcted me respondenrs losclnnony lN kwmmwysiesemavollw 1 -use s.n.l In-vlhnrwlll be used m Valli e. nlwlnallly 1M5 dun-vlnlll wa aFluNG Wml that the nppellant end her daughter had, on their own volition, chosen to leave the u when he was calling (or an ambulance. The respondents notes were eenetetent with the rerspnndenfs daughters testimony that the respondent did not advise them to slay and wait for the amhuiance. It was submitted that the learned tnei iudge had erreneeusty preterreu the arei testimonies oi the respondent and his stair when he sheuid have given more weight te the appalianfs daughtsfs testimony, whteh was eansistent with the contents at the respondents contemporaneous records. [231 we are, wllh respect, not persuaded The teamed trtei tudge had eensidered the testimonies of the appeitanrs daughter, the respondent and the lattafs statt and had set out the reasons tor his preierenee we epine that his conclusion was ra onai based on the evidence presented and not repugnant ta common sense This was the approach set out by the Fsderai Court in Na Hoo Km v wendy Tan Lee Peng [2020] 10 cu 1 (FC) when asssssing a mat isottrfs nndings. 124) The respondents version wns never ehaiienged based en the contents of ms dental records. The relevant parts of his t:mss— examine ten are as toiiawe so Now, for this test entry Ior 11.12 2015, when drd you wrrte these notes7 501 This Oriel wrote alts! I came back from the nospita/. in kW£UmWy5EGSqmEv0UMv 1 ‘Nate s.ri.i In-vihnrwm be used ta mm has arinr.ii-y VMS dun-vinnt VII nFiuNG Wmi so Doctor, this is the Dental Report that you prepared. Now, th/s ls your notes on the day and these are the notes in the medrcai Isplzn‘ rhere is more lnrorrnation here than in the medical report. Could you explain why thats the case? so: Because I wroleon in met, when l came back and wrote rt in inlet, But when llri wn'h'ng the report, I wrote about whatever happened and asked my stair because they were in the surgery with me, so whatever I rniseect outi asked them and than only I wrote everything rn detail [25] it was never pm in the resporidem that his notes wnlradiued his Iesllmunyr nor was it suggested «hat his notes accurately represented what happened. The respondents slaﬁ also \|esM'lsd that the appellant and her daughter had leit at lheir own volltlorl desplle her telling meni not In leave Her testimony, the, was not challenged dullng crossexarrilnatlon. ln glsl. the appellant did not put her case to the respondent. Her pleaded allegations remain unsumanliated [251 we would also add \|haHal\|Ing to challenge the versiurl put by respondent and his s1afV meant that the appellant had abandoned that part other pleaded case. A party‘: case must be expressly put to the opponent's witnesses under cmss~ examination as a tailure to do so would mean that he has taken to accent his dpponcrirs version and would also bat hini lrorn raising it in argument: See Aik Mmg (M) Sdn BM 5 ors v Chang ching chuen 5 arc and another appeal [1955] 3 CLJ in kw£L1rnWy5EGScniEv0LlMv 1 'NnI2 Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be used ta mm ms nﬂnlhallly lhls dun-vlnhl ta nFluNG Wﬂxl 539 (CA), and the House 01 Lord's decision in Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways co [1919] so ML) 35 [271 On ma oonlmry, me apparent mnlladwctiun ha in the appenanrs daughter‘: ta any. The appellant‘: daughter had‘ in her witness statement, S!a\|5d that she and the respundenl had earned the appeuam out of the ewe and mm me sum. Her (esﬂmony under cmss—9rammav.iI.>n was qmte amersm. The relevant pans 0! her Iesnmony are as inﬂows: SC 5:: you men helped your mother out me clmlc and dawn the sharrs? SP? ‘/93. so so you were no/ding new arm? SP2 ‘/95 SC And she started to walk down the stairs herself? SP2 No. so So how and you go down the slam? SP2 There was another man from me c/rm: who helped as we/I So we held mar under her arms and /iiesd her out. IN kwmmwyszesqmavouﬁv 1 Wu smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y 1M5 dun-mm VII mum pm [25] The wssmsa mar mags, m ms judgment, rsssonsmy held max aﬂhough he drd not behave the appellanfs daughter to he mtanlionally untrulrlful In her hesﬁmony, he lnund lha\| she must not have been anlwlyiocused and was m a state on high alarm at that me. We are lrlerefars resume that the reamed Inal judge’: ﬁndings were nm pxswy wrung and were indeed we“ supportsd by We evidence presented. We are hesrranl (D Inlerrere with me learned mags: ﬁndings or facts based an me credibility or the mnsssss, as me assessment or the wnnsssss rs well wllhm ms pumsw as me max Judge: Lmg Hock Ung V Ts: us" Land Deva/apmenl Co [zuosi 4 cu 396 (CA) [291 We mu new address me rssue orwhslher ms respondent had raﬂed ca comply mm some urine stammry reqmremenrs under Ihe AC1 and NS Regmalmns, rlamery failing to have essenhar \|We—savmg equipment‘ vs es and drugs and ramng Io altend to me appsnanc. The learned Ina! gauge, in ms judgment, am not address INS xssue al length and seemed \|o opins that the respondent dld not Dream (he relevam Slahﬂory pruvwsums Neverlheless, the learned trial judge Concluded that lhe need to perlurm CPR did not me as me appeﬂant am not uorrapse or V059 consciousness when she was m the clmic. Even W the respondenl had breached me rerevanx slaluwry requirernerllsr the breaches am not cause the misfortune mac fell on me appewam [so] We ﬁnd norsmmmnereamed,-«1ge's ﬁnding \|ha( there was no csusaw link as he had jummsuy appreu‘a\|ed Ihe svwaenoa, IN kwmmwyszcs-mavoUHu 1 Nuns Sum In-nhnv WW be used m mm me mmmu-y 1M5 dun-mm VII mum pm namely that the appeﬂant was not tmeansctaus when she was the clln emergency aid uneer me stetutery requiremems tr al at her eandtlton was made wnrse when she walked dawn the SIBWS, whtch, as we found earner, was a den on made by ner and wmcrt would require the respondent to gwe her dattghlev Conclusion {:1} The tecmet ﬁndings of the tnet court should not be atetumeu where me wndustons were, to a large extent, based en me creoibrlity or the witnesses ano tne impresston terrneo by the tnel Judge who has seen them and waged trretr nonesty and accuracy‘ Ohms Arrnnes Ltd v Maltran Arr corp. Sdn Brrd & enomer sppss/[1996] 3 cu 153. we are also ssltsﬂed met me taauet nndings oi the learned man page were not plainly wrong and that there are no errars met warrant an appellate in\|ervertIiort. The appeal ts tneretore dtsmtssed wtlh costs 01 Rmztmoanu to me respondent subjecl to euocatur. Dated. 3 November 2023. ‘/ta.»/:29-vf dye (MOHAMED IAINI MAZLAN) — JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL, MALAYSIA IN aweumwyszeemevotrna 13 «we. s.nn In-vthnrwm a. med e my r... annmun VMI dun-mm wa murtc vwut x Sasha" ms Vendargon, Manmohan s. DhIHen A Desmond Mun [Messrs P. s Ranjan A CD] CoI.mse\ «or (he Rasgondem G. K Ganesan, Mural] ma Plllax, K. N esema, Namayam Zalnudln‘ Amira Nazlha Zainal, T.Favaam 5. J. Lheela [Munah E Pu Associates] IN kwmmwyszcsqmavmwv 1 mm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny 1M5 dun-mm VII mum pm appsllanl and her daughler man made lheir way dawnslalrs eul oflhe clinic wnlle lne respondent was an me phone calling car an ambulance The respondent had callec lna hospllal lcr an ambulance but was laid lnal none was available. Tne appellanl and nsi daugnler man went la lhe nospllall lamsa by a good sainanlan. The respondent went II1 ms car. [41 The appellanl suﬂersd a cardiac arresl upcn arrlval at me ncsunars emergency deaarlmerll. she was successfully resuscilatad cm sulierac wnal ls known rnecrcallyaa Hypoxia lschemll: Encapnalcpalny, a lype cl hlaln damage. The allencing pnysician name in his records rnal llreappellanl had sunered a Poslcavdiac arrasl secondary to an anapnylaeiic shock. l-ler airways were not blocked wnen sne was lmucalec. Iii. Hlgh Court’: ﬂndlngs [5] The Higlr Court summarised ma allegalicns cl negligence against me respondent as lpllows: (l) Falllng Io diagnosslhe appellanllaasosnain wnetnersne was allergic in penlclllimbased medicines, wnicn in «ms case was Lignecaine and Amoxicllllrl: and (ll) Failing to have lne neaessary equipment lc slap e in. appellanrs ccncmcn or lc resuscnale ner and lo arrange and supervise ner lrarls1er lo ine riospnal properly. rn kwlmmwysiesqmavollw -was Smnl In-vlhnrwlll as used m mm ms nﬂnlnnllly 1M5 dun-mm vla mane Wml [5] ll] [91 ll was not dlspuled lnal lne respondenl, as a denllal, owed a duiy ol care lo lne appellant as nls pallenl. on me «rel lssua. the learned Hlgn ceurl judge neld lnal lne lnjury smlered by me apaellanl was not due to me medicallans me: me resnondenl gave. The learned judge‘s ﬁrldlllgs were based on several laclels. ollne medleellens glvarl le lhe appellanl, only two could nave caused an anaanylecllo snoek. Llgnacallleand Amaxlclllln Llgllocairle. wnlan ls used as a local anaaslllelle, was ruled cm as me nppellanl had previously been admlnlslered ll by the respondent when she well! for a (000! exllaclio in 2013 sne dld nol surlar any adverse raaollon then. Llgnocaine was also applled ldlne Ryles tube used on lne appellant when ene was nospllallsed wlthuut any adverse leacllnrls Arnoxlelllln was also ruled out. The learned judge camelo llns ﬂndlrlg as ll would reoulre al least lnlny nllnules «or me body lo absorb Arnoxlclllin aﬂer lngesliun before ll can take efiecl. The appellant rlad sullered breellllng dlllleullies about one lo laur nunules sller sne ned lexen ll The second lssue took up much of me learned judge‘s delloerallon. ll was oolllerldsd man we raspondenl was inepl auler lne anpellanl nad suvlered orealnlng dllﬂculliesj as re. . had lalled lo aaoenam Lhscause olnerureaming dllllounles. . dld nol lake charge of me sllualion, leavlrlg lne aooellsnl and her daugmel in a lurcn, . did not can 911 ioran amhulanoeand had instead called the hospital oiroctiy, and . aio not have iri place a proper system to deal with emergencies. it was also argued that the issporiaaiit shuuia have checked the aopeuahrs uitais aﬂar he had perlomied the Hairiiiiah manoeuvre. [10] The pivom! issue at the triai and this appsa whether the appeiiaht had walked out hohi the clinic without the resporiaehts khowiaoga or consenli prwhather she had done so at me resppriderirs behes\| It was submilled that the appellant's condition would riot have aetshoratsn had the raspohdent made her stay and waixad tor the ambuiarioe. mi The aopsiiarit ooritahttao that tha learned that wdge erred in praiariirig the respondent‘: version that me apoeiiaht and her daughter had. on their own vciitiaii, Ieit the ciihic ttaspite his adviw to wait for ah ariiouiarioe it was aiao auhiiiittsd that the ﬁnding was oornrary to whal the respcndenl had contemporaneously wrillen in NS dental records. The Ieamsd judge was satishoa that the respcndent had hrauy ahouiiatt with the appellant whether she tent better, which she answared In the amrriiatiira, aria that he had reasunabiy taken steps In oaiitotari amhuiance as he did riotdiscouritlhs poasihititythat sha might be sinrerihg tmrii other riietttoai prooiariia even though her airway was not iiihiattatt hy any totsign ahiocts, It was atso oonlended that tha taspanaarit had faiied to advise the appaiiaiit In ramairi at the cllmu aha aﬂend In her. ih kw£UmWy5EGSqmEv0LiMv 5 -was s.ii.i In-vihnrwiii as used M mm o. nﬂnihhiily Mimi dnunvinnl wa aFiuNG Wﬂxi [121 The ieamed judge aoeepted the respcndenfs version that the appeitants daughter had led her out ufme a whilst he was eating lor an ahrtbuiartce and that he had no eepertunity to attend to the eooeiiant The iearned tudge hetd that the respondents well-betrtg was no longer in the appeuants oontml as the appeiianrs daughter had decrded to take her own course cl action The teamed [udge also did not iatttt the vespondenl tor rtul being VI the some oar with the appettent when she was brougm to the hosortai by the good semantan, as the hospitai was mereiy ﬁve minutes away and that the good Samaritan had dnven at high speed wﬂhotli stopping a\| the heme lighls. [13] As hr the respondents ierture to can 911 and Instead oeiting the hospital direotiy, the iearrred Judge held that this was meet, as the appeitant had chosen to leave the at and that in any event, it made perfect sense In can the hospital direetiy given that the hcspttai was only We minutes away and that there weuid not have oeen any need te route the emergency c.aH by raining 911. 114) Tltsﬂna Issue was whether the respondent had failed to make ayaitehte trtesaving equipment and e weuasenned care system to provide emergency care srervioa under section as etthe Private r-teaitncare Facrirtresand Servioes Act was (‘the Ann and Its zoos Reguiatiarts (‘the Reguialiorts’), nanteiy Regulations 75(1), (3), (5) and sehedute 5, and laiiing to treat the appetiant at the cunt: IN hwtwmwysiesqmavotwv we sent I-vihnrwm re tn... m yaw has nﬂﬂihnﬂly 1M5 dun-right vta nFit.ING wrist [15] Section as of me not reads as renews Section :3. Emory-ncy rmtmnz And sum" (1) Every licensed and regrstslad pm/ate has/rhcare Iarvmy or ssrwce shall at 5/! trme: be capable alinsliluﬁng, and making available, ssssnllsl Ms saving measures and impvsmsnting smsrgsncy procedures on any person rsqurr-mg such zrsarmsrrz or services (2) The nature and scope 0/ such emergency measures, procedures and ssrwcas shall be prescribed. [1 a] Regmaucns 7511 ), tab‘ 15) and schedme 5 at the Regulamns are as lauaws 75. Basic Emovgoncy cm Sarvlcns (1) A/lplivals medical clinics orprrvare dental clinics shall have 5 we//-deﬁned care system far pmvidmg basic aulpaliem emergency care same; to any occasional emergency pallsn! who comes 0! is brought in ms pmrazs meurcar clrnics orprivsle denial c/uuzs by chance‘ (2) 1776 nature and scope or such emergency cars services shall be m accoldanw with a private msdrcal clinic’: or pnvsts dental clinic '5. IN kwmmwy5EGsqmav0UHy 7 Wu sum ...m.mm be used m mm u. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm (2) A/[pm/519 medical dmics orpm/ale denial clinics srreu pmv/ds /mmedrats emergency care services which include iiIe—sa»/ing procedures when life, organ of limb is in jeopardy and management 0/ smsrgsncy psychlamc cond/‘buns. (5) Policies and procedures gavcmrr-g me acceptance and care 0/ emergency penenzc my be established. Fmh Schaduln Enic Enlnmsney services. Equipmnm, Apparatus, Mnteriars And Pmnnauuucals 1, Prryers Medical Clinic Each pm/ate memcal c/Inlc shs/I umess otherwise speciﬁed by standards set for ma! private msdicai C/mic, provide 8! B rnrru-rnurn ihe Ialiawmg services and equrpmenl, both adult and paedrerric, to provide emergency care- (a) an emergency call system, ([2) oxygen. (0) yerm/eupn assrslancs squfpmsm, inc/ucmg airway: and manual breathing nag. id) mvsvenous mcrepy supplies necessary Icr me level of srsrwces Ia stabilize Ms patient as speuiiied by the person In charge, (9) e/ecrrocardiogram: (0 /slyngoscope and enuouscnsal tubes. :1 possible. IN kwaumwyszesemavmwv -we my n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. er«mr.u-y 1M5 ﬂan-mm y.. nF\uNG pm (9) suction eauipi-rierit. (rt) in dwelling urinary eetrielers and (i) drugs and other emergency medical equipment and supplies, necessary lur llie level ol services to stabilize the patient as speciﬁed by tire person in chalgei 2. Fvivete Dental clinic Each private dental clinic sliall unless otherwise specified oy standards set for trial private dental clinic, provide at a minimum tlie lollowing services and squirznient, botri adult and paediatric, to provide emergency care. (a) an emergency cell system; (b) vantllatien ass/stance squipmsrlt, (c) sucliori equipment; and rd) drugs and other emergency medical equipment and sulwlies, necessary lor llie Isval dl services to stabilize trie patient as speemed by me person in charge. [171 The teamed judge relied an the minutes tendered by me respondent at a meeting belween trie Malaysian Private Dental Practitioners Association and true Principal Director at Dental services ol trie Ministry oi Health in March 2021. rlie nilnutes show tnat it was decided that emergency drugs and oxygen \|aiIKs would only be req ed iia dental clinic periorrns a procedure ttiat requires sedation and that only an Atiltau Dag IS ottierwiee neeassary. The appellant argued tnatttie learned judge erred in velylng on me minutes as ttiey should not be used to interpret statutory regulations ttiet tied been in place since May 2003. The teamed iudge also ruled that tne in kwtttlrriwyszcsirrnavutlrtv 9 -use s.i.i luvlhnrwlll be used m mm s. nlwlriallly MIME dun-vlnril vta aFluNG Wﬂxl respendenn nad done me necessary by saving [or an ernaarenee and that mere was no need oer him to perform cardwopulrnansry resuscmﬂon a: the appenanl was H01 uneoneuous when she was m the were she was taken la the haspwlaly c cron the ground ﬂoor Flndlraga [co] To make a case for negngence, rc re vi(al 10 pnwa that the respondent's negngenee caused me injury and ma! [here must be a lmk between the mwry and me neglrgem act There may, huwsver, be more man one negngern ac1 Isadmg to me wuury. The supreme ceun rn werrg srew Vmg v Gunung nrngga/ Quarry & Construction [2011] 2 MLJ 1 held that there must be a link between me wmngdoing and me damage caused and mat me burden has on the {I ma prove :1. The apex com expounded that wnere Iwo ur rners (actors camd euncrinme \|O me damage, me erucrer rssue re wnemer any or these vectors had malsnally eonmumed m «he p\aInIm‘s njury, The com also hem that what is a ma\|ena\| eonmmmon is e quesnen cf degree luv une noun we decrde. [191 The rssue cl whether Ina nredreanon gyen lo the sppeuanx was the cause :1! me appsﬂanfs misfortune was not canvassed ex mis appeal we are nevenneness enne new that the Vearned Judge’: ﬁnmnge were mrrem, as i\ had been Iaauany es\|abhshsd lhal «no appeHanl was not ellergu: to any or the medications adlmmstered or oonsurned.	2,231	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023	PERAYU PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd RESPONDEN Chu Kok Wei	CONTRACT: Appeal from the Subordinate Court – Whether the Defendant had repudiated the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) Forms and Variation Orders? – Issue on the defects of works – Whether non-performance of works is caused by the Plaintiff that forced the Defendant to leave the site – Whether the Defendant had repudiated the contract and be held liable? − The test of “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence”.	29/11/2023	YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=54408d88-6409-470c-8ac7-0502f98cfb02&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023 ANTARA CHU KOK WEI (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) − PERAYU DAN PCOM PACIFIC SDN BHD (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − RESPONDEN (Dalam perkara mengenai Rayuan Sivil No.: BA-12BNCVC-8-04/2023 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam Antara PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − Perayu Dan Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) – Responden) (Dalam perkara mengenai Rayuan Sivil No.: BA-12BNCVC-7-04/2023 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam Antara Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) – Perayu 29/11/2023 10:33:29 BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023 Kand. 39 S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Dan PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − Responden) (Disatukan menurut Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 16 June 2023 Diputuskan oleh Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Rozi Binti Bainon di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 5 Oktober 2023) (Dalam perkara mengenai Guaman Sivil No.: BA-B52NCvC-334-09/2019 Di Mahkamah Sesyen di Shah Alam Antara Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) − Plaintif Dan PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) – Defendan Diputuskan oleh Hakim Ishak bin Bakri pada 17 Mac 2023 di Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant appeal against the decision of the Shah Alam Sessions Court handed down on 17-3-2023 after a full trial. [2] The Sessions Court judge (SCj) decided as follows: (a) Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) has been successful, on balance of probabilities, to prove that the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Bhd) had repudiated the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) Forms and Variation Orders by taking a position that there is no timeline in completing the works and there are defective works by the Defendant. (b) however, the learned SCj held that the Defendant was not be given an opportunity to rectify the defects before the Plaintiff appointed a new contractor to rectify the defects and to complete the unfinished works by the Defendant. (c) in terms of damages, the SCj finds that the Plaintiff is successful in proving the fact but not the quantum of damages, thus Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages. (d) the SCj make a ruling that the Plaintiff is only entitled for nominal damages in the amount of RM70,000.00 with interest and costs. (e) the SCj allows the interest of 5% per annum on the judgment sum of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing of summons until the date of full payment and costs. (f) costs of the trial is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The appeal at the Shah Alam High Court (SAHC): [3] The Defendant has filed its appeal at SAHC NCvC11 and the Plaintiff has filed its appeal before this Court (SAHC NCvC12). The case at SAHC NCvC11 has been transferred to this Court and the hearing of these 2 appeals are before me. [4] The parties are given full opportunity to explain and clarify each of their issues pertaining to the errors made by the learned SCj. I have listened to their verbal submissions, read their written submissions, cause papers and the grounds of judgment by the learned SCj. [5] For the purpose of this grounds of judgment both the Parties are refer to as Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) and the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd). [6] On 5-10-2023, my decisions are as follows via eReview: [1] Dua rayuan daripada keputusan Tuan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bijaksana (selepas ini disebut “Tn HMS”) didengar bersama iaitu Rayuan No. 7 yang difailkan di MTSA NCvC11 telah dipindahkan untuk didengar bersama-sama dengan Rayuan No. 8 di Mahkamah ini. [2] Tuntutan Plaintif (Chu Kok Wei) yang difailkan di Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam terhadap Defendan (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) telah didengar melalui perbicaraan penuh. [3] Plaintif (Chu Kok Wei) sebagai pemilik banglo 4 tingkat di Bukit Damansara telah mengambil khidmat Defendan (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) untuk memasang (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) suatu Sistem Rumah Pintar Crestron dengan teknologi HOMEX (selepas ini disebut “Sistem Rumah Pintar”) dalam banglo tersebut. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [4] Plaintif memplidkan fakta mengenai – a) pembayaran dan program kerja di mana pada perenggan 14 pernyataan tuntutan menyatakan “setelah pembayaran jumlah yang diterangkan di atas pada 24-4-2018, dengan penyiapan dalam masa 12 minggu iaitu pada 24-7-2018.”. b) Defendan mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa Plaintif dan keluarganya akan berpindah masuk ke banglo tersebut pada 3-8-2018 maka Sistem Rumah Pintar perlu tersedia siap. c) pada 3-8-2018 Plaintif mendapati sistem sekuriti rumah dan sistem kawalan peralatan rumah tidak beroperasi dan kerja pemasangan tidak dibuat dengan betul atau tidak dengan kemahiran yang munasabah. d) hasil perbincangan, kerja pemasangan hanya dapat disiapkan pada 28-9-2018 (hampir 7 minggu selepas Plaintif dan keluarganya berpindah masuk ke banglo tersebut). e) terdapat 4 mesyuarat diadakan antara Plaintif dan Defendan. f) penemuan Plaintif mengenai kecacatan sekuriti rangkaian, kecacatan pemasangan dan kerja pembaikan. [5] Kausa tindakan terhadap Defendan ialah perlanggaran kontrak dan kewajipan berkanun dan kecuaian. Relief yang dipohon adalah – a) ganti rugi khas bagi kos menggunakan pengawal keselamatan berjumlah RM115,796.64; kos melantik pakar IT, kos untuk membaiki kecacatan pemasangan berjumlah RM328,926.00. b) ganti rugi am. c) kos. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 d) faedah. Perbicaraan penuh di Mahkamah Sesyen: [6] Berdasarkan fakta kes, Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengenal past 3 isu untuk diputuskan oleh Mahkamah dan mencapai dapatannya. [7] Pada perenggan 307, 308 dan 309 Grounds of Judgment (GoJ), Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa Plaintif hanya layak memperoleh nominal damages in the amount of RM70,000.00 with interest (5% per annum on the judgement sums of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing summons until the date of full payment) and costs of the trial is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff.”. [8] Plaintif dan Defendan merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap keputusan Tn HMS. [9] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Notis Rayuan Plaintif dan Notis Rayuan Balas Defendan mengenai kekhilafan fakta dan undang-undang yang dikatakan dicapai oleh Tn HMS. [10] Bagi isu “timeline for the completion and the delivery”, Tn HMS telah meneliti Bill of Quantities Form (BOQ) yang merujuk kepada terma kontrak dan berdasarkan analisa terma Tn HMS mencapai dapatan dari segi fakta dan undang-undang bahawa wujud kelewatan oleh Defendan. Pada perenggan 45 GoJ, Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa “the defendant had repudiated the agreement under the BOQ Form by taking the position that it was not contractually bound to complete the works within certain period of time and there is no timeline to complete the installation works.”. [11] Berkenaan dengan kecacatan (defects) pada kerja Defendan, Tn HMS memperincikan mengenai kerja Defendan. [12] Apabila Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa Defendan telah melanggar terma kontrak, selanjutnya Tn HMS menggunapakai prinsip undang-undang dalam mengira ganti rugi yang diawardkan kepada Plaintif. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [13] Perayu (Chu Kok Wei) tidak berpuas hati dengan sebahagian keputusan Tn HMS. Dalam rayuan balas, Perayu (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) merayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Tn HMS yang mengawardkan ganti rugi nominal kepada Chu Kok Wei dan menyatakan bahawa kos sebanyak RM30,000.00 yang diawardkan itu adalah khilaf. Berdasarkan skala kos, kos hanyalah RM5,450.00. PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd merayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Tn HMS dan memohon agar tuntutan Plaintif terhadap ditolak. [14] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti hujahan bertulis dan mendengar hujahan lisan pihak-pihak, dengan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan seperti yang berikut: a) rayuan oleh Perayu Chu Kok Wei: Ganti rugi nominal yang diawardkan oleh Tn HMS dikekalkan dan ganti rugi khas yang ditolak oleh Tn HMS dikekalkan. Mahkamah ini membenarkan kos yang diawardkan oleh Tn HMS dikurangkan daripada RM30,000.00 kepada RM5,450.00. b) rayuan balas oleh PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd: ditolak. c) tiada kos rayuan dibenarkan kepada Perayu dan Perayu dalam rayuan balas. [7] The Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) is not happy and unsatisfied that I affirmed the SCj’s decision that the Plaintiff is only entitled for damages in the sum of RM70,000.00 (nominal damages) and interest of 5% per annum on the judgment sum of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing of summons until the date of full payment and costs. I have reversed the costs of the trial that is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [8] Here, I will write my reasons for that decisions and first and foremost, in the notice of appeal, the Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) stated – “… CHU KOK WEI, Perayu yang dinamakan di atas tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Rozi Binti Bainon yang diberikan di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam pada 5 Oktober 2023 merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap sebahagian sahaja daripada keputusan tersebut yang memutuskan bahawa – (i) awad oleh Mahkamah Sesyen hanya ganti rugi nominal sahaja dalam jumlah RM70,000-00, dikekalkan; (ii) penolakan Mahkamah Sesyen terhadap tuntutan Perayu untuk ganti rugi khas berjumlah RM518,847.64, atau tuntutan alternatifnya untuk pengembalian (restitution) jumlah RM423,137.38 yang dibayar oleh Perayu kepada Responden, dikekalkan; (iii) awad oleh Mahkamah Sesyen kos kepada Perayu dalam jumlah RM30,000-00, dikurangkan kepada RM5,450-00; (iv) berbangkit daripada keputusan di atas, bahawa tiada kos diawadkan kepada Perayu dalam prosiding Mahkamah Tinggi.”. [9] For the Defendant’s appeal, I will write my grounds of judgment separately. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 The Plaintiff’s claims as per the amended statement of claim [10] The Plaintiff is the house owner (bungalow) at Jalan Setiakasih, Bukit Damansara, Kuala Lumpur. [11] The Plaintiff has appointed the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd/PCOM), a company incorporated under the laws of Malaysia and having its registered address at Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. At all material times, PCOM was and is in the business of selling and installing ‘Smart Home Systems’ in residential and commercial properties. The Bill of Quantities Form/BOQ Form: [12] The Plaintiff’s Bungalow, i.e. a 4-storey building with built-up area of approximately 12,000 sq ft, began construction on 2015, and was completed in August 2018. [13] By way of BOQ Form dated 20-10-2016, the Plaintiff agreed to engage the Defendant, and the Defendant agreed to sell to the Plaintiff and install a Crestron Smart Home System with HOMEX technology (“the Smart Home System”) in the Bungalow which includes – (i) an integrated CCTV and alarm system (“Home Security System”); (ii) an integrated home automation system to control home appliances automatically or remotely (“Home Appliance Control System”); S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (iii) an integrated home entertainment system to control entertainment devices automatically or remotely (“AV Control and Distributions System”); (iv) an integrated climate / ambiance system to control heat, light intensity, motion and occupancy sensors automatically or remotely (“Climate / Ambiance System”); (v) a Network security system based on agreed network typology with WiFi access points to connect the above systems and to provide them with the protection of a firewall hardware and an appropriate logical sub-partitioning of network as desired by the Plaintiff (“Integrated Network System”); and (vi) all associated cabling and installation works required to ensure the proper installation and operation of all the above systems, which are to be integrated by way of a ‘Crestron’ system. [14] The Plaintiff aver that it was an express term of the BOQ Form that – (i) the installation work would cost approximately RM 439,981.62 (inclusive of 6% of GST) (“the final BOQ sum”); (ii) it would take approximately 12 weeks (4 weeks of wiring work + 8 weeks of installation work) to complete the said installations in the Bungalow; S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (iii) a down payment of 35% was to be paid to PCOM upon confirmation of the total quotation amount; (iv) an additional 30% was to be paid to PCOM upon final confirmation of the quotation for the hardware devices; (v) another 30% was to be paid to PCOM upon hardware delivery and commencement of installation; and (vi) the final 5% was to be paid to PCOM upon the Plaintiff’s approval of the installation work. [15] And according to the Plaintiff, it was an implied term of the BOQ Form that – (i) the hardware, software and/or electronic devices provided by PCOM would be fit for their intended purposes; (ii) the hardware, software and/or electronic devices provided by PCOM would be of satisfactory quality; (iii) the Smart Home System and the installation work would be carried out with reasonable care and skill; (iv) the wiring installation work carried out by PCOM would be of satisfactory quality; and S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (v) all installation work would comply with standards and best practices set by the Smart Home System equipment’s manufacturer, Crestron. [16] The Plaintiff relied on the relevant written laws governing the cabling and installation works as in the Electricity Regulations, 1994 made pursuant to the Electricity Supply Act, 1990 and specifically Regulations 15(1), 15(2), 15(6), 16, 18 and 35 which impose duties on PCOM to, inter alia, ensure that – (i) any apparatus, conductor (including cables) or accessory for the purpose of connection to an installation shall be sufficient in size, power and number for the purpose for which it is intended and shall be constructed, installed, arranged, protected, worked and maintained in such a manner to prevent danger [Regulation 15(1)]; (ii) any conductor shall be insulated and effectively protected or so placed in such a manner as to prevent danger [Regulation 15(2)]; (iii) any conductor or apparatus that is expose d to the weather and water shall be protected in such a manner as to prevent danger [Regulation 15(6)]; (iv) any fuse or circuit breaker shall be constructed and arranged in such a manner so as to break the current when it exceeds a given value for a sufficient time to prevent danger [Regulation 16]; S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (v) effective means shall be provided for making dead every part of the system and protecting the same from excess current [Regulation 18]; and (vi) a complete system of earthing conductors made of an acceptable material shall be provided, connected to the earth, and effectively maintained [Regulation 35]. [17] The Plaintiff supports its claims based on the following facts: A. Payment and Work Programme: (a) Since the engagement of PCOM in 2016, the Plaintiff had made payments totalling RM423,137.38 in 7 tranches (96.17% of the final BOQ sum) to PCOM and the details of the payments is spelt out in the table in the amended statement of claim. (b) at the material time, the site on which the bungalow is situated was ready to accommodate the installation works by PCOM and the wiring works of the Smart Home System had commenced thereafter. (c) the Defendant’s representatives were invited by the Plaintiff, and did participate in regular site meetings for progress updates and various job scheduling to ensure the installation of the Smart Home System would be completed based on the agreed timeline. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (d) on 24-10-2016, the initial BOQ sum was increased by RM52,258 to RM428,056.23 (“the 2nd BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by PCOM. (e) accordingly, additional payments were made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. (f) in April 2017, the 2nd BOQ sum was increased by RM2,544.00 to RM430,600.23 (“the 3rd BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. The Plaintiff paid. (g) on 28-2-2018, the 3rd BOQ sum was increased by RM6,254.00 to RM436,854.23 (“4th BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. (h) on 13-3-2018, the 4th BOQ sum was increased by RM3,127.00 to the final BOQ sum, RM 439,981.62, by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. (i) on 13 -3-2018 and 24-4-2018, the Plaintiff paid a sum totalling RM134,192.29 to the Defendant (30% of the final BOQ sum) upon hardware delivery and commencement of installation work by the Defendant. (j) therefore, the Plaintiff avers that the Defendant ought to have commenced its installation works upon payment of the sums by 24-4-2018 at the latest, with completion within 12 weeks, that is, by 24-7-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (k) at all material times, the Defendant and/or its employees and/or its agents had actual knowledge that the Plaintiff and his family would be moving into the bungalow by 3- 8-2018, and would therefore require the Smart Home System, particularly the security system, to be operational and properly functioning at that time. B. Late Completion and Defective Installation Work: (a) on 3-8-2018, upon moving into the bungalow with his family, the Plaintiff discovered the defects as follows: (i) the Home Security System and the Home Appliance Control System were not operational; and (ii) the installation work was not done properly or had not been performed with reasonable care and skill. (b) prior to the Plaintiff and his family move-in on 3-8-2018, there was no indication or at all by the Defendant and/or its employees, servants and/or agents that an extension of time was required for the Defendant to complete the installation work in the bungalow. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 C. The Meetings between the Parties: (a) 1st Meeting on 5-8-2018: Plaintiff immediately contacted Mr. Avan Tan, Senior Sales Account Manager of the Defendant and Mr. Eric Goh Ka Han, Regional Sales Director of the Defendant, who agreed to meet the Plaintiff at the bungalow on 5-8-2018. (b) 2nd Meeting on 6-8-2018: upon numerous requests by the Plaintiff, Mr. Guven Togan, Chief Executive Officer of the Defendant also agreed to meet him at the bungalow. (c) after the Defendant’s staff failed to turn up for work at the bungalow on 4-8-2018 despite not having completed their work, the Plaintiff again raised his grave concerns on the lack of progress of the works to Mr Avan Tan and demanded an updated work schedule to indicate the current state of the project, the remaining work and a timeline for completion. (d) Mr. Avan Tan indicated that the Defendant’s workers would come in to complete 4 components of the Smart Home System, namely CCTV, alarm, air conditioning and lighting, on 5-8-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 (e) on the morning of 5-8-2018, however, only 2 foreign workers attended the bungalow, and performed some checks which demonstrated that a substantial number of cables had not been successfully connected. On the same morning (5-8-2018), Mr. Rizal of the Defendant sent a revised work programme of the installation work to the Plaintiff, which stated that the Defendant’s installation work would only be completed by 28-9-2018, that is, almost 7 weeks after the Plaintiff had already moved into the Bungalow on 3-8-2018. (f) later, on that same evening (5-8-2018), the Defendant’s programmer, Mr Avan Tan and Mr Eric Goh attended the bungalow. The said programmer also confirmed that a substantial number of cables in the bungalow had not been successfully connected. (g) at the 2nd meeting, at or around 12 noon, the Plaintiff demanded from Mr. Guven Togan a copy of the system wiring diagram. During the said meeting, Mr Togan himself expressed shock at the rate of progress of the project, and in particular, that the Defendant had allowed the Plaintiff and his family to move into the bungalow on 3-8-2018 knowing that the Plaintiff would be relying on the integrated Home Security System, but without informing or advising the Plaintiff that that Home Security System was in fact not ready for use. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 (h) 3rd Meeting, on the same evening (6-8-2018) at or around 7 p.m., another meeting was held between the Plaintiff and the Defendant (Mr. Eric Goh and Mr. Avan Tan), when the consolidated BOQ Forms were provided to the Plaintiff. In the 3rd Meeting, the Defendant offered the Plaintiff a sum of approximately RM43,000.00 as compensation for the delay in the installation of the system and the Defendant’s breaches of the terms contained in the BOQ Form, which the Plaintiff did not accept. (i) 4th Meeting, on the afternoon of 7-8-2018, a meeting was held between the Plaintiff and the Defendant (Mr. Avan Tan), when Mr. Avan Tan wrongfully informed the Plaintiff that that BOQ Form apparently did not prescribe any timelines for the completion of the Smart Home System installation by the Defendant. The Plaintiff thereafter demanded that a copy of the system wiring diagrams be provided to him. (j) however, the Defendant refused and/or failed to comply with the Plaintiff’s demands, and merely handed over the system wiring diagrams and the information in relation to the Smart Home System installation works. The said diagrams were merely system schematic drawing and did not include any actual cable routing diagrams. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (k) the Plaintiff had to engage another contractor to complete the Installation Work. D. Discovery Of Defects And Rectification Works: (a) as a high-ranking officer of a financial institution with significant delegated authority in financial market/capital market activities, the Plaintiff pleaded that both the physical and digital security of the Plaintiff and his family are of utmost importance. (b) the bungalow was also especially exposed to risks of security breaches by reason of its size and location. Therefore, the Plaintiff has engaged 2 additional security guards to provide protection for the Plaintiff and his family, i.e. − (i) a professional IT security specialist to assess and mitigate the cyber security risks arising from the Network Security Defects; and (ii) a new Crestron authorised installer, Inthome Linc Solution (“Inthome”) to complete the unfinished work by PCOM, and rectify any defective works by PCOM (“Rectification Works”). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 E. Particulars of Network Security Defects: The Plaintiff has discovered the following significant defects in the network security (“Network Security Defects”) (resulting in cyber security risks) and installation (“Installation Defects”) of the Smart Home System by the Defendant: (i) Wi-Fi Network (ii) Router Administrator Authentication (iii) Host Enumeration (iv) Network Switch Configuration (v) Firewall Configuration (vi) CCTV System (vii) Dumpster Diving Risk F. Installation Defects: (a) in or about early December November 2018, Inthome installers informed the Plaintiff that a significant amount of cables installed by the Defendant were either faulty or did not follow the required engineering standards. The installation of cables by the Defendant were also in breach of the terms of the BOQ. (b) the significant Installation Defects by the Defendant and the consequential Rectification Work carried out by Inthome therein, were in respect of, inter alia, the following components of the Smart Home System: S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (i) Home Appliance Control System. (ii) Multi Room (6 zones) Audio Distribution System. (iii) Home Security System. (iv) General Cabling Works. (v) Equipment Rack. [18] By the matters aforesaid, the Plaintiff avers and particularize that the Defendant had breached the contract and statutory duties, negligence and undertaken express and/or implied contractual obligations, covenants and duties under the BOQ Form. The Defendant wrongfully failed to meet its contractual obligations under the BOQ Form and its Implied Terms and/or breached its statutory duties under inter alia regulations 15(1), 15(2), 15(6), 16, 18 and 35 of the Electricity Regulations 1994. The loss suffered by the Plaintiff: [19] By reason of the matters abovesaid, the Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage including but not limited to expenses by the Plaintiff in, amongst others, namely – (a) mitigating the physical hazards and/or cyber security risks arising from the Network Security Defects, CCTV and/or alarm defects, rectifying the Installation Defects, and mitigating his loss. (b) Special Damages as particularized at paragraph 50. (c) General Damages. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (d) Costs. (e) Interest for such period and at such rate as the Court deems fit. Errors made by the learned SCj [20] The Plaintiff has called 5 factual witnesses and 1 expert witness, and filed the corresponding witness statements/expert affidavit and the Defendant has called 3 witnesses. [21] The Plaintiff stated in its appeal that the learned trial Judge was plainly wrong in arriving at his decision in 6 critical areas, which warrants appellate intervention, namely − First: the learned trial Judge was plainly wrong in finding that the Plaintiff was not successful in proving the quantum of damages, and is therefore only entitled to nominal damages. The learned trial Judge failed to appreciate that evidence for the quantum of damages claimed were produced, and that the Plaintiff and his witnesses were never challenged by the Defendant on the validity, authenticity and reasonableness of the rectification costs for the defects in the installation of the smart home system, nor have the Defendant provided any alternative evidence as to what was a reasonable cost. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Second: the learned trial Judge also erred in law and in fact, in finding that the Defendant has a right to be given an opportunity to rectify the Installation Defects, and that the hiring of the new Crestron authorised installer, Inthome, is “too remote” or “indirect”. In fact, the Defendant was aware that the Plaintiff was looking to appoint another system integrator, and had no objection to it. The learned Judge failed to judiciously appreciate that the Plaintiff only had a duty to take all reasonable steps to mitigate his loss, and that a reasonable and prudent man in the position of the Plaintiff would not have the confidence to allow the Defendant to rectify the defects, given the Defendant’s prior conduct. Third: the learned Judge erred in finding that the Defendant had never agreed to supply a 4K video system to the Plaintiff, when the evidence shows from, inter alia, the proposals made by the Defendant’s sales person to the Plaintiff, that the accessories prescribed by the Defendant and the Whatsapp conversation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s sales person is that the Defendant was aware at all time that the Plaintiff requested for a 4K video system, and that the Defendant had misrepresented the video system purchased by the Plaintiff as being 4K compatible. Fourth: the learned trial judge erred in fact and in law, in finding that the “new system integrator” was a form of upgrade, when the Plaintiff was merely claiming for the cost to reinstate or place himself in the position in which he would have been had the Defendant performed its contractual obligations. In any event, the Defendant also had not pleaded upgrade or betterment in its Amended Defence. In the alternative, the learned judge ought to have at least S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 reduced the Plaintiff’s claim for the difference in sum for the ‘upgrade’. Fifth: the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact, in finding that the costs incurred by the Plaintiff to hire additional security guards due to the defective alarm system and CCTV is too remote and indirect. The Plaintiff is entitled to be put in the same position as if the alarm system and CCTV had been operational when he and his family moved into the bungalow, and the cost of additional security guards were therefore a foreseeable loss resulting from the defective alarm system and CCTV installed by the Defendant. Sixth: the learned trial Judge erred in finding that the Plaintiff has failed to prove the costs adjustment in the sum of RM16,028.00 from inappropriate or unnecessary items sold by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. The learned judge failed to judiciously appreciate that the Defendant did not plead unjust enrichment by the Plaintiff for not returning the said inappropriate or unnecessary equipment and items, or counterclaim for the same. [22] Therefore, whether the contentions by the Plaintiff that the learned SCj has made errors that the Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages in the sum of RM70,000.00; the Plaintiff is not entitled to his claim for special damages in the sum of RM518,847.64; or his alternative claim for restitution of the sum of RM423,137.38 paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant are to be determined at the appellate stage. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 The Sessions Court judge’s (the learned SCj) grounds of judgment [23] Based on the facts of the case, the learned SCj has identified the issues to be tried, namely − (a) whether the Defendant had repudiated the contract and whether the Plaintiff was entitled to treat the contract with the Defendant as having come to an end on 7-8-2018? (b) if the question in (a) is answered in the affirmative, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of rectification works? (c) whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim for damages? [24] The learned SCj held that the Defendant is bound to complete the works within the period stipulated in the BOQ Form. The Defendant has failed to meet the timeline; therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to treat the contract ended on 7-8-2018. [25] The reasons for arriving his findings of facts can be read from the paragraphs as follows: (a) in paragraph 22 of the learned SCj’s grounds of judgment held that – “22. The Court finds that it is unusual for any parties entering into contract without timeline for its completion. The terms of the delivery terms, though the actual date is not specifically stated in a form of day, month and year, the S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Defendant own interpretation stated that the wiring works to start within 4 weeks, upon receiving the 35% down payment from the Plaintiff which connotes timeline and ‘if the bungalow was ready for such works to be commenced’”. (b) via a WhatsApp chat group, all the contractors including the Defendant know about the coordination and synchronization in order to meet the dateline imposed by the Plaintiff (paragraph 24). (c) in paragraph 28 of the learned SCj’s grounds of judgment held that the Defendant’s own witness i.e. SD3 has admitted that the Defendant was in the knowledge that there was a completion date for the installation works when he prepared the Defendant’s work programme on the basis that it would complete the installation works at the bungalow together with all the other contractors on 30-9-2017. (d) in paragraph 38, the learned SCj disagree with the Defendant that the various ongoing works carried out by the other contractor contributed to the delay. According to the learned SCj, all contractors including the Defendant were required to work hand in hand to avoid any delay. Factors raised by the Defendant to have affected their delay was only raised for the first time in writing in the Defendant’s solicitors’ letter dated 30-8-2018 after the stop work order was issued by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [26] Be that as it may, in answering the issue “whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of rectification works”, the learned SCj wrote in length his grounds in arriving to his decisions on damages, and these can be read from paragraphs 46 to 167. [27] In my grounds of judgment I will highlight some of the following facts pertaining to the rectification works. I have read the SCj’s grounds of judgment where he has examined and analyzed the facts in details, namely − (a) through the evidences from both parties’ witnesses: The Plaintiff’s witnesses are − • Mr. Quah Zheng Wei, architect (SP-1). • Mr. Khoo Yoon Yin, programmer (SP-2). • Mr. Fong Choong Fook, an expert witness (SP-3). • Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4). • Mr. Baxter Oswald Anak Michael Jodi (SP-5). • Mr. Chu Kok Wei, the Plaintiff (SP-6). The Defendant’s witnesses are − • Mr. Guven Togan (SD-1). • Mr. Avan Tan Cheow Wee (SD-2). • Mr. Muhamad Khairul Rizal bin Abdul Karim (SD-3). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 (b) the witnesses had been testified via examination-in-chief, cross examination and re-examination about the facts on – • the defects in the installation of the Smart Home System; • inconsistency in implementation and the System Plotting Drawings; • meetings between both parties; • the Plaintiff’s ask the Defendant to stop work and leave the bungalow; • the Plaintiff’s demands (such as the Defendant to issue public apology to the Plaintiff; • compensation in the sum of RM140,000.00 being the forfeiture of all professional fees and the hardware cost of the security element of the Smart Home System; • cost for all wiring works by the Plaintiff’s own electricians; • installation of new hardware by a new installer, the Defendant to assist the new installer; • re-imbursement of all other costs incurred by the Plaintiff to achieve the state of security and usability (including the cost of engaging an additional security guard until the completion of the installation of the Smart Home System). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (c) the proposal by the Defendant’s vide its solicitors’ letter dated 30-8-2018 where the Defendant proposed that the new installer to be appointed to “conduct a buy-off of the work done” by the Defendant. However, this proposal was rejected by the Plaintiff and no reply to the Defendant solicitors’ letter. (d) the evidences pertaining to the rectification are – • the Plaintiff has engaged a professional IT security specialist to assess and mitigate the cyber security risks arising from the defects in the network security as installed and configured by the Defendant. • the Plaintiff has engaged Inthome as the new installer to complete the installation of the Smart Home System and to rectify the installation works through the recommendation of SP-2. • Mr. Khoo Yoon Yin, programmer (SP-2) was the Defendant software programmer to carry out the programming of the Smart Home System. SP-2 was retained by the Plaintiff to continue working on the programming of the Smart Home System. • the Plaintiff has engaged another contractor (Pro AV Works) to rectify the Multiroom Audio Distribution System together with Inthome. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 • the Plaintiff has engaged CNS Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd for the relaying of power cables. CNS Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd also assisting Inthome in the relaying of data and audio cables. • the Plaintiff has engaged Mr. Tam Pak Cheong as the Clerk of Works to oversee and coordinate the rectification works. Mr. Tam Pak Cheong was also the Clerk of Works for the construction of the bungalow. (e) Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4) testified that the cost of all rectification works carried out by Inthome amounted to RM265,169.00. (f) the learned SCj has taken into consideration after hearing the Defendant’s defence and its witnesses, where the following facts are extracted: • the Defendant was forced to leave the site, no damage to the tamper switches and cables were detected. No sufficient particulars as to what anti-tamper switches the Plaintiff is referring to nor what kind of damage the Plaintiff is alleging. • with regard to the empty cases, the Defendant stated that they were in the midst of testing and terminating the cables into the cases. However, the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site on 7-8-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 • with regard to the installation of sensors, the Defendant stated that they had installed the sensors correctly as per the System Plotting Drawing/Device Plotting Layout. And the final positioning of sensors will be subject to the final condition of the site and may require changes as per the Plaintiff’s instructions. And the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site. On the issue of the adhesive for the installation of the sensors, the Defendant had used the adhesive as provided by the manufacturer of the sensors. Therefore, there is no issue that the adhesive is inappropriate. • with regard to the non-weatherproof indoor motion sensor, the Defendant stated that it would depend on the installation circumstances. In areas that were fully exposed to sun and rain, the Defendant had installed weatherproof sensors at outdoors areas that were not exposed to sun and rain, namely ceiling mounted to outdoor roofs. The cables were installed inside the ceiling of the outdoor roofs and were also not exposed to sun and rain. • with regard to the CCTV at the guardhouse and outdoor area of the ground floor, the Defendant stated that during the time the Defendant was forced to leave the site, it was all in good working order. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 • with regard to install the firewall for the entire Smart Home System, the Defendant stated that the firewall only can be installed once the whole system is configured and implemented. Otherwise, it will expose the firewall to outside risk of malware or hackers and weaken the firewall. • with regard to the CCTV, the Defendant contended that the CCTV were only activated within the closed local circuit (“LAN”) and had not been exposed to any external access or compromised in any manner and the Defendant had yet to complete the network configuration. • with regard to the air-conditioning at certain locations in the bungalow were not functioning, SP-4 and SD-3 had testified and Inthome had completed the cable installation, re-terminated the IR cables with solder and wrapping the terminations with a layer of heat shrink tube. The works on configuration and testing of the air- conditioning control were still in progress. However, the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site with the stop order by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 • with regards to lighting defects, SD-3 and SP-1 had testified on the issue about the light fitting drawings. The Defendant’s witness (SD-3) blamed the electrical contractor (CNS). However, no drawings or documents from CNS were adduced by the Defendant to show that CNS required the Defendant to supply dimmable dins at the first floor of the bungalow. • with regards to momentary switches defects, Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4) had rectified the momentary switches and SP-2 had programmed them to function as intended. However, the Defendant stated that when they were forced to leave the site on 7-8- 2018, the momentary switches were properly connected to the terminal block and were working as intended. The Defendant avers that the momentary switches can be re-programmed to suit the Plaintiff’s needs. (g) other than the above defects, the other defects and rectification works had been examined by the learned SCj, where both Plaintiff and Defendant had argued regarding the roller shutter, Switch Socket Outlet (SSO) control, Crestron keypads, motorized projector screen, overloading and poor termination of power cables, excessive data cables length, dumpster diving risk, alarm and control system, curtain control system, lighting control system, TV control and AV distribution system, and general cabling work. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 The High Court’s decision [28] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff has laid out the summary of the evidences in the table format as attached in Appendixes A and B. This Court also finds that the learned SCj did studied the evidences after hearing the trial. [29] LAW OF EVIDENCE: “HE WHO CLAIMS, PROVES”: the fundamental principle of the law of evidence is that the burden of proving a fact is on the person claiming the existence of that said fact, except where it is stipulated by any law that the proof of that fact lies on another person. [30] This evidentiary principle of “he who claims, proves” is entrenched in the Evidence Act 1950. Sections 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. [31] The Court of Appeal in Poratha Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Technofit Sdn Bhd [2018] AMEJ 0214 [2019] 1 LNS 941; [2020] 1 MLJ 74, reiterated this principle. It held that the party claiming damages bears the burden of proving the fact and the quantum of the damages suffered and that if the claimant only succeeds in proving the fact and not the quantum, it will only be entitled to nominal damages. Y.A Hasnah Hashim JCA (as she then was) in delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal held – “[44] It is trite law that the party claiming damages bears the burden of proving the fact and quantum of damages suffered. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [45] The defendant bears the burden of proving both the fact and the amount of damages suffered as a result of the breach by the plaintiff. Special damages unlike general damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, and recoverable only where they can be included in the proper measure of damages …”. [32] In Chang Hang Guan & Ors. v. Perumahan Falim (Penang) Sdn Bhd [1994] 1 CLJ 19, Edgar Joseph Jr held− “When a plaintiff claims damages from a defendant, he has to show that the loss in respect of which he claims damages was caused by the defendant’s wrong and also that the damages are not too remote to be recoverable. Where precise evidence is obtainable, the court naturally expects to have it, where it is not, the court must do the best it can. General difficulty of proof does not dispense with the necessity for proof.”. [33] In arriving to the decision, the delay in finishing and completing the works was proven by the Plaintiff. I agree. This Court should and never will interfere with this finding. [34] Now, to answer whether the awarding of the damages by the learned SCj is correct? Paragraph 174 to 206 in his grounds of judgment stated the application of the law to the fact. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 [35] The learned SCj starts its reasons as follows: “174. The law on damages for breach of contract is trite. the law on damages is set out in s. 74 of the Contract Act 1950. Pursuant to the provision, compensation can only be awarded against the guilty party for breach of contract if the loss or damage suffered by the other party satisfies two conditions. 175. The first condition is that it arises naturally in the usual course of things from the breach or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. 176. The second condition is that it is not to remote or indirect. When a contract has been broken, the party suffers by the breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. 177. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. It is trite law that the party seeking damages bears the burden of proving both the fact and quantum of damages, which the plaintiff is claiming. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 178. If the plaintiff fails to prove the fact of damage, its claim for damages will fail. However, if the plaintiff only succeeds in proving the fact but not the quantum of damages, it will only be entitled to nominal damages.”. [36] The learned SCj refers to few cases on damages that are Popular Industries Ltd. v. The Eastern Garment Manufacturing Co. Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 CLJ (rep) 635; Leong Hin Enterprise Sdn Bhd v. Chevron Malaysia Ltd [2018] MLJU 1747. [37] Paragraphs 181 to 206 of the SCj’s grounds of judgment did explain the reasons why he only awarded the nominal damages to the Plaintiff. The re-hearing @ appellate stage: [38] The Appellant (Chu Kok Wei) and the Respondent (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) had submit verbally and also filed their written submissions accordingly. [39] It is true that the Plaintiff has issued the Stop Work Order on 7-8- 2018 and forced the Defendant’s team to leave the Plaintiff’s bungalow. The Defendant contends that they are not given the opportunity to perform any rectification and/or repairs to the alleged defects claimed by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [40] This Court finds that the defects are not just the allegations by the Plaintiff, the particulars and details of the defects already proved by the Plaintiff. I will not interfere with the finding of the learned SCj on the defects. The parties had been given opportunity to prove their case accordingly at the trial court. [41] The case of Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd v Sun-Jaya M & E Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 136 cited by the learned counsel for the Defendant is applicable in this present case. In Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd, the Court at paragraphs 138 and 139, page 201 held that a contractor shall be given opportunity to rectify the defects before the employer can get services of a third party to rectify those defects. [42] Here, the Plaintiff had engaged and appointed the new contractor and installer and/or new system integrator to continue the works and the discussion between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to reach an amicable settlement pertaining to the works came to end when the Defendant was “chased out” from continuing with the works as per the contract. [43] Due to the Plaintiff’s act for preventing the Defendant to rectify the defects, the learned counsel for the Defendant refer to section 54 of the Contracts Act 1950 and cited the decisions in the cases of Mah Sau Cheong v. Tan Eng Chin [2019] 1 LNS 560; Yuk Tung Construction Sdn Bhd v. Daya CMT Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1314 where the Court gave judgment on the principle of “Prevention Principle” where a party cannot insist on the performance of a contractual obligation by the other if it is itself the cause of the non-performance; MS Elevators Engineering Sdn. Bhd. v Jasmurni Construction Sdn. Bhd. [2022] 1 LNS 815. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 [44] In re-hearing of this appeal by the Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei), this Court has agreed with the finding of facts by the learned SCj that the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) is held liable for the defects in performing its obligation to complete the Smart Home System for the Plaintiff. [45] However, the quantum of damages as sought by the Plaintiff as per the statement of claim namely, − (i) Special Damages in the amount of RM115,796.60 for hiring additional security guards from 13-8-2018 to end of September 2019 to ensure the safety of the Plaintiff and his family; (ii) costs of engaging the IT specialist; (iii) RM387,023.00 as the costs of rectifying the installation defects; (iv) RM16,028.00 as costs adjustment from inappropriate or unnecessary items sold by the Defendant; (v) General Damages for breach of the BOQ Form, negligence and fraudulent and/or reckless misrepresentation; (vi) further and/or in the alternative, the sum of RM423,137.38 to be restituted to the Plaintiff; and (vii) costs and interest, S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 are too excessive after considering the circumstances and chronology of events in this case. [46] In reaching to its decision, the learned SCj has evaluating the original suit and also the counter claim suit. [47] The BOQ Form/s had stipulated the amounts to be paid and the installation works were defective, therefore, the learned SCj concluded that the sum that can be claimed by the Plaintiff is only RM70,000.00 is sufficient. [48] The Defendant has proved that for the Smart Home System as at 7-8-2018 was estimated at RM395,953.38 and this is equivalent to 89.99% of the total contract work value, including Variation Orders. (See the delivery orders refer to all materials, equipment and items sent to the Bungalow for the Smart Home System at RR3(5), pages 118 to 148). [49] At the appellate stage, the learned counsel for the Defendant submits that the payment terms agreed between the parties are not based on the value of works done but rather the milestones achieved, which the Defendant exceeds 95% holistically. Thus, the Defendant is entitled to retain all the sums paid by the Respondent before this. And, to date, the Plaintiff also did not return any of the Defendant’s items and/or materials alleged to be defective and/or unnecessary. As such, this contradicts the Plaintiff’s position that he is not satisfied with the Defendant’s works up until the Stop Work Order was issued. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 Principles of appellate intervention [50] In the case of Ahmad Zulfendi bin Anuar v. Mohd Shahril bin Abdul Rahman [2022] 4 MLJ 892, the High Court held − “[7] The central feature of appellate intervention is well- established. It is to ascertain whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the evidence and on the basis of the governing law. The Federal Court in the case of Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, where the Federal Court held as follows: [14] In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention, ie to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase ‘insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence’ melerly related to such process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal’s restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention, ie that a decision arrived at by a S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test. [8] Thus in Kerajaan Malaysia v. Global Upline Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2017] 1 MLJ 170 the Court of Appeal held that an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its conclusion and where there has been insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. [9] In the leading case of Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 the Federal Court affirmed with unmistakable clarity that the principle on which an appellate court could intervene with findings of fact by the trial court is ‘the plainly wrong test’ principle. [10] This important principle involves a number of circumstances, but must necessarily extends to situations where it can be shown that the impugned decision is vitiated with plain material errors, or where crucial evidence had been miscontrued, or where the trial judge had so manifestly not taken proper advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses or not properly analysed the entirely of the evidence before him, or where a decision was arrived without adequate judicial appreciation of the evidence such as to make it rationally unsupportable. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 [11] Above all, the Federal Court in Ng Hoo Kui established that the criterion that is central to appellate intervention must remain that deference to the trier of fact is still the rule and not the exception. And the plainly wrong test should not be used by the appellate court as a means to substitute the impugned decision with its own.”. [51] In re-hearing of the appeal before me, I have applied the test of “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence” in relation to the process of determining whether the Sessions Court had arrived at its decision or findings correctly on the basis of the relevant law and the established evidence (see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309). [52] The conclusion made by the learned SCj is in accordance with the law, there is no gross error made by the learned SCj. I would like to quote the following: (a) in the case of Ineax Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Ineax Process Sdn Bhd And Ng Wee Keat (Third Party) [2017] 1 LNS 1187, the High Court has referred to the leading decision of the Court of Appeal in Juahir Sadikon v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Johor [1996] 4 CLJ 1 which reaffirms the rule that “he who asserts must prove”, whereby Siti Norma Yaakob JCA (as she then was) instructively held as follows: S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 “He who alleges must prove such allegation and the onus is on the appellant to do so. See section 103 of the Act. Thus, it is incumbent upon the appellant to produce Tan Sri Basir as his witness to prove the allegation. The fact that the appellant was unable to secure the attendance of Tan Sri Basir as a witness does not shift the burden to the respondent to produce the witness and testify as to what he had uttered, as firstly, the respondent never raised such an allegation and, secondly, has denied even making one. For this very reason, the adverse inference under section 114 (g) of the Act relied upon by the appellant cannot be accepted as establishing that if the witness had been produced, his evidence would work against the respondent. There is no obligation in law for the respondent to produce the witness as that obligation rests with the appellant, the party who alleges, and the fact that the appellant was unable to do so is fatal to his case. For this very reason too, the adverse inference under section 114 (g) is invoked against the appellant.”. Further, in the same case, the High Court referred to the following passage from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Pernec Ebiz Sdn Bhd v. CCI Technology Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 2 MLJ 117− “Even though the burden upon a plaintiff in a civil suit is only to prove its case upon a balance of probabilities, it must present its case sufficiently clearly to do so. It S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 cannot merely file pleadings, file bundles of documents, proceed to trial, call witnesses to testify and argue on the various issues and expect the court to make out the case on its own for one party or the other. The submissions failed to analyze the pleadings, the facts and the evidence as against the issues requiring a decision, and to tabulate the same so that a logical and reasoned decision could be made that satisfied the fundamental requirement of a fair and just decision. Where the party upon whom the burden of proving its case lies fails to do so, it fails to prove its case and its action must be dismissed.”. (b) in the case of Heritage Grand Vacation Club Bhd V. Pacific Fantasy Vacation Sdn Bhd [2016] 7 CLJ 679, the Court of Appeal laid down the principles on pleading − “[4] It is well-established that it is not the function of the court to build a case for the plaintiff/defendant inconsistent with the pleaded case. In Yew Wan Leong v. Lai Kok Chye [1990] 1 CLJ 1113, the Supreme Court had in strong terms held, and which still stands as a ‘gold standard’ in pleading rules and evidence, as follows: It is not the duty of the court to make out a case for one of the parties when the party concerned does not raise or wish to raise the point. In disposing of a suit or matter involving a disputed question of fact, it is S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 not proper for the court to displace the case made by a party in its pleadings and give effect to an entirely new case which the party had not made out in its own pleadings. The trial of a suit should be confined to the pleas on which the parties are at variance. [5] The above case must be seen to be the ‘gold standard’ for pleading rules and is consistent with a long line of authorities from England as well as Malaysia. (See Janagi v. Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 1 LNS 42; Lee Ah Chor v. Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 667; KEP Mohamed Ali v. KEP Mohamed Ismail [1980] 1 LNS 169). In Recaliva Design Steel (M) Sdn Bhd v. Vista Access Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 10 CLJ 491, the High Court held that on pleading rules and issues to be tried made the following observations: After having heard the evidence of the defendants, it is crystal clear to me that the version defendants attempted to project to me was never part of their defence. In such circumstances, the court is not obliged to consider in its judgment, stories which are not reflective of the pleadings. Pleadings are essential foundation to analyse disputes. Evidence must relate to pleadings and/or directly relevant to pleadings. The court is not concerned what issues the parties have framed for the determination of the court, when such issues cannot be reflective of the issues to be dealt with pursuant to the pleadings. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 [6] This ‘gold standard’ also plays an important part when parties as per the pleadings have agreed to the issues to be tried. That is to say, the issues to be tried must be as per the pleadings or arising from the pleadings and cannot be one which can be said to be the unpleaded case of the parties. The ‘gold standard’ has a number of exceptions in a restricted sense and those exceptions are not meant to override the ‘gold standard’ for pleading rules in all aspects.”. (c) in the case of Zainuddin Bin Uyub Dan Jalil Bin Tumirin [2009] 1 LNS 1139, the High Court cited the Court of Appeal case, Karumalay Vanniyan & Anor v. Ananthan Rethinam [2005] 2 CLJ 429, which was held – “A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. If there are contemporary documents, then he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. A trier of fact who makes findings based purely upon the demeanour of a witness S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 without undertaking a critical analysis of what witness’s evidence runs the risk of having his findings corrected on appeal. It does not matter whether the issue for decision is one that arises in a civil or criminal case: the approach to judicial appreciation of evidence is the same. There are a number of important and leading cases in which the point has been considered.”. (d) the principles of “the best evidence rule” must be applied. In the case of Juta Damai Sdn Bhd v. Permodalan Negeri Selangor Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 318, the Court of Appeal held − “Returning to the question of proof, we observe that there is no provision that requires that such loss is only provable by production of receipts. The best evidence rule requires proof not by the ‘best evidence’ but by the ‘best evidence available’. The unavailability of receipts was explained on the grounds the receipts were not kept for more than six years. The explanation is not inherently implausible.”. (e) the case of Telekom Malaysia Bhd v. KLK Electronic Sdn Bhd [2019] 4 MLJ 631 pertaining to the burden of proof. The decision of the Court of Appeal held – “[35] It is fundamental principle of law that in a civil case, the legal burden of proof lies on the party who brings the claim. The evidential burden may shift to the S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 defendant once the plaintiff has established prima facie case.”. Conclusion [53] For the reasons given above, I see no good reason to interfere on the whole findings of the learned SCj’s finding on the quantum of damages. [54] Only part of the learned SCj’s findings that is the costs of the trial at the Sessions Court at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff is reversed and/or set aside and this Court allows costs is RM5,450-00 payable to the Plaintiff. Dated: 29 November 2023. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam NCvC12 S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 The Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Lai Wei Shiung Messrs.Tommy Thomas, Kuala Lumpur For the Defendant: Nur Muhaimin binti Mohd Husaimi with her, Sri Richgopinath & Joel Lim Messrs. Joel & Mei, Kuala Lumpur S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	69,350	Tika 2.6.0
BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023	PERAYU PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd RESPONDEN Chu Kok Wei	CONTRACT: Appeal from the Subordinate Court – Whether the Defendant had repudiated the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) Forms and Variation Orders? – Issue on the defects of works – Whether non-performance of works is caused by the Plaintiff that forced the Defendant to leave the site – Whether the Defendant had repudiated the contract and be held liable? − The test of “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence”.	29/11/2023	YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=54408d88-6409-470c-8ac7-0502f98cfb02&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023 ANTARA CHU KOK WEI (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) − PERAYU DAN PCOM PACIFIC SDN BHD (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − RESPONDEN (Dalam perkara mengenai Rayuan Sivil No.: BA-12BNCVC-8-04/2023 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam Antara PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − Perayu Dan Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) – Responden) (Dalam perkara mengenai Rayuan Sivil No.: BA-12BNCVC-7-04/2023 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam Antara Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) – Perayu 29/11/2023 10:33:29 BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023 Kand. 39 S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Dan PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − Responden) (Disatukan menurut Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 16 June 2023 Diputuskan oleh Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Rozi Binti Bainon di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 5 Oktober 2023) (Dalam perkara mengenai Guaman Sivil No.: BA-B52NCvC-334-09/2019 Di Mahkamah Sesyen di Shah Alam Antara Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) − Plaintif Dan PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) – Defendan Diputuskan oleh Hakim Ishak bin Bakri pada 17 Mac 2023 di Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant appeal against the decision of the Shah Alam Sessions Court handed down on 17-3-2023 after a full trial. [2] The Sessions Court judge (SCj) decided as follows: (a) Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) has been successful, on balance of probabilities, to prove that the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Bhd) had repudiated the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) Forms and Variation Orders by taking a position that there is no timeline in completing the works and there are defective works by the Defendant. (b) however, the learned SCj held that the Defendant was not be given an opportunity to rectify the defects before the Plaintiff appointed a new contractor to rectify the defects and to complete the unfinished works by the Defendant. (c) in terms of damages, the SCj finds that the Plaintiff is successful in proving the fact but not the quantum of damages, thus Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages. (d) the SCj make a ruling that the Plaintiff is only entitled for nominal damages in the amount of RM70,000.00 with interest and costs. (e) the SCj allows the interest of 5% per annum on the judgment sum of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing of summons until the date of full payment and costs. (f) costs of the trial is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The appeal at the Shah Alam High Court (SAHC): [3] The Defendant has filed its appeal at SAHC NCvC11 and the Plaintiff has filed its appeal before this Court (SAHC NCvC12). The case at SAHC NCvC11 has been transferred to this Court and the hearing of these 2 appeals are before me. [4] The parties are given full opportunity to explain and clarify each of their issues pertaining to the errors made by the learned SCj. I have listened to their verbal submissions, read their written submissions, cause papers and the grounds of judgment by the learned SCj. [5] For the purpose of this grounds of judgment both the Parties are refer to as Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) and the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd). [6] On 5-10-2023, my decisions are as follows via eReview: [1] Dua rayuan daripada keputusan Tuan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bijaksana (selepas ini disebut “Tn HMS”) didengar bersama iaitu Rayuan No. 7 yang difailkan di MTSA NCvC11 telah dipindahkan untuk didengar bersama-sama dengan Rayuan No. 8 di Mahkamah ini. [2] Tuntutan Plaintif (Chu Kok Wei) yang difailkan di Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam terhadap Defendan (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) telah didengar melalui perbicaraan penuh. [3] Plaintif (Chu Kok Wei) sebagai pemilik banglo 4 tingkat di Bukit Damansara telah mengambil khidmat Defendan (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) untuk memasang (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) suatu Sistem Rumah Pintar Crestron dengan teknologi HOMEX (selepas ini disebut “Sistem Rumah Pintar”) dalam banglo tersebut. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [4] Plaintif memplidkan fakta mengenai – a) pembayaran dan program kerja di mana pada perenggan 14 pernyataan tuntutan menyatakan “setelah pembayaran jumlah yang diterangkan di atas pada 24-4-2018, dengan penyiapan dalam masa 12 minggu iaitu pada 24-7-2018.”. b) Defendan mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa Plaintif dan keluarganya akan berpindah masuk ke banglo tersebut pada 3-8-2018 maka Sistem Rumah Pintar perlu tersedia siap. c) pada 3-8-2018 Plaintif mendapati sistem sekuriti rumah dan sistem kawalan peralatan rumah tidak beroperasi dan kerja pemasangan tidak dibuat dengan betul atau tidak dengan kemahiran yang munasabah. d) hasil perbincangan, kerja pemasangan hanya dapat disiapkan pada 28-9-2018 (hampir 7 minggu selepas Plaintif dan keluarganya berpindah masuk ke banglo tersebut). e) terdapat 4 mesyuarat diadakan antara Plaintif dan Defendan. f) penemuan Plaintif mengenai kecacatan sekuriti rangkaian, kecacatan pemasangan dan kerja pembaikan. [5] Kausa tindakan terhadap Defendan ialah perlanggaran kontrak dan kewajipan berkanun dan kecuaian. Relief yang dipohon adalah – a) ganti rugi khas bagi kos menggunakan pengawal keselamatan berjumlah RM115,796.64; kos melantik pakar IT, kos untuk membaiki kecacatan pemasangan berjumlah RM328,926.00. b) ganti rugi am. c) kos. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 d) faedah. Perbicaraan penuh di Mahkamah Sesyen: [6] Berdasarkan fakta kes, Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengenal past 3 isu untuk diputuskan oleh Mahkamah dan mencapai dapatannya. [7] Pada perenggan 307, 308 dan 309 Grounds of Judgment (GoJ), Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa Plaintif hanya layak memperoleh nominal damages in the amount of RM70,000.00 with interest (5% per annum on the judgement sums of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing summons until the date of full payment) and costs of the trial is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff.”. [8] Plaintif dan Defendan merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap keputusan Tn HMS. [9] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Notis Rayuan Plaintif dan Notis Rayuan Balas Defendan mengenai kekhilafan fakta dan undang-undang yang dikatakan dicapai oleh Tn HMS. [10] Bagi isu “timeline for the completion and the delivery”, Tn HMS telah meneliti Bill of Quantities Form (BOQ) yang merujuk kepada terma kontrak dan berdasarkan analisa terma Tn HMS mencapai dapatan dari segi fakta dan undang-undang bahawa wujud kelewatan oleh Defendan. Pada perenggan 45 GoJ, Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa “the defendant had repudiated the agreement under the BOQ Form by taking the position that it was not contractually bound to complete the works within certain period of time and there is no timeline to complete the installation works.”. [11] Berkenaan dengan kecacatan (defects) pada kerja Defendan, Tn HMS memperincikan mengenai kerja Defendan. [12] Apabila Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa Defendan telah melanggar terma kontrak, selanjutnya Tn HMS menggunapakai prinsip undang-undang dalam mengira ganti rugi yang diawardkan kepada Plaintif. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [13] Perayu (Chu Kok Wei) tidak berpuas hati dengan sebahagian keputusan Tn HMS. Dalam rayuan balas, Perayu (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) merayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Tn HMS yang mengawardkan ganti rugi nominal kepada Chu Kok Wei dan menyatakan bahawa kos sebanyak RM30,000.00 yang diawardkan itu adalah khilaf. Berdasarkan skala kos, kos hanyalah RM5,450.00. PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd merayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Tn HMS dan memohon agar tuntutan Plaintif terhadap ditolak. [14] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti hujahan bertulis dan mendengar hujahan lisan pihak-pihak, dengan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan seperti yang berikut: a) rayuan oleh Perayu Chu Kok Wei: Ganti rugi nominal yang diawardkan oleh Tn HMS dikekalkan dan ganti rugi khas yang ditolak oleh Tn HMS dikekalkan. Mahkamah ini membenarkan kos yang diawardkan oleh Tn HMS dikurangkan daripada RM30,000.00 kepada RM5,450.00. b) rayuan balas oleh PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd: ditolak. c) tiada kos rayuan dibenarkan kepada Perayu dan Perayu dalam rayuan balas. [7] The Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) is not happy and unsatisfied that I affirmed the SCj’s decision that the Plaintiff is only entitled for damages in the sum of RM70,000.00 (nominal damages) and interest of 5% per annum on the judgment sum of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing of summons until the date of full payment and costs. I have reversed the costs of the trial that is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [8] Here, I will write my reasons for that decisions and first and foremost, in the notice of appeal, the Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) stated – “… CHU KOK WEI, Perayu yang dinamakan di atas tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Rozi Binti Bainon yang diberikan di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam pada 5 Oktober 2023 merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap sebahagian sahaja daripada keputusan tersebut yang memutuskan bahawa – (i) awad oleh Mahkamah Sesyen hanya ganti rugi nominal sahaja dalam jumlah RM70,000-00, dikekalkan; (ii) penolakan Mahkamah Sesyen terhadap tuntutan Perayu untuk ganti rugi khas berjumlah RM518,847.64, atau tuntutan alternatifnya untuk pengembalian (restitution) jumlah RM423,137.38 yang dibayar oleh Perayu kepada Responden, dikekalkan; (iii) awad oleh Mahkamah Sesyen kos kepada Perayu dalam jumlah RM30,000-00, dikurangkan kepada RM5,450-00; (iv) berbangkit daripada keputusan di atas, bahawa tiada kos diawadkan kepada Perayu dalam prosiding Mahkamah Tinggi.”. [9] For the Defendant’s appeal, I will write my grounds of judgment separately. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 The Plaintiff’s claims as per the amended statement of claim [10] The Plaintiff is the house owner (bungalow) at Jalan Setiakasih, Bukit Damansara, Kuala Lumpur. [11] The Plaintiff has appointed the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd/PCOM), a company incorporated under the laws of Malaysia and having its registered address at Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. At all material times, PCOM was and is in the business of selling and installing ‘Smart Home Systems’ in residential and commercial properties. The Bill of Quantities Form/BOQ Form: [12] The Plaintiff’s Bungalow, i.e. a 4-storey building with built-up area of approximately 12,000 sq ft, began construction on 2015, and was completed in August 2018. [13] By way of BOQ Form dated 20-10-2016, the Plaintiff agreed to engage the Defendant, and the Defendant agreed to sell to the Plaintiff and install a Crestron Smart Home System with HOMEX technology (“the Smart Home System”) in the Bungalow which includes – (i) an integrated CCTV and alarm system (“Home Security System”); (ii) an integrated home automation system to control home appliances automatically or remotely (“Home Appliance Control System”); S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (iii) an integrated home entertainment system to control entertainment devices automatically or remotely (“AV Control and Distributions System”); (iv) an integrated climate / ambiance system to control heat, light intensity, motion and occupancy sensors automatically or remotely (“Climate / Ambiance System”); (v) a Network security system based on agreed network typology with WiFi access points to connect the above systems and to provide them with the protection of a firewall hardware and an appropriate logical sub-partitioning of network as desired by the Plaintiff (“Integrated Network System”); and (vi) all associated cabling and installation works required to ensure the proper installation and operation of all the above systems, which are to be integrated by way of a ‘Crestron’ system. [14] The Plaintiff aver that it was an express term of the BOQ Form that – (i) the installation work would cost approximately RM 439,981.62 (inclusive of 6% of GST) (“the final BOQ sum”); (ii) it would take approximately 12 weeks (4 weeks of wiring work + 8 weeks of installation work) to complete the said installations in the Bungalow; S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (iii) a down payment of 35% was to be paid to PCOM upon confirmation of the total quotation amount; (iv) an additional 30% was to be paid to PCOM upon final confirmation of the quotation for the hardware devices; (v) another 30% was to be paid to PCOM upon hardware delivery and commencement of installation; and (vi) the final 5% was to be paid to PCOM upon the Plaintiff’s approval of the installation work. [15] And according to the Plaintiff, it was an implied term of the BOQ Form that – (i) the hardware, software and/or electronic devices provided by PCOM would be fit for their intended purposes; (ii) the hardware, software and/or electronic devices provided by PCOM would be of satisfactory quality; (iii) the Smart Home System and the installation work would be carried out with reasonable care and skill; (iv) the wiring installation work carried out by PCOM would be of satisfactory quality; and S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (v) all installation work would comply with standards and best practices set by the Smart Home System equipment’s manufacturer, Crestron. [16] The Plaintiff relied on the relevant written laws governing the cabling and installation works as in the Electricity Regulations, 1994 made pursuant to the Electricity Supply Act, 1990 and specifically Regulations 15(1), 15(2), 15(6), 16, 18 and 35 which impose duties on PCOM to, inter alia, ensure that – (i) any apparatus, conductor (including cables) or accessory for the purpose of connection to an installation shall be sufficient in size, power and number for the purpose for which it is intended and shall be constructed, installed, arranged, protected, worked and maintained in such a manner to prevent danger [Regulation 15(1)]; (ii) any conductor shall be insulated and effectively protected or so placed in such a manner as to prevent danger [Regulation 15(2)]; (iii) any conductor or apparatus that is expose d to the weather and water shall be protected in such a manner as to prevent danger [Regulation 15(6)]; (iv) any fuse or circuit breaker shall be constructed and arranged in such a manner so as to break the current when it exceeds a given value for a sufficient time to prevent danger [Regulation 16]; S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (v) effective means shall be provided for making dead every part of the system and protecting the same from excess current [Regulation 18]; and (vi) a complete system of earthing conductors made of an acceptable material shall be provided, connected to the earth, and effectively maintained [Regulation 35]. [17] The Plaintiff supports its claims based on the following facts: A. Payment and Work Programme: (a) Since the engagement of PCOM in 2016, the Plaintiff had made payments totalling RM423,137.38 in 7 tranches (96.17% of the final BOQ sum) to PCOM and the details of the payments is spelt out in the table in the amended statement of claim. (b) at the material time, the site on which the bungalow is situated was ready to accommodate the installation works by PCOM and the wiring works of the Smart Home System had commenced thereafter. (c) the Defendant’s representatives were invited by the Plaintiff, and did participate in regular site meetings for progress updates and various job scheduling to ensure the installation of the Smart Home System would be completed based on the agreed timeline. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (d) on 24-10-2016, the initial BOQ sum was increased by RM52,258 to RM428,056.23 (“the 2nd BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by PCOM. (e) accordingly, additional payments were made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. (f) in April 2017, the 2nd BOQ sum was increased by RM2,544.00 to RM430,600.23 (“the 3rd BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. The Plaintiff paid. (g) on 28-2-2018, the 3rd BOQ sum was increased by RM6,254.00 to RM436,854.23 (“4th BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. (h) on 13-3-2018, the 4th BOQ sum was increased by RM3,127.00 to the final BOQ sum, RM 439,981.62, by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. (i) on 13 -3-2018 and 24-4-2018, the Plaintiff paid a sum totalling RM134,192.29 to the Defendant (30% of the final BOQ sum) upon hardware delivery and commencement of installation work by the Defendant. (j) therefore, the Plaintiff avers that the Defendant ought to have commenced its installation works upon payment of the sums by 24-4-2018 at the latest, with completion within 12 weeks, that is, by 24-7-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (k) at all material times, the Defendant and/or its employees and/or its agents had actual knowledge that the Plaintiff and his family would be moving into the bungalow by 3- 8-2018, and would therefore require the Smart Home System, particularly the security system, to be operational and properly functioning at that time. B. Late Completion and Defective Installation Work: (a) on 3-8-2018, upon moving into the bungalow with his family, the Plaintiff discovered the defects as follows: (i) the Home Security System and the Home Appliance Control System were not operational; and (ii) the installation work was not done properly or had not been performed with reasonable care and skill. (b) prior to the Plaintiff and his family move-in on 3-8-2018, there was no indication or at all by the Defendant and/or its employees, servants and/or agents that an extension of time was required for the Defendant to complete the installation work in the bungalow. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 C. The Meetings between the Parties: (a) 1st Meeting on 5-8-2018: Plaintiff immediately contacted Mr. Avan Tan, Senior Sales Account Manager of the Defendant and Mr. Eric Goh Ka Han, Regional Sales Director of the Defendant, who agreed to meet the Plaintiff at the bungalow on 5-8-2018. (b) 2nd Meeting on 6-8-2018: upon numerous requests by the Plaintiff, Mr. Guven Togan, Chief Executive Officer of the Defendant also agreed to meet him at the bungalow. (c) after the Defendant’s staff failed to turn up for work at the bungalow on 4-8-2018 despite not having completed their work, the Plaintiff again raised his grave concerns on the lack of progress of the works to Mr Avan Tan and demanded an updated work schedule to indicate the current state of the project, the remaining work and a timeline for completion. (d) Mr. Avan Tan indicated that the Defendant’s workers would come in to complete 4 components of the Smart Home System, namely CCTV, alarm, air conditioning and lighting, on 5-8-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 (e) on the morning of 5-8-2018, however, only 2 foreign workers attended the bungalow, and performed some checks which demonstrated that a substantial number of cables had not been successfully connected. On the same morning (5-8-2018), Mr. Rizal of the Defendant sent a revised work programme of the installation work to the Plaintiff, which stated that the Defendant’s installation work would only be completed by 28-9-2018, that is, almost 7 weeks after the Plaintiff had already moved into the Bungalow on 3-8-2018. (f) later, on that same evening (5-8-2018), the Defendant’s programmer, Mr Avan Tan and Mr Eric Goh attended the bungalow. The said programmer also confirmed that a substantial number of cables in the bungalow had not been successfully connected. (g) at the 2nd meeting, at or around 12 noon, the Plaintiff demanded from Mr. Guven Togan a copy of the system wiring diagram. During the said meeting, Mr Togan himself expressed shock at the rate of progress of the project, and in particular, that the Defendant had allowed the Plaintiff and his family to move into the bungalow on 3-8-2018 knowing that the Plaintiff would be relying on the integrated Home Security System, but without informing or advising the Plaintiff that that Home Security System was in fact not ready for use. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 (h) 3rd Meeting, on the same evening (6-8-2018) at or around 7 p.m., another meeting was held between the Plaintiff and the Defendant (Mr. Eric Goh and Mr. Avan Tan), when the consolidated BOQ Forms were provided to the Plaintiff. In the 3rd Meeting, the Defendant offered the Plaintiff a sum of approximately RM43,000.00 as compensation for the delay in the installation of the system and the Defendant’s breaches of the terms contained in the BOQ Form, which the Plaintiff did not accept. (i) 4th Meeting, on the afternoon of 7-8-2018, a meeting was held between the Plaintiff and the Defendant (Mr. Avan Tan), when Mr. Avan Tan wrongfully informed the Plaintiff that that BOQ Form apparently did not prescribe any timelines for the completion of the Smart Home System installation by the Defendant. The Plaintiff thereafter demanded that a copy of the system wiring diagrams be provided to him. (j) however, the Defendant refused and/or failed to comply with the Plaintiff’s demands, and merely handed over the system wiring diagrams and the information in relation to the Smart Home System installation works. The said diagrams were merely system schematic drawing and did not include any actual cable routing diagrams. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (k) the Plaintiff had to engage another contractor to complete the Installation Work. D. Discovery Of Defects And Rectification Works: (a) as a high-ranking officer of a financial institution with significant delegated authority in financial market/capital market activities, the Plaintiff pleaded that both the physical and digital security of the Plaintiff and his family are of utmost importance. (b) the bungalow was also especially exposed to risks of security breaches by reason of its size and location. Therefore, the Plaintiff has engaged 2 additional security guards to provide protection for the Plaintiff and his family, i.e. − (i) a professional IT security specialist to assess and mitigate the cyber security risks arising from the Network Security Defects; and (ii) a new Crestron authorised installer, Inthome Linc Solution (“Inthome”) to complete the unfinished work by PCOM, and rectify any defective works by PCOM (“Rectification Works”). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 E. Particulars of Network Security Defects: The Plaintiff has discovered the following significant defects in the network security (“Network Security Defects”) (resulting in cyber security risks) and installation (“Installation Defects”) of the Smart Home System by the Defendant: (i) Wi-Fi Network (ii) Router Administrator Authentication (iii) Host Enumeration (iv) Network Switch Configuration (v) Firewall Configuration (vi) CCTV System (vii) Dumpster Diving Risk F. Installation Defects: (a) in or about early December November 2018, Inthome installers informed the Plaintiff that a significant amount of cables installed by the Defendant were either faulty or did not follow the required engineering standards. The installation of cables by the Defendant were also in breach of the terms of the BOQ. (b) the significant Installation Defects by the Defendant and the consequential Rectification Work carried out by Inthome therein, were in respect of, inter alia, the following components of the Smart Home System: S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (i) Home Appliance Control System. (ii) Multi Room (6 zones) Audio Distribution System. (iii) Home Security System. (iv) General Cabling Works. (v) Equipment Rack. [18] By the matters aforesaid, the Plaintiff avers and particularize that the Defendant had breached the contract and statutory duties, negligence and undertaken express and/or implied contractual obligations, covenants and duties under the BOQ Form. The Defendant wrongfully failed to meet its contractual obligations under the BOQ Form and its Implied Terms and/or breached its statutory duties under inter alia regulations 15(1), 15(2), 15(6), 16, 18 and 35 of the Electricity Regulations 1994. The loss suffered by the Plaintiff: [19] By reason of the matters abovesaid, the Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage including but not limited to expenses by the Plaintiff in, amongst others, namely – (a) mitigating the physical hazards and/or cyber security risks arising from the Network Security Defects, CCTV and/or alarm defects, rectifying the Installation Defects, and mitigating his loss. (b) Special Damages as particularized at paragraph 50. (c) General Damages. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (d) Costs. (e) Interest for such period and at such rate as the Court deems fit. Errors made by the learned SCj [20] The Plaintiff has called 5 factual witnesses and 1 expert witness, and filed the corresponding witness statements/expert affidavit and the Defendant has called 3 witnesses. [21] The Plaintiff stated in its appeal that the learned trial Judge was plainly wrong in arriving at his decision in 6 critical areas, which warrants appellate intervention, namely − First: the learned trial Judge was plainly wrong in finding that the Plaintiff was not successful in proving the quantum of damages, and is therefore only entitled to nominal damages. The learned trial Judge failed to appreciate that evidence for the quantum of damages claimed were produced, and that the Plaintiff and his witnesses were never challenged by the Defendant on the validity, authenticity and reasonableness of the rectification costs for the defects in the installation of the smart home system, nor have the Defendant provided any alternative evidence as to what was a reasonable cost. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Second: the learned trial Judge also erred in law and in fact, in finding that the Defendant has a right to be given an opportunity to rectify the Installation Defects, and that the hiring of the new Crestron authorised installer, Inthome, is “too remote” or “indirect”. In fact, the Defendant was aware that the Plaintiff was looking to appoint another system integrator, and had no objection to it. The learned Judge failed to judiciously appreciate that the Plaintiff only had a duty to take all reasonable steps to mitigate his loss, and that a reasonable and prudent man in the position of the Plaintiff would not have the confidence to allow the Defendant to rectify the defects, given the Defendant’s prior conduct. Third: the learned Judge erred in finding that the Defendant had never agreed to supply a 4K video system to the Plaintiff, when the evidence shows from, inter alia, the proposals made by the Defendant’s sales person to the Plaintiff, that the accessories prescribed by the Defendant and the Whatsapp conversation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s sales person is that the Defendant was aware at all time that the Plaintiff requested for a 4K video system, and that the Defendant had misrepresented the video system purchased by the Plaintiff as being 4K compatible. Fourth: the learned trial judge erred in fact and in law, in finding that the “new system integrator” was a form of upgrade, when the Plaintiff was merely claiming for the cost to reinstate or place himself in the position in which he would have been had the Defendant performed its contractual obligations. In any event, the Defendant also had not pleaded upgrade or betterment in its Amended Defence. In the alternative, the learned judge ought to have at least S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 reduced the Plaintiff’s claim for the difference in sum for the ‘upgrade’. Fifth: the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact, in finding that the costs incurred by the Plaintiff to hire additional security guards due to the defective alarm system and CCTV is too remote and indirect. The Plaintiff is entitled to be put in the same position as if the alarm system and CCTV had been operational when he and his family moved into the bungalow, and the cost of additional security guards were therefore a foreseeable loss resulting from the defective alarm system and CCTV installed by the Defendant. Sixth: the learned trial Judge erred in finding that the Plaintiff has failed to prove the costs adjustment in the sum of RM16,028.00 from inappropriate or unnecessary items sold by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. The learned judge failed to judiciously appreciate that the Defendant did not plead unjust enrichment by the Plaintiff for not returning the said inappropriate or unnecessary equipment and items, or counterclaim for the same. [22] Therefore, whether the contentions by the Plaintiff that the learned SCj has made errors that the Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages in the sum of RM70,000.00; the Plaintiff is not entitled to his claim for special damages in the sum of RM518,847.64; or his alternative claim for restitution of the sum of RM423,137.38 paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant are to be determined at the appellate stage. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 The Sessions Court judge’s (the learned SCj) grounds of judgment [23] Based on the facts of the case, the learned SCj has identified the issues to be tried, namely − (a) whether the Defendant had repudiated the contract and whether the Plaintiff was entitled to treat the contract with the Defendant as having come to an end on 7-8-2018? (b) if the question in (a) is answered in the affirmative, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of rectification works? (c) whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim for damages? [24] The learned SCj held that the Defendant is bound to complete the works within the period stipulated in the BOQ Form. The Defendant has failed to meet the timeline; therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to treat the contract ended on 7-8-2018. [25] The reasons for arriving his findings of facts can be read from the paragraphs as follows: (a) in paragraph 22 of the learned SCj’s grounds of judgment held that – “22. The Court finds that it is unusual for any parties entering into contract without timeline for its completion. The terms of the delivery terms, though the actual date is not specifically stated in a form of day, month and year, the S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Defendant own interpretation stated that the wiring works to start within 4 weeks, upon receiving the 35% down payment from the Plaintiff which connotes timeline and ‘if the bungalow was ready for such works to be commenced’”. (b) via a WhatsApp chat group, all the contractors including the Defendant know about the coordination and synchronization in order to meet the dateline imposed by the Plaintiff (paragraph 24). (c) in paragraph 28 of the learned SCj’s grounds of judgment held that the Defendant’s own witness i.e. SD3 has admitted that the Defendant was in the knowledge that there was a completion date for the installation works when he prepared the Defendant’s work programme on the basis that it would complete the installation works at the bungalow together with all the other contractors on 30-9-2017. (d) in paragraph 38, the learned SCj disagree with the Defendant that the various ongoing works carried out by the other contractor contributed to the delay. According to the learned SCj, all contractors including the Defendant were required to work hand in hand to avoid any delay. Factors raised by the Defendant to have affected their delay was only raised for the first time in writing in the Defendant’s solicitors’ letter dated 30-8-2018 after the stop work order was issued by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [26] Be that as it may, in answering the issue “whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of rectification works”, the learned SCj wrote in length his grounds in arriving to his decisions on damages, and these can be read from paragraphs 46 to 167. [27] In my grounds of judgment I will highlight some of the following facts pertaining to the rectification works. I have read the SCj’s grounds of judgment where he has examined and analyzed the facts in details, namely − (a) through the evidences from both parties’ witnesses: The Plaintiff’s witnesses are − • Mr. Quah Zheng Wei, architect (SP-1). • Mr. Khoo Yoon Yin, programmer (SP-2). • Mr. Fong Choong Fook, an expert witness (SP-3). • Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4). • Mr. Baxter Oswald Anak Michael Jodi (SP-5). • Mr. Chu Kok Wei, the Plaintiff (SP-6). The Defendant’s witnesses are − • Mr. Guven Togan (SD-1). • Mr. Avan Tan Cheow Wee (SD-2). • Mr. Muhamad Khairul Rizal bin Abdul Karim (SD-3). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 (b) the witnesses had been testified via examination-in-chief, cross examination and re-examination about the facts on – • the defects in the installation of the Smart Home System; • inconsistency in implementation and the System Plotting Drawings; • meetings between both parties; • the Plaintiff’s ask the Defendant to stop work and leave the bungalow; • the Plaintiff’s demands (such as the Defendant to issue public apology to the Plaintiff; • compensation in the sum of RM140,000.00 being the forfeiture of all professional fees and the hardware cost of the security element of the Smart Home System; • cost for all wiring works by the Plaintiff’s own electricians; • installation of new hardware by a new installer, the Defendant to assist the new installer; • re-imbursement of all other costs incurred by the Plaintiff to achieve the state of security and usability (including the cost of engaging an additional security guard until the completion of the installation of the Smart Home System). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (c) the proposal by the Defendant’s vide its solicitors’ letter dated 30-8-2018 where the Defendant proposed that the new installer to be appointed to “conduct a buy-off of the work done” by the Defendant. However, this proposal was rejected by the Plaintiff and no reply to the Defendant solicitors’ letter. (d) the evidences pertaining to the rectification are – • the Plaintiff has engaged a professional IT security specialist to assess and mitigate the cyber security risks arising from the defects in the network security as installed and configured by the Defendant. • the Plaintiff has engaged Inthome as the new installer to complete the installation of the Smart Home System and to rectify the installation works through the recommendation of SP-2. • Mr. Khoo Yoon Yin, programmer (SP-2) was the Defendant software programmer to carry out the programming of the Smart Home System. SP-2 was retained by the Plaintiff to continue working on the programming of the Smart Home System. • the Plaintiff has engaged another contractor (Pro AV Works) to rectify the Multiroom Audio Distribution System together with Inthome. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 • the Plaintiff has engaged CNS Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd for the relaying of power cables. CNS Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd also assisting Inthome in the relaying of data and audio cables. • the Plaintiff has engaged Mr. Tam Pak Cheong as the Clerk of Works to oversee and coordinate the rectification works. Mr. Tam Pak Cheong was also the Clerk of Works for the construction of the bungalow. (e) Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4) testified that the cost of all rectification works carried out by Inthome amounted to RM265,169.00. (f) the learned SCj has taken into consideration after hearing the Defendant’s defence and its witnesses, where the following facts are extracted: • the Defendant was forced to leave the site, no damage to the tamper switches and cables were detected. No sufficient particulars as to what anti-tamper switches the Plaintiff is referring to nor what kind of damage the Plaintiff is alleging. • with regard to the empty cases, the Defendant stated that they were in the midst of testing and terminating the cables into the cases. However, the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site on 7-8-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 • with regard to the installation of sensors, the Defendant stated that they had installed the sensors correctly as per the System Plotting Drawing/Device Plotting Layout. And the final positioning of sensors will be subject to the final condition of the site and may require changes as per the Plaintiff’s instructions. And the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site. On the issue of the adhesive for the installation of the sensors, the Defendant had used the adhesive as provided by the manufacturer of the sensors. Therefore, there is no issue that the adhesive is inappropriate. • with regard to the non-weatherproof indoor motion sensor, the Defendant stated that it would depend on the installation circumstances. In areas that were fully exposed to sun and rain, the Defendant had installed weatherproof sensors at outdoors areas that were not exposed to sun and rain, namely ceiling mounted to outdoor roofs. The cables were installed inside the ceiling of the outdoor roofs and were also not exposed to sun and rain. • with regard to the CCTV at the guardhouse and outdoor area of the ground floor, the Defendant stated that during the time the Defendant was forced to leave the site, it was all in good working order. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 • with regard to install the firewall for the entire Smart Home System, the Defendant stated that the firewall only can be installed once the whole system is configured and implemented. Otherwise, it will expose the firewall to outside risk of malware or hackers and weaken the firewall. • with regard to the CCTV, the Defendant contended that the CCTV were only activated within the closed local circuit (“LAN”) and had not been exposed to any external access or compromised in any manner and the Defendant had yet to complete the network configuration. • with regard to the air-conditioning at certain locations in the bungalow were not functioning, SP-4 and SD-3 had testified and Inthome had completed the cable installation, re-terminated the IR cables with solder and wrapping the terminations with a layer of heat shrink tube. The works on configuration and testing of the air- conditioning control were still in progress. However, the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site with the stop order by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 • with regards to lighting defects, SD-3 and SP-1 had testified on the issue about the light fitting drawings. The Defendant’s witness (SD-3) blamed the electrical contractor (CNS). However, no drawings or documents from CNS were adduced by the Defendant to show that CNS required the Defendant to supply dimmable dins at the first floor of the bungalow. • with regards to momentary switches defects, Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4) had rectified the momentary switches and SP-2 had programmed them to function as intended. However, the Defendant stated that when they were forced to leave the site on 7-8- 2018, the momentary switches were properly connected to the terminal block and were working as intended. The Defendant avers that the momentary switches can be re-programmed to suit the Plaintiff’s needs. (g) other than the above defects, the other defects and rectification works had been examined by the learned SCj, where both Plaintiff and Defendant had argued regarding the roller shutter, Switch Socket Outlet (SSO) control, Crestron keypads, motorized projector screen, overloading and poor termination of power cables, excessive data cables length, dumpster diving risk, alarm and control system, curtain control system, lighting control system, TV control and AV distribution system, and general cabling work. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 The High Court’s decision [28] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff has laid out the summary of the evidences in the table format as attached in Appendixes A and B. This Court also finds that the learned SCj did studied the evidences after hearing the trial. [29] LAW OF EVIDENCE: “HE WHO CLAIMS, PROVES”: the fundamental principle of the law of evidence is that the burden of proving a fact is on the person claiming the existence of that said fact, except where it is stipulated by any law that the proof of that fact lies on another person. [30] This evidentiary principle of “he who claims, proves” is entrenched in the Evidence Act 1950. Sections 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. [31] The Court of Appeal in Poratha Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Technofit Sdn Bhd [2018] AMEJ 0214 [2019] 1 LNS 941; [2020] 1 MLJ 74, reiterated this principle. It held that the party claiming damages bears the burden of proving the fact and the quantum of the damages suffered and that if the claimant only succeeds in proving the fact and not the quantum, it will only be entitled to nominal damages. Y.A Hasnah Hashim JCA (as she then was) in delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal held – “[44] It is trite law that the party claiming damages bears the burden of proving the fact and quantum of damages suffered. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [45] The defendant bears the burden of proving both the fact and the amount of damages suffered as a result of the breach by the plaintiff. Special damages unlike general damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, and recoverable only where they can be included in the proper measure of damages …”. [32] In Chang Hang Guan & Ors. v. Perumahan Falim (Penang) Sdn Bhd [1994] 1 CLJ 19, Edgar Joseph Jr held− “When a plaintiff claims damages from a defendant, he has to show that the loss in respect of which he claims damages was caused by the defendant’s wrong and also that the damages are not too remote to be recoverable. Where precise evidence is obtainable, the court naturally expects to have it, where it is not, the court must do the best it can. General difficulty of proof does not dispense with the necessity for proof.”. [33] In arriving to the decision, the delay in finishing and completing the works was proven by the Plaintiff. I agree. This Court should and never will interfere with this finding. [34] Now, to answer whether the awarding of the damages by the learned SCj is correct? Paragraph 174 to 206 in his grounds of judgment stated the application of the law to the fact. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 [35] The learned SCj starts its reasons as follows: “174. The law on damages for breach of contract is trite. the law on damages is set out in s. 74 of the Contract Act 1950. Pursuant to the provision, compensation can only be awarded against the guilty party for breach of contract if the loss or damage suffered by the other party satisfies two conditions. 175. The first condition is that it arises naturally in the usual course of things from the breach or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. 176. The second condition is that it is not to remote or indirect. When a contract has been broken, the party suffers by the breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. 177. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. It is trite law that the party seeking damages bears the burden of proving both the fact and quantum of damages, which the plaintiff is claiming. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 178. If the plaintiff fails to prove the fact of damage, its claim for damages will fail. However, if the plaintiff only succeeds in proving the fact but not the quantum of damages, it will only be entitled to nominal damages.”. [36] The learned SCj refers to few cases on damages that are Popular Industries Ltd. v. The Eastern Garment Manufacturing Co. Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 CLJ (rep) 635; Leong Hin Enterprise Sdn Bhd v. Chevron Malaysia Ltd [2018] MLJU 1747. [37] Paragraphs 181 to 206 of the SCj’s grounds of judgment did explain the reasons why he only awarded the nominal damages to the Plaintiff. The re-hearing @ appellate stage: [38] The Appellant (Chu Kok Wei) and the Respondent (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) had submit verbally and also filed their written submissions accordingly. [39] It is true that the Plaintiff has issued the Stop Work Order on 7-8- 2018 and forced the Defendant’s team to leave the Plaintiff’s bungalow. The Defendant contends that they are not given the opportunity to perform any rectification and/or repairs to the alleged defects claimed by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [40] This Court finds that the defects are not just the allegations by the Plaintiff, the particulars and details of the defects already proved by the Plaintiff. I will not interfere with the finding of the learned SCj on the defects. The parties had been given opportunity to prove their case accordingly at the trial court. [41] The case of Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd v Sun-Jaya M & E Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 136 cited by the learned counsel for the Defendant is applicable in this present case. In Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd, the Court at paragraphs 138 and 139, page 201 held that a contractor shall be given opportunity to rectify the defects before the employer can get services of a third party to rectify those defects. [42] Here, the Plaintiff had engaged and appointed the new contractor and installer and/or new system integrator to continue the works and the discussion between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to reach an amicable settlement pertaining to the works came to end when the Defendant was “chased out” from continuing with the works as per the contract. [43] Due to the Plaintiff’s act for preventing the Defendant to rectify the defects, the learned counsel for the Defendant refer to section 54 of the Contracts Act 1950 and cited the decisions in the cases of Mah Sau Cheong v. Tan Eng Chin [2019] 1 LNS 560; Yuk Tung Construction Sdn Bhd v. Daya CMT Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1314 where the Court gave judgment on the principle of “Prevention Principle” where a party cannot insist on the performance of a contractual obligation by the other if it is itself the cause of the non-performance; MS Elevators Engineering Sdn. Bhd. v Jasmurni Construction Sdn. Bhd. [2022] 1 LNS 815. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 [44] In re-hearing of this appeal by the Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei), this Court has agreed with the finding of facts by the learned SCj that the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) is held liable for the defects in performing its obligation to complete the Smart Home System for the Plaintiff. [45] However, the quantum of damages as sought by the Plaintiff as per the statement of claim namely, − (i) Special Damages in the amount of RM115,796.60 for hiring additional security guards from 13-8-2018 to end of September 2019 to ensure the safety of the Plaintiff and his family; (ii) costs of engaging the IT specialist; (iii) RM387,023.00 as the costs of rectifying the installation defects; (iv) RM16,028.00 as costs adjustment from inappropriate or unnecessary items sold by the Defendant; (v) General Damages for breach of the BOQ Form, negligence and fraudulent and/or reckless misrepresentation; (vi) further and/or in the alternative, the sum of RM423,137.38 to be restituted to the Plaintiff; and (vii) costs and interest, S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 are too excessive after considering the circumstances and chronology of events in this case. [46] In reaching to its decision, the learned SCj has evaluating the original suit and also the counter claim suit. [47] The BOQ Form/s had stipulated the amounts to be paid and the installation works were defective, therefore, the learned SCj concluded that the sum that can be claimed by the Plaintiff is only RM70,000.00 is sufficient. [48] The Defendant has proved that for the Smart Home System as at 7-8-2018 was estimated at RM395,953.38 and this is equivalent to 89.99% of the total contract work value, including Variation Orders. (See the delivery orders refer to all materials, equipment and items sent to the Bungalow for the Smart Home System at RR3(5), pages 118 to 148). [49] At the appellate stage, the learned counsel for the Defendant submits that the payment terms agreed between the parties are not based on the value of works done but rather the milestones achieved, which the Defendant exceeds 95% holistically. Thus, the Defendant is entitled to retain all the sums paid by the Respondent before this. And, to date, the Plaintiff also did not return any of the Defendant’s items and/or materials alleged to be defective and/or unnecessary. As such, this contradicts the Plaintiff’s position that he is not satisfied with the Defendant’s works up until the Stop Work Order was issued. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 Principles of appellate intervention [50] In the case of Ahmad Zulfendi bin Anuar v. Mohd Shahril bin Abdul Rahman [2022] 4 MLJ 892, the High Court held − “[7] The central feature of appellate intervention is well- established. It is to ascertain whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the evidence and on the basis of the governing law. The Federal Court in the case of Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, where the Federal Court held as follows: [14] In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention, ie to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase ‘insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence’ melerly related to such process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal’s restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention, ie that a decision arrived at by a S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test. [8] Thus in Kerajaan Malaysia v. Global Upline Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2017] 1 MLJ 170 the Court of Appeal held that an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its conclusion and where there has been insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. [9] In the leading case of Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 the Federal Court affirmed with unmistakable clarity that the principle on which an appellate court could intervene with findings of fact by the trial court is ‘the plainly wrong test’ principle. [10] This important principle involves a number of circumstances, but must necessarily extends to situations where it can be shown that the impugned decision is vitiated with plain material errors, or where crucial evidence had been miscontrued, or where the trial judge had so manifestly not taken proper advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses or not properly analysed the entirely of the evidence before him, or where a decision was arrived without adequate judicial appreciation of the evidence such as to make it rationally unsupportable. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 [11] Above all, the Federal Court in Ng Hoo Kui established that the criterion that is central to appellate intervention must remain that deference to the trier of fact is still the rule and not the exception. And the plainly wrong test should not be used by the appellate court as a means to substitute the impugned decision with its own.”. [51] In re-hearing of the appeal before me, I have applied the test of “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence” in relation to the process of determining whether the Sessions Court had arrived at its decision or findings correctly on the basis of the relevant law and the established evidence (see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309). [52] The conclusion made by the learned SCj is in accordance with the law, there is no gross error made by the learned SCj. I would like to quote the following: (a) in the case of Ineax Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Ineax Process Sdn Bhd And Ng Wee Keat (Third Party) [2017] 1 LNS 1187, the High Court has referred to the leading decision of the Court of Appeal in Juahir Sadikon v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Johor [1996] 4 CLJ 1 which reaffirms the rule that “he who asserts must prove”, whereby Siti Norma Yaakob JCA (as she then was) instructively held as follows: S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 “He who alleges must prove such allegation and the onus is on the appellant to do so. See section 103 of the Act. Thus, it is incumbent upon the appellant to produce Tan Sri Basir as his witness to prove the allegation. The fact that the appellant was unable to secure the attendance of Tan Sri Basir as a witness does not shift the burden to the respondent to produce the witness and testify as to what he had uttered, as firstly, the respondent never raised such an allegation and, secondly, has denied even making one. For this very reason, the adverse inference under section 114 (g) of the Act relied upon by the appellant cannot be accepted as establishing that if the witness had been produced, his evidence would work against the respondent. There is no obligation in law for the respondent to produce the witness as that obligation rests with the appellant, the party who alleges, and the fact that the appellant was unable to do so is fatal to his case. For this very reason too, the adverse inference under section 114 (g) is invoked against the appellant.”. Further, in the same case, the High Court referred to the following passage from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Pernec Ebiz Sdn Bhd v. CCI Technology Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 2 MLJ 117− “Even though the burden upon a plaintiff in a civil suit is only to prove its case upon a balance of probabilities, it must present its case sufficiently clearly to do so. It S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 cannot merely file pleadings, file bundles of documents, proceed to trial, call witnesses to testify and argue on the various issues and expect the court to make out the case on its own for one party or the other. The submissions failed to analyze the pleadings, the facts and the evidence as against the issues requiring a decision, and to tabulate the same so that a logical and reasoned decision could be made that satisfied the fundamental requirement of a fair and just decision. Where the party upon whom the burden of proving its case lies fails to do so, it fails to prove its case and its action must be dismissed.”. (b) in the case of Heritage Grand Vacation Club Bhd V. Pacific Fantasy Vacation Sdn Bhd [2016] 7 CLJ 679, the Court of Appeal laid down the principles on pleading − “[4] It is well-established that it is not the function of the court to build a case for the plaintiff/defendant inconsistent with the pleaded case. In Yew Wan Leong v. Lai Kok Chye [1990] 1 CLJ 1113, the Supreme Court had in strong terms held, and which still stands as a ‘gold standard’ in pleading rules and evidence, as follows: It is not the duty of the court to make out a case for one of the parties when the party concerned does not raise or wish to raise the point. In disposing of a suit or matter involving a disputed question of fact, it is S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 not proper for the court to displace the case made by a party in its pleadings and give effect to an entirely new case which the party had not made out in its own pleadings. The trial of a suit should be confined to the pleas on which the parties are at variance. [5] The above case must be seen to be the ‘gold standard’ for pleading rules and is consistent with a long line of authorities from England as well as Malaysia. (See Janagi v. Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 1 LNS 42; Lee Ah Chor v. Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 667; KEP Mohamed Ali v. KEP Mohamed Ismail [1980] 1 LNS 169). In Recaliva Design Steel (M) Sdn Bhd v. Vista Access Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 10 CLJ 491, the High Court held that on pleading rules and issues to be tried made the following observations: After having heard the evidence of the defendants, it is crystal clear to me that the version defendants attempted to project to me was never part of their defence. In such circumstances, the court is not obliged to consider in its judgment, stories which are not reflective of the pleadings. Pleadings are essential foundation to analyse disputes. Evidence must relate to pleadings and/or directly relevant to pleadings. The court is not concerned what issues the parties have framed for the determination of the court, when such issues cannot be reflective of the issues to be dealt with pursuant to the pleadings. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 [6] This ‘gold standard’ also plays an important part when parties as per the pleadings have agreed to the issues to be tried. That is to say, the issues to be tried must be as per the pleadings or arising from the pleadings and cannot be one which can be said to be the unpleaded case of the parties. The ‘gold standard’ has a number of exceptions in a restricted sense and those exceptions are not meant to override the ‘gold standard’ for pleading rules in all aspects.”. (c) in the case of Zainuddin Bin Uyub Dan Jalil Bin Tumirin [2009] 1 LNS 1139, the High Court cited the Court of Appeal case, Karumalay Vanniyan & Anor v. Ananthan Rethinam [2005] 2 CLJ 429, which was held – “A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. If there are contemporary documents, then he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. A trier of fact who makes findings based purely upon the demeanour of a witness S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 without undertaking a critical analysis of what witness’s evidence runs the risk of having his findings corrected on appeal. It does not matter whether the issue for decision is one that arises in a civil or criminal case: the approach to judicial appreciation of evidence is the same. There are a number of important and leading cases in which the point has been considered.”. (d) the principles of “the best evidence rule” must be applied. In the case of Juta Damai Sdn Bhd v. Permodalan Negeri Selangor Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 318, the Court of Appeal held − “Returning to the question of proof, we observe that there is no provision that requires that such loss is only provable by production of receipts. The best evidence rule requires proof not by the ‘best evidence’ but by the ‘best evidence available’. The unavailability of receipts was explained on the grounds the receipts were not kept for more than six years. The explanation is not inherently implausible.”. (e) the case of Telekom Malaysia Bhd v. KLK Electronic Sdn Bhd [2019] 4 MLJ 631 pertaining to the burden of proof. The decision of the Court of Appeal held – “[35] It is fundamental principle of law that in a civil case, the legal burden of proof lies on the party who brings the claim. The evidential burden may shift to the S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 defendant once the plaintiff has established prima facie case.”. Conclusion [53] For the reasons given above, I see no good reason to interfere on the whole findings of the learned SCj’s finding on the quantum of damages. [54] Only part of the learned SCj’s findings that is the costs of the trial at the Sessions Court at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff is reversed and/or set aside and this Court allows costs is RM5,450-00 payable to the Plaintiff. Dated: 29 November 2023. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam NCvC12 S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 The Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Lai Wei Shiung Messrs.Tommy Thomas, Kuala Lumpur For the Defendant: Nur Muhaimin binti Mohd Husaimi with her, Sri Richgopinath & Joel Lim Messrs. Joel & Mei, Kuala Lumpur S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	69,350	Tika 2.6.0
BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023	PERAYU PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd RESPONDEN Chu Kok Wei	CONTRACT: Appeal from the Subordinate Court – Whether the Defendant had repudiated the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) Forms and Variation Orders? – Issue on the defects of works – Whether non-performance of works is caused by the Plaintiff that forced the Defendant to leave the site – Whether the Defendant had repudiated the contract and be held liable? − The test of “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence”.	29/11/2023	YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=54408d88-6409-470c-8ac7-0502f98cfb02&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023 ANTARA CHU KOK WEI (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) − PERAYU DAN PCOM PACIFIC SDN BHD (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − RESPONDEN (Dalam perkara mengenai Rayuan Sivil No.: BA-12BNCVC-8-04/2023 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam Antara PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − Perayu Dan Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) – Responden) (Dalam perkara mengenai Rayuan Sivil No.: BA-12BNCVC-7-04/2023 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam Antara Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) – Perayu 29/11/2023 10:33:29 BA-12BNCvC-8-04/2023 Kand. 39 S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Dan PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) − Responden) (Disatukan menurut Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 16 June 2023 Diputuskan oleh Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Rozi Binti Bainon di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 5 Oktober 2023) (Dalam perkara mengenai Guaman Sivil No.: BA-B52NCvC-334-09/2019 Di Mahkamah Sesyen di Shah Alam Antara Chu Kok Wei (No K/P: 741216-10-5775) − Plaintif Dan PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat: 493171-U) – Defendan Diputuskan oleh Hakim Ishak bin Bakri pada 17 Mac 2023 di Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant appeal against the decision of the Shah Alam Sessions Court handed down on 17-3-2023 after a full trial. [2] The Sessions Court judge (SCj) decided as follows: (a) Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) has been successful, on balance of probabilities, to prove that the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Bhd) had repudiated the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) Forms and Variation Orders by taking a position that there is no timeline in completing the works and there are defective works by the Defendant. (b) however, the learned SCj held that the Defendant was not be given an opportunity to rectify the defects before the Plaintiff appointed a new contractor to rectify the defects and to complete the unfinished works by the Defendant. (c) in terms of damages, the SCj finds that the Plaintiff is successful in proving the fact but not the quantum of damages, thus Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages. (d) the SCj make a ruling that the Plaintiff is only entitled for nominal damages in the amount of RM70,000.00 with interest and costs. (e) the SCj allows the interest of 5% per annum on the judgment sum of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing of summons until the date of full payment and costs. (f) costs of the trial is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The appeal at the Shah Alam High Court (SAHC): [3] The Defendant has filed its appeal at SAHC NCvC11 and the Plaintiff has filed its appeal before this Court (SAHC NCvC12). The case at SAHC NCvC11 has been transferred to this Court and the hearing of these 2 appeals are before me. [4] The parties are given full opportunity to explain and clarify each of their issues pertaining to the errors made by the learned SCj. I have listened to their verbal submissions, read their written submissions, cause papers and the grounds of judgment by the learned SCj. [5] For the purpose of this grounds of judgment both the Parties are refer to as Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) and the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd). [6] On 5-10-2023, my decisions are as follows via eReview: [1] Dua rayuan daripada keputusan Tuan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bijaksana (selepas ini disebut “Tn HMS”) didengar bersama iaitu Rayuan No. 7 yang difailkan di MTSA NCvC11 telah dipindahkan untuk didengar bersama-sama dengan Rayuan No. 8 di Mahkamah ini. [2] Tuntutan Plaintif (Chu Kok Wei) yang difailkan di Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam terhadap Defendan (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) telah didengar melalui perbicaraan penuh. [3] Plaintif (Chu Kok Wei) sebagai pemilik banglo 4 tingkat di Bukit Damansara telah mengambil khidmat Defendan (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) untuk memasang (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) suatu Sistem Rumah Pintar Crestron dengan teknologi HOMEX (selepas ini disebut “Sistem Rumah Pintar”) dalam banglo tersebut. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [4] Plaintif memplidkan fakta mengenai – a) pembayaran dan program kerja di mana pada perenggan 14 pernyataan tuntutan menyatakan “setelah pembayaran jumlah yang diterangkan di atas pada 24-4-2018, dengan penyiapan dalam masa 12 minggu iaitu pada 24-7-2018.”. b) Defendan mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa Plaintif dan keluarganya akan berpindah masuk ke banglo tersebut pada 3-8-2018 maka Sistem Rumah Pintar perlu tersedia siap. c) pada 3-8-2018 Plaintif mendapati sistem sekuriti rumah dan sistem kawalan peralatan rumah tidak beroperasi dan kerja pemasangan tidak dibuat dengan betul atau tidak dengan kemahiran yang munasabah. d) hasil perbincangan, kerja pemasangan hanya dapat disiapkan pada 28-9-2018 (hampir 7 minggu selepas Plaintif dan keluarganya berpindah masuk ke banglo tersebut). e) terdapat 4 mesyuarat diadakan antara Plaintif dan Defendan. f) penemuan Plaintif mengenai kecacatan sekuriti rangkaian, kecacatan pemasangan dan kerja pembaikan. [5] Kausa tindakan terhadap Defendan ialah perlanggaran kontrak dan kewajipan berkanun dan kecuaian. Relief yang dipohon adalah – a) ganti rugi khas bagi kos menggunakan pengawal keselamatan berjumlah RM115,796.64; kos melantik pakar IT, kos untuk membaiki kecacatan pemasangan berjumlah RM328,926.00. b) ganti rugi am. c) kos. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 d) faedah. Perbicaraan penuh di Mahkamah Sesyen: [6] Berdasarkan fakta kes, Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengenal past 3 isu untuk diputuskan oleh Mahkamah dan mencapai dapatannya. [7] Pada perenggan 307, 308 dan 309 Grounds of Judgment (GoJ), Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa Plaintif hanya layak memperoleh nominal damages in the amount of RM70,000.00 with interest (5% per annum on the judgement sums of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing summons until the date of full payment) and costs of the trial is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff.”. [8] Plaintif dan Defendan merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap keputusan Tn HMS. [9] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Notis Rayuan Plaintif dan Notis Rayuan Balas Defendan mengenai kekhilafan fakta dan undang-undang yang dikatakan dicapai oleh Tn HMS. [10] Bagi isu “timeline for the completion and the delivery”, Tn HMS telah meneliti Bill of Quantities Form (BOQ) yang merujuk kepada terma kontrak dan berdasarkan analisa terma Tn HMS mencapai dapatan dari segi fakta dan undang-undang bahawa wujud kelewatan oleh Defendan. Pada perenggan 45 GoJ, Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa “the defendant had repudiated the agreement under the BOQ Form by taking the position that it was not contractually bound to complete the works within certain period of time and there is no timeline to complete the installation works.”. [11] Berkenaan dengan kecacatan (defects) pada kerja Defendan, Tn HMS memperincikan mengenai kerja Defendan. [12] Apabila Tn HMS memutuskan bahawa Defendan telah melanggar terma kontrak, selanjutnya Tn HMS menggunapakai prinsip undang-undang dalam mengira ganti rugi yang diawardkan kepada Plaintif. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [13] Perayu (Chu Kok Wei) tidak berpuas hati dengan sebahagian keputusan Tn HMS. Dalam rayuan balas, Perayu (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) merayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Tn HMS yang mengawardkan ganti rugi nominal kepada Chu Kok Wei dan menyatakan bahawa kos sebanyak RM30,000.00 yang diawardkan itu adalah khilaf. Berdasarkan skala kos, kos hanyalah RM5,450.00. PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd merayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Tn HMS dan memohon agar tuntutan Plaintif terhadap ditolak. [14] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti hujahan bertulis dan mendengar hujahan lisan pihak-pihak, dengan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan seperti yang berikut: a) rayuan oleh Perayu Chu Kok Wei: Ganti rugi nominal yang diawardkan oleh Tn HMS dikekalkan dan ganti rugi khas yang ditolak oleh Tn HMS dikekalkan. Mahkamah ini membenarkan kos yang diawardkan oleh Tn HMS dikurangkan daripada RM30,000.00 kepada RM5,450.00. b) rayuan balas oleh PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd: ditolak. c) tiada kos rayuan dibenarkan kepada Perayu dan Perayu dalam rayuan balas. [7] The Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) is not happy and unsatisfied that I affirmed the SCj’s decision that the Plaintiff is only entitled for damages in the sum of RM70,000.00 (nominal damages) and interest of 5% per annum on the judgment sum of RM70,000.00 from the date of filing of summons until the date of full payment and costs. I have reversed the costs of the trial that is fixed at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [8] Here, I will write my reasons for that decisions and first and foremost, in the notice of appeal, the Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei) stated – “… CHU KOK WEI, Perayu yang dinamakan di atas tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Rozi Binti Bainon yang diberikan di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam pada 5 Oktober 2023 merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap sebahagian sahaja daripada keputusan tersebut yang memutuskan bahawa – (i) awad oleh Mahkamah Sesyen hanya ganti rugi nominal sahaja dalam jumlah RM70,000-00, dikekalkan; (ii) penolakan Mahkamah Sesyen terhadap tuntutan Perayu untuk ganti rugi khas berjumlah RM518,847.64, atau tuntutan alternatifnya untuk pengembalian (restitution) jumlah RM423,137.38 yang dibayar oleh Perayu kepada Responden, dikekalkan; (iii) awad oleh Mahkamah Sesyen kos kepada Perayu dalam jumlah RM30,000-00, dikurangkan kepada RM5,450-00; (iv) berbangkit daripada keputusan di atas, bahawa tiada kos diawadkan kepada Perayu dalam prosiding Mahkamah Tinggi.”. [9] For the Defendant’s appeal, I will write my grounds of judgment separately. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 The Plaintiff’s claims as per the amended statement of claim [10] The Plaintiff is the house owner (bungalow) at Jalan Setiakasih, Bukit Damansara, Kuala Lumpur. [11] The Plaintiff has appointed the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd/PCOM), a company incorporated under the laws of Malaysia and having its registered address at Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. At all material times, PCOM was and is in the business of selling and installing ‘Smart Home Systems’ in residential and commercial properties. The Bill of Quantities Form/BOQ Form: [12] The Plaintiff’s Bungalow, i.e. a 4-storey building with built-up area of approximately 12,000 sq ft, began construction on 2015, and was completed in August 2018. [13] By way of BOQ Form dated 20-10-2016, the Plaintiff agreed to engage the Defendant, and the Defendant agreed to sell to the Plaintiff and install a Crestron Smart Home System with HOMEX technology (“the Smart Home System”) in the Bungalow which includes – (i) an integrated CCTV and alarm system (“Home Security System”); (ii) an integrated home automation system to control home appliances automatically or remotely (“Home Appliance Control System”); S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (iii) an integrated home entertainment system to control entertainment devices automatically or remotely (“AV Control and Distributions System”); (iv) an integrated climate / ambiance system to control heat, light intensity, motion and occupancy sensors automatically or remotely (“Climate / Ambiance System”); (v) a Network security system based on agreed network typology with WiFi access points to connect the above systems and to provide them with the protection of a firewall hardware and an appropriate logical sub-partitioning of network as desired by the Plaintiff (“Integrated Network System”); and (vi) all associated cabling and installation works required to ensure the proper installation and operation of all the above systems, which are to be integrated by way of a ‘Crestron’ system. [14] The Plaintiff aver that it was an express term of the BOQ Form that – (i) the installation work would cost approximately RM 439,981.62 (inclusive of 6% of GST) (“the final BOQ sum”); (ii) it would take approximately 12 weeks (4 weeks of wiring work + 8 weeks of installation work) to complete the said installations in the Bungalow; S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (iii) a down payment of 35% was to be paid to PCOM upon confirmation of the total quotation amount; (iv) an additional 30% was to be paid to PCOM upon final confirmation of the quotation for the hardware devices; (v) another 30% was to be paid to PCOM upon hardware delivery and commencement of installation; and (vi) the final 5% was to be paid to PCOM upon the Plaintiff’s approval of the installation work. [15] And according to the Plaintiff, it was an implied term of the BOQ Form that – (i) the hardware, software and/or electronic devices provided by PCOM would be fit for their intended purposes; (ii) the hardware, software and/or electronic devices provided by PCOM would be of satisfactory quality; (iii) the Smart Home System and the installation work would be carried out with reasonable care and skill; (iv) the wiring installation work carried out by PCOM would be of satisfactory quality; and S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (v) all installation work would comply with standards and best practices set by the Smart Home System equipment’s manufacturer, Crestron. [16] The Plaintiff relied on the relevant written laws governing the cabling and installation works as in the Electricity Regulations, 1994 made pursuant to the Electricity Supply Act, 1990 and specifically Regulations 15(1), 15(2), 15(6), 16, 18 and 35 which impose duties on PCOM to, inter alia, ensure that – (i) any apparatus, conductor (including cables) or accessory for the purpose of connection to an installation shall be sufficient in size, power and number for the purpose for which it is intended and shall be constructed, installed, arranged, protected, worked and maintained in such a manner to prevent danger [Regulation 15(1)]; (ii) any conductor shall be insulated and effectively protected or so placed in such a manner as to prevent danger [Regulation 15(2)]; (iii) any conductor or apparatus that is expose d to the weather and water shall be protected in such a manner as to prevent danger [Regulation 15(6)]; (iv) any fuse or circuit breaker shall be constructed and arranged in such a manner so as to break the current when it exceeds a given value for a sufficient time to prevent danger [Regulation 16]; S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (v) effective means shall be provided for making dead every part of the system and protecting the same from excess current [Regulation 18]; and (vi) a complete system of earthing conductors made of an acceptable material shall be provided, connected to the earth, and effectively maintained [Regulation 35]. [17] The Plaintiff supports its claims based on the following facts: A. Payment and Work Programme: (a) Since the engagement of PCOM in 2016, the Plaintiff had made payments totalling RM423,137.38 in 7 tranches (96.17% of the final BOQ sum) to PCOM and the details of the payments is spelt out in the table in the amended statement of claim. (b) at the material time, the site on which the bungalow is situated was ready to accommodate the installation works by PCOM and the wiring works of the Smart Home System had commenced thereafter. (c) the Defendant’s representatives were invited by the Plaintiff, and did participate in regular site meetings for progress updates and various job scheduling to ensure the installation of the Smart Home System would be completed based on the agreed timeline. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (d) on 24-10-2016, the initial BOQ sum was increased by RM52,258 to RM428,056.23 (“the 2nd BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by PCOM. (e) accordingly, additional payments were made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. (f) in April 2017, the 2nd BOQ sum was increased by RM2,544.00 to RM430,600.23 (“the 3rd BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. The Plaintiff paid. (g) on 28-2-2018, the 3rd BOQ sum was increased by RM6,254.00 to RM436,854.23 (“4th BOQ sum”) by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. (h) on 13-3-2018, the 4th BOQ sum was increased by RM3,127.00 to the final BOQ sum, RM 439,981.62, by way of a variation order issued by the Defendant. (i) on 13 -3-2018 and 24-4-2018, the Plaintiff paid a sum totalling RM134,192.29 to the Defendant (30% of the final BOQ sum) upon hardware delivery and commencement of installation work by the Defendant. (j) therefore, the Plaintiff avers that the Defendant ought to have commenced its installation works upon payment of the sums by 24-4-2018 at the latest, with completion within 12 weeks, that is, by 24-7-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (k) at all material times, the Defendant and/or its employees and/or its agents had actual knowledge that the Plaintiff and his family would be moving into the bungalow by 3- 8-2018, and would therefore require the Smart Home System, particularly the security system, to be operational and properly functioning at that time. B. Late Completion and Defective Installation Work: (a) on 3-8-2018, upon moving into the bungalow with his family, the Plaintiff discovered the defects as follows: (i) the Home Security System and the Home Appliance Control System were not operational; and (ii) the installation work was not done properly or had not been performed with reasonable care and skill. (b) prior to the Plaintiff and his family move-in on 3-8-2018, there was no indication or at all by the Defendant and/or its employees, servants and/or agents that an extension of time was required for the Defendant to complete the installation work in the bungalow. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 C. The Meetings between the Parties: (a) 1st Meeting on 5-8-2018: Plaintiff immediately contacted Mr. Avan Tan, Senior Sales Account Manager of the Defendant and Mr. Eric Goh Ka Han, Regional Sales Director of the Defendant, who agreed to meet the Plaintiff at the bungalow on 5-8-2018. (b) 2nd Meeting on 6-8-2018: upon numerous requests by the Plaintiff, Mr. Guven Togan, Chief Executive Officer of the Defendant also agreed to meet him at the bungalow. (c) after the Defendant’s staff failed to turn up for work at the bungalow on 4-8-2018 despite not having completed their work, the Plaintiff again raised his grave concerns on the lack of progress of the works to Mr Avan Tan and demanded an updated work schedule to indicate the current state of the project, the remaining work and a timeline for completion. (d) Mr. Avan Tan indicated that the Defendant’s workers would come in to complete 4 components of the Smart Home System, namely CCTV, alarm, air conditioning and lighting, on 5-8-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 (e) on the morning of 5-8-2018, however, only 2 foreign workers attended the bungalow, and performed some checks which demonstrated that a substantial number of cables had not been successfully connected. On the same morning (5-8-2018), Mr. Rizal of the Defendant sent a revised work programme of the installation work to the Plaintiff, which stated that the Defendant’s installation work would only be completed by 28-9-2018, that is, almost 7 weeks after the Plaintiff had already moved into the Bungalow on 3-8-2018. (f) later, on that same evening (5-8-2018), the Defendant’s programmer, Mr Avan Tan and Mr Eric Goh attended the bungalow. The said programmer also confirmed that a substantial number of cables in the bungalow had not been successfully connected. (g) at the 2nd meeting, at or around 12 noon, the Plaintiff demanded from Mr. Guven Togan a copy of the system wiring diagram. During the said meeting, Mr Togan himself expressed shock at the rate of progress of the project, and in particular, that the Defendant had allowed the Plaintiff and his family to move into the bungalow on 3-8-2018 knowing that the Plaintiff would be relying on the integrated Home Security System, but without informing or advising the Plaintiff that that Home Security System was in fact not ready for use. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 (h) 3rd Meeting, on the same evening (6-8-2018) at or around 7 p.m., another meeting was held between the Plaintiff and the Defendant (Mr. Eric Goh and Mr. Avan Tan), when the consolidated BOQ Forms were provided to the Plaintiff. In the 3rd Meeting, the Defendant offered the Plaintiff a sum of approximately RM43,000.00 as compensation for the delay in the installation of the system and the Defendant’s breaches of the terms contained in the BOQ Form, which the Plaintiff did not accept. (i) 4th Meeting, on the afternoon of 7-8-2018, a meeting was held between the Plaintiff and the Defendant (Mr. Avan Tan), when Mr. Avan Tan wrongfully informed the Plaintiff that that BOQ Form apparently did not prescribe any timelines for the completion of the Smart Home System installation by the Defendant. The Plaintiff thereafter demanded that a copy of the system wiring diagrams be provided to him. (j) however, the Defendant refused and/or failed to comply with the Plaintiff’s demands, and merely handed over the system wiring diagrams and the information in relation to the Smart Home System installation works. The said diagrams were merely system schematic drawing and did not include any actual cable routing diagrams. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (k) the Plaintiff had to engage another contractor to complete the Installation Work. D. Discovery Of Defects And Rectification Works: (a) as a high-ranking officer of a financial institution with significant delegated authority in financial market/capital market activities, the Plaintiff pleaded that both the physical and digital security of the Plaintiff and his family are of utmost importance. (b) the bungalow was also especially exposed to risks of security breaches by reason of its size and location. Therefore, the Plaintiff has engaged 2 additional security guards to provide protection for the Plaintiff and his family, i.e. − (i) a professional IT security specialist to assess and mitigate the cyber security risks arising from the Network Security Defects; and (ii) a new Crestron authorised installer, Inthome Linc Solution (“Inthome”) to complete the unfinished work by PCOM, and rectify any defective works by PCOM (“Rectification Works”). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 E. Particulars of Network Security Defects: The Plaintiff has discovered the following significant defects in the network security (“Network Security Defects”) (resulting in cyber security risks) and installation (“Installation Defects”) of the Smart Home System by the Defendant: (i) Wi-Fi Network (ii) Router Administrator Authentication (iii) Host Enumeration (iv) Network Switch Configuration (v) Firewall Configuration (vi) CCTV System (vii) Dumpster Diving Risk F. Installation Defects: (a) in or about early December November 2018, Inthome installers informed the Plaintiff that a significant amount of cables installed by the Defendant were either faulty or did not follow the required engineering standards. The installation of cables by the Defendant were also in breach of the terms of the BOQ. (b) the significant Installation Defects by the Defendant and the consequential Rectification Work carried out by Inthome therein, were in respect of, inter alia, the following components of the Smart Home System: S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (i) Home Appliance Control System. (ii) Multi Room (6 zones) Audio Distribution System. (iii) Home Security System. (iv) General Cabling Works. (v) Equipment Rack. [18] By the matters aforesaid, the Plaintiff avers and particularize that the Defendant had breached the contract and statutory duties, negligence and undertaken express and/or implied contractual obligations, covenants and duties under the BOQ Form. The Defendant wrongfully failed to meet its contractual obligations under the BOQ Form and its Implied Terms and/or breached its statutory duties under inter alia regulations 15(1), 15(2), 15(6), 16, 18 and 35 of the Electricity Regulations 1994. The loss suffered by the Plaintiff: [19] By reason of the matters abovesaid, the Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage including but not limited to expenses by the Plaintiff in, amongst others, namely – (a) mitigating the physical hazards and/or cyber security risks arising from the Network Security Defects, CCTV and/or alarm defects, rectifying the Installation Defects, and mitigating his loss. (b) Special Damages as particularized at paragraph 50. (c) General Damages. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (d) Costs. (e) Interest for such period and at such rate as the Court deems fit. Errors made by the learned SCj [20] The Plaintiff has called 5 factual witnesses and 1 expert witness, and filed the corresponding witness statements/expert affidavit and the Defendant has called 3 witnesses. [21] The Plaintiff stated in its appeal that the learned trial Judge was plainly wrong in arriving at his decision in 6 critical areas, which warrants appellate intervention, namely − First: the learned trial Judge was plainly wrong in finding that the Plaintiff was not successful in proving the quantum of damages, and is therefore only entitled to nominal damages. The learned trial Judge failed to appreciate that evidence for the quantum of damages claimed were produced, and that the Plaintiff and his witnesses were never challenged by the Defendant on the validity, authenticity and reasonableness of the rectification costs for the defects in the installation of the smart home system, nor have the Defendant provided any alternative evidence as to what was a reasonable cost. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Second: the learned trial Judge also erred in law and in fact, in finding that the Defendant has a right to be given an opportunity to rectify the Installation Defects, and that the hiring of the new Crestron authorised installer, Inthome, is “too remote” or “indirect”. In fact, the Defendant was aware that the Plaintiff was looking to appoint another system integrator, and had no objection to it. The learned Judge failed to judiciously appreciate that the Plaintiff only had a duty to take all reasonable steps to mitigate his loss, and that a reasonable and prudent man in the position of the Plaintiff would not have the confidence to allow the Defendant to rectify the defects, given the Defendant’s prior conduct. Third: the learned Judge erred in finding that the Defendant had never agreed to supply a 4K video system to the Plaintiff, when the evidence shows from, inter alia, the proposals made by the Defendant’s sales person to the Plaintiff, that the accessories prescribed by the Defendant and the Whatsapp conversation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s sales person is that the Defendant was aware at all time that the Plaintiff requested for a 4K video system, and that the Defendant had misrepresented the video system purchased by the Plaintiff as being 4K compatible. Fourth: the learned trial judge erred in fact and in law, in finding that the “new system integrator” was a form of upgrade, when the Plaintiff was merely claiming for the cost to reinstate or place himself in the position in which he would have been had the Defendant performed its contractual obligations. In any event, the Defendant also had not pleaded upgrade or betterment in its Amended Defence. In the alternative, the learned judge ought to have at least S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 reduced the Plaintiff’s claim for the difference in sum for the ‘upgrade’. Fifth: the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact, in finding that the costs incurred by the Plaintiff to hire additional security guards due to the defective alarm system and CCTV is too remote and indirect. The Plaintiff is entitled to be put in the same position as if the alarm system and CCTV had been operational when he and his family moved into the bungalow, and the cost of additional security guards were therefore a foreseeable loss resulting from the defective alarm system and CCTV installed by the Defendant. Sixth: the learned trial Judge erred in finding that the Plaintiff has failed to prove the costs adjustment in the sum of RM16,028.00 from inappropriate or unnecessary items sold by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. The learned judge failed to judiciously appreciate that the Defendant did not plead unjust enrichment by the Plaintiff for not returning the said inappropriate or unnecessary equipment and items, or counterclaim for the same. [22] Therefore, whether the contentions by the Plaintiff that the learned SCj has made errors that the Plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages in the sum of RM70,000.00; the Plaintiff is not entitled to his claim for special damages in the sum of RM518,847.64; or his alternative claim for restitution of the sum of RM423,137.38 paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant are to be determined at the appellate stage. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 The Sessions Court judge’s (the learned SCj) grounds of judgment [23] Based on the facts of the case, the learned SCj has identified the issues to be tried, namely − (a) whether the Defendant had repudiated the contract and whether the Plaintiff was entitled to treat the contract with the Defendant as having come to an end on 7-8-2018? (b) if the question in (a) is answered in the affirmative, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of rectification works? (c) whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim for damages? [24] The learned SCj held that the Defendant is bound to complete the works within the period stipulated in the BOQ Form. The Defendant has failed to meet the timeline; therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to treat the contract ended on 7-8-2018. [25] The reasons for arriving his findings of facts can be read from the paragraphs as follows: (a) in paragraph 22 of the learned SCj’s grounds of judgment held that – “22. The Court finds that it is unusual for any parties entering into contract without timeline for its completion. The terms of the delivery terms, though the actual date is not specifically stated in a form of day, month and year, the S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Defendant own interpretation stated that the wiring works to start within 4 weeks, upon receiving the 35% down payment from the Plaintiff which connotes timeline and ‘if the bungalow was ready for such works to be commenced’”. (b) via a WhatsApp chat group, all the contractors including the Defendant know about the coordination and synchronization in order to meet the dateline imposed by the Plaintiff (paragraph 24). (c) in paragraph 28 of the learned SCj’s grounds of judgment held that the Defendant’s own witness i.e. SD3 has admitted that the Defendant was in the knowledge that there was a completion date for the installation works when he prepared the Defendant’s work programme on the basis that it would complete the installation works at the bungalow together with all the other contractors on 30-9-2017. (d) in paragraph 38, the learned SCj disagree with the Defendant that the various ongoing works carried out by the other contractor contributed to the delay. According to the learned SCj, all contractors including the Defendant were required to work hand in hand to avoid any delay. Factors raised by the Defendant to have affected their delay was only raised for the first time in writing in the Defendant’s solicitors’ letter dated 30-8-2018 after the stop work order was issued by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [26] Be that as it may, in answering the issue “whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of rectification works”, the learned SCj wrote in length his grounds in arriving to his decisions on damages, and these can be read from paragraphs 46 to 167. [27] In my grounds of judgment I will highlight some of the following facts pertaining to the rectification works. I have read the SCj’s grounds of judgment where he has examined and analyzed the facts in details, namely − (a) through the evidences from both parties’ witnesses: The Plaintiff’s witnesses are − • Mr. Quah Zheng Wei, architect (SP-1). • Mr. Khoo Yoon Yin, programmer (SP-2). • Mr. Fong Choong Fook, an expert witness (SP-3). • Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4). • Mr. Baxter Oswald Anak Michael Jodi (SP-5). • Mr. Chu Kok Wei, the Plaintiff (SP-6). The Defendant’s witnesses are − • Mr. Guven Togan (SD-1). • Mr. Avan Tan Cheow Wee (SD-2). • Mr. Muhamad Khairul Rizal bin Abdul Karim (SD-3). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 (b) the witnesses had been testified via examination-in-chief, cross examination and re-examination about the facts on – • the defects in the installation of the Smart Home System; • inconsistency in implementation and the System Plotting Drawings; • meetings between both parties; • the Plaintiff’s ask the Defendant to stop work and leave the bungalow; • the Plaintiff’s demands (such as the Defendant to issue public apology to the Plaintiff; • compensation in the sum of RM140,000.00 being the forfeiture of all professional fees and the hardware cost of the security element of the Smart Home System; • cost for all wiring works by the Plaintiff’s own electricians; • installation of new hardware by a new installer, the Defendant to assist the new installer; • re-imbursement of all other costs incurred by the Plaintiff to achieve the state of security and usability (including the cost of engaging an additional security guard until the completion of the installation of the Smart Home System). S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (c) the proposal by the Defendant’s vide its solicitors’ letter dated 30-8-2018 where the Defendant proposed that the new installer to be appointed to “conduct a buy-off of the work done” by the Defendant. However, this proposal was rejected by the Plaintiff and no reply to the Defendant solicitors’ letter. (d) the evidences pertaining to the rectification are – • the Plaintiff has engaged a professional IT security specialist to assess and mitigate the cyber security risks arising from the defects in the network security as installed and configured by the Defendant. • the Plaintiff has engaged Inthome as the new installer to complete the installation of the Smart Home System and to rectify the installation works through the recommendation of SP-2. • Mr. Khoo Yoon Yin, programmer (SP-2) was the Defendant software programmer to carry out the programming of the Smart Home System. SP-2 was retained by the Plaintiff to continue working on the programming of the Smart Home System. • the Plaintiff has engaged another contractor (Pro AV Works) to rectify the Multiroom Audio Distribution System together with Inthome. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 • the Plaintiff has engaged CNS Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd for the relaying of power cables. CNS Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd also assisting Inthome in the relaying of data and audio cables. • the Plaintiff has engaged Mr. Tam Pak Cheong as the Clerk of Works to oversee and coordinate the rectification works. Mr. Tam Pak Cheong was also the Clerk of Works for the construction of the bungalow. (e) Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4) testified that the cost of all rectification works carried out by Inthome amounted to RM265,169.00. (f) the learned SCj has taken into consideration after hearing the Defendant’s defence and its witnesses, where the following facts are extracted: • the Defendant was forced to leave the site, no damage to the tamper switches and cables were detected. No sufficient particulars as to what anti-tamper switches the Plaintiff is referring to nor what kind of damage the Plaintiff is alleging. • with regard to the empty cases, the Defendant stated that they were in the midst of testing and terminating the cables into the cases. However, the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site on 7-8-2018. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 • with regard to the installation of sensors, the Defendant stated that they had installed the sensors correctly as per the System Plotting Drawing/Device Plotting Layout. And the final positioning of sensors will be subject to the final condition of the site and may require changes as per the Plaintiff’s instructions. And the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site. On the issue of the adhesive for the installation of the sensors, the Defendant had used the adhesive as provided by the manufacturer of the sensors. Therefore, there is no issue that the adhesive is inappropriate. • with regard to the non-weatherproof indoor motion sensor, the Defendant stated that it would depend on the installation circumstances. In areas that were fully exposed to sun and rain, the Defendant had installed weatherproof sensors at outdoors areas that were not exposed to sun and rain, namely ceiling mounted to outdoor roofs. The cables were installed inside the ceiling of the outdoor roofs and were also not exposed to sun and rain. • with regard to the CCTV at the guardhouse and outdoor area of the ground floor, the Defendant stated that during the time the Defendant was forced to leave the site, it was all in good working order. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 • with regard to install the firewall for the entire Smart Home System, the Defendant stated that the firewall only can be installed once the whole system is configured and implemented. Otherwise, it will expose the firewall to outside risk of malware or hackers and weaken the firewall. • with regard to the CCTV, the Defendant contended that the CCTV were only activated within the closed local circuit (“LAN”) and had not been exposed to any external access or compromised in any manner and the Defendant had yet to complete the network configuration. • with regard to the air-conditioning at certain locations in the bungalow were not functioning, SP-4 and SD-3 had testified and Inthome had completed the cable installation, re-terminated the IR cables with solder and wrapping the terminations with a layer of heat shrink tube. The works on configuration and testing of the air- conditioning control were still in progress. However, the Defendant cannot do and complete the works as they were forced to leave the site with the stop order by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 • with regards to lighting defects, SD-3 and SP-1 had testified on the issue about the light fitting drawings. The Defendant’s witness (SD-3) blamed the electrical contractor (CNS). However, no drawings or documents from CNS were adduced by the Defendant to show that CNS required the Defendant to supply dimmable dins at the first floor of the bungalow. • with regards to momentary switches defects, Mr. Wayne Haw Thing Keong, from Inthome (SP-4) had rectified the momentary switches and SP-2 had programmed them to function as intended. However, the Defendant stated that when they were forced to leave the site on 7-8- 2018, the momentary switches were properly connected to the terminal block and were working as intended. The Defendant avers that the momentary switches can be re-programmed to suit the Plaintiff’s needs. (g) other than the above defects, the other defects and rectification works had been examined by the learned SCj, where both Plaintiff and Defendant had argued regarding the roller shutter, Switch Socket Outlet (SSO) control, Crestron keypads, motorized projector screen, overloading and poor termination of power cables, excessive data cables length, dumpster diving risk, alarm and control system, curtain control system, lighting control system, TV control and AV distribution system, and general cabling work. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 The High Court’s decision [28] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff has laid out the summary of the evidences in the table format as attached in Appendixes A and B. This Court also finds that the learned SCj did studied the evidences after hearing the trial. [29] LAW OF EVIDENCE: “HE WHO CLAIMS, PROVES”: the fundamental principle of the law of evidence is that the burden of proving a fact is on the person claiming the existence of that said fact, except where it is stipulated by any law that the proof of that fact lies on another person. [30] This evidentiary principle of “he who claims, proves” is entrenched in the Evidence Act 1950. Sections 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. [31] The Court of Appeal in Poratha Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Technofit Sdn Bhd [2018] AMEJ 0214 [2019] 1 LNS 941; [2020] 1 MLJ 74, reiterated this principle. It held that the party claiming damages bears the burden of proving the fact and the quantum of the damages suffered and that if the claimant only succeeds in proving the fact and not the quantum, it will only be entitled to nominal damages. Y.A Hasnah Hashim JCA (as she then was) in delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal held – “[44] It is trite law that the party claiming damages bears the burden of proving the fact and quantum of damages suffered. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [45] The defendant bears the burden of proving both the fact and the amount of damages suffered as a result of the breach by the plaintiff. Special damages unlike general damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, and recoverable only where they can be included in the proper measure of damages …”. [32] In Chang Hang Guan & Ors. v. Perumahan Falim (Penang) Sdn Bhd [1994] 1 CLJ 19, Edgar Joseph Jr held− “When a plaintiff claims damages from a defendant, he has to show that the loss in respect of which he claims damages was caused by the defendant’s wrong and also that the damages are not too remote to be recoverable. Where precise evidence is obtainable, the court naturally expects to have it, where it is not, the court must do the best it can. General difficulty of proof does not dispense with the necessity for proof.”. [33] In arriving to the decision, the delay in finishing and completing the works was proven by the Plaintiff. I agree. This Court should and never will interfere with this finding. [34] Now, to answer whether the awarding of the damages by the learned SCj is correct? Paragraph 174 to 206 in his grounds of judgment stated the application of the law to the fact. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 [35] The learned SCj starts its reasons as follows: “174. The law on damages for breach of contract is trite. the law on damages is set out in s. 74 of the Contract Act 1950. Pursuant to the provision, compensation can only be awarded against the guilty party for breach of contract if the loss or damage suffered by the other party satisfies two conditions. 175. The first condition is that it arises naturally in the usual course of things from the breach or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. 176. The second condition is that it is not to remote or indirect. When a contract has been broken, the party suffers by the breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. 177. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. It is trite law that the party seeking damages bears the burden of proving both the fact and quantum of damages, which the plaintiff is claiming. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 178. If the plaintiff fails to prove the fact of damage, its claim for damages will fail. However, if the plaintiff only succeeds in proving the fact but not the quantum of damages, it will only be entitled to nominal damages.”. [36] The learned SCj refers to few cases on damages that are Popular Industries Ltd. v. The Eastern Garment Manufacturing Co. Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 CLJ (rep) 635; Leong Hin Enterprise Sdn Bhd v. Chevron Malaysia Ltd [2018] MLJU 1747. [37] Paragraphs 181 to 206 of the SCj’s grounds of judgment did explain the reasons why he only awarded the nominal damages to the Plaintiff. The re-hearing @ appellate stage: [38] The Appellant (Chu Kok Wei) and the Respondent (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) had submit verbally and also filed their written submissions accordingly. [39] It is true that the Plaintiff has issued the Stop Work Order on 7-8- 2018 and forced the Defendant’s team to leave the Plaintiff’s bungalow. The Defendant contends that they are not given the opportunity to perform any rectification and/or repairs to the alleged defects claimed by the Plaintiff. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [40] This Court finds that the defects are not just the allegations by the Plaintiff, the particulars and details of the defects already proved by the Plaintiff. I will not interfere with the finding of the learned SCj on the defects. The parties had been given opportunity to prove their case accordingly at the trial court. [41] The case of Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd v Sun-Jaya M & E Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 136 cited by the learned counsel for the Defendant is applicable in this present case. In Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd, the Court at paragraphs 138 and 139, page 201 held that a contractor shall be given opportunity to rectify the defects before the employer can get services of a third party to rectify those defects. [42] Here, the Plaintiff had engaged and appointed the new contractor and installer and/or new system integrator to continue the works and the discussion between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to reach an amicable settlement pertaining to the works came to end when the Defendant was “chased out” from continuing with the works as per the contract. [43] Due to the Plaintiff’s act for preventing the Defendant to rectify the defects, the learned counsel for the Defendant refer to section 54 of the Contracts Act 1950 and cited the decisions in the cases of Mah Sau Cheong v. Tan Eng Chin [2019] 1 LNS 560; Yuk Tung Construction Sdn Bhd v. Daya CMT Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1314 where the Court gave judgment on the principle of “Prevention Principle” where a party cannot insist on the performance of a contractual obligation by the other if it is itself the cause of the non-performance; MS Elevators Engineering Sdn. Bhd. v Jasmurni Construction Sdn. Bhd. [2022] 1 LNS 815. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 [44] In re-hearing of this appeal by the Plaintiff (Chu Kok Wei), this Court has agreed with the finding of facts by the learned SCj that the Defendant (PCOM Pacific Sdn Bhd) is held liable for the defects in performing its obligation to complete the Smart Home System for the Plaintiff. [45] However, the quantum of damages as sought by the Plaintiff as per the statement of claim namely, − (i) Special Damages in the amount of RM115,796.60 for hiring additional security guards from 13-8-2018 to end of September 2019 to ensure the safety of the Plaintiff and his family; (ii) costs of engaging the IT specialist; (iii) RM387,023.00 as the costs of rectifying the installation defects; (iv) RM16,028.00 as costs adjustment from inappropriate or unnecessary items sold by the Defendant; (v) General Damages for breach of the BOQ Form, negligence and fraudulent and/or reckless misrepresentation; (vi) further and/or in the alternative, the sum of RM423,137.38 to be restituted to the Plaintiff; and (vii) costs and interest, S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 are too excessive after considering the circumstances and chronology of events in this case. [46] In reaching to its decision, the learned SCj has evaluating the original suit and also the counter claim suit. [47] The BOQ Form/s had stipulated the amounts to be paid and the installation works were defective, therefore, the learned SCj concluded that the sum that can be claimed by the Plaintiff is only RM70,000.00 is sufficient. [48] The Defendant has proved that for the Smart Home System as at 7-8-2018 was estimated at RM395,953.38 and this is equivalent to 89.99% of the total contract work value, including Variation Orders. (See the delivery orders refer to all materials, equipment and items sent to the Bungalow for the Smart Home System at RR3(5), pages 118 to 148). [49] At the appellate stage, the learned counsel for the Defendant submits that the payment terms agreed between the parties are not based on the value of works done but rather the milestones achieved, which the Defendant exceeds 95% holistically. Thus, the Defendant is entitled to retain all the sums paid by the Respondent before this. And, to date, the Plaintiff also did not return any of the Defendant’s items and/or materials alleged to be defective and/or unnecessary. As such, this contradicts the Plaintiff’s position that he is not satisfied with the Defendant’s works up until the Stop Work Order was issued. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 Principles of appellate intervention [50] In the case of Ahmad Zulfendi bin Anuar v. Mohd Shahril bin Abdul Rahman [2022] 4 MLJ 892, the High Court held − “[7] The central feature of appellate intervention is well- established. It is to ascertain whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the evidence and on the basis of the governing law. The Federal Court in the case of Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, where the Federal Court held as follows: [14] In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention, ie to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase ‘insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence’ melerly related to such process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal’s restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention, ie that a decision arrived at by a S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test. [8] Thus in Kerajaan Malaysia v. Global Upline Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2017] 1 MLJ 170 the Court of Appeal held that an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its conclusion and where there has been insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. [9] In the leading case of Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 the Federal Court affirmed with unmistakable clarity that the principle on which an appellate court could intervene with findings of fact by the trial court is ‘the plainly wrong test’ principle. [10] This important principle involves a number of circumstances, but must necessarily extends to situations where it can be shown that the impugned decision is vitiated with plain material errors, or where crucial evidence had been miscontrued, or where the trial judge had so manifestly not taken proper advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses or not properly analysed the entirely of the evidence before him, or where a decision was arrived without adequate judicial appreciation of the evidence such as to make it rationally unsupportable. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 [11] Above all, the Federal Court in Ng Hoo Kui established that the criterion that is central to appellate intervention must remain that deference to the trier of fact is still the rule and not the exception. And the plainly wrong test should not be used by the appellate court as a means to substitute the impugned decision with its own.”. [51] In re-hearing of the appeal before me, I have applied the test of “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence” in relation to the process of determining whether the Sessions Court had arrived at its decision or findings correctly on the basis of the relevant law and the established evidence (see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309). [52] The conclusion made by the learned SCj is in accordance with the law, there is no gross error made by the learned SCj. I would like to quote the following: (a) in the case of Ineax Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Ineax Process Sdn Bhd And Ng Wee Keat (Third Party) [2017] 1 LNS 1187, the High Court has referred to the leading decision of the Court of Appeal in Juahir Sadikon v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Johor [1996] 4 CLJ 1 which reaffirms the rule that “he who asserts must prove”, whereby Siti Norma Yaakob JCA (as she then was) instructively held as follows: S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 “He who alleges must prove such allegation and the onus is on the appellant to do so. See section 103 of the Act. Thus, it is incumbent upon the appellant to produce Tan Sri Basir as his witness to prove the allegation. The fact that the appellant was unable to secure the attendance of Tan Sri Basir as a witness does not shift the burden to the respondent to produce the witness and testify as to what he had uttered, as firstly, the respondent never raised such an allegation and, secondly, has denied even making one. For this very reason, the adverse inference under section 114 (g) of the Act relied upon by the appellant cannot be accepted as establishing that if the witness had been produced, his evidence would work against the respondent. There is no obligation in law for the respondent to produce the witness as that obligation rests with the appellant, the party who alleges, and the fact that the appellant was unable to do so is fatal to his case. For this very reason too, the adverse inference under section 114 (g) is invoked against the appellant.”. Further, in the same case, the High Court referred to the following passage from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Pernec Ebiz Sdn Bhd v. CCI Technology Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 2 MLJ 117− “Even though the burden upon a plaintiff in a civil suit is only to prove its case upon a balance of probabilities, it must present its case sufficiently clearly to do so. It S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 cannot merely file pleadings, file bundles of documents, proceed to trial, call witnesses to testify and argue on the various issues and expect the court to make out the case on its own for one party or the other. The submissions failed to analyze the pleadings, the facts and the evidence as against the issues requiring a decision, and to tabulate the same so that a logical and reasoned decision could be made that satisfied the fundamental requirement of a fair and just decision. Where the party upon whom the burden of proving its case lies fails to do so, it fails to prove its case and its action must be dismissed.”. (b) in the case of Heritage Grand Vacation Club Bhd V. Pacific Fantasy Vacation Sdn Bhd [2016] 7 CLJ 679, the Court of Appeal laid down the principles on pleading − “[4] It is well-established that it is not the function of the court to build a case for the plaintiff/defendant inconsistent with the pleaded case. In Yew Wan Leong v. Lai Kok Chye [1990] 1 CLJ 1113, the Supreme Court had in strong terms held, and which still stands as a ‘gold standard’ in pleading rules and evidence, as follows: It is not the duty of the court to make out a case for one of the parties when the party concerned does not raise or wish to raise the point. In disposing of a suit or matter involving a disputed question of fact, it is S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 not proper for the court to displace the case made by a party in its pleadings and give effect to an entirely new case which the party had not made out in its own pleadings. The trial of a suit should be confined to the pleas on which the parties are at variance. [5] The above case must be seen to be the ‘gold standard’ for pleading rules and is consistent with a long line of authorities from England as well as Malaysia. (See Janagi v. Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 1 LNS 42; Lee Ah Chor v. Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 667; KEP Mohamed Ali v. KEP Mohamed Ismail [1980] 1 LNS 169). In Recaliva Design Steel (M) Sdn Bhd v. Vista Access Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 10 CLJ 491, the High Court held that on pleading rules and issues to be tried made the following observations: After having heard the evidence of the defendants, it is crystal clear to me that the version defendants attempted to project to me was never part of their defence. In such circumstances, the court is not obliged to consider in its judgment, stories which are not reflective of the pleadings. Pleadings are essential foundation to analyse disputes. Evidence must relate to pleadings and/or directly relevant to pleadings. The court is not concerned what issues the parties have framed for the determination of the court, when such issues cannot be reflective of the issues to be dealt with pursuant to the pleadings. S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 [6] This ‘gold standard’ also plays an important part when parties as per the pleadings have agreed to the issues to be tried. That is to say, the issues to be tried must be as per the pleadings or arising from the pleadings and cannot be one which can be said to be the unpleaded case of the parties. The ‘gold standard’ has a number of exceptions in a restricted sense and those exceptions are not meant to override the ‘gold standard’ for pleading rules in all aspects.”. (c) in the case of Zainuddin Bin Uyub Dan Jalil Bin Tumirin [2009] 1 LNS 1139, the High Court cited the Court of Appeal case, Karumalay Vanniyan & Anor v. Ananthan Rethinam [2005] 2 CLJ 429, which was held – “A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. If there are contemporary documents, then he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. A trier of fact who makes findings based purely upon the demeanour of a witness S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 without undertaking a critical analysis of what witness’s evidence runs the risk of having his findings corrected on appeal. It does not matter whether the issue for decision is one that arises in a civil or criminal case: the approach to judicial appreciation of evidence is the same. There are a number of important and leading cases in which the point has been considered.”. (d) the principles of “the best evidence rule” must be applied. In the case of Juta Damai Sdn Bhd v. Permodalan Negeri Selangor Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 318, the Court of Appeal held − “Returning to the question of proof, we observe that there is no provision that requires that such loss is only provable by production of receipts. The best evidence rule requires proof not by the ‘best evidence’ but by the ‘best evidence available’. The unavailability of receipts was explained on the grounds the receipts were not kept for more than six years. The explanation is not inherently implausible.”. (e) the case of Telekom Malaysia Bhd v. KLK Electronic Sdn Bhd [2019] 4 MLJ 631 pertaining to the burden of proof. The decision of the Court of Appeal held – “[35] It is fundamental principle of law that in a civil case, the legal burden of proof lies on the party who brings the claim. The evidential burden may shift to the S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 defendant once the plaintiff has established prima facie case.”. Conclusion [53] For the reasons given above, I see no good reason to interfere on the whole findings of the learned SCj’s finding on the quantum of damages. [54] Only part of the learned SCj’s findings that is the costs of the trial at the Sessions Court at the amount of RM30,000.00 payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff is reversed and/or set aside and this Court allows costs is RM5,450-00 payable to the Plaintiff. Dated: 29 November 2023. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam NCvC12 S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 The Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Lai Wei Shiung Messrs.Tommy Thomas, Kuala Lumpur For the Defendant: Nur Muhaimin binti Mohd Husaimi with her, Sri Richgopinath & Joel Lim Messrs. Joel & Mei, Kuala Lumpur S/N iI1AVAlkDEeKxwUCYz7Ag Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	69,350	Tika 2.6.0
PA-24NCvC-1181-11/2022	PEMOHON Chan Heng Cheang RESPONDEN 1. ) Lam Ah Kow @ Lam Wai Min 2. ) Chan Phaik Choon 3. ) Chan Paik Mei 4. ) Chan Lin Yen 5. ) Teh Lie Yet @ Teh Lie Yet 6. ) Chan Heng Sin 7. ) Chan Heng Keat 8. ) Chan Paik Khee 9. ) Chan Heng Khee 10. ) Chan Lin Yen (sebagai pentadbir bagi Harta Pesaka Chan Heng Kooi, Si mati)11. ) Teh Lie Yet (sebagai pentadbir bagi Harta Pesaka Chan Heng Weng, Si mati)1 2. ) Chan Heng Cheang (sebagai pentadbir bagi Harta Pesaka Cheng Khow Chin, Si mati)1 3. ) Kim How Jewellers Sdn. Bhd.	Originating Summons – Question for determination posed by liquidator of company – Whether a consent judgment is binding upon the company, which would abolish or waive the debts owed by the second group of respondents to the company – The company was not a party to the suit where the consent judgment was entered into – Whether the majority directors signed the consent judgment in their capacity as directors of the company – Whether the contributories ought to pay interest on the debt owed by them to the company pursuant to a Public Ruling issued by the IRB and section 140A of the Income Tax Act 1967 read with the Transfer Pricing Guidelines.	29/11/2023	YA Dato' Quay Chew Soon	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=4bd5f13b-452b-49e5-a60b-5a7c7eb9e97d&Inline=true	29/11/2023 16:58:44 PA-24NCvC-1181-11/2022 Kand. 43 S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O/HVSytF5UmmC1p8frnpfQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—2mcvc—11a1—11/2n22 Kand. 43 29/11/2022 mvsaut IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAVA AT PENAMG ORIGINATING suMMoNs NO P 2AMcvc 13 1 ma Dalam perkara mm How Gems sun Bhd (147555-K) (dalam hkmdaslj, Dan Dalam perkara Kim How Jewellery (M) Sdn Bhd (¢29o42—u) 1ds\sm lwkmdasl)‘ Dan Dalam perkara Penman Penggumngan benankh 23 9 202m yang an Dual (erhadap Kim How Gems sdn Bhd (1415554<) an hawah Pshsyen No. PA-28NCC»174-ID/2019‘ Dan Dawn perkara Penman Pengguhmgan henankh 23.9 2020 yang dx bum (erhadap Kim How Jeweuery (M) Sdn Bhd (129u42-up an hawsh Pensyen No. PA-2sNco175— 10/2019; Dan Dawn perkara akaun - akaun nan akaun — akuan yang a. sum berkenaan dengan Kim How Gems Sdn Bhd (141555 Kjdan Km: How Jeweuery (M) Sdn Bhd (1290-zzvuh. Dan Dimm perkara Pervghakiman Pevseluluan berlankh 23.6.2014 I 24.11.2014 yang di rakamkan dw Mahkamah Tmggt an Pmau Pmang aw bawah Guaman SMI No PA’ 22NCVC4H4»O7/2012, Dan Dalam perkara ‘Public Ruhng No. 3/2015‘ yang di kemarkan nleh Lembaga Hasvl Da\am Negen darn Seksyen IAOA‘ Akxa Cukax Pendapatan 1967 an [7503 dengan ‘Charmer IX » m D/KVSyIF5Ummc1pB4mp1u «mm. smm ...m.mm .. HIGH m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VI mum pom! “Transfer Pnclng Guidelines‘ yang .uga dw keluarkan nleh Lembaga Hasn Da\am Nsgen. Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen A8713), Akta Syankal - Syankal 2016, Dan Dalam perkara mengenal Aluran 7, 17. 23 dan Aluran 92 Kaedah 4‘ Kaedah — Kaedah Mankaman 2012: Dan Dalam perkars mengenax twang kuasa yang same ads. Between LAM AH KOW @ LAM WAI M\N . Applicant And CHAN HENG CHEANG CHAN PHNK cHooN CHAN PNK MEI CHAN LIN YEN TEH LIE YET @ THE us VET CHAN HENG SIN cHAN HENG KEAT CHAN PAIK KHEE CHAN HENG KHEE CHAN LIN YEN (sebagax penladblv bag! Hana Pesaka Chan Hang K001. Si mam) . TEH us var (sehagax pennaamr bag: Hana Pesaka Chan Hang weng, sy mam CHAN HENG CHEANG (sehagal penladbv bagi Hana Pesaka cneng Khuw cm 31 mam KIM How JEWELLERS sun EHD ., Respondents a1om~4:nmbuM4x O . .... .3 S GROUNDS QF B_E§\|§lON m 0/HvsyxF5ummc1paImp1u mm. smnw ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 M mm .. mmny mm: dnuumnl vu mum pom! 41 Next, lrie Appllcarlt explained tn.-it paragrapn 4 or me ‘Public Ruling No 8/2015‘ issued by me lnland Revenue soard slates tnat -ila oompany loans or advanoes to directors wilhoul interest is deemed to receive interest inoome lmm lba loans or advances tor tlie basis period tor a year otassessnient and assessed under paragrapn 4te) ollne lnoome Tax Adi 1967 and secllon 140E at me lnoome Tax Act 1967 is avvlicable“ Paragraph 5 or the aforesaid Publlc Ruling provides the formula lor such Interest lrlcome, which ls based on the average lendlng rate and Ulls lakes el19c1 (mm 1.1 2014. 42 in siniilarvein, section 140A ot me Income Tax Act 1967, read wiln ‘Chaplet IX — Transler Pricing Guldellnes' issued by the Inland Revenue Board. provides lriat interest uugh\| to be cnarged on me loan given by a company to -associated persons‘ 43 According to lne Applicant, based on me rate lor the period rrom 1 1 2014 to 3092022 issued by Bank Negara Malaysia. are average lending rate lor me said period is 4.35%. 44 Premlsed on trie above, the Ap nt posed an anclllary question Namely -wnelner tne said debtors ol tne said 2 companies ougln to pay lnleresl on the aulsmrldlrlg debts owed by them \I) the said 2 Companies respsctlvely pursuanl la the alorerrienlioned Fubllc Ruling and section 140A 01 the Incnme Tax Acl1967 read Wllh ‘Chapter IX - Trarls1el Pllclng Guldelines‘" 45, Again, both groups omespendenla did not raise any challenge lo the payment at interest as described above Anuordinglyi I answered the abevemenlionad duestion irl tne afﬁrmallve and granted prayer 5 above. 45 witn regard to prayer 6 above, the Applicant exp ‘ ed trial tne company searon mnducled on me debtor. Kim How sun Bhd was not lruirlul and lie was unable to obtain any mlorniation thereon. upon me Appllcanrs enquiry, trie directors oltrie companies intormed liim lnattriey also were unsure about Kim How sdn End's debt Apparently, tne said debt or RMZ800 was already relleeled in lne accuunls or Kim Haw Gems son and oelbre may were appointed as directors, In the circumstances. I allowed lrie prayer lor triis deal to be written on. 47 Slrlce (here were no oblecllcrl, I allowed me prayer mat the oos\| 0! ma Orlglrlallrlg summons be paid lroni tne assets or ine companies cunclu ‘ n I ‘l ru D/KVSyIF5UmmC1pB4mp1Q woe s.n.i mnlhnrwlll be in... a my i... anyin.ii.y MIMI dnuuvlml vn aFluNQ pnnxl 43 £50 ordered. Daled 23 Ocwber 2023 4? nu.-y on-w Soon Judge H’ h Conn ol Malaya, Penang cm: Dmsmn NCVC 1 came»; M Kanesavv mm M Kmwsan & Auaclales) «or me N1D\Ican\| Hos Klk Pm am Zah Hannm bmll Ramzan (Messrs Nos 6. MO!!!) 507019 1“ 2" 3". W. 5"‘. 1ﬂ"‘. 11" and l2"‘ Reanonaenls Ong Yu Shun. Yu Mann xx and Mamba Lope: {Mcuvs m. Clrambersol‘/u smn om» Var live 6"’ and 7"’ Respondents sm uMv5yIF5ummc1ps4mvVu ‘2 “Nair Snr1\|\nuuhnrwH\I>e HIGH m mm .. mmmuny mm: dnuumnl _ mum W Introtiucllou 1 The Apphcant tiied this originating summons dated 29 it 2022 as a result oi a dispute between Mo groups :11 Respam1enIs.The met group or Resportdems are the 1“. 2"“. 3N, 4, 5“. 10"‘, 11'" and 12”’ Respundems. The second group oi Respondents are the 6"‘ and r" Respondents Eu\|h groups at Respondents agreed to reier their dispute to oourt tor deterrninetion 2 The 5“. 9"‘ and 13-" Respondents ere unrepresented. They did not appear at the hearing oi the originating summons Nor did they me any afﬁdavit in connection therewith aecttgrourid nets 3 The Respondents ale the ounlnbulnnas and debtors at two companies Nameiy (V) Kim How Gems Sdn Ehd and (H) Kim How Jewetiery (M) sdn BM (collecllvely the “Companies”! 4 At the material time, the dtreclors of the companies were ti) Chen Hang cheeng t-tterig Chem the 1“ Respondent. (ii) Chan Phatk choon, the 2"“ Respondent. tii Chan Hsrtg Khee (‘Hovtg Kh '). the 9 Respondent and (iv) the tete ctien Heng Kooi (“Hang xoort, represented py the adminislralor oi his eslale as the 10'" Respondent 5. Upon the petition oi the 6"‘ end 7'" Respondents, the companies were wound-up on 23.9.2020 by mutuei ooneent. The Appiicant was appointed as the tiouidetor ot the companies Tltu disuuu botw on the two groups at Respondents 6. The dispute between the two groups at Rapondents invoiues the interpretation ol a consent JI.iﬂgmen\| dated 23.a,2otA and 2411 2014 t-consent Jtmgmanl"). The consent Judgment was recorded under Penang High court civii Suil Nu ZZNCVCABA-D7/2D121“S:\|d sun’). 7. The said suit was initiated by the 5'" and 7'" Respt)ndenIs1as\|he pteirititts) against Hertg Kooi (as the deteridant), his personai oepeoity and as the exeoutortor the estate oi cneng Khow chin The said suit was settted through the consent Judgmen\|. 3 Paragvaph 7 of the consent Judgment reads. IN mwsytrsuninctpmwu «mu. s.n.i mmhnrwm .. med M new i... nrwirinﬂly snii. dnuuvtnrit Vﬂ nFit.ING Wm! rnare shat: be no claims whalsaever oy the pants: narnaiy the P\nin\|iW5 ana / or the netenoant antt / or the estate ane I or Kim Now Gems Sdn am am tor Kim Haw iewetiery (M) Sdrt am aqaiusl eich uthev arising out ot ano / er in connection wtm the dlipuiu herein and / or any other atsputes whlnh are penonp: 9 The 5'" and 7'" Respondents oontena that paragraph 7 oi the content Judgmen\| has abulished or watueo aH oetats owing by them to the Companies The hrst gmttp of Rssportoenm on the other hand oontentt that the consenuuogment is not pinning upon the companies Amt that the 6"‘ and W Respondertls still remain as oeptors oi the Compantes to. The consent onterdateo 24.11 201A is an aneeaiett arder. While the consent omer oatee 236.2014 is a seated order. Both the consent Orders are toenttoat except that the consent oroer oateo 24.tt mm is in the Enghsh ianguage white the consent Order oatett 23 6 2014 is in the Maiay ianguage ouutlon tor dmrmin it. The pnnctpat question tor delevminahon is th e “Whether the corrserrt Juoprnent is binding upon the companies, which wouie ahohsh or waive the oepts ﬁwmg by the 6"‘ and 7'" Respondents to the Companies.’ 12 At the hearing oitne Ongtnaltng Summons on to 5 2023. I answered this question in the negalive II was my tindtng that the Consenmudgment IS not binding on the companies. By reason that the some ' were not names to the Said su , where the 0onsen\| Judgment was enterett into. Here are the grounds 01 my decision The ConnntJudgmutIl Is not ' mg upon the companies 13 The events teaotng to the Said sun were these. The tate Madam cheng Know chin mother) passed away teaurng a Wiil umter Mothers win, at: her pmperliss were bequealhed to her nine chiidreno who are amongst the Respundenls herein. The companies torrneo part at the assets at Mothers estate t4. one ot Mother's ontioren r e t-teng Koo. obtained a Grant ot Probate By vtnus thereot, t-teng Kooi was appointed as the executor ot Mothers estate. 15 Pursuant to Mothers VVHL each ot her nine chtldren ts entitiett to an equai share :3! the assets of Mothers estate, There was a dispute by the 4 IN mwsnraunnctearmate «war. a.n.t nuvihnrwm a. u... a mm a. nﬂgihnﬂly ann. dnuuvinhl VII .nuua amt 6"‘ and 1'" Respondents, who were amongst the beneiictanes The 6“ and 7“ Respondents aileged that Heng Kooit the then executor of Mothers estate. iaited to distribute their share oi the assets oi Mothers estate to them. is The 5'" and 7-" Respondents suhsequen\|\|y iited the satd suit against Heng Koci it was pteaded that Heng Kooi, in hts own capaetty and as the executor oi Mothers estate. was tn breach oi itductary duties and had iaited to property perierrn his duties 17. The said sutt was between (t) the st" and 7” Respondents as [3 ms and (it) Heng Kooi as deiendaitt ciearty, the coiitpantes were not pantes to the said suit ttenoe, the companies were not panies to the consent Judgment which vms recorded in the said suit As such, I iind that the consent Judgment cannot possibly blild the companies ts. The em and 7* Respondents aver that Hang cheang and Hang Khee attended a me atien oi the said suit that was oonducteo by the pres ing judge Aooording to the em and 7“ Respondents. during the me Heng Knoit Heng cheang and Heng Khee provided them wtth a s gte page document together with the reievant pages oi the generai iedger or the 6"‘ and 7'“ Respondents‘ debt owing to the companies. 19. The e“ and 7'" Respondents pnIn\| out that Hang Koot, Heng chearig and Heitg t<hee signed the drait consent Judgment Al that time, Hang Koot, t-ieng cheang and Heng Khee were diredors oi the companies. on that score. the am and 7* Respondents contend that the companies. represented by the said directors. were privy to the consent Judgment zu I ottagree. Ftrstty, I aooept the explanation proierred by the nrst group oi Respondents that Heitg cheang and Heng Khes were cater: to attend the rnediatton in the said suit un behatior Mothers estate And that the subsequent signing oi the consent Judgment by Heng cheang and t-ieng Khee was on behaii oi Mothers estate 2t Theyt together with the parties tn the said suit (t.e. the 6"‘ and 7'" Respondents and Hang t<oot), tonrted the irtatonty beneneiartee oi Mothers estate As the dispute in the said suit oonoerneo the dtstriputien oi Mothers estate, it is piaustbte that Heny §hean9 and t-teng Khee attended the mediation oi the said suit and signed the consent Judgment on behaii oi Mothers estate. ru omvsytrautttnetautnpio “Nair s.tt.t murthnrwiu a. ti... M vuﬂi i... nﬂntnnﬂly MVMI dnuurimt Vﬂ .rtutto vtmxi 22 Heng Knot, Hang crteang and Hang Khes are beneﬁciaries ol Mothers estate. t cartslder that tney nad signed tne consent Judgment on benatt ot the estate, agrsetng to the settlement between tne 5'" and 7'" Respondents and tne estate Tney were not stgntng as directors at tne Cempsnles. Hertg cneang and Heng Knee were tnere tn tttetreapaeity as oenenctertee ol Motners estate. 23 secondly, avert tl tt ts true tttatt Heng cneang and t-leng Knee attended tne medlallon olttte said sutt and stgned lhe Consenmudgmenl tn tnetr capaclly as directors ottne Oompanlest tnet alone cannot htnd tne Companles secauee tn the nrst place‘ tne cornpantee were not parttee tn the satd suit Ttte cumpantes were never added as parties to ttte said sutt. The cause papers at tne satd sun were never served on tne companies, As suott, nu amount ol Involvement hylhelr dlrectors can blnd tne corrtaentes to the Cunsenl Judgment, It is alsu wortn noting tnet not all at tne dtreetors ot tne cumpentee stgned lhe consent Judgment. 24. In my optnton, the consent Judgment ts not enlorceattle agamsl the Companies oeeauee they were not garttes te tne Satd sutt, wnere the consent Judgment was recorded nte mun has no turtsdtetion over any person other than those properly brought before ll. ln lhls lrtslanwt the Companles were not properly brought oetore tne cottrl tn retatton to tne said sutt. I reler to tne followlng autnortttes 25. ln Khsllg cnwee Llarl v wong Tak Tndng [1983] CLJ (Rep) 195 at 200, the Federal court ttetd ~trt ourtudgntent, tne court, mluw has no jurlsdlcttlurl trrnersrtt orameiwlaet dyer any person tﬂhtr than these grooerry orougnt tutor. tt. as Dfsﬂtes or persons treated as l/llluy wars names - 26 In sanapatny cttetttar v Psriakaluppan clrettter 3. Anor [1962] 25 MLJ 207 at 21 t, ttta Prtvy council satd ‘Al me am and of the range It a can stlclt as Craig y Kartssarl to wmdl Iufarvnca is made in me court 0IA1wnal‘s mdgmsnl wrtens tn emu wnat had natwenetl was met a dmndant round nrrnserv tne sumac! or In order for the payment at molny wnnout having oeen g/van any prtor appomlrlly even or knowlrlg Ihalpvocaotitngs to tint and won lakan Hymns! him Such a dohcl of plwcdtuut Iitlnmrmctsd, ts an amont to nilurul/uslfce Art nrdar so rnede ts vqulvlfanl in e renrsal to Maw an tnt-rested parry names to me court and, Wills mndﬁ wtfhoulhls amwescenec andrn rt mlslaken belts! as to rtrs legs: pcmilon, ll shouldm mm! Lordship: vrlw by “set astde . wnotty . as trregutsr “ srn onvsytrsunncteunate ‘ wt... s.n.t tnmhnrwlll be u... m my s. nﬂnlnnllly MVMI dnuuvlnrtl y.. nFlt.ING vtmxl 27 Thirdty, the 5'" and r" Respundents themselves have amnned that Heng Kooi, Heng cheang and Heng Khee had signed the consent Judgmert\| on betiait oi Mother's estate. This admission by the 5'" and 1“ Respondents was made in the winding up petition that they had riied against the companies. The 5'" and 7" Respondents hart sworn atiidavits oonnnning the same to oe true. 28 Paragraph 18 of the winding up petition Ned by \|I1e 3"‘ and 7"‘ Respondents against the companies states: ‘The oisnute in the sari: CMI suii euiriiinaiee inio a consent order dated 23 June 2014 oetween the Petnnnevs and as weii as the Matoriw DIrIc1nrl, who aiimd lo the lINl\|I or [III consent order on tuhait or thr Exuh ot iri. Docuud ‘ 29 The 3" and 7- Respundenls are bound by their pleading and statement on oath They cannot approoate and reprohate. They cannot now change their stance in an attempt to avoid payment oi the amuums owing by them to the companies. so. Fentnenllyi the winding up order that was recorded by rnutuiii consent ot the parties in retation to the winding up at the companies expressly pmvlded that the companies reserved their nghta against the 6“ and 7“ Respondents it reads -2 That the winding up al the raid company is without ad ii hy either party at any ausgaiiorrr, claimly oeni.rros Ind /nr the gmll s in winding up Pemnn suii No FA~28NCC-‘t75e10I2D19 and senses reserve their mp-aim IiIhL5' 3\|. Fourthty. it is germane to note that the 5'" and 7* Respondents had inetitirted oontempt proceedings againet Heng Kooi tor tenure to comply with the consent Judgment However, no such pmoeedtngs were instituted by them against the companies This tonihes my view that the consent Judgment is not enioroeabie against the companies The t-nrne ottho coherent Judgment 32. The run text oi the consent Judgment reads ‘I That the eohrirnt order herein ooristituter e tun ario hnai eeitiernerri oi ait eiairnr oy the Ptaintﬂs in the suit herein r sru omirsrrrsiiriincipoirnpiu “Nair s.ii.i mmhnrwm r. or... In may i... aririnniir MIMI dnuurtml Vﬂ hFtt.INﬂ ooiiai 2 Thai the r=iaintiits snarl rlo\| be at llberly la rite rresri suns in vespecl or the dawn Vllrvlflr 3 that industrial court case Ne tsruzssrto by tho Fll:\| lahintitr adainst tdiri Haw Gems sdn EM be withdrawn tarttmiin 5 That industrial court Case Nu ta/utarto hy the Sewnd Ptaintin soairisi Klm Haw Jewellery son arid be wnhdrawrl lullrlvlttrlr 5 Yhal the First r=tainiirrs appeal to the Own or Appeal by way or Appeal No P-0L339—1l)Hﬂ\|4 be wlmdrawn loriirwiih 5 niatthe uarandsni shall dsiitouie the assets urine utsteor chend Khow chin i-the estate“) io ine oenerisiariss Irvcludlrlg ine Plalrtﬂﬂs as soon as ooasiote siioteot is the datiumurr 01 RM252,7nn on irom the Firm Plalnmls entitlement and rurtsztzszv Du train the seoond vlaintirrs an\|l\|lamurt\|r 1 "rev: snail oe no claims wttaunever or the pamu namely the Plalnllﬂs and: orthe nerendaniand /Mme eslala and r or Klm Haw Gems sdn and and r or Kim New Jewellery wit sun and against eaotr other arising out at and r or in mnnecllon with the dlspulns harem um ror any other aiaouiaa wfttch are pending, a That each party Are In near their own cash 33. The 6"’ and 7'" Respondents assert that a global settlement was reached in the s suit, which culminated in the consent Judgment Admittedly, the wording ot paragraph 7 ol the consent Judgment is dratted widely to purportedly oaplure claims by the companies. But that does not dehact trim the taai that the companies were not parties to the said suit 34. The slumbllng block remalns that the oornpanies were not panies to the consent Judgment. Hence, the consent Judgment cannot be erirursed against the companies As an asi E4 perhaps a settlement agreement could have been executed to include persons who were not parties In the Said suit, where the Consent Judgment was entered into 35. Next, the 5'" and 1'" Respondents harp on the lad that pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 or the consent Judgment. they withdrew their respective actions against the companies at the Industrial court. They complain that the Companies cannot distance themselves imrn the Cunsem Judgment, and yet beneﬁt liom I\| at the seine time. as My response is the As the ctaimantsinthe industrial court suns, the 6"‘ and 7*" Respondents are obvlously at liberty to withdraw those claims srn dnvsyrrsunnmaumara ° «war. a.n.i nurlhnrwm a. o... m mm o. aniirniiy snn. dnuurlnrrt Vﬂ mune Wm! agams\| ms Companies As ms planmus m me send sun. may can agree to do so as a term oi lhe settlement \71 me sans Sml. :7. By me same token, Heng Koo: (as me delendant in me sam Suit) may negohale such a term In me sememenl ov me Saxd sun It us me preroganve cf Hang Koo: (as me exsculor :71 Manners esme) to procure such a lawn ol selllemenl m ms mlereslolML71her‘s same. Gramed that the Companies may have beneﬁled «mm me withdrawal of me lnduslnal coun smts Med agains\| lhem by me am and 7'" Respondents am .1 does no! vauaw that me Companies are Ihereby bound by me Cnnsenl Judgmenl. Anc ary ordnvs 35 In the Origma ng Summons‘ me Apphcant sought for the lollowmg rehe¢s' 1:) It me Answev \|o aussnon Na 1 u m (M negallve, \l .s played far In: lmkrwmw order w. m 1.: days mm me am cl me Omev. me vanmnu debtors shaH pay to me Apnhuml. menaems awmg m Ihe sand 2 Oompanleslovme pnncIpa\ amounls 35 same as lnllnws. Owmg m Km: How Gems 3.. am Fnnglgl Ammml Owed 1:» cu... new many - RM 571.175 as (by 7 RM 351L001: no tax I am mm as my on... Hang Sm I am «,ssa,usa 15 1e» Chan New Kent - RM 59,335 95 m Chan van xnss . am 350 am no m cm Nang Km ~ RM 379 gm no on em Mung Kw ~ RM 335 3&7 on In em Hang Wang — RM ammo no 1,» Eslile L11 Chang Km Chm — RM 21226.49 (k) Km: Haw Jewellers Sun and 7 RM man an (n Km: Now 56!! am . RM mm an (m) mm Now Jewellerv (M) Sdn am . RM 2u7_7s5 as .. um w u M Sun and Pnncrgl Ammml owsa n.) Chan Hang Chsxng 7 RM Ln4nA5D 93 (la) Chan ppm Chmn 7 RM 732,41: 62 m Chan Punk Men 7 RM saa,57u us my man Hana sun 7 RM zuse 25 (e) Chanﬂenq Keal . RM1,m,7155e (47 cm Palk Knee . am 499 can no (97 cu... Hum; Khu — RM Aswan no 9 sm umvsyxrsummcwmmu «mm. smuw ...m.mn .. U... m may he mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI nF\uNa Wm! my Chan Hem «am - RM mam” no up cm Nana wsng - RM 450,000 ou in Klm Haw uwsiim sun aim 7 RM am 05 (5) ii We deblml iaasmea iii nmagraph(17ovpaIagvapM2}-Ibavemslhecase mny bebshaﬂ van 1o paylhelvmlpemlva dabls WVINII 14 aaysimm ins aaie cl me am in be made havmn. Ihen the said dealers snau pay \n\|9Vell (Nelson at m iais av rm vemaiii per annum 157. pa! avinum) caicuisi-u «mm me says after mu wiry oi the 14 days until me am. «is um deals In r:p:\|idIn1u\Il7y(he saia ﬂemors toms Awlicam 45) Hlhe Answer Io ma Quashan Na (2) I! m we ammlallve. 11 I5 pram «arm- mowing mam Puuuam la the Public Raving No eizois iuuad by im Vnlanﬂ Revenue mm and Semen mm income Tax 1157 mad wilh ‘Chﬂvlzv IX—Tmr\|b1EV Pricing cimeiines which Ii aim Issued hy ms wand Revenue Board, in. said demon anus raid 2 Comnanles aiiaii pnylnlemsl al ma me on sow. per annum on ma dams wing by them respaciwaiy In me an 2 Companiu as nl 1 1 2010 caicuia1eaimm 1 1 2014 1mm me dale cl ms oiuei neisiii aim Var ms was mcunad my 1 1 znu ‘meresl at the rale oi new [191 aimum snaii be paiu an we sul73£qioen\| aaaiimiai dams saiwiaied «mm lmz aaies me mpaswe dams were mmma umii ma diva oi Ina may herein and an such mkeIEs\| shall be pabd by me win dablnn In via Apghcanl Wilhm 14 days Mme dale oima oiaar hsnm is; An amsi lhnl me sum in RM 2.800 on swing by Kim Haw san am to Kim New Gems Sdn am: man be »mi1amai1 m A iunnariamisaiisniiai ardev mai me Order herein snaii bind an We dablars ima ms mnlnbularies Mme sum 2 Compamu is) cosi oi ims appiicaiion man be mm lmm me estate at Ina Said 2 Companies‘ 39 Consequenl upun my answer in the main question (is man the Consent Judgment IS nu\| binding upon the Companies and the debts owing Dy the 5% and 1“ Respmmanis in the Companies are therefuve not abolished or waived). i granted prayer 3 above i ordered me debtors concerned \|0 pay their respemive debts due to the CDMDRVHES (D the ADPUCEM w\\|hIn 14 days. 40 \ male that the 5"‘ and 7" Respondems did ND! raise any serious chaHenge to me “Fnnupai Amount Owed". as sfaled by the Appllcanl above Aomrdlng lo their written submlssmns, -me soie issue for the Com‘: determination of Enclosure 1 IS whether lhe Consent omais are binding on the Companies“ sm D/KVSyIF5UmmC1pB4mp1Q ‘“ “Nair s.n.i nuvihnrwm .. 1.... In mm .. iim.1-i mm: dnuumnl _ mime Wm!	1,623	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
N-05(SH)-417-09/2019	PERAYU LEE CHEE SOON RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]	Seksyen 37A Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Pindaan) 2014 – Seksyen 37(d) and 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 - Anggapan berganda (double presumption) - Membuktikan pemilikan, pengetahuan dan pengedaran dadah - Sebelum kes pembelaan bermula pada 28/3/2019, Hakim Perbicaraan menggunapakai anggapan berganda di bawah 37(d) and 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 - Tiada kekhilafan di pihak Hakim Perbicaraan memakai anggapan berganda sehinggalah ianya dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan pada 5/4/2019 - Di akhir kes pembelaan, Hakim pada 4/9/2019 telah memutuskan untuk tidak bergantung kepada apa-apa anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 - Memakai pengedaran langsung terhadap Ketiga-tiga Perayu bagi membuktikan pengedaran dadah - Pihak pembelaan telah gagal untuk mematahkan anggapan diatas imbangan kebarangkalian (balance of probabilities) bagi pertuduhan pengedaran dan pemilikan dadah – Isu (presumed trafficking) dan kegagalan pihak pembelaan untuk mematahkan anggapan-anggapan yang berbangkit diatas imbangan kebarangkalian ini sepatutnya sudah berkubur - Terdapat kekhilafan pemakaian perundangan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan - Isu Perayu-perayu dihalang dari menyediakan pembelaan yang berkesan untuk mematahkan anggapan pengedaran, diprejudiskan sehingga berlaku salah laksana keadilan (miscarriage of justice) tidak mempunyai merit sama sekali dan ditolak - Isu anggapan berganda untuk kes- kes pengedaran dadah dibawah seksyen 37(d) dan seksyen 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang digunakan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan, penggunaannya kini telah melanggar rule against double presumption - Tiada kemudaratan atau ketidakadilan serius berlaku kerana ketiga-tiga Perayu telah mengetahui bahawa beban pembuktian yang perlu dipikul untuk mematahkan kedua-dua anggapan tersebut masih tetap sama - Ketinggalan, atau pertukaran perintah (change of ruling) yang dilakukan bukanlah merupakan suatu salah arah serius yang memprejudiskan Perayu-Perayu - Kesilapan teknikal yang tidak menjurus ke arah kegagalan keadilan (failure of justice) yang tidak boleh diperbetulkan – Tidak wujud apa - apa “appealable error” - Keterangan yang sedia ada adalah lemah dan tidak kukuh - Hakim Perbicaraan membuat inferens berdasarkan kepada kelakuan Perayu-Perayu ketika kejadian dan semasa serbuan untuk membuktikan pengetahuan dan pemilikan - Elemen niat bersama dibawah seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan - Kelakuan yang mencurigakan tidak mencukupi untuk membuktikan kaitan Bersama - Pihak Pendakwaan gagal membuktikan peranan yang dimainkan oleh setiap Perayu serta kewujudan pemuafakatan niat Bersama - Tiada keterangan langsung atau keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) yang mantap - Profil DNA milik Perayu-Perayu hanyalah membuktikan kehadiran atau keberadaan mereka - Pertuduhan berkaitan senjata api, Timbalan Pendakwaraya secara jujur mengakui bahawa rantaian keterangan berkenaan penemuan ekshibit senjata api tersebut adalah terputus - Sabitan yang dijatuhkan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan tidak boleh dikekalkan.	29/11/2023	YA Dato' Azmi Bin AriffinKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6e122442-b570-4e8a-993b-982075c6e10a&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. N-05(SH)-417-09/2019, N-05(SH)-418-09/2019, N-05(SH)-419-09/2019, N-05(SH)-420-09/2019, N-05(SH)-421-09/2019, N-05(SH)-422-09/2019, N-05(SH)-423-09/2019, N-05(SH)-424-09/2019, N-05(SH)-425-09/2019 & N-05(SH)-426-09/2019 ANTARA 1. LEE CHEE SOON (No. Kp: 700329-08-5941) 2. LIM AH LEK (No. Kp: 640609-085573) 3. WAI CHUN FUNG (No. Kp: 820625-05-5487) - PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA - RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban, Negeri Sembilan Permohonan Jenayan No. 45A-2-02/2016, 45A-3-02/2016 & 45A-4-02/2016 Antara 1. Lee Chee Soon (No. Kp: 700329-08-5941) 2. Lim Ah Lek 29/11/2023 11:57:20 N-05(SH)-417-09/2019 Kand. 45 S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (No. Kp: 640609-085573) 3. Wai Chun Fung (No. Kp: 820625-05-5487) - Perayu Dan Pendakwa Raya - Responden] KORAM HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, HMR AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH, HMR AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, HMR PENGHAKIMAN Pertuduhan [1] Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Ketiga bersama seorang Perayu Kedua, Lim Ah Lek (meninggal dunia) telah dituduh di atas pertuduhan-pertuduhan berikut: (i) Dua (2) pertuduhan bagi pengedaran dadah berjumlah 882.14 gram Methamphetamine dan 23.37 grams Heroin dan Monoacetylmorphine sebagaimana berikut: Pertuduhan Pertama S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama dengan niat bersama telah mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu 882.14 gram Methamphetamine pada 24 Julai 2015 jam lebih kurang 11.00 pagi di alamat No. 1045 Lorong Kaloi 17/3, Taman Permai 2, dalam daerah Seremban, dalam Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39(B)(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan" Pertuduhan Kedua “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama dengan niat bersama-sama telah memiliki dadah berbahaya iaitu 23.37 gram Heroin dan Monoacetylmorphines pada 24 Julai 2015 jam lebih kurang 11.00 pagi, di alamat No. 1045 Lorong Kaloi 17/3, Taman Permai 2, dalam daerah Seremban, dalam Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan" (ii) Dua (2) pertuduhan pemilikan dadah berjumlah 1.52 gram Methamphetamine dan 34.74 gram Prepared Opium sebagaimana berikut: Pertuduhan Ketiga S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama dengan niat bersama-sama telah memiliki dadah berbahaya iaitu 1.52 gram Methamphetamine pada 24 Julai 2015 jam lebih kurang 11.00 pagi, di alamat No. 1045 Lorong Kaloi 1713, Taman Permai 2, dalam daerah Seremban, dalam Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 12(3) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan" Pertuduhan Keempat “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama dengan niat bersama-sama telah memiliki dadah berbahaya iaitu 34.74 gram Prepared Opium pada 24 Julai 2015 jam lebih kurang 11.00 pagi, di alamat No. 1045 Lorong Kaloi 1713, Taman Permai 2, dalam daerah Seremban, dalam Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 9(1)(b) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 9(2) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” (iii) Satu (1) pertuduhan pemilikan racun berjumlah 94.56 gram Chloroquine sebagaimana berikut: Pertuduhan Kelima “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama dengan niat bersama telah memiliki 94.56 gram Chloroquine pada 24 Julai 2015 jam lebih S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 kurang 11.00 pagi, di alamat No.1045 Lorong Kaloi 1713, Taman Permai 2, dalam daerah Seremban, dalam Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 9(1) Akta Racun 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 32(2) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” (iv) Satu (1) pertuduhan pemilikan 1 pucuk pistol dan 72 peluru hidup. Pertuduhan Keenam “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama dengan niat bersama telah memiliki satu (1) pucuk pistol dan 72 butir peluru dengan menyalahi undang - undang pada 24 Julai 2015 jam lebih kurang 11.00 pagi, di alamat No.1045 Lorong Kaloi 1713, Taman Permai 2, dalam daerah Seremban, dalam Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 8 Akta Senjata Api 1960 dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan” [2] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya mengemukakan suatu kes prima facie terhadap ketiga-tiga Perayu dan telah memanggil mereka bertiga untuk mereka membela dirinya. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [3] Ketiga-tiga Perayu telah memilih untuk memberi keterangan bersumpah di kandang saksi. Enam (6) saksi pembelaan dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. [4] Di akhir kes pembelaan, pada 4/9/2019 Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah mendapati ketiga - tiga Perayu bersalah di atas keenam- enam pertuduhan tersebut dan telah dikenakan hukuman seperti berikut: (a) Pertuduhan Pertama: Pemenjaraan seumur hidup dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 dan 15 sebatan. (b) Pertuduhan Kedua: Pemenjaraan seumur hidup dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 dan 15 sebatan. (c) Pertuduhan Ketiga: Pemenjaraan selama empat (4) tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015. (d) Pertuduhan Keempat: Pemenjaraan selama empat (4) tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/ 2015. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (e) Pertuduhan Kelima: Pemenjaraan selama empat (4) tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/ 2015 (f) Pertuduhan Keenam: Pemenjaraan selama empat (4) tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/ 2015. [5] Tidak berpuashati dengan keputusan tersebut, pada 30/9/2019, Perayu Pertama, Kedua dan Ketiga telah menfailkan Notis Rayuan terhadap hukuman sahaja. [6] Pada 18/9/2019, pihak Pendakwa Raya telah memfailkan rayuan silang atas hukuman terhadap ketiga-tiga Perayu tersebut. [7] Walau bagaimanapun, melalui Notis Usul yang difailkan oleh ketiga- tiga Perayu bertarikh 11/11/2020, mereka telah memohon kepada Mahkamah Rayuan untuk memasukkan juga sabitan di dalam Notis Rayuan Terpinda mereka. Permohonan mereka ini telah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan pada 15/2/2021. Fakta kes Pendakwaan [8] Bertindak di atas maklumat yang diterima, pada 24/7/2015, jam lebih kurang 11.00 pagi, SP1 (D/SI Zainal Bin Nasir) yang mengetuai sepasukan anggota polis seramai tiga (3) orang dari Ibu Pejabat Polis Kontinjen (IPK) Negeri Sembilan telah pergi ke sebuah rumah beralamat di No.1045, Jalan Keloi 17/3, Taman Permai 2, Seremban, Negeri Sembilan. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [9] SP1 mendapati pintu pagar rumah tersebut tidak berkunci. SP1 telah masuk ke hadapan rumah itu dan mendapati pintu grill berkunci tetapi pintu sliding tidak berkunci. SP1 telah membuka pintu sliding tersebut. [10] SP1 melihat Perayu Pertama (Lee Chee Soon) berdiri di ruang tamu mengadap ke arah SP1. SP1 menunjukkan kad kuasanya sambil mengarahkan Perayu Pertama membuka pintu grill tersebut. Perayu Pertama telah mengambil kunci grill daripada mega di ruang tamu dan cuba melengah-lenggah untuk membuka pintu grill dan kemudian menjerit dalam bahasa loghat Cina iaitu “Mata Lai”. Setelah pintu grill dibuka, SP1 telah mengarahkan anggotanya untuk menangkap Perayu Pertama. [11] SP1 juga nampak Perayu Kedua (meninggal dunia) berlari dari bilik kedua ke bilik ketiga. [12] SP1 dan anggotanya yang lain kemudian bergegas ke bilik ketiga dan terus menuju ke bilik air di dalam bilik ketiga tersebut. SP1 nampak Perayu Kedua sedang membuang sesuatu ke dalam tandas dan menarik flush tandas. SP1 telah menahan Perayu Kedua. [13] SP1 kemudiannya telah membuat pemeriksaan di dalam bilik pertama rumah dan mendapati Perayu Ketiga (Wai Chun Fung) sedang duduk di atas lantai dan kelihatan berada di dalam keadaan terkejut. Perayu Ketiga juga telah ditahan oleh SP1. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [14] Dengan disaksikan oleh ketiga-tiga Perayu, SP1 dan pasukannya telah menjalankan pemeriksaan lanjut di dalam rumah itu. [15] Di bilik pertama dan di ruang tamu, SP1 telah menjumpai pelbagai peralatan menghisap dadah termasuk botol-botol menghisap dadah Methamphetamine. [16] Di bilik kedua, SP1 menjumpai peralatan menghisah dadah. [17] Di bilik air bilik ketiga, SP1 mendapati siling telah diubah suai dan SP1 kemudian naik memeriksa siling dengan memanjat mangkuk tandas dan menolak bahagian siling tersebut. Di atas siling bilik ketiga tersebut, SP1 menjumpai dan merampas barang-barang berikut: (a) Satu (1) beg berwarna hitam yang mengandungi dua (2) paket plastik lutsinar berisi bahan disyaki dadah Methamphetamine; (b) Satu (1) beg kecil warna merah yang mengandungi satu pastik berisi bahan disyaki dadah Ketamin dan satu paket plastik berisi 89 biji pil logo WY disyaki dadah berbahaya (Beg ditanda “B" oleh SP1); (c) Satu (1) beg plastik tulisan KLINIK ASIA MUAR yang mengandungi 6 paket plastik berisi bahan disyaki dadah Methamphetamine (Beg ditanda "C" oleh SP1); S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (d) Satu (1) beg kain merah yang mengandungi 2 paket plastik berisi bahan disyaki dadah Methamphetamine (Beg ditanda "D" oleh SP1); (e) Satu (1) kotak tulisan KINGSTON ISOTONIC yang mengandungi 4 paket plastik berisi bahan disyaki dadah Methamphetamine (Beg ditanda "E" oleh SP1); (f) Sebungkusan surat akhbar tulisan Cina yang mengandungi 1 paket plastik berisi bahan disyaki dadah Heroin (Keratan akhbar ditanda “F” oleh SP1); (g) Satu (1) beg hitam logo "APPLE" yang mengandungi sepucuk pistol satu magazine, satu gari tangan dan satu beg uncang warna hitam berisi 72 butir peluru hidup pelbagai jenis dan 2 kelongsong peluru (Beg ditanda "G" oleh SP1); dan (h) Satu botol plastik berisi cecair pekat warna hitam disyaki sebagai candu (Botol plastik ditanda "H" oleh SP1). [18] SP1 telah memaklumkan kejadian dan tangkapan ke atas ketiga-tiga Perayu ini kepada pegawai penyiasat kes iaitu SP9 (Inspektor Nadirah binti binti Haji Mustapha). [19] Pada 24/7/2015, jam lebih kurang 12.00 tengah hari, SP9 tiba di tempat kejadian. Manakala pada jam 3.00 petang hari yang sama juga, S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 pasukan forensik yang diketuai oleh SP5 (Inspektor Tan Cheng Kiat) pula sampai di tempat tersebut bagi menjalankan siasatan. [20] Pada jam lebih kurang 5.00 petang, SP1 telah membawa rampasan barang kes beserta ketiga-tiga Perayu menaiki van menuju ke Jabatan Siasatan Narkotik, IPK Seremban, Negeri Sembilan bagi membuat urusan dokumentasi. [21] Pada jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang, SP1 tiba di IPK Negeri Sembilan. Selepas SP1 selesai membuat segala proses timbangan dan penandaan barang kes, maka pada jam lebih kurang 9.00 malam, di tempat yang sama juga, SP1 telah menyerahkan kesemua barang kes yang dirampas dan ketiga - tiga Perayu kepada SP9. (Senarai bongkar dan senarai penerimaan barang kes masing-masing ditandakan sebagai P14 dan P15). [22] Kandungan yang terdapat di dalam satu (1) kotak bertanda “N” (P18) adalah seperti berikut: (a) Satu (1) beg hitam bertanda “NA” (P19) di mana di dalamnya mengandungi satu (1) paket plastik bertanda NA (1) (P19A) dan satu (1) paket plastik bertanda NA (2) (P19B) berisi bahan kristal jernih. Berat bersih dadah Methamphetamine ialah 86.34 gram; (b) Satu (1) beg kecil warna merah bertanda “NB” (P21) di dalamnya mengandungi satu (1) paket plastik bertanda “NB1” (P21A) berisi bahan kristal jernih. Berat bersih Chloroquine ialah 94.56 gram; S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (c) Satu (1) paket plastik bertanda “NB2” (P23) yang mengandungi 89 biji pil berwarna merah. Berat bersih dadah Methamphetamine ialah 1.52 gram; (d) Satu (1) beg plastik tulisan KLINIK ASIA MUAR bertanda “NC” (P25) di mana di dalamnya terdapat 1 paket plastik bertanda “NC1” (P25A). Di dalam P25A terdapat enam (6) paket plastik yang masing - masing bertanda: “NC 1” (P25A); “NC 2” (P25B); “NC 3” (P25C); “NC4” (P25D); “NC5” (P25E); dan “NC6” (P25F). [23] Kandungan berat bersih kesemua dadah yang terdapat di dalam keenam-enam paket plastik ini bila disatukan berjumlah 337.9 gram Methamphetamine. (e) Satu (1) beg kain merah bertanda “ND” (P27) di mana di dalamnya mengandungi 1 paket plastik bertanda “ND” (P27A). S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Di dalam P27A terdapat 2 paket plastik yang masing - masing bertanda “ND1” (P27A) dan “ND2” (P27B). Berat bersih dadah Methamphetamine ialah 226.2 gram; (f) Satu (1) kotak tulisan KINGSTON ISOTONIC bertanda “NE” (P29) di mana di dalamnya mengandungi 4 paket plastik bertanda “NE1”, “NE2”, “NE3” dan “NE4” yang masing-masing bertanda P29(A), P29(B), P29(C) dan P29(D). Kandungan berat bersih kesemua dadah yang terdapat di dalam keempat-empat paket plastik ini bila disatukan berjumlah 231.7 gram Methamphetamine. (g) Sebungkusan surat akhbar bertulisan Cina bertanda “NF” (P31) di mana di dalamnya mengandungi 1 paket plastik bertanda “NF1” (P31A) berisi 21.58 Heroin dan 1.79 gram Methamphetamine. (h) Satu (1) beg hitam logo "APPLE" bertanda “G” (P41) di mana di dalamnya mengandungi 1 hostler bertulisan Police bertanda “G1” (P37) berisi sepucuk pistol jenama BRO - GRIP WE - TECH 3203700132 JL (P39), 1 magazine bertanda “G3” (P38), 1 plastik bertanda “G4” (P43) berisi sepasang gari bertanda “G4” (P44) dan 1 beg uncang warna hitam bertanda “G5” berisi 72 butir peluru hidup pelbagai jenis dan 2 kelongsong peluru (P46 - P64). S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (i) Satu (1) botol plastik bertanda “H” (P33) di mana di dalamnya mengandungi cecair pekat warna hitam yang disyaki candu masak. (j) Mangga (P65) (k) Anak kunci (P66). [24] Pada 27/7/2015, jam lebih kurang 2.52 petang, SP2 (Dr. Saravanan Kumar a/l Jayaram) seorang Ahli Kimia dari Jabatan Kimia Malaysia, Petaling Jaya, Selangor telah menerima satu (1) telah menerima satu (1) kotak bertanda “N” (P18) bermeterai PDRM daripada SP9. SP2 telah mengeluarkan dan menyerahkan resit rasmi Jabatan Kimia Malaysia (P16) kepada SP9. Setelah analisa dibuat oleh SP2 ke atas kesemua barang- barang kes tersebut, SP2 telah menyediakan dan menyerahkan satu Laporan Kimia bertarikh 26/10/2015 (P17) kepada SP9. [25] Pada 27/7/2015, jam lebih kurang 3.09 petang, SP9 telah menghantar 29 ekshibit kepada SP6 (Mohd Izuan bin Othman) seorang Ahli Kimia dari Jabatan Kimia Malaysia, Petaling Jaya, Selangor untuk tujuan analisa Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). SP6 telah mengeluarkan dan menyerahkan resit rasmi Jabatan Kimia Malaysia (P69 (a -e)) dan satu Laporan Kimia (P70 (a-g)) kepada SP9. Laporan Kimia tersebut mengandungi butiran seperti berikut: (i) Terdapat profil DNA milik Tertuduh Pertama dikesan pada berus gigi bertanda 14(3); S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (ii) Terdapat profil DNA milik Tertuduh Kedua dikesan pada gelas kaca (2) dan seluar pendek (13); (iii) Terdapat profil DNA milik Tertuduh Ketiga dikesan pada puntung rokok (7(1)) dan (8); (iv) Terdapat profil DNA “Lelaki X” yang tidak sepadan dengan profil DNA milik ketiga-tiga Tertuduh pada berus gigi bertanda 14(5); (v) Terdapat profil DNA “Lelaki Y” yang tidak sepadan dengan profil DNA milik ketiga - tiga Tertuduh pada puntung rokok 7(2); (vi) Terdapat profil DNA yang mempunyai sekurang-kurangnya 2 penyumbang pada gelas kaca 4 di mana penyumbang majoriti ialah Tertuduh Kedua manakala penyumbang minor adalah lemah dan tidak konklusif untuk dikenalpasti; (vii) Terdapat satu profil bercampur telah diperolehi pada kesan DNA surih pada berus gigi 14(1) yang terdiri daripada 2 penyumbang. Namun demikian, profil bagi ketiga - tiga Tertuduh, “Lelaki X” dan “Lelaki Y” dikecualikan daripada menjadi penyumbang kepada profil DNA campuran ini. [26] Pada 28/7/2015, jam lebih kurang 12.10 tengah hari, SP9 telah menghantar senjata api dan peluru kepada SP7 (SM Abas bin Sadikon) seorang Pemeriksa Senjata bagi tujuan pemeriksaan serviceability. Ujian S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 senjata api dan peluru dijalankan oleh SP7 dan beliau mengesahkan senjata api ini berfungsi. SP7 telah menyediakan Laporan Pemeriksaannya bertarikh 28/7/2015 (P72) dan menyerahkan semula barang - barang kes ini kepada SP9 pada 30/7/2015 jam lebih kurang 4.15 petang di Cawangan Persenjataan, IPK Negeri Sembilan. [27] Pemilik rumah di premis kejadian iaitu Veeknesraj Muthaliyar a/l M.M Aruldas (SP8) mengesahkan bahawa beliau ada meminta SP3 (Subramaniam a/l K Mutiah) untuk menguruskan penyewaan rumah tersebut. [28] Kemudiannya, seorang lelaki bernama Danial Jackson telah menghubungi SP3 untuk menyewa rumah tersebut. SP3 telah bertemu dengan Danial sebanyak 2 kali untuk urusan penyewaan rumah itu. Pada 8/3/2015, SP3 telah menyerahkan kunci rumah tersebut kepada Danial setelah deposit rumah dibayar olehnya. SP3 camkan Danial Jackson sebagai Perayu Ketiga. Pada ketika itu tiada sebarang perjanjian sewaan yang dibuat di antara SP3 dengan penyewa. SP3 tidak pernah melihat Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua. Ringkasan Keterangan Kes Pembelaan [29] Ketiga-tiga Perayu memilih untuk memberi keterangan secara bersumpah. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Keterangan Perayu Pertama [30] Pada pagi 24/7/2015, Perayu Pertama telah pergi ke Seremban bersama Perayu Kedua kerana Perayu Kedua perlu mencari peminjam wangnya yang telah menghilangkan diri. Semasa mereka bersarapan pagi, mereka berdua bersembang dengan Perayu Ketiga yang juga merupakan kawan Perayu Kedua. [31] Pada tarikh yang sama, jam sekitar 10.30 pagi, Perayu Ketiga mengajak Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua ke rumahnya di Taman Permai, dimana Perayu Ketiga menumpang bilik di rumah tersebut bagi tujuan menyegarkan diri, minum-minum dan menghisap rokok. [32] Ketiga-tiga Perayu minum dan merokok di rumah tersebut. Kemudian, Perayu Pertama pergi mencuci muka dan memberus giginya kerana mulutnya berbau rokok. Tiba-tiba terdapat orang di pintu yang mengatakan bahawa mereka adalah polis. Perayu Pertama mengambil kunci di atas meja sambil memanggil Perayu Ketiga. Perayu Pertama tidak tahu kunci mana yang digunakan untuk membuka pintu dan mangga pada pintu tersebut. Lantas pihak polis telah memarahi beliau. Setelah mangga dibuka, pihak polis masuk ke dalam rumah tersebut, ketiga-tiga Perayu telah disuruh untuk duduk di ruang tamu di dalam keadaan bergari. SP1 telah membuat pemeriksaan di dalam rumah dan menemui barang-barang di atas siling tandas. [33] Perayu Pertama menafikan mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai barangan salah yang ditemui tersebut. Ini adalah kerana beliau hanya S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 seorang lah tetamu di rumah tersebut. Malahan ini adalah kali pertama beliau datang ke rumah itu dan beliau juga tidak mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan terhadap rumah orang lain. [34] Perayu Pertama datang ke Melaka untuk bekerja membuat wiring di gereja isteri Perayu Kedua. Perayu Pertama tinggal bersama-sama keluarga Perayu Kedua. Perayu Pertama menyatakan beliau ada memberitahu SP1 dan SP9 bahawa beliau tidak mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai dadah dan senjata api yang dirampas itu. Keterangan Perayu Kedua (SD2) [35] Perayu Kedua adalah peminjam wang berlesen dan menetap di Tampin, Melaka bersama isterinya Tay Goh Moy. [36] Pada pagi 24/7/2015, Perayu Kedua telah datang ke Seremban bersama Perayu Pertama kerana Perayu Kedua perlu mencari peminjam wang yang telah menghilangkan diri. Semasa mereka bersarapan, mereka berdua berbual - bual dengan Perayu Ketiga. [37] Pada jam 10.30 pagi tarikh yang sama, Perayu Ketiga mengajak mereka Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua ke rumahnya di Taman Permai untuk menyegarkan diri, minum-minum dan menghisap rokok. Perayu Kedua diberitahu oleh Perayu Ketiga bahawa ramai orang tinggal di rumah itu dan kawan Perayu Ketiga yang mengajak beliau tinggal di situ. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [38] Ketika Perayu Kedua sedang menghala ke tandas untuk membuang air kecil, Perayu Kedua mendengar Perayu Pertama berkata kepada Perayu Ketiga ada orang datang. Semasa Perayu Kedua mengepam tandas, tiba- tiba seorang lelaki Melayu berada di pintu tandas. [39] Rumah tersebut dipenuhi oleh polis. Ketiga-tiga Perayu telah disuruh duduk di ruang tamu dalam keadaan bergari. SP1 telah membuat pemeriksaan di dalam rumah tersebut dan menemui barang di atas siling tandas. [40] Perayu Kedua menafikan mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah dan senjata api yang ditemui kerana beliau menyatakan bahawa beliau hanya tetamu di rumah tersebut, baru kali pertama datang ke rumah tersebut dan tidak mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan terhadap rumah orang lain. [41] Perayu Pertama telah datang ke Melaka untuk bekerja membuat pendawaian (wiring) di gereja isteri Perayu Kedua dan telah tinggal bersama keluarga Perayu Kedua. [42] Perayu Kedua ada memberitahu SP1 dan SP9 bahawa beliau tidak tahu menahu pun berkenaan dadah dan senjata api yang dirampas itu. [43] Keterangan Perayu Ketiga (SD3). [44] Perayu Ketiga bekerja sebagai kontraktor TM. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [45] Perayu Ketiga mempunyai masalah dengan isterinya dan telah diajak oleh rakannya bernama Teh Kean Heng (SD4) dari gereja untuk menumpang di rumah tempat kejadian pada 23/7/2015 iaitu sehari sebelum ketiga-tiga Perayu ditahan oleh pihak polis. Perayu Ketiga telah diberitahu oleh SD4 bahawa seorang lelaki India sewa rumah itu untuk "short stay' sahaja. [46] Perayu Ketiga menafikan beliau adalah penyewa rumah tersebut dan menafikan bahawa agen rumah mengenali beliau sebelum ini. [47] Pada pagi 24/7/2015, Perayu Ketiga telah bersembang dengan Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua dan dimaklumkan oleh Perayu Kedua bahawa beliau ke Seremban untuk mencari peminjam wang yang menghilangkan diri. [48] Pada jam 10.30 pagi tarikh yang sama, Perayu Ketiga mengajak Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua ke rumahnya di Taman Permai untuk menyegarkan diri, minum-minum dan menghisap rokok. [49] Ketika mereka bertiga sedang menghisap rokok, Perayu Pertama telah meminta untuk membasuh muka dan memberus giginya kerana bau rokok yang kuat. Tiba-tiba Perayu Pertama mengatakan ada orang di pintu rumah dan kata mereka adalah polis. [50] Kemudian, rumah tersebut dipenuhi oleh pihak polis. Ketiga-tiga Perayu telah disuruh duduk di ruang tamu dalam keadaan bergari. SP1 telah S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 membuat pemeriksaan di dalam rumah tersebut dan menemui barang kes dadah dan senjata api di atas siling tandas. [51] Perayu Ketiga menafikan mempunyai pengetahuan tentang kewujudan barangan salah iaitu dadah dan senjata api yang ditemui kerana beliau hanya tetamu di rumah tersebut dan tidak mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan terhadap rumah orang lain. [52] Perayu Ketiga ada memberitahu SP1 dan SP9 bahawa beliau tidak tahu menahu tentang dadah dan senjata api yang dirampas itu. Keterangan Tean Kean Heng (SD4) [53] Sebelum 24/7/2015, SD4 tinggal menyewa di bilik pertama di rumah No.1045, Lorong Kaloi, 17/3, Taman Permai 2, Seremban selama 4 bulan. Bilik itu kemudiannya disewa pula oleh seorang lelaki India bernama Subra dengan harga RM150 sebulan. [54] SD4 menafikan mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai dadah dan senjata api yang ditemui diatas siling tandas kerana SD4 tidak menggunakan tandas tersebut. SD4 tidak pernah membuka siling tandas tersebut. [55] SD4 mengenali Perayu Ketiga kerana mereka sembahyang di gereja yang sama. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [56] Perayu Ketiga mempunyai masalah dengan isterinya dan pada 23/7/2015, SD4 telah mengajak Perayu Ketiga untuk menumpang di biliknya. SD4 telah pergi ke Taiping pada jam 9.45 pagi 24/7/2015 dan meninggalkan kunci rumah kepada Perayu Ketiga untuk membolehkan Perayu Ketiga tinggal di situ selama 2 hingga 3 hari. Selepas seminggu, SD4 mengetahui bahawa rumah tersebut telah diserbu oleh pihak polis. [57] SD4 menyatakan Perayu Ketiga hanya datang ke rumah tersebut dengan membawa beberapa helai baju, berus gigi dan tuala sahaja. [58] Sejak SD4 menyewa di situ, SD4 mendapati ramai orang yang keluar masuk ke dalam rumah tersebut dan wajah mereka ini adalah seperti penagih dadah. Keterangan Tay Goh Moy (SD5) [59] SD5 adalah isteri kepada Perayu Kedua. [60] SD5 adalah seorang suri rumahtangga dan suaminya iaitu Perayu Kedua bekerja sebagai peminjam wang. [61] Perayu Kedua bekerja di Singapura dan datang ke Tampin untuk membantu urusan wiring di gereja SD5. [62] Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua datang ke Seremban kerana Perayu Kedua ingin mencari peminjam wang yang menghilangkan diri. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [63] Perayu Kedua tidak mempunyai rumah di Seremban. Keterangan Ho Kien Fatt (SD6) [64] SD6 adalah paderi di gereja Revival Prayer Church Sanctuary dan merupakan jiran kepada Perayu Ketiga. [65] SD6 telah dimaklumkan oleh Perayu Ketiga bahawa pada 23/7/2015 Perayu Ketiga telah bergaduh besar dengan isterinya seorang wanita Vietnam dan di atas sebab itu Perayu Ketiga telah meninggalkan rumahnya dan tinggal di rumah kawannya. [66] SD6 mengetahui bahawa Perayu Ketiga telah ditangkap polis setelah dimaklumkan oleh isteri Perayu Ketiga kerana isteri Perayu Ketiga hendak pulang ke Vietnam bersama anak-anaknya. [67] SD6 ada menyimpan surat dan dokumen-dokumen penting milik Perayu Ketiga yang diambil daripada rumah Perayu Ketiga beralamat di No. 5598, Jalan SJ 5/4, Taman Seremban Jaya, Seremban kerana Perayu Ketiga berada di penjara. Dapatan Mahkamah Tinggi Di Akhir Kes Pembelaan (a) Pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh Ketiga-tiga Perayu hanyalah penafian kosong dan pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought) sahaja kerana ketiadaan keterangan sokongan dari saksi-saksi yang boleh dipercayai atau kredibel. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 (b) Wujud niat bersama ketiga-tiga Perayu bagi melakukan kesalahan terhadap kesemua pertuduhan. (c) Terdapat presumed trafficking dan bukan direct trafficking. (d) Perayu-Perayu gagal mematahkan kes pendakwaan di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. (e) Rantaian keterangan melibatkan dadah dan senjata api tidak terputus. (f) Tiada kacau ganggu pada ekshibit yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan. (g) Keterangan SD 4 tidak boleh dipercayai. Alasan - Alasan Petisyen Rayuan Perayu - Perayu (a) Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah gagal untuk memberi indikasi kepada Perayu-Perayu samada pembelaan diri dipanggil berdasarkan kepada pengedaran langsung (direct trafficking) atau anggapan pengedaran (presumed trafficking). (b) Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf bila beliau menggunapakai anggapan berganda (double presumptions) di bawah seksyen 37(d) dan seksyen 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 tiga (3) S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 bulan selepas beliau membuat perintah wujudnya suatu kes prima facie terhadap ketiga-tiga Perayu. (c) Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah gagal memutuskan di akhir kes pembelaan samada anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 telah dipatahkan atau disangkal oleh Perayu-Perayu. (d) Terdapat pemecahan rantaian ekshibit, kacau ganggu yang serius pada ekshibit dan kehadiran ekshibit yang tidak wujud semasa meterai jabatan kimia dibuka. (e) Hasil analisa cap jari dan DNA ke atas semua eksibit dadah dan senjata api atas ceiling tandas adalah negatif. Tiada cap jari atau DNA mana- mana Perayu ke atas semua barangan kes dadah dan senjata api di atas siling tandas. Barang kes di jumpai di tempat tersembunyi yang tidak dapat dilihat dengan mata kasar. (f) Tiada elemen pengetahuan dan pemilikan yang dapat kemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan bagi membuktikan pengedaran. (g) Terdapat empat (4) lagi DNA pada berus gigi yang bukan DNA Perayu- Perayu. Ini menunjukkan bahawa terdapat 4 orang lain yang ada ekses di rumah tersebut. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Prinsip Undang-undang di Peringkat Rayuan [68] Mengenai isu sabitan dan hukuman, Mahkamah dalam mendengar rayuan ini berpandukan kepada prinsip undang-undang yang mantap di mana mahkamah di peringkat rayuan seharusnya mengambil pendirian untuk tidak menganggu sabitan yang telah dibuat oleh mahkamah perbicaraan melainkan ternyata keputusan tersebut terdapat salah arah, tidak menurut undang-undang dan terdapat keterangan kukuh yang menunjukkan bahawa hakim perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf di dalam menilai keterangan yang telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan. [69] Menyentuh mengenai prinsip yang sama, di dalam kes LCY v TWY [2019) 7 CLJ 158, YAA Tun Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat HMR (kini KHN) menyatakan seperti berikut: “[26] The principle of law on appellate intervention is settled. In Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 453, the Federal Court reiterated the principle as follows at p.476: [60] It is now established that the principle on which an appellate court interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is "the plainly wrong test" principle; see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin & Anor (P) v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Anor [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2005] 1 MLJ 1 (at p. 10) per Steve Shim CJ SS. More recently, this principle of appellate intervention was affirmed by the Federal Court in UEM Group Berhad v Genisys lntergrated Engineers Pte Ltd /2010] 9 CLJ 785 where it was held at p. 800: S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence (See Chew Yee Wah & Anor v Choo Ah Pat [1978]1 LNS 32; Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484; and Chin v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309.” Keputusan Kami [70] Walaupun terdapat beberapa alasan-alasan rayuan yang dibangkitkan di dalam Petisyen Rayuan Perayu-Perayu, namun kami tidak berhasrat untuk mengupas setiap satu alasan-alasan tersebut. Kami mendapati hanya terdapat beberapa isu utama sahaja di dalam rayuan ini yang harus diputuskan. Ini akan kami jelaskan dan perincikan kemudian. [71] Bagi mengelakkan sebarang kekeliruan, wajar diperjelaskan bahawa terdapat dua (2) Alasan Penghakiman yang disediakan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana. Alasan Penghakiman Pertama bertarikh 30/9/2019. Alasan Pertama ini disediakan kerana pada 30/9/2019, ketiga- tiga Perayu telah menfailkan Notis Rayuan bertarikh 10/9/2019 terhadap HUKUMAN sahaja. [72] Pada 18/9/2019, pihak Pendakwa Raya pula telah memfailkan rayuan silang atas hukuman terhadap ketiga-tiga Perayu ini. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [73] Tiada rayuan dibuat oleh Ketiga-tiga Perayu terhadap sabitan. Oleh sebab itulah maka Alasan Penghakiman Pertama ini hanya disediakan terhadap hukuman sahaja dan bukannya terhadap sabitan. [74] Namun begitu, seperti yang telah dinyatakan sebelum ini, pada 15/2/2021, Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan Notis Usul ketiga-tiga Perayu untuk memasukkan sabitan di dalam Notis Rayuan Terpinda mereka. Dengan kebenaran yang diberikan ini, maka rayuan Ketiga-tiga Perayu kini adalah terhadap SABITAN dan HUKUMAN. Berikutan dengan itu, pada bulan Mei 2022, Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah dimaklumkan tentang keperluan untuk menulis pula Alasan Penghakiman mengenai sabitan. Alasan Penghakiman Kedua bertarikh 5/1/2023 yang disediakan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana adalah terhadap SABITAN sahaja. [75] Sewajarnya dinyatakan bahawa sebelum penghujahan penuh dibuat oleh pihak-pihak di hadapan kami pada 24/10/2023, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya yang bijaksana telah memaklumkan kepada kami bahawa Perayu Kedua (Lim Ah Lek) telah meninggal dunia pada 22/7/2022. Sehubungan itu, peguam Perayu Kedua memohon untuk menarik balik rayuannya terhadap sabitan dan hukuman (R12, R13 dan R14). Timbalan Pendakwa Raya juga turut memohon untuk menarik balik rayuan silang mereka terhadap hukuman atas Perayu Kedua (R16). Kami sebulat suara membatalkan kesemua rayuan yang melibatkan Perayu Kedua (R12, R13, R14 dan R16). [76] Meskipun rayuan terhadap Perayu Kedua telah dibatalkan dan fokus utama rayuan sepatutnya terhadap Perayu Pertama dan Ketiga sahaja, S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 namun kami tidak dapat mengelak dari mengulas peranan Perayu Kedua kerana rantaian keterangan yang terjalin dan berkait rapat di antara Ketiga- tiga Perayu menjadikan ianya amat sukar untuk dipisahkan. [77] Peguam Perayu Pertama yang bijaksana membangkitkan isu bahawa Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana semasa prosiding perbicaraan telah membuat perintah pertamanya bertarikh 12/12/2018 bila mana ketika beliau menyatakan wujudnya suatu kes prima facie terhadap Ketiga-tiga Perayu, beliau telah gagal untuk memberikan indikasi/petunjuk samada pembelaan diri dipanggil di atas pengedaran langsung (direct trafficking) atau anggapan pengedaran (presumed trafficking). [78] Bagi merungkai persoalan ini, sewajarnya diteliti semula arahan sebenar Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana tersebut (Kandungan 8 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(2) m/s 314) bila beliau memutuskan seperti berikut: “Mengambil kira keterangan saksi-saksi dan hujahan-hujahan bertulis dari kedua - dua pihak, saya mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan kes prima facie di akhir kes pendakwaan. Oleh itu saya memanggil ketiga-tiga OKT untuk membela diri terhadap semua pertuduhan yang dikemukakan.” [79] Berdasarkan kepada perintah yang dibuat di atas, sudah terang lagi bersuluh bahawa tiada apa-apa indikasi sedemikian yang diberikan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana semasa memanggil ketiga-tiga Perayu untuk membela diri. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [80] Namun begitu, pada 28/3/2019, sebelum kes pembelaan bermula, Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah membuat perintah kedua (Kandungan 8 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(2) m/s 315) bila beliau menyatakan seperti berikut: “Dalam memanggil pembelaan ini, saya membangkitkan presumption di bawah 37D dan 37DA Akta Dadah Berbahaya.” [81] Berdasarkan kepada perintah kedua ini, Hakim Perbicaaan yang bijaksana telah menggunapakai anggapan berganda (double presumption) di bawah seksyen 37(d) and 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [82] Adakah pemakaian anggapan berganda ini dibenarkan oleh undang- undang?. Seharusnya dijelaskan bahawa melalui Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Pindaan) 2014 Akta A1457, Parlimen telah memperkenalkan peruntukan baru iaitu seksyen 37A Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Pindaan) 2014 berkuatkuasa pada 14/2/2014 yang membenarkan anggapan berganda di bawah 37(d) and 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 digunakan terhadap Tertuduh bagi membuktikan pemilikan, pengetahuan dan pengedaran dadah. Seksyen 37A tersebut memperuntukan seperti berikut: “Notwithstanding anything under any written law or rule of law, a presumption may be applied under this Part in addition to or in conjunction with any presumption provided under this Part or any other written law.” S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [83] Pada hakikatnya, seksyen baru ini diperkenalkan untuk mengatasi kesan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Muhammed Hassan v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 MLJ 273, di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan pada 9/12/1997 telah memutuskan bahawa adalah terlalu keras dan menindas (oppressive) untuk menafsirkan penggunaan secara otomatik anggapan atas anggapan (presumption upon presumption). [84] Selanjutnya, pada 5/4/2019, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Alma Nudo Atenza v. PP & Another Appeal [2019] 3 MLRA 1; [2019] MLJU 280 telah membuat suatu keputusan yang sangat penting di mana sembilan hakim bersidang yang diketuai oleh YAA Tun Richard Malanjum KHN (beliau pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan bahawa seksyen 37A Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Pindaan) 2014 adalah tidak berpelembagaan kerana ianya telah melanggar Perkara 5(1) dibaca bersama Perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Sehubungan itu, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membatalkan penggunaan anggapan berganda untuk kes-kes pengedaran dadah di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [85] Berbalik kepada rayuan di hadapan kami ini, wajar diulangi bahawa sebelum kes pembelaan bermula pada 28/3/2019, Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah menggunapakai anggapan berganda di bawah 37(d) and 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 terhadap ketiga-tiga Perayu. [86] Pada hemat kami, pada masa itu, tiada kekhilafan di pihak Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana bila beliau memakai anggapan berganda ini kerana pada ketika perintah itu dibuat pindaan kepada seksyen 37A Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Pindaan) 2014 Akta 1457 telah mula berkuatkuasa pada S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 14/2/2014 sehinggalah ianya dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan pada 5/4 /2019. Berikutan dengan pembatalan itu, anggapan berganda tidak boleh lagi digunakan di dalam kes-kes pengedaran dadah. [87] Menyedari keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut, di akhir kes pembelaan, Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana, pada 4/9/2019 telah memutuskan untuk tidak lagi bergantung kepada apa-apa anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 tetapi sebaliknya memakai pengedaran langsung terhadap Ketiga-tiga Perayu bagi membuktikan pengedaran dadah tersebut. Keputusan ini jelas dapat dilihat di dalam Nota Prosiding Kandungan 8 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(2) di m/s 382 bila beliau menyatakan seperti berikut: “Setelah mahkamah ini meneliti pembelaan ketiga-tiga OKT ke atas keenam-enam pertuduhan dan meneliti keterangan kes pihak pendakwaan secara keseluruhan untuk kesemua enam pertuduhan, adalah diputuskan ketiga - tiga tertuduh gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan munasabah ke atas keenam-enam pertuduhan. Dengan itu ketiga-tiga tertuduh secara pembuktian terus tanpa menggunakan apa- apa anggapan di bawah s.37 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan niat bersama antara ketiga-tiga tertuduh tanpa sebarang keraguan munasabah di bawah s.34 Kanun Keseksaan. Dengan ini mahkamah ini mendapati ketiga-tiga kamu disabitkan bersalah ke atas keenam-enam pertuduhan ke atas kamu.” [88] Namun begitu, keganjilan mula menjelma apabila di dalam Alasan Penghakiman Keduanya bertarikh 5/1/2023 terhadap sabitan, Hakim S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah memutuskan bahawa pihak pembelaan telah gagal untuk mematahkan anggapan di atas imbangan kebarangkalian (balance of probabilities) bagi pertuduhan pengedaran dan pemilikan dadah berkenaan sedangkan pendekatan dan pendirian awal yang diambil oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana pada 4/9/2019 adalah untuk tidak meletakkan apa - apa sandaran kepada mana-mana anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [89] Oleh itu, pada hemat kami isu berkenaan presumed trafficking dan kegagalan pihak pembelaan untuk mematahkan anggapan-anggapan yang berbangkit di atas imbangan kebarangkalian ini sepatutnya sudah pun berkubur. Namun begitu, ianya telah dihidupkan kembali oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana melalui Alasan Penghakiman Keduanya sepertimana yang terzahir di dalam Kandungan 33 Rekod Rayuan Tambahan Jilid 1 di m/s 25-26 bilamana beliau memutuskan seperti berikut: “[73] Berdasarkan keterangan semasa pembelaan dan pendakwaan seperti yang dijelaskan di atas, mahkamah ini menjalankan “maximum evaluation” terhadap semua keterangan yang dikemukakan. [74] Untuk tuduhan pertama dan kedua terhadap pengedaran dadah, OKT-OKT telah gagal mematahkan kes pendakwaan atas beban “on the balance of probabilities”. Ini kerana mahkamah mendapati ada “presumed trafficking” tetapi bukan “direct trafficking”. Pembelaan yang dibawa seperti yang dijelaskan di atas, tidak langsung S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 menjejaskan kes pendakwaan atas dasar pembelaan telah mematahkan kes pendakwaan “on the balance of probalities”. [75] Begitu juga bagi pertuduhan ketiga sehingga kelima untuk memiliki dadah. Anggapan mereka memiliki dadah ini juga tidak dipatahkan “on the balance of probabilities” seperti yang dikehendaki dalam kes Ooi Hock Kheng v. PP [2014] 1 LNS 685. [76] Bagi pertuduhan keenam pula ketiga-tiga OKT tidak membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. [77] Oleh itu, mahkamah ini mensabitkan OKT-OKT dengan semua enam pertuduhan tersebut. Seperti yang dinyatakan, alasan berkenaan hukuman telah diberikan.” [90] Rumusan dari keseluruhan rentetan peristiwa di atas, tidak dapat disangkal lagi bahawa terdapat beberapa kekhilafan pemakaian perundangan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana di mana kami tidak berhasrat untuk mengulanginya semula. Cukuplah sekadar kami menyenaraikan mengikut turutan masa beberapa nas undang-undang yang memutuskan tentang perkara sebegini. [91] Di dalam kes Caniete Robelyn Masterelo v. Public Prosecutor (Federal Court Criminal Appeal No. 05 (M)-240-10 of 2018 (B) (unreported), yang diputuskan pada 13/11/2019, Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan bahawa adalah menjadi kewajipan hakim perbicaraan untuk memberi S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 indikasi kepada tertuduh samada beliau menggunakan anggapan bila memanggil tertuduh membela diri di dalam kes pengedaran dadah. Melalui Sistem Pengurusan Mahkamah (CMS) yang dirakamkan pada 13/11/2019, panel Mahkamah Persekutuan yang dipengerusikan oleh David Wong Dak Wah HB (Sabah dan Sarawak) memutuskan antara lain seperti berikut: Mahkamah: “This is is the unanimous decision of the Court. In view of the fact that the trial judge had failed to indicate, at the end of the Prosecution's case, as to what basis was the Appellant to enter his defence, we are of the view that the Appellant has been prejudiced in the preparation of the defence. As such we find the conviction on trafficking is not safe. However, there are enough evidence to convict her on possession. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction for trafficking and substituted with one for possession under s.12(2) read together with s.39A(2) of the DDA. The Appellant is sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment w.e.f.d.o.a 15.11.13." [92] Di dalam kes Rozman bin Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor (Mahkamah Persekutuan Rayuan No: 05-(M)-205-09/2019(B) (unreported) melalui transkrip persidangan dirakamkan pada 1/11/2021, Mahkamah Persekutuan yang dipengerusikan oleh Azahar bin Mohamed HMP (beliau pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan di antara lain seperti berikut: “Mahkamah Tinggi sebelum memanggil Perayu membuat pembelaan tidak menyatakan samada kes prima facie wujud disebabkan S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 presumption possession di Seksyen 37D (sic) atau Actual possession di bawah Seksyen 37A(sic) atau Seksyen 2 ADB. Miscarriage of justice berlaku kerana Perayu tidak tahu hala tuju dan beban pembuktian yang dikenakan ke atas beliau sewaktu membuat pembelaan" [93] Di dalam Sathya Vello v. Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 MLJ 111 di m/s 128, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Abdul Rahman Sebli HMP (beliau pada ketika itu) pada 21/4/2022 menyatakan di antaranya seperti berikut: [57] There is no requirement in s. 180 of the CPC that when calling for the accused to enter on his defence, the trial judge must inform him verbally or in writing of the reason or reasons why he is calling for him to enter on his defence. What is required is for the trial judge to be satisfied that the prosecution has adduced credible evidence to prove each ingredient of the offence charged. There is no other requirement and the law reports are replete with authorities on what constitutes “prima facie case”. [58] In fact the trial judge is not even required to provide any reason for calling for the defence. The authority for this proposition is the decision of this court in Junaidi Abdullah v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 201; [1993] 3 MLJ 217. This is what the court said through Mohamed Azmi SCJ at p. 206 (CLJ); p. 223 after referring to Ong CJ’s observations in Yap Chai Chai & Anor v. PP [1973] 1 LNS 177; [1973] 1 MLJ 219: S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 In our opinion, there is also no statutory provision requiring a judge sitting alone to expressly record his reason before calling the accused to enter his defence or to state his findings on the credibility of main prosecution witnesses. But, as a matter of practice, where there is a particular reason for doing so, such as where a submission to answer has been made in a complex case, or where the accused is called to answer a defence on a lesser or alternative charge, judges do sometimes give their reasons. In uncomplicated cases, such as in the instant appeal, it is not obligatory or even necessary to do so. By calling an accused to enter his defence, it should be assumed that the trial judge must on evaluation of the evidence, have been satisfied that the prosecution had, at that stage of the trial, established a prima facie case which, if unrebutted, would warrant a conviction of the accused. To arrive at such a conclusion, it is inherent that the judge must consider all the evidence adduced by the prosecution as tested in cross-examination, on a prima facie basis. In this appeal, the establishment of a prima facie case of unlawful possession of a firearm under s.57 of the Internal Security Act was so obvious, even to the defence counsel, that it became academic and unnecessary for the court to consider an order of acquittal under s.180 of the Code. [59] I see no reason why this panel should depart from this decision, which was based on sound policy considerations. The decision was reaffirmed by this court in PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in a separate judgment said: S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 The failure by the trial court either to make or to record such a finding does not in our judgment occasion a miscarriage of justice. It is sufficient for the judicial arbiter – be he judge or magistrate – to give his reasons in his written grounds of judgment for requiring an accused to make his defence. [60] The case was also applied in the Court of Appeal case of Yap You Jee v. PP & Other Appeals [2015] 7 CLJ 897 through the judgment of Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat JCA (as the Right Honourable Chief Justice then was). So, if the law does not require the trial judge to give any reason for calling for the accused’s defence, there is no reason why he is required to inform the accused at the close of the prosecution case whether any presumption of law applies against him. In any case, even if there is a failure to do so at this stage of the trial, it does not ipso facto and for that reason alone, render the decision to call for the defence fatally flawed. What will be fatal is not to comply with s.180 at all. [74] I fail to understand how the failure by the learned trial judge to inform the appellant whether his defence was called on presumed trafficking or on direct trafficking had prejudiced him in the preparation of his defence. First of all, the law does not require the trial judge to do so when calling for his defence. The fact that the appellant would have to bear the burden of rebutting the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da) of the DDA if his defence was called on presumed trafficking is neither here nor there and is not a valid reason in law for imposing S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 such duty on the trial judge if on the evidence the presumption applied against him. [76] In the present case, the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da) did A not apply against the appellant as there was no evidence that he had knowledge of the presence of the drugs in the specially constructed compartments of the luggage bags. What was established was only evidenceof custody and control of the luggage bags containing the drugs. This triggered the presumption of knowledge under s.37(d) and not the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da). [77] Since only custody and control of the drugs had been established against the appellant at the close of the prosecution case and not knowledge of the drugs, it should have been obvious to the appellant that it was the presumption of knowledge under s.37(d) that applied against him and not the presumption of trafficking under s.7(da), which required affirmative evidence of knowledge to be established by the prosecution, of which there was none. [78] Therefore, given the fact that only custody and control of the drugs had been proved against the appellant at the close of the prosecution case and D not knowledge of the presence of the drugs to trigger the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da), there was absolutely no basis for the appellant’s concern that he would have to rebut the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da) due to the failure by the learned trial judge to inform him verbally or in writing whether his defence was called on presumed trafficking or on direct trafficking. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 [79] On the factual matrix of the case, there were only two presumptions under the DDA that would apply against the appellant, either the presumption of knowledge under s.37(d) or the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da). The presumption of knowledge under s.37(d) would apply upon proof of custody or control of the drugs and the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da) would apply upon affirmative proof of knowledge of the drugs, ie, upon proof of mens rea possession of the drugs. Mere proof of physical custody or control of the drugs would not be sufficient to trigger the presumption of trafficking under s.37(da). It is perhaps appropriate at this point to also mention that the court can only invoke either of the presumptions and not both. [94] Sewajarnya ditekankan bahawa keseluruhan penghakiman di dalam kes Sathya Vello (supra) ini telah diketepikan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui panel berasingan yang dipengerusikan oleh YAA Ketua Hakim Negara Tun Tengku Maimum binti Tuan Mat pada 15/6/2022 melalui pendengaran semakan semula di bawah Aturan 137 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Persekutuan 1995. Alasan semakan semula yang diberikan oleh panel ini mengikut Nota keterangan bertarikh 15/6/2022 adalah seperti berikut: “This is our unanimous decision. Enclosure 1 is an application for a review under Rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court. It is trite that the threshold for review is very high. One of the grounds raised by the applicant in the application is breach of natural justice. The earlier panel had departed from earlier decision of this court without invitation from S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 the prosecution and without giving the applicant the right to be heard. Having considered the submission, we are satisfied that the applicant has met the threshold of review. We find that this is an exceptional case where we should exercise our discretion to ensure certainty and clarity in the administration of criminal law in particular drug trafficking cases." Mahkamah: “A long line of cases has established that the proviso to section 92(1) of the CJA is utilized with care and circumspection in rare cases. The majority of the case law however does not support the legal position that the proviso may be utilized to circumvent a breach of section 182A of the CPC where such breach has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. This latter element will turn on the fact of each particular case. In the instant case, having examined the facts, we are of the unanimous view that the non- consideration of the accused cautioned statement and his sister’s evidence has occasioned material prejudice resulting to miscarriage of justice. This is therefore not a fit case to apply proviso under section 92(1) of the CJA. Even if we invoke section 37(d) of the DDA, such that the sister’s evidence is also considered, it is probable on a balance that the evidence would have rebutted presumption of knowledge. Accordingly, we find merit on the appeal. On the totality of the evidence, we find the conviction unsafe, we therefore allowed the appeal, we set aside the conviction and sentenced, the appellant is acquitted and discharged.” S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 [95] Bersandarkan kepada keputusan semakan semula kes Sathya Vello (supra) ini yang jelas memihak kepada tertuduh, adalah jelas tidak memadai bagi Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana untuk hanya menyatakan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya mengemukakan suatu kes prima facie tanpa menyebut apa-apa anggapan jika ada yang ingin digunakanya terhadap seseorang. tertuduh. Kegagalan menyatakan anggapan-anggapan tersebut, akan membawa kepada salah arah (misdirection), ketidakadilan dan prejudis jika di akhir kes pembelaan, Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana kemudiannya menggunakan pula mana-mana anggapan untuk mensabitkan tertuduh. [96] Berbalik kepada rayuan di hadapan kami ini, meskipun pada permulaannya tiada apa-apa indikasi diberikan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan kepada Perayu-Perayu ketika beliau memutuskan wujudnya suatu kes prima facie dan memanggil Ketiga-tiga Perayu untuk membela diri, namun sebelum kes pembelaan bermula, indikasi ini ada diberikan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana bila menyatakan secara jelas bahawa anggapan-anggapan dibawah seksyen 37(d) dan seksyen 37(da) berbangkit terhadap Perayu-Perayu. [97] Meskipun tidak dinafikan bahawa terdapat kelewatan di dalam memaklumkan pemakaian anggapan-anggapan ini, namun ianya bukanlah sesuatu yang memudaratkan kerana anggapan-anggapan ini sudah pun berada di dalam pengetahuan Perayu-Perayu sebelum mereka mula memberi keterangan bersumpah masing-masing. Maka dengan itu, pada hemat kami, isu bahawa mereka dihalang dari menyediakan pembelaan yang berkesan untuk mematahkan anggapan pengedaran, diprejudiskan S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 sehingga berlaku salah laksana keadilan (miscarriage of justice) kepada mereka tidak mempunyai merit sama sekali dan ditolak. [98] Mengenai isu anggapan berganda untuk kes- kes pengedaran dadah di bawah seksyen 37(d) dan seksyen 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang digunakan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana, kami mendapati penggunaannya kini telah melanggar rule against double presumption sepertimana yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes Alma Nudo Atenza (supra). [99] Sewajarnya diulangi dan ditekankan bahawa pada ketika Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana menggunakan anggapan berganda ini pada 28/3/2019 iaitu sebelum prosiding pembelaan bermula, pemakaian anggapan berganda ini adalah sah di sisi undang-undang untuk diaplikasikan susulan dari pindaan seksyen 37A Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Pindaan) 2014 yang berkuatkuasa pada 14/2/2014 sehinggalah ianya dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan pada 5/4/2019 melalui keputusan kes Alma Nudo Atenza. [100] Walaupun kami menyedari tentang perubahan ini, namun kami masih mendapati tiada kemudaratan atau ketidakadilan serius berlaku di dalam kes ini kerana ketiga-tiga Perayu telah pun mengetahui bahawa beban pembuktian yang perlu dipikul oleh mereka untuk mematahkan kedua-dua anggapan tersebut masih tetap sama sahaja iaitu di atas imbangan kebarangkalian dan bukannya mereka dikehendaki untuk melepaskan tahap pembuktian yang berbeza-beza di dalam kes anggapan pengedaran ini. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 [101] Seperkara lagi, di akhir kes pembelaan, Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana di dalam keputusan yang disampaikannya pada 4/9/2019 telah gagal memutuskan samada anggapan seksyen 37(d) dan 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 telah berjaya dipatahkan oleh Perayu-perayu. Kegagalan menyatakan pendirian sedemikian adalah kerana Hakim Perbicaraan kini memutuskan pula wujudnya pengedaran terus tanpa beliau bergantung lagi kepada apa-apa anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. Ini jelas dapat dilihat di dalam Kandungan 8 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(2) di m/s 382 di mana beliau menyatakan seperti berikut: “Setelah mahkamah ini meneliti pembelaan ketiga - tiga OKT ke atas keenam-enam pertuduhan dan meneliti keterangan kes pihak pendakwaan secara keseluruhan untuk kesemua enam pertuduhan, adalah diputuskan ketiga-tiga tertuduh gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan munasabah ke atas keenam-enam pertuduhan. Dengan itu ketiga-tiga tertuduh secara pembuktian terus tanpa menggunakan apa-apa anggapan di bawah s.37 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan niat bersama antara ketiga- tiga tertuduh tanpa sebarang keraguan munasabah di bawah s.34 Kanun Keseksaan. Dengan ini mahkamah ini mendapati ketiga-tiga kamu disabitkan bersalah ke atas keenam-enam pertuduhan ke atas kamu.” [102] Lanjutan daripada itu, kekeliruan berlaku pula bila Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana di dalam Alasan Penghakiman Keduanya telah secara terang menyatakan bahawa Ketiga-tiga Perayu ini telah gagal mematahkan kedua-dua anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(d) dan 37(da) Akta Dadah S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 Berbahaya 1952. Ini dapat dilihat di dalam Alasan Penghakimannya di Kandungan 33 Rekod Rayuan Tambahan di m/s 25-26, di mana beliau menyatakan seperti berikut: [74] Untuk tuduhan pertama dan kedua terhadap pengedaran dadah, OKT-OKT telah gagal mematahkan kes pendakwaan atas beban ‘on the balance of probabilities. Ini kerana mahkamah mendapati ada ‘presumed trafficking’ tetapi bukan ‘direct trafficking’. Pembelaan yang dibawa seperti yang dijelaskan di atas, tidak langsung menjejaskan kes pendakwaan atas dasar pembelaan telah mematahkan kes pendakwaan ‘on the balance of probabilities. [103] Kami telah membaca Nota Keterangan dan bahagian penghakiman di atas beberapa kali dan berhati-hati bagi memahami maksud sebenar keputusan Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana ini. Pada hemat kami ketinggalan, atau pertukaran perintah (change of ruling) yang dilakukan di dalam penghakimannya sepertimana yang dinyatakan di atas bukan lah merupakan suatu salah arah serius yang memprejudiskan Perayu-Perayu. Ia masih boleh disifatkan sebagai kesilapan teknikal sahaja yang tidak menjurus ke arah kegagalan keadilan (failure of justice) yang tidak boleh diperbetulkan oleh Mahkamah ini. Justeru itu, kami berpandangan tiada wujud apa - apa “appealable error” seperti yang dihujahkan oleh peguambela Perayu-Perayu. [104] Walaupun begitu, setelah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan terhadap ketiga-tiga Perayu, kami mendapati keterangan yang sedia ada adalah lemah dan tidak kukuh bagi mengaitkan dan membuktikan Perayu Pertama S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 dan Ketiga termasuk Perayu Kedua telah melakukan kesalahan seperti yang dipertuduhkan terhadap mereka. [105] Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana telah membuat inferens berdasarkan kepada kelakuan Perayu-Perayu ketika kejadian dan semasa serbuan di buat oleh pihak polis untuk membuktikan pengetahuan dan pemilikan mereka terhadap barangan salah yang dijumpai ini serta elemen niat bersama di bawah seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Dapatan ini dibuat atas tingkah laku Perayu Pertama yang berlenggah untuk membuka pintu dan menjerit "Mata Lai" bagi memaklumkan kepada Perayu-Perayu lain tentang kedatangan pihak polis, tindakan Perayu Kedua yang berlari dari bilik kedua ke bilik ketiga dan mengepam/flush mangkuk tandas sebelum ditahan serta reaksi Perayu Ketiga yang terkejut apabila ditahan dalam bilik pertama di dalam rumah tersebut. [106] Pada hemat kami sandaran kepada kelakuan yang mencurigakan ini sahaja tidak mencukupi untuk membuktikan kaitan mereka dengan kesalahan ini. Sayugia dinyatakan terdapat pelbagai sebab-sebab lain yang boleh ditafsirkan mengapa mereka berkelakuan sedemikian setelah menyedari kemunculan dan kehadiran pihak polis. Sudah terang lagi bersuluh, pihak Pendakwaan juga gagal membuktikan peranan yang dimainkan oleh setiap Perayu serta kewujudan pemuafakatan niat bersama mereka untuk melakukan kesalahan-kesalahan ini. [107] Lebih parah lagi bila kami mendapati tiada keterangan langsung atau keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) yang mantap untuk membuktikan Ketiga-tiga Perayu ini terlibat dengan pengedaran dan S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 pemilikan dadah-dadah yang ditemui tersebut. Dadah-dadah ini juga dijumpai di atas siling dan tiada terdapat profil DNA mereka untuk mengaitkan penglibatan mereka dengan perjumpaan dadah-dadah yang tersembunyi ini. JIka seandainya anggapan-anggapan ini berbangkit sekali pun, kami tiada keraguan bahawa ianya telah berjaya disangkal oleh Perayu-Perayu. Dengan itu, kami sebulat suara memutuskan bahawa sabitan ke atas Ketiga-tiga Perayu ini adalah tidak selamat dan wajar diketepikan. [108] Tidak dapat dinafikan terdapat kesan profil DNA milik ketiga-tiga Perayu. Profil DNA tersebut adalah pada barangan seperti berikut: • DNA milik Perayu Pertama dikesan pada berus gigi tanda 14(3) ditemui dalam bilik air ruang dapur. • DNA milik Perayu Kedua dikesan pada gelas kaca bertanda 2 (dirampas dari meja rak TV dalam bilik no.1) dan seluar pendek bertanda 13 (dirampas dalam bilik air ruang dapur). • DNA milik Perayu Ketiga ditemui pada punting rokok bertanda 7(1) dan 8 yang ditemui dalam bilik kedua rumah. • DNA major milik Perayu Kedua ditemui pada gelas bertanda 4 yang dirampas atas meja rak TV dalam bilik No.2. S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 [109] Pada hemat kami, profil DNA milik Perayu-Perayu yang berjaya dikesan ini hanyalah setakat mampu untuk membuktikan kehadiran atau keberadaan mereka di rumah tersebut sahaja dan tidak lebih daripada itu. [110] Bagi pertuduhan keenam pula yang berkaitan dengan senjata api, Timbalan Pendakwaraya yang bijaksana telah secara jujur mengakui bahawa rantaian keterangan berkenaan penemuan ekshibit senjata api tersebut adalah terputus dan dengan itu sabitan yang dijatuhkan oleh Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana tidak boleh dikekalkan. Kami berpandangan serupa. Kesimpulan [111] Setelah menilai keseluruhan keterangan serta Kedua-dua Alasan Penghakiman Hakim Perbicaraan yang bijaksana, kami sebulat suara memutuskan seperti berikut: R7: N-05(SH)-417-09/2019 (a) Rayuan Perayu Pertama dibenarkan; (b) Sabitan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2A) Akta yang sama bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan dan hukuman pemenjaraan seumur hidup dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 dan 15 sebatan rotan bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; dan S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 (c) Perayu Pertama dilepaskan dan dibebaskan. R8: N-05(SH)-418-09/2019 (a) Rayuan Perayu Pertama dibenarkan; (b) Sabitan di bawah seksyen 8 Akta Senjata Api 1968 dan hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; dan (c) Perayu Pertama dilepaskan dan dibebaskan. R9: N-05(SH)-419-09/2019 (a) Rayuan Perayu Ketiga dibenarkan; (b) Sabitan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2A) Akta yang sama bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan dan hukuman pemenjaraan seumur hidup dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 dan 15 sebatan rotan bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; dan (c) Perayu Ketiga dilepaskan dan dibebaskan. R10: N-05(SH)-420-09/2019 (a) Rayuan Perayu Ketiga dibenarkan; S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 (b) Bagi Pertuduhan Pertama, sabitan di bawah seksyen 9(1) Akta Racun 1952 (Semakan 1989) dan hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; (c) Bagi Pertuduhan Kedua, sabitan di bawah seksyen 9(1)(b) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; (d) Bagi Pertuduhan Ketiga, sabitan di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; dan (e) Perayu Ketiga dilepaskan dan dibebaskan dari ketiga-tiga pertuduhan ini. R11: N-05(SH)-421-09/2019 (a) Rayuan Perayu Pertama dibenarkan; (b) Bagi Pertuduhan Pertama, sabitan di bawah seksyen 9(1) Akta Racun 1952 (Semakan 1989) dan hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 24 Julai 2015 yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 (c) Bagi Pertuduhan Kedua, sabitan di bawah seksyen 9(1)(b) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; (d) Bagi Pertuduhan Ketiga, sabitan di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 24 Julai 2015 yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; dan (e) Perayu Pertama dilepaskan dan dibebaskan dari ketiga-ketiga pertuduhan ini. R12: N-05(SH)-422-09/2019 Rayuan Perayu Kedua dibatalkan. R13: N-05(SH)-423-09/2019 Rayuan Perayu Kedua dibatalkan. R14: N-05(SH)-424-09/2019 Rayuan Perayu Kedua dibatalkan. R15: N-05(SH)-425-09/2019 (a) Rayuan Perayu Ketiga dibenarkan; S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 (b) Sabitan di bawah seksyen 8 Akta Senjata Api 1968 dan hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 24/7/2015 yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan; dan (c) Perayu Ketiga dilepaskan dan dibebaskan. R16: N-05(SH)-426-09/2019 Rayuan silang Responden di atas hukuman terhadap Perayu Pertama, Kedua dan Ketiga dibatalkan. Tarikh: 28 November 2023 - Sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 Kaunsel Bagi Perayu Pertama : Datuk Hisyam Teh Poh Teik (Low Wei Loke Dan Kee Wei Lon Bersamanya) [Firma Hisyam Teh] Bagi Perayu Kedua & Ketiga : Saranjeet Kaur Sidhu [S Sidhu & Co] Bagi Responden : Eyu Ghim Siang Timbalan Pendakwa Raya S/N QiQSbnC1ik6ZO5ggdcbhCg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	73,706	Tika 2.6.0
WA-25-336-10/2021	PEMOHON SOO MUN YEE RESPONDEN 1. ) MENTERI PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN (DAHULU DIKENALI SEBAGAI MENTERI KESEJAHTERAAN BANDAR, PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN) 2. ) PENGAWAL PERUMAHAN KEMENTERIAN PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN (DAHULU DIKENALI SEBAGAI KEMENTERIAN KESEJAHTERAAN BANDAR, PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN) 3. ) ALPINE RETURN SDN BHD 4. ) NOR AZMI BIN MOHAMED	Contract — Illegality — Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 — Sale and purchase agreement (‘SPA’) — Whether reg 11(3) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 gave the controller of housing power to waive or modify any provision in SPA between developer and buyer — Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989, reg 11(3)Civil Procedure — Appeal — Retrospective application — Pronouncement of common law by superior court after SPA was executed — Whether superior precedent applicable retrospectively	29/11/2023	YA Dato' Wan Ahmad Farid Bin Wan Salleh	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c62f89e3-2466-457d-a7e1-66e9ddc63898&Inline=true	29/11/2023 17:36:51 WA-25-336-10/2021 Kand. 67 S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 44kvxmYkfUWn4Wbp3cY4mA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—25—336—1D/2021 Kand. 57 29/mznza ]":]b-5) DALAM MAHKAMAH nurse: MALAVA nu KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH FERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA [BAMAGIAN RAVUAN DAN KIIASA-KUASAKHAS) FERMOHONAN SEMAKAN KEMAKIMM4 N0 WA-Z5-3:6-IDI2021 Da\am perxam Am Panama" Pemmahan [Kzwdan can Pnnrsnn-u) 1966 Dun Damn pauaua Faramran-Pevnlurnn Pemaman wmmnan (Kavmsn Dan PerIuerun}l9d9 Dan Dal-am pnvkava Amen 53 Knsdah-Kaedah Mnhkzmllc zmz rm. Dalam cam. xapumsan yang dnbum clan Pnngav/9! Pnnlnlhm mulllul Iuvulburlaﬂkh 2909 2am umuk memmda vempoh mesa mluk penyel-than mxhkin kuluna dllnm suam penanjnan mu bah yang mlamalanganv anlnrl Alvlne Rumm Sun am :4... S00 Mun Vea benankh as mzme d-In cans 2:215 Dan Dalam wxara “bockma farm‘ bamnkn 0712 201: aw mlam Npme Return San am am Son Mun n. a. Sin: Hang wa. ANYARA son MUN VEE (ND. KIF 10ﬂ2I1-Io-5132) ...PEMONON DAN 1. MENYERI FERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEIIIPATAN [DAHULU DIKENALI SEBAGAI m wwxmvkvuvm4wnp3cv4mA «am. am ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm MENTERI KE5EJAHTERAAN swam, PERUMANAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN) PENGAWAL PERUMAHAN KEMENTERIAN PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN (DAHULU DIKENALI SEBAGAI KEMENIERIAN KESEJAMIERAAN BANDAR. PERUMAHAN DAN KERMAAN YEMPAYAN . ALPINE REYURN sou. awn. (No. svanmn 645750-M) NOR AZMI am MOHAMED ...RESPONDEN-RESPDNDEN JUDGMENT The Panic: [11 The apphcani us a purchaser ol mo cnndommium umls known as Lot M9-10 Blok Resxdenlvm One (“um 49“) and Lot «-17-: 1'Unr117') Blck ResIden\|\a\ One (mm mg 3“ respondem. Alpma Re\|urn Sdn Bhd Alpme Remm is a housing devemper Hcensed undev me Huusmg Devemptnenk (Comm! am Lmensmg) Am 1966 ('HDA') ll developed a serwcs apanmenl pmiecl known as ‘Star nasmensr Im:a(eﬂ a\| Seksyen 43‘ Eandar Kuala Lumpurcme sand Pmjecl") [21 Yha names executed Mu separala sane and Purchase Agmsmarns dated 19 1.2015 and a 5 2015, respeclwsiy (cmleqmvely referred m as ‘me sPAs'7. [3] Fur bvevi , Unws 49 and 17 mu be referred w as me said Fame\s. m The ﬁrs\| mponaann :5 lb: Mmis\|er nl Housmg and Loan! euvemmem (‘the Munster’). IN wwxmvkvuvvn4wup3cv4mA “Nuns saw ...m.mm be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [A7] ll me rallo at Any Mmg Lac only applbes Io lulure spas, men ll can be said lhal lne parties were unaware lhalanhe lime (M SPA: waie exeeulea on 19 1 2015 and 3.5.2015 respectively, lrie Conlmller ol Hnusmg riaa no pawavs \|o ganl exlension undensg ll which is thus u/Ira was me HDA However. on me cnner hand, it me pmpas expreseaa by me Federal Cmlfl in Any Mmg Lee has a ielrowecliva aflecli llieri lne Housing conrmllers plrrponeu extension mime oould nor be legally el-leclive [451 My respectful View IS lne iuagrnenl pl Ang Ming Lea has .- ielraspealiue ellect The allandanl cnnsequences of my nnning would be the purponad enension ol linle is invalid in the cmzumslannss, ll does nnl inaner wnelner me SPA: were executed beforeuraﬂevthe impugnud ascisian The impugned decision would be illegal anyway [491 will now explain my reasons [sol nie answer as lo wnelner Ang Ming Lee has a ielmpenive eneia ar olllelwise can be louna III we rseenl judgmenl onne com 04 Appeal n UE Eu: Sn /In {M} Sdn and vLu Jung mi 5 Ann: L Anpr IppIal[ZOZ\|] I ML! :54 CA In dslivenng lne luﬂgmenl ol lne own. Hashim Hamzah JCA held as lallows Nuxl. lneie ll rmlilrvu Ixpnnly innniionea in Ana Ming Lee iag-raing lne prespeanlry cl on em dlallan Thnufmui in. amien urine Fedeml Own Inlllg Ming Lea opersnes nlmlbltllvaly (as main Pm-aoinoi V Mom! R-9l1zl'blnAbuBn!qsr\|2D0§] s MU 39G:[2(m6\|1 cu 457 Ind Samcrlylh Jaya Sdn and V Penladmr Tsnlll ouian Nlllu Linger and aiming our lzawl 3 ML! 5si.l2m1is cu szsl. [51] In shun, ma aacleion in Any Ming Lee is applicnple relroepeclively In lne vans in me insranl case My ruading mung Ming Lea VI llial lne Federal Courl ti npl speciiy lnal as as on an mg 11 ufItle1§B9 Ragulaﬂbna being ullru virus in HDA was to apply pioapacrively. I\| lnerelpre means mar il applies relmspecllvely. IN MKVXMVKVLIWMWDDSCVAMA “Nair a.ii.i nuvlhnrwm re UIQG w new i... nﬂmnnﬂly MIMI dnuuvlnnl Vﬂ nFluNG vlmxl [52] In View or me clear pmnoiinoement by \|h: coun olApoi:al in Les Jerig vim, iny iespecwiil View is inai \|he quesliun ai uloppel ooe: not arise Wnh me greatest iespecl to ins praposiliun in Alpine Raiiiin. ane cannot be expeclsd In hlmoul a lemi in the SPA vmich is held no be illeqni [531 The coniioil-i oi Housing has no power to extend the limo «oi tn. delivery or vacant possession in me ﬁisi place. Tneistpm my iuaginani, ma qiiesiion oi whether the SPA: were executed belore. in ins midsl oi lha Dan!\|IIAc\|lon, or alter ins asiniaiy ui Ills VF is ineievani. i ﬁnd suppon in the said proposition in me judgment or ins coiiri ouppeai in Lee Jang viin We asapiee wilh ins osisnosni an unis issiia The deuslun M in. Fudorai Com ll Aug Ming Lee is dearlhm ins noiiung Corllmllev ties in poi-is wnnimisi ID mm and modlly in. lnvms And mrvﬂmuni pi me aaneoiileii agreement in Ilia ﬁr:\| pllcl minim. mo iuiis cl iiinaii-si ms appimi is omainso iisioia DY Illa! \M SPA: Ms imn Ixlculad is not iamni [54] Lemon camel twins 3-“ respnndem invitea me no ouncliids inai there exists a NEW agieemeni on ins time irame ioi ine 3"‘ raspondevll lo osiniai Dis VF atlhe saio Parcels In oiiaiiago Haigni, vidslhe settlement agreemenl, ins mnjonty oi ins noiiss piiyais. Including ins iasponuenis. agaaa \|o a Waive! un lhe Ilvlpnslllan oi ina LAD. having me: house! mmpleled and delivered by "we appeiiani wiliiin ins new completion oats, Despite agnssing lo ins waiver, ins respondents still piooaeosd \|o ﬁle a claim wiiii ins riiniinai roi Hﬂmﬂbuyar claims may ablainad ms award in inaii iavoiii. more the LAD was calculated from me inliial periad oldelay undel tne SPA [55] ‘me Colin 0! Appeal held that i\| was nnl ngiii and proper ioi tne iaspondenis. despite ineii pnimise Io conditionally waive me LAD iinoai ins SPA. la iesile iiom insii pmmisa ann siia tor Isl: delivery iinoei lhe SPA as nine seniemant agiaainent did noi exis\| )1 SN MkvxmVkVLlWMWhp3:VAmA “Nair s.ii.i nuvihnrwlll be UIQG M my i... nﬂﬂlnnllly siiii. dnulvllnl Vﬂ nFluNG Wm! [56] Anplylng the law \|e the (acts In the Instant case, axoepl [or III: SFM. nu o\|hBr aglaelrlenl was mad: bedwecn \|he Dames. There was no wawel an me pan nlthe applicant as in Oxbridge Hergm either on lhe Issue of out oflime 157] In dwslmssing me appncanon -n Encl 13 m slnke out judxcxal renew, mm Indiana man the Issua nl me delly \n ma apnlica on 04 ;ud1cIa\ rewew can be rsvislled a\| me sunsxanuve stage I wvll deal wnn uns Issue now [55] The quwlon As, men does time startle tun? Is Mom on da\|e of me «npugnea decision? Is n vnwn me date 1:! me SPA? 0 53 r 316) on me ROG aromas lhal nn appncanon lcr iudicwal rewew shall be made pro-npuy and. m any ev2n\|, wnrnn three months mam me dale when me wounds 0! appucanon ﬁrs! amass or when me uecnuon u ﬁrs! cvmmumcalad up the applacanl. 15g] The mm m my view, does not run «um me date 0! ms impugned dams-on, which was on 29 9201:, since the SPA: wave not even sqgned men n cannol be «am me dale: nﬂhe 5?» enher because Iher: us nolhmg In the 5:». ma! menu In ma nnpugnaa declswan made by the commnsr olHnusmq [Bu] In pm 13 o1AIS—2, me apphmnx amrmaa as follows: Responder! xec-gs melalm snnn paguamnya burl-mm mm 2021 mnmaklumkm blhlwn Responder: Kemge mendnpm kehenavan dau Kamarlnnm K-I-juhluvun Band: r-snnnanan aan Kuqnnn Ylmpalan unluk mamundn lzmpnh Iaralun mﬂvkan knsmg hananah dun as bulnn The lad man me -ppl-cnnrs so am had, on numerous occasnoni, sougm for them to be supplmi mm me ducumem relating to (ha wnpugnea usmsnm inmuaned that me applvcanl was unaware of its exwslence sm ukvxmvkruwn4wnpa:v4mA “Nana s.nn nmhnrwm n. med w my n. snnnnn mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! [51] ll was noi unm ine iener dated 0.7.2021 iroin ine 3‘ resoondenrs Solicﬂnrs enciosing ine Irnpugmd lellev irem ine coniroiier oi Housing inai iiie applicam was made aware or me impugned decision were was no evidence beiore iris couri insi ine apphcanl knew aimuiirie impugned decision befure B 7 202i in my iuddrneni. iinie sians lo iun irorn 3.7.2021, Wﬂlch is when me impugned dacixran I8 /rvsl communicated id rrie upplrcanl [62] since me appiicaiion for iudiciai review was med on 610.2021, I held lhi\| ii is wiinin ins iiine siipuiaied under 0 53 r3(6) oi ine ROC [as] on me rllhel issue raised by ine ieanied src. inai ine appiicani snouid have axhausled me remedy di an aweai \|o ine Minular housed in red 12 oi ine was Regulahom. wnn iespeoi, me oonuoiieioiiiousino Housing coniuouer nas no powerio exirend irie ﬁmei ii is ineieioie open ior me I" end 2"‘ resoondenis \|o iaunon n ooiiaierai sliack on inai decision by ﬁling inis iudiciai review upun being made aware oi ine impugned decision in Eu Flnanm and v. Lim voke Foo mm 2 MLJ :7 re, Ihe Federsi cduii neid inai me gsnsm niie is max why: an OMB! is 1 nuiiii an applal is eoinemai useiess as ﬂap In my deosion en appenl. saw an umev can be wwslsluﬂy anacm n ooiiaiesi proceedings, ii can be aisieqardeo and iinmaied in any Dr!1csaﬂIHil.bvYmI nny cam! or lllbtllal md vmlmvsv n is relied upon ~ in ulhsrwordb. ii Vi iueim Io ooiinieiu muck Flndlnil [541 in VIEW oiAng Ming Lee, Whlc rise a ra\|m5Dec1iva eiiedi and Les Jeng vim. irie impugned dec oi ihe conirouer oi Hnusing is plainly iiiegai and iiieieioie arnenaoie In iudiciai review. [65] I have deiioeiaied ine furlher submissions made bylhe pa ‘es as w wiieirier ins Iindlng oi u\|\|ra vires oi reg may in A719 Ming Lee renders all eariier decisions made by ine Housing conirouer under Ins said reguiaiion and union taken by me develuper in reliance or 10 rn MkvxmVkMwMWnp3:V4rnA “Nair s.n.i nuvihnrwm be 0.... M new i... aniin.ii-y MVMI dnuuviml Vﬂ nF\uNﬂ Wm! me al that decnsnon ns eouany unnuwmn, nun and void and 0! no negan enecn in me nmnn on ma recent dectsncn of me UK suuneme com in R (Majen) It Home smewy [2u22] AC 451 5c. [65] My snon answer no me issue mean is n am bound by me dacmne on stare decls/s, Modern English annhunnies may be Dsrsuasnve‘ bul may ave no\| bnnding In delermmmg whether no accep\| nnenrgunaance Ihns Ccurln will have regard no me neean cnmumslances in panncular me prcvnsnans nn me HDA and me 1939 Regunennons as Inmrpreled by Aug Mmg Lee Unhl and unless I\| ns reversed by anomen penen of me Federal Court‘ 1 am mum by me ooonrine M emame nudinzial precedenl [57] An nrder of cemnrarn vs hereby issued no quesn ma nmpugned aecnsen. [say nu View on me publnc mlerssl generated from me case of lhns nenure, nam makmg no order as no costs Tarikh: 29 November 202: L4 (wm mmnn FARID B\|N wm SALLEH) Haknm Mshkamaln Tmggn Kuala Lumpur m ukvxmvkruvm4wup3cv4mA «me smm ...m.mm .. med m my n... mnmuny mm: dnuuvnnnl VII .mnc v-man Fmak-pmak: am Pmak Pumohovl ElhwS1ngh A/L smngam sw- Taman Nauana Wan Balbur sag Pmau Responds: Lwuw Numg Em sm .5 Nurldayu src 1, 2‘ o Janalan Peauam Negnrl. Pmvlpya an mm Rsspandan 3 CecHI\|a Tan a Sell! My Slvaam mus" Soh mm a Ca sm 44kvxmvkruwMwnp3cv4mA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! [51 The 2"‘ respondent is me Nousmg Cmlroller (‘Housing Gon\|mIIev') allached to lhe Mtmslry 0! Hon g and Loss» Govrrnnrem rtrre Mtntslry [6] The A" respondent, Nor Azm' bin Mohamed (“Nur Azmi"), an alﬁcer olme Housing Controller. urn Faclual Background [7] CI 25(1) 0! me SPAs provide trrat the «me at delwsry ol vacam pcssassmn ('VP') oi me said wardens Is an mnnlhs vrdnr the date of me rsspecnrre spas [5] on 11112019, lhn 3"’vespcnden\| rssued ssparala nnhces M delwary of VP at the sand Parcels The nutipes state mler aha as inﬂows. W: h-any gwe you mum In take lhe deltv-y M V-cam nonunion Ind knyl 1:! rr. urd Pmpeny wrrnrn iuunsen 114; days fmm me date M Ihll Vallar In awardanoe be owe; 2&3; trur. Sale am Purchase Apreernenr dared omsmns rnrrr wmm you shaH he desued Tn hive liken ddhvury M v/aunt pommor M be sad pmveny and we man not be tram lornny mu or dlmlat W lha . pvqalrly and/ur rne nxrrrres and nrnrrgr rrrerrnrr (91 on 17.7 mm. the apphcant, lhrough her soucnors, wrote In enquve rrurn me 3’“respandenI Ia provide her wnn me dowmemary entruernerrr issuad by me Mlmslry oi Housing and Local Governments (‘me M’ islry") (er the amresporrdent to vary the delivery 0! me VP «mm as rnamns lo so rrrorrms. In the same letter. ma appltcanl zﬂso demanded a sum pr RM19I‘565.2l)5 berng rrqrrrdated and ascertained damages (‘LAD’) hr me purpoﬂad Ials dehvery olVF tmrn he 3"’ respondent [or urnt No H74 sm «mnmtrw..awr...a.wnn “Nate e.nn mmhnrwm r. .r.... w my r... nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ muNa vmm [10] In the wetter. me appHr:anl's eonennrs mhmaleﬂ tnanr-eapnlicant nan patd a booking fee aatea 712.2u13 Aommung to me sone-tors, aeapne me tact mat the sPAs were only executed on 19 1 2015, me uppltcam was entmea (0 racaiva vncanl possession oi lha sam Parce\s on or before 7 12 2015 The wetter went on to alatze. um cuuu n ounllnd be renews mm possess n of me mopeny on of Delete 7 Dqclmhlr 201! on etnnt V5 ﬁubded by me recent deulvan III sn Damantara 567! am: V mn Kuurv Cllmv 4 Ana! 1202-11 ML./U 3:: [111 The eolieners atsn enquired new tne SPA; pmvtded so rnontns for eornpteuon and urged me arv respondent to provide mam wim dn<;umerv1iryen\|nIemen\|lurme 3‘ respondent to vary the SPAINM 36 nmnms In so monvns [121 A sum alRM190,D93 15 was alsn demanded to: unn No M9-so VII in separate leller [13] In response, tne 3” reswndsn\|, mruugh ns su\' \|crs. Messy: Soh Hayalt a. G0. was a letter dated 8.7 2021, enclosed a lens! ﬂaked 2s 9 mm «mm the Mmislry wnten Durpcnadly auowen tne extension fur the delivery MVP [ram as monnns In an months (‘Ihe unpuonen dectslarfl. The letter was stgned by me contnaner at Hou g, the 4-" respondent herein. wno cm rug 1: enne Hnusmg Uevelopmenl (Control and Ltcensing) Regulations 19B§('1he was Regulations’) in arnvtno at ms decision [14] tn vtew o1 the purpaﬂed extensuon ol Itmrz, me 3'“ respondent assenea Iha\| II was not nb1tga\|ed to pay any LAD lo the eppticant [151 Para 5 oflhe said letter slates as ralkms Kmmy on Vniurmsd nut our chum nu succemmly ahlamed a dechrnilmu umar on 24 non n. uptn. Rtlum Sdn am: V Matthew ug Hack mg I 3 athnvs we Kuata Lumpm man Conn one.-mne Summons Na wA—24Ncvc«s4-«M020 wh-um tne Inamed Mam Naunn tnn Mum omen J nae aeaarea sm ukyxmvkMwMwopa:wmA «ma s.n.t nuvthnrwm a. U... a my t... nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dnumtml Vﬂ mum am um um Amendment 01 moa.npaup.. pr so mans 31 diun 25w am clause 21m M me :1: mm raurchal aammam cl ms mm .5 me am bmdmu uvnn um puwasevs and me nmchnsals counlu dam-1 lav limudmed damn" bind an m. run. I cum IulhoMY mung Mmg up waidnsms The Judlclal Ravlew [16] Aaensvsaa me applicant commenced an appricanon fur leave an judicial ravxew fa an order cl cemnran lo quuh me impugned decision, The apnllcluon is supported by lhe applicnnl n Easy 2 (ws»2'p. [17] The leave appﬁcalion was heard heme my Ieamsa bmlhev, Ahmad Kama: J. on 9.11 2021. The learned Samar Federal coma (“srcw had no omecmcn tome apphcanon for leave pmvAdedl\|\aHhe1‘,2"‘ and Am resppnuencs are a\| ’ber1y In raise Ihe I5sue an nma hmilalian during (he sums-mve app alinrv us) The Caun men gnmaa leave lov \|he appucam Kc commnca ma wmmal reviewapphcalion an 9.11 2021 [:9] Smoe me impugned declsmn mans the suqecn mallet 01 cnnlenlion in x judml rswew ya av importance. u now reproduce ma rmevim pans of ma lellerswgned by Enclk Nor Azmi, ms 4-" respondent, on behalf nllhs 2"“ raspondnru The weuer Mules I: «wows Malan mmakmmkan bahawa smash mama ptnnohnnun (um unzuk m-mm. Jlduil u (Pena wan Juan saw .1. bawlh Pualman cc‘ Pom Pavaluvan Pamljuan Psmmahnn (Kiwabn dan Peﬂaermn) «sac, Jabaun Im hanya metuluskln luunun urahan mwkan kusang den penylnpln klmudahan mama L4 bulum mm dnnplda 5 man uapaaa en bulan am» sylmt-sv-mt mm... up-n. aw Lampnn am MkvxmVkNWMWhp3:V4mA «mm. saw ...m.mm .. U... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum v-NM 120] The apphcamalso seek: [or a declavallnrl lnal leg um ollhe 1959 Regula\|ions is ultra ynss lne HDA Reg 1143) provides as lollows Wnnre me Cnmmlllv 1: uusﬁld IIu\| awlng lo spsclal urwmsvances or havdship nr nacnuly wmpHam:e wllh any 0! ms provmcni In ma wvllrauzﬂsalelslmvvﬁltlinnbleurmmwnnavy. he mﬂyn by e ueﬂlﬁmlz VII wnung, walve cl nwlry such provrslan: Pmwldnd mm All such mm. or muﬂllicnlmvl snall be awmved a sum aprllcalmn ls made unnr ln. expiry M ma lnne sllpulmed Ior lna hinﬂmg aver no vaum pussesslon lmdet Ihe unllmn av salt or alltt me yauany at any exlensma :11 time W any, grarvlud by me Oamvoler [21] An appllcalion NI End 13 by the :5” responaenl \|o slrike out me yumclal levlew was als ' sea by Ihls Conn on 9 3 2022. [22] There are iurmer exchanges ol amdavlls belween lhs pames al lne subslan\|Ive slage_ wmch will be vaferved lo as and wnen me need arises [231 Learned counsel lnr me appllcanl releneu MB In lne purpcrled appnwal fmm me 2'“ responaenl, whlch was lssuad and srgned by Enclk Nor Azml My allenlmn was man drawn \|u lhe yudgmenl ollne Federal Cnurl In Federal com In Any Mlng Lu 5 Or: y Komcnrorian Klsnjahfaraan Emdur, Ponnnamn din Klrliaan runpanan 5 Anor A Orllppeals[2ﬂ19] 1 cu 162 F0 The case Camus me pmposmorl lnal reg 11(3) or me lass Ragulanans. eonlening puwernn lne concrolleml Houslng In waiveormo wynny pwvlslorl In Schedule H M me cnnlrad olsale, was ulna was me HDA [24] The Feaeral oaunlunner nelu lnanne Conlmlleral Houslng has no power la walva or modlfy any pmvlslan ln me Schadule H comracl 0! sale because 5 24 af lne HDA does nol ccnler power on me Mlmslsr of Housing (“the Mlnlaleﬂl lo make regulaunns in: me purpaae of aalegaling ma power lo walve or ﬂlodﬁy ma Schsdula H common or sale lo me cunlmllen 01 Housing am MkvxmVkrL1wMwnp3cVAmA “Nun: a.nn nuvlhnrwm be UIQG M my me uﬂmnnﬂly mm: m.n.n y. mane vtmxl [25] Learned counsel [hen submhted Ihal nownere ln me said approval purponealy omalnsa by tho 31 respondenl company statm mat the declslcn to amend cl 25 ct lhe SPA was made by the Mmlster mrnsell [25] on me oonlrary, lne lmpugned decision was made lay Enclk Nor Azmi on banall nllhe canuollsr pl Houslng under rag lt nllha 1939 Regulations [271 lt ls lnr lhls raasnn that leumed oaunsal tor tna appllcanl urged me \|o cunclude lhat tne lmpugned decision 15 ultra ms the HDA and Ihere4ore lnvﬂhd am unantoroeaole. The 3" rnspormarrn submlsslon [291 aelore me, learned counsel fur tne 3" applrcan «ms Cmlrl lo oisnngulsn Ang Mmg Lu Fm one, In the mlllnl case. we apnllcatlun fnv the extenston M \|lms was made prior to undenaklrlg lne cnnstructron works In contrast the develnpel ln Ang Mlng L99 made lhe appltcaltort lor (ha axtonspn nl lime alter the pamas slgnsd the sl>As [291 My altenuon was then dlreclsd to a line ulaumorllles posl Ang Mmg Lee. whlc Includes one judgment oltne Hlgn court VI Eco Green cny Sdn Bhd v Trlbunnl runtu:-n Plmbull Rumlh 5 on [2020] MLJU Ash wtrion dls\|lrIguls\|'lsd Aug Mtrlg Lee on raols In tnal case. the Hlgh court nelo mat Ang Mlng Lee was dlsllnguisllable on tans stnbs no rnoamcauon was made alter tne s»gnmg olme SPA when the parties enlaraa lnla lna SPA, me oornpletion period was almady ﬁxed al 36 nmntns [an] In any event‘ aomrdlng to learned counsel tor the 3'6 respondent. ma appllcarﬂ smula not pe allowed la lake advanlage ol the luagnrant In Any Mr;-lg Lac la unluslly enrlch harseﬂ m MkvxmVkrL1wMwl:p3cVAmA “Nair Smnl ...n.rym .. u... m my r... nﬂmnnllly mm: dnuuvlnnl wa nFluNG Wm! [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] Learned counsel lurlher sunmillea lllal ma appllcaril never raised any ems: nslowards the so-memri pened MIEH me panes signed me SPN The obleclinn was only raised aller me vl=s were aelrwaraa Under me circumstances, me applicanl should be prevenleu lrom aariyirig me assumed lacls var Iha Sam Plrcels. which was an mamris lmm the dais of me SPA: ll wuuldl lrleralore. be ulllusl. aacordlng la lsamed counsel, la allew Ihe applicant to go back on lnal assummian In srmrl, \|he appllearil E eslavped lrnm allaglnglhm me exlensiorl at lime was invalid as the parlles weie MIGH me genuine impressran max me 60»manIh period was valid when ma SPA: were signad This pmpcsllinn nri esloppel can be seen In \|he judgrrierilauhe Higli courl in Alp: a Ratum Sdn Bhd v Mlrthcw My Hock sing I on mm 1 cu lzo. II was held lhal me purchasers should be eslonnea lmm ml lallew-ng ms sl=As as execuled by menu “by Vaklnﬁ acyanlage :2! me iullr-g lrl Ang Ming Lee in unjustly erirlcri memselves”. Flnally, learned counsel lor me 3 respomem subrrlilled that were sxlsled a new agieerrienlan me lime lrarrie lorlhe aw respormeril m aellyer the W oi me said parcels And \|o corrlplals me cnmmon laullmes lor me said Pmjed The an nspormenl, aammlrrg to Izamed oaureel would rlol have agreed In sell the sale Fareels Io lrie appllclrll a\| ma agreed pnca wllrieul ma amended lem. on the dale ol delivery Learned ceurisal lor ins 3"’ respondanll wriila eeriaaalrig that me issue olnew agreerrieril and the aeclnris elssloppel were ml ralseu aim onnsldeved In Any Ming Lea‘ releneu me to Oxbndge Neiqnt sari Bhd y Abdul Runk Mend Yuinf I Arie: lzolsl 2 cL.l 252 CA. r~ MkvxmVkrL1wMwl:p3cv4mA “Nair Smnl nmlhnrwm s. HIGH M yaw he nﬂnlrrallly ml. dnuuvlnnl VII nFluNG Wm! Tm sutnnlsslon M the Mtnlmr, an controller of tlouulng Ind tler Axlnt [as] The learned Sennr Federal Counsel who represented lne Minaler, the contmueroi Houslng and Enek Nnr Azmi sublnillled lnntwhen tne lmpugrled declslun was made on 29.9.2014, the pvesumpllnn or vahdlly auplree tn lne euwnrstanees, reg 1113; at lne I989 Regulalions rnust be presumed Io be valtd [37] According lu lne learned SFC, Ang Mmg Lee was enty decided on 25 ll 2019 alter the dellvery dl vacant pusseaston by tne am raspnndanl nampany to me apptiaanls en 11 ll 2019 The teamed src lurlner contended lnal the respendenls had acted well wrtntn lne lnen apulleable law tnal recngnlsed lne Valldtly ol reg 11(3), which ernpewared lne conlrellar at Housing \|a grunt lne exlenslorl at time In sen Housing Comonlion sdn and v Lee Pail cm [1952] 2 ML! 31 re, ldr exarnpte or 32 at the SPA exempted lne apeananl ll lne rton-NWmen\| at any terms and adndmans al the agreement was caused by cneurnstanees beyond Ihetr oenlmt. It was netd lnal ll ms open te the developer to try and persuade lne cdnlruller ol Houslnu to rnodlly lna riguurs ul paragrapn (at and tr) ol rule 12(I t ollhe lnen Hausmg oevetopers (Conlml and Ltuensing) Rutes, mm, eul WI tne aoaenee at wawer av rnadlhealton by lne Oanlmllerr :1 32 0! the SPA n yard and mevefure the devetaper .s liable VI damages tor the delay rn oornplelrnn [35] The learned src also echoed tne argument at teamed counsel tor lne am respondent lnal, unlike lne inslanl case. tne sxterlston cﬂltme tn Ang Mlng Lee was granted mtdway lnmugn tne construcrtdn and tend aher lne purenasera entered lna SPA [35] ll wus lunhar submtllad by lne teamed SFC tnut the eephcanta anauenge agarnst the dee n at the 2* respandent snoutd [all because ll was made out of me. [An] Aeedrdtnq to tne learned SFC, me applrcant was aware at the extension 0! Itme granted by the Commller of Housmg when she srgned bvlh :2! the slats an l9, 2015 and a 5 2015 raspeeuuaty slnce the apphcanl was aware o the extended tune e1 lne dehvery ru MkvxmVkVUWMWbD3cV4mA «mt. s.n.t mmhnrwm be u... m mm r... annmu-y mm. dnuumnl n. .nune v-mat oi [he VP oi an nipntns when sne signed tiie spa, Ihe stipulated lime [or iria avplicam lp challenge tne impugned daclsitm would lie in Apiil 2015 and August 2015, respectively [41] The learned SFC lnen uiged tnis court in eanelude Iha\| Slrloe the application to eiiallenge me pugrled decision I3 out or time as stipulated in 0 53 r ale; oi ins Rules ol Cutm zmz (“ROC“l. lnis cpurl nas no jurisdiction in hear me app‘ ‘ ; Wong Kln rioona 5 Anor v Kama Pengalall Japamn Aiiim sexllai L Anor[2\|l13] 4 Mu lul FC. [421 Finally, tiie learned src supiniiled lnal tlieie was np ellon made by me applicant is challaitga ins impugned decluon liiiougn an appeal to lne Minister under reg 12 aflhe 1959 Regulations Analysis [43] Let nie begin with the lSSue niestdppel raised Dy learned counsel ior the 3'" iesppndant and In imidni lne teained SFC daiened. [44] on the issue oi eswppel. teamed cpunsel iui \|he applicant neavily relied on A/pins Rulum and uiged tne court to conclude tiiat ma applicant sliauld he esloppedirpni no\| hpnpunng tne [arms oi the spa [451 My undeislandlnq of me ialip Alpine Retum is lnal lna developer “did ndl oommil any illegality, iiregulaniy pi deparl iiuin tne pipvisidns oi tna [inset Regulations in [area a! iris maIsrI'aI1.lIrla' Accovdlng to me leained Judge, the ﬂevaloper adneied la lne iequiieinenis oi me 1959 Regulations and applied lor tne extension undai rag 1113]‘ which wu allowed py me Housing cpniidliei maid lhs ainendnienis were made and piidclu the execution dime SPAS lNI\h liie nouse lwyeis [45] In snort, unlike Ang Ming Les, ins impugned declskln was made well beipie the signing pi me SPAS, IN umnmuwiuwapamnn “Nair Smnl nuvlhnrwlll be .i... m min i... pﬂﬂlrinllly MVMI dnuuvlniil n. AHLING mi	2,132	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
B-08-49-03/2023	PEMOHON ALUPOLE (M) SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN METAL ONE ENGINEERING SDN. BHD.	Applicant Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the decision of the Klang High Court dismissing the Applicant's appeal against the decision of the Klang Sessions Court Judge on 28/9/2022 – The Plaintiff appointed the Defendant to supply twenty (20) Aluminium Alloys Flood Lighting Columns [AAFLCs] pursuant to a Purchase Order dated 21/3/2019 - It is the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant was supposed to have delivered the AAFLCs by late May or early June 2019 - Unfortunately, this did not happen which resulted in considerable delay and eventually in September 2019, the Plaintiff had to procure the AAFLCs from a company in China - It is the Defendant’s case that in June 2019, the Defendant had completed the fabrication work for 20 sets of AAFLC and had successfully performed the Factory Acceptance Test (“FAT”) in the presence of the Plaintiff’s representatives - The Defendant has also sent the AAFLC’s specimens for the PWHT process and the test had been carried out. Defendant have performed their obligations under the PO and there was no total failure of consideration - The invoice number 2242 dated 22/7/2019 for the outstanding sum of RM34,642.50 due to the Defendant was still not paid - The Plaintiff’s application for leave is made pursuant to sections 68 Court of Judicature Act 1964 - It is trite that an appellate court will not interfere with the finding of the court below unless it can be shown the lower court had erred - there is sufficient appreciation of the evidence in its entirety by the trial judge in arriving at the conclusion that the Defendant had fulfilled all its obligations - There is unequivocally no prima facie error as the facts and law have been appropriately and inclusively considered and rightfully decided upon by the trial judge and appellate judge - The merits of the leave application are, in any event irrelevant - The Plaintiff had also failed to raise any questions of law but instead merely advance questions of fact which have been appropriately addressed in detail by the trial judge - No merits in the Plaintiff’s application to warrant this Honourable Court to exercise its powers to interfere with the finding of the court below - The Applicant/Plaintiff application is dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00 The costs are subject to allocatur fees.	28/11/2023	YA Dato' Azmi Bin AriffinKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7c10dce0-3591-484d-b8bf-a279c67b0db5&Inline=true	1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO. B- 08-49-03/2023 BETWEEN ALUPOLE(M)SDN.BHD. … APPLICANT AND METAL ONE ENGINEERING SON. BHD. … RESPONDENT [In The High Court Of Malaya In Klang In Selangor Civil Appeal No. BL-12B-16-10/2022 Between Alupole (M) Sdn. Bhd. … Appellant And Metal One Engineering Sdn. Bhd. … Respondent] 28/11/2023 10:14:41 B-08-49-03/2023 Kand. 35 S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CORAM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, JCA AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, JCA JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Enclosure 1 dated 8/3/2023 is the Applicant Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the decision of the Klang High Court dismissing the Applicant's appeal against the decision of the Klang Sessions Court Judge on 28/9/2022. [2] For ease of reference, the Appellant shall be hereinafter referred to as the Plaintiff and the Respondents as the Defendant in this Judgment. The Suit [3] On 26/2/2019, an Australian Company named Liquip Victoria has awarded the Plaintiff a contract to supply aluminium alloys amounting USD 78,425 (RM 335,580.58) via Purchase Order dated 26/2/2019. [4] The contract requires the Plaintiff to ship twenty (20) Aluminium Alloys Flood Lighting Columns [AAFLCs] to Mobil Oil Micronesia Incorporation at Majuro Bulk Plant, Marshall Island, Australia by 12/4/2019. S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [5] The Plaintiff appointed the Defendant to supply twenty (20) Aluminium Alloys Flood Lighting Columns [AAFLCs] pursuant to a Purchase Order dated 21/3/2019 [hereinafter referred to as the said “First PO" in order for the Plaintiff to fulfil the order made by Liquip Victoria. [6] The First PO was then substituted by the Purchase Order dated 25/3/2019 (hereinafter referred to as the “Second PO”) due to a typographical error. The contract price pursuant to the Second PO was RM147,550. 00. The payments were to be made in four tranches which were as follows: (i) First payment of 30% (RM44,265.00); (ii) Second payment of 30% (RM44,265.00); (iii) Third payment of 35% (RM51,642.50); and (iv) Fourth payment of 5% (RM7,377.50). [7] The Second PO sets out the following scope of work for the Defendant: (i) to prepare metal specimen and 20 sets of AAFLC; and (ii) to deliver the said 2 specimens for Post Weld Heat Treatment (“PWHT”) Test. [8] The Plaintiff had made the first and second payments amounting to a total sum of RM88,530.00 to the Defendant via invoice number 2222 S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 dated 22/3/2019 (RM44,265.00) and invoice number 2231 dated 29/4/2019 (RM 44,265.00) respectively. [9] It is the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant was supposed to have delivered the AAFLCs by late May or early June 2019. Unfortunately, this did not happen which resulted in considerable delay and eventually in September 2019, the Plaintiff had to procure the AAFLCs from a company in China. [10] It is the Defendant’s case that in June 2019, the Defendant had completed the fabrication work for 20 sets of AAFLC and had successfully performed the Factory Acceptance Test (“FAT”) in the presence of the Plaintiff’s representatives. The Defendant has also sent the AAFLC’s specimens for the PWHT process and the test had been carried out. Defendant have performed their obligations under the PO and there was no total failure of consideration. The invoice number 2242 dated 22/7/2019 for the outstanding sum of RM34,642.50 due to the Defendant was still not paid. [11] On 30/6/2020, the Plaintiff filed a suit against the Defendant in the Klang Sessions Court for a refund of deposit of RM44,265.00, a refund of the second stage payment of RM44,265.00 and a reimbursement of RM96,834.04 for new the order of AAFLC which the Plaintiff had to obtained from China, interest and costs. [12] The Defendant filed their defence and its counterclaim against the Plaintiff claiming for a declaration that the amended PO is unlawfully terminated by the Plaintiff and the sum of RM34,642.50 is to be paid to the Defendant from the date of the judgment. S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [13] On 28/9/2022, the learned Sessions Court Judge dismissed the Plaintiff's claim and allowed the counterclaim of RM34,642.50 with costs of RM4,855.00. [14] Dissatisfied, in October 2022, the Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Klang High Court. [15] On 7/2/2023 the learned High Court Judge dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeal and affirmed the Sessions Court decision. [16] By reason that the adjudged sum awarded is below the RM250,000.00 threshold pursuant to section 68(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, the Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal to this Court. Sessions Court Decision [17] On 28/9/2022, after 5 days of trial, the learned Sessions Court Judge dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim and granted the Respondent's counterclaim. The reasons stated amongst others, are as follows (page 489 Enclosure 25 Ikatan Teras Bersama): “[44] Based on the evidence, this Court was of the view the the plaintiff cannot deny the fact that the defendant had completed the fabrication. The fact that the Plaintiff’s submissions regarding the delay of the fabrication and the delivery of the poles clearly pointed out that the defendant had completed the AAFLC poles. S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [45] Thus, this Court agreed with the defendant’s submissions that the Plaintiff ought to be estopped by conduct or by principle of approbation and reprobating. [49] Based on the evidence above, this Court accepted the defendant’s submissions that there was no challenges nor complaints by the Plaintiff in relation to the progress report prepared and FAT conducted by the defendant. [50] Therefore, since there was neither objection nor dispute from the Plaintiff when the FAT was conducted, this Court was of the view that the defendant has completed the fabrication work of AAFLC poles and distinctly, the Plaintiff’s submission is devoid of merits.” High Court Decision [18] At the High Court, the learned judge dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeal and affirmed the Sessions Court decision. However, the appellate judge had not provided written grounds for her judgment. Questions of Law [19] The Plaintiff raised nine (9) grounds in support of the questions of law which are briefly summarised as follows: S.1: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila menolak tuntutan Pemohon terhadap Responden. S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 S.2: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila membenarkan tuntutan balas Responden dengan membuat deklarasi bahawa Pesanan Belian bertarikh 25.03.2019 telah dibatalkan oleh Pemohon secara tidak sah di sisi undang - undang. S.3: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila telah membenarkan tuntutan balas Responden sebanyak RM34,642.50 dengan kos sebanyak RM4,855.00 dan faedah sebanyak 5% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian penuh. S.4: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila membuat dapatan Pesanan Belian bertarikh 21.03.2019 telah digantikan dengan Pesanan Belian bertarikh 25.03.2019. S.5: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila telah membuat dapatan bahawa Responden telah menyempurnakan kerja-kerjanya menurut spesifikasi dalam Pesanan Belian bertarikh 21.03.2019. S.6: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila membuat dapatan bahawa fabrikasi Aloy Aluminium Flood Lighting Columns telah dilengkapkan oleh Responden. S.7: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila mengenepikan keterangan-keterangan dan S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 bukti-bukti bahawa "Factory Acceptance Test" belum berjaya dilakukan oleh Responden. S.8: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila mengenepikan keterangan-kerterangan dan bukti-bukti bahawa "Post Welding Heat Treatment" gagal dilengkapkan oleh Responden. S.9: Bahawa Hakim telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang- undang apabila mendapati bahawa tiada total "failure of consideration" yang melayakkan Pemohon membatalkan Pesanan Belian bertarikh 21.03.2019. Our Decisions [20] The Plaintiff’s application for leave is made pursuant to sections 68 Court of Judicature Act 1964 which reads: Non - appealable matters (1) No appeals shah be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases; (a) when the amount or value of the subject -matter of the claim (exclusive of interest) is less than two hundred and fifty thousand ringgit, except with the leave of the Court of Appeal; (b) where the judgment or order is made by consent of parties; S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 (c) where the judgment or order relates to costs only, which by law are left to the discretion of the Court, except with the leave of the Court of Appeal; (d) where, by any written law for the time being in force, the judgment or order of the High Court is expressly declared to be final; (e) where a High Court dismissed any application for a summary judgment; (f) where a High Court dismissed any application to strike out any writ or pleading; and (g) where a High Court allowed any application to set aside a judgment in default. (2) (Deleted). (3) No appeal shall lie from a decision of a Judge in Chambers in a summary way on an interpleader summons, where the facts are not in dispute, except by leave of the Court of Appeal, but an appeal shall lie from a judgment given in court on the trial of an interpleader issue. [21] In Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor [2020] 4 CLJ 865, speaking through Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal JCA (as he then was) held as follows: S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [7] Applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal are governed by s. 68(1)(a) of the CJA 1964 which effectively states that no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the claim (exclusive of interest) is less than RM250,000, except with the leave of the Court of Appeal. [8] Where appeals are filed without leave having been obtained, and where leave is required, the court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal (see Harcharan Singh Sohan Singh v. Ranjit Kaur S Gean Singh [2011] 3 CLJ 593 ("Harcharan Singh ")). The requirement for leave serves as a filter against frivolous or unmeritorious proceedings (O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237). It must follow that no appeal can be filed against the decision of the Court of Appeal regarding leave as otherwise the filter principle would be defeated (Lam Kong Co Ltd v. Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 1 CLJ 1; [2000] 1 MLJ 129 ("Lam Kong ")) [22] It is trite that an appellate court will not interfere with the finding of the court below unless it can be shown the lower court had erred. In order to succeed for leave to appeal, the Plaintiff must meet the threshold set out in Pang Hon Chin v. Nahar Singh [1986] 2 MLJ 145 where Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) held as follows: “The circumstances in which leave to appeal will be granted would include cases where the applicant is able to demonstrate a prima facie case of error (see (1907) 123 LT Jo 202) or if the question is one of general principle decided for the first time or a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of the Federal Court would be to the public advantage.” S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [23] This principle was further echoed in the Court of Appeal case of United Oriental Assurance Sdn Bhd v. Penang Medical Centre Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 542 wherein: • The applicant, United Oriental Assurance Sdn Bhd, was the second defendant in the court below. The court had held that applicant was generally liable to the respondent as insurer per se. The respondent had filed a claim against the appellant and the first defendant for a sum less that than RM250,000. Thus, this application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. • The applicant contended that leave to appeal should be given on grounds that the decision of the trial judge affects a fundamental principle of law, is of vital importance in the public interest, involves a serious and important issue of law, and there is a question of general principle where further argument before a higher tribunal would be of public advantage. • The Court of Appeal through Abu Mansor JCA (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the court found that there had been no error by the court below and therefore no reason to interfere with its finding. The application for leave was dismissed. [24] Having read the learned Sessions Court Judge’s ground of judgment, we find there is sufficient appreciation of the evidence in its entirety by the trial judge in arriving at the conclusion that the Defendant had fulfilled all its obligations. S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [25] There is unequivocally no prima facie error as the facts and law have been appropriately and inclusively considered and rightfully decided upon by the trial judge and appellate judge. We are mindful that the merits of the leave application are, in any event irrelevant. [26] The Plaintiff had also failed to raise any questions of law but instead merely advance questions of fact which have been appropriately addressed in detail by the trial judge. [27] In the premises, we unanimously find that the Plaintiff had failed to meet the principles enunciated by the court in Pang Hong Chin (supra). We find no merits in the Plaintiff’s application to warrant this Honourable Court to exercise its powers to interfere with the finding of the court below. [28] For reasons stated above, the Applicant/Plaintiff application is dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00 The costs are subject to allocatur fees. Date: 27 November 2023 - sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Counsel For the Appellant : (1) YM Raja Saidatul Akhma Raja Lope (2) Cik Amelia Edreena Azmir [Lope Maizura, Petaling Jaya] For the Respondents : (1) Datuk Joshua Kevin, (2) Leng Wie Mun (3) Encik Reuben Ong [Kevin & Co. Kuala Lumpur] S/N 4NwQfJE1TUi4v6J5xnsNtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	16,405	Tika 2.6.0
BA-22NCvC-295-08/2020	PLAINTIF TKH CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) DMC DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD 2. ) YAP HOE HUP 3. ) TAN LEE HIONG 4. ) JEFFREY YAP LEE WEI	Perjanjian jual beli hartanah - balasan - beban pembuktian dokumen di bahagian B ikatan dokumen - keadaan keadaan tabir korporat boleh disingkap	28/11/2023	YA Puan Indra Nehru Savandiah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b85e8464-1812-4869-9295-69dd2e555fe5&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN NO. GUAMAN.: BA-22NCVC-295-08/2020 ANTARA TKH CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD … PLAINTIF [NO. SYKT: 363188-T] DAN 1. DMC DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD [NO. SYKT: 596063-P] 2. YAP HOE HUP [NO. K/P: 580317-10-6369] 3. TAN LEE HIONG [NO. K/P: 640528-04-5764] 4. JEFFREY YAP LEE WEI [NO. K/P: 840705-14-6467] … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN _________________________________________________________ ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Rayuan 1. Rayuan di dalam kes ini difailkan oleh plaintif yang tidak puas hati dengan keputusan Mahkamah yang menolak tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan. 28/11/2023 15:30:51 BA-22NCvC-295-08/2020 Kand. 111 S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Ringkasan Kes Plaintif 2. Plaintif ialah subkontraktor yang dilantik oleh Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd bagi satu projek Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. 3. Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd, kontraktor utama, berhutang kepada plaintiff sebanyak RM3,391,114.66 untuk kerja-kerja subkontrak bagi projek Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. 4. Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd, plaintif dan defendan pertama telah memasuki satu perjanjian penyelesaian bertarikh 21.08.2015. 5. Antara terma-terma perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut adalah seperti berikut: (i) RM 2,438,100.00 akan dibayar oleh Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd bagi pihak plaintif kepada defendan pertama sebagai bayaran S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 penuh harga belian satu unit rumah berkembar dua tingkat yang dikenalpastikan sebagai Lot Pemaju No. 5, Jalah Merah Kesumba U9/20, Casa Mon’t yang perlu diserahkan kepada plaintif pada atau sebelum 19.08.2018. (ii) Baki wang sebanyak RM953,014.66 akan dibayar oleh Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd kepada plaintif dalam masa yang diperuntukkan di dalam terma 1.3(a), perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut. 6. Plaintif dan defendan pertama telah memasuki perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 20.08.2015. 7. Plaintif mendakwa defendan pertama gagal menyerahkan milikan kosong rumah tersebut dalam masa 36 bulan dari tarikh perjanjian jual beli. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 8. Adalah juga pernyataan plaintif bahawa pampasan pada kadar 10% setahun akan dikenakan terhadap defendan pertama jika defendan pertama gagal menyerahkan milikan kosong rumah tersebut dari tarikh tamat masa untuk serahan milikan kosong rumah tersebut sehingga tarikh ianya dibuat. 9. Plaintif mendakwa harga jual beli rumah tersebut telah dijelaskan. 10. Plaintif mendakwa bukti pembayaran adalah resit bertarikh 18.09.2015. 11. Peguamcara plaintif dikatakan telah membuat pertanyaan berhubung penyerahan milikan kosong rumah tersebut. 12. Peguamcara plaintif telah dimaklumkan oleh peguamcara Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd bahawa akan memberi maklum balas setelah menghubungi defendan pertama. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 13. Apabila tiada maklumbalas daripada peguamcara Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd, sekitar bulan Julai 2019, plaintif telah menghubungi defendan kedua dan defendan ketiga bertanyakan status milikan kosong rumah tersebut. 14. Defendan ketiga telah memaklumkan plaintif bahawa rumah tersebut telah dilelong oleh sebuah syarikat bernama Indacon Sdn Bhd. 15. Plaintif mendakwa beliau terkejut dengan maklumat tersebut kerana beliau tidak pernah dimaklum oleh defendan-defendan akan perkara tersebut. 16. Plaintif kemudiannya telah menghubungi Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan untuk memperolehi maklumat berhubung projek Casa Mon’t. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 17. Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan telah memaklumkan kepada plaintif bahawa tanah projek Casa Mon’t telah dilelongkan oleh sebuah syarikat bernama Indacon Sdn Bhd. 18. Pada 08.07.2020, plaintif telah menghantar notis kepada defendan pertama menuntut milikan kosong rumah tersebut. 19. Plaintif juga memaklumkan kepada defendan pertama jika gagal diberikan milikan kosong rumah tersebut, maka perjanjian jual beli rumah tersebut akan ditamatkan. 20. Selanjutnya plaintif menuntut daripada defendan pertama wang sebanyak RM2,438,100.00 yang dikatakan telah dijelaskan kepada defendan pertama sebagai harga jual beli rumah tersebut. 21. Plaintif juga mendakwa defendan pertama, defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat mengetahui bahawa beliau telah memasuki perjanjian penyelesaian di mana Dinamik S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd akan melangsaikan hutang kepada plaintif secara membeli rumah tersebut untuk beliau daripada defendan pertama. 22. Oleh yang demikian, adalah dakwaan plaintif selaku pengarah- pengarah syarikat defendan pertama, defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat hendaklah bertanggungjawab untuk membayar balik plaintif wang harga jual beli rumah tersebut. 23. Plaintif mendakwa defendan kedua, defendan ketiga, dan defendan keempat sebagai “directing will and mind of” defendan pertama. 24. Tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan adalah seperti berikut: (i) satu deklarasi bahawa perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 20.08.2015 ditamatkan secara sah atau terbatal. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (ii) defendan-defendan secara bersama dan/atau berasingan membayar plaintif, RM2,438,100.00. (iii) faedah, kos dan lain-lain relief yang wajar dan berpatutan. Ringkasan Kes Defendan-Defendan 25. Defendan pertama adalah sebuah syarikat sendirian berhad yang merupakan pemaju perumahan. 26. Defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat ialah pengarah-pengarah syarikat defendan pertama. 27. Defendan pertama mendakwa walaupun ada resit bahawa harga jual beli rumah itu telah dijelaskan namun sebenarnya tiada wang yang dibayar oleh Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd kepada defendan pertama. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 28. Tidak ada wang yang dimasukkan ke akaun Akta Kemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Pelesenan) 1966. 29. Defendan pertama menafikan ianya telah diperkayakan sebab tidak menerima wang sejumlah RM2,438,100.00 daripada Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd ataupun plaintif. 30. Defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat mendakwa mereka telah bertindak dalam kapasiti mereka selaku pengarah syarikat defendan pertama. 31. Oleh yang demikian berdasarkan prinsip entiti berasingan, mereka tidak perlu menanggung kerugian yang didakwa dialami oleh plaintif, jika ada. 32. Defendan-defendan memohon tuntutan plaintif ditolak. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Isu-isu Untuk Dibicarakan 33. Sama ada defendan pertama dibayar RM2,438,100.00 oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd bagi pihak plaintif untuk membeli rumah tersebut. 34. Sama ada resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 membuktikan ada pembayaran bagi jumlah RM2,438,100.00 dibuat. 35. Sama ada tabir korporat perlu disingkap terhadap defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat. Keputusan Mahkamah 36. Beban pembuktian kes sivil adalah atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Dalam konteks ini, rujukan dibuat kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Ho Hup Construction Company Berhad v Woo Thin Chong [2018] 2 MLRA 321 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 “[43] It was trite that while it was true that the overall burden of proving a civil claim on a balance of probabilities was on the party bringing the action (the plaintiff), a party who alleged or relied upon a particular fact had the onus or responsibility to establish on evidence the existence of that fact. Sections 101, 102 and 103 of the EA (in so far as was material for our decision on this point) were as follows: “Section 101: Burden of proof (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependant on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 ILLUSTRATIONS … …” “Section 102: On whom burden of proof of lies The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. ILLUSTRATIONS … …” Section 103: Burden of proof as to particular fact The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of the fact shall lie on any particular person. ILLUSTRATIONS … …” S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 37. Resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 terletak di bahagian B, ikatan dokumen bersama yang difailkan di mahkamah. 38. Sehubungan dengan dokumen-dokumen yang diletak di bahagian B, prinsip undang-undang adalah jelas, ianya bermakna kewujudan dokumen itu tidak dipertikaikan. Apa yang menjadi pertikaian adalah isi kandungannya tidak dipersetujui dan perlu dibuktikan. 39. Mahkamah membuat rujukan kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 845 yang menghuraikan secara terperinci berhubung kategori-kategori dokumen di bahagian A, B dan C di dalam sesebuah ikatan dokumen kes. 40. Rujukan dibuat kepada Aturan 34 Kaedah 2(2) (d) dan (e), yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 845, seperti berikut: S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “[34] It is necessary to consider the express provisions of Order 34 r 2(2)(d) and (e) to comprehend the legal basis for the categorization of bundles of documents to be utilised at trial: "2 (2) At a pre-trial case management, the Court may consider any matter including the possibility of settlement of all or any of the issues in the action or proceedings and require the parties to furnish the Court with such information as it thinks fit, and the appropriate orders and directions that should be made to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action or proceedings, including --- (a)... (b)... (e) the period within which the parties are to file a bundle of all documents that will be relied on or S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 referred to in the course of the trial by any party, Including documents referred to in the witness statement of a witness; (d) the contents of the bundle of the documents referred to in subparagraph (c) shall be agreed on between all parties as far as possible and this bundle of agreed documents shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as Part A; (e) If the parties are unable to agree on certain documents, those documents on which agreement cannot be reached shall be included in separate bundles and each bundle shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as follows: (1) Part B - documents where the authenticity is not disputed but the contents are disputed; (II) Part C - documents where the authenticity and contents are disputed; S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [35\| As stipulated in Order 34 Rule 2(2)(d) and (e), bundles of documents filed at trial fall within three separate bundles, Parts A, B and C. Part A in envisaged as being agreed on by all parties as far as possible. Does that encompass the truth of the contents of the documents? [36] To answer that question it is necessary to consider Order 34 Rule 2(2)(e). It provides that documents where the authenticity is agreed but the contents are in dispute, the documents are to be placed in Part B. This in turn means that while the parties are in agreement that such a document exists and is not a fabrication, the contents of the document remain in dispute. So the relevant witness is to be present at trial to be cross-examined on the contents only, of the document.” S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 41. Sekarang balik kepada fakta kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, adalah jelas resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 terletak di bahagian B ikatan dokumen bersama. 42. Adalah menjadi tanggungjawab pihak plaintif membuktikan kesahihan isi kandungan resit tersebut. 43. Keterangan defendan ketiga iaitu Tan Lee Hiong menjurus kepada dapatan fakta beliau adalah bidan terjun bagi syarikat suami beliau. 44. Beliau menjelaskan setelah suami beliau jatuh sakit, beliau telah membantu operasi syarikat dalam hal-hal seperti menandatangani cek. 45. Adalah jelas melalui keterangan beliau bahawa beliau tidak cakna akan hal ehwal operasi syarikat iaitu defendan pertama. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 46. Beliau berkata resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 nampaknya dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama merujuk kepada kepala surat. Selain itu, beliau tidak ada apa-apa pengetahuan berhubung resit tersebut. 47. Mahkamah mendapati defendan ketiga tidak memahami akan perjalanan urusan syarikat defendan pertama dan keliru akan fakta-fakta berhubung operasi syarikat tersebut. 48. Beliau telus dan memberitahu mahkamah bahawa beliau jarang pergi ke pejabat syarikat defendan pertama dan hanya menandatangani cek-cek sebab suami beliau tidak sihat. 49. Menurut defendan keempat, wang RM2,438,100.00 yang dinyatakan di dalam resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 tidak dibayar kepada defendan pertama oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 50. Defendan keempat memberi keterangan beliau tidak ada pengetahuan berhubung degan resit tersebut dan menekan fakta bahawa beliau hanya menandatangani perjanjian-perjanjian dalam kapasiti sebagai pengarah syarikat defendan pertama. 51. Defendan keempat juga memberi keterangan resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 nampaknya dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama merujuk kepada kepala surat. 52. Keterangan defendan kedua adalah syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd tidak membuat bayaran bagi jumlah RM2,438,100.00. 53. Beliau menjelaskan bayaran tidak dibuat sebab syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd tidak ada wang. 54. Beliau seterusnya menjelaskan tujuan resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 disediakan adalah semata-mata untuk kegunaan dalaman sahaja. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 55. Di peringkat pemeriksaan balas yang agak dramatik, defendan kedua masih mengekalkan versi keterangan beliau bahawa tujuan resit itu dikeluarkan adalah untuk kegunaan dalaman sahaja dan tidak ada wang diterima oleh defendan pertama. 56. Dalam pemeriksaan semula, defendan kedua menjelaskan resit itu tidak disediakan oleh akauntan beliau dan tiada nombor cek. 57. Di dalam kes ini, fakta bayaran sepertimana yang perlu dibuat di bawah Akta Kemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Perlesenan) 1966 tidak dibuktikan sepertimana keterangan defendan kedua yang menghuraikan akan keperluan berbuat sedemikian. 58. Di dalam keterangan plaintif, plaintif memberitahu mahkamah bahawa beliau tidak tahu samada syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd ada membuat bayaran sebanyak RM2,438,100.00. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 59. Plaintif juga memberi keterangan syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd gagal menjelaskan baki hutang tertunggak sebanyak RM953,014.66 kepada beliau. 60. Resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 adalah dikeluarkan kepada Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn. Bhd. 61. Plaintif gagal memberi penjelasan yang munasabah bagaimana resit tersebut diperolehi oleh beliau. 62. Tidak ada saksi yang dipanggil dari syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd untuk membuktikan akan kesahihan isi kandungan resit tersebut. Ini meninggalkan lompang yang tidak terjawab dalam kes plaintif. 63. Resit tersebut bertarikh 18.09.2015 di mana pihak Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd dikatakan telah membuat bayaran sebanyak S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 RM2,438,100.00 untuk membeli rumah tersebut daripada defendan pertama. Di dalam resit itu, tiada butiran cara bayaran dibuat. 64. Adalah fakta yang sedia ada di mahkamah ini bahawa Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd telah memasuki satu perjanjian penyelesaian di antara plaintif dan defendan pertama untuk menyelesaikan masalah hutang syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd dengan plaintif pada 21.08.2015. 65. Adalah juga fakta yang tidak tercabar bahawa syarikat Dinamik Maju Corportation Sdn Bhd berhutang kepada plaintif sebanyak RM3,391,114.66. 66. Bayaran RM2,438,100.00 adalah bagi pihak syarikat Dinamik Maju Corportation Sdn Bhd melangsaikan sebahagian hutang tertunggak kepada plaintif. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 67. Keterangan plaintif bercanggah dari penyata tuntutan berhubung fakta di mana plaintif menafikan cadangan peguam defendan pertama, defendan kedua dan defendan ketiga bahawa perjanjian penyelesaian dimasuki sebab syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd menghadapi masalah kewangan untuk menjelaskan hutang plaintif. 68. Mahkamah setelah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan fakta sedia ada, memutuskan pihak plaintif gagal membuktikan kesahihan isi kandungan resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 berdasarkan sebab-sebab seperti berikut :- (i) Resit itu bertarikh 18.09.2015. Perjanjian penyelesaian bertarikh 21.08.2015. (ii) Perjanjian penyelesaian dimasuki kerana syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd menghadapi masalah kewangan. (iii) Kajian kes menjurus kepada dapatan fakta adalah tidak munasabah bagi syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd yang menghadapi masalah kewangan pada 21.08.2015 S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 secara tiba-tiba berupaya membuat bayaran penuh harga belian rumah tersebut bagi jumlah sebanyak RM2,438,100.00 kepada defendan pertama. (iv) Di dalam perbicaraan ini, tiada keterangan fakta yang dibuktikan sememangnya bayaran itu dibuat sama ada dalam bentuk wang tunai atau cek. (v) Persoalan yang timbul di sini adalah jikalau syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd berupaya membuat bayaran bagi jumlah sebanyak RM2,438,100.00 yang merupakan hutang syarikat tersebut kepada pihak plaintif dalam jangka masa lebih kurang 1 bulan dari tarikh perjanjian penyelesaian, adalah logik hutang tersebut dijelaskan secara terus kepada plaintif oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd dan tidak ada keperluan untuk satu perjanjian penyelesaian sepertimana yang tertera di dalam kes ini. (vi) Keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah ini oleh plaintiff adalah baki hutang sebanyak RM953,014.66 tidak dijelaskan oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd kemudian seperti yang dijanjikan. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 (vii) Dalam pada itu, analisis fakta-fakta yang dikemukakan di mahkamah ini adalah diputuskan wang sebanyak RM2,438,100.00 tidak pernah dibayar oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd kepada defendan pertama. 69. Mahkamah ini menerima penjelasan defendan kedua bahawa resit tersebut disediakan semata-mata untuk urusan dalaman dan isi kandungan resit itu tidak benar. 70. Fakta keterangan ini diperkukuhkan oleh keterangan plaintif bahawa hutang tertunggak sebanyak RM953,014.66 tidak dijelaskan oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd. 71. Perkara ini telah dinyatakan di dalam penyata pembelaan di mana peruntukan Seksyen 26 Akta Kontrak 1950 ada diplidkan. 72. Kegagalan plaintif memanggil saksi dari syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd untuk membuktikan fakta keterangan S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 berhubung pembayaran wang harga jual beli rumah tersebut juga memperkuatkan kesangsian akan kesahihan butiran dalam resit berkenaan. Adalah penting untuk diingati bahawa resit itu dikeluarkan atas nama syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd dan bukan atas nama plaintif. Maka, pihak yang boleh memberi penjelasan berhubung isi kandungan resit tersebut adalah pihak syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd. 73. Adalah menjadi kewajipan untuk membuat bayaran bagi sebuah transaksi kontrak dalam sesuatu perjanjian jual beli. 74. Kegagalan membuat bayaran harga belian rumah itu memberi kesan pembatalan perjanjian jual beli tersebut di bawah Seksyen 26 Akta Kontrak 1950. 75. Justeru, kontrak perjanjian jual beli antara plaintif dan defendan pertama adalah terbatal dan tidak sah kerana mahkamah membuat dapatan fakta bahawa bayaran sebanyak S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 RM2,438,100.00 gagal dibuktikan dibuat kepada defendan pertama. 76. Oleh yang demikian defendan pertama tidak diperkayakan akibat transaksi jual beli rumah tersebut. 77. Alasan ini sahaja mencukupi untuk mahkamah ini menolak tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan. 78. Walaubagimanapun bagi tujuan kesempurnaan kes, dikaji sama ada tabir korporat perlu disingkap terhadap defendan kedua, ketiga dan keempat. 79. Rujukan dibuat kepada kes Theta Edge Bhd (previously known as Lityan Holdings Sdn Bhd v Infornential Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2017] 2 MLJ 34, yang memutuskan tabir korporat akan disingkap oleh mahkamah dalam hal-hal keadaan yang sesuai. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 80. Dalam mengambil hal-hal keadaan yang sesuai, mahkamah ini memutuskan segala tindakan defendan kedua, ketiga dan keempat dalam kes ini tidak membuktikan sebarang tindakan frod ataupun ketidakwajaran. 81. Malahan dalam kes ini, plaintif sedia maklum atas pemakluman oleh defendan ketiga akan tindakan oleh Indacon Sdn Bhd tetapi tidak mengambil tindakan untuk menjaga kepentingan beliau. 82. Dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, tidak ada keterangan yang berbentuk frod, penyembunyian fakta sebenar ataupun ketidakwajaran yang mengizinkan akan keperluan untuk tabir korporat disingkap. 83. Penyataan plaintif dalam penyataan tuntutan bahawa defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat sebagai pengarah dan “directing will and mind of” defendan pertama tidak S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 mengenalpastikan elemen-elemen yang perlu disangkal oleh defendan-defendan supaya tabir korporat perlu disingkap. Kesimpulan 84. Adalah diputuskan plaintif telah gagal membuktikan kes atas imbangan kebarangkalian terhadap defendan-defendan. 85. Oleh yang demikian wajar dan adil tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 terhadap defendan pertama, defendan kedua dan defendan ketiga dan sebanyak RM10,000.00 kepada defendan keempat tertakluk fi alokatur. Tarikh: 28 November 2023 (INDRA NEHRU SAVANDIAH) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Tarikh keputusan: 15 September 2023 Peguam-Peguam: Bagi pihak plaintif: Pari Perumal & Jayaratnam K. [Tetuan Jayaratnam & Partners] Bagi pihak D1 – D3: Chai Yow San, [Tetuan Chai Yow San & Co.] Bagi pihak D4: Tan Kim Choong, [Tetuan K. C. Tang & Co.] S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	26,520	Tika 2.6.0
BA-22NCvC-295-08/2020	PLAINTIF TKH CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) DMC DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD 2. ) YAP HOE HUP 3. ) TAN LEE HIONG 4. ) JEFFREY YAP LEE WEI	Perjanjian jual beli hartanah - balasan - beban pembuktian dokumen di bahagian B ikatan dokumen - keadaan keadaan tabir korporat boleh disingkap	28/11/2023	YA Puan Indra Nehru Savandiah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b85e8464-1812-4869-9295-69dd2e555fe5&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN NO. GUAMAN.: BA-22NCVC-295-08/2020 ANTARA TKH CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD … PLAINTIF [NO. SYKT: 363188-T] DAN 1. DMC DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD [NO. SYKT: 596063-P] 2. YAP HOE HUP [NO. K/P: 580317-10-6369] 3. TAN LEE HIONG [NO. K/P: 640528-04-5764] 4. JEFFREY YAP LEE WEI [NO. K/P: 840705-14-6467] … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN _________________________________________________________ ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Rayuan 1. Rayuan di dalam kes ini difailkan oleh plaintif yang tidak puas hati dengan keputusan Mahkamah yang menolak tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan. 28/11/2023 15:30:51 BA-22NCvC-295-08/2020 Kand. 111 S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Ringkasan Kes Plaintif 2. Plaintif ialah subkontraktor yang dilantik oleh Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd bagi satu projek Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. 3. Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd, kontraktor utama, berhutang kepada plaintiff sebanyak RM3,391,114.66 untuk kerja-kerja subkontrak bagi projek Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. 4. Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd, plaintif dan defendan pertama telah memasuki satu perjanjian penyelesaian bertarikh 21.08.2015. 5. Antara terma-terma perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut adalah seperti berikut: (i) RM 2,438,100.00 akan dibayar oleh Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd bagi pihak plaintif kepada defendan pertama sebagai bayaran S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 penuh harga belian satu unit rumah berkembar dua tingkat yang dikenalpastikan sebagai Lot Pemaju No. 5, Jalah Merah Kesumba U9/20, Casa Mon’t yang perlu diserahkan kepada plaintif pada atau sebelum 19.08.2018. (ii) Baki wang sebanyak RM953,014.66 akan dibayar oleh Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd kepada plaintif dalam masa yang diperuntukkan di dalam terma 1.3(a), perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut. 6. Plaintif dan defendan pertama telah memasuki perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 20.08.2015. 7. Plaintif mendakwa defendan pertama gagal menyerahkan milikan kosong rumah tersebut dalam masa 36 bulan dari tarikh perjanjian jual beli. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 8. Adalah juga pernyataan plaintif bahawa pampasan pada kadar 10% setahun akan dikenakan terhadap defendan pertama jika defendan pertama gagal menyerahkan milikan kosong rumah tersebut dari tarikh tamat masa untuk serahan milikan kosong rumah tersebut sehingga tarikh ianya dibuat. 9. Plaintif mendakwa harga jual beli rumah tersebut telah dijelaskan. 10. Plaintif mendakwa bukti pembayaran adalah resit bertarikh 18.09.2015. 11. Peguamcara plaintif dikatakan telah membuat pertanyaan berhubung penyerahan milikan kosong rumah tersebut. 12. Peguamcara plaintif telah dimaklumkan oleh peguamcara Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd bahawa akan memberi maklum balas setelah menghubungi defendan pertama. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 13. Apabila tiada maklumbalas daripada peguamcara Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd, sekitar bulan Julai 2019, plaintif telah menghubungi defendan kedua dan defendan ketiga bertanyakan status milikan kosong rumah tersebut. 14. Defendan ketiga telah memaklumkan plaintif bahawa rumah tersebut telah dilelong oleh sebuah syarikat bernama Indacon Sdn Bhd. 15. Plaintif mendakwa beliau terkejut dengan maklumat tersebut kerana beliau tidak pernah dimaklum oleh defendan-defendan akan perkara tersebut. 16. Plaintif kemudiannya telah menghubungi Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan untuk memperolehi maklumat berhubung projek Casa Mon’t. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 17. Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan telah memaklumkan kepada plaintif bahawa tanah projek Casa Mon’t telah dilelongkan oleh sebuah syarikat bernama Indacon Sdn Bhd. 18. Pada 08.07.2020, plaintif telah menghantar notis kepada defendan pertama menuntut milikan kosong rumah tersebut. 19. Plaintif juga memaklumkan kepada defendan pertama jika gagal diberikan milikan kosong rumah tersebut, maka perjanjian jual beli rumah tersebut akan ditamatkan. 20. Selanjutnya plaintif menuntut daripada defendan pertama wang sebanyak RM2,438,100.00 yang dikatakan telah dijelaskan kepada defendan pertama sebagai harga jual beli rumah tersebut. 21. Plaintif juga mendakwa defendan pertama, defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat mengetahui bahawa beliau telah memasuki perjanjian penyelesaian di mana Dinamik S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd akan melangsaikan hutang kepada plaintif secara membeli rumah tersebut untuk beliau daripada defendan pertama. 22. Oleh yang demikian, adalah dakwaan plaintif selaku pengarah- pengarah syarikat defendan pertama, defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat hendaklah bertanggungjawab untuk membayar balik plaintif wang harga jual beli rumah tersebut. 23. Plaintif mendakwa defendan kedua, defendan ketiga, dan defendan keempat sebagai “directing will and mind of” defendan pertama. 24. Tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan adalah seperti berikut: (i) satu deklarasi bahawa perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 20.08.2015 ditamatkan secara sah atau terbatal. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (ii) defendan-defendan secara bersama dan/atau berasingan membayar plaintif, RM2,438,100.00. (iii) faedah, kos dan lain-lain relief yang wajar dan berpatutan. Ringkasan Kes Defendan-Defendan 25. Defendan pertama adalah sebuah syarikat sendirian berhad yang merupakan pemaju perumahan. 26. Defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat ialah pengarah-pengarah syarikat defendan pertama. 27. Defendan pertama mendakwa walaupun ada resit bahawa harga jual beli rumah itu telah dijelaskan namun sebenarnya tiada wang yang dibayar oleh Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd kepada defendan pertama. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 28. Tidak ada wang yang dimasukkan ke akaun Akta Kemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Pelesenan) 1966. 29. Defendan pertama menafikan ianya telah diperkayakan sebab tidak menerima wang sejumlah RM2,438,100.00 daripada Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd ataupun plaintif. 30. Defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat mendakwa mereka telah bertindak dalam kapasiti mereka selaku pengarah syarikat defendan pertama. 31. Oleh yang demikian berdasarkan prinsip entiti berasingan, mereka tidak perlu menanggung kerugian yang didakwa dialami oleh plaintif, jika ada. 32. Defendan-defendan memohon tuntutan plaintif ditolak. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Isu-isu Untuk Dibicarakan 33. Sama ada defendan pertama dibayar RM2,438,100.00 oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd bagi pihak plaintif untuk membeli rumah tersebut. 34. Sama ada resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 membuktikan ada pembayaran bagi jumlah RM2,438,100.00 dibuat. 35. Sama ada tabir korporat perlu disingkap terhadap defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat. Keputusan Mahkamah 36. Beban pembuktian kes sivil adalah atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Dalam konteks ini, rujukan dibuat kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Ho Hup Construction Company Berhad v Woo Thin Chong [2018] 2 MLRA 321 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 “[43] It was trite that while it was true that the overall burden of proving a civil claim on a balance of probabilities was on the party bringing the action (the plaintiff), a party who alleged or relied upon a particular fact had the onus or responsibility to establish on evidence the existence of that fact. Sections 101, 102 and 103 of the EA (in so far as was material for our decision on this point) were as follows: “Section 101: Burden of proof (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependant on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 ILLUSTRATIONS … …” “Section 102: On whom burden of proof of lies The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. ILLUSTRATIONS … …” Section 103: Burden of proof as to particular fact The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of the fact shall lie on any particular person. ILLUSTRATIONS … …” S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 37. Resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 terletak di bahagian B, ikatan dokumen bersama yang difailkan di mahkamah. 38. Sehubungan dengan dokumen-dokumen yang diletak di bahagian B, prinsip undang-undang adalah jelas, ianya bermakna kewujudan dokumen itu tidak dipertikaikan. Apa yang menjadi pertikaian adalah isi kandungannya tidak dipersetujui dan perlu dibuktikan. 39. Mahkamah membuat rujukan kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 845 yang menghuraikan secara terperinci berhubung kategori-kategori dokumen di bahagian A, B dan C di dalam sesebuah ikatan dokumen kes. 40. Rujukan dibuat kepada Aturan 34 Kaedah 2(2) (d) dan (e), yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 845, seperti berikut: S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “[34] It is necessary to consider the express provisions of Order 34 r 2(2)(d) and (e) to comprehend the legal basis for the categorization of bundles of documents to be utilised at trial: "2 (2) At a pre-trial case management, the Court may consider any matter including the possibility of settlement of all or any of the issues in the action or proceedings and require the parties to furnish the Court with such information as it thinks fit, and the appropriate orders and directions that should be made to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action or proceedings, including --- (a)... (b)... (e) the period within which the parties are to file a bundle of all documents that will be relied on or S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 referred to in the course of the trial by any party, Including documents referred to in the witness statement of a witness; (d) the contents of the bundle of the documents referred to in subparagraph (c) shall be agreed on between all parties as far as possible and this bundle of agreed documents shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as Part A; (e) If the parties are unable to agree on certain documents, those documents on which agreement cannot be reached shall be included in separate bundles and each bundle shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as follows: (1) Part B - documents where the authenticity is not disputed but the contents are disputed; (II) Part C - documents where the authenticity and contents are disputed; S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [35\| As stipulated in Order 34 Rule 2(2)(d) and (e), bundles of documents filed at trial fall within three separate bundles, Parts A, B and C. Part A in envisaged as being agreed on by all parties as far as possible. Does that encompass the truth of the contents of the documents? [36] To answer that question it is necessary to consider Order 34 Rule 2(2)(e). It provides that documents where the authenticity is agreed but the contents are in dispute, the documents are to be placed in Part B. This in turn means that while the parties are in agreement that such a document exists and is not a fabrication, the contents of the document remain in dispute. So the relevant witness is to be present at trial to be cross-examined on the contents only, of the document.” S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 41. Sekarang balik kepada fakta kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, adalah jelas resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 terletak di bahagian B ikatan dokumen bersama. 42. Adalah menjadi tanggungjawab pihak plaintif membuktikan kesahihan isi kandungan resit tersebut. 43. Keterangan defendan ketiga iaitu Tan Lee Hiong menjurus kepada dapatan fakta beliau adalah bidan terjun bagi syarikat suami beliau. 44. Beliau menjelaskan setelah suami beliau jatuh sakit, beliau telah membantu operasi syarikat dalam hal-hal seperti menandatangani cek. 45. Adalah jelas melalui keterangan beliau bahawa beliau tidak cakna akan hal ehwal operasi syarikat iaitu defendan pertama. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 46. Beliau berkata resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 nampaknya dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama merujuk kepada kepala surat. Selain itu, beliau tidak ada apa-apa pengetahuan berhubung resit tersebut. 47. Mahkamah mendapati defendan ketiga tidak memahami akan perjalanan urusan syarikat defendan pertama dan keliru akan fakta-fakta berhubung operasi syarikat tersebut. 48. Beliau telus dan memberitahu mahkamah bahawa beliau jarang pergi ke pejabat syarikat defendan pertama dan hanya menandatangani cek-cek sebab suami beliau tidak sihat. 49. Menurut defendan keempat, wang RM2,438,100.00 yang dinyatakan di dalam resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 tidak dibayar kepada defendan pertama oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 50. Defendan keempat memberi keterangan beliau tidak ada pengetahuan berhubung degan resit tersebut dan menekan fakta bahawa beliau hanya menandatangani perjanjian-perjanjian dalam kapasiti sebagai pengarah syarikat defendan pertama. 51. Defendan keempat juga memberi keterangan resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 nampaknya dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama merujuk kepada kepala surat. 52. Keterangan defendan kedua adalah syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd tidak membuat bayaran bagi jumlah RM2,438,100.00. 53. Beliau menjelaskan bayaran tidak dibuat sebab syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd tidak ada wang. 54. Beliau seterusnya menjelaskan tujuan resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 disediakan adalah semata-mata untuk kegunaan dalaman sahaja. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 55. Di peringkat pemeriksaan balas yang agak dramatik, defendan kedua masih mengekalkan versi keterangan beliau bahawa tujuan resit itu dikeluarkan adalah untuk kegunaan dalaman sahaja dan tidak ada wang diterima oleh defendan pertama. 56. Dalam pemeriksaan semula, defendan kedua menjelaskan resit itu tidak disediakan oleh akauntan beliau dan tiada nombor cek. 57. Di dalam kes ini, fakta bayaran sepertimana yang perlu dibuat di bawah Akta Kemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Perlesenan) 1966 tidak dibuktikan sepertimana keterangan defendan kedua yang menghuraikan akan keperluan berbuat sedemikian. 58. Di dalam keterangan plaintif, plaintif memberitahu mahkamah bahawa beliau tidak tahu samada syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd ada membuat bayaran sebanyak RM2,438,100.00. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 59. Plaintif juga memberi keterangan syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd gagal menjelaskan baki hutang tertunggak sebanyak RM953,014.66 kepada beliau. 60. Resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 adalah dikeluarkan kepada Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn. Bhd. 61. Plaintif gagal memberi penjelasan yang munasabah bagaimana resit tersebut diperolehi oleh beliau. 62. Tidak ada saksi yang dipanggil dari syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd untuk membuktikan akan kesahihan isi kandungan resit tersebut. Ini meninggalkan lompang yang tidak terjawab dalam kes plaintif. 63. Resit tersebut bertarikh 18.09.2015 di mana pihak Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd dikatakan telah membuat bayaran sebanyak S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 RM2,438,100.00 untuk membeli rumah tersebut daripada defendan pertama. Di dalam resit itu, tiada butiran cara bayaran dibuat. 64. Adalah fakta yang sedia ada di mahkamah ini bahawa Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd telah memasuki satu perjanjian penyelesaian di antara plaintif dan defendan pertama untuk menyelesaikan masalah hutang syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd dengan plaintif pada 21.08.2015. 65. Adalah juga fakta yang tidak tercabar bahawa syarikat Dinamik Maju Corportation Sdn Bhd berhutang kepada plaintif sebanyak RM3,391,114.66. 66. Bayaran RM2,438,100.00 adalah bagi pihak syarikat Dinamik Maju Corportation Sdn Bhd melangsaikan sebahagian hutang tertunggak kepada plaintif. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 67. Keterangan plaintif bercanggah dari penyata tuntutan berhubung fakta di mana plaintif menafikan cadangan peguam defendan pertama, defendan kedua dan defendan ketiga bahawa perjanjian penyelesaian dimasuki sebab syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd menghadapi masalah kewangan untuk menjelaskan hutang plaintif. 68. Mahkamah setelah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan fakta sedia ada, memutuskan pihak plaintif gagal membuktikan kesahihan isi kandungan resit bertarikh 18.09.2015 berdasarkan sebab-sebab seperti berikut :- (i) Resit itu bertarikh 18.09.2015. Perjanjian penyelesaian bertarikh 21.08.2015. (ii) Perjanjian penyelesaian dimasuki kerana syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd menghadapi masalah kewangan. (iii) Kajian kes menjurus kepada dapatan fakta adalah tidak munasabah bagi syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd yang menghadapi masalah kewangan pada 21.08.2015 S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 secara tiba-tiba berupaya membuat bayaran penuh harga belian rumah tersebut bagi jumlah sebanyak RM2,438,100.00 kepada defendan pertama. (iv) Di dalam perbicaraan ini, tiada keterangan fakta yang dibuktikan sememangnya bayaran itu dibuat sama ada dalam bentuk wang tunai atau cek. (v) Persoalan yang timbul di sini adalah jikalau syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd berupaya membuat bayaran bagi jumlah sebanyak RM2,438,100.00 yang merupakan hutang syarikat tersebut kepada pihak plaintif dalam jangka masa lebih kurang 1 bulan dari tarikh perjanjian penyelesaian, adalah logik hutang tersebut dijelaskan secara terus kepada plaintif oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd dan tidak ada keperluan untuk satu perjanjian penyelesaian sepertimana yang tertera di dalam kes ini. (vi) Keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah ini oleh plaintiff adalah baki hutang sebanyak RM953,014.66 tidak dijelaskan oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd kemudian seperti yang dijanjikan. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 (vii) Dalam pada itu, analisis fakta-fakta yang dikemukakan di mahkamah ini adalah diputuskan wang sebanyak RM2,438,100.00 tidak pernah dibayar oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd kepada defendan pertama. 69. Mahkamah ini menerima penjelasan defendan kedua bahawa resit tersebut disediakan semata-mata untuk urusan dalaman dan isi kandungan resit itu tidak benar. 70. Fakta keterangan ini diperkukuhkan oleh keterangan plaintif bahawa hutang tertunggak sebanyak RM953,014.66 tidak dijelaskan oleh syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd. 71. Perkara ini telah dinyatakan di dalam penyata pembelaan di mana peruntukan Seksyen 26 Akta Kontrak 1950 ada diplidkan. 72. Kegagalan plaintif memanggil saksi dari syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd untuk membuktikan fakta keterangan S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 berhubung pembayaran wang harga jual beli rumah tersebut juga memperkuatkan kesangsian akan kesahihan butiran dalam resit berkenaan. Adalah penting untuk diingati bahawa resit itu dikeluarkan atas nama syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd dan bukan atas nama plaintif. Maka, pihak yang boleh memberi penjelasan berhubung isi kandungan resit tersebut adalah pihak syarikat Dinamik Maju Corporation Sdn Bhd. 73. Adalah menjadi kewajipan untuk membuat bayaran bagi sebuah transaksi kontrak dalam sesuatu perjanjian jual beli. 74. Kegagalan membuat bayaran harga belian rumah itu memberi kesan pembatalan perjanjian jual beli tersebut di bawah Seksyen 26 Akta Kontrak 1950. 75. Justeru, kontrak perjanjian jual beli antara plaintif dan defendan pertama adalah terbatal dan tidak sah kerana mahkamah membuat dapatan fakta bahawa bayaran sebanyak S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 RM2,438,100.00 gagal dibuktikan dibuat kepada defendan pertama. 76. Oleh yang demikian defendan pertama tidak diperkayakan akibat transaksi jual beli rumah tersebut. 77. Alasan ini sahaja mencukupi untuk mahkamah ini menolak tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan. 78. Walaubagimanapun bagi tujuan kesempurnaan kes, dikaji sama ada tabir korporat perlu disingkap terhadap defendan kedua, ketiga dan keempat. 79. Rujukan dibuat kepada kes Theta Edge Bhd (previously known as Lityan Holdings Sdn Bhd v Infornential Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2017] 2 MLJ 34, yang memutuskan tabir korporat akan disingkap oleh mahkamah dalam hal-hal keadaan yang sesuai. S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 80. Dalam mengambil hal-hal keadaan yang sesuai, mahkamah ini memutuskan segala tindakan defendan kedua, ketiga dan keempat dalam kes ini tidak membuktikan sebarang tindakan frod ataupun ketidakwajaran. 81. Malahan dalam kes ini, plaintif sedia maklum atas pemakluman oleh defendan ketiga akan tindakan oleh Indacon Sdn Bhd tetapi tidak mengambil tindakan untuk menjaga kepentingan beliau. 82. Dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah ini, tidak ada keterangan yang berbentuk frod, penyembunyian fakta sebenar ataupun ketidakwajaran yang mengizinkan akan keperluan untuk tabir korporat disingkap. 83. Penyataan plaintif dalam penyataan tuntutan bahawa defendan kedua, defendan ketiga dan defendan keempat sebagai pengarah dan “directing will and mind of” defendan pertama tidak S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 mengenalpastikan elemen-elemen yang perlu disangkal oleh defendan-defendan supaya tabir korporat perlu disingkap. Kesimpulan 84. Adalah diputuskan plaintif telah gagal membuktikan kes atas imbangan kebarangkalian terhadap defendan-defendan. 85. Oleh yang demikian wajar dan adil tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 terhadap defendan pertama, defendan kedua dan defendan ketiga dan sebanyak RM10,000.00 kepada defendan keempat tertakluk fi alokatur. Tarikh: 28 November 2023 (INDRA NEHRU SAVANDIAH) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Tarikh keputusan: 15 September 2023 Peguam-Peguam: Bagi pihak plaintif: Pari Perumal & Jayaratnam K. [Tetuan Jayaratnam & Partners] Bagi pihak D1 – D3: Chai Yow San, [Tetuan Chai Yow San & Co.] Bagi pihak D4: Tan Kim Choong, [Tetuan K. C. Tang & Co.] S/N ZIReuBIYaUiSlWndLlVf5Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	26,520	Tika 2.6.0
JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022	PLAINTIF 1. ) IBRAHIM BIN YAACOB SEBAGAI BAPA YANG SAH DAN PENANGGUNGAN KEPADA MOHAMAD ZULHELMI IKMAL BIN IBRAHIM SIMATI UNTUK DIRI SENDIRI 2. ) ZAINAB BT ABDULLAH SEBAGAI IBU YANG SAH DAN PENANGGUNGAN KEPADA MOHAMAD ZULHELMI IKMAL BIN IBRAHIM SIMATI UNTUK DIRI SENDIRI DEFENDAN 1. ) MUHAMMAD HAIKAL BIN MAHATHIR 2. ) MAHATHIR BIN ABU BAKAR	Kemalangan jalan raya - simati meninggal di tempat kejadian - keterangan defendan langgar belakang - sama ada kemalangan akibat defendan tukar lorong atau langgar dari belakang	28/11/2023	Puan Lailawati Binti Ali	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=315ff08a-7ddc-4fde-a62a-fb879903b8e1&Inline=true	JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BHARU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. JA – A53KJ – 455 – 07/2022 ANTARA 1. IBRAHIM BIN YAACOB sebagai bapa yang sah dan penanggungan kepada MOHAMAD ZULHELMI IKMAL BIN IBRAHIM simati untuk diri sendiri 2. ZAINAB BT ABDULLAH sebagai ibu yang sah dan penanggungan kepada MOHAMAD ZULHELMI IKMAL BIN IBRAHIM simati untuk diri sendiri … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. MUHAMMAD HAIKAL BIN MAHATHIR 2. MAHATHIR BIN ABU BAKAR … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN 1. Plaintif-plaintif iaitu waris-waris yang sah dan penanggung kepada MOHAMAD ZULHELMI IKMAL BIN IBRAHIM (si mati) memulakan tindakan ini di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Undang-undang Sivil 1967 (Akta 67) menuntut gantirugi am dan khas lanjutan satu kemalangan jalan raya yang berlaku pada 25.7.2019 melibatkan si mati dan defendan pertama. 28/11/2023 16:24:38 JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Kand. 23 S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 2 2. Pada 18.9.2023, Mahkamah telah menolak tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan kos kerana telah gagal membuktikan kesnya di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Mahkamah juga telah membuat taksiran kuantum gantirugi (provisional). 3. Plaintif-plaintif telah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah tersebut. 4. Mahkamah kini mengemukakan alasan-alasanya seperti berikut. FAKTA KES 5. Pada 25.7.2019 jam lebih kurang 6.40 petang si mati yang sedang menunggang motorsikalnya JNX 4364 telah terlibat dengan satu kemalangan jalan raya di Jalan Masai Kongkong dengan motorsikal no. JTC 536 yang ditunggang oleh defendan pertama (D1). 6. Kemalangan tersebut telah meragut nyawa si mati di tempat kejadian dan D1 turut mengalami kecederaan. 7. Saksi-saksi yang dipanggil di dalam kes ini adalah seperti berikut: i. Mohamad Izul Ikhwan bin Ibrahim (SP1); ii. Ibrahim bin Yaacob (SP2); iii. Inspektor Nurul Najwa binti Abdullah (SP3); iv. Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir (D1). Versi Plaintif S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 3 8. Versi kemalangan yang diplidkan oleh plaintif seperti di perenggan 5 Penyata Tuntutan plaintif ialah: ‘Pada 25.7.2019 jam lebih kurang 6.40 petang atau pada sekitar waktu itu, simati tersebut sedang menunggang motorsikal no. JNX 4364 dari arah Seri Alam menuju ke arah KongKong dan apabila sampai berhampiran Jalan Masai KongKong, motorsikal si mati tersebut telah terlibat dalam suatu kemalangan jalan raya dengan sebuah motorsikal no. JTC 536 yang ditunggang oleh defendan pertama yang sedang dalam perjalanan yang sama dan di sebelah kiri motorsikal si mati tersebut lalu membelok masuk ke simpang di sebelah kanan motorsikal si mati tersebut secara tiba-tiba.” 9. Tiada versi plaintif dikemukakan memandangkan plaintif meninggal dunia di tempat kejadian. Namun begitu pengawai penyiasat SP3 ada membuat siasatan kes. Keterangan SP3 ialah: i. Ada 2 kenderaan motorsikal yang terlibat di dalam kemalangan ini iaitu no JTC 536 ditunggang defendan pertama dan no. JNX 4364 ditunggang si mati; ii. Arah perjalanan si mati ialah dari bawah ke atas rajah kasar manakala defendan pertama dari bawah hendak membelok ke simpang kanan; iii. SP3 pergi ke tempat kejadian pada 25.7.2019 lebih kurang pukul 10.15 malam dan kali kedua pada 26.7.2019 lebih kurang pukul 11.00 pagi; iv. Jalan tempat kemalangan ada 2 lorong menghala ke atas dan 2 lorong menghala ke bawah; S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 4 v. Tiada serpihan kaca atau komponen kenderaan atau kesan kemalangan dijumpai di tempat kejadian; vi. Kerosakan motorsikal D1 iaitu JTC 536 ialah ekzos sebelah kanan, pemijak kaki kanan, handle kanan, cover set kanan, lampu depan dan mudguard belakang; vii. Manakala kerosakan motorsikal si mati no. JNX 4364 handle bar sebelah kiri bengkok, footrest hadapan kiri bengkok; viii. Menurut siasatan, D1 bergerak dari bawah hendak belok ke kanan simpang. Tiada garisan berhenti ataupun lampu isyarat untuk masuk simpang kanan namun tiada halangan untuk kenderaan berbuat demikian. SP3 setuju masa soal balas bahawa memang biasa untuk kenderaan dari bawah untuk membelok ke kanan; ix. Simati bergerak dari bawah ke atas. Simati tidak menggunakan Lorong kiri sebaliknya berada di Lorong kanan; x. D1 membuat laporan polis pada malam kejadian. Rakaman percakapan juga diambil selepas itu. Laporan polis D1 dan rakaman percakapannya adalah konsisten; xi. SP3 tidak pasti di mana tempat pertembungan berlaku, namun berkemungkinan di Lorong kanan mengikut keterangan D1; xii. Keputusan kes ialah RTM kerana tiada laporan polis daripada si mati yang telah meninggal dunia dan SP3 tidak dapat pastikan kecuaian siapa menyebabkan kemalangan. 10. Tiada lagi saksi lain dipanggil oleh plaintif mengenai isu liability ini. Versi defendan S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 5 11. D1 memberi keterangan bahawa pada hari kejadian, beliau dalam perjalanan balik dari tempat kerja di CIDB Tampoi menuju ke rumah di Taman Kota Masai. D1 bergerak dari bawah rajah kasar hendak membelok ke kanan ke Jalan Cempedak 2 dan pada masa itu berada di Lorong kanan berhampiran jalan bertanda A1. Apabila menghampiri simpang D1 memberi isyarat untuk membelok ke Jalan Cempedak 2. Semasa hendak mula membelok ke Jalan Cempedak 2 tiba-tiba motorsikal si mati melanggar motorsikal D1 dari arah belakang di bahagian ekszos. 12. D1 menandakan ‘X’ di Lorong kanan berhampiran A1 sebagai tempat pelanggaran. Selepas pelanggaran, D1 tercampak ke Ý’dan motorsikal berada di ‘Z’. 13. Semasa di soal balas D1 menafikan beliau berada di Lorong kiri dan menukar Lorong ke kanan apabila hampir sampai ke simpang. Sebaliknya D1 memberitahu beliau sudah berada di Lorong kanan semenjak selepas lampu isyarat di Taman Cendana (sebelum lokasi kemalangan). D1 juga tidak bersetuju beliau hanya memberi lampu isyarat ke kanan semasa sampai di simpang sebaliknya lampu isyarat ke kanan sudah diberikan sebelum itu. 14. D1 bersetuju bahawa kemalangan berlaku semasa beliau baru hendak membelok dan belum lagi membelok. D1 juga menyatakan bahawa beliau ada berhenti dahulu sebelum membelok walaupun tidak dinyatakan di dalam laporan polisnya. S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 6 15. D1 bersetuju sebelum kemalangan beliau menunggang motorsikal di sebelah kiri lorong kanan dan kemalangan berlaku semasa merubah dari kiri Lorong kanan dan hendak membelok masuk ke simpang kanan. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN 16. Di dalam mana-mana kes kemalangan jalan raya yang bersandarkan kepada kecuaian sebagai kausa tindakan, beban pembuktian kecuaian adalah ke atas plaintif. Prinsip undang-undang matan ini dinyatakan dengan jelas di dalam locus classicus Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamed Ali [1971] 1 LNS 151; [1971] 2 MLJ 175 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: “In a negligence action the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence. The plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the defendant’s negligence. Evidence is the foundation of proof, with which it must not be confounded. Proof is that which leads to a conclusion as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts which are the subject of inquiry. Evidence, if accepted and believed, may result in proof, but it is not necessarily proof of itself.”; see 15 Halsbury (3rd Edn.) p. 260.” 17. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Ng Chui Sai v. Maimon Bt. Ali [1983] 1 MLJ 110 di mana Hashim Yeop A. Sani H (pada masa itu) telah menyatakan: In an action for negligence the onus of proving the allegation of negligence rests on the person who makes it unless there are disclosed facts which raise a presumption in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff must show affirmatively that there has been a breach of a specific or genuine duty by the defendant and this resulted in the damage to the plaintiff. If he fails to prove this the action must fail.” S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 7 18. Beban pembuktian diletakkan ke atas plaintif untuk membuktian kesnya adalah selari dengan peruntukan seksyen-seksyen 101 dan 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 (rujuk MGI Securities Sdn Bhd v. Teong Teck Leng & Ors [2000] 5 CLJ 163; [2000] 1 MLJ 354). ANALISA DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH 19. Mahkamah mendapati semasa pelanggaran berlaku kedudukan motorsikal D1 adalah di ‘X’ berhampiran garisan A1 dan baru hendak mula masuk ke simpang. Ini bermakna kedudukan motorsikal D1 masih lagi dalam keadaan menegak dan bukannya membelok ke kanan. Kedudukan menegak motorsikal D1 ini adalah selari dengan kerosakan yang dialami oleh kedua-dua motorsikal tersebut. Jika dilihat pada gambar P4(13) kerosakan pada motorsikal D1 tertumpu kepada bahagian belakang meliputi ekzos motorsikal terkopak manakala lampu dan lampu isyarat belakang pecah dan mudguard belakang pecah. Gambar P4(2) pula menunjukkan mudguard depan motorsikal si mati tiada. 20. Mahkamah menerima keterangan D1 bahawa beliau telah berada di Lorong kanan dan telah memberikan isyarat ke kanan sebelum menghampiri simpang tersebut. Keterangan D1 ini adalah konsisten dengan laporan polis D1 yang dibuat beberapa jam selepas kemalangan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Kartiyayani & Anor v Lee Leong Sin & Anor [1975] 1 MLJ 119 di mana diputuskan: “The main test as to whether there has been a delay in making the report is whether it was made as early as can reasonably be expected in the S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 8 circumstances of the case and before there is opportunity for tutoring or concoction.” 21. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan D1 bahawa D1 telah mengambil langkah-langkah yang wajar sebelum membelok masuk ke simpang kanan. D1 telah berada di Lorong kanan dan telah memberi isyarat ke kanan apabila menghampiri simpang kanan tersebut. Mahkamah juga menerima keterangan D1 bahawa impak pelanggaran adalah di ‘X’ yang berada di Lorong kanan berhampiran garisan A1. 22. Sungguhpun tiada garisan berhenti dan tiada lampu isyarat untuk mengawal pergerakan trafik keluar masuk simpang tersebut, namun seperti keterangan SP3, adalah satu kebiasaan untuk kenderaan keluar masuk simpang tersebut dari jalan utama dan ianya tidak menjadi satu kesalahan. 23. Mahkamah juga tidak mendapati D1 cuai di dalam menyebabkan kemalangan kerana Mahkamah berpendapat D1 telah mengambil langkah-langkah yang munasabah apabila menghampiri simpang kanan dengan tujuan untuk membelok masuk ke kanan. Mahkamah juga mendapati 24. Menurut keterangan SP3 pada masa kejadian trafik tidak sibuk, cuaca baik dan tiada apa-apa halangan pandangan dari bawah ke atas rajah kasar seperti yang dirakamkan di dalam gambar-gambar P4(5-8). Jalan tersebut merupakan jalan lurus 4 lorong di mana 2 lorong ke atas dan 2 lorong ke bawah. S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 9 25. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, Mahkamah berpendapat mana-mana penguna jalan raya yang munasabah yang bergerak dari bawah ke atas boleh melihat dengan jelas pergerakan kenderaan dan pengguna jalan raya yang berada di sekeliling mereka sekiranya tumpuan diberikan sepenuhnya. 26. Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah mendapati simati telah cuai kerana gagal memberikan tumpuan kepada trafik dan kewujudan motorsikal D1 yang berada berhampiran garisan A1 sedang hendak membelok masuk simpang kanan. Sekiranya simati memberikan tumpuan penuh dan menunggang dengan lebih berhati-hati, simati sepatutnya sedar akan kewujudan simpang di sebelah kanan jalan dan kebarangkalian kenderaan keluar masuk simpang adalah tinggi. 27. Pelanggaran ini bukanlah diakibatkan oleh tindakan D1 menukar Lorong dari Lorong kiri ke Lorong kanan seperti yang diplidkan oleh plaintif-plaintif di dalam Penyata Tuntutan mereka. Sebaliknya, D1 sudah sedia berada di Lorong kanan sebelum menghampiri simpang tersebut lagi. D1 sudah berada di laluannya yang sah dan sudah mengambil langkah-langkah persediaan untuk memasuki simpang kanan tersebut. 28. Penekanan oleh plaintif mengenai keterangan D1 semasa disoal balas di mana D1 bersetuju kemalangan berlaku akibat defendan pertama bergerak dari sebelah kiri Lorong kanan ke sebelah kanan Lorong kanan iaitu ke arah garisan A1 tidak terjumlah kepada bukti kecuaian D1. Keterangan tersebut tidak boleh dilihat secara berasingan tanpa menimbangkannya bersama-sama keterangan lain di dalam kes ini. S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 10 Tambahan pula, impak pelanggaran di ‘X’ berhampiran garisan A1 menunjukkan semasa kemalangan D1 sudah berada di bahagian kanan di Lorong kanan tersebut dan baru hendak mula membelok semasa simati datang dari arah belakang dan melanggar motorsikal D1. 29. Di dalam kes ini Mahkamah memutuskan kemalangan ini merupakan kemalangan langgar belakang di mana motorsikal si mati telah melanggar motorsikal D1 dari arah belakang semasa D1 sedang mula hendak membelok ke kanan. 30. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Rahman Ali v Lim Kasy [2022] MLRHU 468 di mana diputuskan: “[21] It is trite that unless the evidence proves otherwise, the driver of a vehicle who hits the front vehicle should totally be blamed for the road accident. … The driver who is tailgating a vehicle has the responsibility to give an extra attention and to have a safe drive distance to avoid any collusion by reducing the distance between him and the vehicle ahead and never get so close to the vehicle in front that he cannot stop safely as to leave enough space to be able to manoeuvre if the vehicle in front breakdown …” 31. Selain itu, keterangan juga menunjukkan arah perjalanan si mati adalah dari bawah dan menuju ke atas. Jalan ini mempunyai 2 lorong menuju ke atas dan si mati berada di Lorong kanan. Sungguhpun tiada halangan untuk si mati berada di Lorong kanan dan bukannya satu kesalahan namun di dalam situasi ini di mana terdapat simpang di Lorong kanan di mana kenderaan akan keluar masuk simpang, adalah lebih munasabah sekiranya si mati menggunakan Lorong kiri. S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 11 32. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Thanalakshmi Muchan v Ong Koi Soi [2009] 1 MLRH 470 di mana diputuskan: “… Motorsikal sepatutnya menurut Highway Code baahwa hendaklah sentiasa menunggang di sebelah kiri jalan kecuali memotong kenderaan di hadapan. Oleh itu jelas di sini si mati telah gagal mematuhi Highway Code semasa menunggang motorsikalnya. Walaupun pelanggaran Highway Code bukan menjadi satu kesalahan jenayah menurut s 68(3) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (APJ), tetapi dalam tindakan sivil ianya boleh menunjukkan satu kecuaian dipihak yang melanggat Highway Code tersebut …” 33. SP3 memberitahu keputusan selepas siasatan ialah RTM dan tiada apa- apa pertuduhan dikenakan terhadap D1 walaupun ini melibatkan kemalangan maut. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahyuddin bin Hamid & Anor (kedua-dua ibu bapa yang sah serta penanggung kepada Norsyarah Syazwani binti Mahyuddin, si mati) v Zhamaluddin bin Shamsuddin & Anor [2021] MLJU 1620 di mana diputuskan: “… in the present case, no action was taken against the first defendant. Nor was there any prosecution brought against him. Had the evidence loomed large, appearing to show the first defendant’s negligence as cause of the accident, he would have been facing charges in court. That is not the present case, however. Considering the apparent absence of charges, the first defendant is not, in my judgment, prevented from tethering reliance to such a fact as part of the evidence supporting his defence …”. 34. Setelah menimbang kesemua keterangan yang dikemukakan, di atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah mendapati plaintif-plaintif gagal membuktikan kesnya terhadap defendan-defendan. Mahkamah mendapati kemalangan ini disebabkan oleh kecuaian simati semata- S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 12 mata. D1 tidak bertanggungan cuai di dalam kemalangan ini. Oleh yang demikian, tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ditolak dengan kos. KUANTUM ATAS DASAR 100% GANTIRUGI AM 35. Di dalam kes ini, kedua-dua plaintif ibu bapa si mati merupakan orang yang bergantung kepada sokongan nafkah di bawah seksyen 7(3) Akta 67 tersebut. 36. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Chan Chin Ming & Anor v Lim Yok Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 di mana Mahkamah Agung menerangkan maksud kehilangan saraan (loss of support) seperti berikut: “Further, in our opinion, loss of support is for all practical purposes translated into financial loss sustained by a dependant. Having regard to the class of persons entitled as stated above, it is a logical conclusion to say that a plaintiff can only claim in such a case for financial loss which he sustains as a dependant and not in any other way.” 37. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Muhammad Hanif Ishak v. Mohammad Syazwan Mohamad Fuad [2017] 1 LNS 372 yang menegaskan keperluan membuktikan tuntutan kehilangan pendapatan atas pembuktian ketat. Mahkamah berpendapat prinsip yang sama juga adalah terpakai di dalam kes pembuktian kehilangan tanggungan memandangkan jumlah tanggungan yang diberikan adalah berpadanan dengan pendapatan yang diperolehi. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan: S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 13 “[20] This court is of the view that claims such as this should require strict proof. The courts especially at the Magistrate and Sessions court level where most of the accident matters are litigated should warn itself from being too lenient in dictating that claims involving earnings would require adequate documentary proof and should not shy away from demanding as such. The production of minimal evidence and purely oral evidence without any form of corroboration should not be easily entertained. It is the responsibility of the courts to ask parties to adhere closely to the strict proof rule and the courts should not be too readily persuaded especially by the element of sympathy to give unsubstantiated awards for earnings loss.” 38. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada peringatan yang diberikan di dalam kes Siti Ajar Mat Zain v. Cindy Teoh & Anor. [1997] 2 CLJ SUPP 282 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan: “In my experience in this type of cases, I notice that more often than not, the amount of contribution by a son, etc. who died in road accidents tend to be exaggerated for obvious reasons. And it is almost impossible for the defendants to disprove it. Indeed, if we were to believe all the evidence adduced in Court by parents of deceased sons as to how generous they were to their parents, it appears that only exceptionally good sons die in road accidents”. 39. Mengambilkira peringatan dan panduan yang telah digariskan di dalam kes-kes di atas, Mahkamah telah membuat taksiran kehilangan tanggungan dan gantirugi khas yang mana turut dirayu oleh pihak plaintif-plaintif. 40. SP2 memberi keterangan bagi pihak dirinya dan isterinya iaitu ibu simati (plaintif kedua). Menurut SP2, simati berniaga di Facebook atas nama Z & I Vaperz menjual vape secara atas talian. S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 14 41. SP2 mempunyai 4 orang anak termasuk si mati. Kesemua mereka tinggal Bersama di dalam satu rumah. SP2 memberitahu simati memberi SP2 dan isteri wang sebanyak RM1,500.00/sebulan daripada pendapatan simati RM2,000.00/sebulan. 42. Simati memberikan wang secara tunai sama ada kepada SP2 atau isterinya. Melalui Penyata Saksi SP2) (WSSP2) di Soalan & Jawapan no. 18, SP2 menyenaraikan perbelanjaan bulanan seisi rumah beliau yang berjumlah RM3,650.00. SP2 mengaku perbelanjaan adalah untuk seisi rumah termasuk adik-adik si mati yang tinggal Bersama. SP2 turut mengaku semasa pemeriksaan balas SP dan isteri sendiri hanya menggunakan / membelanjakan RM400 – RM500/sebulan daripada wang RM1,500.00 yang diberikan oleh simati. 43. Keterangan SP2 lagi pada masa kemalangan SP2 bekerja technician dengan gaji RM5,000.00 sebulan. SP2 turut menyatakan wang yang diberikan oleh simati perlu untuk menampung perbelanjaan isi rumah kerana gaji beliau tidak cukup. 44. Plaintif memanggil SP1 untuk membuktikan pekerjaan dan pendapatan si mati. SP1 merupakan adik si mati dan juga merupakan rakan kongsi si mati. Simati dan SP1 menjalankan perniagaan atas talian melalui aplikasi Facebook menjual alatan vape menerusi perniagaan yang dinamakan sebagai Z & I Vaperz. 45. Tugas simati di dalam perniagaan ini ialah mengambil pesanan pelanggan, membuat promosi, menghantar pesanan pelanggan dan memberikan servis membaiki selepas jualan. S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 15 46. Menurut SP1 lagi keuntungan kasar setiap bulan perniagaan ini ialah RM6,000.00 dan keuntungan bersih setelah ditolak kos perniagaan ialah RM4,000.00. Memandangkan perniagaan ini merupakan perkongsian, maka untung bersih dibahagi dua iaitu setiap daripada mereka mendapat RM2,000.00/sebulan. 47. SP1 mengemukakan P1 iaitu rekod pembeliaan alatan vape dan P2 sebagai rekod jualan perniagaan mereka mulai Mac 2019 sehingga 25 Julai 2019. Daripada kedua-dua rekod tersebut, pengiraan keuntungan bersih dan pendapatan sebenar si mati adalah seperti berikut: Bulan Untung Kasar (RM) Modal (RM) Untung Bersih (RM) Pendapatan Simati (RM) Mac 821 1,540 - 719 - April 8,535 7,308 1.227 615.50 Mei 11,520 7,303 4,217 2,108.50 Jun 8,303 4,512 3,791 1,895.50 Julai 6,376 1,810 4,566 2,283 Jumlah 6,900.50/5 bulan = 1,201.90 sebulan 48. Berdasarkan keterangan dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh plaintif sendiri, ianya menunjukkan pendapatan si mati tidak sampai RM2,000.00/sebulan seperti yang didakwa oleh SP1. S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 16 50. Berdasarkan keterangan SP1 dan SP2, Mahkamah memutuskan semasa kemalangan si mati mempunyai pekerjaan dan pendapatan. Plaintif telah Berjaya membuktikan melalui saksi-saksi dan keterangan dokumentar yang si mati menjalankan perniagaan atas talian menjual peralatan vape sebagai sumber pendapatannya. 51. Namun begitu, mengenai pendapatan simati Mahkamah menolak keterangan SP1 dan SP2 bahawa simati memperoleh keuntungan bersih RM2,000/sebulan daripada perniagaan tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan dokumen semasa menunjukkan perniagaan tersebut Berjaya memperoleh secara purata RM1,200.00 sebulan berdasarkan rekod P1 dan P2 yang dikemukakan. 52. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229 yang menekankan keterangan secara lisan seseorang saksi perlu diuji dengan keterangan dokumen semasa (contemporaneous document) untuk menentukan keesahannya. Mahkamah di dalam kes tersebut memutuskan: “Nevertheless the learned trial judge expressed himself to be completely satisfied with the veracity of the respondent’s witnesses and their evidence. He purported to come to certain findings of fact on the oral evidence but did not notice or consider that the respondent’s oral evidence openly clashed with its contemporaneous documentary evidence. For myself, I would with respect feel somewhat safer to refer to and rely on the acts and deeds of a witness which are contemporaneous with the event and to draw the reasonable inferences from them than to believe his subsequent recollection or version of it, particularly if he is a witness with a purpose of his own to serve and if it did not account for the statements in his documents and writings. Judicial appreciation of evidence requires that the oral evidence be critically tested against the whole of the other S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 17 evidence and the circumstances of the case. Plausibility should never be mistaken for veracity." 53. Berdasarkan nas undang-undang di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat eksibit P1 dan P2 yang merekodkan transaksi semasa perniagaan SP1 dan si mati merupakan dokumen semasa yang boleh digunakan untuk membuktikan pendapatan sebenar simati sebelum kemalangan berbanding keterangan lisan SP1 sendiri yang memberitahu pendapatan si mati ialah RM2,000.00/ sebulan. 54. Berdasarkan pengiraan yang dikemukakan, purata pendapatan si mati enam (6) bulan sebelum kemalangan ialah dalam lingkungan RM1,200.00/sebulan. Oleh itu adalah mustahil bagi simati memberikan sejumlah RM1,500.00 kepada kedua ibu-bapanya sebagai tanggungan. 55. Sementelah pula di dalam kes ini SP2 mempunyai pekerjaan dan pendapatan yang selesa. SP2 juga merupakan ketua keluarga dan sudah tentu tanggungjawab menyediakan makanan dan tempat tinggal dan keperluan harian yang lain adalah di atas bahu SP2. 56. Selain itu perbelanjaan isi rumah yang dikemukakan melalui Soalan & Jawapan no. 18 WSSP2 adalah termasuk tiga lagi adik beradik simati yang mana bukan di dalam tanggungan si mati. 57. Berdasarkan keseluruhan keterangan yang dikemukakan, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan defendan bahawa jumlah munasabah sumbangan simati kepada kedua ibu-bapanya ialah RM500/sebulan S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 18 mengambilkira untung bersih perniagaan simati dan SP1 sebulan ialah lebih kurang RM1,200/sebulan. 58. Simati meninggal dunia pada usia 25 tahun semasa kemalangan. Menurut seksyen 7 Akta 67 multiplier yang terpakai ialah 16 tahun. 59. Berdasarkan keseluruhan keterangan di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan plaintif gagal membuktikan simati menyumbang RM1,500/sebulan kepada plaintif pertama dan kedua. Sebaliknya Mahkamah memutuskan jumlah RM500/sebulan adalah munasabah dan lebih berkemungkinan berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan. 60. Oleh yang demikian, tuntutan kehilangan tanggungan yang dibenarkan ialan RM500 x 12 x 16 tahun = RM96,000.00. GANTIRUGI KHAS 61. Gantirugi khas yang dibenarkan ialah untuk kesedihan. Kemalangan ini berlaku pada 25.7.2019 dan menurut s 7(3A) Akta 67, awad diberikan untuk kesedihan ialah RM10,000.00. 62. Hanya selepas pindaan ke atas seksyen tersebut melalui Akta A1591 yang berkuatkuasa pada 1.9.2019 awad dinaikkan kepada RM30,000.00. 63. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah membenarkan RM10,000.00 untuk kesedihan. S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-455-07/2022 Ibrahim bin Yaacob & Anor v Muhammad Haikal bin Mahathir & Anor 19 65. Lain-lain gantirugi khas dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak. KESIMPULAN 66. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, tuntutan plaintif-plaintif ditolak dengan kos. Bertarikh 28 November 2023 ………………………………… LAILAWATI BINTI ALI Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Sivil 3 Johor Bharu Bagi pihak plaintif: Bagi pihak defendan: Teo Han Ley Noor Fauziah bt Kadir T/n Teo & Assoc. T/n S.K Lee S/N ivBfMdx93kmKvuHmQO44Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	30,771	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24NCC-131-03/2018	PEMOHON EXPO ELECTRONICS SDN BHD RESPONDEN Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM) PENCELAH 1. ) DATO SRI YAP SENG YEW 2. ) DATIN SRI GAN LI LI	Application to Intervene-O15 Rule 6 ROC-functus officio-party could not intervene in proceedings under Order 15 Rule 6 ROC where the proceedings had come to an end- affected party- right to be heard.	28/11/2023	YA Tuan Wan Muhammad Amin Bin Wan Yahya	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64ed19a7-2a10-48be-861e-8029c6fc063d&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) SAMAN PEMULA NO.: WA-24NCC-131-03/2018 Di dalam perkara Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd [No Syarikat: 558394-A] Dan Di dalam perkara Seksyen 555 (1) dan (2) Akta Syarikat 2016 dan/atau Seksyen 308 (5) Akta Syarikat 1965 Dan Di dalam Seksyen 77 Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967 Dan Di dalam perkara Aturan 88 Kaedah 2, Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan dalam bidangkuasa sedia ada Mahkamah Mulia ini. ANTARA EXPO ELECTRONICS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat : 109668-P) (Di dalam Likuidasi) … PLAINTIF DAN SURUHANJAYA SYARIKAT MALAYSIA … DEFENDAN DAN 28/11/2023 16:12:31 WA-24NCC-131-03/2018 Kand. 63 S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 29 1. DATO SRl’ YAP SENG YEW (No. K/P: 590805-I 0-5567) 2. DATIN SRl’ GAN LI Ll (No. K/P: 611024-10-5994) … PENCELAH-PENCELAH YANG DICADANGKAN JUDGMENT (Enclosure 16) [1] This was essentially an application by the Proposed Interveners via Notice of Application dated 27.5.2022 (Enclosure 16) to intervene in the proceedings and to set aside this Court’s Order dated 28.6.2018 under, inter alia, Order 15 Rule 6 and/or Order 42 Rule 3 and/or Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (“ROC”), the inherent jurisdiction of the Court (“this Application”). [2] On 28.6.2018, this Court through His Lordship Mohamed Zaini bin Mazlan (as he then was) had made the following Orders in respect of the Originating Summons (“the Originating Summons” or “Enclosure 1”): “1. bahawa nama syarikat Cekap Asia Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat 558394-A) dimasukkan semula ke dalam daftar syarikat Defendan menurut peruntukan Seksyen 555 Akta Syarikat 2016 (Akta 777); dan 2. Kos tindakan sebanyak RM2,000.00 dibayar oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan dalan tempoh tiga puluh (30) hari dari tarikh perintah.” (“Order dated 28.6.2018”) [3] The Proposed Interveners sought to intervene and set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. [4] Having heard arguments from all the parties I dismissed this Application and set out below the reasons for my decision. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 29 A] SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS [5] The Plaintiff, through its liquidators, had applied to reinstate the company, Cekap Asia Sdn. Bhd. (“Cekap Asia”) via Enclosure 1 as an “aggrieved party” under Section 555(1) of the Companies Act 2016 (“CA 2016”). [6] The Plaintiff’s grounds for reinstating the Cekap Asia (Enclosure 1) were, inter alia, as follows: i) The former directors of Cekap Asia had committed fraud on Cekap Asia and misappropriated its funds; ii) Thus, Cekap Asia has a cause of action for fraud, breach of directors’ duties and “unjust enrichment” against the former directors of Cekap Asia. iii) If Cekap Asia is not reinstated, it will not have any remedy against its said former directors in respect of their aforementioned wrongdoings. [7] Cekap Asia was incorporated on 8.9.2001 and the Proposed Interveners were its directors, both of whom are husband and wife. [8] The Plaintiff claimed that it had dealings with the Cekap Asia and its former directors, the Proposed Interveners, in respect of the sale of the Plaintiff’s Merces Holdings Berhad (“Merces”) shares, which was not completed and this had caused losses to the Plaintiff. [9] The Plaintiff alleged that: i) In or around 2004 the Plaintiff sold its shares in Merces to Cekap Asia and the Proposed Interveners (“Share Sale Agreement”) upon the following terms: a) The Plaintiff’s shares in Merces was sold for the total purchase price of RM23,000,000.00. b) The Plaintiff was to transfer 1,800,000 of its shares in Merces to the 1st Proposed Intervener for the consideration of RM5,250,000.00; S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 29 c) The Plaintiff was to transfer 1,460,000 of its shares in Merces to the 2nd Proposed Intervener for the consideration of RM4,750,000.00; and d) The Plaintiff was to transfer the balance 11,749,000 of its shares in Merces to Cekap Asia for the consideration of RM13,000,000.00 (“Cekap Asia Transaction”); ii) There was no formal agreement signed between the Plaintiff and the Proposed Interveners in respect of the Sale of Shares Agreement at the time. Nevertheless, parties agreed to implement the following safeguards in the event the 1st Proposed Intervener was unable to pay the RM13,000,000.00 in respect of the Cekap Asia Transaction: a) The Proposed Interveners would resign as Cekap Asia’s directors; b) The Proposed Interveners would transfer 100% of their shares in Cekap Asia to the Plaintiff; and c) Allow the Plaintiff to appoint a new board of directors for Cekap Asia. (“Security Agreement”) iii) Following the Share Sale Agreement, the Plaintiff had transferred: a) 1,800,000 of its Merces shares to the 1st Proposed Intervener and received RM5,250,000.00; b) 1,460,000 of its Merces shares to the 2nd Proposed Intervener and received RM4,740,000.00; c) 11,749,000 of its Merces shares to the Cekap Asia in or about November 2004 but did not receive any consideration for the said transfer (i.e. the RM13,000,000.00). S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 29 iv) The Proposed Interveners then used their powers as directors of Cekap Asia to transfer 11,749,000 of the Merces shares owned by Cekap Asia to themselves. v) The Plaintiff later discovered that Cekap Asia had been deregistered on or about 27.8.2010. [10] In support of Enclosure 1 the Plaintiff contended that Cekap Asia ought to be reinstated into the Register to enable the Plaintiff: i) to take over Cekap Asia based on the Security Agreement; and ii) to initiate legal action against the Proposed Interveners by using Cekap Asia as the plaintiff (in the intended legal action) in order to reacquire all the shares in Merces which were “surreptitiously” transferred by the Proposed Interveners from Cekap Asia to themselves. [11] The reliefs that were sought by the Plaintiff in Enclosure 1 were substantially as follows: “(1) bahawa Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat 558394-A) [Cekap Asia] dikembalikan kepada daftar syarikat; (2) bahawa 100% pegangan saham di dalam Cekap Asia dipindah milik dan didaftarkan kepada Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 109668-P]; (3) bahawa individu-individu yang berikut dilantik sebagai pengarah- pengarah di dalam Cekap Asia: - (a) Abu Bakar Bin Ahmad (No. K/P: 631130-05-5191); (b) Syed Nagiff Bin Syed Mokhtar (No. K/P: 651218-10-6609); (4) bahawa Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 109668-P] dibenarkan untuk melantik Setiausaha Syarikat ahli lembaga pengarah baru di dalam Cekap Asia seperti yang berikut:- (a) Wong Youn Kim (F) (MAICSA 7018778) (No. K/P: 700823-10- 5530). (5) bahawa tiada perintah kos;” (own emphasis added) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 29 [12] It is evident from the Order dated 28.6.2018 that only prayer 1 of Enclosure 1 was essentially allowed and the other reliefs prayed by the Plaintiff were not granted. [13] The following are the chronological order of events that transpired after the Order dated 28.6.2018 was granted (paragraph 9 of the Defendant’s (“SSM”) Affidavit In Reply (Enclosure 20)): NO DATE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 1. 19.04.2019 Court Order pursuant to Section 555 Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016) dated 28.06.2018 was lodged. Defendant has updated the status of Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd (558394-A) from 'dissolved' to 'existing'. A copy of the Court Order dated 28.06.2018 is marked as Exhibit AA-2. 2. 16.07.2019 Form Section 58 CA 2016 - Notification of Change in the Register of Directors, Managers and Secretaries was lodged by Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd (558394-A) in connection to: (i) Resignation of company secretary Tan Mee Teck (No. K/P: 540712-10-6020) on 15.07.2019; (ii) Appointment of new company secretary Wong Youn Kim (No. K/P: 700823-10-5530) on 15.07.2019; The resolution on the resignation and appointment of the company secretary dated 15.07.2019 was attached and it was signed by the existing director at the material time namely Dato' Sri Yap Seng Yew dan Datin Sri Gan Li Li. A copy of Form 58 CA 2016 on the resignation and appointment of the company secretary and the resolution is marked as Exhibit AA-3. 3. 17.07.2019 Form Section 58 CA 2016 - Notification of Change in the Register of Directors, Managers and Secretaries was lodged by Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd (558394-A) in connection to: (i) Appointment of new directors - Abu Bakar bin Ahmad (No. K/P: 631130-05-5191) and Syed S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 29 Nagiff bin Syed Mokhtar (No. K/P: 651218-10- 6609) on 15.07.2019; and (ii) Resignation of directors - Dato' Sri Yap Seng Yew (No. K/P: 590805-10-5567) and Datin Sri Gan Li Li (No. K/P: 611024-10-5994) on 15.07.2019. Letter of resignation of Dato' Sri Yap Seng Yew and Datin Sri Gan Li Li dated 15.07.2019 were attached. However, the resolution for appointment of new directors was not attached. A copy of Form 58 CA 2016 on the resignation and appointment of directors and the letter of resignation are marked as Exhibit AA-4. 4. 06.09.2020 Form Section 51 CA 2016 - Register of Member was lodged as follows: (i) 1 unit of share owned by Haslina binti Mohammad Fesal Arbee (No. K/P: 630106-085206) and 1 unit of share owned by Suzlita binti Nasron (No. K/P: 760614-10-5002) were transferred to Abu Bakar bin Ahmad (No. K/P: 631130-05-5191) (1 unit) and Syed Nagiff bin Syed Mokhtar (No. K/P: 651218- 10-6609) (1 unit); A copy of Form 51 CA 2016 dated 06.09.2020 are marked as Exhibit AA-5. 5. 29.09.2020 Form Section 51 AS 2016 - Register of Member was lodged as follows: (i) 1 unit of share owned by Abu Bakar bin Ahmad (No. K/P: 631130-05-5191) were transferred to Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 109668- P); and (ii) 1 unit of share owned by Syed Nagiff bin Syed Mokhtar (No. K/P: 651218-10-6609) were transferred to Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 109668-P). A copy of Form 51 CA 2016 dated 29.09.2020 are marked as Exhibit AA-6. (own emphasis added) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 29 [14] The above chronology as provided by the Defendant in Enclosure 20 is not in dispute. [15] It would appear from the above chronology that after Cekap Asia was reinstated the Plaintiff, inter alia, used the documents it obtained from the Security Agreement to replace the Proposed Interveners as directors of Cekap Asia with its own directors. Between 2019 and 2020 the Plaintiff essentially took over control of Cekap Asia. [16] Thereafter, in February 2021, Cekap Asia initiated Shah Alam High Court Suit No. BA-22NCC-18-02/2021 (“Suit 18”) against the Proposed Interveners herein (as the 1st and 2nd defendants respectively) and Hong Leong Investment Bank Berhad (as the 3rd defendant). B] THE RELIEFS SOUGHT AND THE PROPOSED INTERVENERS GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THIS APPLICATION [17] In this Application the Proposed Interveners substantially sought the following reliefs: “1. Yap Seng Yew dan Gan Li Li, the proposed intervenors be given leave to intervene in this Originating Summons. 2. Pursuant to Order (1) above, that: a) The Proposed Intervenors be joined as the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in the Originating Summons herein. b) The Title of the Originating Summons herein be amended to reflect that the Proposed Intervenors be joined as the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in the Originating Summons herein. 3. That the Order of this Court handed down on 28.6.2018 be set aside. 4. That this Originating Summons be struck off and /or dismissed. 5. The Proposed Intervenors is given liberty to apply for consequential Orders.” (own emphasis added) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 29 [18] The Proposed Interveners grounds in support of this Application can be summarised as follows: i) The Proposed Intervenors were deliberately omitted from this Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) by the Plaintiff even though they were parties with vested interests, being the former directors of Cekap Asia. ii) The Proposed Interveners were therefore deprived of the right to be heard and that is a serious breach of natural justice. iii) The Plaintiff did not give full and frank disclosure and had misled the Court by concealing the decision of the High Court in Shah Alam High Court Suit No. 22-350-2010 (“Suit 350”). Suit 350 is between the Plaintiff herein and the Proposed Interveners (as the first and second defendants respectively) and one Tan Kak Teck. In Suit 350 the Plaintiff’s claim against, inter alia, the Proposed Interveners was for the sum of RM13,000,000.00 pertaining to the Cekap Asia Transaction. iv) The Plaintiff had committed fraud on the Court. v) The Court did not allowed prayers 2 to 4 of Enclosure 1, namely, for the change of the directors and shareholders of Cekap Asia but this was done anyway by the Plaintiff as stated in the chronology in paragraph 13 above. [19] Therefore, the Proposed Interveners contended that the Order dated 28.6.2018 was obtained through: i) Breach of natural justice. ii) Concealment of material information. iii) Dishonesty. iv) Misrepresentation. v) Fraud on the court. (paragraph 4 of the Proposed Interveners Affidavit In Support (Enclosure 17)) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 29 [20] The Proposed Interveners claimed that they were only aware of the Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) a few days before the hearing of the application to strike out Suit 18. Main Issues [21] I would summarise the Proposed Interveners grounds in support of this Application to essentially two main issues as follows: i) Whether the Proposed Interveners were deliberately excluded from the Originating Summons thereby depriving them the right to be heard in breach of the principles of natural justice; and ii) Whether the Plaintiff had concealed the High Court’s decision in Suit 350 and committed fraud on the Court. C] THIS APPLICATION [22] There are two parts of this Application: i) The Proposed Interveners’ application to intervene in these proceedings; and ii) The Proposed Interveners’ application to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. [23] I must first highlight some complications with this Application: i) The main action (the Originating Summons in Enclosure 1) has ended when the Order dated 28.6.2018 was granted. Therefore, can the Proposed Interveners intervene in the proceedings at this stage? (see Hong Leong Bank Bhd (formerly known as Hong Leong Finance Bhd) v. Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622); ii) The Proposed Interveners did not separate their application to intervene with their application to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 which means if the Court finds that the Proposed Interveners are not entitled to intervene the matter ends there. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 29 However, if it is shown that the Proposed Interveners are entitled to intervene but have failed to satisfy the requirements for setting aside a Court Order then this Application would still be dismissed. [24] It is noted that in some cases the application to intervene is made separately from any other applications or reliefs the proposed intervener intends to make or seek in the event he is allowed to intervene in the proceedings. That is not the case here. The issues of whether the Proposed Interveners have the right to intervene and whether there are grounds to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 are both dealt with in this Application. [25] Hence, I will deal with the application to intervene first. D] APPLICATION TO INTERVENE [26] The intervention part of this Application is made pursuant to Order 15 Rule 6 ROC. [27] The Plaintiff contended that the Court is functus officio after the Order dated 28.6.2018 was given and therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this Application. It was held in Staghorn (supra) that a party could not intervene in proceedings under Order 15 Rule 6 ROC where the proceedings had come to an end. [28] In response to this contention and in support of the Proposed Interveners’ application to intervene in these proceedings learned counsel for the Proposed Interveners relied heavily on the Federal Court case of Dr Lourdes Dava Raj a/l Curuz Dural Raj v. Dr Milton Lum Siew Wah & Anor [2020] 5 MLJ 185. In Dr Lourdes (supra), a complaint was made by Dr Milton (the first respondent) against the Appellant (Dr Lourdes) to the Malaysian Medical Council (“MMC”). The MMC, by majority decision, decided that Dr Lourdes had no case to answer (“MMC’s First Decision”). Dr Milton then filed judicial review proceedings to quash the MMC’s First Decision and to declare that Dr Lourdes was guilty of the charges and direct MMC to impose the appropriate sentence after hearing Dr Lourdes’s mitigation. Dr Lourdes was not made a party to the judicial review application before the High Court which reliefs prayed for directly affected him. Dr Lourdes was also not served S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 29 with the judicial review cause papers. The judicial review proceedings were dismissed by the High Court but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision”). Pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s direction, MMC convened a hearing to hear Dr Lourdes’ mitigation and after hearing him (Dr Lourdes attended the hearing under protest) punished him with a reprimand (“MMC’s Second Decision”). Dr Lourdes applied to the High Court to set aside MMC’s Second Decision and declare that he was not bound by the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision as he was never notified of the court proceedings. The High Court dismissed the application holding that it was not the proper forum to challenge the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision and that until the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision was set aside, MMC was bound by it. Dr Lourdes then applied for leave to intervene (“Intervention Application”) in the Court of Appeal proceedings in which Court of Appeal’s JR Decision was made, in order to set aside and reinstate the MMC’s First Decision acquitting him. The Court of Appeal dismissed the intervention application (“the Court of Appeal’s Intervention Decision”). Dr Lourdes then filed an application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against the Court of Appeal’s Intervention Decision. The leave application was allowed and later the appeal proper. [29] In Dr Lourdes (supra) the questions of law on which leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s Intervention Decision was given were: “(a) whether an order made in absentia in a judicial review application against a party, who, though directly affected by the application was not served with the relevant cause papers as required by O 53 r 4(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘the ROC’), ought to be set aside as of right for breach of the right to be heard; and (b) whether, on the ground that proceedings had come to an end, such a party would, nevertheless, not be allowed to intervene in the proceedings under O 15 r 6 of the ROC to set aside the order.” (own emphasis added) [30] Based on the facts and the decision of the Federal Court in the Dr Lourdes (supra) it would appear that the Federal Court had distinguished Staghorn (supra) and this can be seen from the following passages: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 29 “[43] Therefore, in Staghorn, the issues of an affected party not being given notice, and not being accorded the opportunity to be heard in his own defence did not arise in the same manner as in the present appeal. In Staghorn, this court found that Staghorn Sdn Bhd was not an interested party by reason of it having no interest in the land. Here Dr Lourdes was a party most directly involved as the entire proceedings emanated from an allegation of professional misconduct on his part. He was central to the entire case and his exclusion from participation in one of the most important aspects of adjudication resulted in the reversal of a finding of innocence, without his having been heard in his own defence at all. A clearer case of a breach of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice is rarely seen, and that rule is the right to be heard (see B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 1 MLJ 169 (PC) 2 April 1962 per Denning LJ). This resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice. [44] We have found above that Dr Lourdes is an affected party. We are therefore of the view that Staghorn is inapplicable to the factual matrix of the present case as the facts, law and considerations differ were entirely different and distinguishable there. Staghorn also was decided on the considerable length of time it took for Staghorn Sdn Bhd to apply to intervene. That is not the case here, as Dr Lourdes had no notice whatsoever of the judicial review filed by Dr Milton, until MMC took steps to carry out the order of the Court of Appeal and convened to hear Dr Lourdes’ plea in mitigation. There was no delay on Dr Lourdes’ part.” (own emphasis added) [31] Therefore, the principle laid down in Staghorn (supra) is still applicable and in order for the Proposed Interveners to come within the exception in Dr Lourdes (supra), they must show: i) that they are an affected party in that the Order dated 28.6.2018 directly affected them; and ii) that they have the right to be heard at the Originating Summons but was deprived of that right in breach of the rules of natural justice. [32] It is not in dispute that the Proposed Interveners were not made a party to the Originating Summons and based on the above two questions whether they ought to have been made a party. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 29 [33] Firstly, there is no provision in CA 2016 or Section 555 CA 2016 that specifically provides that the directors of a company which company had been struck off from the Register under Section 550 CA 2016 is required to be made a party in an application to reinstate the said company. Therefore, there is no compulsion under CA 2016 for the Plaintiff to make the Proposed Interveners parties to the Originating Summons. [34] Secondly, the Originating Summons concerns Cekap Asia and not the Proposed Interveners. The Proposed Interveners were directors of Cekap Asia at the material time but it was their own action or inaction that had caused or allowed Cekap Asia to be struck off. [35] Thirdly, the Order dated 28.6.2018 to reinstate Cekap Asia affects Cekap Asia as a company/entity and not the Proposed Interveners specifically. [36] In this regard, I must emphasise that except for the reinstatement, the other reliefs prayed for in the Originating Summons were not allowed in particular regarding the change of shareholders and the appointment of directors and company secretary. [37] Therefore, the Proposed Interveners have not fulfilled the requirements which would allow them to come within the exceptions in Dr Lourdes (supra) to intervene in proceedings which have ended. [38] The Proposed Interveners were not deprived of the right to be heard as it was not mandatory for them to be made a party under Section 555 CA 2016. In any event, the Order dated 28.6.2018 did not affect the Proposed Interveners. The Proposed Interveners position can be easily distinguished from the facts of Dr Lourdes (supra). The following passage from Dr Lourdes is very instructive on this point and bears repeating: “[43] ….. In Staghorn, this court found that Staghorn Sdn Bhd was not an interested party by reason of it having no interest in the land. Here Dr Lourdes was a party most directly involved as the entire proceedings emanated from an allegation of professional misconduct on his part. He was central to the entire case and his exclusion from participation in one of the most important aspects of adjudication resulted in the reversal of a finding of innocence, without his having been heard in his own defence at all. A clearer S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 29 case of a breach of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice is rarely seen, and that rule is the right to be heard (see B Surinder . Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 1 MLJ 169 (PC) 2 April 1962 per Denning LJ). This resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice.” (own emphasis added) [39] It is clear that the Proposed Interveners are not central to the Originating Summons and in particular the Order dated 28.6.2018. It must be remembered that in Dr Lourdes (supra), Dr Lourdes’s right to intervene only became an issue because of the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision reversing the High Court’s decision to dismiss the judicial review proceedings. There was no point or reason for Dr Lourdes to intervene in the judicial review proceedings at the High Court stage as the decision was in his favour, i.e. the judicial review proceedings were dismissed. [40] Here the Order dated 28.6.2018 only directly affects Cekap Asia, the other reliefs in the Originating Summons were disallowed. Even if the other reliefs in the Originating Summons could be said to affect the Proposed Interveners, it is of no consequence as those reliefs were not allowed. This is similar to the situation in the case of Dr Lourdes (supra), in which it only became necessary for Dr Lourdes to intervene in the proceedings at the Court of Appeal due to the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision as it (and not the High Court’s decision) affected Dr Lourdes. [41] Further, apart from allowing Cekap Asia to be struck off the Register, the Proposed Interveners’ lack of interest in Cekap Asia can also be seen from the fact that the Proposed Interveners had given the Plaintiff undated resignation letters (“Resignation Letters”) as directors of the Cekap Asia pursuant to the Security Agreement. It is not in dispute that the Resignation Letters were signed and given by the Proposed Interveners to the Plaintiff several years prior to Cekap Asia being struck off. [42] There was no correspondence or other evidence to show that the Proposed Interveners had retracted the Resignation Letters or requested for them to be returned. [43] The Proposed Interveners main complaint on this point is that Cekap Asia was reinstated so that the Plaintiff (through Cekap Asia) could then initiate its legal action in Suit 18 against the S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 29 Proposed Interveners. Therefore, it seems clear to me that the Proposed Interveners’ grievance is not that Cekap Asia was reinstated but the subsequent conduct of Cekap Asia in initiating Suit 18. [44] It must be noted that the reinstatement of Cekap Asia and Cekap Asia’s initiation of Suit 18 are two separate and distinct matters. [45] Hence, the reinstatement of Cekap Asia was not really an issue for the Proposed Interveners. The reinstatement of Cekap Asia and the Order dated 28.6.2018 did not affect the Proposed Interveners. [46] Having considered all the above matters, I concluded that there was no breach of natural justice. The Proposed Interveners have no right to intervene in the Originating Summons which proceedings have ended. Though this Application can be dismissed on this ground alone, however, for purpose of completeness I also considered the second part of this Application on the Proposed Interveners’ application to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. E] APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 28.6.2018 [47] I have already dealt with the issue of breach of natural justice and whether the Proposed Interveners have the right to be heard at the hearing of the Originating Summons. As the Proposed Interveners have no right to intervene in these proceedings it follows that they have no right to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. [48] Nevertheless, assuming that the Proposed Interveners have the right to intervene in the Originating Summons, the second issue is whether they have valid grounds to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. Fresh Suit [49] I will begin by reiterating the grounds relied on by the Proposed Interveners to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 as stated in paragraph 19 above: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 29 i) Breach of natural justice. ii) Concealment of material information. iii) Dishonesty. iv) Misrepresentation. v) Fraud on the court. [50] Learned counsel for the Proposed Interveners referred to the Court of Appeal case of Lee Chai Sen v. Magnum Consortium Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 1871 to contend that there is no necessity for a fresh suit to be initiated to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. However, this rule only applies where the final judgment was obtained in breach of the rules of natural justice. This can be seen from the following passage from Lee Chai Sen (supra): “[27] lt is thus settled that, on the authorities of Annie Quah Lay Nah v Syed Jafer Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors and on Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd (supra), wherein the Federal Court affirmed the rule laid down in the judgment of Lord Diplock in Isaacs v Robertson, one exception where a final judgment of the High Court may be set aside ex debito justitiae is where the final judgment can be proved to be null and void because it has been obtained in breach of the rules of natural justice. In such circumstances the person affected by such judgment is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside and the court may exercise its inherent power to strike out the order without the need to file an appeal or a fresh suit.” (own emphasis added) [51] In the present case I have found that there was no breach of natural justice and in any event the Proposed Interveners grounds to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 include concealment of material information, dishonesty and fraud. These are quasi criminal allegations, in particular fraud. Thus, the proper mode for applying to set aside a judgment or order obtained by fraud would be by way of a fresh suit or action. The Federal Court in Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab-Malaysia Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75 referred to the following passage in case of Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Sahari Murid [1980] 1 LNS 92 and held as follows: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 29 “Reverting to the point relied on by the Court of Appeal, that of the perfected order not being capable of being amended or altered except for certain exceptions as stated in Hock Hua Bank supra, a passage therefrom as quoted by the Court of Appeal is set out as follows: Clearly the court has no power under any application in the same action to alter, vary or set aside a judgement regularly obtained after it is drawn up receipt under the slip rule in O. 28 r. 11 of the Rules of Supreme Court 1957 (O. 20 r. 11 of the Rules of High Court 1980) so far as necessary to correct errors in expressing the intention of the court: Re. St Nazarie Co., Kelsey v. Doune; Hession v. Jones, unless it is a judgement by default or made in the absence of a party at the trial or hearing. But if a judgement or order has been obtained by fraud or where further evidence which could not possibly have been adduced at the original hearing is forthcoming, a fresh action will lie to impeach the original judgement: Hip Foong Hong c. Neotia & Co., & Jonesco v. Beard. The hearing of the action will in a proper case be expedited: Smith v. Peizer.” (own emphasis added) [52] In Chee Pok Choy & Ors v. Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 CLJ 321, a case which involved “deliberate fraud practised upon the court” similar to the allegation in this Application, the order sought to be set aside was done via a fresh suit. The Court of Appeal in Chee Pok Choy (supra) held at pages 336 and 342 as follows: “The principle then to be culled from the authorities is that a judgment may be impeached for deliberate fraud practised upon the court, and it is insufficient to show that a litigant merely convinced the court through misleading or erroneous evidence. Whether the test has been met in any given case must, I think, depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. But there is some guidance in the cases as to how fraud may be established. There is a most useful passage in Satish Chandra v. Satish Kantha Roy AIR [1923] PC 73, 76: Charges of fraud and collusion like those contained in the plaint in this case must, no doubt, be proved by those who make them – proved by established facts or inferences legitimately drawn from those facts taken together as a whole. Suspicions and surmises and conjecture are not permissible substitutes for those facts or those inferences, but that by no means requires that every puzzling artifice or contrivance resorted to by S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 29 one accused of fraud must necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a clever and dexterous knave would escape.” ……….. “The learned judge had ample jurisdiction to act upon the evidence and to set aside the order for sale on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. I have already adverted to the relevant authorities on the point earlier in this judgment. I pause now to mention one other on the subject that I consider helpful. It is Cheah Wong Nyan & Anor. v. Palaniappa & Ors [1935] MLJ 31. In that case, Whitley J, entertained an action to set aside a judgment fraudulently obtained in an earlier suit. He said (at p. 32): The Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud in a subsequent action brought for that purpose, the proper remedy being an original action and not a rehearing. Cole v. Langford [1898] 2 QB 36 and Priestman v. Thomas [1884] 9 PD 210. In the latter case a compromise was effected in an action in the Probate Division under which a certain will was admitted to probate. Afterwards it was discovered that the will was a forgery and an action was brought against the parties who had propounded the will claiming that the compromise might be set aside on the ground of fraud. The jury having found that the compromise was procured by fraud, judgment was given setting aside the compromise. One of the earliest pronouncements of this principle was made by Lord Coke in the Duchess of Kingston’s Case, [1776] 2 Sm. LC 12th Edition at page 762 where he observed that acts of the highest judicial authority though not to be impeached from within yet are impeachable from without for although it is not permitted to show that the court was mistaken it may be shown that they were misled. ‘Fraud is an intrinsic collateral act which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. It avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.’ Accordingly, as stated in Spencer Bower on Actionable Misrepresentation 2nd Edition p. 358, when both parties collude and conspired to deceive the court judgments have at the suit of a stranger interested been set aside on proof of the requisite facts. It would thus appear clear that the Plaintiffs who are admittedly interested strangers are entitled to have this judgment set aside if they can satisfy the Court that it was obtained by fraud and collusion. (own emphasis added) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 29 [53] The rationale behind this rule is simply that allegations such as fraud cannot be determined by way of affidavit evidence alone especially when dealing with an application to set aside a judgment or order, a matter of such a serious nature (Badiaddin (supra)). Fresh evidence is required to be produced (see Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Pegawai Kewangan Negeri Pahang [2016] 3 MLJ 1 - a case also involving concealment or suppression of matters and fraud on the Court). [54] I must stress that similar allegations of concealment of material information and fraud practised upon the Court in the present case were raised in Chee Pok Choy (supra) and Seruan Gemilang (supra) and this had necessitated a trial in both these cases to determine whether the High Court order ought to be set aside. [55] As this Application was also premised on, inter alia, concealment and fraud as well as breach of natural justice the proper mode to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 would be by commencing a fresh suit. [56] Hence, this is another ground for dismissing this Application. The alleged “Material Information” and whether it would affect the Order dated 28.6.2018 [57] The next issue that I have also taken into consideration is whether the alleged “material information” that is whether the High Court’s decision in Suit 350 would have had a material effect on this Court’s decision in granting the Order dated 28.6.2018. [58] In this regard, it was held in Seruan Gemilang (supra) as follows: “[47] Applying the principle as laid down in Ladd v Marshall [ 1954] 3 All ER 745, the respondents (citing para 561 of Halsburys Laws of England (4 th Ed) Vol 26) submitted that: an action will lie to rescind a judgment on the ground of the discovery of new evidence which would have had a material effect upon the decision of the court. It must be present: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 29 (a) that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial; (b) that the further evidence is such that, if given would have an important influence on the result of the trial, although it need not be decisive; and (c) that the evidence is such as is presumably to be believed.” (own emphasis added) [59] First and foremost, what transpired before Justice Zaini at the hearing of the Originating Summons cannot be determined by affidavit evidence alone and this Application ought to have been made via a fresh suit (Seruan Gemilang (supra); Chee Pok Choy (supra)). In the absence of “fresh evidence” there is no material for me to examine to determine whether there are grounds to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. [60] Secondly, even if the “material information” is confined only to the High Court’s decision in Suit 350, the question is whether it would have had a material effect on Justice Zaini’s decision. [61] The short answer to this question is it would not. My reasons are as follow: i) The reinstatement of Cekap Asia was allowed (essentially prayer 1 of the Originating Summons) as the Court was satisfied that the Plaintiff was an “aggrieved party” under Section 555(1) CA 2016 which provides: “Any person who is aggrieved by the decision of the Registrar to strike off the company may, within seven years after the name of the company has been struck off, apply to the Court to reinstate the name of the company into the register.” (own emphasis added) ii) The Plaintiff is said to be “aggrieved” by the decision of the Defendant (the “Registrar” under Section 555 CA 2016) to strike off Cekap Asia. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 29 iii) The Defendant had no objection to the Originating Summons. The Defendant is a neutral party in the dispute between the Plaintiff and the Proposed Interveners. iv) Suit 350 is not a suit by Cekap Asia. v) The High Court’s decision in Suit 350 involved the right of the Plaintiff to initiate Suit 350 against the Proposed Interveners and not Cekap Asia’s right to initiate a similar suit (i.e. Suit 18). In, inter alia, paragraph 12 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment in Suit 350 (Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd v. Sri Yap Seng Yew & Ors [2015] MLJU 2326) Justice Suraya Othman (as she then was) held as follows: “Thus, the plaintiff has failed to establish their nexus or privity or locus standi to bring this suit. Written or documentary evidence on the sale of shares for RM 23 million.” (own emphasis added) vi) Just because the Plaintiff’s claim against the Proposed Interveners in Suit 350 was not allowed, it does not necessarily mean that Cekap Asia has no valid claim against the Proposed Interveners or that the Plaintiff is not aggrieved by the Defendant’s decision to strike off Cekap Asia. vii) To further reinforce the point that the High Court’s decision in Suit 350 would not have a material effect on Justice Zaini’s decision is the fact that the Proposed Interveners (as the 1st and 2nd defendants in Suit 18) had attempted to strike out Suit 18 but had failed to do so. The learned Judicial Commissioner, Justice Rozi Bainon, in dismissing the Proposed Interveners’ application to strike out Cekap Asia’s claim on 21.3.2022 held at paragraphs 40 and 44 of her Grounds of Judgment as follows: “[40] For finality of the litigation, this Court must hear the evidence by all the witnesses to be called. By just relying on the grounds of judgment in Suit 350, there is no finality of litigation between the parties.” ………… S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 23 of 29 “[44] In view of the foregoing, it is my judgment that having evaluated Enclosure 12 and its supporting documents, I find that the Plaintiff has succeed to establish that there is cause of action against the D1 & D2. As such, I dismiss Enclosure 12, with costs.” (own emphasis added) viii) It must be borne in mind that the Proposed Interveners application to strike out Suit 18 was on the grounds of res judicata and issue estoppel in that the same issues and matters raised in Suit 18 had been raised and decided in Suit 350. Arising from Justice Rozi’s decision to dismiss the striking out application, Suit 18 would proceed to trial. Thus, Cekap Asia’s claim cannot be said to be obviously unsustainable. [62] Therefore, and in any event, based on the above the High Court’s decision in Suit 350 would not have any material effect on Justice Zaini’s decision to grant the Order dated 28.6.2018 even if it was brought to His Lordship’s attention at the hearing of the Originating Summons. F] DELAY, LACHES AND AFTERTHOUGHT [63] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff argued this Application was filed with inordinate and excessive delay, that is 1 year and 3 months after Cekap Asia commenced Suit 18 in February 2021. [64] The Proposed Interveners averred that they were not aware of the Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) until a few days before the hearing of the application to strike out Suit 18 when the Proposed Interveners’ solicitors were served with a Notice of Intention to Use Affidavit dated 10.2.2022 (paragraph 7 of the Proposed Interveners’ Affidavit In Support (Enclosure 17)). [65] It is rather hard to fathom the Proposed Interveners’ averment that they only found out about the Originating Summons on or about February 2022. [66] The following chronology of event will show why the Proposed Interveners’ above averment cannot be accepted: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 24 of 29 i) Cekap Asia was struck off the Register sometime in May 2011. ii) When Cekap Asia was struck off the Register in May 2011 the Proposed Interveners were still directors of Cekap Asia. iii) The Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) was filed on 8.3.2018. iv) Cekap Asia was reinstated vide Order dated 28.6.2018. v) The Proposed Interveners were removed as directors of Cekap Asia on 15.7.2019. The Proposed Interveners aver they were not aware of their removal as directors of Cekap Asia. vi) Suit 18 was filed in February 2021. vii) Hong Leong Investment Bank Berhad (the 3rd defendant in Suit 18) in its Amended Defence dated 26.4.2021 (“Hong Leong’s Amended Defence”) in Suit 18 pleaded the matters stated in paragraphs (i), (iii) and (iv) above. viii) This Application was filed on 27.5.2022. [67] Based on the above chronology, the Proposed Interveners would and should have known of the reinstatement of Cekap Asia when Suit 18 was filed and served on them on or about February 2021. This is because the Proposed Interveners were directors of Cekap Asia and as they themselves aver, they did not know they were removed as directors of Cekap Asia. Hence, it is only logical and reasonable for the Proposed Interveners to inquire or check how Cekap Asia was able to file Suit 18 without their approval or authorisation as directors of Cekap Asia. This is bearing in mind that Suit 18 is an action by Cekap Asia against, inter alia, the Proposed Interveners themselves. [68] Given that the Proposed Interveners believed they were still the directors of Cekap Asia at the material time, surely upon being served with the Suit 18 Writ, it would naturally have prompted them investigate how Cekap Asia initiated the action. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 25 of 29 [69] To put it simply, if the directors of a company are sued by the company, they would immediately react to find out how the company was able to commence the said action against them. [70] At the very latest, the Proposed Interveners should have known about the Originating Summons and the Order dated 28.6.2018 when Hong Leong’s Amended Defence was served on them, on or about 26.4.2021. This Application was only filed about 1 year later. [71] Hence, the Proposed Interveners are guilty of laches and their conduct must be treated as a waiver of their rights or that it is tantamount to an acquiescence of the Order dated 28.6.2018. [72] The principle of law on delay and laches can be found in the classic case of Alfred Templeton & Ors v. Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 202 where it was held: “Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a claim. A court of equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by laches. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches the court considers whether there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part and any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant. The doctrine of laches rests on the consideration that it is unjust to give a plaintiff a remedy where he has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though not waiving the remedy, put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted: 14 Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Ed) paras 1181, 1182. Laches has been succinctly described as ‘inaction with one’s eyes open’.” (own emphasis added) [73] The fact of the matter is that the Proposed Interveners showed no interest in Cekap Asia after the Share Sale Agreement and was not even aware of Cekap Asia being struck off from the Register. [74] The Proposed Interveners claim did not know they were removed as directors of Cekap Asia, however, the filing of Suit 18 did not immediately cause them to find out what had happened to Cekap Asia until about more than a year later when this Application was filed. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 26 of 29 [75] Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Proposed Interveners were not interested or concerned with Cekap Asia and the only reason they filed this Application was to stop Suit 18 from proceeding. This would explain why this Application was filed after the High Court in Suit 18 dismissed the Proposed Interveners striking out application on 21.3.2022. [76] Having failed to strike out Suit 18, the Proposed Interveners then filed this Application on 27.5.2022. [77] The filing of this Application was thus an afterthought and designed to derail Suit 18 which was already proceeding to trial. [78] In the circumstances this Application is devoid of merit. G] CONCLUSION [79] Lastly, I would be remiss if I do not address learned counsel for the Proposed Interveners’ argument that in granting the Order dated 28.6.2018, Justice Zaini did not allow prayers 2 to 4 of Enclosure 1 for the change of the directors and shareholders of Cekap Asia but the Plaintiff was still able do so after the Order dated 28.6.2018 was entered. [80] In no way can the Order dated 28.6.2018 (for which prayers 2 to 4 were now allowed) be construed as restraining the Plaintiff from changing or effecting the change of directors or shareholders of Cekap Asia in the usual manner as was done in this case, which is allowed under CA 2016. [81] It seems to be me the Proposed Interveners are suggesting the Plaintiff’s act of changing the directors and shareholders of Cekap Asia was, in some way or extent, designed to circumvent the Order dated 28.6.2018. [82] I do not find this to be an issue as the Order dated 28.6.2018 merely allows Cekap Asia to be reinstated with costs to be paid to the Defendant. That is all. The Order dated 28.6.2018 clearly did not prohibit the Plaintiff from changing the directors or shareholders of Cekap Asia. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 27 of 29 [83] If the Plaintiff’s act of changing the directors and shareholders of Cekap Asia was an issue then what the Proposed Interveners should have done is challenge that act and not the Order dated 28.6.2018 which only reinstates Cekap Asia. [84] This again clearly shows that it is not Cekap Asia (as a company) that the Proposed Interveners are concerned about but the Plaintiff. [85] I must further add that in reinstating Cekap Asia the Plaintiff and/or its nominees were responsible for bearing the costs and continued management of Cekap Asia as well as fulfil the requirements or conditions placed by the Defendant for allowing Cekap Asia to be reinstated. The Proposed Interveners were not concerned with these matters thereby further demonstrating their disinterest in Cekap Asia or its reinstatement. [86] For the reasons stated above, I dismissed this Application with costs of RM15,000/- in favour of the Plaintiff and RM1,000/- in favour of the Defendant. Dated this 23rd day of November, 2023 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 28 of 29 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF Dinesh Praveen Nair (Low Ming Yung, PDK together with him) Messrs Dinesh Praveen Nair C3-3-13, Solaris Dutamas Jalan Dutamas 1 50480 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-6211 4817 Email: [email protected] COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT Nor Syairah Sulaiman Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia Seksyen Litigasi Bahagian Pendakwaan & Litigasi Tingkat 28 Menara SSM 2 Sentral No. 7, Jalan Stesen Sentral 5 Kuala Lumpur Sentral Tel: 03-2299 5437 COUNSEL FOR THE PROPOSED INTERVENERS Terence Chan (KY Lui and Yeap Xi Jin together with him) Messrs Lim Kian Leong & Co Bilik 10-8, Tingkat 10, Wisma UOA II No. 21, Jalan Pinang 50450 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-2161 4199 Email: [email protected] LEGISLATION / RULES CITED Companies Act 2016 ▪ Section 550 ▪ Section 555(1) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 29 of 29 Rules of Court 2012 ▪ Order 15 Rule 6 ▪ Order 42 Rule 3 ▪ Order 92 Rule 4 CASES CITED 1. Alfred Templeton & Ors v. Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 202 2. Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab-Malaysia Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75 3. Chee Pok Choy & Ors v. Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 CLJ 321 4. Dr Lourdes Dava Raj a/l Curuz Dural Raj v. Dr Milton Lum Siew Wah & Anor [2020] 5 MLJ 185 5. Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd v. Sri Yap Seng Yew & Ors [2015] MLJU 2326 6. Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Sahari Murid [1980] 1 LNS 92 7. Hong Leong Bank Bhd (formerly known as Hong Leong Finance Bhd) v. Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622 8. Lee Chai Sen v. Magnum Consortium Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 1871 9. Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Pegawai Kewangan Negeri Pahang [2016] 3 MLJ 1 S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	56,378	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24NCC-131-03/2018	PEMOHON EXPO ELECTRONICS SDN BHD RESPONDEN Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM) PENCELAH 1. ) DATO SRI YAP SENG YEW 2. ) DATIN SRI GAN LI LI	Application to Intervene-O15 Rule 6 ROC-functus officio-party could not intervene in proceedings under Order 15 Rule 6 ROC where the proceedings had come to an end- affected party- right to be heard.	28/11/2023	YA Tuan Wan Muhammad Amin Bin Wan Yahya	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64ed19a7-2a10-48be-861e-8029c6fc063d&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) SAMAN PEMULA NO.: WA-24NCC-131-03/2018 Di dalam perkara Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd [No Syarikat: 558394-A] Dan Di dalam perkara Seksyen 555 (1) dan (2) Akta Syarikat 2016 dan/atau Seksyen 308 (5) Akta Syarikat 1965 Dan Di dalam Seksyen 77 Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967 Dan Di dalam perkara Aturan 88 Kaedah 2, Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan dalam bidangkuasa sedia ada Mahkamah Mulia ini. ANTARA EXPO ELECTRONICS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat : 109668-P) (Di dalam Likuidasi) … PLAINTIF DAN SURUHANJAYA SYARIKAT MALAYSIA … DEFENDAN DAN 28/11/2023 16:12:31 WA-24NCC-131-03/2018 Kand. 63 S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 29 1. DATO SRl’ YAP SENG YEW (No. K/P: 590805-I 0-5567) 2. DATIN SRl’ GAN LI Ll (No. K/P: 611024-10-5994) … PENCELAH-PENCELAH YANG DICADANGKAN JUDGMENT (Enclosure 16) [1] This was essentially an application by the Proposed Interveners via Notice of Application dated 27.5.2022 (Enclosure 16) to intervene in the proceedings and to set aside this Court’s Order dated 28.6.2018 under, inter alia, Order 15 Rule 6 and/or Order 42 Rule 3 and/or Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (“ROC”), the inherent jurisdiction of the Court (“this Application”). [2] On 28.6.2018, this Court through His Lordship Mohamed Zaini bin Mazlan (as he then was) had made the following Orders in respect of the Originating Summons (“the Originating Summons” or “Enclosure 1”): “1. bahawa nama syarikat Cekap Asia Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat 558394-A) dimasukkan semula ke dalam daftar syarikat Defendan menurut peruntukan Seksyen 555 Akta Syarikat 2016 (Akta 777); dan 2. Kos tindakan sebanyak RM2,000.00 dibayar oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan dalan tempoh tiga puluh (30) hari dari tarikh perintah.” (“Order dated 28.6.2018”) [3] The Proposed Interveners sought to intervene and set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. [4] Having heard arguments from all the parties I dismissed this Application and set out below the reasons for my decision. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 29 A] SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS [5] The Plaintiff, through its liquidators, had applied to reinstate the company, Cekap Asia Sdn. Bhd. (“Cekap Asia”) via Enclosure 1 as an “aggrieved party” under Section 555(1) of the Companies Act 2016 (“CA 2016”). [6] The Plaintiff’s grounds for reinstating the Cekap Asia (Enclosure 1) were, inter alia, as follows: i) The former directors of Cekap Asia had committed fraud on Cekap Asia and misappropriated its funds; ii) Thus, Cekap Asia has a cause of action for fraud, breach of directors’ duties and “unjust enrichment” against the former directors of Cekap Asia. iii) If Cekap Asia is not reinstated, it will not have any remedy against its said former directors in respect of their aforementioned wrongdoings. [7] Cekap Asia was incorporated on 8.9.2001 and the Proposed Interveners were its directors, both of whom are husband and wife. [8] The Plaintiff claimed that it had dealings with the Cekap Asia and its former directors, the Proposed Interveners, in respect of the sale of the Plaintiff’s Merces Holdings Berhad (“Merces”) shares, which was not completed and this had caused losses to the Plaintiff. [9] The Plaintiff alleged that: i) In or around 2004 the Plaintiff sold its shares in Merces to Cekap Asia and the Proposed Interveners (“Share Sale Agreement”) upon the following terms: a) The Plaintiff’s shares in Merces was sold for the total purchase price of RM23,000,000.00. b) The Plaintiff was to transfer 1,800,000 of its shares in Merces to the 1st Proposed Intervener for the consideration of RM5,250,000.00; S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 29 c) The Plaintiff was to transfer 1,460,000 of its shares in Merces to the 2nd Proposed Intervener for the consideration of RM4,750,000.00; and d) The Plaintiff was to transfer the balance 11,749,000 of its shares in Merces to Cekap Asia for the consideration of RM13,000,000.00 (“Cekap Asia Transaction”); ii) There was no formal agreement signed between the Plaintiff and the Proposed Interveners in respect of the Sale of Shares Agreement at the time. Nevertheless, parties agreed to implement the following safeguards in the event the 1st Proposed Intervener was unable to pay the RM13,000,000.00 in respect of the Cekap Asia Transaction: a) The Proposed Interveners would resign as Cekap Asia’s directors; b) The Proposed Interveners would transfer 100% of their shares in Cekap Asia to the Plaintiff; and c) Allow the Plaintiff to appoint a new board of directors for Cekap Asia. (“Security Agreement”) iii) Following the Share Sale Agreement, the Plaintiff had transferred: a) 1,800,000 of its Merces shares to the 1st Proposed Intervener and received RM5,250,000.00; b) 1,460,000 of its Merces shares to the 2nd Proposed Intervener and received RM4,740,000.00; c) 11,749,000 of its Merces shares to the Cekap Asia in or about November 2004 but did not receive any consideration for the said transfer (i.e. the RM13,000,000.00). S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 29 iv) The Proposed Interveners then used their powers as directors of Cekap Asia to transfer 11,749,000 of the Merces shares owned by Cekap Asia to themselves. v) The Plaintiff later discovered that Cekap Asia had been deregistered on or about 27.8.2010. [10] In support of Enclosure 1 the Plaintiff contended that Cekap Asia ought to be reinstated into the Register to enable the Plaintiff: i) to take over Cekap Asia based on the Security Agreement; and ii) to initiate legal action against the Proposed Interveners by using Cekap Asia as the plaintiff (in the intended legal action) in order to reacquire all the shares in Merces which were “surreptitiously” transferred by the Proposed Interveners from Cekap Asia to themselves. [11] The reliefs that were sought by the Plaintiff in Enclosure 1 were substantially as follows: “(1) bahawa Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat 558394-A) [Cekap Asia] dikembalikan kepada daftar syarikat; (2) bahawa 100% pegangan saham di dalam Cekap Asia dipindah milik dan didaftarkan kepada Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 109668-P]; (3) bahawa individu-individu yang berikut dilantik sebagai pengarah- pengarah di dalam Cekap Asia: - (a) Abu Bakar Bin Ahmad (No. K/P: 631130-05-5191); (b) Syed Nagiff Bin Syed Mokhtar (No. K/P: 651218-10-6609); (4) bahawa Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 109668-P] dibenarkan untuk melantik Setiausaha Syarikat ahli lembaga pengarah baru di dalam Cekap Asia seperti yang berikut:- (a) Wong Youn Kim (F) (MAICSA 7018778) (No. K/P: 700823-10- 5530). (5) bahawa tiada perintah kos;” (own emphasis added) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 29 [12] It is evident from the Order dated 28.6.2018 that only prayer 1 of Enclosure 1 was essentially allowed and the other reliefs prayed by the Plaintiff were not granted. [13] The following are the chronological order of events that transpired after the Order dated 28.6.2018 was granted (paragraph 9 of the Defendant’s (“SSM”) Affidavit In Reply (Enclosure 20)): NO DATE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 1. 19.04.2019 Court Order pursuant to Section 555 Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016) dated 28.06.2018 was lodged. Defendant has updated the status of Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd (558394-A) from 'dissolved' to 'existing'. A copy of the Court Order dated 28.06.2018 is marked as Exhibit AA-2. 2. 16.07.2019 Form Section 58 CA 2016 - Notification of Change in the Register of Directors, Managers and Secretaries was lodged by Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd (558394-A) in connection to: (i) Resignation of company secretary Tan Mee Teck (No. K/P: 540712-10-6020) on 15.07.2019; (ii) Appointment of new company secretary Wong Youn Kim (No. K/P: 700823-10-5530) on 15.07.2019; The resolution on the resignation and appointment of the company secretary dated 15.07.2019 was attached and it was signed by the existing director at the material time namely Dato' Sri Yap Seng Yew dan Datin Sri Gan Li Li. A copy of Form 58 CA 2016 on the resignation and appointment of the company secretary and the resolution is marked as Exhibit AA-3. 3. 17.07.2019 Form Section 58 CA 2016 - Notification of Change in the Register of Directors, Managers and Secretaries was lodged by Cekap Asia Sdn Bhd (558394-A) in connection to: (i) Appointment of new directors - Abu Bakar bin Ahmad (No. K/P: 631130-05-5191) and Syed S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 29 Nagiff bin Syed Mokhtar (No. K/P: 651218-10- 6609) on 15.07.2019; and (ii) Resignation of directors - Dato' Sri Yap Seng Yew (No. K/P: 590805-10-5567) and Datin Sri Gan Li Li (No. K/P: 611024-10-5994) on 15.07.2019. Letter of resignation of Dato' Sri Yap Seng Yew and Datin Sri Gan Li Li dated 15.07.2019 were attached. However, the resolution for appointment of new directors was not attached. A copy of Form 58 CA 2016 on the resignation and appointment of directors and the letter of resignation are marked as Exhibit AA-4. 4. 06.09.2020 Form Section 51 CA 2016 - Register of Member was lodged as follows: (i) 1 unit of share owned by Haslina binti Mohammad Fesal Arbee (No. K/P: 630106-085206) and 1 unit of share owned by Suzlita binti Nasron (No. K/P: 760614-10-5002) were transferred to Abu Bakar bin Ahmad (No. K/P: 631130-05-5191) (1 unit) and Syed Nagiff bin Syed Mokhtar (No. K/P: 651218- 10-6609) (1 unit); A copy of Form 51 CA 2016 dated 06.09.2020 are marked as Exhibit AA-5. 5. 29.09.2020 Form Section 51 AS 2016 - Register of Member was lodged as follows: (i) 1 unit of share owned by Abu Bakar bin Ahmad (No. K/P: 631130-05-5191) were transferred to Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 109668- P); and (ii) 1 unit of share owned by Syed Nagiff bin Syed Mokhtar (No. K/P: 651218-10-6609) were transferred to Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 109668-P). A copy of Form 51 CA 2016 dated 29.09.2020 are marked as Exhibit AA-6. (own emphasis added) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 29 [14] The above chronology as provided by the Defendant in Enclosure 20 is not in dispute. [15] It would appear from the above chronology that after Cekap Asia was reinstated the Plaintiff, inter alia, used the documents it obtained from the Security Agreement to replace the Proposed Interveners as directors of Cekap Asia with its own directors. Between 2019 and 2020 the Plaintiff essentially took over control of Cekap Asia. [16] Thereafter, in February 2021, Cekap Asia initiated Shah Alam High Court Suit No. BA-22NCC-18-02/2021 (“Suit 18”) against the Proposed Interveners herein (as the 1st and 2nd defendants respectively) and Hong Leong Investment Bank Berhad (as the 3rd defendant). B] THE RELIEFS SOUGHT AND THE PROPOSED INTERVENERS GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THIS APPLICATION [17] In this Application the Proposed Interveners substantially sought the following reliefs: “1. Yap Seng Yew dan Gan Li Li, the proposed intervenors be given leave to intervene in this Originating Summons. 2. Pursuant to Order (1) above, that: a) The Proposed Intervenors be joined as the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in the Originating Summons herein. b) The Title of the Originating Summons herein be amended to reflect that the Proposed Intervenors be joined as the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in the Originating Summons herein. 3. That the Order of this Court handed down on 28.6.2018 be set aside. 4. That this Originating Summons be struck off and /or dismissed. 5. The Proposed Intervenors is given liberty to apply for consequential Orders.” (own emphasis added) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 29 [18] The Proposed Interveners grounds in support of this Application can be summarised as follows: i) The Proposed Intervenors were deliberately omitted from this Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) by the Plaintiff even though they were parties with vested interests, being the former directors of Cekap Asia. ii) The Proposed Interveners were therefore deprived of the right to be heard and that is a serious breach of natural justice. iii) The Plaintiff did not give full and frank disclosure and had misled the Court by concealing the decision of the High Court in Shah Alam High Court Suit No. 22-350-2010 (“Suit 350”). Suit 350 is between the Plaintiff herein and the Proposed Interveners (as the first and second defendants respectively) and one Tan Kak Teck. In Suit 350 the Plaintiff’s claim against, inter alia, the Proposed Interveners was for the sum of RM13,000,000.00 pertaining to the Cekap Asia Transaction. iv) The Plaintiff had committed fraud on the Court. v) The Court did not allowed prayers 2 to 4 of Enclosure 1, namely, for the change of the directors and shareholders of Cekap Asia but this was done anyway by the Plaintiff as stated in the chronology in paragraph 13 above. [19] Therefore, the Proposed Interveners contended that the Order dated 28.6.2018 was obtained through: i) Breach of natural justice. ii) Concealment of material information. iii) Dishonesty. iv) Misrepresentation. v) Fraud on the court. (paragraph 4 of the Proposed Interveners Affidavit In Support (Enclosure 17)) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 29 [20] The Proposed Interveners claimed that they were only aware of the Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) a few days before the hearing of the application to strike out Suit 18. Main Issues [21] I would summarise the Proposed Interveners grounds in support of this Application to essentially two main issues as follows: i) Whether the Proposed Interveners were deliberately excluded from the Originating Summons thereby depriving them the right to be heard in breach of the principles of natural justice; and ii) Whether the Plaintiff had concealed the High Court’s decision in Suit 350 and committed fraud on the Court. C] THIS APPLICATION [22] There are two parts of this Application: i) The Proposed Interveners’ application to intervene in these proceedings; and ii) The Proposed Interveners’ application to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. [23] I must first highlight some complications with this Application: i) The main action (the Originating Summons in Enclosure 1) has ended when the Order dated 28.6.2018 was granted. Therefore, can the Proposed Interveners intervene in the proceedings at this stage? (see Hong Leong Bank Bhd (formerly known as Hong Leong Finance Bhd) v. Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622); ii) The Proposed Interveners did not separate their application to intervene with their application to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 which means if the Court finds that the Proposed Interveners are not entitled to intervene the matter ends there. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 29 However, if it is shown that the Proposed Interveners are entitled to intervene but have failed to satisfy the requirements for setting aside a Court Order then this Application would still be dismissed. [24] It is noted that in some cases the application to intervene is made separately from any other applications or reliefs the proposed intervener intends to make or seek in the event he is allowed to intervene in the proceedings. That is not the case here. The issues of whether the Proposed Interveners have the right to intervene and whether there are grounds to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 are both dealt with in this Application. [25] Hence, I will deal with the application to intervene first. D] APPLICATION TO INTERVENE [26] The intervention part of this Application is made pursuant to Order 15 Rule 6 ROC. [27] The Plaintiff contended that the Court is functus officio after the Order dated 28.6.2018 was given and therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this Application. It was held in Staghorn (supra) that a party could not intervene in proceedings under Order 15 Rule 6 ROC where the proceedings had come to an end. [28] In response to this contention and in support of the Proposed Interveners’ application to intervene in these proceedings learned counsel for the Proposed Interveners relied heavily on the Federal Court case of Dr Lourdes Dava Raj a/l Curuz Dural Raj v. Dr Milton Lum Siew Wah & Anor [2020] 5 MLJ 185. In Dr Lourdes (supra), a complaint was made by Dr Milton (the first respondent) against the Appellant (Dr Lourdes) to the Malaysian Medical Council (“MMC”). The MMC, by majority decision, decided that Dr Lourdes had no case to answer (“MMC’s First Decision”). Dr Milton then filed judicial review proceedings to quash the MMC’s First Decision and to declare that Dr Lourdes was guilty of the charges and direct MMC to impose the appropriate sentence after hearing Dr Lourdes’s mitigation. Dr Lourdes was not made a party to the judicial review application before the High Court which reliefs prayed for directly affected him. Dr Lourdes was also not served S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 29 with the judicial review cause papers. The judicial review proceedings were dismissed by the High Court but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision”). Pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s direction, MMC convened a hearing to hear Dr Lourdes’ mitigation and after hearing him (Dr Lourdes attended the hearing under protest) punished him with a reprimand (“MMC’s Second Decision”). Dr Lourdes applied to the High Court to set aside MMC’s Second Decision and declare that he was not bound by the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision as he was never notified of the court proceedings. The High Court dismissed the application holding that it was not the proper forum to challenge the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision and that until the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision was set aside, MMC was bound by it. Dr Lourdes then applied for leave to intervene (“Intervention Application”) in the Court of Appeal proceedings in which Court of Appeal’s JR Decision was made, in order to set aside and reinstate the MMC’s First Decision acquitting him. The Court of Appeal dismissed the intervention application (“the Court of Appeal’s Intervention Decision”). Dr Lourdes then filed an application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against the Court of Appeal’s Intervention Decision. The leave application was allowed and later the appeal proper. [29] In Dr Lourdes (supra) the questions of law on which leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s Intervention Decision was given were: “(a) whether an order made in absentia in a judicial review application against a party, who, though directly affected by the application was not served with the relevant cause papers as required by O 53 r 4(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘the ROC’), ought to be set aside as of right for breach of the right to be heard; and (b) whether, on the ground that proceedings had come to an end, such a party would, nevertheless, not be allowed to intervene in the proceedings under O 15 r 6 of the ROC to set aside the order.” (own emphasis added) [30] Based on the facts and the decision of the Federal Court in the Dr Lourdes (supra) it would appear that the Federal Court had distinguished Staghorn (supra) and this can be seen from the following passages: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 29 “[43] Therefore, in Staghorn, the issues of an affected party not being given notice, and not being accorded the opportunity to be heard in his own defence did not arise in the same manner as in the present appeal. In Staghorn, this court found that Staghorn Sdn Bhd was not an interested party by reason of it having no interest in the land. Here Dr Lourdes was a party most directly involved as the entire proceedings emanated from an allegation of professional misconduct on his part. He was central to the entire case and his exclusion from participation in one of the most important aspects of adjudication resulted in the reversal of a finding of innocence, without his having been heard in his own defence at all. A clearer case of a breach of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice is rarely seen, and that rule is the right to be heard (see B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 1 MLJ 169 (PC) 2 April 1962 per Denning LJ). This resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice. [44] We have found above that Dr Lourdes is an affected party. We are therefore of the view that Staghorn is inapplicable to the factual matrix of the present case as the facts, law and considerations differ were entirely different and distinguishable there. Staghorn also was decided on the considerable length of time it took for Staghorn Sdn Bhd to apply to intervene. That is not the case here, as Dr Lourdes had no notice whatsoever of the judicial review filed by Dr Milton, until MMC took steps to carry out the order of the Court of Appeal and convened to hear Dr Lourdes’ plea in mitigation. There was no delay on Dr Lourdes’ part.” (own emphasis added) [31] Therefore, the principle laid down in Staghorn (supra) is still applicable and in order for the Proposed Interveners to come within the exception in Dr Lourdes (supra), they must show: i) that they are an affected party in that the Order dated 28.6.2018 directly affected them; and ii) that they have the right to be heard at the Originating Summons but was deprived of that right in breach of the rules of natural justice. [32] It is not in dispute that the Proposed Interveners were not made a party to the Originating Summons and based on the above two questions whether they ought to have been made a party. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 29 [33] Firstly, there is no provision in CA 2016 or Section 555 CA 2016 that specifically provides that the directors of a company which company had been struck off from the Register under Section 550 CA 2016 is required to be made a party in an application to reinstate the said company. Therefore, there is no compulsion under CA 2016 for the Plaintiff to make the Proposed Interveners parties to the Originating Summons. [34] Secondly, the Originating Summons concerns Cekap Asia and not the Proposed Interveners. The Proposed Interveners were directors of Cekap Asia at the material time but it was their own action or inaction that had caused or allowed Cekap Asia to be struck off. [35] Thirdly, the Order dated 28.6.2018 to reinstate Cekap Asia affects Cekap Asia as a company/entity and not the Proposed Interveners specifically. [36] In this regard, I must emphasise that except for the reinstatement, the other reliefs prayed for in the Originating Summons were not allowed in particular regarding the change of shareholders and the appointment of directors and company secretary. [37] Therefore, the Proposed Interveners have not fulfilled the requirements which would allow them to come within the exceptions in Dr Lourdes (supra) to intervene in proceedings which have ended. [38] The Proposed Interveners were not deprived of the right to be heard as it was not mandatory for them to be made a party under Section 555 CA 2016. In any event, the Order dated 28.6.2018 did not affect the Proposed Interveners. The Proposed Interveners position can be easily distinguished from the facts of Dr Lourdes (supra). The following passage from Dr Lourdes is very instructive on this point and bears repeating: “[43] ….. In Staghorn, this court found that Staghorn Sdn Bhd was not an interested party by reason of it having no interest in the land. Here Dr Lourdes was a party most directly involved as the entire proceedings emanated from an allegation of professional misconduct on his part. He was central to the entire case and his exclusion from participation in one of the most important aspects of adjudication resulted in the reversal of a finding of innocence, without his having been heard in his own defence at all. A clearer S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 29 case of a breach of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice is rarely seen, and that rule is the right to be heard (see B Surinder . Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 1 MLJ 169 (PC) 2 April 1962 per Denning LJ). This resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice.” (own emphasis added) [39] It is clear that the Proposed Interveners are not central to the Originating Summons and in particular the Order dated 28.6.2018. It must be remembered that in Dr Lourdes (supra), Dr Lourdes’s right to intervene only became an issue because of the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision reversing the High Court’s decision to dismiss the judicial review proceedings. There was no point or reason for Dr Lourdes to intervene in the judicial review proceedings at the High Court stage as the decision was in his favour, i.e. the judicial review proceedings were dismissed. [40] Here the Order dated 28.6.2018 only directly affects Cekap Asia, the other reliefs in the Originating Summons were disallowed. Even if the other reliefs in the Originating Summons could be said to affect the Proposed Interveners, it is of no consequence as those reliefs were not allowed. This is similar to the situation in the case of Dr Lourdes (supra), in which it only became necessary for Dr Lourdes to intervene in the proceedings at the Court of Appeal due to the Court of Appeal’s JR Decision as it (and not the High Court’s decision) affected Dr Lourdes. [41] Further, apart from allowing Cekap Asia to be struck off the Register, the Proposed Interveners’ lack of interest in Cekap Asia can also be seen from the fact that the Proposed Interveners had given the Plaintiff undated resignation letters (“Resignation Letters”) as directors of the Cekap Asia pursuant to the Security Agreement. It is not in dispute that the Resignation Letters were signed and given by the Proposed Interveners to the Plaintiff several years prior to Cekap Asia being struck off. [42] There was no correspondence or other evidence to show that the Proposed Interveners had retracted the Resignation Letters or requested for them to be returned. [43] The Proposed Interveners main complaint on this point is that Cekap Asia was reinstated so that the Plaintiff (through Cekap Asia) could then initiate its legal action in Suit 18 against the S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 29 Proposed Interveners. Therefore, it seems clear to me that the Proposed Interveners’ grievance is not that Cekap Asia was reinstated but the subsequent conduct of Cekap Asia in initiating Suit 18. [44] It must be noted that the reinstatement of Cekap Asia and Cekap Asia’s initiation of Suit 18 are two separate and distinct matters. [45] Hence, the reinstatement of Cekap Asia was not really an issue for the Proposed Interveners. The reinstatement of Cekap Asia and the Order dated 28.6.2018 did not affect the Proposed Interveners. [46] Having considered all the above matters, I concluded that there was no breach of natural justice. The Proposed Interveners have no right to intervene in the Originating Summons which proceedings have ended. Though this Application can be dismissed on this ground alone, however, for purpose of completeness I also considered the second part of this Application on the Proposed Interveners’ application to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. E] APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 28.6.2018 [47] I have already dealt with the issue of breach of natural justice and whether the Proposed Interveners have the right to be heard at the hearing of the Originating Summons. As the Proposed Interveners have no right to intervene in these proceedings it follows that they have no right to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. [48] Nevertheless, assuming that the Proposed Interveners have the right to intervene in the Originating Summons, the second issue is whether they have valid grounds to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. Fresh Suit [49] I will begin by reiterating the grounds relied on by the Proposed Interveners to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 as stated in paragraph 19 above: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 29 i) Breach of natural justice. ii) Concealment of material information. iii) Dishonesty. iv) Misrepresentation. v) Fraud on the court. [50] Learned counsel for the Proposed Interveners referred to the Court of Appeal case of Lee Chai Sen v. Magnum Consortium Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 1871 to contend that there is no necessity for a fresh suit to be initiated to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. However, this rule only applies where the final judgment was obtained in breach of the rules of natural justice. This can be seen from the following passage from Lee Chai Sen (supra): “[27] lt is thus settled that, on the authorities of Annie Quah Lay Nah v Syed Jafer Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors and on Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd (supra), wherein the Federal Court affirmed the rule laid down in the judgment of Lord Diplock in Isaacs v Robertson, one exception where a final judgment of the High Court may be set aside ex debito justitiae is where the final judgment can be proved to be null and void because it has been obtained in breach of the rules of natural justice. In such circumstances the person affected by such judgment is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside and the court may exercise its inherent power to strike out the order without the need to file an appeal or a fresh suit.” (own emphasis added) [51] In the present case I have found that there was no breach of natural justice and in any event the Proposed Interveners grounds to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 include concealment of material information, dishonesty and fraud. These are quasi criminal allegations, in particular fraud. Thus, the proper mode for applying to set aside a judgment or order obtained by fraud would be by way of a fresh suit or action. The Federal Court in Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab-Malaysia Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75 referred to the following passage in case of Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Sahari Murid [1980] 1 LNS 92 and held as follows: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 29 “Reverting to the point relied on by the Court of Appeal, that of the perfected order not being capable of being amended or altered except for certain exceptions as stated in Hock Hua Bank supra, a passage therefrom as quoted by the Court of Appeal is set out as follows: Clearly the court has no power under any application in the same action to alter, vary or set aside a judgement regularly obtained after it is drawn up receipt under the slip rule in O. 28 r. 11 of the Rules of Supreme Court 1957 (O. 20 r. 11 of the Rules of High Court 1980) so far as necessary to correct errors in expressing the intention of the court: Re. St Nazarie Co., Kelsey v. Doune; Hession v. Jones, unless it is a judgement by default or made in the absence of a party at the trial or hearing. But if a judgement or order has been obtained by fraud or where further evidence which could not possibly have been adduced at the original hearing is forthcoming, a fresh action will lie to impeach the original judgement: Hip Foong Hong c. Neotia & Co., & Jonesco v. Beard. The hearing of the action will in a proper case be expedited: Smith v. Peizer.” (own emphasis added) [52] In Chee Pok Choy & Ors v. Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 CLJ 321, a case which involved “deliberate fraud practised upon the court” similar to the allegation in this Application, the order sought to be set aside was done via a fresh suit. The Court of Appeal in Chee Pok Choy (supra) held at pages 336 and 342 as follows: “The principle then to be culled from the authorities is that a judgment may be impeached for deliberate fraud practised upon the court, and it is insufficient to show that a litigant merely convinced the court through misleading or erroneous evidence. Whether the test has been met in any given case must, I think, depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. But there is some guidance in the cases as to how fraud may be established. There is a most useful passage in Satish Chandra v. Satish Kantha Roy AIR [1923] PC 73, 76: Charges of fraud and collusion like those contained in the plaint in this case must, no doubt, be proved by those who make them – proved by established facts or inferences legitimately drawn from those facts taken together as a whole. Suspicions and surmises and conjecture are not permissible substitutes for those facts or those inferences, but that by no means requires that every puzzling artifice or contrivance resorted to by S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 29 one accused of fraud must necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a clever and dexterous knave would escape.” ……….. “The learned judge had ample jurisdiction to act upon the evidence and to set aside the order for sale on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. I have already adverted to the relevant authorities on the point earlier in this judgment. I pause now to mention one other on the subject that I consider helpful. It is Cheah Wong Nyan & Anor. v. Palaniappa & Ors [1935] MLJ 31. In that case, Whitley J, entertained an action to set aside a judgment fraudulently obtained in an earlier suit. He said (at p. 32): The Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud in a subsequent action brought for that purpose, the proper remedy being an original action and not a rehearing. Cole v. Langford [1898] 2 QB 36 and Priestman v. Thomas [1884] 9 PD 210. In the latter case a compromise was effected in an action in the Probate Division under which a certain will was admitted to probate. Afterwards it was discovered that the will was a forgery and an action was brought against the parties who had propounded the will claiming that the compromise might be set aside on the ground of fraud. The jury having found that the compromise was procured by fraud, judgment was given setting aside the compromise. One of the earliest pronouncements of this principle was made by Lord Coke in the Duchess of Kingston’s Case, [1776] 2 Sm. LC 12th Edition at page 762 where he observed that acts of the highest judicial authority though not to be impeached from within yet are impeachable from without for although it is not permitted to show that the court was mistaken it may be shown that they were misled. ‘Fraud is an intrinsic collateral act which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. It avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.’ Accordingly, as stated in Spencer Bower on Actionable Misrepresentation 2nd Edition p. 358, when both parties collude and conspired to deceive the court judgments have at the suit of a stranger interested been set aside on proof of the requisite facts. It would thus appear clear that the Plaintiffs who are admittedly interested strangers are entitled to have this judgment set aside if they can satisfy the Court that it was obtained by fraud and collusion. (own emphasis added) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 29 [53] The rationale behind this rule is simply that allegations such as fraud cannot be determined by way of affidavit evidence alone especially when dealing with an application to set aside a judgment or order, a matter of such a serious nature (Badiaddin (supra)). Fresh evidence is required to be produced (see Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Pegawai Kewangan Negeri Pahang [2016] 3 MLJ 1 - a case also involving concealment or suppression of matters and fraud on the Court). [54] I must stress that similar allegations of concealment of material information and fraud practised upon the Court in the present case were raised in Chee Pok Choy (supra) and Seruan Gemilang (supra) and this had necessitated a trial in both these cases to determine whether the High Court order ought to be set aside. [55] As this Application was also premised on, inter alia, concealment and fraud as well as breach of natural justice the proper mode to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018 would be by commencing a fresh suit. [56] Hence, this is another ground for dismissing this Application. The alleged “Material Information” and whether it would affect the Order dated 28.6.2018 [57] The next issue that I have also taken into consideration is whether the alleged “material information” that is whether the High Court’s decision in Suit 350 would have had a material effect on this Court’s decision in granting the Order dated 28.6.2018. [58] In this regard, it was held in Seruan Gemilang (supra) as follows: “[47] Applying the principle as laid down in Ladd v Marshall [ 1954] 3 All ER 745, the respondents (citing para 561 of Halsburys Laws of England (4 th Ed) Vol 26) submitted that: an action will lie to rescind a judgment on the ground of the discovery of new evidence which would have had a material effect upon the decision of the court. It must be present: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 29 (a) that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial; (b) that the further evidence is such that, if given would have an important influence on the result of the trial, although it need not be decisive; and (c) that the evidence is such as is presumably to be believed.” (own emphasis added) [59] First and foremost, what transpired before Justice Zaini at the hearing of the Originating Summons cannot be determined by affidavit evidence alone and this Application ought to have been made via a fresh suit (Seruan Gemilang (supra); Chee Pok Choy (supra)). In the absence of “fresh evidence” there is no material for me to examine to determine whether there are grounds to set aside the Order dated 28.6.2018. [60] Secondly, even if the “material information” is confined only to the High Court’s decision in Suit 350, the question is whether it would have had a material effect on Justice Zaini’s decision. [61] The short answer to this question is it would not. My reasons are as follow: i) The reinstatement of Cekap Asia was allowed (essentially prayer 1 of the Originating Summons) as the Court was satisfied that the Plaintiff was an “aggrieved party” under Section 555(1) CA 2016 which provides: “Any person who is aggrieved by the decision of the Registrar to strike off the company may, within seven years after the name of the company has been struck off, apply to the Court to reinstate the name of the company into the register.” (own emphasis added) ii) The Plaintiff is said to be “aggrieved” by the decision of the Defendant (the “Registrar” under Section 555 CA 2016) to strike off Cekap Asia. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 29 iii) The Defendant had no objection to the Originating Summons. The Defendant is a neutral party in the dispute between the Plaintiff and the Proposed Interveners. iv) Suit 350 is not a suit by Cekap Asia. v) The High Court’s decision in Suit 350 involved the right of the Plaintiff to initiate Suit 350 against the Proposed Interveners and not Cekap Asia’s right to initiate a similar suit (i.e. Suit 18). In, inter alia, paragraph 12 of the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment in Suit 350 (Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd v. Sri Yap Seng Yew & Ors [2015] MLJU 2326) Justice Suraya Othman (as she then was) held as follows: “Thus, the plaintiff has failed to establish their nexus or privity or locus standi to bring this suit. Written or documentary evidence on the sale of shares for RM 23 million.” (own emphasis added) vi) Just because the Plaintiff’s claim against the Proposed Interveners in Suit 350 was not allowed, it does not necessarily mean that Cekap Asia has no valid claim against the Proposed Interveners or that the Plaintiff is not aggrieved by the Defendant’s decision to strike off Cekap Asia. vii) To further reinforce the point that the High Court’s decision in Suit 350 would not have a material effect on Justice Zaini’s decision is the fact that the Proposed Interveners (as the 1st and 2nd defendants in Suit 18) had attempted to strike out Suit 18 but had failed to do so. The learned Judicial Commissioner, Justice Rozi Bainon, in dismissing the Proposed Interveners’ application to strike out Cekap Asia’s claim on 21.3.2022 held at paragraphs 40 and 44 of her Grounds of Judgment as follows: “[40] For finality of the litigation, this Court must hear the evidence by all the witnesses to be called. By just relying on the grounds of judgment in Suit 350, there is no finality of litigation between the parties.” ………… S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 23 of 29 “[44] In view of the foregoing, it is my judgment that having evaluated Enclosure 12 and its supporting documents, I find that the Plaintiff has succeed to establish that there is cause of action against the D1 & D2. As such, I dismiss Enclosure 12, with costs.” (own emphasis added) viii) It must be borne in mind that the Proposed Interveners application to strike out Suit 18 was on the grounds of res judicata and issue estoppel in that the same issues and matters raised in Suit 18 had been raised and decided in Suit 350. Arising from Justice Rozi’s decision to dismiss the striking out application, Suit 18 would proceed to trial. Thus, Cekap Asia’s claim cannot be said to be obviously unsustainable. [62] Therefore, and in any event, based on the above the High Court’s decision in Suit 350 would not have any material effect on Justice Zaini’s decision to grant the Order dated 28.6.2018 even if it was brought to His Lordship’s attention at the hearing of the Originating Summons. F] DELAY, LACHES AND AFTERTHOUGHT [63] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff argued this Application was filed with inordinate and excessive delay, that is 1 year and 3 months after Cekap Asia commenced Suit 18 in February 2021. [64] The Proposed Interveners averred that they were not aware of the Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) until a few days before the hearing of the application to strike out Suit 18 when the Proposed Interveners’ solicitors were served with a Notice of Intention to Use Affidavit dated 10.2.2022 (paragraph 7 of the Proposed Interveners’ Affidavit In Support (Enclosure 17)). [65] It is rather hard to fathom the Proposed Interveners’ averment that they only found out about the Originating Summons on or about February 2022. [66] The following chronology of event will show why the Proposed Interveners’ above averment cannot be accepted: S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 24 of 29 i) Cekap Asia was struck off the Register sometime in May 2011. ii) When Cekap Asia was struck off the Register in May 2011 the Proposed Interveners were still directors of Cekap Asia. iii) The Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) was filed on 8.3.2018. iv) Cekap Asia was reinstated vide Order dated 28.6.2018. v) The Proposed Interveners were removed as directors of Cekap Asia on 15.7.2019. The Proposed Interveners aver they were not aware of their removal as directors of Cekap Asia. vi) Suit 18 was filed in February 2021. vii) Hong Leong Investment Bank Berhad (the 3rd defendant in Suit 18) in its Amended Defence dated 26.4.2021 (“Hong Leong’s Amended Defence”) in Suit 18 pleaded the matters stated in paragraphs (i), (iii) and (iv) above. viii) This Application was filed on 27.5.2022. [67] Based on the above chronology, the Proposed Interveners would and should have known of the reinstatement of Cekap Asia when Suit 18 was filed and served on them on or about February 2021. This is because the Proposed Interveners were directors of Cekap Asia and as they themselves aver, they did not know they were removed as directors of Cekap Asia. Hence, it is only logical and reasonable for the Proposed Interveners to inquire or check how Cekap Asia was able to file Suit 18 without their approval or authorisation as directors of Cekap Asia. This is bearing in mind that Suit 18 is an action by Cekap Asia against, inter alia, the Proposed Interveners themselves. [68] Given that the Proposed Interveners believed they were still the directors of Cekap Asia at the material time, surely upon being served with the Suit 18 Writ, it would naturally have prompted them investigate how Cekap Asia initiated the action. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 25 of 29 [69] To put it simply, if the directors of a company are sued by the company, they would immediately react to find out how the company was able to commence the said action against them. [70] At the very latest, the Proposed Interveners should have known about the Originating Summons and the Order dated 28.6.2018 when Hong Leong’s Amended Defence was served on them, on or about 26.4.2021. This Application was only filed about 1 year later. [71] Hence, the Proposed Interveners are guilty of laches and their conduct must be treated as a waiver of their rights or that it is tantamount to an acquiescence of the Order dated 28.6.2018. [72] The principle of law on delay and laches can be found in the classic case of Alfred Templeton & Ors v. Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 202 where it was held: “Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a claim. A court of equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by laches. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches the court considers whether there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part and any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant. The doctrine of laches rests on the consideration that it is unjust to give a plaintiff a remedy where he has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though not waiving the remedy, put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted: 14 Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Ed) paras 1181, 1182. Laches has been succinctly described as ‘inaction with one’s eyes open’.” (own emphasis added) [73] The fact of the matter is that the Proposed Interveners showed no interest in Cekap Asia after the Share Sale Agreement and was not even aware of Cekap Asia being struck off from the Register. [74] The Proposed Interveners claim did not know they were removed as directors of Cekap Asia, however, the filing of Suit 18 did not immediately cause them to find out what had happened to Cekap Asia until about more than a year later when this Application was filed. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 26 of 29 [75] Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Proposed Interveners were not interested or concerned with Cekap Asia and the only reason they filed this Application was to stop Suit 18 from proceeding. This would explain why this Application was filed after the High Court in Suit 18 dismissed the Proposed Interveners striking out application on 21.3.2022. [76] Having failed to strike out Suit 18, the Proposed Interveners then filed this Application on 27.5.2022. [77] The filing of this Application was thus an afterthought and designed to derail Suit 18 which was already proceeding to trial. [78] In the circumstances this Application is devoid of merit. G] CONCLUSION [79] Lastly, I would be remiss if I do not address learned counsel for the Proposed Interveners’ argument that in granting the Order dated 28.6.2018, Justice Zaini did not allow prayers 2 to 4 of Enclosure 1 for the change of the directors and shareholders of Cekap Asia but the Plaintiff was still able do so after the Order dated 28.6.2018 was entered. [80] In no way can the Order dated 28.6.2018 (for which prayers 2 to 4 were now allowed) be construed as restraining the Plaintiff from changing or effecting the change of directors or shareholders of Cekap Asia in the usual manner as was done in this case, which is allowed under CA 2016. [81] It seems to be me the Proposed Interveners are suggesting the Plaintiff’s act of changing the directors and shareholders of Cekap Asia was, in some way or extent, designed to circumvent the Order dated 28.6.2018. [82] I do not find this to be an issue as the Order dated 28.6.2018 merely allows Cekap Asia to be reinstated with costs to be paid to the Defendant. That is all. The Order dated 28.6.2018 clearly did not prohibit the Plaintiff from changing the directors or shareholders of Cekap Asia. S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 27 of 29 [83] If the Plaintiff’s act of changing the directors and shareholders of Cekap Asia was an issue then what the Proposed Interveners should have done is challenge that act and not the Order dated 28.6.2018 which only reinstates Cekap Asia. [84] This again clearly shows that it is not Cekap Asia (as a company) that the Proposed Interveners are concerned about but the Plaintiff. [85] I must further add that in reinstating Cekap Asia the Plaintiff and/or its nominees were responsible for bearing the costs and continued management of Cekap Asia as well as fulfil the requirements or conditions placed by the Defendant for allowing Cekap Asia to be reinstated. The Proposed Interveners were not concerned with these matters thereby further demonstrating their disinterest in Cekap Asia or its reinstatement. [86] For the reasons stated above, I dismissed this Application with costs of RM15,000/- in favour of the Plaintiff and RM1,000/- in favour of the Defendant. Dated this 23rd day of November, 2023 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 28 of 29 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF Dinesh Praveen Nair (Low Ming Yung, PDK together with him) Messrs Dinesh Praveen Nair C3-3-13, Solaris Dutamas Jalan Dutamas 1 50480 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-6211 4817 Email: [email protected] COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT Nor Syairah Sulaiman Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia Seksyen Litigasi Bahagian Pendakwaan & Litigasi Tingkat 28 Menara SSM 2 Sentral No. 7, Jalan Stesen Sentral 5 Kuala Lumpur Sentral Tel: 03-2299 5437 COUNSEL FOR THE PROPOSED INTERVENERS Terence Chan (KY Lui and Yeap Xi Jin together with him) Messrs Lim Kian Leong & Co Bilik 10-8, Tingkat 10, Wisma UOA II No. 21, Jalan Pinang 50450 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-2161 4199 Email: [email protected] LEGISLATION / RULES CITED Companies Act 2016 ▪ Section 550 ▪ Section 555(1) S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 29 of 29 Rules of Court 2012 ▪ Order 15 Rule 6 ▪ Order 42 Rule 3 ▪ Order 92 Rule 4 CASES CITED 1. Alfred Templeton & Ors v. Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 202 2. Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab-Malaysia Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75 3. Chee Pok Choy & Ors v. Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 CLJ 321 4. Dr Lourdes Dava Raj a/l Curuz Dural Raj v. Dr Milton Lum Siew Wah & Anor [2020] 5 MLJ 185 5. Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd v. Sri Yap Seng Yew & Ors [2015] MLJU 2326 6. Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Sahari Murid [1980] 1 LNS 92 7. Hong Leong Bank Bhd (formerly known as Hong Leong Finance Bhd) v. Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622 8. Lee Chai Sen v. Magnum Consortium Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 1871 9. Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Pegawai Kewangan Negeri Pahang [2016] 3 MLJ 1 S/N pxntZBAqvkiGHoApxvwGPQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	56,378	Tika 2.6.0

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