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Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ebt_cleanup_watcher(struct ebt_entry_watcher *w, struct net *net, unsigned int *i)
{
struct xt_tgdtor_param par;
if (i && (*i)-- == 0)
return 1;
par.net = net;
par.target = w->u.watcher;
par.targinfo = w->data;
par.family = NFPROTO_BRIDGE;
if (par.target->destroy != NULL)
par.target->destroy(&par);
module_put(par.target->me);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void kgdb_arch_late(void)
{
int i, cpu;
struct perf_event_attr attr;
struct perf_event **pevent;
/*
* Pre-allocate the hw breakpoint structions in the non-atomic
* portion of kgdb because this operation requires mutexs to
* complete.
*/
hw_breakpoint_init(&attr);
attr.bp_addr = (unsigned long)kgdb_arch_init;
attr.bp_len = HW_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1;
attr.bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_W;
attr.disabled = 1;
for (i = 0; i < HBP_NUM; i++) {
if (breakinfo[i].pev)
continue;
breakinfo[i].pev = register_wide_hw_breakpoint(&attr, NULL);
if (IS_ERR((void * __force)breakinfo[i].pev)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kgdb: Could not allocate hw"
"breakpoints\nDisabling the kernel debugger\n");
breakinfo[i].pev = NULL;
kgdb_arch_exit();
return;
}
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
pevent = per_cpu_ptr(breakinfo[i].pev, cpu);
pevent[0]->hw.sample_period = 1;
pevent[0]->overflow_handler = kgdb_hw_overflow_handler;
if (pevent[0]->destroy != NULL) {
pevent[0]->destroy = NULL;
release_bp_slot(*pevent);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static zval *php_zip_get_property_ptr_ptr(zval *object, zval *member, int type, void **cache_slot) /* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object *obj;
zval tmp_member;
zval *retval = NULL;
zip_prop_handler *hnd = NULL;
zend_object_handlers *std_hnd;
if (Z_TYPE_P(member) != IS_STRING) {
ZVAL_COPY(&tmp_member, member);
convert_to_string(&tmp_member);
member = &tmp_member;
cache_slot = NULL;
}
obj = Z_ZIP_P(object);
if (obj->prop_handler != NULL) {
hnd = zend_hash_find_ptr(obj->prop_handler, Z_STR_P(member));
}
if (hnd == NULL) {
std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
retval = std_hnd->get_property_ptr_ptr(object, member, type, cache_slot);
}
if (member == &tmp_member) {
zval_dtor(member);
}
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void GetSanitizedEnabledFlagsForCurrentPlatform(
FlagsStorage* flags_storage, std::set<std::string>* result) {
GetSanitizedEnabledFlags(flags_storage, result);
std::set<std::string> platform_experiments;
int current_platform = GetCurrentPlatform();
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_experiments; ++i) {
if (experiments[i].supported_platforms & current_platform)
AddInternalName(experiments[i], &platform_experiments);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (experiments[i].supported_platforms & kOsCrOSOwnerOnly)
AddInternalName(experiments[i], &platform_experiments);
#endif
}
std::set<std::string> new_enabled_experiments =
base::STLSetIntersection<std::set<std::string> >(
platform_experiments, *result);
result->swap(new_enabled_experiments);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: scoped_refptr<Extension> LoadAndExpectSuccess(DictionaryValue* manifest,
const std::string& name) {
std::string error;
scoped_refptr<Extension> extension = LoadExtension(manifest, &error);
EXPECT_TRUE(extension) << "Unexpected failure for " << name;
EXPECT_EQ("", error) << "Unexpected error for " << name;
return extension;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: size_t AMRExtractor::countTracks() {
return mInitCheck == OK ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 162,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int nfs4_do_open_expired(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_open_expired(ctx, state);
trace_nfs4_open_expired(ctx, 0, err);
if (nfs4_clear_cap_atomic_open_v1(server, err, &exception))
continue;
switch (err) {
default:
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_GRACE:
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
err = 0;
}
} while (exception.retry);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void netlink_increment_head(struct netlink_ring *ring)
{
ring->head = ring->head != ring->frame_max ? ring->head + 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
dma_addr_t *addr)
{
PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(xhci);
while (1) {
TRBType type;
pci_dma_read(pci_dev, ring->dequeue, trb, TRB_SIZE);
trb->addr = ring->dequeue;
trb->ccs = ring->ccs;
le64_to_cpus(&trb->parameter);
le32_to_cpus(&trb->status);
le32_to_cpus(&trb->control);
trace_usb_xhci_fetch_trb(ring->dequeue, trb_name(trb),
trb->parameter, trb->status, trb->control);
if ((trb->control & TRB_C) != ring->ccs) {
return 0;
}
type = TRB_TYPE(*trb);
if (type != TR_LINK) {
if (addr) {
*addr = ring->dequeue;
}
ring->dequeue += TRB_SIZE;
return type;
} else {
ring->dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb->parameter);
if (trb->control & TRB_LK_TC) {
ring->ccs = !ring->ccs;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsVIPS(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 4)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\010\362\246\266",4) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
if (memcmp(magick,"\266\246\362\010",4) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void dn_unhash_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
write_lock(&dn_hash_lock);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock(&dn_hash_lock);
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: Element* SVGDocumentExtensions::removeElementFromPendingResourcesForRemoval(const AtomicString& id)
{
if (id.isEmpty())
return 0;
SVGPendingElements* resourceSet = m_pendingResourcesForRemoval.get(id);
if (!resourceSet || resourceSet->isEmpty())
return 0;
SVGPendingElements::iterator firstElement = resourceSet->begin();
Element* element = *firstElement;
resourceSet->remove(firstElement);
if (resourceSet->isEmpty())
removePendingResourceForRemoval(id);
return element;
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_start_element)
{
php_xmlwriter_string_arg(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, xmlTextWriterStartElement, "Invalid Element Name");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool RenderLayerScrollableArea::overflowControlsIntersectRect(const IntRect& localRect) const
{
const IntRect borderBox = box().pixelSnappedBorderBoxRect();
if (rectForHorizontalScrollbar(borderBox).intersects(localRect))
return true;
if (rectForVerticalScrollbar(borderBox).intersects(localRect))
return true;
if (scrollCornerRect().intersects(localRect))
return true;
if (resizerCornerRect(borderBox, ResizerForPointer).intersects(localRect))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static struct btrfs_dir_item *insert_with_overflow(struct btrfs_trans_handle
*trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path,
struct btrfs_key *cpu_key,
u32 data_size,
const char *name,
int name_len)
{
int ret;
char *ptr;
struct btrfs_item *item;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
ret = btrfs_insert_empty_item(trans, root, path, cpu_key, data_size);
if (ret == -EEXIST) {
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
di = btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
if (di)
return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
btrfs_extend_item(root, path, data_size);
} else if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
WARN_ON(ret > 0);
leaf = path->nodes[0];
item = btrfs_item_nr(path->slots[0]);
ptr = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0], char);
BUG_ON(data_size > btrfs_item_size(leaf, item));
ptr += btrfs_item_size(leaf, item) - data_size;
return (struct btrfs_dir_item *)ptr;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void ClearMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "clear");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
bool result = impl->myMaplikeClear(script_state, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException()) {
return;
}
V8SetReturnValueBool(info, result);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
int received_content_length, int original_content_length,
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled, bool via_data_reduction_proxy,
PrefService* prefs) {
int64 total_received = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength);
int64 total_original = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength);
total_received += received_content_length;
total_original += original_content_length;
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, total_received);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, total_original);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
UpdateContentLengthPrefsForDataReductionProxy(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
via_data_reduction_proxy,
base::Time::Now(),
prefs);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 171,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int FLTIsLineFilter(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pszValue)
return 0;
if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_SPATIAL &&
psFilterNode->psRightNode &&
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_GEOMETRY_LINE)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(chr)
{
zend_long c;
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() != 1) {
WRONG_PARAM_COUNT;
}
#ifndef FAST_ZPP
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l", &c) == FAILURE) {
c = 0;
}
#else
ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_START_EX(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, 1, 1)
Z_PARAM_LONG(c)
ZEND_PARSE_PARAMETERS_END_EX(c = 0);
#endif
c &= 0xff;
if (CG(one_char_string)[c]) {
ZVAL_INTERNED_STR(return_value, CG(one_char_string)[c]);
} else {
ZVAL_NEW_STR(return_value, zend_string_alloc(1, 0));
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[0] = (char)c;
Z_STRVAL_P(return_value)[1] = '\0';
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCompileShader(GLuint client_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCompileShader");
Shader* shader = GetShaderInfoNotProgram(client_id, "glCompileShader");
if (!shader) {
return;
}
ShaderTranslator* translator = NULL;
if (use_shader_translator_) {
translator = shader->shader_type() == GL_VERTEX_SHADER ?
vertex_translator_.get() : fragment_translator_.get();
}
program_manager()->DoCompileShader(
shader,
translator,
feature_info_->feature_flags().angle_translated_shader_source ?
ProgramManager::kANGLE : ProgramManager::kGL);
};
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Browser::DidEndColorChooser() {
color_chooser_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: Framebuffer* GetBoundReadFramebuffer() const {
GLenum target = GetReadFramebufferTarget();
return GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(target);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int getlistselopts(char *tag, struct listargs *args)
{
int c;
static struct buf buf;
if ( (c = prot_getc(imapd_in)) == ')')
return prot_getc(imapd_in);
else
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
for (;;) {
c = getword(imapd_in, &buf);
if (!*buf.s) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Invalid syntax in List command\r\n",
tag);
return EOF;
}
lcase(buf.s);
if (!strcmp(buf.s, "subscribed")) {
args->sel |= LIST_SEL_SUBSCRIBED;
args->ret |= LIST_RET_SUBSCRIBED;
} else if (!strcmp(buf.s, "vendor.cmu-dav")) {
args->sel |= LIST_SEL_DAV;
} else if (!strcmp(buf.s, "remote")) {
args->sel |= LIST_SEL_REMOTE;
} else if (!strcmp(buf.s, "recursivematch")) {
args->sel |= LIST_SEL_RECURSIVEMATCH;
} else if (!strcmp(buf.s, "special-use")) {
args->sel |= LIST_SEL_SPECIALUSE;
args->ret |= LIST_RET_SPECIALUSE;
} else if (!strcmp(buf.s, "metadata")) {
struct getmetadata_options opts = OPTS_INITIALIZER;
args->sel |= LIST_SEL_METADATA;
args->ret |= LIST_RET_METADATA;
strarray_t options = STRARRAY_INITIALIZER;
c = parse_metadata_string_or_list(tag, &options, NULL);
parse_getmetadata_options(&options, &opts);
args->metaopts = opts;
strarray_fini(&options);
if (c == EOF) return EOF;
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Invalid List selection option \"%s\"\r\n",
tag, buf.s);
return EOF;
}
if (c != ' ') break;
}
if (c != ')') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing close parenthesis for List selection options\r\n", tag);
return EOF;
}
if (args->sel & list_select_mod_opts
&& ! (args->sel & list_select_base_opts)) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Invalid combination of selection options\r\n",
tag);
return EOF;
}
return prot_getc(imapd_in);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void voidMethodOptionalDictionaryArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Dictionary, optionalDictionaryArg, Dictionary(info[0], info.GetIsolate()));
if (!optionalDictionaryArg.isUndefinedOrNull() && !optionalDictionaryArg.isObject()) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodOptionalDictionaryArg", "TestObjectPython", "parameter 1 ('optionalDictionaryArg') is not an object."), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
imp->voidMethodOptionalDictionaryArg(optionalDictionaryArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: verify_for_user_checksum(krb5_context context,
krb5_keyblock *key,
krb5_pa_for_user *req)
{
krb5_error_code code;
int i;
krb5_int32 name_type;
char *p;
krb5_data data;
krb5_boolean valid = FALSE;
if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(req->cksum.checksum_type)) {
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
}
/*
* Checksum is over name type and string components of
* client principal name and auth_package.
*/
data.length = 4;
for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, req->user); i++) {
data.length += krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length;
}
data.length += krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length;
data.length += req->auth_package.length;
p = data.data = malloc(data.length);
if (data.data == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
name_type = krb5_princ_type(context, req->user);
p[0] = (name_type >> 0 ) & 0xFF;
p[1] = (name_type >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
p[2] = (name_type >> 16) & 0xFF;
p[3] = (name_type >> 24) & 0xFF;
p += 4;
for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, req->user); i++) {
if (krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length > 0) {
memcpy(p, krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->data,
krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length);
}
p += krb5_princ_component(context, req->user, i)->length;
}
if (krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length > 0) {
memcpy(p, krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->data,
krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length);
}
p += krb5_princ_realm(context, req->user)->length;
if (req->auth_package.length > 0)
memcpy(p, req->auth_package.data, req->auth_package.length);
p += req->auth_package.length;
code = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context,
key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM,
&data,
&req->cksum,
&valid);
if (code == 0 && valid == FALSE)
code = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
free(data.data);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 54,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: RenderObject* HTMLSelectElement::createRenderer(RenderStyle*)
{
if (usesMenuList())
return new (document()->renderArena()) RenderMenuList(this);
return new (document()->renderArena()) RenderListBox(this);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline double MagickLog10(const double x)
{
#define Log10Epsilon (1.0e-11)
if (fabs(x) < Log10Epsilon)
return(log10(Log10Epsilon));
return(log10(fabs(x)));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 96,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: parse_object(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an object is a possibly empty sequence of object fields, separated by
* commas and surrounded by curly braces.
*/
json_struct_action ostart = sem->object_start;
json_struct_action oend = sem->object_end;
JsonTokenType tok;
if (ostart != NULL)
(*ostart) (sem->semstate);
* itself. Note that we increment this after we call the semantic routine
* for the object start and restore it before we call the routine for the
* object end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
/* we know this will succeeed, just clearing the token */
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_START);
tok = lex_peek(lex);
switch (tok)
{
case JSON_TOKEN_STRING:
parse_object_field(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_object_field(lex, sem);
break;
case JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END:
break;
default:
/* case of an invalid initial token inside the object */
report_parse_error(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_START, lex);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_OBJECT_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (oend != NULL)
(*oend) (sem->semstate);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: InstallPromptPermissions() {
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 131,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int vm_insert_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long pfn)
{
int ret;
pgprot_t pgprot = vma->vm_page_prot;
/*
* Technically, architectures with pte_special can avoid all these
* restrictions (same for remap_pfn_range). However we would like
* consistency in testing and feature parity among all, so we should
* try to keep these invariants in place for everybody.
*/
BUG_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP)));
BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP)) ==
(VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP));
BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags & VM_PFNMAP) && is_cow_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags & VM_MIXEDMAP) && pfn_valid(pfn));
if (addr < vma->vm_start || addr >= vma->vm_end)
return -EFAULT;
if (track_pfn_insert(vma, &pgprot, pfn))
return -EINVAL;
ret = insert_pfn(vma, addr, pfn, pgprot);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 57,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: update_info_in_idle_data_free (UpdateInfoInIdleData *data)
{
g_object_weak_unref (G_OBJECT (data->device), update_info_in_idle_device_unreffed, data);
g_free (data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
unsigned int val = 0;
int err;
if (level != SOL_NETLINK)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (optlen >= sizeof(int) &&
get_user(val, (unsigned int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case NETLINK_PKTINFO:
if (val)
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_RECV_PKTINFO;
else
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_RECV_PKTINFO;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: {
if (!netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_RECV))
return -EPERM;
err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (!val || val - 1 >= nlk->ngroups)
return -EINVAL;
netlink_table_grab();
netlink_update_socket_mc(nlk, val,
optname == NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP);
netlink_table_ungrab();
if (nlk->netlink_bind)
nlk->netlink_bind(val);
err = 0;
break;
}
case NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR:
if (val)
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR;
else
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS:
if (val) {
nlk->flags |= NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS;
clear_bit(0, &nlk->state);
wake_up_interruptible(&nlk->wait);
} else {
nlk->flags &= ~NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS;
}
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void acpi_os_delete_lock(acpi_spinlock handle)
{
ACPI_FREE(handle);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::ShouldTransferNavigation(bool is_main_frame_navigation) {
if (!delegate_)
return true;
return delegate_->ShouldTransferNavigation(is_main_frame_navigation);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void SetOnError(const base::Callback<void(SocketStreamEvent*)>& callback) {
on_error_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void vrend_renderer_reset(void)
{
if (vrend_state.sync_thread) {
vrend_free_sync_thread();
vrend_state.stop_sync_thread = false;
}
vrend_reset_fences();
vrend_decode_reset(false);
vrend_object_fini_resource_table();
vrend_decode_reset(true);
vrend_object_init_resource_table();
vrend_renderer_context_create_internal(0, 0, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: String16 V8Debugger::setBreakpoint(const String16& sourceID, const ScriptBreakpoint& scriptBreakpoint, int* actualLineNumber, int* actualColumnNumber)
{
v8::HandleScope scope(m_isolate);
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(debuggerContext());
v8::Local<v8::Object> info = v8::Object::New(m_isolate);
info->Set(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "sourceID"), toV8String(m_isolate, sourceID));
info->Set(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "lineNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, scriptBreakpoint.lineNumber));
info->Set(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "columnNumber"), v8::Integer::New(m_isolate, scriptBreakpoint.columnNumber));
info->Set(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "condition"), toV8String(m_isolate, scriptBreakpoint.condition));
v8::Local<v8::Function> setBreakpointFunction = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(m_debuggerScript.Get(m_isolate)->Get(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "setBreakpoint")));
v8::Local<v8::Value> breakpointId = v8::Debug::Call(debuggerContext(), setBreakpointFunction, info).ToLocalChecked();
if (!breakpointId->IsString())
return "";
*actualLineNumber = info->Get(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "lineNumber"))->Int32Value();
*actualColumnNumber = info->Get(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "columnNumber"))->Int32Value();
return toProtocolString(breakpointId.As<v8::String>());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int tg_cfs_schedulable_down(struct task_group *tg, void *data)
{
struct cfs_schedulable_data *d = data;
struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b = &tg->cfs_bandwidth;
s64 quota = 0, parent_quota = -1;
if (!tg->parent) {
quota = RUNTIME_INF;
} else {
struct cfs_bandwidth *parent_b = &tg->parent->cfs_bandwidth;
quota = normalize_cfs_quota(tg, d);
parent_quota = parent_b->hierarchical_quota;
/*
* ensure max(child_quota) <= parent_quota, inherit when no
* limit is set
*/
if (quota == RUNTIME_INF)
quota = parent_quota;
else if (parent_quota != RUNTIME_INF && quota > parent_quota)
return -EINVAL;
}
cfs_b->hierarchical_quota = quota;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: auth_update_key(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_oberthur_updatekey_info *info)
{
int rv, ii;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (info->data_len != sizeof(void *) || !info->data)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
if (info->type == SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_CRT) {
struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_rsa *rsa = (struct sc_pkcs15_prkey_rsa *)info->data;
struct sc_pkcs15_bignum bn[5];
sc_log(card->ctx, "Import RSA CRT");
bn[0] = rsa->p;
bn[1] = rsa->q;
bn[2] = rsa->iqmp;
bn[3] = rsa->dmp1;
bn[4] = rsa->dmq1;
for (ii=0;ii<5;ii++) {
struct auth_update_component_info args;
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(args));
args.type = SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_RSA_CRT;
args.component = ii+1;
args.data = bn[ii].data;
args.len = bn[ii].len;
rv = auth_update_component(card, &args);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Update RSA component failed");
}
}
else if (info->type == SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_DES) {
rv = SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
else {
rv = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int zlib_compress_update(struct crypto_pcomp *tfm,
struct comp_request *req)
{
int ret;
struct zlib_ctx *dctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_pcomp_tfm(tfm));
struct z_stream_s *stream = &dctx->comp_stream;
pr_debug("avail_in %u, avail_out %u\n", req->avail_in, req->avail_out);
stream->next_in = req->next_in;
stream->avail_in = req->avail_in;
stream->next_out = req->next_out;
stream->avail_out = req->avail_out;
ret = zlib_deflate(stream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
switch (ret) {
case Z_OK:
break;
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
pr_debug("zlib_deflate could not make progress\n");
return -EAGAIN;
default:
pr_debug("zlib_deflate failed %d\n", ret);
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = req->avail_out - stream->avail_out;
pr_debug("avail_in %lu, avail_out %lu (consumed %lu, produced %u)\n",
stream->avail_in, stream->avail_out,
req->avail_in - stream->avail_in, ret);
req->next_in = stream->next_in;
req->avail_in = stream->avail_in;
req->next_out = stream->next_out;
req->avail_out = stream->avail_out;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: AutofillManager::AutofillManager(
AutofillDriver* driver,
AutofillClient* client,
const std::string& app_locale,
AutofillDownloadManagerState enable_download_manager)
: AutofillManager(driver,
client,
client->GetPersonalDataManager(),
app_locale,
enable_download_manager) {}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void FileReaderLoader::setEncoding(const String& encoding)
{
if (!encoding.isEmpty())
m_encoding = WTF::TextEncoding(encoding);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void OMXCodec::on_message(const omx_message &msg) {
if (mState == ERROR) {
/*
* only drop EVENT messages, EBD and FBD are still
* processed for bookkeeping purposes
*/
if (msg.type == omx_message::EVENT) {
ALOGW("Dropping OMX EVENT message - we're in ERROR state.");
return;
}
}
switch (msg.type) {
case omx_message::EVENT:
{
onEvent(
msg.u.event_data.event, msg.u.event_data.data1,
msg.u.event_data.data2);
break;
}
case omx_message::EMPTY_BUFFER_DONE:
{
IOMX::buffer_id buffer = msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer;
CODEC_LOGV("EMPTY_BUFFER_DONE(buffer: %u)", buffer);
Vector<BufferInfo> *buffers = &mPortBuffers[kPortIndexInput];
size_t i = 0;
while (i < buffers->size() && (*buffers)[i].mBuffer != buffer) {
++i;
}
CHECK(i < buffers->size());
if ((*buffers)[i].mStatus != OWNED_BY_COMPONENT) {
ALOGW("We already own input buffer %u, yet received "
"an EMPTY_BUFFER_DONE.", buffer);
}
BufferInfo* info = &buffers->editItemAt(i);
info->mStatus = OWNED_BY_US;
if (info->mMediaBuffer != NULL) {
info->mMediaBuffer->release();
info->mMediaBuffer = NULL;
}
if (mPortStatus[kPortIndexInput] == DISABLING) {
CODEC_LOGV("Port is disabled, freeing buffer %u", buffer);
status_t err = freeBuffer(kPortIndexInput, i);
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
} else if (mState != ERROR
&& mPortStatus[kPortIndexInput] != SHUTTING_DOWN) {
CHECK_EQ((int)mPortStatus[kPortIndexInput], (int)ENABLED);
if (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
drainAnyInputBuffer();
} else {
drainInputBuffer(&buffers->editItemAt(i));
}
}
break;
}
case omx_message::FILL_BUFFER_DONE:
{
IOMX::buffer_id buffer = msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer;
OMX_U32 flags = msg.u.extended_buffer_data.flags;
CODEC_LOGV("FILL_BUFFER_DONE(buffer: %u, size: %u, flags: 0x%08x, timestamp: %lld us (%.2f secs))",
buffer,
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.range_length,
flags,
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp,
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp / 1E6);
Vector<BufferInfo> *buffers = &mPortBuffers[kPortIndexOutput];
size_t i = 0;
while (i < buffers->size() && (*buffers)[i].mBuffer != buffer) {
++i;
}
CHECK(i < buffers->size());
BufferInfo *info = &buffers->editItemAt(i);
if (info->mStatus != OWNED_BY_COMPONENT) {
ALOGW("We already own output buffer %u, yet received "
"a FILL_BUFFER_DONE.", buffer);
}
info->mStatus = OWNED_BY_US;
if (mPortStatus[kPortIndexOutput] == DISABLING) {
CODEC_LOGV("Port is disabled, freeing buffer %u", buffer);
status_t err = freeBuffer(kPortIndexOutput, i);
CHECK_EQ(err, (status_t)OK);
#if 0
} else if (mPortStatus[kPortIndexOutput] == ENABLED
&& (flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
CODEC_LOGV("No more output data.");
mNoMoreOutputData = true;
mBufferFilled.signal();
#endif
} else if (mPortStatus[kPortIndexOutput] != SHUTTING_DOWN) {
CHECK_EQ((int)mPortStatus[kPortIndexOutput], (int)ENABLED);
MediaBuffer *buffer = info->mMediaBuffer;
bool isGraphicBuffer = buffer->graphicBuffer() != NULL;
if (!isGraphicBuffer
&& msg.u.extended_buffer_data.range_offset
+ msg.u.extended_buffer_data.range_length
> buffer->size()) {
CODEC_LOGE(
"Codec lied about its buffer size requirements, "
"sending a buffer larger than the originally "
"advertised size in FILL_BUFFER_DONE!");
}
buffer->set_range(
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.range_offset,
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.range_length);
buffer->meta_data()->clear();
buffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp);
if (msg.u.extended_buffer_data.flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME) {
buffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, true);
}
bool isCodecSpecific = false;
if (msg.u.extended_buffer_data.flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
buffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsCodecConfig, true);
isCodecSpecific = true;
}
if (isGraphicBuffer || mQuirks & kOutputBuffersAreUnreadable) {
buffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsUnreadable, true);
}
buffer->meta_data()->setInt32(
kKeyBufferID,
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer);
if (msg.u.extended_buffer_data.flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
CODEC_LOGV("No more output data.");
mNoMoreOutputData = true;
}
if (mIsEncoder && mIsVideo) {
int64_t decodingTimeUs = isCodecSpecific? 0: getDecodingTimeUs();
buffer->meta_data()->setInt64(kKeyDecodingTime, decodingTimeUs);
}
if (mTargetTimeUs >= 0) {
CHECK(msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp <= mTargetTimeUs);
if (msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp < mTargetTimeUs) {
CODEC_LOGV(
"skipping output buffer at timestamp %lld us",
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp);
fillOutputBuffer(info);
break;
}
CODEC_LOGV(
"returning output buffer at target timestamp "
"%lld us",
msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp);
mTargetTimeUs = -1;
}
mFilledBuffers.push_back(i);
mBufferFilled.signal();
if (mIsEncoder) {
sched_yield();
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
CHECK(!"should not be here.");
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static struct sock *unix_find_socket_byinode(struct inode *i)
{
struct sock *s;
spin_lock(&unix_table_lock);
sk_for_each(s,
&unix_socket_table[i->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE - 1)]) {
struct dentry *dentry = unix_sk(s)->path.dentry;
if (dentry && dentry->d_inode == i) {
sock_hold(s);
goto found;
}
}
s = NULL;
found:
spin_unlock(&unix_table_lock);
return s;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: gx_dc_pattern2_color_has_bbox(const gx_device_color * pdevc)
{
gs_pattern2_instance_t *pinst = (gs_pattern2_instance_t *)pdevc->ccolor.pattern;
const gs_shading_t *psh = pinst->templat.Shading;
return psh->params.have_BBox;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: CSSStyleSheet::CSSStyleSheet(StyleSheetContents* contents,
Node& owner_node,
bool is_inline_stylesheet,
const TextPosition& start_position)
: contents_(contents),
is_inline_stylesheet_(is_inline_stylesheet),
owner_node_(&owner_node),
start_position_(start_position) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(IsAcceptableCSSStyleSheetParent(owner_node));
#endif
contents_->RegisterClient(this);
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int mcryptd_create_hash(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
struct mcryptd_queue *queue)
{
struct hashd_instance_ctx *ctx;
struct ahash_instance *inst;
struct shash_alg *salg;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
int err;
salg = shash_attr_alg(tb[1], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(salg))
return PTR_ERR(salg);
alg = &salg->base;
pr_debug("crypto: mcryptd hash alg: %s\n", alg->cra_name);
inst = mcryptd_alloc_instance(alg, ahash_instance_headroom(),
sizeof(*ctx));
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
ctx = ahash_instance_ctx(inst);
ctx->queue = queue;
err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(&ctx->spawn, salg,
ahash_crypto_instance(inst));
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
inst->alg.halg.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.halg.digestsize = salg->digestsize;
inst->alg.halg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct mcryptd_hash_ctx);
inst->alg.halg.base.cra_init = mcryptd_hash_init_tfm;
inst->alg.halg.base.cra_exit = mcryptd_hash_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.init = mcryptd_hash_init_enqueue;
inst->alg.update = mcryptd_hash_update_enqueue;
inst->alg.final = mcryptd_hash_final_enqueue;
inst->alg.finup = mcryptd_hash_finup_enqueue;
inst->alg.export = mcryptd_hash_export;
inst->alg.import = mcryptd_hash_import;
inst->alg.setkey = mcryptd_hash_setkey;
inst->alg.digest = mcryptd_hash_digest_enqueue;
err = ahash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
crypto_drop_shash(&ctx->spawn);
out_free_inst:
kfree(inst);
}
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: nfsd4_destroy_session(struct svc_rqst *r,
struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_destroy_session *sessionid)
{
struct nfsd4_session *ses;
__be32 status;
int ref_held_by_me = 0;
struct net *net = SVC_NET(r);
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
status = nfserr_not_only_op;
if (nfsd4_compound_in_session(cstate->session, &sessionid->sessionid)) {
if (!nfsd4_last_compound_op(r))
goto out;
ref_held_by_me++;
}
dump_sessionid(__func__, &sessionid->sessionid);
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
ses = find_in_sessionid_hashtbl(&sessionid->sessionid, net, &status);
if (!ses)
goto out_client_lock;
status = nfserr_wrong_cred;
if (!nfsd4_mach_creds_match(ses->se_client, r))
goto out_put_session;
status = mark_session_dead_locked(ses, 1 + ref_held_by_me);
if (status)
goto out_put_session;
unhash_session(ses);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
nfsd4_probe_callback_sync(ses->se_client);
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
status = nfs_ok;
out_put_session:
nfsd4_put_session_locked(ses);
out_client_lock:
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int crypto_probing_notify(unsigned long val, void *v)
{
int ok;
ok = blocking_notifier_call_chain(&crypto_chain, val, v);
if (ok == NOTIFY_DONE) {
request_module("cryptomgr");
ok = blocking_notifier_call_chain(&crypto_chain, val, v);
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
int retval;
kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid;
krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid);
if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid))
return -EINVAL;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
!gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid))
goto error;
if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
!gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid))
goto error;
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
!gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid))
goto error;
}
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
new->gid = krgid;
if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
new->egid = kegid;
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
new->sgid = ksgid;
new->fsgid = new->egid;
return commit_creds(new);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 21,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool NavigationControllerImpl::NeedsReload() const {
return needs_reload_;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::pullBatteryData(Parcel* reply) {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
int32_t time = systemTime() / 1000000L; //in ms
int32_t totalTime;
for (int i = 0; i < NUM_AUDIO_DEVICES; i++) {
totalTime = mBatteryAudio.totalTime[i];
if (mBatteryAudio.deviceOn[i]
&& (mBatteryAudio.lastTime[i] != 0)) {
int32_t tmpTime = mBatteryAudio.lastTime[i] + time;
totalTime += tmpTime;
}
reply->writeInt32(totalTime);
mBatteryAudio.totalTime[i] = 0;
}
BatteryUsageInfo info;
int size = mBatteryData.size();
reply->writeInt32(size);
int i = 0;
while (i < size) {
info = mBatteryData.valueAt(i);
reply->writeInt32(mBatteryData.keyAt(i)); //UID
reply->writeInt32(info.audioTotalTime);
reply->writeInt32(info.videoTotalTime);
info.audioTotalTime = 0;
info.videoTotalTime = 0;
if (info.refCount <= 0) {
mBatteryData.removeItemsAt(i);
size --;
i --;
}
i++;
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void __netdev_adjacent_dev_unlink_neighbour(struct net_device *dev,
struct net_device *upper_dev)
{
__netdev_adjacent_dev_unlink_lists(dev, upper_dev, 1,
&dev->adj_list.upper,
&upper_dev->adj_list.lower);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int v9fs_complete_renameat(V9fsPDU *pdu, int32_t olddirfid,
V9fsString *old_name, int32_t newdirfid,
V9fsString *new_name)
{
int err = 0;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
V9fsFidState *newdirfidp = NULL, *olddirfidp = NULL;
olddirfidp = get_fid(pdu, olddirfid);
if (olddirfidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (newdirfid != -1) {
newdirfidp = get_fid(pdu, newdirfid);
if (newdirfidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
} else {
newdirfidp = get_fid(pdu, olddirfid);
}
err = v9fs_co_renameat(pdu, &olddirfidp->path, old_name,
&newdirfidp->path, new_name);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
if (s->ctx.export_flags & V9FS_PATHNAME_FSCONTEXT) {
/* Only for path based fid we need to do the below fixup */
v9fs_fix_fid_paths(pdu, &olddirfidp->path, old_name,
&newdirfidp->path, new_name);
}
out:
if (olddirfidp) {
put_fid(pdu, olddirfidp);
}
if (newdirfidp) {
put_fid(pdu, newdirfidp);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int __init init_ext4_fs(void)
{
int err;
err = init_ext4_system_zone();
if (err)
return err;
ext4_kset = kset_create_and_add("ext4", NULL, fs_kobj);
if (!ext4_kset)
goto out4;
ext4_proc_root = proc_mkdir("fs/ext4", NULL);
err = init_ext4_mballoc();
if (err)
goto out3;
err = init_ext4_xattr();
if (err)
goto out2;
err = init_inodecache();
if (err)
goto out1;
register_as_ext2();
register_as_ext3();
err = register_filesystem(&ext4_fs_type);
if (err)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
unregister_as_ext2();
unregister_as_ext3();
destroy_inodecache();
out1:
exit_ext4_xattr();
out2:
exit_ext4_mballoc();
out3:
remove_proc_entry("fs/ext4", NULL);
kset_unregister(ext4_kset);
out4:
exit_ext4_system_zone();
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int mov_write_uuid_tag_ipod(AVIOContext *pb)
{
avio_wb32(pb, 28);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "uuid");
avio_wb32(pb, 0x6b6840f2);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x5f244fc5);
avio_wb32(pb, 0xba39a51b);
avio_wb32(pb, 0xcf0323f3);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0);
return 28;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct mii_bus *devm_mdiobus_alloc_size(struct device *dev, int sizeof_priv)
{
struct mii_bus **ptr, *bus;
ptr = devres_alloc(_devm_mdiobus_free, sizeof(*ptr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ptr)
return NULL;
/* use raw alloc_dr for kmalloc caller tracing */
bus = mdiobus_alloc_size(sizeof_priv);
if (bus) {
*ptr = bus;
devres_add(dev, ptr);
} else {
devres_free(ptr);
}
return bus;
}
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 89,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: des_setkey(const char *key, struct php_crypt_extended_data *data)
{
uint32_t k0, k1, rawkey0, rawkey1;
int shifts, round;
rawkey0 =
(uint32_t)(u_char)key[3] |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[2] << 8) |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[1] << 16) |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[0] << 24);
rawkey1 =
(uint32_t)(u_char)key[7] |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[6] << 8) |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[5] << 16) |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[4] << 24);
if ((rawkey0 | rawkey1)
&& rawkey0 == data->old_rawkey0
&& rawkey1 == data->old_rawkey1) {
/*
* Already setup for this key.
* This optimisation fails on a zero key (which is weak and
* has bad parity anyway) in order to simplify the starting
* conditions.
*/
return(0);
}
data->old_rawkey0 = rawkey0;
data->old_rawkey1 = rawkey1;
/*
* Do key permutation and split into two 28-bit subkeys.
*/
k0 = key_perm_maskl[0][rawkey0 >> 25]
| key_perm_maskl[1][(rawkey0 >> 17) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[2][(rawkey0 >> 9) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[3][(rawkey0 >> 1) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[4][rawkey1 >> 25]
| key_perm_maskl[5][(rawkey1 >> 17) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[6][(rawkey1 >> 9) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[7][(rawkey1 >> 1) & 0x7f];
k1 = key_perm_maskr[0][rawkey0 >> 25]
| key_perm_maskr[1][(rawkey0 >> 17) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[2][(rawkey0 >> 9) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[3][(rawkey0 >> 1) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[4][rawkey1 >> 25]
| key_perm_maskr[5][(rawkey1 >> 17) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[6][(rawkey1 >> 9) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[7][(rawkey1 >> 1) & 0x7f];
/*
* Rotate subkeys and do compression permutation.
*/
shifts = 0;
for (round = 0; round < 16; round++) {
uint32_t t0, t1;
shifts += key_shifts[round];
t0 = (k0 << shifts) | (k0 >> (28 - shifts));
t1 = (k1 << shifts) | (k1 >> (28 - shifts));
data->de_keysl[15 - round] =
data->en_keysl[round] = comp_maskl[0][(t0 >> 21) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[1][(t0 >> 14) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[2][(t0 >> 7) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[3][t0 & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[4][(t1 >> 21) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[5][(t1 >> 14) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[6][(t1 >> 7) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[7][t1 & 0x7f];
data->de_keysr[15 - round] =
data->en_keysr[round] = comp_maskr[0][(t0 >> 21) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[1][(t0 >> 14) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[2][(t0 >> 7) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[3][t0 & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[4][(t1 >> 21) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[5][(t1 >> 14) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[6][(t1 >> 7) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[7][t1 & 0x7f];
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 10,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionServiceBackend::ExtensionServiceBackend(
base::WeakPtr<ExtensionService> frontend,
const FilePath& install_directory)
: frontend_(frontend),
install_directory_(install_directory) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool system_level() const { return system_level_; }
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
[email protected]
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 152,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: unsigned char lodepng_chunk_private(const unsigned char* chunk)
{
return((chunk[6] & 32) != 0);
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void ip4_frag_init(struct inet_frag_queue *q, void *a)
{
struct ipq *qp = container_of(q, struct ipq, q);
struct ip4_create_arg *arg = a;
qp->protocol = arg->iph->protocol;
qp->id = arg->iph->id;
qp->ecn = ip4_frag_ecn(arg->iph->tos);
qp->saddr = arg->iph->saddr;
qp->daddr = arg->iph->daddr;
qp->user = arg->user;
qp->peer = sysctl_ipfrag_max_dist ?
inet_getpeer_v4(arg->iph->saddr, 1) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: EnumTraits<media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi, media::VideoCaptureApi>::ToMojom(
media::VideoCaptureApi input) {
switch (input) {
case media::VideoCaptureApi::LINUX_V4L2_SINGLE_PLANE:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::LINUX_V4L2_SINGLE_PLANE;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::WIN_MEDIA_FOUNDATION:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::WIN_MEDIA_FOUNDATION;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::WIN_MEDIA_FOUNDATION_SENSOR:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::WIN_MEDIA_FOUNDATION_SENSOR;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::WIN_DIRECT_SHOW:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::WIN_DIRECT_SHOW;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::MACOSX_AVFOUNDATION:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::MACOSX_AVFOUNDATION;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::MACOSX_DECKLINK:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::MACOSX_DECKLINK;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::ANDROID_API1:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::ANDROID_API1;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::ANDROID_API2_LEGACY:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::ANDROID_API2_LEGACY;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::ANDROID_API2_FULL:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::ANDROID_API2_FULL;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::ANDROID_API2_LIMITED:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::ANDROID_API2_LIMITED;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::VIRTUAL_DEVICE:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::VIRTUAL_DEVICE;
case media::VideoCaptureApi::UNKNOWN:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::UNKNOWN;
}
NOTREACHED();
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureApi::UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Enable camera blob stream when needed"
This reverts commit 10f4b93635e12f9fa0cba1641a10938ca38ed448.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 601492 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://findit-for-me.appspot.com/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzEwZjRiOTM2MzVlMTJmOWZhMGNiYTE2NDFhMTA5MzhjYTM4ZWQ0NDgM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.memory/Linux%20ChromiumOS%20MSan%20Tests/9190
Sample Failed Step: capture_unittests
Original change's description:
> Enable camera blob stream when needed
>
> Since blob stream needs higher resolution, it causes higher cpu loading
> to require higher resolution and resize to smaller resolution.
> In hangout app, we don't need blob stream. Enabling blob stream when
> needed can save a lot of cpu usage.
>
> BUG=b:114676133
> TEST=manually test in apprtc and CCA. make sure picture taking still
> works in CCA.
>
> Change-Id: I9144461bc76627903d0b3b359ce9cf962ff3628c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1261242
> Commit-Queue: Heng-ruey Hsu <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601492}
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
BUG=b:114676133
Change-Id: If173ffe9259f7eca849b184806bd56e2a9fbaac4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1292256
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601538}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 140,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::SetConfigRefreshTimer(
const base::TimeDelta& delay) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(delay >= base::TimeDelta());
config_refresh_timer_.Stop();
config_refresh_timer_.Start(
FROM_HERE, delay, this,
&DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::RetrieveConfig);
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void LocationByteStringAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "locationByteString");
v8::Local<v8::Value> target;
if (!holder->Get(isolate->GetCurrentContext(), V8AtomicString(isolate, "locationByteString"))
.ToLocal(&target)) {
return;
}
if (!target->IsObject()) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The attribute value is not an object");
return;
}
bool result;
if (!target.As<v8::Object>()->Set(
isolate->GetCurrentContext(),
V8AtomicString(isolate, "hrefByteString"),
v8_value).To(&result)) {
return;
}
if (!result)
return;
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: add_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result,
Oid val_type, bool key_scalar)
{
JsonTypeCategory tcategory;
Oid outfuncoid;
if (val_type == InvalidOid)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("could not determine input data type")));
if (is_null)
{
tcategory = JSONTYPE_NULL;
outfuncoid = InvalidOid;
}
else
json_categorize_type(val_type,
&tcategory, &outfuncoid);
datum_to_json(val, is_null, result, tcategory, outfuncoid, key_scalar);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: sp<NativeHandle> BufferQueueConsumer::getSidebandStream() const {
return mCore->mSidebandStream;
}
Commit Message: BQ: Add permission check to BufferQueueConsumer::dump
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Id7bd8cf95045b497943ea39dde49e877aa6f5c4e
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 164,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::HandleGestureBegin() {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->HandleGestureBegin();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: URLRequestTestFTP()
: test_server_(TestServer::TYPE_FTP, TestServer::kLocalhost, FilePath()) {
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
[email protected],[email protected]
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 102,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void FrameView::addWidget(RenderWidget* object)
{
m_widgets.add(object);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static DoublePixelPacket **DestroyPixelThreadSet(DoublePixelPacket **pixels)
{
register ssize_t
i;
assert(pixels != (DoublePixelPacket **) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource); i++)
if (pixels[i] != (DoublePixelPacket *) NULL)
pixels[i]=(DoublePixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels[i]);
pixels=(DoublePixelPacket **) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void catc_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct catc *catc = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
usb_set_intfdata(intf, NULL);
if (catc) {
unregister_netdev(catc->netdev);
usb_free_urb(catc->ctrl_urb);
usb_free_urb(catc->tx_urb);
usb_free_urb(catc->rx_urb);
usb_free_urb(catc->irq_urb);
free_netdev(catc->netdev);
}
}
Commit Message: catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: NavigationController* TabStripModel::GetOpenerOfTabContentsAt(int index) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
return contents_data_.at(index)->opener;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void cmd_parse_status(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
char *value = NULL;
struct Buffy *inc = NULL;
struct ImapMbox mx;
struct ImapStatus *status = NULL;
unsigned int olduv, oldun;
unsigned int litlen;
short new = 0;
short new_msg_count = 0;
char *mailbox = imap_next_word(s);
/* We need a real tokenizer. */
if (imap_get_literal_count(mailbox, &litlen) == 0)
{
if (imap_cmd_step(idata) != IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE)
{
idata->status = IMAP_FATAL;
return;
}
mailbox = idata->buf;
s = mailbox + litlen;
*s = '\0';
s++;
SKIPWS(s);
}
else
{
s = imap_next_word(mailbox);
*(s - 1) = '\0';
imap_unmunge_mbox_name(idata, mailbox);
}
status = imap_mboxcache_get(idata, mailbox, 1);
olduv = status->uidvalidity;
oldun = status->uidnext;
if (*s++ != '(')
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS\n");
return;
}
while (*s && *s != ')')
{
value = imap_next_word(s);
errno = 0;
const unsigned long ulcount = strtoul(value, &value, 10);
if (((errno == ERANGE) && (ulcount == ULONG_MAX)) || ((unsigned int) ulcount != ulcount))
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing STATUS number\n");
return;
}
const unsigned int count = (unsigned int) ulcount;
if (mutt_str_strncmp("MESSAGES", s, 8) == 0)
{
status->messages = count;
new_msg_count = 1;
}
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("RECENT", s, 6) == 0)
status->recent = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDNEXT", s, 7) == 0)
status->uidnext = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UIDVALIDITY", s, 11) == 0)
status->uidvalidity = count;
else if (mutt_str_strncmp("UNSEEN", s, 6) == 0)
status->unseen = count;
s = value;
if (*s && *s != ')')
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
mutt_debug(3, "%s (UIDVALIDITY: %u, UIDNEXT: %u) %d messages, %d recent, %d unseen\n",
status->name, status->uidvalidity, status->uidnext,
status->messages, status->recent, status->unseen);
/* caller is prepared to handle the result herself */
if (idata->cmddata && idata->cmdtype == IMAP_CT_STATUS)
{
memcpy(idata->cmddata, status, sizeof(struct ImapStatus));
return;
}
mutt_debug(3, "Running default STATUS handler\n");
/* should perhaps move this code back to imap_buffy_check */
for (inc = Incoming; inc; inc = inc->next)
{
if (inc->magic != MUTT_IMAP)
continue;
if (imap_parse_path(inc->path, &mx) < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error parsing mailbox %s, skipping\n", inc->path);
continue;
}
if (imap_account_match(&idata->conn->account, &mx.account))
{
if (mx.mbox)
{
value = mutt_str_strdup(mx.mbox);
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, value, mutt_str_strlen(value) + 1);
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
else
value = mutt_str_strdup("INBOX");
if (value && (imap_mxcmp(mailbox, value) == 0))
{
mutt_debug(3, "Found %s in buffy list (OV: %u ON: %u U: %d)\n", mailbox,
olduv, oldun, status->unseen);
if (MailCheckRecent)
{
if (olduv && olduv == status->uidvalidity)
{
if (oldun < status->uidnext)
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else if (!olduv && !oldun)
{
/* first check per session, use recent. might need a flag for this. */
new = (status->recent > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
}
else
new = (status->unseen > 0);
#ifdef USE_SIDEBAR
if ((inc->new != new) || (inc->msg_count != status->messages) ||
(inc->msg_unread != status->unseen))
{
mutt_menu_set_current_redraw(REDRAW_SIDEBAR);
}
#endif
inc->new = new;
if (new_msg_count)
inc->msg_count = status->messages;
inc->msg_unread = status->unseen;
if (inc->new)
{
/* force back to keep detecting new mail until the mailbox is
opened */
status->uidnext = oldun;
}
FREE(&value);
return;
}
FREE(&value);
}
FREE(&mx.mbox);
}
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: xmlIsNameChar(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int c) {
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) == 0) {
/*
* Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
* Update 5 of XML-1.0
*/
if ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* accelerators */
(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) || /* !start */
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(c == '-') || (c == '.') || (c == 0xB7) || /* !start */
((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
((c >= 0x300) && (c <= 0x36F)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
((c >= 0x203F) && (c <= 0x2040)) || /* !start */
((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))))
return(1);
} else {
if ((IS_LETTER(c)) || (IS_DIGIT(c)) ||
(c == '.') || (c == '-') ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(IS_COMBINING(c)) ||
(IS_EXTENDER(c)))
return(1);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PersistentSparseHistogramDataManager::UseSampleMapRecords(uint64_t id,
const void* user) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
return GetSampleMapRecordsWhileLocked(id)->Acquire(user);
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: virtual ~RemoveTabAnimation() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static inline void unregister_as_ext3(void) { }
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int em_ret_near_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->_eip;
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
register_address_increment(ctxt, &ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP], ctxt->src.val);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void yv12_extend_frame_bottom_c(YV12_BUFFER_CONFIG *ybf)
{
int i;
unsigned char *src_ptr1, *src_ptr2;
unsigned char *dest_ptr2;
unsigned int Border;
int plane_stride;
int plane_height;
/***********/
/* Y Plane */
/***********/
Border = ybf->border;
plane_stride = ybf->y_stride;
plane_height = ybf->y_height;
src_ptr1 = ybf->y_buffer - Border;
src_ptr2 = src_ptr1 + (plane_height * plane_stride) - plane_stride;
dest_ptr2 = src_ptr2 + plane_stride;
for (i = 0; i < (int)Border; i++)
{
memcpy(dest_ptr2, src_ptr2, plane_stride);
dest_ptr2 += plane_stride;
}
/***********/
/* U Plane */
/***********/
plane_stride = ybf->uv_stride;
plane_height = ybf->uv_height;
Border /= 2;
src_ptr1 = ybf->u_buffer - Border;
src_ptr2 = src_ptr1 + (plane_height * plane_stride) - plane_stride;
dest_ptr2 = src_ptr2 + plane_stride;
for (i = 0; i < (int)(Border); i++)
{
memcpy(dest_ptr2, src_ptr2, plane_stride);
dest_ptr2 += plane_stride;
}
/***********/
/* V Plane */
/***********/
src_ptr1 = ybf->v_buffer - Border;
src_ptr2 = src_ptr1 + (plane_height * plane_stride) - plane_stride;
dest_ptr2 = src_ptr2 + plane_stride;
for (i = 0; i < (int)(Border); i++)
{
memcpy(dest_ptr2, src_ptr2, plane_stride);
dest_ptr2 += plane_stride;
}
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void addClassName(const char *prefix,
const char *actual,
size_t length)
{
size_t offset = strlen(prefix);
size_t have = (unsigned) (Style_className_end - Style_className);
size_t need = (offset + length + 1);
if ((have + need) >= Style_className_len) {
Style_className_len += 1024 + 2 * (have + need);
if (Style_className == 0) {
Style_className = typeMallocn(char, Style_className_len);
} else {
Style_className = typeRealloc(char, Style_className, Style_className_len);
}
if (Style_className == NULL)
outofmem(__FILE__, "addClassName");
Style_className_end = Style_className + have;
}
if (offset)
strcpy(Style_className_end, prefix);
if (length)
memcpy(Style_className_end + offset, actual, length);
Style_className_end[offset + length] = '\0';
strtolower(Style_className_end);
Style_className_end += (offset + length);
}
Commit Message: snapshot of project "lynx", label v2-8-9dev_15b
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
{
unsigned char *p;
int len;
p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
sfree(p);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: qboolean FS_CL_ExtractFromPakFile( void *searchpath, const char *fullpath, const char *filename, const char *cvar_lastVersion ) {
int srcLength;
int destLength;
unsigned char *srcData;
unsigned char *destData;
qboolean needToCopy;
FILE *destHandle;
int read;
needToCopy = qtrue;
srcLength = FS_ReadFileDir(filename, searchpath, qfalse, (void **)&srcData);
if ( srcLength == -1 ) {
return qfalse;
}
destHandle = Sys_FOpen( fullpath, "rb" );
if ( destHandle ) {
fseek( destHandle, 0, SEEK_END );
destLength = ftell( destHandle );
fseek( destHandle, 0, SEEK_SET );
if ( destLength > 0 ) {
destData = (unsigned char*)Z_Malloc( destLength );
read = fread( destData, 1, destLength, destHandle );
if (read == 0) {
Com_Error (ERR_FATAL, "FS_CL_ExtractFromPakFile: 0 bytes read");
}
if ( destLength == srcLength ) {
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < destLength; i++ ) {
if ( destData[i] != srcData[i] ) {
break;
}
}
if ( i == destLength ) {
needToCopy = qfalse;
}
}
Z_Free( destData ); // TTimo
}
fclose( destHandle );
}
if ( needToCopy ) {
fileHandle_t f;
Com_DPrintf("FS_ExtractFromPakFile: FS_FOpenFileWrite '%s'\n", filename);
f = FS_FOpenFileWrite( filename );
if ( !f ) {
Com_Printf( "Failed to open %s\n", filename );
return qfalse;
}
FS_Write( srcData, srcLength, f );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
#ifdef __linux__
if ( cvar_lastVersion ) {
Cvar_Set( cvar_lastVersion, Cvar_VariableString( "version" ) );
}
#endif
}
FS_FreeFile( srcData );
return qtrue;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int vfio_pci_for_each_slot_or_bus(struct pci_dev *pdev,
int (*fn)(struct pci_dev *,
void *data), void *data,
bool slot)
{
struct vfio_pci_walk_info walk = {
.fn = fn, .data = data, .pdev = pdev, .slot = slot, .ret = 0,
};
pci_walk_bus(pdev->bus, vfio_pci_walk_wrapper, &walk);
return walk.ret;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int jpc_ns_synthesize(jpc_fix_t *a, int xstart, int ystart, int width,
int height, int stride)
{
int numrows = height;
int numcols = width;
int rowparity = ystart & 1;
int colparity = xstart & 1;
int maxcols;
jpc_fix_t *startptr;
int i;
startptr = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < numrows; ++i) {
jpc_ns_invlift_row(startptr, numcols, colparity);
jpc_qmfb_join_row(startptr, numcols, colparity);
startptr += stride;
}
maxcols = (numcols / JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE) * JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
startptr = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < maxcols; i += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE) {
jpc_ns_invlift_colgrp(startptr, numrows, stride, rowparity);
jpc_qmfb_join_colgrp(startptr, numrows, stride, rowparity);
startptr += JPC_QMFB_COLGRPSIZE;
}
if (maxcols < numcols) {
jpc_ns_invlift_colres(startptr, numrows, numcols - maxcols, stride,
rowparity);
jpc_qmfb_join_colres(startptr, numrows, numcols - maxcols, stride,
rowparity);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::IsMouseFocusable() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::RequestOpenURL(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
bool uses_post,
const scoped_refptr<ResourceRequestBodyImpl>& body,
const std::string& extra_headers,
const Referrer& referrer,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
bool force_new_process_for_new_contents,
bool should_replace_current_entry,
bool user_gesture) {
if (render_frame_host !=
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->current_frame_host()) {
return;
}
SiteInstance* current_site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
std::vector<GURL> redirect_chain;
GURL dest_url(url);
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldAllowOpenURL(
current_site_instance, url)) {
dest_url = GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL);
}
int frame_tree_node_id = -1;
if (disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB &&
render_frame_host->GetParent()) {
frame_tree_node_id =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree_node_id();
}
OpenURLParams params(dest_url, referrer, frame_tree_node_id, disposition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
true /* is_renderer_initiated */);
params.force_new_process_for_new_contents =
force_new_process_for_new_contents;
params.uses_post = uses_post;
params.post_data = body;
params.extra_headers = extra_headers;
if (redirect_chain.size() > 0)
params.redirect_chain = redirect_chain;
params.should_replace_current_entry = should_replace_current_entry;
params.user_gesture = user_gesture;
params.source_site_instance = current_site_instance;
params.source_render_frame_id = render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
params.source_render_process_id = render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID();
if (render_frame_host->web_ui()) {
params.referrer = Referrer();
params.is_renderer_initiated = false;
}
GetContentClient()->browser()->OverrideNavigationParams(
current_site_instance, ¶ms.transition, ¶ms.is_renderer_initiated,
¶ms.referrer);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OpenURL(params);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoPathCommandsCHROMIUM(
GLuint path,
GLsizei numCommands,
const GLubyte* commands,
GLsizei numCoords,
GLenum coordType,
const GLvoid* coords,
GLsizei coords_bufsize) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void tcp_undo_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, bool unmark_loss)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (unmark_loss) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
tcp_for_write_queue(skb, sk) {
if (skb == tcp_send_head(sk))
break;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked &= ~TCPCB_LOST;
}
tp->lost_out = 0;
tcp_clear_all_retrans_hints(tp);
}
if (tp->prior_ssthresh) {
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->undo_cwnd)
tp->snd_cwnd = icsk->icsk_ca_ops->undo_cwnd(sk);
else
tp->snd_cwnd = max(tp->snd_cwnd, tp->snd_ssthresh << 1);
if (tp->prior_ssthresh > tp->snd_ssthresh) {
tp->snd_ssthresh = tp->prior_ssthresh;
tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr(tp);
}
}
tp->snd_cwnd_stamp = tcp_time_stamp;
tp->undo_marker = 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int __net_init ipv4_inetpeer_init(struct net *net)
{
struct inet_peer_base *bp = kmalloc(sizeof(*bp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bp)
return -ENOMEM;
inet_peer_base_init(bp);
net->ipv4.peers = bp;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService::ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService(
content::BrowserContext* context,
ArcBridgeService* bridge_service)
: context_(context),
arc_bridge_service_(bridge_service),
highlighter_client_(std::make_unique<HighlighterControllerClient>(this)),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework()->SetHost(this);
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework()->AddObserver(this);
ArcSessionManager::Get()->AddObserver(this);
chromeos::CrasAudioHandler::Get()->AddAudioObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void _6502_anal_esil_inc_reg(RAnalOp *op, ut8 data0, char* sign)
{
char* reg = NULL;
switch(data0) {
case 0xe8: // inx
case 0xca: // dex
reg = "x";
break;
case 0xc8: // iny
case 0x88: // dey
reg = "y";
break;
}
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,%s%s=", reg, sign, sign);
_6502_anal_update_flags (op, _6502_FLAGS_NZ);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10294 - crash in r2_hoobr__6502_op
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 81,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: char *am_reconstruct_url(request_rec *r)
{
char *url;
/* This function will construct an full url for a given path relative to
* the root of the web site. To configure what hostname and port this
* function will use, see the UseCanonicalName configuration directive.
*/
url = ap_construct_url(r->pool, r->unparsed_uri, r);
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
"reconstruct_url: url==\"%s\", unparsed_uri==\"%s\"", url,
r->unparsed_uri);
return url;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 91,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void TabStrip::UpdateContrastRatioValues() {
if (!controller_)
return;
const SkColor inactive_bg = GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE);
const auto get_alpha = [inactive_bg](SkColor target, float contrast) {
return color_utils::GetBlendValueWithMinimumContrast(inactive_bg, target,
inactive_bg, contrast);
};
const SkColor active_bg = GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE);
const auto get_hover_opacity = [active_bg, &get_alpha](float contrast) {
return get_alpha(active_bg, contrast) / 255.0f;
};
constexpr float kStandardWidthContrast = 1.11f;
hover_opacity_min_ = get_hover_opacity(kStandardWidthContrast);
constexpr float kMinWidthContrast = 1.19f;
hover_opacity_max_ = get_hover_opacity(kMinWidthContrast);
constexpr float kRadialGradientContrast = 1.13728f;
radial_highlight_opacity_ = get_hover_opacity(kRadialGradientContrast);
const SkColor inactive_fg = GetTabForegroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE, inactive_bg);
constexpr float kTabSeparatorContrast = 2.5f;
const SkAlpha separator_alpha = get_alpha(inactive_fg, kTabSeparatorContrast);
separator_color_ =
color_utils::AlphaBlend(inactive_fg, inactive_bg, separator_alpha);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::rangeUnderflow() const
{
return willValidate() && m_inputType->rangeUnderflow(value());
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void SetShouldGrant(bool should_grant) {
should_grant_ = should_grant;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::DetachFromFrame() {
DCHECK(frame_);
fetcher_->StopFetching();
if (frame_ && !SentDidFinishLoad())
LoadFailed(ResourceError::CancelledError(Url()));
if (!frame_)
return;
fetcher_->ClearContext();
application_cache_host_->DetachFromDocumentLoader();
application_cache_host_.Clear();
service_worker_network_provider_ = nullptr;
WeakIdentifierMap<DocumentLoader>::NotifyObjectDestroyed(this);
ClearMainResourceHandle();
frame_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void nodeNameAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestInterfaceNodeV8Internal::nodeNameAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void SoftMPEG4::updatePortDefinitions(bool updateCrop, bool updateInputSize) {
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::updatePortDefinitions(updateCrop, updateInputSize);
/* We have to align our width and height - this should affect stride! */
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nStride = align(def->format.video.nStride, 16);
def->format.video.nSliceHeight = align(def->format.video.nSliceHeight, 16);
def->nBufferSize = (def->format.video.nStride * def->format.video.nSliceHeight * 3) / 2;
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,105 |
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