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The Rebate is not justified
The British rebate is an undeserved anomaly - no other country has a similar arrangement to pay back part of its contribution to the EU budget. Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden all make a bigger net contribution to the EU than Britain does (in proportion to the size of their populations), [1] yet they do get special treatment. Britain knew how the EU operated when it chose to join more than thirty years ago - if it didn’t like the structure of the budget, whereby rich countries pay more than poor ones, it could have stayed outside. In any case, a few billion Euros a year is a small sum to pay for access to a huge continent-wide market, the department for Business Innovation & Skills estimated that GDP in 2006 was 2.2% higher than it would have been without a single market, [2] in Britain this would be almost $50billion.
[1] BBC News, ‘EU Budget’, 2007
[2] BIS, ‘The Benefits and Achievements of EU Single Market’
|
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate While the UK is the only country to have so far received a rebate the Commission pointed out that the Fontainbleu agreement was based on the principle that ‘….any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.’ [1] This could clearly apply to many other countries apart from Britain, Germany and other countries could therefore ask for a rebate if they wish. While there is no other compensation mechanism like the rebate there are lump sum payments to the Netherlands and Sweden [2] while Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria all have reduced rates of the European portion of VAT, [3] and the same states also pay less towards the rebate. [4]\n\n[1] Patterson, Ben, ‘The UK rebate issue’, p.2 (link downloads pdf)\n\n[2] Europa, ‘Where does the money come from?’, 2010\n\n[3] Notenboom, Harry, ‘Structure and composition of the European Union own resources System’, 2009, p.17\n\n[4] Ibid, p.15\n"
] |
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not feel sorry for the new EU members and give up its rebate out of pity for them. They chose to enter the EU and accepted the terms of membership - including the rebate arrangements. Indeed, it could be argued that membership was not necessarily good for the former communist states - having escaped one bureaucratic and ideological superstate, they have now chosen to be ruled by another, exchanging Moscow for Brussels. EU membership will impose thousands of unnecessary regulations upon them and tie them to a “European social model” which is clearly failing in the western states - both these things could hold back their economic growth and leave them poorer than they could have been outside the EU. Even the development aid they will receive will largely be wasted because it has to be spent in ways Brussels demands rather than in locally productive investment.\n\nAnd if Britain did wish to be nice to the new member states, it could do so without giving up the principle of the rebate. Tony Blair agreed to alter the rebate in December 2005. Britain would not seek rebate payments linked to new member states agricultural and regional aid spending, but should keep the rebate in terms of spending of the original 15 EU countries who agreed .\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain can be on good terms with the East European states without dropping the rebate. Tony Blair in his deal on the rebate in 2005 gave a good deal to the new members of the EU which gave much more in structural funds to these members and at the same time reduced the British rebate. [1]\n\n[1] White, Michael, and Watt, Nicholas, ‘Blair clinches deal with offer of big rebate cut’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain does not want to be at the heart of Europe - it wants to be in the EU, but not run by the EU. Even if the rebate went, the UK would remain outside any EU “core group” of countries, as it has chosen not to join the Schengen agreement on passport free movement, and to stay outside the Euro. Both these decisions have very wide political and popular support in the UK, and neither will be changed even if the rebate was weakly given away. So tensions will continue between Britain and its European partners, but at least by defending the rebate they will know that the UK is prepared to stand up for its interests and respect it.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate It might be worth giving up the British rebate for serious CAP reform, but it is unnecessary. If the CAP were abolished, Britain’s net payments to the EU would automatically be much smaller anyway, so the rebate (66% of the difference between the UK’s contributions to the EU and its receipts from it) would also shrink away to insignificance. CAP reform is worth doing for its own sake, and other EU countries will only agree to it once they realise that fact - offering up the rebate will make no difference. In any case, even if the rebate was a useful bargaining chip to be cashed in, there is no chance of individual countries such as France (or Eire, Spain, Greece, Italy, Belgium, etc.) agreeing to changing the CAP at present and any one country could prevent it, so Britain should hold on to the rebate card.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate With the expansion of the European Union it is no longer justified that Britain should not be paying more towards the European Union, and in particular the much poorer Eastern European states which have joined. Britain cannot expect to get as much back from the European Union as it puts in. Britain should accept being one of the biggest contributors and in return would get a bigger influence one the EU, rather than being constantly frozen out of decisions by France and Germany.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate There may be bigger problems but the rebate is symptomatic of many of them. The reason for many of Europe’s problems is the determination for member states to take from the EU but not give and to haggle over everything rather than working together. The rebate is a prime example of one state believing that it deserves a small amount of money more than others and as such should be scrapped in order to help show that both big and small problems can be tackled through one state being willing to give up something important to it in return for others doing the same on other issues.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate When the rebate was agreed over twenty years ago, Britain was poor after decades of decline. In fact it was the third poorest state in the then European Economic Community (after Ireland and Greece) [1] , so the size of its net contribution to the budget was clearly unfair. Now the UK is one of the EU member countries and the rebate is no longer justifiable in the way it was originally justified. The sums involved are small compared to the overall UK budget - much less than the margin of error in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s tax and spending plans, in 2003 for example Gordon Brown had to borrow £10 billion more than expected. [2] It is partly (perhaps largely) because of Margaret Thatcher’s achievements in power that the UK is so strong economically, so agreeing that the rebate is no longer necessary is a tribute to her legacy, not a betrayal.\n\n[1] OECD, ‘1984, Gross domestic product: Per head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year’, 2011\n\n[2] Schifferes, Steve, ‘Chancellor to squeeze wages’, 2003\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate is bad for Britain and the EU as it leads to a complacency in the UK about the way the EU is run. Knowing that two-thirds of Britain’s net contribution will be returned anyway, British politicians and civil servants have not had to be serious about tackling waste and corruption at Brussels. Giving the rebate up would focus British minds much more clearly upon how the EU operates and would lead them to demand higher standards, both of the Commission and of their own elected representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate New member states are much poorer than the UK\n\nBritain should give up the rebate in solidarity with the new member states. Most of the ten recent entrants to the EU are still struggling to overcome the legacy of communist rule and are much poorer than the previous 15 member states. In 2009 Bulgaria and Romania had less than half the average EU GDP per capita whereas the UK was about 120% EU average. [1] As one of the richest EU members, Britain has a moral responsibility to contribute its share of the money needed to allow the new member states to make a success of EU membership. It also has a self-interest in contributing to their economic development, for as they become richer their citizens will increasingly buy the services and media exports in which Britain specialises. Indeed, because the rebate is paid for by all member states the new member states will be contributing payments towards Britain’s rebate - clearly something which Britain cannot attempt to defend given the disparity in wealth.\n\n[1] Eurostat, ‘European economic statistics’, 2010, p.31\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Enlargement could mean a new start\n\nBritain should not alienate its natural allies among the new member states by insisting on the rebate. Like Britain, the new member states are largely economically liberal, anti-federalist regarding the future of the EU, and are pro-American in terms of foreign policy. As a result Britain is much more likely to be able to work with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary on these issues. [1] They also recognise that Britain promoted the cause of their membership throughout the 1990s and appreciate its willingness to grant immediate free movement to their citizens who wish to work in Britain. In all these ways they are closer to Britain than to France or Germany, the two big states who have traditionally dominated EU decision-making. Enlargement presents Britain with a great opportunity to influence the future direction of Europe in partnership with these new states, but this opportunity will be lost if British insists on the rebate regardless of Central and Eastern European opinion.\n\n[1] Number 10, ‘Transcript of press conference given by the Prime Minister David Cameron at the EU Summit in Brussels on 17 December 2010’, 2010\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate should go in exchange for CAP reform\n\nIt is worth giving the rebate up in exchange for serious reform of the EU budget, particularly of the Common Agricultural Policy which spends 40% of the EU’s budget [1] on 3% of its population. [2] The CAP not only wastes taxpayers’ money, it also raises the cost of food for European consumers, ruins the environment and prevents poor farmers in the developing world from trading their way out of poverty. Even in its own terms it is a disaster, for most CAP money goes to a small number of rich landowners running huge agribusiness estates, not to small-scale peasant farmers preserving the traditional rural way of life. If offering to give up the British rebate helps to get agreement on reform, then it is a sacrifice well worth making. Britain on the other hand favors using CAP more to protect the environment rather than encourage food production. [3]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Budget 2011 in figures’, 2011\n\n[2] Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans, Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy’, 2007, p.9\n\n[3] Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’, 2011\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Giving up the rebate would mean better relations with the Europe Union\n\nIt is worth giving up the rebate to remove a constant source of tension and ill-feeling between Britain and its European partners. Until the rebate is abandoned, Britain will never be at the heart of Europe. This limits our ability to promote our other interests in Europe, as every argument always ends up back at the rebate, and weakens our moral authority. Denmark for example is similarly Euro sceptic but is fiercely opposed to the UK rebate and aims to scrap it during Denmark’s next EU Presidency in 2012. [1] Because preserving the rebate has always been the Prime Minister’s priority, every other British goal has been given up instead. This led to bad deals for Britain over the ERM, at Maastricht, and in 2002 when Tony Blair accepted a Franco-German agreement to leave the CAP unreformed until 2013. This is because Britain is inevitably on its own in any possible change to the rebate whereas on almost any other issue Britain has allies. So when Britain’s opponents can link the rebate to an issue Britain may be able to keep the rebate but will in other respects be on the losing side. [2]\n\n[1] Jensen, Arne Nis, ‘The UK rebate – or rethinking the EU budget?’, 2011, p.27\n\n[2] Rennie, David, and Helm, Toby, ‘Blair is all alone in Britain’s EU rebate row’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate makes membership acceptable to the British people\n\nThe EU is a vast wasteful bureaucracy, for example creating a ‘House of European History’ for €14 million, [1] and is beyond reform. Anything to limit Britain’s contribution to this monster with pretensions to becoming a super-state is desirable. Many in the UK, between 35 and 65% of the population, [2] would prefer that we withdrew altogether, but if we can’t at least we should “starve the beast” by limiting the amount of money we give it to do harm with. Even if you think Britain should stay in the EU, you must recognise that the rebate is one of the only things that makes EU membership acceptable to ordinary people. Giving up the rebate is likely to swing British opinion strongly in favour of withdrawal.\n\n[1] Banks, Martin, ‘Parliament hits back at claims of ‘wasteful’ spending plans’, 2011\n\n[2] Hannan, Daniel, ‘Would Britain vote to leave the EU?’, 2009\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Europe needs to tackle much bigger problems\n\nThose EU leaders who are most critical of the rebate are ignoring the EU’s real and serious problems by spending large amounts of time in rows with Britain over the rebate. Europe has immense problems such as persistent 10% unemployment, which has gone up as a result of the financial crisis, the rejection of the EU constitution by voters, the challenge of globalisation, the failure to make the single market in services work fairly, corruption and waste at Brussels, etc. This is even before the immense difficulties with the Euro which the Eurozone is currently suffering from. All these issues are much more important than the rebate for the future of the European Union. If Europe can once again become competitive economically then the financial gains for Europe will be much greater than persuading Britain to drop the rebate.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not pay more than other countries\n\nBritain’s rebate is completely justified. Without it Britain would pay far more into the EU than it ever received back. The UK government argues “Without the rebate, the UK's net contribution as a percentage of national income would be twice as big as France's, and 1.5 times bigger than Germany's.” [1] This is because most of the EU’s budget goes to pay for the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and regional aid programmes. The UK’s farming sector is a very small part of the economy, and very few of its regions count as poor in Europe-wide terms, so Britain receives little funding back from the EU. Meanwhile as a result of new members joining the EU development funding has been taken away from poorer areas of Britain, many of which will no longer be eligible, to be redirected to Eastern and Central European countries which need it much more, [2] Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget will go up .The rebate recognises this and returns two-thirds of the UK’s net EU contribution (payments less receipts) every year. Even with the rebate, the UK is still the second biggest net contributor (proportional to population) of all the EU states. Over the past ten years Britain has contributed 2½ times as much to the EU budget as France has [3] - and without the rebate it would have been 15 times as much!\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU budget commissioner calls for UK rebate to end’, 2010\n\n[2] European Union Committee, ‘Future Financing of the European Union’, 2005, p.154\n\n[3] The Economist, ‘About a rebate’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate could never be regained\n\nMargaret Thatcher fought for four years to win the rebate for Britain, famously wielding her handbag at EU summits until it was agreed. Giving it up is a clear betrayal of Thatcher’s legacy and shows the present government’s unwillingness to stand up for Britain’s interests in Brussels. With the situation now different due to there being more members there is no chance of any future British Prime Minister being able to repeat Mrs Thatcher’s achievement of 1984, so once the rebate is given up, it can never be regained.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.4375
] |
[
89.0625,
89.3125,
86.5625,
86.875,
89.875,
88.875,
89.9375,
87.8125,
85.875,
83.0625,
84.1875,
85.6875,
84.375,
84.3125,
91.75,
84.1875
] |
Giving up the rebate would mean better relations with the Europe Union
It is worth giving up the rebate to remove a constant source of tension and ill-feeling between Britain and its European partners. Until the rebate is abandoned, Britain will never be at the heart of Europe. This limits our ability to promote our other interests in Europe, as every argument always ends up back at the rebate, and weakens our moral authority. Denmark for example is similarly Euro sceptic but is fiercely opposed to the UK rebate and aims to scrap it during Denmark’s next EU Presidency in 2012. [1] Because preserving the rebate has always been the Prime Minister’s priority, every other British goal has been given up instead. This led to bad deals for Britain over the ERM, at Maastricht, and in 2002 when Tony Blair accepted a Franco-German agreement to leave the CAP unreformed until 2013. This is because Britain is inevitably on its own in any possible change to the rebate whereas on almost any other issue Britain has allies. So when Britain’s opponents can link the rebate to an issue Britain may be able to keep the rebate but will in other respects be on the losing side. [2]
[1] Jensen, Arne Nis, ‘The UK rebate – or rethinking the EU budget?’, 2011, p.27
[2] Rennie, David, and Helm, Toby, ‘Blair is all alone in Britain’s EU rebate row’, 2005
|
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain does not want to be at the heart of Europe - it wants to be in the EU, but not run by the EU. Even if the rebate went, the UK would remain outside any EU “core group” of countries, as it has chosen not to join the Schengen agreement on passport free movement, and to stay outside the Euro. Both these decisions have very wide political and popular support in the UK, and neither will be changed even if the rebate was weakly given away. So tensions will continue between Britain and its European partners, but at least by defending the rebate they will know that the UK is prepared to stand up for its interests and respect it.\n"
] |
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not feel sorry for the new EU members and give up its rebate out of pity for them. They chose to enter the EU and accepted the terms of membership - including the rebate arrangements. Indeed, it could be argued that membership was not necessarily good for the former communist states - having escaped one bureaucratic and ideological superstate, they have now chosen to be ruled by another, exchanging Moscow for Brussels. EU membership will impose thousands of unnecessary regulations upon them and tie them to a “European social model” which is clearly failing in the western states - both these things could hold back their economic growth and leave them poorer than they could have been outside the EU. Even the development aid they will receive will largely be wasted because it has to be spent in ways Brussels demands rather than in locally productive investment.\n\nAnd if Britain did wish to be nice to the new member states, it could do so without giving up the principle of the rebate. Tony Blair agreed to alter the rebate in December 2005. Britain would not seek rebate payments linked to new member states agricultural and regional aid spending, but should keep the rebate in terms of spending of the original 15 EU countries who agreed .\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain can be on good terms with the East European states without dropping the rebate. Tony Blair in his deal on the rebate in 2005 gave a good deal to the new members of the EU which gave much more in structural funds to these members and at the same time reduced the British rebate. [1]\n\n[1] White, Michael, and Watt, Nicholas, ‘Blair clinches deal with offer of big rebate cut’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate It might be worth giving up the British rebate for serious CAP reform, but it is unnecessary. If the CAP were abolished, Britain’s net payments to the EU would automatically be much smaller anyway, so the rebate (66% of the difference between the UK’s contributions to the EU and its receipts from it) would also shrink away to insignificance. CAP reform is worth doing for its own sake, and other EU countries will only agree to it once they realise that fact - offering up the rebate will make no difference. In any case, even if the rebate was a useful bargaining chip to be cashed in, there is no chance of individual countries such as France (or Eire, Spain, Greece, Italy, Belgium, etc.) agreeing to changing the CAP at present and any one country could prevent it, so Britain should hold on to the rebate card.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate While the UK is the only country to have so far received a rebate the Commission pointed out that the Fontainbleu agreement was based on the principle that ‘….any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.’ [1] This could clearly apply to many other countries apart from Britain, Germany and other countries could therefore ask for a rebate if they wish. While there is no other compensation mechanism like the rebate there are lump sum payments to the Netherlands and Sweden [2] while Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria all have reduced rates of the European portion of VAT, [3] and the same states also pay less towards the rebate. [4]\n\n[1] Patterson, Ben, ‘The UK rebate issue’, p.2 (link downloads pdf)\n\n[2] Europa, ‘Where does the money come from?’, 2010\n\n[3] Notenboom, Harry, ‘Structure and composition of the European Union own resources System’, 2009, p.17\n\n[4] Ibid, p.15\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate With the expansion of the European Union it is no longer justified that Britain should not be paying more towards the European Union, and in particular the much poorer Eastern European states which have joined. Britain cannot expect to get as much back from the European Union as it puts in. Britain should accept being one of the biggest contributors and in return would get a bigger influence one the EU, rather than being constantly frozen out of decisions by France and Germany.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate There may be bigger problems but the rebate is symptomatic of many of them. The reason for many of Europe’s problems is the determination for member states to take from the EU but not give and to haggle over everything rather than working together. The rebate is a prime example of one state believing that it deserves a small amount of money more than others and as such should be scrapped in order to help show that both big and small problems can be tackled through one state being willing to give up something important to it in return for others doing the same on other issues.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate When the rebate was agreed over twenty years ago, Britain was poor after decades of decline. In fact it was the third poorest state in the then European Economic Community (after Ireland and Greece) [1] , so the size of its net contribution to the budget was clearly unfair. Now the UK is one of the EU member countries and the rebate is no longer justifiable in the way it was originally justified. The sums involved are small compared to the overall UK budget - much less than the margin of error in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s tax and spending plans, in 2003 for example Gordon Brown had to borrow £10 billion more than expected. [2] It is partly (perhaps largely) because of Margaret Thatcher’s achievements in power that the UK is so strong economically, so agreeing that the rebate is no longer necessary is a tribute to her legacy, not a betrayal.\n\n[1] OECD, ‘1984, Gross domestic product: Per head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year’, 2011\n\n[2] Schifferes, Steve, ‘Chancellor to squeeze wages’, 2003\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate is bad for Britain and the EU as it leads to a complacency in the UK about the way the EU is run. Knowing that two-thirds of Britain’s net contribution will be returned anyway, British politicians and civil servants have not had to be serious about tackling waste and corruption at Brussels. Giving the rebate up would focus British minds much more clearly upon how the EU operates and would lead them to demand higher standards, both of the Commission and of their own elected representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate New member states are much poorer than the UK\n\nBritain should give up the rebate in solidarity with the new member states. Most of the ten recent entrants to the EU are still struggling to overcome the legacy of communist rule and are much poorer than the previous 15 member states. In 2009 Bulgaria and Romania had less than half the average EU GDP per capita whereas the UK was about 120% EU average. [1] As one of the richest EU members, Britain has a moral responsibility to contribute its share of the money needed to allow the new member states to make a success of EU membership. It also has a self-interest in contributing to their economic development, for as they become richer their citizens will increasingly buy the services and media exports in which Britain specialises. Indeed, because the rebate is paid for by all member states the new member states will be contributing payments towards Britain’s rebate - clearly something which Britain cannot attempt to defend given the disparity in wealth.\n\n[1] Eurostat, ‘European economic statistics’, 2010, p.31\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Enlargement could mean a new start\n\nBritain should not alienate its natural allies among the new member states by insisting on the rebate. Like Britain, the new member states are largely economically liberal, anti-federalist regarding the future of the EU, and are pro-American in terms of foreign policy. As a result Britain is much more likely to be able to work with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary on these issues. [1] They also recognise that Britain promoted the cause of their membership throughout the 1990s and appreciate its willingness to grant immediate free movement to their citizens who wish to work in Britain. In all these ways they are closer to Britain than to France or Germany, the two big states who have traditionally dominated EU decision-making. Enlargement presents Britain with a great opportunity to influence the future direction of Europe in partnership with these new states, but this opportunity will be lost if British insists on the rebate regardless of Central and Eastern European opinion.\n\n[1] Number 10, ‘Transcript of press conference given by the Prime Minister David Cameron at the EU Summit in Brussels on 17 December 2010’, 2010\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate should go in exchange for CAP reform\n\nIt is worth giving the rebate up in exchange for serious reform of the EU budget, particularly of the Common Agricultural Policy which spends 40% of the EU’s budget [1] on 3% of its population. [2] The CAP not only wastes taxpayers’ money, it also raises the cost of food for European consumers, ruins the environment and prevents poor farmers in the developing world from trading their way out of poverty. Even in its own terms it is a disaster, for most CAP money goes to a small number of rich landowners running huge agribusiness estates, not to small-scale peasant farmers preserving the traditional rural way of life. If offering to give up the British rebate helps to get agreement on reform, then it is a sacrifice well worth making. Britain on the other hand favors using CAP more to protect the environment rather than encourage food production. [3]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Budget 2011 in figures’, 2011\n\n[2] Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans, Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy’, 2007, p.9\n\n[3] Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’, 2011\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate is not justified\n\nThe British rebate is an undeserved anomaly - no other country has a similar arrangement to pay back part of its contribution to the EU budget. Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden all make a bigger net contribution to the EU than Britain does (in proportion to the size of their populations), [1] yet they do get special treatment. Britain knew how the EU operated when it chose to join more than thirty years ago - if it didn’t like the structure of the budget, whereby rich countries pay more than poor ones, it could have stayed outside. In any case, a few billion Euros a year is a small sum to pay for access to a huge continent-wide market, the department for Business Innovation & Skills estimated that GDP in 2006 was 2.2% higher than it would have been without a single market, [2] in Britain this would be almost $50billion.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU Budget’, 2007\n\n[2] BIS, ‘The Benefits and Achievements of EU Single Market’\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate makes membership acceptable to the British people\n\nThe EU is a vast wasteful bureaucracy, for example creating a ‘House of European History’ for €14 million, [1] and is beyond reform. Anything to limit Britain’s contribution to this monster with pretensions to becoming a super-state is desirable. Many in the UK, between 35 and 65% of the population, [2] would prefer that we withdrew altogether, but if we can’t at least we should “starve the beast” by limiting the amount of money we give it to do harm with. Even if you think Britain should stay in the EU, you must recognise that the rebate is one of the only things that makes EU membership acceptable to ordinary people. Giving up the rebate is likely to swing British opinion strongly in favour of withdrawal.\n\n[1] Banks, Martin, ‘Parliament hits back at claims of ‘wasteful’ spending plans’, 2011\n\n[2] Hannan, Daniel, ‘Would Britain vote to leave the EU?’, 2009\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Europe needs to tackle much bigger problems\n\nThose EU leaders who are most critical of the rebate are ignoring the EU’s real and serious problems by spending large amounts of time in rows with Britain over the rebate. Europe has immense problems such as persistent 10% unemployment, which has gone up as a result of the financial crisis, the rejection of the EU constitution by voters, the challenge of globalisation, the failure to make the single market in services work fairly, corruption and waste at Brussels, etc. This is even before the immense difficulties with the Euro which the Eurozone is currently suffering from. All these issues are much more important than the rebate for the future of the European Union. If Europe can once again become competitive economically then the financial gains for Europe will be much greater than persuading Britain to drop the rebate.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not pay more than other countries\n\nBritain’s rebate is completely justified. Without it Britain would pay far more into the EU than it ever received back. The UK government argues “Without the rebate, the UK's net contribution as a percentage of national income would be twice as big as France's, and 1.5 times bigger than Germany's.” [1] This is because most of the EU’s budget goes to pay for the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and regional aid programmes. The UK’s farming sector is a very small part of the economy, and very few of its regions count as poor in Europe-wide terms, so Britain receives little funding back from the EU. Meanwhile as a result of new members joining the EU development funding has been taken away from poorer areas of Britain, many of which will no longer be eligible, to be redirected to Eastern and Central European countries which need it much more, [2] Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget will go up .The rebate recognises this and returns two-thirds of the UK’s net EU contribution (payments less receipts) every year. Even with the rebate, the UK is still the second biggest net contributor (proportional to population) of all the EU states. Over the past ten years Britain has contributed 2½ times as much to the EU budget as France has [3] - and without the rebate it would have been 15 times as much!\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU budget commissioner calls for UK rebate to end’, 2010\n\n[2] European Union Committee, ‘Future Financing of the European Union’, 2005, p.154\n\n[3] The Economist, ‘About a rebate’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate could never be regained\n\nMargaret Thatcher fought for four years to win the rebate for Britain, famously wielding her handbag at EU summits until it was agreed. Giving it up is a clear betrayal of Thatcher’s legacy and shows the present government’s unwillingness to stand up for Britain’s interests in Brussels. With the situation now different due to there being more members there is no chance of any future British Prime Minister being able to repeat Mrs Thatcher’s achievement of 1984, so once the rebate is given up, it can never be regained.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.8125
] |
[
90.1875,
91.625,
92.75,
88.1875,
86.1875,
88.25,
85.0625,
87,
83.5625,
84.5625,
84.5,
83.8125,
84.25,
88.375,
84.125,
87.0625
] |
The Rebate makes membership acceptable to the British people
The EU is a vast wasteful bureaucracy, for example creating a ‘House of European History’ for €14 million, [1] and is beyond reform. Anything to limit Britain’s contribution to this monster with pretensions to becoming a super-state is desirable. Many in the UK, between 35 and 65% of the population, [2] would prefer that we withdrew altogether, but if we can’t at least we should “starve the beast” by limiting the amount of money we give it to do harm with. Even if you think Britain should stay in the EU, you must recognise that the rebate is one of the only things that makes EU membership acceptable to ordinary people. Giving up the rebate is likely to swing British opinion strongly in favour of withdrawal.
[1] Banks, Martin, ‘Parliament hits back at claims of ‘wasteful’ spending plans’, 2011
[2] Hannan, Daniel, ‘Would Britain vote to leave the EU?’, 2009
|
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate is bad for Britain and the EU as it leads to a complacency in the UK about the way the EU is run. Knowing that two-thirds of Britain’s net contribution will be returned anyway, British politicians and civil servants have not had to be serious about tackling waste and corruption at Brussels. Giving the rebate up would focus British minds much more clearly upon how the EU operates and would lead them to demand higher standards, both of the Commission and of their own elected representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.\n"
] |
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate With the expansion of the European Union it is no longer justified that Britain should not be paying more towards the European Union, and in particular the much poorer Eastern European states which have joined. Britain cannot expect to get as much back from the European Union as it puts in. Britain should accept being one of the biggest contributors and in return would get a bigger influence one the EU, rather than being constantly frozen out of decisions by France and Germany.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate There may be bigger problems but the rebate is symptomatic of many of them. The reason for many of Europe’s problems is the determination for member states to take from the EU but not give and to haggle over everything rather than working together. The rebate is a prime example of one state believing that it deserves a small amount of money more than others and as such should be scrapped in order to help show that both big and small problems can be tackled through one state being willing to give up something important to it in return for others doing the same on other issues.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate When the rebate was agreed over twenty years ago, Britain was poor after decades of decline. In fact it was the third poorest state in the then European Economic Community (after Ireland and Greece) [1] , so the size of its net contribution to the budget was clearly unfair. Now the UK is one of the EU member countries and the rebate is no longer justifiable in the way it was originally justified. The sums involved are small compared to the overall UK budget - much less than the margin of error in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s tax and spending plans, in 2003 for example Gordon Brown had to borrow £10 billion more than expected. [2] It is partly (perhaps largely) because of Margaret Thatcher’s achievements in power that the UK is so strong economically, so agreeing that the rebate is no longer necessary is a tribute to her legacy, not a betrayal.\n\n[1] OECD, ‘1984, Gross domestic product: Per head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year’, 2011\n\n[2] Schifferes, Steve, ‘Chancellor to squeeze wages’, 2003\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not feel sorry for the new EU members and give up its rebate out of pity for them. They chose to enter the EU and accepted the terms of membership - including the rebate arrangements. Indeed, it could be argued that membership was not necessarily good for the former communist states - having escaped one bureaucratic and ideological superstate, they have now chosen to be ruled by another, exchanging Moscow for Brussels. EU membership will impose thousands of unnecessary regulations upon them and tie them to a “European social model” which is clearly failing in the western states - both these things could hold back their economic growth and leave them poorer than they could have been outside the EU. Even the development aid they will receive will largely be wasted because it has to be spent in ways Brussels demands rather than in locally productive investment.\n\nAnd if Britain did wish to be nice to the new member states, it could do so without giving up the principle of the rebate. Tony Blair agreed to alter the rebate in December 2005. Britain would not seek rebate payments linked to new member states agricultural and regional aid spending, but should keep the rebate in terms of spending of the original 15 EU countries who agreed .\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain can be on good terms with the East European states without dropping the rebate. Tony Blair in his deal on the rebate in 2005 gave a good deal to the new members of the EU which gave much more in structural funds to these members and at the same time reduced the British rebate. [1]\n\n[1] White, Michael, and Watt, Nicholas, ‘Blair clinches deal with offer of big rebate cut’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain does not want to be at the heart of Europe - it wants to be in the EU, but not run by the EU. Even if the rebate went, the UK would remain outside any EU “core group” of countries, as it has chosen not to join the Schengen agreement on passport free movement, and to stay outside the Euro. Both these decisions have very wide political and popular support in the UK, and neither will be changed even if the rebate was weakly given away. So tensions will continue between Britain and its European partners, but at least by defending the rebate they will know that the UK is prepared to stand up for its interests and respect it.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate It might be worth giving up the British rebate for serious CAP reform, but it is unnecessary. If the CAP were abolished, Britain’s net payments to the EU would automatically be much smaller anyway, so the rebate (66% of the difference between the UK’s contributions to the EU and its receipts from it) would also shrink away to insignificance. CAP reform is worth doing for its own sake, and other EU countries will only agree to it once they realise that fact - offering up the rebate will make no difference. In any case, even if the rebate was a useful bargaining chip to be cashed in, there is no chance of individual countries such as France (or Eire, Spain, Greece, Italy, Belgium, etc.) agreeing to changing the CAP at present and any one country could prevent it, so Britain should hold on to the rebate card.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate While the UK is the only country to have so far received a rebate the Commission pointed out that the Fontainbleu agreement was based on the principle that ‘….any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.’ [1] This could clearly apply to many other countries apart from Britain, Germany and other countries could therefore ask for a rebate if they wish. While there is no other compensation mechanism like the rebate there are lump sum payments to the Netherlands and Sweden [2] while Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria all have reduced rates of the European portion of VAT, [3] and the same states also pay less towards the rebate. [4]\n\n[1] Patterson, Ben, ‘The UK rebate issue’, p.2 (link downloads pdf)\n\n[2] Europa, ‘Where does the money come from?’, 2010\n\n[3] Notenboom, Harry, ‘Structure and composition of the European Union own resources System’, 2009, p.17\n\n[4] Ibid, p.15\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Europe needs to tackle much bigger problems\n\nThose EU leaders who are most critical of the rebate are ignoring the EU’s real and serious problems by spending large amounts of time in rows with Britain over the rebate. Europe has immense problems such as persistent 10% unemployment, which has gone up as a result of the financial crisis, the rejection of the EU constitution by voters, the challenge of globalisation, the failure to make the single market in services work fairly, corruption and waste at Brussels, etc. This is even before the immense difficulties with the Euro which the Eurozone is currently suffering from. All these issues are much more important than the rebate for the future of the European Union. If Europe can once again become competitive economically then the financial gains for Europe will be much greater than persuading Britain to drop the rebate.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not pay more than other countries\n\nBritain’s rebate is completely justified. Without it Britain would pay far more into the EU than it ever received back. The UK government argues “Without the rebate, the UK's net contribution as a percentage of national income would be twice as big as France's, and 1.5 times bigger than Germany's.” [1] This is because most of the EU’s budget goes to pay for the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and regional aid programmes. The UK’s farming sector is a very small part of the economy, and very few of its regions count as poor in Europe-wide terms, so Britain receives little funding back from the EU. Meanwhile as a result of new members joining the EU development funding has been taken away from poorer areas of Britain, many of which will no longer be eligible, to be redirected to Eastern and Central European countries which need it much more, [2] Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget will go up .The rebate recognises this and returns two-thirds of the UK’s net EU contribution (payments less receipts) every year. Even with the rebate, the UK is still the second biggest net contributor (proportional to population) of all the EU states. Over the past ten years Britain has contributed 2½ times as much to the EU budget as France has [3] - and without the rebate it would have been 15 times as much!\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU budget commissioner calls for UK rebate to end’, 2010\n\n[2] European Union Committee, ‘Future Financing of the European Union’, 2005, p.154\n\n[3] The Economist, ‘About a rebate’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate could never be regained\n\nMargaret Thatcher fought for four years to win the rebate for Britain, famously wielding her handbag at EU summits until it was agreed. Giving it up is a clear betrayal of Thatcher’s legacy and shows the present government’s unwillingness to stand up for Britain’s interests in Brussels. With the situation now different due to there being more members there is no chance of any future British Prime Minister being able to repeat Mrs Thatcher’s achievement of 1984, so once the rebate is given up, it can never be regained.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate New member states are much poorer than the UK\n\nBritain should give up the rebate in solidarity with the new member states. Most of the ten recent entrants to the EU are still struggling to overcome the legacy of communist rule and are much poorer than the previous 15 member states. In 2009 Bulgaria and Romania had less than half the average EU GDP per capita whereas the UK was about 120% EU average. [1] As one of the richest EU members, Britain has a moral responsibility to contribute its share of the money needed to allow the new member states to make a success of EU membership. It also has a self-interest in contributing to their economic development, for as they become richer their citizens will increasingly buy the services and media exports in which Britain specialises. Indeed, because the rebate is paid for by all member states the new member states will be contributing payments towards Britain’s rebate - clearly something which Britain cannot attempt to defend given the disparity in wealth.\n\n[1] Eurostat, ‘European economic statistics’, 2010, p.31\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Enlargement could mean a new start\n\nBritain should not alienate its natural allies among the new member states by insisting on the rebate. Like Britain, the new member states are largely economically liberal, anti-federalist regarding the future of the EU, and are pro-American in terms of foreign policy. As a result Britain is much more likely to be able to work with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary on these issues. [1] They also recognise that Britain promoted the cause of their membership throughout the 1990s and appreciate its willingness to grant immediate free movement to their citizens who wish to work in Britain. In all these ways they are closer to Britain than to France or Germany, the two big states who have traditionally dominated EU decision-making. Enlargement presents Britain with a great opportunity to influence the future direction of Europe in partnership with these new states, but this opportunity will be lost if British insists on the rebate regardless of Central and Eastern European opinion.\n\n[1] Number 10, ‘Transcript of press conference given by the Prime Minister David Cameron at the EU Summit in Brussels on 17 December 2010’, 2010\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate should go in exchange for CAP reform\n\nIt is worth giving the rebate up in exchange for serious reform of the EU budget, particularly of the Common Agricultural Policy which spends 40% of the EU’s budget [1] on 3% of its population. [2] The CAP not only wastes taxpayers’ money, it also raises the cost of food for European consumers, ruins the environment and prevents poor farmers in the developing world from trading their way out of poverty. Even in its own terms it is a disaster, for most CAP money goes to a small number of rich landowners running huge agribusiness estates, not to small-scale peasant farmers preserving the traditional rural way of life. If offering to give up the British rebate helps to get agreement on reform, then it is a sacrifice well worth making. Britain on the other hand favors using CAP more to protect the environment rather than encourage food production. [3]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Budget 2011 in figures’, 2011\n\n[2] Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans, Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy’, 2007, p.9\n\n[3] Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’, 2011\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate is not justified\n\nThe British rebate is an undeserved anomaly - no other country has a similar arrangement to pay back part of its contribution to the EU budget. Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden all make a bigger net contribution to the EU than Britain does (in proportion to the size of their populations), [1] yet they do get special treatment. Britain knew how the EU operated when it chose to join more than thirty years ago - if it didn’t like the structure of the budget, whereby rich countries pay more than poor ones, it could have stayed outside. In any case, a few billion Euros a year is a small sum to pay for access to a huge continent-wide market, the department for Business Innovation & Skills estimated that GDP in 2006 was 2.2% higher than it would have been without a single market, [2] in Britain this would be almost $50billion.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU Budget’, 2007\n\n[2] BIS, ‘The Benefits and Achievements of EU Single Market’\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Giving up the rebate would mean better relations with the Europe Union\n\nIt is worth giving up the rebate to remove a constant source of tension and ill-feeling between Britain and its European partners. Until the rebate is abandoned, Britain will never be at the heart of Europe. This limits our ability to promote our other interests in Europe, as every argument always ends up back at the rebate, and weakens our moral authority. Denmark for example is similarly Euro sceptic but is fiercely opposed to the UK rebate and aims to scrap it during Denmark’s next EU Presidency in 2012. [1] Because preserving the rebate has always been the Prime Minister’s priority, every other British goal has been given up instead. This led to bad deals for Britain over the ERM, at Maastricht, and in 2002 when Tony Blair accepted a Franco-German agreement to leave the CAP unreformed until 2013. This is because Britain is inevitably on its own in any possible change to the rebate whereas on almost any other issue Britain has allies. So when Britain’s opponents can link the rebate to an issue Britain may be able to keep the rebate but will in other respects be on the losing side. [2]\n\n[1] Jensen, Arne Nis, ‘The UK rebate – or rethinking the EU budget?’, 2011, p.27\n\n[2] Rennie, David, and Helm, Toby, ‘Blair is all alone in Britain’s EU rebate row’, 2005\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
90.5
] |
[
87.5,
87.75,
86.8125,
86.3125,
86.625,
89.0625,
88.9375,
84.875,
84.9375,
83.5,
83.625,
83.6875,
83,
84.625,
84.9375,
83.9375
] |
Europe needs to tackle much bigger problems
Those EU leaders who are most critical of the rebate are ignoring the EU’s real and serious problems by spending large amounts of time in rows with Britain over the rebate. Europe has immense problems such as persistent 10% unemployment, which has gone up as a result of the financial crisis, the rejection of the EU constitution by voters, the challenge of globalisation, the failure to make the single market in services work fairly, corruption and waste at Brussels, etc. This is even before the immense difficulties with the Euro which the Eurozone is currently suffering from. All these issues are much more important than the rebate for the future of the European Union. If Europe can once again become competitive economically then the financial gains for Europe will be much greater than persuading Britain to drop the rebate.
|
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate There may be bigger problems but the rebate is symptomatic of many of them. The reason for many of Europe’s problems is the determination for member states to take from the EU but not give and to haggle over everything rather than working together. The rebate is a prime example of one state believing that it deserves a small amount of money more than others and as such should be scrapped in order to help show that both big and small problems can be tackled through one state being willing to give up something important to it in return for others doing the same on other issues.\n"
] |
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate With the expansion of the European Union it is no longer justified that Britain should not be paying more towards the European Union, and in particular the much poorer Eastern European states which have joined. Britain cannot expect to get as much back from the European Union as it puts in. Britain should accept being one of the biggest contributors and in return would get a bigger influence one the EU, rather than being constantly frozen out of decisions by France and Germany.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate When the rebate was agreed over twenty years ago, Britain was poor after decades of decline. In fact it was the third poorest state in the then European Economic Community (after Ireland and Greece) [1] , so the size of its net contribution to the budget was clearly unfair. Now the UK is one of the EU member countries and the rebate is no longer justifiable in the way it was originally justified. The sums involved are small compared to the overall UK budget - much less than the margin of error in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s tax and spending plans, in 2003 for example Gordon Brown had to borrow £10 billion more than expected. [2] It is partly (perhaps largely) because of Margaret Thatcher’s achievements in power that the UK is so strong economically, so agreeing that the rebate is no longer necessary is a tribute to her legacy, not a betrayal.\n\n[1] OECD, ‘1984, Gross domestic product: Per head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year’, 2011\n\n[2] Schifferes, Steve, ‘Chancellor to squeeze wages’, 2003\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate is bad for Britain and the EU as it leads to a complacency in the UK about the way the EU is run. Knowing that two-thirds of Britain’s net contribution will be returned anyway, British politicians and civil servants have not had to be serious about tackling waste and corruption at Brussels. Giving the rebate up would focus British minds much more clearly upon how the EU operates and would lead them to demand higher standards, both of the Commission and of their own elected representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not feel sorry for the new EU members and give up its rebate out of pity for them. They chose to enter the EU and accepted the terms of membership - including the rebate arrangements. Indeed, it could be argued that membership was not necessarily good for the former communist states - having escaped one bureaucratic and ideological superstate, they have now chosen to be ruled by another, exchanging Moscow for Brussels. EU membership will impose thousands of unnecessary regulations upon them and tie them to a “European social model” which is clearly failing in the western states - both these things could hold back their economic growth and leave them poorer than they could have been outside the EU. Even the development aid they will receive will largely be wasted because it has to be spent in ways Brussels demands rather than in locally productive investment.\n\nAnd if Britain did wish to be nice to the new member states, it could do so without giving up the principle of the rebate. Tony Blair agreed to alter the rebate in December 2005. Britain would not seek rebate payments linked to new member states agricultural and regional aid spending, but should keep the rebate in terms of spending of the original 15 EU countries who agreed .\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain can be on good terms with the East European states without dropping the rebate. Tony Blair in his deal on the rebate in 2005 gave a good deal to the new members of the EU which gave much more in structural funds to these members and at the same time reduced the British rebate. [1]\n\n[1] White, Michael, and Watt, Nicholas, ‘Blair clinches deal with offer of big rebate cut’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain does not want to be at the heart of Europe - it wants to be in the EU, but not run by the EU. Even if the rebate went, the UK would remain outside any EU “core group” of countries, as it has chosen not to join the Schengen agreement on passport free movement, and to stay outside the Euro. Both these decisions have very wide political and popular support in the UK, and neither will be changed even if the rebate was weakly given away. So tensions will continue between Britain and its European partners, but at least by defending the rebate they will know that the UK is prepared to stand up for its interests and respect it.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate It might be worth giving up the British rebate for serious CAP reform, but it is unnecessary. If the CAP were abolished, Britain’s net payments to the EU would automatically be much smaller anyway, so the rebate (66% of the difference between the UK’s contributions to the EU and its receipts from it) would also shrink away to insignificance. CAP reform is worth doing for its own sake, and other EU countries will only agree to it once they realise that fact - offering up the rebate will make no difference. In any case, even if the rebate was a useful bargaining chip to be cashed in, there is no chance of individual countries such as France (or Eire, Spain, Greece, Italy, Belgium, etc.) agreeing to changing the CAP at present and any one country could prevent it, so Britain should hold on to the rebate card.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate While the UK is the only country to have so far received a rebate the Commission pointed out that the Fontainbleu agreement was based on the principle that ‘….any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.’ [1] This could clearly apply to many other countries apart from Britain, Germany and other countries could therefore ask for a rebate if they wish. While there is no other compensation mechanism like the rebate there are lump sum payments to the Netherlands and Sweden [2] while Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria all have reduced rates of the European portion of VAT, [3] and the same states also pay less towards the rebate. [4]\n\n[1] Patterson, Ben, ‘The UK rebate issue’, p.2 (link downloads pdf)\n\n[2] Europa, ‘Where does the money come from?’, 2010\n\n[3] Notenboom, Harry, ‘Structure and composition of the European Union own resources System’, 2009, p.17\n\n[4] Ibid, p.15\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate makes membership acceptable to the British people\n\nThe EU is a vast wasteful bureaucracy, for example creating a ‘House of European History’ for €14 million, [1] and is beyond reform. Anything to limit Britain’s contribution to this monster with pretensions to becoming a super-state is desirable. Many in the UK, between 35 and 65% of the population, [2] would prefer that we withdrew altogether, but if we can’t at least we should “starve the beast” by limiting the amount of money we give it to do harm with. Even if you think Britain should stay in the EU, you must recognise that the rebate is one of the only things that makes EU membership acceptable to ordinary people. Giving up the rebate is likely to swing British opinion strongly in favour of withdrawal.\n\n[1] Banks, Martin, ‘Parliament hits back at claims of ‘wasteful’ spending plans’, 2011\n\n[2] Hannan, Daniel, ‘Would Britain vote to leave the EU?’, 2009\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not pay more than other countries\n\nBritain’s rebate is completely justified. Without it Britain would pay far more into the EU than it ever received back. The UK government argues “Without the rebate, the UK's net contribution as a percentage of national income would be twice as big as France's, and 1.5 times bigger than Germany's.” [1] This is because most of the EU’s budget goes to pay for the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and regional aid programmes. The UK’s farming sector is a very small part of the economy, and very few of its regions count as poor in Europe-wide terms, so Britain receives little funding back from the EU. Meanwhile as a result of new members joining the EU development funding has been taken away from poorer areas of Britain, many of which will no longer be eligible, to be redirected to Eastern and Central European countries which need it much more, [2] Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget will go up .The rebate recognises this and returns two-thirds of the UK’s net EU contribution (payments less receipts) every year. Even with the rebate, the UK is still the second biggest net contributor (proportional to population) of all the EU states. Over the past ten years Britain has contributed 2½ times as much to the EU budget as France has [3] - and without the rebate it would have been 15 times as much!\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU budget commissioner calls for UK rebate to end’, 2010\n\n[2] European Union Committee, ‘Future Financing of the European Union’, 2005, p.154\n\n[3] The Economist, ‘About a rebate’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate could never be regained\n\nMargaret Thatcher fought for four years to win the rebate for Britain, famously wielding her handbag at EU summits until it was agreed. Giving it up is a clear betrayal of Thatcher’s legacy and shows the present government’s unwillingness to stand up for Britain’s interests in Brussels. With the situation now different due to there being more members there is no chance of any future British Prime Minister being able to repeat Mrs Thatcher’s achievement of 1984, so once the rebate is given up, it can never be regained.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate New member states are much poorer than the UK\n\nBritain should give up the rebate in solidarity with the new member states. Most of the ten recent entrants to the EU are still struggling to overcome the legacy of communist rule and are much poorer than the previous 15 member states. In 2009 Bulgaria and Romania had less than half the average EU GDP per capita whereas the UK was about 120% EU average. [1] As one of the richest EU members, Britain has a moral responsibility to contribute its share of the money needed to allow the new member states to make a success of EU membership. It also has a self-interest in contributing to their economic development, for as they become richer their citizens will increasingly buy the services and media exports in which Britain specialises. Indeed, because the rebate is paid for by all member states the new member states will be contributing payments towards Britain’s rebate - clearly something which Britain cannot attempt to defend given the disparity in wealth.\n\n[1] Eurostat, ‘European economic statistics’, 2010, p.31\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Enlargement could mean a new start\n\nBritain should not alienate its natural allies among the new member states by insisting on the rebate. Like Britain, the new member states are largely economically liberal, anti-federalist regarding the future of the EU, and are pro-American in terms of foreign policy. As a result Britain is much more likely to be able to work with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary on these issues. [1] They also recognise that Britain promoted the cause of their membership throughout the 1990s and appreciate its willingness to grant immediate free movement to their citizens who wish to work in Britain. In all these ways they are closer to Britain than to France or Germany, the two big states who have traditionally dominated EU decision-making. Enlargement presents Britain with a great opportunity to influence the future direction of Europe in partnership with these new states, but this opportunity will be lost if British insists on the rebate regardless of Central and Eastern European opinion.\n\n[1] Number 10, ‘Transcript of press conference given by the Prime Minister David Cameron at the EU Summit in Brussels on 17 December 2010’, 2010\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate should go in exchange for CAP reform\n\nIt is worth giving the rebate up in exchange for serious reform of the EU budget, particularly of the Common Agricultural Policy which spends 40% of the EU’s budget [1] on 3% of its population. [2] The CAP not only wastes taxpayers’ money, it also raises the cost of food for European consumers, ruins the environment and prevents poor farmers in the developing world from trading their way out of poverty. Even in its own terms it is a disaster, for most CAP money goes to a small number of rich landowners running huge agribusiness estates, not to small-scale peasant farmers preserving the traditional rural way of life. If offering to give up the British rebate helps to get agreement on reform, then it is a sacrifice well worth making. Britain on the other hand favors using CAP more to protect the environment rather than encourage food production. [3]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Budget 2011 in figures’, 2011\n\n[2] Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans, Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy’, 2007, p.9\n\n[3] Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’, 2011\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate is not justified\n\nThe British rebate is an undeserved anomaly - no other country has a similar arrangement to pay back part of its contribution to the EU budget. Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden all make a bigger net contribution to the EU than Britain does (in proportion to the size of their populations), [1] yet they do get special treatment. Britain knew how the EU operated when it chose to join more than thirty years ago - if it didn’t like the structure of the budget, whereby rich countries pay more than poor ones, it could have stayed outside. In any case, a few billion Euros a year is a small sum to pay for access to a huge continent-wide market, the department for Business Innovation & Skills estimated that GDP in 2006 was 2.2% higher than it would have been without a single market, [2] in Britain this would be almost $50billion.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU Budget’, 2007\n\n[2] BIS, ‘The Benefits and Achievements of EU Single Market’\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Giving up the rebate would mean better relations with the Europe Union\n\nIt is worth giving up the rebate to remove a constant source of tension and ill-feeling between Britain and its European partners. Until the rebate is abandoned, Britain will never be at the heart of Europe. This limits our ability to promote our other interests in Europe, as every argument always ends up back at the rebate, and weakens our moral authority. Denmark for example is similarly Euro sceptic but is fiercely opposed to the UK rebate and aims to scrap it during Denmark’s next EU Presidency in 2012. [1] Because preserving the rebate has always been the Prime Minister’s priority, every other British goal has been given up instead. This led to bad deals for Britain over the ERM, at Maastricht, and in 2002 when Tony Blair accepted a Franco-German agreement to leave the CAP unreformed until 2013. This is because Britain is inevitably on its own in any possible change to the rebate whereas on almost any other issue Britain has allies. So when Britain’s opponents can link the rebate to an issue Britain may be able to keep the rebate but will in other respects be on the losing side. [2]\n\n[1] Jensen, Arne Nis, ‘The UK rebate – or rethinking the EU budget?’, 2011, p.27\n\n[2] Rennie, David, and Helm, Toby, ‘Blair is all alone in Britain’s EU rebate row’, 2005\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.5
] |
[
86.375,
85.0625,
89.6875,
84.8125,
86.125,
85.4375,
86.3125,
84.5,
84.1875,
83.5,
83.4375,
83.6875,
83.3125,
84.0625,
83.875,
84.125
] |
Britain should not pay more than other countries
Britain’s rebate is completely justified. Without it Britain would pay far more into the EU than it ever received back. The UK government argues “Without the rebate, the UK's net contribution as a percentage of national income would be twice as big as France's, and 1.5 times bigger than Germany's.” [1] This is because most of the EU’s budget goes to pay for the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and regional aid programmes. The UK’s farming sector is a very small part of the economy, and very few of its regions count as poor in Europe-wide terms, so Britain receives little funding back from the EU. Meanwhile as a result of new members joining the EU development funding has been taken away from poorer areas of Britain, many of which will no longer be eligible, to be redirected to Eastern and Central European countries which need it much more, [2] Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget will go up .The rebate recognises this and returns two-thirds of the UK’s net EU contribution (payments less receipts) every year. Even with the rebate, the UK is still the second biggest net contributor (proportional to population) of all the EU states. Over the past ten years Britain has contributed 2½ times as much to the EU budget as France has [3] - and without the rebate it would have been 15 times as much!
[1] BBC News, ‘EU budget commissioner calls for UK rebate to end’, 2010
[2] European Union Committee, ‘Future Financing of the European Union’, 2005, p.154
[3] The Economist, ‘About a rebate’, 2005
|
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate With the expansion of the European Union it is no longer justified that Britain should not be paying more towards the European Union, and in particular the much poorer Eastern European states which have joined. Britain cannot expect to get as much back from the European Union as it puts in. Britain should accept being one of the biggest contributors and in return would get a bigger influence one the EU, rather than being constantly frozen out of decisions by France and Germany.\n"
] |
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate There may be bigger problems but the rebate is symptomatic of many of them. The reason for many of Europe’s problems is the determination for member states to take from the EU but not give and to haggle over everything rather than working together. The rebate is a prime example of one state believing that it deserves a small amount of money more than others and as such should be scrapped in order to help show that both big and small problems can be tackled through one state being willing to give up something important to it in return for others doing the same on other issues.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate When the rebate was agreed over twenty years ago, Britain was poor after decades of decline. In fact it was the third poorest state in the then European Economic Community (after Ireland and Greece) [1] , so the size of its net contribution to the budget was clearly unfair. Now the UK is one of the EU member countries and the rebate is no longer justifiable in the way it was originally justified. The sums involved are small compared to the overall UK budget - much less than the margin of error in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s tax and spending plans, in 2003 for example Gordon Brown had to borrow £10 billion more than expected. [2] It is partly (perhaps largely) because of Margaret Thatcher’s achievements in power that the UK is so strong economically, so agreeing that the rebate is no longer necessary is a tribute to her legacy, not a betrayal.\n\n[1] OECD, ‘1984, Gross domestic product: Per head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year’, 2011\n\n[2] Schifferes, Steve, ‘Chancellor to squeeze wages’, 2003\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate is bad for Britain and the EU as it leads to a complacency in the UK about the way the EU is run. Knowing that two-thirds of Britain’s net contribution will be returned anyway, British politicians and civil servants have not had to be serious about tackling waste and corruption at Brussels. Giving the rebate up would focus British minds much more clearly upon how the EU operates and would lead them to demand higher standards, both of the Commission and of their own elected representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not feel sorry for the new EU members and give up its rebate out of pity for them. They chose to enter the EU and accepted the terms of membership - including the rebate arrangements. Indeed, it could be argued that membership was not necessarily good for the former communist states - having escaped one bureaucratic and ideological superstate, they have now chosen to be ruled by another, exchanging Moscow for Brussels. EU membership will impose thousands of unnecessary regulations upon them and tie them to a “European social model” which is clearly failing in the western states - both these things could hold back their economic growth and leave them poorer than they could have been outside the EU. Even the development aid they will receive will largely be wasted because it has to be spent in ways Brussels demands rather than in locally productive investment.\n\nAnd if Britain did wish to be nice to the new member states, it could do so without giving up the principle of the rebate. Tony Blair agreed to alter the rebate in December 2005. Britain would not seek rebate payments linked to new member states agricultural and regional aid spending, but should keep the rebate in terms of spending of the original 15 EU countries who agreed .\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain can be on good terms with the East European states without dropping the rebate. Tony Blair in his deal on the rebate in 2005 gave a good deal to the new members of the EU which gave much more in structural funds to these members and at the same time reduced the British rebate. [1]\n\n[1] White, Michael, and Watt, Nicholas, ‘Blair clinches deal with offer of big rebate cut’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain does not want to be at the heart of Europe - it wants to be in the EU, but not run by the EU. Even if the rebate went, the UK would remain outside any EU “core group” of countries, as it has chosen not to join the Schengen agreement on passport free movement, and to stay outside the Euro. Both these decisions have very wide political and popular support in the UK, and neither will be changed even if the rebate was weakly given away. So tensions will continue between Britain and its European partners, but at least by defending the rebate they will know that the UK is prepared to stand up for its interests and respect it.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate It might be worth giving up the British rebate for serious CAP reform, but it is unnecessary. If the CAP were abolished, Britain’s net payments to the EU would automatically be much smaller anyway, so the rebate (66% of the difference between the UK’s contributions to the EU and its receipts from it) would also shrink away to insignificance. CAP reform is worth doing for its own sake, and other EU countries will only agree to it once they realise that fact - offering up the rebate will make no difference. In any case, even if the rebate was a useful bargaining chip to be cashed in, there is no chance of individual countries such as France (or Eire, Spain, Greece, Italy, Belgium, etc.) agreeing to changing the CAP at present and any one country could prevent it, so Britain should hold on to the rebate card.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate While the UK is the only country to have so far received a rebate the Commission pointed out that the Fontainbleu agreement was based on the principle that ‘….any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.’ [1] This could clearly apply to many other countries apart from Britain, Germany and other countries could therefore ask for a rebate if they wish. While there is no other compensation mechanism like the rebate there are lump sum payments to the Netherlands and Sweden [2] while Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria all have reduced rates of the European portion of VAT, [3] and the same states also pay less towards the rebate. [4]\n\n[1] Patterson, Ben, ‘The UK rebate issue’, p.2 (link downloads pdf)\n\n[2] Europa, ‘Where does the money come from?’, 2010\n\n[3] Notenboom, Harry, ‘Structure and composition of the European Union own resources System’, 2009, p.17\n\n[4] Ibid, p.15\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate makes membership acceptable to the British people\n\nThe EU is a vast wasteful bureaucracy, for example creating a ‘House of European History’ for €14 million, [1] and is beyond reform. Anything to limit Britain’s contribution to this monster with pretensions to becoming a super-state is desirable. Many in the UK, between 35 and 65% of the population, [2] would prefer that we withdrew altogether, but if we can’t at least we should “starve the beast” by limiting the amount of money we give it to do harm with. Even if you think Britain should stay in the EU, you must recognise that the rebate is one of the only things that makes EU membership acceptable to ordinary people. Giving up the rebate is likely to swing British opinion strongly in favour of withdrawal.\n\n[1] Banks, Martin, ‘Parliament hits back at claims of ‘wasteful’ spending plans’, 2011\n\n[2] Hannan, Daniel, ‘Would Britain vote to leave the EU?’, 2009\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Europe needs to tackle much bigger problems\n\nThose EU leaders who are most critical of the rebate are ignoring the EU’s real and serious problems by spending large amounts of time in rows with Britain over the rebate. Europe has immense problems such as persistent 10% unemployment, which has gone up as a result of the financial crisis, the rejection of the EU constitution by voters, the challenge of globalisation, the failure to make the single market in services work fairly, corruption and waste at Brussels, etc. This is even before the immense difficulties with the Euro which the Eurozone is currently suffering from. All these issues are much more important than the rebate for the future of the European Union. If Europe can once again become competitive economically then the financial gains for Europe will be much greater than persuading Britain to drop the rebate.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate could never be regained\n\nMargaret Thatcher fought for four years to win the rebate for Britain, famously wielding her handbag at EU summits until it was agreed. Giving it up is a clear betrayal of Thatcher’s legacy and shows the present government’s unwillingness to stand up for Britain’s interests in Brussels. With the situation now different due to there being more members there is no chance of any future British Prime Minister being able to repeat Mrs Thatcher’s achievement of 1984, so once the rebate is given up, it can never be regained.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate New member states are much poorer than the UK\n\nBritain should give up the rebate in solidarity with the new member states. Most of the ten recent entrants to the EU are still struggling to overcome the legacy of communist rule and are much poorer than the previous 15 member states. In 2009 Bulgaria and Romania had less than half the average EU GDP per capita whereas the UK was about 120% EU average. [1] As one of the richest EU members, Britain has a moral responsibility to contribute its share of the money needed to allow the new member states to make a success of EU membership. It also has a self-interest in contributing to their economic development, for as they become richer their citizens will increasingly buy the services and media exports in which Britain specialises. Indeed, because the rebate is paid for by all member states the new member states will be contributing payments towards Britain’s rebate - clearly something which Britain cannot attempt to defend given the disparity in wealth.\n\n[1] Eurostat, ‘European economic statistics’, 2010, p.31\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Enlargement could mean a new start\n\nBritain should not alienate its natural allies among the new member states by insisting on the rebate. Like Britain, the new member states are largely economically liberal, anti-federalist regarding the future of the EU, and are pro-American in terms of foreign policy. As a result Britain is much more likely to be able to work with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary on these issues. [1] They also recognise that Britain promoted the cause of their membership throughout the 1990s and appreciate its willingness to grant immediate free movement to their citizens who wish to work in Britain. In all these ways they are closer to Britain than to France or Germany, the two big states who have traditionally dominated EU decision-making. Enlargement presents Britain with a great opportunity to influence the future direction of Europe in partnership with these new states, but this opportunity will be lost if British insists on the rebate regardless of Central and Eastern European opinion.\n\n[1] Number 10, ‘Transcript of press conference given by the Prime Minister David Cameron at the EU Summit in Brussels on 17 December 2010’, 2010\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate should go in exchange for CAP reform\n\nIt is worth giving the rebate up in exchange for serious reform of the EU budget, particularly of the Common Agricultural Policy which spends 40% of the EU’s budget [1] on 3% of its population. [2] The CAP not only wastes taxpayers’ money, it also raises the cost of food for European consumers, ruins the environment and prevents poor farmers in the developing world from trading their way out of poverty. Even in its own terms it is a disaster, for most CAP money goes to a small number of rich landowners running huge agribusiness estates, not to small-scale peasant farmers preserving the traditional rural way of life. If offering to give up the British rebate helps to get agreement on reform, then it is a sacrifice well worth making. Britain on the other hand favors using CAP more to protect the environment rather than encourage food production. [3]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Budget 2011 in figures’, 2011\n\n[2] Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans, Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy’, 2007, p.9\n\n[3] Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’, 2011\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate is not justified\n\nThe British rebate is an undeserved anomaly - no other country has a similar arrangement to pay back part of its contribution to the EU budget. Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden all make a bigger net contribution to the EU than Britain does (in proportion to the size of their populations), [1] yet they do get special treatment. Britain knew how the EU operated when it chose to join more than thirty years ago - if it didn’t like the structure of the budget, whereby rich countries pay more than poor ones, it could have stayed outside. In any case, a few billion Euros a year is a small sum to pay for access to a huge continent-wide market, the department for Business Innovation & Skills estimated that GDP in 2006 was 2.2% higher than it would have been without a single market, [2] in Britain this would be almost $50billion.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU Budget’, 2007\n\n[2] BIS, ‘The Benefits and Achievements of EU Single Market’\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Giving up the rebate would mean better relations with the Europe Union\n\nIt is worth giving up the rebate to remove a constant source of tension and ill-feeling between Britain and its European partners. Until the rebate is abandoned, Britain will never be at the heart of Europe. This limits our ability to promote our other interests in Europe, as every argument always ends up back at the rebate, and weakens our moral authority. Denmark for example is similarly Euro sceptic but is fiercely opposed to the UK rebate and aims to scrap it during Denmark’s next EU Presidency in 2012. [1] Because preserving the rebate has always been the Prime Minister’s priority, every other British goal has been given up instead. This led to bad deals for Britain over the ERM, at Maastricht, and in 2002 when Tony Blair accepted a Franco-German agreement to leave the CAP unreformed until 2013. This is because Britain is inevitably on its own in any possible change to the rebate whereas on almost any other issue Britain has allies. So when Britain’s opponents can link the rebate to an issue Britain may be able to keep the rebate but will in other respects be on the losing side. [2]\n\n[1] Jensen, Arne Nis, ‘The UK rebate – or rethinking the EU budget?’, 2011, p.27\n\n[2] Rennie, David, and Helm, Toby, ‘Blair is all alone in Britain’s EU rebate row’, 2005\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.4375
] |
[
90,
91,
88.9375,
85.625,
86.0625,
84.4375,
86.1875,
89.3125,
83.1875,
84,
83.375,
86.3125,
83.0625,
83.625,
90.8125,
83.1875
] |
The rebate could never be regained
Margaret Thatcher fought for four years to win the rebate for Britain, famously wielding her handbag at EU summits until it was agreed. Giving it up is a clear betrayal of Thatcher’s legacy and shows the present government’s unwillingness to stand up for Britain’s interests in Brussels. With the situation now different due to there being more members there is no chance of any future British Prime Minister being able to repeat Mrs Thatcher’s achievement of 1984, so once the rebate is given up, it can never be regained.
|
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate When the rebate was agreed over twenty years ago, Britain was poor after decades of decline. In fact it was the third poorest state in the then European Economic Community (after Ireland and Greece) [1] , so the size of its net contribution to the budget was clearly unfair. Now the UK is one of the EU member countries and the rebate is no longer justifiable in the way it was originally justified. The sums involved are small compared to the overall UK budget - much less than the margin of error in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s tax and spending plans, in 2003 for example Gordon Brown had to borrow £10 billion more than expected. [2] It is partly (perhaps largely) because of Margaret Thatcher’s achievements in power that the UK is so strong economically, so agreeing that the rebate is no longer necessary is a tribute to her legacy, not a betrayal.\n\n[1] OECD, ‘1984, Gross domestic product: Per head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year’, 2011\n\n[2] Schifferes, Steve, ‘Chancellor to squeeze wages’, 2003\n"
] |
[
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate With the expansion of the European Union it is no longer justified that Britain should not be paying more towards the European Union, and in particular the much poorer Eastern European states which have joined. Britain cannot expect to get as much back from the European Union as it puts in. Britain should accept being one of the biggest contributors and in return would get a bigger influence one the EU, rather than being constantly frozen out of decisions by France and Germany.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate There may be bigger problems but the rebate is symptomatic of many of them. The reason for many of Europe’s problems is the determination for member states to take from the EU but not give and to haggle over everything rather than working together. The rebate is a prime example of one state believing that it deserves a small amount of money more than others and as such should be scrapped in order to help show that both big and small problems can be tackled through one state being willing to give up something important to it in return for others doing the same on other issues.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate is bad for Britain and the EU as it leads to a complacency in the UK about the way the EU is run. Knowing that two-thirds of Britain’s net contribution will be returned anyway, British politicians and civil servants have not had to be serious about tackling waste and corruption at Brussels. Giving the rebate up would focus British minds much more clearly upon how the EU operates and would lead them to demand higher standards, both of the Commission and of their own elected representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not feel sorry for the new EU members and give up its rebate out of pity for them. They chose to enter the EU and accepted the terms of membership - including the rebate arrangements. Indeed, it could be argued that membership was not necessarily good for the former communist states - having escaped one bureaucratic and ideological superstate, they have now chosen to be ruled by another, exchanging Moscow for Brussels. EU membership will impose thousands of unnecessary regulations upon them and tie them to a “European social model” which is clearly failing in the western states - both these things could hold back their economic growth and leave them poorer than they could have been outside the EU. Even the development aid they will receive will largely be wasted because it has to be spent in ways Brussels demands rather than in locally productive investment.\n\nAnd if Britain did wish to be nice to the new member states, it could do so without giving up the principle of the rebate. Tony Blair agreed to alter the rebate in December 2005. Britain would not seek rebate payments linked to new member states agricultural and regional aid spending, but should keep the rebate in terms of spending of the original 15 EU countries who agreed .\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain can be on good terms with the East European states without dropping the rebate. Tony Blair in his deal on the rebate in 2005 gave a good deal to the new members of the EU which gave much more in structural funds to these members and at the same time reduced the British rebate. [1]\n\n[1] White, Michael, and Watt, Nicholas, ‘Blair clinches deal with offer of big rebate cut’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain does not want to be at the heart of Europe - it wants to be in the EU, but not run by the EU. Even if the rebate went, the UK would remain outside any EU “core group” of countries, as it has chosen not to join the Schengen agreement on passport free movement, and to stay outside the Euro. Both these decisions have very wide political and popular support in the UK, and neither will be changed even if the rebate was weakly given away. So tensions will continue between Britain and its European partners, but at least by defending the rebate they will know that the UK is prepared to stand up for its interests and respect it.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate It might be worth giving up the British rebate for serious CAP reform, but it is unnecessary. If the CAP were abolished, Britain’s net payments to the EU would automatically be much smaller anyway, so the rebate (66% of the difference between the UK’s contributions to the EU and its receipts from it) would also shrink away to insignificance. CAP reform is worth doing for its own sake, and other EU countries will only agree to it once they realise that fact - offering up the rebate will make no difference. In any case, even if the rebate was a useful bargaining chip to be cashed in, there is no chance of individual countries such as France (or Eire, Spain, Greece, Italy, Belgium, etc.) agreeing to changing the CAP at present and any one country could prevent it, so Britain should hold on to the rebate card.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate While the UK is the only country to have so far received a rebate the Commission pointed out that the Fontainbleu agreement was based on the principle that ‘….any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.’ [1] This could clearly apply to many other countries apart from Britain, Germany and other countries could therefore ask for a rebate if they wish. While there is no other compensation mechanism like the rebate there are lump sum payments to the Netherlands and Sweden [2] while Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria all have reduced rates of the European portion of VAT, [3] and the same states also pay less towards the rebate. [4]\n\n[1] Patterson, Ben, ‘The UK rebate issue’, p.2 (link downloads pdf)\n\n[2] Europa, ‘Where does the money come from?’, 2010\n\n[3] Notenboom, Harry, ‘Structure and composition of the European Union own resources System’, 2009, p.17\n\n[4] Ibid, p.15\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate makes membership acceptable to the British people\n\nThe EU is a vast wasteful bureaucracy, for example creating a ‘House of European History’ for €14 million, [1] and is beyond reform. Anything to limit Britain’s contribution to this monster with pretensions to becoming a super-state is desirable. Many in the UK, between 35 and 65% of the population, [2] would prefer that we withdrew altogether, but if we can’t at least we should “starve the beast” by limiting the amount of money we give it to do harm with. Even if you think Britain should stay in the EU, you must recognise that the rebate is one of the only things that makes EU membership acceptable to ordinary people. Giving up the rebate is likely to swing British opinion strongly in favour of withdrawal.\n\n[1] Banks, Martin, ‘Parliament hits back at claims of ‘wasteful’ spending plans’, 2011\n\n[2] Hannan, Daniel, ‘Would Britain vote to leave the EU?’, 2009\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Europe needs to tackle much bigger problems\n\nThose EU leaders who are most critical of the rebate are ignoring the EU’s real and serious problems by spending large amounts of time in rows with Britain over the rebate. Europe has immense problems such as persistent 10% unemployment, which has gone up as a result of the financial crisis, the rejection of the EU constitution by voters, the challenge of globalisation, the failure to make the single market in services work fairly, corruption and waste at Brussels, etc. This is even before the immense difficulties with the Euro which the Eurozone is currently suffering from. All these issues are much more important than the rebate for the future of the European Union. If Europe can once again become competitive economically then the financial gains for Europe will be much greater than persuading Britain to drop the rebate.\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Britain should not pay more than other countries\n\nBritain’s rebate is completely justified. Without it Britain would pay far more into the EU than it ever received back. The UK government argues “Without the rebate, the UK's net contribution as a percentage of national income would be twice as big as France's, and 1.5 times bigger than Germany's.” [1] This is because most of the EU’s budget goes to pay for the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and regional aid programmes. The UK’s farming sector is a very small part of the economy, and very few of its regions count as poor in Europe-wide terms, so Britain receives little funding back from the EU. Meanwhile as a result of new members joining the EU development funding has been taken away from poorer areas of Britain, many of which will no longer be eligible, to be redirected to Eastern and Central European countries which need it much more, [2] Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget will go up .The rebate recognises this and returns two-thirds of the UK’s net EU contribution (payments less receipts) every year. Even with the rebate, the UK is still the second biggest net contributor (proportional to population) of all the EU states. Over the past ten years Britain has contributed 2½ times as much to the EU budget as France has [3] - and without the rebate it would have been 15 times as much!\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU budget commissioner calls for UK rebate to end’, 2010\n\n[2] European Union Committee, ‘Future Financing of the European Union’, 2005, p.154\n\n[3] The Economist, ‘About a rebate’, 2005\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate New member states are much poorer than the UK\n\nBritain should give up the rebate in solidarity with the new member states. Most of the ten recent entrants to the EU are still struggling to overcome the legacy of communist rule and are much poorer than the previous 15 member states. In 2009 Bulgaria and Romania had less than half the average EU GDP per capita whereas the UK was about 120% EU average. [1] As one of the richest EU members, Britain has a moral responsibility to contribute its share of the money needed to allow the new member states to make a success of EU membership. It also has a self-interest in contributing to their economic development, for as they become richer their citizens will increasingly buy the services and media exports in which Britain specialises. Indeed, because the rebate is paid for by all member states the new member states will be contributing payments towards Britain’s rebate - clearly something which Britain cannot attempt to defend given the disparity in wealth.\n\n[1] Eurostat, ‘European economic statistics’, 2010, p.31\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Enlargement could mean a new start\n\nBritain should not alienate its natural allies among the new member states by insisting on the rebate. Like Britain, the new member states are largely economically liberal, anti-federalist regarding the future of the EU, and are pro-American in terms of foreign policy. As a result Britain is much more likely to be able to work with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary on these issues. [1] They also recognise that Britain promoted the cause of their membership throughout the 1990s and appreciate its willingness to grant immediate free movement to their citizens who wish to work in Britain. In all these ways they are closer to Britain than to France or Germany, the two big states who have traditionally dominated EU decision-making. Enlargement presents Britain with a great opportunity to influence the future direction of Europe in partnership with these new states, but this opportunity will be lost if British insists on the rebate regardless of Central and Eastern European opinion.\n\n[1] Number 10, ‘Transcript of press conference given by the Prime Minister David Cameron at the EU Summit in Brussels on 17 December 2010’, 2010\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The rebate should go in exchange for CAP reform\n\nIt is worth giving the rebate up in exchange for serious reform of the EU budget, particularly of the Common Agricultural Policy which spends 40% of the EU’s budget [1] on 3% of its population. [2] The CAP not only wastes taxpayers’ money, it also raises the cost of food for European consumers, ruins the environment and prevents poor farmers in the developing world from trading their way out of poverty. Even in its own terms it is a disaster, for most CAP money goes to a small number of rich landowners running huge agribusiness estates, not to small-scale peasant farmers preserving the traditional rural way of life. If offering to give up the British rebate helps to get agreement on reform, then it is a sacrifice well worth making. Britain on the other hand favors using CAP more to protect the environment rather than encourage food production. [3]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Budget 2011 in figures’, 2011\n\n[2] Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans, Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy’, 2007, p.9\n\n[3] Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’, 2011\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate The Rebate is not justified\n\nThe British rebate is an undeserved anomaly - no other country has a similar arrangement to pay back part of its contribution to the EU budget. Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden all make a bigger net contribution to the EU than Britain does (in proportion to the size of their populations), [1] yet they do get special treatment. Britain knew how the EU operated when it chose to join more than thirty years ago - if it didn’t like the structure of the budget, whereby rich countries pay more than poor ones, it could have stayed outside. In any case, a few billion Euros a year is a small sum to pay for access to a huge continent-wide market, the department for Business Innovation & Skills estimated that GDP in 2006 was 2.2% higher than it would have been without a single market, [2] in Britain this would be almost $50billion.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘EU Budget’, 2007\n\n[2] BIS, ‘The Benefits and Achievements of EU Single Market’\n",
"europe house believes britain should give its eu rebate Giving up the rebate would mean better relations with the Europe Union\n\nIt is worth giving up the rebate to remove a constant source of tension and ill-feeling between Britain and its European partners. Until the rebate is abandoned, Britain will never be at the heart of Europe. This limits our ability to promote our other interests in Europe, as every argument always ends up back at the rebate, and weakens our moral authority. Denmark for example is similarly Euro sceptic but is fiercely opposed to the UK rebate and aims to scrap it during Denmark’s next EU Presidency in 2012. [1] Because preserving the rebate has always been the Prime Minister’s priority, every other British goal has been given up instead. This led to bad deals for Britain over the ERM, at Maastricht, and in 2002 when Tony Blair accepted a Franco-German agreement to leave the CAP unreformed until 2013. This is because Britain is inevitably on its own in any possible change to the rebate whereas on almost any other issue Britain has allies. So when Britain’s opponents can link the rebate to an issue Britain may be able to keep the rebate but will in other respects be on the losing side. [2]\n\n[1] Jensen, Arne Nis, ‘The UK rebate – or rethinking the EU budget?’, 2011, p.27\n\n[2] Rennie, David, and Helm, Toby, ‘Blair is all alone in Britain’s EU rebate row’, 2005\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.3125
] |
[
87.25,
85.9375,
87.625,
85.375,
89.375,
86.125,
86.6875,
88.0625,
83.4375,
84.125,
83.25,
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Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.
Neo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]
One of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]
[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf
[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf
[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration\n\nThe role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration\n\nNeo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]\n\nIt also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.\n\n[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration\n\nSpill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.\n\nNeo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into\n\nintegration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the\n\nintegration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).\n\nThe Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n\n[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities\n\nStanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]\n\n[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.\n\nThe core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]\n\n[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882\n\n[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis 1965\n\nIn 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.\n\n[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799\n\n[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.9375
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Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration
The role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.\n\nNeo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]\n\nOne of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]\n\n[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf\n\n[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf\n\n[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration\n\nNeo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]\n\nIt also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.\n\n[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration\n\nSpill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.\n\nNeo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into\n\nintegration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the\n\nintegration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).\n\nThe Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n\n[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities\n\nStanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]\n\n[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.\n\nThe core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]\n\n[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882\n\n[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis 1965\n\nIn 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.\n\n[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799\n\n[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94
] |
[
86.875,
85.1875,
84.6875,
88,
88.3125,
83.9375,
86.5,
87.6875,
85.8125,
84.3125,
86.3125,
86.4375,
86.25,
83.75,
88.5625,
87.75
] |
Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration
Neo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]
It also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.
[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.\n\nNeo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]\n\nOne of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]\n\n[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf\n\n[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf\n\n[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration\n\nThe role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration\n\nSpill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.\n\nNeo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into\n\nintegration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the\n\nintegration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).\n\nThe Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n\n[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities\n\nStanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]\n\n[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.\n\nThe core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]\n\n[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882\n\n[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis 1965\n\nIn 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.\n\n[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799\n\n[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.4375
] |
[
90.8125,
89.5625,
91.5,
91.875,
86.625,
89.6875,
85.4375,
91.1875,
84.9375,
83.75,
84.25,
85,
88.6875,
84.5625,
86.875,
84.3125
] |
Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration
Spill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]
[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.\n\nNeo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]\n\nOne of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]\n\n[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf\n\n[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf\n\n[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration\n\nThe role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration\n\nNeo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]\n\nIt also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.\n\n[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.\n\nNeo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into\n\nintegration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the\n\nintegration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).\n\nThe Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n\n[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities\n\nStanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]\n\n[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.\n\nThe core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]\n\n[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882\n\n[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis 1965\n\nIn 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.\n\n[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799\n\n[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.5
] |
[
90.375,
86.0625,
89.9375,
84.5625,
89.8125,
84.1875,
87.8125,
87.8125,
86.25,
85.5625,
84.375,
86,
89.4375,
83.25,
91.9375,
88.5625
] |
Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.
Neo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into
integration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the
integration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]
[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.\n\nNeo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]\n\nOne of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]\n\n[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf\n\n[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf\n\n[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration\n\nThe role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration\n\nNeo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]\n\nIt also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.\n\n[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration\n\nSpill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).\n\nThe Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n\n[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities\n\nStanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]\n\n[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.\n\nThe core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]\n\n[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882\n\n[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis 1965\n\nIn 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.\n\n[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799\n\n[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.6875
] |
[
87.5,
84.625,
84.6875,
91.5625,
91.9375,
85.375,
86.4375,
89.5,
86.5625,
84.4375,
85.25,
85.75,
90.9375,
84,
90.5,
87.9375
] |
The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).
The Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.
[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract
[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities\n\nStanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]\n\n[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.\n\nThe core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]\n\n[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882\n\n[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis 1965\n\nIn 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.\n\n[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799\n\n[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.\n\nNeo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]\n\nOne of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]\n\n[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf\n\n[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf\n\n[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration\n\nThe role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration\n\nNeo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]\n\nIt also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.\n\n[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration\n\nSpill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.\n\nNeo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into\n\nintegration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the\n\nintegration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
90.0625
] |
[
88.875,
84.25,
89.6875,
85.6875,
84.6875,
87.0625,
85.6875,
87.3125,
84.25,
84.6875,
85.625,
84.875,
83.75,
85,
84.9375,
86.125
] |
The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities
Stanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]
[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).\n\nThe Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n\n[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.\n\nThe core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]\n\n[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882\n\n[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis 1965\n\nIn 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.\n\n[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799\n\n[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.\n\nNeo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]\n\nOne of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]\n\n[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf\n\n[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf\n\n[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration\n\nThe role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration\n\nNeo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]\n\nIt also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.\n\n[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration\n\nSpill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.\n\nNeo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into\n\nintegration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the\n\nintegration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.25
] |
[
84.5,
85.25,
91.4375,
85.6875,
84.25,
86.5,
86.125,
85.5625,
85.5,
83.5625,
84.75,
83.25,
83.125,
83.6875,
83.5625,
83.9375
] |
The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.
The core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]
[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882
[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).\n\nThe Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n\n[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities\n\nStanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]\n\n[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis 1965\n\nIn 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.\n\n[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799\n\n[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.\n\nNeo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]\n\nOne of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]\n\n[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf\n\n[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf\n\n[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration\n\nThe role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration\n\nNeo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]\n\nIt also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.\n\n[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration\n\nSpill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.\n\nNeo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into\n\nintegration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the\n\nintegration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n"
] |
normal
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Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.0625
] |
[
86.375,
90.125,
87.375,
87.5,
85.375,
86.125,
87.6875,
90.875,
86.25,
85,
85,
87.1875,
84.9375,
86.5625,
85.9375,
87
] |
The Empty Chair Crisis 1965
In 1965 during the Empty Chair Crisis brought integration came to a halt and shifted the institutional balance of power away from the commission to the Council of Ministers, it shows that spillover will not always occur. [1] It was caused by President de Gaulle of France being in conflict with other member states, specifically Germany and Italy. France wanted a deal on the Common Agricultural Policy but was unwilling to agree to further integration through creating majority voting in the Council of Ministers. When France took on the Presidency the normal system of mediation was lost. Bonn and Rome were unwilling to give way. [2] De Gaulle pulled his ministers out of the Council of Ministers thus reasserting the power of national governments. This showed that states would not automatically be prepared to give up their national sovereignty and might of helped lead to the abandonment of Neo-functionalism in the 1970s.
[1] Moga, Teodor Lucian, ‘The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009 pp.796-807, http://www.japss.org/upload/14._Mogaarticle.pdf , p.799
[2] Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘De-commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis : the Community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6’, LSE Research Online, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20071025203706/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2422/01/Decommisioningempty.pdf
|
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 may lead some to presume that National governments are all powerful, but it may have just been a ‘speed-bump’ on the road of spillover. Ben Rosamond (2005) [1] did a reassessment of Haas and concluded that he never abandoned Neofunctionalism; he just changed it and accepted more the view of ‘Complex Interdependence’. The revival of integration since 1985 including the Treaty of Maastricht 1991 led to co-decision procedures which are an example of Political spillover as political decisions and procedure moved to the supranational level.\n\n[1] Rosamond, Ben, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1076/\n"
] |
[
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Ernst B. Haas was the founder of Neo-functionalism in 1951, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified the 3 types of spill-over within the theory. However neither author placed a time limit on how long the integration process would take. The revival of European integration in 1985 shows it may be many years between instances when Neo-functionalism is an adequate theory for explaining integration. This may be equally coming true in the financial crisis as the Euro is necessitating further reforms and may well lead to much greater integration in order to have the tools prevent members being forced out. The political spill-over concept makes account for the fact that national elites 'will undergo a learning process, developing the perception that their interests will be better served by seeking supranational than national solutions'. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism has a liberal view of the international system; whereby agreements can be easily reached.\n\nActually the European Union has proven the exact opposite of the statement – “Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender” as they give more and more power to the united institutions of the European Union – the European Commission and the European Parliament. The most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, proves this as it gives more rights to the EU on account of national power Lisbon’ gives the European Parliament a much greater say in the EU’s decision-making process, it reduced national vetos, created a president and a representative for foreign affairs. [1]\n\n[1] Europa, ‘Treaty of Lisbon: The Treaty at a glance’, Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism too has proved 'out of date'. It fails to pay enough attention to supranational institutions; its focus is too exclusively on big treaty negotiations and fails to understand to increasing importance of economic issues. Intergovernmentalism as a theory collapses in the view of actual integration taking place: the revival of integration from mid-1980s onwards. In the 1990s Intergovernmentalism was supplanted by 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' from the scholar Andrew Moravcsik in his work 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993). [1]\n\n[1] Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (30th Anniversary Edition) (December 1993). http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences1.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism believes in building a community Europe, but then the question is raised, what is the purpose of this new entity? There is no common outlook and getting the major powers of Europe to agree what this should be will be near impossible. Intergovernmentalists would also argue that economic determinism regarding integration is wrong. As they believe national governments have to consciously make these decisions and will not be economically driven alone, ‘Extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests’. It will always be politics that drive integration, while the motive may be economic – to solve a crisis or even just to profit – the key decisions by all actors will be political. [1]\n\n[1] Martell, Luke, ‘Globalisation and Economic Determinism’, Paper given at Global Studies Association conference, Challenging Globalization, September 2009, www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/ssfa2/globecdet.pdf , p.4\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The role of elites acting in their national interest better explains the logic behind integration. Key players such as Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state. Another example to contradicting the role Delors played was that of Margaret Thatcher. Her relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the Single European Act (i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers). [1] It is because of this that the role of individual elites is far superior to that of supranational entrepreneurs.\n\n[1] Dinan, Desmond, ‘The Single European Act’, European Union Centre of Excellence, http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Dinan_SEA_paper.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism is too simple, it does not account for external forces well, as some states have better defined their international position more towards US hegemony than towards each other. “Whereas in economic issues (soft power) the EU has been able to respond to the US in trade disputes, in political and security affairs (hard power) the panorama is mostly discouraging“. [1] Intergovernmentalism rejects economic determinism and therefore rejects Neo-functionalism’s ability to predict. Neo-functionalism may provide a starting point for analysis but it requires much more to be able to explain other pressures of integration.\n\n[1] Dominguez-Rivera, Roberto, ‘Dealing with the U.S. hegemony: soft and hard power in the external relations of the EU’, 8th International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 27 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/6481/1/000459_1.PDF\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Intergovernmentalism assumes states to be the core actors, this is difficult to deny as most economic boundaries and policies are administered by the nation state. It believes that the logic of diversity will prevail in areas of high politics (e.g. security), however it does accept the logic of integration in low politics, that when interests coincide integration is possible (when there is consensus among elites, similar external situations and domestic politics situations). Intergovernmentalism does not allow for the idealist aim of transforming the regional system to a ‘better’ order as what qualifies as ‘better’? The logic of diversity denies the possibility of states agreeing on what is ‘better’.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The counter theory to spill-over is the logic of diversity. Neo-functionalism is flawed as it assumes that integration in low politics (economic) will lead to integration in areas of high politics. This is not possible as issues of high politics are integral to the national interest; so integration will only be possible when national interests coincide, which is possible but unlikely. Neo-functionalism believes areas of high politics can be cultivated into integration, whereas intergovernmentalism believes that the fate of the nation-state should never be subject to the decisions of others.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The Founder of Neo-functionalism abandoned his own Theory (Haas).\n\nThe Founder of Neo-functionalist theory Ernst B. Haas later abandoned his own theory; According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991)- “By the mid-1970 s, Ernst Haas had effectively abandoned the neo-functionalist theory by assimilating it within general interdependence theories of international relations”. [1] The theory proved a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in high politics; “…at the time of the ‘empty chair’ crisis [see next point] neo-functionalism was considered too incapable of describing the process of integration in general because of its extreme Eurocentric nature. Rosamond states that it is emerged from the process of complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment.” [2] Neo-functionalism remained a partial theory, good at explaining particular parts of integration but required supplanting by other theories to keep it relevant.\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n\n[2] ‘European Political Theories: Neo – functionalism’, May 2011, http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25795541/Neo%20-%20functionalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities\n\nStanley Hoffman used a Neo-Realist view of International relations to build the theory of intergovernmentalism. In a neo-realist understanding the international system is characterised by anarchy and the distribution of economic and military capabilities is of primary importance. States will not trust each other but can still reach agreement, but the agreement will be characterised by bargaining and negotiation (not an automatic process!) ‘Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender’. [1]\n\n[1] Wikipedia, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, en.wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political The assumption of the automaticity of Spill-over is wrong.\n\nThe core of Neo-functionalism that spill-over being the main driving force behind continuing integration assumed the automaticity of integration. Once integration has started it will be a self-continuing force that will eventually integrate the whole of Europe - is clearly wrong. Supranational functionalism 'assumed first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke'. [1] The functional method of spill-over is very limited, its success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more. For example no common defence or foreign policy within the community project has been successful. This failure in high politics is fundamental, without a coordinated foreign and security policy the role of the EU in the world is open to question. Opposition too much further enlargement reduces the role the EU can play outside the union unless a common foreign policy can be agreed. [2]\n\n[1] Hoffmann, S. ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915, p882\n\n[2] Pabst, Adrian, ‘The EU as a Security/Defence Community?’, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 2/3 July 2004, http://www.ieis.lu/CONTENT%20of%20new%20Website/NEW%20Executive%20Summaries/PDF-Format/exs%204,%20EU%20as%20Security-Defence%20Community.pdf\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism proposes a purpose to EU integration.\n\nNeo-functionalism proposed building a community Europe, through the concept of spillover the theory proposes economic determinism. Spill-over will eventually lead to a completely integrated Europe with a strong central government. This has not yet been proved true, as EU integration has become a long and difficult process. This is understandable since it is not exactly easy to integrate together all those policies, economies and people. However this would most probably be the eventual result, which is already visible: The experience of the European Union (EU) is widely perceived as not just an example, but the model for regional integration. In recent years, the EU has also been pursuing an increasing number of trade agreements which may in turn lead to spillover. [1] Furthermore the recent enlargements of the EU in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey have renewed the academic and political interest in the effects of European Economic integration. [2]\n\nOne of the theory’s strengths is to predict the outcome of integration and an eventual conclusion to the process, allowing for political and economic aims to be made and realised. For example ‘Larger companies have been acting on the assumption that the internal market will eventually be established’. [3]\n\n[1] Bilal, Sanoussi, ‘Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration?’, Paper to be presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), 29-31 August 2005, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/52D667FD6C95057DC125719D004B65F6/$FILE/Bilal%20-%20Can%20EU%20be%20a%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20for%20comments.pdf\n\n[2] Lafourcade, Miren, and Paluzie, Elisenda, ‘European Integration, FDI and the Internal Geography of Trade: Evidence from Western-European Border Regions’, 23 December 2004, www.cepr.org/RESEARCH/Networks/TID/Paluzie.pdf\n\n[3] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/20/1/1.extract\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Supranational Entrepreneurs played a crucial role in integration\n\nThe role of supranational entrepreneurs within the development of integration within Europe has been crucial. Characters such as Jean Monnet envisaged and worked continuously towards uniting Europe. As the head of France's General Planning Commission, Monnet was the real author of what has become known as the 1950 Schuman Plan to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner of the Common Market. Later a similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the all-important 1992 project that would see the single market and eventually fully Economic and Monetary Union complete. These characters act in support of integration within Europe and represent an empirical example of cultivated spill-over. Unmitigated pressure from Delors in pushing for the single market ensured that it became a reality in the time it did.\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism - liberal theory of regional integration\n\nNeo-functionalism is an example of a liberal theory of regional integration. Its focus is on human welfare needs, not political conflict and law. Its focus is on individuals aggregated into interest groups as the main actors in integration, so the focus is on low politics and the areas which become integrated in the European Union reflect that. As such there has been much more progress on economic integration than there has on creating a common foreign and security policy. [1]\n\nIt also accepts the independent role of international organisations and that the transformation of the international regional system towards a better order is feasible so making the European Union a project worth investing effort in.\n\n[1] Center for European studies, ‘European Union –Common Foreign and Security Policy’, unc.edu, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/eu/Cfsp/cfsp1.html\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism explains the cause of integration\n\nSpill-over is the following concept – in order to enjoy the full benefits of integration of the first sector you need to integrate the related sectors. An example of this is the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) evolving into other energy sectors and forming Euratom. There are three types of spill-over – functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over. Firstly, functional spill-over, which regards spill-over in an economic context. For example, this might involve integrating coal and steel, then integrating transport systems so that coal and steel are moved around more easily. Secondly, there is Political spill-over, where political actors shift their allegiance to a new centre, for example from the national parliament to Brussels. Thirdly, there is cultivated spill-over, which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice; for example the European Commission’s growing autonomy. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n",
"ic policy economy general international europe philosophy political Neo-functionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis.\n\nNeo-functionalism is an accessible theory which provides a good starting point for analysis. As a theory it has the advantages of being able to predict the outcome of integration and clearly explains which actors must be studied in order to explain integration. Haas and Lindberg’s “main thesis was that sectorial integration was inherently expansive - integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into\n\nintegration of other tasks(…) In the basis of this analysis, Haas argued that an acceleration of the\n\nintegration process could be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' within a decade”. [1]\n\n[1] Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe \"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.1-22, http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/spill-over.txt\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.5625
] |
[
87.4375,
87.25,
86.375,
84.75,
85.375,
84.5625,
84.6875,
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84.6875,
84.5,
86,
86.3125
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Reduce smoking
A ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.
The ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.
1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html
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[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Nip the problem in the bud\n\nSmoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.\n\nA ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.\n\n1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4\n\n2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Easy to introduce\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .\n\n1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Lower healthcare costs\n\nSmoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2\n\nThe reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .\n\nThis would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.\n\n1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer\n\n2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS\n\n3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduces growth of tobacco\n\nLess people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.\n\n1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry\n\n2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Unenforceable\n\nSmoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.\n\nGhana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3\n\n1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html\n\n2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html\n\n3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative\n\nIf it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .\n\n1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Paternalistic\n\nPersonal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Ban would harm the wider economy\n\nA ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2\n\n1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624\n\n2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.75
] |
[
92.25,
86.3125,
91.625,
84.875,
85.125,
88.625,
86.625,
85.3125,
87,
83.6875,
83.125,
83.75,
84.0625,
85.8125,
86.375,
84.0625
] |
Nip the problem in the bud
Smoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.
A ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.
1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4
2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control
|
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduce smoking\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.\n\nThe ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.\n\n1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Easy to introduce\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .\n\n1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Lower healthcare costs\n\nSmoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2\n\nThe reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .\n\nThis would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.\n\n1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer\n\n2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS\n\n3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduces growth of tobacco\n\nLess people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.\n\n1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry\n\n2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Unenforceable\n\nSmoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.\n\nGhana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3\n\n1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html\n\n2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html\n\n3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative\n\nIf it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .\n\n1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Paternalistic\n\nPersonal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Ban would harm the wider economy\n\nA ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2\n\n1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624\n\n2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.5
] |
[
93.0625,
86.25,
91,
83.75,
84.75,
88.1875,
85,
84.8125,
85.25,
84.375,
82.875,
83.5,
84.625,
85.9375,
87.0625,
84.0625
] |
Easy to introduce
A ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .
1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
|
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduce smoking\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.\n\nThe ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.\n\n1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Nip the problem in the bud\n\nSmoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.\n\nA ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.\n\n1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4\n\n2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Lower healthcare costs\n\nSmoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2\n\nThe reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .\n\nThis would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.\n\n1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer\n\n2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS\n\n3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduces growth of tobacco\n\nLess people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.\n\n1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry\n\n2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Unenforceable\n\nSmoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.\n\nGhana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3\n\n1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html\n\n2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html\n\n3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative\n\nIf it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .\n\n1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Paternalistic\n\nPersonal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Ban would harm the wider economy\n\nA ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2\n\n1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624\n\n2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
96.5625
] |
[
84.9375,
84,
83.6875,
82.6875,
83.625,
83.0625,
83.1875,
89.5625,
82.5625,
82.5625,
81.625,
82.125,
88.0625,
88.0625,
83.8125,
82.5625
] |
Lower healthcare costs
Smoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2
The reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .
This would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.
1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer
2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS
3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572
|
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduce smoking\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.\n\nThe ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.\n\n1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Nip the problem in the bud\n\nSmoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.\n\nA ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.\n\n1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4\n\n2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Easy to introduce\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .\n\n1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduces growth of tobacco\n\nLess people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.\n\n1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry\n\n2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Unenforceable\n\nSmoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.\n\nGhana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3\n\n1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html\n\n2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html\n\n3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative\n\nIf it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .\n\n1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Paternalistic\n\nPersonal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Ban would harm the wider economy\n\nA ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2\n\n1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624\n\n2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
96.3125
] |
[
88.75,
84.875,
84.5625,
85.6875,
84.4375,
85.8125,
87.375,
83.0625,
82.5,
83.8125,
81.875,
82.5625,
82.4375,
82.4375,
82.8125,
82.625
] |
Reduces growth of tobacco
Less people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.
1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry
2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3
|
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduce smoking\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.\n\nThe ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.\n\n1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Nip the problem in the bud\n\nSmoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.\n\nA ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.\n\n1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4\n\n2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Easy to introduce\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .\n\n1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Lower healthcare costs\n\nSmoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2\n\nThe reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .\n\nThis would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.\n\n1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer\n\n2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS\n\n3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Unenforceable\n\nSmoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.\n\nGhana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3\n\n1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html\n\n2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html\n\n3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative\n\nIf it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .\n\n1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Paternalistic\n\nPersonal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Ban would harm the wider economy\n\nA ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2\n\n1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624\n\n2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.875
] |
[
85.0625,
84.3125,
83.625,
84.4375,
83.0625,
84.5,
85.5,
82.625,
82.4375,
83.0625,
82.0625,
81.5,
81.625,
82.6875,
82.75,
82.75
] |
Unenforceable
Smoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.
Ghana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3
1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html
2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html
3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18
|
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative\n\nIf it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .\n\n1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Paternalistic\n\nPersonal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Ban would harm the wider economy\n\nA ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2\n\n1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624\n\n2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduce smoking\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.\n\nThe ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.\n\n1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Nip the problem in the bud\n\nSmoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.\n\nA ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.\n\n1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4\n\n2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Easy to introduce\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .\n\n1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Lower healthcare costs\n\nSmoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2\n\nThe reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .\n\nThis would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.\n\n1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer\n\n2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS\n\n3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduces growth of tobacco\n\nLess people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.\n\n1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry\n\n2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.4375
] |
[
85.0625,
83.9375,
83.875,
86.1875,
86.0625,
84.1875,
92.3125,
83.75,
90.5625,
83.5625,
82.8125,
83.375,
84.1875,
91.875,
82.8125,
83
] |
Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative
If it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .
1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit
|
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Unenforceable\n\nSmoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.\n\nGhana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3\n\n1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html\n\n2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html\n\n3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Paternalistic\n\nPersonal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Ban would harm the wider economy\n\nA ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2\n\n1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624\n\n2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduce smoking\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.\n\nThe ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.\n\n1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Nip the problem in the bud\n\nSmoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.\n\nA ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.\n\n1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4\n\n2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Easy to introduce\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .\n\n1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Lower healthcare costs\n\nSmoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2\n\nThe reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .\n\nThis would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.\n\n1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer\n\n2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS\n\n3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduces growth of tobacco\n\nLess people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.\n\n1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry\n\n2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
87.0625
] |
[
83.6875,
83.25,
88.75,
84.3125,
84.125,
83.875,
87.0625,
83.9375,
84.125,
83.0625,
82.4375,
82.5,
83.375,
83.9375,
81.75,
82.6875
] |
Paternalistic
Personal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.
|
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Unenforceable\n\nSmoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.\n\nGhana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3\n\n1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html\n\n2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html\n\n3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative\n\nIf it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .\n\n1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Ban would harm the wider economy\n\nA ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2\n\n1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624\n\n2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduce smoking\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.\n\nThe ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.\n\n1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Nip the problem in the bud\n\nSmoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.\n\nA ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.\n\n1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4\n\n2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Easy to introduce\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .\n\n1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Lower healthcare costs\n\nSmoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2\n\nThe reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .\n\nThis would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.\n\n1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer\n\n2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS\n\n3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduces growth of tobacco\n\nLess people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.\n\n1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry\n\n2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
96
] |
[
83.375,
83.4375,
83.4375,
84.5625,
85.875,
83.875,
84.5,
83.0625,
81.9375,
83.875,
82.5,
83.4375,
83.75,
83.0625,
82.75,
83.125
] |
Ban would harm the wider economy
A ban could harm the wider economy – from bars to clubs, if smokers are unable to smoke inside, they may be more likely to stay away. According to some critics, this lead to the closures of bars in the UK when such a ban was brought in 1 . Research in the United States has shown drops in employment in bars of between 4 and 16 percent. 2
1 BBC News, “MPs campaign to relax smoking ban in pubs”, BBC News, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13948624
2 Pakko, Michael R., 'Clearing the Haze? New Evidence on the Economic Impact of Smoking Bans', The Regional Economist, January 2008, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=3
|
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Even if such a link were true – the campaign against the ban on smoking in public places in the UK accept that it’s unlikely that it is the primary cause of closures in the UK 1 – the public health benefits would make it worth it. Reductions on spending in some areas of the economy is likely to be balanced by increases elsewhere; of course there will be losses in some industries – particularly tabacco itself but those who stop smoking will have the money to spend elsewhere.\n\nMoreover the economic effects are likely to be different in Africa; smoking outside in the UK, bearing in mind the infamous British weather, is a far less attractive proposition than smoking outdoors in many African countries.\n\n1 'Why we want government to amend the smoking ban', Save Our Pubs & Clubs, http://www.amendthesmokingban.com/our_case\n"
] |
[
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Personal autonomy arguments sound reasonable, but often ignore the wider consequences. Public health is a key issue – the state has a role in stopping people harming themselves – they may be harming themselves but the cost often falls on government through public healthcare, and therefore on all taxpayers. Moreover smoking also harms others through passive smoking, this is particularly true in public places that are enclosed.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Each has its own disadvantages. A growing form of tobacco sales in Africa – Nigeria in particular – is the “single stick” 1 . If retailers break packets of cigarettes apart, customers won’t see the packets containing health warnings or similar.\n\nCost increases can lead to increased use of rollups 2 , or even counterfeit cigarettes, 3 both of which have happened in South Africa as a result of taxation. At any rate, it’s not a zero sum game – more than one policy can be introduced at the same time.\n\n1 Kluger, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911796,00.html\n\n2 Olitola, Bukola, “The use of roll-your-own cigarettes in South Africa”, Public Health Association of South Africa, 26 February 2014, http://www.phasa.org.za/use-roll-cigarettes-south-africa/\n\n3 Miti, Siya, “Tobacco tax hikes 'boost illegal traders'”, Dispatch Live, 28 February 2014, http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/tobacco-tax-hikes-boost-illegal-traders/\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It often doesn’t require enforcement – it changes attitudes itself, making people not do so. In Scotland, within three months 99% of locations abided by the ban, without the need for excess heavy handed enforcement 1 . This is because non-smokers will ask a smoker to stub it out if they are smoking where they are not allowed to. There seems little reason why this wont happen in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa just as in the west.\n\nEven so, a lot of laws are not enforceable in all cases – that doesn’t mean that they will be complete failures.\n\n1 The Scottish Government, 'Smoking ban gets seal of public approval', scotland.gov.uk, 26 June 2006, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2006/06/26080617\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public What those statistics mean could be questionable – did the ban make people stop, or only provide an extra incentive or assistance for those who already want to stop to do so? It could be suggested that this would simply lead to increased smoking within the home.\n\nEven so, other measures could be more effective, if the goal is a simple reduction in smoking numbers.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Is it really the job of African states to stop smoking? Africans have the same amount of personal responsibility to choose to smoke or not – policies should reflect that.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Yes, tobacco is harmful – but is it really a benefit to remove economic activity, which people choose to do? Labour abuses occur in other industries – but that’s an argument for increased labour protections and economic development, not economic self-inflicted wounds.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public It would require a large amount of resources for law enforcement to go in to such public places occasionally to see that the ban is being enforced.\n\nIt would be easier to enforce conditions relating to the packaging and production of tobacco, which occurs on fewer sites, than ban an activity in certain places which is not so enforceable.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public The argument that states will save money due to less people smoking based upon healthcare costs from treating smoking related diseases is over-simplistic. While smoking does cause medical costs, taxation can counterbalance this – in 2009, the South African government gained 9 billion Rand (€620 million) from excise duties on tobacco 1 . Paradoxically, less people smoking could lead to less money for other projects. Indeed, some countries in Europe raise the amount of health expenditure it causes from tobacco taxation 2 .\n\n1 American Cancer Society, “Tobacco tax success story: South Africa”, tobaccofreekids.org, October 2012, http://global.tobaccofreekids.org/files/pdfs/en/success_SoAfrica_en.pdf\n\n2 BBC News, “Smoking disease costs NHS £5Bn”, BBC News, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8086142.stm\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Unenforceable\n\nSmoking bans are often unenforceable in higher income countries. This is because they require expensive manpower or CCTV in order to stop those flouting the ban, with scarce resources a police force will almost always have other more important crimes to deal with. If Berlin 1 and New York City 2 cannot enforce them, most African cities won’t be able to either.\n\nGhana's advertising ban has been flouted in the past. When asked in a survey about advertising 35% of Ghanaians recalled hearing a tobacco advert on radio or television despite such ads being banned. 3\n\n1 AFP, 'Smoking Ban not Enforced in Parts of Germany', Spiegel Online, 2 July 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,563424,00.html\n\n2 Huff Post New York, 'NYC Smoking Ban In Parks Will Not Be Enforced By NYPD: Mayor', Huffington Post, 2 November 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/nyc-smoking-ban_n_822144.html\n\n3 Kaloko, Mustapha, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.18\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Pack labelling or taxation a better alternative\n\nIf it’s not enforceable, enforceable solutions ought to be used instead. It would be easier to enforce pack labelling and branding requirements, from larger and clearer health warnings to even brand-free packs. Of course, American-style lawsuits by governments against tobacco manufacturers could be tried, as suggested in Nigeria 1 .\n\n1 IRIN, “NIGERIA: Govt hits tobacco companies with whopping law suit”, irinnews.org, 9 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report/75239/nigeria-govt-hits-tobacco-companies-with-whopping-law-suit\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Paternalistic\n\nPersonal autonomy has to be the key to this debate. If people want to smoke – and the owner of the public place has no issue with that – it is not the role of the state to step in. While smoking is dangerous, people should be free in a society to take their own risks, and live with their decisions. All that is required is ensuring that smokers are educated about the risks so that they can make an informed decision.\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduce smoking\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would help reduce the rates of people smoking, by making it appear socially unusual – people will have to leave enclosed public places to smoke, each time they want to smoke. This is particularly important in Africa which is at an early stage of the tobacco epidemic where it can be prevented from ever coming to be seen as being normal.\n\nThe ban both through the new obstacle and the change in norms could reduce smoking rates. In England, nine months after such a ban, the fall in smoking rates (such as with much of the Global North) accelerated 1 - it has been claimed by up to 400,000.\n\n1 Daily Mail Reporter, “Smoking ban spurs 400,000 people to quit the habit”, Daily Mail, 4 July 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1030575/Smoking-ban-spurs-400-000-people-quit-habit.html\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Nip the problem in the bud\n\nSmoking rates in Africa are relatively low; a range of 8%-27% with an average of only 18% of the population smoking 1 (or, the tobacco epidemic is at an early stage 2 ). That’s good, but the challenge is to keep it that way and reduce it.\n\nA ban on smoking in public places at this stage would stop tobacco gaining the widespread social acceptability that caused it to thrice in the 20th century in the Global North. The solution is to get the solutions in now, not later.\n\n1 Kaloko, Mustapha, 'The Impact of Tobacco Use on Health and Socio-Economic Development in Africa', African Union Commission, 2013, http://www.carmma.org/sites/default/files/PDF-uploads/AU_report_English_FINAL.pdf , p.4\n\n2 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “What we do: Tobacco control strategy overview”, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, no date, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Tobacco-Control\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Easy to introduce\n\nA ban on smoking in public places would be simple to enforce – it is an obvious activity, and does not require any form of complex equipment or other special techniques . It would largely be enforced by other users of public places and those working there. If it changes attitudes enough, it could be largely self-enforcing – by changing attitudes and creating peer pressure 1 .\n\n1 See Hartocollis, Anemona, “Why Citizens (gasp) are the smoking police), New York Times, 16 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/nyregion/17smoking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Lower healthcare costs\n\nSmoking caused disease causes large expenses for healthcare systems, something which is particularly burdensome in countries without the rich well developed healthcare systems of the developed world. In the UK lung cancer, one of the diseases caused by smoking, costs £90 per person or £9071 per patient. 1 Even the cost per head of population is higher than Ghana’s entire healthcare budget of $83.4 (about £50) per person. 2\n\nThe reduction in smoking, which would be triggered by the ban, would lead to a drop in smoking related illness. A study in the US state of Arizona showed that hospital admissions for smoking related diseases dropped after a ban on smoking in public places 3 .\n\nThis would allow resources to be focused on the big killers other than tobacco – including HIV AIDS.\n\n1 The National Cancer Research Institute, ‘Lung cancer UK price tag eclipses the cost of any other cancer’, Cancer Research UK, 7 November 2012, http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/cancer-news/press-release/lung-cancer-uk-price-tag-eclipses-the-cost-of-any-other-cancer\n\n2 Assuming Ghanaian health spending of 5.2% of GDP which is $40.71 billion split between a population of 25.37 million from World Bank Databank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana#cp_fin http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS\n\n3 Herman, Patricia M., and Walsh, Michele E. “Hospital Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction, Angina, Stroke, and Asthma After Implementation of Arizona’s Comprehensive Statewide Smoking Ban”, American Journal of Public Health, March 2011, http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2009.179572\n",
"on healthcare international africa house believes ghanas ban smoking public Reduces growth of tobacco\n\nLess people smoking means less tobacco being purchased – something that would contribute to the reduction in the tobacco industry. The industry is known for its exploitative labour practices, from child labour (80,000 children in Malawi work in tobacco farming, can result in nicotine poisoning – 90% of what is grown is sold to American Big Tobacco 1 ) to extortionate loans. 2 Reducing the size of such an industry can only be a good thing.\n\n1 Palitza, Kristin, “Child labour: tobacco’s smoking gun”, The Guardian, 14 September 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/sep/14/malawi-child-labour-tobacco-industry\n\n2 Action on Smoking and Health, p3\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.125
] |
[
84.75,
83.1875,
83.5,
84.375,
84.3125,
85.25,
83.875,
83.4375,
81.75,
82.6875,
83.375,
83,
82.8125,
82.8125,
82.6875,
83.4375
] |
Control over Catalan destiny would reduce tensions and may help prevent independence
For Spain by far the biggest reason for allowing a referendum is that it may well be the best way of keeping Catalonia within Spain over the long term. So long as Spain says it will not allow a referendum or give the Catalans control over their own destiny the movement for Catalan independence is likely to get stronger as it can focus on the denial of democratic rights – Spain is waving a red flag to the bull. Allow a referendum, particularly if it has to be accompanied by a long period of campaigning for reflection and Catalans will have to agonise whether it is in their own best interests, 1 decide whether they want to damage their economy by having large companies such as Planeta the world’s largest Spanish language publishing business pulling out, 2 sever extensive links with Spain, and risk their membership of the European Union which Spain would veto. 3 If Spain were to offer as an alternative a new constitutional settlement that solves many of the grievances the Catalans have at the moment they might find they really want to remain within Spain, 4 much as many scots would prefer devo-max.
1 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html
2 Charlemagne, ‘Hostage to Catalonia’, The Economist, 5th October 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/10/spanish-politics
3 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html
4 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html
|
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum This would be a very risky course to take; currently there is 51% support for independence and that could as well go up as down when given the opportunity. With both the Spanish and Catalan economies in crisis it is likely that such a referendum would only be bolstered by anger at the government due to the state of the economy. This might therefore be an option for Spain at some point in the future when the economy is back on its feet and so less of an issue but at the moment it would be waving goodbye to Spain as we know it.\n"
] |
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Not getting your way in a democracy is not an excuse for turning to violence. Catalonia instead must attempt to persuade the other regions of Spain to allow a referendum or if it can’t then accept that the majority in Spain do not want Catalonian independence and respect their position. Violence will not help persuade the rest of Spain of its case; it did not for the Basques, and will not for Catalonia. So far the Catalan independence movement has recognised this with Lopez Tena the leader of the Catalan Solidarity for Independence party states “We would under no condition follow that [violent] path. That’s not how things are done in a democratic country.” 1\n\n1 Primor, Adar, ‘Catalan leader predicts independence in about two years, and close friendship with Israel’, Haaretz, 4 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/catalan-leader-predicts-independence-in-about-two-years-and-close-friendship-with-israel.premium-1.468285\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Such a decision by the Catalan government would clearly be against the Spanish Constitution and therefore illegal. The constitution makes it “the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up” so such a move would invite a military response. Some members of the ruling PP party have already stated that the Guardia Civil should take over the Mossos (Catalan police). 1 There are also members of the army who would be willing to take such action, \"Catalan independence? Over my dead body and that of many soldiers\" says Colonel Francisco Aleman who also compared the crisis to the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. 2\n\n1 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n\n2 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is far from clear whether self determination gives peoples the right to decide whether they should be independent. The Supreme Court of Canada has looked at this issue with reference to Quebec that has in the past argued for its right to self determination. The court argues “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” This is because such a right must fit in with the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. 1\n\n1 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do Para 126/7\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Section 2 of the constitution continues “it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 1 However it is not the constitution that is the problem blocking a referendum; rather it is the Spanish parliament. The government and parliament clearly could ask the King to allow a referendum on Catalan independence if it so wished. It should do so in order to prevent any more existential challenges to the constitution; constitutions have to be flexible if they are to survive the government is therefore wrong to treat it as a static unchanging document and justification for ruling out a referendum for Catalan independence. 2\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is not up to the Spanish state to choose when the Catalans should be able to have a referendum on independence. A time of crisis is as good as any; economic grievances are one of the main drivers in the desire for independence so it should come as no surprise that there is increase desire for a referendum when there is just such a crisis. Spain has already shown that it considers that there never has been and never will be a right time for a divorce. Even in the good times attempts to get an autonomy statute were met by challenges in the constitutional court which after years of deliberation watered down the agreement which had already been watered down by the Spanish Parliament. 1 More recently it was in large part the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister to consider a request to consider Catalonia the same way as the Basques and Navarra in terms of finances that triggered the current crisis. 2\n\n1 Pericay, Gaspar, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’, Catalan News Agency, 28 June 2010, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/the-spanish-constitutional-court-shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonom\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum For the most part this is simply being alarmists. However if other Spanish regions do wish to go their own way then all the arguments for why Catalonia should be allowed its own choice apply to them as well.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalonia will hold its own referendum regardless of Spain’s position\n\nCatalonia is likely to go its own way and decide it should make its own decisions regardless of the rest of Spain’s views. Artur Mas Catalonia’s President says \"If we can go ahead with a referendum because the government authorises it, it's better. If not, we should do it anyway\". 1 So regardless of the Spanish position in his next four year term he will hold a referendum asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?” If Spain then does not back down about allowing this then there may well be a constitutional crisis. So far the Catalan option is simply to “internationalise the conflict we will have to go to Brussels to explain that they don't even let us consult with the people”. 2\n\nUltimately despite being within Spain so long as support for independence remains strong the Catalans probably have more cards to play; they provide more in taxes than they receive so could cut Madrid off, or in the final play they could unilaterally secede leaving Spain with the unpalatable option of either negotiating to get Catalonia back in, accepting, or invading.\n\n1 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n2 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Catalonia leader threatens to draw EU into independence row with Spain’, guardian.co.uk, 15 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/15/catalonia-leader-threat-independence-eu-spain\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalans clearly want self determination\n\nEvery peoples has the right to self determination. This is enshrined in the UN Charter right at the start in Article 1 as a purpose of the United Nations “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and is also in other major international agreements. 1 Large numbers of states have been recognised since this principle of self determination was recognised by the world in 1945 a great many of them states that are less natural states in terms of size, economy, ethnicity or geography so it would be wrong to deny a right exercised by so many others from the Catalans. It is clear that the Catalans wish to exercise this right to decide their own destiny democratically through a referendum. When polled by the Catalan Survey Institute 74.1% said they would be in favour of organising a referendum with 19.9% against, the remaining 6% were undecided. 2\n\n1 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml\n\n2 Coll, Gaspar Pericay, ‘74% of Catalan citizens are in favour of holding an independence referendum in Catalonia’, Catalan News Agency, 10 October 2012, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/74-catalan-citizens-are-favour-holding-independence-referendum-catalonia\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum If a referendum is not allowed violence may be the result\n\nThe worst case scenario is one in which the Spanish government continues to deny the Catalan people the ability to decide for themselves democratically and peacefully then it is possible that eventually the result will be a change from a peaceful movement to a violent one. Some outside observers see parallels with the break up of Yugoslavia where the solution has to be further decentralisation and the center accepting a democratic route – in Yugoslavia failure to do so ultimately lead to several wars. 1 2 For the moment there are only the slightest of hints that things may get more radical if denied Pujol the General secretary of the governing Catalan party says \"There will be no way to avoid it. If we don't deliver it someone else will. More radical parties. But in a negotiation… it's not the best thing to reveal what you are going to do next\" so there is the possibility some factions of the independence movement turning to violence as Eta did in the Basque region if denied the democratic route. 3\n\n1 Stanic, Ana, ‘Catalunya and Spain: more than time for dialogue’, Open Democracy, 18 October 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ana-stanic/catalunya-and-spain-more-than-time-for-dialogue\n\n2 Basta, Karlo, ‘Reducing Catalonia’s autonomy as a reaction to the fiscal crisis would only provide more fuel for secession-minded nationalists’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 26 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/26/catalonia-autonomy-karlo-basta/\n\n3 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalan independence would lead to further break up of the Spanish state\n\nThe issue of Catalan independence does not just affect Catalonia but the whole of Spain. All the regions of Spain have strong regional identities and Catalan is merely most widely spoken regional language with the both the Basque region and Galicia in particular having their own languages. Therefore a Catalan bid for independence might prompt other regions to make a bid for independence too. Moreover Catalan is spoken in regions outside Catalonia so these regions could potentially decide they are better off with Catalonia than Spain. 1\n\nThe basques in particular, who have already turned to the political path from that of violent separatism, are likely to take inspiration to work towards peaceful independence if the Catalans succeed and are allowed a referendum. 2 If Catalonia is allowed to secede then why should the Basque region be any different?\n\n1 McCormick, Mark, ‘The languages of Spain – interactive’, guardian.co.uk, 19 January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jan/19/spain-languages-map-interactive\n\n2 Zabalo, Julen, ‘Basque nationalists are taking inspiration from Scotland and Northern Ireland by using politics as a vehicle for independence’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 25 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/25/basque-nationalism-julen-zabalo/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Spain is one indivisible nation\n\nThe Spanish constitution does not allow the holding of referendums on independence by Spanish regions. Spain is a single ‘demos’ made up of all the regions together rather than being separate and simply brought together under one banner. The Constitution says it “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. 1\n\nMoreover while referendums may be allowed for “political decisions of special importance” “The referendum shall be called by the King on the President of the Government's\n\nproposal after previous authorization by the Congress.” 2 So the calling of one is first up to the national government to decide one is needed and then requires the approval of the national parliament. In case that was not clear enough it is reiterated in section 149 on the role of the State and Regions “The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums.” 3\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Ibid, Section 92\n\n3 Ibid, section 149\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum The middle of a crisis is not the right time for divorce\n\nBoth Catalonia and Spain are in the middle of an economic crisis. Spain is considering a bail out by the European central bank and the prospect of losing 20% of its economy and the uncertainty while it happens would have an immense impact on the rest of the economy at a time when Spain already has unemployment of 23%. On the other side Catalonia’s regional government needs bailing out by Spain’s central government; it is seeking 5 billion Euros from a bailout fund set up by the Spanish government. Therefore while Catalonia may be the richest part of the Spanish economy but its government is missing its deficit targets. 1 It is therefore exactly the wrong time for Catalonia to be rocking the boat with a referendum on independence and the uncertainty this creates. Catalonia needs the Spanish government for its own bailout and the Spanish government needs stability if it is to avoid a bail out from the European Union and the conditions that are likely to come with such action.\n\n1 Tremlett, Giles, and Traynor, Ian, ‘Catalonia's €5bn plea brings Spanish bailout nearer”, The Guardian, 28 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/catalonias-plea-brings-spanish-bailout-nearer\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
88.3125
] |
[
84.1875,
84.4375,
84,
83.9375,
87.375,
85.375,
84.6875,
83.25,
83.4375,
83.5625,
83.125,
83.4375
] |
Catalonia will hold its own referendum regardless of Spain’s position
Catalonia is likely to go its own way and decide it should make its own decisions regardless of the rest of Spain’s views. Artur Mas Catalonia’s President says "If we can go ahead with a referendum because the government authorises it, it's better. If not, we should do it anyway". 1 So regardless of the Spanish position in his next four year term he will hold a referendum asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?” If Spain then does not back down about allowing this then there may well be a constitutional crisis. So far the Catalan option is simply to “internationalise the conflict we will have to go to Brussels to explain that they don't even let us consult with the people”. 2
Ultimately despite being within Spain so long as support for independence remains strong the Catalans probably have more cards to play; they provide more in taxes than they receive so could cut Madrid off, or in the final play they could unilaterally secede leaving Spain with the unpalatable option of either negotiating to get Catalonia back in, accepting, or invading.
1 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html
2 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Catalonia leader threatens to draw EU into independence row with Spain’, guardian.co.uk, 15 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/15/catalonia-leader-threat-independence-eu-spain
|
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Such a decision by the Catalan government would clearly be against the Spanish Constitution and therefore illegal. The constitution makes it “the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up” so such a move would invite a military response. Some members of the ruling PP party have already stated that the Guardia Civil should take over the Mossos (Catalan police). 1 There are also members of the army who would be willing to take such action, \"Catalan independence? Over my dead body and that of many soldiers\" says Colonel Francisco Aleman who also compared the crisis to the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. 2\n\n1 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n\n2 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n"
] |
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum This would be a very risky course to take; currently there is 51% support for independence and that could as well go up as down when given the opportunity. With both the Spanish and Catalan economies in crisis it is likely that such a referendum would only be bolstered by anger at the government due to the state of the economy. This might therefore be an option for Spain at some point in the future when the economy is back on its feet and so less of an issue but at the moment it would be waving goodbye to Spain as we know it.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Not getting your way in a democracy is not an excuse for turning to violence. Catalonia instead must attempt to persuade the other regions of Spain to allow a referendum or if it can’t then accept that the majority in Spain do not want Catalonian independence and respect their position. Violence will not help persuade the rest of Spain of its case; it did not for the Basques, and will not for Catalonia. So far the Catalan independence movement has recognised this with Lopez Tena the leader of the Catalan Solidarity for Independence party states “We would under no condition follow that [violent] path. That’s not how things are done in a democratic country.” 1\n\n1 Primor, Adar, ‘Catalan leader predicts independence in about two years, and close friendship with Israel’, Haaretz, 4 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/catalan-leader-predicts-independence-in-about-two-years-and-close-friendship-with-israel.premium-1.468285\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is far from clear whether self determination gives peoples the right to decide whether they should be independent. The Supreme Court of Canada has looked at this issue with reference to Quebec that has in the past argued for its right to self determination. The court argues “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” This is because such a right must fit in with the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. 1\n\n1 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do Para 126/7\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Section 2 of the constitution continues “it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 1 However it is not the constitution that is the problem blocking a referendum; rather it is the Spanish parliament. The government and parliament clearly could ask the King to allow a referendum on Catalan independence if it so wished. It should do so in order to prevent any more existential challenges to the constitution; constitutions have to be flexible if they are to survive the government is therefore wrong to treat it as a static unchanging document and justification for ruling out a referendum for Catalan independence. 2\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is not up to the Spanish state to choose when the Catalans should be able to have a referendum on independence. A time of crisis is as good as any; economic grievances are one of the main drivers in the desire for independence so it should come as no surprise that there is increase desire for a referendum when there is just such a crisis. Spain has already shown that it considers that there never has been and never will be a right time for a divorce. Even in the good times attempts to get an autonomy statute were met by challenges in the constitutional court which after years of deliberation watered down the agreement which had already been watered down by the Spanish Parliament. 1 More recently it was in large part the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister to consider a request to consider Catalonia the same way as the Basques and Navarra in terms of finances that triggered the current crisis. 2\n\n1 Pericay, Gaspar, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’, Catalan News Agency, 28 June 2010, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/the-spanish-constitutional-court-shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonom\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum For the most part this is simply being alarmists. However if other Spanish regions do wish to go their own way then all the arguments for why Catalonia should be allowed its own choice apply to them as well.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Control over Catalan destiny would reduce tensions and may help prevent independence\n\nFor Spain by far the biggest reason for allowing a referendum is that it may well be the best way of keeping Catalonia within Spain over the long term. So long as Spain says it will not allow a referendum or give the Catalans control over their own destiny the movement for Catalan independence is likely to get stronger as it can focus on the denial of democratic rights – Spain is waving a red flag to the bull. Allow a referendum, particularly if it has to be accompanied by a long period of campaigning for reflection and Catalans will have to agonise whether it is in their own best interests, 1 decide whether they want to damage their economy by having large companies such as Planeta the world’s largest Spanish language publishing business pulling out, 2 sever extensive links with Spain, and risk their membership of the European Union which Spain would veto. 3 If Spain were to offer as an alternative a new constitutional settlement that solves many of the grievances the Catalans have at the moment they might find they really want to remain within Spain, 4 much as many scots would prefer devo-max.\n\n1 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n\n2 Charlemagne, ‘Hostage to Catalonia’, The Economist, 5th October 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/10/spanish-politics\n\n3 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n4 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalans clearly want self determination\n\nEvery peoples has the right to self determination. This is enshrined in the UN Charter right at the start in Article 1 as a purpose of the United Nations “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and is also in other major international agreements. 1 Large numbers of states have been recognised since this principle of self determination was recognised by the world in 1945 a great many of them states that are less natural states in terms of size, economy, ethnicity or geography so it would be wrong to deny a right exercised by so many others from the Catalans. It is clear that the Catalans wish to exercise this right to decide their own destiny democratically through a referendum. When polled by the Catalan Survey Institute 74.1% said they would be in favour of organising a referendum with 19.9% against, the remaining 6% were undecided. 2\n\n1 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml\n\n2 Coll, Gaspar Pericay, ‘74% of Catalan citizens are in favour of holding an independence referendum in Catalonia’, Catalan News Agency, 10 October 2012, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/74-catalan-citizens-are-favour-holding-independence-referendum-catalonia\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum If a referendum is not allowed violence may be the result\n\nThe worst case scenario is one in which the Spanish government continues to deny the Catalan people the ability to decide for themselves democratically and peacefully then it is possible that eventually the result will be a change from a peaceful movement to a violent one. Some outside observers see parallels with the break up of Yugoslavia where the solution has to be further decentralisation and the center accepting a democratic route – in Yugoslavia failure to do so ultimately lead to several wars. 1 2 For the moment there are only the slightest of hints that things may get more radical if denied Pujol the General secretary of the governing Catalan party says \"There will be no way to avoid it. If we don't deliver it someone else will. More radical parties. But in a negotiation… it's not the best thing to reveal what you are going to do next\" so there is the possibility some factions of the independence movement turning to violence as Eta did in the Basque region if denied the democratic route. 3\n\n1 Stanic, Ana, ‘Catalunya and Spain: more than time for dialogue’, Open Democracy, 18 October 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ana-stanic/catalunya-and-spain-more-than-time-for-dialogue\n\n2 Basta, Karlo, ‘Reducing Catalonia’s autonomy as a reaction to the fiscal crisis would only provide more fuel for secession-minded nationalists’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 26 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/26/catalonia-autonomy-karlo-basta/\n\n3 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalan independence would lead to further break up of the Spanish state\n\nThe issue of Catalan independence does not just affect Catalonia but the whole of Spain. All the regions of Spain have strong regional identities and Catalan is merely most widely spoken regional language with the both the Basque region and Galicia in particular having their own languages. Therefore a Catalan bid for independence might prompt other regions to make a bid for independence too. Moreover Catalan is spoken in regions outside Catalonia so these regions could potentially decide they are better off with Catalonia than Spain. 1\n\nThe basques in particular, who have already turned to the political path from that of violent separatism, are likely to take inspiration to work towards peaceful independence if the Catalans succeed and are allowed a referendum. 2 If Catalonia is allowed to secede then why should the Basque region be any different?\n\n1 McCormick, Mark, ‘The languages of Spain – interactive’, guardian.co.uk, 19 January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jan/19/spain-languages-map-interactive\n\n2 Zabalo, Julen, ‘Basque nationalists are taking inspiration from Scotland and Northern Ireland by using politics as a vehicle for independence’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 25 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/25/basque-nationalism-julen-zabalo/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Spain is one indivisible nation\n\nThe Spanish constitution does not allow the holding of referendums on independence by Spanish regions. Spain is a single ‘demos’ made up of all the regions together rather than being separate and simply brought together under one banner. The Constitution says it “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. 1\n\nMoreover while referendums may be allowed for “political decisions of special importance” “The referendum shall be called by the King on the President of the Government's\n\nproposal after previous authorization by the Congress.” 2 So the calling of one is first up to the national government to decide one is needed and then requires the approval of the national parliament. In case that was not clear enough it is reiterated in section 149 on the role of the State and Regions “The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums.” 3\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Ibid, Section 92\n\n3 Ibid, section 149\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum The middle of a crisis is not the right time for divorce\n\nBoth Catalonia and Spain are in the middle of an economic crisis. Spain is considering a bail out by the European central bank and the prospect of losing 20% of its economy and the uncertainty while it happens would have an immense impact on the rest of the economy at a time when Spain already has unemployment of 23%. On the other side Catalonia’s regional government needs bailing out by Spain’s central government; it is seeking 5 billion Euros from a bailout fund set up by the Spanish government. Therefore while Catalonia may be the richest part of the Spanish economy but its government is missing its deficit targets. 1 It is therefore exactly the wrong time for Catalonia to be rocking the boat with a referendum on independence and the uncertainty this creates. Catalonia needs the Spanish government for its own bailout and the Spanish government needs stability if it is to avoid a bail out from the European Union and the conditions that are likely to come with such action.\n\n1 Tremlett, Giles, and Traynor, Ian, ‘Catalonia's €5bn plea brings Spanish bailout nearer”, The Guardian, 28 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/catalonias-plea-brings-spanish-bailout-nearer\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.625
] |
[
91.4375,
89.375,
86.5625,
85.5,
87,
87.4375,
86.125,
83.8125,
86,
84.5625,
86.75,
88.625
] |
Catalans clearly want self determination
Every peoples has the right to self determination. This is enshrined in the UN Charter right at the start in Article 1 as a purpose of the United Nations “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and is also in other major international agreements. 1 Large numbers of states have been recognised since this principle of self determination was recognised by the world in 1945 a great many of them states that are less natural states in terms of size, economy, ethnicity or geography so it would be wrong to deny a right exercised by so many others from the Catalans. It is clear that the Catalans wish to exercise this right to decide their own destiny democratically through a referendum. When polled by the Catalan Survey Institute 74.1% said they would be in favour of organising a referendum with 19.9% against, the remaining 6% were undecided. 2
1 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
2 Coll, Gaspar Pericay, ‘74% of Catalan citizens are in favour of holding an independence referendum in Catalonia’, Catalan News Agency, 10 October 2012, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/74-catalan-citizens-are-favour-holding-independence-referendum-catalonia
|
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is far from clear whether self determination gives peoples the right to decide whether they should be independent. The Supreme Court of Canada has looked at this issue with reference to Quebec that has in the past argued for its right to self determination. The court argues “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” This is because such a right must fit in with the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. 1\n\n1 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do Para 126/7\n"
] |
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum This would be a very risky course to take; currently there is 51% support for independence and that could as well go up as down when given the opportunity. With both the Spanish and Catalan economies in crisis it is likely that such a referendum would only be bolstered by anger at the government due to the state of the economy. This might therefore be an option for Spain at some point in the future when the economy is back on its feet and so less of an issue but at the moment it would be waving goodbye to Spain as we know it.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Not getting your way in a democracy is not an excuse for turning to violence. Catalonia instead must attempt to persuade the other regions of Spain to allow a referendum or if it can’t then accept that the majority in Spain do not want Catalonian independence and respect their position. Violence will not help persuade the rest of Spain of its case; it did not for the Basques, and will not for Catalonia. So far the Catalan independence movement has recognised this with Lopez Tena the leader of the Catalan Solidarity for Independence party states “We would under no condition follow that [violent] path. That’s not how things are done in a democratic country.” 1\n\n1 Primor, Adar, ‘Catalan leader predicts independence in about two years, and close friendship with Israel’, Haaretz, 4 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/catalan-leader-predicts-independence-in-about-two-years-and-close-friendship-with-israel.premium-1.468285\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Such a decision by the Catalan government would clearly be against the Spanish Constitution and therefore illegal. The constitution makes it “the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up” so such a move would invite a military response. Some members of the ruling PP party have already stated that the Guardia Civil should take over the Mossos (Catalan police). 1 There are also members of the army who would be willing to take such action, \"Catalan independence? Over my dead body and that of many soldiers\" says Colonel Francisco Aleman who also compared the crisis to the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. 2\n\n1 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n\n2 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Section 2 of the constitution continues “it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 1 However it is not the constitution that is the problem blocking a referendum; rather it is the Spanish parliament. The government and parliament clearly could ask the King to allow a referendum on Catalan independence if it so wished. It should do so in order to prevent any more existential challenges to the constitution; constitutions have to be flexible if they are to survive the government is therefore wrong to treat it as a static unchanging document and justification for ruling out a referendum for Catalan independence. 2\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is not up to the Spanish state to choose when the Catalans should be able to have a referendum on independence. A time of crisis is as good as any; economic grievances are one of the main drivers in the desire for independence so it should come as no surprise that there is increase desire for a referendum when there is just such a crisis. Spain has already shown that it considers that there never has been and never will be a right time for a divorce. Even in the good times attempts to get an autonomy statute were met by challenges in the constitutional court which after years of deliberation watered down the agreement which had already been watered down by the Spanish Parliament. 1 More recently it was in large part the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister to consider a request to consider Catalonia the same way as the Basques and Navarra in terms of finances that triggered the current crisis. 2\n\n1 Pericay, Gaspar, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’, Catalan News Agency, 28 June 2010, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/the-spanish-constitutional-court-shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonom\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum For the most part this is simply being alarmists. However if other Spanish regions do wish to go their own way then all the arguments for why Catalonia should be allowed its own choice apply to them as well.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Control over Catalan destiny would reduce tensions and may help prevent independence\n\nFor Spain by far the biggest reason for allowing a referendum is that it may well be the best way of keeping Catalonia within Spain over the long term. So long as Spain says it will not allow a referendum or give the Catalans control over their own destiny the movement for Catalan independence is likely to get stronger as it can focus on the denial of democratic rights – Spain is waving a red flag to the bull. Allow a referendum, particularly if it has to be accompanied by a long period of campaigning for reflection and Catalans will have to agonise whether it is in their own best interests, 1 decide whether they want to damage their economy by having large companies such as Planeta the world’s largest Spanish language publishing business pulling out, 2 sever extensive links with Spain, and risk their membership of the European Union which Spain would veto. 3 If Spain were to offer as an alternative a new constitutional settlement that solves many of the grievances the Catalans have at the moment they might find they really want to remain within Spain, 4 much as many scots would prefer devo-max.\n\n1 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n\n2 Charlemagne, ‘Hostage to Catalonia’, The Economist, 5th October 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/10/spanish-politics\n\n3 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n4 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalonia will hold its own referendum regardless of Spain’s position\n\nCatalonia is likely to go its own way and decide it should make its own decisions regardless of the rest of Spain’s views. Artur Mas Catalonia’s President says \"If we can go ahead with a referendum because the government authorises it, it's better. If not, we should do it anyway\". 1 So regardless of the Spanish position in his next four year term he will hold a referendum asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?” If Spain then does not back down about allowing this then there may well be a constitutional crisis. So far the Catalan option is simply to “internationalise the conflict we will have to go to Brussels to explain that they don't even let us consult with the people”. 2\n\nUltimately despite being within Spain so long as support for independence remains strong the Catalans probably have more cards to play; they provide more in taxes than they receive so could cut Madrid off, or in the final play they could unilaterally secede leaving Spain with the unpalatable option of either negotiating to get Catalonia back in, accepting, or invading.\n\n1 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n2 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Catalonia leader threatens to draw EU into independence row with Spain’, guardian.co.uk, 15 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/15/catalonia-leader-threat-independence-eu-spain\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum If a referendum is not allowed violence may be the result\n\nThe worst case scenario is one in which the Spanish government continues to deny the Catalan people the ability to decide for themselves democratically and peacefully then it is possible that eventually the result will be a change from a peaceful movement to a violent one. Some outside observers see parallels with the break up of Yugoslavia where the solution has to be further decentralisation and the center accepting a democratic route – in Yugoslavia failure to do so ultimately lead to several wars. 1 2 For the moment there are only the slightest of hints that things may get more radical if denied Pujol the General secretary of the governing Catalan party says \"There will be no way to avoid it. If we don't deliver it someone else will. More radical parties. But in a negotiation… it's not the best thing to reveal what you are going to do next\" so there is the possibility some factions of the independence movement turning to violence as Eta did in the Basque region if denied the democratic route. 3\n\n1 Stanic, Ana, ‘Catalunya and Spain: more than time for dialogue’, Open Democracy, 18 October 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ana-stanic/catalunya-and-spain-more-than-time-for-dialogue\n\n2 Basta, Karlo, ‘Reducing Catalonia’s autonomy as a reaction to the fiscal crisis would only provide more fuel for secession-minded nationalists’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 26 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/26/catalonia-autonomy-karlo-basta/\n\n3 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalan independence would lead to further break up of the Spanish state\n\nThe issue of Catalan independence does not just affect Catalonia but the whole of Spain. All the regions of Spain have strong regional identities and Catalan is merely most widely spoken regional language with the both the Basque region and Galicia in particular having their own languages. Therefore a Catalan bid for independence might prompt other regions to make a bid for independence too. Moreover Catalan is spoken in regions outside Catalonia so these regions could potentially decide they are better off with Catalonia than Spain. 1\n\nThe basques in particular, who have already turned to the political path from that of violent separatism, are likely to take inspiration to work towards peaceful independence if the Catalans succeed and are allowed a referendum. 2 If Catalonia is allowed to secede then why should the Basque region be any different?\n\n1 McCormick, Mark, ‘The languages of Spain – interactive’, guardian.co.uk, 19 January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jan/19/spain-languages-map-interactive\n\n2 Zabalo, Julen, ‘Basque nationalists are taking inspiration from Scotland and Northern Ireland by using politics as a vehicle for independence’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 25 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/25/basque-nationalism-julen-zabalo/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Spain is one indivisible nation\n\nThe Spanish constitution does not allow the holding of referendums on independence by Spanish regions. Spain is a single ‘demos’ made up of all the regions together rather than being separate and simply brought together under one banner. The Constitution says it “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. 1\n\nMoreover while referendums may be allowed for “political decisions of special importance” “The referendum shall be called by the King on the President of the Government's\n\nproposal after previous authorization by the Congress.” 2 So the calling of one is first up to the national government to decide one is needed and then requires the approval of the national parliament. In case that was not clear enough it is reiterated in section 149 on the role of the State and Regions “The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums.” 3\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Ibid, Section 92\n\n3 Ibid, section 149\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum The middle of a crisis is not the right time for divorce\n\nBoth Catalonia and Spain are in the middle of an economic crisis. Spain is considering a bail out by the European central bank and the prospect of losing 20% of its economy and the uncertainty while it happens would have an immense impact on the rest of the economy at a time when Spain already has unemployment of 23%. On the other side Catalonia’s regional government needs bailing out by Spain’s central government; it is seeking 5 billion Euros from a bailout fund set up by the Spanish government. Therefore while Catalonia may be the richest part of the Spanish economy but its government is missing its deficit targets. 1 It is therefore exactly the wrong time for Catalonia to be rocking the boat with a referendum on independence and the uncertainty this creates. Catalonia needs the Spanish government for its own bailout and the Spanish government needs stability if it is to avoid a bail out from the European Union and the conditions that are likely to come with such action.\n\n1 Tremlett, Giles, and Traynor, Ian, ‘Catalonia's €5bn plea brings Spanish bailout nearer”, The Guardian, 28 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/catalonias-plea-brings-spanish-bailout-nearer\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.3125
] |
[
90.1875,
87.125,
88.375,
84.5625,
87.875,
86.0625,
86.125,
83.6875,
84.25,
83.9375,
86.4375,
86.25
] |
If a referendum is not allowed violence may be the result
The worst case scenario is one in which the Spanish government continues to deny the Catalan people the ability to decide for themselves democratically and peacefully then it is possible that eventually the result will be a change from a peaceful movement to a violent one. Some outside observers see parallels with the break up of Yugoslavia where the solution has to be further decentralisation and the center accepting a democratic route – in Yugoslavia failure to do so ultimately lead to several wars. 1 2 For the moment there are only the slightest of hints that things may get more radical if denied Pujol the General secretary of the governing Catalan party says "There will be no way to avoid it. If we don't deliver it someone else will. More radical parties. But in a negotiation… it's not the best thing to reveal what you are going to do next" so there is the possibility some factions of the independence movement turning to violence as Eta did in the Basque region if denied the democratic route. 3
1 Stanic, Ana, ‘Catalunya and Spain: more than time for dialogue’, Open Democracy, 18 October 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ana-stanic/catalunya-and-spain-more-than-time-for-dialogue
2 Basta, Karlo, ‘Reducing Catalonia’s autonomy as a reaction to the fiscal crisis would only provide more fuel for secession-minded nationalists’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 26 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/26/catalonia-autonomy-karlo-basta/
3 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252
|
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Not getting your way in a democracy is not an excuse for turning to violence. Catalonia instead must attempt to persuade the other regions of Spain to allow a referendum or if it can’t then accept that the majority in Spain do not want Catalonian independence and respect their position. Violence will not help persuade the rest of Spain of its case; it did not for the Basques, and will not for Catalonia. So far the Catalan independence movement has recognised this with Lopez Tena the leader of the Catalan Solidarity for Independence party states “We would under no condition follow that [violent] path. That’s not how things are done in a democratic country.” 1\n\n1 Primor, Adar, ‘Catalan leader predicts independence in about two years, and close friendship with Israel’, Haaretz, 4 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/catalan-leader-predicts-independence-in-about-two-years-and-close-friendship-with-israel.premium-1.468285\n"
] |
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum This would be a very risky course to take; currently there is 51% support for independence and that could as well go up as down when given the opportunity. With both the Spanish and Catalan economies in crisis it is likely that such a referendum would only be bolstered by anger at the government due to the state of the economy. This might therefore be an option for Spain at some point in the future when the economy is back on its feet and so less of an issue but at the moment it would be waving goodbye to Spain as we know it.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Such a decision by the Catalan government would clearly be against the Spanish Constitution and therefore illegal. The constitution makes it “the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up” so such a move would invite a military response. Some members of the ruling PP party have already stated that the Guardia Civil should take over the Mossos (Catalan police). 1 There are also members of the army who would be willing to take such action, \"Catalan independence? Over my dead body and that of many soldiers\" says Colonel Francisco Aleman who also compared the crisis to the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. 2\n\n1 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n\n2 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is far from clear whether self determination gives peoples the right to decide whether they should be independent. The Supreme Court of Canada has looked at this issue with reference to Quebec that has in the past argued for its right to self determination. The court argues “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” This is because such a right must fit in with the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. 1\n\n1 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do Para 126/7\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Section 2 of the constitution continues “it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 1 However it is not the constitution that is the problem blocking a referendum; rather it is the Spanish parliament. The government and parliament clearly could ask the King to allow a referendum on Catalan independence if it so wished. It should do so in order to prevent any more existential challenges to the constitution; constitutions have to be flexible if they are to survive the government is therefore wrong to treat it as a static unchanging document and justification for ruling out a referendum for Catalan independence. 2\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is not up to the Spanish state to choose when the Catalans should be able to have a referendum on independence. A time of crisis is as good as any; economic grievances are one of the main drivers in the desire for independence so it should come as no surprise that there is increase desire for a referendum when there is just such a crisis. Spain has already shown that it considers that there never has been and never will be a right time for a divorce. Even in the good times attempts to get an autonomy statute were met by challenges in the constitutional court which after years of deliberation watered down the agreement which had already been watered down by the Spanish Parliament. 1 More recently it was in large part the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister to consider a request to consider Catalonia the same way as the Basques and Navarra in terms of finances that triggered the current crisis. 2\n\n1 Pericay, Gaspar, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’, Catalan News Agency, 28 June 2010, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/the-spanish-constitutional-court-shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonom\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum For the most part this is simply being alarmists. However if other Spanish regions do wish to go their own way then all the arguments for why Catalonia should be allowed its own choice apply to them as well.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Control over Catalan destiny would reduce tensions and may help prevent independence\n\nFor Spain by far the biggest reason for allowing a referendum is that it may well be the best way of keeping Catalonia within Spain over the long term. So long as Spain says it will not allow a referendum or give the Catalans control over their own destiny the movement for Catalan independence is likely to get stronger as it can focus on the denial of democratic rights – Spain is waving a red flag to the bull. Allow a referendum, particularly if it has to be accompanied by a long period of campaigning for reflection and Catalans will have to agonise whether it is in their own best interests, 1 decide whether they want to damage their economy by having large companies such as Planeta the world’s largest Spanish language publishing business pulling out, 2 sever extensive links with Spain, and risk their membership of the European Union which Spain would veto. 3 If Spain were to offer as an alternative a new constitutional settlement that solves many of the grievances the Catalans have at the moment they might find they really want to remain within Spain, 4 much as many scots would prefer devo-max.\n\n1 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n\n2 Charlemagne, ‘Hostage to Catalonia’, The Economist, 5th October 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/10/spanish-politics\n\n3 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n4 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalonia will hold its own referendum regardless of Spain’s position\n\nCatalonia is likely to go its own way and decide it should make its own decisions regardless of the rest of Spain’s views. Artur Mas Catalonia’s President says \"If we can go ahead with a referendum because the government authorises it, it's better. If not, we should do it anyway\". 1 So regardless of the Spanish position in his next four year term he will hold a referendum asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?” If Spain then does not back down about allowing this then there may well be a constitutional crisis. So far the Catalan option is simply to “internationalise the conflict we will have to go to Brussels to explain that they don't even let us consult with the people”. 2\n\nUltimately despite being within Spain so long as support for independence remains strong the Catalans probably have more cards to play; they provide more in taxes than they receive so could cut Madrid off, or in the final play they could unilaterally secede leaving Spain with the unpalatable option of either negotiating to get Catalonia back in, accepting, or invading.\n\n1 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n2 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Catalonia leader threatens to draw EU into independence row with Spain’, guardian.co.uk, 15 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/15/catalonia-leader-threat-independence-eu-spain\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalans clearly want self determination\n\nEvery peoples has the right to self determination. This is enshrined in the UN Charter right at the start in Article 1 as a purpose of the United Nations “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and is also in other major international agreements. 1 Large numbers of states have been recognised since this principle of self determination was recognised by the world in 1945 a great many of them states that are less natural states in terms of size, economy, ethnicity or geography so it would be wrong to deny a right exercised by so many others from the Catalans. It is clear that the Catalans wish to exercise this right to decide their own destiny democratically through a referendum. When polled by the Catalan Survey Institute 74.1% said they would be in favour of organising a referendum with 19.9% against, the remaining 6% were undecided. 2\n\n1 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml\n\n2 Coll, Gaspar Pericay, ‘74% of Catalan citizens are in favour of holding an independence referendum in Catalonia’, Catalan News Agency, 10 October 2012, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/74-catalan-citizens-are-favour-holding-independence-referendum-catalonia\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalan independence would lead to further break up of the Spanish state\n\nThe issue of Catalan independence does not just affect Catalonia but the whole of Spain. All the regions of Spain have strong regional identities and Catalan is merely most widely spoken regional language with the both the Basque region and Galicia in particular having their own languages. Therefore a Catalan bid for independence might prompt other regions to make a bid for independence too. Moreover Catalan is spoken in regions outside Catalonia so these regions could potentially decide they are better off with Catalonia than Spain. 1\n\nThe basques in particular, who have already turned to the political path from that of violent separatism, are likely to take inspiration to work towards peaceful independence if the Catalans succeed and are allowed a referendum. 2 If Catalonia is allowed to secede then why should the Basque region be any different?\n\n1 McCormick, Mark, ‘The languages of Spain – interactive’, guardian.co.uk, 19 January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jan/19/spain-languages-map-interactive\n\n2 Zabalo, Julen, ‘Basque nationalists are taking inspiration from Scotland and Northern Ireland by using politics as a vehicle for independence’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 25 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/25/basque-nationalism-julen-zabalo/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Spain is one indivisible nation\n\nThe Spanish constitution does not allow the holding of referendums on independence by Spanish regions. Spain is a single ‘demos’ made up of all the regions together rather than being separate and simply brought together under one banner. The Constitution says it “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. 1\n\nMoreover while referendums may be allowed for “political decisions of special importance” “The referendum shall be called by the King on the President of the Government's\n\nproposal after previous authorization by the Congress.” 2 So the calling of one is first up to the national government to decide one is needed and then requires the approval of the national parliament. In case that was not clear enough it is reiterated in section 149 on the role of the State and Regions “The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums.” 3\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Ibid, Section 92\n\n3 Ibid, section 149\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum The middle of a crisis is not the right time for divorce\n\nBoth Catalonia and Spain are in the middle of an economic crisis. Spain is considering a bail out by the European central bank and the prospect of losing 20% of its economy and the uncertainty while it happens would have an immense impact on the rest of the economy at a time when Spain already has unemployment of 23%. On the other side Catalonia’s regional government needs bailing out by Spain’s central government; it is seeking 5 billion Euros from a bailout fund set up by the Spanish government. Therefore while Catalonia may be the richest part of the Spanish economy but its government is missing its deficit targets. 1 It is therefore exactly the wrong time for Catalonia to be rocking the boat with a referendum on independence and the uncertainty this creates. Catalonia needs the Spanish government for its own bailout and the Spanish government needs stability if it is to avoid a bail out from the European Union and the conditions that are likely to come with such action.\n\n1 Tremlett, Giles, and Traynor, Ian, ‘Catalonia's €5bn plea brings Spanish bailout nearer”, The Guardian, 28 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/catalonias-plea-brings-spanish-bailout-nearer\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.25
] |
[
84.8125,
86.5625,
83.875,
84.1875,
84.125,
84.875,
83.5625,
83.6875,
82.9375,
83.9375,
83.5,
83.125
] |
Catalan independence would lead to further break up of the Spanish state
The issue of Catalan independence does not just affect Catalonia but the whole of Spain. All the regions of Spain have strong regional identities and Catalan is merely most widely spoken regional language with the both the Basque region and Galicia in particular having their own languages. Therefore a Catalan bid for independence might prompt other regions to make a bid for independence too. Moreover Catalan is spoken in regions outside Catalonia so these regions could potentially decide they are better off with Catalonia than Spain. 1
The basques in particular, who have already turned to the political path from that of violent separatism, are likely to take inspiration to work towards peaceful independence if the Catalans succeed and are allowed a referendum. 2 If Catalonia is allowed to secede then why should the Basque region be any different?
1 McCormick, Mark, ‘The languages of Spain – interactive’, guardian.co.uk, 19 January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jan/19/spain-languages-map-interactive
2 Zabalo, Julen, ‘Basque nationalists are taking inspiration from Scotland and Northern Ireland by using politics as a vehicle for independence’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 25 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/25/basque-nationalism-julen-zabalo/
|
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum For the most part this is simply being alarmists. However if other Spanish regions do wish to go their own way then all the arguments for why Catalonia should be allowed its own choice apply to them as well.\n"
] |
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Section 2 of the constitution continues “it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 1 However it is not the constitution that is the problem blocking a referendum; rather it is the Spanish parliament. The government and parliament clearly could ask the King to allow a referendum on Catalan independence if it so wished. It should do so in order to prevent any more existential challenges to the constitution; constitutions have to be flexible if they are to survive the government is therefore wrong to treat it as a static unchanging document and justification for ruling out a referendum for Catalan independence. 2\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is not up to the Spanish state to choose when the Catalans should be able to have a referendum on independence. A time of crisis is as good as any; economic grievances are one of the main drivers in the desire for independence so it should come as no surprise that there is increase desire for a referendum when there is just such a crisis. Spain has already shown that it considers that there never has been and never will be a right time for a divorce. Even in the good times attempts to get an autonomy statute were met by challenges in the constitutional court which after years of deliberation watered down the agreement which had already been watered down by the Spanish Parliament. 1 More recently it was in large part the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister to consider a request to consider Catalonia the same way as the Basques and Navarra in terms of finances that triggered the current crisis. 2\n\n1 Pericay, Gaspar, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’, Catalan News Agency, 28 June 2010, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/the-spanish-constitutional-court-shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonom\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum This would be a very risky course to take; currently there is 51% support for independence and that could as well go up as down when given the opportunity. With both the Spanish and Catalan economies in crisis it is likely that such a referendum would only be bolstered by anger at the government due to the state of the economy. This might therefore be an option for Spain at some point in the future when the economy is back on its feet and so less of an issue but at the moment it would be waving goodbye to Spain as we know it.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Not getting your way in a democracy is not an excuse for turning to violence. Catalonia instead must attempt to persuade the other regions of Spain to allow a referendum or if it can’t then accept that the majority in Spain do not want Catalonian independence and respect their position. Violence will not help persuade the rest of Spain of its case; it did not for the Basques, and will not for Catalonia. So far the Catalan independence movement has recognised this with Lopez Tena the leader of the Catalan Solidarity for Independence party states “We would under no condition follow that [violent] path. That’s not how things are done in a democratic country.” 1\n\n1 Primor, Adar, ‘Catalan leader predicts independence in about two years, and close friendship with Israel’, Haaretz, 4 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/catalan-leader-predicts-independence-in-about-two-years-and-close-friendship-with-israel.premium-1.468285\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Such a decision by the Catalan government would clearly be against the Spanish Constitution and therefore illegal. The constitution makes it “the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up” so such a move would invite a military response. Some members of the ruling PP party have already stated that the Guardia Civil should take over the Mossos (Catalan police). 1 There are also members of the army who would be willing to take such action, \"Catalan independence? Over my dead body and that of many soldiers\" says Colonel Francisco Aleman who also compared the crisis to the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. 2\n\n1 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n\n2 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is far from clear whether self determination gives peoples the right to decide whether they should be independent. The Supreme Court of Canada has looked at this issue with reference to Quebec that has in the past argued for its right to self determination. The court argues “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” This is because such a right must fit in with the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. 1\n\n1 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do Para 126/7\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Spain is one indivisible nation\n\nThe Spanish constitution does not allow the holding of referendums on independence by Spanish regions. Spain is a single ‘demos’ made up of all the regions together rather than being separate and simply brought together under one banner. The Constitution says it “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. 1\n\nMoreover while referendums may be allowed for “political decisions of special importance” “The referendum shall be called by the King on the President of the Government's\n\nproposal after previous authorization by the Congress.” 2 So the calling of one is first up to the national government to decide one is needed and then requires the approval of the national parliament. In case that was not clear enough it is reiterated in section 149 on the role of the State and Regions “The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums.” 3\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Ibid, Section 92\n\n3 Ibid, section 149\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum The middle of a crisis is not the right time for divorce\n\nBoth Catalonia and Spain are in the middle of an economic crisis. Spain is considering a bail out by the European central bank and the prospect of losing 20% of its economy and the uncertainty while it happens would have an immense impact on the rest of the economy at a time when Spain already has unemployment of 23%. On the other side Catalonia’s regional government needs bailing out by Spain’s central government; it is seeking 5 billion Euros from a bailout fund set up by the Spanish government. Therefore while Catalonia may be the richest part of the Spanish economy but its government is missing its deficit targets. 1 It is therefore exactly the wrong time for Catalonia to be rocking the boat with a referendum on independence and the uncertainty this creates. Catalonia needs the Spanish government for its own bailout and the Spanish government needs stability if it is to avoid a bail out from the European Union and the conditions that are likely to come with such action.\n\n1 Tremlett, Giles, and Traynor, Ian, ‘Catalonia's €5bn plea brings Spanish bailout nearer”, The Guardian, 28 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/catalonias-plea-brings-spanish-bailout-nearer\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Control over Catalan destiny would reduce tensions and may help prevent independence\n\nFor Spain by far the biggest reason for allowing a referendum is that it may well be the best way of keeping Catalonia within Spain over the long term. So long as Spain says it will not allow a referendum or give the Catalans control over their own destiny the movement for Catalan independence is likely to get stronger as it can focus on the denial of democratic rights – Spain is waving a red flag to the bull. Allow a referendum, particularly if it has to be accompanied by a long period of campaigning for reflection and Catalans will have to agonise whether it is in their own best interests, 1 decide whether they want to damage their economy by having large companies such as Planeta the world’s largest Spanish language publishing business pulling out, 2 sever extensive links with Spain, and risk their membership of the European Union which Spain would veto. 3 If Spain were to offer as an alternative a new constitutional settlement that solves many of the grievances the Catalans have at the moment they might find they really want to remain within Spain, 4 much as many scots would prefer devo-max.\n\n1 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n\n2 Charlemagne, ‘Hostage to Catalonia’, The Economist, 5th October 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/10/spanish-politics\n\n3 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n4 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalonia will hold its own referendum regardless of Spain’s position\n\nCatalonia is likely to go its own way and decide it should make its own decisions regardless of the rest of Spain’s views. Artur Mas Catalonia’s President says \"If we can go ahead with a referendum because the government authorises it, it's better. If not, we should do it anyway\". 1 So regardless of the Spanish position in his next four year term he will hold a referendum asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?” If Spain then does not back down about allowing this then there may well be a constitutional crisis. So far the Catalan option is simply to “internationalise the conflict we will have to go to Brussels to explain that they don't even let us consult with the people”. 2\n\nUltimately despite being within Spain so long as support for independence remains strong the Catalans probably have more cards to play; they provide more in taxes than they receive so could cut Madrid off, or in the final play they could unilaterally secede leaving Spain with the unpalatable option of either negotiating to get Catalonia back in, accepting, or invading.\n\n1 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n2 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Catalonia leader threatens to draw EU into independence row with Spain’, guardian.co.uk, 15 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/15/catalonia-leader-threat-independence-eu-spain\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalans clearly want self determination\n\nEvery peoples has the right to self determination. This is enshrined in the UN Charter right at the start in Article 1 as a purpose of the United Nations “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and is also in other major international agreements. 1 Large numbers of states have been recognised since this principle of self determination was recognised by the world in 1945 a great many of them states that are less natural states in terms of size, economy, ethnicity or geography so it would be wrong to deny a right exercised by so many others from the Catalans. It is clear that the Catalans wish to exercise this right to decide their own destiny democratically through a referendum. When polled by the Catalan Survey Institute 74.1% said they would be in favour of organising a referendum with 19.9% against, the remaining 6% were undecided. 2\n\n1 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml\n\n2 Coll, Gaspar Pericay, ‘74% of Catalan citizens are in favour of holding an independence referendum in Catalonia’, Catalan News Agency, 10 October 2012, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/74-catalan-citizens-are-favour-holding-independence-referendum-catalonia\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum If a referendum is not allowed violence may be the result\n\nThe worst case scenario is one in which the Spanish government continues to deny the Catalan people the ability to decide for themselves democratically and peacefully then it is possible that eventually the result will be a change from a peaceful movement to a violent one. Some outside observers see parallels with the break up of Yugoslavia where the solution has to be further decentralisation and the center accepting a democratic route – in Yugoslavia failure to do so ultimately lead to several wars. 1 2 For the moment there are only the slightest of hints that things may get more radical if denied Pujol the General secretary of the governing Catalan party says \"There will be no way to avoid it. If we don't deliver it someone else will. More radical parties. But in a negotiation… it's not the best thing to reveal what you are going to do next\" so there is the possibility some factions of the independence movement turning to violence as Eta did in the Basque region if denied the democratic route. 3\n\n1 Stanic, Ana, ‘Catalunya and Spain: more than time for dialogue’, Open Democracy, 18 October 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ana-stanic/catalunya-and-spain-more-than-time-for-dialogue\n\n2 Basta, Karlo, ‘Reducing Catalonia’s autonomy as a reaction to the fiscal crisis would only provide more fuel for secession-minded nationalists’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 26 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/26/catalonia-autonomy-karlo-basta/\n\n3 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.4375
] |
[
84.1875,
86.0625,
85.3125,
85.8125,
84.375,
83.9375,
83.4375,
82.6875,
83.6875,
84.5,
82.4375,
83.75
] |
Spain is one indivisible nation
The Spanish constitution does not allow the holding of referendums on independence by Spanish regions. Spain is a single ‘demos’ made up of all the regions together rather than being separate and simply brought together under one banner. The Constitution says it “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. 1
Moreover while referendums may be allowed for “political decisions of special importance” “The referendum shall be called by the King on the President of the Government's
proposal after previous authorization by the Congress.” 2 So the calling of one is first up to the national government to decide one is needed and then requires the approval of the national parliament. In case that was not clear enough it is reiterated in section 149 on the role of the State and Regions “The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums.” 3
1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2
2 Ibid, Section 92
3 Ibid, section 149
|
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Section 2 of the constitution continues “it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 1 However it is not the constitution that is the problem blocking a referendum; rather it is the Spanish parliament. The government and parliament clearly could ask the King to allow a referendum on Catalan independence if it so wished. It should do so in order to prevent any more existential challenges to the constitution; constitutions have to be flexible if they are to survive the government is therefore wrong to treat it as a static unchanging document and justification for ruling out a referendum for Catalan independence. 2\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n"
] |
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is not up to the Spanish state to choose when the Catalans should be able to have a referendum on independence. A time of crisis is as good as any; economic grievances are one of the main drivers in the desire for independence so it should come as no surprise that there is increase desire for a referendum when there is just such a crisis. Spain has already shown that it considers that there never has been and never will be a right time for a divorce. Even in the good times attempts to get an autonomy statute were met by challenges in the constitutional court which after years of deliberation watered down the agreement which had already been watered down by the Spanish Parliament. 1 More recently it was in large part the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister to consider a request to consider Catalonia the same way as the Basques and Navarra in terms of finances that triggered the current crisis. 2\n\n1 Pericay, Gaspar, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’, Catalan News Agency, 28 June 2010, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/the-spanish-constitutional-court-shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonom\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum For the most part this is simply being alarmists. However if other Spanish regions do wish to go their own way then all the arguments for why Catalonia should be allowed its own choice apply to them as well.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum This would be a very risky course to take; currently there is 51% support for independence and that could as well go up as down when given the opportunity. With both the Spanish and Catalan economies in crisis it is likely that such a referendum would only be bolstered by anger at the government due to the state of the economy. This might therefore be an option for Spain at some point in the future when the economy is back on its feet and so less of an issue but at the moment it would be waving goodbye to Spain as we know it.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Not getting your way in a democracy is not an excuse for turning to violence. Catalonia instead must attempt to persuade the other regions of Spain to allow a referendum or if it can’t then accept that the majority in Spain do not want Catalonian independence and respect their position. Violence will not help persuade the rest of Spain of its case; it did not for the Basques, and will not for Catalonia. So far the Catalan independence movement has recognised this with Lopez Tena the leader of the Catalan Solidarity for Independence party states “We would under no condition follow that [violent] path. That’s not how things are done in a democratic country.” 1\n\n1 Primor, Adar, ‘Catalan leader predicts independence in about two years, and close friendship with Israel’, Haaretz, 4 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/catalan-leader-predicts-independence-in-about-two-years-and-close-friendship-with-israel.premium-1.468285\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Such a decision by the Catalan government would clearly be against the Spanish Constitution and therefore illegal. The constitution makes it “the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up” so such a move would invite a military response. Some members of the ruling PP party have already stated that the Guardia Civil should take over the Mossos (Catalan police). 1 There are also members of the army who would be willing to take such action, \"Catalan independence? Over my dead body and that of many soldiers\" says Colonel Francisco Aleman who also compared the crisis to the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. 2\n\n1 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n\n2 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is far from clear whether self determination gives peoples the right to decide whether they should be independent. The Supreme Court of Canada has looked at this issue with reference to Quebec that has in the past argued for its right to self determination. The court argues “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” This is because such a right must fit in with the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. 1\n\n1 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do Para 126/7\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalan independence would lead to further break up of the Spanish state\n\nThe issue of Catalan independence does not just affect Catalonia but the whole of Spain. All the regions of Spain have strong regional identities and Catalan is merely most widely spoken regional language with the both the Basque region and Galicia in particular having their own languages. Therefore a Catalan bid for independence might prompt other regions to make a bid for independence too. Moreover Catalan is spoken in regions outside Catalonia so these regions could potentially decide they are better off with Catalonia than Spain. 1\n\nThe basques in particular, who have already turned to the political path from that of violent separatism, are likely to take inspiration to work towards peaceful independence if the Catalans succeed and are allowed a referendum. 2 If Catalonia is allowed to secede then why should the Basque region be any different?\n\n1 McCormick, Mark, ‘The languages of Spain – interactive’, guardian.co.uk, 19 January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jan/19/spain-languages-map-interactive\n\n2 Zabalo, Julen, ‘Basque nationalists are taking inspiration from Scotland and Northern Ireland by using politics as a vehicle for independence’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 25 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/25/basque-nationalism-julen-zabalo/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum The middle of a crisis is not the right time for divorce\n\nBoth Catalonia and Spain are in the middle of an economic crisis. Spain is considering a bail out by the European central bank and the prospect of losing 20% of its economy and the uncertainty while it happens would have an immense impact on the rest of the economy at a time when Spain already has unemployment of 23%. On the other side Catalonia’s regional government needs bailing out by Spain’s central government; it is seeking 5 billion Euros from a bailout fund set up by the Spanish government. Therefore while Catalonia may be the richest part of the Spanish economy but its government is missing its deficit targets. 1 It is therefore exactly the wrong time for Catalonia to be rocking the boat with a referendum on independence and the uncertainty this creates. Catalonia needs the Spanish government for its own bailout and the Spanish government needs stability if it is to avoid a bail out from the European Union and the conditions that are likely to come with such action.\n\n1 Tremlett, Giles, and Traynor, Ian, ‘Catalonia's €5bn plea brings Spanish bailout nearer”, The Guardian, 28 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/catalonias-plea-brings-spanish-bailout-nearer\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Control over Catalan destiny would reduce tensions and may help prevent independence\n\nFor Spain by far the biggest reason for allowing a referendum is that it may well be the best way of keeping Catalonia within Spain over the long term. So long as Spain says it will not allow a referendum or give the Catalans control over their own destiny the movement for Catalan independence is likely to get stronger as it can focus on the denial of democratic rights – Spain is waving a red flag to the bull. Allow a referendum, particularly if it has to be accompanied by a long period of campaigning for reflection and Catalans will have to agonise whether it is in their own best interests, 1 decide whether they want to damage their economy by having large companies such as Planeta the world’s largest Spanish language publishing business pulling out, 2 sever extensive links with Spain, and risk their membership of the European Union which Spain would veto. 3 If Spain were to offer as an alternative a new constitutional settlement that solves many of the grievances the Catalans have at the moment they might find they really want to remain within Spain, 4 much as many scots would prefer devo-max.\n\n1 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n\n2 Charlemagne, ‘Hostage to Catalonia’, The Economist, 5th October 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/10/spanish-politics\n\n3 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n4 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalonia will hold its own referendum regardless of Spain’s position\n\nCatalonia is likely to go its own way and decide it should make its own decisions regardless of the rest of Spain’s views. Artur Mas Catalonia’s President says \"If we can go ahead with a referendum because the government authorises it, it's better. If not, we should do it anyway\". 1 So regardless of the Spanish position in his next four year term he will hold a referendum asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?” If Spain then does not back down about allowing this then there may well be a constitutional crisis. So far the Catalan option is simply to “internationalise the conflict we will have to go to Brussels to explain that they don't even let us consult with the people”. 2\n\nUltimately despite being within Spain so long as support for independence remains strong the Catalans probably have more cards to play; they provide more in taxes than they receive so could cut Madrid off, or in the final play they could unilaterally secede leaving Spain with the unpalatable option of either negotiating to get Catalonia back in, accepting, or invading.\n\n1 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n2 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Catalonia leader threatens to draw EU into independence row with Spain’, guardian.co.uk, 15 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/15/catalonia-leader-threat-independence-eu-spain\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalans clearly want self determination\n\nEvery peoples has the right to self determination. This is enshrined in the UN Charter right at the start in Article 1 as a purpose of the United Nations “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and is also in other major international agreements. 1 Large numbers of states have been recognised since this principle of self determination was recognised by the world in 1945 a great many of them states that are less natural states in terms of size, economy, ethnicity or geography so it would be wrong to deny a right exercised by so many others from the Catalans. It is clear that the Catalans wish to exercise this right to decide their own destiny democratically through a referendum. When polled by the Catalan Survey Institute 74.1% said they would be in favour of organising a referendum with 19.9% against, the remaining 6% were undecided. 2\n\n1 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml\n\n2 Coll, Gaspar Pericay, ‘74% of Catalan citizens are in favour of holding an independence referendum in Catalonia’, Catalan News Agency, 10 October 2012, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/74-catalan-citizens-are-favour-holding-independence-referendum-catalonia\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum If a referendum is not allowed violence may be the result\n\nThe worst case scenario is one in which the Spanish government continues to deny the Catalan people the ability to decide for themselves democratically and peacefully then it is possible that eventually the result will be a change from a peaceful movement to a violent one. Some outside observers see parallels with the break up of Yugoslavia where the solution has to be further decentralisation and the center accepting a democratic route – in Yugoslavia failure to do so ultimately lead to several wars. 1 2 For the moment there are only the slightest of hints that things may get more radical if denied Pujol the General secretary of the governing Catalan party says \"There will be no way to avoid it. If we don't deliver it someone else will. More radical parties. But in a negotiation… it's not the best thing to reveal what you are going to do next\" so there is the possibility some factions of the independence movement turning to violence as Eta did in the Basque region if denied the democratic route. 3\n\n1 Stanic, Ana, ‘Catalunya and Spain: more than time for dialogue’, Open Democracy, 18 October 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ana-stanic/catalunya-and-spain-more-than-time-for-dialogue\n\n2 Basta, Karlo, ‘Reducing Catalonia’s autonomy as a reaction to the fiscal crisis would only provide more fuel for secession-minded nationalists’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 26 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/26/catalonia-autonomy-karlo-basta/\n\n3 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.0625
] |
[
90.6875,
89.5,
87.375,
84.5,
85.75,
84.4375,
83.5625,
83.125,
84.625,
87.6875,
85.125,
85
] |
The middle of a crisis is not the right time for divorce
Both Catalonia and Spain are in the middle of an economic crisis. Spain is considering a bail out by the European central bank and the prospect of losing 20% of its economy and the uncertainty while it happens would have an immense impact on the rest of the economy at a time when Spain already has unemployment of 23%. On the other side Catalonia’s regional government needs bailing out by Spain’s central government; it is seeking 5 billion Euros from a bailout fund set up by the Spanish government. Therefore while Catalonia may be the richest part of the Spanish economy but its government is missing its deficit targets. 1 It is therefore exactly the wrong time for Catalonia to be rocking the boat with a referendum on independence and the uncertainty this creates. Catalonia needs the Spanish government for its own bailout and the Spanish government needs stability if it is to avoid a bail out from the European Union and the conditions that are likely to come with such action.
1 Tremlett, Giles, and Traynor, Ian, ‘Catalonia's €5bn plea brings Spanish bailout nearer”, The Guardian, 28 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/catalonias-plea-brings-spanish-bailout-nearer
|
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is not up to the Spanish state to choose when the Catalans should be able to have a referendum on independence. A time of crisis is as good as any; economic grievances are one of the main drivers in the desire for independence so it should come as no surprise that there is increase desire for a referendum when there is just such a crisis. Spain has already shown that it considers that there never has been and never will be a right time for a divorce. Even in the good times attempts to get an autonomy statute were met by challenges in the constitutional court which after years of deliberation watered down the agreement which had already been watered down by the Spanish Parliament. 1 More recently it was in large part the refusal of the Spanish Prime Minister to consider a request to consider Catalonia the same way as the Basques and Navarra in terms of finances that triggered the current crisis. 2\n\n1 Pericay, Gaspar, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Court shortens the current Catalan Statute of Autonomy’, Catalan News Agency, 28 June 2010, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/the-spanish-constitutional-court-shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonom\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n"
] |
[
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Section 2 of the constitution continues “it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 1 However it is not the constitution that is the problem blocking a referendum; rather it is the Spanish parliament. The government and parliament clearly could ask the King to allow a referendum on Catalan independence if it so wished. It should do so in order to prevent any more existential challenges to the constitution; constitutions have to be flexible if they are to survive the government is therefore wrong to treat it as a static unchanging document and justification for ruling out a referendum for Catalan independence. 2\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum For the most part this is simply being alarmists. However if other Spanish regions do wish to go their own way then all the arguments for why Catalonia should be allowed its own choice apply to them as well.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum This would be a very risky course to take; currently there is 51% support for independence and that could as well go up as down when given the opportunity. With both the Spanish and Catalan economies in crisis it is likely that such a referendum would only be bolstered by anger at the government due to the state of the economy. This might therefore be an option for Spain at some point in the future when the economy is back on its feet and so less of an issue but at the moment it would be waving goodbye to Spain as we know it.\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Not getting your way in a democracy is not an excuse for turning to violence. Catalonia instead must attempt to persuade the other regions of Spain to allow a referendum or if it can’t then accept that the majority in Spain do not want Catalonian independence and respect their position. Violence will not help persuade the rest of Spain of its case; it did not for the Basques, and will not for Catalonia. So far the Catalan independence movement has recognised this with Lopez Tena the leader of the Catalan Solidarity for Independence party states “We would under no condition follow that [violent] path. That’s not how things are done in a democratic country.” 1\n\n1 Primor, Adar, ‘Catalan leader predicts independence in about two years, and close friendship with Israel’, Haaretz, 4 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/catalan-leader-predicts-independence-in-about-two-years-and-close-friendship-with-israel.premium-1.468285\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Such a decision by the Catalan government would clearly be against the Spanish Constitution and therefore illegal. The constitution makes it “the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up” so such a move would invite a military response. Some members of the ruling PP party have already stated that the Guardia Civil should take over the Mossos (Catalan police). 1 There are also members of the army who would be willing to take such action, \"Catalan independence? Over my dead body and that of many soldiers\" says Colonel Francisco Aleman who also compared the crisis to the start of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. 2\n\n1 Guibernau, Montserrat, ‘Calls for independence in Catalonia are part of an evolution of Spain’s democracy that the country’s constitution may have to come to accommodate.’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 8 October 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/08/catalonia-independence-spain-constitution/\n\n2 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum It is far from clear whether self determination gives peoples the right to decide whether they should be independent. The Supreme Court of Canada has looked at this issue with reference to Quebec that has in the past argued for its right to self determination. The court argues “The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” This is because such a right must fit in with the principle of territorial integrity of existing states. 1\n\n1 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do Para 126/7\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalan independence would lead to further break up of the Spanish state\n\nThe issue of Catalan independence does not just affect Catalonia but the whole of Spain. All the regions of Spain have strong regional identities and Catalan is merely most widely spoken regional language with the both the Basque region and Galicia in particular having their own languages. Therefore a Catalan bid for independence might prompt other regions to make a bid for independence too. Moreover Catalan is spoken in regions outside Catalonia so these regions could potentially decide they are better off with Catalonia than Spain. 1\n\nThe basques in particular, who have already turned to the political path from that of violent separatism, are likely to take inspiration to work towards peaceful independence if the Catalans succeed and are allowed a referendum. 2 If Catalonia is allowed to secede then why should the Basque region be any different?\n\n1 McCormick, Mark, ‘The languages of Spain – interactive’, guardian.co.uk, 19 January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jan/19/spain-languages-map-interactive\n\n2 Zabalo, Julen, ‘Basque nationalists are taking inspiration from Scotland and Northern Ireland by using politics as a vehicle for independence’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 25 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/25/basque-nationalism-julen-zabalo/\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Spain is one indivisible nation\n\nThe Spanish constitution does not allow the holding of referendums on independence by Spanish regions. Spain is a single ‘demos’ made up of all the regions together rather than being separate and simply brought together under one banner. The Constitution says it “is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. 1\n\nMoreover while referendums may be allowed for “political decisions of special importance” “The referendum shall be called by the King on the President of the Government's\n\nproposal after previous authorization by the Congress.” 2 So the calling of one is first up to the national government to decide one is needed and then requires the approval of the national parliament. In case that was not clear enough it is reiterated in section 149 on the role of the State and Regions “The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: Authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums.” 3\n\n1 Cortes Generales, Spanish Constitution, 27 December 1978, http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf Section 2\n\n2 Ibid, Section 92\n\n3 Ibid, section 149\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Control over Catalan destiny would reduce tensions and may help prevent independence\n\nFor Spain by far the biggest reason for allowing a referendum is that it may well be the best way of keeping Catalonia within Spain over the long term. So long as Spain says it will not allow a referendum or give the Catalans control over their own destiny the movement for Catalan independence is likely to get stronger as it can focus on the denial of democratic rights – Spain is waving a red flag to the bull. Allow a referendum, particularly if it has to be accompanied by a long period of campaigning for reflection and Catalans will have to agonise whether it is in their own best interests, 1 decide whether they want to damage their economy by having large companies such as Planeta the world’s largest Spanish language publishing business pulling out, 2 sever extensive links with Spain, and risk their membership of the European Union which Spain would veto. 3 If Spain were to offer as an alternative a new constitutional settlement that solves many of the grievances the Catalans have at the moment they might find they really want to remain within Spain, 4 much as many scots would prefer devo-max.\n\n1 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n\n2 Charlemagne, ‘Hostage to Catalonia’, The Economist, 5th October 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/10/spanish-politics\n\n3 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n4 Bloomberg editors, ‘To Keep Catalonia In, Spain Should Allow a Cote to Secede’, Bloomberg, 15 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede.html\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalonia will hold its own referendum regardless of Spain’s position\n\nCatalonia is likely to go its own way and decide it should make its own decisions regardless of the rest of Spain’s views. Artur Mas Catalonia’s President says \"If we can go ahead with a referendum because the government authorises it, it's better. If not, we should do it anyway\". 1 So regardless of the Spanish position in his next four year term he will hold a referendum asking “Do you want Catalonia to become a new state within the European Union?” If Spain then does not back down about allowing this then there may well be a constitutional crisis. So far the Catalan option is simply to “internationalise the conflict we will have to go to Brussels to explain that they don't even let us consult with the people”. 2\n\nUltimately despite being within Spain so long as support for independence remains strong the Catalans probably have more cards to play; they provide more in taxes than they receive so could cut Madrid off, or in the final play they could unilaterally secede leaving Spain with the unpalatable option of either negotiating to get Catalonia back in, accepting, or invading.\n\n1 Bollier, Sam, ‘Catalans press for secession from Spain’, Al Jazeera, 30 September 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292913514639254.html\n\n2 Tremlett, Giles, ‘Catalonia leader threatens to draw EU into independence row with Spain’, guardian.co.uk, 15 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/15/catalonia-leader-threat-independence-eu-spain\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum Catalans clearly want self determination\n\nEvery peoples has the right to self determination. This is enshrined in the UN Charter right at the start in Article 1 as a purpose of the United Nations “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and is also in other major international agreements. 1 Large numbers of states have been recognised since this principle of self determination was recognised by the world in 1945 a great many of them states that are less natural states in terms of size, economy, ethnicity or geography so it would be wrong to deny a right exercised by so many others from the Catalans. It is clear that the Catalans wish to exercise this right to decide their own destiny democratically through a referendum. When polled by the Catalan Survey Institute 74.1% said they would be in favour of organising a referendum with 19.9% against, the remaining 6% were undecided. 2\n\n1 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml\n\n2 Coll, Gaspar Pericay, ‘74% of Catalan citizens are in favour of holding an independence referendum in Catalonia’, Catalan News Agency, 10 October 2012, http://www.catalannewsagency.com/news/politics/74-catalan-citizens-are-favour-holding-independence-referendum-catalonia\n",
"europe politics local government voting house would allow referendum If a referendum is not allowed violence may be the result\n\nThe worst case scenario is one in which the Spanish government continues to deny the Catalan people the ability to decide for themselves democratically and peacefully then it is possible that eventually the result will be a change from a peaceful movement to a violent one. Some outside observers see parallels with the break up of Yugoslavia where the solution has to be further decentralisation and the center accepting a democratic route – in Yugoslavia failure to do so ultimately lead to several wars. 1 2 For the moment there are only the slightest of hints that things may get more radical if denied Pujol the General secretary of the governing Catalan party says \"There will be no way to avoid it. If we don't deliver it someone else will. More radical parties. But in a negotiation… it's not the best thing to reveal what you are going to do next\" so there is the possibility some factions of the independence movement turning to violence as Eta did in the Basque region if denied the democratic route. 3\n\n1 Stanic, Ana, ‘Catalunya and Spain: more than time for dialogue’, Open Democracy, 18 October 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ana-stanic/catalunya-and-spain-more-than-time-for-dialogue\n\n2 Basta, Karlo, ‘Reducing Catalonia’s autonomy as a reaction to the fiscal crisis would only provide more fuel for secession-minded nationalists’, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Politics and Policy, 26 September 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/26/catalonia-autonomy-karlo-basta/\n\n3 Mason, Paul, ‘Catalan leaders seek independence vote, legal or not’, BBC News, 5 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.1875
] |
[
83.25,
85.4375,
87.4375,
82.9375,
83.6875,
82.625,
82.3125,
82.1875,
82.8125,
83.3125,
82.375,
82.6875
] |
Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis
The official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation [1] . The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead [2] . On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez [3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors [4] . The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’ [5] . The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.
[1] El-Tablawy & Fam, 2013
[2] Loveluck, 2013
[3] Maqbool, 2013
[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013
[5] Bowen, 2013
|
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes There have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’. [1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt [2] . This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.\n\n[1] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[2] Sciutto & Labott, 2013\n"
] |
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’ [1] . Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.\n\n[1] El Amrani, 2011\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power [1] . The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue [2] . Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.\n\n[1] The World Bank, accessed 2013\n\n[2] Bakr, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership [1] . As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds [2] . The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official [3] . The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.\n\n[1] G uerin, 2013\n\n[2] el-Deen, 2013\n\n[3] Aswat Masr iya, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes While just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move [1] . This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt [1] . To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.\n\n[1] CNN Staff, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular\n\nMorsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund [1] , raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010 [2] . Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability [3] . In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago [4] . This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.\n\n[1] Werr, 2013\n\n[2] Ahram Online, 2013\n\n[3] Fam & Shahine, 2013\n\n[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles\n\nSeparation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally [1] . Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda [2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring [3] . The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy [4] .\n\n[1] Wikipedia\n\n[2] CNN Staff, 2013\n\n[3] Spencer, 2012\n\n[4] Reuters, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country\n\nAnother major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi [1] . While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.\n\n[1] Khalil, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected\n\nIt was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Most Egyptians still supported Morsi\n\nA poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi [1] . The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army has no place in a modern democracy\n\nThe army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.1875
] |
[
83.3125,
85.4375,
86.25,
83.8125,
85.875,
85.1875,
83.8125,
83.0625,
84.1875,
82.9375,
86,
84
] |
Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular
Morsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund [1] , raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010 [2] . Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability [3] . In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago [4] . This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.
[1] Werr, 2013
[2] Ahram Online, 2013
[3] Fam & Shahine, 2013
[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013
|
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power [1] . The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue [2] . Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.\n\n[1] The World Bank, accessed 2013\n\n[2] Bakr, 2012\n"
] |
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes There have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’. [1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt [2] . This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.\n\n[1] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[2] Sciutto & Labott, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’ [1] . Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.\n\n[1] El Amrani, 2011\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership [1] . As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds [2] . The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official [3] . The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.\n\n[1] G uerin, 2013\n\n[2] el-Deen, 2013\n\n[3] Aswat Masr iya, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes While just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move [1] . This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt [1] . To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.\n\n[1] CNN Staff, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis\n\nThe official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation [1] . The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead [2] . On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez [3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors [4] . The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’ [5] . The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.\n\n[1] El-Tablawy & Fam, 2013\n\n[2] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[3] Maqbool, 2013\n\n[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013\n\n[5] Bowen, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles\n\nSeparation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally [1] . Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda [2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring [3] . The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy [4] .\n\n[1] Wikipedia\n\n[2] CNN Staff, 2013\n\n[3] Spencer, 2012\n\n[4] Reuters, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country\n\nAnother major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi [1] . While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.\n\n[1] Khalil, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected\n\nIt was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Most Egyptians still supported Morsi\n\nA poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi [1] . The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army has no place in a modern democracy\n\nThe army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.3125
] |
[
84.0625,
83.25,
83.1875,
84.0625,
82.8125,
83.4375,
82.5625,
82.125,
83.125,
82.625,
83.75,
82.1875
] |
Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles
Separation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally [1] . Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda [2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring [3] . The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy [4] .
[1] Wikipedia
[2] CNN Staff, 2013
[3] Spencer, 2012
[4] Reuters, 2013
|
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership [1] . As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds [2] . The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official [3] . The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.\n\n[1] G uerin, 2013\n\n[2] el-Deen, 2013\n\n[3] Aswat Masr iya, 2013\n"
] |
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes There have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’. [1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt [2] . This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.\n\n[1] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[2] Sciutto & Labott, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’ [1] . Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.\n\n[1] El Amrani, 2011\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power [1] . The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue [2] . Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.\n\n[1] The World Bank, accessed 2013\n\n[2] Bakr, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes While just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move [1] . This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt [1] . To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.\n\n[1] CNN Staff, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis\n\nThe official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation [1] . The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead [2] . On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez [3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors [4] . The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’ [5] . The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.\n\n[1] El-Tablawy & Fam, 2013\n\n[2] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[3] Maqbool, 2013\n\n[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013\n\n[5] Bowen, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular\n\nMorsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund [1] , raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010 [2] . Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability [3] . In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago [4] . This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.\n\n[1] Werr, 2013\n\n[2] Ahram Online, 2013\n\n[3] Fam & Shahine, 2013\n\n[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country\n\nAnother major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi [1] . While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.\n\n[1] Khalil, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected\n\nIt was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Most Egyptians still supported Morsi\n\nA poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi [1] . The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army has no place in a modern democracy\n\nThe army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
89
] |
[
84.5,
84.125,
84.0625,
84.0625,
88.125,
87,
84.0625,
83.0625,
83.875,
85.6875,
83.6875,
87.1875
] |
Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country
Another major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi [1] . While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.
[1] Khalil, 2012
|
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’ [1] . Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.\n\n[1] El Amrani, 2011\n"
] |
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes There have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’. [1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt [2] . This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.\n\n[1] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[2] Sciutto & Labott, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power [1] . The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue [2] . Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.\n\n[1] The World Bank, accessed 2013\n\n[2] Bakr, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership [1] . As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds [2] . The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official [3] . The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.\n\n[1] G uerin, 2013\n\n[2] el-Deen, 2013\n\n[3] Aswat Masr iya, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes While just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move [1] . This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt [1] . To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.\n\n[1] CNN Staff, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis\n\nThe official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation [1] . The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead [2] . On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez [3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors [4] . The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’ [5] . The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.\n\n[1] El-Tablawy & Fam, 2013\n\n[2] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[3] Maqbool, 2013\n\n[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013\n\n[5] Bowen, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular\n\nMorsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund [1] , raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010 [2] . Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability [3] . In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago [4] . This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.\n\n[1] Werr, 2013\n\n[2] Ahram Online, 2013\n\n[3] Fam & Shahine, 2013\n\n[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles\n\nSeparation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally [1] . Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda [2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring [3] . The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy [4] .\n\n[1] Wikipedia\n\n[2] CNN Staff, 2013\n\n[3] Spencer, 2012\n\n[4] Reuters, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected\n\nIt was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Most Egyptians still supported Morsi\n\nA poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi [1] . The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army has no place in a modern democracy\n\nThe army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.5
] |
[
83.4375,
83.8125,
83.5625,
83.6875,
83.125,
84.5625,
82.625,
82.5,
82.75,
82.4375,
82.8125,
82.375
] |
Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected
It was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.
|
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt [1] . To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.\n\n[1] CNN Staff, 2013\n"
] |
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes While just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move [1] . This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes There have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’. [1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt [2] . This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.\n\n[1] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[2] Sciutto & Labott, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’ [1] . Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.\n\n[1] El Amrani, 2011\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power [1] . The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue [2] . Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.\n\n[1] The World Bank, accessed 2013\n\n[2] Bakr, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership [1] . As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds [2] . The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official [3] . The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.\n\n[1] G uerin, 2013\n\n[2] el-Deen, 2013\n\n[3] Aswat Masr iya, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Most Egyptians still supported Morsi\n\nA poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi [1] . The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army has no place in a modern democracy\n\nThe army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis\n\nThe official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation [1] . The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead [2] . On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez [3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors [4] . The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’ [5] . The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.\n\n[1] El-Tablawy & Fam, 2013\n\n[2] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[3] Maqbool, 2013\n\n[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013\n\n[5] Bowen, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular\n\nMorsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund [1] , raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010 [2] . Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability [3] . In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago [4] . This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.\n\n[1] Werr, 2013\n\n[2] Ahram Online, 2013\n\n[3] Fam & Shahine, 2013\n\n[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles\n\nSeparation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally [1] . Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda [2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring [3] . The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy [4] .\n\n[1] Wikipedia\n\n[2] CNN Staff, 2013\n\n[3] Spencer, 2012\n\n[4] Reuters, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country\n\nAnother major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi [1] . While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.\n\n[1] Khalil, 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.75
] |
[
90.375,
84.8125,
84.1875,
84.5,
84.4375,
86.125,
83.3125,
83.6875,
83.4375,
84.25,
85.3125,
84
] |
Most Egyptians still supported Morsi
A poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi [1] . The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.
[1] Smith, 2013
|
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes While just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move [1] . This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n"
] |
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt [1] . To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.\n\n[1] CNN Staff, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes There have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’. [1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt [2] . This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.\n\n[1] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[2] Sciutto & Labott, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’ [1] . Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.\n\n[1] El Amrani, 2011\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power [1] . The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue [2] . Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.\n\n[1] The World Bank, accessed 2013\n\n[2] Bakr, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership [1] . As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds [2] . The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official [3] . The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.\n\n[1] G uerin, 2013\n\n[2] el-Deen, 2013\n\n[3] Aswat Masr iya, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected\n\nIt was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army has no place in a modern democracy\n\nThe army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis\n\nThe official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation [1] . The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead [2] . On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez [3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors [4] . The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’ [5] . The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.\n\n[1] El-Tablawy & Fam, 2013\n\n[2] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[3] Maqbool, 2013\n\n[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013\n\n[5] Bowen, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular\n\nMorsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund [1] , raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010 [2] . Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability [3] . In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago [4] . This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.\n\n[1] Werr, 2013\n\n[2] Ahram Online, 2013\n\n[3] Fam & Shahine, 2013\n\n[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles\n\nSeparation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally [1] . Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda [2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring [3] . The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy [4] .\n\n[1] Wikipedia\n\n[2] CNN Staff, 2013\n\n[3] Spencer, 2012\n\n[4] Reuters, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country\n\nAnother major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi [1] . While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.\n\n[1] Khalil, 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
96.75
] |
[
83.9375,
91.3125,
84.5,
84.25,
84.6875,
84.8125,
83.9375,
83.25,
84.6875,
85.75,
85.4375,
86.375
] |
The army has no place in a modern democracy
The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.
[1] May et al., 2004
[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16
|
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The army should not have a position of influence in democratic, civilian politics. It is generally accepted that the military’s responsibility is to the state [1] . This means that they cannot become involved in the governing of said state, as this is a breach of the civil-military relationship. According to Huntington, ‘Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’ [2] . It is important, therefore, that civilian supremacy is maintained and that the military is subservient to the civilian government. In modern democracies it is expected that the government is held to account at the polls, as long as they act legally, rather than military whims. There is also a tendency for military figures to feel more inclined towards intervention in civil society after their initial attempt, as demonstrated by the most recent military coup as the military had previously taken charge between the fall of Mubarak and Morsi’s election. For this reason, the overthrow of the civilian government at the hands of the Egyptian military is flawed.\n\n[1] May et al., 2004\n\n[2] Huntington, 1957 pg. 16\n"
] |
[
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes While just over half of respondents to the poll thought that deposing Morsi was wrong, 46% of Egyptians felt it was the correct move [1] . This shows that there was still a large amount of support for the Egyptian army’s actions. 51% of the population is not an overwhelming figure. In addition to this, the poll which produced these results only interviewed 1,405 people. With a population of over 84 million, it is possible that majority of the population actually supported the Army.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government had acted to monopolise their power within the government, hence undermining their democratic position. To begin with, Morsi’s cabinet had consisted of about 25% candidates from his own party, with the rest belonging to the opposition parties. This by 2013 this had dropped to roughly 1/3 Morsi supporters. This, in combination with Morsi’s extra judicial powers implied that the president was attempting to extend his political power. Many liberals feared that this would be done to enforce the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Egypt [1] . To preserve the democratic integrity of the Egyptian government, the army had to intervene.\n\n[1] CNN Staff, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes There have been continued protests and violence since the military coup. The post-Morsi leadership and the Egyptian army have therefore done little to bring the Egyptian crisis under control. The most notable incident was on 14th August 2013, over a month since the military coup removed Morsi, when over one thousand people were killed in a day’s fighting between security forces and protestors. Human Rights Watch declared that this was ‘the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history’. [1] Even after the ban on un-notified protesting there have been continued demonstrations of civil disobedience. Due to the handling of these demonstrations the USA has threatened to cut some of its $1.3 billion military aid to Egypt [2] . This inability to gain control of the situation echoes the reasoning for removing Morsi.\n\n[1] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[2] Sciutto & Labott, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi maintained relatively moderate rhetoric and did not declare any intention to impose sharia law. When questioned about Islamic society and non-Muslims he stated that he believed Coptic Christians had inherent rights and stated that Islam and sharia law ‘cannot be imposed on the people and it cannot be done from the top’ [1] . Morsi’s comments on the respect owed to everyone’s rights and beliefs seem to contradict any notion that he planned on enforcing a strict interpretation of sharia law.\n\n[1] El Amrani, 2011\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The Morsi government arguably did not have enough time to deal with Egypt’s economic conditions. Tourism and investment had already been in decline prior to Morsi assuming power [1] . The global perception of Egypt as unstable was unavoidable following the revolution which had deposed Mubarak. The ex-dictator had been a symbol of security and stability prior to the Arab Spring. Tourism dropped from 14.7 million people to 9.8 million in the first year post-Mubarak, which led to a loss of revenue [2] . Unemployment had been on the rise prior to the Arab Spring, as was the cost of living. Morsi’s establishment had only been given one year to resolve the economic crisis which was insufficient time to put any economic recovery plan in to full effect.\n\n[1] The World Bank, accessed 2013\n\n[2] Bakr, 2012\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes The post-Morsi leadership, with the assistance of the military, have arguably continued the trend of undemocratic governing. These actions have given the impression that they are acting hypocritically by removing Morsi. In November 2013 a new law was enacted which banned peaceful protest without prior notification to the police. Believed to be aimed at Morsi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood, this law sought to curb protests being conducted against the Egyptian army’s leadership [1] . As protest is a political right, many human rights groups have had a negative response to this legislation. Defiance of these laws has led to the use of teargas and violence to disperse crowds [2] . The new constitution also places the defence ministry firmly in the hands of the military, giving policy control to an unelected official [3] . The claims of the military backed authorities being anti-democratic illustrate the hypocrisy of removing Morsi.\n\n[1] G uerin, 2013\n\n[2] el-Deen, 2013\n\n[3] Aswat Masr iya, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Mohamed Morsi had been democratically elected\n\nIt was wrong to depose Morsi as he had been chosen to serve as the first democratically elected president in Egypt. Morsi was elected as president with 51.7% of the vote. Having won the 2011-2 elections, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice party had a democratic mandate which they should have been able to fulfil. The military coup which removed them from power was therefore a violation of the democracy which Egypt had fought to establish.\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Most Egyptians still supported Morsi\n\nA poll conducted in November 2013 illustrated that the majority of Egyptians still supported Morsi. The Egyptian army’s claim that they were acting in the name of the people is therefore invalid. The poll, conducted by Zogby Research Services LLC, found that 51% of Egyptians believed that it was wrong to depose Morsi [1] . The fact that the army were acting to the contrary of the wishes of a sizeable proportion of the population therefore exemplifies that the army were not acting ‘for the people’ as a whole.\n\n[1] Smith, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Failed to gain control of the Egyptian crisis\n\nThe official line of argument for the Egyptian army’s intervention was that Morsi’s administration was failing to grasp control of a worsening situation [1] . The response to Morsi’s judicial immunity had been largely negative, with tens of thousands taking to the streets to protest. Soon after, pro-Morsi protestors began their own protests. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were called to defend the palace and the resulting clashes left ten dead [2] . On the 1st July 2013 millions of protestors gathered in Tahrir Square, as well as in Alexandria, Port Said and Suez [3] and the Egyptian army stated it would intervene if the government did not ‘meet the demands of the people’ by restructuring the government to appease protestors [4] . The protestors did not disperse, and there were several ministers who resigned from government. With no clear policy change in sight, Morsi had evidently failed to take control of the situation. General el-Sisi, leader of the coup, claimed that they ‘could not stay silent and blind to the call of the Egyptian masses’ [5] . The intervention was necessary as Egypt had become ungovernable.\n\n[1] El-Tablawy & Fam, 2013\n\n[2] Loveluck, 2013\n\n[3] Maqbool, 2013\n\n[4] Abdelaziz & Wederman, 2013\n\n[5] Bowen, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi’s economic and social policies had been ineffective and unpopular\n\nMorsi’s inability to tackle the main issues which faced Egypt was another issue which caused the large-scale protests leading to his removal. One of the major reasons for Egypt’s Lotus Revolution was the lack of economic reform. Rising living costs, unemployment and wage levels were causes of grievance for the majority of Egyptians. The Egyptian population hoped that, once the corruption of the Mubarak regime was replaced by a democratic system, their economic condition would improve. This was not to be the case. The Morsi government planned to reduce its fuel subsidies to entitle the country to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund [1] , raising the living costs of the average citizens. In conjunction with the subsidy cuts, the government failed to tackle unemployment. At the time of Morsi’s ouster from government there were 3.6 million unemployed, an increase of one million since 2010 [2] . Analysts linked the lack of jobs to the security of the state claiming that unemployment would lead to greater numbers of rioters and furthering instability [3] . In a poll assessing the Egyptians’ attitude toward their government and their future, 61% felt they were worse off than five years ago [4] . This dissatisfaction then led to dissent.\n\n[1] Werr, 2013\n\n[2] Ahram Online, 2013\n\n[3] Fam & Shahine, 2013\n\n[4] Zogby Research Services, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi Undermined Democratic Principles\n\nSeparation of powers is a key democratic principle which Morsi undermined with the November 2012 declaration. The underlying idea of the separation of powers is that one branch of government should not have undue power over any other. That is why there are a number of checks and balances set out which allows each branch to constrain the actions of the others to prevent them acting illegally [1] . Morsi’s declaration that he would remove the checks and balances which the judiciary held over the presidency violated this principle. This led many to fear that Morsi was returning the country to a dictatorship where he could force through the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda [2] , undoing the work of the Arab Spring [3] . The army’s intercession was welcomed by many as maintaining democracy [4] .\n\n[1] Wikipedia\n\n[2] CNN Staff, 2013\n\n[3] Spencer, 2012\n\n[4] Reuters, 2013\n",
"africa middle east politics defence leadership voting house believes Morsi was going to implement Islamic policies on a secular country\n\nAnother major concern of the anti-Morsi protestors on whose behalf the Egyptian army intervened was the Islamist nature of Morsi [1] . While many supported the Islamic nature of the Muslim brotherhood, there were equally many liberals and Coptic Christians who were afraid of Egypt transforming in to an Islamic state. Mubarak had managed to secure popularity within these groups by exploiting this fear that, should his regime be overthrown, extreme Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood would take control and deprive them of their rights. The Morsi government’s constitution was thus perceived as a threat to minority and secular rights, and thus a security issue. Even if this was not the case, Morsi should have done more to calm the population’s fear rather than allowing discord to materialise.\n\n[1] Khalil, 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.1875
] |
[
85.1875,
92.3125,
84.1875,
83.6875,
83.8125,
88.375,
83.9375,
82.9375,
84.5625,
82.8125,
87.875,
83.6875
] |
The military operations were necessary for long term peace:
As Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Haleviargue explain, “the Israeli public will not make territorial concessions on the West Bank or the Golan Heights if Gaza is allowed to become a neighboring terrorist state that can launch attacks with impunity. Israel had already had a bad enough experience letting that happen with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.”(1) Without the assurance that they will be allowed to protect their homes and families following withdrawal, Israelis will rightly perceive a two-state solution as an existential threat. They will continue to share the left-wing vision of coexistence with a peaceful Palestinian neighbor in theory, but in reality will heed the right's warnings of Jewish powerlessness.(4)
Meanwhile, the stronger Hamas becomes, the more resistance moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will face to making any concessions to Israel.(1) Therefore damaging Hamas, via Operation Cast Lead, actually aided the peace process in the long run, and was necessary in order to make an eventual two-state peace solution possible. The Israeli attacks may also eventually help force Hamas to accept a more durable ceasefire. Unlike the botched invasion of Lebanon in 2006, when Israel set itself the unattainable goal of eliminating the military capability of Hezbollah, during Operation Cast Lead it was made clear that the objective was not to wipe out Hamas, but instead to force the radical group to accept a durable cease-fire on Israel's terms.(8) This was necessary as prior to Operation Cast Lead Hamas showed no interest in peace, opting instead to pursue its political objectives through the use of terrorism. When Hamas came to power in Gaza in January 2006, it failed to control the rocket fire from the variety of miltary brigades, including its own al-Qassam brigade, into Israel and failed to establish internal stability. The widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas, which ended in June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza and ousted leaders of President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, made Israel more wary of the security threat an unstable Gaza could pose.(9)
In Israel's view, Hamas' behavior and its reliance on terror tactics will never change if it thinks it can attack with impunity, and so the Israeli military operations were necessary and justified in the name of restoring Israel's deterrent and weakening Hamas, both of which make long term peace more likely.
|
[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The long-term security of Israel rests in a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempting to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.\n\nA crucial step towards peace is to bring Hamas to the bargaining table. Israel's levelling of Gaza emboldened Hamas' message of resistance, and allowed Gazans to continue to rely on Hamas. As long as Israel continues to justify Arab and Palestinian anger through its disproportionate response, it is unlikely that enough trust can be established to reach a peace deal.\n\nEven Israelis recognize that this assualt has created an even larger barrier to peace. “This policy [Operation Cast Lead] is not strengthening Israel,” noted Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together.\"(10)\n"
] |
[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Under the same logic, over 1 million residents of Gaza have been under occupation since 1967, facing limited rights of movement, regular air raids, military checkpoints, random searches and seizures, random arrests, the destruction of sanitation facilities, homes, schools, roads, shops, markets, and health facilities, and therefore Hamas has the right act in its own self-defense by whatever means it sees fit. If Palestinians do not have an army to call to its defense, how can the entire population be punished for the actions of non-state military groups?\n\nIsrael’s right to take positive steps of some kind in the interests of its own safety does not mean it has the right to do anything it wishes in order to protect itself. It is also evident that Israel violated international law and committed war crimes, was was reported in the Goldstone Report.\n\nBetween the time when the shelling from Gaza started in 2001 and Operation Cast Lead, 20 Israeli civilians were killed by rockets or mortars, according to estimates by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that killed more than 1,400 people.(10) As Javier Solana, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said in late December 2008, \"the current Israeli strikes are inflicting an unacceptable toll on Palestinian civilians.\"(14)\n\nIt is a widely accepted principle of international law that actions taken pursuant to a state’s right to defend itself must be proportionate to the danger that the state faces. While the 20 deaths that resulted from the actions of Hamas and its associates were tragic, the nature of these attacks did not justify a full scale military invasion of the Gaza strip, or the mass destruction of infrastructure essential to life in the strip.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel similarly violated the ceasefire prior to 2008, and had unlawfully kidnapped and imprisoned hundreds of Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel's attack on Gaza was not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the following principle: an end to the Israeli siege on Gaza in exchange for an end to Hamas-led rocket attacks on Israel. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before Operation Cast Lead was launched. Israel should have accepted Hamas’s offer and assessed whether Hamas’s intention to be bound by its terms was genuine before launching a military attack.(6) If an action isn't truly an act of last resort, it cannot be legitimately termed 'self-defense', and so is not justified. Hamas were prepared to enter into negotiations with Israel and it was prepared to discuss the more intricate details of the deal it had proposed. Its attempts to avoid conflict were committed and consistent enough to suggest that Gaza’s leaders were not engaged in diplomatic posturing or sabre rattling. Israel targeted more than just military targets, including UN warehouses holding medical and food supplies, UN schools, and hospitals. Its imprecise tactics and refusal to allow access of humanitarian workers show that it was not merely self-defense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 None of these arguments change that fact that 250,000 Israelis in southern Israel lived under constant fear of Hamas rocket attacks, which Hamas escalated after a ceasefire which it refused to extend. It is notable that Syria, an implacable enemy of Israel, actually played a significant role in triggering he conflict. The Damascus office of Hamas, which operates under the aegis of the regime of Bashar al Assad, vetoed the efforts of Hamas leaders in Gaza to extend the cease-fire and insisted on escalating rocket attacks.(4) The role of foreign powers in proving the conflict through Hamas has been recognized outside of Israel was well: Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, assailed Israel's air strikes but also held Hamas responsible. The Egyptian government understood that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is increasingly allied with Iran and its goals for fomenting regional instability.(1) Israel could not possibly have been expected to thus not take military action to defend itself when coming under rocket fire from a terrorist government dedicated to Israel's destruction and under the direction of foreign states which are mortal enemies of Israel's existence. There was simply no other way to stop the rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel's blockade of Gaza was not a justified reason for Hamas' rocket attacks. Israeli control of Gaza’s borders was a response to Hamas’ exploitation of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to turn it into an armed, Islamic state dedicated to the destruction of Israel above all else, even its own economy. Hamas was not provoked. Quite the contrary. Hamas’ arms smuggling was the provocation. Then, on top of this provocation, Hamas fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. The idea that Hamas was provoked leapfrogs the facts.(27)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 It is indisputable that Hamas has launched violent attacks against civilian targets. Israel, on the other hand, conducts its operations exercising all due care to limit civilian casualties. Hamas terrorists, however, set up their headquarters and store weapons in private homes, schools, colleges and mosques. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit have blamed Hamas for provoking the Israeli attack on Hamas targets embedded in civilian areas.(28) Israel's air assault has resulted in more Palestinian casualties, but that is in part because Hamas deliberately locates its security forces in residential neighborhoods. This is intended both to deter Israel from attacking in the first place as well as to turn world opinion against the Jewish state when it does attack. By all accounts, however, the Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces.(1)\n\nIsrael actually put its own troops in harm’s way to minimize civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.(13) This shows Israel's commitment to preventing civilian casualties and thus the justification of Operation Cast Lead. The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian casualties can be explained by the fact that Israel has early warning systems and hospitals. Israel invests significantly more in stable buildings that do not crumble when subjected a blast, systems that can detect incoming rocket fire, and an extensive and modern network of hospitals and emergency response teams. This, and the fact that Israel does not attempt to shield its military installations behind civilian homes and businesses, helps lower the number of civilian casualties as compared to in Gaza.(2)\n\nThe claim that Israel violated the principle of proportionality, by killing more Hamas terrorists than the number of Israeli civilians killed by Hamas rockets, is absurd. There is no legal equivalence between the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and the deliberate killings of Hamas combatants. Under the laws of war, any number of combatants can be killed to prevent the killing of even one innocent civilian.(29) Moreover, if Israel were to be 'proportional' and respond to the Hamas attacks in the same way, what would that mean? Would this require that it launch rocket attacks back against Gazan civilians? Obviously not (this would result in even more civilian deaths), and this is where the logic of proportionality against terrorist attacks makes little sense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The most important thing for regional peace in the long run is not the belief among Israelis that there is a 'military solution' to the conflict, but rather the belief of Hamas and its backers in Syria and Iran that Israel can be 'solved' militarily. It is this belief that causes them to constantly return to using force against Israel, as they did with the rocket attacks. Therefore to establish peace in the long run, Israeli deterrent and demonstration that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity are the most important factors, and these are exactly what Operation Cast Lead re-established. Moreover, Hamas may promotes itself as the legitimate power in Gaza, but in reality, Hamas is at its core a terrorist organization that refuses to renounce violence or recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hamas came to power in Gaza through a violent coup against the Palestinian Authority government. Since Hamas refuses to live in peace with Israel, the Israeli government has no choice but to seek Hamas' replacement.(2)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were proportionate to the threat:\n\nOperation Cast Lead was justified as it was proportionate to Hamas' rocket attacks against Israel. It should be remembered that 250,000 Israelis living in the southern part of the country had lived under years of terrorism before Operation Cast Lead was launched, often in bomb shelters, and the economy has suffered. The world's media may only have paid attention when Israel responded to Hamas' barrage, but this does not mean that Israel was not already under severe attack by this point.(1) Moreover, the Israeli strikes were rightly measured to disable Hamas rocket attacks.(11)\n\nTerror groups fire indiscriminately at innocent Israelis and then complain of excessive or disproportionate force when Israel fires back. But according to internationally accepted laws of war, Israel is permitted to respond with the force necessary to end the conflict.(2)\n\nIsrael was legitimate in using full force to win its war on Hamas; Israel was under no obligation to restrain itself in what is, on Hamas' own terms, an existential war. Provoked by Hamas, Israel had every right to wage a disproportionate and overwhelming response. Hamas has repeatedly stated that its objective is to destroy Israel. Such an existential threat goes beyond simply Hamas' rocket attacks, as it portends much more destructive attacks in the future. This justifies defensive attacks from Israel that go beyond responding merely to the Hamas rockets, and would even justify Israeli efforts to fully demobilize or destroy Hamas.(12) In spite of this, Israel was actually far more restrained and proportionate than it was obligated to be. Israeli precision strikes sought to minimize civilian deaths, as Benjamin Netanyahu argued: \"In launching precision strikes against Hamas rocket launchers, headquarters, weapons depots, smuggling tunnels and training camps, Israel is trying to minimize civilian casualties.\"(13) Unlike Hamas, Israeli strikes targeted military sites, not civilians. As Gary Grant argued: \"Even if you target your action at military sites, civilians are inevitably going to get killed...these need to be contrasted with the actions of Hamas where every single rocket is designed to attack civilian populations, so every single act of Hamas in firing these rockets is clearly an illegal act without any legal justification.\"(2)\n\nIsrael may have been justified in acting disproportionately, but instead chose to respond in a proportionate and limited manner which minimized civilian deaths in Gaza, and thus the Israeli military operations were certainly justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were legitimate as Israeli self-defense:\n\nThe military operations were a legitimate use of the Israeli state’s right to defend itself and its citizens: To quote then-President-elect Barack Obama - \"If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I would do everything to stop that, and would expect Israel to do the same thing.\"(1)\n\nPrior to Israel's 2008-2009 military operations, Hamas had consistently violated the terms of the ceasefire between Gaza and Israel. It launched a total 6,300 rockets during an agreed hiatus in the confrontation, killing 10 and wounding more than 780. Hamas refused to extend the truce past 19 December 2008 and subsequently resumed attacks, firing nearly 300 more missiles, rockets and mortars.(1) Hamas was the first to actually escalate the conflict after the ceasefire expired, with a systematic increase in rocket attacks to a magnitude of hundreds of rockets fired daily in late December.(2) The 250,000 Israelis who lived in the southern part of the country were under constant threat, often in bomb shelters, and the economy suffered as a result.(1) Israel went to great lengths to avoid its military escalation. Just a few days before Israel's military operations, outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made an appeal on the Arab television station Al-Arabiya asking Gaza residents to stop the firing of rockets and mortar shells so that a military response could be avoided.(3) This appeal was apparently ignored by Hamas and the other militant groups in Gaza, and so Israel proceeded to respond militarily to remove the capacity of Gaza to launch rocket and mortar attacks – Israel was left with no other way to ensure that the inhabitants of the country’s southern regions would not have to live in fear of rocket fire.\n\nGaza was also a test case, intended to prove that Israel remained a legitimate and authoritative actor in the region. Much more was at stake than merely the military outcome of Israel's operation. The issue, rather, was Israel's ability to restore its deterrence power and uphold the principle that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity.(4) Israel's military operations were a good tool to fulfill this need for self-defense and did so effectively. The Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces, both to its leadership and to the tunnels from Gaza to Egypt that Hamas uses to smuggle in weapons and build its growing army.(1) Doing this damage was necessary as Israel could never be safe with a strong terrorist regime in control of Gaza. As David Harris, Executive Director for the American Jewish Committee, argued: \"Israel could not tolerate a terrorist regime on its border that was launching repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and villages.\"(5) Therefore there can be no debate that Israel had the right to defend itself as well as the right to determine how best to do so.\n\nWhile it is easy for countries and foreigners to state their opinions about Israel's security interests and how its actions may or may not fulfill them, Israel's right to make that judgment itself must be respected. Therefore Israel's military operations against Gaza were justified as legitimate self defense against Hamas and militant aggression which was putting the lives of Israeli citizens in jeopardy.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations harmed the chances of peace in the long term:\n\nThe long-term security of Israel rests with a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempts to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.(10)\n\nOperation Cast Lead ignored history, which teaches that there is no military solution to peace with the Palestinians. As a Daily Star Editorial argued, \"For the Israelis, once they have exercised this latest spasm of gratuitous bloodletting, there will be yet another opportunity to accept the oft-proved impossibility of a military solution. The Palestinian people will not be battered into submission, no amount of air strikes will make the core issues in the moribund peace process go away, and all of the same difficult decisions will still be waiting when the dust settles.\"(18) Thus Operation Cast Lead actually undermined future peace by once more making Israelis believe they can fight their way to a solution, which they cannot. As Nicholas Kristoff argues, \"What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other.\"(10)\n\nIsrael cannot stop rocket attacks by military action alone; eventually a political deal will be needed.(19) Operation Cast Lead emboldened the anti-negotiation side of Israeli politics, however, which focus on their claim that Israel should not negotiate with Hamas. However, Hamas was democratically elected, and so Israel must make peace with them. If Hamas was an authoritarian regime, Israel could possible attempt to get rid of it and make peace with the Palestinians in Gaza separately. But, because Hamas was democratically elected, any efforts by Israel to destroy them will be seen in Gaza as an effort to destroy the Palestinians and their democratic will. This would not enable any long-term peace with the Palestinians. Therefore, a long-term peace depends on working with Hamas, rather than attempting to destroy them.(20) Instead, Israel pursued Operation Cast Lead, which included an Israeli ground assault in Gaza, the excessive force of which is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.(10) The fact that Hamas was always going to survive Israel's assault meant that Operation Cast Lead was always going to help to consolidate the legitimacy of the Hamas movement, and to ensure that all the efforts of Israel to eliminate that fundamental pillar of resistance will produce the reverse result.(22)\n\nIsrael's offensive gave Iran and its allies a way to pressure Egypt, Jordan and other Arab 'moderates'. Like the Lebanon war of 2006, Israel's battle with Hamas in Gaza produced a schism among Muslim states. Iran and its Lebanon based ally Hezbollah have joined Hamas's Damascus-based leadership in calling for a new intifada, or uprising, against Israel -- and also against the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which are accused of silently supporting Israel's air attacks.(23) Israel’s ruthless attack on Gaza and the massive civilian casualties it has inflicted has severely damaged the nation's moral stature in the world. This moral deficit will cause problems for Israel in its future engagements in the world. Therefore long term peace in the region was harmed by Operation Cast Lead, and so it was not justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense:\n\nIsrael has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that they amounted to an act of 'self-defense' as recognized by Article 51, United Nations Charter. This contention should be rejected: the rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they were, did not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defense. Under international law, self-defense is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity.\n\nOperation Cast Lead caused the deaths of over 1,400 Palestinians, over 300 of whom were children, injured 4,500 more and resulted in the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN facilities and government buildings. If, as Israel has stated, Cast Lead was carried out in accordance with the terms of international law, and the safeguards incorporated into the contemporary law of war, then Israeli forces had a duty to protect civilian infrastructure under the fourth Geneva Convention. The death and destruction that Israeli forces wrought throughout the Gaza Strip was not commensurate with the losses caused by Hamas rocket fire, no matter how horrific those attacks may have been.\n\nIsrael’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defense, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary. Israel could have agreed to renew the truce with Hamas.(15) Israel's attack on Gaza was also not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the principle that Hamas stop firing rockets at Israel in return for Israel lifting its siege on Gaza. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before it started Operation Cast Lead, and Israel should have taken it then and seen how went before resorting to military force.(6)\n\nIsrael arguably provoked the entire conflict by targeting Palestinian civilians with its blockade on Gaza. According to Hebrew University international law expert Yuval Shani, \"It is my opinion that in this situation, and given the question marks regarding Israel's status in Gaza and Gaza's long-standing dependency on Israel, cutting off its water and electricity supplies would be equivalent to a direct attack on a civilian target, especially given that the motive for doing so is one of collective punishment, which is, in itself, a problematic motive.\"(26) Hamas had offered to renew the ceasefire if Israel reopened Gaza's border crossings. The strip had been sealed by Israel in an economic siege aimed at toppling Hamas. The blockade had brought the territory near economic collapse.(21) Therefore this blockade must be seen as the true cause of the conflict, and thus Operation Cast Lead was not a legitimate act of self-defense.\n\nThe lack of efficacy of Operation Cast Lead also undermines its legitimacy as 'self-defense': while Hamas's offensive capacities were blunted for a while, the likelihood, as with Hezbollah after Lebanon in 2006, is that it will quickly rebuild its military strength. Indeed, the assassinations of its leaders by Israel over the years- and the raids on its weapons workshops- did little to limit its rise to power.(16) Israel's overall strategy, moreover, is not one of 'self-defense' against Hamas, but rather to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward their Hamas government. This is why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza’s utilities, and why, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents were deprived running water. As Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues, argued: “The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza.”(10) Rashid Khalidi added to this argument: \"This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about 'restoring Israel’s deterrence,' as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: 'The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.'\"(17)\n\nIsraeli internal politics may also have played a role in determining the size and scope of Cast Lead. Israel was preparing for general elections on 10 February 2009. The prospect of a return to power by the hawk Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, promising tough action against Hamas, hardened the positions of Israel's more moderate political leaders, and may have caused them to launch such an operation to 'look tough', rather than judging its proportionality on its own merits.(21)Therefore Operation Cast Lead should be regarded not as legitimate self-defense, but rather as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and consequently w\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians:\n\nThe killing of over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more than 4,500 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire. For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire. And yet in 2005-8, according to the UN, the Israeli army killed about 1,250 Palestinians in Gaza, including 222 children. Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it.(15) The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious, but the numbers speak for themselves: 800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed during Operation Cast Lead. In contrast, around a dozen Israelis were killed, many of them soldiers.(17) Precision strikes which avoided civilian deaths were never going to be possible in the crowded Gaza Strip. As Akiva Eldar argued: \"The tremendous population density in the Gaza Strip does not allow a 'surgical operation' over an extended period that would minimize damage to civilian populations. The difficult images from the Strip will soon replace those of the damage inflicted by Qassam rockets in the western Negev. The scale of losses, which works in 'favor' of the Palestinians, will return Israel to the role of Goliath.\"(24)\n\nIt is notable that Israel is more culpable for the civilian deaths it causes than Hamas is with its rockets, as Israel had options (such as ending the blockade and negotiating with Hamas) which could have caused fewer civilian deaths, whereas Hamas did not. Rather Hamas responds as the disproportionately weaker party; the Palestinians were compelled to use the crude means at their disposal to free their lands from Israeli occupation, even if this meant being unable to target them well and some civilian deaths resulting.(25) Israel's Operation Cast Lead was less legitimate as it was not Israel's only option, and so cannot be regarded as proportionate. Furthermore, Israel's use of white phosphorous in Gaza was a humanitarian crime. The use of white phosphorous by Israel to shield its military movements in Gaza was a humanitarian crime, as the chemical causes serious health problems to civilians that inhale it. And, by all accounts, the chemical was inhaled by many Gazan civilians.(25)\n"
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normal
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Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
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[
94.5
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90.5625,
90.8125,
86.4375,
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91.5625,
84.0625,
84.6875,
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87.6875,
86.6875
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The military operations were proportionate to the threat:
Operation Cast Lead was justified as it was proportionate to Hamas' rocket attacks against Israel. It should be remembered that 250,000 Israelis living in the southern part of the country had lived under years of terrorism before Operation Cast Lead was launched, often in bomb shelters, and the economy has suffered. The world's media may only have paid attention when Israel responded to Hamas' barrage, but this does not mean that Israel was not already under severe attack by this point.(1) Moreover, the Israeli strikes were rightly measured to disable Hamas rocket attacks.(11)
Terror groups fire indiscriminately at innocent Israelis and then complain of excessive or disproportionate force when Israel fires back. But according to internationally accepted laws of war, Israel is permitted to respond with the force necessary to end the conflict.(2)
Israel was legitimate in using full force to win its war on Hamas; Israel was under no obligation to restrain itself in what is, on Hamas' own terms, an existential war. Provoked by Hamas, Israel had every right to wage a disproportionate and overwhelming response. Hamas has repeatedly stated that its objective is to destroy Israel. Such an existential threat goes beyond simply Hamas' rocket attacks, as it portends much more destructive attacks in the future. This justifies defensive attacks from Israel that go beyond responding merely to the Hamas rockets, and would even justify Israeli efforts to fully demobilize or destroy Hamas.(12) In spite of this, Israel was actually far more restrained and proportionate than it was obligated to be. Israeli precision strikes sought to minimize civilian deaths, as Benjamin Netanyahu argued: "In launching precision strikes against Hamas rocket launchers, headquarters, weapons depots, smuggling tunnels and training camps, Israel is trying to minimize civilian casualties."(13) Unlike Hamas, Israeli strikes targeted military sites, not civilians. As Gary Grant argued: "Even if you target your action at military sites, civilians are inevitably going to get killed...these need to be contrasted with the actions of Hamas where every single rocket is designed to attack civilian populations, so every single act of Hamas in firing these rockets is clearly an illegal act without any legal justification."(2)
Israel may have been justified in acting disproportionately, but instead chose to respond in a proportionate and limited manner which minimized civilian deaths in Gaza, and thus the Israeli military operations were certainly justified.
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[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Under the same logic, over 1 million residents of Gaza have been under occupation since 1967, facing limited rights of movement, regular air raids, military checkpoints, random searches and seizures, random arrests, the destruction of sanitation facilities, homes, schools, roads, shops, markets, and health facilities, and therefore Hamas has the right act in its own self-defense by whatever means it sees fit. If Palestinians do not have an army to call to its defense, how can the entire population be punished for the actions of non-state military groups?\n\nIsrael’s right to take positive steps of some kind in the interests of its own safety does not mean it has the right to do anything it wishes in order to protect itself. It is also evident that Israel violated international law and committed war crimes, was was reported in the Goldstone Report.\n\nBetween the time when the shelling from Gaza started in 2001 and Operation Cast Lead, 20 Israeli civilians were killed by rockets or mortars, according to estimates by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that killed more than 1,400 people.(10) As Javier Solana, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said in late December 2008, \"the current Israeli strikes are inflicting an unacceptable toll on Palestinian civilians.\"(14)\n\nIt is a widely accepted principle of international law that actions taken pursuant to a state’s right to defend itself must be proportionate to the danger that the state faces. While the 20 deaths that resulted from the actions of Hamas and its associates were tragic, the nature of these attacks did not justify a full scale military invasion of the Gaza strip, or the mass destruction of infrastructure essential to life in the strip.\n"
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[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The long-term security of Israel rests in a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempting to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.\n\nA crucial step towards peace is to bring Hamas to the bargaining table. Israel's levelling of Gaza emboldened Hamas' message of resistance, and allowed Gazans to continue to rely on Hamas. As long as Israel continues to justify Arab and Palestinian anger through its disproportionate response, it is unlikely that enough trust can be established to reach a peace deal.\n\nEven Israelis recognize that this assualt has created an even larger barrier to peace. “This policy [Operation Cast Lead] is not strengthening Israel,” noted Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together.\"(10)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel similarly violated the ceasefire prior to 2008, and had unlawfully kidnapped and imprisoned hundreds of Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel's attack on Gaza was not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the following principle: an end to the Israeli siege on Gaza in exchange for an end to Hamas-led rocket attacks on Israel. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before Operation Cast Lead was launched. Israel should have accepted Hamas’s offer and assessed whether Hamas’s intention to be bound by its terms was genuine before launching a military attack.(6) If an action isn't truly an act of last resort, it cannot be legitimately termed 'self-defense', and so is not justified. Hamas were prepared to enter into negotiations with Israel and it was prepared to discuss the more intricate details of the deal it had proposed. Its attempts to avoid conflict were committed and consistent enough to suggest that Gaza’s leaders were not engaged in diplomatic posturing or sabre rattling. Israel targeted more than just military targets, including UN warehouses holding medical and food supplies, UN schools, and hospitals. Its imprecise tactics and refusal to allow access of humanitarian workers show that it was not merely self-defense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 None of these arguments change that fact that 250,000 Israelis in southern Israel lived under constant fear of Hamas rocket attacks, which Hamas escalated after a ceasefire which it refused to extend. It is notable that Syria, an implacable enemy of Israel, actually played a significant role in triggering he conflict. The Damascus office of Hamas, which operates under the aegis of the regime of Bashar al Assad, vetoed the efforts of Hamas leaders in Gaza to extend the cease-fire and insisted on escalating rocket attacks.(4) The role of foreign powers in proving the conflict through Hamas has been recognized outside of Israel was well: Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, assailed Israel's air strikes but also held Hamas responsible. The Egyptian government understood that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is increasingly allied with Iran and its goals for fomenting regional instability.(1) Israel could not possibly have been expected to thus not take military action to defend itself when coming under rocket fire from a terrorist government dedicated to Israel's destruction and under the direction of foreign states which are mortal enemies of Israel's existence. There was simply no other way to stop the rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel's blockade of Gaza was not a justified reason for Hamas' rocket attacks. Israeli control of Gaza’s borders was a response to Hamas’ exploitation of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to turn it into an armed, Islamic state dedicated to the destruction of Israel above all else, even its own economy. Hamas was not provoked. Quite the contrary. Hamas’ arms smuggling was the provocation. Then, on top of this provocation, Hamas fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. The idea that Hamas was provoked leapfrogs the facts.(27)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 It is indisputable that Hamas has launched violent attacks against civilian targets. Israel, on the other hand, conducts its operations exercising all due care to limit civilian casualties. Hamas terrorists, however, set up their headquarters and store weapons in private homes, schools, colleges and mosques. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit have blamed Hamas for provoking the Israeli attack on Hamas targets embedded in civilian areas.(28) Israel's air assault has resulted in more Palestinian casualties, but that is in part because Hamas deliberately locates its security forces in residential neighborhoods. This is intended both to deter Israel from attacking in the first place as well as to turn world opinion against the Jewish state when it does attack. By all accounts, however, the Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces.(1)\n\nIsrael actually put its own troops in harm’s way to minimize civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.(13) This shows Israel's commitment to preventing civilian casualties and thus the justification of Operation Cast Lead. The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian casualties can be explained by the fact that Israel has early warning systems and hospitals. Israel invests significantly more in stable buildings that do not crumble when subjected a blast, systems that can detect incoming rocket fire, and an extensive and modern network of hospitals and emergency response teams. This, and the fact that Israel does not attempt to shield its military installations behind civilian homes and businesses, helps lower the number of civilian casualties as compared to in Gaza.(2)\n\nThe claim that Israel violated the principle of proportionality, by killing more Hamas terrorists than the number of Israeli civilians killed by Hamas rockets, is absurd. There is no legal equivalence between the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and the deliberate killings of Hamas combatants. Under the laws of war, any number of combatants can be killed to prevent the killing of even one innocent civilian.(29) Moreover, if Israel were to be 'proportional' and respond to the Hamas attacks in the same way, what would that mean? Would this require that it launch rocket attacks back against Gazan civilians? Obviously not (this would result in even more civilian deaths), and this is where the logic of proportionality against terrorist attacks makes little sense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The most important thing for regional peace in the long run is not the belief among Israelis that there is a 'military solution' to the conflict, but rather the belief of Hamas and its backers in Syria and Iran that Israel can be 'solved' militarily. It is this belief that causes them to constantly return to using force against Israel, as they did with the rocket attacks. Therefore to establish peace in the long run, Israeli deterrent and demonstration that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity are the most important factors, and these are exactly what Operation Cast Lead re-established. Moreover, Hamas may promotes itself as the legitimate power in Gaza, but in reality, Hamas is at its core a terrorist organization that refuses to renounce violence or recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hamas came to power in Gaza through a violent coup against the Palestinian Authority government. Since Hamas refuses to live in peace with Israel, the Israeli government has no choice but to seek Hamas' replacement.(2)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were necessary for long term peace:\n\nAs Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Haleviargue explain, “the Israeli public will not make territorial concessions on the West Bank or the Golan Heights if Gaza is allowed to become a neighboring terrorist state that can launch attacks with impunity. Israel had already had a bad enough experience letting that happen with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.”(1) Without the assurance that they will be allowed to protect their homes and families following withdrawal, Israelis will rightly perceive a two-state solution as an existential threat. They will continue to share the left-wing vision of coexistence with a peaceful Palestinian neighbor in theory, but in reality will heed the right's warnings of Jewish powerlessness.(4)\n\nMeanwhile, the stronger Hamas becomes, the more resistance moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will face to making any concessions to Israel.(1) Therefore damaging Hamas, via Operation Cast Lead, actually aided the peace process in the long run, and was necessary in order to make an eventual two-state peace solution possible. The Israeli attacks may also eventually help force Hamas to accept a more durable ceasefire. Unlike the botched invasion of Lebanon in 2006, when Israel set itself the unattainable goal of eliminating the military capability of Hezbollah, during Operation Cast Lead it was made clear that the objective was not to wipe out Hamas, but instead to force the radical group to accept a durable cease-fire on Israel's terms.(8) This was necessary as prior to Operation Cast Lead Hamas showed no interest in peace, opting instead to pursue its political objectives through the use of terrorism. When Hamas came to power in Gaza in January 2006, it failed to control the rocket fire from the variety of miltary brigades, including its own al-Qassam brigade, into Israel and failed to establish internal stability. The widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas, which ended in June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza and ousted leaders of President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, made Israel more wary of the security threat an unstable Gaza could pose.(9)\n\nIn Israel's view, Hamas' behavior and its reliance on terror tactics will never change if it thinks it can attack with impunity, and so the Israeli military operations were necessary and justified in the name of restoring Israel's deterrent and weakening Hamas, both of which make long term peace more likely.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were legitimate as Israeli self-defense:\n\nThe military operations were a legitimate use of the Israeli state’s right to defend itself and its citizens: To quote then-President-elect Barack Obama - \"If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I would do everything to stop that, and would expect Israel to do the same thing.\"(1)\n\nPrior to Israel's 2008-2009 military operations, Hamas had consistently violated the terms of the ceasefire between Gaza and Israel. It launched a total 6,300 rockets during an agreed hiatus in the confrontation, killing 10 and wounding more than 780. Hamas refused to extend the truce past 19 December 2008 and subsequently resumed attacks, firing nearly 300 more missiles, rockets and mortars.(1) Hamas was the first to actually escalate the conflict after the ceasefire expired, with a systematic increase in rocket attacks to a magnitude of hundreds of rockets fired daily in late December.(2) The 250,000 Israelis who lived in the southern part of the country were under constant threat, often in bomb shelters, and the economy suffered as a result.(1) Israel went to great lengths to avoid its military escalation. Just a few days before Israel's military operations, outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made an appeal on the Arab television station Al-Arabiya asking Gaza residents to stop the firing of rockets and mortar shells so that a military response could be avoided.(3) This appeal was apparently ignored by Hamas and the other militant groups in Gaza, and so Israel proceeded to respond militarily to remove the capacity of Gaza to launch rocket and mortar attacks – Israel was left with no other way to ensure that the inhabitants of the country’s southern regions would not have to live in fear of rocket fire.\n\nGaza was also a test case, intended to prove that Israel remained a legitimate and authoritative actor in the region. Much more was at stake than merely the military outcome of Israel's operation. The issue, rather, was Israel's ability to restore its deterrence power and uphold the principle that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity.(4) Israel's military operations were a good tool to fulfill this need for self-defense and did so effectively. The Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces, both to its leadership and to the tunnels from Gaza to Egypt that Hamas uses to smuggle in weapons and build its growing army.(1) Doing this damage was necessary as Israel could never be safe with a strong terrorist regime in control of Gaza. As David Harris, Executive Director for the American Jewish Committee, argued: \"Israel could not tolerate a terrorist regime on its border that was launching repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and villages.\"(5) Therefore there can be no debate that Israel had the right to defend itself as well as the right to determine how best to do so.\n\nWhile it is easy for countries and foreigners to state their opinions about Israel's security interests and how its actions may or may not fulfill them, Israel's right to make that judgment itself must be respected. Therefore Israel's military operations against Gaza were justified as legitimate self defense against Hamas and militant aggression which was putting the lives of Israeli citizens in jeopardy.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations harmed the chances of peace in the long term:\n\nThe long-term security of Israel rests with a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempts to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.(10)\n\nOperation Cast Lead ignored history, which teaches that there is no military solution to peace with the Palestinians. As a Daily Star Editorial argued, \"For the Israelis, once they have exercised this latest spasm of gratuitous bloodletting, there will be yet another opportunity to accept the oft-proved impossibility of a military solution. The Palestinian people will not be battered into submission, no amount of air strikes will make the core issues in the moribund peace process go away, and all of the same difficult decisions will still be waiting when the dust settles.\"(18) Thus Operation Cast Lead actually undermined future peace by once more making Israelis believe they can fight their way to a solution, which they cannot. As Nicholas Kristoff argues, \"What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other.\"(10)\n\nIsrael cannot stop rocket attacks by military action alone; eventually a political deal will be needed.(19) Operation Cast Lead emboldened the anti-negotiation side of Israeli politics, however, which focus on their claim that Israel should not negotiate with Hamas. However, Hamas was democratically elected, and so Israel must make peace with them. If Hamas was an authoritarian regime, Israel could possible attempt to get rid of it and make peace with the Palestinians in Gaza separately. But, because Hamas was democratically elected, any efforts by Israel to destroy them will be seen in Gaza as an effort to destroy the Palestinians and their democratic will. This would not enable any long-term peace with the Palestinians. Therefore, a long-term peace depends on working with Hamas, rather than attempting to destroy them.(20) Instead, Israel pursued Operation Cast Lead, which included an Israeli ground assault in Gaza, the excessive force of which is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.(10) The fact that Hamas was always going to survive Israel's assault meant that Operation Cast Lead was always going to help to consolidate the legitimacy of the Hamas movement, and to ensure that all the efforts of Israel to eliminate that fundamental pillar of resistance will produce the reverse result.(22)\n\nIsrael's offensive gave Iran and its allies a way to pressure Egypt, Jordan and other Arab 'moderates'. Like the Lebanon war of 2006, Israel's battle with Hamas in Gaza produced a schism among Muslim states. Iran and its Lebanon based ally Hezbollah have joined Hamas's Damascus-based leadership in calling for a new intifada, or uprising, against Israel -- and also against the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which are accused of silently supporting Israel's air attacks.(23) Israel’s ruthless attack on Gaza and the massive civilian casualties it has inflicted has severely damaged the nation's moral stature in the world. This moral deficit will cause problems for Israel in its future engagements in the world. Therefore long term peace in the region was harmed by Operation Cast Lead, and so it was not justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense:\n\nIsrael has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that they amounted to an act of 'self-defense' as recognized by Article 51, United Nations Charter. This contention should be rejected: the rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they were, did not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defense. Under international law, self-defense is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity.\n\nOperation Cast Lead caused the deaths of over 1,400 Palestinians, over 300 of whom were children, injured 4,500 more and resulted in the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN facilities and government buildings. If, as Israel has stated, Cast Lead was carried out in accordance with the terms of international law, and the safeguards incorporated into the contemporary law of war, then Israeli forces had a duty to protect civilian infrastructure under the fourth Geneva Convention. The death and destruction that Israeli forces wrought throughout the Gaza Strip was not commensurate with the losses caused by Hamas rocket fire, no matter how horrific those attacks may have been.\n\nIsrael’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defense, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary. Israel could have agreed to renew the truce with Hamas.(15) Israel's attack on Gaza was also not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the principle that Hamas stop firing rockets at Israel in return for Israel lifting its siege on Gaza. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before it started Operation Cast Lead, and Israel should have taken it then and seen how went before resorting to military force.(6)\n\nIsrael arguably provoked the entire conflict by targeting Palestinian civilians with its blockade on Gaza. According to Hebrew University international law expert Yuval Shani, \"It is my opinion that in this situation, and given the question marks regarding Israel's status in Gaza and Gaza's long-standing dependency on Israel, cutting off its water and electricity supplies would be equivalent to a direct attack on a civilian target, especially given that the motive for doing so is one of collective punishment, which is, in itself, a problematic motive.\"(26) Hamas had offered to renew the ceasefire if Israel reopened Gaza's border crossings. The strip had been sealed by Israel in an economic siege aimed at toppling Hamas. The blockade had brought the territory near economic collapse.(21) Therefore this blockade must be seen as the true cause of the conflict, and thus Operation Cast Lead was not a legitimate act of self-defense.\n\nThe lack of efficacy of Operation Cast Lead also undermines its legitimacy as 'self-defense': while Hamas's offensive capacities were blunted for a while, the likelihood, as with Hezbollah after Lebanon in 2006, is that it will quickly rebuild its military strength. Indeed, the assassinations of its leaders by Israel over the years- and the raids on its weapons workshops- did little to limit its rise to power.(16) Israel's overall strategy, moreover, is not one of 'self-defense' against Hamas, but rather to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward their Hamas government. This is why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza’s utilities, and why, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents were deprived running water. As Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues, argued: “The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza.”(10) Rashid Khalidi added to this argument: \"This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about 'restoring Israel’s deterrence,' as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: 'The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.'\"(17)\n\nIsraeli internal politics may also have played a role in determining the size and scope of Cast Lead. Israel was preparing for general elections on 10 February 2009. The prospect of a return to power by the hawk Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, promising tough action against Hamas, hardened the positions of Israel's more moderate political leaders, and may have caused them to launch such an operation to 'look tough', rather than judging its proportionality on its own merits.(21)Therefore Operation Cast Lead should be regarded not as legitimate self-defense, but rather as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and consequently w\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians:\n\nThe killing of over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more than 4,500 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire. For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire. And yet in 2005-8, according to the UN, the Israeli army killed about 1,250 Palestinians in Gaza, including 222 children. Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it.(15) The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious, but the numbers speak for themselves: 800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed during Operation Cast Lead. In contrast, around a dozen Israelis were killed, many of them soldiers.(17) Precision strikes which avoided civilian deaths were never going to be possible in the crowded Gaza Strip. As Akiva Eldar argued: \"The tremendous population density in the Gaza Strip does not allow a 'surgical operation' over an extended period that would minimize damage to civilian populations. The difficult images from the Strip will soon replace those of the damage inflicted by Qassam rockets in the western Negev. The scale of losses, which works in 'favor' of the Palestinians, will return Israel to the role of Goliath.\"(24)\n\nIt is notable that Israel is more culpable for the civilian deaths it causes than Hamas is with its rockets, as Israel had options (such as ending the blockade and negotiating with Hamas) which could have caused fewer civilian deaths, whereas Hamas did not. Rather Hamas responds as the disproportionately weaker party; the Palestinians were compelled to use the crude means at their disposal to free their lands from Israeli occupation, even if this meant being unable to target them well and some civilian deaths resulting.(25) Israel's Operation Cast Lead was less legitimate as it was not Israel's only option, and so cannot be regarded as proportionate. Furthermore, Israel's use of white phosphorous in Gaza was a humanitarian crime. The use of white phosphorous by Israel to shield its military movements in Gaza was a humanitarian crime, as the chemical causes serious health problems to civilians that inhale it. And, by all accounts, the chemical was inhaled by many Gazan civilians.(25)\n"
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normal
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Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
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[
93.0625
] |
[
89.0625,
91.125,
86.3125,
89.5625,
84.75,
84.375,
85.3125,
86.0625,
90.8125,
92.5
] |
The military operations were legitimate as Israeli self-defense:
The military operations were a legitimate use of the Israeli state’s right to defend itself and its citizens: To quote then-President-elect Barack Obama - "If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I would do everything to stop that, and would expect Israel to do the same thing."(1)
Prior to Israel's 2008-2009 military operations, Hamas had consistently violated the terms of the ceasefire between Gaza and Israel. It launched a total 6,300 rockets during an agreed hiatus in the confrontation, killing 10 and wounding more than 780. Hamas refused to extend the truce past 19 December 2008 and subsequently resumed attacks, firing nearly 300 more missiles, rockets and mortars.(1) Hamas was the first to actually escalate the conflict after the ceasefire expired, with a systematic increase in rocket attacks to a magnitude of hundreds of rockets fired daily in late December.(2) The 250,000 Israelis who lived in the southern part of the country were under constant threat, often in bomb shelters, and the economy suffered as a result.(1) Israel went to great lengths to avoid its military escalation. Just a few days before Israel's military operations, outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made an appeal on the Arab television station Al-Arabiya asking Gaza residents to stop the firing of rockets and mortar shells so that a military response could be avoided.(3) This appeal was apparently ignored by Hamas and the other militant groups in Gaza, and so Israel proceeded to respond militarily to remove the capacity of Gaza to launch rocket and mortar attacks – Israel was left with no other way to ensure that the inhabitants of the country’s southern regions would not have to live in fear of rocket fire.
Gaza was also a test case, intended to prove that Israel remained a legitimate and authoritative actor in the region. Much more was at stake than merely the military outcome of Israel's operation. The issue, rather, was Israel's ability to restore its deterrence power and uphold the principle that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity.(4) Israel's military operations were a good tool to fulfill this need for self-defense and did so effectively. The Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces, both to its leadership and to the tunnels from Gaza to Egypt that Hamas uses to smuggle in weapons and build its growing army.(1) Doing this damage was necessary as Israel could never be safe with a strong terrorist regime in control of Gaza. As David Harris, Executive Director for the American Jewish Committee, argued: "Israel could not tolerate a terrorist regime on its border that was launching repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and villages."(5) Therefore there can be no debate that Israel had the right to defend itself as well as the right to determine how best to do so.
While it is easy for countries and foreigners to state their opinions about Israel's security interests and how its actions may or may not fulfill them, Israel's right to make that judgment itself must be respected. Therefore Israel's military operations against Gaza were justified as legitimate self defense against Hamas and militant aggression which was putting the lives of Israeli citizens in jeopardy.
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[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel similarly violated the ceasefire prior to 2008, and had unlawfully kidnapped and imprisoned hundreds of Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel's attack on Gaza was not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the following principle: an end to the Israeli siege on Gaza in exchange for an end to Hamas-led rocket attacks on Israel. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before Operation Cast Lead was launched. Israel should have accepted Hamas’s offer and assessed whether Hamas’s intention to be bound by its terms was genuine before launching a military attack.(6) If an action isn't truly an act of last resort, it cannot be legitimately termed 'self-defense', and so is not justified. Hamas were prepared to enter into negotiations with Israel and it was prepared to discuss the more intricate details of the deal it had proposed. Its attempts to avoid conflict were committed and consistent enough to suggest that Gaza’s leaders were not engaged in diplomatic posturing or sabre rattling. Israel targeted more than just military targets, including UN warehouses holding medical and food supplies, UN schools, and hospitals. Its imprecise tactics and refusal to allow access of humanitarian workers show that it was not merely self-defense.\n"
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[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The long-term security of Israel rests in a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempting to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.\n\nA crucial step towards peace is to bring Hamas to the bargaining table. Israel's levelling of Gaza emboldened Hamas' message of resistance, and allowed Gazans to continue to rely on Hamas. As long as Israel continues to justify Arab and Palestinian anger through its disproportionate response, it is unlikely that enough trust can be established to reach a peace deal.\n\nEven Israelis recognize that this assualt has created an even larger barrier to peace. “This policy [Operation Cast Lead] is not strengthening Israel,” noted Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together.\"(10)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Under the same logic, over 1 million residents of Gaza have been under occupation since 1967, facing limited rights of movement, regular air raids, military checkpoints, random searches and seizures, random arrests, the destruction of sanitation facilities, homes, schools, roads, shops, markets, and health facilities, and therefore Hamas has the right act in its own self-defense by whatever means it sees fit. If Palestinians do not have an army to call to its defense, how can the entire population be punished for the actions of non-state military groups?\n\nIsrael’s right to take positive steps of some kind in the interests of its own safety does not mean it has the right to do anything it wishes in order to protect itself. It is also evident that Israel violated international law and committed war crimes, was was reported in the Goldstone Report.\n\nBetween the time when the shelling from Gaza started in 2001 and Operation Cast Lead, 20 Israeli civilians were killed by rockets or mortars, according to estimates by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that killed more than 1,400 people.(10) As Javier Solana, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said in late December 2008, \"the current Israeli strikes are inflicting an unacceptable toll on Palestinian civilians.\"(14)\n\nIt is a widely accepted principle of international law that actions taken pursuant to a state’s right to defend itself must be proportionate to the danger that the state faces. While the 20 deaths that resulted from the actions of Hamas and its associates were tragic, the nature of these attacks did not justify a full scale military invasion of the Gaza strip, or the mass destruction of infrastructure essential to life in the strip.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 None of these arguments change that fact that 250,000 Israelis in southern Israel lived under constant fear of Hamas rocket attacks, which Hamas escalated after a ceasefire which it refused to extend. It is notable that Syria, an implacable enemy of Israel, actually played a significant role in triggering he conflict. The Damascus office of Hamas, which operates under the aegis of the regime of Bashar al Assad, vetoed the efforts of Hamas leaders in Gaza to extend the cease-fire and insisted on escalating rocket attacks.(4) The role of foreign powers in proving the conflict through Hamas has been recognized outside of Israel was well: Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, assailed Israel's air strikes but also held Hamas responsible. The Egyptian government understood that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is increasingly allied with Iran and its goals for fomenting regional instability.(1) Israel could not possibly have been expected to thus not take military action to defend itself when coming under rocket fire from a terrorist government dedicated to Israel's destruction and under the direction of foreign states which are mortal enemies of Israel's existence. There was simply no other way to stop the rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel's blockade of Gaza was not a justified reason for Hamas' rocket attacks. Israeli control of Gaza’s borders was a response to Hamas’ exploitation of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to turn it into an armed, Islamic state dedicated to the destruction of Israel above all else, even its own economy. Hamas was not provoked. Quite the contrary. Hamas’ arms smuggling was the provocation. Then, on top of this provocation, Hamas fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. The idea that Hamas was provoked leapfrogs the facts.(27)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 It is indisputable that Hamas has launched violent attacks against civilian targets. Israel, on the other hand, conducts its operations exercising all due care to limit civilian casualties. Hamas terrorists, however, set up their headquarters and store weapons in private homes, schools, colleges and mosques. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit have blamed Hamas for provoking the Israeli attack on Hamas targets embedded in civilian areas.(28) Israel's air assault has resulted in more Palestinian casualties, but that is in part because Hamas deliberately locates its security forces in residential neighborhoods. This is intended both to deter Israel from attacking in the first place as well as to turn world opinion against the Jewish state when it does attack. By all accounts, however, the Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces.(1)\n\nIsrael actually put its own troops in harm’s way to minimize civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.(13) This shows Israel's commitment to preventing civilian casualties and thus the justification of Operation Cast Lead. The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian casualties can be explained by the fact that Israel has early warning systems and hospitals. Israel invests significantly more in stable buildings that do not crumble when subjected a blast, systems that can detect incoming rocket fire, and an extensive and modern network of hospitals and emergency response teams. This, and the fact that Israel does not attempt to shield its military installations behind civilian homes and businesses, helps lower the number of civilian casualties as compared to in Gaza.(2)\n\nThe claim that Israel violated the principle of proportionality, by killing more Hamas terrorists than the number of Israeli civilians killed by Hamas rockets, is absurd. There is no legal equivalence between the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and the deliberate killings of Hamas combatants. Under the laws of war, any number of combatants can be killed to prevent the killing of even one innocent civilian.(29) Moreover, if Israel were to be 'proportional' and respond to the Hamas attacks in the same way, what would that mean? Would this require that it launch rocket attacks back against Gazan civilians? Obviously not (this would result in even more civilian deaths), and this is where the logic of proportionality against terrorist attacks makes little sense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The most important thing for regional peace in the long run is not the belief among Israelis that there is a 'military solution' to the conflict, but rather the belief of Hamas and its backers in Syria and Iran that Israel can be 'solved' militarily. It is this belief that causes them to constantly return to using force against Israel, as they did with the rocket attacks. Therefore to establish peace in the long run, Israeli deterrent and demonstration that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity are the most important factors, and these are exactly what Operation Cast Lead re-established. Moreover, Hamas may promotes itself as the legitimate power in Gaza, but in reality, Hamas is at its core a terrorist organization that refuses to renounce violence or recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hamas came to power in Gaza through a violent coup against the Palestinian Authority government. Since Hamas refuses to live in peace with Israel, the Israeli government has no choice but to seek Hamas' replacement.(2)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were necessary for long term peace:\n\nAs Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Haleviargue explain, “the Israeli public will not make territorial concessions on the West Bank or the Golan Heights if Gaza is allowed to become a neighboring terrorist state that can launch attacks with impunity. Israel had already had a bad enough experience letting that happen with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.”(1) Without the assurance that they will be allowed to protect their homes and families following withdrawal, Israelis will rightly perceive a two-state solution as an existential threat. They will continue to share the left-wing vision of coexistence with a peaceful Palestinian neighbor in theory, but in reality will heed the right's warnings of Jewish powerlessness.(4)\n\nMeanwhile, the stronger Hamas becomes, the more resistance moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will face to making any concessions to Israel.(1) Therefore damaging Hamas, via Operation Cast Lead, actually aided the peace process in the long run, and was necessary in order to make an eventual two-state peace solution possible. The Israeli attacks may also eventually help force Hamas to accept a more durable ceasefire. Unlike the botched invasion of Lebanon in 2006, when Israel set itself the unattainable goal of eliminating the military capability of Hezbollah, during Operation Cast Lead it was made clear that the objective was not to wipe out Hamas, but instead to force the radical group to accept a durable cease-fire on Israel's terms.(8) This was necessary as prior to Operation Cast Lead Hamas showed no interest in peace, opting instead to pursue its political objectives through the use of terrorism. When Hamas came to power in Gaza in January 2006, it failed to control the rocket fire from the variety of miltary brigades, including its own al-Qassam brigade, into Israel and failed to establish internal stability. The widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas, which ended in June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza and ousted leaders of President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, made Israel more wary of the security threat an unstable Gaza could pose.(9)\n\nIn Israel's view, Hamas' behavior and its reliance on terror tactics will never change if it thinks it can attack with impunity, and so the Israeli military operations were necessary and justified in the name of restoring Israel's deterrent and weakening Hamas, both of which make long term peace more likely.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were proportionate to the threat:\n\nOperation Cast Lead was justified as it was proportionate to Hamas' rocket attacks against Israel. It should be remembered that 250,000 Israelis living in the southern part of the country had lived under years of terrorism before Operation Cast Lead was launched, often in bomb shelters, and the economy has suffered. The world's media may only have paid attention when Israel responded to Hamas' barrage, but this does not mean that Israel was not already under severe attack by this point.(1) Moreover, the Israeli strikes were rightly measured to disable Hamas rocket attacks.(11)\n\nTerror groups fire indiscriminately at innocent Israelis and then complain of excessive or disproportionate force when Israel fires back. But according to internationally accepted laws of war, Israel is permitted to respond with the force necessary to end the conflict.(2)\n\nIsrael was legitimate in using full force to win its war on Hamas; Israel was under no obligation to restrain itself in what is, on Hamas' own terms, an existential war. Provoked by Hamas, Israel had every right to wage a disproportionate and overwhelming response. Hamas has repeatedly stated that its objective is to destroy Israel. Such an existential threat goes beyond simply Hamas' rocket attacks, as it portends much more destructive attacks in the future. This justifies defensive attacks from Israel that go beyond responding merely to the Hamas rockets, and would even justify Israeli efforts to fully demobilize or destroy Hamas.(12) In spite of this, Israel was actually far more restrained and proportionate than it was obligated to be. Israeli precision strikes sought to minimize civilian deaths, as Benjamin Netanyahu argued: \"In launching precision strikes against Hamas rocket launchers, headquarters, weapons depots, smuggling tunnels and training camps, Israel is trying to minimize civilian casualties.\"(13) Unlike Hamas, Israeli strikes targeted military sites, not civilians. As Gary Grant argued: \"Even if you target your action at military sites, civilians are inevitably going to get killed...these need to be contrasted with the actions of Hamas where every single rocket is designed to attack civilian populations, so every single act of Hamas in firing these rockets is clearly an illegal act without any legal justification.\"(2)\n\nIsrael may have been justified in acting disproportionately, but instead chose to respond in a proportionate and limited manner which minimized civilian deaths in Gaza, and thus the Israeli military operations were certainly justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations harmed the chances of peace in the long term:\n\nThe long-term security of Israel rests with a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempts to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.(10)\n\nOperation Cast Lead ignored history, which teaches that there is no military solution to peace with the Palestinians. As a Daily Star Editorial argued, \"For the Israelis, once they have exercised this latest spasm of gratuitous bloodletting, there will be yet another opportunity to accept the oft-proved impossibility of a military solution. The Palestinian people will not be battered into submission, no amount of air strikes will make the core issues in the moribund peace process go away, and all of the same difficult decisions will still be waiting when the dust settles.\"(18) Thus Operation Cast Lead actually undermined future peace by once more making Israelis believe they can fight their way to a solution, which they cannot. As Nicholas Kristoff argues, \"What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other.\"(10)\n\nIsrael cannot stop rocket attacks by military action alone; eventually a political deal will be needed.(19) Operation Cast Lead emboldened the anti-negotiation side of Israeli politics, however, which focus on their claim that Israel should not negotiate with Hamas. However, Hamas was democratically elected, and so Israel must make peace with them. If Hamas was an authoritarian regime, Israel could possible attempt to get rid of it and make peace with the Palestinians in Gaza separately. But, because Hamas was democratically elected, any efforts by Israel to destroy them will be seen in Gaza as an effort to destroy the Palestinians and their democratic will. This would not enable any long-term peace with the Palestinians. Therefore, a long-term peace depends on working with Hamas, rather than attempting to destroy them.(20) Instead, Israel pursued Operation Cast Lead, which included an Israeli ground assault in Gaza, the excessive force of which is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.(10) The fact that Hamas was always going to survive Israel's assault meant that Operation Cast Lead was always going to help to consolidate the legitimacy of the Hamas movement, and to ensure that all the efforts of Israel to eliminate that fundamental pillar of resistance will produce the reverse result.(22)\n\nIsrael's offensive gave Iran and its allies a way to pressure Egypt, Jordan and other Arab 'moderates'. Like the Lebanon war of 2006, Israel's battle with Hamas in Gaza produced a schism among Muslim states. Iran and its Lebanon based ally Hezbollah have joined Hamas's Damascus-based leadership in calling for a new intifada, or uprising, against Israel -- and also against the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which are accused of silently supporting Israel's air attacks.(23) Israel’s ruthless attack on Gaza and the massive civilian casualties it has inflicted has severely damaged the nation's moral stature in the world. This moral deficit will cause problems for Israel in its future engagements in the world. Therefore long term peace in the region was harmed by Operation Cast Lead, and so it was not justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense:\n\nIsrael has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that they amounted to an act of 'self-defense' as recognized by Article 51, United Nations Charter. This contention should be rejected: the rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they were, did not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defense. Under international law, self-defense is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity.\n\nOperation Cast Lead caused the deaths of over 1,400 Palestinians, over 300 of whom were children, injured 4,500 more and resulted in the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN facilities and government buildings. If, as Israel has stated, Cast Lead was carried out in accordance with the terms of international law, and the safeguards incorporated into the contemporary law of war, then Israeli forces had a duty to protect civilian infrastructure under the fourth Geneva Convention. The death and destruction that Israeli forces wrought throughout the Gaza Strip was not commensurate with the losses caused by Hamas rocket fire, no matter how horrific those attacks may have been.\n\nIsrael’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defense, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary. Israel could have agreed to renew the truce with Hamas.(15) Israel's attack on Gaza was also not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the principle that Hamas stop firing rockets at Israel in return for Israel lifting its siege on Gaza. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before it started Operation Cast Lead, and Israel should have taken it then and seen how went before resorting to military force.(6)\n\nIsrael arguably provoked the entire conflict by targeting Palestinian civilians with its blockade on Gaza. According to Hebrew University international law expert Yuval Shani, \"It is my opinion that in this situation, and given the question marks regarding Israel's status in Gaza and Gaza's long-standing dependency on Israel, cutting off its water and electricity supplies would be equivalent to a direct attack on a civilian target, especially given that the motive for doing so is one of collective punishment, which is, in itself, a problematic motive.\"(26) Hamas had offered to renew the ceasefire if Israel reopened Gaza's border crossings. The strip had been sealed by Israel in an economic siege aimed at toppling Hamas. The blockade had brought the territory near economic collapse.(21) Therefore this blockade must be seen as the true cause of the conflict, and thus Operation Cast Lead was not a legitimate act of self-defense.\n\nThe lack of efficacy of Operation Cast Lead also undermines its legitimacy as 'self-defense': while Hamas's offensive capacities were blunted for a while, the likelihood, as with Hezbollah after Lebanon in 2006, is that it will quickly rebuild its military strength. Indeed, the assassinations of its leaders by Israel over the years- and the raids on its weapons workshops- did little to limit its rise to power.(16) Israel's overall strategy, moreover, is not one of 'self-defense' against Hamas, but rather to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward their Hamas government. This is why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza’s utilities, and why, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents were deprived running water. As Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues, argued: “The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza.”(10) Rashid Khalidi added to this argument: \"This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about 'restoring Israel’s deterrence,' as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: 'The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.'\"(17)\n\nIsraeli internal politics may also have played a role in determining the size and scope of Cast Lead. Israel was preparing for general elections on 10 February 2009. The prospect of a return to power by the hawk Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, promising tough action against Hamas, hardened the positions of Israel's more moderate political leaders, and may have caused them to launch such an operation to 'look tough', rather than judging its proportionality on its own merits.(21)Therefore Operation Cast Lead should be regarded not as legitimate self-defense, but rather as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and consequently w\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians:\n\nThe killing of over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more than 4,500 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire. For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire. And yet in 2005-8, according to the UN, the Israeli army killed about 1,250 Palestinians in Gaza, including 222 children. Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it.(15) The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious, but the numbers speak for themselves: 800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed during Operation Cast Lead. In contrast, around a dozen Israelis were killed, many of them soldiers.(17) Precision strikes which avoided civilian deaths were never going to be possible in the crowded Gaza Strip. As Akiva Eldar argued: \"The tremendous population density in the Gaza Strip does not allow a 'surgical operation' over an extended period that would minimize damage to civilian populations. The difficult images from the Strip will soon replace those of the damage inflicted by Qassam rockets in the western Negev. The scale of losses, which works in 'favor' of the Palestinians, will return Israel to the role of Goliath.\"(24)\n\nIt is notable that Israel is more culpable for the civilian deaths it causes than Hamas is with its rockets, as Israel had options (such as ending the blockade and negotiating with Hamas) which could have caused fewer civilian deaths, whereas Hamas did not. Rather Hamas responds as the disproportionately weaker party; the Palestinians were compelled to use the crude means at their disposal to free their lands from Israeli occupation, even if this meant being unable to target them well and some civilian deaths resulting.(25) Israel's Operation Cast Lead was less legitimate as it was not Israel's only option, and so cannot be regarded as proportionate. Furthermore, Israel's use of white phosphorous in Gaza was a humanitarian crime. The use of white phosphorous by Israel to shield its military movements in Gaza was a humanitarian crime, as the chemical causes serious health problems to civilians that inhale it. And, by all accounts, the chemical was inhaled by many Gazan civilians.(25)\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.0625
] |
[
89.625,
93.3125,
87.25,
85.1875,
87.4375,
85.3125,
85.875,
88.375,
93.5,
90.875
] |
Israel's military operations harmed the chances of peace in the long term:
The long-term security of Israel rests with a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempts to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.(10)
Operation Cast Lead ignored history, which teaches that there is no military solution to peace with the Palestinians. As a Daily Star Editorial argued, "For the Israelis, once they have exercised this latest spasm of gratuitous bloodletting, there will be yet another opportunity to accept the oft-proved impossibility of a military solution. The Palestinian people will not be battered into submission, no amount of air strikes will make the core issues in the moribund peace process go away, and all of the same difficult decisions will still be waiting when the dust settles."(18) Thus Operation Cast Lead actually undermined future peace by once more making Israelis believe they can fight their way to a solution, which they cannot. As Nicholas Kristoff argues, "What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other."(10)
Israel cannot stop rocket attacks by military action alone; eventually a political deal will be needed.(19) Operation Cast Lead emboldened the anti-negotiation side of Israeli politics, however, which focus on their claim that Israel should not negotiate with Hamas. However, Hamas was democratically elected, and so Israel must make peace with them. If Hamas was an authoritarian regime, Israel could possible attempt to get rid of it and make peace with the Palestinians in Gaza separately. But, because Hamas was democratically elected, any efforts by Israel to destroy them will be seen in Gaza as an effort to destroy the Palestinians and their democratic will. This would not enable any long-term peace with the Palestinians. Therefore, a long-term peace depends on working with Hamas, rather than attempting to destroy them.(20) Instead, Israel pursued Operation Cast Lead, which included an Israeli ground assault in Gaza, the excessive force of which is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.(10) The fact that Hamas was always going to survive Israel's assault meant that Operation Cast Lead was always going to help to consolidate the legitimacy of the Hamas movement, and to ensure that all the efforts of Israel to eliminate that fundamental pillar of resistance will produce the reverse result.(22)
Israel's offensive gave Iran and its allies a way to pressure Egypt, Jordan and other Arab 'moderates'. Like the Lebanon war of 2006, Israel's battle with Hamas in Gaza produced a schism among Muslim states. Iran and its Lebanon based ally Hezbollah have joined Hamas's Damascus-based leadership in calling for a new intifada, or uprising, against Israel -- and also against the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which are accused of silently supporting Israel's air attacks.(23) Israel’s ruthless attack on Gaza and the massive civilian casualties it has inflicted has severely damaged the nation's moral stature in the world. This moral deficit will cause problems for Israel in its future engagements in the world. Therefore long term peace in the region was harmed by Operation Cast Lead, and so it was not justified.
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[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The most important thing for regional peace in the long run is not the belief among Israelis that there is a 'military solution' to the conflict, but rather the belief of Hamas and its backers in Syria and Iran that Israel can be 'solved' militarily. It is this belief that causes them to constantly return to using force against Israel, as they did with the rocket attacks. Therefore to establish peace in the long run, Israeli deterrent and demonstration that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity are the most important factors, and these are exactly what Operation Cast Lead re-established. Moreover, Hamas may promotes itself as the legitimate power in Gaza, but in reality, Hamas is at its core a terrorist organization that refuses to renounce violence or recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hamas came to power in Gaza through a violent coup against the Palestinian Authority government. Since Hamas refuses to live in peace with Israel, the Israeli government has no choice but to seek Hamas' replacement.(2)\n"
] |
[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 None of these arguments change that fact that 250,000 Israelis in southern Israel lived under constant fear of Hamas rocket attacks, which Hamas escalated after a ceasefire which it refused to extend. It is notable that Syria, an implacable enemy of Israel, actually played a significant role in triggering he conflict. The Damascus office of Hamas, which operates under the aegis of the regime of Bashar al Assad, vetoed the efforts of Hamas leaders in Gaza to extend the cease-fire and insisted on escalating rocket attacks.(4) The role of foreign powers in proving the conflict through Hamas has been recognized outside of Israel was well: Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, assailed Israel's air strikes but also held Hamas responsible. The Egyptian government understood that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is increasingly allied with Iran and its goals for fomenting regional instability.(1) Israel could not possibly have been expected to thus not take military action to defend itself when coming under rocket fire from a terrorist government dedicated to Israel's destruction and under the direction of foreign states which are mortal enemies of Israel's existence. There was simply no other way to stop the rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel's blockade of Gaza was not a justified reason for Hamas' rocket attacks. Israeli control of Gaza’s borders was a response to Hamas’ exploitation of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to turn it into an armed, Islamic state dedicated to the destruction of Israel above all else, even its own economy. Hamas was not provoked. Quite the contrary. Hamas’ arms smuggling was the provocation. Then, on top of this provocation, Hamas fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. The idea that Hamas was provoked leapfrogs the facts.(27)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 It is indisputable that Hamas has launched violent attacks against civilian targets. Israel, on the other hand, conducts its operations exercising all due care to limit civilian casualties. Hamas terrorists, however, set up their headquarters and store weapons in private homes, schools, colleges and mosques. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit have blamed Hamas for provoking the Israeli attack on Hamas targets embedded in civilian areas.(28) Israel's air assault has resulted in more Palestinian casualties, but that is in part because Hamas deliberately locates its security forces in residential neighborhoods. This is intended both to deter Israel from attacking in the first place as well as to turn world opinion against the Jewish state when it does attack. By all accounts, however, the Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces.(1)\n\nIsrael actually put its own troops in harm’s way to minimize civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.(13) This shows Israel's commitment to preventing civilian casualties and thus the justification of Operation Cast Lead. The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian casualties can be explained by the fact that Israel has early warning systems and hospitals. Israel invests significantly more in stable buildings that do not crumble when subjected a blast, systems that can detect incoming rocket fire, and an extensive and modern network of hospitals and emergency response teams. This, and the fact that Israel does not attempt to shield its military installations behind civilian homes and businesses, helps lower the number of civilian casualties as compared to in Gaza.(2)\n\nThe claim that Israel violated the principle of proportionality, by killing more Hamas terrorists than the number of Israeli civilians killed by Hamas rockets, is absurd. There is no legal equivalence between the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and the deliberate killings of Hamas combatants. Under the laws of war, any number of combatants can be killed to prevent the killing of even one innocent civilian.(29) Moreover, if Israel were to be 'proportional' and respond to the Hamas attacks in the same way, what would that mean? Would this require that it launch rocket attacks back against Gazan civilians? Obviously not (this would result in even more civilian deaths), and this is where the logic of proportionality against terrorist attacks makes little sense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The long-term security of Israel rests in a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempting to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.\n\nA crucial step towards peace is to bring Hamas to the bargaining table. Israel's levelling of Gaza emboldened Hamas' message of resistance, and allowed Gazans to continue to rely on Hamas. As long as Israel continues to justify Arab and Palestinian anger through its disproportionate response, it is unlikely that enough trust can be established to reach a peace deal.\n\nEven Israelis recognize that this assualt has created an even larger barrier to peace. “This policy [Operation Cast Lead] is not strengthening Israel,” noted Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together.\"(10)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Under the same logic, over 1 million residents of Gaza have been under occupation since 1967, facing limited rights of movement, regular air raids, military checkpoints, random searches and seizures, random arrests, the destruction of sanitation facilities, homes, schools, roads, shops, markets, and health facilities, and therefore Hamas has the right act in its own self-defense by whatever means it sees fit. If Palestinians do not have an army to call to its defense, how can the entire population be punished for the actions of non-state military groups?\n\nIsrael’s right to take positive steps of some kind in the interests of its own safety does not mean it has the right to do anything it wishes in order to protect itself. It is also evident that Israel violated international law and committed war crimes, was was reported in the Goldstone Report.\n\nBetween the time when the shelling from Gaza started in 2001 and Operation Cast Lead, 20 Israeli civilians were killed by rockets or mortars, according to estimates by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that killed more than 1,400 people.(10) As Javier Solana, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said in late December 2008, \"the current Israeli strikes are inflicting an unacceptable toll on Palestinian civilians.\"(14)\n\nIt is a widely accepted principle of international law that actions taken pursuant to a state’s right to defend itself must be proportionate to the danger that the state faces. While the 20 deaths that resulted from the actions of Hamas and its associates were tragic, the nature of these attacks did not justify a full scale military invasion of the Gaza strip, or the mass destruction of infrastructure essential to life in the strip.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel similarly violated the ceasefire prior to 2008, and had unlawfully kidnapped and imprisoned hundreds of Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel's attack on Gaza was not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the following principle: an end to the Israeli siege on Gaza in exchange for an end to Hamas-led rocket attacks on Israel. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before Operation Cast Lead was launched. Israel should have accepted Hamas’s offer and assessed whether Hamas’s intention to be bound by its terms was genuine before launching a military attack.(6) If an action isn't truly an act of last resort, it cannot be legitimately termed 'self-defense', and so is not justified. Hamas were prepared to enter into negotiations with Israel and it was prepared to discuss the more intricate details of the deal it had proposed. Its attempts to avoid conflict were committed and consistent enough to suggest that Gaza’s leaders were not engaged in diplomatic posturing or sabre rattling. Israel targeted more than just military targets, including UN warehouses holding medical and food supplies, UN schools, and hospitals. Its imprecise tactics and refusal to allow access of humanitarian workers show that it was not merely self-defense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense:\n\nIsrael has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that they amounted to an act of 'self-defense' as recognized by Article 51, United Nations Charter. This contention should be rejected: the rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they were, did not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defense. Under international law, self-defense is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity.\n\nOperation Cast Lead caused the deaths of over 1,400 Palestinians, over 300 of whom were children, injured 4,500 more and resulted in the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN facilities and government buildings. If, as Israel has stated, Cast Lead was carried out in accordance with the terms of international law, and the safeguards incorporated into the contemporary law of war, then Israeli forces had a duty to protect civilian infrastructure under the fourth Geneva Convention. The death and destruction that Israeli forces wrought throughout the Gaza Strip was not commensurate with the losses caused by Hamas rocket fire, no matter how horrific those attacks may have been.\n\nIsrael’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defense, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary. Israel could have agreed to renew the truce with Hamas.(15) Israel's attack on Gaza was also not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the principle that Hamas stop firing rockets at Israel in return for Israel lifting its siege on Gaza. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before it started Operation Cast Lead, and Israel should have taken it then and seen how went before resorting to military force.(6)\n\nIsrael arguably provoked the entire conflict by targeting Palestinian civilians with its blockade on Gaza. According to Hebrew University international law expert Yuval Shani, \"It is my opinion that in this situation, and given the question marks regarding Israel's status in Gaza and Gaza's long-standing dependency on Israel, cutting off its water and electricity supplies would be equivalent to a direct attack on a civilian target, especially given that the motive for doing so is one of collective punishment, which is, in itself, a problematic motive.\"(26) Hamas had offered to renew the ceasefire if Israel reopened Gaza's border crossings. The strip had been sealed by Israel in an economic siege aimed at toppling Hamas. The blockade had brought the territory near economic collapse.(21) Therefore this blockade must be seen as the true cause of the conflict, and thus Operation Cast Lead was not a legitimate act of self-defense.\n\nThe lack of efficacy of Operation Cast Lead also undermines its legitimacy as 'self-defense': while Hamas's offensive capacities were blunted for a while, the likelihood, as with Hezbollah after Lebanon in 2006, is that it will quickly rebuild its military strength. Indeed, the assassinations of its leaders by Israel over the years- and the raids on its weapons workshops- did little to limit its rise to power.(16) Israel's overall strategy, moreover, is not one of 'self-defense' against Hamas, but rather to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward their Hamas government. This is why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza’s utilities, and why, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents were deprived running water. As Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues, argued: “The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza.”(10) Rashid Khalidi added to this argument: \"This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about 'restoring Israel’s deterrence,' as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: 'The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.'\"(17)\n\nIsraeli internal politics may also have played a role in determining the size and scope of Cast Lead. Israel was preparing for general elections on 10 February 2009. The prospect of a return to power by the hawk Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, promising tough action against Hamas, hardened the positions of Israel's more moderate political leaders, and may have caused them to launch such an operation to 'look tough', rather than judging its proportionality on its own merits.(21)Therefore Operation Cast Lead should be regarded not as legitimate self-defense, but rather as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and consequently w\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians:\n\nThe killing of over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more than 4,500 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire. For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire. And yet in 2005-8, according to the UN, the Israeli army killed about 1,250 Palestinians in Gaza, including 222 children. Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it.(15) The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious, but the numbers speak for themselves: 800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed during Operation Cast Lead. In contrast, around a dozen Israelis were killed, many of them soldiers.(17) Precision strikes which avoided civilian deaths were never going to be possible in the crowded Gaza Strip. As Akiva Eldar argued: \"The tremendous population density in the Gaza Strip does not allow a 'surgical operation' over an extended period that would minimize damage to civilian populations. The difficult images from the Strip will soon replace those of the damage inflicted by Qassam rockets in the western Negev. The scale of losses, which works in 'favor' of the Palestinians, will return Israel to the role of Goliath.\"(24)\n\nIt is notable that Israel is more culpable for the civilian deaths it causes than Hamas is with its rockets, as Israel had options (such as ending the blockade and negotiating with Hamas) which could have caused fewer civilian deaths, whereas Hamas did not. Rather Hamas responds as the disproportionately weaker party; the Palestinians were compelled to use the crude means at their disposal to free their lands from Israeli occupation, even if this meant being unable to target them well and some civilian deaths resulting.(25) Israel's Operation Cast Lead was less legitimate as it was not Israel's only option, and so cannot be regarded as proportionate. Furthermore, Israel's use of white phosphorous in Gaza was a humanitarian crime. The use of white phosphorous by Israel to shield its military movements in Gaza was a humanitarian crime, as the chemical causes serious health problems to civilians that inhale it. And, by all accounts, the chemical was inhaled by many Gazan civilians.(25)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were necessary for long term peace:\n\nAs Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Haleviargue explain, “the Israeli public will not make territorial concessions on the West Bank or the Golan Heights if Gaza is allowed to become a neighboring terrorist state that can launch attacks with impunity. Israel had already had a bad enough experience letting that happen with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.”(1) Without the assurance that they will be allowed to protect their homes and families following withdrawal, Israelis will rightly perceive a two-state solution as an existential threat. They will continue to share the left-wing vision of coexistence with a peaceful Palestinian neighbor in theory, but in reality will heed the right's warnings of Jewish powerlessness.(4)\n\nMeanwhile, the stronger Hamas becomes, the more resistance moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will face to making any concessions to Israel.(1) Therefore damaging Hamas, via Operation Cast Lead, actually aided the peace process in the long run, and was necessary in order to make an eventual two-state peace solution possible. The Israeli attacks may also eventually help force Hamas to accept a more durable ceasefire. Unlike the botched invasion of Lebanon in 2006, when Israel set itself the unattainable goal of eliminating the military capability of Hezbollah, during Operation Cast Lead it was made clear that the objective was not to wipe out Hamas, but instead to force the radical group to accept a durable cease-fire on Israel's terms.(8) This was necessary as prior to Operation Cast Lead Hamas showed no interest in peace, opting instead to pursue its political objectives through the use of terrorism. When Hamas came to power in Gaza in January 2006, it failed to control the rocket fire from the variety of miltary brigades, including its own al-Qassam brigade, into Israel and failed to establish internal stability. The widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas, which ended in June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza and ousted leaders of President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, made Israel more wary of the security threat an unstable Gaza could pose.(9)\n\nIn Israel's view, Hamas' behavior and its reliance on terror tactics will never change if it thinks it can attack with impunity, and so the Israeli military operations were necessary and justified in the name of restoring Israel's deterrent and weakening Hamas, both of which make long term peace more likely.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were proportionate to the threat:\n\nOperation Cast Lead was justified as it was proportionate to Hamas' rocket attacks against Israel. It should be remembered that 250,000 Israelis living in the southern part of the country had lived under years of terrorism before Operation Cast Lead was launched, often in bomb shelters, and the economy has suffered. The world's media may only have paid attention when Israel responded to Hamas' barrage, but this does not mean that Israel was not already under severe attack by this point.(1) Moreover, the Israeli strikes were rightly measured to disable Hamas rocket attacks.(11)\n\nTerror groups fire indiscriminately at innocent Israelis and then complain of excessive or disproportionate force when Israel fires back. But according to internationally accepted laws of war, Israel is permitted to respond with the force necessary to end the conflict.(2)\n\nIsrael was legitimate in using full force to win its war on Hamas; Israel was under no obligation to restrain itself in what is, on Hamas' own terms, an existential war. Provoked by Hamas, Israel had every right to wage a disproportionate and overwhelming response. Hamas has repeatedly stated that its objective is to destroy Israel. Such an existential threat goes beyond simply Hamas' rocket attacks, as it portends much more destructive attacks in the future. This justifies defensive attacks from Israel that go beyond responding merely to the Hamas rockets, and would even justify Israeli efforts to fully demobilize or destroy Hamas.(12) In spite of this, Israel was actually far more restrained and proportionate than it was obligated to be. Israeli precision strikes sought to minimize civilian deaths, as Benjamin Netanyahu argued: \"In launching precision strikes against Hamas rocket launchers, headquarters, weapons depots, smuggling tunnels and training camps, Israel is trying to minimize civilian casualties.\"(13) Unlike Hamas, Israeli strikes targeted military sites, not civilians. As Gary Grant argued: \"Even if you target your action at military sites, civilians are inevitably going to get killed...these need to be contrasted with the actions of Hamas where every single rocket is designed to attack civilian populations, so every single act of Hamas in firing these rockets is clearly an illegal act without any legal justification.\"(2)\n\nIsrael may have been justified in acting disproportionately, but instead chose to respond in a proportionate and limited manner which minimized civilian deaths in Gaza, and thus the Israeli military operations were certainly justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were legitimate as Israeli self-defense:\n\nThe military operations were a legitimate use of the Israeli state’s right to defend itself and its citizens: To quote then-President-elect Barack Obama - \"If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I would do everything to stop that, and would expect Israel to do the same thing.\"(1)\n\nPrior to Israel's 2008-2009 military operations, Hamas had consistently violated the terms of the ceasefire between Gaza and Israel. It launched a total 6,300 rockets during an agreed hiatus in the confrontation, killing 10 and wounding more than 780. Hamas refused to extend the truce past 19 December 2008 and subsequently resumed attacks, firing nearly 300 more missiles, rockets and mortars.(1) Hamas was the first to actually escalate the conflict after the ceasefire expired, with a systematic increase in rocket attacks to a magnitude of hundreds of rockets fired daily in late December.(2) The 250,000 Israelis who lived in the southern part of the country were under constant threat, often in bomb shelters, and the economy suffered as a result.(1) Israel went to great lengths to avoid its military escalation. Just a few days before Israel's military operations, outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made an appeal on the Arab television station Al-Arabiya asking Gaza residents to stop the firing of rockets and mortar shells so that a military response could be avoided.(3) This appeal was apparently ignored by Hamas and the other militant groups in Gaza, and so Israel proceeded to respond militarily to remove the capacity of Gaza to launch rocket and mortar attacks – Israel was left with no other way to ensure that the inhabitants of the country’s southern regions would not have to live in fear of rocket fire.\n\nGaza was also a test case, intended to prove that Israel remained a legitimate and authoritative actor in the region. Much more was at stake than merely the military outcome of Israel's operation. The issue, rather, was Israel's ability to restore its deterrence power and uphold the principle that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity.(4) Israel's military operations were a good tool to fulfill this need for self-defense and did so effectively. The Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces, both to its leadership and to the tunnels from Gaza to Egypt that Hamas uses to smuggle in weapons and build its growing army.(1) Doing this damage was necessary as Israel could never be safe with a strong terrorist regime in control of Gaza. As David Harris, Executive Director for the American Jewish Committee, argued: \"Israel could not tolerate a terrorist regime on its border that was launching repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and villages.\"(5) Therefore there can be no debate that Israel had the right to defend itself as well as the right to determine how best to do so.\n\nWhile it is easy for countries and foreigners to state their opinions about Israel's security interests and how its actions may or may not fulfill them, Israel's right to make that judgment itself must be respected. Therefore Israel's military operations against Gaza were justified as legitimate self defense against Hamas and militant aggression which was putting the lives of Israeli citizens in jeopardy.\n"
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Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
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94.875
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Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense:
Israel has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that they amounted to an act of 'self-defense' as recognized by Article 51, United Nations Charter. This contention should be rejected: the rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they were, did not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defense. Under international law, self-defense is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity.
Operation Cast Lead caused the deaths of over 1,400 Palestinians, over 300 of whom were children, injured 4,500 more and resulted in the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN facilities and government buildings. If, as Israel has stated, Cast Lead was carried out in accordance with the terms of international law, and the safeguards incorporated into the contemporary law of war, then Israeli forces had a duty to protect civilian infrastructure under the fourth Geneva Convention. The death and destruction that Israeli forces wrought throughout the Gaza Strip was not commensurate with the losses caused by Hamas rocket fire, no matter how horrific those attacks may have been.
Israel’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defense, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary. Israel could have agreed to renew the truce with Hamas.(15) Israel's attack on Gaza was also not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the principle that Hamas stop firing rockets at Israel in return for Israel lifting its siege on Gaza. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before it started Operation Cast Lead, and Israel should have taken it then and seen how went before resorting to military force.(6)
Israel arguably provoked the entire conflict by targeting Palestinian civilians with its blockade on Gaza. According to Hebrew University international law expert Yuval Shani, "It is my opinion that in this situation, and given the question marks regarding Israel's status in Gaza and Gaza's long-standing dependency on Israel, cutting off its water and electricity supplies would be equivalent to a direct attack on a civilian target, especially given that the motive for doing so is one of collective punishment, which is, in itself, a problematic motive."(26) Hamas had offered to renew the ceasefire if Israel reopened Gaza's border crossings. The strip had been sealed by Israel in an economic siege aimed at toppling Hamas. The blockade had brought the territory near economic collapse.(21) Therefore this blockade must be seen as the true cause of the conflict, and thus Operation Cast Lead was not a legitimate act of self-defense.
The lack of efficacy of Operation Cast Lead also undermines its legitimacy as 'self-defense': while Hamas's offensive capacities were blunted for a while, the likelihood, as with Hezbollah after Lebanon in 2006, is that it will quickly rebuild its military strength. Indeed, the assassinations of its leaders by Israel over the years- and the raids on its weapons workshops- did little to limit its rise to power.(16) Israel's overall strategy, moreover, is not one of 'self-defense' against Hamas, but rather to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward their Hamas government. This is why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza’s utilities, and why, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents were deprived running water. As Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues, argued: “The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza.”(10) Rashid Khalidi added to this argument: "This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about 'restoring Israel’s deterrence,' as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: 'The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.'"(17)
Israeli internal politics may also have played a role in determining the size and scope of Cast Lead. Israel was preparing for general elections on 10 February 2009. The prospect of a return to power by the hawk Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, promising tough action against Hamas, hardened the positions of Israel's more moderate political leaders, and may have caused them to launch such an operation to 'look tough', rather than judging its proportionality on its own merits.(21)Therefore Operation Cast Lead should be regarded not as legitimate self-defense, but rather as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and consequently w
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"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 None of these arguments change that fact that 250,000 Israelis in southern Israel lived under constant fear of Hamas rocket attacks, which Hamas escalated after a ceasefire which it refused to extend. It is notable that Syria, an implacable enemy of Israel, actually played a significant role in triggering he conflict. The Damascus office of Hamas, which operates under the aegis of the regime of Bashar al Assad, vetoed the efforts of Hamas leaders in Gaza to extend the cease-fire and insisted on escalating rocket attacks.(4) The role of foreign powers in proving the conflict through Hamas has been recognized outside of Israel was well: Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, assailed Israel's air strikes but also held Hamas responsible. The Egyptian government understood that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is increasingly allied with Iran and its goals for fomenting regional instability.(1) Israel could not possibly have been expected to thus not take military action to defend itself when coming under rocket fire from a terrorist government dedicated to Israel's destruction and under the direction of foreign states which are mortal enemies of Israel's existence. There was simply no other way to stop the rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel's blockade of Gaza was not a justified reason for Hamas' rocket attacks. Israeli control of Gaza’s borders was a response to Hamas’ exploitation of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to turn it into an armed, Islamic state dedicated to the destruction of Israel above all else, even its own economy. Hamas was not provoked. Quite the contrary. Hamas’ arms smuggling was the provocation. Then, on top of this provocation, Hamas fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. The idea that Hamas was provoked leapfrogs the facts.(27)\n"
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"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 It is indisputable that Hamas has launched violent attacks against civilian targets. Israel, on the other hand, conducts its operations exercising all due care to limit civilian casualties. Hamas terrorists, however, set up their headquarters and store weapons in private homes, schools, colleges and mosques. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit have blamed Hamas for provoking the Israeli attack on Hamas targets embedded in civilian areas.(28) Israel's air assault has resulted in more Palestinian casualties, but that is in part because Hamas deliberately locates its security forces in residential neighborhoods. This is intended both to deter Israel from attacking in the first place as well as to turn world opinion against the Jewish state when it does attack. By all accounts, however, the Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces.(1)\n\nIsrael actually put its own troops in harm’s way to minimize civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.(13) This shows Israel's commitment to preventing civilian casualties and thus the justification of Operation Cast Lead. The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian casualties can be explained by the fact that Israel has early warning systems and hospitals. Israel invests significantly more in stable buildings that do not crumble when subjected a blast, systems that can detect incoming rocket fire, and an extensive and modern network of hospitals and emergency response teams. This, and the fact that Israel does not attempt to shield its military installations behind civilian homes and businesses, helps lower the number of civilian casualties as compared to in Gaza.(2)\n\nThe claim that Israel violated the principle of proportionality, by killing more Hamas terrorists than the number of Israeli civilians killed by Hamas rockets, is absurd. There is no legal equivalence between the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and the deliberate killings of Hamas combatants. Under the laws of war, any number of combatants can be killed to prevent the killing of even one innocent civilian.(29) Moreover, if Israel were to be 'proportional' and respond to the Hamas attacks in the same way, what would that mean? Would this require that it launch rocket attacks back against Gazan civilians? Obviously not (this would result in even more civilian deaths), and this is where the logic of proportionality against terrorist attacks makes little sense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The most important thing for regional peace in the long run is not the belief among Israelis that there is a 'military solution' to the conflict, but rather the belief of Hamas and its backers in Syria and Iran that Israel can be 'solved' militarily. It is this belief that causes them to constantly return to using force against Israel, as they did with the rocket attacks. Therefore to establish peace in the long run, Israeli deterrent and demonstration that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity are the most important factors, and these are exactly what Operation Cast Lead re-established. Moreover, Hamas may promotes itself as the legitimate power in Gaza, but in reality, Hamas is at its core a terrorist organization that refuses to renounce violence or recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hamas came to power in Gaza through a violent coup against the Palestinian Authority government. Since Hamas refuses to live in peace with Israel, the Israeli government has no choice but to seek Hamas' replacement.(2)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The long-term security of Israel rests in a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempting to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.\n\nA crucial step towards peace is to bring Hamas to the bargaining table. Israel's levelling of Gaza emboldened Hamas' message of resistance, and allowed Gazans to continue to rely on Hamas. As long as Israel continues to justify Arab and Palestinian anger through its disproportionate response, it is unlikely that enough trust can be established to reach a peace deal.\n\nEven Israelis recognize that this assualt has created an even larger barrier to peace. “This policy [Operation Cast Lead] is not strengthening Israel,” noted Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together.\"(10)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Under the same logic, over 1 million residents of Gaza have been under occupation since 1967, facing limited rights of movement, regular air raids, military checkpoints, random searches and seizures, random arrests, the destruction of sanitation facilities, homes, schools, roads, shops, markets, and health facilities, and therefore Hamas has the right act in its own self-defense by whatever means it sees fit. If Palestinians do not have an army to call to its defense, how can the entire population be punished for the actions of non-state military groups?\n\nIsrael’s right to take positive steps of some kind in the interests of its own safety does not mean it has the right to do anything it wishes in order to protect itself. It is also evident that Israel violated international law and committed war crimes, was was reported in the Goldstone Report.\n\nBetween the time when the shelling from Gaza started in 2001 and Operation Cast Lead, 20 Israeli civilians were killed by rockets or mortars, according to estimates by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that killed more than 1,400 people.(10) As Javier Solana, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said in late December 2008, \"the current Israeli strikes are inflicting an unacceptable toll on Palestinian civilians.\"(14)\n\nIt is a widely accepted principle of international law that actions taken pursuant to a state’s right to defend itself must be proportionate to the danger that the state faces. While the 20 deaths that resulted from the actions of Hamas and its associates were tragic, the nature of these attacks did not justify a full scale military invasion of the Gaza strip, or the mass destruction of infrastructure essential to life in the strip.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel similarly violated the ceasefire prior to 2008, and had unlawfully kidnapped and imprisoned hundreds of Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel's attack on Gaza was not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the following principle: an end to the Israeli siege on Gaza in exchange for an end to Hamas-led rocket attacks on Israel. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before Operation Cast Lead was launched. Israel should have accepted Hamas’s offer and assessed whether Hamas’s intention to be bound by its terms was genuine before launching a military attack.(6) If an action isn't truly an act of last resort, it cannot be legitimately termed 'self-defense', and so is not justified. Hamas were prepared to enter into negotiations with Israel and it was prepared to discuss the more intricate details of the deal it had proposed. Its attempts to avoid conflict were committed and consistent enough to suggest that Gaza’s leaders were not engaged in diplomatic posturing or sabre rattling. Israel targeted more than just military targets, including UN warehouses holding medical and food supplies, UN schools, and hospitals. Its imprecise tactics and refusal to allow access of humanitarian workers show that it was not merely self-defense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations harmed the chances of peace in the long term:\n\nThe long-term security of Israel rests with a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempts to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.(10)\n\nOperation Cast Lead ignored history, which teaches that there is no military solution to peace with the Palestinians. As a Daily Star Editorial argued, \"For the Israelis, once they have exercised this latest spasm of gratuitous bloodletting, there will be yet another opportunity to accept the oft-proved impossibility of a military solution. The Palestinian people will not be battered into submission, no amount of air strikes will make the core issues in the moribund peace process go away, and all of the same difficult decisions will still be waiting when the dust settles.\"(18) Thus Operation Cast Lead actually undermined future peace by once more making Israelis believe they can fight their way to a solution, which they cannot. As Nicholas Kristoff argues, \"What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other.\"(10)\n\nIsrael cannot stop rocket attacks by military action alone; eventually a political deal will be needed.(19) Operation Cast Lead emboldened the anti-negotiation side of Israeli politics, however, which focus on their claim that Israel should not negotiate with Hamas. However, Hamas was democratically elected, and so Israel must make peace with them. If Hamas was an authoritarian regime, Israel could possible attempt to get rid of it and make peace with the Palestinians in Gaza separately. But, because Hamas was democratically elected, any efforts by Israel to destroy them will be seen in Gaza as an effort to destroy the Palestinians and their democratic will. This would not enable any long-term peace with the Palestinians. Therefore, a long-term peace depends on working with Hamas, rather than attempting to destroy them.(20) Instead, Israel pursued Operation Cast Lead, which included an Israeli ground assault in Gaza, the excessive force of which is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.(10) The fact that Hamas was always going to survive Israel's assault meant that Operation Cast Lead was always going to help to consolidate the legitimacy of the Hamas movement, and to ensure that all the efforts of Israel to eliminate that fundamental pillar of resistance will produce the reverse result.(22)\n\nIsrael's offensive gave Iran and its allies a way to pressure Egypt, Jordan and other Arab 'moderates'. Like the Lebanon war of 2006, Israel's battle with Hamas in Gaza produced a schism among Muslim states. Iran and its Lebanon based ally Hezbollah have joined Hamas's Damascus-based leadership in calling for a new intifada, or uprising, against Israel -- and also against the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which are accused of silently supporting Israel's air attacks.(23) Israel’s ruthless attack on Gaza and the massive civilian casualties it has inflicted has severely damaged the nation's moral stature in the world. This moral deficit will cause problems for Israel in its future engagements in the world. Therefore long term peace in the region was harmed by Operation Cast Lead, and so it was not justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians:\n\nThe killing of over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more than 4,500 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire. For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire. And yet in 2005-8, according to the UN, the Israeli army killed about 1,250 Palestinians in Gaza, including 222 children. Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it.(15) The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious, but the numbers speak for themselves: 800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed during Operation Cast Lead. In contrast, around a dozen Israelis were killed, many of them soldiers.(17) Precision strikes which avoided civilian deaths were never going to be possible in the crowded Gaza Strip. As Akiva Eldar argued: \"The tremendous population density in the Gaza Strip does not allow a 'surgical operation' over an extended period that would minimize damage to civilian populations. The difficult images from the Strip will soon replace those of the damage inflicted by Qassam rockets in the western Negev. The scale of losses, which works in 'favor' of the Palestinians, will return Israel to the role of Goliath.\"(24)\n\nIt is notable that Israel is more culpable for the civilian deaths it causes than Hamas is with its rockets, as Israel had options (such as ending the blockade and negotiating with Hamas) which could have caused fewer civilian deaths, whereas Hamas did not. Rather Hamas responds as the disproportionately weaker party; the Palestinians were compelled to use the crude means at their disposal to free their lands from Israeli occupation, even if this meant being unable to target them well and some civilian deaths resulting.(25) Israel's Operation Cast Lead was less legitimate as it was not Israel's only option, and so cannot be regarded as proportionate. Furthermore, Israel's use of white phosphorous in Gaza was a humanitarian crime. The use of white phosphorous by Israel to shield its military movements in Gaza was a humanitarian crime, as the chemical causes serious health problems to civilians that inhale it. And, by all accounts, the chemical was inhaled by many Gazan civilians.(25)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were necessary for long term peace:\n\nAs Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Haleviargue explain, “the Israeli public will not make territorial concessions on the West Bank or the Golan Heights if Gaza is allowed to become a neighboring terrorist state that can launch attacks with impunity. Israel had already had a bad enough experience letting that happen with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.”(1) Without the assurance that they will be allowed to protect their homes and families following withdrawal, Israelis will rightly perceive a two-state solution as an existential threat. They will continue to share the left-wing vision of coexistence with a peaceful Palestinian neighbor in theory, but in reality will heed the right's warnings of Jewish powerlessness.(4)\n\nMeanwhile, the stronger Hamas becomes, the more resistance moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will face to making any concessions to Israel.(1) Therefore damaging Hamas, via Operation Cast Lead, actually aided the peace process in the long run, and was necessary in order to make an eventual two-state peace solution possible. The Israeli attacks may also eventually help force Hamas to accept a more durable ceasefire. Unlike the botched invasion of Lebanon in 2006, when Israel set itself the unattainable goal of eliminating the military capability of Hezbollah, during Operation Cast Lead it was made clear that the objective was not to wipe out Hamas, but instead to force the radical group to accept a durable cease-fire on Israel's terms.(8) This was necessary as prior to Operation Cast Lead Hamas showed no interest in peace, opting instead to pursue its political objectives through the use of terrorism. When Hamas came to power in Gaza in January 2006, it failed to control the rocket fire from the variety of miltary brigades, including its own al-Qassam brigade, into Israel and failed to establish internal stability. The widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas, which ended in June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza and ousted leaders of President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, made Israel more wary of the security threat an unstable Gaza could pose.(9)\n\nIn Israel's view, Hamas' behavior and its reliance on terror tactics will never change if it thinks it can attack with impunity, and so the Israeli military operations were necessary and justified in the name of restoring Israel's deterrent and weakening Hamas, both of which make long term peace more likely.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were proportionate to the threat:\n\nOperation Cast Lead was justified as it was proportionate to Hamas' rocket attacks against Israel. It should be remembered that 250,000 Israelis living in the southern part of the country had lived under years of terrorism before Operation Cast Lead was launched, often in bomb shelters, and the economy has suffered. The world's media may only have paid attention when Israel responded to Hamas' barrage, but this does not mean that Israel was not already under severe attack by this point.(1) Moreover, the Israeli strikes were rightly measured to disable Hamas rocket attacks.(11)\n\nTerror groups fire indiscriminately at innocent Israelis and then complain of excessive or disproportionate force when Israel fires back. But according to internationally accepted laws of war, Israel is permitted to respond with the force necessary to end the conflict.(2)\n\nIsrael was legitimate in using full force to win its war on Hamas; Israel was under no obligation to restrain itself in what is, on Hamas' own terms, an existential war. Provoked by Hamas, Israel had every right to wage a disproportionate and overwhelming response. Hamas has repeatedly stated that its objective is to destroy Israel. Such an existential threat goes beyond simply Hamas' rocket attacks, as it portends much more destructive attacks in the future. This justifies defensive attacks from Israel that go beyond responding merely to the Hamas rockets, and would even justify Israeli efforts to fully demobilize or destroy Hamas.(12) In spite of this, Israel was actually far more restrained and proportionate than it was obligated to be. Israeli precision strikes sought to minimize civilian deaths, as Benjamin Netanyahu argued: \"In launching precision strikes against Hamas rocket launchers, headquarters, weapons depots, smuggling tunnels and training camps, Israel is trying to minimize civilian casualties.\"(13) Unlike Hamas, Israeli strikes targeted military sites, not civilians. As Gary Grant argued: \"Even if you target your action at military sites, civilians are inevitably going to get killed...these need to be contrasted with the actions of Hamas where every single rocket is designed to attack civilian populations, so every single act of Hamas in firing these rockets is clearly an illegal act without any legal justification.\"(2)\n\nIsrael may have been justified in acting disproportionately, but instead chose to respond in a proportionate and limited manner which minimized civilian deaths in Gaza, and thus the Israeli military operations were certainly justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were legitimate as Israeli self-defense:\n\nThe military operations were a legitimate use of the Israeli state’s right to defend itself and its citizens: To quote then-President-elect Barack Obama - \"If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I would do everything to stop that, and would expect Israel to do the same thing.\"(1)\n\nPrior to Israel's 2008-2009 military operations, Hamas had consistently violated the terms of the ceasefire between Gaza and Israel. It launched a total 6,300 rockets during an agreed hiatus in the confrontation, killing 10 and wounding more than 780. Hamas refused to extend the truce past 19 December 2008 and subsequently resumed attacks, firing nearly 300 more missiles, rockets and mortars.(1) Hamas was the first to actually escalate the conflict after the ceasefire expired, with a systematic increase in rocket attacks to a magnitude of hundreds of rockets fired daily in late December.(2) The 250,000 Israelis who lived in the southern part of the country were under constant threat, often in bomb shelters, and the economy suffered as a result.(1) Israel went to great lengths to avoid its military escalation. Just a few days before Israel's military operations, outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made an appeal on the Arab television station Al-Arabiya asking Gaza residents to stop the firing of rockets and mortar shells so that a military response could be avoided.(3) This appeal was apparently ignored by Hamas and the other militant groups in Gaza, and so Israel proceeded to respond militarily to remove the capacity of Gaza to launch rocket and mortar attacks – Israel was left with no other way to ensure that the inhabitants of the country’s southern regions would not have to live in fear of rocket fire.\n\nGaza was also a test case, intended to prove that Israel remained a legitimate and authoritative actor in the region. Much more was at stake than merely the military outcome of Israel's operation. The issue, rather, was Israel's ability to restore its deterrence power and uphold the principle that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity.(4) Israel's military operations were a good tool to fulfill this need for self-defense and did so effectively. The Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces, both to its leadership and to the tunnels from Gaza to Egypt that Hamas uses to smuggle in weapons and build its growing army.(1) Doing this damage was necessary as Israel could never be safe with a strong terrorist regime in control of Gaza. As David Harris, Executive Director for the American Jewish Committee, argued: \"Israel could not tolerate a terrorist regime on its border that was launching repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and villages.\"(5) Therefore there can be no debate that Israel had the right to defend itself as well as the right to determine how best to do so.\n\nWhile it is easy for countries and foreigners to state their opinions about Israel's security interests and how its actions may or may not fulfill them, Israel's right to make that judgment itself must be respected. Therefore Israel's military operations against Gaza were justified as legitimate self defense against Hamas and militant aggression which was putting the lives of Israeli citizens in jeopardy.\n"
] |
normal
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Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
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[
93.625
] |
[
90.375,
87.9375,
89.9375,
89.375,
91.75,
84.625,
87.4375,
87.1875,
89.8125,
92.375
] |
Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians:
The killing of over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more than 4,500 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire. For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire. And yet in 2005-8, according to the UN, the Israeli army killed about 1,250 Palestinians in Gaza, including 222 children. Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it.(15) The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious, but the numbers speak for themselves: 800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed during Operation Cast Lead. In contrast, around a dozen Israelis were killed, many of them soldiers.(17) Precision strikes which avoided civilian deaths were never going to be possible in the crowded Gaza Strip. As Akiva Eldar argued: "The tremendous population density in the Gaza Strip does not allow a 'surgical operation' over an extended period that would minimize damage to civilian populations. The difficult images from the Strip will soon replace those of the damage inflicted by Qassam rockets in the western Negev. The scale of losses, which works in 'favor' of the Palestinians, will return Israel to the role of Goliath."(24)
It is notable that Israel is more culpable for the civilian deaths it causes than Hamas is with its rockets, as Israel had options (such as ending the blockade and negotiating with Hamas) which could have caused fewer civilian deaths, whereas Hamas did not. Rather Hamas responds as the disproportionately weaker party; the Palestinians were compelled to use the crude means at their disposal to free their lands from Israeli occupation, even if this meant being unable to target them well and some civilian deaths resulting.(25) Israel's Operation Cast Lead was less legitimate as it was not Israel's only option, and so cannot be regarded as proportionate. Furthermore, Israel's use of white phosphorous in Gaza was a humanitarian crime. The use of white phosphorous by Israel to shield its military movements in Gaza was a humanitarian crime, as the chemical causes serious health problems to civilians that inhale it. And, by all accounts, the chemical was inhaled by many Gazan civilians.(25)
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[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 It is indisputable that Hamas has launched violent attacks against civilian targets. Israel, on the other hand, conducts its operations exercising all due care to limit civilian casualties. Hamas terrorists, however, set up their headquarters and store weapons in private homes, schools, colleges and mosques. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit have blamed Hamas for provoking the Israeli attack on Hamas targets embedded in civilian areas.(28) Israel's air assault has resulted in more Palestinian casualties, but that is in part because Hamas deliberately locates its security forces in residential neighborhoods. This is intended both to deter Israel from attacking in the first place as well as to turn world opinion against the Jewish state when it does attack. By all accounts, however, the Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces.(1)\n\nIsrael actually put its own troops in harm’s way to minimize civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.(13) This shows Israel's commitment to preventing civilian casualties and thus the justification of Operation Cast Lead. The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian casualties can be explained by the fact that Israel has early warning systems and hospitals. Israel invests significantly more in stable buildings that do not crumble when subjected a blast, systems that can detect incoming rocket fire, and an extensive and modern network of hospitals and emergency response teams. This, and the fact that Israel does not attempt to shield its military installations behind civilian homes and businesses, helps lower the number of civilian casualties as compared to in Gaza.(2)\n\nThe claim that Israel violated the principle of proportionality, by killing more Hamas terrorists than the number of Israeli civilians killed by Hamas rockets, is absurd. There is no legal equivalence between the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and the deliberate killings of Hamas combatants. Under the laws of war, any number of combatants can be killed to prevent the killing of even one innocent civilian.(29) Moreover, if Israel were to be 'proportional' and respond to the Hamas attacks in the same way, what would that mean? Would this require that it launch rocket attacks back against Gazan civilians? Obviously not (this would result in even more civilian deaths), and this is where the logic of proportionality against terrorist attacks makes little sense.\n"
] |
[
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 None of these arguments change that fact that 250,000 Israelis in southern Israel lived under constant fear of Hamas rocket attacks, which Hamas escalated after a ceasefire which it refused to extend. It is notable that Syria, an implacable enemy of Israel, actually played a significant role in triggering he conflict. The Damascus office of Hamas, which operates under the aegis of the regime of Bashar al Assad, vetoed the efforts of Hamas leaders in Gaza to extend the cease-fire and insisted on escalating rocket attacks.(4) The role of foreign powers in proving the conflict through Hamas has been recognized outside of Israel was well: Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, assailed Israel's air strikes but also held Hamas responsible. The Egyptian government understood that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is increasingly allied with Iran and its goals for fomenting regional instability.(1) Israel could not possibly have been expected to thus not take military action to defend itself when coming under rocket fire from a terrorist government dedicated to Israel's destruction and under the direction of foreign states which are mortal enemies of Israel's existence. There was simply no other way to stop the rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel's blockade of Gaza was not a justified reason for Hamas' rocket attacks. Israeli control of Gaza’s borders was a response to Hamas’ exploitation of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to turn it into an armed, Islamic state dedicated to the destruction of Israel above all else, even its own economy. Hamas was not provoked. Quite the contrary. Hamas’ arms smuggling was the provocation. Then, on top of this provocation, Hamas fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. The idea that Hamas was provoked leapfrogs the facts.(27)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The most important thing for regional peace in the long run is not the belief among Israelis that there is a 'military solution' to the conflict, but rather the belief of Hamas and its backers in Syria and Iran that Israel can be 'solved' militarily. It is this belief that causes them to constantly return to using force against Israel, as they did with the rocket attacks. Therefore to establish peace in the long run, Israeli deterrent and demonstration that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity are the most important factors, and these are exactly what Operation Cast Lead re-established. Moreover, Hamas may promotes itself as the legitimate power in Gaza, but in reality, Hamas is at its core a terrorist organization that refuses to renounce violence or recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hamas came to power in Gaza through a violent coup against the Palestinian Authority government. Since Hamas refuses to live in peace with Israel, the Israeli government has no choice but to seek Hamas' replacement.(2)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The long-term security of Israel rests in a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempting to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.\n\nA crucial step towards peace is to bring Hamas to the bargaining table. Israel's levelling of Gaza emboldened Hamas' message of resistance, and allowed Gazans to continue to rely on Hamas. As long as Israel continues to justify Arab and Palestinian anger through its disproportionate response, it is unlikely that enough trust can be established to reach a peace deal.\n\nEven Israelis recognize that this assualt has created an even larger barrier to peace. “This policy [Operation Cast Lead] is not strengthening Israel,” noted Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together.\"(10)\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Under the same logic, over 1 million residents of Gaza have been under occupation since 1967, facing limited rights of movement, regular air raids, military checkpoints, random searches and seizures, random arrests, the destruction of sanitation facilities, homes, schools, roads, shops, markets, and health facilities, and therefore Hamas has the right act in its own self-defense by whatever means it sees fit. If Palestinians do not have an army to call to its defense, how can the entire population be punished for the actions of non-state military groups?\n\nIsrael’s right to take positive steps of some kind in the interests of its own safety does not mean it has the right to do anything it wishes in order to protect itself. It is also evident that Israel violated international law and committed war crimes, was was reported in the Goldstone Report.\n\nBetween the time when the shelling from Gaza started in 2001 and Operation Cast Lead, 20 Israeli civilians were killed by rockets or mortars, according to estimates by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that killed more than 1,400 people.(10) As Javier Solana, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said in late December 2008, \"the current Israeli strikes are inflicting an unacceptable toll on Palestinian civilians.\"(14)\n\nIt is a widely accepted principle of international law that actions taken pursuant to a state’s right to defend itself must be proportionate to the danger that the state faces. While the 20 deaths that resulted from the actions of Hamas and its associates were tragic, the nature of these attacks did not justify a full scale military invasion of the Gaza strip, or the mass destruction of infrastructure essential to life in the strip.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel similarly violated the ceasefire prior to 2008, and had unlawfully kidnapped and imprisoned hundreds of Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel's attack on Gaza was not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the following principle: an end to the Israeli siege on Gaza in exchange for an end to Hamas-led rocket attacks on Israel. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before Operation Cast Lead was launched. Israel should have accepted Hamas’s offer and assessed whether Hamas’s intention to be bound by its terms was genuine before launching a military attack.(6) If an action isn't truly an act of last resort, it cannot be legitimately termed 'self-defense', and so is not justified. Hamas were prepared to enter into negotiations with Israel and it was prepared to discuss the more intricate details of the deal it had proposed. Its attempts to avoid conflict were committed and consistent enough to suggest that Gaza’s leaders were not engaged in diplomatic posturing or sabre rattling. Israel targeted more than just military targets, including UN warehouses holding medical and food supplies, UN schools, and hospitals. Its imprecise tactics and refusal to allow access of humanitarian workers show that it was not merely self-defense.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations harmed the chances of peace in the long term:\n\nThe long-term security of Israel rests with a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempts to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.(10)\n\nOperation Cast Lead ignored history, which teaches that there is no military solution to peace with the Palestinians. As a Daily Star Editorial argued, \"For the Israelis, once they have exercised this latest spasm of gratuitous bloodletting, there will be yet another opportunity to accept the oft-proved impossibility of a military solution. The Palestinian people will not be battered into submission, no amount of air strikes will make the core issues in the moribund peace process go away, and all of the same difficult decisions will still be waiting when the dust settles.\"(18) Thus Operation Cast Lead actually undermined future peace by once more making Israelis believe they can fight their way to a solution, which they cannot. As Nicholas Kristoff argues, \"What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other.\"(10)\n\nIsrael cannot stop rocket attacks by military action alone; eventually a political deal will be needed.(19) Operation Cast Lead emboldened the anti-negotiation side of Israeli politics, however, which focus on their claim that Israel should not negotiate with Hamas. However, Hamas was democratically elected, and so Israel must make peace with them. If Hamas was an authoritarian regime, Israel could possible attempt to get rid of it and make peace with the Palestinians in Gaza separately. But, because Hamas was democratically elected, any efforts by Israel to destroy them will be seen in Gaza as an effort to destroy the Palestinians and their democratic will. This would not enable any long-term peace with the Palestinians. Therefore, a long-term peace depends on working with Hamas, rather than attempting to destroy them.(20) Instead, Israel pursued Operation Cast Lead, which included an Israeli ground assault in Gaza, the excessive force of which is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.(10) The fact that Hamas was always going to survive Israel's assault meant that Operation Cast Lead was always going to help to consolidate the legitimacy of the Hamas movement, and to ensure that all the efforts of Israel to eliminate that fundamental pillar of resistance will produce the reverse result.(22)\n\nIsrael's offensive gave Iran and its allies a way to pressure Egypt, Jordan and other Arab 'moderates'. Like the Lebanon war of 2006, Israel's battle with Hamas in Gaza produced a schism among Muslim states. Iran and its Lebanon based ally Hezbollah have joined Hamas's Damascus-based leadership in calling for a new intifada, or uprising, against Israel -- and also against the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which are accused of silently supporting Israel's air attacks.(23) Israel’s ruthless attack on Gaza and the massive civilian casualties it has inflicted has severely damaged the nation's moral stature in the world. This moral deficit will cause problems for Israel in its future engagements in the world. Therefore long term peace in the region was harmed by Operation Cast Lead, and so it was not justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense:\n\nIsrael has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that they amounted to an act of 'self-defense' as recognized by Article 51, United Nations Charter. This contention should be rejected: the rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they were, did not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defense. Under international law, self-defense is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity.\n\nOperation Cast Lead caused the deaths of over 1,400 Palestinians, over 300 of whom were children, injured 4,500 more and resulted in the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN facilities and government buildings. If, as Israel has stated, Cast Lead was carried out in accordance with the terms of international law, and the safeguards incorporated into the contemporary law of war, then Israeli forces had a duty to protect civilian infrastructure under the fourth Geneva Convention. The death and destruction that Israeli forces wrought throughout the Gaza Strip was not commensurate with the losses caused by Hamas rocket fire, no matter how horrific those attacks may have been.\n\nIsrael’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defense, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary. Israel could have agreed to renew the truce with Hamas.(15) Israel's attack on Gaza was also not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the principle that Hamas stop firing rockets at Israel in return for Israel lifting its siege on Gaza. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before it started Operation Cast Lead, and Israel should have taken it then and seen how went before resorting to military force.(6)\n\nIsrael arguably provoked the entire conflict by targeting Palestinian civilians with its blockade on Gaza. According to Hebrew University international law expert Yuval Shani, \"It is my opinion that in this situation, and given the question marks regarding Israel's status in Gaza and Gaza's long-standing dependency on Israel, cutting off its water and electricity supplies would be equivalent to a direct attack on a civilian target, especially given that the motive for doing so is one of collective punishment, which is, in itself, a problematic motive.\"(26) Hamas had offered to renew the ceasefire if Israel reopened Gaza's border crossings. The strip had been sealed by Israel in an economic siege aimed at toppling Hamas. The blockade had brought the territory near economic collapse.(21) Therefore this blockade must be seen as the true cause of the conflict, and thus Operation Cast Lead was not a legitimate act of self-defense.\n\nThe lack of efficacy of Operation Cast Lead also undermines its legitimacy as 'self-defense': while Hamas's offensive capacities were blunted for a while, the likelihood, as with Hezbollah after Lebanon in 2006, is that it will quickly rebuild its military strength. Indeed, the assassinations of its leaders by Israel over the years- and the raids on its weapons workshops- did little to limit its rise to power.(16) Israel's overall strategy, moreover, is not one of 'self-defense' against Hamas, but rather to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward their Hamas government. This is why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza’s utilities, and why, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents were deprived running water. As Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues, argued: “The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza.”(10) Rashid Khalidi added to this argument: \"This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about 'restoring Israel’s deterrence,' as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: 'The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.'\"(17)\n\nIsraeli internal politics may also have played a role in determining the size and scope of Cast Lead. Israel was preparing for general elections on 10 February 2009. The prospect of a return to power by the hawk Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, promising tough action against Hamas, hardened the positions of Israel's more moderate political leaders, and may have caused them to launch such an operation to 'look tough', rather than judging its proportionality on its own merits.(21)Therefore Operation Cast Lead should be regarded not as legitimate self-defense, but rather as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and consequently w\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were necessary for long term peace:\n\nAs Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Haleviargue explain, “the Israeli public will not make territorial concessions on the West Bank or the Golan Heights if Gaza is allowed to become a neighboring terrorist state that can launch attacks with impunity. Israel had already had a bad enough experience letting that happen with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.”(1) Without the assurance that they will be allowed to protect their homes and families following withdrawal, Israelis will rightly perceive a two-state solution as an existential threat. They will continue to share the left-wing vision of coexistence with a peaceful Palestinian neighbor in theory, but in reality will heed the right's warnings of Jewish powerlessness.(4)\n\nMeanwhile, the stronger Hamas becomes, the more resistance moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will face to making any concessions to Israel.(1) Therefore damaging Hamas, via Operation Cast Lead, actually aided the peace process in the long run, and was necessary in order to make an eventual two-state peace solution possible. The Israeli attacks may also eventually help force Hamas to accept a more durable ceasefire. Unlike the botched invasion of Lebanon in 2006, when Israel set itself the unattainable goal of eliminating the military capability of Hezbollah, during Operation Cast Lead it was made clear that the objective was not to wipe out Hamas, but instead to force the radical group to accept a durable cease-fire on Israel's terms.(8) This was necessary as prior to Operation Cast Lead Hamas showed no interest in peace, opting instead to pursue its political objectives through the use of terrorism. When Hamas came to power in Gaza in January 2006, it failed to control the rocket fire from the variety of miltary brigades, including its own al-Qassam brigade, into Israel and failed to establish internal stability. The widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas, which ended in June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza and ousted leaders of President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, made Israel more wary of the security threat an unstable Gaza could pose.(9)\n\nIn Israel's view, Hamas' behavior and its reliance on terror tactics will never change if it thinks it can attack with impunity, and so the Israeli military operations were necessary and justified in the name of restoring Israel's deterrent and weakening Hamas, both of which make long term peace more likely.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were proportionate to the threat:\n\nOperation Cast Lead was justified as it was proportionate to Hamas' rocket attacks against Israel. It should be remembered that 250,000 Israelis living in the southern part of the country had lived under years of terrorism before Operation Cast Lead was launched, often in bomb shelters, and the economy has suffered. The world's media may only have paid attention when Israel responded to Hamas' barrage, but this does not mean that Israel was not already under severe attack by this point.(1) Moreover, the Israeli strikes were rightly measured to disable Hamas rocket attacks.(11)\n\nTerror groups fire indiscriminately at innocent Israelis and then complain of excessive or disproportionate force when Israel fires back. But according to internationally accepted laws of war, Israel is permitted to respond with the force necessary to end the conflict.(2)\n\nIsrael was legitimate in using full force to win its war on Hamas; Israel was under no obligation to restrain itself in what is, on Hamas' own terms, an existential war. Provoked by Hamas, Israel had every right to wage a disproportionate and overwhelming response. Hamas has repeatedly stated that its objective is to destroy Israel. Such an existential threat goes beyond simply Hamas' rocket attacks, as it portends much more destructive attacks in the future. This justifies defensive attacks from Israel that go beyond responding merely to the Hamas rockets, and would even justify Israeli efforts to fully demobilize or destroy Hamas.(12) In spite of this, Israel was actually far more restrained and proportionate than it was obligated to be. Israeli precision strikes sought to minimize civilian deaths, as Benjamin Netanyahu argued: \"In launching precision strikes against Hamas rocket launchers, headquarters, weapons depots, smuggling tunnels and training camps, Israel is trying to minimize civilian casualties.\"(13) Unlike Hamas, Israeli strikes targeted military sites, not civilians. As Gary Grant argued: \"Even if you target your action at military sites, civilians are inevitably going to get killed...these need to be contrasted with the actions of Hamas where every single rocket is designed to attack civilian populations, so every single act of Hamas in firing these rockets is clearly an illegal act without any legal justification.\"(2)\n\nIsrael may have been justified in acting disproportionately, but instead chose to respond in a proportionate and limited manner which minimized civilian deaths in Gaza, and thus the Israeli military operations were certainly justified.\n",
"middle east politics terrorism warpeace house believes israels 2008 2009 The military operations were legitimate as Israeli self-defense:\n\nThe military operations were a legitimate use of the Israeli state’s right to defend itself and its citizens: To quote then-President-elect Barack Obama - \"If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I would do everything to stop that, and would expect Israel to do the same thing.\"(1)\n\nPrior to Israel's 2008-2009 military operations, Hamas had consistently violated the terms of the ceasefire between Gaza and Israel. It launched a total 6,300 rockets during an agreed hiatus in the confrontation, killing 10 and wounding more than 780. Hamas refused to extend the truce past 19 December 2008 and subsequently resumed attacks, firing nearly 300 more missiles, rockets and mortars.(1) Hamas was the first to actually escalate the conflict after the ceasefire expired, with a systematic increase in rocket attacks to a magnitude of hundreds of rockets fired daily in late December.(2) The 250,000 Israelis who lived in the southern part of the country were under constant threat, often in bomb shelters, and the economy suffered as a result.(1) Israel went to great lengths to avoid its military escalation. Just a few days before Israel's military operations, outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made an appeal on the Arab television station Al-Arabiya asking Gaza residents to stop the firing of rockets and mortar shells so that a military response could be avoided.(3) This appeal was apparently ignored by Hamas and the other militant groups in Gaza, and so Israel proceeded to respond militarily to remove the capacity of Gaza to launch rocket and mortar attacks – Israel was left with no other way to ensure that the inhabitants of the country’s southern regions would not have to live in fear of rocket fire.\n\nGaza was also a test case, intended to prove that Israel remained a legitimate and authoritative actor in the region. Much more was at stake than merely the military outcome of Israel's operation. The issue, rather, was Israel's ability to restore its deterrence power and uphold the principle that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity.(4) Israel's military operations were a good tool to fulfill this need for self-defense and did so effectively. The Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces, both to its leadership and to the tunnels from Gaza to Egypt that Hamas uses to smuggle in weapons and build its growing army.(1) Doing this damage was necessary as Israel could never be safe with a strong terrorist regime in control of Gaza. As David Harris, Executive Director for the American Jewish Committee, argued: \"Israel could not tolerate a terrorist regime on its border that was launching repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and villages.\"(5) Therefore there can be no debate that Israel had the right to defend itself as well as the right to determine how best to do so.\n\nWhile it is easy for countries and foreigners to state their opinions about Israel's security interests and how its actions may or may not fulfill them, Israel's right to make that judgment itself must be respected. Therefore Israel's military operations against Gaza were justified as legitimate self defense against Hamas and militant aggression which was putting the lives of Israeli citizens in jeopardy.\n"
] |
normal
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Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.1875
] |
[
89.8125,
86,
83.9375,
89.3125,
85.1875,
83.5,
85.8125,
84.75,
92.25,
89.25
] |
NATO expansion was, and is, necessary for international stability
Enlargement was necessary to prevent Europe “reverting to type”. The rise once again of the ethnic and religious causes of war. [1] And this is still a reason for NATO to expand to help stabilise Europe. The Balkans is only the worst area for Ethnic tensions; there are similar cases all over Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The history of Eastern Europe has been one of empires not the nation state. Stalin had a policy of divide and rule; he made sure each soviet republic included substantial minorities in order to prevent the growth of nationalist movements. [2] Stalin only continued a long tradition of ethnic movements within empires in Eastern Europe. The Balkan problem for example is considered an effect of the Ottoman empire; hence the Christian/Moslem divides in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Austrian Empire settled people on its frontiers in much the same way; the result is that none of the eastern European states is ethnically homogeneous. The Violent break-up of Yugoslavia showed the way many other states could potentially go, NATO wished to avoid this and enlargement was its best solution.
[1] Coker, Christopher, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe’ pp5-12 NATO looks east ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, Praeger publishing, 1998) p.8
[2] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.460
|
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato Stability could have been ensured without a military alliance like NATO. The European Union could have managed to create stability on its own, the EU itself since the Lisbon Treaty has gained the role of the West European Union security organisation. Additionally admission to NATO (and incidentally the EU) require social harmonisation and stability to occur before a new state can join, to quote the NATO Handbook directly; “States which are involved in ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, before they can become members.” [1] If these nations had to sort out their problems first what was the point of enlargement, it is not enlargement per se that is meaning that these disputes are solved.\n\n[1] NATO, The NATO Handbook; The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, 1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm\n"
] |
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato Again NATO need not have been the method why which these were fulfilled; the EU could equally provide collective defence within Europe and create the trust between member state’s militaries. It is also the European Union that has done most to turn Robinson’s ‘insecure and uncertain East’ into being part of ‘a prosperous, secure and self-confident West’. While it may be able to unite East and West Europe NATO is itself a symbol of division to others – particularly to Russia.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The objectives of creating stability in these fledgling democracies could be better achieved under the existing ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP) programme. The policy received strong support under the Clinton administration involves regular consultations, exercises and opportunities for education that seek to professionalize the civilian and military institutions of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover this was individually tailored to each member based on their own requirements. [1] This policy of genuine aid is preferable to the wish-list of democratic ideals that compose the criteria for NATO membership. Paradoxically, if a country was actually able to achieve all the criteria delineated for membership, the necessity for their NATO protection would be marginal. Conversely, were the republics predictably unable to realize these goals, the protection of NATO through expansion or PFP would be genuine. Yet, it is in these situations of tenuous stability that States will be denied proper civilian and military aid from NATO.\n\n[1] The NATO Handbook; Partnership for Peace, Aim and scope\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the protracted collapse of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States did remove the overwhelming threat of the USSR against Western Europe. However, the threat persists in a different form. The newly independent republics remain vulnerable to the vast political and military influence of Russia. The new threat is the destruction of stability of the new republics, and thus Russian expansion that is hostile to both the republics and the Western European states in their proximity – worry that this would occur lead to many eastern European states applying to NATO as soon as they could. [1] The solution is pre-emptive expansion in the other direction. The broadening of NATO to include the Eastern republics shall offer a bulwark against Russian expansion. NATO shall continue to perform the role of a defensive alliance against a putative military threat.\n\n[1] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.455, 458, 461-2, 475\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The expense of NATO expansion is marginal when compared to the defence budgets of the major NATO States. The US defence expenditure alone for the fiscal year 2012 is $553 billion. [1] Further, the correct equation is not between the expense of stationing troops in these new States and the current saving from non-deployment. The balance is between the expense of forward deployment or other military investment and the prohibitive cost in dollars and lives from a conflict between NATO and Russia, or a conflagration in any of the Eastern republics. NATO expansion is nothing more than a cost-effective insurance policy against a very real risk.\n\n[1] Department of Defence, US budget, gpoaccess, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy12/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD-7.pdf\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato It ought to be accepted that the NATO alliance is already diluted. It should not be perceived as a standing military force, but a holding company whose individual members can draw upon a collective infrastructure and military support in the event of intervention in and around Europe. The expansion of NATO should be the opportunity to re-examine the current force deployment and strategic capability of the alliance. For example, the US maintains significant permanent deployment of infantry, aircraft and armour in Germany that could possibly be transferred to a more active role in protecting the borders of the newly independent republics. Similarly, the NATO ‘After-Action’ report into ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo highlighted the dependence of the offensive on the US capacity for strategic airlift. The acquisition of the requisite air transport by the Western European States would allow more credible guarantees of security throughout Europe. Forward deployment of NATO troops into the new republics is not a prerequisite for expansion. The core of the alliance is the pledge to protect which is undiminished by the addition of new members.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion is not the cause of nationalism in Russia, rather the Russian leadership stokes nationalism in order to direct attention away from the government. The Russian people are concerned about hardship and hazard within their own borders rather than without. Yes it is true that the expansion of NATO antagonises Russia but this should not be a major concern of NATO, any expansion of a military alliance is likely to worry those countries that are outside that alliance. Moreover, failing to expand NATO to countries that are potentially threatened by the same nationalism and belligerency of Russia would be implicitly rewarding that belligerency. NATO should not be teaching Russia the lesson that hostility in Eastern Europe gets results that lessen the security of all.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO is a fundamental part of the international architecture used to further peace and prosperity in Europe\n\nPeace has many foundations and no one international organisation can create all these foundations itself. NATO is therefore just as necessary to the peace of Europe as the OSCE or EU and all of these organisations need to expand to cover the states within Europe to promote peace. NATO therefore in its Message from Turnberry – its response to the end of the cold war - “express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy.” [1] Collective defence is as necessary as economic cooperation in creating peace, this is something that in Europe only NATO can provide. Peace is also promoted by NATO through the security cooperation that it provides; building trust between the member states. This need for trust and equality between the parts of Europe was also explicitly stated by NATO’s Secretary General when he stated “Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East.” [2] NATO enlargement helps heal this fault line and shows the cold war in Europe is really over.\n\n[1] NATO, ‘The Message from Turnberry’, NATO website, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm\n\n[2] Robertson, George, \"NATO: Enlarging and redefining itself\" Speech 18 February 2002 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020218a.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion would benefit eastern European and post Soviet states\n\nThe opportunity of NATO membership creates the incentive for the newly independent republics to achieve internal stability. The criteria for NATO membership include stable democracy; civilian control of the armed forces; a sufficient military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to collective security; and the absence of active disputes on or within the borders of the State. [1] This incentivisation is critical given the European Union was and still is expanding slower than NATO – many new NATO members such as Albania are years away from achieving EU membership. [2] NATO membership will help these fledging States to help themselves.\n\n[ NATO, ‘NATO enlargement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 May 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm\n\n[2] BBC News, ‘Albania applies for EU membership’, 28 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8023127.stm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Further expansion of NATO will antagonise Russia\n\nRussia considers NATO expansion to be very antagonistic towards it. Continued NATO expansion would only serve to manufacture the expansionist demon that NATO fears. The election of the ultranationalist Duma in 1996, the choice of the hardliner Yvegeny Primakov as foreign minister, and the failure of the reformist party ‘Russia’s Choice’ under Yegor Gaidar even to clear the 5% hurdle for Duma membership was in whole or in part, due to the Russian sense of isolation from Western Europe. President Putin has also made a lot out of his opposition to NATO expansion which he has opposed since he was first elected President. [1] This sense is dramatically emboldened by such provocative actions as threatening to station NATO troops on its borders. The Russian people are unlikely to consider that the forward deployment is not directed against them, as is shown by Russia’s worries about and threats in response to National Missile Defense which is not aimed at them, [2] but instead is only designed to maintain internal stability in the neighbouring republics. By inflaming Russian nationalism, NATO expansion is obstructs democratic development for Russia and undermines the security of its neighbouring republics.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Putin warns against Nato expansion’, 26 January 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1137859.stm\n\n[2] Quetteville, Harry de, and Pierce, Andrew, ‘Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal’, The Telegraph, 17 January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-t...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The cost of expansion is prohibitive\n\nThe costs of NATO expansion are prohibitive at a time when the Western European members are scaling back their defence budgets and the reducing the size of their conventional forces. The Clinton administration estimated the costs of the initial expansion to be $27 to $35 to 2010, but this is mostly the costs restructuring and of making forces interoperable rather than the costs of protecting the new members. [1] The cost of stationing forces in Eastern Europe would be considerably higher and if NATO ever had to defend these countries the cost would be higher still. Given the fragile economies of the new republics, the existing NATO States will be obliged to absorb the expense of expansion. Even a decade after expansion the new members have mostly not succeeded in reaching the 2% of GDP the alliance targets and their combined defence budgets are only a third of Russia’s. [2] The proper question is whether the taxpayers of the US and Western European States wish to pay to protect citizens of distant republics from phantom threats.\n\n[1] ‘Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report’, Arms Control Association, March 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2148\n\n[2] The Economist, ‘Scars, scares and scarcity’, 12 May 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18682793\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Russia is no longer a threat\n\nRussia no longer presents a credible threat to Eastern Europe or the existing NATO States which NATO expansion could counterbalance. Russia can no longer offer the conventional military threat of the Cold War. The acceptance of this reality by the US is evidenced by the fact that troop numbers in Europe are much reduced from a peak of 277,000 troops and will be reduced further to 30,000 in the next few years. [1] This is the key question for a military alliance as defence is the key purpose. Expansion should therefore be decided based upon the yardstick of whether the expansion is necessary for the security of NATO members. If there is no credible threat then there is no reason to expand the alliance. At the same time while Russia is no longer a conventional military threat it still has its immense nuclear armament. This will remain a threat no matter how many of Russia’s neighbours join NATO but Russia could feel increasingly obliged to focus on its nuclear arsenal to respond to NATO expansion – something which would create a threat to western Europe.\n\n[1] Shanker, Thom, and Erlanger, Steven, ‘U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe’, The New York Times, 13 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/europe/europe-weighs-implication...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Expanding NATO will overstretch the resources of its core members\n\nNATO expansion can in the long term only lead to the overstretching of the organisation and thus the undermining of stability for the entirety of Europe. The credibility of the commitment of article V of the NATO Charter in which every member pledges to come to the defence of another has already been undermined by the inclusion of small countries that would be unable to defend themselves and are practically indefensible. [1] NATO runs the grave risk of becoming so large and diverse it resembles a political organisation rather than a military alliance. The military contribution of the new members would be by definition limited. Were these republics already capable of providing sufficient security to their borders, there would be no necessity for NATO membership. At the point where the NATO commitments become more declaratory than real, the security of every State including the new members is called into question. There are already worries, particularly from the United States, that the U.S. provides a free guarantee while Europe free rides, this is even more of a problem with smaller countries who cannot defend themselves even if they did spend NATOs agreed 2% of GDP on defence. [2] Thus NATO expansion might in fact assist any State eager for its own expansionism in Eastern Europe.\n\n[1] The Economist, ‘Georgia’s prospects’, 19 October 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8068850\n\n[2] Haddick, Robert, ‘This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO’, ForeignPolicy.com, 17 June 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/this_week_at_war_moral_...\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.5
] |
[
89.9375,
89.75,
86,
84.0625,
85.375,
88.6875,
84.375,
83.5625,
83.375,
83.125,
83.25,
85.3125
] |
NATO is a fundamental part of the international architecture used to further peace and prosperity in Europe
Peace has many foundations and no one international organisation can create all these foundations itself. NATO is therefore just as necessary to the peace of Europe as the OSCE or EU and all of these organisations need to expand to cover the states within Europe to promote peace. NATO therefore in its Message from Turnberry – its response to the end of the cold war - “express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy.” [1] Collective defence is as necessary as economic cooperation in creating peace, this is something that in Europe only NATO can provide. Peace is also promoted by NATO through the security cooperation that it provides; building trust between the member states. This need for trust and equality between the parts of Europe was also explicitly stated by NATO’s Secretary General when he stated “Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East.” [2] NATO enlargement helps heal this fault line and shows the cold war in Europe is really over.
[1] NATO, ‘The Message from Turnberry’, NATO website, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm
[2] Robertson, George, "NATO: Enlarging and redefining itself" Speech 18 February 2002 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020218a.htm
|
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato Again NATO need not have been the method why which these were fulfilled; the EU could equally provide collective defence within Europe and create the trust between member state’s militaries. It is also the European Union that has done most to turn Robinson’s ‘insecure and uncertain East’ into being part of ‘a prosperous, secure and self-confident West’. While it may be able to unite East and West Europe NATO is itself a symbol of division to others – particularly to Russia.\n"
] |
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato Stability could have been ensured without a military alliance like NATO. The European Union could have managed to create stability on its own, the EU itself since the Lisbon Treaty has gained the role of the West European Union security organisation. Additionally admission to NATO (and incidentally the EU) require social harmonisation and stability to occur before a new state can join, to quote the NATO Handbook directly; “States which are involved in ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, before they can become members.” [1] If these nations had to sort out their problems first what was the point of enlargement, it is not enlargement per se that is meaning that these disputes are solved.\n\n[1] NATO, The NATO Handbook; The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, 1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The objectives of creating stability in these fledgling democracies could be better achieved under the existing ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP) programme. The policy received strong support under the Clinton administration involves regular consultations, exercises and opportunities for education that seek to professionalize the civilian and military institutions of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover this was individually tailored to each member based on their own requirements. [1] This policy of genuine aid is preferable to the wish-list of democratic ideals that compose the criteria for NATO membership. Paradoxically, if a country was actually able to achieve all the criteria delineated for membership, the necessity for their NATO protection would be marginal. Conversely, were the republics predictably unable to realize these goals, the protection of NATO through expansion or PFP would be genuine. Yet, it is in these situations of tenuous stability that States will be denied proper civilian and military aid from NATO.\n\n[1] The NATO Handbook; Partnership for Peace, Aim and scope\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the protracted collapse of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States did remove the overwhelming threat of the USSR against Western Europe. However, the threat persists in a different form. The newly independent republics remain vulnerable to the vast political and military influence of Russia. The new threat is the destruction of stability of the new republics, and thus Russian expansion that is hostile to both the republics and the Western European states in their proximity – worry that this would occur lead to many eastern European states applying to NATO as soon as they could. [1] The solution is pre-emptive expansion in the other direction. The broadening of NATO to include the Eastern republics shall offer a bulwark against Russian expansion. NATO shall continue to perform the role of a defensive alliance against a putative military threat.\n\n[1] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.455, 458, 461-2, 475\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The expense of NATO expansion is marginal when compared to the defence budgets of the major NATO States. The US defence expenditure alone for the fiscal year 2012 is $553 billion. [1] Further, the correct equation is not between the expense of stationing troops in these new States and the current saving from non-deployment. The balance is between the expense of forward deployment or other military investment and the prohibitive cost in dollars and lives from a conflict between NATO and Russia, or a conflagration in any of the Eastern republics. NATO expansion is nothing more than a cost-effective insurance policy against a very real risk.\n\n[1] Department of Defence, US budget, gpoaccess, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy12/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD-7.pdf\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato It ought to be accepted that the NATO alliance is already diluted. It should not be perceived as a standing military force, but a holding company whose individual members can draw upon a collective infrastructure and military support in the event of intervention in and around Europe. The expansion of NATO should be the opportunity to re-examine the current force deployment and strategic capability of the alliance. For example, the US maintains significant permanent deployment of infantry, aircraft and armour in Germany that could possibly be transferred to a more active role in protecting the borders of the newly independent republics. Similarly, the NATO ‘After-Action’ report into ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo highlighted the dependence of the offensive on the US capacity for strategic airlift. The acquisition of the requisite air transport by the Western European States would allow more credible guarantees of security throughout Europe. Forward deployment of NATO troops into the new republics is not a prerequisite for expansion. The core of the alliance is the pledge to protect which is undiminished by the addition of new members.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion is not the cause of nationalism in Russia, rather the Russian leadership stokes nationalism in order to direct attention away from the government. The Russian people are concerned about hardship and hazard within their own borders rather than without. Yes it is true that the expansion of NATO antagonises Russia but this should not be a major concern of NATO, any expansion of a military alliance is likely to worry those countries that are outside that alliance. Moreover, failing to expand NATO to countries that are potentially threatened by the same nationalism and belligerency of Russia would be implicitly rewarding that belligerency. NATO should not be teaching Russia the lesson that hostility in Eastern Europe gets results that lessen the security of all.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion was, and is, necessary for international stability\n\nEnlargement was necessary to prevent Europe “reverting to type”. The rise once again of the ethnic and religious causes of war. [1] And this is still a reason for NATO to expand to help stabilise Europe. The Balkans is only the worst area for Ethnic tensions; there are similar cases all over Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The history of Eastern Europe has been one of empires not the nation state. Stalin had a policy of divide and rule; he made sure each soviet republic included substantial minorities in order to prevent the growth of nationalist movements. [2] Stalin only continued a long tradition of ethnic movements within empires in Eastern Europe. The Balkan problem for example is considered an effect of the Ottoman empire; hence the Christian/Moslem divides in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Austrian Empire settled people on its frontiers in much the same way; the result is that none of the eastern European states is ethnically homogeneous. The Violent break-up of Yugoslavia showed the way many other states could potentially go, NATO wished to avoid this and enlargement was its best solution.\n\n[1] Coker, Christopher, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe’ pp5-12 NATO looks east ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, Praeger publishing, 1998) p.8\n\n[2] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.460\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion would benefit eastern European and post Soviet states\n\nThe opportunity of NATO membership creates the incentive for the newly independent republics to achieve internal stability. The criteria for NATO membership include stable democracy; civilian control of the armed forces; a sufficient military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to collective security; and the absence of active disputes on or within the borders of the State. [1] This incentivisation is critical given the European Union was and still is expanding slower than NATO – many new NATO members such as Albania are years away from achieving EU membership. [2] NATO membership will help these fledging States to help themselves.\n\n[ NATO, ‘NATO enlargement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 May 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm\n\n[2] BBC News, ‘Albania applies for EU membership’, 28 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8023127.stm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Further expansion of NATO will antagonise Russia\n\nRussia considers NATO expansion to be very antagonistic towards it. Continued NATO expansion would only serve to manufacture the expansionist demon that NATO fears. The election of the ultranationalist Duma in 1996, the choice of the hardliner Yvegeny Primakov as foreign minister, and the failure of the reformist party ‘Russia’s Choice’ under Yegor Gaidar even to clear the 5% hurdle for Duma membership was in whole or in part, due to the Russian sense of isolation from Western Europe. President Putin has also made a lot out of his opposition to NATO expansion which he has opposed since he was first elected President. [1] This sense is dramatically emboldened by such provocative actions as threatening to station NATO troops on its borders. The Russian people are unlikely to consider that the forward deployment is not directed against them, as is shown by Russia’s worries about and threats in response to National Missile Defense which is not aimed at them, [2] but instead is only designed to maintain internal stability in the neighbouring republics. By inflaming Russian nationalism, NATO expansion is obstructs democratic development for Russia and undermines the security of its neighbouring republics.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Putin warns against Nato expansion’, 26 January 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1137859.stm\n\n[2] Quetteville, Harry de, and Pierce, Andrew, ‘Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal’, The Telegraph, 17 January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-t...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The cost of expansion is prohibitive\n\nThe costs of NATO expansion are prohibitive at a time when the Western European members are scaling back their defence budgets and the reducing the size of their conventional forces. The Clinton administration estimated the costs of the initial expansion to be $27 to $35 to 2010, but this is mostly the costs restructuring and of making forces interoperable rather than the costs of protecting the new members. [1] The cost of stationing forces in Eastern Europe would be considerably higher and if NATO ever had to defend these countries the cost would be higher still. Given the fragile economies of the new republics, the existing NATO States will be obliged to absorb the expense of expansion. Even a decade after expansion the new members have mostly not succeeded in reaching the 2% of GDP the alliance targets and their combined defence budgets are only a third of Russia’s. [2] The proper question is whether the taxpayers of the US and Western European States wish to pay to protect citizens of distant republics from phantom threats.\n\n[1] ‘Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report’, Arms Control Association, March 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2148\n\n[2] The Economist, ‘Scars, scares and scarcity’, 12 May 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18682793\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Russia is no longer a threat\n\nRussia no longer presents a credible threat to Eastern Europe or the existing NATO States which NATO expansion could counterbalance. Russia can no longer offer the conventional military threat of the Cold War. The acceptance of this reality by the US is evidenced by the fact that troop numbers in Europe are much reduced from a peak of 277,000 troops and will be reduced further to 30,000 in the next few years. [1] This is the key question for a military alliance as defence is the key purpose. Expansion should therefore be decided based upon the yardstick of whether the expansion is necessary for the security of NATO members. If there is no credible threat then there is no reason to expand the alliance. At the same time while Russia is no longer a conventional military threat it still has its immense nuclear armament. This will remain a threat no matter how many of Russia’s neighbours join NATO but Russia could feel increasingly obliged to focus on its nuclear arsenal to respond to NATO expansion – something which would create a threat to western Europe.\n\n[1] Shanker, Thom, and Erlanger, Steven, ‘U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe’, The New York Times, 13 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/europe/europe-weighs-implication...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Expanding NATO will overstretch the resources of its core members\n\nNATO expansion can in the long term only lead to the overstretching of the organisation and thus the undermining of stability for the entirety of Europe. The credibility of the commitment of article V of the NATO Charter in which every member pledges to come to the defence of another has already been undermined by the inclusion of small countries that would be unable to defend themselves and are practically indefensible. [1] NATO runs the grave risk of becoming so large and diverse it resembles a political organisation rather than a military alliance. The military contribution of the new members would be by definition limited. Were these republics already capable of providing sufficient security to their borders, there would be no necessity for NATO membership. At the point where the NATO commitments become more declaratory than real, the security of every State including the new members is called into question. There are already worries, particularly from the United States, that the U.S. provides a free guarantee while Europe free rides, this is even more of a problem with smaller countries who cannot defend themselves even if they did spend NATOs agreed 2% of GDP on defence. [2] Thus NATO expansion might in fact assist any State eager for its own expansionism in Eastern Europe.\n\n[1] The Economist, ‘Georgia’s prospects’, 19 October 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8068850\n\n[2] Haddick, Robert, ‘This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO’, ForeignPolicy.com, 17 June 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/this_week_at_war_moral_...\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.25
] |
[
87.25,
85.125,
83.8125,
83.5,
84.375,
83.8125,
82.875,
82.75,
82.5625,
82.5,
82.375,
83.1875
] |
NATO expansion would benefit eastern European and post Soviet states
The opportunity of NATO membership creates the incentive for the newly independent republics to achieve internal stability. The criteria for NATO membership include stable democracy; civilian control of the armed forces; a sufficient military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to collective security; and the absence of active disputes on or within the borders of the State. [1] This incentivisation is critical given the European Union was and still is expanding slower than NATO – many new NATO members such as Albania are years away from achieving EU membership. [2] NATO membership will help these fledging States to help themselves.
[ NATO, ‘NATO enlargement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 May 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm
[2] BBC News, ‘Albania applies for EU membership’, 28 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8023127.stm
|
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato The objectives of creating stability in these fledgling democracies could be better achieved under the existing ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP) programme. The policy received strong support under the Clinton administration involves regular consultations, exercises and opportunities for education that seek to professionalize the civilian and military institutions of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover this was individually tailored to each member based on their own requirements. [1] This policy of genuine aid is preferable to the wish-list of democratic ideals that compose the criteria for NATO membership. Paradoxically, if a country was actually able to achieve all the criteria delineated for membership, the necessity for their NATO protection would be marginal. Conversely, were the republics predictably unable to realize these goals, the protection of NATO through expansion or PFP would be genuine. Yet, it is in these situations of tenuous stability that States will be denied proper civilian and military aid from NATO.\n\n[1] The NATO Handbook; Partnership for Peace, Aim and scope\n"
] |
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato Stability could have been ensured without a military alliance like NATO. The European Union could have managed to create stability on its own, the EU itself since the Lisbon Treaty has gained the role of the West European Union security organisation. Additionally admission to NATO (and incidentally the EU) require social harmonisation and stability to occur before a new state can join, to quote the NATO Handbook directly; “States which are involved in ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, before they can become members.” [1] If these nations had to sort out their problems first what was the point of enlargement, it is not enlargement per se that is meaning that these disputes are solved.\n\n[1] NATO, The NATO Handbook; The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, 1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Again NATO need not have been the method why which these were fulfilled; the EU could equally provide collective defence within Europe and create the trust between member state’s militaries. It is also the European Union that has done most to turn Robinson’s ‘insecure and uncertain East’ into being part of ‘a prosperous, secure and self-confident West’. While it may be able to unite East and West Europe NATO is itself a symbol of division to others – particularly to Russia.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the protracted collapse of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States did remove the overwhelming threat of the USSR against Western Europe. However, the threat persists in a different form. The newly independent republics remain vulnerable to the vast political and military influence of Russia. The new threat is the destruction of stability of the new republics, and thus Russian expansion that is hostile to both the republics and the Western European states in their proximity – worry that this would occur lead to many eastern European states applying to NATO as soon as they could. [1] The solution is pre-emptive expansion in the other direction. The broadening of NATO to include the Eastern republics shall offer a bulwark against Russian expansion. NATO shall continue to perform the role of a defensive alliance against a putative military threat.\n\n[1] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.455, 458, 461-2, 475\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The expense of NATO expansion is marginal when compared to the defence budgets of the major NATO States. The US defence expenditure alone for the fiscal year 2012 is $553 billion. [1] Further, the correct equation is not between the expense of stationing troops in these new States and the current saving from non-deployment. The balance is between the expense of forward deployment or other military investment and the prohibitive cost in dollars and lives from a conflict between NATO and Russia, or a conflagration in any of the Eastern republics. NATO expansion is nothing more than a cost-effective insurance policy against a very real risk.\n\n[1] Department of Defence, US budget, gpoaccess, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy12/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD-7.pdf\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato It ought to be accepted that the NATO alliance is already diluted. It should not be perceived as a standing military force, but a holding company whose individual members can draw upon a collective infrastructure and military support in the event of intervention in and around Europe. The expansion of NATO should be the opportunity to re-examine the current force deployment and strategic capability of the alliance. For example, the US maintains significant permanent deployment of infantry, aircraft and armour in Germany that could possibly be transferred to a more active role in protecting the borders of the newly independent republics. Similarly, the NATO ‘After-Action’ report into ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo highlighted the dependence of the offensive on the US capacity for strategic airlift. The acquisition of the requisite air transport by the Western European States would allow more credible guarantees of security throughout Europe. Forward deployment of NATO troops into the new republics is not a prerequisite for expansion. The core of the alliance is the pledge to protect which is undiminished by the addition of new members.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion is not the cause of nationalism in Russia, rather the Russian leadership stokes nationalism in order to direct attention away from the government. The Russian people are concerned about hardship and hazard within their own borders rather than without. Yes it is true that the expansion of NATO antagonises Russia but this should not be a major concern of NATO, any expansion of a military alliance is likely to worry those countries that are outside that alliance. Moreover, failing to expand NATO to countries that are potentially threatened by the same nationalism and belligerency of Russia would be implicitly rewarding that belligerency. NATO should not be teaching Russia the lesson that hostility in Eastern Europe gets results that lessen the security of all.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion was, and is, necessary for international stability\n\nEnlargement was necessary to prevent Europe “reverting to type”. The rise once again of the ethnic and religious causes of war. [1] And this is still a reason for NATO to expand to help stabilise Europe. The Balkans is only the worst area for Ethnic tensions; there are similar cases all over Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The history of Eastern Europe has been one of empires not the nation state. Stalin had a policy of divide and rule; he made sure each soviet republic included substantial minorities in order to prevent the growth of nationalist movements. [2] Stalin only continued a long tradition of ethnic movements within empires in Eastern Europe. The Balkan problem for example is considered an effect of the Ottoman empire; hence the Christian/Moslem divides in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Austrian Empire settled people on its frontiers in much the same way; the result is that none of the eastern European states is ethnically homogeneous. The Violent break-up of Yugoslavia showed the way many other states could potentially go, NATO wished to avoid this and enlargement was its best solution.\n\n[1] Coker, Christopher, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe’ pp5-12 NATO looks east ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, Praeger publishing, 1998) p.8\n\n[2] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.460\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO is a fundamental part of the international architecture used to further peace and prosperity in Europe\n\nPeace has many foundations and no one international organisation can create all these foundations itself. NATO is therefore just as necessary to the peace of Europe as the OSCE or EU and all of these organisations need to expand to cover the states within Europe to promote peace. NATO therefore in its Message from Turnberry – its response to the end of the cold war - “express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy.” [1] Collective defence is as necessary as economic cooperation in creating peace, this is something that in Europe only NATO can provide. Peace is also promoted by NATO through the security cooperation that it provides; building trust between the member states. This need for trust and equality between the parts of Europe was also explicitly stated by NATO’s Secretary General when he stated “Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East.” [2] NATO enlargement helps heal this fault line and shows the cold war in Europe is really over.\n\n[1] NATO, ‘The Message from Turnberry’, NATO website, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm\n\n[2] Robertson, George, \"NATO: Enlarging and redefining itself\" Speech 18 February 2002 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020218a.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Further expansion of NATO will antagonise Russia\n\nRussia considers NATO expansion to be very antagonistic towards it. Continued NATO expansion would only serve to manufacture the expansionist demon that NATO fears. The election of the ultranationalist Duma in 1996, the choice of the hardliner Yvegeny Primakov as foreign minister, and the failure of the reformist party ‘Russia’s Choice’ under Yegor Gaidar even to clear the 5% hurdle for Duma membership was in whole or in part, due to the Russian sense of isolation from Western Europe. President Putin has also made a lot out of his opposition to NATO expansion which he has opposed since he was first elected President. [1] This sense is dramatically emboldened by such provocative actions as threatening to station NATO troops on its borders. The Russian people are unlikely to consider that the forward deployment is not directed against them, as is shown by Russia’s worries about and threats in response to National Missile Defense which is not aimed at them, [2] but instead is only designed to maintain internal stability in the neighbouring republics. By inflaming Russian nationalism, NATO expansion is obstructs democratic development for Russia and undermines the security of its neighbouring republics.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Putin warns against Nato expansion’, 26 January 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1137859.stm\n\n[2] Quetteville, Harry de, and Pierce, Andrew, ‘Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal’, The Telegraph, 17 January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-t...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The cost of expansion is prohibitive\n\nThe costs of NATO expansion are prohibitive at a time when the Western European members are scaling back their defence budgets and the reducing the size of their conventional forces. The Clinton administration estimated the costs of the initial expansion to be $27 to $35 to 2010, but this is mostly the costs restructuring and of making forces interoperable rather than the costs of protecting the new members. [1] The cost of stationing forces in Eastern Europe would be considerably higher and if NATO ever had to defend these countries the cost would be higher still. Given the fragile economies of the new republics, the existing NATO States will be obliged to absorb the expense of expansion. Even a decade after expansion the new members have mostly not succeeded in reaching the 2% of GDP the alliance targets and their combined defence budgets are only a third of Russia’s. [2] The proper question is whether the taxpayers of the US and Western European States wish to pay to protect citizens of distant republics from phantom threats.\n\n[1] ‘Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report’, Arms Control Association, March 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2148\n\n[2] The Economist, ‘Scars, scares and scarcity’, 12 May 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18682793\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Russia is no longer a threat\n\nRussia no longer presents a credible threat to Eastern Europe or the existing NATO States which NATO expansion could counterbalance. Russia can no longer offer the conventional military threat of the Cold War. The acceptance of this reality by the US is evidenced by the fact that troop numbers in Europe are much reduced from a peak of 277,000 troops and will be reduced further to 30,000 in the next few years. [1] This is the key question for a military alliance as defence is the key purpose. Expansion should therefore be decided based upon the yardstick of whether the expansion is necessary for the security of NATO members. If there is no credible threat then there is no reason to expand the alliance. At the same time while Russia is no longer a conventional military threat it still has its immense nuclear armament. This will remain a threat no matter how many of Russia’s neighbours join NATO but Russia could feel increasingly obliged to focus on its nuclear arsenal to respond to NATO expansion – something which would create a threat to western Europe.\n\n[1] Shanker, Thom, and Erlanger, Steven, ‘U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe’, The New York Times, 13 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/europe/europe-weighs-implication...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Expanding NATO will overstretch the resources of its core members\n\nNATO expansion can in the long term only lead to the overstretching of the organisation and thus the undermining of stability for the entirety of Europe. The credibility of the commitment of article V of the NATO Charter in which every member pledges to come to the defence of another has already been undermined by the inclusion of small countries that would be unable to defend themselves and are practically indefensible. [1] NATO runs the grave risk of becoming so large and diverse it resembles a political organisation rather than a military alliance. The military contribution of the new members would be by definition limited. Were these republics already capable of providing sufficient security to their borders, there would be no necessity for NATO membership. At the point where the NATO commitments become more declaratory than real, the security of every State including the new members is called into question. There are already worries, particularly from the United States, that the U.S. provides a free guarantee while Europe free rides, this is even more of a problem with smaller countries who cannot defend themselves even if they did spend NATOs agreed 2% of GDP on defence. [2] Thus NATO expansion might in fact assist any State eager for its own expansionism in Eastern Europe.\n\n[1] The Economist, ‘Georgia’s prospects’, 19 October 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8068850\n\n[2] Haddick, Robert, ‘This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO’, ForeignPolicy.com, 17 June 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/this_week_at_war_moral_...\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.125
] |
[
93.5,
90.1875,
87.25,
83.6875,
86.4375,
84.75,
83.4375,
82.6875,
83.4375,
83.625,
82.3125,
89.1875
] |
Further expansion of NATO will antagonise Russia
Russia considers NATO expansion to be very antagonistic towards it. Continued NATO expansion would only serve to manufacture the expansionist demon that NATO fears. The election of the ultranationalist Duma in 1996, the choice of the hardliner Yvegeny Primakov as foreign minister, and the failure of the reformist party ‘Russia’s Choice’ under Yegor Gaidar even to clear the 5% hurdle for Duma membership was in whole or in part, due to the Russian sense of isolation from Western Europe. President Putin has also made a lot out of his opposition to NATO expansion which he has opposed since he was first elected President. [1] This sense is dramatically emboldened by such provocative actions as threatening to station NATO troops on its borders. The Russian people are unlikely to consider that the forward deployment is not directed against them, as is shown by Russia’s worries about and threats in response to National Missile Defense which is not aimed at them, [2] but instead is only designed to maintain internal stability in the neighbouring republics. By inflaming Russian nationalism, NATO expansion is obstructs democratic development for Russia and undermines the security of its neighbouring republics.
[1] BBC News, ‘Putin warns against Nato expansion’, 26 January 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1137859.stm
[2] Quetteville, Harry de, and Pierce, Andrew, ‘Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal’, The Telegraph, 17 January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-t...
|
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion is not the cause of nationalism in Russia, rather the Russian leadership stokes nationalism in order to direct attention away from the government. The Russian people are concerned about hardship and hazard within their own borders rather than without. Yes it is true that the expansion of NATO antagonises Russia but this should not be a major concern of NATO, any expansion of a military alliance is likely to worry those countries that are outside that alliance. Moreover, failing to expand NATO to countries that are potentially threatened by the same nationalism and belligerency of Russia would be implicitly rewarding that belligerency. NATO should not be teaching Russia the lesson that hostility in Eastern Europe gets results that lessen the security of all.\n"
] |
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the protracted collapse of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States did remove the overwhelming threat of the USSR against Western Europe. However, the threat persists in a different form. The newly independent republics remain vulnerable to the vast political and military influence of Russia. The new threat is the destruction of stability of the new republics, and thus Russian expansion that is hostile to both the republics and the Western European states in their proximity – worry that this would occur lead to many eastern European states applying to NATO as soon as they could. [1] The solution is pre-emptive expansion in the other direction. The broadening of NATO to include the Eastern republics shall offer a bulwark against Russian expansion. NATO shall continue to perform the role of a defensive alliance against a putative military threat.\n\n[1] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.455, 458, 461-2, 475\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The expense of NATO expansion is marginal when compared to the defence budgets of the major NATO States. The US defence expenditure alone for the fiscal year 2012 is $553 billion. [1] Further, the correct equation is not between the expense of stationing troops in these new States and the current saving from non-deployment. The balance is between the expense of forward deployment or other military investment and the prohibitive cost in dollars and lives from a conflict between NATO and Russia, or a conflagration in any of the Eastern republics. NATO expansion is nothing more than a cost-effective insurance policy against a very real risk.\n\n[1] Department of Defence, US budget, gpoaccess, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy12/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD-7.pdf\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato It ought to be accepted that the NATO alliance is already diluted. It should not be perceived as a standing military force, but a holding company whose individual members can draw upon a collective infrastructure and military support in the event of intervention in and around Europe. The expansion of NATO should be the opportunity to re-examine the current force deployment and strategic capability of the alliance. For example, the US maintains significant permanent deployment of infantry, aircraft and armour in Germany that could possibly be transferred to a more active role in protecting the borders of the newly independent republics. Similarly, the NATO ‘After-Action’ report into ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo highlighted the dependence of the offensive on the US capacity for strategic airlift. The acquisition of the requisite air transport by the Western European States would allow more credible guarantees of security throughout Europe. Forward deployment of NATO troops into the new republics is not a prerequisite for expansion. The core of the alliance is the pledge to protect which is undiminished by the addition of new members.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Stability could have been ensured without a military alliance like NATO. The European Union could have managed to create stability on its own, the EU itself since the Lisbon Treaty has gained the role of the West European Union security organisation. Additionally admission to NATO (and incidentally the EU) require social harmonisation and stability to occur before a new state can join, to quote the NATO Handbook directly; “States which are involved in ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, before they can become members.” [1] If these nations had to sort out their problems first what was the point of enlargement, it is not enlargement per se that is meaning that these disputes are solved.\n\n[1] NATO, The NATO Handbook; The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, 1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Again NATO need not have been the method why which these were fulfilled; the EU could equally provide collective defence within Europe and create the trust between member state’s militaries. It is also the European Union that has done most to turn Robinson’s ‘insecure and uncertain East’ into being part of ‘a prosperous, secure and self-confident West’. While it may be able to unite East and West Europe NATO is itself a symbol of division to others – particularly to Russia.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The objectives of creating stability in these fledgling democracies could be better achieved under the existing ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP) programme. The policy received strong support under the Clinton administration involves regular consultations, exercises and opportunities for education that seek to professionalize the civilian and military institutions of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover this was individually tailored to each member based on their own requirements. [1] This policy of genuine aid is preferable to the wish-list of democratic ideals that compose the criteria for NATO membership. Paradoxically, if a country was actually able to achieve all the criteria delineated for membership, the necessity for their NATO protection would be marginal. Conversely, were the republics predictably unable to realize these goals, the protection of NATO through expansion or PFP would be genuine. Yet, it is in these situations of tenuous stability that States will be denied proper civilian and military aid from NATO.\n\n[1] The NATO Handbook; Partnership for Peace, Aim and scope\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The cost of expansion is prohibitive\n\nThe costs of NATO expansion are prohibitive at a time when the Western European members are scaling back their defence budgets and the reducing the size of their conventional forces. The Clinton administration estimated the costs of the initial expansion to be $27 to $35 to 2010, but this is mostly the costs restructuring and of making forces interoperable rather than the costs of protecting the new members. [1] The cost of stationing forces in Eastern Europe would be considerably higher and if NATO ever had to defend these countries the cost would be higher still. Given the fragile economies of the new republics, the existing NATO States will be obliged to absorb the expense of expansion. Even a decade after expansion the new members have mostly not succeeded in reaching the 2% of GDP the alliance targets and their combined defence budgets are only a third of Russia’s. [2] The proper question is whether the taxpayers of the US and Western European States wish to pay to protect citizens of distant republics from phantom threats.\n\n[1] ‘Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report’, Arms Control Association, March 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2148\n\n[2] The Economist, ‘Scars, scares and scarcity’, 12 May 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18682793\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Russia is no longer a threat\n\nRussia no longer presents a credible threat to Eastern Europe or the existing NATO States which NATO expansion could counterbalance. Russia can no longer offer the conventional military threat of the Cold War. The acceptance of this reality by the US is evidenced by the fact that troop numbers in Europe are much reduced from a peak of 277,000 troops and will be reduced further to 30,000 in the next few years. [1] This is the key question for a military alliance as defence is the key purpose. Expansion should therefore be decided based upon the yardstick of whether the expansion is necessary for the security of NATO members. If there is no credible threat then there is no reason to expand the alliance. At the same time while Russia is no longer a conventional military threat it still has its immense nuclear armament. This will remain a threat no matter how many of Russia’s neighbours join NATO but Russia could feel increasingly obliged to focus on its nuclear arsenal to respond to NATO expansion – something which would create a threat to western Europe.\n\n[1] Shanker, Thom, and Erlanger, Steven, ‘U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe’, The New York Times, 13 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/europe/europe-weighs-implication...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Expanding NATO will overstretch the resources of its core members\n\nNATO expansion can in the long term only lead to the overstretching of the organisation and thus the undermining of stability for the entirety of Europe. The credibility of the commitment of article V of the NATO Charter in which every member pledges to come to the defence of another has already been undermined by the inclusion of small countries that would be unable to defend themselves and are practically indefensible. [1] NATO runs the grave risk of becoming so large and diverse it resembles a political organisation rather than a military alliance. The military contribution of the new members would be by definition limited. Were these republics already capable of providing sufficient security to their borders, there would be no necessity for NATO membership. At the point where the NATO commitments become more declaratory than real, the security of every State including the new members is called into question. There are already worries, particularly from the United States, that the U.S. provides a free guarantee while Europe free rides, this is even more of a problem with smaller countries who cannot defend themselves even if they did spend NATOs agreed 2% of GDP on defence. [2] Thus NATO expansion might in fact assist any State eager for its own expansionism in Eastern Europe.\n\n[1] The Economist, ‘Georgia’s prospects’, 19 October 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8068850\n\n[2] Haddick, Robert, ‘This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO’, ForeignPolicy.com, 17 June 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/this_week_at_war_moral_...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion was, and is, necessary for international stability\n\nEnlargement was necessary to prevent Europe “reverting to type”. The rise once again of the ethnic and religious causes of war. [1] And this is still a reason for NATO to expand to help stabilise Europe. The Balkans is only the worst area for Ethnic tensions; there are similar cases all over Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The history of Eastern Europe has been one of empires not the nation state. Stalin had a policy of divide and rule; he made sure each soviet republic included substantial minorities in order to prevent the growth of nationalist movements. [2] Stalin only continued a long tradition of ethnic movements within empires in Eastern Europe. The Balkan problem for example is considered an effect of the Ottoman empire; hence the Christian/Moslem divides in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Austrian Empire settled people on its frontiers in much the same way; the result is that none of the eastern European states is ethnically homogeneous. The Violent break-up of Yugoslavia showed the way many other states could potentially go, NATO wished to avoid this and enlargement was its best solution.\n\n[1] Coker, Christopher, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe’ pp5-12 NATO looks east ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, Praeger publishing, 1998) p.8\n\n[2] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.460\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO is a fundamental part of the international architecture used to further peace and prosperity in Europe\n\nPeace has many foundations and no one international organisation can create all these foundations itself. NATO is therefore just as necessary to the peace of Europe as the OSCE or EU and all of these organisations need to expand to cover the states within Europe to promote peace. NATO therefore in its Message from Turnberry – its response to the end of the cold war - “express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy.” [1] Collective defence is as necessary as economic cooperation in creating peace, this is something that in Europe only NATO can provide. Peace is also promoted by NATO through the security cooperation that it provides; building trust between the member states. This need for trust and equality between the parts of Europe was also explicitly stated by NATO’s Secretary General when he stated “Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East.” [2] NATO enlargement helps heal this fault line and shows the cold war in Europe is really over.\n\n[1] NATO, ‘The Message from Turnberry’, NATO website, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm\n\n[2] Robertson, George, \"NATO: Enlarging and redefining itself\" Speech 18 February 2002 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020218a.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion would benefit eastern European and post Soviet states\n\nThe opportunity of NATO membership creates the incentive for the newly independent republics to achieve internal stability. The criteria for NATO membership include stable democracy; civilian control of the armed forces; a sufficient military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to collective security; and the absence of active disputes on or within the borders of the State. [1] This incentivisation is critical given the European Union was and still is expanding slower than NATO – many new NATO members such as Albania are years away from achieving EU membership. [2] NATO membership will help these fledging States to help themselves.\n\n[ NATO, ‘NATO enlargement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 May 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm\n\n[2] BBC News, ‘Albania applies for EU membership’, 28 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8023127.stm\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.875
] |
[
90.3125,
83.6875,
85.25,
84,
85.375,
83.9375,
82.6875,
84.4375,
82.6875,
83.6875,
82.9375,
83.5
] |
The cost of expansion is prohibitive
The costs of NATO expansion are prohibitive at a time when the Western European members are scaling back their defence budgets and the reducing the size of their conventional forces. The Clinton administration estimated the costs of the initial expansion to be $27 to $35 to 2010, but this is mostly the costs restructuring and of making forces interoperable rather than the costs of protecting the new members. [1] The cost of stationing forces in Eastern Europe would be considerably higher and if NATO ever had to defend these countries the cost would be higher still. Given the fragile economies of the new republics, the existing NATO States will be obliged to absorb the expense of expansion. Even a decade after expansion the new members have mostly not succeeded in reaching the 2% of GDP the alliance targets and their combined defence budgets are only a third of Russia’s. [2] The proper question is whether the taxpayers of the US and Western European States wish to pay to protect citizens of distant republics from phantom threats.
[1] ‘Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report’, Arms Control Association, March 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2148
[2] The Economist, ‘Scars, scares and scarcity’, 12 May 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18682793
|
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato The expense of NATO expansion is marginal when compared to the defence budgets of the major NATO States. The US defence expenditure alone for the fiscal year 2012 is $553 billion. [1] Further, the correct equation is not between the expense of stationing troops in these new States and the current saving from non-deployment. The balance is between the expense of forward deployment or other military investment and the prohibitive cost in dollars and lives from a conflict between NATO and Russia, or a conflagration in any of the Eastern republics. NATO expansion is nothing more than a cost-effective insurance policy against a very real risk.\n\n[1] Department of Defence, US budget, gpoaccess, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy12/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD-7.pdf\n"
] |
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the protracted collapse of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States did remove the overwhelming threat of the USSR against Western Europe. However, the threat persists in a different form. The newly independent republics remain vulnerable to the vast political and military influence of Russia. The new threat is the destruction of stability of the new republics, and thus Russian expansion that is hostile to both the republics and the Western European states in their proximity – worry that this would occur lead to many eastern European states applying to NATO as soon as they could. [1] The solution is pre-emptive expansion in the other direction. The broadening of NATO to include the Eastern republics shall offer a bulwark against Russian expansion. NATO shall continue to perform the role of a defensive alliance against a putative military threat.\n\n[1] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.455, 458, 461-2, 475\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato It ought to be accepted that the NATO alliance is already diluted. It should not be perceived as a standing military force, but a holding company whose individual members can draw upon a collective infrastructure and military support in the event of intervention in and around Europe. The expansion of NATO should be the opportunity to re-examine the current force deployment and strategic capability of the alliance. For example, the US maintains significant permanent deployment of infantry, aircraft and armour in Germany that could possibly be transferred to a more active role in protecting the borders of the newly independent republics. Similarly, the NATO ‘After-Action’ report into ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo highlighted the dependence of the offensive on the US capacity for strategic airlift. The acquisition of the requisite air transport by the Western European States would allow more credible guarantees of security throughout Europe. Forward deployment of NATO troops into the new republics is not a prerequisite for expansion. The core of the alliance is the pledge to protect which is undiminished by the addition of new members.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion is not the cause of nationalism in Russia, rather the Russian leadership stokes nationalism in order to direct attention away from the government. The Russian people are concerned about hardship and hazard within their own borders rather than without. Yes it is true that the expansion of NATO antagonises Russia but this should not be a major concern of NATO, any expansion of a military alliance is likely to worry those countries that are outside that alliance. Moreover, failing to expand NATO to countries that are potentially threatened by the same nationalism and belligerency of Russia would be implicitly rewarding that belligerency. NATO should not be teaching Russia the lesson that hostility in Eastern Europe gets results that lessen the security of all.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Stability could have been ensured without a military alliance like NATO. The European Union could have managed to create stability on its own, the EU itself since the Lisbon Treaty has gained the role of the West European Union security organisation. Additionally admission to NATO (and incidentally the EU) require social harmonisation and stability to occur before a new state can join, to quote the NATO Handbook directly; “States which are involved in ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, before they can become members.” [1] If these nations had to sort out their problems first what was the point of enlargement, it is not enlargement per se that is meaning that these disputes are solved.\n\n[1] NATO, The NATO Handbook; The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, 1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Again NATO need not have been the method why which these were fulfilled; the EU could equally provide collective defence within Europe and create the trust between member state’s militaries. It is also the European Union that has done most to turn Robinson’s ‘insecure and uncertain East’ into being part of ‘a prosperous, secure and self-confident West’. While it may be able to unite East and West Europe NATO is itself a symbol of division to others – particularly to Russia.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The objectives of creating stability in these fledgling democracies could be better achieved under the existing ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP) programme. The policy received strong support under the Clinton administration involves regular consultations, exercises and opportunities for education that seek to professionalize the civilian and military institutions of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover this was individually tailored to each member based on their own requirements. [1] This policy of genuine aid is preferable to the wish-list of democratic ideals that compose the criteria for NATO membership. Paradoxically, if a country was actually able to achieve all the criteria delineated for membership, the necessity for their NATO protection would be marginal. Conversely, were the republics predictably unable to realize these goals, the protection of NATO through expansion or PFP would be genuine. Yet, it is in these situations of tenuous stability that States will be denied proper civilian and military aid from NATO.\n\n[1] The NATO Handbook; Partnership for Peace, Aim and scope\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Further expansion of NATO will antagonise Russia\n\nRussia considers NATO expansion to be very antagonistic towards it. Continued NATO expansion would only serve to manufacture the expansionist demon that NATO fears. The election of the ultranationalist Duma in 1996, the choice of the hardliner Yvegeny Primakov as foreign minister, and the failure of the reformist party ‘Russia’s Choice’ under Yegor Gaidar even to clear the 5% hurdle for Duma membership was in whole or in part, due to the Russian sense of isolation from Western Europe. President Putin has also made a lot out of his opposition to NATO expansion which he has opposed since he was first elected President. [1] This sense is dramatically emboldened by such provocative actions as threatening to station NATO troops on its borders. The Russian people are unlikely to consider that the forward deployment is not directed against them, as is shown by Russia’s worries about and threats in response to National Missile Defense which is not aimed at them, [2] but instead is only designed to maintain internal stability in the neighbouring republics. By inflaming Russian nationalism, NATO expansion is obstructs democratic development for Russia and undermines the security of its neighbouring republics.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Putin warns against Nato expansion’, 26 January 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1137859.stm\n\n[2] Quetteville, Harry de, and Pierce, Andrew, ‘Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal’, The Telegraph, 17 January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-t...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Russia is no longer a threat\n\nRussia no longer presents a credible threat to Eastern Europe or the existing NATO States which NATO expansion could counterbalance. Russia can no longer offer the conventional military threat of the Cold War. The acceptance of this reality by the US is evidenced by the fact that troop numbers in Europe are much reduced from a peak of 277,000 troops and will be reduced further to 30,000 in the next few years. [1] This is the key question for a military alliance as defence is the key purpose. Expansion should therefore be decided based upon the yardstick of whether the expansion is necessary for the security of NATO members. If there is no credible threat then there is no reason to expand the alliance. At the same time while Russia is no longer a conventional military threat it still has its immense nuclear armament. This will remain a threat no matter how many of Russia’s neighbours join NATO but Russia could feel increasingly obliged to focus on its nuclear arsenal to respond to NATO expansion – something which would create a threat to western Europe.\n\n[1] Shanker, Thom, and Erlanger, Steven, ‘U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe’, The New York Times, 13 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/europe/europe-weighs-implication...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Expanding NATO will overstretch the resources of its core members\n\nNATO expansion can in the long term only lead to the overstretching of the organisation and thus the undermining of stability for the entirety of Europe. The credibility of the commitment of article V of the NATO Charter in which every member pledges to come to the defence of another has already been undermined by the inclusion of small countries that would be unable to defend themselves and are practically indefensible. [1] NATO runs the grave risk of becoming so large and diverse it resembles a political organisation rather than a military alliance. The military contribution of the new members would be by definition limited. Were these republics already capable of providing sufficient security to their borders, there would be no necessity for NATO membership. At the point where the NATO commitments become more declaratory than real, the security of every State including the new members is called into question. There are already worries, particularly from the United States, that the U.S. provides a free guarantee while Europe free rides, this is even more of a problem with smaller countries who cannot defend themselves even if they did spend NATOs agreed 2% of GDP on defence. [2] Thus NATO expansion might in fact assist any State eager for its own expansionism in Eastern Europe.\n\n[1] The Economist, ‘Georgia’s prospects’, 19 October 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8068850\n\n[2] Haddick, Robert, ‘This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO’, ForeignPolicy.com, 17 June 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/this_week_at_war_moral_...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion was, and is, necessary for international stability\n\nEnlargement was necessary to prevent Europe “reverting to type”. The rise once again of the ethnic and religious causes of war. [1] And this is still a reason for NATO to expand to help stabilise Europe. The Balkans is only the worst area for Ethnic tensions; there are similar cases all over Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The history of Eastern Europe has been one of empires not the nation state. Stalin had a policy of divide and rule; he made sure each soviet republic included substantial minorities in order to prevent the growth of nationalist movements. [2] Stalin only continued a long tradition of ethnic movements within empires in Eastern Europe. The Balkan problem for example is considered an effect of the Ottoman empire; hence the Christian/Moslem divides in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Austrian Empire settled people on its frontiers in much the same way; the result is that none of the eastern European states is ethnically homogeneous. The Violent break-up of Yugoslavia showed the way many other states could potentially go, NATO wished to avoid this and enlargement was its best solution.\n\n[1] Coker, Christopher, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe’ pp5-12 NATO looks east ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, Praeger publishing, 1998) p.8\n\n[2] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.460\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO is a fundamental part of the international architecture used to further peace and prosperity in Europe\n\nPeace has many foundations and no one international organisation can create all these foundations itself. NATO is therefore just as necessary to the peace of Europe as the OSCE or EU and all of these organisations need to expand to cover the states within Europe to promote peace. NATO therefore in its Message from Turnberry – its response to the end of the cold war - “express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy.” [1] Collective defence is as necessary as economic cooperation in creating peace, this is something that in Europe only NATO can provide. Peace is also promoted by NATO through the security cooperation that it provides; building trust between the member states. This need for trust and equality between the parts of Europe was also explicitly stated by NATO’s Secretary General when he stated “Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East.” [2] NATO enlargement helps heal this fault line and shows the cold war in Europe is really over.\n\n[1] NATO, ‘The Message from Turnberry’, NATO website, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm\n\n[2] Robertson, George, \"NATO: Enlarging and redefining itself\" Speech 18 February 2002 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020218a.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion would benefit eastern European and post Soviet states\n\nThe opportunity of NATO membership creates the incentive for the newly independent republics to achieve internal stability. The criteria for NATO membership include stable democracy; civilian control of the armed forces; a sufficient military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to collective security; and the absence of active disputes on or within the borders of the State. [1] This incentivisation is critical given the European Union was and still is expanding slower than NATO – many new NATO members such as Albania are years away from achieving EU membership. [2] NATO membership will help these fledging States to help themselves.\n\n[ NATO, ‘NATO enlargement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 May 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm\n\n[2] BBC News, ‘Albania applies for EU membership’, 28 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8023127.stm\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.4375
] |
[
88.125,
89,
83.875,
84,
84.75,
86.8125,
82.3125,
83.625,
83.625,
83.9375,
82.9375,
84.375
] |
Russia is no longer a threat
Russia no longer presents a credible threat to Eastern Europe or the existing NATO States which NATO expansion could counterbalance. Russia can no longer offer the conventional military threat of the Cold War. The acceptance of this reality by the US is evidenced by the fact that troop numbers in Europe are much reduced from a peak of 277,000 troops and will be reduced further to 30,000 in the next few years. [1] This is the key question for a military alliance as defence is the key purpose. Expansion should therefore be decided based upon the yardstick of whether the expansion is necessary for the security of NATO members. If there is no credible threat then there is no reason to expand the alliance. At the same time while Russia is no longer a conventional military threat it still has its immense nuclear armament. This will remain a threat no matter how many of Russia’s neighbours join NATO but Russia could feel increasingly obliged to focus on its nuclear arsenal to respond to NATO expansion – something which would create a threat to western Europe.
[1] Shanker, Thom, and Erlanger, Steven, ‘U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe’, The New York Times, 13 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/europe/europe-weighs-implication...
|
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the protracted collapse of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States did remove the overwhelming threat of the USSR against Western Europe. However, the threat persists in a different form. The newly independent republics remain vulnerable to the vast political and military influence of Russia. The new threat is the destruction of stability of the new republics, and thus Russian expansion that is hostile to both the republics and the Western European states in their proximity – worry that this would occur lead to many eastern European states applying to NATO as soon as they could. [1] The solution is pre-emptive expansion in the other direction. The broadening of NATO to include the Eastern republics shall offer a bulwark against Russian expansion. NATO shall continue to perform the role of a defensive alliance against a putative military threat.\n\n[1] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.455, 458, 461-2, 475\n"
] |
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato The expense of NATO expansion is marginal when compared to the defence budgets of the major NATO States. The US defence expenditure alone for the fiscal year 2012 is $553 billion. [1] Further, the correct equation is not between the expense of stationing troops in these new States and the current saving from non-deployment. The balance is between the expense of forward deployment or other military investment and the prohibitive cost in dollars and lives from a conflict between NATO and Russia, or a conflagration in any of the Eastern republics. NATO expansion is nothing more than a cost-effective insurance policy against a very real risk.\n\n[1] Department of Defence, US budget, gpoaccess, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy12/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD-7.pdf\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato It ought to be accepted that the NATO alliance is already diluted. It should not be perceived as a standing military force, but a holding company whose individual members can draw upon a collective infrastructure and military support in the event of intervention in and around Europe. The expansion of NATO should be the opportunity to re-examine the current force deployment and strategic capability of the alliance. For example, the US maintains significant permanent deployment of infantry, aircraft and armour in Germany that could possibly be transferred to a more active role in protecting the borders of the newly independent republics. Similarly, the NATO ‘After-Action’ report into ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo highlighted the dependence of the offensive on the US capacity for strategic airlift. The acquisition of the requisite air transport by the Western European States would allow more credible guarantees of security throughout Europe. Forward deployment of NATO troops into the new republics is not a prerequisite for expansion. The core of the alliance is the pledge to protect which is undiminished by the addition of new members.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion is not the cause of nationalism in Russia, rather the Russian leadership stokes nationalism in order to direct attention away from the government. The Russian people are concerned about hardship and hazard within their own borders rather than without. Yes it is true that the expansion of NATO antagonises Russia but this should not be a major concern of NATO, any expansion of a military alliance is likely to worry those countries that are outside that alliance. Moreover, failing to expand NATO to countries that are potentially threatened by the same nationalism and belligerency of Russia would be implicitly rewarding that belligerency. NATO should not be teaching Russia the lesson that hostility in Eastern Europe gets results that lessen the security of all.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Stability could have been ensured without a military alliance like NATO. The European Union could have managed to create stability on its own, the EU itself since the Lisbon Treaty has gained the role of the West European Union security organisation. Additionally admission to NATO (and incidentally the EU) require social harmonisation and stability to occur before a new state can join, to quote the NATO Handbook directly; “States which are involved in ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, before they can become members.” [1] If these nations had to sort out their problems first what was the point of enlargement, it is not enlargement per se that is meaning that these disputes are solved.\n\n[1] NATO, The NATO Handbook; The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, 1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Again NATO need not have been the method why which these were fulfilled; the EU could equally provide collective defence within Europe and create the trust between member state’s militaries. It is also the European Union that has done most to turn Robinson’s ‘insecure and uncertain East’ into being part of ‘a prosperous, secure and self-confident West’. While it may be able to unite East and West Europe NATO is itself a symbol of division to others – particularly to Russia.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The objectives of creating stability in these fledgling democracies could be better achieved under the existing ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP) programme. The policy received strong support under the Clinton administration involves regular consultations, exercises and opportunities for education that seek to professionalize the civilian and military institutions of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover this was individually tailored to each member based on their own requirements. [1] This policy of genuine aid is preferable to the wish-list of democratic ideals that compose the criteria for NATO membership. Paradoxically, if a country was actually able to achieve all the criteria delineated for membership, the necessity for their NATO protection would be marginal. Conversely, were the republics predictably unable to realize these goals, the protection of NATO through expansion or PFP would be genuine. Yet, it is in these situations of tenuous stability that States will be denied proper civilian and military aid from NATO.\n\n[1] The NATO Handbook; Partnership for Peace, Aim and scope\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Further expansion of NATO will antagonise Russia\n\nRussia considers NATO expansion to be very antagonistic towards it. Continued NATO expansion would only serve to manufacture the expansionist demon that NATO fears. The election of the ultranationalist Duma in 1996, the choice of the hardliner Yvegeny Primakov as foreign minister, and the failure of the reformist party ‘Russia’s Choice’ under Yegor Gaidar even to clear the 5% hurdle for Duma membership was in whole or in part, due to the Russian sense of isolation from Western Europe. President Putin has also made a lot out of his opposition to NATO expansion which he has opposed since he was first elected President. [1] This sense is dramatically emboldened by such provocative actions as threatening to station NATO troops on its borders. The Russian people are unlikely to consider that the forward deployment is not directed against them, as is shown by Russia’s worries about and threats in response to National Missile Defense which is not aimed at them, [2] but instead is only designed to maintain internal stability in the neighbouring republics. By inflaming Russian nationalism, NATO expansion is obstructs democratic development for Russia and undermines the security of its neighbouring republics.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Putin warns against Nato expansion’, 26 January 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1137859.stm\n\n[2] Quetteville, Harry de, and Pierce, Andrew, ‘Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal’, The Telegraph, 17 January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-t...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The cost of expansion is prohibitive\n\nThe costs of NATO expansion are prohibitive at a time when the Western European members are scaling back their defence budgets and the reducing the size of their conventional forces. The Clinton administration estimated the costs of the initial expansion to be $27 to $35 to 2010, but this is mostly the costs restructuring and of making forces interoperable rather than the costs of protecting the new members. [1] The cost of stationing forces in Eastern Europe would be considerably higher and if NATO ever had to defend these countries the cost would be higher still. Given the fragile economies of the new republics, the existing NATO States will be obliged to absorb the expense of expansion. Even a decade after expansion the new members have mostly not succeeded in reaching the 2% of GDP the alliance targets and their combined defence budgets are only a third of Russia’s. [2] The proper question is whether the taxpayers of the US and Western European States wish to pay to protect citizens of distant republics from phantom threats.\n\n[1] ‘Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report’, Arms Control Association, March 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2148\n\n[2] The Economist, ‘Scars, scares and scarcity’, 12 May 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18682793\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Expanding NATO will overstretch the resources of its core members\n\nNATO expansion can in the long term only lead to the overstretching of the organisation and thus the undermining of stability for the entirety of Europe. The credibility of the commitment of article V of the NATO Charter in which every member pledges to come to the defence of another has already been undermined by the inclusion of small countries that would be unable to defend themselves and are practically indefensible. [1] NATO runs the grave risk of becoming so large and diverse it resembles a political organisation rather than a military alliance. The military contribution of the new members would be by definition limited. Were these republics already capable of providing sufficient security to their borders, there would be no necessity for NATO membership. At the point where the NATO commitments become more declaratory than real, the security of every State including the new members is called into question. There are already worries, particularly from the United States, that the U.S. provides a free guarantee while Europe free rides, this is even more of a problem with smaller countries who cannot defend themselves even if they did spend NATOs agreed 2% of GDP on defence. [2] Thus NATO expansion might in fact assist any State eager for its own expansionism in Eastern Europe.\n\n[1] The Economist, ‘Georgia’s prospects’, 19 October 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8068850\n\n[2] Haddick, Robert, ‘This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO’, ForeignPolicy.com, 17 June 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/this_week_at_war_moral_...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion was, and is, necessary for international stability\n\nEnlargement was necessary to prevent Europe “reverting to type”. The rise once again of the ethnic and religious causes of war. [1] And this is still a reason for NATO to expand to help stabilise Europe. The Balkans is only the worst area for Ethnic tensions; there are similar cases all over Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The history of Eastern Europe has been one of empires not the nation state. Stalin had a policy of divide and rule; he made sure each soviet republic included substantial minorities in order to prevent the growth of nationalist movements. [2] Stalin only continued a long tradition of ethnic movements within empires in Eastern Europe. The Balkan problem for example is considered an effect of the Ottoman empire; hence the Christian/Moslem divides in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Austrian Empire settled people on its frontiers in much the same way; the result is that none of the eastern European states is ethnically homogeneous. The Violent break-up of Yugoslavia showed the way many other states could potentially go, NATO wished to avoid this and enlargement was its best solution.\n\n[1] Coker, Christopher, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe’ pp5-12 NATO looks east ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, Praeger publishing, 1998) p.8\n\n[2] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.460\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO is a fundamental part of the international architecture used to further peace and prosperity in Europe\n\nPeace has many foundations and no one international organisation can create all these foundations itself. NATO is therefore just as necessary to the peace of Europe as the OSCE or EU and all of these organisations need to expand to cover the states within Europe to promote peace. NATO therefore in its Message from Turnberry – its response to the end of the cold war - “express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy.” [1] Collective defence is as necessary as economic cooperation in creating peace, this is something that in Europe only NATO can provide. Peace is also promoted by NATO through the security cooperation that it provides; building trust between the member states. This need for trust and equality between the parts of Europe was also explicitly stated by NATO’s Secretary General when he stated “Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East.” [2] NATO enlargement helps heal this fault line and shows the cold war in Europe is really over.\n\n[1] NATO, ‘The Message from Turnberry’, NATO website, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm\n\n[2] Robertson, George, \"NATO: Enlarging and redefining itself\" Speech 18 February 2002 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020218a.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion would benefit eastern European and post Soviet states\n\nThe opportunity of NATO membership creates the incentive for the newly independent republics to achieve internal stability. The criteria for NATO membership include stable democracy; civilian control of the armed forces; a sufficient military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to collective security; and the absence of active disputes on or within the borders of the State. [1] This incentivisation is critical given the European Union was and still is expanding slower than NATO – many new NATO members such as Albania are years away from achieving EU membership. [2] NATO membership will help these fledging States to help themselves.\n\n[ NATO, ‘NATO enlargement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 May 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm\n\n[2] BBC News, ‘Albania applies for EU membership’, 28 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8023127.stm\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.875
] |
[
85.25,
89.75,
85.1875,
84.625,
86.5,
84.5625,
83.9375,
83.5625,
83.3125,
85.0625,
84.1875,
83.75
] |
Expanding NATO will overstretch the resources of its core members
NATO expansion can in the long term only lead to the overstretching of the organisation and thus the undermining of stability for the entirety of Europe. The credibility of the commitment of article V of the NATO Charter in which every member pledges to come to the defence of another has already been undermined by the inclusion of small countries that would be unable to defend themselves and are practically indefensible. [1] NATO runs the grave risk of becoming so large and diverse it resembles a political organisation rather than a military alliance. The military contribution of the new members would be by definition limited. Were these republics already capable of providing sufficient security to their borders, there would be no necessity for NATO membership. At the point where the NATO commitments become more declaratory than real, the security of every State including the new members is called into question. There are already worries, particularly from the United States, that the U.S. provides a free guarantee while Europe free rides, this is even more of a problem with smaller countries who cannot defend themselves even if they did spend NATOs agreed 2% of GDP on defence. [2] Thus NATO expansion might in fact assist any State eager for its own expansionism in Eastern Europe.
[1] The Economist, ‘Georgia’s prospects’, 19 October 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8068850
[2] Haddick, Robert, ‘This Week at War: Moral Hazard at NATO’, ForeignPolicy.com, 17 June 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/this_week_at_war_moral_...
|
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato It ought to be accepted that the NATO alliance is already diluted. It should not be perceived as a standing military force, but a holding company whose individual members can draw upon a collective infrastructure and military support in the event of intervention in and around Europe. The expansion of NATO should be the opportunity to re-examine the current force deployment and strategic capability of the alliance. For example, the US maintains significant permanent deployment of infantry, aircraft and armour in Germany that could possibly be transferred to a more active role in protecting the borders of the newly independent republics. Similarly, the NATO ‘After-Action’ report into ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo highlighted the dependence of the offensive on the US capacity for strategic airlift. The acquisition of the requisite air transport by the Western European States would allow more credible guarantees of security throughout Europe. Forward deployment of NATO troops into the new republics is not a prerequisite for expansion. The core of the alliance is the pledge to protect which is undiminished by the addition of new members.\n"
] |
[
"americas global politics house would expand nato The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the protracted collapse of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States did remove the overwhelming threat of the USSR against Western Europe. However, the threat persists in a different form. The newly independent republics remain vulnerable to the vast political and military influence of Russia. The new threat is the destruction of stability of the new republics, and thus Russian expansion that is hostile to both the republics and the Western European states in their proximity – worry that this would occur lead to many eastern European states applying to NATO as soon as they could. [1] The solution is pre-emptive expansion in the other direction. The broadening of NATO to include the Eastern republics shall offer a bulwark against Russian expansion. NATO shall continue to perform the role of a defensive alliance against a putative military threat.\n\n[1] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.455, 458, 461-2, 475\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The expense of NATO expansion is marginal when compared to the defence budgets of the major NATO States. The US defence expenditure alone for the fiscal year 2012 is $553 billion. [1] Further, the correct equation is not between the expense of stationing troops in these new States and the current saving from non-deployment. The balance is between the expense of forward deployment or other military investment and the prohibitive cost in dollars and lives from a conflict between NATO and Russia, or a conflagration in any of the Eastern republics. NATO expansion is nothing more than a cost-effective insurance policy against a very real risk.\n\n[1] Department of Defence, US budget, gpoaccess, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy12/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD-7.pdf\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion is not the cause of nationalism in Russia, rather the Russian leadership stokes nationalism in order to direct attention away from the government. The Russian people are concerned about hardship and hazard within their own borders rather than without. Yes it is true that the expansion of NATO antagonises Russia but this should not be a major concern of NATO, any expansion of a military alliance is likely to worry those countries that are outside that alliance. Moreover, failing to expand NATO to countries that are potentially threatened by the same nationalism and belligerency of Russia would be implicitly rewarding that belligerency. NATO should not be teaching Russia the lesson that hostility in Eastern Europe gets results that lessen the security of all.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Stability could have been ensured without a military alliance like NATO. The European Union could have managed to create stability on its own, the EU itself since the Lisbon Treaty has gained the role of the West European Union security organisation. Additionally admission to NATO (and incidentally the EU) require social harmonisation and stability to occur before a new state can join, to quote the NATO Handbook directly; “States which are involved in ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes, must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, before they can become members.” [1] If these nations had to sort out their problems first what was the point of enlargement, it is not enlargement per se that is meaning that these disputes are solved.\n\n[1] NATO, The NATO Handbook; The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, 1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Again NATO need not have been the method why which these were fulfilled; the EU could equally provide collective defence within Europe and create the trust between member state’s militaries. It is also the European Union that has done most to turn Robinson’s ‘insecure and uncertain East’ into being part of ‘a prosperous, secure and self-confident West’. While it may be able to unite East and West Europe NATO is itself a symbol of division to others – particularly to Russia.\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The objectives of creating stability in these fledgling democracies could be better achieved under the existing ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP) programme. The policy received strong support under the Clinton administration involves regular consultations, exercises and opportunities for education that seek to professionalize the civilian and military institutions of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover this was individually tailored to each member based on their own requirements. [1] This policy of genuine aid is preferable to the wish-list of democratic ideals that compose the criteria for NATO membership. Paradoxically, if a country was actually able to achieve all the criteria delineated for membership, the necessity for their NATO protection would be marginal. Conversely, were the republics predictably unable to realize these goals, the protection of NATO through expansion or PFP would be genuine. Yet, it is in these situations of tenuous stability that States will be denied proper civilian and military aid from NATO.\n\n[1] The NATO Handbook; Partnership for Peace, Aim and scope\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Further expansion of NATO will antagonise Russia\n\nRussia considers NATO expansion to be very antagonistic towards it. Continued NATO expansion would only serve to manufacture the expansionist demon that NATO fears. The election of the ultranationalist Duma in 1996, the choice of the hardliner Yvegeny Primakov as foreign minister, and the failure of the reformist party ‘Russia’s Choice’ under Yegor Gaidar even to clear the 5% hurdle for Duma membership was in whole or in part, due to the Russian sense of isolation from Western Europe. President Putin has also made a lot out of his opposition to NATO expansion which he has opposed since he was first elected President. [1] This sense is dramatically emboldened by such provocative actions as threatening to station NATO troops on its borders. The Russian people are unlikely to consider that the forward deployment is not directed against them, as is shown by Russia’s worries about and threats in response to National Missile Defense which is not aimed at them, [2] but instead is only designed to maintain internal stability in the neighbouring republics. By inflaming Russian nationalism, NATO expansion is obstructs democratic development for Russia and undermines the security of its neighbouring republics.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Putin warns against Nato expansion’, 26 January 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1137859.stm\n\n[2] Quetteville, Harry de, and Pierce, Andrew, ‘Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal’, The Telegraph, 17 January 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-t...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato The cost of expansion is prohibitive\n\nThe costs of NATO expansion are prohibitive at a time when the Western European members are scaling back their defence budgets and the reducing the size of their conventional forces. The Clinton administration estimated the costs of the initial expansion to be $27 to $35 to 2010, but this is mostly the costs restructuring and of making forces interoperable rather than the costs of protecting the new members. [1] The cost of stationing forces in Eastern Europe would be considerably higher and if NATO ever had to defend these countries the cost would be higher still. Given the fragile economies of the new republics, the existing NATO States will be obliged to absorb the expense of expansion. Even a decade after expansion the new members have mostly not succeeded in reaching the 2% of GDP the alliance targets and their combined defence budgets are only a third of Russia’s. [2] The proper question is whether the taxpayers of the US and Western European States wish to pay to protect citizens of distant republics from phantom threats.\n\n[1] ‘Administration Releases NATO Expansion Cost Report’, Arms Control Association, March 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2148\n\n[2] The Economist, ‘Scars, scares and scarcity’, 12 May 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18682793\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato Russia is no longer a threat\n\nRussia no longer presents a credible threat to Eastern Europe or the existing NATO States which NATO expansion could counterbalance. Russia can no longer offer the conventional military threat of the Cold War. The acceptance of this reality by the US is evidenced by the fact that troop numbers in Europe are much reduced from a peak of 277,000 troops and will be reduced further to 30,000 in the next few years. [1] This is the key question for a military alliance as defence is the key purpose. Expansion should therefore be decided based upon the yardstick of whether the expansion is necessary for the security of NATO members. If there is no credible threat then there is no reason to expand the alliance. At the same time while Russia is no longer a conventional military threat it still has its immense nuclear armament. This will remain a threat no matter how many of Russia’s neighbours join NATO but Russia could feel increasingly obliged to focus on its nuclear arsenal to respond to NATO expansion – something which would create a threat to western Europe.\n\n[1] Shanker, Thom, and Erlanger, Steven, ‘U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe’, The New York Times, 13 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/europe/europe-weighs-implication...\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion was, and is, necessary for international stability\n\nEnlargement was necessary to prevent Europe “reverting to type”. The rise once again of the ethnic and religious causes of war. [1] And this is still a reason for NATO to expand to help stabilise Europe. The Balkans is only the worst area for Ethnic tensions; there are similar cases all over Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The history of Eastern Europe has been one of empires not the nation state. Stalin had a policy of divide and rule; he made sure each soviet republic included substantial minorities in order to prevent the growth of nationalist movements. [2] Stalin only continued a long tradition of ethnic movements within empires in Eastern Europe. The Balkan problem for example is considered an effect of the Ottoman empire; hence the Christian/Moslem divides in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Austrian Empire settled people on its frontiers in much the same way; the result is that none of the eastern European states is ethnically homogeneous. The Violent break-up of Yugoslavia showed the way many other states could potentially go, NATO wished to avoid this and enlargement was its best solution.\n\n[1] Coker, Christopher, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe’ pp5-12 NATO looks east ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, Praeger publishing, 1998) p.8\n\n[2] Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.460\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO is a fundamental part of the international architecture used to further peace and prosperity in Europe\n\nPeace has many foundations and no one international organisation can create all these foundations itself. NATO is therefore just as necessary to the peace of Europe as the OSCE or EU and all of these organisations need to expand to cover the states within Europe to promote peace. NATO therefore in its Message from Turnberry – its response to the end of the cold war - “express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy.” [1] Collective defence is as necessary as economic cooperation in creating peace, this is something that in Europe only NATO can provide. Peace is also promoted by NATO through the security cooperation that it provides; building trust between the member states. This need for trust and equality between the parts of Europe was also explicitly stated by NATO’s Secretary General when he stated “Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East.” [2] NATO enlargement helps heal this fault line and shows the cold war in Europe is really over.\n\n[1] NATO, ‘The Message from Turnberry’, NATO website, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm\n\n[2] Robertson, George, \"NATO: Enlarging and redefining itself\" Speech 18 February 2002 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020218a.htm\n",
"americas global politics house would expand nato NATO expansion would benefit eastern European and post Soviet states\n\nThe opportunity of NATO membership creates the incentive for the newly independent republics to achieve internal stability. The criteria for NATO membership include stable democracy; civilian control of the armed forces; a sufficient military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to collective security; and the absence of active disputes on or within the borders of the State. [1] This incentivisation is critical given the European Union was and still is expanding slower than NATO – many new NATO members such as Albania are years away from achieving EU membership. [2] NATO membership will help these fledging States to help themselves.\n\n[ NATO, ‘NATO enlargement’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 May 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm\n\n[2] BBC News, ‘Albania applies for EU membership’, 28 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8023127.stm\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.25
] |
[
91.375,
88.25,
84.25,
88.125,
86.0625,
90.5625,
82.75,
83.625,
83.5,
85.75,
85.25,
85.8125
] |
Sacrifice of sovereignty
Guinea-Bissau would have to sacrifice its autonomy if it became the new front for the war on drugs. In order to receive assistance from the US, a state must adhere to US policy on drugs. If it fails to do so, like Bolivia did in 2009, then aid is severed under the certification system1. This restricts the recipient state’s ability to respond to the drug threat in a way that they deem suitable to their own circumstances. As a state should be free to form domestic policy without influence by external actors, the USA’s certification process is a violation of national sovereignty.
1) Walsh,J. ‘U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past’, Washington Office on Latin America, 17 September 2009
|
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let It is only fair that the US should have some say on domestic drug policy considering the extent of their military assistance. The offers of assistance are optional and the conditions of compliance are known by both parties. The US gave $6,495 million in military assistance to the Columbian government between 1998 and 2008 to counter the narcotics trade and the rebels who were reliant on the business1. Since this funding comes from the USA’s federal budget, the US should be able to dictate how the money is spent.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n"
] |
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let There is a stronger focus on alternative development in drugs policy compared to the beginning of the drug war. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), historically influenced by US drug policy, has taken an increasingly alternative development-orientated stance. The UNODC has committed itself to effective alternative incomes, gender mainstreaming and community participation which demonstrates a global shift towards beneficial development1.\n\n1) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Making a difference through Alternative Development’ data accessed 30 January 2014\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let The judicial system is not capable of handling narcotics cases fairly. Corruption and civil war have left Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system broken. Military leader General Antonio Indaj, who has alleged links to the drugs trade, has vetted all political and judicial appointments1. Considering that Guinea-Bissau has no prison, it is unlikely that those in the drug trade will be properly prosecuted. The US’ judicial system is seen as far more impartial and is, therefore, a more logical choice.\n\n1) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Part of the financial assistance received by countries on the front line of the drug war is a fund for ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. Plan Columbia, the USA’s attempt to reduce drug cultivation, saw 27% of all funding going towards democratic initiatives1. In a review by the Congressional Research Service of US drug control policy, the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions is a priority for the US2. If the US drug war was brought to Guinea-Bissau then funding would most likely go towards promoting democratic institutions and a transition of power from the military to the civilians.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n\n2) Wyler,L. ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Interdiction rarely works. If Guinea-Bissau were to remove illicit drug operations from within its territories then the cartels would move elsewhere. Known as the hydra effect, once one potential drug route is cut off then another one is found and the trade continues1. This was the case for interdiction efforts between the US and Mexico. Initial government operations were successful at interdicting drugs being shipped between South American and Florida. In retaliation, traffickers began to use the US-Mexico border. The border witnesses large volumes of trade and interdicting the drugs proved to be nearly impossible2. It is logical to conclude that traffickers would find a new way to ensure drugs reached the Western markets if Guinea-Bissau sought US assistance.\n\n1) Boaz,D. ‘The Hydra-Headed Drug Business’, CATO institute, 30 June 1998\n\n2) Morton,D. ‘The War on Drugs in Mexico: a failed state?’, Third World Quarterly,39:3, pg.1639\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Considering that many of the military leaders have an invested interest in the drug trade, it is unlikely that Guinea-Bissau will seek help on these grounds. Antonio Indaj, the army’s Chief of Staff, was accused in 2013 of acting as a middle man in transactions between the South American cartels and the Western markets1. Not only has he been involved in drugs transactions, but Indaj has also been accessed of supplying weaponry to the FARC. This makes it unlikely that these leaders would want US assistance which would disrupt their profits and possibly leave them open to prosecution.\n\n1) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Corruption is still present in many states which have joined the US drug war. The war on drugs has done little, and perhaps exacerbated, Columbia’s corruption despite US assistance. In 2011, Columbian ex-government ministers were jailed and prosecuted for corruption and co-operation with paramilitaries.1Judicial reforms have also met with varied success. The Merida Initiative in Mexico, designed at removing the corruption of the cartels, has failed to address corruption in the judicial system which is still rampant. 2\n\n1) Bogota,S. ‘Closer and closer to the top’, The Economist, 29 July 2011\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US assistance does not guarantee success against illicit drug organisations. Despite the militarisation of the drug war in the Reagan-era, armed gangs are still prominent throughout the drug world. In Columbia, the left wing FARC still remains despite decades of war against the Columbian and USA governments1. The FARC, who use drugs for much of its income, still control large territories in the South Eastern territories. The effectiveness of military aid is consequently uncertain.\n\n1) Acosta,N. ‘Colombia’s FARC rebels end holiday ceasefire’, Reuters, 15 January 2014\n\n2) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Judiciary are undermined\n\nShould Guinea-Bissau become the new front of the US drug war then their judiciary will be furthered undermined. The US has frequently tried offenders from other countries in the US, superseding the local judiciary1. While this is usually due to formal agreements between states, extradition can cause indignation amongst the local population. Guinea-Bissau’s ex Naval chief Na Tchuto was arrested by American forces and, rather than allowing his home state to prosecute him, was tried by the New York District Court. This caused resentment in Guinea-Bissau towards the US2.\n\n1) Aronofsky,D. & Qin,J. ‘U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases’\n\n2) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Gives power to military coup leaders\n\nAssistance from the US would ensure that the coup leaders of Guinea Bissau remain in power. The securitisation of issues such as drugs and ‘terror’ is encouraged by the United States. A major problem with this policy is that it provides undue power and legitimacy to those countering the threat1. In early 2014, the military were still unconstitutionally ruling over the country. The drug war provides an external threat for the military to justify their leadership position. Considering the military has refused to allow democratic elections to occur and has regularly committed coups2, the US drug war could be a perfect excuse for to remain in power until the ‘threat’ subsides.\n\n1) Crick,E. ‘Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs’, International Journal of Drug Policy, 2012\n\n2) BBC, ‘Guinea-Bissau drug trade ‘rises since coup’, 31 June 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let War on the poor\n\nThe war on drugs has turned in to a war on the poorest in society. Through heavy handed techniques of enforcement and militarisation, the American war on drugs has failed to identify to key motivating factor for many of those involved in the trade; poverty1. Guinea-Bissau is the 5th poorest nation in the world, and other primary exports such as cashew nuts are starting to fail1. Due to lucrative profits, many of the poorer in society turn to the drug trade. US policy does not put enough of a focus on alternative development projects which can provide a livelihood through licit means. Instead they are treated as criminals and, in turn, are pushed further away from reconciliation.\n\n1) Falco,M. ‘Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars’, Daedalus, 121:2, 2007, pg4\n\n2) The Guardian, ‘Guinea-Bissau’s dwindling cashew nut exports leave farmers facing hardship’, 23 August 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US will provide equipment\n\nGuinea-Bissau should join the US drug war as they do not have the means to fight the war themselves. The local law enforcement is underfunded and ill-equipped to deal with the international threat. Guinea Bissau has one ship which patrols 350km of coastline, their officers have little in the way of land transport, petrol, phones or hand cuffs1. The limited reach of the law has allowed the cartels and gangs to prosper which, in turn, further damages law and order in Guinea Bissau. US military assistance will therefore help restore law and order to Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Parkinson,C. ‘LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa’, In Sight Crime, 29 August 2013\n\n2) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008Shirk,D. ‘The Drug War in Mexico’, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2011\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Becoming a narco-state\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s social fabric is being destroyed by the presence of the drug trade and requires international support. Guinea-Bissau has been named as Africa’s first Narco-state; a country controlled by drug cartels and gangs. Violence committed by these gangs has escalated since the arrival of the Columbian cartels in 20071. Addiction, a consequence of the cocaine and heroin use, is prevalent throughout much of the country. It was estimated in 2012 that around 20-30% of the population use crack, an extremely addictive form of cocaine, and there is only one clinic in the country2. The only people who are visibly profiting from the presence of drugs are the Columbian drug lords who have extravagant mansions and modern cars3. Guinea-Bissau cannot hope to fight the prominence of these gangs by themselves and require aid.\n\n1) Time, ‘Guinea-Bissau: World’s First Narco-State’, data accessed 28 January 2014\n\n2) Hatcher,J. ‘Guinea-Bissau: How Cocaine Transformed a Tiny African Nation’, Time, 15 October 2012\n\n3) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Prevent drugs from reaching Western markets\n\nBy joining the war on drugs, Guinea-Bissau will be in a better position to thwart the transportation of cheap cocaine and heroin to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau’s position makes it ideal for the cocaine trade, where drugs can be unloaded from Latin America and then distributed more easily to the West1. Around 18 tons of cocaine (worth $1.25 billion) passes through West Africa annually, most of it travelling through the state2. US assistance and interdiction operations would help prevent illicit drugs from reaching the profitable Western markets.\n\n1) Smoltczyk,A. ‘Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a “Drug Trafficker’s Dream”, Spiegel, 8 March 2013\n\n2) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Deal with Corruption\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s institutions have become too corrupt to deal with the drug problem and require support. The police, army and judiciary have all been implicated in the drug trade. The involvement of state officials in drug trafficking means that criminals are not prosecuted against. When two soldiers and a civilian were apprehended with 635kg (worth £25.4 million in 2013), they were detained and then immediately released with Colonel Arsenio Blade claiming ‘They were on the road hitching a ride’1. Judges are often bribed or sent death threats when faced with sentencing those involved in the drug trade. The USA has provided restructuring assistance to institutions which have reduced corruption, such as in the Mexico Merida Initiative, and could do the same with Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95
] |
[
87.0625,
85.6875,
89.5625,
85.5,
86.125,
84,
85.3125,
84.125,
84.4375,
83.6875,
85.1875,
84.625,
85,
84.1875
] |
Judiciary are undermined
Should Guinea-Bissau become the new front of the US drug war then their judiciary will be furthered undermined. The US has frequently tried offenders from other countries in the US, superseding the local judiciary1. While this is usually due to formal agreements between states, extradition can cause indignation amongst the local population. Guinea-Bissau’s ex Naval chief Na Tchuto was arrested by American forces and, rather than allowing his home state to prosecute him, was tried by the New York District Court. This caused resentment in Guinea-Bissau towards the US2.
1) Aronofsky,D. & Qin,J. ‘U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases’
2) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013
|
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let The judicial system is not capable of handling narcotics cases fairly. Corruption and civil war have left Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system broken. Military leader General Antonio Indaj, who has alleged links to the drugs trade, has vetted all political and judicial appointments1. Considering that Guinea-Bissau has no prison, it is unlikely that those in the drug trade will be properly prosecuted. The US’ judicial system is seen as far more impartial and is, therefore, a more logical choice.\n\n1) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n"
] |
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let It is only fair that the US should have some say on domestic drug policy considering the extent of their military assistance. The offers of assistance are optional and the conditions of compliance are known by both parties. The US gave $6,495 million in military assistance to the Columbian government between 1998 and 2008 to counter the narcotics trade and the rebels who were reliant on the business1. Since this funding comes from the USA’s federal budget, the US should be able to dictate how the money is spent.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let There is a stronger focus on alternative development in drugs policy compared to the beginning of the drug war. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), historically influenced by US drug policy, has taken an increasingly alternative development-orientated stance. The UNODC has committed itself to effective alternative incomes, gender mainstreaming and community participation which demonstrates a global shift towards beneficial development1.\n\n1) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Making a difference through Alternative Development’ data accessed 30 January 2014\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Part of the financial assistance received by countries on the front line of the drug war is a fund for ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. Plan Columbia, the USA’s attempt to reduce drug cultivation, saw 27% of all funding going towards democratic initiatives1. In a review by the Congressional Research Service of US drug control policy, the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions is a priority for the US2. If the US drug war was brought to Guinea-Bissau then funding would most likely go towards promoting democratic institutions and a transition of power from the military to the civilians.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n\n2) Wyler,L. ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Interdiction rarely works. If Guinea-Bissau were to remove illicit drug operations from within its territories then the cartels would move elsewhere. Known as the hydra effect, once one potential drug route is cut off then another one is found and the trade continues1. This was the case for interdiction efforts between the US and Mexico. Initial government operations were successful at interdicting drugs being shipped between South American and Florida. In retaliation, traffickers began to use the US-Mexico border. The border witnesses large volumes of trade and interdicting the drugs proved to be nearly impossible2. It is logical to conclude that traffickers would find a new way to ensure drugs reached the Western markets if Guinea-Bissau sought US assistance.\n\n1) Boaz,D. ‘The Hydra-Headed Drug Business’, CATO institute, 30 June 1998\n\n2) Morton,D. ‘The War on Drugs in Mexico: a failed state?’, Third World Quarterly,39:3, pg.1639\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Considering that many of the military leaders have an invested interest in the drug trade, it is unlikely that Guinea-Bissau will seek help on these grounds. Antonio Indaj, the army’s Chief of Staff, was accused in 2013 of acting as a middle man in transactions between the South American cartels and the Western markets1. Not only has he been involved in drugs transactions, but Indaj has also been accessed of supplying weaponry to the FARC. This makes it unlikely that these leaders would want US assistance which would disrupt their profits and possibly leave them open to prosecution.\n\n1) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Corruption is still present in many states which have joined the US drug war. The war on drugs has done little, and perhaps exacerbated, Columbia’s corruption despite US assistance. In 2011, Columbian ex-government ministers were jailed and prosecuted for corruption and co-operation with paramilitaries.1Judicial reforms have also met with varied success. The Merida Initiative in Mexico, designed at removing the corruption of the cartels, has failed to address corruption in the judicial system which is still rampant. 2\n\n1) Bogota,S. ‘Closer and closer to the top’, The Economist, 29 July 2011\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US assistance does not guarantee success against illicit drug organisations. Despite the militarisation of the drug war in the Reagan-era, armed gangs are still prominent throughout the drug world. In Columbia, the left wing FARC still remains despite decades of war against the Columbian and USA governments1. The FARC, who use drugs for much of its income, still control large territories in the South Eastern territories. The effectiveness of military aid is consequently uncertain.\n\n1) Acosta,N. ‘Colombia’s FARC rebels end holiday ceasefire’, Reuters, 15 January 2014\n\n2) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Sacrifice of sovereignty\n\nGuinea-Bissau would have to sacrifice its autonomy if it became the new front for the war on drugs. In order to receive assistance from the US, a state must adhere to US policy on drugs. If it fails to do so, like Bolivia did in 2009, then aid is severed under the certification system1. This restricts the recipient state’s ability to respond to the drug threat in a way that they deem suitable to their own circumstances. As a state should be free to form domestic policy without influence by external actors, the USA’s certification process is a violation of national sovereignty.\n\n1) Walsh,J. ‘U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past’, Washington Office on Latin America, 17 September 2009\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Gives power to military coup leaders\n\nAssistance from the US would ensure that the coup leaders of Guinea Bissau remain in power. The securitisation of issues such as drugs and ‘terror’ is encouraged by the United States. A major problem with this policy is that it provides undue power and legitimacy to those countering the threat1. In early 2014, the military were still unconstitutionally ruling over the country. The drug war provides an external threat for the military to justify their leadership position. Considering the military has refused to allow democratic elections to occur and has regularly committed coups2, the US drug war could be a perfect excuse for to remain in power until the ‘threat’ subsides.\n\n1) Crick,E. ‘Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs’, International Journal of Drug Policy, 2012\n\n2) BBC, ‘Guinea-Bissau drug trade ‘rises since coup’, 31 June 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let War on the poor\n\nThe war on drugs has turned in to a war on the poorest in society. Through heavy handed techniques of enforcement and militarisation, the American war on drugs has failed to identify to key motivating factor for many of those involved in the trade; poverty1. Guinea-Bissau is the 5th poorest nation in the world, and other primary exports such as cashew nuts are starting to fail1. Due to lucrative profits, many of the poorer in society turn to the drug trade. US policy does not put enough of a focus on alternative development projects which can provide a livelihood through licit means. Instead they are treated as criminals and, in turn, are pushed further away from reconciliation.\n\n1) Falco,M. ‘Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars’, Daedalus, 121:2, 2007, pg4\n\n2) The Guardian, ‘Guinea-Bissau’s dwindling cashew nut exports leave farmers facing hardship’, 23 August 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US will provide equipment\n\nGuinea-Bissau should join the US drug war as they do not have the means to fight the war themselves. The local law enforcement is underfunded and ill-equipped to deal with the international threat. Guinea Bissau has one ship which patrols 350km of coastline, their officers have little in the way of land transport, petrol, phones or hand cuffs1. The limited reach of the law has allowed the cartels and gangs to prosper which, in turn, further damages law and order in Guinea Bissau. US military assistance will therefore help restore law and order to Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Parkinson,C. ‘LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa’, In Sight Crime, 29 August 2013\n\n2) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008Shirk,D. ‘The Drug War in Mexico’, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2011\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Becoming a narco-state\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s social fabric is being destroyed by the presence of the drug trade and requires international support. Guinea-Bissau has been named as Africa’s first Narco-state; a country controlled by drug cartels and gangs. Violence committed by these gangs has escalated since the arrival of the Columbian cartels in 20071. Addiction, a consequence of the cocaine and heroin use, is prevalent throughout much of the country. It was estimated in 2012 that around 20-30% of the population use crack, an extremely addictive form of cocaine, and there is only one clinic in the country2. The only people who are visibly profiting from the presence of drugs are the Columbian drug lords who have extravagant mansions and modern cars3. Guinea-Bissau cannot hope to fight the prominence of these gangs by themselves and require aid.\n\n1) Time, ‘Guinea-Bissau: World’s First Narco-State’, data accessed 28 January 2014\n\n2) Hatcher,J. ‘Guinea-Bissau: How Cocaine Transformed a Tiny African Nation’, Time, 15 October 2012\n\n3) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Prevent drugs from reaching Western markets\n\nBy joining the war on drugs, Guinea-Bissau will be in a better position to thwart the transportation of cheap cocaine and heroin to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau’s position makes it ideal for the cocaine trade, where drugs can be unloaded from Latin America and then distributed more easily to the West1. Around 18 tons of cocaine (worth $1.25 billion) passes through West Africa annually, most of it travelling through the state2. US assistance and interdiction operations would help prevent illicit drugs from reaching the profitable Western markets.\n\n1) Smoltczyk,A. ‘Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a “Drug Trafficker’s Dream”, Spiegel, 8 March 2013\n\n2) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Deal with Corruption\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s institutions have become too corrupt to deal with the drug problem and require support. The police, army and judiciary have all been implicated in the drug trade. The involvement of state officials in drug trafficking means that criminals are not prosecuted against. When two soldiers and a civilian were apprehended with 635kg (worth £25.4 million in 2013), they were detained and then immediately released with Colonel Arsenio Blade claiming ‘They were on the road hitching a ride’1. Judges are often bribed or sent death threats when faced with sentencing those involved in the drug trade. The USA has provided restructuring assistance to institutions which have reduced corruption, such as in the Mexico Merida Initiative, and could do the same with Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.625
] |
[
89.75,
85.625,
85,
83.5625,
84.3125,
84.375,
83.75,
84,
83.25,
83.125,
83.5625,
83.125,
83.25,
84.125
] |
Gives power to military coup leaders
Assistance from the US would ensure that the coup leaders of Guinea Bissau remain in power. The securitisation of issues such as drugs and ‘terror’ is encouraged by the United States. A major problem with this policy is that it provides undue power and legitimacy to those countering the threat1. In early 2014, the military were still unconstitutionally ruling over the country. The drug war provides an external threat for the military to justify their leadership position. Considering the military has refused to allow democratic elections to occur and has regularly committed coups2, the US drug war could be a perfect excuse for to remain in power until the ‘threat’ subsides.
1) Crick,E. ‘Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs’, International Journal of Drug Policy, 2012
2) BBC, ‘Guinea-Bissau drug trade ‘rises since coup’, 31 June 2012
|
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Part of the financial assistance received by countries on the front line of the drug war is a fund for ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. Plan Columbia, the USA’s attempt to reduce drug cultivation, saw 27% of all funding going towards democratic initiatives1. In a review by the Congressional Research Service of US drug control policy, the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions is a priority for the US2. If the US drug war was brought to Guinea-Bissau then funding would most likely go towards promoting democratic institutions and a transition of power from the military to the civilians.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n\n2) Wyler,L. ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013\n"
] |
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let It is only fair that the US should have some say on domestic drug policy considering the extent of their military assistance. The offers of assistance are optional and the conditions of compliance are known by both parties. The US gave $6,495 million in military assistance to the Columbian government between 1998 and 2008 to counter the narcotics trade and the rebels who were reliant on the business1. Since this funding comes from the USA’s federal budget, the US should be able to dictate how the money is spent.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let There is a stronger focus on alternative development in drugs policy compared to the beginning of the drug war. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), historically influenced by US drug policy, has taken an increasingly alternative development-orientated stance. The UNODC has committed itself to effective alternative incomes, gender mainstreaming and community participation which demonstrates a global shift towards beneficial development1.\n\n1) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Making a difference through Alternative Development’ data accessed 30 January 2014\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let The judicial system is not capable of handling narcotics cases fairly. Corruption and civil war have left Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system broken. Military leader General Antonio Indaj, who has alleged links to the drugs trade, has vetted all political and judicial appointments1. Considering that Guinea-Bissau has no prison, it is unlikely that those in the drug trade will be properly prosecuted. The US’ judicial system is seen as far more impartial and is, therefore, a more logical choice.\n\n1) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Interdiction rarely works. If Guinea-Bissau were to remove illicit drug operations from within its territories then the cartels would move elsewhere. Known as the hydra effect, once one potential drug route is cut off then another one is found and the trade continues1. This was the case for interdiction efforts between the US and Mexico. Initial government operations were successful at interdicting drugs being shipped between South American and Florida. In retaliation, traffickers began to use the US-Mexico border. The border witnesses large volumes of trade and interdicting the drugs proved to be nearly impossible2. It is logical to conclude that traffickers would find a new way to ensure drugs reached the Western markets if Guinea-Bissau sought US assistance.\n\n1) Boaz,D. ‘The Hydra-Headed Drug Business’, CATO institute, 30 June 1998\n\n2) Morton,D. ‘The War on Drugs in Mexico: a failed state?’, Third World Quarterly,39:3, pg.1639\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Considering that many of the military leaders have an invested interest in the drug trade, it is unlikely that Guinea-Bissau will seek help on these grounds. Antonio Indaj, the army’s Chief of Staff, was accused in 2013 of acting as a middle man in transactions between the South American cartels and the Western markets1. Not only has he been involved in drugs transactions, but Indaj has also been accessed of supplying weaponry to the FARC. This makes it unlikely that these leaders would want US assistance which would disrupt their profits and possibly leave them open to prosecution.\n\n1) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Corruption is still present in many states which have joined the US drug war. The war on drugs has done little, and perhaps exacerbated, Columbia’s corruption despite US assistance. In 2011, Columbian ex-government ministers were jailed and prosecuted for corruption and co-operation with paramilitaries.1Judicial reforms have also met with varied success. The Merida Initiative in Mexico, designed at removing the corruption of the cartels, has failed to address corruption in the judicial system which is still rampant. 2\n\n1) Bogota,S. ‘Closer and closer to the top’, The Economist, 29 July 2011\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US assistance does not guarantee success against illicit drug organisations. Despite the militarisation of the drug war in the Reagan-era, armed gangs are still prominent throughout the drug world. In Columbia, the left wing FARC still remains despite decades of war against the Columbian and USA governments1. The FARC, who use drugs for much of its income, still control large territories in the South Eastern territories. The effectiveness of military aid is consequently uncertain.\n\n1) Acosta,N. ‘Colombia’s FARC rebels end holiday ceasefire’, Reuters, 15 January 2014\n\n2) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Sacrifice of sovereignty\n\nGuinea-Bissau would have to sacrifice its autonomy if it became the new front for the war on drugs. In order to receive assistance from the US, a state must adhere to US policy on drugs. If it fails to do so, like Bolivia did in 2009, then aid is severed under the certification system1. This restricts the recipient state’s ability to respond to the drug threat in a way that they deem suitable to their own circumstances. As a state should be free to form domestic policy without influence by external actors, the USA’s certification process is a violation of national sovereignty.\n\n1) Walsh,J. ‘U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past’, Washington Office on Latin America, 17 September 2009\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Judiciary are undermined\n\nShould Guinea-Bissau become the new front of the US drug war then their judiciary will be furthered undermined. The US has frequently tried offenders from other countries in the US, superseding the local judiciary1. While this is usually due to formal agreements between states, extradition can cause indignation amongst the local population. Guinea-Bissau’s ex Naval chief Na Tchuto was arrested by American forces and, rather than allowing his home state to prosecute him, was tried by the New York District Court. This caused resentment in Guinea-Bissau towards the US2.\n\n1) Aronofsky,D. & Qin,J. ‘U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases’\n\n2) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let War on the poor\n\nThe war on drugs has turned in to a war on the poorest in society. Through heavy handed techniques of enforcement and militarisation, the American war on drugs has failed to identify to key motivating factor for many of those involved in the trade; poverty1. Guinea-Bissau is the 5th poorest nation in the world, and other primary exports such as cashew nuts are starting to fail1. Due to lucrative profits, many of the poorer in society turn to the drug trade. US policy does not put enough of a focus on alternative development projects which can provide a livelihood through licit means. Instead they are treated as criminals and, in turn, are pushed further away from reconciliation.\n\n1) Falco,M. ‘Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars’, Daedalus, 121:2, 2007, pg4\n\n2) The Guardian, ‘Guinea-Bissau’s dwindling cashew nut exports leave farmers facing hardship’, 23 August 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US will provide equipment\n\nGuinea-Bissau should join the US drug war as they do not have the means to fight the war themselves. The local law enforcement is underfunded and ill-equipped to deal with the international threat. Guinea Bissau has one ship which patrols 350km of coastline, their officers have little in the way of land transport, petrol, phones or hand cuffs1. The limited reach of the law has allowed the cartels and gangs to prosper which, in turn, further damages law and order in Guinea Bissau. US military assistance will therefore help restore law and order to Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Parkinson,C. ‘LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa’, In Sight Crime, 29 August 2013\n\n2) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008Shirk,D. ‘The Drug War in Mexico’, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2011\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Becoming a narco-state\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s social fabric is being destroyed by the presence of the drug trade and requires international support. Guinea-Bissau has been named as Africa’s first Narco-state; a country controlled by drug cartels and gangs. Violence committed by these gangs has escalated since the arrival of the Columbian cartels in 20071. Addiction, a consequence of the cocaine and heroin use, is prevalent throughout much of the country. It was estimated in 2012 that around 20-30% of the population use crack, an extremely addictive form of cocaine, and there is only one clinic in the country2. The only people who are visibly profiting from the presence of drugs are the Columbian drug lords who have extravagant mansions and modern cars3. Guinea-Bissau cannot hope to fight the prominence of these gangs by themselves and require aid.\n\n1) Time, ‘Guinea-Bissau: World’s First Narco-State’, data accessed 28 January 2014\n\n2) Hatcher,J. ‘Guinea-Bissau: How Cocaine Transformed a Tiny African Nation’, Time, 15 October 2012\n\n3) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Prevent drugs from reaching Western markets\n\nBy joining the war on drugs, Guinea-Bissau will be in a better position to thwart the transportation of cheap cocaine and heroin to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau’s position makes it ideal for the cocaine trade, where drugs can be unloaded from Latin America and then distributed more easily to the West1. Around 18 tons of cocaine (worth $1.25 billion) passes through West Africa annually, most of it travelling through the state2. US assistance and interdiction operations would help prevent illicit drugs from reaching the profitable Western markets.\n\n1) Smoltczyk,A. ‘Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a “Drug Trafficker’s Dream”, Spiegel, 8 March 2013\n\n2) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Deal with Corruption\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s institutions have become too corrupt to deal with the drug problem and require support. The police, army and judiciary have all been implicated in the drug trade. The involvement of state officials in drug trafficking means that criminals are not prosecuted against. When two soldiers and a civilian were apprehended with 635kg (worth £25.4 million in 2013), they were detained and then immediately released with Colonel Arsenio Blade claiming ‘They were on the road hitching a ride’1. Judges are often bribed or sent death threats when faced with sentencing those involved in the drug trade. The USA has provided restructuring assistance to institutions which have reduced corruption, such as in the Mexico Merida Initiative, and could do the same with Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.9375
] |
[
90.25,
85.4375,
84.9375,
83.875,
86.5625,
83.6875,
84.4375,
83.625,
83.25,
83.25,
84.8125,
84.5625,
84,
83.625
] |
War on the poor
The war on drugs has turned in to a war on the poorest in society. Through heavy handed techniques of enforcement and militarisation, the American war on drugs has failed to identify to key motivating factor for many of those involved in the trade; poverty1. Guinea-Bissau is the 5th poorest nation in the world, and other primary exports such as cashew nuts are starting to fail1. Due to lucrative profits, many of the poorer in society turn to the drug trade. US policy does not put enough of a focus on alternative development projects which can provide a livelihood through licit means. Instead they are treated as criminals and, in turn, are pushed further away from reconciliation.
1) Falco,M. ‘Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars’, Daedalus, 121:2, 2007, pg4
2) The Guardian, ‘Guinea-Bissau’s dwindling cashew nut exports leave farmers facing hardship’, 23 August 2012
|
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let There is a stronger focus on alternative development in drugs policy compared to the beginning of the drug war. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), historically influenced by US drug policy, has taken an increasingly alternative development-orientated stance. The UNODC has committed itself to effective alternative incomes, gender mainstreaming and community participation which demonstrates a global shift towards beneficial development1.\n\n1) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Making a difference through Alternative Development’ data accessed 30 January 2014\n"
] |
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let It is only fair that the US should have some say on domestic drug policy considering the extent of their military assistance. The offers of assistance are optional and the conditions of compliance are known by both parties. The US gave $6,495 million in military assistance to the Columbian government between 1998 and 2008 to counter the narcotics trade and the rebels who were reliant on the business1. Since this funding comes from the USA’s federal budget, the US should be able to dictate how the money is spent.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let The judicial system is not capable of handling narcotics cases fairly. Corruption and civil war have left Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system broken. Military leader General Antonio Indaj, who has alleged links to the drugs trade, has vetted all political and judicial appointments1. Considering that Guinea-Bissau has no prison, it is unlikely that those in the drug trade will be properly prosecuted. The US’ judicial system is seen as far more impartial and is, therefore, a more logical choice.\n\n1) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Part of the financial assistance received by countries on the front line of the drug war is a fund for ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. Plan Columbia, the USA’s attempt to reduce drug cultivation, saw 27% of all funding going towards democratic initiatives1. In a review by the Congressional Research Service of US drug control policy, the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions is a priority for the US2. If the US drug war was brought to Guinea-Bissau then funding would most likely go towards promoting democratic institutions and a transition of power from the military to the civilians.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n\n2) Wyler,L. ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Interdiction rarely works. If Guinea-Bissau were to remove illicit drug operations from within its territories then the cartels would move elsewhere. Known as the hydra effect, once one potential drug route is cut off then another one is found and the trade continues1. This was the case for interdiction efforts between the US and Mexico. Initial government operations were successful at interdicting drugs being shipped between South American and Florida. In retaliation, traffickers began to use the US-Mexico border. The border witnesses large volumes of trade and interdicting the drugs proved to be nearly impossible2. It is logical to conclude that traffickers would find a new way to ensure drugs reached the Western markets if Guinea-Bissau sought US assistance.\n\n1) Boaz,D. ‘The Hydra-Headed Drug Business’, CATO institute, 30 June 1998\n\n2) Morton,D. ‘The War on Drugs in Mexico: a failed state?’, Third World Quarterly,39:3, pg.1639\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Considering that many of the military leaders have an invested interest in the drug trade, it is unlikely that Guinea-Bissau will seek help on these grounds. Antonio Indaj, the army’s Chief of Staff, was accused in 2013 of acting as a middle man in transactions between the South American cartels and the Western markets1. Not only has he been involved in drugs transactions, but Indaj has also been accessed of supplying weaponry to the FARC. This makes it unlikely that these leaders would want US assistance which would disrupt their profits and possibly leave them open to prosecution.\n\n1) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Corruption is still present in many states which have joined the US drug war. The war on drugs has done little, and perhaps exacerbated, Columbia’s corruption despite US assistance. In 2011, Columbian ex-government ministers were jailed and prosecuted for corruption and co-operation with paramilitaries.1Judicial reforms have also met with varied success. The Merida Initiative in Mexico, designed at removing the corruption of the cartels, has failed to address corruption in the judicial system which is still rampant. 2\n\n1) Bogota,S. ‘Closer and closer to the top’, The Economist, 29 July 2011\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US assistance does not guarantee success against illicit drug organisations. Despite the militarisation of the drug war in the Reagan-era, armed gangs are still prominent throughout the drug world. In Columbia, the left wing FARC still remains despite decades of war against the Columbian and USA governments1. The FARC, who use drugs for much of its income, still control large territories in the South Eastern territories. The effectiveness of military aid is consequently uncertain.\n\n1) Acosta,N. ‘Colombia’s FARC rebels end holiday ceasefire’, Reuters, 15 January 2014\n\n2) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Sacrifice of sovereignty\n\nGuinea-Bissau would have to sacrifice its autonomy if it became the new front for the war on drugs. In order to receive assistance from the US, a state must adhere to US policy on drugs. If it fails to do so, like Bolivia did in 2009, then aid is severed under the certification system1. This restricts the recipient state’s ability to respond to the drug threat in a way that they deem suitable to their own circumstances. As a state should be free to form domestic policy without influence by external actors, the USA’s certification process is a violation of national sovereignty.\n\n1) Walsh,J. ‘U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past’, Washington Office on Latin America, 17 September 2009\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Judiciary are undermined\n\nShould Guinea-Bissau become the new front of the US drug war then their judiciary will be furthered undermined. The US has frequently tried offenders from other countries in the US, superseding the local judiciary1. While this is usually due to formal agreements between states, extradition can cause indignation amongst the local population. Guinea-Bissau’s ex Naval chief Na Tchuto was arrested by American forces and, rather than allowing his home state to prosecute him, was tried by the New York District Court. This caused resentment in Guinea-Bissau towards the US2.\n\n1) Aronofsky,D. & Qin,J. ‘U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases’\n\n2) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Gives power to military coup leaders\n\nAssistance from the US would ensure that the coup leaders of Guinea Bissau remain in power. The securitisation of issues such as drugs and ‘terror’ is encouraged by the United States. A major problem with this policy is that it provides undue power and legitimacy to those countering the threat1. In early 2014, the military were still unconstitutionally ruling over the country. The drug war provides an external threat for the military to justify their leadership position. Considering the military has refused to allow democratic elections to occur and has regularly committed coups2, the US drug war could be a perfect excuse for to remain in power until the ‘threat’ subsides.\n\n1) Crick,E. ‘Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs’, International Journal of Drug Policy, 2012\n\n2) BBC, ‘Guinea-Bissau drug trade ‘rises since coup’, 31 June 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US will provide equipment\n\nGuinea-Bissau should join the US drug war as they do not have the means to fight the war themselves. The local law enforcement is underfunded and ill-equipped to deal with the international threat. Guinea Bissau has one ship which patrols 350km of coastline, their officers have little in the way of land transport, petrol, phones or hand cuffs1. The limited reach of the law has allowed the cartels and gangs to prosper which, in turn, further damages law and order in Guinea Bissau. US military assistance will therefore help restore law and order to Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Parkinson,C. ‘LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa’, In Sight Crime, 29 August 2013\n\n2) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008Shirk,D. ‘The Drug War in Mexico’, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2011\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Becoming a narco-state\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s social fabric is being destroyed by the presence of the drug trade and requires international support. Guinea-Bissau has been named as Africa’s first Narco-state; a country controlled by drug cartels and gangs. Violence committed by these gangs has escalated since the arrival of the Columbian cartels in 20071. Addiction, a consequence of the cocaine and heroin use, is prevalent throughout much of the country. It was estimated in 2012 that around 20-30% of the population use crack, an extremely addictive form of cocaine, and there is only one clinic in the country2. The only people who are visibly profiting from the presence of drugs are the Columbian drug lords who have extravagant mansions and modern cars3. Guinea-Bissau cannot hope to fight the prominence of these gangs by themselves and require aid.\n\n1) Time, ‘Guinea-Bissau: World’s First Narco-State’, data accessed 28 January 2014\n\n2) Hatcher,J. ‘Guinea-Bissau: How Cocaine Transformed a Tiny African Nation’, Time, 15 October 2012\n\n3) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Prevent drugs from reaching Western markets\n\nBy joining the war on drugs, Guinea-Bissau will be in a better position to thwart the transportation of cheap cocaine and heroin to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau’s position makes it ideal for the cocaine trade, where drugs can be unloaded from Latin America and then distributed more easily to the West1. Around 18 tons of cocaine (worth $1.25 billion) passes through West Africa annually, most of it travelling through the state2. US assistance and interdiction operations would help prevent illicit drugs from reaching the profitable Western markets.\n\n1) Smoltczyk,A. ‘Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a “Drug Trafficker’s Dream”, Spiegel, 8 March 2013\n\n2) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Deal with Corruption\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s institutions have become too corrupt to deal with the drug problem and require support. The police, army and judiciary have all been implicated in the drug trade. The involvement of state officials in drug trafficking means that criminals are not prosecuted against. When two soldiers and a civilian were apprehended with 635kg (worth £25.4 million in 2013), they were detained and then immediately released with Colonel Arsenio Blade claiming ‘They were on the road hitching a ride’1. Judges are often bribed or sent death threats when faced with sentencing those involved in the drug trade. The USA has provided restructuring assistance to institutions which have reduced corruption, such as in the Mexico Merida Initiative, and could do the same with Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.5625
] |
[
84.5,
84.6875,
85.6875,
84.4375,
85.6875,
83.4375,
84.0625,
82.9375,
82.8125,
83.4375,
83.3125,
83.375,
83.875,
82.8125
] |
US will provide equipment
Guinea-Bissau should join the US drug war as they do not have the means to fight the war themselves. The local law enforcement is underfunded and ill-equipped to deal with the international threat. Guinea Bissau has one ship which patrols 350km of coastline, their officers have little in the way of land transport, petrol, phones or hand cuffs1. The limited reach of the law has allowed the cartels and gangs to prosper which, in turn, further damages law and order in Guinea Bissau. US military assistance will therefore help restore law and order to Guinea Bissau.
1) Parkinson,C. ‘LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa’, In Sight Crime, 29 August 2013
2) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008Shirk,D. ‘The Drug War in Mexico’, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2011
|
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US assistance does not guarantee success against illicit drug organisations. Despite the militarisation of the drug war in the Reagan-era, armed gangs are still prominent throughout the drug world. In Columbia, the left wing FARC still remains despite decades of war against the Columbian and USA governments1. The FARC, who use drugs for much of its income, still control large territories in the South Eastern territories. The effectiveness of military aid is consequently uncertain.\n\n1) Acosta,N. ‘Colombia’s FARC rebels end holiday ceasefire’, Reuters, 15 January 2014\n\n2) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n"
] |
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Interdiction rarely works. If Guinea-Bissau were to remove illicit drug operations from within its territories then the cartels would move elsewhere. Known as the hydra effect, once one potential drug route is cut off then another one is found and the trade continues1. This was the case for interdiction efforts between the US and Mexico. Initial government operations were successful at interdicting drugs being shipped between South American and Florida. In retaliation, traffickers began to use the US-Mexico border. The border witnesses large volumes of trade and interdicting the drugs proved to be nearly impossible2. It is logical to conclude that traffickers would find a new way to ensure drugs reached the Western markets if Guinea-Bissau sought US assistance.\n\n1) Boaz,D. ‘The Hydra-Headed Drug Business’, CATO institute, 30 June 1998\n\n2) Morton,D. ‘The War on Drugs in Mexico: a failed state?’, Third World Quarterly,39:3, pg.1639\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Considering that many of the military leaders have an invested interest in the drug trade, it is unlikely that Guinea-Bissau will seek help on these grounds. Antonio Indaj, the army’s Chief of Staff, was accused in 2013 of acting as a middle man in transactions between the South American cartels and the Western markets1. Not only has he been involved in drugs transactions, but Indaj has also been accessed of supplying weaponry to the FARC. This makes it unlikely that these leaders would want US assistance which would disrupt their profits and possibly leave them open to prosecution.\n\n1) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Corruption is still present in many states which have joined the US drug war. The war on drugs has done little, and perhaps exacerbated, Columbia’s corruption despite US assistance. In 2011, Columbian ex-government ministers were jailed and prosecuted for corruption and co-operation with paramilitaries.1Judicial reforms have also met with varied success. The Merida Initiative in Mexico, designed at removing the corruption of the cartels, has failed to address corruption in the judicial system which is still rampant. 2\n\n1) Bogota,S. ‘Closer and closer to the top’, The Economist, 29 July 2011\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let It is only fair that the US should have some say on domestic drug policy considering the extent of their military assistance. The offers of assistance are optional and the conditions of compliance are known by both parties. The US gave $6,495 million in military assistance to the Columbian government between 1998 and 2008 to counter the narcotics trade and the rebels who were reliant on the business1. Since this funding comes from the USA’s federal budget, the US should be able to dictate how the money is spent.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let There is a stronger focus on alternative development in drugs policy compared to the beginning of the drug war. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), historically influenced by US drug policy, has taken an increasingly alternative development-orientated stance. The UNODC has committed itself to effective alternative incomes, gender mainstreaming and community participation which demonstrates a global shift towards beneficial development1.\n\n1) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Making a difference through Alternative Development’ data accessed 30 January 2014\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let The judicial system is not capable of handling narcotics cases fairly. Corruption and civil war have left Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system broken. Military leader General Antonio Indaj, who has alleged links to the drugs trade, has vetted all political and judicial appointments1. Considering that Guinea-Bissau has no prison, it is unlikely that those in the drug trade will be properly prosecuted. The US’ judicial system is seen as far more impartial and is, therefore, a more logical choice.\n\n1) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Part of the financial assistance received by countries on the front line of the drug war is a fund for ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. Plan Columbia, the USA’s attempt to reduce drug cultivation, saw 27% of all funding going towards democratic initiatives1. In a review by the Congressional Research Service of US drug control policy, the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions is a priority for the US2. If the US drug war was brought to Guinea-Bissau then funding would most likely go towards promoting democratic institutions and a transition of power from the military to the civilians.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n\n2) Wyler,L. ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Becoming a narco-state\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s social fabric is being destroyed by the presence of the drug trade and requires international support. Guinea-Bissau has been named as Africa’s first Narco-state; a country controlled by drug cartels and gangs. Violence committed by these gangs has escalated since the arrival of the Columbian cartels in 20071. Addiction, a consequence of the cocaine and heroin use, is prevalent throughout much of the country. It was estimated in 2012 that around 20-30% of the population use crack, an extremely addictive form of cocaine, and there is only one clinic in the country2. The only people who are visibly profiting from the presence of drugs are the Columbian drug lords who have extravagant mansions and modern cars3. Guinea-Bissau cannot hope to fight the prominence of these gangs by themselves and require aid.\n\n1) Time, ‘Guinea-Bissau: World’s First Narco-State’, data accessed 28 January 2014\n\n2) Hatcher,J. ‘Guinea-Bissau: How Cocaine Transformed a Tiny African Nation’, Time, 15 October 2012\n\n3) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Prevent drugs from reaching Western markets\n\nBy joining the war on drugs, Guinea-Bissau will be in a better position to thwart the transportation of cheap cocaine and heroin to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau’s position makes it ideal for the cocaine trade, where drugs can be unloaded from Latin America and then distributed more easily to the West1. Around 18 tons of cocaine (worth $1.25 billion) passes through West Africa annually, most of it travelling through the state2. US assistance and interdiction operations would help prevent illicit drugs from reaching the profitable Western markets.\n\n1) Smoltczyk,A. ‘Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a “Drug Trafficker’s Dream”, Spiegel, 8 March 2013\n\n2) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Deal with Corruption\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s institutions have become too corrupt to deal with the drug problem and require support. The police, army and judiciary have all been implicated in the drug trade. The involvement of state officials in drug trafficking means that criminals are not prosecuted against. When two soldiers and a civilian were apprehended with 635kg (worth £25.4 million in 2013), they were detained and then immediately released with Colonel Arsenio Blade claiming ‘They were on the road hitching a ride’1. Judges are often bribed or sent death threats when faced with sentencing those involved in the drug trade. The USA has provided restructuring assistance to institutions which have reduced corruption, such as in the Mexico Merida Initiative, and could do the same with Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Sacrifice of sovereignty\n\nGuinea-Bissau would have to sacrifice its autonomy if it became the new front for the war on drugs. In order to receive assistance from the US, a state must adhere to US policy on drugs. If it fails to do so, like Bolivia did in 2009, then aid is severed under the certification system1. This restricts the recipient state’s ability to respond to the drug threat in a way that they deem suitable to their own circumstances. As a state should be free to form domestic policy without influence by external actors, the USA’s certification process is a violation of national sovereignty.\n\n1) Walsh,J. ‘U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past’, Washington Office on Latin America, 17 September 2009\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Judiciary are undermined\n\nShould Guinea-Bissau become the new front of the US drug war then their judiciary will be furthered undermined. The US has frequently tried offenders from other countries in the US, superseding the local judiciary1. While this is usually due to formal agreements between states, extradition can cause indignation amongst the local population. Guinea-Bissau’s ex Naval chief Na Tchuto was arrested by American forces and, rather than allowing his home state to prosecute him, was tried by the New York District Court. This caused resentment in Guinea-Bissau towards the US2.\n\n1) Aronofsky,D. & Qin,J. ‘U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases’\n\n2) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Gives power to military coup leaders\n\nAssistance from the US would ensure that the coup leaders of Guinea Bissau remain in power. The securitisation of issues such as drugs and ‘terror’ is encouraged by the United States. A major problem with this policy is that it provides undue power and legitimacy to those countering the threat1. In early 2014, the military were still unconstitutionally ruling over the country. The drug war provides an external threat for the military to justify their leadership position. Considering the military has refused to allow democratic elections to occur and has regularly committed coups2, the US drug war could be a perfect excuse for to remain in power until the ‘threat’ subsides.\n\n1) Crick,E. ‘Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs’, International Journal of Drug Policy, 2012\n\n2) BBC, ‘Guinea-Bissau drug trade ‘rises since coup’, 31 June 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let War on the poor\n\nThe war on drugs has turned in to a war on the poorest in society. Through heavy handed techniques of enforcement and militarisation, the American war on drugs has failed to identify to key motivating factor for many of those involved in the trade; poverty1. Guinea-Bissau is the 5th poorest nation in the world, and other primary exports such as cashew nuts are starting to fail1. Due to lucrative profits, many of the poorer in society turn to the drug trade. US policy does not put enough of a focus on alternative development projects which can provide a livelihood through licit means. Instead they are treated as criminals and, in turn, are pushed further away from reconciliation.\n\n1) Falco,M. ‘Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars’, Daedalus, 121:2, 2007, pg4\n\n2) The Guardian, ‘Guinea-Bissau’s dwindling cashew nut exports leave farmers facing hardship’, 23 August 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.25
] |
[
90.5,
92.8125,
89.8125,
88.3125,
89.6875,
87.6875,
90.4375,
83.6875,
84.75,
84.4375,
87.625,
86.625,
88.25,
88
] |
Becoming a narco-state
Guinea-Bissau’s social fabric is being destroyed by the presence of the drug trade and requires international support. Guinea-Bissau has been named as Africa’s first Narco-state; a country controlled by drug cartels and gangs. Violence committed by these gangs has escalated since the arrival of the Columbian cartels in 20071. Addiction, a consequence of the cocaine and heroin use, is prevalent throughout much of the country. It was estimated in 2012 that around 20-30% of the population use crack, an extremely addictive form of cocaine, and there is only one clinic in the country2. The only people who are visibly profiting from the presence of drugs are the Columbian drug lords who have extravagant mansions and modern cars3. Guinea-Bissau cannot hope to fight the prominence of these gangs by themselves and require aid.
1) Time, ‘Guinea-Bissau: World’s First Narco-State’, data accessed 28 January 2014
2) Hatcher,J. ‘Guinea-Bissau: How Cocaine Transformed a Tiny African Nation’, Time, 15 October 2012
3) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008
|
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Considering that many of the military leaders have an invested interest in the drug trade, it is unlikely that Guinea-Bissau will seek help on these grounds. Antonio Indaj, the army’s Chief of Staff, was accused in 2013 of acting as a middle man in transactions between the South American cartels and the Western markets1. Not only has he been involved in drugs transactions, but Indaj has also been accessed of supplying weaponry to the FARC. This makes it unlikely that these leaders would want US assistance which would disrupt their profits and possibly leave them open to prosecution.\n\n1) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n"
] |
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Interdiction rarely works. If Guinea-Bissau were to remove illicit drug operations from within its territories then the cartels would move elsewhere. Known as the hydra effect, once one potential drug route is cut off then another one is found and the trade continues1. This was the case for interdiction efforts between the US and Mexico. Initial government operations were successful at interdicting drugs being shipped between South American and Florida. In retaliation, traffickers began to use the US-Mexico border. The border witnesses large volumes of trade and interdicting the drugs proved to be nearly impossible2. It is logical to conclude that traffickers would find a new way to ensure drugs reached the Western markets if Guinea-Bissau sought US assistance.\n\n1) Boaz,D. ‘The Hydra-Headed Drug Business’, CATO institute, 30 June 1998\n\n2) Morton,D. ‘The War on Drugs in Mexico: a failed state?’, Third World Quarterly,39:3, pg.1639\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Corruption is still present in many states which have joined the US drug war. The war on drugs has done little, and perhaps exacerbated, Columbia’s corruption despite US assistance. In 2011, Columbian ex-government ministers were jailed and prosecuted for corruption and co-operation with paramilitaries.1Judicial reforms have also met with varied success. The Merida Initiative in Mexico, designed at removing the corruption of the cartels, has failed to address corruption in the judicial system which is still rampant. 2\n\n1) Bogota,S. ‘Closer and closer to the top’, The Economist, 29 July 2011\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US assistance does not guarantee success against illicit drug organisations. Despite the militarisation of the drug war in the Reagan-era, armed gangs are still prominent throughout the drug world. In Columbia, the left wing FARC still remains despite decades of war against the Columbian and USA governments1. The FARC, who use drugs for much of its income, still control large territories in the South Eastern territories. The effectiveness of military aid is consequently uncertain.\n\n1) Acosta,N. ‘Colombia’s FARC rebels end holiday ceasefire’, Reuters, 15 January 2014\n\n2) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let It is only fair that the US should have some say on domestic drug policy considering the extent of their military assistance. The offers of assistance are optional and the conditions of compliance are known by both parties. The US gave $6,495 million in military assistance to the Columbian government between 1998 and 2008 to counter the narcotics trade and the rebels who were reliant on the business1. Since this funding comes from the USA’s federal budget, the US should be able to dictate how the money is spent.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let There is a stronger focus on alternative development in drugs policy compared to the beginning of the drug war. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), historically influenced by US drug policy, has taken an increasingly alternative development-orientated stance. The UNODC has committed itself to effective alternative incomes, gender mainstreaming and community participation which demonstrates a global shift towards beneficial development1.\n\n1) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Making a difference through Alternative Development’ data accessed 30 January 2014\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let The judicial system is not capable of handling narcotics cases fairly. Corruption and civil war have left Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system broken. Military leader General Antonio Indaj, who has alleged links to the drugs trade, has vetted all political and judicial appointments1. Considering that Guinea-Bissau has no prison, it is unlikely that those in the drug trade will be properly prosecuted. The US’ judicial system is seen as far more impartial and is, therefore, a more logical choice.\n\n1) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Part of the financial assistance received by countries on the front line of the drug war is a fund for ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. Plan Columbia, the USA’s attempt to reduce drug cultivation, saw 27% of all funding going towards democratic initiatives1. In a review by the Congressional Research Service of US drug control policy, the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions is a priority for the US2. If the US drug war was brought to Guinea-Bissau then funding would most likely go towards promoting democratic institutions and a transition of power from the military to the civilians.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n\n2) Wyler,L. ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US will provide equipment\n\nGuinea-Bissau should join the US drug war as they do not have the means to fight the war themselves. The local law enforcement is underfunded and ill-equipped to deal with the international threat. Guinea Bissau has one ship which patrols 350km of coastline, their officers have little in the way of land transport, petrol, phones or hand cuffs1. The limited reach of the law has allowed the cartels and gangs to prosper which, in turn, further damages law and order in Guinea Bissau. US military assistance will therefore help restore law and order to Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Parkinson,C. ‘LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa’, In Sight Crime, 29 August 2013\n\n2) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008Shirk,D. ‘The Drug War in Mexico’, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2011\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Prevent drugs from reaching Western markets\n\nBy joining the war on drugs, Guinea-Bissau will be in a better position to thwart the transportation of cheap cocaine and heroin to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau’s position makes it ideal for the cocaine trade, where drugs can be unloaded from Latin America and then distributed more easily to the West1. Around 18 tons of cocaine (worth $1.25 billion) passes through West Africa annually, most of it travelling through the state2. US assistance and interdiction operations would help prevent illicit drugs from reaching the profitable Western markets.\n\n1) Smoltczyk,A. ‘Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a “Drug Trafficker’s Dream”, Spiegel, 8 March 2013\n\n2) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Deal with Corruption\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s institutions have become too corrupt to deal with the drug problem and require support. The police, army and judiciary have all been implicated in the drug trade. The involvement of state officials in drug trafficking means that criminals are not prosecuted against. When two soldiers and a civilian were apprehended with 635kg (worth £25.4 million in 2013), they were detained and then immediately released with Colonel Arsenio Blade claiming ‘They were on the road hitching a ride’1. Judges are often bribed or sent death threats when faced with sentencing those involved in the drug trade. The USA has provided restructuring assistance to institutions which have reduced corruption, such as in the Mexico Merida Initiative, and could do the same with Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Sacrifice of sovereignty\n\nGuinea-Bissau would have to sacrifice its autonomy if it became the new front for the war on drugs. In order to receive assistance from the US, a state must adhere to US policy on drugs. If it fails to do so, like Bolivia did in 2009, then aid is severed under the certification system1. This restricts the recipient state’s ability to respond to the drug threat in a way that they deem suitable to their own circumstances. As a state should be free to form domestic policy without influence by external actors, the USA’s certification process is a violation of national sovereignty.\n\n1) Walsh,J. ‘U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past’, Washington Office on Latin America, 17 September 2009\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Judiciary are undermined\n\nShould Guinea-Bissau become the new front of the US drug war then their judiciary will be furthered undermined. The US has frequently tried offenders from other countries in the US, superseding the local judiciary1. While this is usually due to formal agreements between states, extradition can cause indignation amongst the local population. Guinea-Bissau’s ex Naval chief Na Tchuto was arrested by American forces and, rather than allowing his home state to prosecute him, was tried by the New York District Court. This caused resentment in Guinea-Bissau towards the US2.\n\n1) Aronofsky,D. & Qin,J. ‘U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases’\n\n2) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Gives power to military coup leaders\n\nAssistance from the US would ensure that the coup leaders of Guinea Bissau remain in power. The securitisation of issues such as drugs and ‘terror’ is encouraged by the United States. A major problem with this policy is that it provides undue power and legitimacy to those countering the threat1. In early 2014, the military were still unconstitutionally ruling over the country. The drug war provides an external threat for the military to justify their leadership position. Considering the military has refused to allow democratic elections to occur and has regularly committed coups2, the US drug war could be a perfect excuse for to remain in power until the ‘threat’ subsides.\n\n1) Crick,E. ‘Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs’, International Journal of Drug Policy, 2012\n\n2) BBC, ‘Guinea-Bissau drug trade ‘rises since coup’, 31 June 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let War on the poor\n\nThe war on drugs has turned in to a war on the poorest in society. Through heavy handed techniques of enforcement and militarisation, the American war on drugs has failed to identify to key motivating factor for many of those involved in the trade; poverty1. Guinea-Bissau is the 5th poorest nation in the world, and other primary exports such as cashew nuts are starting to fail1. Due to lucrative profits, many of the poorer in society turn to the drug trade. US policy does not put enough of a focus on alternative development projects which can provide a livelihood through licit means. Instead they are treated as criminals and, in turn, are pushed further away from reconciliation.\n\n1) Falco,M. ‘Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars’, Daedalus, 121:2, 2007, pg4\n\n2) The Guardian, ‘Guinea-Bissau’s dwindling cashew nut exports leave farmers facing hardship’, 23 August 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.5625
] |
[
86.5,
86,
88.4375,
85.8125,
87.25,
86.875,
85.9375,
85.375,
85.625,
85,
85.25,
84.25,
85.25,
84.1875
] |
Prevent drugs from reaching Western markets
By joining the war on drugs, Guinea-Bissau will be in a better position to thwart the transportation of cheap cocaine and heroin to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau’s position makes it ideal for the cocaine trade, where drugs can be unloaded from Latin America and then distributed more easily to the West1. Around 18 tons of cocaine (worth $1.25 billion) passes through West Africa annually, most of it travelling through the state2. US assistance and interdiction operations would help prevent illicit drugs from reaching the profitable Western markets.
1) Smoltczyk,A. ‘Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a “Drug Trafficker’s Dream”, Spiegel, 8 March 2013
2) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013
|
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Interdiction rarely works. If Guinea-Bissau were to remove illicit drug operations from within its territories then the cartels would move elsewhere. Known as the hydra effect, once one potential drug route is cut off then another one is found and the trade continues1. This was the case for interdiction efforts between the US and Mexico. Initial government operations were successful at interdicting drugs being shipped between South American and Florida. In retaliation, traffickers began to use the US-Mexico border. The border witnesses large volumes of trade and interdicting the drugs proved to be nearly impossible2. It is logical to conclude that traffickers would find a new way to ensure drugs reached the Western markets if Guinea-Bissau sought US assistance.\n\n1) Boaz,D. ‘The Hydra-Headed Drug Business’, CATO institute, 30 June 1998\n\n2) Morton,D. ‘The War on Drugs in Mexico: a failed state?’, Third World Quarterly,39:3, pg.1639\n"
] |
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Considering that many of the military leaders have an invested interest in the drug trade, it is unlikely that Guinea-Bissau will seek help on these grounds. Antonio Indaj, the army’s Chief of Staff, was accused in 2013 of acting as a middle man in transactions between the South American cartels and the Western markets1. Not only has he been involved in drugs transactions, but Indaj has also been accessed of supplying weaponry to the FARC. This makes it unlikely that these leaders would want US assistance which would disrupt their profits and possibly leave them open to prosecution.\n\n1) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Corruption is still present in many states which have joined the US drug war. The war on drugs has done little, and perhaps exacerbated, Columbia’s corruption despite US assistance. In 2011, Columbian ex-government ministers were jailed and prosecuted for corruption and co-operation with paramilitaries.1Judicial reforms have also met with varied success. The Merida Initiative in Mexico, designed at removing the corruption of the cartels, has failed to address corruption in the judicial system which is still rampant. 2\n\n1) Bogota,S. ‘Closer and closer to the top’, The Economist, 29 July 2011\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US assistance does not guarantee success against illicit drug organisations. Despite the militarisation of the drug war in the Reagan-era, armed gangs are still prominent throughout the drug world. In Columbia, the left wing FARC still remains despite decades of war against the Columbian and USA governments1. The FARC, who use drugs for much of its income, still control large territories in the South Eastern territories. The effectiveness of military aid is consequently uncertain.\n\n1) Acosta,N. ‘Colombia’s FARC rebels end holiday ceasefire’, Reuters, 15 January 2014\n\n2) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let It is only fair that the US should have some say on domestic drug policy considering the extent of their military assistance. The offers of assistance are optional and the conditions of compliance are known by both parties. The US gave $6,495 million in military assistance to the Columbian government between 1998 and 2008 to counter the narcotics trade and the rebels who were reliant on the business1. Since this funding comes from the USA’s federal budget, the US should be able to dictate how the money is spent.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let There is a stronger focus on alternative development in drugs policy compared to the beginning of the drug war. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), historically influenced by US drug policy, has taken an increasingly alternative development-orientated stance. The UNODC has committed itself to effective alternative incomes, gender mainstreaming and community participation which demonstrates a global shift towards beneficial development1.\n\n1) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Making a difference through Alternative Development’ data accessed 30 January 2014\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let The judicial system is not capable of handling narcotics cases fairly. Corruption and civil war have left Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system broken. Military leader General Antonio Indaj, who has alleged links to the drugs trade, has vetted all political and judicial appointments1. Considering that Guinea-Bissau has no prison, it is unlikely that those in the drug trade will be properly prosecuted. The US’ judicial system is seen as far more impartial and is, therefore, a more logical choice.\n\n1) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Part of the financial assistance received by countries on the front line of the drug war is a fund for ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. Plan Columbia, the USA’s attempt to reduce drug cultivation, saw 27% of all funding going towards democratic initiatives1. In a review by the Congressional Research Service of US drug control policy, the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions is a priority for the US2. If the US drug war was brought to Guinea-Bissau then funding would most likely go towards promoting democratic institutions and a transition of power from the military to the civilians.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n\n2) Wyler,L. ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US will provide equipment\n\nGuinea-Bissau should join the US drug war as they do not have the means to fight the war themselves. The local law enforcement is underfunded and ill-equipped to deal with the international threat. Guinea Bissau has one ship which patrols 350km of coastline, their officers have little in the way of land transport, petrol, phones or hand cuffs1. The limited reach of the law has allowed the cartels and gangs to prosper which, in turn, further damages law and order in Guinea Bissau. US military assistance will therefore help restore law and order to Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Parkinson,C. ‘LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa’, In Sight Crime, 29 August 2013\n\n2) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008Shirk,D. ‘The Drug War in Mexico’, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2011\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Becoming a narco-state\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s social fabric is being destroyed by the presence of the drug trade and requires international support. Guinea-Bissau has been named as Africa’s first Narco-state; a country controlled by drug cartels and gangs. Violence committed by these gangs has escalated since the arrival of the Columbian cartels in 20071. Addiction, a consequence of the cocaine and heroin use, is prevalent throughout much of the country. It was estimated in 2012 that around 20-30% of the population use crack, an extremely addictive form of cocaine, and there is only one clinic in the country2. The only people who are visibly profiting from the presence of drugs are the Columbian drug lords who have extravagant mansions and modern cars3. Guinea-Bissau cannot hope to fight the prominence of these gangs by themselves and require aid.\n\n1) Time, ‘Guinea-Bissau: World’s First Narco-State’, data accessed 28 January 2014\n\n2) Hatcher,J. ‘Guinea-Bissau: How Cocaine Transformed a Tiny African Nation’, Time, 15 October 2012\n\n3) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Deal with Corruption\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s institutions have become too corrupt to deal with the drug problem and require support. The police, army and judiciary have all been implicated in the drug trade. The involvement of state officials in drug trafficking means that criminals are not prosecuted against. When two soldiers and a civilian were apprehended with 635kg (worth £25.4 million in 2013), they were detained and then immediately released with Colonel Arsenio Blade claiming ‘They were on the road hitching a ride’1. Judges are often bribed or sent death threats when faced with sentencing those involved in the drug trade. The USA has provided restructuring assistance to institutions which have reduced corruption, such as in the Mexico Merida Initiative, and could do the same with Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Sacrifice of sovereignty\n\nGuinea-Bissau would have to sacrifice its autonomy if it became the new front for the war on drugs. In order to receive assistance from the US, a state must adhere to US policy on drugs. If it fails to do so, like Bolivia did in 2009, then aid is severed under the certification system1. This restricts the recipient state’s ability to respond to the drug threat in a way that they deem suitable to their own circumstances. As a state should be free to form domestic policy without influence by external actors, the USA’s certification process is a violation of national sovereignty.\n\n1) Walsh,J. ‘U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past’, Washington Office on Latin America, 17 September 2009\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Judiciary are undermined\n\nShould Guinea-Bissau become the new front of the US drug war then their judiciary will be furthered undermined. The US has frequently tried offenders from other countries in the US, superseding the local judiciary1. While this is usually due to formal agreements between states, extradition can cause indignation amongst the local population. Guinea-Bissau’s ex Naval chief Na Tchuto was arrested by American forces and, rather than allowing his home state to prosecute him, was tried by the New York District Court. This caused resentment in Guinea-Bissau towards the US2.\n\n1) Aronofsky,D. & Qin,J. ‘U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases’\n\n2) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Gives power to military coup leaders\n\nAssistance from the US would ensure that the coup leaders of Guinea Bissau remain in power. The securitisation of issues such as drugs and ‘terror’ is encouraged by the United States. A major problem with this policy is that it provides undue power and legitimacy to those countering the threat1. In early 2014, the military were still unconstitutionally ruling over the country. The drug war provides an external threat for the military to justify their leadership position. Considering the military has refused to allow democratic elections to occur and has regularly committed coups2, the US drug war could be a perfect excuse for to remain in power until the ‘threat’ subsides.\n\n1) Crick,E. ‘Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs’, International Journal of Drug Policy, 2012\n\n2) BBC, ‘Guinea-Bissau drug trade ‘rises since coup’, 31 June 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let War on the poor\n\nThe war on drugs has turned in to a war on the poorest in society. Through heavy handed techniques of enforcement and militarisation, the American war on drugs has failed to identify to key motivating factor for many of those involved in the trade; poverty1. Guinea-Bissau is the 5th poorest nation in the world, and other primary exports such as cashew nuts are starting to fail1. Due to lucrative profits, many of the poorer in society turn to the drug trade. US policy does not put enough of a focus on alternative development projects which can provide a livelihood through licit means. Instead they are treated as criminals and, in turn, are pushed further away from reconciliation.\n\n1) Falco,M. ‘Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars’, Daedalus, 121:2, 2007, pg4\n\n2) The Guardian, ‘Guinea-Bissau’s dwindling cashew nut exports leave farmers facing hardship’, 23 August 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.5
] |
[
92.1875,
88.375,
91.25,
86.3125,
88.4375,
86.4375,
86.9375,
84.5625,
84.0625,
84.4375,
86.4375,
84.25,
86,
86.0625
] |
Deal with Corruption
Guinea-Bissau’s institutions have become too corrupt to deal with the drug problem and require support. The police, army and judiciary have all been implicated in the drug trade. The involvement of state officials in drug trafficking means that criminals are not prosecuted against. When two soldiers and a civilian were apprehended with 635kg (worth £25.4 million in 2013), they were detained and then immediately released with Colonel Arsenio Blade claiming ‘They were on the road hitching a ride’1. Judges are often bribed or sent death threats when faced with sentencing those involved in the drug trade. The USA has provided restructuring assistance to institutions which have reduced corruption, such as in the Mexico Merida Initiative, and could do the same with Guinea Bissau.
1) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008
2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012
|
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Corruption is still present in many states which have joined the US drug war. The war on drugs has done little, and perhaps exacerbated, Columbia’s corruption despite US assistance. In 2011, Columbian ex-government ministers were jailed and prosecuted for corruption and co-operation with paramilitaries.1Judicial reforms have also met with varied success. The Merida Initiative in Mexico, designed at removing the corruption of the cartels, has failed to address corruption in the judicial system which is still rampant. 2\n\n1) Bogota,S. ‘Closer and closer to the top’, The Economist, 29 July 2011\n\n2) Corcoran,P. ‘Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy On Corrupt Judges’, In Sight Crime, 16 February 2012\n"
] |
[
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Interdiction rarely works. If Guinea-Bissau were to remove illicit drug operations from within its territories then the cartels would move elsewhere. Known as the hydra effect, once one potential drug route is cut off then another one is found and the trade continues1. This was the case for interdiction efforts between the US and Mexico. Initial government operations were successful at interdicting drugs being shipped between South American and Florida. In retaliation, traffickers began to use the US-Mexico border. The border witnesses large volumes of trade and interdicting the drugs proved to be nearly impossible2. It is logical to conclude that traffickers would find a new way to ensure drugs reached the Western markets if Guinea-Bissau sought US assistance.\n\n1) Boaz,D. ‘The Hydra-Headed Drug Business’, CATO institute, 30 June 1998\n\n2) Morton,D. ‘The War on Drugs in Mexico: a failed state?’, Third World Quarterly,39:3, pg.1639\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Considering that many of the military leaders have an invested interest in the drug trade, it is unlikely that Guinea-Bissau will seek help on these grounds. Antonio Indaj, the army’s Chief of Staff, was accused in 2013 of acting as a middle man in transactions between the South American cartels and the Western markets1. Not only has he been involved in drugs transactions, but Indaj has also been accessed of supplying weaponry to the FARC. This makes it unlikely that these leaders would want US assistance which would disrupt their profits and possibly leave them open to prosecution.\n\n1) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US assistance does not guarantee success against illicit drug organisations. Despite the militarisation of the drug war in the Reagan-era, armed gangs are still prominent throughout the drug world. In Columbia, the left wing FARC still remains despite decades of war against the Columbian and USA governments1. The FARC, who use drugs for much of its income, still control large territories in the South Eastern territories. The effectiveness of military aid is consequently uncertain.\n\n1) Acosta,N. ‘Colombia’s FARC rebels end holiday ceasefire’, Reuters, 15 January 2014\n\n2) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let It is only fair that the US should have some say on domestic drug policy considering the extent of their military assistance. The offers of assistance are optional and the conditions of compliance are known by both parties. The US gave $6,495 million in military assistance to the Columbian government between 1998 and 2008 to counter the narcotics trade and the rebels who were reliant on the business1. Since this funding comes from the USA’s federal budget, the US should be able to dictate how the money is spent.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let There is a stronger focus on alternative development in drugs policy compared to the beginning of the drug war. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), historically influenced by US drug policy, has taken an increasingly alternative development-orientated stance. The UNODC has committed itself to effective alternative incomes, gender mainstreaming and community participation which demonstrates a global shift towards beneficial development1.\n\n1) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Making a difference through Alternative Development’ data accessed 30 January 2014\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let The judicial system is not capable of handling narcotics cases fairly. Corruption and civil war have left Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system broken. Military leader General Antonio Indaj, who has alleged links to the drugs trade, has vetted all political and judicial appointments1. Considering that Guinea-Bissau has no prison, it is unlikely that those in the drug trade will be properly prosecuted. The US’ judicial system is seen as far more impartial and is, therefore, a more logical choice.\n\n1) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Part of the financial assistance received by countries on the front line of the drug war is a fund for ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’. Plan Columbia, the USA’s attempt to reduce drug cultivation, saw 27% of all funding going towards democratic initiatives1. In a review by the Congressional Research Service of US drug control policy, the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions is a priority for the US2. If the US drug war was brought to Guinea-Bissau then funding would most likely go towards promoting democratic institutions and a transition of power from the military to the civilians.\n\n1) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008\n\n2) Wyler,L. ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let US will provide equipment\n\nGuinea-Bissau should join the US drug war as they do not have the means to fight the war themselves. The local law enforcement is underfunded and ill-equipped to deal with the international threat. Guinea Bissau has one ship which patrols 350km of coastline, their officers have little in the way of land transport, petrol, phones or hand cuffs1. The limited reach of the law has allowed the cartels and gangs to prosper which, in turn, further damages law and order in Guinea Bissau. US military assistance will therefore help restore law and order to Guinea Bissau.\n\n1) Parkinson,C. ‘LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa’, In Sight Crime, 29 August 2013\n\n2) Acevedo,B. ‘Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytical Assessment’, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008Shirk,D. ‘The Drug War in Mexico’, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2011\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Becoming a narco-state\n\nGuinea-Bissau’s social fabric is being destroyed by the presence of the drug trade and requires international support. Guinea-Bissau has been named as Africa’s first Narco-state; a country controlled by drug cartels and gangs. Violence committed by these gangs has escalated since the arrival of the Columbian cartels in 20071. Addiction, a consequence of the cocaine and heroin use, is prevalent throughout much of the country. It was estimated in 2012 that around 20-30% of the population use crack, an extremely addictive form of cocaine, and there is only one clinic in the country2. The only people who are visibly profiting from the presence of drugs are the Columbian drug lords who have extravagant mansions and modern cars3. Guinea-Bissau cannot hope to fight the prominence of these gangs by themselves and require aid.\n\n1) Time, ‘Guinea-Bissau: World’s First Narco-State’, data accessed 28 January 2014\n\n2) Hatcher,J. ‘Guinea-Bissau: How Cocaine Transformed a Tiny African Nation’, Time, 15 October 2012\n\n3) Vulliamy,E. ‘How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state’, The Guardian, 9 March 2008\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Prevent drugs from reaching Western markets\n\nBy joining the war on drugs, Guinea-Bissau will be in a better position to thwart the transportation of cheap cocaine and heroin to Europe and North America. Guinea-Bissau’s position makes it ideal for the cocaine trade, where drugs can be unloaded from Latin America and then distributed more easily to the West1. Around 18 tons of cocaine (worth $1.25 billion) passes through West Africa annually, most of it travelling through the state2. US assistance and interdiction operations would help prevent illicit drugs from reaching the profitable Western markets.\n\n1) Smoltczyk,A. ‘Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a “Drug Trafficker’s Dream”, Spiegel, 8 March 2013\n\n2) Hoffman,M. ‘Guinea-Bissau and the South Atlantic Cocaine Trade’, Centre for American Progress, 22 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Sacrifice of sovereignty\n\nGuinea-Bissau would have to sacrifice its autonomy if it became the new front for the war on drugs. In order to receive assistance from the US, a state must adhere to US policy on drugs. If it fails to do so, like Bolivia did in 2009, then aid is severed under the certification system1. This restricts the recipient state’s ability to respond to the drug threat in a way that they deem suitable to their own circumstances. As a state should be free to form domestic policy without influence by external actors, the USA’s certification process is a violation of national sovereignty.\n\n1) Walsh,J. ‘U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past’, Washington Office on Latin America, 17 September 2009\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Judiciary are undermined\n\nShould Guinea-Bissau become the new front of the US drug war then their judiciary will be furthered undermined. The US has frequently tried offenders from other countries in the US, superseding the local judiciary1. While this is usually due to formal agreements between states, extradition can cause indignation amongst the local population. Guinea-Bissau’s ex Naval chief Na Tchuto was arrested by American forces and, rather than allowing his home state to prosecute him, was tried by the New York District Court. This caused resentment in Guinea-Bissau towards the US2.\n\n1) Aronofsky,D. & Qin,J. ‘U.S. International Narcotics Extradition Cases’\n\n2) Reitano,T. & Shaw,M. ‘Arrest of Guinea-Bissau’s Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking’, Institute for Security Studies, 12 August 2013\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let Gives power to military coup leaders\n\nAssistance from the US would ensure that the coup leaders of Guinea Bissau remain in power. The securitisation of issues such as drugs and ‘terror’ is encouraged by the United States. A major problem with this policy is that it provides undue power and legitimacy to those countering the threat1. In early 2014, the military were still unconstitutionally ruling over the country. The drug war provides an external threat for the military to justify their leadership position. Considering the military has refused to allow democratic elections to occur and has regularly committed coups2, the US drug war could be a perfect excuse for to remain in power until the ‘threat’ subsides.\n\n1) Crick,E. ‘Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs’, International Journal of Drug Policy, 2012\n\n2) BBC, ‘Guinea-Bissau drug trade ‘rises since coup’, 31 June 2012\n",
"africa law crime policing house believes guinea bissau should not let War on the poor\n\nThe war on drugs has turned in to a war on the poorest in society. Through heavy handed techniques of enforcement and militarisation, the American war on drugs has failed to identify to key motivating factor for many of those involved in the trade; poverty1. Guinea-Bissau is the 5th poorest nation in the world, and other primary exports such as cashew nuts are starting to fail1. Due to lucrative profits, many of the poorer in society turn to the drug trade. US policy does not put enough of a focus on alternative development projects which can provide a livelihood through licit means. Instead they are treated as criminals and, in turn, are pushed further away from reconciliation.\n\n1) Falco,M. ‘Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars’, Daedalus, 121:2, 2007, pg4\n\n2) The Guardian, ‘Guinea-Bissau’s dwindling cashew nut exports leave farmers facing hardship’, 23 August 2012\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.25
] |
[
84.9375,
91.375,
88,
88.4375,
85.875,
89.4375,
88.875,
83.75,
83.75,
83.5,
84.625,
85.125,
84.75,
83.375
] |
Expansion is in the interests of NATO
Expansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending. [1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members.
[1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
|
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO. [1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. [2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.\n\n[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/\n\n[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf , p.89\n"
] |
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach. [1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.\n\n[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013 [1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance. [2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall. [3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet. [4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.\n\n[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance. [1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to? Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO.\n\n[1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011, http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and There is a strong precedent for expansion\n\nThere is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours. [1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.\n\n[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The people of Ukraine and Georgia want to join\n\nMany people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining. [1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held. [2]\n\nBoth states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership. [3]\n\n[1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West is reliant on Russia’s Gas reserves\n\nNATO’s European members have an additional reason not to offend Russia by continuing to expand the alliance in defiance of Moscow. Much of Europe depends on imports of Russian gas for their energy needs, Russia currently supplies 25% of European gas and this may rise to as high as 55% by 2020. [1] Unfortunately the Kremlin has made clear over the past three years that it is prepared to use its control of energy as a political weapon. It has already limited the flow of energy to states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia) who have annoyed it on several occasions, and may well be prepared to turn lights, heating and factories off across Europe in retaliation for interference in its near abroad. [2]\n\nRussia’s energy riches in a time of high oil prices also mean that it is far richer and self-confident than at any time since the fall of communism. The profits of its energy wealth have also enabled its military to be strengthened. This means that even if Moscow backed down in response to western assertiveness in the past, it is now determined to overturn past humiliations.\n\n[1] Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre, ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No.2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp.65-84, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-dependence\n\n[2] Weir, Fred, ‘Why Russia is cutting off gas supplies to Belarus’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0621/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-gas-supplies-to-Belarus\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West needs to deal with Russia\n\nWestern countries should seek to compromise with Russia, as they need its cooperation in a whole range of areas. Global efforts against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security and organised crime will all fail without Russian participation. Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council also means that alienating Moscow could frustrate international efforts to bring security and freedom to states such as Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq. In particular the west needs Russian help in Syria; the UNSC has only been able to get humanitarian resolutions on the country when Russia has been cooperative. [1] And NATO depends on Russian goodwill to allow supplies into Afghanistan via the safer northern route, [2] cooperation that is likely to be withdrawn if Georgia and Ukraine remain candidates for membership.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26311212\n\n[2] Cullison, Alan, ‘Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes’, The Telegraph, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421106592452.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and NATO is divided on how to deal with Georgia\n\nThe conflict in Georgia showed how NATO is already badly divided over how to respond to Russia. Old European states such as Germany and Italy are much readier to accommodate Russian interests than America, [1] which is supported by newer NATO members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The same fault has been seen in relation to the response to Russian moves in Crimea; Germany has been much more cautious. [2] The United States faces a danger that if it pushes for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections, it will split the alliance completely.\n\n[1] Traynor, Ian, ‘Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia’, guardian.co.uk, 2 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia\n\n[2] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Europe Is Completely Divided Over How to Respond to Russia’, Carnegie Europe, 4 March 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/04/europe-is-completely-divided-over-how-to-respond-to-russia/h2gi\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.25
] |
[
91.5625,
86.4375,
91.75,
87,
86.5,
84.25,
83.375,
85.8125,
85.625,
86.8125
] |
There is a strong precedent for expansion
There is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours. [1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.
[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146
|
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach. [1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.\n\n[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes\n"
] |
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO. [1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. [2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.\n\n[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/\n\n[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf , p.89\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013 [1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance. [2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall. [3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet. [4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.\n\n[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance. [1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to? Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO.\n\n[1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011, http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Expansion is in the interests of NATO\n\nExpansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending. [1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members.\n\n[1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The people of Ukraine and Georgia want to join\n\nMany people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining. [1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held. [2]\n\nBoth states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership. [3]\n\n[1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West is reliant on Russia’s Gas reserves\n\nNATO’s European members have an additional reason not to offend Russia by continuing to expand the alliance in defiance of Moscow. Much of Europe depends on imports of Russian gas for their energy needs, Russia currently supplies 25% of European gas and this may rise to as high as 55% by 2020. [1] Unfortunately the Kremlin has made clear over the past three years that it is prepared to use its control of energy as a political weapon. It has already limited the flow of energy to states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia) who have annoyed it on several occasions, and may well be prepared to turn lights, heating and factories off across Europe in retaliation for interference in its near abroad. [2]\n\nRussia’s energy riches in a time of high oil prices also mean that it is far richer and self-confident than at any time since the fall of communism. The profits of its energy wealth have also enabled its military to be strengthened. This means that even if Moscow backed down in response to western assertiveness in the past, it is now determined to overturn past humiliations.\n\n[1] Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre, ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No.2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp.65-84, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-dependence\n\n[2] Weir, Fred, ‘Why Russia is cutting off gas supplies to Belarus’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0621/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-gas-supplies-to-Belarus\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West needs to deal with Russia\n\nWestern countries should seek to compromise with Russia, as they need its cooperation in a whole range of areas. Global efforts against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security and organised crime will all fail without Russian participation. Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council also means that alienating Moscow could frustrate international efforts to bring security and freedom to states such as Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq. In particular the west needs Russian help in Syria; the UNSC has only been able to get humanitarian resolutions on the country when Russia has been cooperative. [1] And NATO depends on Russian goodwill to allow supplies into Afghanistan via the safer northern route, [2] cooperation that is likely to be withdrawn if Georgia and Ukraine remain candidates for membership.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26311212\n\n[2] Cullison, Alan, ‘Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes’, The Telegraph, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421106592452.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and NATO is divided on how to deal with Georgia\n\nThe conflict in Georgia showed how NATO is already badly divided over how to respond to Russia. Old European states such as Germany and Italy are much readier to accommodate Russian interests than America, [1] which is supported by newer NATO members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The same fault has been seen in relation to the response to Russian moves in Crimea; Germany has been much more cautious. [2] The United States faces a danger that if it pushes for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections, it will split the alliance completely.\n\n[1] Traynor, Ian, ‘Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia’, guardian.co.uk, 2 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia\n\n[2] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Europe Is Completely Divided Over How to Respond to Russia’, Carnegie Europe, 4 March 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/04/europe-is-completely-divided-over-how-to-respond-to-russia/h2gi\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.125
] |
[
91.75,
86,
90,
89.9375,
84.6875,
84.6875,
82.6875,
84.875,
84.5625,
86.375
] |
The people of Ukraine and Georgia want to join
Many people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining. [1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held. [2]
Both states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership. [3]
[1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf
[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.
[3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.
|
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013 [1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance. [2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall. [3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet. [4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.\n\n[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n"
] |
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO. [1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. [2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.\n\n[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/\n\n[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf , p.89\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach. [1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.\n\n[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance. [1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to? Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO.\n\n[1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011, http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Expansion is in the interests of NATO\n\nExpansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending. [1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members.\n\n[1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and There is a strong precedent for expansion\n\nThere is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours. [1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.\n\n[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West is reliant on Russia’s Gas reserves\n\nNATO’s European members have an additional reason not to offend Russia by continuing to expand the alliance in defiance of Moscow. Much of Europe depends on imports of Russian gas for their energy needs, Russia currently supplies 25% of European gas and this may rise to as high as 55% by 2020. [1] Unfortunately the Kremlin has made clear over the past three years that it is prepared to use its control of energy as a political weapon. It has already limited the flow of energy to states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia) who have annoyed it on several occasions, and may well be prepared to turn lights, heating and factories off across Europe in retaliation for interference in its near abroad. [2]\n\nRussia’s energy riches in a time of high oil prices also mean that it is far richer and self-confident than at any time since the fall of communism. The profits of its energy wealth have also enabled its military to be strengthened. This means that even if Moscow backed down in response to western assertiveness in the past, it is now determined to overturn past humiliations.\n\n[1] Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre, ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No.2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp.65-84, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-dependence\n\n[2] Weir, Fred, ‘Why Russia is cutting off gas supplies to Belarus’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0621/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-gas-supplies-to-Belarus\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West needs to deal with Russia\n\nWestern countries should seek to compromise with Russia, as they need its cooperation in a whole range of areas. Global efforts against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security and organised crime will all fail without Russian participation. Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council also means that alienating Moscow could frustrate international efforts to bring security and freedom to states such as Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq. In particular the west needs Russian help in Syria; the UNSC has only been able to get humanitarian resolutions on the country when Russia has been cooperative. [1] And NATO depends on Russian goodwill to allow supplies into Afghanistan via the safer northern route, [2] cooperation that is likely to be withdrawn if Georgia and Ukraine remain candidates for membership.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26311212\n\n[2] Cullison, Alan, ‘Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes’, The Telegraph, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421106592452.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and NATO is divided on how to deal with Georgia\n\nThe conflict in Georgia showed how NATO is already badly divided over how to respond to Russia. Old European states such as Germany and Italy are much readier to accommodate Russian interests than America, [1] which is supported by newer NATO members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The same fault has been seen in relation to the response to Russian moves in Crimea; Germany has been much more cautious. [2] The United States faces a danger that if it pushes for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections, it will split the alliance completely.\n\n[1] Traynor, Ian, ‘Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia’, guardian.co.uk, 2 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia\n\n[2] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Europe Is Completely Divided Over How to Respond to Russia’, Carnegie Europe, 4 March 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/04/europe-is-completely-divided-over-how-to-respond-to-russia/h2gi\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.125
] |
[
91.75,
94.125,
85,
91.4375,
85,
86.125,
85.8125,
84.4375,
85.8125,
88.875
] |
The West is reliant on Russia’s Gas reserves
NATO’s European members have an additional reason not to offend Russia by continuing to expand the alliance in defiance of Moscow. Much of Europe depends on imports of Russian gas for their energy needs, Russia currently supplies 25% of European gas and this may rise to as high as 55% by 2020. [1] Unfortunately the Kremlin has made clear over the past three years that it is prepared to use its control of energy as a political weapon. It has already limited the flow of energy to states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia) who have annoyed it on several occasions, and may well be prepared to turn lights, heating and factories off across Europe in retaliation for interference in its near abroad. [2]
Russia’s energy riches in a time of high oil prices also mean that it is far richer and self-confident than at any time since the fall of communism. The profits of its energy wealth have also enabled its military to be strengthened. This means that even if Moscow backed down in response to western assertiveness in the past, it is now determined to overturn past humiliations.
[1] Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre, ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No.2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp.65-84, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-dependence
[2] Weir, Fred, ‘Why Russia is cutting off gas supplies to Belarus’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0621/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-gas-supplies-to-Belarus
|
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance. [1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to? Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO.\n\n[1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011, http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html\n"
] |
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO. [1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. [2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.\n\n[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/\n\n[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf , p.89\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach. [1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.\n\n[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013 [1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance. [2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall. [3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet. [4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.\n\n[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West needs to deal with Russia\n\nWestern countries should seek to compromise with Russia, as they need its cooperation in a whole range of areas. Global efforts against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security and organised crime will all fail without Russian participation. Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council also means that alienating Moscow could frustrate international efforts to bring security and freedom to states such as Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq. In particular the west needs Russian help in Syria; the UNSC has only been able to get humanitarian resolutions on the country when Russia has been cooperative. [1] And NATO depends on Russian goodwill to allow supplies into Afghanistan via the safer northern route, [2] cooperation that is likely to be withdrawn if Georgia and Ukraine remain candidates for membership.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26311212\n\n[2] Cullison, Alan, ‘Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes’, The Telegraph, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421106592452.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and NATO is divided on how to deal with Georgia\n\nThe conflict in Georgia showed how NATO is already badly divided over how to respond to Russia. Old European states such as Germany and Italy are much readier to accommodate Russian interests than America, [1] which is supported by newer NATO members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The same fault has been seen in relation to the response to Russian moves in Crimea; Germany has been much more cautious. [2] The United States faces a danger that if it pushes for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections, it will split the alliance completely.\n\n[1] Traynor, Ian, ‘Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia’, guardian.co.uk, 2 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia\n\n[2] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Europe Is Completely Divided Over How to Respond to Russia’, Carnegie Europe, 4 March 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/04/europe-is-completely-divided-over-how-to-respond-to-russia/h2gi\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Expansion is in the interests of NATO\n\nExpansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending. [1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members.\n\n[1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and There is a strong precedent for expansion\n\nThere is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours. [1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.\n\n[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The people of Ukraine and Georgia want to join\n\nMany people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining. [1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held. [2]\n\nBoth states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership. [3]\n\n[1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.8125
] |
[
87,
84.125,
83.6875,
85,
83.1875,
84,
83.6875,
83.6875,
84.4375,
82.75
] |
The West needs to deal with Russia
Western countries should seek to compromise with Russia, as they need its cooperation in a whole range of areas. Global efforts against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security and organised crime will all fail without Russian participation. Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council also means that alienating Moscow could frustrate international efforts to bring security and freedom to states such as Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq. In particular the west needs Russian help in Syria; the UNSC has only been able to get humanitarian resolutions on the country when Russia has been cooperative. [1] And NATO depends on Russian goodwill to allow supplies into Afghanistan via the safer northern route, [2] cooperation that is likely to be withdrawn if Georgia and Ukraine remain candidates for membership.
[1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26311212
[2] Cullison, Alan, ‘Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes’, The Telegraph, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421106592452.html
|
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit.\n"
] |
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance. [1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to? Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO.\n\n[1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011, http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO. [1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. [2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.\n\n[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/\n\n[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf , p.89\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach. [1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.\n\n[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013 [1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance. [2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall. [3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet. [4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.\n\n[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West is reliant on Russia’s Gas reserves\n\nNATO’s European members have an additional reason not to offend Russia by continuing to expand the alliance in defiance of Moscow. Much of Europe depends on imports of Russian gas for their energy needs, Russia currently supplies 25% of European gas and this may rise to as high as 55% by 2020. [1] Unfortunately the Kremlin has made clear over the past three years that it is prepared to use its control of energy as a political weapon. It has already limited the flow of energy to states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia) who have annoyed it on several occasions, and may well be prepared to turn lights, heating and factories off across Europe in retaliation for interference in its near abroad. [2]\n\nRussia’s energy riches in a time of high oil prices also mean that it is far richer and self-confident than at any time since the fall of communism. The profits of its energy wealth have also enabled its military to be strengthened. This means that even if Moscow backed down in response to western assertiveness in the past, it is now determined to overturn past humiliations.\n\n[1] Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre, ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No.2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp.65-84, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-dependence\n\n[2] Weir, Fred, ‘Why Russia is cutting off gas supplies to Belarus’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0621/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-gas-supplies-to-Belarus\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and NATO is divided on how to deal with Georgia\n\nThe conflict in Georgia showed how NATO is already badly divided over how to respond to Russia. Old European states such as Germany and Italy are much readier to accommodate Russian interests than America, [1] which is supported by newer NATO members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The same fault has been seen in relation to the response to Russian moves in Crimea; Germany has been much more cautious. [2] The United States faces a danger that if it pushes for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections, it will split the alliance completely.\n\n[1] Traynor, Ian, ‘Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia’, guardian.co.uk, 2 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia\n\n[2] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Europe Is Completely Divided Over How to Respond to Russia’, Carnegie Europe, 4 March 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/04/europe-is-completely-divided-over-how-to-respond-to-russia/h2gi\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Expansion is in the interests of NATO\n\nExpansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending. [1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members.\n\n[1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and There is a strong precedent for expansion\n\nThere is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours. [1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.\n\n[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The people of Ukraine and Georgia want to join\n\nMany people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining. [1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held. [2]\n\nBoth states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership. [3]\n\n[1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.875
] |
[
84.125,
84.875,
84,
86.1875,
83.4375,
84.1875,
84.4375,
84.625,
83.5625,
82.25
] |
NATO is divided on how to deal with Georgia
The conflict in Georgia showed how NATO is already badly divided over how to respond to Russia. Old European states such as Germany and Italy are much readier to accommodate Russian interests than America, [1] which is supported by newer NATO members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The same fault has been seen in relation to the response to Russian moves in Crimea; Germany has been much more cautious. [2] The United States faces a danger that if it pushes for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections, it will split the alliance completely.
[1] Traynor, Ian, ‘Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia’, guardian.co.uk, 2 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia
[2] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Europe Is Completely Divided Over How to Respond to Russia’, Carnegie Europe, 4 March 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/04/europe-is-completely-divided-over-how-to-respond-to-russia/h2gi
|
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk.\n"
] |
[
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit.\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance. [1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to? Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO.\n\n[1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011, http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO. [1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet. [2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia.\n\n[1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/\n\n[2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf , p.89\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach. [1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine.\n\n[1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013 [1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance. [2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall. [3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet. [4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so.\n\n[1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n\n[4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf , p.16\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West is reliant on Russia’s Gas reserves\n\nNATO’s European members have an additional reason not to offend Russia by continuing to expand the alliance in defiance of Moscow. Much of Europe depends on imports of Russian gas for their energy needs, Russia currently supplies 25% of European gas and this may rise to as high as 55% by 2020. [1] Unfortunately the Kremlin has made clear over the past three years that it is prepared to use its control of energy as a political weapon. It has already limited the flow of energy to states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia) who have annoyed it on several occasions, and may well be prepared to turn lights, heating and factories off across Europe in retaliation for interference in its near abroad. [2]\n\nRussia’s energy riches in a time of high oil prices also mean that it is far richer and self-confident than at any time since the fall of communism. The profits of its energy wealth have also enabled its military to be strengthened. This means that even if Moscow backed down in response to western assertiveness in the past, it is now determined to overturn past humiliations.\n\n[1] Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre, ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No.2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp.65-84, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-dependence\n\n[2] Weir, Fred, ‘Why Russia is cutting off gas supplies to Belarus’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0621/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-gas-supplies-to-Belarus\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The West needs to deal with Russia\n\nWestern countries should seek to compromise with Russia, as they need its cooperation in a whole range of areas. Global efforts against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security and organised crime will all fail without Russian participation. Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council also means that alienating Moscow could frustrate international efforts to bring security and freedom to states such as Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq. In particular the west needs Russian help in Syria; the UNSC has only been able to get humanitarian resolutions on the country when Russia has been cooperative. [1] And NATO depends on Russian goodwill to allow supplies into Afghanistan via the safer northern route, [2] cooperation that is likely to be withdrawn if Georgia and Ukraine remain candidates for membership.\n\n[1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26311212\n\n[2] Cullison, Alan, ‘Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes’, The Telegraph, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421106592452.html\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and Expansion is in the interests of NATO\n\nExpansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending. [1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members.\n\n[1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and There is a strong precedent for expansion\n\nThere is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours. [1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion.\n\n[1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146\n",
"europe politics defence house would extend nato membership georgia and The people of Ukraine and Georgia want to join\n\nMany people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining. [1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held. [2]\n\nBoth states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership. [3]\n\n[1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf\n\n[2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376.\n\n[3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
90.625
] |
[
85.5625,
85,
87.1875,
86.8125,
84.875,
84.3125,
84.6875,
85.5625,
85,
83.9375
] |
Would prevent further atrocities
An international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas).
This would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too.
|
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious.\n\nProsecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield.\n"
] |
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n\nEven if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause?\n\nDenialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] .\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1]\n\nWhen he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] .\n\n[1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html\n\n[2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 http://www.refworld.org/type,CASELAW,ICJ,,3c6cd39b4,0.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements.\n\nThe general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too.\n\nWhile there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.\n\nIsrael itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962.\n\nSharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] .\n\n[1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/node/79081/section/3\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Historical record\n\nProsecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties.\n\nBy removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides.\n\n[1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit/story/0,,1931205,00.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Impunity\n\nIn addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention.\n\nThe purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded.\n\n[1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-16/news/mn-35764_1_defense-officials\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Necessary for an impartial peace.\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1]\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/ariel-sharon-war-crimes_b_4584178.html\n\n[2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Was unlikely ever to happen anyway\n\nAt any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Took a key role in negotiations\n\nSharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan.\n\nIf he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2]\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.568192\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations\n\nA prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted.\n\nThis is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] .\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well\n\nWhile many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world.\n\nIf he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.6875
] |
[
95.0625,
85.625,
88.1875,
88.9375,
85.375,
86.3125,
85.3125,
83.75,
83.9375,
86.625,
87.8125,
83.875,
85,
86.625
] |
Historical record
Prosecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties.
By removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides.
[1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit/story/0,,1931205,00.html
|
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause?\n\nDenialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] .\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n"
] |
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious.\n\nProsecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n\nEven if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1]\n\nWhen he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] .\n\n[1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html\n\n[2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 http://www.refworld.org/type,CASELAW,ICJ,,3c6cd39b4,0.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements.\n\nThe general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too.\n\nWhile there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.\n\nIsrael itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962.\n\nSharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] .\n\n[1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/node/79081/section/3\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Would prevent further atrocities\n\nAn international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas).\n\nThis would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Impunity\n\nIn addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention.\n\nThe purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded.\n\n[1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-16/news/mn-35764_1_defense-officials\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Necessary for an impartial peace.\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1]\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/ariel-sharon-war-crimes_b_4584178.html\n\n[2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Was unlikely ever to happen anyway\n\nAt any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Took a key role in negotiations\n\nSharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan.\n\nIf he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2]\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.568192\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations\n\nA prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted.\n\nThis is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] .\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well\n\nWhile many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world.\n\nIf he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93
] |
[
85.6875,
85.375,
83.6875,
84.375,
84.25,
83.9375,
83.6875,
83.125,
82.5,
82.875,
84.0625,
82.4375,
83.0625,
83.3125
] |
Impunity
In addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention.
The purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded.
[1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-16/news/mn-35764_1_defense-officials
|
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1]\n\nWhen he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] .\n\n[1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html\n\n[2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 http://www.refworld.org/type,CASELAW,ICJ,,3c6cd39b4,0.html\n"
] |
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious.\n\nProsecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n\nEven if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause?\n\nDenialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] .\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements.\n\nThe general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too.\n\nWhile there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.\n\nIsrael itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962.\n\nSharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] .\n\n[1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/node/79081/section/3\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Would prevent further atrocities\n\nAn international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas).\n\nThis would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Historical record\n\nProsecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties.\n\nBy removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides.\n\n[1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit/story/0,,1931205,00.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Necessary for an impartial peace.\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1]\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/ariel-sharon-war-crimes_b_4584178.html\n\n[2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Was unlikely ever to happen anyway\n\nAt any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Took a key role in negotiations\n\nSharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan.\n\nIf he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2]\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.568192\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations\n\nA prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted.\n\nThis is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] .\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well\n\nWhile many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world.\n\nIf he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.375
] |
[
88.625,
89.375,
87.875,
85.5,
84.875,
84.5,
86.625,
85.375,
83.0625,
84.0625,
89.3125,
83.75,
86,
89.0625
] |
Necessary for an impartial peace.
By prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1]
The career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.
[1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/ariel-sharon-war-crimes_b_4584178.html
[2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm
|
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n\nEven if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position.\n"
] |
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious.\n\nProsecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause?\n\nDenialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] .\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1]\n\nWhen he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] .\n\n[1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html\n\n[2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 http://www.refworld.org/type,CASELAW,ICJ,,3c6cd39b4,0.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements.\n\nThe general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too.\n\nWhile there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.\n\nIsrael itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962.\n\nSharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] .\n\n[1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/node/79081/section/3\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Would prevent further atrocities\n\nAn international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas).\n\nThis would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Historical record\n\nProsecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties.\n\nBy removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides.\n\n[1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit/story/0,,1931205,00.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Impunity\n\nIn addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention.\n\nThe purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded.\n\n[1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-16/news/mn-35764_1_defense-officials\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Was unlikely ever to happen anyway\n\nAt any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Took a key role in negotiations\n\nSharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan.\n\nIf he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2]\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.568192\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations\n\nA prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted.\n\nThis is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] .\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well\n\nWhile many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world.\n\nIf he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.4375
] |
[
91.625,
84.25,
87.25,
86.5625,
85.25,
83.625,
82.9375,
84,
82.75,
82.5,
84.125,
84.3125,
88.1875,
83.9375
] |
Was unlikely ever to happen anyway
At any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions.
|
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.\n\nIsrael itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962.\n\nSharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] .\n\n[1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/node/79081/section/3\n"
] |
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements.\n\nThe general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too.\n\nWhile there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious.\n\nProsecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n\nEven if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause?\n\nDenialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] .\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1]\n\nWhen he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] .\n\n[1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html\n\n[2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 http://www.refworld.org/type,CASELAW,ICJ,,3c6cd39b4,0.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Took a key role in negotiations\n\nSharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan.\n\nIf he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2]\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.568192\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations\n\nA prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted.\n\nThis is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] .\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well\n\nWhile many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world.\n\nIf he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Would prevent further atrocities\n\nAn international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas).\n\nThis would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Historical record\n\nProsecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties.\n\nBy removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides.\n\n[1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit/story/0,,1931205,00.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Impunity\n\nIn addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention.\n\nThe purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded.\n\n[1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-16/news/mn-35764_1_defense-officials\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Necessary for an impartial peace.\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1]\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/ariel-sharon-war-crimes_b_4584178.html\n\n[2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.6875
] |
[
87.75,
85.125,
86.3125,
83.875,
84.1875,
83.5625,
84.4375,
82.8125,
82.9375,
83.875,
84.3125,
84,
84.25,
84.0625
] |
Took a key role in negotiations
Sharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan.
If he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2]
[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/
[2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.568192
|
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements.\n\nThe general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them.\n"
] |
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too.\n\nWhile there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.\n\nIsrael itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962.\n\nSharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] .\n\n[1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/node/79081/section/3\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious.\n\nProsecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n\nEven if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause?\n\nDenialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] .\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1]\n\nWhen he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] .\n\n[1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html\n\n[2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 http://www.refworld.org/type,CASELAW,ICJ,,3c6cd39b4,0.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Was unlikely ever to happen anyway\n\nAt any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations\n\nA prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted.\n\nThis is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] .\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well\n\nWhile many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world.\n\nIf he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Would prevent further atrocities\n\nAn international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas).\n\nThis would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Historical record\n\nProsecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties.\n\nBy removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides.\n\n[1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit/story/0,,1931205,00.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Impunity\n\nIn addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention.\n\nThe purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded.\n\n[1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-16/news/mn-35764_1_defense-officials\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Necessary for an impartial peace.\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1]\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/ariel-sharon-war-crimes_b_4584178.html\n\n[2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91
] |
[
83.9375,
82.625,
83.125,
82.25,
82.8125,
82.5,
82.9375,
82.125,
83.1875,
82.625,
82.1875,
81.9375,
82.0625,
83.0625
] |
Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations
A prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted.
This is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] .
[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/
[2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322
[3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf
|
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely.\n"
] |
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements.\n\nThe general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too.\n\nWhile there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.\n\nIsrael itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962.\n\nSharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] .\n\n[1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/node/79081/section/3\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious.\n\nProsecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n\nEven if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause?\n\nDenialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] .\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1]\n\nWhen he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] .\n\n[1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html\n\n[2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 http://www.refworld.org/type,CASELAW,ICJ,,3c6cd39b4,0.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Was unlikely ever to happen anyway\n\nAt any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Took a key role in negotiations\n\nSharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan.\n\nIf he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2]\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.568192\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well\n\nWhile many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world.\n\nIf he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Would prevent further atrocities\n\nAn international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas).\n\nThis would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Historical record\n\nProsecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties.\n\nBy removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides.\n\n[1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit/story/0,,1931205,00.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Impunity\n\nIn addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention.\n\nThe purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded.\n\n[1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-16/news/mn-35764_1_defense-officials\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Necessary for an impartial peace.\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1]\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/ariel-sharon-war-crimes_b_4584178.html\n\n[2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.9375
] |
[
90.0625,
84.875,
89.3125,
85.8125,
86.625,
83.8125,
85.625,
85,
84.3125,
83.75,
83.75,
84.625,
83.25,
88.3125
] |
If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well
While many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world.
If he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial.
|
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too.\n\nWhile there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too.\n"
] |
[
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements.\n\nThe general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.\n\nIsrael itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962.\n\nSharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] .\n\n[1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/node/79081/section/3\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious.\n\nProsecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n\nEven if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause?\n\nDenialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] .\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1]\n\nWhen he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] .\n\n[1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/kahan.html\n\n[2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 http://www.refworld.org/type,CASELAW,ICJ,,3c6cd39b4,0.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Was unlikely ever to happen anyway\n\nAt any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Took a key role in negotiations\n\nSharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan.\n\nIf he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2]\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.568192\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations\n\nA prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted.\n\nThis is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] .\n\n[1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/11/ariel-sharon-israels-soldier-and-strongman-1928-2014/\n\n[2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Would prevent further atrocities\n\nAn international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas).\n\nThis would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too.\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Historical record\n\nProsecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties.\n\nBy removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides.\n\n[1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, http://www.theguardian.com/values/socialaudit/story/0,,1931205,00.html\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Impunity\n\nIn addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention.\n\nThe purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded.\n\n[1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-16/news/mn-35764_1_defense-officials\n",
"middle east law human rights international law punishment politics defence Necessary for an impartial peace.\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1]\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/ariel-sharon-war-crimes_b_4584178.html\n\n[2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.75
] |
[
86.8125,
86.625,
88.375,
85.875,
84.875,
85.1875,
85.375,
85.125,
83.375,
83.75,
85.875,
83.625,
84.8125,
84.875
] |
A new perspective, raising topical issues
The first film created in Nollywood - ‘Living in Bondage’ - raised fundamental issues concerning marriage, wealth and spirituality. The film indicates the need to be aware of cults and what they can drive individuals to do. Furthermore films such ‘Street Girls’ and ‘Mama’s Girls’ provide insight into the lives of prostitutes and the sex industry. ‘Street Girls’ is enabling awareness of why girls are forced into prostitution and why they may be forced to commit criminal offences. Poverty is identified as a key driving factor.
The range of topics covered - from immigration, women, witchcraft, corruption, terrorism, and infrastructure deficits - counteract historic silences in the public sphere. The films are raising awareness to viewers by presenting the stories in a new light - understandable, humorous, and relatable; and will encourage citizens to demand change.
Nollywood is showing the limits of believing in a single perspective, the Western perspective, to stories on Africa.
|
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Fundamentally, the topics raised by Nollywood are commercialising accepted views. The industry is building a business founded on distributing images of witchcraft, abuse, and domestic violence.\n\nFirst, a majority of the films are politically incorrect and provide negative portrayals of women and sexuality. Gender roles are reinforced as women become sexualised objects, male possession, and the source of trouble - required to be put in their ‘place’. In the case of LGBT representations, homosexuality has been represented as Satanic in films such as 2010’s ‘Men in Love’ [1] . Second, in the case of witchcraft, dramas have made society more accepting of, and open to, sorcery. The films show how it remains prevalent in society and can provide a tool to access riches. With the audience interested in watching stories on witchcraft the industry is feeding such demands. Witchcraft sells; and continues to remain a prominent theme justifying why people make their decisions and action.\n\nThis is not the kind of perception change Africa needs.\n\n[1] In Nigeria homosexuality is illegal and continues to be criminalised.\n"
] |
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be First, the narrative of whether Africa is 'rising' has been debated, and requires reflection. Second, if Africa were rising will Nollywood push Nigeria to rise in the wrong direction? Nollywood is a private-sector organisation, with concentrated profits. Inequality in Nigeria has continued to rise since 1985 as shown by the GINI coefficient (Aigbokhan, 2008); and with lavish lifestyles being created for famous actresses and directors who hit ‘big money’ will Nollywood only act to benefit elites and create a new elite class? Economic growth and revenue production cannot solve the issue of poverty without tackling inequality.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Although the industry has encouraged entrepreneurialism we need to recognise it is also promoting risky businesses. Firstly, the individuals working in the industry are required to produce a quick turnover. The fact that no security and support is provided by the government or state means the risk of failed entrepreneurial strategies falls on the individual. The producers and directors may be forced to borrow money from loan sharks and at high interest-rates to get capital quickly; and need to be able to ensure profits are generated rapidly. Such a tenuous industry is clearly not in a position to change opinions of Africa and may instead be creating a negative perception of risk-taking and cutthroat capitalism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Opportunities for development are limited as the industry continues to function informally. The informal structure means there is no legal institution controlling transactions, there is no governing body ensuring taxation is paid and revenues collected, and finally, there is little security to the workers within the industry. Financial records are limited in the industry, which makes it hard to predict the developmental scope of Nollywood and the real revenues produced.\n\nInformality prevents legitimacy; capability to assist national development; and fundamental capital losses. It also prevents it becoming a force for changing perceptions of those outside Africa. Formalisation is required for the industry to assist developmental potential [1] .\n\n[1] See further readings: McCall, 2012.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The issue of piracy is being tackled. Recognising the potential benefits Nollywood can bring to Nigeria and the scale of the piracy problem, investments are being made to stop piracy in the growing industry.\n\nInvestments have been proposed by the World Bank to tackle piracy, and ensure profits are not lost. Further, Nollywood UP, the Nollywood Upgrade Project, is providing funding to control piracy. Nollywood UP is improving the capacity of the innovative industry - by providing solutions for distribution and vital training in high-quality film making.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be New funding sources are emerging. The diasporic community for example are playing a central role in funding the long-term growth of the industry. Recognising potential, and being a major consumer base for the films produced, the African diaspora is investing in Nollywood.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Nollywood films are viewed globally. Channels are dedicated to the films - such as South Africa’s MultiChoice and BSkyB’s Nollywood Movies. BSkyB distributes programmes and films directly to airlines, instantly broadening the audience. Furthermore, YouTube subscribers have sought to enhance the global viewing popularity; and recently developed iROKO Partners is ensuring internet users can access Nollywood films. iROKO Partners shows the biggest markets are based in the US, UK, Canada, Italy and Germany (Kermeliotis, 2012).\n\nNew partnerships are being formed with Hollywood and global film festivals [1] , which show the future shift of broadcasting Nollywood films in cinemas. A recent film produced by Pat Nebo - ‘Dead broke’ - is set to be premiered in Lagos, Accra, and London.\n\n[1] Cannes (2013) recently showcased ‘La Pirogue’; and in the summer of 2013 France hosted its first Nollywood Week in Paris, showcasing seven of the best Nollywood films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Encouraging film entrepreneurs\n\nThe Nollywood industry is providing solutions to pressing issues - including high rates of unemployment. The dynamic industry provides an opportunity for youths to explore interests and invest in their talents and creativity. The recognition gained for Nollywood has shown how Nigeria's youths can initiate, and develop, a sustainable industry. Rather than seeing the rising young population as a potential threat [1] , the rise of Nollywood showcases the talent of the young population and helps overthrow perceptions of Africa just being about natural resources.\n\nAdditionally, the growth of Nollywood is continuing to encourage individuals to enter the creative industry – whether to work in production, acting or distribution, the rise of Nollywood is creating an entrepreneurial spirit, drive, and motivation to create change. Individuals are no longer relying on the government or international community to provide funds, support and infrastructure, but moulding their own futures.\n\n[1] See further readings: Urdal, 2006.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Development from within\n\nNollywood is showcasing Nigeria’s capability to sustain, build, and finance its own economy. Recent estimates suggest around 50 films are produced weekly, selling between 20,000 to 200,000 units, and creating jobs for around one million individuals (Moudio, 2013). The industry is initiating vital development, enabling Nigeria to have capital to change perceptions.\n\nNollywood is following previous cultural industry paths. Hollywood developed from low-budget films, and in 2013 the entertainment industry generated around $522bn in revenue, and is continuing to be one of America’s biggest sources of tourism (Statista, 2013). In Nollywood’s case, the industry is already proving to be of vital importance for regional and domestic tourism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Epitomising rising Africa\n\nNollywood epitomises Africa, and life in African spaces. The fast-pace nature of production shows how quickly things changes and everything is on the move. The structure of production shows the dynamic nature of everyday life, action, and flow of ideas. As Rem Koolhaas’ (2002) film documentary - Lagos - showed the congestion, informality, and buzz of the city needs to be viewed positively and a sign of entrepreneurialism. The documentary suggested African cities were setting a new trend to be followed by the West, and developing a rising economy. Africa is not simply in need of assistance, but rather a fast-pace environment that needs greater understanding.\n\nAfrica is rising [1] and Nollywood acts to reinforce this reality. With more films being produced, bigger revenues made, and new investors emerging, Nollywood shows Africa's economies are changing, growing, and emerging. Interest and collaborative investments being made by the World Bank shows the industry will continue to rise. Nollywood’s growth provides an alternative to the dominant Afro-pessimism.\n\n[1] See further readings: The Economist, 2013.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Small audience viewings\n\nIn reality, Nollywood’s audience is constrained - questioning the extent to which stereotypes can be changed. First, language acts as a barrier. 56% of Nollywood films are produced in local languages - such as Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa (UNESCO, 2009). Although English accounts for 44% of films produced, the linguistic diversity may limit who sees which film and what issues are therefore discussed. Second, a majority of the films are sold in hardcopy - whether on cassette or pirate DVDs.\n\nFinally, the industry is characterised by fast and cheap production. Quantity over quality limits popularity and audience viewings. Further, the limited attention to quality means Nollywood remains at the bottom of the global value chain for film production. It is difficult to change perceptions with poor quality films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The problem of piracy\n\nPirated copies of Nollywood films are a key issue. Piracy emerges as an issue for two key reasons. First, the lack of the lack of legal structure - the lack of formal regulation. Legal systems and strict copyright controls are needed to ensure piracy is stopped. Second, the production system is slow - therefore alternative means of production are used to meet the growing demand for films released. New methods for distribution are required.\n\nCalls have been made for the government to take action against piracy. However, with corruption prevalent little action has been made. Half of the film profits are lost through piracy (CNN, 2009), and piracy acts to reinforce the image of bad governance, and inadequate structures, within African states. The industry is being undermined and undervalued, through the piracy market, with high costs to the entrepreneurs.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Short term hype\n\nDespite the boom in Nollywood’s industry it remains hard to get investment. With funding issues prevalent the hype surrounding Nollywood is temporary.\n\nThe difficulties in getting funding, mean films produced are often safe and politically popular - aware that funds can be gained for backing. For example, the controversial film – Boko Haram – aimed to provide an alternative perspective into the Islamist extremist group. The core subject matter was to explore terrorism; however, following the controversial story and topic, marketers dropped out, fearing a political backlash. Titles had to be changed and the film adapted to be more sensitive. The ideas behind the films, and the stories told, are being altered due to funding constraints [1] . Perspectives, on and in Africa, cannot be changed if the topics raised are altered to meet sensitivity regulations. Hegemony will persist.\n\n[1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.125
] |
[
85.625,
85.8125,
85.3125,
83.9375,
84.75,
84.75,
83.0625,
82.75,
82.875,
85.875,
83.3125,
88.5625
] |
Encouraging film entrepreneurs
The Nollywood industry is providing solutions to pressing issues - including high rates of unemployment. The dynamic industry provides an opportunity for youths to explore interests and invest in their talents and creativity. The recognition gained for Nollywood has shown how Nigeria's youths can initiate, and develop, a sustainable industry. Rather than seeing the rising young population as a potential threat [1] , the rise of Nollywood showcases the talent of the young population and helps overthrow perceptions of Africa just being about natural resources.
Additionally, the growth of Nollywood is continuing to encourage individuals to enter the creative industry – whether to work in production, acting or distribution, the rise of Nollywood is creating an entrepreneurial spirit, drive, and motivation to create change. Individuals are no longer relying on the government or international community to provide funds, support and infrastructure, but moulding their own futures.
[1] See further readings: Urdal, 2006.
|
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Although the industry has encouraged entrepreneurialism we need to recognise it is also promoting risky businesses. Firstly, the individuals working in the industry are required to produce a quick turnover. The fact that no security and support is provided by the government or state means the risk of failed entrepreneurial strategies falls on the individual. The producers and directors may be forced to borrow money from loan sharks and at high interest-rates to get capital quickly; and need to be able to ensure profits are generated rapidly. Such a tenuous industry is clearly not in a position to change opinions of Africa and may instead be creating a negative perception of risk-taking and cutthroat capitalism.\n"
] |
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Fundamentally, the topics raised by Nollywood are commercialising accepted views. The industry is building a business founded on distributing images of witchcraft, abuse, and domestic violence.\n\nFirst, a majority of the films are politically incorrect and provide negative portrayals of women and sexuality. Gender roles are reinforced as women become sexualised objects, male possession, and the source of trouble - required to be put in their ‘place’. In the case of LGBT representations, homosexuality has been represented as Satanic in films such as 2010’s ‘Men in Love’ [1] . Second, in the case of witchcraft, dramas have made society more accepting of, and open to, sorcery. The films show how it remains prevalent in society and can provide a tool to access riches. With the audience interested in watching stories on witchcraft the industry is feeding such demands. Witchcraft sells; and continues to remain a prominent theme justifying why people make their decisions and action.\n\nThis is not the kind of perception change Africa needs.\n\n[1] In Nigeria homosexuality is illegal and continues to be criminalised.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be First, the narrative of whether Africa is 'rising' has been debated, and requires reflection. Second, if Africa were rising will Nollywood push Nigeria to rise in the wrong direction? Nollywood is a private-sector organisation, with concentrated profits. Inequality in Nigeria has continued to rise since 1985 as shown by the GINI coefficient (Aigbokhan, 2008); and with lavish lifestyles being created for famous actresses and directors who hit ‘big money’ will Nollywood only act to benefit elites and create a new elite class? Economic growth and revenue production cannot solve the issue of poverty without tackling inequality.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Opportunities for development are limited as the industry continues to function informally. The informal structure means there is no legal institution controlling transactions, there is no governing body ensuring taxation is paid and revenues collected, and finally, there is little security to the workers within the industry. Financial records are limited in the industry, which makes it hard to predict the developmental scope of Nollywood and the real revenues produced.\n\nInformality prevents legitimacy; capability to assist national development; and fundamental capital losses. It also prevents it becoming a force for changing perceptions of those outside Africa. Formalisation is required for the industry to assist developmental potential [1] .\n\n[1] See further readings: McCall, 2012.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The issue of piracy is being tackled. Recognising the potential benefits Nollywood can bring to Nigeria and the scale of the piracy problem, investments are being made to stop piracy in the growing industry.\n\nInvestments have been proposed by the World Bank to tackle piracy, and ensure profits are not lost. Further, Nollywood UP, the Nollywood Upgrade Project, is providing funding to control piracy. Nollywood UP is improving the capacity of the innovative industry - by providing solutions for distribution and vital training in high-quality film making.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be New funding sources are emerging. The diasporic community for example are playing a central role in funding the long-term growth of the industry. Recognising potential, and being a major consumer base for the films produced, the African diaspora is investing in Nollywood.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Nollywood films are viewed globally. Channels are dedicated to the films - such as South Africa’s MultiChoice and BSkyB’s Nollywood Movies. BSkyB distributes programmes and films directly to airlines, instantly broadening the audience. Furthermore, YouTube subscribers have sought to enhance the global viewing popularity; and recently developed iROKO Partners is ensuring internet users can access Nollywood films. iROKO Partners shows the biggest markets are based in the US, UK, Canada, Italy and Germany (Kermeliotis, 2012).\n\nNew partnerships are being formed with Hollywood and global film festivals [1] , which show the future shift of broadcasting Nollywood films in cinemas. A recent film produced by Pat Nebo - ‘Dead broke’ - is set to be premiered in Lagos, Accra, and London.\n\n[1] Cannes (2013) recently showcased ‘La Pirogue’; and in the summer of 2013 France hosted its first Nollywood Week in Paris, showcasing seven of the best Nollywood films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be A new perspective, raising topical issues\n\nThe first film created in Nollywood - ‘Living in Bondage’ - raised fundamental issues concerning marriage, wealth and spirituality. The film indicates the need to be aware of cults and what they can drive individuals to do. Furthermore films such ‘Street Girls’ and ‘Mama’s Girls’ provide insight into the lives of prostitutes and the sex industry. ‘Street Girls’ is enabling awareness of why girls are forced into prostitution and why they may be forced to commit criminal offences. Poverty is identified as a key driving factor.\n\nThe range of topics covered - from immigration, women, witchcraft, corruption, terrorism, and infrastructure deficits - counteract historic silences in the public sphere. The films are raising awareness to viewers by presenting the stories in a new light - understandable, humorous, and relatable; and will encourage citizens to demand change.\n\nNollywood is showing the limits of believing in a single perspective, the Western perspective, to stories on Africa.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Development from within\n\nNollywood is showcasing Nigeria’s capability to sustain, build, and finance its own economy. Recent estimates suggest around 50 films are produced weekly, selling between 20,000 to 200,000 units, and creating jobs for around one million individuals (Moudio, 2013). The industry is initiating vital development, enabling Nigeria to have capital to change perceptions.\n\nNollywood is following previous cultural industry paths. Hollywood developed from low-budget films, and in 2013 the entertainment industry generated around $522bn in revenue, and is continuing to be one of America’s biggest sources of tourism (Statista, 2013). In Nollywood’s case, the industry is already proving to be of vital importance for regional and domestic tourism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Epitomising rising Africa\n\nNollywood epitomises Africa, and life in African spaces. The fast-pace nature of production shows how quickly things changes and everything is on the move. The structure of production shows the dynamic nature of everyday life, action, and flow of ideas. As Rem Koolhaas’ (2002) film documentary - Lagos - showed the congestion, informality, and buzz of the city needs to be viewed positively and a sign of entrepreneurialism. The documentary suggested African cities were setting a new trend to be followed by the West, and developing a rising economy. Africa is not simply in need of assistance, but rather a fast-pace environment that needs greater understanding.\n\nAfrica is rising [1] and Nollywood acts to reinforce this reality. With more films being produced, bigger revenues made, and new investors emerging, Nollywood shows Africa's economies are changing, growing, and emerging. Interest and collaborative investments being made by the World Bank shows the industry will continue to rise. Nollywood’s growth provides an alternative to the dominant Afro-pessimism.\n\n[1] See further readings: The Economist, 2013.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Small audience viewings\n\nIn reality, Nollywood’s audience is constrained - questioning the extent to which stereotypes can be changed. First, language acts as a barrier. 56% of Nollywood films are produced in local languages - such as Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa (UNESCO, 2009). Although English accounts for 44% of films produced, the linguistic diversity may limit who sees which film and what issues are therefore discussed. Second, a majority of the films are sold in hardcopy - whether on cassette or pirate DVDs.\n\nFinally, the industry is characterised by fast and cheap production. Quantity over quality limits popularity and audience viewings. Further, the limited attention to quality means Nollywood remains at the bottom of the global value chain for film production. It is difficult to change perceptions with poor quality films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The problem of piracy\n\nPirated copies of Nollywood films are a key issue. Piracy emerges as an issue for two key reasons. First, the lack of the lack of legal structure - the lack of formal regulation. Legal systems and strict copyright controls are needed to ensure piracy is stopped. Second, the production system is slow - therefore alternative means of production are used to meet the growing demand for films released. New methods for distribution are required.\n\nCalls have been made for the government to take action against piracy. However, with corruption prevalent little action has been made. Half of the film profits are lost through piracy (CNN, 2009), and piracy acts to reinforce the image of bad governance, and inadequate structures, within African states. The industry is being undermined and undervalued, through the piracy market, with high costs to the entrepreneurs.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Short term hype\n\nDespite the boom in Nollywood’s industry it remains hard to get investment. With funding issues prevalent the hype surrounding Nollywood is temporary.\n\nThe difficulties in getting funding, mean films produced are often safe and politically popular - aware that funds can be gained for backing. For example, the controversial film – Boko Haram – aimed to provide an alternative perspective into the Islamist extremist group. The core subject matter was to explore terrorism; however, following the controversial story and topic, marketers dropped out, fearing a political backlash. Titles had to be changed and the film adapted to be more sensitive. The ideas behind the films, and the stories told, are being altered due to funding constraints [1] . Perspectives, on and in Africa, cannot be changed if the topics raised are altered to meet sensitivity regulations. Hegemony will persist.\n\n[1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.75
] |
[
87.3125,
90.3125,
90.9375,
84.375,
85.9375,
83.1875,
83.1875,
82.875,
83.5625,
83.6875,
83.375,
85.25
] |
Development from within
Nollywood is showcasing Nigeria’s capability to sustain, build, and finance its own economy. Recent estimates suggest around 50 films are produced weekly, selling between 20,000 to 200,000 units, and creating jobs for around one million individuals (Moudio, 2013). The industry is initiating vital development, enabling Nigeria to have capital to change perceptions.
Nollywood is following previous cultural industry paths. Hollywood developed from low-budget films, and in 2013 the entertainment industry generated around $522bn in revenue, and is continuing to be one of America’s biggest sources of tourism (Statista, 2013). In Nollywood’s case, the industry is already proving to be of vital importance for regional and domestic tourism.
|
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Opportunities for development are limited as the industry continues to function informally. The informal structure means there is no legal institution controlling transactions, there is no governing body ensuring taxation is paid and revenues collected, and finally, there is little security to the workers within the industry. Financial records are limited in the industry, which makes it hard to predict the developmental scope of Nollywood and the real revenues produced.\n\nInformality prevents legitimacy; capability to assist national development; and fundamental capital losses. It also prevents it becoming a force for changing perceptions of those outside Africa. Formalisation is required for the industry to assist developmental potential [1] .\n\n[1] See further readings: McCall, 2012.\n"
] |
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Fundamentally, the topics raised by Nollywood are commercialising accepted views. The industry is building a business founded on distributing images of witchcraft, abuse, and domestic violence.\n\nFirst, a majority of the films are politically incorrect and provide negative portrayals of women and sexuality. Gender roles are reinforced as women become sexualised objects, male possession, and the source of trouble - required to be put in their ‘place’. In the case of LGBT representations, homosexuality has been represented as Satanic in films such as 2010’s ‘Men in Love’ [1] . Second, in the case of witchcraft, dramas have made society more accepting of, and open to, sorcery. The films show how it remains prevalent in society and can provide a tool to access riches. With the audience interested in watching stories on witchcraft the industry is feeding such demands. Witchcraft sells; and continues to remain a prominent theme justifying why people make their decisions and action.\n\nThis is not the kind of perception change Africa needs.\n\n[1] In Nigeria homosexuality is illegal and continues to be criminalised.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be First, the narrative of whether Africa is 'rising' has been debated, and requires reflection. Second, if Africa were rising will Nollywood push Nigeria to rise in the wrong direction? Nollywood is a private-sector organisation, with concentrated profits. Inequality in Nigeria has continued to rise since 1985 as shown by the GINI coefficient (Aigbokhan, 2008); and with lavish lifestyles being created for famous actresses and directors who hit ‘big money’ will Nollywood only act to benefit elites and create a new elite class? Economic growth and revenue production cannot solve the issue of poverty without tackling inequality.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Although the industry has encouraged entrepreneurialism we need to recognise it is also promoting risky businesses. Firstly, the individuals working in the industry are required to produce a quick turnover. The fact that no security and support is provided by the government or state means the risk of failed entrepreneurial strategies falls on the individual. The producers and directors may be forced to borrow money from loan sharks and at high interest-rates to get capital quickly; and need to be able to ensure profits are generated rapidly. Such a tenuous industry is clearly not in a position to change opinions of Africa and may instead be creating a negative perception of risk-taking and cutthroat capitalism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The issue of piracy is being tackled. Recognising the potential benefits Nollywood can bring to Nigeria and the scale of the piracy problem, investments are being made to stop piracy in the growing industry.\n\nInvestments have been proposed by the World Bank to tackle piracy, and ensure profits are not lost. Further, Nollywood UP, the Nollywood Upgrade Project, is providing funding to control piracy. Nollywood UP is improving the capacity of the innovative industry - by providing solutions for distribution and vital training in high-quality film making.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be New funding sources are emerging. The diasporic community for example are playing a central role in funding the long-term growth of the industry. Recognising potential, and being a major consumer base for the films produced, the African diaspora is investing in Nollywood.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Nollywood films are viewed globally. Channels are dedicated to the films - such as South Africa’s MultiChoice and BSkyB’s Nollywood Movies. BSkyB distributes programmes and films directly to airlines, instantly broadening the audience. Furthermore, YouTube subscribers have sought to enhance the global viewing popularity; and recently developed iROKO Partners is ensuring internet users can access Nollywood films. iROKO Partners shows the biggest markets are based in the US, UK, Canada, Italy and Germany (Kermeliotis, 2012).\n\nNew partnerships are being formed with Hollywood and global film festivals [1] , which show the future shift of broadcasting Nollywood films in cinemas. A recent film produced by Pat Nebo - ‘Dead broke’ - is set to be premiered in Lagos, Accra, and London.\n\n[1] Cannes (2013) recently showcased ‘La Pirogue’; and in the summer of 2013 France hosted its first Nollywood Week in Paris, showcasing seven of the best Nollywood films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be A new perspective, raising topical issues\n\nThe first film created in Nollywood - ‘Living in Bondage’ - raised fundamental issues concerning marriage, wealth and spirituality. The film indicates the need to be aware of cults and what they can drive individuals to do. Furthermore films such ‘Street Girls’ and ‘Mama’s Girls’ provide insight into the lives of prostitutes and the sex industry. ‘Street Girls’ is enabling awareness of why girls are forced into prostitution and why they may be forced to commit criminal offences. Poverty is identified as a key driving factor.\n\nThe range of topics covered - from immigration, women, witchcraft, corruption, terrorism, and infrastructure deficits - counteract historic silences in the public sphere. The films are raising awareness to viewers by presenting the stories in a new light - understandable, humorous, and relatable; and will encourage citizens to demand change.\n\nNollywood is showing the limits of believing in a single perspective, the Western perspective, to stories on Africa.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Encouraging film entrepreneurs\n\nThe Nollywood industry is providing solutions to pressing issues - including high rates of unemployment. The dynamic industry provides an opportunity for youths to explore interests and invest in their talents and creativity. The recognition gained for Nollywood has shown how Nigeria's youths can initiate, and develop, a sustainable industry. Rather than seeing the rising young population as a potential threat [1] , the rise of Nollywood showcases the talent of the young population and helps overthrow perceptions of Africa just being about natural resources.\n\nAdditionally, the growth of Nollywood is continuing to encourage individuals to enter the creative industry – whether to work in production, acting or distribution, the rise of Nollywood is creating an entrepreneurial spirit, drive, and motivation to create change. Individuals are no longer relying on the government or international community to provide funds, support and infrastructure, but moulding their own futures.\n\n[1] See further readings: Urdal, 2006.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Epitomising rising Africa\n\nNollywood epitomises Africa, and life in African spaces. The fast-pace nature of production shows how quickly things changes and everything is on the move. The structure of production shows the dynamic nature of everyday life, action, and flow of ideas. As Rem Koolhaas’ (2002) film documentary - Lagos - showed the congestion, informality, and buzz of the city needs to be viewed positively and a sign of entrepreneurialism. The documentary suggested African cities were setting a new trend to be followed by the West, and developing a rising economy. Africa is not simply in need of assistance, but rather a fast-pace environment that needs greater understanding.\n\nAfrica is rising [1] and Nollywood acts to reinforce this reality. With more films being produced, bigger revenues made, and new investors emerging, Nollywood shows Africa's economies are changing, growing, and emerging. Interest and collaborative investments being made by the World Bank shows the industry will continue to rise. Nollywood’s growth provides an alternative to the dominant Afro-pessimism.\n\n[1] See further readings: The Economist, 2013.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Small audience viewings\n\nIn reality, Nollywood’s audience is constrained - questioning the extent to which stereotypes can be changed. First, language acts as a barrier. 56% of Nollywood films are produced in local languages - such as Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa (UNESCO, 2009). Although English accounts for 44% of films produced, the linguistic diversity may limit who sees which film and what issues are therefore discussed. Second, a majority of the films are sold in hardcopy - whether on cassette or pirate DVDs.\n\nFinally, the industry is characterised by fast and cheap production. Quantity over quality limits popularity and audience viewings. Further, the limited attention to quality means Nollywood remains at the bottom of the global value chain for film production. It is difficult to change perceptions with poor quality films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The problem of piracy\n\nPirated copies of Nollywood films are a key issue. Piracy emerges as an issue for two key reasons. First, the lack of the lack of legal structure - the lack of formal regulation. Legal systems and strict copyright controls are needed to ensure piracy is stopped. Second, the production system is slow - therefore alternative means of production are used to meet the growing demand for films released. New methods for distribution are required.\n\nCalls have been made for the government to take action against piracy. However, with corruption prevalent little action has been made. Half of the film profits are lost through piracy (CNN, 2009), and piracy acts to reinforce the image of bad governance, and inadequate structures, within African states. The industry is being undermined and undervalued, through the piracy market, with high costs to the entrepreneurs.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Short term hype\n\nDespite the boom in Nollywood’s industry it remains hard to get investment. With funding issues prevalent the hype surrounding Nollywood is temporary.\n\nThe difficulties in getting funding, mean films produced are often safe and politically popular - aware that funds can be gained for backing. For example, the controversial film – Boko Haram – aimed to provide an alternative perspective into the Islamist extremist group. The core subject matter was to explore terrorism; however, following the controversial story and topic, marketers dropped out, fearing a political backlash. Titles had to be changed and the film adapted to be more sensitive. The ideas behind the films, and the stories told, are being altered due to funding constraints [1] . Perspectives, on and in Africa, cannot be changed if the topics raised are altered to meet sensitivity regulations. Hegemony will persist.\n\n[1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.4375
] |
[
90.3125,
91.4375,
92.875,
84.625,
86.5625,
84.75,
83.1875,
83.8125,
83.0625,
87.1875,
83.3125,
85.625
] |
Epitomising rising Africa
Nollywood epitomises Africa, and life in African spaces. The fast-pace nature of production shows how quickly things changes and everything is on the move. The structure of production shows the dynamic nature of everyday life, action, and flow of ideas. As Rem Koolhaas’ (2002) film documentary - Lagos - showed the congestion, informality, and buzz of the city needs to be viewed positively and a sign of entrepreneurialism. The documentary suggested African cities were setting a new trend to be followed by the West, and developing a rising economy. Africa is not simply in need of assistance, but rather a fast-pace environment that needs greater understanding.
Africa is rising [1] and Nollywood acts to reinforce this reality. With more films being produced, bigger revenues made, and new investors emerging, Nollywood shows Africa's economies are changing, growing, and emerging. Interest and collaborative investments being made by the World Bank shows the industry will continue to rise. Nollywood’s growth provides an alternative to the dominant Afro-pessimism.
[1] See further readings: The Economist, 2013.
|
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be First, the narrative of whether Africa is 'rising' has been debated, and requires reflection. Second, if Africa were rising will Nollywood push Nigeria to rise in the wrong direction? Nollywood is a private-sector organisation, with concentrated profits. Inequality in Nigeria has continued to rise since 1985 as shown by the GINI coefficient (Aigbokhan, 2008); and with lavish lifestyles being created for famous actresses and directors who hit ‘big money’ will Nollywood only act to benefit elites and create a new elite class? Economic growth and revenue production cannot solve the issue of poverty without tackling inequality.\n"
] |
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Fundamentally, the topics raised by Nollywood are commercialising accepted views. The industry is building a business founded on distributing images of witchcraft, abuse, and domestic violence.\n\nFirst, a majority of the films are politically incorrect and provide negative portrayals of women and sexuality. Gender roles are reinforced as women become sexualised objects, male possession, and the source of trouble - required to be put in their ‘place’. In the case of LGBT representations, homosexuality has been represented as Satanic in films such as 2010’s ‘Men in Love’ [1] . Second, in the case of witchcraft, dramas have made society more accepting of, and open to, sorcery. The films show how it remains prevalent in society and can provide a tool to access riches. With the audience interested in watching stories on witchcraft the industry is feeding such demands. Witchcraft sells; and continues to remain a prominent theme justifying why people make their decisions and action.\n\nThis is not the kind of perception change Africa needs.\n\n[1] In Nigeria homosexuality is illegal and continues to be criminalised.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Although the industry has encouraged entrepreneurialism we need to recognise it is also promoting risky businesses. Firstly, the individuals working in the industry are required to produce a quick turnover. The fact that no security and support is provided by the government or state means the risk of failed entrepreneurial strategies falls on the individual. The producers and directors may be forced to borrow money from loan sharks and at high interest-rates to get capital quickly; and need to be able to ensure profits are generated rapidly. Such a tenuous industry is clearly not in a position to change opinions of Africa and may instead be creating a negative perception of risk-taking and cutthroat capitalism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Opportunities for development are limited as the industry continues to function informally. The informal structure means there is no legal institution controlling transactions, there is no governing body ensuring taxation is paid and revenues collected, and finally, there is little security to the workers within the industry. Financial records are limited in the industry, which makes it hard to predict the developmental scope of Nollywood and the real revenues produced.\n\nInformality prevents legitimacy; capability to assist national development; and fundamental capital losses. It also prevents it becoming a force for changing perceptions of those outside Africa. Formalisation is required for the industry to assist developmental potential [1] .\n\n[1] See further readings: McCall, 2012.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The issue of piracy is being tackled. Recognising the potential benefits Nollywood can bring to Nigeria and the scale of the piracy problem, investments are being made to stop piracy in the growing industry.\n\nInvestments have been proposed by the World Bank to tackle piracy, and ensure profits are not lost. Further, Nollywood UP, the Nollywood Upgrade Project, is providing funding to control piracy. Nollywood UP is improving the capacity of the innovative industry - by providing solutions for distribution and vital training in high-quality film making.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be New funding sources are emerging. The diasporic community for example are playing a central role in funding the long-term growth of the industry. Recognising potential, and being a major consumer base for the films produced, the African diaspora is investing in Nollywood.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Nollywood films are viewed globally. Channels are dedicated to the films - such as South Africa’s MultiChoice and BSkyB’s Nollywood Movies. BSkyB distributes programmes and films directly to airlines, instantly broadening the audience. Furthermore, YouTube subscribers have sought to enhance the global viewing popularity; and recently developed iROKO Partners is ensuring internet users can access Nollywood films. iROKO Partners shows the biggest markets are based in the US, UK, Canada, Italy and Germany (Kermeliotis, 2012).\n\nNew partnerships are being formed with Hollywood and global film festivals [1] , which show the future shift of broadcasting Nollywood films in cinemas. A recent film produced by Pat Nebo - ‘Dead broke’ - is set to be premiered in Lagos, Accra, and London.\n\n[1] Cannes (2013) recently showcased ‘La Pirogue’; and in the summer of 2013 France hosted its first Nollywood Week in Paris, showcasing seven of the best Nollywood films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be A new perspective, raising topical issues\n\nThe first film created in Nollywood - ‘Living in Bondage’ - raised fundamental issues concerning marriage, wealth and spirituality. The film indicates the need to be aware of cults and what they can drive individuals to do. Furthermore films such ‘Street Girls’ and ‘Mama’s Girls’ provide insight into the lives of prostitutes and the sex industry. ‘Street Girls’ is enabling awareness of why girls are forced into prostitution and why they may be forced to commit criminal offences. Poverty is identified as a key driving factor.\n\nThe range of topics covered - from immigration, women, witchcraft, corruption, terrorism, and infrastructure deficits - counteract historic silences in the public sphere. The films are raising awareness to viewers by presenting the stories in a new light - understandable, humorous, and relatable; and will encourage citizens to demand change.\n\nNollywood is showing the limits of believing in a single perspective, the Western perspective, to stories on Africa.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Encouraging film entrepreneurs\n\nThe Nollywood industry is providing solutions to pressing issues - including high rates of unemployment. The dynamic industry provides an opportunity for youths to explore interests and invest in their talents and creativity. The recognition gained for Nollywood has shown how Nigeria's youths can initiate, and develop, a sustainable industry. Rather than seeing the rising young population as a potential threat [1] , the rise of Nollywood showcases the talent of the young population and helps overthrow perceptions of Africa just being about natural resources.\n\nAdditionally, the growth of Nollywood is continuing to encourage individuals to enter the creative industry – whether to work in production, acting or distribution, the rise of Nollywood is creating an entrepreneurial spirit, drive, and motivation to create change. Individuals are no longer relying on the government or international community to provide funds, support and infrastructure, but moulding their own futures.\n\n[1] See further readings: Urdal, 2006.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Development from within\n\nNollywood is showcasing Nigeria’s capability to sustain, build, and finance its own economy. Recent estimates suggest around 50 films are produced weekly, selling between 20,000 to 200,000 units, and creating jobs for around one million individuals (Moudio, 2013). The industry is initiating vital development, enabling Nigeria to have capital to change perceptions.\n\nNollywood is following previous cultural industry paths. Hollywood developed from low-budget films, and in 2013 the entertainment industry generated around $522bn in revenue, and is continuing to be one of America’s biggest sources of tourism (Statista, 2013). In Nollywood’s case, the industry is already proving to be of vital importance for regional and domestic tourism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Small audience viewings\n\nIn reality, Nollywood’s audience is constrained - questioning the extent to which stereotypes can be changed. First, language acts as a barrier. 56% of Nollywood films are produced in local languages - such as Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa (UNESCO, 2009). Although English accounts for 44% of films produced, the linguistic diversity may limit who sees which film and what issues are therefore discussed. Second, a majority of the films are sold in hardcopy - whether on cassette or pirate DVDs.\n\nFinally, the industry is characterised by fast and cheap production. Quantity over quality limits popularity and audience viewings. Further, the limited attention to quality means Nollywood remains at the bottom of the global value chain for film production. It is difficult to change perceptions with poor quality films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The problem of piracy\n\nPirated copies of Nollywood films are a key issue. Piracy emerges as an issue for two key reasons. First, the lack of the lack of legal structure - the lack of formal regulation. Legal systems and strict copyright controls are needed to ensure piracy is stopped. Second, the production system is slow - therefore alternative means of production are used to meet the growing demand for films released. New methods for distribution are required.\n\nCalls have been made for the government to take action against piracy. However, with corruption prevalent little action has been made. Half of the film profits are lost through piracy (CNN, 2009), and piracy acts to reinforce the image of bad governance, and inadequate structures, within African states. The industry is being undermined and undervalued, through the piracy market, with high costs to the entrepreneurs.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Short term hype\n\nDespite the boom in Nollywood’s industry it remains hard to get investment. With funding issues prevalent the hype surrounding Nollywood is temporary.\n\nThe difficulties in getting funding, mean films produced are often safe and politically popular - aware that funds can be gained for backing. For example, the controversial film – Boko Haram – aimed to provide an alternative perspective into the Islamist extremist group. The core subject matter was to explore terrorism; however, following the controversial story and topic, marketers dropped out, fearing a political backlash. Titles had to be changed and the film adapted to be more sensitive. The ideas behind the films, and the stories told, are being altered due to funding constraints [1] . Perspectives, on and in Africa, cannot be changed if the topics raised are altered to meet sensitivity regulations. Hegemony will persist.\n\n[1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.5625
] |
[
90.3125,
93.0625,
91.6875,
84.9375,
86.6875,
84.6875,
83.875,
84.0625,
83.875,
83.9375,
83.5,
88.5625
] |
Small audience viewings
In reality, Nollywood’s audience is constrained - questioning the extent to which stereotypes can be changed. First, language acts as a barrier. 56% of Nollywood films are produced in local languages - such as Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa (UNESCO, 2009). Although English accounts for 44% of films produced, the linguistic diversity may limit who sees which film and what issues are therefore discussed. Second, a majority of the films are sold in hardcopy - whether on cassette or pirate DVDs.
Finally, the industry is characterised by fast and cheap production. Quantity over quality limits popularity and audience viewings. Further, the limited attention to quality means Nollywood remains at the bottom of the global value chain for film production. It is difficult to change perceptions with poor quality films.
|
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Nollywood films are viewed globally. Channels are dedicated to the films - such as South Africa’s MultiChoice and BSkyB’s Nollywood Movies. BSkyB distributes programmes and films directly to airlines, instantly broadening the audience. Furthermore, YouTube subscribers have sought to enhance the global viewing popularity; and recently developed iROKO Partners is ensuring internet users can access Nollywood films. iROKO Partners shows the biggest markets are based in the US, UK, Canada, Italy and Germany (Kermeliotis, 2012).\n\nNew partnerships are being formed with Hollywood and global film festivals [1] , which show the future shift of broadcasting Nollywood films in cinemas. A recent film produced by Pat Nebo - ‘Dead broke’ - is set to be premiered in Lagos, Accra, and London.\n\n[1] Cannes (2013) recently showcased ‘La Pirogue’; and in the summer of 2013 France hosted its first Nollywood Week in Paris, showcasing seven of the best Nollywood films.\n"
] |
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The issue of piracy is being tackled. Recognising the potential benefits Nollywood can bring to Nigeria and the scale of the piracy problem, investments are being made to stop piracy in the growing industry.\n\nInvestments have been proposed by the World Bank to tackle piracy, and ensure profits are not lost. Further, Nollywood UP, the Nollywood Upgrade Project, is providing funding to control piracy. Nollywood UP is improving the capacity of the innovative industry - by providing solutions for distribution and vital training in high-quality film making.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be New funding sources are emerging. The diasporic community for example are playing a central role in funding the long-term growth of the industry. Recognising potential, and being a major consumer base for the films produced, the African diaspora is investing in Nollywood.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Fundamentally, the topics raised by Nollywood are commercialising accepted views. The industry is building a business founded on distributing images of witchcraft, abuse, and domestic violence.\n\nFirst, a majority of the films are politically incorrect and provide negative portrayals of women and sexuality. Gender roles are reinforced as women become sexualised objects, male possession, and the source of trouble - required to be put in their ‘place’. In the case of LGBT representations, homosexuality has been represented as Satanic in films such as 2010’s ‘Men in Love’ [1] . Second, in the case of witchcraft, dramas have made society more accepting of, and open to, sorcery. The films show how it remains prevalent in society and can provide a tool to access riches. With the audience interested in watching stories on witchcraft the industry is feeding such demands. Witchcraft sells; and continues to remain a prominent theme justifying why people make their decisions and action.\n\nThis is not the kind of perception change Africa needs.\n\n[1] In Nigeria homosexuality is illegal and continues to be criminalised.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be First, the narrative of whether Africa is 'rising' has been debated, and requires reflection. Second, if Africa were rising will Nollywood push Nigeria to rise in the wrong direction? Nollywood is a private-sector organisation, with concentrated profits. Inequality in Nigeria has continued to rise since 1985 as shown by the GINI coefficient (Aigbokhan, 2008); and with lavish lifestyles being created for famous actresses and directors who hit ‘big money’ will Nollywood only act to benefit elites and create a new elite class? Economic growth and revenue production cannot solve the issue of poverty without tackling inequality.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Although the industry has encouraged entrepreneurialism we need to recognise it is also promoting risky businesses. Firstly, the individuals working in the industry are required to produce a quick turnover. The fact that no security and support is provided by the government or state means the risk of failed entrepreneurial strategies falls on the individual. The producers and directors may be forced to borrow money from loan sharks and at high interest-rates to get capital quickly; and need to be able to ensure profits are generated rapidly. Such a tenuous industry is clearly not in a position to change opinions of Africa and may instead be creating a negative perception of risk-taking and cutthroat capitalism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Opportunities for development are limited as the industry continues to function informally. The informal structure means there is no legal institution controlling transactions, there is no governing body ensuring taxation is paid and revenues collected, and finally, there is little security to the workers within the industry. Financial records are limited in the industry, which makes it hard to predict the developmental scope of Nollywood and the real revenues produced.\n\nInformality prevents legitimacy; capability to assist national development; and fundamental capital losses. It also prevents it becoming a force for changing perceptions of those outside Africa. Formalisation is required for the industry to assist developmental potential [1] .\n\n[1] See further readings: McCall, 2012.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The problem of piracy\n\nPirated copies of Nollywood films are a key issue. Piracy emerges as an issue for two key reasons. First, the lack of the lack of legal structure - the lack of formal regulation. Legal systems and strict copyright controls are needed to ensure piracy is stopped. Second, the production system is slow - therefore alternative means of production are used to meet the growing demand for films released. New methods for distribution are required.\n\nCalls have been made for the government to take action against piracy. However, with corruption prevalent little action has been made. Half of the film profits are lost through piracy (CNN, 2009), and piracy acts to reinforce the image of bad governance, and inadequate structures, within African states. The industry is being undermined and undervalued, through the piracy market, with high costs to the entrepreneurs.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Short term hype\n\nDespite the boom in Nollywood’s industry it remains hard to get investment. With funding issues prevalent the hype surrounding Nollywood is temporary.\n\nThe difficulties in getting funding, mean films produced are often safe and politically popular - aware that funds can be gained for backing. For example, the controversial film – Boko Haram – aimed to provide an alternative perspective into the Islamist extremist group. The core subject matter was to explore terrorism; however, following the controversial story and topic, marketers dropped out, fearing a political backlash. Titles had to be changed and the film adapted to be more sensitive. The ideas behind the films, and the stories told, are being altered due to funding constraints [1] . Perspectives, on and in Africa, cannot be changed if the topics raised are altered to meet sensitivity regulations. Hegemony will persist.\n\n[1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2013.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be A new perspective, raising topical issues\n\nThe first film created in Nollywood - ‘Living in Bondage’ - raised fundamental issues concerning marriage, wealth and spirituality. The film indicates the need to be aware of cults and what they can drive individuals to do. Furthermore films such ‘Street Girls’ and ‘Mama’s Girls’ provide insight into the lives of prostitutes and the sex industry. ‘Street Girls’ is enabling awareness of why girls are forced into prostitution and why they may be forced to commit criminal offences. Poverty is identified as a key driving factor.\n\nThe range of topics covered - from immigration, women, witchcraft, corruption, terrorism, and infrastructure deficits - counteract historic silences in the public sphere. The films are raising awareness to viewers by presenting the stories in a new light - understandable, humorous, and relatable; and will encourage citizens to demand change.\n\nNollywood is showing the limits of believing in a single perspective, the Western perspective, to stories on Africa.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Encouraging film entrepreneurs\n\nThe Nollywood industry is providing solutions to pressing issues - including high rates of unemployment. The dynamic industry provides an opportunity for youths to explore interests and invest in their talents and creativity. The recognition gained for Nollywood has shown how Nigeria's youths can initiate, and develop, a sustainable industry. Rather than seeing the rising young population as a potential threat [1] , the rise of Nollywood showcases the talent of the young population and helps overthrow perceptions of Africa just being about natural resources.\n\nAdditionally, the growth of Nollywood is continuing to encourage individuals to enter the creative industry – whether to work in production, acting or distribution, the rise of Nollywood is creating an entrepreneurial spirit, drive, and motivation to create change. Individuals are no longer relying on the government or international community to provide funds, support and infrastructure, but moulding their own futures.\n\n[1] See further readings: Urdal, 2006.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Development from within\n\nNollywood is showcasing Nigeria’s capability to sustain, build, and finance its own economy. Recent estimates suggest around 50 films are produced weekly, selling between 20,000 to 200,000 units, and creating jobs for around one million individuals (Moudio, 2013). The industry is initiating vital development, enabling Nigeria to have capital to change perceptions.\n\nNollywood is following previous cultural industry paths. Hollywood developed from low-budget films, and in 2013 the entertainment industry generated around $522bn in revenue, and is continuing to be one of America’s biggest sources of tourism (Statista, 2013). In Nollywood’s case, the industry is already proving to be of vital importance for regional and domestic tourism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Epitomising rising Africa\n\nNollywood epitomises Africa, and life in African spaces. The fast-pace nature of production shows how quickly things changes and everything is on the move. The structure of production shows the dynamic nature of everyday life, action, and flow of ideas. As Rem Koolhaas’ (2002) film documentary - Lagos - showed the congestion, informality, and buzz of the city needs to be viewed positively and a sign of entrepreneurialism. The documentary suggested African cities were setting a new trend to be followed by the West, and developing a rising economy. Africa is not simply in need of assistance, but rather a fast-pace environment that needs greater understanding.\n\nAfrica is rising [1] and Nollywood acts to reinforce this reality. With more films being produced, bigger revenues made, and new investors emerging, Nollywood shows Africa's economies are changing, growing, and emerging. Interest and collaborative investments being made by the World Bank shows the industry will continue to rise. Nollywood’s growth provides an alternative to the dominant Afro-pessimism.\n\n[1] See further readings: The Economist, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.1875
] |
[
88.5,
87.8125,
85.375,
83.5,
84.75,
84.4375,
84.6875,
83.75,
83.125,
83.25,
83.625,
82.9375
] |
The problem of piracy
Pirated copies of Nollywood films are a key issue. Piracy emerges as an issue for two key reasons. First, the lack of the lack of legal structure - the lack of formal regulation. Legal systems and strict copyright controls are needed to ensure piracy is stopped. Second, the production system is slow - therefore alternative means of production are used to meet the growing demand for films released. New methods for distribution are required.
Calls have been made for the government to take action against piracy. However, with corruption prevalent little action has been made. Half of the film profits are lost through piracy (CNN, 2009), and piracy acts to reinforce the image of bad governance, and inadequate structures, within African states. The industry is being undermined and undervalued, through the piracy market, with high costs to the entrepreneurs.
|
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The issue of piracy is being tackled. Recognising the potential benefits Nollywood can bring to Nigeria and the scale of the piracy problem, investments are being made to stop piracy in the growing industry.\n\nInvestments have been proposed by the World Bank to tackle piracy, and ensure profits are not lost. Further, Nollywood UP, the Nollywood Upgrade Project, is providing funding to control piracy. Nollywood UP is improving the capacity of the innovative industry - by providing solutions for distribution and vital training in high-quality film making.\n"
] |
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be New funding sources are emerging. The diasporic community for example are playing a central role in funding the long-term growth of the industry. Recognising potential, and being a major consumer base for the films produced, the African diaspora is investing in Nollywood.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Nollywood films are viewed globally. Channels are dedicated to the films - such as South Africa’s MultiChoice and BSkyB’s Nollywood Movies. BSkyB distributes programmes and films directly to airlines, instantly broadening the audience. Furthermore, YouTube subscribers have sought to enhance the global viewing popularity; and recently developed iROKO Partners is ensuring internet users can access Nollywood films. iROKO Partners shows the biggest markets are based in the US, UK, Canada, Italy and Germany (Kermeliotis, 2012).\n\nNew partnerships are being formed with Hollywood and global film festivals [1] , which show the future shift of broadcasting Nollywood films in cinemas. A recent film produced by Pat Nebo - ‘Dead broke’ - is set to be premiered in Lagos, Accra, and London.\n\n[1] Cannes (2013) recently showcased ‘La Pirogue’; and in the summer of 2013 France hosted its first Nollywood Week in Paris, showcasing seven of the best Nollywood films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Fundamentally, the topics raised by Nollywood are commercialising accepted views. The industry is building a business founded on distributing images of witchcraft, abuse, and domestic violence.\n\nFirst, a majority of the films are politically incorrect and provide negative portrayals of women and sexuality. Gender roles are reinforced as women become sexualised objects, male possession, and the source of trouble - required to be put in their ‘place’. In the case of LGBT representations, homosexuality has been represented as Satanic in films such as 2010’s ‘Men in Love’ [1] . Second, in the case of witchcraft, dramas have made society more accepting of, and open to, sorcery. The films show how it remains prevalent in society and can provide a tool to access riches. With the audience interested in watching stories on witchcraft the industry is feeding such demands. Witchcraft sells; and continues to remain a prominent theme justifying why people make their decisions and action.\n\nThis is not the kind of perception change Africa needs.\n\n[1] In Nigeria homosexuality is illegal and continues to be criminalised.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be First, the narrative of whether Africa is 'rising' has been debated, and requires reflection. Second, if Africa were rising will Nollywood push Nigeria to rise in the wrong direction? Nollywood is a private-sector organisation, with concentrated profits. Inequality in Nigeria has continued to rise since 1985 as shown by the GINI coefficient (Aigbokhan, 2008); and with lavish lifestyles being created for famous actresses and directors who hit ‘big money’ will Nollywood only act to benefit elites and create a new elite class? Economic growth and revenue production cannot solve the issue of poverty without tackling inequality.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Although the industry has encouraged entrepreneurialism we need to recognise it is also promoting risky businesses. Firstly, the individuals working in the industry are required to produce a quick turnover. The fact that no security and support is provided by the government or state means the risk of failed entrepreneurial strategies falls on the individual. The producers and directors may be forced to borrow money from loan sharks and at high interest-rates to get capital quickly; and need to be able to ensure profits are generated rapidly. Such a tenuous industry is clearly not in a position to change opinions of Africa and may instead be creating a negative perception of risk-taking and cutthroat capitalism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Opportunities for development are limited as the industry continues to function informally. The informal structure means there is no legal institution controlling transactions, there is no governing body ensuring taxation is paid and revenues collected, and finally, there is little security to the workers within the industry. Financial records are limited in the industry, which makes it hard to predict the developmental scope of Nollywood and the real revenues produced.\n\nInformality prevents legitimacy; capability to assist national development; and fundamental capital losses. It also prevents it becoming a force for changing perceptions of those outside Africa. Formalisation is required for the industry to assist developmental potential [1] .\n\n[1] See further readings: McCall, 2012.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Small audience viewings\n\nIn reality, Nollywood’s audience is constrained - questioning the extent to which stereotypes can be changed. First, language acts as a barrier. 56% of Nollywood films are produced in local languages - such as Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa (UNESCO, 2009). Although English accounts for 44% of films produced, the linguistic diversity may limit who sees which film and what issues are therefore discussed. Second, a majority of the films are sold in hardcopy - whether on cassette or pirate DVDs.\n\nFinally, the industry is characterised by fast and cheap production. Quantity over quality limits popularity and audience viewings. Further, the limited attention to quality means Nollywood remains at the bottom of the global value chain for film production. It is difficult to change perceptions with poor quality films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Short term hype\n\nDespite the boom in Nollywood’s industry it remains hard to get investment. With funding issues prevalent the hype surrounding Nollywood is temporary.\n\nThe difficulties in getting funding, mean films produced are often safe and politically popular - aware that funds can be gained for backing. For example, the controversial film – Boko Haram – aimed to provide an alternative perspective into the Islamist extremist group. The core subject matter was to explore terrorism; however, following the controversial story and topic, marketers dropped out, fearing a political backlash. Titles had to be changed and the film adapted to be more sensitive. The ideas behind the films, and the stories told, are being altered due to funding constraints [1] . Perspectives, on and in Africa, cannot be changed if the topics raised are altered to meet sensitivity regulations. Hegemony will persist.\n\n[1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2013.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be A new perspective, raising topical issues\n\nThe first film created in Nollywood - ‘Living in Bondage’ - raised fundamental issues concerning marriage, wealth and spirituality. The film indicates the need to be aware of cults and what they can drive individuals to do. Furthermore films such ‘Street Girls’ and ‘Mama’s Girls’ provide insight into the lives of prostitutes and the sex industry. ‘Street Girls’ is enabling awareness of why girls are forced into prostitution and why they may be forced to commit criminal offences. Poverty is identified as a key driving factor.\n\nThe range of topics covered - from immigration, women, witchcraft, corruption, terrorism, and infrastructure deficits - counteract historic silences in the public sphere. The films are raising awareness to viewers by presenting the stories in a new light - understandable, humorous, and relatable; and will encourage citizens to demand change.\n\nNollywood is showing the limits of believing in a single perspective, the Western perspective, to stories on Africa.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Encouraging film entrepreneurs\n\nThe Nollywood industry is providing solutions to pressing issues - including high rates of unemployment. The dynamic industry provides an opportunity for youths to explore interests and invest in their talents and creativity. The recognition gained for Nollywood has shown how Nigeria's youths can initiate, and develop, a sustainable industry. Rather than seeing the rising young population as a potential threat [1] , the rise of Nollywood showcases the talent of the young population and helps overthrow perceptions of Africa just being about natural resources.\n\nAdditionally, the growth of Nollywood is continuing to encourage individuals to enter the creative industry – whether to work in production, acting or distribution, the rise of Nollywood is creating an entrepreneurial spirit, drive, and motivation to create change. Individuals are no longer relying on the government or international community to provide funds, support and infrastructure, but moulding their own futures.\n\n[1] See further readings: Urdal, 2006.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Development from within\n\nNollywood is showcasing Nigeria’s capability to sustain, build, and finance its own economy. Recent estimates suggest around 50 films are produced weekly, selling between 20,000 to 200,000 units, and creating jobs for around one million individuals (Moudio, 2013). The industry is initiating vital development, enabling Nigeria to have capital to change perceptions.\n\nNollywood is following previous cultural industry paths. Hollywood developed from low-budget films, and in 2013 the entertainment industry generated around $522bn in revenue, and is continuing to be one of America’s biggest sources of tourism (Statista, 2013). In Nollywood’s case, the industry is already proving to be of vital importance for regional and domestic tourism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Epitomising rising Africa\n\nNollywood epitomises Africa, and life in African spaces. The fast-pace nature of production shows how quickly things changes and everything is on the move. The structure of production shows the dynamic nature of everyday life, action, and flow of ideas. As Rem Koolhaas’ (2002) film documentary - Lagos - showed the congestion, informality, and buzz of the city needs to be viewed positively and a sign of entrepreneurialism. The documentary suggested African cities were setting a new trend to be followed by the West, and developing a rising economy. Africa is not simply in need of assistance, but rather a fast-pace environment that needs greater understanding.\n\nAfrica is rising [1] and Nollywood acts to reinforce this reality. With more films being produced, bigger revenues made, and new investors emerging, Nollywood shows Africa's economies are changing, growing, and emerging. Interest and collaborative investments being made by the World Bank shows the industry will continue to rise. Nollywood’s growth provides an alternative to the dominant Afro-pessimism.\n\n[1] See further readings: The Economist, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94
] |
[
86.4375,
85.25,
84.4375,
84.1875,
86,
85.1875,
83.4375,
83.4375,
83.1875,
83.375,
83,
83.3125
] |
Short term hype
Despite the boom in Nollywood’s industry it remains hard to get investment. With funding issues prevalent the hype surrounding Nollywood is temporary.
The difficulties in getting funding, mean films produced are often safe and politically popular - aware that funds can be gained for backing. For example, the controversial film – Boko Haram – aimed to provide an alternative perspective into the Islamist extremist group. The core subject matter was to explore terrorism; however, following the controversial story and topic, marketers dropped out, fearing a political backlash. Titles had to be changed and the film adapted to be more sensitive. The ideas behind the films, and the stories told, are being altered due to funding constraints [1] . Perspectives, on and in Africa, cannot be changed if the topics raised are altered to meet sensitivity regulations. Hegemony will persist.
[1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2013.
|
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be New funding sources are emerging. The diasporic community for example are playing a central role in funding the long-term growth of the industry. Recognising potential, and being a major consumer base for the films produced, the African diaspora is investing in Nollywood.\n"
] |
[
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The issue of piracy is being tackled. Recognising the potential benefits Nollywood can bring to Nigeria and the scale of the piracy problem, investments are being made to stop piracy in the growing industry.\n\nInvestments have been proposed by the World Bank to tackle piracy, and ensure profits are not lost. Further, Nollywood UP, the Nollywood Upgrade Project, is providing funding to control piracy. Nollywood UP is improving the capacity of the innovative industry - by providing solutions for distribution and vital training in high-quality film making.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Nollywood films are viewed globally. Channels are dedicated to the films - such as South Africa’s MultiChoice and BSkyB’s Nollywood Movies. BSkyB distributes programmes and films directly to airlines, instantly broadening the audience. Furthermore, YouTube subscribers have sought to enhance the global viewing popularity; and recently developed iROKO Partners is ensuring internet users can access Nollywood films. iROKO Partners shows the biggest markets are based in the US, UK, Canada, Italy and Germany (Kermeliotis, 2012).\n\nNew partnerships are being formed with Hollywood and global film festivals [1] , which show the future shift of broadcasting Nollywood films in cinemas. A recent film produced by Pat Nebo - ‘Dead broke’ - is set to be premiered in Lagos, Accra, and London.\n\n[1] Cannes (2013) recently showcased ‘La Pirogue’; and in the summer of 2013 France hosted its first Nollywood Week in Paris, showcasing seven of the best Nollywood films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Fundamentally, the topics raised by Nollywood are commercialising accepted views. The industry is building a business founded on distributing images of witchcraft, abuse, and domestic violence.\n\nFirst, a majority of the films are politically incorrect and provide negative portrayals of women and sexuality. Gender roles are reinforced as women become sexualised objects, male possession, and the source of trouble - required to be put in their ‘place’. In the case of LGBT representations, homosexuality has been represented as Satanic in films such as 2010’s ‘Men in Love’ [1] . Second, in the case of witchcraft, dramas have made society more accepting of, and open to, sorcery. The films show how it remains prevalent in society and can provide a tool to access riches. With the audience interested in watching stories on witchcraft the industry is feeding such demands. Witchcraft sells; and continues to remain a prominent theme justifying why people make their decisions and action.\n\nThis is not the kind of perception change Africa needs.\n\n[1] In Nigeria homosexuality is illegal and continues to be criminalised.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be First, the narrative of whether Africa is 'rising' has been debated, and requires reflection. Second, if Africa were rising will Nollywood push Nigeria to rise in the wrong direction? Nollywood is a private-sector organisation, with concentrated profits. Inequality in Nigeria has continued to rise since 1985 as shown by the GINI coefficient (Aigbokhan, 2008); and with lavish lifestyles being created for famous actresses and directors who hit ‘big money’ will Nollywood only act to benefit elites and create a new elite class? Economic growth and revenue production cannot solve the issue of poverty without tackling inequality.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Although the industry has encouraged entrepreneurialism we need to recognise it is also promoting risky businesses. Firstly, the individuals working in the industry are required to produce a quick turnover. The fact that no security and support is provided by the government or state means the risk of failed entrepreneurial strategies falls on the individual. The producers and directors may be forced to borrow money from loan sharks and at high interest-rates to get capital quickly; and need to be able to ensure profits are generated rapidly. Such a tenuous industry is clearly not in a position to change opinions of Africa and may instead be creating a negative perception of risk-taking and cutthroat capitalism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Opportunities for development are limited as the industry continues to function informally. The informal structure means there is no legal institution controlling transactions, there is no governing body ensuring taxation is paid and revenues collected, and finally, there is little security to the workers within the industry. Financial records are limited in the industry, which makes it hard to predict the developmental scope of Nollywood and the real revenues produced.\n\nInformality prevents legitimacy; capability to assist national development; and fundamental capital losses. It also prevents it becoming a force for changing perceptions of those outside Africa. Formalisation is required for the industry to assist developmental potential [1] .\n\n[1] See further readings: McCall, 2012.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Small audience viewings\n\nIn reality, Nollywood’s audience is constrained - questioning the extent to which stereotypes can be changed. First, language acts as a barrier. 56% of Nollywood films are produced in local languages - such as Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa (UNESCO, 2009). Although English accounts for 44% of films produced, the linguistic diversity may limit who sees which film and what issues are therefore discussed. Second, a majority of the films are sold in hardcopy - whether on cassette or pirate DVDs.\n\nFinally, the industry is characterised by fast and cheap production. Quantity over quality limits popularity and audience viewings. Further, the limited attention to quality means Nollywood remains at the bottom of the global value chain for film production. It is difficult to change perceptions with poor quality films.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be The problem of piracy\n\nPirated copies of Nollywood films are a key issue. Piracy emerges as an issue for two key reasons. First, the lack of the lack of legal structure - the lack of formal regulation. Legal systems and strict copyright controls are needed to ensure piracy is stopped. Second, the production system is slow - therefore alternative means of production are used to meet the growing demand for films released. New methods for distribution are required.\n\nCalls have been made for the government to take action against piracy. However, with corruption prevalent little action has been made. Half of the film profits are lost through piracy (CNN, 2009), and piracy acts to reinforce the image of bad governance, and inadequate structures, within African states. The industry is being undermined and undervalued, through the piracy market, with high costs to the entrepreneurs.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be A new perspective, raising topical issues\n\nThe first film created in Nollywood - ‘Living in Bondage’ - raised fundamental issues concerning marriage, wealth and spirituality. The film indicates the need to be aware of cults and what they can drive individuals to do. Furthermore films such ‘Street Girls’ and ‘Mama’s Girls’ provide insight into the lives of prostitutes and the sex industry. ‘Street Girls’ is enabling awareness of why girls are forced into prostitution and why they may be forced to commit criminal offences. Poverty is identified as a key driving factor.\n\nThe range of topics covered - from immigration, women, witchcraft, corruption, terrorism, and infrastructure deficits - counteract historic silences in the public sphere. The films are raising awareness to viewers by presenting the stories in a new light - understandable, humorous, and relatable; and will encourage citizens to demand change.\n\nNollywood is showing the limits of believing in a single perspective, the Western perspective, to stories on Africa.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Encouraging film entrepreneurs\n\nThe Nollywood industry is providing solutions to pressing issues - including high rates of unemployment. The dynamic industry provides an opportunity for youths to explore interests and invest in their talents and creativity. The recognition gained for Nollywood has shown how Nigeria's youths can initiate, and develop, a sustainable industry. Rather than seeing the rising young population as a potential threat [1] , the rise of Nollywood showcases the talent of the young population and helps overthrow perceptions of Africa just being about natural resources.\n\nAdditionally, the growth of Nollywood is continuing to encourage individuals to enter the creative industry – whether to work in production, acting or distribution, the rise of Nollywood is creating an entrepreneurial spirit, drive, and motivation to create change. Individuals are no longer relying on the government or international community to provide funds, support and infrastructure, but moulding their own futures.\n\n[1] See further readings: Urdal, 2006.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Development from within\n\nNollywood is showcasing Nigeria’s capability to sustain, build, and finance its own economy. Recent estimates suggest around 50 films are produced weekly, selling between 20,000 to 200,000 units, and creating jobs for around one million individuals (Moudio, 2013). The industry is initiating vital development, enabling Nigeria to have capital to change perceptions.\n\nNollywood is following previous cultural industry paths. Hollywood developed from low-budget films, and in 2013 the entertainment industry generated around $522bn in revenue, and is continuing to be one of America’s biggest sources of tourism (Statista, 2013). In Nollywood’s case, the industry is already proving to be of vital importance for regional and domestic tourism.\n",
"modern culture international africa house believes nollywood could be Epitomising rising Africa\n\nNollywood epitomises Africa, and life in African spaces. The fast-pace nature of production shows how quickly things changes and everything is on the move. The structure of production shows the dynamic nature of everyday life, action, and flow of ideas. As Rem Koolhaas’ (2002) film documentary - Lagos - showed the congestion, informality, and buzz of the city needs to be viewed positively and a sign of entrepreneurialism. The documentary suggested African cities were setting a new trend to be followed by the West, and developing a rising economy. Africa is not simply in need of assistance, but rather a fast-pace environment that needs greater understanding.\n\nAfrica is rising [1] and Nollywood acts to reinforce this reality. With more films being produced, bigger revenues made, and new investors emerging, Nollywood shows Africa's economies are changing, growing, and emerging. Interest and collaborative investments being made by the World Bank shows the industry will continue to rise. Nollywood’s growth provides an alternative to the dominant Afro-pessimism.\n\n[1] See further readings: The Economist, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.625
] |
[
88,
84.9375,
86,
83.3125,
85.9375,
83.5625,
83.75,
82.6875,
85.25,
83.625,
83.125,
83.6875
] |
Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.
Due to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.
Second, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.
[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
96.4375
] |
[
86.625,
92,
85.625,
86.5,
85.3125,
85.0625,
85.5625,
84.5625,
87.625,
84.5,
83.875,
84.5625,
83.875,
84.9375,
84.3125,
87.5,
88.5625,
88.25
] |
Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.
Giving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.6875
] |
[
85.5,
92,
85.25,
85.9375,
85.375,
85.125,
84.0625,
83.375,
87.3125,
84.5,
83.9375,
84.3125,
84.75,
83.625,
83.625,
86.4375,
85.4375,
84.4375
] |
Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.
Access to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]
In the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.
[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
96.3125
] |
[
85.875,
86.0625,
89.0625,
85.375,
84.75,
84.875,
87.5,
83.5625,
87.1875,
84,
83.8125,
83.8125,
83.1875,
83.875,
84.75,
87,
88.375,
89.625
] |
Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.
Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.
In the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.
[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.5625
] |
[
88.8125,
91.875,
92.4375,
84.6875,
85.0625,
85.75,
84.375,
84.1875,
89.375,
84.9375,
85.0625,
84.4375,
85.0625,
83.4375,
84.75,
85.125,
89.1875,
84.75
] |
Land titles will help end violence against women.
One of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.
Additionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.
[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.
[2] Sweetman, 2008.
[3] Migiro, 2013.
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.6875
] |
[
85.75,
87.0625,
83.9375,
85.1875,
84.25,
85.4375,
83.75,
83.8125,
88,
83.5625,
84.3125,
83.1875,
83.875,
83.125,
83.375,
85.9375,
84.0625,
84.5625
] |
Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.
Land title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.
[1] Lemanski, 2010.
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
91.1875
] |
[
84.25,
84.9375,
84.8125,
84.5625,
84.9375,
83.375,
84.5,
85.0625,
84.125,
82.375,
84.625,
83.5,
83.3125,
84.75,
84.0625,
83.125,
82.6875,
82.5625
] |
Land titles are not affordable to poor women
The cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.
Cheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.
[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.
[2] Frederikse 2011
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94
] |
[
85.5625,
90.1875,
89.8125,
90.6875,
85.125,
84.6875,
84.5625,
84.8125,
88.25,
83.9375,
84.375,
84.875,
85.75,
86.25,
85.9375,
87.1875,
85.5,
84.375
] |
Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.
About 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.
[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
93.4375
] |
[
87.75,
86.5625,
87,
88.8125,
84.375,
84.75,
84.125,
84.0625,
85.3125,
83.8125,
83.25,
83.75,
83.9375,
84.75,
84.8125,
84.4375,
84,
84.1875
] |
Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.
On the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.
On another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titling will increase female poverty.\n\nTitles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.\n\n[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.1875
] |
[
85.75,
84.75,
83.875,
89.4375,
85.625,
83.9375,
84.625,
84.125,
86.3125,
83.8125,
83.0625,
84,
83.9375,
85.0625,
84.3125,
84.6875,
83.6875,
83.4375
] |
Land titling will increase female poverty.
Titles provide a path for the state to gain, and mobilise, resources - such as taxation. Therefore the provision of land titles to women will mean they are forced to pay taxes (including land tax and additional government taxes). Such a reality has major consequences for single female-headed households who represent a disproportionate number of the poor [1] . Increased expenses will impact multiple dimensions of their livelihoods.
[1] For debates on Female-Headed Households in Africa as the ‘poorest of the poor’ see further readings: Chant, 2007.
|
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Female-headed households are not the poorest of the poor, and taxation is required. Taxation is vital resource to enable the government to mobilise key services and as a redistributive tool. By developing an effective functioning taxation system, social policies can be put on the agenda in Africa - providing social support and security to those in need.\n\nHaving access to titles will reduce poverty by encouraging entrepreneurialism, productive use of land, security, better health, and opportunity to enter property markets.\n"
] |
[
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The possession of a formally recognised entitlement to land presents a win-win scenario - being an indicator of good governance and enabling the promotion of good governance. Land titles represent an effective economic institution in society, of which enables democratic, political institutions, such as an accountable state. Land titles mean corruption and rent-seeking behaviour can be monitored.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Renting holds fewer benefits for women than ownership. For empowerment more women need to become home, and landowners. The provision of land titles to women means they have a sense of stability. In the case of Johannesburg, South Africa, a majority of young, female renters engage in different forms of transactional sex due to the expense of renting [1] . Equality in land titling will ensure women are able to save and seek safer livelihood options.\n\n[1] See further readings: Action Aid, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Programmes implemented have taken action to reduce costs. The recent government program in Ethiopia has been government-sponsored and used a participatory model to ensure affordability across a large-scale.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Real empowerment needs to enable strategic, and practical, gender needs (Moser, 1989). Land titling for women enables women to change their position in society and thus how they are viewed by the state and communities. Having a land title means women in high-risk areas can demand changes to be made by the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Although titles may initiate slum upgrading the quality and time-scale of services provided remains questionable. Services can be of poor-quality as states rush to meet demands, and the area whereby women are given titles may remain unsafe and unhealthy spaces. Titling therefore does not fundamentally improve, or provide, services and infrastructure.\n\nFurther, women are given the burden (time and physical) of building decent homes. The provision of land titling transfers responsibility from the state to women.\n\nIn many cases across Africa land is not owned by the state, but rather private actors and international organisations. Such realities have implications in whether women are able to invest in, and build, homes as land titles need to be respected, and recognised, by multiple actors not only the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Having rights does not ensure there will be an awareness of how to use rights and education on what such rights do. To ensure land titles contribute to promoting gender equalities women, and girls, need to be made aware of the meaning of rights and how to use them. Land titles are not the means of providing inter-generational equality, but rather one piece of the puzzle. To ensure equality education and awareness is required.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house The case of Kenya is not representative of evidence across all African nations. In Rwanda, where post-conflict recovery has put gender equality as a fundamental objective, underlying tensions are emerging. Land titles have been distributed to women however male counterparts are beginning to raise doubts over the extent of gender 'equality', arguing policies reflect a gender bias in favour of women. [1]\n\nIn societies where women live in a ‘man’s world’ land titles are not the means of safety and security. Rape, harassment, and abuse occur in public spaces across cities, due to fear, police relations, and social acceptance.\n\n[1] Bikorimana, 2012.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Are women really able to access credit and finance, and should they be able to enter such markets if there is an inability to return payments or get equal profits? Accessing credit with a high interest rate may put women are greater risk. We need to think about the credit lenders, what they charge, and if it can be paid back. Women may be less willing to use their primary asset to gain credit due to the potential risk of loss.\n\nStudies in Madagascar [1] have shown limited differences in the degree of plot investment on land whereby titles were held, or not. The provision of a title has minimal impact in the case of rural Madagascar, suggesting women will be no more ‘entrepreneurial’ than initially believed [2] . Land speculation may become more of a concern with the provision of titles, as land is believed to be of value and thus occupied, but with minimal investments made.\n\n[1] Jacoby and Minten, 2007.\n\n[2] See further readings: Fenske, 2011.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are being granted in high-risk areas.\n\nLand title provision for women across Africa is occurring in informal settlements and slums - therefore the question is whether titles provide an ability to relocate through the property market. First, land titles in the case of South Africa have left inhabitants stuck on the lower-end of the property market [1] . Lemanski (2010) shows homeownership, in Cape Town, does not bring the hoped for financial return. Low-income households are unable to trade their asset (land or home) due to low returns, preventing movement into upgraded houses and areas. Second, dangers emerge as to the degree of future sustainability when considering climate change and the hazardous nature of environments. In Mathare slum, Kenya, landslides are a frequent occurrence. The provision of titles in such areas does not have sustainable.\n\n[1] Lemanski, 2010.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles are not affordable to poor women\n\nThe cost of obtaining land titles is higher than the benefits sought. Research has shown that although there is a desire, by women, to obtain land titles the reality is land titles remain unaffordable. To empower land titles need to be more affordable to include a diverse range of women able to obtain titles and rights [1] . Having expensive titles limits empowerment to the comparatively wealthy. To make matters worse the provision of titles increases the burden on women - introducing additional costs, time commitments, and worries on top of normal activities.\n\nCheaper, and more effective, alternatives are available to provide rights and security of tenure for women. For example Toulmin (2009) emphasises the potential role of using local institutions to register rights. Community organisations, for saving (etc) as in South Africa which prevent the need to go to loan sharks, are a positive alternative to empower women. [2] For real empowerment women need to be included in the process of designing land titles.\n\n[1] See further readings for the case of Dar-es-Salaam: Ayalew et al, 2013.\n\n[2] Frederikse 2011\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles do not solve the main issue for women - rental markets.\n\nAbout 50% of the poor across Africa, including women, used rental accommodation [1] , many are landless. Although it remains debatable as to whether women enter the rental market by choice or not, renting has been noted to provide a greater degree of flexibility. Renting provides flexibility to relocate and manage finances effectively over a short-term. Land titles may therefore increase immobility to those using the rental markets; and enable landlords to raise prices of renting. Titles don’t help those who rent.\n\n[1] Edwards, 1990, p.255\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles, and markets, in Africa remain corrupt.\n\nOn the one hand, land titles do not provide increased tenure security for women and will legitimise gentrification. In urban areas, if women are granted rights over a desired plot of land holding titles may be more of a curse. Poor women may be forced, and enticed, to sell their homes at prices under their market value. Titles often results in urban gentrification, as the spaces become legally mapped and property markets work for the elite.\n\nOn another hand, land titles in African states are based on bad governance, rent-seeking, and corrupt desires. The idea land titles will provide empowerment, security and poverty reduction is based on a Western model of the state. However, the boundary between what is legal and illegal in African states remains less clear-cut. The case of Zimbabwe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (‘Restore Order’) in 2005 is a case in point. Mass evictions occurred despite the homes being classified as ‘legal’ and titles being held. Livelihoods were destroyed as a result. The ability for land titles to empower in a repressive or mercurial state is questionable. Propositions for land titling are based on inadequate blueprints and ideas of the state.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles mean single women can build decent homes.\n\nDue to a lack of access to formal titling women have been pushed into acquiring, and living in, slums [1] . Land titling programmes benefit slum dwellers and inhabitants living in informal housing across African cities. Titles for women mean a sense of security to inhabit space is provided; and women will be encouraged to invest in their land. Titling provision has resulted in slum upgrading, investing in changing the structure of urban Africa.\n\nSecond, being recognised as title holders means women are able to demand new services - such as access to water, sanitation, and lights. Such demand will ensure improved health for women. Women are able to use the law to interact with the state and change their future by demanding crucial services.\n\n[1] Slums are officially defined as a group of individuals living in a household which lacks safe housing, sufficient living space, access to water, adequate sanitation, and/or security of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles for women today will provide inter-generational equalities for the future.\n\nGiving women the right to land will provide the path for gender equality in the present and future. Girls will be granted equal access rights to family land and inheritance in the future, and decisions around marriage dowry can be changed.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will develop entrepreneurial women.\n\nAccess to titles is a means of poverty alleviation for female-headed households and women. Having recognised land rights means first, their land becomes exchangeable and profits can be gained through different strategies. Second, women are able to access credit and finance with the granting of a formal land title. Women are able to become entrepreneurs establishing businesses, agricultural cultivation, and the ability to sell property and land. Such investments have positive benefits for the whole economy. For example by encouraging crop cultivation to small-scale farmers food security can be provided, and the agrarian market revitalised. [1]\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the economy remains highly dependent on agricultural production. The security land titles provides has encouraged agricultural cultivation to women nationwide. Women are able to build a new food market and earn an income to sustain their livelihoods.\n\n[1] See further readings: Oseni, 2013.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles provide a voice in the legal system.\n\nLand titles mean women will be recognised as citizens, with rights. Women will be included in the system of justice and their rights to occupy, build, and use, land, recognised. Titles will provide bottom-up empowerment. A physical and psychological sense of security will be provided; and a sense of social belonging, and place, is enabled. Legal security has benefits for health (mental and physical) and reduces risk. For example, access to titles will reduce the vulnerability of women to ‘property grabbing’.\n\nIn the case of Ethiopia, the introduction of joint land-titling and household registration in 2003 [1] has been shown to have changed women’s perception of tenure security. Previously, the prevalence of polygamous relationships meant only the first wife was granted legal rights and recognition, leaving other wives and households without rights to land. The provision of land titles ensures women equal security within a legal framework. Women are entitled to rights; and titles provide the security to use the legal system.\n\n[1] The Joint titling program in Ethiopia was a implemented as a partnership between the government and World Bank, see further readings: Girma and Giovarelli, 2013; Barne, 2010; and Deninger, 2008.\n",
"ic policy international africa society gender family immigration house Land titles will help end violence against women.\n\nOne of the main forms of gender-based violence includes violent acts carried out by husbands or partners [1] . Evidence shows the provision of land titles reduce risks to female health and vulnerabilities to violence. Women become accepted as, and confident, decision makers within their homes as titling redistributes power within households. Furthermore possessing a land title enables safer sexual relations by offering legal protection. Research in Kenya has shown titles will reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS and rape [2] . Due to gender norms widows are forced into traditional ‘cleansing’ rituals, rape and forced marriage, in order to hold onto physical assets and inherit their rightful land from in-laws. Land titles are therefore a means of tackling gender discrimination and providing freedom of choice on how women can act. Women are less likely to be forced into unsafe sex, following the death of their husband or divorce, to occupy the land.\n\nAdditionally, returning to the case of Kenya, FIDA have reported how a woman's choice to divorce her partner often leaves many property-less [3] . Women may be more likely to remain in an unhappy, dangerous, marriage without changes in property legal systems.\n\n[1] Defined by WHO, 2013.\n\n[2] Sweetman, 2008.\n\n[3] Migiro, 2013.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
97.4375
] |
[
85.9375,
88,
90.875,
89.75,
84.6875,
84.1875,
83.875,
83.9375,
86.6875,
82.9375,
83.75,
83.9375,
84,
85.5,
85.1875,
89.5625,
84.3125,
83.875
] |
Focusing on the leaders of good governance
Previous winners - such as Nelson Mandela and Pedro Pires - made significant changes to their nation-states, ending apartheid and promoting social development. The former leaders provided equality and a functioning democracy to their people. Such needs to be the aim of leaders today.
Providing a prize to the highest achievers provides an example. It highlights leaders from even small countries – such as Cape Verde’s Pires – that can serve as role models for Africa’s leaders. Without the prize the most likely role models would simply be those of the biggest states who are highest profile. Mo Ibrahim (2013) has stated the prize is for “excellence, it’s not a pension”. This is why it is not always awarded. The prize is only be awarded when high-standards of good governance are replicated, and maintained, by leaders. Focusing on the top of government encourages a top down implementation of good government. When the leader acts others will follow; a comparatively small amount of money can therefore make a big difference.
|
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize is too narrowly defined. At what scale should the change be defined? For example civil-society and community leaders can make significant changes to governance at a smaller-scale; promoting democratic governance from a bottom-up initiative can work as well as top down. On another hand, should we only be focusing on the very top? What about the government officials who are not heads of state but make a change to people’s lives? The narrow focus on the head of a party or state neglects the body - such as finance ministers - that maintains that system of governance and work hard to ensure a democratic transition. The focus on heads of state may deter the state body from ensuring effective governance due to the fact their hard work is not rewarded or recognised.\n\nDue to the relatively young nature of democracy and multi-party rule across Africa, the criteria of potential prize candidates needs to be expanded. The number of former heads of states having left in the past three years is small. Therefore the criteria for nomination needs to change.\n"
] |
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Although the prize has gained recognition in the Western world or ‘Global North’ to what extent is the prize, its reward, and meaning, known and understood by African citizens? If the prize is recognising African leadership citizens need to be aware of the prize in the first place - whether their country is up for nomination or not. Awareness is the only way the apparent transparency can hold power and become a reality. Citizens cannot demand change or hold the state to account when they are not aware of the index, the prize, and the so-called changes being made.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize by focusing on leaders ignores the areas where money is needed; not lining already rich people’s pockets but providing money and advice to actually set up these institutions. This means for example ensuring the police and civil servants are well enough paid they don’t resort to corruption etc. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) highlight that there is also a ‘vicious cycle’ whereby the presence of bad institutions - authoritarian, unaccountable, with limited economic innovations - reinforce poverty and bad governance. Although offering rewards where significant change has happened is a positive model, in reality, many African states require funds to be able to enforce change in the first place and break this vicious cycle.\n\nFor good governance to be promoted rewards should not only go to the best, but also the good in a continent where bad governance dominates. For any progress to be made in governance the prize needs to lower standards of expectation, recognise where improvements are made, and use the reward to change the vicious cycle. Some change is better than none; focusing on picking the best with high standards limits any change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo One of the criteria for awarding the prize is ‘demonstrated exceptional leadership’. This clearly allows the IIAG to be fed into the process as it is the IIAG that can show if the leader being considered has demonstrated this leadership. The IIAG provides a useful tool to assist in deciding the prize winner, and nominees.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo It is not contradictory to offer a reward for good governance after the leader has left office. Dictators holding onto power for long periods are one of Africa’s biggest problems. Rewarding those who step aside shows that an important part of good governance is having presidents who stick to constitutional terms. A stable transfer of power is vital in a democracy. This is something that is even more important when the transfer is to a political opponent. One of the most important advances in governance that can be made is to make be considered normal that the opposition is as loyal to the country as the government. When this happens power can easily be transferred without conflict or resulting disorder.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The committee nominating, and choosing, the final candidates remains un-bias and their expertise within multiple aspects of governance means the high standards can be maintained. Having votes would open the prize up to corruption and attempts to influence the outcome by those who are eligible. A technocratic standard is needed for good governance.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The reward is an incentive, not a bribe; consider it as being similar to performance related pay. The prize shows how if excellent leadership is promoted and good governance encouraged the leaders will be praised, recognised and rewarded. The prize is not a bribe, but a way of incentivising leaders to follow a path towards good governance. By highlighting cases where good governance has excelled the prize draws attention to the benefits of good governance through a cost-benefit appraisal. The social, economic, and political returns are highlighted; and other African governments encouraged to follow the trend.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Transparency\n\nThe prize is helping citizens to be aware of good governance, and bad, occurring within their state. By granting the prize citizens are shown what leaders have done right; and the publication of the index - the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) - shows where improvement may be required. The prize is forcing transparency between governments and society. Information on how states are doing means citizens can take action, and demand change where change is needed. The prize is calling for African citizens to get the leadership they deserved, desired, and have a right to.\n\nBy maintaining strict standards on when, and to whom, the reward is provided gives a realistic picture of governance in Africa. It showcases the continued need for good governance; and also doesn’t give citizens and the international community a false illusion that governance is good in Africa when it is not.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Recognition when credit is due\n\nThe past few years have seen African governments, and heads of state, reluctant to leave office; driving political coups; and leading violent crimes against humanity. Mugabe, Kabila, and Kenyatta are but a few articulating the years of sustained bad governance. The prize is only awarded when credit is due - if leaders have made a significant positive impact this will be recognised and rewarded. The prize is therefore for absolute gains in governance, not relative to other countries.\n\nAs the prize is not always awarded it avoids the pitfall that distributing a financial prize where no change has been made to political institutions would reinforce a system. The state would continue to function on undemocratic governance, and the reward would become a new example of dead money [1] . Instead it encourages improved control over aid and money transferred to African states, it shows that rewards are given based on merit. The Mo Ibrahim prize therefore encourages the good institutions that are necessary for prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).\n\n[1] See further readings: Moyo, 2009.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Bribing good governance\n\nThe Mo Ibrahim Prize is bribing African leaders to shift towards good governance. The financial incentive is being distributed to entice leaders to follow good governance approaches and models. The fact that no questions are asked on where the money provided goes; how it is used; and what the former leaders spend it on raise further questions. Most importantly to what extent can we claim elaborate bribery is an effective means to enforce good governance within the continent? For a start having what is essentially a bribe to encourage good governance is hypoctitical. Secondly a bribe for an individual relies on that one individual’s actions. Thus in 2007 the prize was granted to Mozambique’s President Chissano. However, since 2007 declines have emerged in the scores concerning law and rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).\n\nAdditionally for those motivated by money the money provided cannot compete with potential returns that can be gained from natural resources, tax evasion schemes, and capital flight. The bribery incentive does not compete with potential profits gained through alternative forms corruption (Bedell, 2009).\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo A contradictory approach\n\nThe prize will fail to promote good governance due to the contradictory approach it undertakes. Good governance cannot emerge and be sustained by rewarding former presidents. Having a good former president does not mean their successor will encourage their legacy to continue. Why celebrate good former leaders when we need to focus on what is happening now?\n\nMoreover why reward someone just when they can no longer do any good? The prize suffers from the contradiction of regarding giving up power as a necessary criteria to obtain the prize. This ignores that Africa does not want those who are being successful at promoting good governance to leave their post – potentially to someone who will move backwards. Having a prize for someone who could have done more good had they stayed is contradictory.\n\nFinally the prize is not good for Africa; the prize has raised negative stereotypes of African states, leaders, and systems. The attention gained by the prize not being granted for 3 out of 6 years is maintaining negative stereotypes of African leaders. This will only act to reinforce the global system of power - whereby the West intervene to implement a ‘good’ model of governance, not suited to Africa.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Is the IIAG a good measure of ‘good governance’?\n\nHow do we define, classify, and recognise good governance? The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has created the Ibrahim Index. The IIAG calculates governance across Africa and assesses it over time. The IIAG shows governance has improved across the continent since 2000; and in 2013 classified Mauritius with the highest rank and Liberia as showcasing the greatest positive change over 13 years. But does the index have the right weighting? Where ‘good governance’ is found changes depending on the weighting applied. Even odder is that although the foundation has this index it is not actually used when awarding the prize, this is awarded by a committee to those who pass the criteria that don’t include the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The prize is therefore methodologically unsound as a way of looking at and promoting good governance\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Who's on the committee?\n\nWho decides whether governance is going in the right direction within the African continent? The prize committee includes six individuals who make the decision of who is worthy of the reward, and whether it is granted. The panel includes leading figures, not all of whom have held elected positions such as Mohamed ElBaradei, and not all of whom are African, such as Martti Ahtisaari and Mary Robinson (Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee). Among these distinguished panellists the voice of Africa’s population is missing. A prize about good governance should incorporate a people’s vote as good governance is only relevant if it helps the people. Moreover without a public voice there is a lack of transparency in the workings of the committee and the decisions made. Hardly a good standard for a governance prize.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
96
] |
[
90.875,
95.4375,
86.875,
88.125,
88.125,
86.9375,
84.875,
85.75,
86.5,
91.375,
90.1875,
89.75
] |
Transparency
The prize is helping citizens to be aware of good governance, and bad, occurring within their state. By granting the prize citizens are shown what leaders have done right; and the publication of the index - the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) - shows where improvement may be required. The prize is forcing transparency between governments and society. Information on how states are doing means citizens can take action, and demand change where change is needed. The prize is calling for African citizens to get the leadership they deserved, desired, and have a right to.
By maintaining strict standards on when, and to whom, the reward is provided gives a realistic picture of governance in Africa. It showcases the continued need for good governance; and also doesn’t give citizens and the international community a false illusion that governance is good in Africa when it is not.
|
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Although the prize has gained recognition in the Western world or ‘Global North’ to what extent is the prize, its reward, and meaning, known and understood by African citizens? If the prize is recognising African leadership citizens need to be aware of the prize in the first place - whether their country is up for nomination or not. Awareness is the only way the apparent transparency can hold power and become a reality. Citizens cannot demand change or hold the state to account when they are not aware of the index, the prize, and the so-called changes being made.\n"
] |
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize is too narrowly defined. At what scale should the change be defined? For example civil-society and community leaders can make significant changes to governance at a smaller-scale; promoting democratic governance from a bottom-up initiative can work as well as top down. On another hand, should we only be focusing on the very top? What about the government officials who are not heads of state but make a change to people’s lives? The narrow focus on the head of a party or state neglects the body - such as finance ministers - that maintains that system of governance and work hard to ensure a democratic transition. The focus on heads of state may deter the state body from ensuring effective governance due to the fact their hard work is not rewarded or recognised.\n\nDue to the relatively young nature of democracy and multi-party rule across Africa, the criteria of potential prize candidates needs to be expanded. The number of former heads of states having left in the past three years is small. Therefore the criteria for nomination needs to change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize by focusing on leaders ignores the areas where money is needed; not lining already rich people’s pockets but providing money and advice to actually set up these institutions. This means for example ensuring the police and civil servants are well enough paid they don’t resort to corruption etc. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) highlight that there is also a ‘vicious cycle’ whereby the presence of bad institutions - authoritarian, unaccountable, with limited economic innovations - reinforce poverty and bad governance. Although offering rewards where significant change has happened is a positive model, in reality, many African states require funds to be able to enforce change in the first place and break this vicious cycle.\n\nFor good governance to be promoted rewards should not only go to the best, but also the good in a continent where bad governance dominates. For any progress to be made in governance the prize needs to lower standards of expectation, recognise where improvements are made, and use the reward to change the vicious cycle. Some change is better than none; focusing on picking the best with high standards limits any change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo One of the criteria for awarding the prize is ‘demonstrated exceptional leadership’. This clearly allows the IIAG to be fed into the process as it is the IIAG that can show if the leader being considered has demonstrated this leadership. The IIAG provides a useful tool to assist in deciding the prize winner, and nominees.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo It is not contradictory to offer a reward for good governance after the leader has left office. Dictators holding onto power for long periods are one of Africa’s biggest problems. Rewarding those who step aside shows that an important part of good governance is having presidents who stick to constitutional terms. A stable transfer of power is vital in a democracy. This is something that is even more important when the transfer is to a political opponent. One of the most important advances in governance that can be made is to make be considered normal that the opposition is as loyal to the country as the government. When this happens power can easily be transferred without conflict or resulting disorder.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The committee nominating, and choosing, the final candidates remains un-bias and their expertise within multiple aspects of governance means the high standards can be maintained. Having votes would open the prize up to corruption and attempts to influence the outcome by those who are eligible. A technocratic standard is needed for good governance.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The reward is an incentive, not a bribe; consider it as being similar to performance related pay. The prize shows how if excellent leadership is promoted and good governance encouraged the leaders will be praised, recognised and rewarded. The prize is not a bribe, but a way of incentivising leaders to follow a path towards good governance. By highlighting cases where good governance has excelled the prize draws attention to the benefits of good governance through a cost-benefit appraisal. The social, economic, and political returns are highlighted; and other African governments encouraged to follow the trend.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Focusing on the leaders of good governance\n\nPrevious winners - such as Nelson Mandela and Pedro Pires - made significant changes to their nation-states, ending apartheid and promoting social development. The former leaders provided equality and a functioning democracy to their people. Such needs to be the aim of leaders today.\n\nProviding a prize to the highest achievers provides an example. It highlights leaders from even small countries – such as Cape Verde’s Pires – that can serve as role models for Africa’s leaders. Without the prize the most likely role models would simply be those of the biggest states who are highest profile. Mo Ibrahim (2013) has stated the prize is for “excellence, it’s not a pension”. This is why it is not always awarded. The prize is only be awarded when high-standards of good governance are replicated, and maintained, by leaders. Focusing on the top of government encourages a top down implementation of good government. When the leader acts others will follow; a comparatively small amount of money can therefore make a big difference.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Recognition when credit is due\n\nThe past few years have seen African governments, and heads of state, reluctant to leave office; driving political coups; and leading violent crimes against humanity. Mugabe, Kabila, and Kenyatta are but a few articulating the years of sustained bad governance. The prize is only awarded when credit is due - if leaders have made a significant positive impact this will be recognised and rewarded. The prize is therefore for absolute gains in governance, not relative to other countries.\n\nAs the prize is not always awarded it avoids the pitfall that distributing a financial prize where no change has been made to political institutions would reinforce a system. The state would continue to function on undemocratic governance, and the reward would become a new example of dead money [1] . Instead it encourages improved control over aid and money transferred to African states, it shows that rewards are given based on merit. The Mo Ibrahim prize therefore encourages the good institutions that are necessary for prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).\n\n[1] See further readings: Moyo, 2009.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Bribing good governance\n\nThe Mo Ibrahim Prize is bribing African leaders to shift towards good governance. The financial incentive is being distributed to entice leaders to follow good governance approaches and models. The fact that no questions are asked on where the money provided goes; how it is used; and what the former leaders spend it on raise further questions. Most importantly to what extent can we claim elaborate bribery is an effective means to enforce good governance within the continent? For a start having what is essentially a bribe to encourage good governance is hypoctitical. Secondly a bribe for an individual relies on that one individual’s actions. Thus in 2007 the prize was granted to Mozambique’s President Chissano. However, since 2007 declines have emerged in the scores concerning law and rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).\n\nAdditionally for those motivated by money the money provided cannot compete with potential returns that can be gained from natural resources, tax evasion schemes, and capital flight. The bribery incentive does not compete with potential profits gained through alternative forms corruption (Bedell, 2009).\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo A contradictory approach\n\nThe prize will fail to promote good governance due to the contradictory approach it undertakes. Good governance cannot emerge and be sustained by rewarding former presidents. Having a good former president does not mean their successor will encourage their legacy to continue. Why celebrate good former leaders when we need to focus on what is happening now?\n\nMoreover why reward someone just when they can no longer do any good? The prize suffers from the contradiction of regarding giving up power as a necessary criteria to obtain the prize. This ignores that Africa does not want those who are being successful at promoting good governance to leave their post – potentially to someone who will move backwards. Having a prize for someone who could have done more good had they stayed is contradictory.\n\nFinally the prize is not good for Africa; the prize has raised negative stereotypes of African states, leaders, and systems. The attention gained by the prize not being granted for 3 out of 6 years is maintaining negative stereotypes of African leaders. This will only act to reinforce the global system of power - whereby the West intervene to implement a ‘good’ model of governance, not suited to Africa.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Is the IIAG a good measure of ‘good governance’?\n\nHow do we define, classify, and recognise good governance? The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has created the Ibrahim Index. The IIAG calculates governance across Africa and assesses it over time. The IIAG shows governance has improved across the continent since 2000; and in 2013 classified Mauritius with the highest rank and Liberia as showcasing the greatest positive change over 13 years. But does the index have the right weighting? Where ‘good governance’ is found changes depending on the weighting applied. Even odder is that although the foundation has this index it is not actually used when awarding the prize, this is awarded by a committee to those who pass the criteria that don’t include the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The prize is therefore methodologically unsound as a way of looking at and promoting good governance\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Who's on the committee?\n\nWho decides whether governance is going in the right direction within the African continent? The prize committee includes six individuals who make the decision of who is worthy of the reward, and whether it is granted. The panel includes leading figures, not all of whom have held elected positions such as Mohamed ElBaradei, and not all of whom are African, such as Martti Ahtisaari and Mary Robinson (Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee). Among these distinguished panellists the voice of Africa’s population is missing. A prize about good governance should incorporate a people’s vote as good governance is only relevant if it helps the people. Moreover without a public voice there is a lack of transparency in the workings of the committee and the decisions made. Hardly a good standard for a governance prize.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
96.0625
] |
[
90,
90.8125,
86.625,
85.9375,
85.8125,
84.9375,
83.75,
83.5,
83.9375,
87.125,
89.0625,
90.125
] |
Recognition when credit is due
The past few years have seen African governments, and heads of state, reluctant to leave office; driving political coups; and leading violent crimes against humanity. Mugabe, Kabila, and Kenyatta are but a few articulating the years of sustained bad governance. The prize is only awarded when credit is due - if leaders have made a significant positive impact this will be recognised and rewarded. The prize is therefore for absolute gains in governance, not relative to other countries.
As the prize is not always awarded it avoids the pitfall that distributing a financial prize where no change has been made to political institutions would reinforce a system. The state would continue to function on undemocratic governance, and the reward would become a new example of dead money [1] . Instead it encourages improved control over aid and money transferred to African states, it shows that rewards are given based on merit. The Mo Ibrahim prize therefore encourages the good institutions that are necessary for prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).
[1] See further readings: Moyo, 2009.
|
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize by focusing on leaders ignores the areas where money is needed; not lining already rich people’s pockets but providing money and advice to actually set up these institutions. This means for example ensuring the police and civil servants are well enough paid they don’t resort to corruption etc. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) highlight that there is also a ‘vicious cycle’ whereby the presence of bad institutions - authoritarian, unaccountable, with limited economic innovations - reinforce poverty and bad governance. Although offering rewards where significant change has happened is a positive model, in reality, many African states require funds to be able to enforce change in the first place and break this vicious cycle.\n\nFor good governance to be promoted rewards should not only go to the best, but also the good in a continent where bad governance dominates. For any progress to be made in governance the prize needs to lower standards of expectation, recognise where improvements are made, and use the reward to change the vicious cycle. Some change is better than none; focusing on picking the best with high standards limits any change.\n"
] |
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize is too narrowly defined. At what scale should the change be defined? For example civil-society and community leaders can make significant changes to governance at a smaller-scale; promoting democratic governance from a bottom-up initiative can work as well as top down. On another hand, should we only be focusing on the very top? What about the government officials who are not heads of state but make a change to people’s lives? The narrow focus on the head of a party or state neglects the body - such as finance ministers - that maintains that system of governance and work hard to ensure a democratic transition. The focus on heads of state may deter the state body from ensuring effective governance due to the fact their hard work is not rewarded or recognised.\n\nDue to the relatively young nature of democracy and multi-party rule across Africa, the criteria of potential prize candidates needs to be expanded. The number of former heads of states having left in the past three years is small. Therefore the criteria for nomination needs to change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Although the prize has gained recognition in the Western world or ‘Global North’ to what extent is the prize, its reward, and meaning, known and understood by African citizens? If the prize is recognising African leadership citizens need to be aware of the prize in the first place - whether their country is up for nomination or not. Awareness is the only way the apparent transparency can hold power and become a reality. Citizens cannot demand change or hold the state to account when they are not aware of the index, the prize, and the so-called changes being made.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo One of the criteria for awarding the prize is ‘demonstrated exceptional leadership’. This clearly allows the IIAG to be fed into the process as it is the IIAG that can show if the leader being considered has demonstrated this leadership. The IIAG provides a useful tool to assist in deciding the prize winner, and nominees.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo It is not contradictory to offer a reward for good governance after the leader has left office. Dictators holding onto power for long periods are one of Africa’s biggest problems. Rewarding those who step aside shows that an important part of good governance is having presidents who stick to constitutional terms. A stable transfer of power is vital in a democracy. This is something that is even more important when the transfer is to a political opponent. One of the most important advances in governance that can be made is to make be considered normal that the opposition is as loyal to the country as the government. When this happens power can easily be transferred without conflict or resulting disorder.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The committee nominating, and choosing, the final candidates remains un-bias and their expertise within multiple aspects of governance means the high standards can be maintained. Having votes would open the prize up to corruption and attempts to influence the outcome by those who are eligible. A technocratic standard is needed for good governance.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The reward is an incentive, not a bribe; consider it as being similar to performance related pay. The prize shows how if excellent leadership is promoted and good governance encouraged the leaders will be praised, recognised and rewarded. The prize is not a bribe, but a way of incentivising leaders to follow a path towards good governance. By highlighting cases where good governance has excelled the prize draws attention to the benefits of good governance through a cost-benefit appraisal. The social, economic, and political returns are highlighted; and other African governments encouraged to follow the trend.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Focusing on the leaders of good governance\n\nPrevious winners - such as Nelson Mandela and Pedro Pires - made significant changes to their nation-states, ending apartheid and promoting social development. The former leaders provided equality and a functioning democracy to their people. Such needs to be the aim of leaders today.\n\nProviding a prize to the highest achievers provides an example. It highlights leaders from even small countries – such as Cape Verde’s Pires – that can serve as role models for Africa’s leaders. Without the prize the most likely role models would simply be those of the biggest states who are highest profile. Mo Ibrahim (2013) has stated the prize is for “excellence, it’s not a pension”. This is why it is not always awarded. The prize is only be awarded when high-standards of good governance are replicated, and maintained, by leaders. Focusing on the top of government encourages a top down implementation of good government. When the leader acts others will follow; a comparatively small amount of money can therefore make a big difference.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Transparency\n\nThe prize is helping citizens to be aware of good governance, and bad, occurring within their state. By granting the prize citizens are shown what leaders have done right; and the publication of the index - the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) - shows where improvement may be required. The prize is forcing transparency between governments and society. Information on how states are doing means citizens can take action, and demand change where change is needed. The prize is calling for African citizens to get the leadership they deserved, desired, and have a right to.\n\nBy maintaining strict standards on when, and to whom, the reward is provided gives a realistic picture of governance in Africa. It showcases the continued need for good governance; and also doesn’t give citizens and the international community a false illusion that governance is good in Africa when it is not.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Bribing good governance\n\nThe Mo Ibrahim Prize is bribing African leaders to shift towards good governance. The financial incentive is being distributed to entice leaders to follow good governance approaches and models. The fact that no questions are asked on where the money provided goes; how it is used; and what the former leaders spend it on raise further questions. Most importantly to what extent can we claim elaborate bribery is an effective means to enforce good governance within the continent? For a start having what is essentially a bribe to encourage good governance is hypoctitical. Secondly a bribe for an individual relies on that one individual’s actions. Thus in 2007 the prize was granted to Mozambique’s President Chissano. However, since 2007 declines have emerged in the scores concerning law and rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).\n\nAdditionally for those motivated by money the money provided cannot compete with potential returns that can be gained from natural resources, tax evasion schemes, and capital flight. The bribery incentive does not compete with potential profits gained through alternative forms corruption (Bedell, 2009).\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo A contradictory approach\n\nThe prize will fail to promote good governance due to the contradictory approach it undertakes. Good governance cannot emerge and be sustained by rewarding former presidents. Having a good former president does not mean their successor will encourage their legacy to continue. Why celebrate good former leaders when we need to focus on what is happening now?\n\nMoreover why reward someone just when they can no longer do any good? The prize suffers from the contradiction of regarding giving up power as a necessary criteria to obtain the prize. This ignores that Africa does not want those who are being successful at promoting good governance to leave their post – potentially to someone who will move backwards. Having a prize for someone who could have done more good had they stayed is contradictory.\n\nFinally the prize is not good for Africa; the prize has raised negative stereotypes of African states, leaders, and systems. The attention gained by the prize not being granted for 3 out of 6 years is maintaining negative stereotypes of African leaders. This will only act to reinforce the global system of power - whereby the West intervene to implement a ‘good’ model of governance, not suited to Africa.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Is the IIAG a good measure of ‘good governance’?\n\nHow do we define, classify, and recognise good governance? The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has created the Ibrahim Index. The IIAG calculates governance across Africa and assesses it over time. The IIAG shows governance has improved across the continent since 2000; and in 2013 classified Mauritius with the highest rank and Liberia as showcasing the greatest positive change over 13 years. But does the index have the right weighting? Where ‘good governance’ is found changes depending on the weighting applied. Even odder is that although the foundation has this index it is not actually used when awarding the prize, this is awarded by a committee to those who pass the criteria that don’t include the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The prize is therefore methodologically unsound as a way of looking at and promoting good governance\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Who's on the committee?\n\nWho decides whether governance is going in the right direction within the African continent? The prize committee includes six individuals who make the decision of who is worthy of the reward, and whether it is granted. The panel includes leading figures, not all of whom have held elected positions such as Mohamed ElBaradei, and not all of whom are African, such as Martti Ahtisaari and Mary Robinson (Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee). Among these distinguished panellists the voice of Africa’s population is missing. A prize about good governance should incorporate a people’s vote as good governance is only relevant if it helps the people. Moreover without a public voice there is a lack of transparency in the workings of the committee and the decisions made. Hardly a good standard for a governance prize.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.3125
] |
[
93.1875,
90.6875,
85.8125,
88.75,
84.75,
85.8125,
85.125,
84.125,
85,
89.75,
89.125,
86.0625
] |
Bribing good governance
The Mo Ibrahim Prize is bribing African leaders to shift towards good governance. The financial incentive is being distributed to entice leaders to follow good governance approaches and models. The fact that no questions are asked on where the money provided goes; how it is used; and what the former leaders spend it on raise further questions. Most importantly to what extent can we claim elaborate bribery is an effective means to enforce good governance within the continent? For a start having what is essentially a bribe to encourage good governance is hypoctitical. Secondly a bribe for an individual relies on that one individual’s actions. Thus in 2007 the prize was granted to Mozambique’s President Chissano. However, since 2007 declines have emerged in the scores concerning law and rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).
Additionally for those motivated by money the money provided cannot compete with potential returns that can be gained from natural resources, tax evasion schemes, and capital flight. The bribery incentive does not compete with potential profits gained through alternative forms corruption (Bedell, 2009).
|
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The reward is an incentive, not a bribe; consider it as being similar to performance related pay. The prize shows how if excellent leadership is promoted and good governance encouraged the leaders will be praised, recognised and rewarded. The prize is not a bribe, but a way of incentivising leaders to follow a path towards good governance. By highlighting cases where good governance has excelled the prize draws attention to the benefits of good governance through a cost-benefit appraisal. The social, economic, and political returns are highlighted; and other African governments encouraged to follow the trend.\n"
] |
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo One of the criteria for awarding the prize is ‘demonstrated exceptional leadership’. This clearly allows the IIAG to be fed into the process as it is the IIAG that can show if the leader being considered has demonstrated this leadership. The IIAG provides a useful tool to assist in deciding the prize winner, and nominees.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo It is not contradictory to offer a reward for good governance after the leader has left office. Dictators holding onto power for long periods are one of Africa’s biggest problems. Rewarding those who step aside shows that an important part of good governance is having presidents who stick to constitutional terms. A stable transfer of power is vital in a democracy. This is something that is even more important when the transfer is to a political opponent. One of the most important advances in governance that can be made is to make be considered normal that the opposition is as loyal to the country as the government. When this happens power can easily be transferred without conflict or resulting disorder.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The committee nominating, and choosing, the final candidates remains un-bias and their expertise within multiple aspects of governance means the high standards can be maintained. Having votes would open the prize up to corruption and attempts to influence the outcome by those who are eligible. A technocratic standard is needed for good governance.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize is too narrowly defined. At what scale should the change be defined? For example civil-society and community leaders can make significant changes to governance at a smaller-scale; promoting democratic governance from a bottom-up initiative can work as well as top down. On another hand, should we only be focusing on the very top? What about the government officials who are not heads of state but make a change to people’s lives? The narrow focus on the head of a party or state neglects the body - such as finance ministers - that maintains that system of governance and work hard to ensure a democratic transition. The focus on heads of state may deter the state body from ensuring effective governance due to the fact their hard work is not rewarded or recognised.\n\nDue to the relatively young nature of democracy and multi-party rule across Africa, the criteria of potential prize candidates needs to be expanded. The number of former heads of states having left in the past three years is small. Therefore the criteria for nomination needs to change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Although the prize has gained recognition in the Western world or ‘Global North’ to what extent is the prize, its reward, and meaning, known and understood by African citizens? If the prize is recognising African leadership citizens need to be aware of the prize in the first place - whether their country is up for nomination or not. Awareness is the only way the apparent transparency can hold power and become a reality. Citizens cannot demand change or hold the state to account when they are not aware of the index, the prize, and the so-called changes being made.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize by focusing on leaders ignores the areas where money is needed; not lining already rich people’s pockets but providing money and advice to actually set up these institutions. This means for example ensuring the police and civil servants are well enough paid they don’t resort to corruption etc. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) highlight that there is also a ‘vicious cycle’ whereby the presence of bad institutions - authoritarian, unaccountable, with limited economic innovations - reinforce poverty and bad governance. Although offering rewards where significant change has happened is a positive model, in reality, many African states require funds to be able to enforce change in the first place and break this vicious cycle.\n\nFor good governance to be promoted rewards should not only go to the best, but also the good in a continent where bad governance dominates. For any progress to be made in governance the prize needs to lower standards of expectation, recognise where improvements are made, and use the reward to change the vicious cycle. Some change is better than none; focusing on picking the best with high standards limits any change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo A contradictory approach\n\nThe prize will fail to promote good governance due to the contradictory approach it undertakes. Good governance cannot emerge and be sustained by rewarding former presidents. Having a good former president does not mean their successor will encourage their legacy to continue. Why celebrate good former leaders when we need to focus on what is happening now?\n\nMoreover why reward someone just when they can no longer do any good? The prize suffers from the contradiction of regarding giving up power as a necessary criteria to obtain the prize. This ignores that Africa does not want those who are being successful at promoting good governance to leave their post – potentially to someone who will move backwards. Having a prize for someone who could have done more good had they stayed is contradictory.\n\nFinally the prize is not good for Africa; the prize has raised negative stereotypes of African states, leaders, and systems. The attention gained by the prize not being granted for 3 out of 6 years is maintaining negative stereotypes of African leaders. This will only act to reinforce the global system of power - whereby the West intervene to implement a ‘good’ model of governance, not suited to Africa.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Is the IIAG a good measure of ‘good governance’?\n\nHow do we define, classify, and recognise good governance? The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has created the Ibrahim Index. The IIAG calculates governance across Africa and assesses it over time. The IIAG shows governance has improved across the continent since 2000; and in 2013 classified Mauritius with the highest rank and Liberia as showcasing the greatest positive change over 13 years. But does the index have the right weighting? Where ‘good governance’ is found changes depending on the weighting applied. Even odder is that although the foundation has this index it is not actually used when awarding the prize, this is awarded by a committee to those who pass the criteria that don’t include the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The prize is therefore methodologically unsound as a way of looking at and promoting good governance\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Who's on the committee?\n\nWho decides whether governance is going in the right direction within the African continent? The prize committee includes six individuals who make the decision of who is worthy of the reward, and whether it is granted. The panel includes leading figures, not all of whom have held elected positions such as Mohamed ElBaradei, and not all of whom are African, such as Martti Ahtisaari and Mary Robinson (Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee). Among these distinguished panellists the voice of Africa’s population is missing. A prize about good governance should incorporate a people’s vote as good governance is only relevant if it helps the people. Moreover without a public voice there is a lack of transparency in the workings of the committee and the decisions made. Hardly a good standard for a governance prize.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Focusing on the leaders of good governance\n\nPrevious winners - such as Nelson Mandela and Pedro Pires - made significant changes to their nation-states, ending apartheid and promoting social development. The former leaders provided equality and a functioning democracy to their people. Such needs to be the aim of leaders today.\n\nProviding a prize to the highest achievers provides an example. It highlights leaders from even small countries – such as Cape Verde’s Pires – that can serve as role models for Africa’s leaders. Without the prize the most likely role models would simply be those of the biggest states who are highest profile. Mo Ibrahim (2013) has stated the prize is for “excellence, it’s not a pension”. This is why it is not always awarded. The prize is only be awarded when high-standards of good governance are replicated, and maintained, by leaders. Focusing on the top of government encourages a top down implementation of good government. When the leader acts others will follow; a comparatively small amount of money can therefore make a big difference.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Transparency\n\nThe prize is helping citizens to be aware of good governance, and bad, occurring within their state. By granting the prize citizens are shown what leaders have done right; and the publication of the index - the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) - shows where improvement may be required. The prize is forcing transparency between governments and society. Information on how states are doing means citizens can take action, and demand change where change is needed. The prize is calling for African citizens to get the leadership they deserved, desired, and have a right to.\n\nBy maintaining strict standards on when, and to whom, the reward is provided gives a realistic picture of governance in Africa. It showcases the continued need for good governance; and also doesn’t give citizens and the international community a false illusion that governance is good in Africa when it is not.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Recognition when credit is due\n\nThe past few years have seen African governments, and heads of state, reluctant to leave office; driving political coups; and leading violent crimes against humanity. Mugabe, Kabila, and Kenyatta are but a few articulating the years of sustained bad governance. The prize is only awarded when credit is due - if leaders have made a significant positive impact this will be recognised and rewarded. The prize is therefore for absolute gains in governance, not relative to other countries.\n\nAs the prize is not always awarded it avoids the pitfall that distributing a financial prize where no change has been made to political institutions would reinforce a system. The state would continue to function on undemocratic governance, and the reward would become a new example of dead money [1] . Instead it encourages improved control over aid and money transferred to African states, it shows that rewards are given based on merit. The Mo Ibrahim prize therefore encourages the good institutions that are necessary for prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).\n\n[1] See further readings: Moyo, 2009.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.625
] |
[
87.125,
91,
86.625,
87.25,
85.875,
91.875,
85.6875,
87.5,
85.0625,
89.625,
87.4375,
87.75
] |
A contradictory approach
The prize will fail to promote good governance due to the contradictory approach it undertakes. Good governance cannot emerge and be sustained by rewarding former presidents. Having a good former president does not mean their successor will encourage their legacy to continue. Why celebrate good former leaders when we need to focus on what is happening now?
Moreover why reward someone just when they can no longer do any good? The prize suffers from the contradiction of regarding giving up power as a necessary criteria to obtain the prize. This ignores that Africa does not want those who are being successful at promoting good governance to leave their post – potentially to someone who will move backwards. Having a prize for someone who could have done more good had they stayed is contradictory.
Finally the prize is not good for Africa; the prize has raised negative stereotypes of African states, leaders, and systems. The attention gained by the prize not being granted for 3 out of 6 years is maintaining negative stereotypes of African leaders. This will only act to reinforce the global system of power - whereby the West intervene to implement a ‘good’ model of governance, not suited to Africa.
|
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo It is not contradictory to offer a reward for good governance after the leader has left office. Dictators holding onto power for long periods are one of Africa’s biggest problems. Rewarding those who step aside shows that an important part of good governance is having presidents who stick to constitutional terms. A stable transfer of power is vital in a democracy. This is something that is even more important when the transfer is to a political opponent. One of the most important advances in governance that can be made is to make be considered normal that the opposition is as loyal to the country as the government. When this happens power can easily be transferred without conflict or resulting disorder.\n"
] |
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo One of the criteria for awarding the prize is ‘demonstrated exceptional leadership’. This clearly allows the IIAG to be fed into the process as it is the IIAG that can show if the leader being considered has demonstrated this leadership. The IIAG provides a useful tool to assist in deciding the prize winner, and nominees.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The committee nominating, and choosing, the final candidates remains un-bias and their expertise within multiple aspects of governance means the high standards can be maintained. Having votes would open the prize up to corruption and attempts to influence the outcome by those who are eligible. A technocratic standard is needed for good governance.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The reward is an incentive, not a bribe; consider it as being similar to performance related pay. The prize shows how if excellent leadership is promoted and good governance encouraged the leaders will be praised, recognised and rewarded. The prize is not a bribe, but a way of incentivising leaders to follow a path towards good governance. By highlighting cases where good governance has excelled the prize draws attention to the benefits of good governance through a cost-benefit appraisal. The social, economic, and political returns are highlighted; and other African governments encouraged to follow the trend.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize is too narrowly defined. At what scale should the change be defined? For example civil-society and community leaders can make significant changes to governance at a smaller-scale; promoting democratic governance from a bottom-up initiative can work as well as top down. On another hand, should we only be focusing on the very top? What about the government officials who are not heads of state but make a change to people’s lives? The narrow focus on the head of a party or state neglects the body - such as finance ministers - that maintains that system of governance and work hard to ensure a democratic transition. The focus on heads of state may deter the state body from ensuring effective governance due to the fact their hard work is not rewarded or recognised.\n\nDue to the relatively young nature of democracy and multi-party rule across Africa, the criteria of potential prize candidates needs to be expanded. The number of former heads of states having left in the past three years is small. Therefore the criteria for nomination needs to change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Although the prize has gained recognition in the Western world or ‘Global North’ to what extent is the prize, its reward, and meaning, known and understood by African citizens? If the prize is recognising African leadership citizens need to be aware of the prize in the first place - whether their country is up for nomination or not. Awareness is the only way the apparent transparency can hold power and become a reality. Citizens cannot demand change or hold the state to account when they are not aware of the index, the prize, and the so-called changes being made.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize by focusing on leaders ignores the areas where money is needed; not lining already rich people’s pockets but providing money and advice to actually set up these institutions. This means for example ensuring the police and civil servants are well enough paid they don’t resort to corruption etc. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) highlight that there is also a ‘vicious cycle’ whereby the presence of bad institutions - authoritarian, unaccountable, with limited economic innovations - reinforce poverty and bad governance. Although offering rewards where significant change has happened is a positive model, in reality, many African states require funds to be able to enforce change in the first place and break this vicious cycle.\n\nFor good governance to be promoted rewards should not only go to the best, but also the good in a continent where bad governance dominates. For any progress to be made in governance the prize needs to lower standards of expectation, recognise where improvements are made, and use the reward to change the vicious cycle. Some change is better than none; focusing on picking the best with high standards limits any change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Bribing good governance\n\nThe Mo Ibrahim Prize is bribing African leaders to shift towards good governance. The financial incentive is being distributed to entice leaders to follow good governance approaches and models. The fact that no questions are asked on where the money provided goes; how it is used; and what the former leaders spend it on raise further questions. Most importantly to what extent can we claim elaborate bribery is an effective means to enforce good governance within the continent? For a start having what is essentially a bribe to encourage good governance is hypoctitical. Secondly a bribe for an individual relies on that one individual’s actions. Thus in 2007 the prize was granted to Mozambique’s President Chissano. However, since 2007 declines have emerged in the scores concerning law and rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).\n\nAdditionally for those motivated by money the money provided cannot compete with potential returns that can be gained from natural resources, tax evasion schemes, and capital flight. The bribery incentive does not compete with potential profits gained through alternative forms corruption (Bedell, 2009).\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Is the IIAG a good measure of ‘good governance’?\n\nHow do we define, classify, and recognise good governance? The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has created the Ibrahim Index. The IIAG calculates governance across Africa and assesses it over time. The IIAG shows governance has improved across the continent since 2000; and in 2013 classified Mauritius with the highest rank and Liberia as showcasing the greatest positive change over 13 years. But does the index have the right weighting? Where ‘good governance’ is found changes depending on the weighting applied. Even odder is that although the foundation has this index it is not actually used when awarding the prize, this is awarded by a committee to those who pass the criteria that don’t include the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The prize is therefore methodologically unsound as a way of looking at and promoting good governance\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Who's on the committee?\n\nWho decides whether governance is going in the right direction within the African continent? The prize committee includes six individuals who make the decision of who is worthy of the reward, and whether it is granted. The panel includes leading figures, not all of whom have held elected positions such as Mohamed ElBaradei, and not all of whom are African, such as Martti Ahtisaari and Mary Robinson (Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee). Among these distinguished panellists the voice of Africa’s population is missing. A prize about good governance should incorporate a people’s vote as good governance is only relevant if it helps the people. Moreover without a public voice there is a lack of transparency in the workings of the committee and the decisions made. Hardly a good standard for a governance prize.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Focusing on the leaders of good governance\n\nPrevious winners - such as Nelson Mandela and Pedro Pires - made significant changes to their nation-states, ending apartheid and promoting social development. The former leaders provided equality and a functioning democracy to their people. Such needs to be the aim of leaders today.\n\nProviding a prize to the highest achievers provides an example. It highlights leaders from even small countries – such as Cape Verde’s Pires – that can serve as role models for Africa’s leaders. Without the prize the most likely role models would simply be those of the biggest states who are highest profile. Mo Ibrahim (2013) has stated the prize is for “excellence, it’s not a pension”. This is why it is not always awarded. The prize is only be awarded when high-standards of good governance are replicated, and maintained, by leaders. Focusing on the top of government encourages a top down implementation of good government. When the leader acts others will follow; a comparatively small amount of money can therefore make a big difference.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Transparency\n\nThe prize is helping citizens to be aware of good governance, and bad, occurring within their state. By granting the prize citizens are shown what leaders have done right; and the publication of the index - the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) - shows where improvement may be required. The prize is forcing transparency between governments and society. Information on how states are doing means citizens can take action, and demand change where change is needed. The prize is calling for African citizens to get the leadership they deserved, desired, and have a right to.\n\nBy maintaining strict standards on when, and to whom, the reward is provided gives a realistic picture of governance in Africa. It showcases the continued need for good governance; and also doesn’t give citizens and the international community a false illusion that governance is good in Africa when it is not.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Recognition when credit is due\n\nThe past few years have seen African governments, and heads of state, reluctant to leave office; driving political coups; and leading violent crimes against humanity. Mugabe, Kabila, and Kenyatta are but a few articulating the years of sustained bad governance. The prize is only awarded when credit is due - if leaders have made a significant positive impact this will be recognised and rewarded. The prize is therefore for absolute gains in governance, not relative to other countries.\n\nAs the prize is not always awarded it avoids the pitfall that distributing a financial prize where no change has been made to political institutions would reinforce a system. The state would continue to function on undemocratic governance, and the reward would become a new example of dead money [1] . Instead it encourages improved control over aid and money transferred to African states, it shows that rewards are given based on merit. The Mo Ibrahim prize therefore encourages the good institutions that are necessary for prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).\n\n[1] See further readings: Moyo, 2009.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.125
] |
[
89.1875,
86.5625,
88.25,
87.875,
86.9375,
90.4375,
84,
85.375,
85.75,
89.625,
87.4375,
88.6875
] |
Is the IIAG a good measure of ‘good governance’?
How do we define, classify, and recognise good governance? The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has created the Ibrahim Index. The IIAG calculates governance across Africa and assesses it over time. The IIAG shows governance has improved across the continent since 2000; and in 2013 classified Mauritius with the highest rank and Liberia as showcasing the greatest positive change over 13 years. But does the index have the right weighting? Where ‘good governance’ is found changes depending on the weighting applied. Even odder is that although the foundation has this index it is not actually used when awarding the prize, this is awarded by a committee to those who pass the criteria that don’t include the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The prize is therefore methodologically unsound as a way of looking at and promoting good governance
|
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo One of the criteria for awarding the prize is ‘demonstrated exceptional leadership’. This clearly allows the IIAG to be fed into the process as it is the IIAG that can show if the leader being considered has demonstrated this leadership. The IIAG provides a useful tool to assist in deciding the prize winner, and nominees.\n"
] |
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo It is not contradictory to offer a reward for good governance after the leader has left office. Dictators holding onto power for long periods are one of Africa’s biggest problems. Rewarding those who step aside shows that an important part of good governance is having presidents who stick to constitutional terms. A stable transfer of power is vital in a democracy. This is something that is even more important when the transfer is to a political opponent. One of the most important advances in governance that can be made is to make be considered normal that the opposition is as loyal to the country as the government. When this happens power can easily be transferred without conflict or resulting disorder.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The committee nominating, and choosing, the final candidates remains un-bias and their expertise within multiple aspects of governance means the high standards can be maintained. Having votes would open the prize up to corruption and attempts to influence the outcome by those who are eligible. A technocratic standard is needed for good governance.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The reward is an incentive, not a bribe; consider it as being similar to performance related pay. The prize shows how if excellent leadership is promoted and good governance encouraged the leaders will be praised, recognised and rewarded. The prize is not a bribe, but a way of incentivising leaders to follow a path towards good governance. By highlighting cases where good governance has excelled the prize draws attention to the benefits of good governance through a cost-benefit appraisal. The social, economic, and political returns are highlighted; and other African governments encouraged to follow the trend.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize is too narrowly defined. At what scale should the change be defined? For example civil-society and community leaders can make significant changes to governance at a smaller-scale; promoting democratic governance from a bottom-up initiative can work as well as top down. On another hand, should we only be focusing on the very top? What about the government officials who are not heads of state but make a change to people’s lives? The narrow focus on the head of a party or state neglects the body - such as finance ministers - that maintains that system of governance and work hard to ensure a democratic transition. The focus on heads of state may deter the state body from ensuring effective governance due to the fact their hard work is not rewarded or recognised.\n\nDue to the relatively young nature of democracy and multi-party rule across Africa, the criteria of potential prize candidates needs to be expanded. The number of former heads of states having left in the past three years is small. Therefore the criteria for nomination needs to change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Although the prize has gained recognition in the Western world or ‘Global North’ to what extent is the prize, its reward, and meaning, known and understood by African citizens? If the prize is recognising African leadership citizens need to be aware of the prize in the first place - whether their country is up for nomination or not. Awareness is the only way the apparent transparency can hold power and become a reality. Citizens cannot demand change or hold the state to account when they are not aware of the index, the prize, and the so-called changes being made.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize by focusing on leaders ignores the areas where money is needed; not lining already rich people’s pockets but providing money and advice to actually set up these institutions. This means for example ensuring the police and civil servants are well enough paid they don’t resort to corruption etc. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) highlight that there is also a ‘vicious cycle’ whereby the presence of bad institutions - authoritarian, unaccountable, with limited economic innovations - reinforce poverty and bad governance. Although offering rewards where significant change has happened is a positive model, in reality, many African states require funds to be able to enforce change in the first place and break this vicious cycle.\n\nFor good governance to be promoted rewards should not only go to the best, but also the good in a continent where bad governance dominates. For any progress to be made in governance the prize needs to lower standards of expectation, recognise where improvements are made, and use the reward to change the vicious cycle. Some change is better than none; focusing on picking the best with high standards limits any change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Bribing good governance\n\nThe Mo Ibrahim Prize is bribing African leaders to shift towards good governance. The financial incentive is being distributed to entice leaders to follow good governance approaches and models. The fact that no questions are asked on where the money provided goes; how it is used; and what the former leaders spend it on raise further questions. Most importantly to what extent can we claim elaborate bribery is an effective means to enforce good governance within the continent? For a start having what is essentially a bribe to encourage good governance is hypoctitical. Secondly a bribe for an individual relies on that one individual’s actions. Thus in 2007 the prize was granted to Mozambique’s President Chissano. However, since 2007 declines have emerged in the scores concerning law and rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).\n\nAdditionally for those motivated by money the money provided cannot compete with potential returns that can be gained from natural resources, tax evasion schemes, and capital flight. The bribery incentive does not compete with potential profits gained through alternative forms corruption (Bedell, 2009).\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo A contradictory approach\n\nThe prize will fail to promote good governance due to the contradictory approach it undertakes. Good governance cannot emerge and be sustained by rewarding former presidents. Having a good former president does not mean their successor will encourage their legacy to continue. Why celebrate good former leaders when we need to focus on what is happening now?\n\nMoreover why reward someone just when they can no longer do any good? The prize suffers from the contradiction of regarding giving up power as a necessary criteria to obtain the prize. This ignores that Africa does not want those who are being successful at promoting good governance to leave their post – potentially to someone who will move backwards. Having a prize for someone who could have done more good had they stayed is contradictory.\n\nFinally the prize is not good for Africa; the prize has raised negative stereotypes of African states, leaders, and systems. The attention gained by the prize not being granted for 3 out of 6 years is maintaining negative stereotypes of African leaders. This will only act to reinforce the global system of power - whereby the West intervene to implement a ‘good’ model of governance, not suited to Africa.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Who's on the committee?\n\nWho decides whether governance is going in the right direction within the African continent? The prize committee includes six individuals who make the decision of who is worthy of the reward, and whether it is granted. The panel includes leading figures, not all of whom have held elected positions such as Mohamed ElBaradei, and not all of whom are African, such as Martti Ahtisaari and Mary Robinson (Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee). Among these distinguished panellists the voice of Africa’s population is missing. A prize about good governance should incorporate a people’s vote as good governance is only relevant if it helps the people. Moreover without a public voice there is a lack of transparency in the workings of the committee and the decisions made. Hardly a good standard for a governance prize.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Focusing on the leaders of good governance\n\nPrevious winners - such as Nelson Mandela and Pedro Pires - made significant changes to their nation-states, ending apartheid and promoting social development. The former leaders provided equality and a functioning democracy to their people. Such needs to be the aim of leaders today.\n\nProviding a prize to the highest achievers provides an example. It highlights leaders from even small countries – such as Cape Verde’s Pires – that can serve as role models for Africa’s leaders. Without the prize the most likely role models would simply be those of the biggest states who are highest profile. Mo Ibrahim (2013) has stated the prize is for “excellence, it’s not a pension”. This is why it is not always awarded. The prize is only be awarded when high-standards of good governance are replicated, and maintained, by leaders. Focusing on the top of government encourages a top down implementation of good government. When the leader acts others will follow; a comparatively small amount of money can therefore make a big difference.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Transparency\n\nThe prize is helping citizens to be aware of good governance, and bad, occurring within their state. By granting the prize citizens are shown what leaders have done right; and the publication of the index - the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) - shows where improvement may be required. The prize is forcing transparency between governments and society. Information on how states are doing means citizens can take action, and demand change where change is needed. The prize is calling for African citizens to get the leadership they deserved, desired, and have a right to.\n\nBy maintaining strict standards on when, and to whom, the reward is provided gives a realistic picture of governance in Africa. It showcases the continued need for good governance; and also doesn’t give citizens and the international community a false illusion that governance is good in Africa when it is not.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Recognition when credit is due\n\nThe past few years have seen African governments, and heads of state, reluctant to leave office; driving political coups; and leading violent crimes against humanity. Mugabe, Kabila, and Kenyatta are but a few articulating the years of sustained bad governance. The prize is only awarded when credit is due - if leaders have made a significant positive impact this will be recognised and rewarded. The prize is therefore for absolute gains in governance, not relative to other countries.\n\nAs the prize is not always awarded it avoids the pitfall that distributing a financial prize where no change has been made to political institutions would reinforce a system. The state would continue to function on undemocratic governance, and the reward would become a new example of dead money [1] . Instead it encourages improved control over aid and money transferred to African states, it shows that rewards are given based on merit. The Mo Ibrahim prize therefore encourages the good institutions that are necessary for prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).\n\n[1] See further readings: Moyo, 2009.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.125
] |
[
86.25,
90.0625,
87.3125,
87.1875,
86.625,
88.875,
84.625,
85.125,
88.6875,
85.625,
88,
86.125
] |
Who's on the committee?
Who decides whether governance is going in the right direction within the African continent? The prize committee includes six individuals who make the decision of who is worthy of the reward, and whether it is granted. The panel includes leading figures, not all of whom have held elected positions such as Mohamed ElBaradei, and not all of whom are African, such as Martti Ahtisaari and Mary Robinson (Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee). Among these distinguished panellists the voice of Africa’s population is missing. A prize about good governance should incorporate a people’s vote as good governance is only relevant if it helps the people. Moreover without a public voice there is a lack of transparency in the workings of the committee and the decisions made. Hardly a good standard for a governance prize.
|
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The committee nominating, and choosing, the final candidates remains un-bias and their expertise within multiple aspects of governance means the high standards can be maintained. Having votes would open the prize up to corruption and attempts to influence the outcome by those who are eligible. A technocratic standard is needed for good governance.\n"
] |
[
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo One of the criteria for awarding the prize is ‘demonstrated exceptional leadership’. This clearly allows the IIAG to be fed into the process as it is the IIAG that can show if the leader being considered has demonstrated this leadership. The IIAG provides a useful tool to assist in deciding the prize winner, and nominees.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo It is not contradictory to offer a reward for good governance after the leader has left office. Dictators holding onto power for long periods are one of Africa’s biggest problems. Rewarding those who step aside shows that an important part of good governance is having presidents who stick to constitutional terms. A stable transfer of power is vital in a democracy. This is something that is even more important when the transfer is to a political opponent. One of the most important advances in governance that can be made is to make be considered normal that the opposition is as loyal to the country as the government. When this happens power can easily be transferred without conflict or resulting disorder.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The reward is an incentive, not a bribe; consider it as being similar to performance related pay. The prize shows how if excellent leadership is promoted and good governance encouraged the leaders will be praised, recognised and rewarded. The prize is not a bribe, but a way of incentivising leaders to follow a path towards good governance. By highlighting cases where good governance has excelled the prize draws attention to the benefits of good governance through a cost-benefit appraisal. The social, economic, and political returns are highlighted; and other African governments encouraged to follow the trend.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize is too narrowly defined. At what scale should the change be defined? For example civil-society and community leaders can make significant changes to governance at a smaller-scale; promoting democratic governance from a bottom-up initiative can work as well as top down. On another hand, should we only be focusing on the very top? What about the government officials who are not heads of state but make a change to people’s lives? The narrow focus on the head of a party or state neglects the body - such as finance ministers - that maintains that system of governance and work hard to ensure a democratic transition. The focus on heads of state may deter the state body from ensuring effective governance due to the fact their hard work is not rewarded or recognised.\n\nDue to the relatively young nature of democracy and multi-party rule across Africa, the criteria of potential prize candidates needs to be expanded. The number of former heads of states having left in the past three years is small. Therefore the criteria for nomination needs to change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Although the prize has gained recognition in the Western world or ‘Global North’ to what extent is the prize, its reward, and meaning, known and understood by African citizens? If the prize is recognising African leadership citizens need to be aware of the prize in the first place - whether their country is up for nomination or not. Awareness is the only way the apparent transparency can hold power and become a reality. Citizens cannot demand change or hold the state to account when they are not aware of the index, the prize, and the so-called changes being made.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo The prize by focusing on leaders ignores the areas where money is needed; not lining already rich people’s pockets but providing money and advice to actually set up these institutions. This means for example ensuring the police and civil servants are well enough paid they don’t resort to corruption etc. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) highlight that there is also a ‘vicious cycle’ whereby the presence of bad institutions - authoritarian, unaccountable, with limited economic innovations - reinforce poverty and bad governance. Although offering rewards where significant change has happened is a positive model, in reality, many African states require funds to be able to enforce change in the first place and break this vicious cycle.\n\nFor good governance to be promoted rewards should not only go to the best, but also the good in a continent where bad governance dominates. For any progress to be made in governance the prize needs to lower standards of expectation, recognise where improvements are made, and use the reward to change the vicious cycle. Some change is better than none; focusing on picking the best with high standards limits any change.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Bribing good governance\n\nThe Mo Ibrahim Prize is bribing African leaders to shift towards good governance. The financial incentive is being distributed to entice leaders to follow good governance approaches and models. The fact that no questions are asked on where the money provided goes; how it is used; and what the former leaders spend it on raise further questions. Most importantly to what extent can we claim elaborate bribery is an effective means to enforce good governance within the continent? For a start having what is essentially a bribe to encourage good governance is hypoctitical. Secondly a bribe for an individual relies on that one individual’s actions. Thus in 2007 the prize was granted to Mozambique’s President Chissano. However, since 2007 declines have emerged in the scores concerning law and rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013).\n\nAdditionally for those motivated by money the money provided cannot compete with potential returns that can be gained from natural resources, tax evasion schemes, and capital flight. The bribery incentive does not compete with potential profits gained through alternative forms corruption (Bedell, 2009).\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo A contradictory approach\n\nThe prize will fail to promote good governance due to the contradictory approach it undertakes. Good governance cannot emerge and be sustained by rewarding former presidents. Having a good former president does not mean their successor will encourage their legacy to continue. Why celebrate good former leaders when we need to focus on what is happening now?\n\nMoreover why reward someone just when they can no longer do any good? The prize suffers from the contradiction of regarding giving up power as a necessary criteria to obtain the prize. This ignores that Africa does not want those who are being successful at promoting good governance to leave their post – potentially to someone who will move backwards. Having a prize for someone who could have done more good had they stayed is contradictory.\n\nFinally the prize is not good for Africa; the prize has raised negative stereotypes of African states, leaders, and systems. The attention gained by the prize not being granted for 3 out of 6 years is maintaining negative stereotypes of African leaders. This will only act to reinforce the global system of power - whereby the West intervene to implement a ‘good’ model of governance, not suited to Africa.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Is the IIAG a good measure of ‘good governance’?\n\nHow do we define, classify, and recognise good governance? The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has created the Ibrahim Index. The IIAG calculates governance across Africa and assesses it over time. The IIAG shows governance has improved across the continent since 2000; and in 2013 classified Mauritius with the highest rank and Liberia as showcasing the greatest positive change over 13 years. But does the index have the right weighting? Where ‘good governance’ is found changes depending on the weighting applied. Even odder is that although the foundation has this index it is not actually used when awarding the prize, this is awarded by a committee to those who pass the criteria that don’t include the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The prize is therefore methodologically unsound as a way of looking at and promoting good governance\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Focusing on the leaders of good governance\n\nPrevious winners - such as Nelson Mandela and Pedro Pires - made significant changes to their nation-states, ending apartheid and promoting social development. The former leaders provided equality and a functioning democracy to their people. Such needs to be the aim of leaders today.\n\nProviding a prize to the highest achievers provides an example. It highlights leaders from even small countries – such as Cape Verde’s Pires – that can serve as role models for Africa’s leaders. Without the prize the most likely role models would simply be those of the biggest states who are highest profile. Mo Ibrahim (2013) has stated the prize is for “excellence, it’s not a pension”. This is why it is not always awarded. The prize is only be awarded when high-standards of good governance are replicated, and maintained, by leaders. Focusing on the top of government encourages a top down implementation of good government. When the leader acts others will follow; a comparatively small amount of money can therefore make a big difference.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Transparency\n\nThe prize is helping citizens to be aware of good governance, and bad, occurring within their state. By granting the prize citizens are shown what leaders have done right; and the publication of the index - the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) - shows where improvement may be required. The prize is forcing transparency between governments and society. Information on how states are doing means citizens can take action, and demand change where change is needed. The prize is calling for African citizens to get the leadership they deserved, desired, and have a right to.\n\nBy maintaining strict standards on when, and to whom, the reward is provided gives a realistic picture of governance in Africa. It showcases the continued need for good governance; and also doesn’t give citizens and the international community a false illusion that governance is good in Africa when it is not.\n",
"africa politics politics general government leadership house believes mo Recognition when credit is due\n\nThe past few years have seen African governments, and heads of state, reluctant to leave office; driving political coups; and leading violent crimes against humanity. Mugabe, Kabila, and Kenyatta are but a few articulating the years of sustained bad governance. The prize is only awarded when credit is due - if leaders have made a significant positive impact this will be recognised and rewarded. The prize is therefore for absolute gains in governance, not relative to other countries.\n\nAs the prize is not always awarded it avoids the pitfall that distributing a financial prize where no change has been made to political institutions would reinforce a system. The state would continue to function on undemocratic governance, and the reward would become a new example of dead money [1] . Instead it encourages improved control over aid and money transferred to African states, it shows that rewards are given based on merit. The Mo Ibrahim prize therefore encourages the good institutions that are necessary for prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).\n\n[1] See further readings: Moyo, 2009.\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
94.5625
] |
[
86,
84.625,
84.375,
85.25,
87.5,
84.75,
83.25,
84.1875,
84.4375,
83.5625,
84.8125,
83.25
] |
Accountability
It is a fundamental principle of morality that individuals should be held responsible for their crimes – that is the reason why we, as societies, have criminal law.
Prosecuting people – holding them responsible for their crimes – is a moral imperative. We all wish to live in a society where everyone is equally accountable when they commit crime as one in which not everyone is held to account is fundamentally unjust; it creates one rule for the powerless and another for those who are ‘needed’ to help create peace. This would simply incentivise people to try to make themselves indispensable strongmen – not a sustainable basis for a peaceful society.
|
[
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post While distasteful, sometimes cutting deals with perpetrators is necessary to bring a quick end to the human suffering that conflicts cause [1] .\n\nIn advocating prosecutions, justice can simply ignore victims. Atrocities are more than likely to have been committed by more than one side in a conflict. As those leaders do not want to be prosecuted, justice can act as a bar to peace. Moreover if people are responsible and accountable to society then that society should be able to agree to forgo justice in order to create peace if it is deemed necessary.\n\n[1] Grono, Nick and O’Brien, Adam, “Justice in Conflict? The IOCC and Peace Processes”, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, 2008, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/others/ICC%20in%20Africa.pdf , chapter 2\n"
] |
[
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Holocaust denial does still exists today despite the Nuremburg trials and immense amounts of evidence. Also, Japanese denialism over forced prostitution in the Second World War is part of mainstream politics [1] .\n\nDespite ICTY convictions, denial of atrocities in the Yugoslav wars continue.\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Argentina did not prosecute for a long time after the collapse of the junta [1] , a 1986 law, commonly known as the Full Stop Law (also known by its number, Law 23492), prohibited prosecution of those involved in the dirty war which resulted in up to 30,000 deaths.\n\nHowever, Argentina managed to build a lasting peace, and society without prosecutions.\n\n[1] Kersten, Mark, “The Fallacy of Sequencing Peace and Justice”, Opinio Juris, 29 September 2011, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/29/the-fallacy-of-sequencing-peace-and-ju...\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice is not easy. However, it needs to be done – for its own ends, and for a lasting peace. In cases where there are a huge number of perpetrators then the obvious approach is to offer an amnesty to those who committed smaller crimes while prosecuting those who provoked or ordered the crimes.\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Dayton worked despite not inviting Karadzic and Mladic. Both of those are currently on trial for the most serious crimes imaginable – Karadzic for, amongst other things, his alleged role in ordering the Srebrenica massacre, and Mladic for Srbrenica and the Siege of Sarajevo.\n\nThese prosecutions have not caused problems for peace in the Balkans and Croatia, one of the participants in the conflict, has joined the European Union.\n\nSimilarly, despite the ICC indictment, coupled with better results obtained by the Ugandan military, has lead towards the prospect of surrender by the LRA, despite their leaders such as Joseph Kony being indicted [1] .\n\n[1] BBC News, “LRA leader Joseph Kony ‘in surrender talks’ with CAR”, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25027616\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice is needed to help end denialism.\n\nBy creating a historical record through the investigations and trial proceedings [1] , International justice can create a narrative that helps fight denialism over events in the past. It creates an accepted version of events where both victim and accused have had their say.\n\nDenialism can be dangerous because it is likely to create perceptions that are likely to make conflict more likely again. For example the post-First World War Dolchstoßlegende (stab in the back myth) was used by the political right in Germany after WWI implied that the German Army had not lost but Germany had only done so due to the civilian leadership. This not only encouraged a belief that Germany could win in another war but also as the accusation was levelled particularly at socialists and Jews helped pave the way for the holocaust. [2]\n\n[1] Goldstone, p422\n\n[2] Holocaust Encyclopedia, ‘Antisemitism in history: World War I’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 10 June 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007166\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice is needed for a lasting peace\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence.\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest. [1] Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice can harm peace.\n\nFormer ICTR chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, argued that the indictments of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic prevented them from attending the Dayton peace talks. The Russian government tried to get those indictments suspended, but Goldstone informed them that he did not have the power to do so. Slobodan Milosevic, the representative of Serbia also represented Republika Srbska. [1]\n\nIn 2006 thyere was an agreement by the Lord’s Resistance Army to a ceasefire but before they would negotiate towards a final peace the LRA demanded the suspension of the ICC indictments. [2] Even six years on none of the LRA leadership have been caught – had peace been put first it might have occurred then rather than intermittent conflict continuing for years.\n\nPeace is a valid goal. However, an overzealous pursuit of justice may impede negotiations.\n\n[1] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[2] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clarck eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Peace has occurred without justice\n\nArgentina did not prosecute for a long time after the collapse of the junta [1] , a 1986 law, commonly known as the Full Stop Law (also known by its number, Law 23492), prohibited prosecution of those involved in the dirty war which resulted in up to 30,000 deaths.\n\nHowever, Argentina managed to build a lasting peace, and society without prosecutions.\n\n[1] Kersten, Mark, “The Fallacy of Sequencing Peace and Justice”, Opinio Juris, 29 September 2011, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/29/the-fallacy-of-sequencing-peace-and-ju...\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice can be impossible\n\nThe Rwandan genocide one of the largest the world has ever seen since the Second World War. A large number of victims – at least half a million – means a large number of perpetrators. There are 100,000 alleged perpetrators in Uganda. While an informal Gacaca system has been criticized by human rights groups for not being able to provide fair trials, a full system of fair trials would be impractical [1] .\n\nRwanda is now relatively peaceful, with a functioning economy.\n\n[1] Hannum, p492\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
89.1875
] |
[
83.125,
87.8125,
87.8125,
88.25,
85.3125,
82.6875,
84.0625,
86.125,
85.875,
84.25
] |
Justice is needed to help end denialism.
By creating a historical record through the investigations and trial proceedings [1] , International justice can create a narrative that helps fight denialism over events in the past. It creates an accepted version of events where both victim and accused have had their say.
Denialism can be dangerous because it is likely to create perceptions that are likely to make conflict more likely again. For example the post-First World War Dolchstoßlegende (stab in the back myth) was used by the political right in Germany after WWI implied that the German Army had not lost but Germany had only done so due to the civilian leadership. This not only encouraged a belief that Germany could win in another war but also as the accusation was levelled particularly at socialists and Jews helped pave the way for the holocaust. [2]
[1] Goldstone, p422
[2] Holocaust Encyclopedia, ‘Antisemitism in history: World War I’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 10 June 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007166
|
[
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Holocaust denial does still exists today despite the Nuremburg trials and immense amounts of evidence. Also, Japanese denialism over forced prostitution in the Second World War is part of mainstream politics [1] .\n\nDespite ICTY convictions, denial of atrocities in the Yugoslav wars continue.\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n"
] |
[
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post While distasteful, sometimes cutting deals with perpetrators is necessary to bring a quick end to the human suffering that conflicts cause [1] .\n\nIn advocating prosecutions, justice can simply ignore victims. Atrocities are more than likely to have been committed by more than one side in a conflict. As those leaders do not want to be prosecuted, justice can act as a bar to peace. Moreover if people are responsible and accountable to society then that society should be able to agree to forgo justice in order to create peace if it is deemed necessary.\n\n[1] Grono, Nick and O’Brien, Adam, “Justice in Conflict? The IOCC and Peace Processes”, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, 2008, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/others/ICC%20in%20Africa.pdf , chapter 2\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Argentina did not prosecute for a long time after the collapse of the junta [1] , a 1986 law, commonly known as the Full Stop Law (also known by its number, Law 23492), prohibited prosecution of those involved in the dirty war which resulted in up to 30,000 deaths.\n\nHowever, Argentina managed to build a lasting peace, and society without prosecutions.\n\n[1] Kersten, Mark, “The Fallacy of Sequencing Peace and Justice”, Opinio Juris, 29 September 2011, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/29/the-fallacy-of-sequencing-peace-and-ju...\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice is not easy. However, it needs to be done – for its own ends, and for a lasting peace. In cases where there are a huge number of perpetrators then the obvious approach is to offer an amnesty to those who committed smaller crimes while prosecuting those who provoked or ordered the crimes.\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Dayton worked despite not inviting Karadzic and Mladic. Both of those are currently on trial for the most serious crimes imaginable – Karadzic for, amongst other things, his alleged role in ordering the Srebrenica massacre, and Mladic for Srbrenica and the Siege of Sarajevo.\n\nThese prosecutions have not caused problems for peace in the Balkans and Croatia, one of the participants in the conflict, has joined the European Union.\n\nSimilarly, despite the ICC indictment, coupled with better results obtained by the Ugandan military, has lead towards the prospect of surrender by the LRA, despite their leaders such as Joseph Kony being indicted [1] .\n\n[1] BBC News, “LRA leader Joseph Kony ‘in surrender talks’ with CAR”, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25027616\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Accountability\n\nIt is a fundamental principle of morality that individuals should be held responsible for their crimes – that is the reason why we, as societies, have criminal law.\n\nProsecuting people – holding them responsible for their crimes – is a moral imperative. We all wish to live in a society where everyone is equally accountable when they commit crime as one in which not everyone is held to account is fundamentally unjust; it creates one rule for the powerless and another for those who are ‘needed’ to help create peace. This would simply incentivise people to try to make themselves indispensable strongmen – not a sustainable basis for a peaceful society.\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice is needed for a lasting peace\n\nBy prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence.\n\nThe career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest. [1] Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.\n\n[1] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice can harm peace.\n\nFormer ICTR chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, argued that the indictments of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic prevented them from attending the Dayton peace talks. The Russian government tried to get those indictments suspended, but Goldstone informed them that he did not have the power to do so. Slobodan Milosevic, the representative of Serbia also represented Republika Srbska. [1]\n\nIn 2006 thyere was an agreement by the Lord’s Resistance Army to a ceasefire but before they would negotiate towards a final peace the LRA demanded the suspension of the ICC indictments. [2] Even six years on none of the LRA leadership have been caught – had peace been put first it might have occurred then rather than intermittent conflict continuing for years.\n\nPeace is a valid goal. However, an overzealous pursuit of justice may impede negotiations.\n\n[1] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[2] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clarck eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Peace has occurred without justice\n\nArgentina did not prosecute for a long time after the collapse of the junta [1] , a 1986 law, commonly known as the Full Stop Law (also known by its number, Law 23492), prohibited prosecution of those involved in the dirty war which resulted in up to 30,000 deaths.\n\nHowever, Argentina managed to build a lasting peace, and society without prosecutions.\n\n[1] Kersten, Mark, “The Fallacy of Sequencing Peace and Justice”, Opinio Juris, 29 September 2011, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/29/the-fallacy-of-sequencing-peace-and-ju...\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice can be impossible\n\nThe Rwandan genocide one of the largest the world has ever seen since the Second World War. A large number of victims – at least half a million – means a large number of perpetrators. There are 100,000 alleged perpetrators in Uganda. While an informal Gacaca system has been criticized by human rights groups for not being able to provide fair trials, a full system of fair trials would be impractical [1] .\n\nRwanda is now relatively peaceful, with a functioning economy.\n\n[1] Hannum, p492\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
92.125
] |
[
84.25,
85.4375,
83.8125,
86.0625,
83.3125,
82.8125,
82.8125,
82.75,
83.0625,
83.375
] |
Justice is needed for a lasting peace
By prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence.
The career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest. [1] Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace.
[1] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3786883.stm
|
[
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters.\n"
] |
[
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post While distasteful, sometimes cutting deals with perpetrators is necessary to bring a quick end to the human suffering that conflicts cause [1] .\n\nIn advocating prosecutions, justice can simply ignore victims. Atrocities are more than likely to have been committed by more than one side in a conflict. As those leaders do not want to be prosecuted, justice can act as a bar to peace. Moreover if people are responsible and accountable to society then that society should be able to agree to forgo justice in order to create peace if it is deemed necessary.\n\n[1] Grono, Nick and O’Brien, Adam, “Justice in Conflict? The IOCC and Peace Processes”, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, 2008, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/others/ICC%20in%20Africa.pdf , chapter 2\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Holocaust denial does still exists today despite the Nuremburg trials and immense amounts of evidence. Also, Japanese denialism over forced prostitution in the Second World War is part of mainstream politics [1] .\n\nDespite ICTY convictions, denial of atrocities in the Yugoslav wars continue.\n\n[1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200501120160.html\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Argentina did not prosecute for a long time after the collapse of the junta [1] , a 1986 law, commonly known as the Full Stop Law (also known by its number, Law 23492), prohibited prosecution of those involved in the dirty war which resulted in up to 30,000 deaths.\n\nHowever, Argentina managed to build a lasting peace, and society without prosecutions.\n\n[1] Kersten, Mark, “The Fallacy of Sequencing Peace and Justice”, Opinio Juris, 29 September 2011, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/29/the-fallacy-of-sequencing-peace-and-ju...\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice is not easy. However, it needs to be done – for its own ends, and for a lasting peace. In cases where there are a huge number of perpetrators then the obvious approach is to offer an amnesty to those who committed smaller crimes while prosecuting those who provoked or ordered the crimes.\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Dayton worked despite not inviting Karadzic and Mladic. Both of those are currently on trial for the most serious crimes imaginable – Karadzic for, amongst other things, his alleged role in ordering the Srebrenica massacre, and Mladic for Srbrenica and the Siege of Sarajevo.\n\nThese prosecutions have not caused problems for peace in the Balkans and Croatia, one of the participants in the conflict, has joined the European Union.\n\nSimilarly, despite the ICC indictment, coupled with better results obtained by the Ugandan military, has lead towards the prospect of surrender by the LRA, despite their leaders such as Joseph Kony being indicted [1] .\n\n[1] BBC News, “LRA leader Joseph Kony ‘in surrender talks’ with CAR”, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25027616\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Accountability\n\nIt is a fundamental principle of morality that individuals should be held responsible for their crimes – that is the reason why we, as societies, have criminal law.\n\nProsecuting people – holding them responsible for their crimes – is a moral imperative. We all wish to live in a society where everyone is equally accountable when they commit crime as one in which not everyone is held to account is fundamentally unjust; it creates one rule for the powerless and another for those who are ‘needed’ to help create peace. This would simply incentivise people to try to make themselves indispensable strongmen – not a sustainable basis for a peaceful society.\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice is needed to help end denialism.\n\nBy creating a historical record through the investigations and trial proceedings [1] , International justice can create a narrative that helps fight denialism over events in the past. It creates an accepted version of events where both victim and accused have had their say.\n\nDenialism can be dangerous because it is likely to create perceptions that are likely to make conflict more likely again. For example the post-First World War Dolchstoßlegende (stab in the back myth) was used by the political right in Germany after WWI implied that the German Army had not lost but Germany had only done so due to the civilian leadership. This not only encouraged a belief that Germany could win in another war but also as the accusation was levelled particularly at socialists and Jews helped pave the way for the holocaust. [2]\n\n[1] Goldstone, p422\n\n[2] Holocaust Encyclopedia, ‘Antisemitism in history: World War I’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 10 June 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007166\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice can harm peace.\n\nFormer ICTR chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, argued that the indictments of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic prevented them from attending the Dayton peace talks. The Russian government tried to get those indictments suspended, but Goldstone informed them that he did not have the power to do so. Slobodan Milosevic, the representative of Serbia also represented Republika Srbska. [1]\n\nIn 2006 thyere was an agreement by the Lord’s Resistance Army to a ceasefire but before they would negotiate towards a final peace the LRA demanded the suspension of the ICC indictments. [2] Even six years on none of the LRA leadership have been caught – had peace been put first it might have occurred then rather than intermittent conflict continuing for years.\n\nPeace is a valid goal. However, an overzealous pursuit of justice may impede negotiations.\n\n[1] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1367&context=nlj&sei-redir=1 at p421-p322\n\n[2] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clarck eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Waddell_Clark_Courting_Conflict.pdf\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Peace has occurred without justice\n\nArgentina did not prosecute for a long time after the collapse of the junta [1] , a 1986 law, commonly known as the Full Stop Law (also known by its number, Law 23492), prohibited prosecution of those involved in the dirty war which resulted in up to 30,000 deaths.\n\nHowever, Argentina managed to build a lasting peace, and society without prosecutions.\n\n[1] Kersten, Mark, “The Fallacy of Sequencing Peace and Justice”, Opinio Juris, 29 September 2011, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/29/the-fallacy-of-sequencing-peace-and-ju...\n",
"africa law human rights international law punishment house believes post Justice can be impossible\n\nThe Rwandan genocide one of the largest the world has ever seen since the Second World War. A large number of victims – at least half a million – means a large number of perpetrators. There are 100,000 alleged perpetrators in Uganda. While an informal Gacaca system has been criticized by human rights groups for not being able to provide fair trials, a full system of fair trials would be impractical [1] .\n\nRwanda is now relatively peaceful, with a functioning economy.\n\n[1] Hannum, p492\n"
] |
normal
|
Given a claim, find documents that refute the claim.
|
[
95.6875
] |
[
93.9375,
84.3125,
92.5625,
92.125,
90.125,
85.4375,
83.8125,
90.875,
90.0625,
87.8125
] |
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