instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 93
3.53k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetUnset)
{
char *fname, *error;
size_t fname_len;
phar_entry_info *entry;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Write operations disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
if (NULL != (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len))) {
if (entry->is_deleted) {
/* entry is deleted, but has not been flushed to disk yet */
return;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
/* re-populate entry after copy on write */
entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len);
}
entry->is_modified = 0;
entry->is_deleted = 1;
/* we need to "flush" the stream to save the newly deleted file on disk */
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetUnset)
{
char *fname, *error;
size_t fname_len;
phar_entry_info *entry;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Write operations disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
if (NULL != (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len))) {
if (entry->is_deleted) {
/* entry is deleted, but has not been flushed to disk yet */
return;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
if (FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
/* re-populate entry after copy on write */
entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len);
}
entry->is_modified = 0;
entry->is_deleted = 1;
/* we need to "flush" the stream to save the newly deleted file on disk */
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, 0, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 165,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoundPool::doLoad(sp<Sample>& sample)
{
ALOGV("doLoad: loading sample sampleID=%d", sample->sampleID());
sample->startLoad();
mDecodeThread->loadSample(sample->sampleID());
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void SoundPool::doLoad(sp<Sample>& sample)
int sampleID;
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
sampleID = ++mNextSampleID;
sp<Sample> sample = new Sample(sampleID, fd, offset, length);
mSamples.add(sampleID, sample);
sample->startLoad();
}
// mDecodeThread->loadSample() must be called outside of mLock.
// mDecodeThread->loadSample() may block on mDecodeThread message queue space;
// the message queue emptying may block on SoundPool::findSample().
//
// It theoretically possible that sample loads might decode out-of-order.
mDecodeThread->loadSample(sampleID);
return sampleID;
}
| 173,960 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: void CheckFakeData(uint8* audio_data, int frames_written,
double playback_rate) {
size_t length =
(frames_written * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame())
/ algorithm_.bytes_per_channel();
switch (algorithm_.bytes_per_channel()) {
case 4:
DoCheckFakeData<int32>(audio_data, length);
break;
case 2:
DoCheckFakeData<int16>(audio_data, length);
break;
case 1:
DoCheckFakeData<uint8>(audio_data, length);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported audio bit depth in crossfade.";
}
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void CheckFakeData(uint8* audio_data, int frames_written,
| 171,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: juniper_ggsn_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_ggsn_header {
uint8_t svc_id;
uint8_t flags_len;
uint8_t proto;
uint8_t flags;
uint8_t vlan_id[2];
uint8_t res[2];
};
const struct juniper_ggsn_header *gh;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
gh = (struct juniper_ggsn_header *)&l2info.cookie;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "proto %s (%u), vlan %u: ",
tok2str(juniper_protocol_values,"Unknown",gh->proto),
gh->proto,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&gh->vlan_id[0])));
}
switch (gh->proto) {
case JUNIPER_PROTO_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
case JUNIPER_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown GGSN proto (%u)", gh->proto));
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | juniper_ggsn_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
struct juniper_ggsn_header {
uint8_t svc_id;
uint8_t flags_len;
uint8_t proto;
uint8_t flags;
uint8_t vlan_id[2];
uint8_t res[2];
};
const struct juniper_ggsn_header *gh;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
gh = (struct juniper_ggsn_header *)&l2info.cookie;
ND_TCHECK(*gh);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "proto %s (%u), vlan %u: ",
tok2str(juniper_protocol_values,"Unknown",gh->proto),
gh->proto,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&gh->vlan_id[0])));
}
switch (gh->proto) {
case JUNIPER_PROTO_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
case JUNIPER_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown GGSN proto (%u)", gh->proto));
}
return l2info.header_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_services]"));
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* Track::GetLanguage() const
{
return m_info.language;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* Track::GetLanguage() const
| 174,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *get_pid_environ_val(pid_t pid,char *val){
char temp[500];
int i=0;
int foundit=0;
FILE *fp;
sprintf(temp,"/proc/%d/environ",pid);
fp=fopen(temp,"r");
if(fp==NULL)
return NULL;
for(;;){
temp[i]=fgetc(fp);
if(foundit==1 && (temp[i]==0 || temp[i]=='\0' || temp[i]==EOF)){
char *ret;
temp[i]=0;
ret=malloc(strlen(temp)+10);
sprintf(ret,"%s",temp);
fclose(fp);
return ret;
}
switch(temp[i]){
case EOF:
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
case '=':
temp[i]=0;
if(!strcmp(temp,val)){
foundit=1;
}
i=0;
break;
case '\0':
i=0;
break;
default:
i++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix memory overflow if the name of an environment is larger than 500 characters. Bug found by Adam Sampson.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static char *get_pid_environ_val(pid_t pid,char *val){
int temp_size = 500;
char *temp = malloc(temp_size);
int i=0;
int foundit=0;
FILE *fp;
sprintf(temp,"/proc/%d/environ",pid);
fp=fopen(temp,"r");
if(fp==NULL)
return NULL;
for(;;){
if (i >= temp_size) {
temp_size *= 2;
temp = realloc(temp, temp_size);
}
temp[i]=fgetc(fp);
if(foundit==1 && (temp[i]==0 || temp[i]=='\0' || temp[i]==EOF)){
char *ret;
temp[i]=0;
ret=malloc(strlen(temp)+10);
sprintf(ret,"%s",temp);
fclose(fp);
return ret;
}
switch(temp[i]){
case EOF:
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
case '=':
temp[i]=0;
if(!strcmp(temp,val)){
foundit=1;
}
i=0;
break;
case '\0':
i=0;
break;
default:
i++;
}
}
}
| 166,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: dhcpv6_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length, int indent)
{
u_int i, t;
const u_char *tlv, *value;
uint16_t type, optlen;
i = 0;
while (i < length) {
tlv = cp + i;
type = EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv);
optlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv + 2);
value = tlv + 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
for (t = indent; t > 0; t--)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dh6opt_str, "Unknown", type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (%u)", optlen + 4 ));
switch (type) {
case DH6OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_SNTP_SERVERS: {
if (optlen % 16 != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", istr));
return -1;
}
for (t = 0; t < optlen; t += 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, value + t)));
}
break;
case DH6OPT_DOMAIN_LIST: {
const u_char *tp = value;
while (tp < value + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, value + optlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
break;
}
i += 4 + optlen;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13042/HNCP: add DHCPv6-Data bounds checks
hncp_print_rec() validates each HNCP TLV to be within the declared as
well as the on-the-wire packet space. However, dhcpv6_print() in the same
file didn't do the same for the DHCPv6 options within the HNCP
DHCPv6-Data TLV value, which could cause an out-of-bounds read when
decoding an invalid packet. Add missing checks to dhcpv6_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | dhcpv6_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, u_int length, int indent)
{
u_int i, t;
const u_char *tlv, *value;
uint16_t type, optlen;
i = 0;
while (i < length) {
if (i + 4 > length)
return -1;
tlv = cp + i;
type = EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv);
optlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv + 2);
value = tlv + 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
for (t = indent; t > 0; t--)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dh6opt_str, "Unknown", type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo," (%u)", optlen + 4 ));
if (i + 4 + optlen > length)
return -1;
switch (type) {
case DH6OPT_DNS_SERVERS:
case DH6OPT_SNTP_SERVERS: {
if (optlen % 16 != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", istr));
return -1;
}
for (t = 0; t < optlen; t += 16)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, value + t)));
}
break;
case DH6OPT_DOMAIN_LIST: {
const u_char *tp = value;
while (tp < value + optlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if ((tp = ns_nprint(ndo, tp, value + optlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
break;
}
i += 4 + optlen;
}
return 0;
}
| 167,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: long Segment::Load()
{
assert(m_clusters == NULL);
assert(m_clusterSize == 0);
assert(m_clusterCount == 0);
const long long header_status = ParseHeaders();
if (header_status < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(header_status);
if (header_status > 0) //underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
assert(m_pInfo);
assert(m_pTracks);
for (;;)
{
const int status = LoadCluster();
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (status >= 1) //no more clusters
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Segment::Load()
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
if (count >= size) {
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster* [n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + idx;
Cluster** q = m_clusters + count;
assert(q >= p);
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
while (q > p) {
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterPreloadCount;
}
| 174,394 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: CuePoint::~CuePoint()
{
delete[] m_track_positions;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | CuePoint::~CuePoint()
| 174,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: PageGroupLoadDeferrer::PageGroupLoadDeferrer(Page* page, bool deferSelf)
{
const HashSet<Page*>& pages = page->group().pages();
HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator end = pages.end();
for (HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator it = pages.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Page* otherPage = *it;
if ((deferSelf || otherPage != page)) {
if (!otherPage->defersLoading()) {
m_deferredFrames.append(otherPage->mainFrame());
for (Frame* frame = otherPage->mainFrame(); frame; frame = frame->tree()->traverseNext())
frame->document()->suspendScheduledTasks(ActiveDOMObject::WillDeferLoading);
}
}
}
size_t count = m_deferredFrames.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i)
if (Page* page = m_deferredFrames[i]->page())
page->setDefersLoading(true);
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | PageGroupLoadDeferrer::PageGroupLoadDeferrer(Page* page, bool deferSelf)
{
const HashSet<Page*>& pages = page->group().pages();
HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator end = pages.end();
for (HashSet<Page*>::const_iterator it = pages.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Page* otherPage = *it;
if ((deferSelf || otherPage != page)) {
if (!otherPage->defersLoading()) {
m_deferredFrames.append(otherPage->mainFrame());
// Ensure that we notify the client if the initial empty document is accessed before showing anything
// modal, to prevent spoofs while the modal window or sheet is visible.
otherPage->mainFrame()->loader()->notifyIfInitialDocumentAccessed();
for (Frame* frame = otherPage->mainFrame(); frame; frame = frame->tree()->traverseNext())
frame->document()->suspendScheduledTasks(ActiveDOMObject::WillDeferLoading);
}
}
}
size_t count = m_deferredFrames.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i)
if (Page* page = m_deferredFrames[i]->page())
page->setDefersLoading(true);
}
| 171,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: int GetFreeFrameBuffer(size_t min_size, vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
const int idx = FindFreeBufferIndex();
if (idx == num_buffers_)
return -1;
if (ext_fb_list_[idx].size < min_size) {
delete [] ext_fb_list_[idx].data;
ext_fb_list_[idx].data = new uint8_t[min_size];
ext_fb_list_[idx].size = min_size;
}
SetFrameBuffer(idx, fb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int GetFreeFrameBuffer(size_t min_size, vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
const int idx = FindFreeBufferIndex();
if (idx == num_buffers_)
return -1;
if (ext_fb_list_[idx].size < min_size) {
delete [] ext_fb_list_[idx].data;
ext_fb_list_[idx].data = new uint8_t[min_size];
memset(ext_fb_list_[idx].data, 0, min_size);
ext_fb_list_[idx].size = min_size;
}
SetFrameBuffer(idx, fb);
return 0;
}
| 174,544 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: void DelayedExecutor::delayedExecute(const QString &udi)
{
Solid::Device device(udi);
QString exec = m_service.exec();
MacroExpander mx(device);
mx.expandMacros(exec);
KRun::runCommand(exec, QString(), m_service.icon(), 0);
deleteLater();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | void DelayedExecutor::delayedExecute(const QString &udi)
{
Solid::Device device(udi);
QString exec = m_service.exec();
MacroExpander mx(device);
mx.expandMacrosShellQuote(exec);
KRun::runCommand(exec, QString(), m_service.icon(), 0);
deleteLater();
}
| 165,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption::~ContentEncryption() {
delete [] key_id;
delete [] signature;
delete [] sig_key_id;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ContentEncoding::ContentEncryption::~ContentEncryption() {
delete[] key_id;
delete[] signature;
delete[] sig_key_id;
}
| 174,461 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: static const char *skip( const char *in )
{
while ( in && *in && (unsigned char) *in <= 32 )
in++;
return in;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static const char *skip( const char *in )
| 167,312 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseOpened(const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
const string16& description,
int64 estimated_size) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
int64 database_size = 0;
db_tracker_->DatabaseOpened(origin_identifier, database_name, description,
estimated_size, &database_size);
database_connections_.AddConnection(origin_identifier, database_name);
Send(new DatabaseMsg_UpdateSize(origin_identifier, database_name,
database_size));
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseOpened(const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
const string16& description,
int64 estimated_size) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!DatabaseUtil::IsValidOriginIdentifier(origin_identifier)) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_DBMF"));
BadMessageReceived();
return;
}
int64 database_size = 0;
db_tracker_->DatabaseOpened(origin_identifier, database_name, description,
estimated_size, &database_size);
database_connections_.AddConnection(origin_identifier, database_name);
Send(new DatabaseMsg_UpdateSize(origin_identifier, database_name,
database_size));
}
| 171,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: SQLWCHAR* _single_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 1 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SQLWCHAR* _single_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return NULL;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 1 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
| 169,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: void UserActivityDetector::MaybeNotify() {
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (last_observer_notification_time_.is_null() ||
(now - last_observer_notification_time_).InSecondsF() >=
kNotifyIntervalSec) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(UserActivityObserver, observers_, OnUserActivity());
last_observer_notification_time_ = now;
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void UserActivityDetector::MaybeNotify() {
base::TimeTicks now =
!now_for_test_.is_null() ? now_for_test_ : base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (last_observer_notification_time_.is_null() ||
(now - last_observer_notification_time_).InSecondsF() >=
kNotifyIntervalSec) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(UserActivityObserver, observers_, OnUserActivity());
last_observer_notification_time_ = now;
}
}
| 170,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name,
sizeof(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name));
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name, cmsMAX_PATH-1);
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
| 166,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionTtsController* ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<ExtensionTtsController>::get();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ExtensionTtsController* ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance() {
| 170,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_send_plaintext(int sock, xmlNode * msg)
{
char *xml_text = dump_xml_unformatted(msg);
if (xml_text != NULL) {
int rc = 0;
char *unsent = xml_text;
int len = strlen(xml_text);
len++; /* null char */
crm_trace("Message on socket %d: size=%d", sock, len);
retry:
rc = write(sock, unsent, len);
if (rc < 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EINTR:
case EAGAIN:
crm_trace("Retry");
goto retry;
default:
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Could only write %d of the remaining %d bytes", rc, len);
break;
}
} else if (rc < len) {
crm_trace("Only sent %d of %d remaining bytes", rc, len);
len -= rc;
unsent += rc;
goto retry;
} else {
crm_trace("Sent %d bytes: %.100s", rc, xml_text);
}
}
free(xml_text);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_send_plaintext(int sock, xmlNode * msg)
static int
crm_send_plaintext(int sock, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
int rc = 0;
const char *unsent = buf;
int total_send;
if (buf == NULL) {
return -1;
}
total_send = len;
crm_trace("Message on socket %d: size=%d", sock, len);
retry:
rc = write(sock, unsent, len);
if (rc < 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EINTR:
case EAGAIN:
crm_trace("Retry");
goto retry;
default:
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Could only write %d of the remaining %d bytes", rc, (int) len);
break;
}
} else if (rc < len) {
crm_trace("Only sent %d of %d remaining bytes", rc, len);
len -= rc;
unsent += rc;
goto retry;
} else {
crm_trace("Sent %d bytes: %.100s", rc, buf);
}
return rc < 0 ? rc : total_send;
}
| 166,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: static void FocusInCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
const gchar* path,
gpointer user_data) {
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->FocusIn(path);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void FocusInCallback(IBusPanelService* panel,
void FocusIn(IBusPanelService* panel, const gchar* input_context_path) {
if (!input_context_path) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NULL context passed";
} else {
VLOG(1) << "FocusIn: " << input_context_path;
}
// Remember the current ic path.
input_context_path_ = Or(input_context_path, "");
}
| 170,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_exif_tag_int_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
unsigned int *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
field_type = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+2],e->endian);
value_count = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+4],e->endian);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type==3) { // SHORT (uint16)
*pv = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
else if(field_type==4) { // LONG (uint32)
*pv = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int get_exif_tag_int_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
unsigned int *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
field_type = get_exif_ui16(e, tag_pos+2);
value_count = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+4);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type==3) { // SHORT (uint16)
*pv = get_exif_ui16(e, tag_pos+8);
return 1;
}
else if(field_type==4) { // LONG (uint32)
*pv = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+8);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,114 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void VectorClamp3(DDSVector3 *value)
{
value->x = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->z));
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static inline void VectorClamp3(DDSVector3 *value)
{
value->x = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->z));
}
| 168,907 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t nbd_receive_reply(QIOChannel *ioc, NBDReply *reply)
{
uint8_t buf[NBD_REPLY_SIZE];
uint32_t magic;
ssize_t ret;
ret = read_sync(ioc, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (ret != sizeof(buf)) {
LOG("read failed");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Reply
[ 0 .. 3] magic (NBD_REPLY_MAGIC)
[ 4 .. 7] error (0 == no error)
[ 7 .. 15] handle
*/
magic = ldl_be_p(buf);
reply->error = ldl_be_p(buf + 4);
reply->handle = ldq_be_p(buf + 8);
reply->error = nbd_errno_to_system_errno(reply->error);
if (reply->error == ESHUTDOWN) {
/* This works even on mingw which lacks a native ESHUTDOWN */
LOG("server shutting down");
return -EINVAL;
}
TRACE("Got reply: { magic = 0x%" PRIx32 ", .error = % " PRId32
", handle = %" PRIu64" }",
magic, reply->error, reply->handle);
if (magic != NBD_REPLY_MAGIC) {
LOG("invalid magic (got 0x%" PRIx32 ")", magic);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ssize_t nbd_receive_reply(QIOChannel *ioc, NBDReply *reply)
{
uint8_t buf[NBD_REPLY_SIZE];
uint32_t magic;
ssize_t ret;
ret = read_sync(ioc, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
if (ret != sizeof(buf)) {
LOG("read failed");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Reply
[ 0 .. 3] magic (NBD_REPLY_MAGIC)
[ 4 .. 7] error (0 == no error)
[ 7 .. 15] handle
*/
magic = ldl_be_p(buf);
reply->error = ldl_be_p(buf + 4);
reply->handle = ldq_be_p(buf + 8);
reply->error = nbd_errno_to_system_errno(reply->error);
if (reply->error == ESHUTDOWN) {
/* This works even on mingw which lacks a native ESHUTDOWN */
LOG("server shutting down");
return -EINVAL;
}
TRACE("Got reply: { magic = 0x%" PRIx32 ", .error = % " PRId32
", handle = %" PRIu64" }",
magic, reply->error, reply->handle);
if (magic != NBD_REPLY_MAGIC) {
LOG("invalid magic (got 0x%" PRIx32 ")", magic);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,450 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: static EAS_RESULT PushcdlStack (EAS_U32 *pStack, EAS_INT *pStackPtr, EAS_U32 value)
{
/* stack overflow, return an error */
if (*pStackPtr >= CDL_STACK_SIZE)
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
/* push the value onto the stack */
*pStackPtr = *pStackPtr + 1;
pStack[*pStackPtr] = value;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: eas_mdls: fix OOB read.
Bug: 34031018
Change-Id: I8d373c905f64286b23ec819bdbee51368b12e85a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static EAS_RESULT PushcdlStack (EAS_U32 *pStack, EAS_INT *pStackPtr, EAS_U32 value)
{
/* stack overflow, return an error */
if (*pStackPtr >= (CDL_STACK_SIZE - 1)) {
ALOGE("b/34031018, stackPtr(%d)", *pStackPtr);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "34031018");
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
}
/* push the value onto the stack */
*pStackPtr = *pStackPtr + 1;
pStack[*pStackPtr] = value;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
| 174,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: chrm_modification_init(chrm_modification *me, png_modifier *pm,
PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white = white_point(encoding);
/* Original end points: */
me->encoding = encoding;
/* Chromaticities (in fixed point): */
me->wx = fix(chromaticity_x(white));
me->wy = fix(chromaticity_y(white));
me->rx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->red));
me->ry = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->red));
me->gx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->green));
me->gy = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->green));
me->bx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->blue));
me->by = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->blue));
modification_init(&me->this);
me->this.chunk = CHUNK_cHRM;
me->this.modify_fn = chrm_modify;
me->this.add = CHUNK_PLTE;
me->this.next = pm->modifications;
pm->modifications = &me->this;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | chrm_modification_init(chrm_modification *me, png_modifier *pm,
const color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white = white_point(encoding);
/* Original end points: */
me->encoding = encoding;
/* Chromaticities (in fixed point): */
me->wx = fix(chromaticity_x(white));
me->wy = fix(chromaticity_y(white));
me->rx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->red));
me->ry = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->red));
me->gx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->green));
me->gy = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->green));
me->bx = fix(chromaticity_x(encoding->blue));
me->by = fix(chromaticity_y(encoding->blue));
modification_init(&me->this);
me->this.chunk = CHUNK_cHRM;
me->this.modify_fn = chrm_modify;
me->this.add = CHUNK_PLTE;
me->this.next = pm->modifications;
pm->modifications = &me->this;
}
| 173,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
{
/* This is only valid for single tasks */
if (pid <= 0 || tgid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info. */
if (info->si_code >= 0)
return -EPERM;
info->si_signo = sig;
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
{
/* This is only valid for single tasks */
if (pid <= 0 || tgid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
* Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
*/
if (info->si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
WARN_ON_ONCE(info->si_code < 0);
return -EPERM;
}
info->si_signo = sig;
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);
}
| 166,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: AppControllerImpl::~AppControllerImpl() {
if (apps::AppServiceProxy::Get(profile_))
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | AppControllerImpl::~AppControllerImpl() {
AppControllerService::~AppControllerService() {
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
| 172,089 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: static void vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs)
{
kref_put(&ubufs->kref, vhost_net_zerocopy_done_signal);
wait_event(ubufs->wait, !atomic_read(&ubufs->kref.refcount));
kfree(ubufs);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs)
{
kref_put(&ubufs->kref, vhost_net_zerocopy_done_signal);
wait_event(ubufs->wait, !atomic_read(&ubufs->kref.refcount));
}
static void vhost_net_ubuf_put_wait_and_free(struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs)
{
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(ubufs);
kfree(ubufs);
}
| 166,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, 0);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, params.surface_handle, 0);
}
| 171,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: HarfBuzzShaper::HarfBuzzShaper(const Font* font, const TextRun& run, const GlyphData* emphasisData,
HashSet<const SimpleFontData*>* fallbackFonts, FloatRect* bounds)
: Shaper(font, run, emphasisData, fallbackFonts, bounds)
, m_normalizedBufferLength(0)
, m_wordSpacingAdjustment(font->fontDescription().wordSpacing())
, m_letterSpacing(font->fontDescription().letterSpacing())
, m_expansionOpportunityCount(0)
, m_fromIndex(0)
, m_toIndex(m_run.length())
{
m_normalizedBuffer = adoptArrayPtr(new UChar[m_run.length() + 1]);
normalizeCharacters(m_run, m_run.length(), m_normalizedBuffer.get(), &m_normalizedBufferLength);
setExpansion(m_run.expansion());
setFontFeatures();
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
[email protected]
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | HarfBuzzShaper::HarfBuzzShaper(const Font* font, const TextRun& run, const GlyphData* emphasisData,
HashSet<const SimpleFontData*>* fallbackFonts, FloatRect* bounds)
: Shaper(font, run, emphasisData, fallbackFonts, bounds)
, m_normalizedBufferLength(0)
, m_wordSpacingAdjustment(font->fontDescription().wordSpacing())
, m_letterSpacing(font->fontDescription().letterSpacing())
, m_expansionOpportunityCount(0)
, m_fromIndex(0)
, m_toIndex(m_run.length())
, m_totalWidth(0)
{
m_normalizedBuffer = adoptArrayPtr(new UChar[m_run.length() + 1]);
normalizeCharacters(m_run, m_run.length(), m_normalizedBuffer.get(), &m_normalizedBufferLength);
setExpansion(m_run.expansion());
setFontFeatures();
}
| 172,004 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: struct tcp_conn_t *tcp_conn_accept(struct tcp_sock_t *sock)
{
struct tcp_conn_t *conn = calloc(1, sizeof *conn);
if (conn == NULL) {
ERR("Calloc for connection struct failed");
goto error;
}
conn->sd = accept(sock->sd, NULL, NULL);
if (conn->sd < 0) {
ERR("accept failed");
goto error;
}
return conn;
error:
if (conn != NULL)
free(conn);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | struct tcp_conn_t *tcp_conn_accept(struct tcp_sock_t *sock)
struct tcp_conn_t *tcp_conn_select(struct tcp_sock_t *sock,
struct tcp_sock_t *sock6)
{
struct tcp_conn_t *conn = calloc(1, sizeof *conn);
if (conn == NULL) {
ERR("Calloc for connection struct failed");
goto error;
}
fd_set rfds;
struct timeval tv;
int retval = 0;
int nfds = 0;
while (retval == 0) {
FD_ZERO(&rfds);
if (sock) {
FD_SET(sock->sd, &rfds);
nfds = sock->sd;
}
if (sock6) {
FD_SET(sock6->sd, &rfds);
if (sock6->sd > nfds)
nfds = sock6->sd;
}
if (nfds == 0) {
ERR("No valid TCP socket supplied.");
goto error;
}
nfds += 1;
/* Wait up to five seconds. */
tv.tv_sec = 5;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
retval = select(nfds, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
if (retval == -1) {
ERR("Failed to open tcp connection");
goto error;
}
}
if (sock && FD_ISSET(sock->sd, &rfds)) {
conn->sd = accept(sock->sd, NULL, NULL);
NOTE ("Using IPv4");
} else if (sock6 && FD_ISSET(sock6->sd, &rfds)) {
conn->sd = accept(sock6->sd, NULL, NULL);
NOTE ("Using IPv6");
} else {
ERR("select failed");
goto error;
}
if (conn->sd < 0) {
ERR("accept failed");
goto error;
}
return conn;
error:
if (conn != NULL)
free(conn);
return NULL;
}
| 166,589 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::RecordEnumeratedHistogram(const std::string& name,
int sample,
int boundary_value) {
if (!(boundary_value >= 0 && boundary_value <= 100 && sample >= 0 &&
sample < boundary_value)) {
frontend_host_->BadMessageRecieved();
return;
}
if (name == kDevToolsActionTakenHistogram)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(name, sample, boundary_value);
else if (name == kDevToolsPanelShownHistogram)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(name, sample, boundary_value);
else
frontend_host_->BadMessageRecieved();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void DevToolsUIBindings::RecordEnumeratedHistogram(const std::string& name,
int sample,
int boundary_value) {
if (!frontend_host_)
return;
if (!(boundary_value >= 0 && boundary_value <= 100 && sample >= 0 &&
sample < boundary_value)) {
frontend_host_->BadMessageRecieved();
return;
}
if (name == kDevToolsActionTakenHistogram)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(name, sample, boundary_value);
else if (name == kDevToolsPanelShownHistogram)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(name, sample, boundary_value);
else
frontend_host_->BadMessageRecieved();
}
| 172,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: ~ScopedRequest() {
if (requested_) {
owner_->delegate_->StopEnumerateDevices(request_id_);
}
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | ~ScopedRequest() {
if (requested_ && owner_->delegate_) {
owner_->delegate_->StopEnumerateDevices(request_id_);
}
}
| 171,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: inline HTMLIFrameElement::HTMLIFrameElement(Document& document)
: HTMLFrameElementBase(iframeTag, document),
did_load_non_empty_document_(false),
collapsed_by_client_(false),
sandbox_(HTMLIFrameElementSandbox::Create(this)),
referrer_policy_(kReferrerPolicyDefault) {}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | inline HTMLIFrameElement::HTMLIFrameElement(Document& document)
: HTMLFrameElementBase(iframeTag, document),
collapsed_by_client_(false),
sandbox_(HTMLIFrameElementSandbox::Create(this)),
referrer_policy_(kReferrerPolicyDefault) {}
| 172,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Identify and fix the vulnerability in the code. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed function code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dynamicGetbuf(gdIOCtxPtr ctx, void *buf, int len)
{
int rlen, remain;
dpIOCtxPtr dctx;
dynamicPtr *dp;
dctx = (dpIOCtxPtr) ctx;
dp = dctx->dp;
remain = dp->logicalSize - dp->pos;
if(remain >= len) {
rlen = len;
} else {
if(remain <= 0) {
/* 2.0.34: EOF is incorrect. We use 0 for
* errors and EOF, just like fileGetbuf,
* which is a simple fread() wrapper.
* TBB. Original bug report: Daniel Cowgill. */
return 0; /* NOT EOF */
}
rlen = remain;
}
memcpy(buf, (void *) ((char *)dp->data + dp->pos), rlen);
dp->pos += rlen;
return rlen;
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr()
tiff_invalid_read.tiff is corrupt, and causes an invalid read in
gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr(), but not in gdImageCreateFromTiff(). The culprit
is dynamicGetbuf(), which doesn't check for out-of-bound reads. In this case,
dynamicGetbuf() is called with a negative dp->pos, but also positive buffer
overflows have to be handled, in which case 0 has to be returned (cf. commit
75e29a9).
Fixing dynamicGetbuf() exhibits that the corrupt TIFF would still create
the image, because the return value of TIFFReadRGBAImage() is not checked.
We do that, and let createFromTiffRgba() fail if TIFFReadRGBAImage() fails.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to [email protected].
CVE-2016-6911
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int dynamicGetbuf(gdIOCtxPtr ctx, void *buf, int len)
{
int rlen, remain;
dpIOCtxPtr dctx;
dynamicPtr *dp;
dctx = (dpIOCtxPtr) ctx;
dp = dctx->dp;
if (dp->pos < 0 || dp->pos >= dp->realSize) {
return 0;
}
remain = dp->logicalSize - dp->pos;
if(remain >= len) {
rlen = len;
} else {
if(remain <= 0) {
return 0;
}
rlen = remain;
}
if (dp->pos + rlen > dp->realSize) {
rlen = dp->realSize - dp->pos;
}
memcpy(buf, (void *) ((char *)dp->data + dp->pos), rlen);
dp->pos += rlen;
return rlen;
}
| 168,821 |
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