project
stringclasses 765
values | commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| func
stringlengths 19
482k
| vul
int64 0
1
| CVE ID
stringlengths 13
16
| CWE ID
stringclasses 13
values | CWE Name
stringclasses 13
values | CWE Description
stringclasses 13
values | Potential Mitigation
stringclasses 11
values | __index_level_0__
int64 0
23.9k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Android | 5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426 | virtual void SetUp() {
const tuple<int, int, SubpelVarianceFunctionType>& params =
this->GetParam();
log2width_ = get<0>(params);
width_ = 1 << log2width_;
log2height_ = get<1>(params);
height_ = 1 << log2height_;
subpel_variance_ = get<2>(params);
rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
block_size_ = width_ * height_;
src_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
sec_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
ref_ = new uint8_t[block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1];
ASSERT_TRUE(src_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(sec_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(ref_ != NULL);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-1621 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 5,056 |
Chrome | 3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a | PP_Bool LaunchSelLdr(PP_Instance instance,
const char* alleged_url,
int socket_count,
void* imc_handles) {
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> sockets;
IPC::Sender* sender = content::RenderThread::Get();
if (sender == NULL)
sender = g_background_thread_sender.Pointer()->get();
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
if (!sender->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_LaunchNaCl(
GURL(alleged_url), socket_count, &sockets,
&channel_handle))) {
return PP_FALSE;
}
bool invalid_handle = channel_handle.name.empty();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
if (!invalid_handle)
invalid_handle = (channel_handle.socket.fd == -1);
#endif
if (!invalid_handle)
g_channel_handle_map.Get()[instance] = channel_handle;
CHECK(static_cast<int>(sockets.size()) == socket_count);
for (int i = 0; i < socket_count; i++) {
static_cast<nacl::Handle*>(imc_handles)[i] =
nacl::ToNativeHandle(sockets[i]);
}
return PP_TRUE;
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-2888 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 5,347 |
git | de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60 | static void test_show_object(struct object *object,
struct strbuf *path,
const char *last, void *data)
{
struct bitmap_test_data *tdata = data;
int bitmap_pos;
bitmap_pos = bitmap_position(object->oid.hash);
if (bitmap_pos < 0)
die("Object not in bitmap: %s\n", oid_to_hex(&object->oid));
bitmap_set(tdata->base, bitmap_pos);
display_progress(tdata->prg, ++tdata->seen);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-2324 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 3,164 |
dcmtk | beaf5a5c24101daeeafa48c375120b16197c9e95 | int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
#ifdef HAVE_GUSI_H
GUSISetup(GUSIwithSIOUXSockets);
GUSISetup(GUSIwithInternetSockets);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK_H
WSAData winSockData;
/* we need at least version 1.1 */
WORD winSockVersionNeeded = MAKEWORD( 1, 1 );
WSAStartup(winSockVersionNeeded, &winSockData);
#endif
int opt_terminate = 0; /* default: no terminate mode */
const char *opt_cfgName = NULL; /* config file name */
const char *opt_cfgID = NULL; /* name of entry in config file */
dcmDisableGethostbyaddr.set(OFTrue); // disable hostname lookup
OFConsoleApplication app(OFFIS_CONSOLE_APPLICATION , "Network receive for presentation state viewer", rcsid);
OFCommandLine cmd;
cmd.setOptionColumns(LONGCOL, SHORTCOL);
cmd.setParamColumn(LONGCOL + SHORTCOL + 2);
cmd.addParam("config-file", "configuration file to be read");
cmd.addParam("receiver-id", "identifier of receiver in config file", OFCmdParam::PM_Optional);
cmd.addGroup("general options:");
cmd.addOption("--help", "-h", "print this help text and exit", OFCommandLine::AF_Exclusive);
cmd.addOption("--version", "print version information and exit", OFCommandLine::AF_Exclusive);
OFLog::addOptions(cmd);
cmd.addOption("--terminate", "-t", "terminate all running receivers");
/* evaluate command line */
prepareCmdLineArgs(argc, argv, OFFIS_CONSOLE_APPLICATION);
if (app.parseCommandLine(cmd, argc, argv))
{
/* check exclusive options first */
if (cmd.hasExclusiveOption())
{
if (cmd.findOption("--version"))
{
app.printHeader(OFTrue /*print host identifier*/);
COUT << OFendl << "External libraries used:";
#if !defined(WITH_ZLIB) && !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
COUT << " none" << OFendl;
#else
COUT << OFendl;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
COUT << "- ZLIB, Version " << zlibVersion() << OFendl;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
COUT << "- " << OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT << OFendl;
#endif
return 0;
}
}
/* command line parameters and options */
cmd.getParam(1, opt_cfgName);
if (cmd.getParamCount() >= 2) cmd.getParam(2, opt_cfgID);
if (cmd.findOption("--terminate")) opt_terminate = 1;
OFLog::configureFromCommandLine(cmd, app);
}
/* print resource identifier */
OFLOG_DEBUG(dcmpsrcvLogger, rcsid << OFendl);
if ((opt_cfgID == 0)&&(! opt_terminate))
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "parameter receiver-id required unless --terminate is specified");
return 10;
}
if (opt_cfgName)
{
FILE *cfgfile = fopen(opt_cfgName, "rb");
if (cfgfile) fclose(cfgfile); else
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "can't open configuration file '" << opt_cfgName << "'");
return 10;
}
} else {
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "missing configuration file name");
return 10;
}
/* make sure data dictionary is loaded */
if (!dcmDataDict.isDictionaryLoaded())
{
OFLOG_WARN(dcmpsrcvLogger, "no data dictionary loaded, check environment variable: " << DCM_DICT_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE);
}
DVConfiguration dvi(opt_cfgName);
if (opt_terminate)
{
terminateAllReceivers(dvi);
return 0; // application terminates here
}
/* get network configuration from configuration file */
OFBool networkImplicitVROnly = dvi.getTargetImplicitOnly(opt_cfgID);
OFBool networkBitPreserving = dvi.getTargetBitPreservingMode(opt_cfgID);
OFBool opt_correctUIDPadding = dvi.getTargetCorrectUIDPadding(opt_cfgID);
OFBool networkDisableNewVRs = dvi.getTargetDisableNewVRs(opt_cfgID);
unsigned short networkPort = dvi.getTargetPort(opt_cfgID);
unsigned long networkMaxPDU = dvi.getTargetMaxPDU(opt_cfgID);
const char *networkAETitle = dvi.getTargetAETitle(opt_cfgID);
if (networkAETitle==NULL) networkAETitle = dvi.getNetworkAETitle();
unsigned short messagePort = dvi.getMessagePort(); /* port number for IPC */
OFBool keepMessagePortOpen = dvi.getMessagePortKeepOpen();
OFBool useTLS = dvi.getTargetUseTLS(opt_cfgID);
OFBool notifyTermination = OFTrue; // notify IPC server of application termination
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* TLS directory */
const char *current = NULL;
const char *tlsFolder = dvi.getTLSFolder();
if (tlsFolder==NULL) tlsFolder = ".";
/* certificate file */
OFString tlsCertificateFile(tlsFolder);
tlsCertificateFile += PATH_SEPARATOR;
current = dvi.getTargetCertificate(opt_cfgID);
if (current) tlsCertificateFile += current; else tlsCertificateFile += "sitecert.pem";
/* private key file */
OFString tlsPrivateKeyFile(tlsFolder);
tlsPrivateKeyFile += PATH_SEPARATOR;
current = dvi.getTargetPrivateKey(opt_cfgID);
if (current) tlsPrivateKeyFile += current; else tlsPrivateKeyFile += "sitekey.pem";
/* private key password */
const char *tlsPrivateKeyPassword = dvi.getTargetPrivateKeyPassword(opt_cfgID);
/* certificate verification */
DcmCertificateVerification tlsCertVerification = DCV_requireCertificate;
switch (dvi.getTargetPeerAuthentication(opt_cfgID))
{
case DVPSQ_require:
tlsCertVerification = DCV_requireCertificate;
break;
case DVPSQ_verify:
tlsCertVerification = DCV_checkCertificate;
break;
case DVPSQ_ignore:
tlsCertVerification = DCV_ignoreCertificate;
break;
}
/* DH parameter file */
OFString tlsDHParametersFile;
current = dvi.getTargetDiffieHellmanParameters(opt_cfgID);
if (current)
{
tlsDHParametersFile = tlsFolder;
tlsDHParametersFile += PATH_SEPARATOR;
tlsDHParametersFile += current;
}
/* random seed file */
OFString tlsRandomSeedFile(tlsFolder);
tlsRandomSeedFile += PATH_SEPARATOR;
current = dvi.getTargetRandomSeed(opt_cfgID);
if (current) tlsRandomSeedFile += current; else tlsRandomSeedFile += "siteseed.bin";
/* CA certificate directory */
const char *tlsCACertificateFolder = dvi.getTLSCACertificateFolder();
if (tlsCACertificateFolder==NULL) tlsCACertificateFolder = ".";
/* key file format */
int keyFileFormat = SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
if (! dvi.getTLSPEMFormat()) keyFileFormat = SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
/* ciphersuites */
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090700fL
OFString tlsCiphersuites(TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA);
#else
OFString tlsCiphersuites(SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA);
#endif
Uint32 tlsNumberOfCiphersuites = dvi.getTargetNumberOfCipherSuites(opt_cfgID);
if (tlsNumberOfCiphersuites > 0)
{
tlsCiphersuites.clear();
OFString currentSuite;
const char *currentOpenSSL;
for (Uint32 ui=0; ui<tlsNumberOfCiphersuites; ui++)
{
dvi.getTargetCipherSuite(opt_cfgID, ui, currentSuite);
if (NULL == (currentOpenSSL = DcmTLSTransportLayer::findOpenSSLCipherSuiteName(currentSuite.c_str())))
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "ciphersuite '" << currentSuite << "' is unknown. Known ciphersuites are:");
unsigned long numSuites = DcmTLSTransportLayer::getNumberOfCipherSuites();
for (unsigned long cs=0; cs < numSuites; cs++)
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, " " << DcmTLSTransportLayer::getTLSCipherSuiteName(cs));
}
return 1;
} else {
if (!tlsCiphersuites.empty()) tlsCiphersuites += ":";
tlsCiphersuites += currentOpenSSL;
}
}
}
#else
if (useTLS)
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "not compiled with OpenSSL, cannot use TLS");
return 10;
}
#endif
if (networkAETitle==NULL)
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "no application entity title");
return 10;
}
if (networkPort==0)
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "no or invalid port number");
return 10;
}
#ifndef DISABLE_PORT_PERMISSION_CHECK
#ifdef HAVE_GETEUID
/* if port is privileged we must be as well */
if ((networkPort < 1024)&&(geteuid() != 0))
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "cannot listen on port " << networkPort << ", insufficient privileges");
return 10;
}
#endif
#endif
if (networkMaxPDU==0) networkMaxPDU = DEFAULT_MAXPDU;
else if (networkMaxPDU > ASC_MAXIMUMPDUSIZE)
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "max PDU size " << networkMaxPDU << " too big, using default: " << DEFAULT_MAXPDU);
networkMaxPDU = DEFAULT_MAXPDU;
}
if (networkDisableNewVRs)
{
dcmEnableUnknownVRGeneration.set(OFFalse);
dcmEnableUnlimitedTextVRGeneration.set(OFFalse);
dcmEnableOtherFloatStringVRGeneration.set(OFFalse);
dcmEnableOtherDoubleStringVRGeneration.set(OFFalse);
}
OFOStringStream verboseParameters;
OFBool comma=OFFalse;
verboseParameters << "Network parameters:" << OFendl
<< " port : " << networkPort << OFendl
<< " aetitle : " << networkAETitle << OFendl
<< " max pdu : " << networkMaxPDU << OFendl
<< " options : ";
if (networkImplicitVROnly)
{
if (comma) verboseParameters << ", "; else comma=OFTrue;
verboseParameters << "implicit xfer syntax only";
}
if (networkBitPreserving)
{
if (comma) verboseParameters << ", "; else comma=OFTrue;
verboseParameters << "bit-preserving receive mode";
}
if (networkDisableNewVRs)
{
if (comma) verboseParameters << ", "; else comma=OFTrue;
verboseParameters << "disable post-1993 VRs";
}
if (!comma) verboseParameters << "none";
verboseParameters << OFendl;
verboseParameters << " TLS : ";
if (useTLS) verboseParameters << "enabled" << OFendl; else verboseParameters << "disabled" << OFendl;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (useTLS)
{
verboseParameters << " TLS certificate : " << tlsCertificateFile << OFendl
<< " TLS key file : " << tlsPrivateKeyFile << OFendl
<< " TLS DH params : " << tlsDHParametersFile << OFendl
<< " TLS PRNG seed : " << tlsRandomSeedFile << OFendl
<< " TLS CA directory: " << tlsCACertificateFolder << OFendl
<< " TLS ciphersuites: " << tlsCiphersuites << OFendl
<< " TLS key format : ";
if (keyFileFormat == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) verboseParameters << "PEM" << OFendl; else verboseParameters << "DER" << OFendl;
verboseParameters << " TLS cert verify : ";
switch (tlsCertVerification)
{
case DCV_checkCertificate:
verboseParameters << "verify" << OFendl;
break;
case DCV_ignoreCertificate:
verboseParameters << "ignore" << OFendl;
break;
default:
verboseParameters << "require" << OFendl;
break;
}
}
#endif
verboseParameters << OFStringStream_ends;
OFSTRINGSTREAM_GETSTR(verboseParameters, verboseParametersString)
OFLOG_INFO(dcmpsrcvLogger, verboseParametersString);
/* check if we can get access to the database */
const char *dbfolder = dvi.getDatabaseFolder();
OFLOG_INFO(dcmpsrcvLogger, "Using database in directory '" << dbfolder << "'");
OFCondition cond2 = EC_Normal;
DcmQueryRetrieveIndexDatabaseHandle *dbhandle = new DcmQueryRetrieveIndexDatabaseHandle(dbfolder, PSTAT_MAXSTUDYCOUNT, PSTAT_STUDYSIZE, cond2);
delete dbhandle;
if (cond2.bad())
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "Unable to access database '" << dbfolder << "'");
return 1;
}
T_ASC_Network *net = NULL; /* the DICOM network and listen port */
T_ASC_Association *assoc = NULL; /* the DICOM association */
OFBool finished1 = OFFalse;
OFBool finished2 = OFFalse;
int connected = 0;
OFCondition cond = EC_Normal;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DcmTLSTransportLayer *tLayer = NULL;
if (useTLS)
{
tLayer = new DcmTLSTransportLayer(DICOM_APPLICATION_ACCEPTOR, tlsRandomSeedFile.c_str());
if (tLayer == NULL)
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "unable to create TLS transport layer");
return 1;
}
if (tlsCACertificateFolder && (TCS_ok != tLayer->addTrustedCertificateDir(tlsCACertificateFolder, keyFileFormat)))
{
OFLOG_WARN(dcmpsrcvLogger, "unable to load certificates from directory '" << tlsCACertificateFolder << "', ignoring");
}
if ((tlsDHParametersFile.size() > 0) && ! (tLayer->setTempDHParameters(tlsDHParametersFile.c_str())))
{
OFLOG_WARN(dcmpsrcvLogger, "unable to load temporary DH parameter file '" << tlsDHParametersFile << "', ignoring");
}
tLayer->setPrivateKeyPasswd(tlsPrivateKeyPassword); // never prompt on console
if (TCS_ok != tLayer->setPrivateKeyFile(tlsPrivateKeyFile.c_str(), keyFileFormat))
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "unable to load private TLS key from '" << tlsPrivateKeyFile<< "'");
return 1;
}
if (TCS_ok != tLayer->setCertificateFile(tlsCertificateFile.c_str(), keyFileFormat))
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "unable to load certificate from '" << tlsCertificateFile << "'");
return 1;
}
if (! tLayer->checkPrivateKeyMatchesCertificate())
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "private key '" << tlsPrivateKeyFile << "' and certificate '" << tlsCertificateFile << "' do not match");
return 1;
}
if (TCS_ok != tLayer->setCipherSuites(tlsCiphersuites.c_str()))
{
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, "unable to set selected cipher suites");
return 1;
}
tLayer->setCertificateVerification(tlsCertVerification);
}
#endif
while (!finished1)
{
/* open listen socket */
cond = ASC_initializeNetwork(NET_ACCEPTOR, networkPort, 30, &net);
if (errorCond(cond, "Error initialising network:"))
{
return 1;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (tLayer)
{
cond = ASC_setTransportLayer(net, tLayer, 0);
if (cond.bad())
{
OFString temp_str;
OFLOG_FATAL(dcmpsrcvLogger, DimseCondition::dump(temp_str, cond));
return 1;
}
}
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETUID)
/* return to normal uid so that we can't do too much damage in case
* things go very wrong. Only relevant if the program is setuid root,
* and run by another user. Running as root user may be
* potentially disasterous if this program screws up badly.
*/
setuid(getuid());
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FORK
int timeout=1;
#else
int timeout=1000;
#endif
while (!finished2)
{
/* now we connect to the IPC server and request an application ID */
if (messageClient) // on Unix, re-initialize for each connect which is later inherited by the forked child
{
delete messageClient;
messageClient = NULL;
}
if (messagePort > 0)
{
messageClient = new DVPSIPCClient(DVPSIPCMessage::clientStoreSCP, verboseParametersString, messagePort, keepMessagePortOpen);
if (! messageClient->isServerActive())
{
OFLOG_WARN(dcmpsrcvLogger, "no IPC message server found at port " << messagePort << ", disabling IPC");
}
}
connected = 0;
while (!connected)
{
connected = ASC_associationWaiting(net, timeout);
if (!connected) cleanChildren();
}
switch (negotiateAssociation(net, &assoc, networkAETitle, networkMaxPDU, networkImplicitVROnly, useTLS))
{
case assoc_error:
// association has already been deleted, we just wait for the next client to connect.
break;
case assoc_terminate:
finished2=OFTrue;
finished1=OFTrue;
notifyTermination = OFFalse; // IPC server will probably already be down
cond = ASC_dropNetwork(&net);
if (errorCond(cond, "Error dropping network:")) return 1;
break;
case assoc_success:
#ifdef HAVE_FORK
// Unix version - call fork()
int pid;
pid = (int)(fork());
if (pid < 0)
{
char buf[256];
OFLOG_ERROR(dcmpsrcvLogger, "Cannot create association sub-process: " << OFStandard::strerror(errno, buf, sizeof(buf)));
refuseAssociation(assoc, ref_CannotFork);
if (messageClient)
{
// notify about rejected association
OFOStringStream out;
OFString temp_str;
out << "DIMSE Association Rejected:" << OFendl
<< " reason: cannot create association sub-process: " << OFStandard::strerror(errno, buf, sizeof(buf)) << OFendl
<< " calling presentation address: " << assoc->params->DULparams.callingPresentationAddress << OFendl
<< " calling AE title: " << assoc->params->DULparams.callingAPTitle << OFendl
<< " called AE title: " << assoc->params->DULparams.calledAPTitle << OFendl;
out << ASC_dumpConnectionParameters(temp_str, assoc) << OFendl;
out << OFStringStream_ends;
OFSTRINGSTREAM_GETSTR(out, theString)
if (useTLS)
messageClient->notifyReceivedEncryptedDICOMConnection(DVPSIPCMessage::statusError, theString);
else messageClient->notifyReceivedUnencryptedDICOMConnection(DVPSIPCMessage::statusError, theString);
OFSTRINGSTREAM_FREESTR(theString)
}
dropAssociation(&assoc);
} else if (pid > 0)
{
/* parent process */
assoc = NULL;
} else {
/* child process */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
// a generated UID contains the process ID and current time.
// Adding it to the PRNG seed guarantees that we have different seeds for
// different child processes.
char randomUID[65];
dcmGenerateUniqueIdentifier(randomUID);
if (tLayer) tLayer->addPRNGseed(randomUID, strlen(randomUID));
#endif
handleClient(&assoc, dbfolder, networkBitPreserving, useTLS, opt_correctUIDPadding);
finished2=OFTrue;
finished1=OFTrue;
}
#else
// Windows version - call CreateProcess()
finished2=OFTrue;
cond = ASC_dropNetwork(&net);
if (errorCond(cond, "Error dropping network:"))
{
if (messageClient)
{
messageClient->notifyApplicationTerminates(DVPSIPCMessage::statusError);
delete messageClient;
}
return 1;
}
// initialize startup info
const char *receiver_application = dvi.getReceiverName();
PROCESS_INFORMATION procinfo;
STARTUPINFO sinfo;
OFBitmanipTemplate<char>::zeroMem((char *)&sinfo, sizeof(sinfo));
sinfo.cb = sizeof(sinfo);
char commandline[4096];
sprintf(commandline, "%s %s %s", receiver_application, opt_cfgName, opt_cfgID);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (CreateProcess(NULL, commandline, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, &sinfo, &procinfo))
#else
if (CreateProcess(NULL, commandline, NULL, NULL, 0, DETACHED_PROCESS, NULL, NULL, &sinfo, &procinfo))
#endif
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
// a generated UID contains the process ID and current time.
// Adding it to the PRNG seed guarantees that we have different seeds for
// different child processes.
char randomUID[65];
dcmGenerateUniqueIdentifier(randomUID);
if (tLayer) tLayer->addPRNGseed(randomUID, strlen(randomUID));
#endif
handleClient(&assoc, dbfolder, networkBitPreserving, useTLS, opt_correctUIDPadding);
finished1=OFTrue;
} else {
OFLOG_ERROR(dcmpsrcvLogger, "Cannot execute command line: " << commandline);
refuseAssociation(assoc, ref_CannotFork);
if (messageClient)
{
// notify about rejected association
OFOStringStream out;
out << "DIMSE Association Rejected:" << OFendl
<< " reason: cannot execute command line: " << commandline << OFendl
<< " calling presentation address: " << assoc->params->DULparams.callingPresentationAddress << OFendl
<< " calling AE title: " << assoc->params->DULparams.callingAPTitle << OFendl
<< " called AE title: " << assoc->params->DULparams.calledAPTitle << OFendl;
ASC_dumpConnectionParameters(assoc, out);
out << OFStringStream_ends;
OFSTRINGSTREAM_GETSTR(out, theString)
if (useTLS)
messageClient->notifyReceivedEncryptedDICOMConnection(DVPSIPCMessage::statusError, theString);
else messageClient->notifyReceivedUnencryptedDICOMConnection(DVPSIPCMessage::statusError, theString);
OFSTRINGSTREAM_FREESTR(theString)
}
dropAssociation(&assoc);
}
#endif
break;
}
} // finished2
} // finished1
cleanChildren();
// tell the IPC server that we're going to terminate.
// We need to do this before we shutdown WinSock.
if (messageClient && notifyTermination)
{
messageClient->notifyApplicationTerminates(DVPSIPCMessage::statusOK);
delete messageClient;
}
#ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK_H
WSACleanup();
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (tLayer)
{
if (tLayer->canWriteRandomSeed())
{
if (!tLayer->writeRandomSeed(tlsRandomSeedFile.c_str()))
{
OFLOG_WARN(dcmpsrcvLogger, "cannot write back random seed file '" << tlsRandomSeedFile << "', ignoring");
}
} else {
OFLOG_WARN(dcmpsrcvLogger, "cannot write back random seed, ignoring");
}
}
delete tLayer;
#endif
OFSTRINGSTREAM_FREESTR(verboseParametersString)
#ifdef DEBUG
dcmDataDict.clear(); /* useful for debugging with dmalloc */
#endif
return 0;
} | 1 | CVE-2013-6825 | CWE-264 | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | Not Found in CWE Page | 9,318 |
Chrome | 802ecdb9cee0d66fe546bdf24e98150f8f716ad8 | void DoCheckFakeData(uint8* audio_data, size_t length) {
Type* output = reinterpret_cast<Type*>(audio_data);
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
EXPECT_TRUE(algorithm_.is_muted() || output[i] != 0);
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-5152 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 2,223 |
openssl | 708dc2f1291e104fe4eef810bb8ffc1fae5b19c1 | static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
int width)
{
size_t i, j;
if (top > b->top)
top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly
* zeroed */
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
buf[j] = ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i];
}
return 1;
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
int width)
{
size_t i, j;
if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
((unsigned char *)b->d)[i] = buf[j];
}
b->top = top;
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
return (0);
}
top = m->top;
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
}
return ret;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
/*
* Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. If
* this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part.
*/
if (in_mont != NULL)
mont = in_mont;
else {
if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
goto err;
}
#ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED
/*
* If the size of the operands allow it, perform the optimized
* RSAZ exponentiation. For further information see
* crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c and accompanying assembly modules.
*/
if ((16 == a->top) && (16 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 1024)
&& rsaz_avx2_eligible()) {
if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 16))
goto err;
RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->RR.d,
mont->n0[0]);
rr->top = 16;
rr->neg = 0;
bn_correct_top(rr);
ret = 1;
goto err;
} else if ((8 == a->top) && (8 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 512)) {
if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 8))
goto err;
RSAZ_512_mod_exp(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->n0[0], mont->RR.d);
rr->top = 8;
rr->neg = 0;
bn_correct_top(rr);
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
#endif
/* Get the window size to use with size of p. */
window = BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(bits);
#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
if (window >= 5 && (top & 15) == 0 && top <= 64 &&
(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) ==
(CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR) && (t4 = OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]))
window = 5;
else
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
if (window >= 5) {
window = 5; /* ~5% improvement for RSA2048 sign, and even
* for RSA4096 */
if ((top & 7) == 0)
powerbufLen += 2 * top * sizeof(m->d[0]);
}
#endif
(void)0;
/*
* Allocate a buffer large enough to hold all of the pre-computed powers
* of am, am itself and tmp.
*/
numPowers = 1 << window;
powerbufLen += sizeof(m->d[0]) * (top * numPowers +
((2 * top) >
numPowers ? (2 * top) : numPowers));
#ifdef alloca
if (powerbufLen < 3072)
powerbufFree =
alloca(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH);
else
#endif
if ((powerbufFree =
(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(powerbufLen +
MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH))
== NULL)
goto err;
powerbuf = MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(powerbufFree);
memset(powerbuf, 0, powerbufLen);
#ifdef alloca
if (powerbufLen < 3072)
powerbufFree = NULL;
#endif
/* lay down tmp and am right after powers table */
tmp.d = (BN_ULONG *)(powerbuf + sizeof(m->d[0]) * top * numPowers);
am.d = tmp.d + top;
tmp.top = am.top = 0;
tmp.dmax = am.dmax = top;
tmp.neg = am.neg = 0;
tmp.flags = am.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
/* prepare a^0 in Montgomery domain */
#if 1 /* by Shay Gueron's suggestion */
if (m->d[top - 1] & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) {
/* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */
tmp.d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2;
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
tmp.d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2;
tmp.top = top;
} else
#endif
if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
goto err;
/* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */
if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
} else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx))
goto err;
#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
if (t4) {
typedef int (*bn_pwr5_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
static const bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_funcs[4] = {
bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16,
bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32
};
bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_worker = pwr5_funcs[top / 16 - 1];
typedef int (*bn_mul_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0);
int bn_mul_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp,
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0);
int bn_mul_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0);
int bn_mul_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0);
int bn_mul_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0);
static const bn_mul_mont_f mul_funcs[4] = {
bn_mul_mont_t4_8, bn_mul_mont_t4_16,
bn_mul_mont_t4_24, bn_mul_mont_t4_32
};
bn_mul_mont_f mul_worker = mul_funcs[top / 16 - 1];
void bn_mul_mont_vis3(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
void bn_mul_mont_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
void bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
void bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num,
void *table, size_t power);
void bn_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num,
void *table, size_t power);
void bn_flip_t4(BN_ULONG *dst, BN_ULONG *src, size_t num);
BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0;
int stride = 5 * (6 - (top / 16 - 1)); /* multiple of 5, but less
* than 32 */
/*
* BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
* BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]...
*/
for (i = am.top; i < top; i++)
am.d[i] = 0;
for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
tmp.d[i] = 0;
bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(am.d, top, powerbuf, 1);
if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0) &&
!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0))
bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0) &&
!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0))
bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
/* switch to 64-bit domain */
np = alloca(top * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
top /= 2;
bn_flip_t4(np, mont->N.d, top);
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
bn_gather5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
/*
* Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
* significant bits.
*/
while (bits >= 0) {
if (bits < stride)
stride = bits + 1;
bits -= stride;
wvalue = bn_get_bits(p, bits + 1);
if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride))
continue;
/* retry once and fall back */
if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride))
continue;
bits += stride - 5;
wvalue >>= stride - 5;
wvalue &= 31;
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top,
wvalue);
}
bn_flip_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, top);
top *= 2;
/* back to 32-bit domain */
tmp.top = top;
bn_correct_top(&tmp);
OPENSSL_cleanse(np, top * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
} else
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
if (window == 5 && top > 1) {
/*
* This optimization uses ideas from http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239,
* specifically optimization of cache-timing attack countermeasures
* and pre-computation optimization.
*/
/*
* Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as
* 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size...
*/
void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num,
void *table, size_t power);
void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power);
void bn_power5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
int bn_get_bits5(const BN_ULONG *ap, int off);
int bn_from_montgomery(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const BN_ULONG *not_used, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0, *np2;
/*
* BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
* BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]...
*/
for (i = am.top; i < top; i++)
am.d[i] = 0;
for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
tmp.d[i] = 0;
if (top & 7)
np2 = np;
else
for (np2 = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++)
np2[2 * i] = np[i];
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
# if 0
for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
# else
/* same as above, but uses squaring for 1/2 of operations */
for (i = 4; i < 32; i *= 2) {
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) {
int j;
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) {
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, j);
}
}
for (; i < 16; i += 2) {
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i);
}
for (; i < 32; i += 2) {
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
# endif
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
bn_gather5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
/*
* Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
* significant bits.
*/
if (top & 7)
while (bits >= 0) {
for (wvalue = 0, i = 0; i < 5; i++, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top,
wvalue);
} else {
while (bits >= 0) {
wvalue = bn_get_bits5(p->d, bits - 4);
bits -= 5;
bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, wvalue);
}
}
ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np2, n0, top);
tmp.top = top;
bn_correct_top(&tmp);
if (ret) {
if (!BN_copy(rr, &tmp))
ret = 0;
goto err; /* non-zero ret means it's not error */
}
} else
#endif
{
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
goto err;
/*
* If the window size is greater than 1, then calculate
* val[i=2..2^winsize-1]. Powers are computed as a*a^(i-1) (even
* powers could instead be computed as (a^(i/2))^2 to use the slight
* performance advantage of sqr over mul).
*/
if (window > 1) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
goto err;
for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
goto err;
}
}
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
goto err;
/*
* Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
} else
#endif
{
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
goto err;
/*
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
}
/*
* Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
if (window > 1) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
goto err;
for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
goto err;
}
}
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
goto err;
/*
err:
if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
if (powerbuf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbufLen);
if (powerbufFree)
OPENSSL_free(powerbufFree);
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return (ret);
}
int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
/*
* Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
*/
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
goto err;
/* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
#define BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m) \
(BN_mul_word(r, (w)) && \
(/* BN_ucmp(r, (m)) < 0 ? 1 :*/ \
(BN_mod(t, r, m, ctx) && (swap_tmp = r, r = t, t = swap_tmp, 1))))
/*
* BN_MOD_MUL_WORD is only used with 'w' large, so the BN_ucmp test is
* probably more overhead than always using BN_mod (which uses BN_copy if
* a similar test returns true).
*/
/*
* We can use BN_mod and do not need BN_nnmod because our accumulator is
* never negative (the result of BN_mod does not depend on the sign of
* the modulus).
*/
#define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \
(BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx))
if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
/* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
bn_check_top(p);
bn_check_top(m);
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
return (0);
}
if (m->top == 1)
a %= m->d[0]; /* make sure that 'a' is reduced */
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
}
return ret;
}
if (a == 0) {
BN_zero(rr);
ret = 1;
return ret;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (d == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL)
goto err;
if (in_mont != NULL)
mont = in_mont;
else {
if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
goto err;
}
r_is_one = 1; /* except for Montgomery factor */
/* bits-1 >= 0 */
/* The result is accumulated in the product r*w. */
w = a; /* bit 'bits-1' of 'p' is always set */
for (b = bits - 2; b >= 0; b--) {
/* First, square r*w. */
next_w = w * w;
if ((next_w / w) != w) { /* overflow */
if (r_is_one) {
if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
goto err;
r_is_one = 0;
} else {
if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
goto err;
}
next_w = 1;
}
w = next_w;
if (!r_is_one) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* Second, multiply r*w by 'a' if exponent bit is set. */
if (BN_is_bit_set(p, b)) {
next_w = w * a;
if ((next_w / a) != w) { /* overflow */
if (r_is_one) {
if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
goto err;
r_is_one = 0;
} else {
if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
goto err;
}
next_w = a;
}
w = next_w;
}
}
/* Finally, set r:=r*w. */
if (w != 1) {
if (r_is_one) {
if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
goto err;
r_is_one = 0;
} else {
if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
goto err;
}
}
if (r_is_one) { /* can happen only if a == 1 */
if (!BN_one(rr))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
bn_check_top(rr);
return (ret);
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-0702 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 1,022 |
vim | d25f003342aca9889067f2e839963dfeccf1fe05 | do_put(
int regname,
char_u *expr_result, // result for regname "=" when compiled
int dir, // BACKWARD for 'P', FORWARD for 'p'
long count,
int flags)
{
char_u *ptr;
char_u *newp, *oldp;
int yanklen;
int totlen = 0; // init for gcc
linenr_T lnum;
colnr_T col;
long i; // index in y_array[]
int y_type;
long y_size;
int oldlen;
long y_width = 0;
colnr_T vcol;
int delcount;
int incr = 0;
long j;
struct block_def bd;
char_u **y_array = NULL;
yankreg_T *y_current_used = NULL;
long nr_lines = 0;
pos_T new_cursor;
int indent;
int orig_indent = 0; // init for gcc
int indent_diff = 0; // init for gcc
int first_indent = TRUE;
int lendiff = 0;
pos_T old_pos;
char_u *insert_string = NULL;
int allocated = FALSE;
long cnt;
pos_T orig_start = curbuf->b_op_start;
pos_T orig_end = curbuf->b_op_end;
unsigned int cur_ve_flags = get_ve_flags();
#ifdef FEAT_CLIPBOARD
// Adjust register name for "unnamed" in 'clipboard'.
adjust_clip_reg(®name);
(void)may_get_selection(regname);
#endif
if (flags & PUT_FIXINDENT)
orig_indent = get_indent();
curbuf->b_op_start = curwin->w_cursor; // default for '[ mark
curbuf->b_op_end = curwin->w_cursor; // default for '] mark
// Using inserted text works differently, because the register includes
// special characters (newlines, etc.).
if (regname == '.')
{
if (VIsual_active)
stuffcharReadbuff(VIsual_mode);
(void)stuff_inserted((dir == FORWARD ? (count == -1 ? 'o' : 'a') :
(count == -1 ? 'O' : 'i')), count, FALSE);
// Putting the text is done later, so can't really move the cursor to
// the next character. Use "l" to simulate it.
if ((flags & PUT_CURSEND) && gchar_cursor() != NUL)
stuffcharReadbuff('l');
return;
}
// For special registers '%' (file name), '#' (alternate file name) and
// ':' (last command line), etc. we have to create a fake yank register.
// For compiled code "expr_result" holds the expression result.
if (regname == '=' && expr_result != NULL)
insert_string = expr_result;
else if (get_spec_reg(regname, &insert_string, &allocated, TRUE)
&& insert_string == NULL)
return;
// Autocommands may be executed when saving lines for undo. This might
// make "y_array" invalid, so we start undo now to avoid that.
if (u_save(curwin->w_cursor.lnum, curwin->w_cursor.lnum + 1) == FAIL)
goto end;
if (insert_string != NULL)
{
y_type = MCHAR;
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
if (regname == '=')
{
// For the = register we need to split the string at NL
// characters.
// Loop twice: count the number of lines and save them.
for (;;)
{
y_size = 0;
ptr = insert_string;
while (ptr != NULL)
{
if (y_array != NULL)
y_array[y_size] = ptr;
++y_size;
ptr = vim_strchr(ptr, '\n');
if (ptr != NULL)
{
if (y_array != NULL)
*ptr = NUL;
++ptr;
// A trailing '\n' makes the register linewise.
if (*ptr == NUL)
{
y_type = MLINE;
break;
}
}
}
if (y_array != NULL)
break;
y_array = ALLOC_MULT(char_u *, y_size);
if (y_array == NULL)
goto end;
}
}
else
#endif
{
y_size = 1; // use fake one-line yank register
y_array = &insert_string;
}
}
else
{
get_yank_register(regname, FALSE);
y_type = y_current->y_type;
y_width = y_current->y_width;
y_size = y_current->y_size;
y_array = y_current->y_array;
y_current_used = y_current;
}
if (y_type == MLINE)
{
if (flags & PUT_LINE_SPLIT)
{
char_u *p;
// "p" or "P" in Visual mode: split the lines to put the text in
// between.
if (u_save_cursor() == FAIL)
goto end;
p = ml_get_cursor();
if (dir == FORWARD && *p != NUL)
MB_PTR_ADV(p);
ptr = vim_strsave(p);
if (ptr == NULL)
goto end;
ml_append(curwin->w_cursor.lnum, ptr, (colnr_T)0, FALSE);
vim_free(ptr);
oldp = ml_get_curline();
p = oldp + curwin->w_cursor.col;
if (dir == FORWARD && *p != NUL)
MB_PTR_ADV(p);
ptr = vim_strnsave(oldp, p - oldp);
if (ptr == NULL)
goto end;
ml_replace(curwin->w_cursor.lnum, ptr, FALSE);
++nr_lines;
dir = FORWARD;
}
if (flags & PUT_LINE_FORWARD)
{
// Must be "p" for a Visual block, put lines below the block.
curwin->w_cursor = curbuf->b_visual.vi_end;
dir = FORWARD;
}
curbuf->b_op_start = curwin->w_cursor; // default for '[ mark
curbuf->b_op_end = curwin->w_cursor; // default for '] mark
}
if (flags & PUT_LINE) // :put command or "p" in Visual line mode.
y_type = MLINE;
if (y_size == 0 || y_array == NULL)
{
semsg(_(e_nothing_in_register_str),
regname == 0 ? (char_u *)"\"" : transchar(regname));
goto end;
}
if (y_type == MBLOCK)
{
lnum = curwin->w_cursor.lnum + y_size + 1;
if (lnum > curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count)
lnum = curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count + 1;
if (u_save(curwin->w_cursor.lnum - 1, lnum) == FAIL)
goto end;
}
else if (y_type == MLINE)
{
lnum = curwin->w_cursor.lnum;
#ifdef FEAT_FOLDING
// Correct line number for closed fold. Don't move the cursor yet,
// u_save() uses it.
if (dir == BACKWARD)
(void)hasFolding(lnum, &lnum, NULL);
else
(void)hasFolding(lnum, NULL, &lnum);
#endif
if (dir == FORWARD)
++lnum;
// In an empty buffer the empty line is going to be replaced, include
// it in the saved lines.
if ((BUFEMPTY() ? u_save(0, 2) : u_save(lnum - 1, lnum)) == FAIL)
goto end;
#ifdef FEAT_FOLDING
if (dir == FORWARD)
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = lnum - 1;
else
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = lnum;
curbuf->b_op_start = curwin->w_cursor; // for mark_adjust()
#endif
}
else if (u_save_cursor() == FAIL)
goto end;
yanklen = (int)STRLEN(y_array[0]);
if (cur_ve_flags == VE_ALL && y_type == MCHAR)
{
if (gchar_cursor() == TAB)
{
int viscol = getviscol();
int ts = curbuf->b_p_ts;
// Don't need to insert spaces when "p" on the last position of a
// tab or "P" on the first position.
if (dir == FORWARD ?
#ifdef FEAT_VARTABS
tabstop_padding(viscol, ts, curbuf->b_p_vts_array) != 1
#else
ts - (viscol % ts) != 1
#endif
: curwin->w_cursor.coladd > 0)
coladvance_force(viscol);
else
curwin->w_cursor.coladd = 0;
}
else if (curwin->w_cursor.coladd > 0 || gchar_cursor() == NUL)
coladvance_force(getviscol() + (dir == FORWARD));
}
lnum = curwin->w_cursor.lnum;
col = curwin->w_cursor.col;
// Block mode
if (y_type == MBLOCK)
{
int c = gchar_cursor();
colnr_T endcol2 = 0;
if (dir == FORWARD && c != NUL)
{
if (cur_ve_flags == VE_ALL)
getvcol(curwin, &curwin->w_cursor, &col, NULL, &endcol2);
else
getvcol(curwin, &curwin->w_cursor, NULL, NULL, &col);
if (has_mbyte)
// move to start of next multi-byte character
curwin->w_cursor.col += (*mb_ptr2len)(ml_get_cursor());
else
if (c != TAB || cur_ve_flags != VE_ALL)
++curwin->w_cursor.col;
++col;
}
else
getvcol(curwin, &curwin->w_cursor, &col, NULL, &endcol2);
col += curwin->w_cursor.coladd;
if (cur_ve_flags == VE_ALL
&& (curwin->w_cursor.coladd > 0
|| endcol2 == curwin->w_cursor.col))
{
if (dir == FORWARD && c == NUL)
++col;
if (dir != FORWARD && c != NUL && curwin->w_cursor.coladd > 0)
++curwin->w_cursor.col;
if (c == TAB)
{
if (dir == BACKWARD && curwin->w_cursor.col)
curwin->w_cursor.col--;
if (dir == FORWARD && col - 1 == endcol2)
curwin->w_cursor.col++;
}
}
curwin->w_cursor.coladd = 0;
bd.textcol = 0;
for (i = 0; i < y_size; ++i)
{
int spaces = 0;
char shortline;
bd.startspaces = 0;
bd.endspaces = 0;
vcol = 0;
delcount = 0;
// add a new line
if (curwin->w_cursor.lnum > curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count)
{
if (ml_append(curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count, (char_u *)"",
(colnr_T)1, FALSE) == FAIL)
break;
++nr_lines;
}
// get the old line and advance to the position to insert at
oldp = ml_get_curline();
oldlen = (int)STRLEN(oldp);
for (ptr = oldp; vcol < col && *ptr; )
{
// Count a tab for what it's worth (if list mode not on)
incr = lbr_chartabsize_adv(oldp, &ptr, vcol);
vcol += incr;
}
bd.textcol = (colnr_T)(ptr - oldp);
shortline = (vcol < col) || (vcol == col && !*ptr) ;
if (vcol < col) // line too short, padd with spaces
bd.startspaces = col - vcol;
else if (vcol > col)
{
bd.endspaces = vcol - col;
bd.startspaces = incr - bd.endspaces;
--bd.textcol;
delcount = 1;
if (has_mbyte)
bd.textcol -= (*mb_head_off)(oldp, oldp + bd.textcol);
if (oldp[bd.textcol] != TAB)
{
// Only a Tab can be split into spaces. Other
// characters will have to be moved to after the
// block, causing misalignment.
delcount = 0;
bd.endspaces = 0;
}
}
yanklen = (int)STRLEN(y_array[i]);
if ((flags & PUT_BLOCK_INNER) == 0)
{
// calculate number of spaces required to fill right side of
// block
spaces = y_width + 1;
for (j = 0; j < yanklen; j++)
spaces -= lbr_chartabsize(NULL, &y_array[i][j], 0);
if (spaces < 0)
spaces = 0;
}
// Insert the new text.
// First check for multiplication overflow.
if (yanklen + spaces != 0
&& count > ((INT_MAX - (bd.startspaces + bd.endspaces))
/ (yanklen + spaces)))
{
emsg(_(e_resulting_text_too_long));
break;
}
totlen = count * (yanklen + spaces) + bd.startspaces + bd.endspaces;
newp = alloc(totlen + oldlen + 1);
if (newp == NULL)
break;
// copy part up to cursor to new line
ptr = newp;
mch_memmove(ptr, oldp, (size_t)bd.textcol);
ptr += bd.textcol;
// may insert some spaces before the new text
vim_memset(ptr, ' ', (size_t)bd.startspaces);
ptr += bd.startspaces;
// insert the new text
for (j = 0; j < count; ++j)
{
mch_memmove(ptr, y_array[i], (size_t)yanklen);
ptr += yanklen;
// insert block's trailing spaces only if there's text behind
if ((j < count - 1 || !shortline) && spaces)
{
vim_memset(ptr, ' ', (size_t)spaces);
ptr += spaces;
}
}
// may insert some spaces after the new text
vim_memset(ptr, ' ', (size_t)bd.endspaces);
ptr += bd.endspaces;
// move the text after the cursor to the end of the line.
mch_memmove(ptr, oldp + bd.textcol + delcount,
(size_t)(oldlen - bd.textcol - delcount + 1));
ml_replace(curwin->w_cursor.lnum, newp, FALSE);
++curwin->w_cursor.lnum;
if (i == 0)
curwin->w_cursor.col += bd.startspaces;
}
changed_lines(lnum, 0, curwin->w_cursor.lnum, nr_lines);
// Set '[ mark.
curbuf->b_op_start = curwin->w_cursor;
curbuf->b_op_start.lnum = lnum;
// adjust '] mark
curbuf->b_op_end.lnum = curwin->w_cursor.lnum - 1;
curbuf->b_op_end.col = bd.textcol + totlen - 1;
curbuf->b_op_end.coladd = 0;
if (flags & PUT_CURSEND)
{
colnr_T len;
curwin->w_cursor = curbuf->b_op_end;
curwin->w_cursor.col++;
// in Insert mode we might be after the NUL, correct for that
len = (colnr_T)STRLEN(ml_get_curline());
if (curwin->w_cursor.col > len)
curwin->w_cursor.col = len;
}
else
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = lnum;
}
else
{
// Character or Line mode
if (y_type == MCHAR)
{
// if type is MCHAR, FORWARD is the same as BACKWARD on the next
// char
if (dir == FORWARD && gchar_cursor() != NUL)
{
if (has_mbyte)
{
int bytelen = (*mb_ptr2len)(ml_get_cursor());
// put it on the next of the multi-byte character.
col += bytelen;
if (yanklen)
{
curwin->w_cursor.col += bytelen;
curbuf->b_op_end.col += bytelen;
}
}
else
{
++col;
if (yanklen)
{
++curwin->w_cursor.col;
++curbuf->b_op_end.col;
}
}
}
curbuf->b_op_start = curwin->w_cursor;
}
// Line mode: BACKWARD is the same as FORWARD on the previous line
else if (dir == BACKWARD)
--lnum;
new_cursor = curwin->w_cursor;
// simple case: insert into one line at a time
if (y_type == MCHAR && y_size == 1)
{
linenr_T end_lnum = 0; // init for gcc
linenr_T start_lnum = lnum;
int first_byte_off = 0;
if (VIsual_active)
{
end_lnum = curbuf->b_visual.vi_end.lnum;
if (end_lnum < curbuf->b_visual.vi_start.lnum)
end_lnum = curbuf->b_visual.vi_start.lnum;
if (end_lnum > start_lnum)
{
pos_T pos;
// "col" is valid for the first line, in following lines
// the virtual column needs to be used. Matters for
// multi-byte characters.
pos.lnum = lnum;
pos.col = col;
pos.coladd = 0;
getvcol(curwin, &pos, NULL, &vcol, NULL);
}
}
if (count == 0 || yanklen == 0)
{
if (VIsual_active)
lnum = end_lnum;
}
else if (count > INT_MAX / yanklen)
// multiplication overflow
emsg(_(e_resulting_text_too_long));
else
{
totlen = count * yanklen;
do {
oldp = ml_get(lnum);
oldlen = (int)STRLEN(oldp);
if (lnum > start_lnum)
{
pos_T pos;
pos.lnum = lnum;
if (getvpos(&pos, vcol) == OK)
col = pos.col;
else
col = MAXCOL;
}
if (VIsual_active && col > oldlen)
{
lnum++;
continue;
}
newp = alloc(totlen + oldlen + 1);
if (newp == NULL)
goto end; // alloc() gave an error message
mch_memmove(newp, oldp, (size_t)col);
ptr = newp + col;
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i)
{
mch_memmove(ptr, y_array[0], (size_t)yanklen);
ptr += yanklen;
}
STRMOVE(ptr, oldp + col);
ml_replace(lnum, newp, FALSE);
// compute the byte offset for the last character
first_byte_off = mb_head_off(newp, ptr - 1);
// Place cursor on last putted char.
if (lnum == curwin->w_cursor.lnum)
{
// make sure curwin->w_virtcol is updated
changed_cline_bef_curs();
curwin->w_cursor.col += (colnr_T)(totlen - 1);
}
if (VIsual_active)
lnum++;
} while (VIsual_active && lnum <= end_lnum);
if (VIsual_active) // reset lnum to the last visual line
lnum--;
}
// put '] at the first byte of the last character
curbuf->b_op_end = curwin->w_cursor;
curbuf->b_op_end.col -= first_byte_off;
// For "CTRL-O p" in Insert mode, put cursor after last char
if (totlen && (restart_edit != 0 || (flags & PUT_CURSEND)))
++curwin->w_cursor.col;
else
curwin->w_cursor.col -= first_byte_off;
changed_bytes(lnum, col);
}
else
{
linenr_T new_lnum = new_cursor.lnum;
size_t len;
// Insert at least one line. When y_type is MCHAR, break the first
// line in two.
for (cnt = 1; cnt <= count; ++cnt)
{
i = 0;
if (y_type == MCHAR)
{
// Split the current line in two at the insert position.
// First insert y_array[size - 1] in front of second line.
// Then append y_array[0] to first line.
lnum = new_cursor.lnum;
ptr = ml_get(lnum) + col;
totlen = (int)STRLEN(y_array[y_size - 1]);
newp = alloc(STRLEN(ptr) + totlen + 1);
if (newp == NULL)
goto error;
STRCPY(newp, y_array[y_size - 1]);
STRCAT(newp, ptr);
// insert second line
ml_append(lnum, newp, (colnr_T)0, FALSE);
++new_lnum;
vim_free(newp);
oldp = ml_get(lnum);
newp = alloc(col + yanklen + 1);
if (newp == NULL)
goto error;
// copy first part of line
mch_memmove(newp, oldp, (size_t)col);
// append to first line
mch_memmove(newp + col, y_array[0], (size_t)(yanklen + 1));
ml_replace(lnum, newp, FALSE);
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = lnum;
i = 1;
}
for (; i < y_size; ++i)
{
if (y_type != MCHAR || i < y_size - 1)
{
if (ml_append(lnum, y_array[i], (colnr_T)0, FALSE)
== FAIL)
goto error;
new_lnum++;
}
lnum++;
++nr_lines;
if (flags & PUT_FIXINDENT)
{
old_pos = curwin->w_cursor;
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = lnum;
ptr = ml_get(lnum);
if (cnt == count && i == y_size - 1)
lendiff = (int)STRLEN(ptr);
if (*ptr == '#' && preprocs_left())
indent = 0; // Leave # lines at start
else
if (*ptr == NUL)
indent = 0; // Ignore empty lines
else if (first_indent)
{
indent_diff = orig_indent - get_indent();
indent = orig_indent;
first_indent = FALSE;
}
else if ((indent = get_indent() + indent_diff) < 0)
indent = 0;
(void)set_indent(indent, 0);
curwin->w_cursor = old_pos;
// remember how many chars were removed
if (cnt == count && i == y_size - 1)
lendiff -= (int)STRLEN(ml_get(lnum));
}
}
if (cnt == 1)
new_lnum = lnum;
}
error:
// Adjust marks.
if (y_type == MLINE)
{
curbuf->b_op_start.col = 0;
if (dir == FORWARD)
curbuf->b_op_start.lnum++;
}
// Skip mark_adjust when adding lines after the last one, there
// can't be marks there. But still needed in diff mode.
if (curbuf->b_op_start.lnum + (y_type == MCHAR) - 1 + nr_lines
< curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count
#ifdef FEAT_DIFF
|| curwin->w_p_diff
#endif
)
mark_adjust(curbuf->b_op_start.lnum + (y_type == MCHAR),
(linenr_T)MAXLNUM, nr_lines, 0L);
// note changed text for displaying and folding
if (y_type == MCHAR)
changed_lines(curwin->w_cursor.lnum, col,
curwin->w_cursor.lnum + 1, nr_lines);
else
changed_lines(curbuf->b_op_start.lnum, 0,
curbuf->b_op_start.lnum, nr_lines);
if (y_current_used != NULL && (y_current_used != y_current
|| y_current->y_array != y_array))
{
// Something invoked through changed_lines() has changed the
// yank buffer, e.g. a GUI clipboard callback.
emsg(_(e_yank_register_changed_while_using_it));
goto end;
}
// Put the '] mark on the first byte of the last inserted character.
// Correct the length for change in indent.
curbuf->b_op_end.lnum = new_lnum;
len = STRLEN(y_array[y_size - 1]);
col = (colnr_T)len - lendiff;
if (col > 1)
{
curbuf->b_op_end.col = col - 1;
if (len > 0)
curbuf->b_op_end.col -= mb_head_off(y_array[y_size - 1],
y_array[y_size - 1] + len - 1);
}
else
curbuf->b_op_end.col = 0;
if (flags & PUT_CURSLINE)
{
// ":put": put cursor on last inserted line
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = lnum;
beginline(BL_WHITE | BL_FIX);
}
else if (flags & PUT_CURSEND)
{
// put cursor after inserted text
if (y_type == MLINE)
{
if (lnum >= curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count)
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count;
else
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = lnum + 1;
curwin->w_cursor.col = 0;
}
else
{
curwin->w_cursor.lnum = new_lnum;
curwin->w_cursor.col = col;
curbuf->b_op_end = curwin->w_cursor;
if (col > 1)
curbuf->b_op_end.col = col - 1;
}
}
else if (y_type == MLINE)
{
// put cursor on first non-blank in first inserted line
curwin->w_cursor.col = 0;
if (dir == FORWARD)
++curwin->w_cursor.lnum;
beginline(BL_WHITE | BL_FIX);
}
else // put cursor on first inserted character
curwin->w_cursor = new_cursor;
}
}
msgmore(nr_lines);
curwin->w_set_curswant = TRUE;
end:
if (cmdmod.cmod_flags & CMOD_LOCKMARKS)
{
curbuf->b_op_start = orig_start;
curbuf->b_op_end = orig_end;
}
if (allocated)
vim_free(insert_string);
if (regname == '=')
vim_free(y_array);
VIsual_active = FALSE;
// If the cursor is past the end of the line put it at the end.
adjust_cursor_eol();
} | 1 | CVE-2022-2264 | CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write | The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 5,626 |
typed_ast | 156afcb26c198e162504a57caddfe0acd9ed7dce | PyInit__ast3(void)
{
PyObject *m, *d;
if (!init_types()) return NULL;
m = PyModule_Create(&_astmodule);
if (!m) return NULL;
d = PyModule_GetDict(m);
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "AST", (PyObject*)&AST_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyModule_AddIntMacro(m, PyCF_ONLY_AST) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "mod", (PyObject*)mod_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Module", (PyObject*)Module_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Interactive", (PyObject*)Interactive_type) <
0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Expression", (PyObject*)Expression_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "FunctionType", (PyObject*)FunctionType_type) <
0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Suite", (PyObject*)Suite_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "stmt", (PyObject*)stmt_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "FunctionDef", (PyObject*)FunctionDef_type) <
0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "AsyncFunctionDef",
(PyObject*)AsyncFunctionDef_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "ClassDef", (PyObject*)ClassDef_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Return", (PyObject*)Return_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Delete", (PyObject*)Delete_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Assign", (PyObject*)Assign_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "AugAssign", (PyObject*)AugAssign_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "AnnAssign", (PyObject*)AnnAssign_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "For", (PyObject*)For_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "AsyncFor", (PyObject*)AsyncFor_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "While", (PyObject*)While_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "If", (PyObject*)If_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "With", (PyObject*)With_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "AsyncWith", (PyObject*)AsyncWith_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Raise", (PyObject*)Raise_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Try", (PyObject*)Try_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Assert", (PyObject*)Assert_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Import", (PyObject*)Import_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "ImportFrom", (PyObject*)ImportFrom_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Global", (PyObject*)Global_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Nonlocal", (PyObject*)Nonlocal_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Expr", (PyObject*)Expr_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Pass", (PyObject*)Pass_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Break", (PyObject*)Break_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Continue", (PyObject*)Continue_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "expr", (PyObject*)expr_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "BoolOp", (PyObject*)BoolOp_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "BinOp", (PyObject*)BinOp_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "UnaryOp", (PyObject*)UnaryOp_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Lambda", (PyObject*)Lambda_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "IfExp", (PyObject*)IfExp_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Dict", (PyObject*)Dict_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Set", (PyObject*)Set_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "ListComp", (PyObject*)ListComp_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "SetComp", (PyObject*)SetComp_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "DictComp", (PyObject*)DictComp_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "GeneratorExp", (PyObject*)GeneratorExp_type) <
0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Await", (PyObject*)Await_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Yield", (PyObject*)Yield_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "YieldFrom", (PyObject*)YieldFrom_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Compare", (PyObject*)Compare_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Call", (PyObject*)Call_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Num", (PyObject*)Num_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Str", (PyObject*)Str_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "FormattedValue",
(PyObject*)FormattedValue_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "JoinedStr", (PyObject*)JoinedStr_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Bytes", (PyObject*)Bytes_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "NameConstant", (PyObject*)NameConstant_type) <
0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Ellipsis", (PyObject*)Ellipsis_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Constant", (PyObject*)Constant_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Attribute", (PyObject*)Attribute_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Subscript", (PyObject*)Subscript_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Starred", (PyObject*)Starred_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Name", (PyObject*)Name_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "List", (PyObject*)List_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Tuple", (PyObject*)Tuple_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "expr_context", (PyObject*)expr_context_type) <
0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Load", (PyObject*)Load_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Store", (PyObject*)Store_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Del", (PyObject*)Del_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "AugLoad", (PyObject*)AugLoad_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "AugStore", (PyObject*)AugStore_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Param", (PyObject*)Param_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "slice", (PyObject*)slice_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Slice", (PyObject*)Slice_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "ExtSlice", (PyObject*)ExtSlice_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Index", (PyObject*)Index_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "boolop", (PyObject*)boolop_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "And", (PyObject*)And_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Or", (PyObject*)Or_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "operator", (PyObject*)operator_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Add", (PyObject*)Add_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Sub", (PyObject*)Sub_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Mult", (PyObject*)Mult_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "MatMult", (PyObject*)MatMult_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Div", (PyObject*)Div_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Mod", (PyObject*)Mod_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Pow", (PyObject*)Pow_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "LShift", (PyObject*)LShift_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "RShift", (PyObject*)RShift_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "BitOr", (PyObject*)BitOr_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "BitXor", (PyObject*)BitXor_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "BitAnd", (PyObject*)BitAnd_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "FloorDiv", (PyObject*)FloorDiv_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "unaryop", (PyObject*)unaryop_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Invert", (PyObject*)Invert_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Not", (PyObject*)Not_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "UAdd", (PyObject*)UAdd_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "USub", (PyObject*)USub_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "cmpop", (PyObject*)cmpop_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Eq", (PyObject*)Eq_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "NotEq", (PyObject*)NotEq_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Lt", (PyObject*)Lt_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "LtE", (PyObject*)LtE_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Gt", (PyObject*)Gt_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "GtE", (PyObject*)GtE_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "Is", (PyObject*)Is_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "IsNot", (PyObject*)IsNot_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "In", (PyObject*)In_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "NotIn", (PyObject*)NotIn_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "comprehension", (PyObject*)comprehension_type)
< 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "excepthandler", (PyObject*)excepthandler_type)
< 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "ExceptHandler", (PyObject*)ExceptHandler_type)
< 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "arguments", (PyObject*)arguments_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "arg", (PyObject*)arg_type) < 0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "keyword", (PyObject*)keyword_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "alias", (PyObject*)alias_type) < 0) return
NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "withitem", (PyObject*)withitem_type) < 0)
return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "type_ignore", (PyObject*)type_ignore_type) <
0) return NULL;
if (PyDict_SetItemString(d, "TypeIgnore", (PyObject*)TypeIgnore_type) < 0)
return NULL;
return m;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,600 |
linux | fdf82a7856b32d905c39afc85e34364491e46346 | static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
{
enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
} else {
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
continue;
cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
break;
}
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
}
}
return cmd;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,338 |
linux-2.6 | 672ca28e300c17bf8d792a2a7a8631193e580c74 | static inline int use_zero_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
/*
* We don't want to optimize FOLL_ANON for make_pages_present()
* when it tries to page in a VM_LOCKED region. As to VM_SHARED,
* we want to get the page from the page tables to make sure
* that we serialize and update with any other user of that
* mapping.
*/
if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_LOCKED | VM_SHARED))
return 0;
/*
* And if we have a fault or a nopfn routine, it's not an
* anonymous region.
*/
return !vma->vm_ops ||
(!vma->vm_ops->fault && !vma->vm_ops->nopfn);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,716 |
drm | 9f1f1a2dab38d4ce87a13565cf4dc1b73bef3a5f | struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
const char *connector_name = connector->name;
char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL;
struct edid *edid;
if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
/*
* If there are multiple edid files specified and separated
* by commas, search through the list looking for one that
* matches the connector.
*
* If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep
* the last one found one as a fallback.
*/
fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
edidstr = fwstr;
while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {
if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname))
continue;
edidname = colon + 1;
break;
}
if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */
fallback = edidname;
}
| 1 | CVE-2019-12382 | CWE-476 | NULL Pointer Dereference | The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL. | Phase: Implementation
If all pointers that could have been modified are checked for NULL before use, nearly all NULL pointer dereferences can be prevented.
Phase: Requirements
Select a programming language that is not susceptible to these issues.
Phase: Implementation
Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is non-null before acting upon it.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: Checking the return value of the function will typically be sufficient, however beware of race conditions (CWE-362) in a concurrent environment. This solution does not handle the use of improperly initialized variables (CWE-665).
Phase: Architecture and Design
Identify all variables and data stores that receive information from external sources, and apply input validation to make sure that they are only initialized to expected values.
Phase: Implementation
Explicitly initialize all variables and other data stores, either during declaration or just before the first usage. | 8,237 |
linux | 2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f | static inline int fd_eject(int drive)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,432 |
linux | 786de92b3cb26012d3d0f00ee37adf14527f35c4 | static int uas_switch_interface(struct usb_device *udev,
struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int alt;
alt = uas_find_uas_alt_setting(intf);
if (alt < 0)
return alt;
return usb_set_interface(udev,
intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber, alt);
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-16530 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 1,955 |
curl | curl-7_51_0-162-g3ab3c16 | static int dprintf_formatf(
void *data, /* untouched by format(), just sent to the stream() function in
the second argument */
/* function pointer called for each output character */
int (*stream)(int, FILE *),
const char *format, /* %-formatted string */
va_list ap_save) /* list of parameters */
{
/* Base-36 digits for numbers. */
const char *digits = lower_digits;
/* Pointer into the format string. */
char *f;
/* Number of characters written. */
int done = 0;
long param; /* current parameter to read */
long param_num=0; /* parameter counter */
va_stack_t vto[MAX_PARAMETERS];
char *endpos[MAX_PARAMETERS];
char **end;
char work[BUFFSIZE];
va_stack_t *p;
/* 'workend' points to the final buffer byte position, but with an extra
byte as margin to avoid the (false?) warning Coverity gives us
otherwise */
char *workend = &work[sizeof(work) - 2];
/* Do the actual %-code parsing */
if(dprintf_Pass1(format, vto, endpos, ap_save))
return -1;
end = &endpos[0]; /* the initial end-position from the list dprintf_Pass1()
created for us */
f = (char *)format;
while(*f != '\0') {
/* Format spec modifiers. */
int is_alt;
/* Width of a field. */
long width;
/* Precision of a field. */
long prec;
/* Decimal integer is negative. */
int is_neg;
/* Base of a number to be written. */
long base;
/* Integral values to be written. */
mp_uintmax_t num;
/* Used to convert negative in positive. */
mp_intmax_t signed_num;
char *w;
if(*f != '%') {
/* This isn't a format spec, so write everything out until the next one
OR end of string is reached. */
do {
OUTCHAR(*f);
} while(*++f && ('%' != *f));
continue;
}
++f;
/* Check for "%%". Note that although the ANSI standard lists
'%' as a conversion specifier, it says "The complete format
specification shall be `%%'," so we can avoid all the width
and precision processing. */
if(*f == '%') {
++f;
OUTCHAR('%');
continue;
}
/* If this is a positional parameter, the position must follow immediately
after the %, thus create a %<num>$ sequence */
param=dprintf_DollarString(f, &f);
if(!param)
param = param_num;
else
--param;
param_num++; /* increase this always to allow "%2$s %1$s %s" and then the
third %s will pick the 3rd argument */
p = &vto[param];
/* pick up the specified width */
if(p->flags & FLAGS_WIDTHPARAM) {
width = (long)vto[p->width].data.num.as_signed;
param_num++; /* since the width is extracted from a parameter, we
must skip that to get to the next one properly */
if(width < 0) {
/* "A negative field width is taken as a '-' flag followed by a
positive field width." */
width = -width;
p->flags |= FLAGS_LEFT;
p->flags &= ~FLAGS_PAD_NIL;
}
}
else
width = p->width;
/* pick up the specified precision */
if(p->flags & FLAGS_PRECPARAM) {
prec = (long)vto[p->precision].data.num.as_signed;
param_num++; /* since the precision is extracted from a parameter, we
must skip that to get to the next one properly */
if(prec < 0)
/* "A negative precision is taken as if the precision were
omitted." */
prec = -1;
}
else if(p->flags & FLAGS_PREC)
prec = p->precision;
else
prec = -1;
is_alt = (p->flags & FLAGS_ALT) ? 1 : 0;
switch(p->type) {
case FORMAT_INT:
num = p->data.num.as_unsigned;
if(p->flags & FLAGS_CHAR) {
/* Character. */
if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT))
while(--width > 0)
OUTCHAR(' ');
OUTCHAR((char) num);
if(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT)
while(--width > 0)
OUTCHAR(' ');
break;
}
if(p->flags & FLAGS_OCTAL) {
/* Octal unsigned integer. */
base = 8;
goto unsigned_number;
}
else if(p->flags & FLAGS_HEX) {
/* Hexadecimal unsigned integer. */
digits = (p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER)? upper_digits : lower_digits;
base = 16;
goto unsigned_number;
}
else if(p->flags & FLAGS_UNSIGNED) {
/* Decimal unsigned integer. */
base = 10;
goto unsigned_number;
}
/* Decimal integer. */
base = 10;
is_neg = (p->data.num.as_signed < (mp_intmax_t)0) ? 1 : 0;
if(is_neg) {
/* signed_num might fail to hold absolute negative minimum by 1 */
signed_num = p->data.num.as_signed + (mp_intmax_t)1;
signed_num = -signed_num;
num = (mp_uintmax_t)signed_num;
num += (mp_uintmax_t)1;
}
goto number;
unsigned_number:
/* Unsigned number of base BASE. */
is_neg = 0;
number:
/* Number of base BASE. */
/* Supply a default precision if none was given. */
if(prec == -1)
prec = 1;
/* Put the number in WORK. */
w = workend;
while(num > 0) {
*w-- = digits[num % base];
num /= base;
}
width -= (long)(workend - w);
prec -= (long)(workend - w);
if(is_alt && base == 8 && prec <= 0) {
*w-- = '0';
--width;
}
if(prec > 0) {
width -= prec;
while(prec-- > 0)
*w-- = '0';
}
if(is_alt && base == 16)
width -= 2;
if(is_neg || (p->flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN) || (p->flags & FLAGS_SPACE))
--width;
if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT) && !(p->flags & FLAGS_PAD_NIL))
while(width-- > 0)
OUTCHAR(' ');
if(is_neg)
OUTCHAR('-');
else if(p->flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN)
OUTCHAR('+');
else if(p->flags & FLAGS_SPACE)
OUTCHAR(' ');
if(is_alt && base == 16) {
OUTCHAR('0');
if(p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER)
OUTCHAR('X');
else
OUTCHAR('x');
}
if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT) && (p->flags & FLAGS_PAD_NIL))
while(width-- > 0)
OUTCHAR('0');
/* Write the number. */
while(++w <= workend) {
OUTCHAR(*w);
}
if(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT)
while(width-- > 0)
OUTCHAR(' ');
break;
case FORMAT_STRING:
/* String. */
{
static const char null[] = "(nil)";
const char *str;
size_t len;
str = (char *) p->data.str;
if(str == NULL) {
/* Write null[] if there's space. */
if(prec == -1 || prec >= (long) sizeof(null) - 1) {
str = null;
len = sizeof(null) - 1;
/* Disable quotes around (nil) */
p->flags &= (~FLAGS_ALT);
}
else {
str = "";
len = 0;
}
}
else if(prec != -1)
len = (size_t)prec;
else
len = strlen(str);
width -= (len > LONG_MAX) ? LONG_MAX : (long)len;
if(p->flags & FLAGS_ALT)
OUTCHAR('"');
if(!(p->flags&FLAGS_LEFT))
while(width-- > 0)
OUTCHAR(' ');
while((len-- > 0) && *str)
OUTCHAR(*str++);
if(p->flags&FLAGS_LEFT)
while(width-- > 0)
OUTCHAR(' ');
if(p->flags & FLAGS_ALT)
OUTCHAR('"');
}
break;
case FORMAT_PTR:
/* Generic pointer. */
{
void *ptr;
ptr = (void *) p->data.ptr;
if(ptr != NULL) {
/* If the pointer is not NULL, write it as a %#x spec. */
base = 16;
digits = (p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER)? upper_digits : lower_digits;
is_alt = 1;
num = (size_t) ptr;
is_neg = 0;
goto number;
}
else {
/* Write "(nil)" for a nil pointer. */
static const char strnil[] = "(nil)";
const char *point;
width -= (long)(sizeof(strnil) - 1);
if(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT)
while(width-- > 0)
OUTCHAR(' ');
for(point = strnil; *point != '\0'; ++point)
OUTCHAR(*point);
if(! (p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT))
while(width-- > 0)
OUTCHAR(' ');
}
}
break;
case FORMAT_DOUBLE:
{
char formatbuf[32]="%";
char *fptr = &formatbuf[1];
size_t left = sizeof(formatbuf)-strlen(formatbuf);
int len;
width = -1;
if(p->flags & FLAGS_WIDTH)
width = p->width;
else if(p->flags & FLAGS_WIDTHPARAM)
width = (long)vto[p->width].data.num.as_signed;
prec = -1;
if(p->flags & FLAGS_PREC)
prec = p->precision;
else if(p->flags & FLAGS_PRECPARAM)
prec = (long)vto[p->precision].data.num.as_signed;
if(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT)
*fptr++ = '-';
if(p->flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN)
*fptr++ = '+';
if(p->flags & FLAGS_SPACE)
*fptr++ = ' ';
if(p->flags & FLAGS_ALT)
*fptr++ = '#';
*fptr = 0;
if(width >= 0) {
/* RECURSIVE USAGE */
len = curl_msnprintf(fptr, left, "%ld", width);
fptr += len;
left -= len;
}
if(prec >= 0) {
/* RECURSIVE USAGE */
len = curl_msnprintf(fptr, left, ".%ld", prec);
fptr += len;
}
if(p->flags & FLAGS_LONG)
*fptr++ = 'l';
if(p->flags & FLAGS_FLOATE)
*fptr++ = (char)((p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER) ? 'E':'e');
else if(p->flags & FLAGS_FLOATG)
*fptr++ = (char)((p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER) ? 'G' : 'g');
else
*fptr++ = 'f';
*fptr = 0; /* and a final zero termination */
/* NOTE NOTE NOTE!! Not all sprintf implementations return number of
output characters */
(sprintf)(work, formatbuf, p->data.dnum);
for(fptr=work; *fptr; fptr++)
OUTCHAR(*fptr);
}
break;
case FORMAT_INTPTR:
/* Answer the count of characters written. */
#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG_TYPE
if(p->flags & FLAGS_LONGLONG)
*(LONG_LONG_TYPE *) p->data.ptr = (LONG_LONG_TYPE)done;
else
#endif
if(p->flags & FLAGS_LONG)
*(long *) p->data.ptr = (long)done;
else if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_SHORT))
*(int *) p->data.ptr = (int)done;
else
*(short *) p->data.ptr = (short)done;
break;
default:
break;
}
f = *end++; /* goto end of %-code */
}
return done;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-9586 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 7,355 |
didiwiki | 5e5c796617e1712905dc5462b94bd5e6c08d15ea | is_wiki_format_char_or_space(char c)
{
if (isspace(c)) return 1;
if (strchr("/*_-", c)) return 1;
return 0;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,318 |
linux | d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 | int ptrace_writedata(struct task_struct *tsk, char __user *src, unsigned long dst, int len)
{
int copied = 0;
while (len > 0) {
char buf[128];
int this_len, retval;
this_len = (len > sizeof(buf)) ? sizeof(buf) : len;
if (copy_from_user(buf, src, this_len))
return -EFAULT;
retval = access_process_vm(tsk, dst, buf, this_len, 1);
if (!retval) {
if (copied)
break;
return -EIO;
}
copied += retval;
src += retval;
dst += retval;
len -= retval;
}
return copied;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,381 |
Chrome | 4843d98517bd37e5940cd04627c6cfd2ac774d11 | void CorePageLoadMetricsObserver::OnComplete(
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadTiming& timing,
const page_load_metrics::PageLoadExtraInfo& info) {
RecordTimingHistograms(timing, info);
RecordRappor(timing, info);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,859 |
FreeRDP | 0d79670a28c0ab049af08613621aa0c267f977e9 | wf_cliprdr_server_file_contents_request(CliprdrClientContext* context,
const CLIPRDR_FILE_CONTENTS_REQUEST* fileContentsRequest)
{
DWORD uSize = 0;
BYTE* pData = NULL;
HRESULT hRet = S_OK;
FORMATETC vFormatEtc;
LPDATAOBJECT pDataObj = NULL;
STGMEDIUM vStgMedium;
BOOL bIsStreamFile = TRUE;
static LPSTREAM pStreamStc = NULL;
static UINT32 uStreamIdStc = 0;
wfClipboard* clipboard;
UINT rc = ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
UINT sRc;
UINT32 cbRequested;
if (!context || !fileContentsRequest)
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
clipboard = (wfClipboard*)context->custom;
if (!clipboard)
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
cbRequested = fileContentsRequest->cbRequested;
if (fileContentsRequest->dwFlags == FILECONTENTS_SIZE)
cbRequested = sizeof(UINT64);
pData = (BYTE*)calloc(1, cbRequested);
if (!pData)
goto error;
hRet = OleGetClipboard(&pDataObj);
if (FAILED(hRet))
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "filecontents: get ole clipboard failed.");
goto error;
}
ZeroMemory(&vFormatEtc, sizeof(FORMATETC));
ZeroMemory(&vStgMedium, sizeof(STGMEDIUM));
vFormatEtc.cfFormat = RegisterClipboardFormat(CFSTR_FILECONTENTS);
vFormatEtc.tymed = TYMED_ISTREAM;
vFormatEtc.dwAspect = 1;
vFormatEtc.lindex = fileContentsRequest->listIndex;
vFormatEtc.ptd = NULL;
if ((uStreamIdStc != fileContentsRequest->streamId) || !pStreamStc)
{
LPENUMFORMATETC pEnumFormatEtc;
ULONG CeltFetched;
FORMATETC vFormatEtc2;
if (pStreamStc)
{
IStream_Release(pStreamStc);
pStreamStc = NULL;
}
bIsStreamFile = FALSE;
hRet = IDataObject_EnumFormatEtc(pDataObj, DATADIR_GET, &pEnumFormatEtc);
if (hRet == S_OK)
{
do
{
hRet = IEnumFORMATETC_Next(pEnumFormatEtc, 1, &vFormatEtc2, &CeltFetched);
if (hRet == S_OK)
{
if (vFormatEtc2.cfFormat == RegisterClipboardFormat(CFSTR_FILECONTENTS))
{
hRet = IDataObject_GetData(pDataObj, &vFormatEtc, &vStgMedium);
if (hRet == S_OK)
{
pStreamStc = vStgMedium.pstm;
uStreamIdStc = fileContentsRequest->streamId;
bIsStreamFile = TRUE;
}
break;
}
}
} while (hRet == S_OK);
}
}
if (bIsStreamFile == TRUE)
{
if (fileContentsRequest->dwFlags == FILECONTENTS_SIZE)
{
STATSTG vStatStg;
ZeroMemory(&vStatStg, sizeof(STATSTG));
hRet = IStream_Stat(pStreamStc, &vStatStg, STATFLAG_NONAME);
if (hRet == S_OK)
{
*((UINT32*)&pData[0]) = vStatStg.cbSize.LowPart;
*((UINT32*)&pData[4]) = vStatStg.cbSize.HighPart;
uSize = cbRequested;
}
}
else if (fileContentsRequest->dwFlags == FILECONTENTS_RANGE)
{
LARGE_INTEGER dlibMove;
ULARGE_INTEGER dlibNewPosition;
dlibMove.HighPart = fileContentsRequest->nPositionHigh;
dlibMove.LowPart = fileContentsRequest->nPositionLow;
hRet = IStream_Seek(pStreamStc, dlibMove, STREAM_SEEK_SET, &dlibNewPosition);
if (SUCCEEDED(hRet))
hRet = IStream_Read(pStreamStc, pData, cbRequested, (PULONG)&uSize);
}
}
else
{
if (fileContentsRequest->dwFlags == FILECONTENTS_SIZE)
{
*((UINT32*)&pData[0]) =
clipboard->fileDescriptor[fileContentsRequest->listIndex]->nFileSizeLow;
*((UINT32*)&pData[4]) =
clipboard->fileDescriptor[fileContentsRequest->listIndex]->nFileSizeHigh;
uSize = cbRequested;
}
else if (fileContentsRequest->dwFlags == FILECONTENTS_RANGE)
{
BOOL bRet;
bRet = wf_cliprdr_get_file_contents(
clipboard->file_names[fileContentsRequest->listIndex], pData,
fileContentsRequest->nPositionLow, fileContentsRequest->nPositionHigh, cbRequested,
&uSize);
if (bRet == FALSE)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "get file contents failed.");
uSize = 0;
goto error;
}
}
}
rc = CHANNEL_RC_OK;
error:
if (pDataObj)
IDataObject_Release(pDataObj);
if (uSize == 0)
{
free(pData);
pData = NULL;
}
sRc =
cliprdr_send_response_filecontents(clipboard, fileContentsRequest->streamId, uSize, pData);
free(pData);
if (sRc != CHANNEL_RC_OK)
return sRc;
return rc;
} | 1 | CVE-2021-37594 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 6,411 |
linux | 51bda2bca53b265715ca1852528f38dc67429d9a | static int hidp_session_new(struct hidp_session **out, const bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
struct socket *ctrl_sock,
struct socket *intr_sock,
struct hidp_connadd_req *req,
struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
struct hidp_session *session;
int ret;
struct bt_sock *ctrl, *intr;
ctrl = bt_sk(ctrl_sock->sk);
intr = bt_sk(intr_sock->sk);
session = kzalloc(sizeof(*session), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!session)
return -ENOMEM;
/* object and runtime management */
kref_init(&session->ref);
atomic_set(&session->state, HIDP_SESSION_IDLING);
init_waitqueue_head(&session->state_queue);
session->flags = req->flags & (1 << HIDP_BLUETOOTH_VENDOR_ID);
/* connection management */
bacpy(&session->bdaddr, bdaddr);
session->conn = l2cap_conn_get(conn);
session->user.probe = hidp_session_probe;
session->user.remove = hidp_session_remove;
session->ctrl_sock = ctrl_sock;
session->intr_sock = intr_sock;
skb_queue_head_init(&session->ctrl_transmit);
skb_queue_head_init(&session->intr_transmit);
session->ctrl_mtu = min_t(uint, l2cap_pi(ctrl)->chan->omtu,
l2cap_pi(ctrl)->chan->imtu);
session->intr_mtu = min_t(uint, l2cap_pi(intr)->chan->omtu,
l2cap_pi(intr)->chan->imtu);
session->idle_to = req->idle_to;
/* device management */
INIT_WORK(&session->dev_init, hidp_session_dev_work);
setup_timer(&session->timer, hidp_idle_timeout,
(unsigned long)session);
/* session data */
mutex_init(&session->report_mutex);
init_waitqueue_head(&session->report_queue);
ret = hidp_session_dev_init(session, req);
if (ret)
goto err_free;
get_file(session->intr_sock->file);
get_file(session->ctrl_sock->file);
*out = session;
return 0;
err_free:
l2cap_conn_put(session->conn);
kfree(session);
return ret;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,633 |
radare2 | d1e8ac62c6d978d4662f69116e30230d43033c92 | struct addr_t* MACH0_(get_entrypoint)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct addr_t *entry;
int i;
if (!bin->entry && !bin->sects) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(entry = calloc (1, sizeof (struct addr_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->entry) {
entry->addr = entry_to_vaddr (bin);
entry->offset = addr_to_offset (bin, entry->addr);
entry->haddr = sdb_num_get (bin->kv, "mach0.entry.offset", 0);
}
if (!bin->entry || entry->offset == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsects; i++) {
if (!strncmp (bin->sects[i].sectname, "__text", 6)) {
entry->offset = (ut64)bin->sects[i].offset;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "mach0.entry", entry->offset, 0);
entry->addr = (ut64)bin->sects[i].addr;
if (!entry->addr) { // workaround for object files
entry->addr = entry->offset;
}
break;
}
}
bin->entry = entry->addr;
}
return entry;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-7946 | CWE-416 | Use After Free | The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: If a bug causes an attempted access of this pointer, then a NULL dereference could still lead to a crash or other unexpected behavior, but it will reduce or eliminate the risk of code execution. | 704 |
sysstat | edbf507678bf10914e9804ff8a06737fdcb2e781 | int remap_struct(unsigned int gtypes_nr[], unsigned int ftypes_nr[],
void *ps, unsigned int f_size, unsigned int g_size, size_t b_size)
{
int d;
size_t n;
/* Sanity check */
if (MAP_SIZE(ftypes_nr) > f_size)
return -1;
/* Remap [unsigned] long fields */
d = gtypes_nr[0] - ftypes_nr[0];
if (d) {
n = MINIMUM(f_size - ftypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
g_size - gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH);
if ((ftypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH >= b_size) ||
(gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH + n > b_size) ||
(ftypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH + n > b_size))
return -1;
memmove(((char *) ps) + gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
((char *) ps) + ftypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH, n);
if (d > 0) {
memset(((char *) ps) + ftypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
0, d * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH);
}
}
/* Remap [unsigned] int fields */
d = gtypes_nr[1] - ftypes_nr[1];
if (d) {
n = MINIMUM(f_size - ftypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
- ftypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
g_size - gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
- gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH);
if ((gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
ftypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH >= b_size) ||
(gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH + n > b_size) ||
(gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
ftypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH + n > b_size))
return -1;
memmove(((char *) ps) + gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
((char *) ps) + gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ ftypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH, n);
if (d > 0) {
memset(((char *) ps) + gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ ftypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
0, d * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH);
}
}
/* Remap possible fields (like strings of chars) following int fields */
d = gtypes_nr[2] - ftypes_nr[2];
if (d) {
n = MINIMUM(f_size - ftypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
- ftypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
- ftypes_nr[2] * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
g_size - gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
- gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
- gtypes_nr[2] * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH);
if ((gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
ftypes_nr[2] * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH >= b_size) ||
(gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
gtypes_nr[2] * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH + n > b_size) ||
(gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH +
ftypes_nr[2] * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH + n > b_size))
return -1;
memmove(((char *) ps) + gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ gtypes_nr[2] * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
((char *) ps) + gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ ftypes_nr[2] * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH, n);
if (d > 0) {
memset(((char *) ps) + gtypes_nr[0] * ULL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ gtypes_nr[1] * UL_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH
+ ftypes_nr[2] * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH,
0, d * U_ALIGNMENT_WIDTH);
}
}
return 0;
} | 1 | CVE-2019-16167 | CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write | The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 3,671 |
Android | 308396a55280f69ad4112d4f9892f4cbeff042aa | xmlStopParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_USER_STOP;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,262 |
linux | 687cb0884a714ff484d038e9190edc874edcf146 | static enum oom_constraint constrained_alloc(struct oom_control *oc)
{
struct zone *zone;
struct zoneref *z;
enum zone_type high_zoneidx = gfp_zone(oc->gfp_mask);
bool cpuset_limited = false;
int nid;
if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) {
oc->totalpages = mem_cgroup_get_limit(oc->memcg) ?: 1;
return CONSTRAINT_MEMCG;
}
/* Default to all available memory */
oc->totalpages = totalram_pages + total_swap_pages;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA))
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
if (!oc->zonelist)
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
/*
* Reach here only when __GFP_NOFAIL is used. So, we should avoid
* to kill current.We have to random task kill in this case.
* Hopefully, CONSTRAINT_THISNODE...but no way to handle it, now.
*/
if (oc->gfp_mask & __GFP_THISNODE)
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
/*
* This is not a __GFP_THISNODE allocation, so a truncated nodemask in
* the page allocator means a mempolicy is in effect. Cpuset policy
* is enforced in get_page_from_freelist().
*/
if (oc->nodemask &&
!nodes_subset(node_states[N_MEMORY], *oc->nodemask)) {
oc->totalpages = total_swap_pages;
for_each_node_mask(nid, *oc->nodemask)
oc->totalpages += node_spanned_pages(nid);
return CONSTRAINT_MEMORY_POLICY;
}
/* Check this allocation failure is caused by cpuset's wall function */
for_each_zone_zonelist_nodemask(zone, z, oc->zonelist,
high_zoneidx, oc->nodemask)
if (!cpuset_zone_allowed(zone, oc->gfp_mask))
cpuset_limited = true;
if (cpuset_limited) {
oc->totalpages = total_swap_pages;
for_each_node_mask(nid, cpuset_current_mems_allowed)
oc->totalpages += node_spanned_pages(nid);
return CONSTRAINT_CPUSET;
}
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,547 |
Chrome | 108147dfd1ea159fd3632ef92ccc4ab8952980c7 | bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowPluginTypeForDocument(
const Document& document,
const String& type,
const String& type_attribute,
const KURL& url,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
if (document.GetContentSecurityPolicy() &&
!document.GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowPluginType(
type, type_attribute, url, reporting_policy))
return false;
LocalFrame* frame = document.GetFrame();
if (frame && frame->Tree().Parent() && document.IsPluginDocument()) {
ContentSecurityPolicy* parent_csp = frame->Tree()
.Parent()
->GetSecurityContext()
->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (parent_csp && !parent_csp->AllowPluginType(type, type_attribute, url,
reporting_policy))
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 1 | CVE-2019-5799 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 1,533 |
tcpdump | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | l2tp_call_errors_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CRCErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FrameErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "HardOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BufOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Timeout=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AlignErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-13006 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 3,964 |
tcpdump | 5338aac7b8b880b0c5e0c15e27dadc44c5559284 | mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
}
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[1]);
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[hlen], 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(-1);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,861 |
FreeRDP | d6cd14059b257318f176c0ba3ee0a348826a9ef8 | static BOOL security_premaster_hash(const char* input, int length, const BYTE* premaster_secret,
const BYTE* client_random, const BYTE* server_random,
BYTE* output)
{
/* PremasterHash(Input) = SaltedHash(PremasterSecret, Input, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) */
return security_salted_hash(premaster_secret, (BYTE*)input, length, client_random,
server_random, output);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,211 |
mbedtls | e5af9fabf7d68e3807b6ea78792794b8352dbba2 | int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
int auth_done = 0;
unsigned char * data;
unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
size_t add_data_len;
size_t post_avail;
/* The SSL context is only used for debugging purposes! */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */
((void) ssl);
#endif
/* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used
* for CBC transformations in TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. */
#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) )
((void) f_rng);
((void) p_rng);
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) );
if( transform == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no transform provided to encrypt_buf" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( rec == NULL
|| rec->buf == NULL
|| rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset
|| rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|| rec->cid_len != 0
#endif
)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset;
post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload",
data, rec->data_len );
mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
rec->data_len,
(size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
/* The following two code paths implement the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext
* structure present in TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 + CID.
*
* See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information.
*
* Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence
* `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards.
*
* Note also that the two code paths cannot occur simultaneously
* since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There
* is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
{
size_t padding =
ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data,
&rec->data_len,
post_avail,
rec->type,
padding ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/*
* Add CID information
*/
rec->cid_len = transform->out_cid_len;
memcpy( rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
{
size_t padding =
ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
/*
* Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure.
* See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information.
*
* Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence
* `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards.
*/
if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data,
&rec->data_len,
post_avail,
rec->type,
padding ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset );
/*
* Add MAC before if needed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
&& transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED
#endif
) )
{
if( post_avail < transform->maclen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
unsigned char mac[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES];
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc,
data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac );
if( ret == 0 )
memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
{
unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
transform->minor_ver );
ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
add_data, add_data_len );
if( ret != 0 )
goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
data, rec->data_len );
if( ret != 0 )
goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
if( ret != 0 )
goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
if( ret != 0 )
goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled;
memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
hmac_failed_etm_disabled:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len,
transform->maclen );
rec->data_len += transform->maclen;
post_avail -= transform->maclen;
auth_done++;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
/*
* Encrypt
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"including %d bytes of padding",
rec->data_len, 0 ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen,
data, rec->data_len,
data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( rec->data_len != olen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char iv[12];
unsigned char *dynamic_iv;
size_t dynamic_iv_len;
int dynamic_iv_is_explicit =
ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform );
/* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */
if( post_avail < transform->taglen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
/*
* Build nonce for AEAD encryption.
*
* Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic
* part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and
* can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not
* agree with the record sequence number.
* However, since ChaChaPoly as well as all AEAD modes
* in TLS 1.3 use the record sequence number as the
* dynamic part of the nonce, we uniformly use the
* record sequence number here in all cases.
*/
dynamic_iv = rec->ctr;
dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr );
ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ),
transform->iv_enc,
transform->fixed_ivlen,
dynamic_iv,
dynamic_iv_len );
/*
* Build additional data for AEAD encryption.
* This depends on the TLS version.
*/
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
transform->minor_ver );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)",
iv, transform->ivlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)",
dynamic_iv,
dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD",
add_data, add_data_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"including 0 bytes of padding",
rec->data_len ) );
/*
* Encrypt and authenticate
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
iv, transform->ivlen,
add_data, add_data_len,
data, rec->data_len, /* src */
data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */
&rec->data_len,
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag",
data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen,
transform->taglen );
/* Account for authentication tag. */
post_avail -= transform->taglen;
/*
* Prefix record content with dynamic IV in case it is explicit.
*/
if( dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0 )
{
if( rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
memcpy( data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len );
rec->data_offset -= dynamic_iv_len;
rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len;
}
auth_done++;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t padlen, i;
size_t olen;
/* Currently we're always using minimal padding
* (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */
padlen = transform->ivlen - ( rec->data_len + 1 ) % transform->ivlen;
if( padlen == transform->ivlen )
padlen = 0;
/* Check there's enough space in the buffer for the padding. */
if( post_avail < padlen + 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ )
data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padlen;
rec->data_len += padlen + 1;
post_avail -= padlen + 1;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/*
* Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per
* Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246)
*/
if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
{
if( f_rng == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
/*
* Generate IV
*/
ret = f_rng( p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
memcpy( data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc,
transform->ivlen );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding",
rec->data_len, transform->ivlen,
padlen + 1 ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
transform->iv_enc,
transform->ivlen,
data, rec->data_len,
data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( rec->data_len != olen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
{
/*
* Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1
*/
memcpy( transform->iv_enc, transform->cipher_ctx_enc.iv,
transform->ivlen );
}
else
#endif
{
data -= transform->ivlen;
rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen;
rec->data_len += transform->ivlen;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
if( auth_done == 0 )
{
unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
/*
* MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num +
* TLSCipherText.type +
* TLSCipherText.version +
* length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) +
* IV + // except for TLS 1.0
* ENC(content + padding + padding_length));
*/
if( post_avail < transform->maclen)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len,
rec, transform->minor_ver );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data,
add_data_len );
ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
add_data_len );
if( ret != 0 )
goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
data, rec->data_len );
if( ret != 0 )
goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
if( ret != 0 )
goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
if( ret != 0 )
goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled;
memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
rec->data_len += transform->maclen;
post_avail -= transform->maclen;
auth_done++;
hmac_failed_etm_enabled:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
if( auth_done != 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) );
return( 0 );
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,077 |
libssh | 4aea835974996b2deb011024c53f4ff4329a95b5 | int ssh_scp_read(ssh_scp scp, void *buffer, size_t size)
{
int rc;
int code;
if (scp == NULL) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
if (scp->state == SSH_SCP_READ_REQUESTED &&
scp->request_type == SSH_SCP_REQUEST_NEWFILE)
{
rc = ssh_scp_accept_request(scp);
if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
return rc;
}
}
if (scp->state != SSH_SCP_READ_READING) {
ssh_set_error(scp->session, SSH_FATAL,
"ssh_scp_read called under invalid state");
return SSH_ERROR;
}
if (scp->processed + size > scp->filelen) {
size = (size_t) (scp->filelen - scp->processed);
}
if (size > 65536) {
size = 65536; /* avoid too large reads */
}
rc = ssh_channel_read(scp->channel, buffer, size, 0);
if (rc != SSH_ERROR) {
scp->processed += rc;
} else {
scp->state = SSH_SCP_ERROR;
return SSH_ERROR;
}
/* Check if we arrived at end of file */
if (scp->processed == scp->filelen) {
scp->processed = scp->filelen = 0;
ssh_channel_write(scp->channel, "", 1);
code = ssh_scp_response(scp, NULL);
if (code == 0) {
scp->state = SSH_SCP_READ_INITED;
return rc;
}
if (code == 1) {
scp->state = SSH_SCP_READ_INITED;
return SSH_ERROR;
}
scp->state = SSH_SCP_ERROR;
return SSH_ERROR;
}
return rc;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,809 |
Chrome | 244c78b3f737f2cacab2d212801b0524cbcc3a7b | void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::RegisterForDevicePolicy(
const std::string& token,
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::TokenType token_type) {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector* connector =
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector();
if (!connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Cloud policy subsystem not initialized.";
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOtherFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
if (is_showing_)
actor_->ShowFatalEnrollmentError();
return;
}
connector->ScheduleServiceInitialization(0);
registrar_.reset(new policy::CloudPolicySubsystem::ObserverRegistrar(
connector->device_cloud_policy_subsystem(), this));
connector->SetDeviceCredentials(user_, token, token_type);
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-2880 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 9,410 |
re2c | c4603ba5ce229db83a2a4fb93e6d4b4e3ec3776a | bool Scanner::open(const std::string &filename, const std::string *parent)
{
Input *in = new Input(msg.filenames.size());
files.push_back(in);
if (!in->open(filename, parent, globopts->incpaths)) {
return false;
}
msg.filenames.push_back(in->escaped_name);
return true;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,730 |
wireshark | 2cb5985bf47bdc8bea78d28483ed224abdd33dc6 | dissect_usb_video_control_interface_descriptor(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb,
guint8 descriptor_len, packet_info *pinfo, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info)
{
video_conv_info_t *video_conv_info = NULL;
video_entity_t *entity = NULL;
proto_item *item = NULL;
proto_item *subtype_item = NULL;
proto_tree *tree = NULL;
guint8 entity_id = 0;
guint16 terminal_type = 0;
int offset = 0;
guint8 subtype;
subtype = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2);
if (parent_tree)
{
const gchar *subtype_str;
subtype_str = val_to_str_ext(subtype, &vc_if_descriptor_subtypes_ext, "Unknown (0x%x)");
tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(parent_tree, tvb, offset, descriptor_len,
ett_descriptor_video_control, &item, "VIDEO CONTROL INTERFACE DESCRIPTOR [%s]",
subtype_str);
}
/* Common fields */
dissect_usb_descriptor_header(tree, tvb, offset, &vid_descriptor_type_vals_ext);
subtype_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_subtype, tvb, offset+2, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
if (subtype == VC_HEADER)
{
guint8 num_vs_interfaces;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_bcdUVC, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_ifdesc_wTotalLength, tvb, offset+2, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_dwClockFrequency, tvb, offset+4, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
num_vs_interfaces = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+8);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_bInCollection, tvb, offset+8, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
if (num_vs_interfaces > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_baInterfaceNr, tvb, offset+9, num_vs_interfaces, ENC_NA);
}
offset += 9 + num_vs_interfaces;
}
else if ((subtype == VC_INPUT_TERMINAL) || (subtype == VC_OUTPUT_TERMINAL))
{
/* Fields common to input and output terminals */
entity_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
terminal_type = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+1);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_terminal_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_terminal_type, tvb, offset+1, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_assoc_terminal, tvb, offset+3, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
if (subtype == VC_OUTPUT_TERMINAL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_src_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
}
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_iTerminal, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
if (subtype == VC_INPUT_TERMINAL)
{
if (terminal_type == ITT_CAMERA)
{
offset = dissect_usb_video_camera_terminal(tree, tvb, offset);
}
else if (terminal_type == ITT_MEDIA_TRANSPORT_INPUT)
{
/* @todo */
}
}
if (subtype == VC_OUTPUT_TERMINAL)
{
if (terminal_type == OTT_MEDIA_TRANSPORT_OUTPUT)
{
/* @todo */
}
}
}
else
{
/* Field common to extension / processing / selector / encoding units */
entity_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_control_ifdesc_unit_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
if (subtype == VC_PROCESSING_UNIT)
{
offset = dissect_usb_video_processing_unit(tree, tvb, offset);
}
else if (subtype == VC_SELECTOR_UNIT)
{
offset = dissect_usb_video_selector_unit(tree, tvb, offset);
}
else if (subtype == VC_EXTENSION_UNIT)
{
offset = dissect_usb_video_extension_unit(tree, tvb, offset);
}
else if (subtype == VC_ENCODING_UNIT)
{
/* @todo UVC 1.5 */
}
else
{
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, subtype_item, &ei_usb_vid_subtype_unknown,
"Unknown VC subtype %u", subtype);
}
}
/* Soak up descriptor bytes beyond those we know how to dissect */
if (offset < descriptor_len)
{
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_descriptor_data, tvb, offset, descriptor_len-offset, ENC_NA);
/* offset = descriptor_len; */
}
if (entity_id != 0)
proto_item_append_text(item, " (Entity %d)", entity_id);
if (subtype != VC_HEADER && usb_conv_info)
{
/* Switch to the usb_conv_info of the Video Control interface */
usb_conv_info = get_usb_iface_conv_info(pinfo, usb_conv_info->interfaceNum);
video_conv_info = (video_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
if (!video_conv_info)
{
video_conv_info = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), video_conv_info_t);
video_conv_info->entities = wmem_tree_new(wmem_file_scope());
usb_conv_info->class_data = video_conv_info;
}
entity = (video_entity_t*) wmem_tree_lookup32(video_conv_info->entities, entity_id);
if (!entity)
{
entity = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), video_entity_t);
entity->entityID = entity_id;
entity->subtype = subtype;
entity->terminalType = terminal_type;
wmem_tree_insert32(video_conv_info->entities, entity_id, entity);
}
}
return descriptor_len;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-5354 | CWE-476 | NULL Pointer Dereference | The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL. | Phase: Implementation
If all pointers that could have been modified are checked for NULL before use, nearly all NULL pointer dereferences can be prevented.
Phase: Requirements
Select a programming language that is not susceptible to these issues.
Phase: Implementation
Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is non-null before acting upon it.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: Checking the return value of the function will typically be sufficient, however beware of race conditions (CWE-362) in a concurrent environment. This solution does not handle the use of improperly initialized variables (CWE-665).
Phase: Architecture and Design
Identify all variables and data stores that receive information from external sources, and apply input validation to make sure that they are only initialized to expected values.
Phase: Implementation
Explicitly initialize all variables and other data stores, either during declaration or just before the first usage. | 90 |
openssl | 34628967f1e65dc8f34e000f0f5518e21afbfc7b | int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
{
unsigned int i;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
int idx;
long mask;
int err=0;
const EVP_MD *md;
q=buf;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return 0;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
{
if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
{
int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
{
/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
err = 1;
}
else
{
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
err = 1;
q+=hashsize;
}
}
}
if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
err = 1;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (err)
return 0;
else
return sizeof buf2;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,869 |
php-src | c395c6e5d7e8df37a21265ff76e48fe75ceb5ae6?w=1 | void gdImagePolygon (gdImagePtr im, gdPointPtr p, int n, int c)
{
int i;
int lx, ly;
typedef void (*image_line)(gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color);
image_line draw_line;
if (n <= 0) {
return;
}
/* Let it be known that we are drawing a polygon so that the opacity
* mask doesn't get cleared after each line.
*/
if (c == gdAntiAliased) {
im->AA_polygon = 1;
}
if ( im->antialias) {
draw_line = gdImageAALine;
} else {
draw_line = gdImageLine;
}
lx = p->x;
ly = p->y;
draw_line(im, lx, ly, p[n - 1].x, p[n - 1].y, c);
for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
p++;
draw_line(im, lx, ly, p->x, p->y, c);
lx = p->x;
ly = p->y;
}
if (c == gdAntiAliased) {
im->AA_polygon = 0;
gdImageAABlend(im);
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,398 |
Chrome | 56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74 | bool NavigationRequest::IsAllowedByCSPDirective(
CSPContext* context,
CSPDirective::Name directive,
bool has_followed_redirect,
bool url_upgraded_after_redirect,
bool is_response_check,
CSPContext::CheckCSPDisposition disposition) {
GURL url;
if (url_upgraded_after_redirect &&
disposition == CSPContext::CheckCSPDisposition::CHECK_REPORT_ONLY_CSP &&
common_params_.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme)) {
GURL::Replacements replacements;
replacements.SetSchemeStr(url::kHttpScheme);
url = common_params_.url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
} else {
url = common_params_.url;
}
return context->IsAllowedByCsp(
directive, url, has_followed_redirect, is_response_check,
common_params_.source_location.value_or(SourceLocation()), disposition,
begin_params_->is_form_submission);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,002 |
qemu | 04bf2526ce87f21b32c9acba1c5518708c243ad0 | static MemTxResult address_space_write_continue(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
MemTxAttrs attrs,
const uint8_t *buf,
int len, hwaddr addr1,
hwaddr l, MemoryRegion *mr)
{
uint8_t *ptr;
uint64_t val;
MemTxResult result = MEMTX_OK;
bool release_lock = false;
for (;;) {
if (!memory_access_is_direct(mr, true)) {
release_lock |= prepare_mmio_access(mr);
l = memory_access_size(mr, l, addr1);
/* XXX: could force current_cpu to NULL to avoid
potential bugs */
switch (l) {
case 8:
/* 64 bit write access */
val = ldq_p(buf);
result |= memory_region_dispatch_write(mr, addr1, val, 8,
attrs);
break;
case 4:
/* 32 bit write access */
val = (uint32_t)ldl_p(buf);
result |= memory_region_dispatch_write(mr, addr1, val, 4,
attrs);
break;
case 2:
/* 16 bit write access */
val = lduw_p(buf);
result |= memory_region_dispatch_write(mr, addr1, val, 2,
attrs);
break;
case 1:
/* 8 bit write access */
val = ldub_p(buf);
result |= memory_region_dispatch_write(mr, addr1, val, 1,
attrs);
break;
default:
abort();
}
} else {
/* RAM case */
ptr = qemu_map_ram_ptr(mr->ram_block, addr1);
memcpy(ptr, buf, l);
invalidate_and_set_dirty(mr, addr1, l);
}
if (release_lock) {
qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
release_lock = false;
}
len -= l;
buf += l;
addr += l;
if (!len) {
break;
}
l = len;
mr = address_space_translate(as, addr, &addr1, &l, true);
}
return result;
} | 1 | CVE-2017-11334 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 6,441 |
linux | c666355e60ddb4748ead3bdd983e3f7f2224aaf0 | static void raremono_device_release(struct v4l2_device *v4l2_dev)
{
struct raremono_device *radio = to_raremono_dev(v4l2_dev);
kfree(radio->buffer);
kfree(radio);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,028 |
linux | 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 | static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
int err;
dp->dccps_role = DCCP_ROLE_CLIENT;
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = usin->sin6_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
IP6_ECN_flow_init(fl6.flowlabel);
if (fl6.flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel;
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
}
}
/*
* connect() to INADDR_ANY means loopback (BSD'ism).
*/
if (ipv6_addr_any(&usin->sin6_addr))
usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 1;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -ENETUNREACH;
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
usin->sin6_scope_id) {
/* If interface is set while binding, indices
* must coincide.
*/
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
sk->sk_bound_dev_if != usin->sin6_scope_id)
return -EINVAL;
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = usin->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Connect to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
return -EINVAL;
}
sk->sk_v6_daddr = usin->sin6_addr;
np->flow_label = fl6.flowlabel;
/*
* DCCP over IPv4
*/
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
u32 exthdrlen = icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "connect: ipv4 mapped\n");
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = usin->sin6_port;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_mapped;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
err = dccp_v4_connect(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
if (err) {
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = exthdrlen;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_af_ops;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v6_do_rcv;
goto failure;
}
np->saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
return err;
}
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr))
saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = saddr ? *saddr : np->saddr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto failure;
}
if (saddr == NULL) {
saddr = &fl6.saddr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = *saddr;
}
/* set the source address */
np->saddr = *saddr;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (np->opt != NULL)
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
np->opt->opt_nflen);
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_REQUESTING);
err = inet6_hash_connect(&dccp_death_row, sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
dp->dccps_iss = secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
inet->inet_sport,
inet->inet_dport);
err = dccp_connect(sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
return 0;
late_failure:
dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_CLOSED);
__sk_dst_reset(sk);
failure:
inet->inet_dport = 0;
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
return err;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-3841 | CWE-416 | Use After Free | The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: If a bug causes an attempted access of this pointer, then a NULL dereference could still lead to a crash or other unexpected behavior, but it will reduce or eliminate the risk of code execution. | 3,691 |
linux | 77e70d351db7de07a46ac49b87a6c3c7a60fca7e | static irqreturn_t sunkbd_interrupt(struct serio *serio,
unsigned char data, unsigned int flags)
{
struct sunkbd *sunkbd = serio_get_drvdata(serio);
if (sunkbd->reset <= -1) {
/*
* If cp[i] is 0xff, sunkbd->reset will stay -1.
* The keyboard sends 0xff 0xff 0xID on powerup.
*/
sunkbd->reset = data;
wake_up_interruptible(&sunkbd->wait);
goto out;
}
if (sunkbd->layout == -1) {
sunkbd->layout = data;
wake_up_interruptible(&sunkbd->wait);
goto out;
}
switch (data) {
case SUNKBD_RET_RESET:
schedule_work(&sunkbd->tq);
sunkbd->reset = -1;
break;
case SUNKBD_RET_LAYOUT:
sunkbd->layout = -1;
break;
case SUNKBD_RET_ALLUP: /* All keys released */
break;
default:
if (!sunkbd->enabled)
break;
if (sunkbd->keycode[data & SUNKBD_KEY]) {
input_report_key(sunkbd->dev,
sunkbd->keycode[data & SUNKBD_KEY],
!(data & SUNKBD_RELEASE));
input_sync(sunkbd->dev);
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"sunkbd.c: Unknown key (scancode %#x) %s.\n",
data & SUNKBD_KEY,
data & SUNKBD_RELEASE ? "released" : "pressed");
}
}
out:
return IRQ_HANDLED;
} | 1 | CVE-2020-25669 | CWE-416 | Use After Free | The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: If a bug causes an attempted access of this pointer, then a NULL dereference could still lead to a crash or other unexpected behavior, but it will reduce or eliminate the risk of code execution. | 4,420 |
WavPack | 25b4a2725d8568212e7cf89ca05ca29d128af7ac | static int do_tag_extractions (WavpackContext *wpc, char *outfilename)
{
int result = WAVPACK_NO_ERROR, i;
FILE *outfile;
for (i = 0; result == WAVPACK_NO_ERROR && i < num_tag_extractions; ++i) {
char *extraction_spec = strdup (tag_extractions [i]);
char *output_spec = strchr (extraction_spec, '=');
char tag_filename [256];
if (output_spec && output_spec > extraction_spec && strlen (output_spec) > 1)
*output_spec++ = 0;
if (dump_tag_item_to_file (wpc, extraction_spec, NULL, tag_filename)) {
int max_length = (int) strlen (outfilename) + (int) strlen (tag_filename) + 10;
char *full_filename;
if (output_spec)
max_length += (int) strlen (output_spec) + 256;
full_filename = malloc (max_length * 2 + 1);
strcpy (full_filename, outfilename);
if (output_spec) {
char *dst = filespec_name (full_filename);
while (*output_spec && dst - full_filename < max_length) {
if (*output_spec == '%') {
switch (*++output_spec) {
case 'a': // audio filename
strcpy (dst, filespec_name (outfilename));
if (filespec_ext (dst)) // get rid of any extension
dst = filespec_ext (dst);
else
dst += strlen (dst);
output_spec++;
break;
case 't': // tag field name
strcpy (dst, tag_filename);
if (filespec_ext (dst)) // get rid of any extension
dst = filespec_ext (dst);
else
dst += strlen (dst);
output_spec++;
break;
case 'e': // default extension
if (filespec_ext (tag_filename)) {
strcpy (dst, filespec_ext (tag_filename) + 1);
dst += strlen (dst);
}
output_spec++;
break;
default:
*dst++ = '%';
}
}
else
*dst++ = *output_spec++;
}
*dst = 0;
}
else
strcpy (filespec_name (full_filename), tag_filename);
if (!overwrite_all && (outfile = fopen (full_filename, "r")) != NULL) {
DoCloseHandle (outfile);
fprintf (stderr, "overwrite %s (yes/no/all)? ", FN_FIT (full_filename));
fflush (stderr);
if (set_console_title)
DoSetConsoleTitle ("overwrite?");
switch (yna ()) {
case 'n':
*full_filename = 0;
break;
case 'a':
overwrite_all = 1;
}
}
// open output file for writing
if (*full_filename) {
if ((outfile = fopen (full_filename, "w")) == NULL) {
error_line ("can't create file %s!", FN_FIT (full_filename));
result = WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else {
dump_tag_item_to_file (wpc, extraction_spec, outfile, NULL);
if (!DoCloseHandle (outfile)) {
error_line ("can't close file %s!", FN_FIT (full_filename));
result = WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!quiet_mode)
error_line ("extracted tag \"%s\" to file %s", extraction_spec, FN_FIT (full_filename));
}
}
free (full_filename);
}
free (extraction_spec);
}
return result;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,907 |
qemu | 1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f | static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iovec *iov,
unsigned int max_num_sg, bool is_write,
hwaddr pa, size_t sz)
{
unsigned num_sg = *p_num_sg;
assert(num_sg <= max_num_sg);
while (sz) {
hwaddr len = sz;
iov[num_sg].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(pa, &len, is_write);
iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
addr[num_sg] = pa;
sz -= len;
pa += len;
num_sg++;
}
*p_num_sg = num_sg;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-6490 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 6,957 |
cifs-utils | 48a654e2e763fce24c22e1b9c695b42804bbdd4a | check_fstab(const char *progname, const char *mountpoint, const char *devname,
char **options)
{
FILE *fstab;
struct mntent *mnt;
/* make sure this mount is listed in /etc/fstab */
fstab = setmntent(_PATH_MNTTAB, "r");
if (!fstab) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open %s for reading!\n", _PATH_MNTTAB);
return EX_FILEIO;
}
while ((mnt = getmntent(fstab))) {
if (!strcmp(mountpoint, mnt->mnt_dir))
break;
}
endmntent(fstab);
if (mnt == NULL || strcmp(mnt->mnt_fsname, devname)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: permission denied: no match for "
"%s found in %s\n", progname, mountpoint, _PATH_MNTTAB);
return EX_USAGE;
}
/*
* 'mount' munges the options from fstab before passing them
* to us. It is non-trivial to test that we have the correct
* set of options. We don't want to trust what the user
* gave us, so just take whatever is in /etc/fstab.
*/
*options = strdup(mnt->mnt_opts);
return 0;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,003 |
jasper | e24bdc716c3327b067c551bc6cfb97fd2370358d | void jp2_box_dump(jp2_box_t *box, FILE *out)
{
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
assert(boxinfo);
fprintf(out, "JP2 box: ");
fprintf(out, "type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n", '"', boxinfo->name,
'"', box->type, box->len);
if (box->ops->dumpdata) {
(*box->ops->dumpdata)(box, out);
}
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 23,080 |
linux | 647bf3d8a8e5777319da92af672289b2a6c4dc66 | static int rxe_mem_alloc(struct rxe_dev *rxe, struct rxe_mem *mem, int num_buf)
{
int i;
int num_map;
struct rxe_map **map = mem->map;
num_map = (num_buf + RXE_BUF_PER_MAP - 1) / RXE_BUF_PER_MAP;
mem->map = kmalloc_array(num_map, sizeof(*map), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mem->map)
goto err1;
for (i = 0; i < num_map; i++) {
mem->map[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(**map), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mem->map[i])
goto err2;
}
WARN_ON(!is_power_of_2(RXE_BUF_PER_MAP));
mem->map_shift = ilog2(RXE_BUF_PER_MAP);
mem->map_mask = RXE_BUF_PER_MAP - 1;
mem->num_buf = num_buf;
mem->num_map = num_map;
mem->max_buf = num_map * RXE_BUF_PER_MAP;
return 0;
err2:
for (i--; i >= 0; i--)
kfree(mem->map[i]);
kfree(mem->map);
err1:
return -ENOMEM;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 16,824 |
linux | 363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76 | void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-15951 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 7,811 |
FFmpeg | 1e42736b95065c69a7481d0cf55247024f54b660 | static int cdxl_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame * const p = data;
int ret, w, h, encoding, aligned_width, buf_size = pkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf = pkt->data;
if (buf_size < 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
encoding = buf[1] & 7;
c->format = buf[1] & 0xE0;
w = AV_RB16(&buf[14]);
h = AV_RB16(&buf[16]);
c->bpp = buf[19];
c->palette_size = AV_RB16(&buf[20]);
c->palette = buf + 32;
c->video = c->palette + c->palette_size;
c->video_size = buf_size - c->palette_size - 32;
if (c->palette_size > 512)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (buf_size < c->palette_size + 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->bpp < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->format != BIT_PLANAR && c->format != BIT_LINE && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Pixel format 0x%0x", c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, w, h)) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->format == CHUNKY)
aligned_width = avctx->width;
else
aligned_width = FFALIGN(c->avctx->width, 16);
c->padded_bits = aligned_width - c->avctx->width;
if (c->video_size < aligned_width * avctx->height * (int64_t)c->bpp / 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!encoding && c->palette_size && c->bpp <= 8 && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
} else if (encoding == 1 && (c->bpp == 6 || c->bpp == 8)) {
if (c->palette_size != (1 << (c->bpp - 1)))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (!encoding && c->bpp == 24 && c->format == CHUNKY &&
!c->palette_size) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Encoding %d, bpp %d and format 0x%x",
encoding, c->bpp, c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (encoding) {
av_fast_padded_malloc(&c->new_video, &c->new_video_size,
h * w + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!c->new_video)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (c->bpp == 8)
cdxl_decode_ham8(c, p);
else
cdxl_decode_ham6(c, p);
} else if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
cdxl_decode_rgb(c, p);
} else {
cdxl_decode_raw(c, p);
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-9996 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 5,703 |
krb5 | 50fe4074f188c2d4da0c421e96553acea8378db2 | free_certauth_handles(krb5_context context, certauth_handle *list)
{
int i;
if (list == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; list[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (list[i]->vt.fini != NULL)
list[i]->vt.fini(context, list[i]->moddata);
free(list[i]);
}
free(list);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,655 |
pesign | 12f16710ee44ef64ddb044a3523c3c4c4d90039a | get_str(Pe *pe, char *strnum)
{
size_t sz;
unsigned long num;
char *strtab;
uint32_t strtabsz;
/* no idea what the real max size for these is, so... we're not going
* to have 4B strings, and this can't be the end of the binary, so
* this is big enough. */
sz = strnlen(strnum, 11);
if (sz == 11)
return NULL;
errno = 0;
num = strtoul(strnum, NULL, 10);
if (errno != 0)
return NULL;
strtab = get_strtab(pe);
if (!strtab)
return NULL;
strtabsz = *(uint32_t *)strtab;
if (num >= strtabsz)
return NULL;
if (strnlen(&strtab[num], strtabsz - num) > strtabsz - num - 1)
return NULL;
return &strtab[num];
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 13,793 |
gst-plugins-bad | 7b12593cceaa0726d7fc370a7556a8e773ccf318 | gst_mpegts_pmt_stream_new (void)
{
GstMpegtsPMTStream *stream;
stream = g_slice_new0 (GstMpegtsPMTStream);
stream->descriptors = g_ptr_array_new_with_free_func ((GDestroyNotify)
gst_mpegts_descriptor_free);
return stream;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,746 |
Chrome | 4c19b042ea31bd393d2265656f94339d1c3d82ff | bool FileUtilProxy::Touch(
scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
const FilePath& file_path,
const base::Time& last_access_time,
const base::Time& last_modified_time,
StatusCallback* callback) {
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy,
new RelayTouchFilePath(file_path, last_access_time,
last_modified_time, callback));
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,183 |
libgd | 53110871935244816bbb9d131da0bccff734bfe9 | static int dynamicGetbuf(gdIOCtxPtr ctx, void *buf, int len)
{
int rlen, remain;
dpIOCtxPtr dctx;
dynamicPtr *dp;
dctx = (dpIOCtxPtr) ctx;
dp = dctx->dp;
remain = dp->logicalSize - dp->pos;
if(remain >= len) {
rlen = len;
} else {
if(remain == 0) {
/* 2.0.34: EOF is incorrect. We use 0 for
* errors and EOF, just like fileGetbuf,
* which is a simple fread() wrapper.
* TBB. Original bug report: Daniel Cowgill. */
return 0; /* NOT EOF */
}
rlen = remain;
}
memcpy(buf, (void *) ((char *)dp->data + dp->pos), rlen);
dp->pos += rlen;
return rlen;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-8670 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 2,885 |
radare2 | 90b71c017a7fa9732fe45fd21b245ee051b1f548 | R_API ut16 r_anal_bb_offset_inst(RAnalBlock *bb, int i) {
if (i < 0 || i >= bb->ninstr) {
return UT16_MAX;
}
return (i > 0 && (i - 1) < bb->op_pos_size) ? bb->op_pos[i - 1] : 0;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,066 |
qemu | 844864fbae66935951529408831c2f22367a57b6 | static int megasas_ctrl_get_info(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(s);
PCIDeviceClass *pci_class = PCI_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(pci_dev);
MegasasBaseClass *base_class = MEGASAS_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(s);
struct mfi_ctrl_info info;
size_t dcmd_size = sizeof(info);
BusChild *kid;
int num_pd_disks = 0;
memset(&info, 0x0, dcmd_size);
if (cmd->iov_size < dcmd_size) {
trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_xfer_len(cmd->index, cmd->iov_size,
dcmd_size);
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
info.pci.vendor = cpu_to_le16(pci_class->vendor_id);
info.pci.device = cpu_to_le16(pci_class->device_id);
info.pci.subvendor = cpu_to_le16(pci_class->subsystem_vendor_id);
info.pci.subdevice = cpu_to_le16(pci_class->subsystem_id);
/*
* For some reason the firmware supports
* only up to 8 device ports.
* Despite supporting a far larger number
* of devices for the physical devices.
* So just display the first 8 devices
* in the device port list, independent
* of how many logical devices are actually
* present.
*/
info.host.type = MFI_INFO_HOST_PCIE;
info.device.type = MFI_INFO_DEV_SAS3G;
info.device.port_count = 8;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &s->bus.qbus.children, sibling) {
SCSIDevice *sdev = SCSI_DEVICE(kid->child);
uint16_t pd_id;
if (num_pd_disks < 8) {
pd_id = ((sdev->id & 0xFF) << 8) | (sdev->lun & 0xFF);
info.device.port_addr[num_pd_disks] =
cpu_to_le64(megasas_get_sata_addr(pd_id));
}
num_pd_disks++;
}
memcpy(info.product_name, base_class->product_name, 24);
snprintf(info.serial_number, 32, "%s", s->hba_serial);
snprintf(info.package_version, 0x60, "%s-QEMU", qemu_hw_version());
memcpy(info.image_component[0].name, "APP", 3);
snprintf(info.image_component[0].version, 10, "%s-QEMU",
base_class->product_version);
memcpy(info.image_component[0].build_date, "Apr 1 2014", 11);
memcpy(info.image_component[0].build_time, "12:34:56", 8);
info.image_component_count = 1;
if (pci_dev->has_rom) {
uint8_t biosver[32];
uint8_t *ptr;
ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(&pci_dev->rom);
memcpy(biosver, ptr + 0x41, 31);
memcpy(info.image_component[1].name, "BIOS", 4);
memcpy(info.image_component[1].version, biosver,
strlen((const char *)biosver));
}
info.current_fw_time = cpu_to_le32(megasas_fw_time());
info.max_arms = 32;
info.max_spans = 8;
info.max_arrays = MEGASAS_MAX_ARRAYS;
info.max_lds = MFI_MAX_LD;
info.max_cmds = cpu_to_le16(s->fw_cmds);
info.max_sg_elements = cpu_to_le16(s->fw_sge);
info.max_request_size = cpu_to_le32(MEGASAS_MAX_SECTORS);
if (!megasas_is_jbod(s))
info.lds_present = cpu_to_le16(num_pd_disks);
info.pd_present = cpu_to_le16(num_pd_disks);
info.pd_disks_present = cpu_to_le16(num_pd_disks);
info.hw_present = cpu_to_le32(MFI_INFO_HW_NVRAM |
MFI_INFO_HW_MEM |
MFI_INFO_HW_FLASH);
info.memory_size = cpu_to_le16(512);
info.nvram_size = cpu_to_le16(32);
info.flash_size = cpu_to_le16(16);
info.raid_levels = cpu_to_le32(MFI_INFO_RAID_0);
info.adapter_ops = cpu_to_le32(MFI_INFO_AOPS_RBLD_RATE |
MFI_INFO_AOPS_SELF_DIAGNOSTIC |
MFI_INFO_AOPS_MIXED_ARRAY);
info.ld_ops = cpu_to_le32(MFI_INFO_LDOPS_DISK_CACHE_POLICY |
MFI_INFO_LDOPS_ACCESS_POLICY |
MFI_INFO_LDOPS_IO_POLICY |
MFI_INFO_LDOPS_WRITE_POLICY |
MFI_INFO_LDOPS_READ_POLICY);
info.max_strips_per_io = cpu_to_le16(s->fw_sge);
info.stripe_sz_ops.min = 3;
info.stripe_sz_ops.max = ctz32(MEGASAS_MAX_SECTORS + 1);
info.properties.pred_fail_poll_interval = cpu_to_le16(300);
info.properties.intr_throttle_cnt = cpu_to_le16(16);
info.properties.intr_throttle_timeout = cpu_to_le16(50);
info.properties.rebuild_rate = 30;
info.properties.patrol_read_rate = 30;
info.properties.bgi_rate = 30;
info.properties.cc_rate = 30;
info.properties.recon_rate = 30;
info.properties.cache_flush_interval = 4;
info.properties.spinup_drv_cnt = 2;
info.properties.spinup_delay = 6;
info.properties.ecc_bucket_size = 15;
info.properties.ecc_bucket_leak_rate = cpu_to_le16(1440);
info.properties.expose_encl_devices = 1;
info.properties.OnOffProperties = cpu_to_le32(MFI_CTRL_PROP_EnableJBOD);
info.pd_ops = cpu_to_le32(MFI_INFO_PDOPS_FORCE_ONLINE |
MFI_INFO_PDOPS_FORCE_OFFLINE);
info.pd_mix_support = cpu_to_le32(MFI_INFO_PDMIX_SAS |
MFI_INFO_PDMIX_SATA |
MFI_INFO_PDMIX_LD);
cmd->iov_size -= dma_buf_read((uint8_t *)&info, dcmd_size, &cmd->qsg);
return MFI_STAT_OK;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-5337 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 740 |
libpng | 2dca15686fadb1b8951cb29b02bad4cae73448da | png_handle_eXIf(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
unsigned int i;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_eXIf");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
else if (info_ptr == NULL || (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_eXIf) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "duplicate");
return;
}
info_ptr->eXIf_buf = png_voidcast(png_bytep,
png_malloc_warn(png_ptr, length));
if (info_ptr->eXIf_buf == NULL)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of memory");
return;
}
info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_EXIF;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
{
png_byte buf[1];
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 1);
info_ptr->eXIf_buf[i] = buf[0];
}
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
png_set_eXIf_1(png_ptr, info_ptr, length, info_ptr->eXIf_buf);
png_free(png_ptr, info_ptr->eXIf_buf);
info_ptr->eXIf_buf = NULL;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,745 |
redis | 1eb08bcd4634ae42ec45e8284923ac048beaa4c3 | static void controloptions (lua_State *L, int opt, const char **fmt,
Header *h) {
switch (opt) {
case ' ': return; /* ignore white spaces */
case '>': h->endian = BIG; return;
case '<': h->endian = LITTLE; return;
case '!': {
int a = getnum(L, fmt, MAXALIGN);
if (!isp2(a))
luaL_error(L, "alignment %d is not a power of 2", a);
h->align = a;
return;
}
default: {
const char *msg = lua_pushfstring(L, "invalid format option '%c'", opt);
luaL_argerror(L, 1, msg);
}
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2018-11219 | CWE-190 | Integer Overflow or Wraparound | The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number. | Phase: Requirements
Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.
Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences.
Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.
Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
Phase: Implementation
Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]
Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system. | 7,970 |
linux | 6f7b0a2a5c0fb03be7c25bd1745baa50582348ef | static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
u32 __user *uaddr2)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int res, ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
/*
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
*/
debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
rt_waiter.task = NULL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, increments q.key (key1) ref
* count.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out_key2;
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
/*
* In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since
* we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has
* completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup
* race with the atomic proxy lock acquisition by the requeue code. The
* futex_requeue dropped our key1 reference and incremented our key2
* reference count.
*/
/* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us. */
if (!q.rt_waiter) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case.
*/
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
}
} else {
/*
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
* the pi_state.
*/
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
ret = rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter, 1);
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, proprogate that. If it
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
/* Unqueue and drop the lock. */
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
}
/*
* If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the
* fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace.
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
if (pi_mutex && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
} else if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
* it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
*/
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(&q.key);
out_key2:
put_futex_key(&key2);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-6647 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 8,537 |
linux | fdac1e0697356ac212259f2147aa60c72e334861 | static void irda_disconnect_indication(void *instance, void *sap,
LM_REASON reason, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct irda_sock *self;
struct sock *sk;
self = instance;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
/* Don't care about it, but let's not leak it */
if(skb)
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
sk = instance;
if (sk == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(%p) : BUG : sk is NULL\n",
__func__, self);
return;
}
/* Prevent race conditions with irda_release() and irda_shutdown() */
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) && sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) {
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
/* Close our TSAP.
* If we leave it open, IrLMP put it back into the list of
* unconnected LSAPs. The problem is that any incoming request
* can then be matched to this socket (and it will be, because
* it is at the head of the list). This would prevent any
* listening socket waiting on the same TSAP to get those
* requests. Some apps forget to close sockets, or hang to it
* a bit too long, so we may stay in this dead state long
* enough to be noticed...
* Note : all socket function do check sk->sk_state, so we are
* safe...
* Jean II
*/
if (self->tsap) {
irttp_close_tsap(self->tsap);
self->tsap = NULL;
}
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
/* Note : once we are there, there is not much you want to do
* with the socket anymore, apart from closing it.
* For example, bind() and connect() won't reset sk->sk_err,
* sk->sk_shutdown and sk->sk_flags to valid values...
* Jean II
*/
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 19,495 |
poppler | 957aa252912cde85d76c41e9710b33425a82b696 | void Splash::scaleMaskYdXu(SplashImageMaskSource src, void *srcData,
int srcWidth, int srcHeight,
int scaledWidth, int scaledHeight,
SplashBitmap *dest) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guint *pixBuf;
Guint pix;
Guchar *destPtr;
int yp, yq, xp, xq, yt, y, yStep, xt, x, xStep, d;
int i, j;
destPtr = dest->data;
if (destPtr == NULL) {
error(errInternal, -1, "dest->data is NULL in Splash::scaleMaskYdXu");
return;
}
yp = srcHeight / scaledHeight;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(srcWidth);
pixBuf = (Guint *)gmallocn(srcWidth, sizeof(int));
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
yt = 0;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
}
memset(pixBuf, 0, srcWidth * sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < yStep; ++i) {
(*src)(srcData, lineBuf);
for (j = 0; j < srcWidth; ++j) {
pixBuf[j] += lineBuf[j];
}
}
xt = 0;
d = (255 << 23) / yStep;
for (x = 0; x < srcWidth; ++x) {
if ((xt += xq) >= srcWidth) {
xt -= srcWidth;
xStep = xp + 1;
} else {
xStep = xp;
}
pix = pixBuf[x];
pix = (pix * d) >> 23;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix;
}
}
}
gfree(pixBuf);
gfree(lineBuf);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,383 |
ImageMagick | df8a62fe4938aa41a39e815937c58bc0ed21b664 | static Image *ReadPCXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowPCXException(severity,tag) \
{ \
if (scanline != (unsigned char *) NULL) \
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline); \
if (pixel_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL) \
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info); \
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL) \
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(page_table); \
ThrowReaderException(severity,tag); \
}
Image
*image;
int
bits,
id,
mask;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
*page_table;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PCXInfo
pcx_info;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p,
*r;
size_t
one,
pcx_packets;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
packet,
pcx_colormap[768],
*pixels,
*scanline;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a PCX file.
*/
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
scanline=(unsigned char *) NULL;
pixel_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"DCX") == 0)
{
size_t
magic;
/*
Read the DCX page table.
*/
magic=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (magic != 987654321)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(1024UL,
sizeof(*page_table));
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowPCXException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (id=0; id < 1024; id++)
{
page_table[id]=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (page_table[id] == 0)
break;
}
}
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) page_table[0],SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&pcx_info.identifier);
for (id=1; id < 1024; id++)
{
int
bits_per_pixel;
/*
Verify PCX identifier.
*/
pcx_info.version=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((count != 1) || (pcx_info.identifier != 0x0a))
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pcx_info.encoding=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == -1)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=(unsigned char) bits_per_pixel;
pcx_info.left=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.top=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.right=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.bottom=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
/*
Read PCX raster colormap.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue((ssize_t) pcx_info.right-
pcx_info.left)+1UL;
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue((ssize_t) pcx_info.bottom-
pcx_info.top)+1UL;
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0) ||
((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel != 1) && (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel != 2) &&
(pcx_info.bits_per_pixel != 4) && (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel != 8)))
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->depth=pcx_info.bits_per_pixel;
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
image->resolution.x=(double) pcx_info.horizontal_resolution;
image->resolution.y=(double) pcx_info.vertical_resolution;
image->colors=16;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(exception->severity,exception->reason);
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
(void) memset(pcx_colormap,0,sizeof(pcx_colormap));
count=ReadBlob(image,3*image->colors,pcx_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pcx_info.reserved=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
pcx_info.planes=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (pcx_info.planes == 0)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (pcx_info.planes > 6)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes) >= 64)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
one=1;
if ((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel != 8) || (pcx_info.planes == 1))
if ((pcx_info.version == 3) || (pcx_info.version == 5) ||
((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes) == 1))
image->colors=(size_t) MagickMin(one << (1UL*
(pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes)),256UL);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel >= 8) && (pcx_info.planes != 1))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
p=pcx_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
}
pcx_info.bytes_per_line=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.palette_info=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.horizontal_screensize=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
pcx_info.vertical_screensize=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < 54; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(image->rows, (size_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pcx_packets=(size_t) image->rows*pcx_info.bytes_per_line;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(pcx_packets, (size_t) pcx_info.planes) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pcx_packets=(size_t) pcx_packets*pcx_info.planes;
if ((size_t) (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes*image->columns) >
(pcx_packets*8U))
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((MagickSizeType) (pcx_packets/8) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(image->columns,
pcx_info.bytes_per_line),MagickMax(8,pcx_info.planes)*sizeof(*scanline));
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(pcx_packets,2*sizeof(*pixels));
if ((scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL))
{
if (scanline != (unsigned char *) NULL)
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
if (pixel_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowPCXException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) memset(scanline,0,(size_t) MagickMax(image->columns,
pcx_info.bytes_per_line)*MagickMax(8,pcx_info.planes)*sizeof(*scanline));
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) memset(pixels,0,(size_t) pcx_packets*(2*sizeof(*pixels)));
/*
Uncompress image data.
*/
p=pixels;
if (pcx_info.encoding == 0)
while (pcx_packets != 0)
{
packet=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
*p++=packet;
pcx_packets--;
}
else
while (pcx_packets != 0)
{
packet=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
if ((packet & 0xc0) != 0xc0)
{
*p++=packet;
pcx_packets--;
continue;
}
count=(ssize_t) (packet & 0x3f);
packet=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for ( ; count != 0; count--)
{
*p++=packet;
pcx_packets--;
if (pcx_packets == 0)
break;
}
}
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
image->alpha_trait=pcx_info.planes > 3 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
else
if ((pcx_info.version == 5) ||
((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes) == 1))
{
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
if (image->colors > 256)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ColormapExceeds256Colors");
if ((pcx_info.bits_per_pixel*pcx_info.planes) == 1)
{
/*
Monochrome colormap.
*/
image->colormap[0].red=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[0].green=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[0].blue=(Quantum) 0;
image->colormap[1].red=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].green=QuantumRange;
image->colormap[1].blue=QuantumRange;
}
else
if (image->colors > 16)
{
/*
256 color images have their color map at the end of the file.
*/
pcx_info.colormap_signature=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,3*image->colors,pcx_colormap);
p=pcx_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
}
}
}
/*
Convert PCX raster image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(y*pcx_info.bytes_per_line*pcx_info.planes);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
r=scanline;
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
for (i=0; i < pcx_info.planes; i++)
{
r=scanline+i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
*r=(*p++);
break;
}
case 1:
{
*r=(*p++);
break;
}
case 2:
{
*r=(*p++);
break;
}
case 3:
default:
{
*r=(*p++);
break;
}
}
r+=pcx_info.planes;
}
}
else
if (pcx_info.planes > 1)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
*r++=0;
for (i=0; i < pcx_info.planes; i++)
{
r=scanline;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
bits=(*p++);
for (mask=0x80; mask != 0; mask>>=1)
{
if (bits & mask)
*r|=1 << i;
r++;
}
}
}
}
else
switch (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
register ssize_t
bit;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
*r++=(unsigned char) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (ssize_t) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
*r++=(unsigned char) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
p++;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-3); x+=4)
{
*r++=(*p >> 6) & 0x3;
*r++=(*p >> 4) & 0x3;
*r++=(*p >> 2) & 0x3;
*r++=(*p) & 0x3;
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
for (i=3; i >= (ssize_t) (4-(image->columns % 4)); i--)
*r++=(unsigned char) ((*p >> (i*2)) & 0x03);
p++;
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
*r++=(*p >> 4) & 0xf;
*r++=(*p) & 0xf;
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
*r++=(*p++ >> 4) & 0xf;
break;
}
case 8:
{
(void) memcpy(r,p,image->columns);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
/*
Transfer image scanline.
*/
r=scanline;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,*r++,q);
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r++),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*r++),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
break;
if (page_table[id] == 0)
break;
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) page_table[id],SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowPCXException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&pcx_info.identifier);
if ((count != 0) && (pcx_info.identifier == 0x0a))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(page_table);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,381 |
php-src | 61cdd1255d5b9c8453be71aacbbf682796ac77d4 | SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, unserialize)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
char *buf;
size_t buf_len;
const unsigned char *p, *s;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
zval entry, inf;
zval *pcount, *pmembers;
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
zend_long count;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &buf, &buf_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
return;
}
/* storage */
s = p = (const unsigned char*)buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
if (*p!= 'x' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
pcount = var_tmp_var(&var_hash);
if (!php_var_unserialize(pcount, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash) || Z_TYPE_P(pcount) != IS_LONG) {
goto outexcept;
}
--p; /* for ';' */
count = Z_LVAL_P(pcount);
while (count-- > 0) {
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *pelement;
zend_string *hash;
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
if(*p != 'O' && *p != 'C' && *p != 'r') {
goto outexcept;
}
/* store reference to allow cross-references between different elements */
if (!php_var_unserialize(&entry, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash)) {
goto outexcept;
}
if (Z_TYPE(entry) != IS_OBJECT) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&entry);
goto outexcept;
}
if (*p == ',') { /* new version has inf */
++p;
if (!php_var_unserialize(&inf, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&entry);
goto outexcept;
}
} else {
ZVAL_UNDEF(&inf);
}
hash = spl_object_storage_get_hash(intern, getThis(), &entry);
if (!hash) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&entry);
zval_ptr_dtor(&inf);
goto outexcept;
}
pelement = spl_object_storage_get(intern, hash);
spl_object_storage_free_hash(intern, hash);
if (pelement) {
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(pelement->inf)) {
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &pelement->inf);
}
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(pelement->obj)) {
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &pelement->obj);
}
}
element = spl_object_storage_attach(intern, getThis(), &entry, Z_ISUNDEF(inf)?NULL:&inf);
var_replace(&var_hash, &entry, &element->obj);
var_replace(&var_hash, &inf, &element->inf);
zval_ptr_dtor(&entry);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&entry);
zval_ptr_dtor(&inf);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&inf);
}
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
/* members */
if (*p!= 'm' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
pmembers = var_tmp_var(&var_hash);
if (!php_var_unserialize(pmembers, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash) || Z_TYPE_P(pmembers) != IS_ARRAY) {
goto outexcept;
}
/* copy members */
object_properties_load(&intern->std, Z_ARRVAL_P(pmembers));
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return;
outexcept:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0, "Error at offset %pd of %d bytes", (zend_long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
return;
} /* }}} */ | 1 | CVE-2016-7480 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 550 |
ImageMagick | a9d563d3d73874312080d30dc4ba07cecad56192 | static MagickBooleanType WriteOnePNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *IMimage_info,Image *IMimage,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
im_vers[32],
libpng_runv[32],
libpng_vers[32],
zlib_runv[32],
zlib_vers[32];
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*image_info;
char
*name,
s[2];
const char
*property,
*value;
const StringInfo
*profile;
int
num_passes,
pass,
ping_wrote_caNv;
png_byte
ping_trans_alpha[256];
png_color
palette[257];
png_color_16
ping_background,
ping_trans_color;
png_info
*ping_info;
png_struct
*ping;
png_uint_32
ping_height,
ping_width;
ssize_t
y;
MagickBooleanType
image_matte,
logging,
matte,
ping_have_blob,
ping_have_cheap_transparency,
ping_have_color,
ping_have_non_bw,
ping_have_PLTE,
ping_have_bKGD,
ping_have_eXIf,
ping_have_iCCP,
ping_have_pHYs,
ping_have_sRGB,
ping_have_tRNS,
ping_exclude_bKGD,
ping_exclude_cHRM,
ping_exclude_date,
/* ping_exclude_EXIF, */
ping_exclude_eXIf,
ping_exclude_gAMA,
ping_exclude_iCCP,
/* ping_exclude_iTXt, */
ping_exclude_oFFs,
ping_exclude_pHYs,
ping_exclude_sRGB,
ping_exclude_tEXt,
ping_exclude_tIME,
/* ping_exclude_tRNS, */
ping_exclude_caNv,
ping_exclude_zCCP, /* hex-encoded iCCP */
ping_exclude_zTXt,
ping_preserve_colormap,
ping_preserve_iCCP,
ping_need_colortype_warning,
status,
tried_332,
tried_333,
tried_444;
MemoryInfo
*volatile pixel_info;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
PNGErrorInfo
error_info;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
*ping_pixels;
volatile int
image_colors,
ping_bit_depth,
ping_color_type,
ping_interlace_method,
ping_compression_method,
ping_filter_method,
ping_num_trans;
volatile size_t
image_depth,
old_bit_depth;
size_t
quality,
rowbytes,
save_image_depth;
int
j,
number_colors,
number_opaque,
number_semitransparent,
number_transparent,
ping_pHYs_unit_type;
png_uint_32
ping_pHYs_x_resolution,
ping_pHYs_y_resolution;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter WriteOnePNGImage()");
image = CloneImage(IMimage,0,0,MagickFalse,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
image_info=(ImageInfo *) CloneImageInfo(IMimage_info);
/* Define these outside of the following "if logging()" block so they will
* show in debuggers.
*/
*im_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(im_vers,
MagickLibVersionText,MagickPathExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(im_vers,
MagickLibAddendum,MagickPathExtent);
*libpng_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(libpng_vers,
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,32);
*libpng_runv='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(libpng_runv,
png_get_libpng_ver(NULL),32);
*zlib_vers='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(zlib_vers,
ZLIB_VERSION,32);
*zlib_runv='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(zlib_runv,
zlib_version,32);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" IM version = %s", im_vers);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Libpng version = %s", libpng_vers);
if (LocaleCompare(libpng_vers,libpng_runv) != 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" running with %s", libpng_runv);
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Zlib version = %s", zlib_vers);
if (LocaleCompare(zlib_vers,zlib_runv) != 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" running with %s", zlib_runv);
}
}
/* Initialize some stuff */
ping_bit_depth=0,
ping_color_type=0,
ping_interlace_method=0,
ping_compression_method=0,
ping_filter_method=0,
ping_num_trans = 0;
ping_background.red = 0;
ping_background.green = 0;
ping_background.blue = 0;
ping_background.gray = 0;
ping_background.index = 0;
ping_trans_color.red=0;
ping_trans_color.green=0;
ping_trans_color.blue=0;
ping_trans_color.gray=0;
ping_pHYs_unit_type = 0;
ping_pHYs_x_resolution = 0;
ping_pHYs_y_resolution = 0;
ping_have_blob=MagickFalse;
ping_have_cheap_transparency=MagickFalse;
ping_have_color=MagickTrue;
ping_have_non_bw=MagickTrue;
ping_have_PLTE=MagickFalse;
ping_have_bKGD=MagickFalse;
ping_have_eXIf=MagickTrue;
ping_have_iCCP=MagickFalse;
ping_have_pHYs=MagickFalse;
ping_have_sRGB=MagickFalse;
ping_have_tRNS=MagickFalse;
ping_exclude_bKGD=mng_info->ping_exclude_bKGD;
ping_exclude_caNv=mng_info->ping_exclude_caNv;
ping_exclude_cHRM=mng_info->ping_exclude_cHRM;
ping_exclude_date=mng_info->ping_exclude_date;
ping_exclude_eXIf=mng_info->ping_exclude_eXIf;
ping_exclude_gAMA=mng_info->ping_exclude_gAMA;
ping_exclude_iCCP=mng_info->ping_exclude_iCCP;
/* ping_exclude_iTXt=mng_info->ping_exclude_iTXt; */
ping_exclude_oFFs=mng_info->ping_exclude_oFFs;
ping_exclude_pHYs=mng_info->ping_exclude_pHYs;
ping_exclude_sRGB=mng_info->ping_exclude_sRGB;
ping_exclude_tEXt=mng_info->ping_exclude_tEXt;
ping_exclude_tIME=mng_info->ping_exclude_tIME;
/* ping_exclude_tRNS=mng_info->ping_exclude_tRNS; */
ping_exclude_zCCP=mng_info->ping_exclude_zCCP; /* hex-encoded iCCP in zTXt */
ping_exclude_zTXt=mng_info->ping_exclude_zTXt;
ping_preserve_colormap = mng_info->ping_preserve_colormap;
ping_preserve_iCCP = mng_info->ping_preserve_iCCP;
ping_need_colortype_warning = MagickFalse;
/* Recognize the ICC sRGB profile and convert it to the sRGB chunk,
* i.e., eliminate the ICC profile and set image->rendering_intent.
* Note that this will not involve any changes to the actual pixels
* but merely passes information to applications that read the resulting
* PNG image.
*
* To do: recognize other variants of the sRGB profile, using the CRC to
* verify all recognized variants including the 7 already known.
*
* Work around libpng16+ rejecting some "known invalid sRGB profiles".
*
* Use something other than image->rendering_intent to record the fact
* that the sRGB profile was found.
*
* Record the ICC version (currently v2 or v4) of the incoming sRGB ICC
* profile. Record the Blackpoint Compensation, if any.
*/
if (ping_exclude_sRGB == MagickFalse && ping_preserve_iCCP == MagickFalse)
{
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (char *) NULL; )
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"ICC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"ICM") == 0))
{
int
icheck,
got_crc=0;
png_uint_32
length,
profile_crc=0;
unsigned char
*data;
length=(png_uint_32) GetStringInfoLength(profile);
for (icheck=0; sRGB_info[icheck].len > 0; icheck++)
{
if (length == sRGB_info[icheck].len)
{
if (got_crc == 0)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Got a %lu-byte ICC profile (potentially sRGB)",
(unsigned long) length);
data=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
profile_crc=crc32(0,data,length);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" with crc=%8x",(unsigned int) profile_crc);
got_crc++;
}
if (profile_crc == sRGB_info[icheck].crc)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" It is sRGB with rendering intent = %s",
Magick_RenderingIntentString_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(
sRGB_info[icheck].intent));
if (image->rendering_intent==UndefinedIntent)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(
sRGB_info[icheck].intent);
}
ping_exclude_iCCP = MagickTrue;
ping_exclude_zCCP = MagickTrue;
ping_have_sRGB = MagickTrue;
break;
}
}
}
if (sRGB_info[icheck].len == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Got %lu-byte ICC profile not recognized as sRGB",
(unsigned long) length);
}
}
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
}
number_opaque = 0;
number_semitransparent = 0;
number_transparent = 0;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (image->storage_class == UndefinedClass)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->storage_class=UndefinedClass");
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->storage_class=DirectClass");
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->storage_class=PseudoClass");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), image->taint ?
" image->taint=MagickTrue":
" image->taint=MagickFalse");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->gamma=%g", image->gamma);
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass &&
(mng_info->write_png8 || mng_info->write_png24 || mng_info->write_png32 ||
mng_info->write_png48 || mng_info->write_png64 ||
(mng_info->write_png_colortype != 1 &&
mng_info->write_png_colortype != 5)))
{
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
image->storage_class = DirectClass;
}
if (ping_preserve_colormap == MagickFalse)
{
if ((image->storage_class != PseudoClass) &&
(image->colormap != (PixelInfo *) NULL))
{
/* Free the bogus colormap; it can cause trouble later */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Freeing bogus colormap");
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
image->colormap);
}
}
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
/*
Sometimes we get PseudoClass images whose RGB values don't match
the colors in the colormap. This code syncs the RGB values.
*/
image->depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
if (image->depth <= 8 && image->taint && image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH == 8)
if (image->depth > 8)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reducing PNG bit depth to 8 since this is a Q8 build.");
image->depth=8;
}
#endif
/* Respect the -depth option */
if (image->depth < 4)
{
register Quantum
*r;
if (image->depth > 2)
{
/* Scale to 4-bit */
LBR04PacketRGBA(image->background_color);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
r=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (r == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
LBR04PixelRGBA(r);
r+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass && image->colormap != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
LBR04PacketRGBA(image->colormap[i]);
}
}
}
else if (image->depth > 1)
{
/* Scale to 2-bit */
LBR02PacketRGBA(image->background_color);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
r=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (r == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
LBR02PixelRGBA(r);
r+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass && image->colormap != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
LBR02PacketRGBA(image->colormap[i]);
}
}
}
else
{
/* Scale to 1-bit */
LBR01PacketRGBA(image->background_color);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
r=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (r == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
LBR01PixelRGBA(r);
r+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass && image->colormap != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
LBR01PacketRGBA(image->colormap[i]);
}
}
}
}
/* To do: set to next higher multiple of 8 */
if (image->depth < 8)
image->depth=8;
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
/* PNG does not handle depths greater than 16 so reduce it even
* if lossy
*/
if (image->depth > 8)
image->depth=16;
#endif
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 8)
if (image->depth > 8)
{
/* To do: fill low byte properly */
image->depth=16;
}
if (image->depth == 16 && mng_info->write_png_depth != 16)
if (mng_info->write_png8 ||
LosslessReduceDepthOK(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
image->depth = 8;
#endif
image_colors = (int) image->colors;
number_opaque = (int) image->colors;
number_transparent = 0;
number_semitransparent = 0;
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype &&
(mng_info->write_png_colortype > 4 || (mng_info->write_png_depth >= 8 &&
mng_info->write_png_colortype < 4 &&
image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)))
{
/* Avoid the expensive BUILD_PALETTE operation if we're sure that we
* are not going to need the result.
*/
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype == 1 ||
mng_info->write_png_colortype == 5)
ping_have_color=MagickFalse;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
number_transparent = 2;
number_semitransparent = 1;
}
}
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype < 7)
{
/* BUILD_PALETTE
*
* Normally we run this just once, but in the case of writing PNG8
* we reduce the transparency to binary and run again, then if there
* are still too many colors we reduce to a simple 4-4-4-1, then 3-3-3-1
* RGBA palette and run again, and then to a simple 3-3-2-1 RGBA
* palette. Then (To do) we take care of a final reduction that is only
* needed if there are still 256 colors present and one of them has both
* transparent and opaque instances.
*/
tried_332 = MagickFalse;
tried_333 = MagickFalse;
tried_444 = MagickFalse;
if (image->depth != GetImageDepth(image,exception))
(void) SetImageDepth(image,image->depth,exception);
for (j=0; j<6; j++)
{
/*
* Sometimes we get DirectClass images that have 256 colors or fewer.
* This code will build a colormap.
*
* Also, sometimes we get PseudoClass images with an out-of-date
* colormap. This code will replace the colormap with a new one.
* Sometimes we get PseudoClass images that have more than 256 colors.
* This code will delete the colormap and change the image to
* DirectClass.
*
* If image->alpha_trait is MagickFalse, we ignore the alpha channel
* even though it sometimes contains left-over non-opaque values.
*
* Also we gather some information (number of opaque, transparent,
* and semitransparent pixels, and whether the image has any non-gray
* pixels or only black-and-white pixels) that we might need later.
*
* Even if the user wants to force GrayAlpha or RGBA (colortype 4 or 6)
* we need to check for bogus non-opaque values, at least.
*/
int
n;
PixelInfo
opaque[260],
semitransparent[260],
transparent[260];
register const Quantum
*r;
register Quantum
*q;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter BUILD_PALETTE:");
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->columns=%.20g",(double) image->columns);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->rows=%.20g",(double) image->rows);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->alpha_trait=%.20g",(double) image->alpha_trait);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->depth=%.20g",(double) image->depth);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass && image->colormap != NULL)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Original colormap:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" i (red,green,blue,alpha)");
for (i=0; i < MagickMin(image->colors,256); i++)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" %d (%d,%d,%d,%d)",
(int) i,
(int) image->colormap[i].red,
(int) image->colormap[i].green,
(int) image->colormap[i].blue,
(int) image->colormap[i].alpha);
}
for (i=image->colors - 10; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
if (i > 255)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" %d (%d,%d,%d,%d)",
(int) i,
(int) image->colormap[i].red,
(int) image->colormap[i].green,
(int) image->colormap[i].blue,
(int) image->colormap[i].alpha);
}
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->colors=%d",(int) image->colors);
if (image->colors == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" (zero means unknown)");
if (ping_preserve_colormap == MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Regenerate the colormap");
}
image_colors=0;
number_opaque = 0;
number_semitransparent = 0;
number_transparent = 0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
r=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (r == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait ||
GetPixelAlpha(image,r) == OpaqueAlpha)
{
if (number_opaque < 259)
{
if (number_opaque == 0)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,r,opaque);
opaque[0].alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
number_opaque=1;
}
for (i=0; i< (ssize_t) number_opaque; i++)
{
if (IsColorEqual(image,r,opaque+i))
break;
}
if (i == (ssize_t) number_opaque && number_opaque < 259)
{
number_opaque++;
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,r,opaque+i);
opaque[i].alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
}
}
}
else if (GetPixelAlpha(image,r) == TransparentAlpha)
{
if (number_transparent < 259)
{
if (number_transparent == 0)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,r,transparent);
ping_trans_color.red=(unsigned short)
GetPixelRed(image,r);
ping_trans_color.green=(unsigned short)
GetPixelGreen(image,r);
ping_trans_color.blue=(unsigned short)
GetPixelBlue(image,r);
ping_trans_color.gray=(unsigned short)
GetPixelGray(image,r);
number_transparent = 1;
}
for (i=0; i< (ssize_t) number_transparent; i++)
{
if (IsColorEqual(image,r,transparent+i))
break;
}
if (i == (ssize_t) number_transparent &&
number_transparent < 259)
{
number_transparent++;
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,r,transparent+i);
}
}
}
else
{
if (number_semitransparent < 259)
{
if (number_semitransparent == 0)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,r,semitransparent);
number_semitransparent = 1;
}
for (i=0; i< (ssize_t) number_semitransparent; i++)
{
if (IsColorEqual(image,r,semitransparent+i)
&& GetPixelAlpha(image,r) ==
semitransparent[i].alpha)
break;
}
if (i == (ssize_t) number_semitransparent &&
number_semitransparent < 259)
{
number_semitransparent++;
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,r,semitransparent+i);
}
}
}
r+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
if (mng_info->write_png8 == MagickFalse &&
ping_exclude_bKGD == MagickFalse)
{
/* Add the background color to the palette, if it
* isn't already there.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Check colormap for background (%d,%d,%d)",
(int) image->background_color.red,
(int) image->background_color.green,
(int) image->background_color.blue);
}
if (number_opaque < 259)
{
for (i=0; i<number_opaque; i++)
{
if (opaque[i].red == image->background_color.red &&
opaque[i].green == image->background_color.green &&
opaque[i].blue == image->background_color.blue)
break;
}
if (i == number_opaque)
{
opaque[i] = image->background_color;
ping_background.index = i;
number_opaque++;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" background_color index is %d",(int) i);
}
}
}
else if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No room in the colormap to add background color");
}
image_colors=number_opaque+number_transparent+number_semitransparent;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_colors > 256)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has more than 256 colors");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has %d colors",image_colors);
}
if (ping_preserve_colormap != MagickFalse)
break;
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype != 7) /* We won't need this info */
{
ping_have_color=MagickFalse;
ping_have_non_bw=MagickFalse;
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"incompatible colorspace");
ping_have_color=MagickTrue;
ping_have_non_bw=MagickTrue;
}
if(image_colors > 256)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
r=q;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelRed(image,r) != GetPixelGreen(image,r) ||
GetPixelRed(image,r) != GetPixelBlue(image,r))
{
ping_have_color=MagickTrue;
ping_have_non_bw=MagickTrue;
break;
}
r+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (ping_have_color != MagickFalse)
break;
/* Worst case is black-and-white; we are looking at every
* pixel twice.
*/
if (ping_have_non_bw == MagickFalse)
{
r=q;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelRed(image,r) != 0 &&
GetPixelRed(image,r) != QuantumRange)
{
ping_have_non_bw=MagickTrue;
break;
}
r+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
}
}
}
if (image_colors < 257)
{
PixelInfo
colormap[260];
/*
* Initialize image colormap.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Sort the new colormap");
/* Sort palette, transparent first */;
n = 0;
for (i=0; i<number_transparent; i++)
colormap[n++] = transparent[i];
for (i=0; i<number_semitransparent; i++)
colormap[n++] = semitransparent[i];
for (i=0; i<number_opaque; i++)
colormap[n++] = opaque[i];
ping_background.index +=
(number_transparent + number_semitransparent);
/* image_colors < 257; search the colormap instead of the pixels
* to get ping_have_color and ping_have_non_bw
*/
for (i=0; i<n; i++)
{
if (ping_have_color == MagickFalse)
{
if (colormap[i].red != colormap[i].green ||
colormap[i].red != colormap[i].blue)
{
ping_have_color=MagickTrue;
ping_have_non_bw=MagickTrue;
break;
}
}
if (ping_have_non_bw == MagickFalse)
{
if (colormap[i].red != 0 && colormap[i].red != QuantumRange)
ping_have_non_bw=MagickTrue;
}
}
if ((mng_info->ping_exclude_tRNS == MagickFalse ||
(number_transparent == 0 && number_semitransparent == 0)) &&
(((mng_info->write_png_colortype-1) ==
PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ||
(mng_info->write_png_colortype == 0)))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (n != (ssize_t) image_colors)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image_colors (%d) and n (%d) don't match",
image_colors, n);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" AcquireImageColormap");
}
image->colors = image_colors;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image_colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
image->filename);
break;
}
for (i=0; i< (ssize_t) image_colors; i++)
image->colormap[i] = colormap[i];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->colors=%d (%d)",
(int) image->colors, image_colors);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Update the pixel indexes");
}
/* Sync the pixel indices with the new colormap */
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i< (ssize_t) image_colors; i++)
{
if ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait ||
image->colormap[i].alpha == GetPixelAlpha(image,q)) &&
image->colormap[i].red == GetPixelRed(image,q) &&
image->colormap[i].green == GetPixelGreen(image,q) &&
image->colormap[i].blue == GetPixelBlue(image,q))
{
SetPixelIndex(image,i,q);
break;
}
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->colors=%d", (int) image->colors);
if (image->colormap != NULL)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" i (red,green,blue,alpha)");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
if (i < 300 || i >= (ssize_t) image->colors - 10)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" %d (%d,%d,%d,%d)",
(int) i,
(int) image->colormap[i].red,
(int) image->colormap[i].green,
(int) image->colormap[i].blue,
(int) image->colormap[i].alpha);
}
}
}
if (number_transparent < 257)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" number_transparent = %d",
number_transparent);
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" number_transparent > 256");
if (number_opaque < 257)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" number_opaque = %d",
number_opaque);
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" number_opaque > 256");
if (number_semitransparent < 257)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" number_semitransparent = %d",
number_semitransparent);
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" number_semitransparent > 256");
if (ping_have_non_bw == MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" All pixels and the background are black or white");
else if (ping_have_color == MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" All pixels and the background are gray");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" At least one pixel or the background is non-gray");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Exit BUILD_PALETTE:");
}
if (mng_info->write_png8 == MagickFalse)
break;
/* Make any reductions necessary for the PNG8 format */
if (image_colors <= 256 &&
image_colors != 0 && image->colormap != NULL &&
number_semitransparent == 0 &&
number_transparent <= 1)
break;
/* PNG8 can't have semitransparent colors so we threshold the
* opacity to 0 or OpaqueOpacity, and PNG8 can only have one
* transparent color so if more than one is transparent we merge
* them into image->background_color.
*/
if (number_semitransparent != 0 || number_transparent > 1)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Thresholding the alpha channel to binary");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,q) < OpaqueAlpha/2)
{
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&image->background_color,q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,TransparentAlpha,q);
}
else
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image_colors != 0 && image_colors <= 256 &&
image->colormap != NULL)
for (i=0; i<image_colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].alpha =
(image->colormap[i].alpha > TransparentAlpha/2 ?
TransparentAlpha : OpaqueAlpha);
}
continue;
}
/* PNG8 can't have more than 256 colors so we quantize the pixels and
* background color to the 4-4-4-1, 3-3-3-1 or 3-3-2-1 palette. If the
* image is mostly gray, the 4-4-4-1 palette is likely to end up with 256
* colors or less.
*/
if (tried_444 == MagickFalse && (image_colors == 0 || image_colors > 256))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the background color to 4-4-4");
tried_444 = MagickTrue;
LBR04PacketRGB(image->background_color);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the pixel colors to 4-4-4");
if (image->colormap == NULL)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,q) == OpaqueAlpha)
LBR04PixelRGB(q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else /* Should not reach this; colormap already exists and
must be <= 256 */
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the colormap to 4-4-4");
for (i=0; i<image_colors; i++)
{
LBR04PacketRGB(image->colormap[i]);
}
}
continue;
}
if (tried_333 == MagickFalse && (image_colors == 0 || image_colors > 256))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the background color to 3-3-3");
tried_333 = MagickTrue;
LBR03PacketRGB(image->background_color);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the pixel colors to 3-3-3-1");
if (image->colormap == NULL)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,q) == OpaqueAlpha)
LBR03RGB(q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else /* Should not reach this; colormap already exists and
must be <= 256 */
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the colormap to 3-3-3-1");
for (i=0; i<image_colors; i++)
{
LBR03PacketRGB(image->colormap[i]);
}
}
continue;
}
if (tried_332 == MagickFalse && (image_colors == 0 || image_colors > 256))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the background color to 3-3-2");
tried_332 = MagickTrue;
/* Red and green were already done so we only quantize the blue
* channel
*/
LBR02PacketBlue(image->background_color);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the pixel colors to 3-3-2-1");
if (image->colormap == NULL)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,q) == OpaqueAlpha)
LBR02PixelBlue(q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else /* Should not reach this; colormap already exists and
must be <= 256 */
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Quantizing the colormap to 3-3-2-1");
for (i=0; i<image_colors; i++)
{
LBR02PacketBlue(image->colormap[i]);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image_colors == 0 || image_colors > 256)
{
/* Take care of special case with 256 opaque colors + 1 transparent
* color. We don't need to quantize to 2-3-2-1; we only need to
* eliminate one color, so we'll merge the two darkest red
* colors (0x49, 0, 0) -> (0x24, 0, 0).
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Merging two dark red background colors to 3-3-2-1");
if (ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.red) == 0x49 &&
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.green) == 0x00 &&
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->background_color.blue) == 0x00)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(0x24);
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Merging two dark red pixel colors to 3-3-2-1");
if (image->colormap == NULL)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,q)) == 0x49 &&
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,q)) == 0x00 &&
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,q)) == 0x00 &&
GetPixelAlpha(image,q) == OpaqueAlpha)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(0x24),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
for (i=0; i<image_colors; i++)
{
if (ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red) == 0x49 &&
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green) == 0x00 &&
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue) == 0x00)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(0x24);
}
}
}
}
}
}
/* END OF BUILD_PALETTE */
/* If we are excluding the tRNS chunk and there is transparency,
* then we must write a Gray-Alpha (color-type 4) or RGBA (color-type 6)
* PNG.
*/
if (mng_info->ping_exclude_tRNS != MagickFalse &&
(number_transparent != 0 || number_semitransparent != 0))
{
unsigned int colortype=mng_info->write_png_colortype;
if (ping_have_color == MagickFalse)
mng_info->write_png_colortype = 5;
else
mng_info->write_png_colortype = 7;
if (colortype != 0 &&
mng_info->write_png_colortype != colortype)
ping_need_colortype_warning=MagickTrue;
}
/* See if cheap transparency is possible. It is only possible
* when there is a single transparent color, no semitransparent
* color, and no opaque color that has the same RGB components
* as the transparent color. We only need this information if
* we are writing a PNG with colortype 0 or 2, and we have not
* excluded the tRNS chunk.
*/
if (number_transparent == 1 &&
mng_info->write_png_colortype < 4)
{
ping_have_cheap_transparency = MagickTrue;
if (number_semitransparent != 0)
ping_have_cheap_transparency = MagickFalse;
else if (image_colors == 0 || image_colors > 256 ||
image->colormap == NULL)
{
register const Quantum
*q;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1, exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelAlpha(image,q) != TransparentAlpha &&
(unsigned short) GetPixelRed(image,q) ==
ping_trans_color.red &&
(unsigned short) GetPixelGreen(image,q) ==
ping_trans_color.green &&
(unsigned short) GetPixelBlue(image,q) ==
ping_trans_color.blue)
{
ping_have_cheap_transparency = MagickFalse;
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (ping_have_cheap_transparency == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/* Assuming that image->colormap[0] is the one transparent color
* and that all others are opaque.
*/
if (image_colors > 1)
for (i=1; i<image_colors; i++)
if (image->colormap[i].red == image->colormap[0].red &&
image->colormap[i].green == image->colormap[0].green &&
image->colormap[i].blue == image->colormap[0].blue)
{
ping_have_cheap_transparency = MagickFalse;
break;
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (ping_have_cheap_transparency == MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Cheap transparency is not possible.");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Cheap transparency is possible.");
}
}
else
ping_have_cheap_transparency = MagickFalse;
image_depth=image->depth;
quantum_info = (QuantumInfo *) NULL;
number_colors=0;
image_colors=(int) image->colors;
image_matte=image->alpha_trait !=
UndefinedPixelTrait ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype < 5)
mng_info->IsPalette=image->storage_class == PseudoClass &&
image_colors <= 256 && image->colormap != NULL;
else
mng_info->IsPalette = MagickFalse;
if ((mng_info->write_png_colortype == 4 || mng_info->write_png8) &&
(image->colors == 0 || image->colormap == NULL))
{
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"Cannot write PNG8 or color-type 3; colormap is NULL",
"`%s'",IMimage->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/*
Allocate the PNG structures
*/
#ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
error_info.image=image;
error_info.exception=exception;
ping=png_create_write_struct_2(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,&error_info,
MagickPNGErrorHandler,MagickPNGWarningHandler,(void *) NULL,
(png_malloc_ptr) Magick_png_malloc,(png_free_ptr) Magick_png_free);
#else
ping=png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,&error_info,
MagickPNGErrorHandler,MagickPNGWarningHandler);
#endif
if (ping == (png_struct *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
ping_info=png_create_info_struct(ping);
if (ping_info == (png_info *) NULL)
{
png_destroy_write_struct(&ping,(png_info **) NULL);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
png_set_write_fn(ping,image,png_put_data,png_flush_data);
pixel_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(ping)))
{
/*
PNG write failed.
*/
#ifdef PNG_DEBUG
if (image_info->verbose)
(void) printf("PNG write has failed.\n");
#endif
png_destroy_write_struct(&ping,&ping_info);
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
if (pixel_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (ping_have_blob != MagickFalse)
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* { For navigation to end of SETJMP-protected block. Within this
* block, use png_error() instead of Throwing an Exception, to ensure
* that libpng is able to clean up, and that the semaphore is unlocked.
*/
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
LockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_BENIGN_ERRORS_SUPPORTED
/* Allow benign errors */
png_set_benign_errors(ping, 1);
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
/* Reject images with too many rows or columns */
png_set_user_limits(ping,
(png_uint_32) MagickMin(0x7fffffffL,
GetMagickResourceLimit(WidthResource)),
(png_uint_32) MagickMin(0x7fffffffL,
GetMagickResourceLimit(HeightResource)));
#endif /* PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED */
/*
Prepare PNG for writing.
*/
#if defined(PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED)
if (mng_info->write_mng)
{
(void) png_permit_mng_features(ping,PNG_ALL_MNG_FEATURES);
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_CHECK_FOR_INVALID_INDEX_SUPPORTED
/* Disable new libpng-1.5.10 feature when writing a MNG because
* zero-length PLTE is OK
*/
png_set_check_for_invalid_index (ping, 0);
# endif
}
#else
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
if (mng_info->write_mng)
png_permit_empty_plte(ping,MagickTrue);
# endif
#endif
x=0;
ping_width=(png_uint_32) image->columns;
ping_height=(png_uint_32) image->rows;
if (mng_info->write_png8 || mng_info->write_png24 || mng_info->write_png32)
image_depth=8;
if (mng_info->write_png48 || mng_info->write_png64)
image_depth=16;
if (mng_info->write_png_depth != 0)
image_depth=mng_info->write_png_depth;
/* Adjust requested depth to next higher valid depth if necessary */
if (image_depth > 8)
image_depth=16;
if ((image_depth > 4) && (image_depth < 8))
image_depth=8;
if (image_depth == 3)
image_depth=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" width=%.20g",(double) ping_width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" height=%.20g",(double) ping_height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image_matte=%.20g",(double) image->alpha_trait);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->depth=%.20g",(double) image->depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Tentative ping_bit_depth=%.20g",(double) image_depth);
}
save_image_depth=image_depth;
ping_bit_depth=(png_byte) save_image_depth;
#if defined(PNG_pHYs_SUPPORTED)
if (ping_exclude_pHYs == MagickFalse)
{
if ((image->resolution.x != 0) && (image->resolution.y != 0) &&
(!mng_info->write_mng || !mng_info->equal_physs))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up pHYs chunk");
if (image->units == PixelsPerInchResolution)
{
ping_pHYs_unit_type=PNG_RESOLUTION_METER;
ping_pHYs_x_resolution=
(png_uint_32) ((100.0*image->resolution.x+0.5)/2.54);
ping_pHYs_y_resolution=
(png_uint_32) ((100.0*image->resolution.y+0.5)/2.54);
}
else if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
ping_pHYs_unit_type=PNG_RESOLUTION_METER;
ping_pHYs_x_resolution=(png_uint_32) (100.0*image->resolution.x+0.5);
ping_pHYs_y_resolution=(png_uint_32) (100.0*image->resolution.y+0.5);
}
else
{
ping_pHYs_unit_type=PNG_RESOLUTION_UNKNOWN;
ping_pHYs_x_resolution=(png_uint_32) image->resolution.x;
ping_pHYs_y_resolution=(png_uint_32) image->resolution.y;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Set up PNG pHYs chunk: xres: %.20g, yres: %.20g, units: %d.",
(double) ping_pHYs_x_resolution,(double) ping_pHYs_y_resolution,
(int) ping_pHYs_unit_type);
ping_have_pHYs = MagickTrue;
}
}
#endif
if (ping_exclude_bKGD == MagickFalse)
{
if ((!mng_info->adjoin || !mng_info->equal_backgrounds))
{
unsigned int
mask;
mask=0xffff;
if (ping_bit_depth == 8)
mask=0x00ff;
if (ping_bit_depth == 4)
mask=0x000f;
if (ping_bit_depth == 2)
mask=0x0003;
if (ping_bit_depth == 1)
mask=0x0001;
ping_background.red=(png_uint_16)
(ScaleQuantumToShort(image->background_color.red) & mask);
ping_background.green=(png_uint_16)
(ScaleQuantumToShort(image->background_color.green) & mask);
ping_background.blue=(png_uint_16)
(ScaleQuantumToShort(image->background_color.blue) & mask);
ping_background.gray=(png_uint_16) ping_background.green;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up bKGD chunk (1)");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" background_color index is %d",
(int) ping_background.index);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ping_bit_depth=%d",ping_bit_depth);
}
ping_have_bKGD = MagickTrue;
}
/*
Select the color type.
*/
matte=image_matte;
old_bit_depth=0;
if (mng_info->IsPalette && mng_info->write_png8)
{
/* To do: make this a function cause it's used twice, except
for reducing the sample depth from 8. */
number_colors=image_colors;
ping_have_tRNS=MagickFalse;
/*
Set image palette.
*/
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up PLTE chunk with %d colors (%d)",
number_colors, image_colors);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colors; i++)
{
palette[i].red=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
palette[i].green=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
palette[i].blue=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
#if MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH == 8
" %3ld (%3d,%3d,%3d)",
#else
" %5ld (%5d,%5d,%5d)",
#endif
(long) i,palette[i].red,palette[i].green,palette[i].blue);
}
ping_have_PLTE=MagickTrue;
image_depth=ping_bit_depth;
ping_num_trans=0;
if (matte != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Identify which colormap entry is transparent.
*/
assert(number_colors <= 256);
assert(image->colormap != NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_transparent; i++)
ping_trans_alpha[i]=0;
ping_num_trans=(unsigned short) (number_transparent +
number_semitransparent);
if (ping_num_trans == 0)
ping_have_tRNS=MagickFalse;
else
ping_have_tRNS=MagickTrue;
}
if (ping_exclude_bKGD == MagickFalse)
{
/*
* Identify which colormap entry is the background color.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(1L*number_colors-1L,1L); i++)
if (IsPNGColorEqual(ping_background,image->colormap[i]))
break;
ping_background.index=(png_byte) i;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" background_color index is %d",
(int) ping_background.index);
}
}
} /* end of write_png8 */
else if (mng_info->write_png_colortype == 1)
{
image_matte=MagickFalse;
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
}
else if (mng_info->write_png24 || mng_info->write_png48 ||
mng_info->write_png_colortype == 3)
{
image_matte=MagickFalse;
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
}
else if (mng_info->write_png32 || mng_info->write_png64 ||
mng_info->write_png_colortype == 7)
{
image_matte=MagickTrue;
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
}
else /* mng_info->write_pngNN not specified */
{
image_depth=ping_bit_depth;
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype != 0)
{
ping_color_type=(png_byte) mng_info->write_png_colortype-1;
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA ||
ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
image_matte=MagickTrue;
else
image_matte=MagickFalse;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PNG colortype %d was specified:",(int) ping_color_type);
}
else /* write_png_colortype not specified */
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Selecting PNG colortype:");
if (image_info->type == TrueColorType)
{
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
image_matte=MagickFalse;
}
else if (image_info->type == TrueColorAlphaType)
{
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
image_matte=MagickTrue;
}
else if (image_info->type == PaletteType ||
image_info->type == PaletteAlphaType)
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
else
{
if (ping_have_color == MagickFalse)
{
if (image_matte == MagickFalse)
{
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
image_matte=MagickFalse;
}
else
{
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
image_matte=MagickTrue;
}
}
else
{
if (image_matte == MagickFalse)
{
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
image_matte=MagickFalse;
}
else
{
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGBA;
image_matte=MagickTrue;
}
}
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Selected PNG colortype=%d",ping_color_type);
if (ping_bit_depth < 8)
{
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA ||
ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB ||
ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
ping_bit_depth=8;
}
old_bit_depth=ping_bit_depth;
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait &&
ping_have_non_bw == MagickFalse)
ping_bit_depth=1;
}
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
size_t one = 1;
ping_bit_depth=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
{
/* DO SOMETHING */
png_error(ping,"image has 0 colors");
}
while ((int) (one << ping_bit_depth) < (ssize_t) image_colors)
ping_bit_depth <<= 1;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number of colors: %.20g",(double) image_colors);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Tentative PNG bit depth: %d",ping_bit_depth);
}
if (ping_bit_depth < (int) mng_info->write_png_depth)
ping_bit_depth = mng_info->write_png_depth;
}
(void) old_bit_depth;
image_depth=ping_bit_depth;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Tentative PNG color type: %s (%.20g)",
PngColorTypeToString(ping_color_type),
(double) ping_color_type);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image_info->type: %.20g",(double) image_info->type);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image_depth: %.20g",(double) image_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->depth: %.20g",(double) image->depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ping_bit_depth: %.20g",(double) ping_bit_depth);
}
if (matte != MagickFalse)
{
if (mng_info->IsPalette)
{
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype == 0)
{
ping_color_type=PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
if (ping_have_color != MagickFalse)
ping_color_type=PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGBA;
}
/*
* Determine if there is any transparent color.
*/
if (number_transparent + number_semitransparent == 0)
{
/*
No transparent pixels are present. Change 4 or 6 to 0 or 2.
*/
image_matte=MagickFalse;
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype == 0)
ping_color_type&=0x03;
}
else
{
unsigned int
mask;
mask=0xffff;
if (ping_bit_depth == 8)
mask=0x00ff;
if (ping_bit_depth == 4)
mask=0x000f;
if (ping_bit_depth == 2)
mask=0x0003;
if (ping_bit_depth == 1)
mask=0x0001;
ping_trans_color.red=(png_uint_16)
(ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[0].red) & mask);
ping_trans_color.green=(png_uint_16)
(ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[0].green) & mask);
ping_trans_color.blue=(png_uint_16)
(ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[0].blue) & mask);
ping_trans_color.gray=(png_uint_16)
(ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelInfoIntensity(image,
image->colormap)) & mask);
ping_trans_color.index=(png_byte) 0;
ping_have_tRNS=MagickTrue;
}
if (ping_have_tRNS != MagickFalse)
{
/*
* Determine if there is one and only one transparent color
* and if so if it is fully transparent.
*/
if (ping_have_cheap_transparency == MagickFalse)
ping_have_tRNS=MagickFalse;
}
if (ping_have_tRNS != MagickFalse)
{
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype == 0)
ping_color_type &= 0x03; /* changes 4 or 6 to 0 or 2 */
if (image_depth == 8)
{
ping_trans_color.red&=0xff;
ping_trans_color.green&=0xff;
ping_trans_color.blue&=0xff;
ping_trans_color.gray&=0xff;
}
}
}
else
{
if (image_depth == 8)
{
ping_trans_color.red&=0xff;
ping_trans_color.green&=0xff;
ping_trans_color.blue&=0xff;
ping_trans_color.gray&=0xff;
}
}
}
matte=image_matte;
if (ping_have_tRNS != MagickFalse)
image_matte=MagickFalse;
if ((mng_info->IsPalette) &&
mng_info->write_png_colortype-1 != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE &&
ping_have_color == MagickFalse &&
(image_matte == MagickFalse || image_depth >= 8))
{
size_t one=1;
if (image_matte != MagickFalse)
ping_color_type=PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
else if (mng_info->write_png_colortype-1 != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
{
ping_color_type=PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
if (save_image_depth == 16 && image_depth == 8)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Scaling ping_trans_color (0)");
}
ping_trans_color.gray*=0x0101;
}
}
if (image_depth > MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH)
image_depth=MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if ((image_colors == 0) ||
((ssize_t) (image_colors-1) > (ssize_t) MaxColormapSize))
image_colors=(int) (one << image_depth);
if (image_depth > 8)
ping_bit_depth=16;
else
{
ping_bit_depth=8;
if ((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if(!mng_info->write_png_depth)
{
ping_bit_depth=1;
while ((int) (one << ping_bit_depth)
< (ssize_t) image_colors)
ping_bit_depth <<= 1;
}
}
else if (ping_color_type ==
PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY && image_colors < 17 &&
mng_info->IsPalette)
{
/* Check if grayscale is reducible */
int
depth_4_ok=MagickTrue,
depth_2_ok=MagickTrue,
depth_1_ok=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_colors; i++)
{
unsigned char
intensity;
intensity=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
if ((intensity & 0x0f) != ((intensity & 0xf0) >> 4))
depth_4_ok=depth_2_ok=depth_1_ok=MagickFalse;
else if ((intensity & 0x03) != ((intensity & 0x0c) >> 2))
depth_2_ok=depth_1_ok=MagickFalse;
else if ((intensity & 0x01) != ((intensity & 0x02) >> 1))
depth_1_ok=MagickFalse;
}
if (depth_1_ok && mng_info->write_png_depth <= 1)
ping_bit_depth=1;
else if (depth_2_ok && mng_info->write_png_depth <= 2)
ping_bit_depth=2;
else if (depth_4_ok && mng_info->write_png_depth <= 4)
ping_bit_depth=4;
}
}
image_depth=ping_bit_depth;
}
else
if (mng_info->IsPalette)
{
number_colors=image_colors;
if (image_depth <= 8)
{
/*
Set image palette.
*/
ping_color_type=(png_byte) PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
if (!(mng_info->have_write_global_plte && matte == MagickFalse))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_colors; i++)
{
palette[i].red=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
palette[i].green=
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
palette[i].blue=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up PLTE chunk with %d colors",
number_colors);
ping_have_PLTE=MagickTrue;
}
/* color_type is PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE */
if (mng_info->write_png_depth == 0)
{
size_t
one;
ping_bit_depth=1;
one=1;
while ((one << ping_bit_depth) < (size_t) number_colors)
ping_bit_depth <<= 1;
}
ping_num_trans=0;
if (matte != MagickFalse)
{
/*
* Set up trans_colors array.
*/
assert(number_colors <= 256);
ping_num_trans=(unsigned short) (number_transparent +
number_semitransparent);
if (ping_num_trans == 0)
ping_have_tRNS=MagickFalse;
else
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Scaling ping_trans_color (1)");
}
ping_have_tRNS=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < ping_num_trans; i++)
{
ping_trans_alpha[i]= (png_byte)
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].alpha);
}
}
}
}
}
else
{
if (image_depth < 8)
image_depth=8;
if ((save_image_depth == 16) && (image_depth == 8))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Scaling ping_trans_color from (%d,%d,%d)",
(int) ping_trans_color.red,
(int) ping_trans_color.green,
(int) ping_trans_color.blue);
}
ping_trans_color.red*=0x0101;
ping_trans_color.green*=0x0101;
ping_trans_color.blue*=0x0101;
ping_trans_color.gray*=0x0101;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" to (%d,%d,%d)",
(int) ping_trans_color.red,
(int) ping_trans_color.green,
(int) ping_trans_color.blue);
}
}
}
if (ping_bit_depth < (ssize_t) mng_info->write_png_depth)
ping_bit_depth = (ssize_t) mng_info->write_png_depth;
/*
Adjust background and transparency samples in sub-8-bit grayscale files.
*/
if (ping_bit_depth < 8 && ping_color_type ==
PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
png_uint_16
maxval;
size_t
one=1;
maxval=(png_uint_16) ((one << ping_bit_depth)-1);
if (ping_exclude_bKGD == MagickFalse)
{
ping_background.gray=(png_uint_16) ((maxval/65535.)*
(ScaleQuantumToShort(((GetPixelInfoIntensity(image,
&image->background_color))) +.5)));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up bKGD chunk (2)");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" background_color index is %d",
(int) ping_background.index);
ping_have_bKGD = MagickTrue;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Scaling ping_trans_color.gray from %d",
(int)ping_trans_color.gray);
ping_trans_color.gray=(png_uint_16) ((maxval/255.)*(
ping_trans_color.gray)+.5);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" to %d", (int)ping_trans_color.gray);
}
if (ping_exclude_bKGD == MagickFalse)
{
if (mng_info->IsPalette && (int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
/*
Identify which colormap entry is the background color.
*/
number_colors=image_colors;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(1L*number_colors,1L); i++)
if (IsPNGColorEqual(image->background_color,image->colormap[i]))
break;
ping_background.index=(png_byte) i;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up bKGD chunk with index=%d",(int) i);
}
if (i < (ssize_t) number_colors)
{
ping_have_bKGD = MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" background =(%d,%d,%d)",
(int) ping_background.red,
(int) ping_background.green,
(int) ping_background.blue);
}
}
else /* Can't happen */
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No room in PLTE to add bKGD color");
ping_have_bKGD = MagickFalse;
}
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PNG color type: %s (%d)", PngColorTypeToString(ping_color_type),
ping_color_type);
/*
Initialize compression level and filtering.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up deflate compression");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression buffer size: 32768");
}
png_set_compression_buffer_size(ping,32768L);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression mem level: 9");
png_set_compression_mem_level(ping, 9);
/* Untangle the "-quality" setting:
Undefined is 0; the default is used.
Default is 75
10's digit:
0 or omitted: Use Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY strategy with the
zlib default compression level
1-9: the zlib compression level
1's digit:
0-4: the PNG filter method
5: libpng adaptive filtering if compression level > 5
libpng filter type "none" if compression level <= 5
or if image is grayscale or palette
6: libpng adaptive filtering
7: "LOCO" filtering (intrapixel differing) if writing
a MNG, otherwise "none". Did not work in IM-6.7.0-9
and earlier because of a missing "else".
8: Z_RLE strategy (or Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY if quality < 10), adaptive
filtering. Unused prior to IM-6.7.0-10, was same as 6
9: Z_RLE strategy (or Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY if quality < 10), no PNG filters
Unused prior to IM-6.7.0-10, was same as 6
Note that using the -quality option, not all combinations of
PNG filter type, zlib compression level, and zlib compression
strategy are possible. This will be addressed soon in a
release that accomodates "-define png:compression-strategy", etc.
*/
quality=image_info->quality == UndefinedCompressionQuality ? 75UL :
image_info->quality;
if (quality <= 9)
{
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy == 0)
mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy = Z_HUFFMAN_ONLY+1;
}
else if (mng_info->write_png_compression_level == 0)
{
int
level;
level=(int) MagickMin((ssize_t) quality/10,9);
mng_info->write_png_compression_level = level+1;
}
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy == 0)
{
if ((quality %10) == 8 || (quality %10) == 9)
#ifdef Z_RLE /* Z_RLE was added to zlib-1.2.0 */
mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy=Z_RLE+1;
#else
mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy = Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY+1;
#endif
}
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 0)
mng_info->write_png_compression_filter=((int) quality % 10) + 1;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_level)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression level: %d",
(int) mng_info->write_png_compression_level-1);
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression strategy: %d",
(int) mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy-1);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up filtering");
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 6)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Base filter method: ADAPTIVE");
else if (mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 0 ||
mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 1)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Base filter method: NONE");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Base filter method: %d",
(int) mng_info->write_png_compression_filter-1);
}
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_level != 0)
png_set_compression_level(ping,mng_info->write_png_compression_level-1);
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 6)
{
if (((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ||
(quality < 50))
png_set_filter(ping,PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE,PNG_NO_FILTERS);
else
png_set_filter(ping,PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE,PNG_ALL_FILTERS);
}
else if (mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 7 ||
mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 10)
png_set_filter(ping,PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE,PNG_ALL_FILTERS);
else if (mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 8)
{
#if defined(PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED) && defined(PNG_INTRAPIXEL_DIFFERENCING)
if (mng_info->write_mng)
{
if (((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) ||
((int) ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGBA))
ping_filter_method=PNG_INTRAPIXEL_DIFFERENCING;
}
#endif
png_set_filter(ping,PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE,PNG_NO_FILTERS);
}
else if (mng_info->write_png_compression_filter == 9)
png_set_filter(ping,PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE,PNG_NO_FILTERS);
else if (mng_info->write_png_compression_filter != 0)
png_set_filter(ping,PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE,
mng_info->write_png_compression_filter-1);
if (mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy != 0)
png_set_compression_strategy(ping,
mng_info->write_png_compression_strategy-1);
ping_interlace_method=image_info->interlace != NoInterlace;
if (mng_info->write_mng)
png_set_sig_bytes(ping,8);
/* Bail out if cannot meet defined png:bit-depth or png:color-type */
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype != 0)
{
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype-1 == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
if (ping_have_color != MagickFalse)
{
ping_color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
if (ping_bit_depth < 8)
ping_bit_depth=8;
}
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype-1 == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
if (ping_have_color != MagickFalse)
ping_color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
}
if (ping_need_colortype_warning != MagickFalse ||
((mng_info->write_png_depth &&
(int) mng_info->write_png_depth != ping_bit_depth) ||
(mng_info->write_png_colortype &&
((int) mng_info->write_png_colortype-1 != ping_color_type &&
mng_info->write_png_colortype != 7 &&
!(mng_info->write_png_colortype == 5 && ping_color_type == 0)))))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
if (ping_need_colortype_warning != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image has transparency but tRNS chunk was excluded");
}
if (mng_info->write_png_depth)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Defined png:bit-depth=%u, Computed depth=%u",
mng_info->write_png_depth,
ping_bit_depth);
}
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Defined png:color-type=%u, Computed color type=%u",
mng_info->write_png_colortype-1,
ping_color_type);
}
}
png_warning(ping,
"Cannot write image with defined png:bit-depth or png:color-type.");
}
if (image_matte != MagickFalse && image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
/* Add an opaque matte channel */
image->alpha_trait = BlendPixelTrait;
(void) SetImageAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Added an opaque matte channel");
}
if (number_transparent != 0 || number_semitransparent != 0)
{
if (ping_color_type < 4)
{
ping_have_tRNS=MagickTrue;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting ping_have_tRNS=MagickTrue.");
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing PNG header chunks");
png_set_IHDR(ping,ping_info,ping_width,ping_height,
ping_bit_depth,ping_color_type,
ping_interlace_method,ping_compression_method,
ping_filter_method);
if (ping_color_type == 3 && ping_have_PLTE != MagickFalse)
{
png_set_PLTE(ping,ping_info,palette,number_colors);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i< (ssize_t) number_colors; i++)
{
if (i < ping_num_trans)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PLTE[%d] = (%d,%d,%d), tRNS[%d] = (%d)",
(int) i,
(int) palette[i].red,
(int) palette[i].green,
(int) palette[i].blue,
(int) i,
(int) ping_trans_alpha[i]);
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PLTE[%d] = (%d,%d,%d)",
(int) i,
(int) palette[i].red,
(int) palette[i].green,
(int) palette[i].blue);
}
}
}
/* Only write the iCCP chunk if we are not writing the sRGB chunk. */
if (ping_exclude_sRGB != MagickFalse ||
(!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_sRGB)))
{
if ((ping_exclude_tEXt == MagickFalse ||
ping_exclude_zTXt == MagickFalse) &&
(ping_exclude_iCCP == MagickFalse || ping_exclude_zCCP == MagickFalse))
{
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (char *) NULL; )
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_iCCP_SUPPORTED
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"ICC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"ICM") == 0))
{
ping_have_iCCP = MagickTrue;
if (ping_exclude_iCCP == MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up iCCP chunk");
png_set_iCCP(ping,ping_info,(png_charp) name,0,
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10500)
(png_charp) GetStringInfoDatum(profile),
#else
(const png_byte *) GetStringInfoDatum(profile),
#endif
(png_uint_32) GetStringInfoLength(profile));
}
else
{
/* Do not write hex-encoded ICC chunk */
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
continue;
}
}
#endif /* WRITE_iCCP */
if (LocaleCompare(name,"exif") == 0)
{
/* Do not write hex-encoded ICC chunk; we will
write it later as an eXIf chunk */
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
continue;
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up zTXt chunk with uuencoded %s profile",
name);
Magick_png_write_raw_profile(image_info,ping,ping_info,
(unsigned char *) name,(unsigned char *) name,
GetStringInfoDatum(profile),
(png_uint_32) GetStringInfoLength(profile));
}
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
}
}
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_sRGB_SUPPORTED)
if ((mng_info->have_write_global_srgb == 0) &&
ping_have_iCCP != MagickTrue &&
(ping_have_sRGB != MagickFalse ||
png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_sRGB)))
{
if (ping_exclude_sRGB == MagickFalse)
{
/*
Note image rendering intent.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up sRGB chunk");
(void) png_set_sRGB(ping,ping_info,(
Magick_RenderingIntent_to_PNG_RenderingIntent(
image->rendering_intent)));
ping_have_sRGB = MagickTrue;
}
}
if ((!mng_info->write_mng) || (!png_get_valid(ping,ping_info,PNG_INFO_sRGB)))
#endif
{
if (ping_exclude_gAMA == MagickFalse &&
ping_have_iCCP == MagickFalse &&
ping_have_sRGB == MagickFalse &&
(ping_exclude_sRGB == MagickFalse ||
(image->gamma < .45 || image->gamma > .46)))
{
if ((mng_info->have_write_global_gama == 0) && (image->gamma != 0.0))
{
/*
Note image gamma.
To do: check for cHRM+gAMA == sRGB, and write sRGB instead.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up gAMA chunk");
png_set_gAMA(ping,ping_info,image->gamma);
}
}
if (ping_exclude_cHRM == MagickFalse && ping_have_sRGB == MagickFalse)
{
if ((mng_info->have_write_global_chrm == 0) &&
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x != 0.0))
{
/*
Note image chromaticity.
Note: if cHRM+gAMA == sRGB write sRGB instead.
*/
PrimaryInfo
bp,
gp,
rp,
wp;
wp=image->chromaticity.white_point;
rp=image->chromaticity.red_primary;
gp=image->chromaticity.green_primary;
bp=image->chromaticity.blue_primary;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up cHRM chunk");
png_set_cHRM(ping,ping_info,wp.x,wp.y,rp.x,rp.y,gp.x,gp.y,
bp.x,bp.y);
}
}
}
if (ping_exclude_bKGD == MagickFalse)
{
if (ping_have_bKGD != MagickFalse)
{
png_set_bKGD(ping,ping_info,&ping_background);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up bKGD chunk");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" background color = (%d,%d,%d)",
(int) ping_background.red,
(int) ping_background.green,
(int) ping_background.blue);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" index = %d, gray=%d",
(int) ping_background.index,
(int) ping_background.gray);
}
}
}
if (ping_exclude_pHYs == MagickFalse)
{
if (ping_have_pHYs != MagickFalse)
{
png_set_pHYs(ping,ping_info,
ping_pHYs_x_resolution,
ping_pHYs_y_resolution,
ping_pHYs_unit_type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up pHYs chunk");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" x_resolution=%lu",
(unsigned long) ping_pHYs_x_resolution);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" y_resolution=%lu",
(unsigned long) ping_pHYs_y_resolution);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" unit_type=%lu",
(unsigned long) ping_pHYs_unit_type);
}
}
}
#if defined(PNG_tIME_SUPPORTED)
if (ping_exclude_tIME == MagickFalse)
{
const char
*timestamp;
if (image->taint == MagickFalse)
{
timestamp=GetImageOption(image_info,"png:tIME");
if (timestamp == (const char *) NULL)
timestamp=GetImageProperty(image,"png:tIME",exception);
}
else
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reset tIME in tainted image");
timestamp=GetImageProperty(image,"date:modify",exception);
}
if (timestamp != (const char *) NULL)
write_tIME_chunk(image,ping,ping_info,timestamp,exception);
}
#endif
if (mng_info->need_blob != MagickFalse)
{
if (OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception) ==
MagickFalse)
png_error(ping,"WriteBlob Failed");
ping_have_blob=MagickTrue;
}
png_write_info_before_PLTE(ping, ping_info);
if (ping_have_tRNS != MagickFalse && ping_color_type < 4)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Calling png_set_tRNS with num_trans=%d",ping_num_trans);
}
if (ping_color_type == 3)
(void) png_set_tRNS(ping, ping_info,
ping_trans_alpha,
ping_num_trans,
NULL);
else
{
(void) png_set_tRNS(ping, ping_info,
NULL,
0,
&ping_trans_color);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" tRNS color =(%d,%d,%d)",
(int) ping_trans_color.red,
(int) ping_trans_color.green,
(int) ping_trans_color.blue);
}
}
}
png_write_info(ping,ping_info);
/* write orNT if image->orientation is defined */
if (image->orientation != UndefinedOrientation)
{
unsigned char
chunk[6];
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,1L); /* data length=1 */
PNGType(chunk,mng_orNT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_orNT,1L);
/* PNG uses Exif orientation values */
chunk[4]=Magick_Orientation_to_Exif_Orientation(image->orientation);
(void) WriteBlob(image,5,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,5));
}
ping_wrote_caNv = MagickFalse;
/* write caNv chunk */
if (ping_exclude_caNv == MagickFalse)
{
if ((image->page.width != 0 && image->page.width != image->columns) ||
(image->page.height != 0 && image->page.height != image->rows) ||
image->page.x != 0 || image->page.y != 0)
{
unsigned char
chunk[20];
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,16L); /* data length=8 */
PNGType(chunk,mng_caNv);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_caNv,16L);
PNGLong(chunk+4,(png_uint_32) image->page.width);
PNGLong(chunk+8,(png_uint_32) image->page.height);
PNGsLong(chunk+12,(png_int_32) image->page.x);
PNGsLong(chunk+16,(png_int_32) image->page.y);
(void) WriteBlob(image,20,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,20));
ping_wrote_caNv = MagickTrue;
}
}
#if defined(PNG_oFFs_SUPPORTED)
if (ping_exclude_oFFs == MagickFalse && ping_wrote_caNv == MagickFalse)
{
if (image->page.x || image->page.y)
{
png_set_oFFs(ping,ping_info,(png_int_32) image->page.x,
(png_int_32) image->page.y, 0);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up oFFs chunk with x=%d, y=%d, units=0",
(int) image->page.x, (int) image->page.y);
}
}
#endif
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER == 10206)
/* avoid libpng-1.2.6 bug by setting PNG_HAVE_IDAT flag */
#define PNG_HAVE_IDAT 0x04
ping->mode |= PNG_HAVE_IDAT;
#undef PNG_HAVE_IDAT
#endif
png_set_packing(ping);
/*
Allocate memory.
*/
rowbytes=image->columns;
if (image_depth > 8)
rowbytes*=2;
switch (ping_color_type)
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
rowbytes*=3;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
rowbytes*=2;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGBA:
rowbytes*=4;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing PNG image data");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocating %.20g bytes of memory for pixels",(double) rowbytes);
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(rowbytes+256,sizeof(*ping_pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Allocation of memory for pixels failed");
ping_pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) memset(ping_pixels,0,(rowbytes+256)*sizeof(*ping_pixels));
/*
Initialize image scanlines.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
png_error(ping,"Memory allocation for quantum_info failed");
quantum_info->format=UndefinedQuantumFormat;
SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,image_depth);
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
num_passes=png_set_interlace_handling(ping);
if ((mng_info->write_png_colortype-1 == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE) ||
((!mng_info->write_png8 && !mng_info->write_png24 &&
!mng_info->write_png48 && !mng_info->write_png64 &&
!mng_info->write_png32) &&
(mng_info->IsPalette ||
(image_info->type == BilevelType)) &&
image_matte == MagickFalse &&
ping_have_non_bw == MagickFalse))
{
/* Palette, Bilevel, or Opaque Monochrome */
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register const Quantum
*p;
quantum_type=RedQuantum;
if (mng_info->IsPalette)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype-1 == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
}
SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,8);
for (pass=0; pass < num_passes; pass++)
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a PNG monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing row of pixels (0)");
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,ping_pixels,exception);
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype-1 != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->columns; i++)
*(ping_pixels+i)=(unsigned char) ((*(ping_pixels+i) > 127) ?
255 : 0);
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing row of pixels (1)");
png_write_row(ping,ping_pixels);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) (pass * image->rows + y),
num_passes * image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else /* Not Palette, Bilevel, or Opaque Monochrome */
{
if ((!mng_info->write_png8 && !mng_info->write_png24 &&
!mng_info->write_png48 && !mng_info->write_png64 &&
!mng_info->write_png32) && (image_matte != MagickFalse ||
(ping_bit_depth >= MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH)) &&
(mng_info->IsPalette) && ping_have_color == MagickFalse)
{
register const Quantum
*p;
for (pass=0; pass < num_passes; pass++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (mng_info->IsPalette)
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
else
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GRAY PNG pixels (2)");
}
else /* PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA */
{
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GRAY_ALPHA PNG pixels (2)");
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayAlphaQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
}
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing row of pixels (2)");
png_write_row(ping,ping_pixels);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) (pass * image->rows + y),
num_passes * image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
register const Quantum
*p;
for (pass=0; pass < num_passes; pass++)
{
if ((image_depth > 8) ||
mng_info->write_png24 ||
mng_info->write_png32 ||
mng_info->write_png48 ||
mng_info->write_png64 ||
(!mng_info->write_png8 && !mng_info->IsPalette))
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1, exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RedQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
else
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
}
else if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
{
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayAlphaQuantum,ping_pixels,
exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GRAY_ALPHA PNG pixels (3)");
}
else if (image_matte != MagickFalse)
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RGBAQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
else
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,RGBQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing row of pixels (3)");
png_write_row(ping,ping_pixels);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) (pass * image->rows + y),
num_passes * image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
/* not ((image_depth > 8) ||
mng_info->write_png24 || mng_info->write_png32 ||
mng_info->write_png48 || mng_info->write_png64 ||
(!mng_info->write_png8 && !mng_info->IsPalette))
*/
{
if ((ping_color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY) &&
(ping_color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" pass %d, Image Is not GRAY or GRAY_ALPHA",pass);
SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,8);
image_depth=8;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" pass %d, Image Is RGB, 16-bit GRAY, or GRAY_ALPHA",
pass);
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1, exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,image->depth);
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
}
else if (ping_color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse && y == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GRAY_ALPHA PNG pixels (4)");
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,GrayAlphaQuantum,ping_pixels,
exception);
}
else
{
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,IndexQuantum,ping_pixels,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse && y <= 2)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing row of non-gray pixels (4)");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ping_pixels[0]=%d,ping_pixels[1]=%d",
(int)ping_pixels[0],(int)ping_pixels[1]);
}
}
png_write_row(ping,ping_pixels);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) (pass * image->rows + y),
num_passes * image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Wrote PNG image data");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Width: %.20g",(double) ping_width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Height: %.20g",(double) ping_height);
if (mng_info->write_png_depth)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Defined png:bit-depth: %d",mng_info->write_png_depth);
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PNG bit-depth written: %d",ping_bit_depth);
if (mng_info->write_png_colortype)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Defined png:color-type: %d",mng_info->write_png_colortype-1);
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PNG color-type written: %d",ping_color_type);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" PNG Interlace method: %d",ping_interlace_method);
}
/*
Generate text chunks after IDAT.
*/
if (ping_exclude_tEXt == MagickFalse || ping_exclude_zTXt == MagickFalse)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
png_textp
text;
value=GetImageProperty(image,property,exception);
/* Don't write any "png:" or "jpeg:" properties; those are just for
* "identify" or for passing through to another JPEG
*/
if ((LocaleNCompare(property,"png:",4) != 0 &&
LocaleNCompare(property,"jpeg:",5) != 0) &&
/* Suppress density and units if we wrote a pHYs chunk */
(ping_exclude_pHYs != MagickFalse ||
LocaleCompare(property,"density") != 0 ||
LocaleCompare(property,"units") != 0) &&
/* Suppress the IM-generated Date:create and Date:modify */
(ping_exclude_date == MagickFalse ||
LocaleNCompare(property, "Date:",5) != 0))
{
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10400
text=(png_textp) png_malloc(ping,
(png_alloc_size_t) sizeof(png_text));
#else
text=(png_textp) png_malloc(ping,(png_size_t) sizeof(png_text));
#endif
text[0].key=(char *) property;
text[0].text=(char *) value;
text[0].text_length=strlen(value);
if (ping_exclude_tEXt != MagickFalse)
text[0].compression=PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_zTXt;
else if (ping_exclude_zTXt != MagickFalse)
text[0].compression=PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_NONE;
else
{
text[0].compression=image_info->compression == NoCompression ||
(image_info->compression == UndefinedCompression &&
text[0].text_length < 128) ? PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_NONE :
PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_zTXt ;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Setting up text chunk");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" keyword: '%s'",text[0].key);
}
png_set_text(ping,ping_info,text,1);
png_free(ping,text);
}
}
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
}
/* write eXIf profile */
if (ping_have_eXIf != MagickFalse && ping_exclude_eXIf == MagickFalse)
{
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (char *) NULL; )
{
if (LocaleCompare(name,"exif") == 0)
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
png_uint_32
length;
unsigned char
chunk[4],
*data;
StringInfo
*ping_profile;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Have eXIf profile");
ping_profile=CloneStringInfo(profile);
data=GetStringInfoDatum(ping_profile),
length=(png_uint_32) GetStringInfoLength(ping_profile);
PNGType(chunk,mng_eXIf);
if (length < 7)
{
ping_profile=DestroyStringInfo(ping_profile);
break; /* otherwise crashes */
}
if (*data == 'E' && *(data+1) == 'x' && *(data+2) == 'i' &&
*(data+3) == 'f' && *(data+4) == '\0' && *(data+5) == '\0')
{
/* skip the "Exif\0\0" JFIF Exif Header ID */
length -= 6;
data += 6;
}
LogPNGChunk(logging,chunk,length);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,chunk);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(crc32(0,chunk,4), data,
(uInt) length));
ping_profile=DestroyStringInfo(ping_profile);
break;
}
}
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing PNG end info");
png_write_end(ping,ping_info);
if (mng_info->need_fram && (int) image->dispose == BackgroundDispose)
{
if (mng_info->page.x || mng_info->page.y ||
(ping_width != mng_info->page.width) ||
(ping_height != mng_info->page.height))
{
unsigned char
chunk[32];
/*
Write FRAM 4 with clipping boundaries followed by FRAM 1.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,27L); /* data length=27 */
PNGType(chunk,mng_FRAM);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_FRAM,27L);
chunk[4]=4;
chunk[5]=0; /* frame name separator (no name) */
chunk[6]=1; /* flag for changing delay, for next frame only */
chunk[7]=0; /* flag for changing frame timeout */
chunk[8]=1; /* flag for changing frame clipping for next frame */
chunk[9]=0; /* flag for changing frame sync_id */
PNGLong(chunk+10,(png_uint_32) (0L)); /* temporary 0 delay */
chunk[14]=0; /* clipping boundaries delta type */
PNGLong(chunk+15,(png_uint_32) (mng_info->page.x)); /* left cb */
PNGLong(chunk+19,
(png_uint_32) (mng_info->page.x + ping_width));
PNGLong(chunk+23,(png_uint_32) (mng_info->page.y)); /* top cb */
PNGLong(chunk+27,
(png_uint_32) (mng_info->page.y + ping_height));
(void) WriteBlob(image,31,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(image,crc32(0,chunk,31));
mng_info->old_framing_mode=4;
mng_info->framing_mode=1;
}
else
mng_info->framing_mode=3;
}
if (mng_info->write_mng && !mng_info->need_fram &&
((int) image->dispose == 3))
png_error(ping, "Cannot convert GIF with disposal method 3 to MNG-LC");
/*
Free PNG resources.
*/
png_destroy_write_struct(&ping,&ping_info);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (ping_have_blob != MagickFalse)
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
/* Store bit depth actually written */
s[0]=(char) ping_bit_depth;
s[1]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(IMimage,"png:bit-depth-written",s,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit WriteOnePNGImage()");
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(ping_semaphore);
#endif
/* } for navigation to beginning of SETJMP-protected block. Revert to
* Throwing an Exception when an error occurs.
*/
return(MagickTrue);
/* End write one PNG image */
} | 1 | CVE-2020-27752 | CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write | The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 5,362 |
ImageMagick6 | c5d012a46ae22be9444326aa37969a3f75daa3ba | MagickExport MagickBooleanType FileToImage(Image *image,const char *filename,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length,
quantum;
ssize_t
count;
struct stat
file_stats;
unsigned char
*blob;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(filename != (const char *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",filename);
status=IsRightsAuthorized(PathPolicyDomain,WritePolicyRights,filename);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
errno=EPERM;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),PolicyError,
"NotAuthorized","`%s'",filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
file=fileno(stdin);
if (LocaleCompare(filename,"-") != 0)
file=open_utf8(filename,O_RDONLY | O_BINARY,0);
if (file == -1)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToOpenBlob",filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
quantum=(size_t) MagickMaxBufferExtent;
if ((fstat(file,&file_stats) == 0) && (file_stats.st_size > 0))
quantum=(size_t) MagickMin(file_stats.st_size,MagickMaxBufferExtent);
blob=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(quantum,sizeof(*blob));
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
file=close(file);
ThrowFileException(exception,ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
for ( ; ; )
{
count=read(file,blob,quantum);
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
length=(size_t) count;
count=WriteBlobStream(image,length,blob);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToWriteBlob",filename);
break;
}
}
file=close(file);
if (file == -1)
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToWriteBlob",filename);
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,320 |
linux | 7d11f77f84b27cef452cee332f4e469503084737 | int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
{
struct rds_iovec vec;
struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
if (args->nr_local == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages * sizeof(struct scatterlist);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 23,154 |
Chrome | b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778 | bool AccessibilityUIElement::isFocusable() const
{
return checkElementState(m_element, ATK_STATE_FOCUSABLE);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,641 |
Android | edd4a76eb4747bd19ed122df46fa46b452c12a0d | status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mTimeToSample = new uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
| 1 | CVE-2014-7917 | CWE-189 | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | Not Found in CWE Page | 2,903 |
tor | a74e7fd40f1a77eb4000d8216bb5b80cdd8a6193 | command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
or_circuit_t *circ;
int id_is_high;
if (we_are_hibernating()) {
log_info(LD_OR,
"Received create cell but we're shutting down. Sending back "
"destroy.");
connection_or_send_destroy(cell->circ_id, conn,
END_CIRC_REASON_HIBERNATING);
return;
}
if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received create cell (type %d) from %s:%d, but we're a client. "
"Sending back a destroy.",
(int)cell->command, conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
connection_or_send_destroy(cell->circ_id, conn,
END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return;
}
/* If the high bit of the circuit ID is not as expected, close the
* circ. */
id_is_high = cell->circ_id & (1<<15);
if ((id_is_high && conn->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ||
(!id_is_high && conn->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received create cell with unexpected circ_id %d. Closing.",
cell->circ_id);
connection_or_send_destroy(cell->circ_id, conn,
END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return;
}
if (circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(cell->circ_id, conn)) {
routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_digest(conn->identity_digest);
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received CREATE cell (circID %d) for known circ. "
"Dropping (age %d).",
cell->circ_id, (int)(time(NULL) - conn->_base.timestamp_created));
if (router)
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Details: nickname \"%s\", platform %s.",
router->nickname, escaped(router->platform));
return;
}
circ = or_circuit_new(cell->circ_id, conn);
circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR;
circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING);
if (cell->command == CELL_CREATE) {
char *onionskin = tor_malloc(ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
memcpy(onionskin, cell->payload, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
/* hand it off to the cpuworkers, and then return. */
if (assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(NULL, circ, onionskin) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Failed to hand off onionskin. Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return;
}
log_debug(LD_OR,"success: handed off onionskin.");
} else {
/* This is a CREATE_FAST cell; we can handle it immediately without using
* a CPU worker. */
char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
char reply[DIGEST_LEN*2];
tor_assert(cell->command == CELL_CREATE_FAST);
/* Make sure we never try to use the OR connection on which we
* received this cell to satisfy an EXTEND request, */
conn->is_connection_with_client = 1;
if (fast_server_handshake(cell->payload, (uint8_t*)reply,
(uint8_t*)keys, sizeof(keys))<0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,"Failed to generate key material. Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return;
}
if (onionskin_answer(circ, CELL_CREATED_FAST, reply, keys)<0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,"Failed to reply to CREATE_FAST cell. Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return;
}
}
} | 1 | CVE-2011-2768 | CWE-264 | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | Not Found in CWE Page | 9,879 |
Android | d48f0f145f8f0f4472bc0af668ac9a8bce44ba9b | status_t MPEG4Source::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK(mStarted);
if (mFirstMoofOffset > 0) {
return fragmentedRead(out, options);
}
*out = NULL;
int64_t targetSampleTimeUs = -1;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
uint32_t findFlags = 0;
switch (mode) {
case ReadOptions::SEEK_PREVIOUS_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_NEXT_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagAfter;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST_SYNC:
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagClosest;
break;
default:
CHECK(!"Should not be here.");
break;
}
uint32_t sampleIndex;
status_t err = mSampleTable->findSampleAtTime(
seekTimeUs, 1000000, mTimescale,
&sampleIndex, findFlags);
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
}
uint32_t syncSampleIndex;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->findSyncSampleNear(
sampleIndex, &syncSampleIndex, findFlags);
}
uint32_t sampleTime;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
sampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &sampleTime);
}
if (err != OK) {
if (err == ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE) {
err = ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
ALOGV("end of stream");
return err;
}
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
targetSampleTimeUs = (sampleTime * 1000000ll) / mTimescale;
}
#if 0
uint32_t syncSampleTime;
CHECK_EQ(OK, mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
syncSampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &syncSampleTime));
ALOGI("seek to time %lld us => sample at time %lld us, "
"sync sample at time %lld us",
seekTimeUs,
sampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale,
syncSampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale);
#endif
mCurrentSampleIndex = syncSampleIndex;
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
}
off64_t offset;
size_t size;
uint32_t cts, stts;
bool isSyncSample;
bool newBuffer = false;
if (mBuffer == NULL) {
newBuffer = true;
status_t err =
mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
mCurrentSampleIndex, &offset, &size, &cts, &isSyncSample, &stts);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&mBuffer);
if (err != OK) {
CHECK(mBuffer == NULL);
return err;
}
}
if ((!mIsAVC && !mIsHEVC) || mWantsNALFragments) {
if (newBuffer) {
ssize_t num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data(), size);
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, ((int64_t)stts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
}
if (!mIsAVC && !mIsHEVC) {
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
CHECK(mBuffer->range_length() >= mNALLengthSize);
const uint8_t *src =
(const uint8_t *)mBuffer->data() + mBuffer->range_offset();
size_t nal_size = parseNALSize(src);
if (mBuffer->range_length() < mNALLengthSize + nal_size) {
ALOGE("incomplete NAL unit.");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *clone = mBuffer->clone();
CHECK(clone != NULL);
clone->set_range(mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize, nal_size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(
mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize + nal_size,
mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize - nal_size);
if (mBuffer->range_length() == 0) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
*out = clone;
return OK;
} else {
ssize_t num_bytes_read = 0;
int32_t drm = 0;
bool usesDRM = (mFormat->findInt32(kKeyIsDRM, &drm) && drm != 0);
if (usesDRM) {
num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t*)mBuffer->data(), size);
} else {
num_bytes_read = mDataSource->readAt(offset, mSrcBuffer, size);
}
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (usesDRM) {
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
} else {
uint8_t *dstData = (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data();
size_t srcOffset = 0;
size_t dstOffset = 0;
while (srcOffset < size) {
bool isMalFormed = (srcOffset + mNALLengthSize > size);
size_t nalLength = 0;
if (!isMalFormed) {
nalLength = parseNALSize(&mSrcBuffer[srcOffset]);
srcOffset += mNALLengthSize;
isMalFormed = srcOffset + nalLength > size;
}
if (isMalFormed) {
ALOGE("Video is malformed");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (nalLength == 0) {
continue;
}
CHECK(dstOffset + 4 <= mBuffer->size());
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 1;
memcpy(&dstData[dstOffset], &mSrcBuffer[srcOffset], nalLength);
srcOffset += nalLength;
dstOffset += nalLength;
}
CHECK_EQ(srcOffset, size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, dstOffset);
}
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, ((int64_t)stts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2015-3832 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 6,067 |
net | 43a6684519ab0a6c52024b5e25322476cabad893 | static int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct icmphdr user_icmph;
struct pingfakehdr pfh;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct ip_options_data opt_copy;
int free = 0;
__be32 saddr, daddr, faddr;
u8 tos;
int err;
pr_debug("ping_v4_sendmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", inet, inet->inet_num);
err = ping_common_sendmsg(AF_INET, msg, len, &user_icmph,
sizeof(user_icmph));
if (err)
return err;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_name) {
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, usin, msg->msg_name);
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
/* no remote port */
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
/* no remote port */
}
ipc.sockc.tsflags = sk->sk_tsflags;
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
ipc.ttl = 0;
ipc.tos = -1;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sk, msg, &ipc, false);
if (unlikely(err)) {
kfree(ipc.opt);
return err;
}
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
if (!ipc.opt) {
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt) {
memcpy(&opt_copy, inet_opt,
sizeof(*inet_opt) + inet_opt->opt.optlen);
ipc.opt = &opt_copy.opt;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, ipc.sockc.tsflags, &ipc.tx_flags);
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = faddr = daddr;
if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
faddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
}
tos = get_rttos(&ipc, inet);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE) ||
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE) ||
(ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.is_strictroute)) {
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
}
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
} else if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->uc_index;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, sk->sk_protocol,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk), faddr, saddr, 0, 0,
sk->sk_uid);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
goto out;
}
err = -EACCES;
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST) &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto out;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (!ipc.addr)
ipc.addr = fl4.daddr;
lock_sock(sk);
pfh.icmph.type = user_icmph.type; /* already checked */
pfh.icmph.code = user_icmph.code; /* ditto */
pfh.icmph.checksum = 0;
pfh.icmph.un.echo.id = inet->inet_sport;
pfh.icmph.un.echo.sequence = user_icmph.un.echo.sequence;
pfh.msg = msg;
pfh.wcheck = 0;
pfh.family = AF_INET;
err = ip_append_data(sk, &fl4, ping_getfrag, &pfh, len,
0, &ipc, &rt, msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
ip_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else
err = ping_v4_push_pending_frames(sk, &pfh, &fl4);
release_sock(sk);
out:
ip_rt_put(rt);
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
if (!err) {
icmp_out_count(sock_net(sk), user_icmph.type);
return len;
}
return err;
do_confirm:
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE)
dst_confirm_neigh(&rt->dst, &fl4.daddr);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,781 |
openssl | 4a23b12a031860253b58d503f296377ca076427b | BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *v, BIGNUM *u, BIGNUM *b, BIGNUM *N)
{
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *S = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
if (u == NULL || A == NULL || v == NULL || b == NULL || N == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
(tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(S = BN_new()) == NULL )
goto err;
/* S = (A*v**u) ** b */
if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp,v,u,N,bn_ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp,A,tmp,N,bn_ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_exp(S,tmp,b,N,bn_ctx))
goto err;
err:
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
BN_clear_free(tmp);
return S;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,940 |
libxml2 | bf22713507fe1fc3a2c4b525cf0a88c2dc87a3a2 | xmlEncodeSpecialChars(const xmlDoc *doc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const xmlChar *input) {
const xmlChar *cur = input;
xmlChar *buffer = NULL;
xmlChar *out = NULL;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
if (input == NULL) return(NULL);
/*
* allocate an translation buffer.
*/
buffer_size = 1000;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMalloc(buffer_size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlEntitiesErrMemory("xmlEncodeSpecialChars: malloc failed");
return(NULL);
}
out = buffer;
while (*cur != '\0') {
size_t indx = out - buffer;
if (indx + 10 > buffer_size) {
growBufferReentrant();
out = &buffer[indx];
}
/*
* By default one have to encode at least '<', '>', '"' and '&' !
*/
if (*cur == '<') {
*out++ = '&';
*out++ = 'l';
*out++ = 't';
*out++ = ';';
} else if (*cur == '>') {
*out++ = '&';
*out++ = 'g';
*out++ = 't';
*out++ = ';';
} else if (*cur == '&') {
*out++ = '&';
*out++ = 'a';
*out++ = 'm';
*out++ = 'p';
*out++ = ';';
} else if (*cur == '"') {
*out++ = '&';
*out++ = 'q';
*out++ = 'u';
*out++ = 'o';
*out++ = 't';
*out++ = ';';
} else if (*cur == '\r') {
*out++ = '&';
*out++ = '#';
*out++ = '1';
*out++ = '3';
*out++ = ';';
} else {
/*
* Works because on UTF-8, all extended sequences cannot
* result in bytes in the ASCII range.
*/
*out++ = *cur;
}
cur++;
}
*out = 0;
return(buffer);
mem_error:
xmlEntitiesErrMemory("xmlEncodeSpecialChars: realloc failed");
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,788 |
linux | 8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4 | static int __net_init sctp_net_init(struct net *net)
{
int status;
/*
* 14. Suggested SCTP Protocol Parameter Values
*/
/* The following protocol parameters are RECOMMENDED: */
/* RTO.Initial - 3 seconds */
net->sctp.rto_initial = SCTP_RTO_INITIAL;
/* RTO.Min - 1 second */
net->sctp.rto_min = SCTP_RTO_MIN;
/* RTO.Max - 60 seconds */
net->sctp.rto_max = SCTP_RTO_MAX;
/* RTO.Alpha - 1/8 */
net->sctp.rto_alpha = SCTP_RTO_ALPHA;
/* RTO.Beta - 1/4 */
net->sctp.rto_beta = SCTP_RTO_BETA;
/* Valid.Cookie.Life - 60 seconds */
net->sctp.valid_cookie_life = SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_LIFE;
/* Whether Cookie Preservative is enabled(1) or not(0) */
net->sctp.cookie_preserve_enable = 1;
/* Default sctp sockets to use md5 as their hmac alg */
#if defined (CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_MD5)
net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg = "md5";
#elif defined (CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_SHA1)
net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg = "sha1";
#else
net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg = NULL;
#endif
/* Max.Burst - 4 */
net->sctp.max_burst = SCTP_DEFAULT_MAX_BURST;
/* Association.Max.Retrans - 10 attempts
* Path.Max.Retrans - 5 attempts (per destination address)
* Max.Init.Retransmits - 8 attempts
*/
net->sctp.max_retrans_association = 10;
net->sctp.max_retrans_path = 5;
net->sctp.max_retrans_init = 8;
/* Sendbuffer growth - do per-socket accounting */
net->sctp.sndbuf_policy = 0;
/* Rcvbuffer growth - do per-socket accounting */
net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy = 0;
/* HB.interval - 30 seconds */
net->sctp.hb_interval = SCTP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_HEARTBEAT;
/* delayed SACK timeout */
net->sctp.sack_timeout = SCTP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SACK;
/* Disable ADDIP by default. */
net->sctp.addip_enable = 0;
net->sctp.addip_noauth = 0;
net->sctp.default_auto_asconf = 0;
/* Enable PR-SCTP by default. */
net->sctp.prsctp_enable = 1;
/* Disable AUTH by default. */
net->sctp.auth_enable = 0;
/* Set SCOPE policy to enabled */
net->sctp.scope_policy = SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_ENABLE;
/* Set the default rwnd update threshold */
net->sctp.rwnd_upd_shift = SCTP_DEFAULT_RWND_SHIFT;
/* Initialize maximum autoclose timeout. */
net->sctp.max_autoclose = INT_MAX / HZ;
status = sctp_sysctl_net_register(net);
if (status)
goto err_sysctl_register;
/* Allocate and initialise sctp mibs. */
status = init_sctp_mibs(net);
if (status)
goto err_init_mibs;
/* Initialize proc fs directory. */
status = sctp_proc_init(net);
if (status)
goto err_init_proc;
sctp_dbg_objcnt_init(net);
/* Initialize the control inode/socket for handling OOTB packets. */
if ((status = sctp_ctl_sock_init(net))) {
pr_err("Failed to initialize the SCTP control sock\n");
goto err_ctl_sock_init;
}
/* Initialize the local address list. */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->sctp.local_addr_list);
spin_lock_init(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
sctp_get_local_addr_list(net);
/* Initialize the address event list */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->sctp.addr_waitq);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
spin_lock_init(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
net->sctp.addr_wq_timer.expires = 0;
setup_timer(&net->sctp.addr_wq_timer, sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler,
(unsigned long)net);
return 0;
err_ctl_sock_init:
sctp_dbg_objcnt_exit(net);
sctp_proc_exit(net);
err_init_proc:
cleanup_sctp_mibs(net);
err_init_mibs:
sctp_sysctl_net_unregister(net);
err_sysctl_register:
return status;
}
| 1 | CVE-2015-5283 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 1,498 |
tensorflow | e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1 | bool AreTensorProtosEqual(const TensorProto& lhs, const TensorProto& rhs) {
Tensor lhs_t(lhs.dtype());
bool success = lhs_t.FromProto(lhs);
DCHECK(success);
Tensor rhs_t(rhs.dtype());
success = rhs_t.FromProto(rhs);
DCHECK(success);
TensorProto lhs_tp;
lhs_t.AsProtoTensorContent(&lhs_tp);
TensorProto rhs_tp;
rhs_t.AsProtoTensorContent(&rhs_tp);
return AreSerializedProtosEqual(lhs_tp, rhs_tp);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,203 |
Chrome | 116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a | void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnUpdatePrintSettings(
int document_cookie,
const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* params) {
std::string dummy_string;
int margins_type = 0;
if (!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, &dummy_string) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr, &dummy_string) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingMarginsType, &margins_type)) {
return;
}
if (printer_.get()) {
const ListValue* page_range_array;
printing::PageRanges new_ranges;
if (job_settings.GetList(printing::kSettingPageRange, &page_range_array)) {
for (size_t index = 0; index < page_range_array->GetSize(); ++index) {
const base::DictionaryValue* dict;
if (!page_range_array->GetDictionary(index, &dict))
continue;
printing::PageRange range;
if (!dict->GetInteger(printing::kSettingPageRangeFrom, &range.from) ||
!dict->GetInteger(printing::kSettingPageRangeTo, &range.to)) {
continue;
}
range.from--;
range.to--;
new_ranges.push_back(range);
}
}
std::vector<int> pages(printing::PageRange::GetPages(new_ranges));
printer_->UpdateSettings(document_cookie, params, pages, margins_type);
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2012-2891 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 4 |
quagga-RE | 790d1e263e8800bc49d0038d481591ecb4e37b88 | bgp_capability_parse (struct peer *peer, size_t length, int *mp_capability,
u_char **error)
{
int ret;
struct stream *s = BGP_INPUT (peer);
size_t end = stream_get_getp (s) + length;
assert (STREAM_READABLE (s) >= length);
while (stream_get_getp (s) < end)
{
size_t start;
u_char *sp = stream_pnt (s);
struct capability_header caphdr;
/* We need at least capability code and capability length. */
if (stream_get_getp(s) + 2 > end)
{
zlog_info ("%s Capability length error (< header)", peer->host);
bgp_notify_send (peer, BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE, 0);
return -1;
}
caphdr.code = stream_getc (s);
caphdr.length = stream_getc (s);
start = stream_get_getp (s);
/* Capability length check sanity check. */
if (start + caphdr.length > end)
{
zlog_info ("%s Capability length error (< length)", peer->host);
bgp_notify_send (peer, BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE, 0);
return -1;
}
if (BGP_DEBUG (normal, NORMAL))
zlog_debug ("%s OPEN has %s capability (%u), length %u",
peer->host,
LOOKUP (capcode_str, caphdr.code),
caphdr.code, caphdr.length);
/* Length sanity check, type-specific, for known capabilities */
switch (caphdr.code)
{
case CAPABILITY_CODE_MP:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_REFRESH:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_REFRESH_OLD:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_ORF:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_ORF_OLD:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_RESTART:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_AS4:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_DYNAMIC:
/* Check length. */
if (caphdr.length < cap_minsizes[caphdr.code])
{
zlog_info ("%s %s Capability length error: got %u,"
" expected at least %u",
peer->host,
LOOKUP (capcode_str, caphdr.code),
caphdr.length,
(unsigned) cap_minsizes[caphdr.code]);
bgp_notify_send (peer, BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE, 0);
return -1;
}
/* we deliberately ignore unknown codes, see below */
default:
break;
}
switch (caphdr.code)
{
case CAPABILITY_CODE_MP:
{
*mp_capability = 1;
/* Ignore capability when override-capability is set. */
if (! CHECK_FLAG (peer->flags, PEER_FLAG_OVERRIDE_CAPABILITY))
{
/* Set negotiated value. */
ret = bgp_capability_mp (peer, &caphdr);
/* Unsupported Capability. */
if (ret < 0)
{
/* Store return data. */
memcpy (*error, sp, caphdr.length + 2);
*error += caphdr.length + 2;
}
}
}
break;
case CAPABILITY_CODE_REFRESH:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_REFRESH_OLD:
{
/* BGP refresh capability */
if (caphdr.code == CAPABILITY_CODE_REFRESH_OLD)
SET_FLAG (peer->cap, PEER_CAP_REFRESH_OLD_RCV);
else
SET_FLAG (peer->cap, PEER_CAP_REFRESH_NEW_RCV);
}
break;
case CAPABILITY_CODE_ORF:
case CAPABILITY_CODE_ORF_OLD:
if (bgp_capability_orf_entry (peer, &caphdr))
return -1;
break;
case CAPABILITY_CODE_RESTART:
if (bgp_capability_restart (peer, &caphdr))
return -1;
break;
case CAPABILITY_CODE_DYNAMIC:
SET_FLAG (peer->cap, PEER_CAP_DYNAMIC_RCV);
break;
case CAPABILITY_CODE_AS4:
/* Already handled as a special-case parsing of the capabilities
* at the beginning of OPEN processing. So we care not a jot
* for the value really, only error case.
*/
if (!bgp_capability_as4 (peer, &caphdr))
return -1;
break;
default:
if (caphdr.code > 128)
{
/* We don't send Notification for unknown vendor specific
capabilities. It seems reasonable for now... */
zlog_warn ("%s Vendor specific capability %d",
peer->host, caphdr.code);
}
else
{
zlog_warn ("%s unrecognized capability code: %d - ignored",
peer->host, caphdr.code);
memcpy (*error, sp, caphdr.length + 2);
*error += caphdr.length + 2;
}
}
if (stream_get_getp(s) != (start + caphdr.length))
{
if (stream_get_getp(s) > (start + caphdr.length))
zlog_warn ("%s Cap-parser for %s read past cap-length, %u!",
peer->host, LOOKUP (capcode_str, caphdr.code),
caphdr.length);
stream_set_getp (s, start + caphdr.length);
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,112 |
linux-2.6 | 04045f98e0457aba7d4e6736f37eed189c48a5f7 | void ieee80211_rx_mgt(struct ieee80211_device *ieee,
struct ieee80211_hdr_4addr *header,
struct ieee80211_rx_stats *stats)
{
switch (WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu(header->frame_ctl))) {
case IEEE80211_STYPE_ASSOC_RESP:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received ASSOCIATION RESPONSE (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
ieee80211_handle_assoc_resp(ieee,
(struct ieee80211_assoc_response *)
header, stats);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_REASSOC_RESP:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received REASSOCIATION RESPONSE (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_PROBE_REQ:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received auth (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
if (ieee->handle_probe_request != NULL)
ieee->handle_probe_request(ieee->dev,
(struct
ieee80211_probe_request *)
header, stats);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_PROBE_RESP:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received PROBE RESPONSE (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
IEEE80211_DEBUG_SCAN("Probe response\n");
ieee80211_process_probe_response(ieee,
(struct
ieee80211_probe_response *)
header, stats);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_BEACON:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received BEACON (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
IEEE80211_DEBUG_SCAN("Beacon\n");
ieee80211_process_probe_response(ieee,
(struct
ieee80211_probe_response *)
header, stats);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_AUTH:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received auth (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
if (ieee->handle_auth != NULL)
ieee->handle_auth(ieee->dev,
(struct ieee80211_auth *)header);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_DISASSOC:
if (ieee->handle_disassoc != NULL)
ieee->handle_disassoc(ieee->dev,
(struct ieee80211_disassoc *)
header);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_ACTION:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("ACTION\n");
if (ieee->handle_action)
ieee->handle_action(ieee->dev,
(struct ieee80211_action *)
header, stats);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received reassoc (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("%s: IEEE80211_REASSOC_REQ received\n",
ieee->dev->name);
if (ieee->handle_reassoc_request != NULL)
ieee->handle_reassoc_request(ieee->dev,
(struct ieee80211_reassoc_request *)
header);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_ASSOC_REQ:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received assoc (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("%s: IEEE80211_ASSOC_REQ received\n",
ieee->dev->name);
if (ieee->handle_assoc_request != NULL)
ieee->handle_assoc_request(ieee->dev);
break;
case IEEE80211_STYPE_DEAUTH:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("DEAUTH\n");
if (ieee->handle_deauth != NULL)
ieee->handle_deauth(ieee->dev,
(struct ieee80211_deauth *)
header);
break;
default:
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("received UNKNOWN (%d)\n",
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
IEEE80211_DEBUG_MGMT("%s: Unknown management packet: %d\n",
ieee->dev->name,
WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(le16_to_cpu
(header->frame_ctl)));
break;
}
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 18,286 |
qemu | 60253ed1e6ec6d8e5ef2efe7bf755f475dce9956 | void rng_backend_request_entropy(RngBackend *s, size_t size,
EntropyReceiveFunc *receive_entropy,
void *opaque)
{
RngBackendClass *k = RNG_BACKEND_GET_CLASS(s);
if (k->request_entropy) {
k->request_entropy(s, size, receive_entropy, opaque);
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-2858 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 3,820 |
Android | 5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426 | void RunAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
uint32_t max_error = 0;
int64_t total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 10000;
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block,
test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1u, max_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has an individual round trip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block , total_error)
<< "Error: 16x16 FHT/IHT has average round trip error > 1 per block";
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-1621 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 7,647 |
ImageMagick | 58d9c46929ca0828edde34d263700c3a5fe8dc3c | MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
if (c == EOF)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 23,586 |
openssl | a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 | static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short length;
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
# endif
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
# endif
if (data >= (d + n - 2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data, length);
if (data + length != d + n) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (data + size > (d + n))
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
tlsext_servername = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
ecpointformatlist_length);
}
# if 0
fprintf(stderr,
"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
# endif
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|| (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
if (size < 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
/* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
/* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
} else {
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
}
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
/*
* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
* request message.
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* The data must be valid */
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->
ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
size,
s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
# endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
unsigned len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
if (size < 4) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/*-
* The extension data consists of:
* uint16 list_length
* uint8 proto_length;
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
len = data[0];
len <<= 8;
len |= data[1];
if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
len = data[2];
if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
switch (data[0]) {
case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
}
# endif
/*
* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
* custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
*/
else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
data += size;
}
if (data != d + n) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
} else {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
*p = data;
ri_check:
/*
* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
* an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
* because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
* However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
* doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
* initial connect only.
*/
if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-2177 | CWE-190 | Integer Overflow or Wraparound | The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number. | Phase: Requirements
Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.
Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences.
Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.
Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
Phase: Implementation
Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]
Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system. | 2,758 |
Android | 3b1c9f692c4d4b7a683c2b358fc89e831a641b88 | status_t MediaHTTP::connect(
const char *uri,
const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers,
off64_t /* offset */) {
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
return mInitCheck;
}
KeyedVector<String8, String8> extHeaders;
if (headers != NULL) {
extHeaders = *headers;
}
if (extHeaders.indexOfKey(String8("User-Agent")) < 0) {
extHeaders.add(String8("User-Agent"), String8(MakeUserAgent().c_str()));
}
bool success = mHTTPConnection->connect(uri, &extHeaders);
mLastHeaders = extHeaders;
mLastURI = uri;
mCachedSizeValid = false;
if (success) {
AString sanitized = uriDebugString(uri);
mName = String8::format("MediaHTTP(%s)", sanitized.c_str());
}
return success ? OK : UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-6699 | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333]
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 9,700 |
savannah | 863d31ae775d56b785dc5b0105b6d251515d81d5 | set_machine_vars ()
{
SHELL_VAR *temp_var;
temp_var = set_if_not ("HOSTTYPE", HOSTTYPE);
temp_var = set_if_not ("OSTYPE", OSTYPE);
temp_var = set_if_not ("MACHTYPE", MACHTYPE);
temp_var = set_if_not ("HOSTNAME", current_host_name);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,984 |
Chrome | 419c4bfbfb94849ed30dcab7c3aaf67afe238b27 | void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(
Blob* blob) {
loader_->Start(blob->GetBlobDataHandle());
}
| 1 | CVE-2019-5758 | CWE-416 | Use After Free | The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Choose a language that provides automatic memory management.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
When freeing pointers, be sure to set them to NULL once they are freed. However, the utilization of multiple or complex data structures may lower the usefulness of this strategy.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: If a bug causes an attempted access of this pointer, then a NULL dereference could still lead to a crash or other unexpected behavior, but it will reduce or eliminate the risk of code execution. | 8,226 |
hivex | 8f1935733b10d974a1a4176d38dd151ed98cf381 | _hivex_get_iconv (hive_h *h, recode_type t)
{
gl_lock_lock (h->iconv_cache[t].mutex);
if (h->iconv_cache[t].handle == NULL) {
if (t == utf8_to_latin1)
h->iconv_cache[t].handle = iconv_open ("LATIN1", "UTF-8");
else if (t == latin1_to_utf8)
h->iconv_cache[t].handle = iconv_open ("UTF-8", "LATIN1");
else if (t == utf8_to_utf16le)
h->iconv_cache[t].handle = iconv_open ("UTF-16LE", "UTF-8");
else if (t == utf16le_to_utf8)
h->iconv_cache[t].handle = iconv_open ("UTF-8", "UTF-16LE");
} else {
/* reinitialize iconv context */
iconv (h->iconv_cache[t].handle, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
}
return h->iconv_cache[t].handle;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 21,814 |
Android | 36b04932bb93cc3269279282686b439a17a89920 | status_t NuMediaExtractor::advance() {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
ssize_t minIndex = fetchTrackSamples();
if (minIndex < 0) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
TrackInfo *info = &mSelectedTracks.editItemAt(minIndex);
info->mSample->release();
info->mSample = NULL;
info->mSampleTimeUs = -1ll;
return OK;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,209 |
linux | a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2 | void drm_crtc_cleanup(struct drm_crtc *crtc)
{
struct drm_device *dev = crtc->dev;
if (crtc->gamma_store) {
kfree(crtc->gamma_store);
crtc->gamma_store = NULL;
}
drm_mode_object_put(dev, &crtc->base);
list_del(&crtc->head);
dev->mode_config.num_crtc--;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,895 |
tcpdump | 83c64fce3a5226b080e535f5131a8a318f30e79b | rpki_rtr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
u_int tlen, pdu_type, pdu_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const rpki_rtr_pdu *pdu_header;
tptr = pptr;
tlen = len;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RPKI-RTR"));
return;
}
while (tlen >= sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu));
pdu_header = (const rpki_rtr_pdu *)tptr;
pdu_type = pdu_header->pdu_type;
pdu_len = EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu_header->length);
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
/* infinite loop check */
if (!pdu_type || !pdu_len) {
break;
}
if (tlen < pdu_len) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print the PDU.
*/
if (rpki_rtr_pdu_print(ndo, tptr, 8))
goto trunc;
tlen -= pdu_len;
tptr += pdu_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s", tstr));
}
| 1 | CVE-2017-13050 | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions. | 1,180 |
tensorflow | 8a6e874437670045e6c7dc6154c7412b4a2135e2 | Status ForwardInputOrCreateNewList(OpKernelContext* c, int32 input_index,
int32 output_index,
const TensorList& input_list,
TensorList** output_list) {
// Attempt to forward the input tensor to the output if possible.
std::unique_ptr<Tensor> maybe_output = c->forward_input(
input_index, output_index, DT_VARIANT, TensorShape{},
c->input_memory_type(input_index), AllocatorAttributes());
Tensor* output_tensor;
if (maybe_output != nullptr && maybe_output->dtype() == DT_VARIANT &&
maybe_output->NumElements() == 1) {
output_tensor = maybe_output.get();
TensorList* tmp_out = output_tensor->scalar<Variant>()().get<TensorList>();
if (tmp_out == nullptr) {
return errors::InvalidArgument(
"Expected input ", input_index, " to be a TensorList but saw ",
output_tensor->scalar<Variant>()().TypeName());
}
if (tmp_out->RefCountIsOne()) {
// Woohoo, forwarding succeeded!
c->set_output(output_index, *output_tensor);
*output_list = tmp_out;
return Status::OK();
}
}
// If forwarding is not possible allocate a new output tensor and copy
// the `input_list` to it.
AllocatorAttributes attr;
attr.set_on_host(true);
TF_RETURN_IF_ERROR(
c->allocate_output(output_index, {}, &output_tensor, attr));
output_tensor->scalar<Variant>()() = input_list.Copy();
*output_list = output_tensor->scalar<Variant>()().get<TensorList>();
return Status::OK();
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,395 |
Chrome | 350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1 | P2PQuicStreamImpl::~P2PQuicStreamImpl() {}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 15,370 |
suricata | 11f3659f64a4e42e90cb3c09fcef66894205aefe | int DecodeTeredo(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt, uint16_t len, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (!g_teredo_enabled)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
uint8_t *start = pkt;
/* Is this packet to short to contain an IPv6 packet ? */
if (len < IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* Teredo encapsulate IPv6 in UDP and can add some custom message
* part before the IPv6 packet. In our case, we just want to get
* over an ORIGIN indication. So we just make one offset if needed. */
if (start[0] == 0x0) {
switch (start[1]) {
/* origin indication: compatible with tunnel */
case 0x0:
/* offset is coherent with len and presence of an IPv6 header */
if (len >= TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH + IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
start += TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH;
else
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
break;
/* authentication: negotiation not real tunnel */
case 0x1:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* this case is not possible in Teredo: not that protocol */
default:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
}
/* There is no specific field that we can check to prove that the packet
* is a Teredo packet. We've zapped here all the possible Teredo header
* and we should have an IPv6 packet at the start pointer.
* We then can only do two checks before sending the encapsulated packets
* to decoding:
* - The packet has a protocol version which is IPv6.
* - The IPv6 length of the packet matches what remains in buffer.
*/
if (IP_GET_RAW_VER(start) == 6) {
IPV6Hdr *thdr = (IPV6Hdr *)start;
if (len == IPV6_HEADER_LEN +
IPV6_GET_RAW_PLEN(thdr) + (start - pkt)) {
if (pq != NULL) {
int blen = len - (start - pkt);
/* spawn off tunnel packet */
Packet *tp = PacketTunnelPktSetup(tv, dtv, p, start, blen,
DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV6, pq);
if (tp != NULL) {
PKT_SET_SRC(tp, PKT_SRC_DECODER_TEREDO);
/* add the tp to the packet queue. */
PacketEnqueue(pq,tp);
StatsIncr(tv, dtv->counter_teredo);
return TM_ECODE_OK;
}
}
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
} | 1 | CVE-2019-1010251 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 3,522 |
linux | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | void set_task_cpu(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int new_cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
/*
* We should never call set_task_cpu() on a blocked task,
* ttwu() will sort out the placement.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(p->state != TASK_RUNNING && p->state != TASK_WAKING &&
!(task_thread_info(p)->preempt_count & PREEMPT_ACTIVE));
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
/*
* The caller should hold either p->pi_lock or rq->lock, when changing
* a task's CPU. ->pi_lock for waking tasks, rq->lock for runnable tasks.
*
* sched_move_task() holds both and thus holding either pins the cgroup,
* see set_task_rq().
*
* Furthermore, all task_rq users should acquire both locks, see
* task_rq_lock().
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(debug_locks && !(lockdep_is_held(&p->pi_lock) ||
lockdep_is_held(&task_rq(p)->lock)));
#endif
#endif
trace_sched_migrate_task(p, new_cpu);
if (task_cpu(p) != new_cpu) {
p->se.nr_migrations++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_MIGRATIONS, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
}
__set_task_cpu(p, new_cpu);
}
| 1 | CVE-2011-2918 | CWE-399 | Resource Management Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources. | Not Found in CWE Page | 2,578 |
evolution-data-server | f26a6f672096790d0bbd76903db4c9a2e44f116b | camel_imapx_server_expunge_sync (CamelIMAPXServer *is,
CamelIMAPXMailbox *mailbox,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
CamelFolder *folder;
gboolean success;
g_return_val_if_fail (CAMEL_IS_IMAPX_SERVER (is), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (CAMEL_IS_IMAPX_MAILBOX (mailbox), FALSE);
folder = imapx_server_ref_folder (is, mailbox);
g_return_val_if_fail (folder != NULL, FALSE);
success = camel_imapx_server_ensure_selected_sync (is, mailbox, cancellable, error);
if (success) {
CamelIMAPXCommand *ic;
ic = camel_imapx_command_new (is, CAMEL_IMAPX_JOB_EXPUNGE, "EXPUNGE");
success = camel_imapx_server_process_command_sync (is, ic, _("Error expunging message"), cancellable, error);
if (success) {
GPtrArray *uids;
CamelStore *parent_store;
const gchar *full_name;
full_name = camel_folder_get_full_name (folder);
parent_store = camel_folder_get_parent_store (folder);
camel_folder_summary_lock (folder->summary);
camel_folder_summary_save_to_db (folder->summary, NULL);
uids = camel_db_get_folder_deleted_uids (parent_store->cdb_r, full_name, NULL);
if (uids && uids->len) {
CamelFolderChangeInfo *changes;
GList *removed = NULL;
gint i;
changes = camel_folder_change_info_new ();
for (i = 0; i < uids->len; i++) {
camel_folder_change_info_remove_uid (changes, uids->pdata[i]);
removed = g_list_prepend (removed, (gpointer) uids->pdata[i]);
}
camel_folder_summary_remove_uids (folder->summary, removed);
camel_folder_summary_save_to_db (folder->summary, NULL);
camel_folder_changed (folder, changes);
camel_folder_change_info_free (changes);
g_list_free (removed);
g_ptr_array_foreach (uids, (GFunc) camel_pstring_free, NULL);
}
if (uids)
g_ptr_array_free (uids, TRUE);
camel_folder_summary_unlock (folder->summary);
}
camel_imapx_command_unref (ic);
}
g_clear_object (&folder);
return success;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 14,449 |
linux | 9f46c187e2e680ecd9de7983e4d081c3391acc76 | static void mmu_free_root_page(struct kvm *kvm, hpa_t *root_hpa,
struct list_head *invalid_list)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
if (!VALID_PAGE(*root_hpa))
return;
sp = to_shadow_page(*root_hpa & PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK);
if (WARN_ON(!sp))
return;
if (is_tdp_mmu_page(sp))
kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(kvm, sp, false);
else if (!--sp->root_count && sp->role.invalid)
kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, invalid_list);
*root_hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 10,085 |
ghostscript | b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498 | static int cieacompareproc(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, ref *testspace)
{
int code = 0;
ref CIEdict1, CIEdict2;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &CIEdict1);
if (code < 0)
return 0;
code = array_get(imemory, testspace, 1, &CIEdict2);
if (code < 0)
return 0;
if (!comparedictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, &CIEdict2, (char *)"WhitePoint"))
return 0;
if (!comparedictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, &CIEdict2, (char *)"BlackPoint"))
return 0;
if (!comparedictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, &CIEdict2, (char *)"RangeA"))
return 0;
if (!comparedictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, &CIEdict2, (char *)"DecodeA"))
return 0;
if (!comparedictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, &CIEdict2, (char *)"MatrixA"))
return 0;
if (!comparedictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, &CIEdict2, (char *)"RangeLMN"))
return 0;
if (!comparedictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, &CIEdict2, (char *)"DecodeLMN"))
return 0;
if (!comparedictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, &CIEdict2, (char *)"MatrixMN"))
return 0;
return 1;
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 12,304 |
gnuplot | 963c7df3e0c5266efff260d0dff757dfe03d3632 | do_enh_writec(int c)
{
/* note: c is meant to hold a char, but is actually an int, for
* the same reasons applying to putc() and friends */
*enhanced_cur_text++ = c;
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 17,242 |
tensorflow | 26eb323554ffccd173e8a79a8c05c15b685ae4d1 | void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {
const Tensor& image = context->input(0);
OP_REQUIRES(context, image.dims() == 3,
errors::InvalidArgument("image must be 3-dimensional",
image.shape().DebugString()));
OP_REQUIRES(
context,
FastBoundsCheck(image.NumElements(), std::numeric_limits<int32>::max()),
errors::InvalidArgument("image cannot have >= int32 max elements"));
const int32 height = static_cast<int32>(image.dim_size(0));
const int32 width = static_cast<int32>(image.dim_size(1));
const int32 channels = static_cast<int32>(image.dim_size(2));
// In some cases, we pass width*channels*2 to png.
const int32 max_row_width = std::numeric_limits<int32>::max() / 2;
OP_REQUIRES(context, FastBoundsCheck(width * channels, max_row_width),
errors::InvalidArgument("image too wide to encode"));
OP_REQUIRES(context, channels >= 1 && channels <= 4,
errors::InvalidArgument(
"image must have 1, 2, 3, or 4 channels, got ", channels));
// Encode image to png string
Tensor* output = nullptr;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context,
context->allocate_output(0, TensorShape({}), &output));
if (desired_channel_bits_ == 8) {
OP_REQUIRES(context,
png::WriteImageToBuffer(
image.flat<uint8>().data(), width, height,
width * channels, channels, desired_channel_bits_,
compression_, &output->scalar<tstring>()(), nullptr),
errors::Internal("PNG encoding failed"));
} else {
OP_REQUIRES(context,
png::WriteImageToBuffer(
image.flat<uint16>().data(), width, height,
width * channels * 2, channels, desired_channel_bits_,
compression_, &output->scalar<tstring>()(), nullptr),
errors::Internal("PNG encoding failed"));
}
} | 1 | CVE-2021-29531 | CWE-787 | Out-of-bounds Write | The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Phase: Requirements
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Note: This is not a complete solution, since many buffer overflows are not related to strings.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note:
This is not necessarily a complete solution, since these mechanisms only detect certain types of overflows. In addition, the result is still a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory:
Double check that the buffer is as large as specified.
When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string.
Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space.
If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
Phases: Operation; Build and Compilation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: These techniques do not provide a complete solution. For instance, exploits frequently use a bug that discloses memory addresses in order to maximize reliability of code execution [REF-1337]. It has also been shown that a side-channel attack can bypass ASLR [REF-1333].
Phase: Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Note: This is not a complete solution, since buffer overflows could be used to overwrite nearby variables to modify the software's state in dangerous ways. In addition, it cannot be used in cases in which self-modifying code is required. Finally, an attack could still cause a denial of service, since the typical response is to exit the application.
Phase: Implementation
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: This approach is still susceptible to calculation errors, including issues such as off-by-one errors (CWE-193) and incorrectly calculating buffer lengths (CWE-131). | 9,529 |
samba | 3f95957d6de321c803a66f3ec67a8ff09befd16d | static char *parsetree_to_sql(struct ldb_module *module,
void *mem_ctx,
const struct ldb_parse_tree *t)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb;
const struct ldb_schema_attribute *a;
struct ldb_val value, subval;
char *wild_card_string;
char *child, *tmp;
char *ret = NULL;
char *attr;
unsigned int i;
ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module);
switch(t->operation) {
case LDB_OP_AND:
tmp = parsetree_to_sql(module, mem_ctx, t->u.list.elements[0]);
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
for (i = 1; i < t->u.list.num_elements; i++) {
child = parsetree_to_sql(module, mem_ctx, t->u.list.elements[i]);
if (child == NULL) return NULL;
tmp = talloc_asprintf_append(tmp, " INTERSECT %s ", child);
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
}
ret = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "SELECT * FROM ( %s )\n", tmp);
return ret;
case LDB_OP_OR:
tmp = parsetree_to_sql(module, mem_ctx, t->u.list.elements[0]);
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
for (i = 1; i < t->u.list.num_elements; i++) {
child = parsetree_to_sql(module, mem_ctx, t->u.list.elements[i]);
if (child == NULL) return NULL;
tmp = talloc_asprintf_append(tmp, " UNION %s ", child);
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
}
return talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "SELECT * FROM ( %s ) ", tmp);
case LDB_OP_NOT:
child = parsetree_to_sql(module, mem_ctx, t->u.isnot.child);
if (child == NULL) return NULL;
return talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
"SELECT eid FROM ldb_entry "
"WHERE eid NOT IN ( %s ) ", child);
case LDB_OP_EQUALITY:
/*
* For simple searches, we want to retrieve the list of EIDs that
* match the criteria.
*/
attr = ldb_attr_casefold(mem_ctx, t->u.equality.attr);
if (attr == NULL) return NULL;
a = ldb_schema_attribute_by_name(ldb, attr);
/* Get a canonicalised copy of the data */
a->syntax->canonicalise_fn(ldb, mem_ctx, &(t->u.equality.value), &value);
if (value.data == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (strcasecmp(t->u.equality.attr, "dn") == 0) {
/* DN query is a special ldb case */
const char *cdn = ldb_dn_get_casefold(
ldb_dn_new(mem_ctx, ldb,
(const char *)value.data));
return lsqlite3_tprintf(mem_ctx,
"SELECT eid FROM ldb_entry "
"WHERE norm_dn = '%q'", cdn);
} else {
/* A normal query. */
return lsqlite3_tprintf(mem_ctx,
"SELECT eid FROM ldb_attribute_values "
"WHERE norm_attr_name = '%q' "
"AND norm_attr_value = '%q'",
attr,
value.data);
}
case LDB_OP_SUBSTRING:
wild_card_string = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx,
(t->u.substring.start_with_wildcard)?"*":"");
if (wild_card_string == NULL) return NULL;
for (i = 0; t->u.substring.chunks[i]; i++) {
wild_card_string = talloc_asprintf_append(wild_card_string, "%s*",
t->u.substring.chunks[i]->data);
if (wild_card_string == NULL) return NULL;
}
if ( ! t->u.substring.end_with_wildcard ) {
/* remove last wildcard */
wild_card_string[strlen(wild_card_string) - 1] = '\0';
}
attr = ldb_attr_casefold(mem_ctx, t->u.substring.attr);
if (attr == NULL) return NULL;
a = ldb_schema_attribute_by_name(ldb, attr);
subval.data = (void *)wild_card_string;
subval.length = strlen(wild_card_string) + 1;
/* Get a canonicalised copy of the data */
a->syntax->canonicalise_fn(ldb, mem_ctx, &(subval), &value);
if (value.data == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return lsqlite3_tprintf(mem_ctx,
"SELECT eid FROM ldb_attribute_values "
"WHERE norm_attr_name = '%q' "
"AND norm_attr_value GLOB '%q'",
attr,
value.data);
case LDB_OP_GREATER:
attr = ldb_attr_casefold(mem_ctx, t->u.equality.attr);
if (attr == NULL) return NULL;
a = ldb_schema_attribute_by_name(ldb, attr);
/* Get a canonicalised copy of the data */
a->syntax->canonicalise_fn(ldb, mem_ctx, &(t->u.equality.value), &value);
if (value.data == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return lsqlite3_tprintf(mem_ctx,
"SELECT eid FROM ldb_attribute_values "
"WHERE norm_attr_name = '%q' "
"AND ldap_compare(norm_attr_value, '>=', '%q', '%q') ",
attr,
value.data,
attr);
case LDB_OP_LESS:
attr = ldb_attr_casefold(mem_ctx, t->u.equality.attr);
if (attr == NULL) return NULL;
a = ldb_schema_attribute_by_name(ldb, attr);
/* Get a canonicalised copy of the data */
a->syntax->canonicalise_fn(ldb, mem_ctx, &(t->u.equality.value), &value);
if (value.data == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return lsqlite3_tprintf(mem_ctx,
"SELECT eid FROM ldb_attribute_values "
"WHERE norm_attr_name = '%q' "
"AND ldap_compare(norm_attr_value, '<=', '%q', '%q') ",
attr,
value.data,
attr);
case LDB_OP_PRESENT:
if (strcasecmp(t->u.present.attr, "dn") == 0) {
return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, "SELECT eid FROM ldb_entry");
}
attr = ldb_attr_casefold(mem_ctx, t->u.present.attr);
if (attr == NULL) return NULL;
return lsqlite3_tprintf(mem_ctx,
"SELECT eid FROM ldb_attribute_values "
"WHERE norm_attr_name = '%q' ",
attr);
case LDB_OP_APPROX:
attr = ldb_attr_casefold(mem_ctx, t->u.equality.attr);
if (attr == NULL) return NULL;
a = ldb_schema_attribute_by_name(ldb, attr);
/* Get a canonicalised copy of the data */
a->syntax->canonicalise_fn(ldb, mem_ctx, &(t->u.equality.value), &value);
if (value.data == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return lsqlite3_tprintf(mem_ctx,
"SELECT eid FROM ldb_attribute_values "
"WHERE norm_attr_name = '%q' "
"AND ldap_compare(norm_attr_value, '~%', 'q', '%q') ",
attr,
value.data,
attr);
case LDB_OP_EXTENDED:
#warning "work out how to handle bitops"
return NULL;
default:
break;
};
/* should never occur */
abort();
return NULL;
} | 1 | CVE-2018-1140 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Phases: Architecture and Design; Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Effectiveness: High
Phase: Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Phase: Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Phase: Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Phase: Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Phase: Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Phase: Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so. | 4,107 |
Android | dd3546765710ce8dd49eb23901d90345dec8282f | AudioSource::AudioSource(
audio_source_t inputSource, const String16 &opPackageName,
uint32_t sampleRate, uint32_t channelCount, uint32_t outSampleRate)
: mStarted(false),
mSampleRate(sampleRate),
mOutSampleRate(outSampleRate > 0 ? outSampleRate : sampleRate),
mPrevSampleTimeUs(0),
mFirstSampleTimeUs(-1ll),
mNumFramesReceived(0),
mNumClientOwnedBuffers(0) {
ALOGV("sampleRate: %u, outSampleRate: %u, channelCount: %u",
sampleRate, outSampleRate, channelCount);
CHECK(channelCount == 1 || channelCount == 2);
CHECK(sampleRate > 0);
size_t minFrameCount;
status_t status = AudioRecord::getMinFrameCount(&minFrameCount,
sampleRate,
AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT,
audio_channel_in_mask_from_count(channelCount));
if (status == OK) {
uint32_t frameCount = kMaxBufferSize / sizeof(int16_t) / channelCount;
size_t bufCount = 2;
while ((bufCount * frameCount) < minFrameCount) {
bufCount++;
}
mRecord = new AudioRecord(
inputSource, sampleRate, AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT,
audio_channel_in_mask_from_count(channelCount),
opPackageName,
(size_t) (bufCount * frameCount),
AudioRecordCallbackFunction,
this,
frameCount /*notificationFrames*/);
mInitCheck = mRecord->initCheck();
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
mRecord.clear();
}
} else {
mInitCheck = status;
}
}
| 1 | CVE-2016-2499 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. |
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges. | 2,415 |
gpac | 7bb1b4a4dd23c885f9db9f577dfe79ecc5433109 | static GFINLINE s32 inverse_recenter(s32 r, u32 v)
{
if ((s64)v > (s64)(2 * r))
return v;
else if (v & 1)
return r - ((v + 1) >> 1);
else
return r + (v >> 1);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 11,940 |
squid | 780c4ea1b4c9d2fb41f6962aa6ed73ae57f74b2b | gopherStart(FwdState * fwd)
{
GopherStateData *gopherState = new GopherStateData(fwd);
debugs(10, 3, gopherState->entry->url());
++ statCounter.server.all.requests;
++ statCounter.server.other.requests;
/* Parse url. */
gopher_request_parse(fwd->request,
&gopherState->type_id, gopherState->request);
comm_add_close_handler(fwd->serverConnection()->fd, gopherStateFree, gopherState);
if (((gopherState->type_id == GOPHER_INDEX) || (gopherState->type_id == GOPHER_CSO))
&& (strchr(gopherState->request, '?') == NULL)) {
/* Index URL without query word */
/* We have to generate search page back to client. No need for connection */
gopherMimeCreate(gopherState);
if (gopherState->type_id == GOPHER_INDEX) {
gopherState->conversion = GopherStateData::HTML_INDEX_PAGE;
} else {
if (gopherState->type_id == GOPHER_CSO) {
gopherState->conversion = GopherStateData::HTML_CSO_PAGE;
} else {
gopherState->conversion = GopherStateData::HTML_INDEX_PAGE;
}
}
gopherToHTML(gopherState, (char *) NULL, 0);
fwd->complete();
return;
}
gopherState->serverConn = fwd->serverConnection();
gopherSendRequest(fwd->serverConnection()->fd, gopherState);
AsyncCall::Pointer timeoutCall = commCbCall(5, 4, "gopherTimeout",
CommTimeoutCbPtrFun(gopherTimeout, gopherState));
commSetConnTimeout(fwd->serverConnection(), Config.Timeout.read, timeoutCall);
} | 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 20,320 |
php | fd9689745c44341b1bd6af4756f324be8abba2fb | void grapheme_register_constants( INIT_FUNC_ARGS )
{
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("GRAPHEME_EXTR_COUNT", GRAPHEME_EXTRACT_TYPE_COUNT, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("GRAPHEME_EXTR_MAXBYTES", GRAPHEME_EXTRACT_TYPE_MAXBYTES, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("GRAPHEME_EXTR_MAXCHARS", GRAPHEME_EXTRACT_TYPE_MAXCHARS, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
}
| 0 | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | NOT_APPLICABLE | 22,715 |
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