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If you use an SCA tool, why should you use a SAST tool as well? Let’s discuss what each tool can and can’t do and how they complement each other. If you’re an SCA user, then you might wonder why you should use a SAST tool too. After all, modern applications consist of up to 90% open source code. To answer this question, let’s first discuss at a high level what each tool can and can’t do. What SCA can do: - Find common open source libraries and components used in your software - Compare findings to a list of known vulnerabilities (e.g., Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, or CVEs) and determine whether components have known and documented vulnerabilities, are out of date, and have patches available - Identify licenses associated with open source components and libraries (e.g., GPL), as well as potential license issues What SCA can’t do: - Identify custom components or libraries your own organization has developed - Identify weaknesses in code that can contribute to vulnerabilities What SAST can do: - Uncover Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) in source code, including custom code, components, and libraries and open source code and components - Identify both security and quality flaws in code and provide remediation advice - Help ensure compliance to a wide variety of embedded quality, reliability, and security standards by identifying specific vulnerabilities listed in these standards What SAST can’t do: - Identify security vulnerabilities or license issues in open source or custom components or libraries - Identify out-of-date components or libraries that require a patch - Identify code that contains CVEs Comparing SAST and SCA SAST is fundamental to software development and enables developers to shift left in the software development life cycle (SDLC). SAST tools are critical for identifying quality and security issues in your software early on, so developers can find and fix issues as they write their code. Using a SAST tool enables developers to learn how to write clean secure code from the start, when it is easier and cheaper to make fixes than in later stages, such as QA and pre-release. An analogy is that SCA identifies all the visible holes in the roof of a house (known vulnerable components and libraries) and provides a quick patch. By contrast, SAST identifies hard-to-detect structural weaknesses in the roof beams and plywood structure and prevents major roof cave-ins (i.e., breaches) by identifying security vulnerabilities that hackers can exploit. What to look for in a static application security testing (SAST) tool - Comprehensive code coverage; accurate identification and prioritization of critical security vulnerabilities to be fixed. - Ease of use. An intuitive, consistent, modern interface involving zero configuration; insight into vulnerabilities with necessary contextual information (e.g., dataflow, CWE vulnerability description, and detailed remediation advice). - Fast incremental analysis results that appear in seconds as developers write code within their IDE. - DevSecOps capabilities. Support for popular build servers and issue trackers; flexible APIs for integration into custom tools. - Enterprise capabilities to support thousands of projects, developers, and millions of issues. - Management-level reporting and compliance to industry standards. Broad and complete support of software quality (CERT C/C++, MISRA, AUTOSAR, ISO 26262, ISO/IEC TS 17961) and security standards (OWASP Top 10, CWE Top 25, PCI DSS) so you can ensure your apps are compliant. - eLearning integration. Contextual guidance and links to short courses specific to the issues identified in code; just-in-time learning when developers need it. To learn more about Coverity SAST, download the datasheet and visit our Coverity webpage. Our latest news is that our Code Sight IDE plugin now supports both Coverity and Black Duck analysis findings together on the developer’s desktop. With Code Sight, developers can address security issues in both proprietary code and open source dependencies as they code, without leaving the IDE. So you can quickly find and fix issues before you check in your code for the next build.
Cisco’s Talos research department has analyzed malware that communicates via DNS. The so-called Dnmessenger trojan can thus request PowerShell scripts from the txt record to avoid detection. In the analysis, the researchers write that the Trojan communicates with the attackers’ c2 server in this way. The malware is notable because this variant takes extensive steps to remain hidden. The trojan is distributed using an infected Word document, which appears to be protected by McAfee software. For example, the file could be sent to a specific target by a phishing email. The malware works with PowerShell to create a backdoor in the victim’s system. To achieve that, the malicious software first checks for administrative access and which version of PowerShell is running on the system. In the next phase, the Dnmessenger Trojan uses a random pre-programmed domain name for dns requests. By retrieving the txt record it is possible for the attackers to provide the trojan with various commands. The PowerShell commands contained in the txt records allow the attacker to control Windows functions on the infected system. It is also possible to send back the generated output of applications via a dns request. According to the researchers, such an attack is difficult to detect, because organizations often do not use filters for DNS. This makes this technique suitable for targeted attacks. The malicious Word file
Rectot ransomware removal instructions What is Rectot? Discovered by Michael Gillespie, Rectot is a malicious program belonging to the Djvu ransomware family. Cyber criminals (the developers) use the program to extort money from people. When Rectot is installed on a computer, it encrypts stored data and prevents victims from accessing their files unless a ransom is paid. It also renames all files by adding the ".rectot" extension. For example, "1.jpg" becomes "1.jpg.rectot". Instructions about how to purchase a decryption tool can be found in the "_readme.txt" text file. The text file ("_readme.txt") states that Rectot has encrypted all files such as photos, documents, databases, and other data with the strongest encryption. To decrypt files, victims must use a decryption tool and a unique key that can be purchased for $980. It can also be purchased for the lesser price of $490 if Rectot's developers are contacted within the first 72 hours after decryption. To contact them, victims must send an email to [email protected] or [email protected] and provide the appointed personal ID, which can be found at the bottom of the ransom message. Another way to contact these cyber criminals is via Telegram using the account name @datarestore. To prove that they have a decryption tool, they offer victims free decryption of one file that can be sent to them via one of the email addresses provided or Telegram. Note, ransomware developers cannot be trusted. Do not pay any ransom, since they will not send the tools that supposedly decrypt files. Unfortunately, there is no other way to decrypt files encoded by ransomware-type programs. Typically, only cyber criminals have decryption tools/keys capable of decryption. Despite this, it might be possible to use an offline decryption tool, however, this is only effective if there was no Internet connection during encryption or the remote server used by these cyber criminals was not responding at the time. Another way to regain access to your files is to restore them from a data backup. Screenshot of a message encouraging users to pay a ransom to decrypt their compromised data: Most ransomware-type programs are very similar - they encrypt data and force victims to purchase decryption tools/keys. The main differences are cost of decryption and cryptography algorithm (symmetric or asymmetric) that cyber criminals use to encrypt data. Some examples of other ransomware-type programs are Virus-encoder, Ferosas, and ge0l0gic. Unfortunately, encryption caused by these programs is impossible to decrypt without tools held only by the developers, unless the program contains bugs/flaws or other vulnerabilities. Therefore, maintain regular data backups. These should not be stored on the computer, otherwise they will also be encrypted - keep backups on a remote server or unplugged storage device. How did ransomware infect my computer? \|Threat Type\|\|Ransomware, Crypto Virus, Files locker\| \|Detection Names (28E6.TMP.EXE)\|\|Avast (Win32:Malware-gen), ESET-NOD32 (a variant of Win32/Kryptik.GTHU), Kaspersky (Trojan.Win32.Scar.rxnn), McAfee (Artemis!283BF952E656), Full List Of Detections (VirusTotal)\| \|Encrypted Files Extension\|\|.rectot\| \|Ransom Demanding Message\|\|_readme.txt text file\| \|Cyber Criminal [email protected], [email protected], @datarestore (telegram)\| \|Symptoms\|\|Cannot open files stored on your computer, previously functional files now have a different extension (for example, my.docx.locked). A ransom demand message is displayed on your desktop. Cyber criminals demand payment of a ransom (usually in bitcoins) to unlock your files.\| \|Additional Information\|\|This malware is designed to show fake Windows Update window, modify Windows "hosts" file (to prevent users from accessing cyber security websites) and inject AZORult trojan into the system.\| \|Distribution methods\|\|Infected email attachments (macros), torrent websites, malicious ads.\| \|Damage\|\|All files are encrypted and cannot be opened without paying a ransom. Additional password-stealing trojans and malware infections can be installed together with a ransomware infection.\| To eliminate Rectot virus our malware researchers recommend scanning your computer with Spyhunter. How to protect yourself from ransomware infections? Study each received email, especially if it contains a web link or attachment. If the email is received from an unknown, suspicious email address and is irrelevant, do not open the file attached to it. The safest way to download software is using official and trustworthy websites. Other channels such as third party downloaders, unofficial websites, and so on, should not be trusted. Third party activation tools (software 'cracking' tools) are illegal and often infect computers with high-risk malicious programs. Therefore, these tools should not be trusted. No third party update tools are safe. All software should be updated using implemented functions or tools provided by the official software developers. Have reputable anti-spyware or anti-virus software installed, updated, and enabled. If your computer is already infected with Rectot, we recommend running a scan with Spyhunter for Windows to automatically eliminate this ransomware. Text presented in Rectot ransomware text file ("_readme.txt"): Don't worry my friend, you can return all your files! All your files like photos, databases, documents and other important are encrypted with strongest encryption and unique key. The only method of recovering files is to purchase decrypt tool and unique key for you. This software will decrypt all your encrypted files. What guarantees you have? You can send one of your encrypted file from your PC and we decrypt it for free. But we can decrypt only 1 file for free. File must not contain valuable information. You can get and look video overview decrypt tool: Price of private key and decrypt software is $980. Discount 50% available if you contact us first 72 hours, that's price for you is $490. Please note that you'll never restore your data without payment. Check your e-mail "Spam" or "Junk" folder if you don't get answer more than 6 hours. To get this software you need write on our e-mail: Reserve e-mail address to contact us: Our Telegram account: Your personal ID: Screenshot of files encrypted by Rectot (".rectot" extension): Malware researcher Michael Gillespie has developed a decryption tool that might restore your data if it was encrypted using an "offline key". As mentioned, each victim gets a unique decryption key, all of which are stored on remote servers controlled by cyber criminals. These are categorized as "online keys", however, there are cases when the infected machine has no Internet connection or the server is timing out/not responding. If this is the case, Rectot will use an "offline encryption key", which is hard-coded. Cyber criminals change offline keys periodically to prevent multiple encryptions with the same key. Michael Gillespie continually gathers offline keys and updates the decrypter, however, the chances of successful decryption are still very low, since only a very small proportion of "offline keys" have so far been gathered. You can download the decrypter by clicking this link (note that the download link remains identical, even though the decrypter is being continually updated). Your files will be restored only if the list of gathered keys includes the one that was used to encrypt your data. Screenshot of STOP/Djvu decrypter by Michael Gillespie: As with most of ransomware from Djvu family, Rectot also displays a fake Windows update pop-up during the encryption: IMPORTANT NOTE! - As well as encrypting data, ransomware-type infections from the Djvu malware family also install a trojan-type virus called AZORult, which is designed to steal various account credentials. Moreover, this malware family is designed to add a number of entries to the Windows hosts file. The entries contain URLs of various websites, most of which are related to malware removal. This is done to prevent users from accessing malware security websites and seeking help. Our website (PCrisk.com) is also on the list. Removing these entries, however, is simple - you can find detailed instructions in this article (note that, although the steps are shown in the Windows 10 environment, the process is virtually identical on all versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system). Screenshot of websites added to Windows hosts file: Rectot ransomware removal: Instant automatic removal of Rectot virus: Manual threat removal might be a lengthy and complicated process that requires advanced computer skills. Spyhunter is a professional automatic malware removal tool that is recommended to get rid of Rectot virus. Download it by clicking the button below: - What is Rectot? - STEP 1. Rectot virus removal using safe mode with networking. - STEP 2. Rectot ransomware removal using System Restore. Windows XP and Windows 7 users: Start your computer in Safe Mode. Click Start, click Shut Down, click Restart, click OK. During your computer start process, press the F8 key on your keyboard multiple times until you see the Windows Advanced Option menu, and then select Safe Mode with Networking from the list. Video showing how to start Windows 7 in "Safe Mode with Networking": Windows 8 users: Start Windows 8 is Safe Mode with Networking - Go to Windows 8 Start Screen, type Advanced, in the search results select Settings. Click Advanced startup options, in the opened "General PC Settings" window, select Advanced startup. Click the "Restart now" button. Your computer will now restart into the "Advanced Startup options menu". Click the "Troubleshoot" button, and then click the "Advanced options" button. In the advanced option screen, click "Startup settings". Click the "Restart" button. Your PC will restart into the Startup Settings screen. Press F5 to boot in Safe Mode with Networking. Video showing how to start Windows 8 in "Safe Mode with Networking": Windows 10 users: Click the Windows logo and select the Power icon. In the opened menu click "Restart" while holding "Shift" button on your keyboard. In the "choose an option" window click on the "Troubleshoot", next select "Advanced options". In the advanced options menu select "Startup Settings" and click on the "Restart" button. In the following window you should click the "F5" button on your keyboard. This will restart your operating system in safe mode with networking. Video showing how to start Windows 10 in "Safe Mode with Networking": Log in to the account infected with the Rectot virus. Start your Internet browser and download a legitimate anti-spyware program. Update the anti-spyware software and start a full system scan. Remove all entries detected. If you cannot start your computer in Safe Mode with Networking, try performing a System Restore. Video showing how to remove ransomware virus using "Safe Mode with Command Prompt" and "System Restore": 1. During your computer start process, press the F8 key on your keyboard multiple times until the Windows Advanced Options menu appears, and then select Safe Mode with Command Prompt from the list and press ENTER. 2. When Command Prompt mode loads, enter the following line: cd restore and press ENTER. 3. Next, type this line: rstrui.exe and press ENTER. 4. In the opened window, click "Next". 5. Select one of the available Restore Points and click "Next" (this will restore your computer system to an earlier time and date, prior to the Rectot ransomware virus infiltrating your PC). 6. In the opened window, click "Yes". 7. After restoring your computer to a previous date, download and scan your PC with recommended malware removal software to eliminate any remaining Rectot ransomware files. To restore individual files encrypted by this ransomware, try using Windows Previous Versions feature. This method is only effective if the System Restore function was enabled on an infected operating system. Note that some variants of Rectot are known to remove Shadow Volume Copies of the files, so this method may not work on all computers. To restore a file, right-click over it, go into Properties, and select the Previous Versions tab. If the relevant file has a Restore Point, select it and click the "Restore" button. If you cannot start your computer in Safe Mode with Networking (or with Command Prompt), boot your computer using a rescue disk. Some variants of ransomware disable Safe Mode making its removal complicated. For this step, you require access to another computer. To protect your computer from file encryption ransomware such as this, use reputable antivirus and anti-spyware programs. As an extra protection method, you can use programs called HitmanPro.Alert and EasySync CryptoMonitor, which artificially implant group policy objects into the registry to block rogue programs such as Rectot ransomware. Note that Windows 10 Fall Creators Update includes a "Controlled Folder Access" feature that blocks ransomware attempts to encrypt your files. By default, this feature automatically protects files stored in Documents, Pictures, Videos, Music, Favorites as well as Desktop folders. Windows 10 users should install this update to protect their data from ransomware attacks. Here is more information on how to get this update and add an additional protection layer from ransomware infections. HitmanPro.Alert CryptoGuard - detects encryption of files and neutralises any attempts without need for user-intervention: Malwarebytes Anti-Ransomware Beta uses advanced proactive technology that monitors ransomware activity and terminates it immediately - before reaching users' files: - The best way to avoid damage from ransomware infections is to maintain regular up-to-date backups. More information on online backup solutions and data recovery software Here. Other tools known to remove Rectot ransomware:
ObliqueRAT is yet another remote access Trojan that is distributed via malicious Microsoft Word macro enabled documents. It targeted toward south Asian governments. A new malicious campaign emerged that conveyed the Dharma ransomware mostly target toward Italian users. The latter, also called CrySIS Ransomware, appeared for the first time in 2016 and over time has evolved into different variations and is increasingly active. PollerYou ransomware encrypts user data using AES, and then requires a ransom of $100 in BTC in order to return the files. It does not add any extension or marker to its encrypted files. This ransomware encrypts user data with Salsa20, and then requires you to write to email to learn how to pay the ransom and return the files. Loda RAT, first detected in 2017 which now slowly matures up into an effective remote access Trojan, yet simple. It steal username/passwords, session cookies and can take screenshots too. Its current version in wild is 1.1.1.
Fundamental to the construction of modular, maintainable, and scalable software programs is the principle of inversion of control (IoC). It’s not a tool or framework per se, but rather a design approach that promotes adaptability and scalability in software. In this piece, we’ll explore the idea of IoC, its advantages, and the ways it might be implemented in different programming paradigms. What is Inversion of Control? Simply said, Inversion of Control is a method of reversing the typical order of operations in a program. The primary control flow of a program is often established by the code of the application. However, in IoC, the control flow is moved to a different part of the system, which is typically referred to as the “container” or “framework.” This container oversees the development and disposal of application parts and their dependencies.When using IoC, programmers are more likely to separate their code into smaller, more manageable chunks. Modifying one portion of an application without having an effect on the rest is made simpler through the use of loosely coupled components and dependency injection. As a result, the code becomes more manageable, readable, and testable. Key Concepts of IoC Dependency Injection (DI): Dependency Injection is a core idea in the IoC framework. When components are instantiated, the IoC container injects the necessary dependencies rather than having the component create them. As a result, the components are freed from the burden of dependency management and become more narrowly focused and reusable. Loose coupling is encouraged by IoC. By hiding the details of dependency creation and management from the components themselves, the architecture of the application may be modified and improved with greater ease. Inversion of Flow: IoC flips the traditional control hierarchy upside down. The application’s code no longer directly oversees the generation and administration of objects; instead, the IoC container is in charge of the control flow. Benefits of IoC By facilitating the separation of concerns, IoC promotes the development of modular code. Because of this, it’s less complicated to learn and keep up with. It is simpler to test individual components within an IoC-based application since it is possible to easily mock or substitute test doubles for dependencies. IoC encourages a modular design where individual parts can be updated independently of the rest of the program. By reducing the amount of coupling between them, components can be used more effectively in multiple contexts. IoC can be used in many different languages and frameworks. Object-Oriented Programming (OOP): IoC can be implemented with frameworks like Spring and ASP.NET Core in object-oriented programming languages like Java and C#. Object construction and dependency injection are handled by containers provided by these frameworks. Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP): By allowing developers to express non-functional requirements (such logging or security) independently from the main application logic, AOP frameworks like AspectJ make IoC possible. The Inversion of Control design approach is a potent tool for making software more reliable and easier to maintain. Developers can produce more modular, testable, and scalable code by decoupling components and handing off responsibility to a container or framework. IoC can be used to build adaptable and easily maintained software regardless of the development paradigm being used, be it object-oriented, functional, or aspect-oriented. In the rapidly changing field of information technology, adopting IoC can help create software that is both reliable and flexible..
Users in an organization are experiencing when attempting to access certain websites. The users report that when they type in a legitimate URL, different boxes appear on the screen, making it difficult to access the legitimate sites. Which of the following would best mitigate this issue? A. Pop-up blockers B. URL filtering
GeSWall is an application that provides support to users who want to protect their computers from internet threats and not only. The utility is a firewall and it is freely distributed. However, it still encompasses a lot of functions that make it a trustful app for users. The interface of the GeSWall is quite simple and it contains three main elements. The left sidebar allows users to access different functions of the firewall with the aid of a tree menu. This is used as a management solution and users have the possibility to explore any of the options. By default, the main window screen of the tool will display the status of the firewall. Users can click on any of the three buttons to change its status. GeSWall has a whitelist feature and trusted applications can be added on it so they do not encounter restrictions anymore. On the other hand, it can easily detect a wide array of keyloggers and other malicious tools that might appear on a computer from different sources. These are easily stopped by the tool, along with other types of intrusions. Malicious software has no chance of replicating itself as such changes are automatically detected and prevented by the app.
The Windows’ Firewall is designed to protect the computer from potential cyber risks and malware. It does so by blocking certain applications from using the internet that might be a threat to the computer’s integrity. All applications use specific “ports” to communicate with their servers and the internet, these ports need to be opened for the applications. In some cases, the ports are opened automatically by the application and it has instant access to the internet. However, in some cases, the ports need to be opened manually and the application is blocked from using the internet until the ports are opened. In this article, we will discuss the complete method to open specific Firewall ports in Windows 10. Types of Ports There are two major types of communications used by ports and it is important to know the difference between them before we move on towards opening ports. Ports are classified into two types depending upon the type of protocol they use. There are two types of protocols and they have been explained as follows. TCP Protocol: The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is one of the most used forms of protocol and it provides a reliable and ordered delivery of data. This type of communication is used by applications which need a secure form of delivery and it is often slower than other protocols. UDP Protocol: The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is used to send messages in the form of Datagrams to other hosts on an IP network. This form of communication provides much less latency but it is also much less secure and the sent message can easily be intercepted. Now that you have a basic understanding of the two major types of protocols that are used by ports, we will move on towards the method to open a specific port. How to Open a Firewall Port in Windows 10? The method to open a Firewall Port is very easy and can be implemented by anyone, however, it is important that you know the exact range of ports that you want to open and are also aware of the protocol that is used by the application for which you want to open the port. - Press “Windows” + “I” to open settings and click on “Update & Security”. - Select the “Windows Security” tab from the left pane and click on “Firewall and Network Protection” option. - Select the “Advanced Settings” button from the list. - A new window will open up, Click on the “Inbound Rules” option and select “New Rule“. - Select “Port” and click on “Next”. - Check the “TCP” or “UDP” option depending upon the application and select “Specified Local Ports” option. - Enter the ports that you want to open, if you are entering multiple ports enter them with a “,” in between. Also, if you are opening a range of ports, enter them with a “–” in between. - Click on “Next” and select “Allow the Connection“. - Select “Next” and make sure all three options are checked. - Again, click on “Next” and write a “Name” for the new rule. - Select “Next” after writing a name and click on “Finish“. - Now, click on “Outbound Rule” and repeat the above process in the same manner. - After setting up the Outbound Rule, the ports have been opened up for both sending and receiving data packets.
As a Security professional should also be familiar with the legal issues surrounding software licensing agreements. There are four main types of License Agreement in use today. Refer to below mindmap for details. Also, Import/Export law will help company to control their Information across multiple countries. Below case study will help us to understand “why” encryption export control is required for a Company/Enterprise. - Let us assume one of the Hosts in South Africa is trying to communicate to one of the hosts in India & traffic exit from your Perimeter router via the Internet. - Also assume this host in South Africa is using some form of an encryption algorithm which is allowed in South Africa, India but “not” in “Singapore.” Because different country may have different laws regarding the transmission of data or encryption standard. - Considering the nature of the IP packet flow, this traffic stream may take many many different routes – let us assume in this case via Singapore. - In this case, your end to end host communication is violating the Law of Singapore; - Hence, if there are chances to break a foreign national’s data laws; we must control data flow to avoid violations & this must be included in “Risk Management.” - The solution of such a problem could be to use Pinned Path(Avoiding flow via Singapore) in WAN Technologies: MPLS, Frame Relay, ATM.
In this paper, the authors present the review of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) using techniques of Expert systems (artificial intelligence). With the growing need of computer networking and e-commerce, the security of the web systems are of the major concern. IDS is the one that can be used for monitoring data congestion and also recognizing the user behavior to identify the malicious attacks and also the illegitimate access of intruders. The main aim of IDS is to safeguard the data confidentiality and integrity. Using the AI techniques once the intrusion is detected it can be represented using alerts to the security officer.
News & Insights The RAVID Future of Information Warfare Randomized Adaptive Virtual Infrastructure Defense (RAVID) is based on the observed history and progression of warfare, regardless of the medium. It is the concept of a continually morphing virtual infrastructure preventing both quantum and traditional attacks from finding success. In world history, we learn of battles involving two factions who “march onto the field of battle”, stand in a line and shoot at each other, both from a stationary position. As technology and skillsets progressed, we were able to hit moving targets from stationary positions and stationary targets from moving positions, finally progressing to generation 5 aircraft dancing in the sky during a battle. In many ways, the history of cybersecurity can be traced back to the earliest forms of military encryption. From Caesar’s cipher in ancient Rome to the use of Enigma machines during World War II, encryption has played a vital role in military strategy. Today, encryption is still a critical component of cybersecurity, however as with traditional communications, other practices and methods must be used in concert to fully protect one’s information and infrastructure. RAVID was designed with this concept in mind, to protect against advanced cyber-attacks by creating a dynamic and flexible infrastructure that actively adapts ahead of changing threats in real-time. RAVID leverages adaptive techniques to continuously monitor the architecture and adjust its posture based on the current threat landscape and environmental conditions at that time. This allows it to quickly detect and respond to attacks in real-time, creating virtual airgaps instantly so that we may fully control all data flow within and without our system. The framework is designed to work within any virtualized environments, such as cloud computing platforms, and can be used to protect a wide range of applications and services. By providing a dynamic and flexible defense mechanism, RAVID helps organizations to reduce their risk of cyber-attacks and improve their overall security posture by removing the threat plane and changing the game for an adversary. Because RAVID is based on the principle of randomization, which means that it introduces randomness into various aspects of the infrastructure, we remove the opportunity for quantum and other advanced computers to mathematically determine how to defeat our system. Leveraging time as the core of our randomization brings the total possibilities to infinite, greatly reducing the ability for probabilistic determination of any current state of our architecture. This condition makes it significantly more difficult for attackers to predict and exploit vulnerabilities. This includes removing all public facing IPs, randomizing, and rotating Private IP addresses, port numbers, and even the locations, as well as the continual moving and reassigning of virtual machines within the network. All this working together allows the One Tier ecosystem solution to change the cyber battlefield and defeat the modern and emerging threats facing our IT organizations today.
\|These scenarios are useful for testing switches and firewalls that have to handle UDP traffic from thousands of source MAC addresses and one or many destination MAC addresses. This cookbook covers two scenarios: A one-sided traffic stream is used to send packets to a network device under test when round-trip reporting is not required. - A single destination MAC address. (This would exercise a firewall or router.) - Thousands of destination MAC addresses. (This would exercise a switch by overflowing the device CAM table.)
Chrome Extension for Trustroot Never fall for a cryptocurrency scam! Trustroot is a blockchain protocol that verifies the identity and reputation of blockchain businesses to help you avoid scammers and hackers. Hackers are constantly looking for new ways to steal cryptocurrency, from altering wallet addresses, to impersonating social media accounts, to hijacking e-mail lists. Trustroot’s Chrome extension detects these attacks before they happen by letting you know you’re transacting with a business that’s fully vetted and verified. Quickly access information regarding a business’s incorporations, wallet addresses, reputation, and more in one place. The Trustroot browser extension scans the text of the webpage you’re currently viewing and automatically identifies wallet addresses on the page--then, the extension displays the following safety indicators next to each address: ✅ Green: Wallet Certified 📒 Yellow: Domain Verified ❌ Red: Wallet Not Certified - Proceed with Caution We put companies transacting in cryptocurrencies through an extensive background check, by authenticating the company's legal registration, wallet ownership, and more, so that you can ensure you are sending money to entity you intended to. Learn more about our mission to decentralize security and reputation on the blockchain at https://trustroot.io or by joining our Telegram community at https://t.me/trustroot.
We recently made a few changes to our Spam filtering service… We have been notified by several customers that some mail has been incorrectly identified (false-positive) as spam or unwanted email. We are addressing those issues as soon as we are informed of the problem. If you a noticing legitimate email being marked as spam, please check out the following Knowledgebase article. You may have noticed some of your emails were tagged with the following Subject: *SPAM* – [Smile Global Gateway Filtering Service] – and then the original email subject was displayed after the tagged portion. Unfortunately, one thing that we overlooked was that the length of the tagged subject was quite long and made it difficult to see what the actual message subject was (especially on mobile devices and webmail). This has been changed back to our standard: [SPAM] – message. Our solution was to add a custom message header that is added to the source of each message received by our Gateway Filtering Service. Here is an example:
Punishing Malicious Users Malicious users are considered to be any users who break the Planipedia Rules, or harm Planipedia content according to the reasons listed on the Block Users page. Most acts of misbehaviour are likely unintentional and minor, and can be suitably dealt with by reminding the user of the rules and offering some basic tips. As the severity and frequency of the offenses increases for a particular user (IP address or login name), appropriate warnings should be issued. The main portion of this article will deal with punishing users that are continually creating malicious content. Reviewing a User's History Upon finding a malicious entry as noted on other administrative pages and in the Planipedia Rules, administrators should review the history of a user. While in the user's page, on the left-side toolbox, a new link to "Logs" will appear. In this Special:Log&user=___ page you will have the ability to select "Block log" from a drop-down list of log types. Clicking Go will then bring up any previous times this user has been blocked from using Planipedia. If a user has already been blocked, as an administrator you should more highly consider blocking the user again, for a longer period of time, as opposed to just issuing a warning. Back on the main user page, there is also a toolbox item called "User Contributions". This page appears similar to the Recent Changes screen, and will allow you to review the changes the user has made through the (diff) page. If several contributions are of a malicious nature (and not merely minor offenses), you should more highly consider blocking the user for a period of time, as opposed to issuing a warning. If the offenses made by a user are only of a minor nature (for example, referencing their company and services within an academic article, or submitting subjective content), or has only made a single offense (not of a sever nature), administrators should politely issue a warning. The warning should explain to the user the contributions that were considered malicious and why, as well as reference the Planipedia Rules. If there are suitable Help materials to recommend to the user to help correct this problem, they should also be provided to curb their reoccurence. You may choose to include the likely punishment should the malicious activity be committed again. After you issue a warning to a user, the administrator should had the "User Contributions" page to their watchlist to more easily keep track of the content added by the user, ensuring the cited offenses are continued. Once a user is deemed as ignoring your warnings and continuing to violate the Planipedia Rules, or in the instance where a user commmits a single, very severe act, administrator should act to block the user. On the Block Users page, an administrator can enter the IP address or user name according to the cited contributor for the malicious change. The length of the time period set for the block should correspond with the severity and/or frequency of the harmful contributions. While this is generally up to the discretion of the administrator, the Special:BlockList page can be used to review which users are currently blocked, the reason, and whether they should be unblocked due to an unfair banning. Generally, first offenses from users will not warrant a long block period; a short one should suffice to get across to the user that if they continue to do so they can be refused access to all Planipedia content. Reasons should always be documented for why a user was blocked, and if it does not fall into the default list provided, you should include your own description.
SMV is a temporal logic model checker based on binary decision diagrams and symbolic model checking. A formal model of railway interlocking logic is built by using SMV, and then CTL specification representing the safety requirements of railway interlocking system is verified. The case study demonstrates that design defects could be found in safety-critical software through model verification, which is the trend of future development. Railway Signalling & Communication Railway Computer Interlocking System
The paper describes details concerning systems used for analysis and the result of data gathered from two various HoneyPot systems, implemented at Institute of Computer Science. The first system uses data mining techniques for the automatic discovery of interesting patterns in connections directed to the HoneyPot. The second one is responsible for the collection and the initial analysis of attacks dedicated to the Web applications, which nowadays is becoming the most interesting target for cybercriminals. The paper presents results from almost a year of usage, with implemented prototypes, which prove it's practical usefulness. The person performing analysis improves effectiveness by using potentially useful data, which is initially filtered from noise, and automatically generated reports. The usage of data mining techniques allows not only detection of important patterns in rapid manner, but also prevents from overlooking interesting patterns in vast amounts of other irrelevant data.
Traditional security and vulnerability study products omit at least 40% of what is physically wired to the network because they do not look for unknown addresses. Because these solutions take too much analysis time and consume too much network resources, they are often used outside office hours. This means that IT security teams can not achieve complete cyber visibility on these mobile, virtual and cloud elements that were simply not present at the time of the scan. The SPECTER solution addresses these issues and provides real-time security information, using recursive network indexing techniques and analyzing network state change through comprehensive network protocol analysis (OSPF, BGP, ARP, DHCP, DNS, ICMPv6, etc.), Spectrum is designed to provide full visibility of the cyber situation, in real-time and dynamically, as mobile, virtual, cloud, physical and virtual network elements evolve Analyzes the network infrastructure Discover changes to network boundaries in real time Installs as a router (without routing function) to monitor real-time changes to the network address space / routing table being used. Validate the profile of the new elements in minutes, as long as they are present Identifies in minutes the new physical or virtual elements connecting to the network, and provides a dynamic visualization of the changes. Lumeta Spectre Scout Legend 1. OSPF LSA Indexing 2. BGP Peer Indexing 3. AWS Active + Passive Broadcast Indexing 4. DMZ Active Indexing through site-site VPN 5. Active + Passive Broadcast Indexing The Specter solution uses complementary data streams (open source and commercial threat detection solutions) and correlates them with its indexed metadata for: Find out in minutes if command and control infrastructures (C2) known on the Internet are accessible within the perimeter of your network Find out in minutes if known Dark Web (TOR) output nodes are accessible from anywhere within your network. Discover recently compromised zombies that work on your network Fournir une identification en temps réel des modifications apportées à l'utilisation du port TCP / UDP, ce qui peut être un indicateur de compromission - par exemple, les violations d'utilisation RDP et FTP. Identify in real time harmful TCP / UDP ports used by known malware attacks. Enrich the Spectrum Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) database by adding NetFlow and other data streams, to provide deeper security information for faster correction. Analyze all segments of the network Discover new active networks in real time. Discover the networks become non-reactive and inaccessible in a few minutes. Sending alarms and network segmentation alerts to SIEMs, GRCs, or Device Policy Checkers for immediate resolution. Find Level 3 Leak Paths from Internal Critical Networks to the Internet or Between Real-Time Network Enclaves The « Leak Paths » is the most used attack vector by cybercriminals! A "Leak Path" is an unauthorized incoming or outgoing connection route to the Internet or subnets. A "Leak Path" crosses the perimeter of the network or between secure areas. For example, this may take the form of an unsecured transfer device exposed to the Internet, or manifest as a forgotten open link to a former trading partner. Spectrum makes it possible to identify all the "Leak Paths", not only the existing ones, but also the new ones, created in real time that can be attributed to a bad configuration or a malicious activity. The exfiltration of intellectual property Secure personal health data Comply with the new GDPR standard Comply with the new GDPR standard « Leak Paths » computer due diligence in case of merger and acquisition
Network packet capture You can use Microsoft Message Analyzer to capture, display, and analyze protocol messaging traffic on your Windows 10 IoT Core device. Working PowerShell Connection (Step 1 to 8 described at PowerShell) Set up your device In order to connect to your device using Message Analyzer, you need to first rename your device. This can be done through SSH or PowerShell using the After you rename your device, reboot the device to apply the name change. Turn off the firewall Connect to your device using PowerShell or SSH and run the following command to disable the firewall. netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off Connect to your device using Message Analyzer Now that your device is set up, let’s connect to it using Microsoft Message Analyzer. - Download the Microsoft Message Analyzer. - Open Message Analyzer. - Click on - In the window that opens, click on the Live Trace button. - Click on the - Replace Localhost with the name of your IoT device, and enter the administrator user name and password. Then click - Click on the Select a trace scenario dropdown and select Local Network Interfaces. - Click the - You should start to see the messages going through the network interfaces on your device. - After you start the trace through Message Analyzer, you can also view the ETW messages from the packet capture driver in your device’s web interface. To do this, go to the ETW tab of the web interface, select Microsoft-Windows-NDIS-PacketCapture from the Registered providers dropdown menu and click the
Troubleshooting Linux Firewalls While Linux firewalls are inexpensive and quite reliable, they lack the supportcomponent of their commerical counterparts. As a result, most users of Linuxfirewalls have to resort to mailing lists to solve their problems. Our authorshave scoured firewall mailing lists and have compiled a list of the most oftenencountered problems in Linux firewalling. This book takes a Chilton's manualdiagnostic approach to solving these problems.The book begins by presenting the two most common Linux firewallconfigurations and demonstrates how to implement these configurations in animperfect network environment, not in an ideal one. Then, the authors proceedto present a methodology for analyzing each problem at various network levels:cabling, hardware components, protocols, services, and applications. Theauthors include diagnostic scripts which the readers can use to analyze andsolve their particular Linux firewall problems. The reference distributions areRed Hat and SuSE (for international market). What people are saying - Write a review Local Firewall Security 18 other sections not shown
Content tagged: cloud computing Reading Time: ~ 3 min. Using #QRcodes for touchless payments? A recent study suggests that 71% of consumers cannot distinguish between real and malicious codes: https://t.co/62wRKkbUSu — via @threatpost #infosec \| #datasecurity #Deepfakes and #biometrics impact our lives, so how do we mitigate the risks? @joepanettieri and @ThreatMurray discuss the good, the bad, and the ugly aspects of these technologies in our latest podcast: https://t.co/oLngT7zmqp
1. For The Impatient¶ 1.1. What is SIMP?¶ The System Integrity Management Platform (SIMP) is an Open Source framework designed around the concept that individuals and organizations should not need to repeat the work of automating the basic components of their operating system infrastructure. By using the Puppet automation stack, SIMP is working toward the concept of a self-healing infrastructure that, when used with a consistent configuration management process, will allow users to have confidence that their systems not only start in compliance but remain in compliance over time. Finally, SIMP has a goal of remaining flexible enough to properly maintain your operational infrastructure. To this end, where possible, the SIMP components are written to allow all security-related capabilities to be easily adjusted to meet the needs of individual applications.
Internet Filtering: Regulating Content Internet filtering is such a growing practice among world nations that the question today is not whether countries filter the Internet, but to what extent. Satellite links often provide connectivity for Internet backbones linking to international gateways. It is at these ports of entry that certain governments place Internet filters. In other instances, governments delegate Internet filtering to national Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This article discusses the reasons and the mechanics for national Internet filtering; the debate that arises as a result of such practices; and the importance of these issues for the telecommunications industry. The Reasons for Internet Filtering In countries where the Internet is filtered, the practice is usually an extension of regulations limiting verbal and written expression. Interestingly, it is not only nations like China and Iran that filter the Internet. There is also government mandated filtering in European democracies as well as in the United States. Countries almost universally agree that certain Internet content is unacceptable, such as in the case of sites promoting child pornography, phishing or fraud. Filtering other types of content is usually politically or culturally driven; be it to suppress political dissent, undermine religious minorities, or prevent the proliferation of ideas advocating women’s rights. There are three primary ways of filtering: IP header filtering, IP payload filtering and Domain Name System (DNS) filtering. Routers performing IP header filtering read IP addresses contained in IP headers. The website IP address is then compared with a blacklist of IP addresses. Whenever a match is found, the packets are dropped. This type of filtering can significantly overblock sites because one IP address can host thousands of websites. Another problem with this method is that it is impossible to keep a blacklist updated. IP payload filtering is more accurate because it filters based on key words rather than IP addresses. However, additional equipment may be needed to perform deep packet inspection. Whenever the equipment identifies a phrase of interest (e.g., “Tiananmen Square Massacre”), IP packets are dropped. While this method is more accurate, overblocking can still occur. Also, the additional equipment must be fast enough to review packet content in real time. Lastly, DNS filtering prevents users from resolving their domain name query to the respective IP address. DNS filtering, also based on blacklists, targets the domain name rather than the IP address. When filtering is done, other issues ensue. For example, is the country transparent about what it is filtering as well as its reasons for doing it? Most countries, upon blocking a site, give the impression that there was some kind technical error getting to the site. Other countries involve the citizenry in the filtering process by encouraging people to submit blocking suggestions. Another important issue is whether ISPs have the power to carry out filtering policy on their own or must they act only by court order? The former approach has led to ISPs misapplying the policy and blocking unintended sites. The Free Speech Argument The free speech argument says that as long as there is the possibility for overblocking, government mandated Internet filtering infringes constitutionally protected speech. In the United States, the Supreme Court has struck down as unconstitutional statutes designed to filter sites with explicit materials that could be viewed by minors. Only in one instance has a statute requiring schools and libraries to place filters on computers accessible by children survived constitutional muster; and this was only because the filtering is done at the user level. Recently, the application of a statute requiring ISPs to block sites involved in copyright infringement has also been suspended. More regulation of the Internet is on the horizon. Currently, the Internet is governed by a private non-profit corporation. Efforts are underway to shift some Internet governance to the International Communications Union (ITU), thus bringing Internet governance to the intergovernmental level. Through all these changes, the satellite industry must not maintain a mere ‘transport’ mentality when it comes to the Internet because it is an integral part of telecommunications and will keep exerting important forces on the industry. Raul Magallanes runs a Houston-based law firm focusing on telecommunications law. He may be reached at +1 (281) 317-1397 or by email at raul@ rmtelecomlaw.com.
• Learn about the most common issues for distributed applications based on OpenSplice DDS • Learn about the family of OpenSplice tools that can help you tune/troubleshoot your OpenSplice DDS applications • Learn techniques for quickly identifying and fixing the issues Distributed applications are hard to build and even harder to tune and troubleshoot. As such it is essential that a framework for building distributed applications is equipped with a series of tools that can help you understand what is going on in your system and when necessary act on it. This Webcast will introduce the most common issues faced by OpenSplice DDS users and will show how our tools can be used to quickly identify and resolve them. In addition we will investigate how some of our tools, such as the Tuner, can be used to “manipulate/tune” the properties of a running system.
A protection operations center is usually a combined entity that attends to protection worries on both a technological as well as organizational level. It includes the whole three foundation mentioned above: processes, individuals, as well as innovation for boosting and also handling the protection posture of an organization. Nonetheless, it might include extra elements than these three, depending upon the nature of the business being addressed. This post briefly discusses what each such element does as well as what its primary functions are. Procedures. The primary goal of the safety procedures center (usually abbreviated as SOC) is to discover and also deal with the causes of risks and also avoid their repetition. By determining, monitoring, as well as fixing problems at the same time environment, this element aids to make sure that threats do not be successful in their purposes. The different functions and responsibilities of the individual components listed here highlight the basic procedure extent of this unit. They likewise illustrate just how these parts communicate with each other to recognize and also measure threats as well as to execute services to them. Individuals. There are 2 individuals commonly involved in the process; the one in charge of finding susceptabilities as well as the one in charge of implementing solutions. The people inside the protection procedures center monitor susceptabilities, resolve them, and also sharp monitoring to the very same. The tracking feature is separated into several different areas, such as endpoints, notifies, email, reporting, combination, as well as assimilation screening. Modern technology. The innovation portion of a security operations center manages the detection, identification, and exploitation of invasions. A few of the innovation made use of right here are intrusion discovery systems (IDS), managed protection solutions (MISS), as well as application protection management devices (ASM). intrusion discovery systems utilize active alarm notification capacities and also easy alarm system alert abilities to discover breaches. Managed safety solutions, on the other hand, permit safety and security experts to produce controlled networks that include both networked computer systems and web servers. Application security administration tools provide application security services to managers. Information as well as occasion administration (IEM) are the final part of a security operations center and it is consisted of a set of software applications as well as tools. These software application and tools permit managers to capture, document, as well as assess security information as well as event management. This final element likewise enables administrators to establish the reason for a safety danger and to react as necessary. IEM provides application safety details and also occasion administration by allowing an administrator to watch all safety and security dangers and also to identify the origin of the hazard. Compliance. Among the primary objectives of an IES is the establishment of a risk assessment, which reviews the level of risk a company deals with. It likewise includes developing a plan to alleviate that danger. Every one of these tasks are done in conformity with the concepts of ITIL. Safety Conformity is defined as an essential duty of an IES and it is a vital activity that sustains the activities of the Operations Facility. Functional functions as well as duties. An IES is executed by a company’s senior management, yet there are a number of functional features that should be done. These functions are divided between several groups. The initial team of operators is in charge of collaborating with various other groups, the next team is in charge of reaction, the 3rd group is responsible for screening and also integration, as well as the last team is responsible for upkeep. NOCS can apply as well as sustain several activities within a company. These activities consist of the following: Operational responsibilities are not the only responsibilities that an IES carries out. It is additionally needed to establish and also preserve inner policies as well as procedures, train workers, as well as carry out best practices. Since operational responsibilities are presumed by many organizations today, it may be assumed that the IES is the single biggest business framework in the company. Nevertheless, there are several various other parts that contribute to the success or failing of any type of company. Given that most of these other aspects are commonly described as the “best practices,” this term has actually come to be a typical summary of what an IES actually does. In-depth records are required to examine dangers against a specific application or segment. These records are typically sent to a main system that monitors the risks against the systems as well as notifies monitoring teams. Alerts are typically obtained by drivers through e-mail or text messages. Many companies pick email notice to enable rapid and simple action times to these type of events. Other types of activities carried out by a safety and security procedures center are carrying out threat analysis, locating hazards to the facilities, and also stopping the assaults. The risks evaluation requires understanding what dangers the business is faced with every day, such as what applications are prone to strike, where, and when. Operators can make use of risk assessments to identify powerlessness in the safety determines that services apply. These weaknesses may consist of absence of firewall programs, application protection, weak password systems, or weak coverage treatments. In a similar way, network monitoring is an additional solution supplied to an operations center. Network tracking sends informs directly to the monitoring team to assist fix a network problem. It enables monitoring of critical applications to make sure that the company can continue to operate efficiently. The network performance surveillance is utilized to examine and also improve the company’s overall network efficiency. indexsy A safety operations center can discover invasions and quit assaults with the help of signaling systems. This type of innovation aids to determine the source of breach as well as block assaulters prior to they can access to the information or data that they are trying to get. It is likewise valuable for determining which IP address to obstruct in the network, which IP address must be blocked, or which user is triggering the rejection of accessibility. Network surveillance can recognize destructive network activities as well as stop them prior to any type of damages occurs to the network. Companies that count on their IT framework to depend on their capability to run smoothly as well as preserve a high level of discretion and also efficiency.
- Jul 27, 2015 An Android malware campaign dubbed MoneyMonger has been found hidden in money-lending apps developed using Flutter. It's emblematic of a rising tide of blackmailing cybercriminals targeting consumers — and their employers stand to feel the effects, too. According to research from the Zimperium zLabs team, the malware uses multiple layers of social engineering to take advantage of its victims and allows malicious actors to steal private information from personal devices, then use that information to blackmail individuals. The MoneyMonger malware, distributed through third-party app stores and sideloaded onto victims' Android devices, was built from the ground up to be malicious, targeting those in need of quick cash, according to Zimperium researchers. It uses multiple layers of social engineering to take advantage of its victims, beginning with a predatory loan scheme and promising quick money to those who follow a few simple instructions. In the process of setting up the app, the victim is told that permissions are needed on the mobile endpoint to ensure they are in good standing to receive a loan. These permissions are then used to collect and exfiltrate data, including from the contact list, GPS location data, a list of installed apps, sound recordings, call logs, SMS lists, and storage and file lists. It also gains camera access. This stolen information is used to blackmail and threaten victims into paying excessively high-interest rates. If the victim fails to pay on time, and in some cases even after the loan is repaid, the malicious actors threaten to reveal information, call people from the contact list, and even send photos from the device. One of the new and interesting things about this malware is how it uses the Flutter software development kit to hide malicious code. While the open source user interface (UI) software kit Flutter has been a game changer for application developers, malicious actors have also taken advantage of its capabilities and framework, deploying apps with critical security and privacy risks to unsuspecting victims. Blackmailing MoneyMonger Malware Hides in Flutter Mobile Apps Money-lending apps built using the Flutter software development kit hide a predatory spyware threat and highlight a growing trend of using personal data for blackmail.
Mandatory Controls, also known as Mandatory Access Controls (MAC), are a type of access control that restricts the user’s ability to access certain restricted data or to perform restricted actions. Privileged Access is often used as a form of mandatory access control, for example, a requirement to be an Administrator or the Root user prevents ordinary users from performing many actions or viewing certain files and directories. Mandatory controls ensure the enforcement of security parameters are followed regardless of user discretion. Mandatory Access Controls are often set by the company or entity in order to comply with legislative requirements such as HIPAA, PCI, or ITAR. These technical controls do not allow a user to access or grant access to specific files or to perform restricted activities at their own individual discretion. This is in contrast to Discretionary Access Controls (DAC), where users or owners of files or resources can grant access to files, data or resources, at their discretion. What Does This Mean for My SMB? Setting up Mandatory Access Controls is something that every single business should adopt. CyberHoot recommends the following MAC prescriptions for MSPs and SMBs: - Remove Administrative Rights to workstations. This prevents accidental malware installation in many cases if a user accidentally launches a malicious program or download. - Review your Data Access permissions and segregate critical Human Resource, Financial, and Intellectual Property data to separate drives, folders, and reduce or remove access permissions to only those with a business justified need for access. Additionally, CyberHoot recommends the following best practices to protect individuals and businesses against, and limit damages from, online cyber attacks: - Adopt a password manager for better personal/work password hygiene - Require two-factor authentication on any SaaS solution or critical accounts - Require 14+ character Passwords in your Governance Policies - Train employees to spot and avoid email-based phishing attacks - Check that employees can spot and avoid phishing emails by testing them - Backup data using the 3-2-1 method - Incorporate the Principle of Least Privilege - Perform a risk assessment every two to three years
In this article, you’ll get a better understanding of what a packed executable is and how to analyze and unpack malware. Finally, you’ll get to know the top packers used in malware. What are packed executables? It’s an executable that has been compressed firstly to minimize its file size, but often to complicate the reversing process. Not to be confused with standard compressions (rar/zip). Packed executables are standalone files that can be executed while still compressed. A packer uses standard compression techniques (LZO, LZMA, …) on the file; of course, the OS won’t recognize these code modifications, but the packer appends an unpacking routine to the executable. When it is run, the unpacking routine unpacks the code and loads it into memory in its original state. Figure 1: Generic example of packed executable Analyzing packed malware 1. Set up the virtual environment To analyze a malware in general, you must first isolate that malware in a virtual environment (VMware or VirtualBox) with the analyzes tools, in order not to infect your main machine. For more details, check out the following links - OALabs Malware Analysis Virtual Machine, OALabs - How to Get and Set Up a Free Windows VM for Malware Analysis, Zeltser Security Corp. - Malware Analysis: First Steps — Creating your lab, Medium 2. Analysis tools Next, you need to have your analysis tools set up. In case you’re not sure, here’s a list: - Process Hacker (Monitor system resources) - Wireshark (Network protocol analyzer) - HxD (Hex Editor) - Resource Hacker (Extract resources from executables) - VirusTotal (Online analysis of malware samples and URLs) Once you’re done, create a snapshot of the current VM’s state. Now that everything is set up, you (Read more...) *** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Infosec Resources authored by Jamal Chahir. Read the original post at: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/infosecResources/~3/jAh0x56qZLA/
A protection operations center is typically a combined entity that addresses protection problems on both a technological as well as organizational degree. It consists of the entire 3 building blocks mentioned above: procedures, people, and also innovation for enhancing and also handling the safety and security stance of a company. However, it may consist of a lot more parts than these 3, relying on the nature of business being attended to. This post briefly reviews what each such element does and what its major functions are. Processes. The main objective of the safety and security procedures center (usually abbreviated as SOC) is to find and also address the reasons for threats as well as stop their repetition. By determining, surveillance, and also dealing with troubles while doing so setting, this element helps to make sure that dangers do not prosper in their goals. The various functions as well as responsibilities of the specific elements listed here highlight the general process scope of this unit. They likewise show how these components communicate with each other to determine and determine risks as well as to execute services to them. Individuals. There are two people commonly involved in the procedure; the one responsible for discovering susceptabilities and the one responsible for applying remedies. The people inside the protection procedures center screen vulnerabilities, settle them, and alert monitoring to the very same. The monitoring function is split right into numerous various locations, such as endpoints, signals, e-mail, reporting, integration, and also combination testing. Innovation. The technology section of a safety and security operations center takes care of the discovery, recognition, and also exploitation of breaches. A few of the innovation made use of here are invasion discovery systems (IDS), managed security services (MISS), and application security administration tools (ASM). intrusion discovery systems make use of energetic alarm system notice capacities and also passive alarm system notification capabilities to spot invasions. Managed security solutions, on the other hand, enable safety and security experts to create regulated networks that consist of both networked computer systems and servers. Application safety monitoring devices provide application protection solutions to administrators. Details and occasion monitoring (IEM) are the final component of a safety and security procedures facility and it is included a collection of software program applications and gadgets. These software and gadgets permit administrators to catch, record, as well as analyze protection info and also occasion monitoring. This final part additionally allows managers to figure out the root cause of a safety danger and also to react appropriately. IEM gives application security info and also event administration by permitting an administrator to see all safety and security dangers as well as to figure out the origin of the hazard. Compliance. Among the main objectives of an IES is the establishment of a risk assessment, which assesses the level of danger an organization deals with. It also entails establishing a strategy to minimize that risk. Every one of these tasks are done in accordance with the principles of ITIL. Safety Compliance is specified as a crucial obligation of an IES and it is a crucial activity that sustains the activities of the Operations Facility. Functional roles as well as responsibilities. An IES is applied by an organization’s senior monitoring, however there are a number of operational functions that have to be performed. These functions are split between several teams. The very first group of drivers is responsible for coordinating with other teams, the following group is responsible for feedback, the 3rd group is in charge of screening and combination, and also the last group is responsible for upkeep. NOCS can carry out and also support numerous activities within a company. These tasks include the following: Functional duties are not the only obligations that an IES carries out. It is also needed to develop and maintain internal plans and treatments, train workers, as well as apply finest methods. Because functional obligations are assumed by many organizations today, it may be assumed that the IES is the single largest organizational framework in the company. However, there are several other elements that add to the success or failure of any kind of company. Considering that many of these other elements are typically described as the “ideal techniques,” this term has come to be a typical description of what an IES really does. Thorough records are needed to evaluate dangers versus a details application or section. These records are commonly sent out to a central system that keeps track of the hazards versus the systems and informs management teams. Alerts are normally received by operators through e-mail or sms message. Most companies select e-mail notification to allow fast and also very easy reaction times to these type of cases. Various other kinds of activities performed by a protection operations facility are carrying out risk assessment, situating threats to the framework, as well as quiting the strikes. The risks analysis requires understanding what threats business is faced with daily, such as what applications are vulnerable to strike, where, and also when. Operators can utilize hazard analyses to recognize powerlessness in the safety determines that services apply. These weak points may consist of absence of firewall programs, application security, weak password systems, or weak reporting treatments. Likewise, network tracking is an additional service used to an operations center. Network monitoring sends out alerts straight to the management team to aid settle a network concern. It allows surveillance of crucial applications to make certain that the organization can continue to operate efficiently. The network efficiency tracking is utilized to evaluate as well as enhance the company’s total network performance. ransomware definition A security operations facility can identify invasions and quit attacks with the help of alerting systems. This type of innovation helps to establish the source of intrusion as well as block attackers prior to they can get to the info or information that they are trying to get. It is additionally beneficial for establishing which IP address to obstruct in the network, which IP address should be blocked, or which individual is creating the rejection of accessibility. Network tracking can identify malicious network tasks and also quit them prior to any type of damage occurs to the network. Companies that rely upon their IT facilities to rely on their ability to operate smoothly and also keep a high degree of discretion and also performance.
The Nemty ransomware family has recently been discovered and described in detail by FortiGuard Labs. Tesorion researchers have investigated the same binary, and have found a couple of minor but crucial deviations from the default AES-CBC encryption algorithm mentioned in their write-up. These deviations make it impossible to use common cryptographic libraries to decrypt a file encrypted by Nemty, even if the AES key and initialization vector (IV) are known. Based on our analysis of the Nemty ransomware, we have been able to develop a process that can in some cases recover the original files for a Nemty infection without involving the threat actor and thus without paying the ransom. To avoid suggesting possible improvements to the ransomware authors, we will not publish the details of our research. Update: Our decryptor is available for download at the NoMoreRansom website. Recently, FortiGuard Labs published a blog post describing the newly discovered Nemty ransomware. Their blog describes many aspects of the ransomware very well, including the process it uses for encrypting the victim’s files. Tesorion has independently analysed the same Nemty binary used by the FortiGuard researchers and can confirm many of their findings. During our analysis we ran the malware in a sandbox and a debugger to get a better understanding and to be able to peek at data that would later be encrypted, such as AES keys and IVs. However, when we took an AES key and IV combination for a file and tried to decrypt the corresponding file using AES-128-CBC (the algorithm described in the FortiGate write-up) we were unsuccessful. When diving deeper into the actual file encryption code, we encountered several minor (but important) differences between the actual code, and the description of its workings by FortiGuard. These differences concern the AES key size, the AES algorithm key scheduling phase, and the CBC mode of operation for the AES algorithm. As we will see, Nemty does not use a standard AES implementation, and the code used in Nemty is incompatible with the standard AES algorithm. This means that even if the AES key and IV for a file are known, we still need to account for these differences to successfully decrypt a file encrypted by Nemty. Let’s start with a brief refresher on cryptography. The data to encrypt is commonly referred to as the ‘plaintext’ and the corresponding encrypted data is called the ‘ciphertext’. Encryption algorithms, or ‘ciphers’, fall roughly into two broad categories: symmetrical and asymmetrical. A symmetrical cipher uses the same key for encryption and decryption. An asymmetrical cipher has two separate keys: a public key used for encryption, and a private key used for decryption. Symmetrical ciphers are typically used to exchange information between two parties that have access to a shared but otherwise secret key. Asymmetrical ciphers are typically used where many different parties have the same public key and need to be able to encrypt data that can subsequently only be decrypted by a single party that is in possession of the private key. If we look at the cryptography that is currently most commonly used and considered safe (enough), then the symmetrical ciphers are usually a lot faster than the asymmetrical ones. A common pattern therefore is to generate a key for a symmetrical cipher (such as AES), use that to encrypt a lot of data, and then use an asymmetrical cipher (such as RSA) to encrypt the key itself using the public key of the intended recepient and send the combination of the encrypted data and the encrypted key to them. This pattern benefits of the speed of the symmetrical cipher for the large amount of data, while using the properties of the asymmetrical one for sharing the key only with the intended recepient. Symmetrical ciphers can be stream or block based. We will only discuss block ciphers here as this is what Nemty uses for file encryption. Block ciphers split the data in blocks of a fixed size, e.g. 128 bits (16 bytes) and perform the encryption itself only on individual blocks. If we encrypt the blocks individually without taking the other blocks of the plaintext into account, this is called ECB (electronic code book) mode. There are however also other so-called modes of operation for block ciphers. One of the most commonly used is CBC (cipher block chaining). When using CBC, a random initialisation vector (IV) is provided for each encryption. This IV is then XORed with the first plaintext block before applying the block cipher. The output of the block cipher is the first block of the ciphertext. The first block of the ciphertext is then XORed with the second block of the plaintext before applying the block cipher to the second block, and so on. The IV is usually distributed together with the ciphertext and does not necessarily have to be kept a secret, as it is only of use when the encryption key itself is also known. AES: keys and key scheduling AES is a block cipher based on the Rijndael block cipher. AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits (16 bytes) and supports three different key sizes: 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits. In cryptography we can broadly state that larger key sizes within the same algorithm are usually more secure, but also usually take more computing time for encryption and decryption. Contrary to the original description by the FortiGuard team that mentions AES-128, in our analysis we actually found that Nemty uses a 256 bits (32 bytes) key for AES. This is the largest possible key size for AES and could be considered as overkill for file encryption in a ransomware, especially as it slows down the encryption process. AES encryption or decryption consists of roughly two phases: first the encryption key (256 bits in the case of Nemty) is expanded to a set of so-called round keys that are derived from the encryption key itself. This phase is often referred to as ‘key scheduling’. (Readers interested in the details of the AES key scheduling process can read the in-depth description on Wikipedia.) After the key scheduling, the actual encryption or decryption of a 128 bit block proceeds over a number of iterations, called rounds, using the round keys. The number of rounds used by AES is dependent on the key size: 10 rounds for 128 bit keys, 12 rounds for 192 bit keys and 14 rounds for 256 bit keys. As each round requires a different set of round keys, the number of round keys that is generated during key scheduling depends also on the size of the key. Furthermore, the algorithm for the key scheduling also works slightly differently for different key sizes. In particular, in the case of 256 bits it contains an additional calculation for some round keys that is absent in the 128 and 192 bit versions. From the Nemty file encryption code it is clear that 14 AES rounds are performed, implying the use of a 256 bit key. This is also confirmed by the fact that a 32 character random string is generated as AES Key, as described by FortiGuard. However, the implementation of the AES key scheduling algorithm in Nemty contains a bug: their implementation does not contain the special additional calculation required for 256 bit keys, and is rather more similar to the 128/192 bit algorithm extended to the number of round keys required for 256 bits. We expect that this is why the FortiGuard team mentioned 128 bit as the key size in their write-up: in the absence of the special calculation for 256 bits keys, the code simply looks more like the 128 or 192 bit variant. When we investigate a malware binary, we often use virtual machines, sandboxes and debuggers to trace its execution and gain access to data that is otherwise unreachable, such as the AES encryption keys and IVs. But even when we were sure that we had the right AES Key and IV, we were still unable to decrypt files encrypted by Nemty. It was only after finding this bug in their AES key scheduling that we understood why our attempts were doomed: standard AES implementations such as those offered by the Windows cryptography provider or OpenSSL are incompatible with the AES variant used in Nemty due to this bug! Only after developing our own AES implementation containing the same bug in the key scheduling were we able to successfully decrypt the first blocks from Nemty encrypted files. AES: mode of operation The bug in the AES key scheduling is not the only non-standard behaviour in Nemty’s AES implementation; the mode of operation is non-standard as well. According to the FortiGuard blog post, CBC is used as mode of operation for AES. However, on close inspection of the code, we noticed that this is not the case. Nemty indeed generates a 128 bit IV for each individual file. However, this IV is XORed with each block before AES encryption, whereas in CBC the IV is only used in the encryption of the first block and the subsequent plaintext blocks are XORed with the preceding ciphertext blocks. Effectively in Nemty each plaintext block is individually XORed with the same file-specific IV and then AES encrypted in ECB mode. After extending our custom Nemty AES implementation with this ‘ECB-with-IV’ mode, we could finally successfully decrypt an encrypted file with the corresponding AES key and IV! Availability of a decryptor and (not) assisting malware authors Using the knowledge gained during our extensive investigation of the Nemty ransomware we were able to develop a process that can in many common cases decrypt files from a Nemty-infected system without contacting the Nemty authors and paying the ransom. This led us to the next (albeit less technical) problem: what to do with these tools? On the one hand we want to freely contribute our decryptor for the benefit of any Nemty victim, on the other hand we don’t want to assist malware authors in fixing their mistakes. Let’s make one thing very clear: although we are a commercial enterprise, we do not want to put victims in a position where they have to choose between paying the ransom or paying us for a decryptor that we have already built. Tesorion believes in the NoMoreRansom initiative where decryptors for several well-known ransomware families are made available online for anyone to download, and we would have liked to contribute our decryptor for the benefit of all victims. Often, these decryptors are based on things like leaked RSA private keys or data from confiscated servers. If the malware authors are still active after such data has been leaked, they build a new version of the malware with e.g. different keys and the whole game has to start over again. Our decryptor however is not based on such leaked data, but rather on a couple of mistakes in the Nemty code. And by publicly providing our tools we provide the authors of Nemty or other ransomware families with the opportunity to analyse our process and learn from these mistakes, making it harder, if not impossible, for us and others to build decryptors for future ransomware variants. We have therefore decided at this point in time to not make our tools publicly available, but rather try a different approach to see if we can stretch the time before the authors fix their bugs while still helping victims at no cost. We offer to provide a custom decryptor to legitimate victims of the Nemty ransomware for free to assist them in recovering their files. This custom decryptor will often be able to recover many important files such as photos or office documents. Update: As we discovered a way to develop a working decryptor and published this blog post, we contacted Europol regarding their NoMoreRansom project. We were initially hesistant to publish our decryptor on the NoMoreRansom website, because we did not want to show the Nemty authors how to fix the bugs that allowed us to decrypt. While working on our decryptors for Nemty 1.5 and 1.6 we had a number of good discussions with Europol, and together we arrived at a setup where the actual ‘cracking’ of the encryption could be performed on our servers. This enabled us to distribute a simple decryptor binary that could use the result from our servers to decrypt the actual files on the victim’s machine. Our decryptor is now available for download at the NoMoreRansom website. In this blog post we describe several peculiar details of the AES implementation in the Nemty ransomware that make it behave different from a standard AES-256-CBC implementation. These differences are important for anyone who aims to develop a decryptor for files encrypted by Nemty. Tesorion has developed such a decryptor capable in many cases of decrypting files without paying the ransom. Indicators of compromise SHA256 of the Nemty binary used in this research 267a9dcf77c33a1af362e2080aaacc01a7ca075658beb002ab41e0712ffe066e
SigOpt is a San Francisco-based company with a cloud-based platform which utilizes algorithms for model insights in various industries such as insurance, financial, trading, and consumer packaged goods. It can also be used in academia for hyperparameter tuning and is used by schools such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of California, Berkeley, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Standford. The company's product is available via online platform or application programming interface and can be used for model development and performance. The models can be tracked, organized, analyzed, and reproduced using the SigOpt software. The features include an optimization engine, enterprise platform, and experiment insights. It can be integrated into existing software and automate optimization. SigOpt's software can be used for tasks such as formulating trading techniques, improving fraud detection, and advancing a company's artificial intelligence technology. In-Q-Tel invests in SigOpt to help U.S. intelligence agencies optimize AI Blair Hanley Frank, ISG February 12, 2018 Documentaries, videos and podcasts Two Sigma & SigOpt Summary of Discussion on Modeling Best Practices March 16, 2019
The application security testing (AST) market has a variety of tools across categories for security professionals, including dynamic application security testing (DAST), static application security testing (SAST), interactive application security testing (IAST), software composition analysis (SCA), and API security testing tools, manual testing tools & fuzzers. But as companies modernize their applications with monolithic codebases residing in on-premises data centers, new requirements for security testing arise. In the past, code chunks lived in private servers, managed by internal infrastructure teams. With the rise of public clouds like Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Microsoft Azure, organizations are modernizing their applications for these clouds for cost savings, flexibility, and better performance. This means a transition towards microservices and containers, with a distributed architecture where apps consist of multiple components and resources. This type of architecture takes advantage of public cloud environments where better orchestration and automation can be achieved with each individual piece. The decomposition of apps in public clouds creates a new set of challenges around application security though. In the past, code was all in one place, but now, it’s spread across many components, services, and resources that all interact with each other. When various components of an app are pointing across s3 buckets in AWS, multiple containers, with APIs to and from other third-party services, it’s hard to tell where a vulnerability starts and ends. We’ll talk about the other types of application security testing, but for this post, we’ll focus on traditional SAST and why it no longer meets the security testing needs of modern, cloud-native apps. First, when we talk about SAST, we refer to application security tools designed to analyze application source code, byte code, and binaries for security vulnerabilities. Apps are analyzed in a non-running state, hence “static” testing. SAST can be used by developers and are integrated into IDEs. These tools tell developers what code may be vulnerable and recommendations on how to fix. SAST tools have source code access and can provide better coverage than DAST and IAST. Also, SAST can be run passively without much configuration or worrying about breaking apps since the code is not executed. The traits that made SAST strong for legacy apps make it weak for cloud native apps. Here are three reasons SAST tools shouldn’t be used for cloud apps. As mentioned before, cloud apps are made of many components with multiple teams working on each one. And these components only communicate with each other during runtime. With static testing, the code isn’t run, meaning that the SAST tool won’t be able to see everything working together to pinpoint vulnerabilities. Each component of a distributed cloud app is scanned independently – vulnerabilities that arise when the components are talking to each other are missed. Scanning code before runtime of a cloud app also results in a large number of false positives and missed vulnerabilities. SAST solutions scan through a long list of potential vulnerabilities to see if the code may be susceptible but many false positives end up being generated as the SAST tool doesn’t know what part of the code is in use and when or if the code is even used (as it could be deprecated). This relates back to the first problem of lack of context. Lots of false positives of vulnerabilities that may not be exploitable (due to input validation and a variety of other reasons) end up being generated by the SAST tool for developers to triage, prioritize, and investigate – wasting time and resources. This is compounded by the fact that many actual vulnerabilities unique to cloud apps are missed. SAST tools are not focused on cloud misconfigurations or permissions and also miss APIs and other services that interact with a cloud app. Only looking at the code base provides a limited view into how the cloud app actually works and what interacts with the core code components. Risk from vulnerabilities builds as misconfigurations around cloud permissions or access in lower layers elevates the risk throughout an application. Finally, SAST tools are only as good as they are up-to-date and what they’re specifically made to scan. SAST tools are often limited to one programming language, framework, or sets of libraries. Cloud native apps working with multiple programming languages, different clouds, various APIs, etc. can mean multiple SAST tools to support a comprehensive code scan. It’s no longer enough to scan code statically – the entire environment needs to be assessed, from how the cloud or container of an app is configured down to the APIs and how each component of an app interacts with each other. SAST solutions no longer have the context of the various microservices, distributed architecture, and services that make up a cloud-native app. New app security testing solutions need to know how a cloud app runs in production and the various components that comprise it. Looking to learn more about Oxeye? - Book a quick Demo with our experts
BGP Flowspec is an extension to BGP that enables the distribution of filtering rules across BGP-enabled routers. These rules specify the type of traffic that should be allowed or denied based on specific criteria such as source or destination IP addresses, protocols, port numbers, and traffic rate. BGP Flowspec can be used to mitigate DDoS attacks by identifying and blocking traffic that matches the attack characteristics in real-time. BGP Flowspec Use Cases BGP Flowspec is useful in mitigating DDoS attacks, but it also has other use cases. Here are some of them: - Filtering unwanted traffic: BGP Flowspec can be used to filter out unwanted traffic such as spam, malware, and other types of traffic that don’t conform to network policies. - Traffic shaping: BGP Flowspec can be used to shape traffic by enforcing traffic policies that prioritize certain types of traffic over others. - Controlling traffic flow: BGP Flowspec can be used to control traffic flow by directing traffic to specific paths, optimizing network performance, and reducing congestion. BGP Flowspec Configuration To configure BGP Flowspec, you need to create filtering rules and distribute them across BGP-enabled routers. The filtering rules can be created using the following criteria: - Source IP address - Destination IP address - Protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP) - Source port number - Destination port number - Traffic rate - IP Fragmentation - TCP Flags Once the filtering rules have been created, they can be distributed across BGP-enabled routers using BGP Flowspec. This involves configuring the BGP Flowspec feature on the router, defining the Flowspec rules, and distributing them across the network. Here are some considerations to keep in mind when deploying BGP Flowspec: - Network topology: BGP Flowspec is best suited for large networks with multiple routers. For small networks, traditional access control lists (ACLs) may be sufficient. - Resource requirements: BGP Flowspec requires significant computational resources, including CPU and memory. Ensure that your network devices can handle the additional load. - Filter rule management: Managing filter rules can be challenging, especially in large networks with many filtering rules. Consider using automation tools to help manage the rules. - Security: Ensure that the filter rules are properly configured to prevent false positives and false negatives. A false positive occurs when legitimate traffic is blocked, while a false negative occurs when malicious traffic is allowed. BGP Flowspec is an extension to BGP that provides fine-grained control over network traffic by allowing the creation and distribution of filtering rules to mitigate DDoS attacks. BGP Flowspec is useful in filtering unwanted traffic, traffic shaping, and controlling traffic flow. When deploying BGP Flowspec, ensure that your network topology can support it, your network devices have sufficient resources, and that the filter rules are properly configured to prevent false positives and false negatives.
The increasing popularity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices makes them an attractive target for malware authors. In this paper, we use sequential pattern mining technique to detect most frequent opcode sequences of malicious IoT applications. Detected maximal frequent patterns (MFP) of opcode sequences can be used to differentiate malicious from benign IoT applications. We then evaluate the suitability of MFPs as a classification feature for K nearest neighbors (KNN), support vector machines (SVM), multilayer perceptron (MLP), AdaBoost, decision tree, and random forest classifier. Specifically, we achieve an accuracy rate of 99% in the detection of unseen IoT malware. We also demonstrate the utility of our approach in detecting polymorphed IoT malware samples.
There are a few cases where simply downloading a file without opening it could lead to execution of attacker controlled code from within the file. It usually involves exploiting a known vulnerability within a program which will handle the file in some way. Here are some examples, but other cases are sure to exist: - The file targets a vulnerability in your antivirus which triggers when the file is scanned - The file targets a vulnerability in your file system such as NTFS where the filename or another property could trigger the bug - The file targets a bug which can be triggered when generating a file preview such as PDF or image thumbnail - A library file (ex. dll) could get executed when saved to the same directory where an application vulnerable to binary planting is executed from - The file is a special file that can change the configuration of a program such as downloading a .wgetrc file with wget on Linux - …and more Windows will try to extract information from the file to display the icon and preview when looking at the folder inside explorer. One example was the Windows Metafile Vulnerability which could be exploited only by previewing the file in explorer. Another attack vectors is the builtin Windows Search. To extract the information necessary for a full text search Windows will scan the files in the background and use the file parser to extract the content. A bug in the file parser can thus lead to code execution. Also, if the path is known to an attacker (i.e. inside the default download folder) opening could be enforced by embedding the file as image, flash file, PDF etc using a file:///... link inside a web page you visit. “Can malicious code trigger without the user executing or opening the file?“, StackExchange Security
There’s no shortage of confusing terminology and acronyms in the cybersecurity field. In this article, we’re taking a look at one acronym that even those who don’t make a living defending others against cybersecurity threats should know about: TTP. What Does TTP Mean in Cybersecurity? TTP stands for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, and this acronym is used when talking about the behavior of a threat actor. Here’s how the National Institute of Standards and Technology defines its individual elements: Essentially, tactics describe what cybercriminals plan to achieve. Examples include obtaining access to sensitive information or making certain important resources unavailable to damage the victim financially or reputationally. Techniques are the general strategies cybercriminals use to breach their victims’ defenses, and they roughly correspond to the major cyber threats, such as malware, phishing, man-in-the-middle attacks, password compromise, and others. Finally, procedures are the specific steps cybercriminals follow to achieve their nefarious goals. They may correspond to specific software vulnerabilities, such as the recently discovered Microsoft Exchange server elevation of privilege vulnerability, or they may reflect gaps in the victims’ defenses. According to MITRE, a not-for-profit organization providing a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations, collecting and filtering data based on TTPs is an effective method for detecting malicious activity. “This approach is effective because the technology on which adversaries operate (e.g., Microsoft Windows) constrains the number and types of techniques they can use to accomplish their goals post-compromise,” explains MITRE. TTPs shouldn’t be confused with Indicators of Compromise, or IoCs for short. If TTPs describe what cybercriminals do, then IoCs talk about the consequences of their actions. If cybercriminals were bank robbers, then TTPs would be the strategies used to reach the inside of the vault. IoCs, on the other hand, would be anything from a smashed lock to missing money. We can illustrate the difference between IoCs and TTPs on a phishing attack whose goal is to steal login credentials: When detected, IoCs ignite incident response activities to protect valuable systems from threat actors. TTPs give the security team the information needed to protect all possible attack vectors. Should SMBs Study TTPs? Small and medium-sized businesses rarely employ a cybersecurity team—let alone one large enough to dedicate time to the study of current and emerging TTPs. Instead of trying to assemble such a team, SMBs are much better off outsourcing this activity to a managed security service provider (MSSP) that provides threat intelligence and threat detection services. SMBs that have yet to implement beginning-to-end strategies to improve their cybersecurity defenses can especially benefit from a partnership with an experienced MSSP, borrowing its experience to implement cybersecurity best practices, such as: - Multi-factor authentication (MFA): Many TTPs used by today’s cybercriminals target weak authentication and login mechanisms. MFA, which strengthens the authentication process by adding one or more extra layers of protection, can block as much as 99.9 percent of identity attacks. - Cybersecurity awareness training: People remain the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain because their actions can sabotage even the most well-thought-out policies and controls. Cybersecurity awareness training can strengthen this link and make it less likely to break. - Endpoint protection: The proliferation of the hybrid work model has led to an explosion of end-points (laptops, tablets, smartphones, etc.), each of which represents a possible attack vector. Modern endpoint protection solutions help discover and defend these endpoints regardless of where they’re physically located. At Aligned Technology Solutions, we understand the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures cybercriminals use to accomplish their objectives, and we’re happy to share this knowledge with SMBs like yours. Book a consultation with us today.
What is Trojan.MalPack.Generic infection? In this post you will find concerning the definition of Trojan.MalPack.Generic as well as its adverse impact on your computer system. Such ransomware are a type of malware that is specified by on the internet scams to demand paying the ransom money by a target. Most of the situations, Trojan.MalPack.Generic ransomware will certainly instruct its targets to launch funds move for the objective of counteracting the modifications that the Trojan infection has actually presented to the target’s tool. These alterations can be as follows: - The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data. In this case, encryption is a way of hiding virus’ code from antiviruses and virus’ analysts. - Network activity detected but not expressed in API logs. Microsoft built an API solution right into its Windows operating system it reveals network activity for all apps and programs that ran on the computer in the past 30-days. This malware hides network activity. - Anomalous binary characteristics. This is a way of hiding virus’ code from antiviruses and virus’ analysts. - Ciphering the records situated on the target’s hard drive — so the sufferer can no more use the information; - Preventing routine access to the target’s workstation. This is the typical behavior of a virus called locker. It blocks access to the computer until the victim pays the ransom. The most regular networks through which Trojan.MalPack.Generic Trojans are infused are: - By means of phishing emails; - As a consequence of user winding up on a resource that hosts a destructive software program; As soon as the Trojan is efficiently injected, it will certainly either cipher the information on the sufferer’s PC or stop the device from functioning in an appropriate fashion – while additionally placing a ransom money note that mentions the requirement for the sufferers to effect the payment for the function of decrypting the records or bring back the file system back to the first problem. In the majority of instances, the ransom money note will certainly show up when the client reboots the COMPUTER after the system has already been damaged. Trojan.MalPack.Generic circulation channels. In different edges of the globe, Trojan.MalPack.Generic expands by leaps and bounds. Nonetheless, the ransom money notes as well as tricks of obtaining the ransom amount might vary depending upon specific local (regional) settings. The ransom money notes and also techniques of extorting the ransom money amount may differ depending on specific regional (regional) setups. Faulty signals regarding unlicensed software program. In particular areas, the Trojans usually wrongfully report having identified some unlicensed applications allowed on the sufferer’s tool. The sharp then demands the customer to pay the ransom money. Faulty statements about unlawful material. In nations where software application piracy is less preferred, this method is not as reliable for the cyber frauds. Additionally, the Trojan.MalPack.Generic popup alert might incorrectly claim to be stemming from a law enforcement establishment and will certainly report having located child pornography or other unlawful data on the device. Trojan.MalPack.Generic popup alert might incorrectly declare to be deriving from a regulation enforcement institution and also will certainly report having situated child porn or various other unlawful data on the gadget. The alert will in a similar way contain a need for the user to pay the ransom money. File Info:crc32: FA0780E7md5: e0efb2d055fc8e99f0c812c1a20322caname: svhost.exesha1: 6c08661de1d2df963add4a457e26e8163a7472a7sha256: 2695f1b67015c87702cccf43a101f0b2fc4e12f3e2bf3ad0d262871750089f46sha512: 9415710d70d3db9fc54179088e9f6fafb20fb386c51e4b1c7ac1793646c305fd08708ef5a96d33d31ef461df1f80a24d03c1d9ca33fdc7d77b5372d2a880721fssdeep: 6144:fDKW1Lgbdl0TBBvjc/mvZzHjEP4pBemJA:7h1Lk70TnvjcOvZjfJAtype: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows Version Info:Translation: 0x0000 0x04b0LegalCopyright: xa9x41ax43ex440x43fx43ex440x430x446x438x44f x41cx430x439x43ax440x43ex441x43ex444x442.x412x441x435 x43fx440x430x432x430 x437x430x449x438x449x435x43dx44b.Assembly Version: 126.96.36.199InternalName: svhost.exeFileVersion: 188.8.131.52CompanyName: Microsoft CorporationComments: x425x43ex441x442-x43fx440x43ex446x435x441x441 x434x43bx44f x441x43bx443x436x431 WindowsProductName: x41ex43fx435x440x430x446x438x43ex43dx43dx430x44f x441x438x441x442x435x43cx430 Microsoftxae WindowsxaeProductVersion: 184.108.40.206FileDescription: x425x43ex441x442-x43fx440x43ex446x435x441x441 x434x43bx44f x441x43bx443x436x431 WindowsOriginalFilename: svhost.exe Trojan.MalPack.Generic also known as: \|K7GW\|\|Password-Stealer ( 00529f421 )\| \|K7AntiVirus\|\|Password-Stealer ( 00529f421 )\| \|SentinelOne\|\|static engine – malicious\| \|Endgame\|\|malicious (high confidence)\| \|ESET-NOD32\|\|a variant of MSIL/PSW.Agent.QQW\| How to remove Trojan.MalPack.Generic ransomware? Unwanted application has ofter come with other viruses and spyware. This threats can steal account credentials, or crypt your documents for ransom. Reasons why I would recommend GridinSoft1 The is an excellent way to deal with recognizing and removing threats – using Gridinsoft Anti-Malware. This program will scan your PC, find and neutralize all suspicious processes.2. Download GridinSoft Anti-Malware. You can download GridinSoft Anti-Malware by clicking the button below: Run the setup file. When setup file has finished downloading, double-click on the setup-antimalware-fix.exe file to install GridinSoft Anti-Malware on your system. An User Account Control asking you about to allow GridinSoft Anti-Malware to make changes to your device. So, you should click “Yes” to continue with the installation. Press “Install” button. Once installed, Anti-Malware will automatically run. Wait for the Anti-Malware scan to complete. GridinSoft Anti-Malware will automatically start scanning your system for Trojan.MalPack.Generic files and other malicious programs. This process can take a 20-30 minutes, so I suggest you periodically check on the status of the scan process. Click on “Clean Now”. When the scan has finished, you will see the list of infections that GridinSoft Anti-Malware has detected. To remove them click on the “Clean Now” button in right corner. Are Your Protected? GridinSoft Anti-Malware will scan and clean your PC for free in the trial period. The free version offer real-time protection for first 2 days. If you want to be fully protected at all times – I can recommended you to purchase a full version: If the guide doesn’t help you to remove Trojan.MalPack.Generic you can always ask me in the comments for getting help. User Review( votes)
Added in 3.8 /protect [-lrw] <on\|off\|nick\|address> [#channel1,#channel2,...] [type] [network] dd/remove/list users from the protect list. -l - Prints all protect users. -r - Removes a address from the protect list. (if no address is specified, clears the protect list) -w - Indicate the protect should be enabled on all networks. on - Turns protect on. off - Turns protect off. address - The address or nick to add/remove from the protect list. [#channel1,#channel2,...] - List of channels to protect in. [type] - A number representing a $mask to use. (if user is not found in the internal address list, a lookup is performed) [network] - The network to protect in. ; Adds '[email protected]' to the protect list on the channel '#channel' /protect [email protected] #channel ; Adds 'nick!@' to the protect list on any channel. /protect nick ; Remove '[email protected]' from the protect list. /protect -r [email protected]
What is ZeroAdypt ransomware? And how does it implement its attack? ZeroAdypt ransomware is a data encrypting malware first discovered in April 2019. Alternatively, it is also known as “.[[email protected]] ransomware”. According to researchers, it is a new variant of 0kilobyt ransomware. Unlike typical ransomware threats, this one does not encrypt its targeted files but overwrites them instead, with zeroes, which is why it’s named ZeroAdypt. At the onset of its attack, ZeroAdypt ransomware creates and downloads additional files from its remote server. It then searches for certain files to encode. According to researchers, it targets dozens of file types – some of which are: .3g2, .3gp, .7z, .accdb, .aes, .ARC, .asc, .asf, .asm, .asx, .avi, .backup, .bak, .bat, .brd, .bundle, .c, .cgm, .cmd, .cpp, .crt, .cs, .csproj, .csr, .csv, .db, .dbf, .dch, .der, .dip, .djvu, .doc, .docb, .docm, .docx, .dot, .dotx, .dwg, .edb, .eml, .flv, .frm, .gif, .gpg, .gz, .htm,.html, .hwp, .Iay6, .ibd, .iso, .jar, .jpeg, .jpg, .js, .jse, .key, .lay, .lbd, .log, .m2ts, .max, .mdf, .mdp, .mid, .midi, .mkv, .mml, .mov, .mp3, .mp4, .mpeg, .mpg, .msg, .myd, .myi, .nef, .ocx, .odg, .odp, .odp, .ods, .odt, .onetoc2, .ost, .otg, .otp, .ott, .PAQ, .pas, .pdf, .pern, .pfx, .php, .png, .pot, .potm, .potx, .ppam, .pps, .ppsm, .ppsx, .ppt, .pptm, .pptx, .pst, .pub, .py, .pyc, .pyd, .pyo, .rar, .raw, .rm, .rpa, .sb2, .sch, .sh, .sin, .sldm, .sldx, .slk, .snt, .sql, .sql, .sqlite3, .sqlitedb, .stc, .std, .sti, .stw, .suo, .svg, .swf, .sxc, .sxd, .sxi, .sxm, .sxw, .tar, .tar, .tbk, .tiff, .txt, .uop, .uot, .vb, .vbe, .vbproj, .vbs, .vcd, .vdi, .vdmk, .vmx, .vob, .vsd, .vsdx, .wks, .wma, .wncry, .wrav, .xdata, .xlc, .xlm, .xls, .xlsb, .xlsm, .xlsx, .xlt, .xltm, .xltx, .xlw, .zip After it alters its targeted files, ZeroAdypt ransomware will open a text file named “READ-Me-Now.txt” which contains the following content: “Your All Files Encrypted For Decrypt Your Data Contact Me: Your ID for Decryption: r4o7x***** If You Try to Decrypt your file and damage it is Gonna Cost You more Price to Decrypt you can Send 1MB Data For Decryption Test” There’s no use paying the ransom demanded by ZeroAdypt ransomware when there’s no guarantee that the crooks will indeed give the decryption key so it’s best to wait until a free decryptor is released by security experts who, at the time of writing, are still trying to come up with a decryptor. In the meantime, you can just use backup copies of the affected files and prioritize the removal of the ransomware. How is the malicious payload of ZeroAdypt ransomware spread over the web? At the time of writing, it isn’t unclear how its creators spread this threat but in most cases, cybercriminals aim to infect as many users as possible in order to increase ransomware payments. To achieve that, not only do they use social engineering tactics but also exploit kits to proliferate. One of the most common exploit kits used by cyber crooks is the Rig exploit kit which helps in identifying system vulnerabilities and takes advantage of them to install the ransomware. To effectively kill ZeroAdypt ransomware from your infected computer, make sure to follow the removal instructions below. Step_1: Restart your PC and boot into Safe Mode with Command Prompt by pressing F8 a couple of times until the Advanced Options menu appears. Step_2: Navigate to Safe Mode with Command Prompt using the arrow keys on your keyboard. After selecting Safe Mode with Command Prompt, hit Enter. Step_3: After loading the Command Prompt type cd restore and hit Enter. Step_4: After cd restore, type in rstrui.exe and hit Enter. Step_5: A new window will appear, and then click Next. Step_6: Select any of the Restore Points on the list and click Next. This will restore your computer to its previous state before being infected with the ZeroAdypt Ransomware. A dialog box will appear and then click Yes. Step_7: After System Restore has been completed, try to enable the disabled Windows services. - Press Win + R keys to launch Run. - Type in msc in the box and press Enter to open Group Policy. - Under Group Policy, navigate to: - User Configuration\Administrative Templates\System - After that, open Prevent access to the command prompt. - Select Disable to enable cmd - Click the OK button - After that, go to: - Configuration\Administrative Templates\System - Double click on the Prevent Access to registry editing tools. - Choose Disabled and click OK. - Navigate to : - User Configuration\Administrative Templates\System>Ctrl+Alt+Del Options - Double click on Remove Task Manager. - And then set its value to Disabled. Step_8: Next, tap Ctrl + Shift + Esc to open the Task Manager and then go to the Processes tab and look for the malicious processes of ZeroAdypt Ransomware and end them all. Step_9: Open Control Panel by pressing Start key + R to launch Run and type appwiz.cpl in the search box and click OK to open the list of installed programs. From there, look for ZeroAdypt ransomware or any malicious program and then Uninstall it. Step_10: Tap Windows + E keys to open the File Explorer then navigate to the following directories and delete the malicious files created by ZeroAdypt ransomware such as READ-Me-Now.txt and [random].exe. - %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup Step_11: Close the File Explorer. Before you proceed to the next steps below, make sure that you are tech-savvy enough to the point where you know exactly how to use and navigate your computer’s Registry. Keep in mind that any changes you make will highly impact your computer. To save you trouble and time, you can just use Restoro, this system tool is proven to be safe and excellent enough that hackers won’t be able to hack into it. But if you can manage Windows Registry well, then by all means go on to the next steps. Step_12: Tap Win + R to open Run and then type in Regedit in the field and tap enter to pull up Windows Registry. Step_13: Navigate to the paths listed below and delete all the registry values added by ZeroAdypt ransomware. - HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop\ - HKEY_USERS\.DEFAULT\Control Panel\Desktop\ Step_14: Close the Registry Editor and empty your Recycle Bin. Congratulations, you have just removed ZeroAdypt Ransomware in Windows 10 all by yourself. If you would like to read more helpful articles and tips about various software and hardware visit fixmypcfree.com daily. Now that’s how you remove ZeroAdypt Ransomware in Windows 10 on a computer. On the other hand, if your computer is going through some system-related issues that have to get fixed, there is a one-click solution known as Restoro you could check out to resolve them. This program is a useful tool that could repair corrupted registries and optimize your PC’s overall performance. Aside from that, it also cleans out your computer for any junk or corrupted files that help you eliminate any unwanted files from your system. This is basically a solution that’s within your grasp with just a click. It’s easy to use as it is user-friendly. For a complete set of instructions in downloading and using it, refer to the steps below Perform a full system scan using Restoro. To do so, follow the instructions below.
Figure of the day: 3 000 000 000 links removed from Google search for pirated content over the year. Google has published a report on the fight against Internet piracy in 2018. It tells about the programs, policies, and technologies that Google uses to ensure copyright compliance. She also shared statistics for the period. More than 3 billion YouTube paid to holders monetizirovat use their content in other videos with the Content ID, the main tool of the company for the management of copyright. More than 100 million U.S. dollars the company has invested in the creation of Content ID, including the costs of personnel and computing resources. More than 1.8 billion YouTube paid to copyright holders in the music industry in the form of advertising revenues for the period from October 2017 to September 2018. More than 3 billion URLS have been removed from Google Search results for copyright infringement after running the tool to send complaints from copyright holders and their agents. More than 10 million ads were rejected by Google in 2017 due to suspicion of copyright infringement or because of the presence of links to sites that violate copyrights.
70-240 in 15 minutes a week: Configuring the Desktop Environment and Managing Security Page 4 Policies form the basis on environment and security configuration in Windows 2000. In very broad terms, two types of policies exist - Local Policy (which is set on an individual computer) and Group Policy (which can be applied to multiple computers and users according to settings in Active Directory). Without Active Directory, only Local Policies can be applied. First well look at Local Policies, followed by an introduction to Group Policy. Local security policy controls security-related settings on an individual Windows 2000 system. Settings found in the Local Security Settings tool relate to three major areas - Account Policy, Local Policy, and Public Key Policy, as shown below: Account Policies control settings such as password policy (password uniqueness, age, etc) and account lockout policy (lockout threshold, duration, etc) for local accounts. That is, these settings only apply to accounts contained within the systems Security Accounts manager (SAM) database, and not to domain accounts. Local Policies contains settings relating to the Audit policy on the local system, the assignment of user rights, and security options. Audit Policy includes options for types of events you wish to audit, such a file and object access over this particular system. User Rights assignment is where you would give users or groups rights to perform system tasks, such as the right to change system time, or the right to back up files and folders. Note that this is different that in NT 4.0, where rights were given using the User Manager tool. The Security Options section of Local Policies allows you to control security-sensitive settings on the local machine, such as disabling the Ctrl+Alt+Del requirement for logon, clearing the pagefile on shutdown, and so forth. An example on some user rights settings is shown below: Public Key Policies in the Local Security Settings tool allow you to set the EFS recovery agent, which by default will be the local administrator account. Although local policy settings give you a strong degree of control, they are still fairly inflexible in that they must be configured locally on each machine. Note that it is possible to export policy settings to a file, and then import those local settings on to another system. Windows 2000 also includes a snap-in called Security Configuration and Analysis. This tool allows you to save policy settings to a database file, and then compare changes to security settings against this database. It is a useful tool in determining the impact that a change to a policy setting will have. This tool also allows you to save the database to a template file (.inf file), which can then be applied to other systems. For more details about the Security Configuration and Analysis tool, click here. In an Active Directory environment, policy settings are more easily applied using Group Policy. Group Policy is a more effective tool because it allows you to centralize the application of policy. Group Policies can be applied at 3 different levels in Active Directory: site, domain, and organizational unit (OU). Group policies allow you to configure all kinds of settings relating to the user and computer environment, such as removing the Run command or forcing certain wallpaper. They also include the security settings we discussed in Local policy. A deeper look at setting areas will be looked at in the Server portion of the series. Although we haven't yet really discussed Active Directory in the series, a brief overview will suffice for now. A site is a physical location in Active Directory. Any policies applied to a site will apply to all users in that site, regardless of the domain or OU they are a part of. A domain is still very similar to what you remember from NT 4. Any policy applied to a domain will affect all users and computers in the domain. Finally, an Organizational Unit, or OU, is a smaller container within a domain that represents breakdown for the purpose of administration or organization of objects (such as users and computers). Any group policy applied to an OU will affect users in that OU, as well as any sub-OUs (since OUs can be nested). Since Group Policy can be set at different levels, it is possible that settings at one level (like site) could conflict with settings at another (like OU). As such, it is important to understand the order in which group policy gets processed. The order is: Local Policy - Site - Domain - OU What that means is very important, and you must understand it. Imagine you are a member of an OU called Sales in a site called Tallinn. All group policy settings merge together. That is, if a Tallinn site-level policy says you get green wallpaper, and a Sales OU-level policy removes the Run command, you will end up with green wallpaper and no Run command. However, if there is a conflict, the settings applied later will take precedence. Imaging the Tallinn site policy removed the Run command, and the Sales OU policy enabled it - you would end up having the Run command, since OU policy is applied after the site policy. Note that logging off and back on isn't necessary in order to obtain the vast majority of group policy settings in Windows 2000. Group policy settings are automatically updated on the client system every 90 minutes by default (with a 30 minute offset). There is much more to Group Policy than just what has been discussed here - a more detailed look at group policy will follow in the Server portion of the series.
You want the router to use a particular source IP address when sending TACACS+ logging messages. The ip tacacs source-interface configuration command allows you to specify a particular source IP address for TACACS logging messages: Router1#configure terminal Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z. Router1(config)#ip tacacs source-interface Loopback0 Router1(config)#end Router1# Note that implementing this command will not only affect AAA accounting; it will also affect AAA authentication and AAA authorization. Normally, when you enable TACACS+ on a router, the source IP addresses on the messages that it sends to the TACACS+ server will be the address of the router's nearest interface. However, this is not always meaningful. If there are many different paths to the server, the router could wind up sending messages through different interfaces. On the server, then, these messages usually will look like they came from different routers, which can make it difficult to analyze the logs. However, if you use a loopback address for the source, all messages from this router will look the same, regardless of which interface they were delivered through. In many networks, the DNS database only contains these loopback IP addresses, which helps make the logs more useful as well. We strongly recommend using this command. Recipe 4.5; Recipe 4.6 Router Configuration and File Management User Access and Privilege Levels Handling Queuing and Congestion Tunnels and VPNs NTP and Time Router Interfaces and Media Simple Network Management Protocol First Hop Redundancy Protocols Appendix 1. External Software Packages Appendix 2. IP Precedence, TOS, and DSCP Classifications
[dropcap]W[/dropcap]e all know very well that the firewall is one of the most important protection elements that users have to prevent malware or intruders from entering their computers and networks. It is the first line of defense against viruses, Trojans, spyware, etc. that allows us to limit and block the internet traffic based on a series of basic rules and criteria. However, the truth is that there are many Linux users who think that it is not necessary to take security measures using Linux. Well, the truth is that according to our point of view they are quite wrong. What is a Firewall And How It Works? The firewall is one of the most important protection elements that users have to prevent malware or intruders from entering their computers and networks. It is the first line of defense against viruses, Trojans, spyware, etc. that allows us to limit and block the internet traffic based on a series of basic rules and criteria. Despite its importance in the prevention of infections, it is also implemented as standard in most modern operating systems and even routers and other network devices, as its real usefulness can often be hidden behind the almost always complex terminology used, especially for users who are starting in the world of internet and computer science. Also Read: Top 8 Best Firewall Software For Windows 10 However, the truth is that there are many Linux users who think that it is not necessary to take security measures using Linux. Well, the truth is that according to our point of view they are quite wrong. As it is true that there are virtually no viruses in Linux, so if we could say that the use of antivirus today is practically not necessary, but in my view, there are precautions that must be implemented in all operating systems that we use. One of these precautions is to have a firewall enabled and properly configured. Now many of you might be wondering that what a Firewall is, what is it for? Do I need it or not? So, if you are facing this same situation then don’t worry as here in this explanatory post we will simply explain to you everything about Firewall. What is a Firewall? A firewall is a software system that simply allows us to manage and filter all incoming and outgoing traffic between 2 networks or computers in the same network. If the incoming or outgoing traffic complies with a series of Rules that we can specify, then the traffic can access or leave our network or computer without any restriction. In case the traffic not complying with the rules the incoming or outgoing traffic will be blocked. Therefore from the definition, we can ensure that with a well-configured firewall we can simply prevent unwanted intrusions in our network and computer as well as block certain type of outgoing traffic from our computer or our network as well. What does a Firewall serve? Basically, the function of a firewall is to protect individual computers, servers or networked equipment against unwanted access by intruders who can steal confidential data, lose essential information or even deny services in our network as well. Hence, it is clear that it is highly recommended that everyone should use a firewall for the following reasons:- - Preserve our security and privacy. - Protect our home or business network. - Protect the information stored in our network, servers or computers. - Avoid the intrusions of unwanted users (both hackers and users belonging to our same network) in our network and computer. - Avoid possible denial of service attacks. Hence, all these points simply justified that a properly configured firewall can simply protect us against attacks such as IP address spoofing, Attacks Source Routing, and much more. How does a Firewall work? The firewall usually remains at the junction point between 2 networks, where the subnets within our network can have another firewall, and each of the computers can have their own software firewall at the same time. In this way, in case of attacks, we can limit the consequences as we can prevent the damage of one subnet to spread to the other. The first thing that we need to know, is how a firewall works is that all the information and traffic that passes through our router and transmitted between networks is analyzed by each of the firewalls present in our network. If the traffic complies with the rules that have been configured in the firewall, traffic then it can enter or leave our network. And if the traffic does not comply with the rules that have been configured in the firewall then the traffic will be blocked and it will not be able to reach its destination. So, what do you think about this? Simply share all your views and thoughts in the comment section below. And if you liked this post then simply do not forget to share this post with your friends and family.
We provide both Static Analysis and Sandbox Analysis of compiled code, by decompiling it and, during the scan, compare the results with sandoxing analysis. We provide this feature for the following Programming Languages: Applications written using those Languages will be automatically decompiled and analyzed. During the analysis, a Sandbox will be created on-the-fly and each compiled component will be stimulated with dedicated YARA scripts. In the meanwhile, the Static Analysis results and Sandbox analysis results will be compared, with a dramatic False Positives reduction. Either you downloaded your firmware image from your device/IoT, or from your Vendor’s site, and we analyze it. Typically a firmware image is made by a bootloader and one or more file systems. We are able to analyze them, even their encrypted parts. In this case we are able to process a Dynamic Analysis too.
With around 200 billion Internet of Things (IoT) devices now in the world, chances are that you have at least a few in your own home. The variety of tasks handled by these can range from the slightly comical, like starting the coffee maker from a smartphone, to serious applications that track users' health, or monitor traffic. It is known that the amount of attention IoT device makers give to matters of security varies greatly, which is a major concern with so many of these devices out in the wild, and performing such important tasks. Concerned by this current state of affairs, researchers at the University of Rennes have developed a new method to detect malware running on compromised IoT devices. Rather than resorting to more traditional ways of detecting malware, which tend to require modifications on the target device, they are using the electromagnetic radiation normally emitted by electronic devices in a novel way. To simulate a compromised IoT device, the team first conducted a study of nearly five thousand malware samples. From this study, they identified three well-known malware variants (DDoS, ransomware, and kernel rootkits). They then developed some malware binaries that were representative of what is typically seen among these variants, then they loaded it onto a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B. Additionally, the researchers used some obfuscation techniques on their software, as would commonly be done with real malware to help it avoid being detected. The malware detection device consists of a Picoscope 6407 oscilloscope connected to a H-Field probe, and a server to collect data captures. The H-Field probe is then positioned just above the main system processor on the Raspberry Pi to collect the electromagnetic signals that it emanates during the course of normal operation. At this point, the team had nothing more than signal traces, which is not interpretable by itself. To make sense of this data, the team designed a convolutional neural network to classify samples into one of the ransomware, rootkit, DDoS, or benign classes. The network was trained on data from 3,000 traces each for 30 malware binaries, and 10,000 traces for benign activity. 20 percent of this dataset was held out for testing, and a very impressive greater than 98% classification accuracy was observed. It was possible for the algorithm to accurately classify malware variants that were unseen during training, which bodes well for the real world utility of this method in detecting newly developed malware. This research may not be ready to make its way out of the lab just yet, but it does hint at the possibility of some interesting new avenues for malware detection in the future. Detecting malware type and identity with a high degree of accuracy, even in the presence of obfuscation, without modifying the target device presents us with an excellent opportunity to better secure our IoT devices.
You can view all our publications from this page. Use the filters below to filter by audience type, title and summary and the sort options to sort for the most recently updated or published content. 26 Jun 2020 Microsoft Office Macro Security Microsoft Office applications can execute macros to automate routine tasks. However, macros can contain malicious code resulting in unauthorised access to sensitive information as part of a targeted cyber intrusion. This document has been developed to discuss approaches that can be applied by organisations to secure systems against malicious macros while balancing both their business and security requirements. What Executives Should Know About Cyber Security This publication discusses high-level topics that executives should know about cyber security within their organisations. Preparing for and Responding to Denial-of-Service Attacks Although organisations cannot avoid being targeted by denial-of-service attacks, there are a number of measures that organisations can implement to prepare for and potentially reduce the impact if targeted. Preparing for denial-of-service attacks before they occur is by far the best strategy, it is very difficult to respond once they begin and efforts at this stage are unlikely to be effective. Mitigating Drive-by Downloads Adversaries are increasingly using drive‐by download techniques to deliver malicious software that compromises computers. This document explains how drive‐by downloads operate and how compromise from these techniques can be mitigated. Mergers, Acquisitions and Machinery of Government Changes This publication provides guidance on strategies that organisations can apply during mergers, acquisitions and Machinery of Government changes. Mitigating Java-based Intrusions Java applications are widely deployed by organisations. As such, exploiting security vulnerabilities in the Java platform is particularly attractive to adversaries seeking unauthorised access to organisations’ networks. Windows Event Logging and Forwarding A common theme identified by the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) while performing investigations is that organisations have insufficient visibility of activity occurring on their workstations and servers. Good visibility of what is happening in an organisation’s environment is essential for conducting an effective investigation. It also aids incident response efforts by providing critical insights into the events relating to a cyber security incident and reduces the overall cost of responding to them. End of Support for Microsoft Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2 On 14 January 2020, Microsoft ended support for Microsoft Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2. As such, organisations no longer receive patches for security vulnerabilities identified in these products. Subsequently, adversaries may use these unpatched security vulnerabilities to target Microsoft Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2 servers. Securing PowerShell in the Enterprise This document describes a maturity framework for PowerShell in a way that balances the security and business requirements of organisations. This maturity framework will enable organisations to take incremental steps towards securing PowerShell across their environment. Introduction to Cross Domain Solutions This document introduces technical and non-technical audiences to the concept of a Cross Domain Solution (CDS), a type of security capability that is used to connect discrete systems within separate security domains in an assured manner. Travelling Overseas with Electronic Devices This publication provides guidance on strategies that individuals can take to secure the use of electronic devices when travelling overseas. Fundamentals of Cross Domain Solutions This guidance introduces technical and non-technical audiences to cross domain security principles for securely connecting security domains. It explains the purpose of a Cross Domain Solution (CDS) and promotes a data-centric approach to a CDS system implementation based on architectural principles and risk management. This guidance also covers a broad range of fundamental concepts relating to a CDS, which should be accessible to readers who have some familiarity with the field of cyber security. Organisations with complex information sharing requirements are encouraged to refer to this guidance in the planning, analysis, design and implementation of CDS systems. Industrial Control Systems Remote Access Protocol External parties may need to connect remotely to critical infrastructure control networks. This is to allow manufacturers of equipment the ability to maintain the equipment when a fault is experienced that cannot be fixed in the required timeframe. Such access to external parties will only occur in extraordinary circumstances, and will only be given at critical times where access is required to maintain the quality of everyday life in Australia. Implementing Multi-Factor Authentication Multi-factor authentication is one of the most effective controls an organisation can implement to prevent an adversary from gaining access to a device or network and accessing sensitive information. When implemented correctly, multi-factor authentication can make it significantly more difficult for an adversary to steal legitimate credentials to facilitate further malicious activities on a network. Due to its effectiveness, multi-factor authentication is one of the Essential Eight from the Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents. Privileged access allows administrators to perform their duties such as establishing and making changes to key servers, networking devices, user workstations and user accounts. Privileged access or credentials are often seen as the ‘keys to the kingdom’ as they allow the bearers to have access and control over many different assets within a network. This publication provides guidance on how to implement secure administration techniques. Preparing for and Responding to Cyber Security Incidents The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) is responsible for monitoring and responding to cyber threats targeting Australian interests. The ACSC can help organisations respond to cyber security incidents. Reporting cyber security incidents ensures that the ACSC can provide timely assistance. Web Conferencing Security Web conferencing solutions (also commonly referred to as online collaboration tools) often provide audio/video conferencing, real-time chat, desktop sharing and file transfer capabilities. As we increasingly use web conferencing to keep in touch while working from home, it is important to ensure that this is done securely without introducing unnecessary privacy, security and legal risks. This document provides guidance on both how to select a web conferencing solution and how to use it securely. Protecting Web Applications and Users This document provides advice for web developers and security professionals on how they can protect their existing web applications by implementing low cost and effective security controls which do not require changes to a web application’s code. These security controls when applied to new web applications in development, whether in the application’s code or server configuration, form part of the defence-in-depth strategy. Restricting Administrative Privileges This publication provides guidance on restricting the use of administrative privileges. Restricting the use of administrative privileges is one of the eight essential mitigation strategies from the Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents. Detecting Socially Engineered Messages Socially engineered messages present a significant threat to individuals and organisations due to their ability to assist an adversary with compromising accounts, devices, systems or sensitive information. This document offers guidance on identifying socially engineered messages delivered by email, SMS, instant messaging or other direct messaging services offered by social media applications. Hardening Microsoft Office 365 ProPlus, Office 2019 and Office 2016 Workstations are often targeted by adversaries using malicious websites, emails or removable media in an attempt to extract sensitive information. Hardening applications on workstations is an important part of reducing this risk. Using Virtual Private Networks Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections can be an effective means of providing remote access to a network; however, VPN connections can be abused by an adversary to gain access to a network without relying on malware and covert communication channels. This document identifies security controls that should be considered when implementing VPN connections. Malicious Email Mitigation Strategies Socially engineered emails containing malicious attachments and embedded links are routinely used in targeted cyber intrusions against organisations. This document has been developed to provide mitigation strategies for the security risks posed by these malicious emails. Using Remote Desktop Clients Remote access solutions are increasingly being used to access organisations’ systems. One common method of enabling remote access is to use a remote desktop client. This document provides guidance on security risks associated with the use of remote desktop clients. 22 May 2020 COVID-19 – Remote access to Operational Technology Environments This cyber security advice is for critical infrastructure providers who are deploying business continuity plans for Operational Technology Environments (OTE)/Industrial Control Systems (ICS) during the COVID-19 pandemic. 06 Apr 2020 COVID-19 Protecting Your Small Business This guide has been developed to help small and micro businesses adapt to working during the COVID-19 pandemic. It will help businesses with simple and actionable advice in order to both identify common and emerging cyber threats and develop resilient business practices to protect themselves. 31 Oct 2019 Quick Wins for your End of Support Every software product has a lifecycle. Knowing key dates in a program’s lifecycle can help you make informed decisions about the products your small business relies on every day. This guide helps small businesses understand what end of support is, why it is important to be prepared and when to update, upgrade or make other changes. 09 Oct 2019 Step-by-Step Guide – Turning on Automatic Updates (For iMac & MacBook, and iPhone & iPad) This step-by-step guide shows you how to turn on automatic updates if you use an iMac, MacBook, iPhone or iPad. Quick Wins for your Portable Devices Mobile technology is an essential part of modern business. While these devices may be small, the cyber threats when transporting them outside of the office are huge. This guide helps small businesses understand what is a portable device, why it is important to manage their use and how to keep the data on portable devices secure. Step-by-Step Guide – Turning on Automatic Updates (For Windows 10) This step-by-step guide shows you how to turn on automatic updates if you use Microsoft Windows 10. 01 Jul 2018 Protecting Industrial Control Systems Industrial control systems are essential to our daily life. They control the water we drink, the electricity we rely on and the transport that moves us all. It is critical that cyber threats to industrial control systems are understood and mitigated appropriately to ensure essential services continue to provide for everyone. 01 Feb 2017 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents – Mitigation Details The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) has developed prioritised mitigation strategies to help cyber security professionals in all organisations mitigate cyber security incidents caused by various cyber threats. This guidance addresses targeted cyber intrusions (i.e. those executed by advanced persistent threats such as foreign intelligence services), ransomware and external adversaries with destructive intent, malicious insiders, ‘business email compromise’, and industrial control systems. Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents Australian Cyber Security Hotline 1300 CYBER1(1300 292 371)
Testing Human Vulnerability: The Importance of Threat Simulations In today’s digital age, we are producing more information than ever. Thus, the importance of cybersecurity awareness cannot be overstated. As technology evolves, so do the threats that target individuals and organizations. While controls at the technological front are crucial components of a robust cybersecurity strategy, the organization often overlooks the human element. Employees and individuals are, unintentionally, the weakest link in the security chain. This is where threat simulations come into play. In this blog, we will explore the importance of testing human vulnerability through threat simulations, focusing on phishing simulation platforms and their role as an essential security awareness tool. The Importance of Human Elements in Cybersecurity As technology evolves, cybercriminals are becoming more sophisticated in their approaches. While firewalls, anti-virus software, and other technical safeguards are essential, they are not foolproof. Attackers recognize that humans are often the easiest route to infiltrate an organization’s systems. This is where the human factor comes into play. Cybercriminals frequently exploit human weaknesses, such as fear, greed, trust, and ignorance, to launch cyberattacks. Phishing is a prime example. Attackers construct convincing emails that trick individuals into revealing sensitive information or downloading malicious files, leading to security incidents, data breaches, financial loss, and reputational damage. To overcome this risk, organizations must educate their employees on recognizing and responding to cyber threats. Phishing Simulators: A Vital Component Phishing simulators are one of the most important tools in the cybersecurity awareness arsenal. These platforms enable organizations to recreate realistic phishing scenarios in a controlled environment, allowing employees to experience phishing attempts without real-world consequences. By sending simulated phishing emails, calls, and messages to employees, organizations can evaluate their ability to recognize and respond to phishing attempts. Phishing simulators offer several key benefits, such as realistic scenarios, assessments, metrics, and reporting. Security Awareness Tools: Strengthening the Human Element While phishing simulation platforms are invaluable, a comprehensive cybersecurity awareness tool extends beyond just testing human vulnerability against phishing attacks. It encompasses a wider range of security topics such as ransomware, social engineering, data protection, and security best practices. The Importance of Regular Testing Phishing simulators and security awareness tools should not be seen as a one-time effort but as ongoing programs. Cyber threats evolve rapidly, and human vulnerabilities can reemerge if not regularly tested and addressed. Regular testing keeps employees vigilant and reinforces their ability to detect and respond to threats effectively. Cybersecurity awareness is the foundation of a robust defence. It is not enough to rely solely on IT departments to protect an organization’s digital assets. Instead, every employee, from the receptionist to the CEO, must be an active and informed part of the security strategy. Testing human vulnerability through threat simulations, including phishing simulators and security awareness tools, is crucial to protecting your organization against ever-evolving cyber threats. By investing in these tools and fostering a culture of security awareness, you can empower your employees to become your strongest defense against malicious actors in the digital realm. We, Cybersec Knights, have one of the best phishing simulators and cybersecurity awareness tools that your organization can leverage to test and educate your employees. If you are thinking or actively looking for a solution to perform a threat simulation on your employees, look no further and reach out to us, and we will be more than glad to assist you with your requirements.
ArmoBest, NSA, AllControls, WorkloadScan In order to reduce the attack surface, it is recommend, when it is possible, to harden your application using security services such as SELinux®, AppArmor®, and seccomp. Starting from Kubernetes version 22, SELinux is enabled by default. CronJob, DaemonSet, Deployment, Job, Pod, ReplicaSet, StatefulSet Check if there is AppArmor or Seccomp or SELinux or Capabilities are defined in the securityContext of container and pod. If none of these fields are defined for both the container and pod, alert. You can use AppArmor, Seccomp, SELinux and Linux Capabilities mechanisms to restrict containers abilities to utilize unwanted privileges. Updated 6 days ago
DFF (Digital Forensics Framework) is a simple but powerful tool with a flexible module system which will help you in your digital forensics works, including file recovery due to error or crash, evidence research and analysis, etc. DFF provides a robust architecture and some handy modules. The Cryptographic Implementations Analysis Toolkit (CIAT) is a compendium of command line and graphical tools whose aim is to help in the detection and analysis of encrypted byte sequences within files (executable and non-executable). It is particularly helpful in the forensic analysis and reverse engineering of malware using cryptographic code and encrypted payloads. A 'honeypot' is designed to detect server-side attacks. In contrast, a 'honeyclient' is designed to detect client-side attacks. Specifically, a honeyclient is a dedicated host that drives specially instrumented applications to access remote servers to see if those servers are behaving in a malicious manner (by compromising the client). Honeyclients can proactively detect exploits against client applications without known signatures. This framework uses a client-server model with SOAP messaging as the primary communication method, and uses the free version of VMware Server as a means of virtualizing the client environment.
Access control list (ACL) A list of access control entries (ACEs) that contain permissions defining who or what can access the object to which it is applied. A technology developed by Microsoft that is an outgrowth of Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) and Component Object Model (COM), which allows Web developers to make Web pages interactive and provide the same types of functions as Java applets. Ad hoc wireless network An 802.11 wi-fi network that operates in a computer-to-computer manner instead of going through a wireless access point (WAP).
Lots of vulnerabilities in applications are closely related to outdated third-party components. We’re at bspeka often get requests for a Penetration Testing, but it’s not always means Penetration Testing. Thats why we’ve decided to write this article. Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration testing both are options of Security Testing. Let’s dive into this topic and try to cover main aspects of these processes from the Application Security point of view.
Appendix Q. Troubleshooting IPv4 Routing Protocols This appendix contains an entire chapter that was published as a chapter in one of the past editions of this book or a related book. The author includes this appendix with the current edition as extra reading for anyone interested in learning more. However, note that the content in this appendix has not been edited since it was published in the earlier edition, so references to exams and exam topics, and to other chapters, will be outdated. This appendix was previously published as Chapter 11 of the book CCNA Routing and Switching ICND2 200-105 Official Cert Guide, published in 2016. To troubleshoot a possible IPv4 routing protocol problem, first focus on interfaces, and then on ...
sysechk (System Security Checker) Tool and Usage System Security Checker, or sysechk, is a tool to perform a system audit against a set of best practices. It uses a modular approach to test the system. Usage and audience sysechk is commonly used for IT audit or system hardening. Target users for this tool are auditors, security professionals, and system administrators. - sysechk is written in shell script - Can run non-privileged (as normal user) - Command line interface - + Used language is shell script - + The source code of this software is available Author and Maintainers Sysechk is under development by Cédric Félizard. Support operating systems Sysechk is known to work on Linux.
Reports and Papers Archive Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are used in a wide variety of applications including environmental monitoring, electrical grids, and manufacturing plants. WSNs are plagued by the possibility of bugs manifesting only at deployment. However, debugging deployed WSNs is challenging for several reasons—the remote location of deployed nodes, the non-determinism of execution, and the limited hardware resources available. A primary debugging mechanism, record and replay, logs a trace of events while a node is deployed, such that the events can be replayed later for debugging. Existing recording methods for WSNs cannot capture the complete code execution, thus negating the possibility of a faithful replay and causing some bugs to go unnoticed. Existing approaches are not resource efficient enough to capture all sources of non-determinism. We have designed, developed, and verified two novel approaches to solve the problem of practical record and replay for WSNs. Our first approach, Aveksha, uses additional hardware to trace tasks and other generic events at the function and task level. Aveksha does not need to stop the target processor, making it non-intrusive. Using Aveksha we have discovered a previously unknown bug in a common operating system. Our second approach, Tardis, uses only software to deterministically record and replay WSN nodes. Tardis is able to record all sources of non-determinism, based on the observation that such information is compressible using a combination of techniques specialized for respective sources. We demonstrate Tardis by diagnosing a newly discovered routing protocol bug. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a defense which prevents control-flow hijacking attacks. While recent research has shown that coarse-grained CFI does not stop attacks, fine-grained CFI is believed to be secure. We argue that assessing the effectiveness of practical CFI implementations is non-trivial and that common evaluation metrics fail to do so. We then evaluate fully-precise static CFI—- the most restrictive CFI policy that does not break functionality—- and reveal limitations in its security. Using a generalization of non-control-data attacks which we call Control-Flow Bending (CFB), we show how an attacker can leverage a memory corruption vulnerability to achieve Turing-complete computation on memory using just calls to the standard library. We use this attack technique to evaluate fully-precise static CFI on six real binaries and show that in five out of six cases, powerful attacks are still possible. Our results suggest that CFI may not be a reliable defense against memory corruption vulnerabilities. We further evaluate shadow stacks in combination with CFI and find that their presence for security is necessary: deploying shadow stacks removes arbitrary code execution capabilities of attackers in three of six cases. Modern systems rely on Address-Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) to protect software against memory corruption vulnerabilities. The security of ASLR depends on randomizing regions in memory which can be broken by leaking addresses. While information leaks are common for client applications, server software has been hardened to reduce such information leaks. Memory deduplication is a common feature of Virtual Machine Monitors (VMMs) that reduces the memory footprint and increases the cost-effectiveness of virtual machines (VMs) running on the same host. Memory pages with the same content are merged into one read-only memory page. Writing to these pages is expensive due to page faults caused by the memory protection, and this cost can be used by an attacker as a side-channel to detect whether a page has been shared. Leveraging this memory side-channel, we craft an attack that leaks the address-space layouts of the neighboring VMs, and hence, defeats ASLR. Our proof-of-concept exploit, CAIN (Cross-VM ASL INtrospection) defeats ASLR of a 64-bit Windows Server 2012 victim VM in less than 5 hours (for 64-bit Linux victims the attack takes several days). Further, we show that CAIN reliably defeats ASLR, regardless of the number of victim VMs or the system load. Applications written in low-level languages without type or memory safety are prone to memory corruption. Attackers gain code execution capabilities through memory corruption despite all currently deployed defenses. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a promising security property that restricts indirect control-flow transfers to a static set of well-known locations. We present Lockdown, a modular, fine-grained CFI policy that protects binary-only applications and libraries without requiring source-code. Lockdown adaptively discovers the control-flow graph of a running process based on the executed code. The sandbox component of Lockdown restricts interactions between different shared objects to imported and exported functions by enforcing fine-grained CFI checks using information from a trusted dynamic loader. A shadow stack enforces precise integrity for function returns. Our prototype implementation shows that Lockdown results in low performance overhead and a security analysis discusses any remaining gadgets. Website Forgery is a type of web based attack where the phisher builds a website that is completely independent or a replica of a legitimate website, with the goal of deceiving a user by extracting information that could be used to defraud or launch other attacks upon the victim. In this paper we attempt to identify the different types of website forgery phishing attacks and non-technical countermeasure that could be used by users, (mostly by non IT users) that lack the understanding of how phishing attack works and how they can prevent themselves from these criminals. In this paper I reviewed the literature concerning investigator digital forensics models and how they apply to field investigators. A brief history of community supervision and how offenders are supervised will be established. I also covered the difference between community supervision standards and police standards concerning searches, evidence, standards of proof, and the difference between parole boards and courts. Currently, the burden for digital forensics for community supervision officers is placed on local or state law enforcement offices, with personnel trained in forensics, but may not place a high priority on outside cases. Forensic field training for community supervision officers could ease the caseloads of outside forensic specialists, and increase fiscal responsible by increasing efficiency and public safety in the field of community supervision. In this paper, we compare, analyze and study the behavior of a malware processes within both Type 1 & Type 2 virtualized environments. In other to achieve this we to set up two different virtualized environments and thoroughly analyze each malware processes behavior. The goal is to see if there is a difference between the behaviors of malware within the 2 different architectures. At the end we achieve a result and realized there is no significant difference on how malware processes run and behave on either virtualized environment. However our study is limited to basic analysis using basic tools. An advance analysis with more sophisticated tools could prove otherwise. We have seen an evolution of increasing scale and complexity of enterprise-class distributed applications, such as, web services for providing anything from critical infrastructure services to electronic commerce. With this evolution, it has become increasingly difficult to understand how these applications perform, when do they fail, and what can be done to make them more resilient to failures, both due to hardware and due to software? Application developers tend to focus on bringing their applications to market quickly without testing the complex failure scenarios that can disrupt or degrade a given web service. Operators configure these web services without the complete knowledge of how the configurations interact with the various layers. Matters are not helped by ad hoc and often poor quality failure logs generated by even mature and widely used software systems. Worse still, both end users and servers sometime suffer from “silent problems” where something goes wrong without any immediate obvious end-user manifestation. To address these reliability issues, characterizing and detecting software problems with some post-detection diagnostic-context is crucial. ^ This dissertation first presents a fault-injection and bug repository-based evaluation to characterize silent and non-silent software failures and configuration problems in three-tier web applications and Java EE application servers. Second, for detection of software failures, we develop simple low-cost application-generic and application-specific consistency checks, while for duplicate web requests (a class of performance problems), we develop a generic autocorrelation-based algorithm at the server end.Third, to provide diagnostic-context as a post-detection step for performance problems, we develop an algorithm based on pair-wise correlation of system metrics to diagnose the root-cause of the detected problem. ^ The need to ensure the primary functionality of any system means that considerations of security are often secondary. Computer security considerations are made in relation to considerations of usability, functionality, productivity, and other goals. Decision-making related to security is about finding an appropriate tradeoff. Most existing security mechanisms take a binary approach where an action is either malicious or benign, and therefore allowed or denied. However, security and privacy outcomes are often fuzzy and cannot be represented by a binary decision. It is useful for end users, who may ultimately need to allow or deny an action, to understand the potential differences among objects and the way that these differences are communicated matters. ^ In this work, we use machine learning and feature extraction techniques to model normal behavior in various contexts and then used those models to detect the degree that new behavior is anomalous. This measurement can then be used, not as a binary signal but as a more nuanced indicator that can be communicated to a user to help guide decision-making. ^ We examine the application of this idea in two domains. The first is the installation of applications on a mobile device. The focus in this domain is on permissions that represent capabilities and access to data, and we generate a model for expected permission requests. Various user studies were conducted to explore effective ways to communicate this measurement to influence decision-making by end users. Next, we examined to the domain of insider threat detection in the setting of a source code repository. The goal was to build models of expected user access and more appropriately predict the degree that new behavior deviates from the previous behavior. This information can be utilized and understood by security personnel to focus on unexpected patterns.^ One major impediment to large-scale use of cloud services is concern for confidentiality of the data and the computations carried out on it. This dissertation advances the state of art for secure and private outsourcing to untrusted cloud servers by solving three problems in the computational outsourcing setting and extending the semantics of oblivious storage in the storage outsourcing setting. ^ In computational outsourcing, this dissertation provides protocols for two parties to collaboratively design engineering systems and check certain properties of the codesigning system with the help of a cloud server, without leaking the designing parameters to each other or to the server. It also provides approaches to outsource two computationally intensive tasks, image feature extraction and generalized matrix multiplication, preserving the confidentiality of both the input data and the output result. Experiments are included to demonstrate the viability of the protocols. ^ In storage outsourcing, this dissertation extends the semantics of the oblivious storage scheme by providing algorithms to support nearest neighbor search. It enables clients to perform nearest neighbor queries on the outsourced storage without leaking the access pattern.^ Meaning-Based Machine Learning (MBML) is a research program intended to show how training machine learning (ML) algorithms on meaningful data produces more accurate results than that of using unstructured data. Security for public cloud providers is an ongoing concern. Programs like FedRAMP look to certify a minimum level of compliance. This project aims to build a tool to help decision makers compare different clouds solutions and weigh the risks against their own organizational needs. Our goal is to improve the detection of phishing attack emails by using natural language processing (NLP) technology that models the semantic meaning behind the email text. In this paper we identified and addressed some of the key challenges in digital forensics. An intensive review was conducted of the major challenges that have already been identified. At the end, the findings proposed a solution and how having a standardized body that governs the digital forensics community could make a difference.
What is cloud application security? In this guide, we'll examine the changes, challenges, and opportunities of evolving cloud security solutions. Cloud application security is becoming more of a critical issue as cloud-based applications gain popularity. The cloud allows a modular approach to building applications, enabling development and operations teams to quickly create and deploy feature-rich apps. However, the same characteristics that make cloud-native applications nimble and agile can also introduce a variety of cloud application security risks. Incorporating cloud application security practices is an effective way for organizations to avoid application security risks, ensure a smoothly running software development lifecycle (SDLC), and establish an overall strong security posture. However, implementing these practices within DevSecOps teams can often be extremely challenging for complex, microservices-based, cloud-native applications. What is cloud application security? Cloud application security is a combination of policies, processes, and controls that aim to reduce the risk of exposing cloud-based applications to compromise or failure from external or internal threats. Cloud application security generally involves authentication and access control, data encryption, identity and user management, and vulnerability management. It also entails secure development practices, security monitoring and logging, compliance and governance, and incident response. Cloud application security practices enable organizations to follow secure coding practices, monitor and log activities for detection and response, comply with regulations, and develop incident response plans. Many organizations host applications that are distributed over hybrid cloud environments and have some combination of private cloud, public cloud, and on-premises resources. Cloud application security is a shared responsibility between the cloud service provider and the organization using the services. If your app runs in a public cloud, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, or Google Cloud Platform (GCP), the provider secures the infrastructure. At the same time, you’re responsible for security measures within applications and configurations. If your application runs on servers you manage, either on premises or on a private cloud, you’re responsible for securing the application as well as the operating system, network infrastructure, and physical hardware. What are some key characteristics of securing cloud applications? Cloud applications have several important characteristics that require a specific approach to secure effectively and properly to have a good security posture. Open source software To produce applications rapidly, developers often rely on open source software for the application’s primary building blocks. Research estimates that nearly every software program (96%) includes some kind of open source software component, and almost half of those applications (48%) expose high-risk vulnerabilities. Using open source software can help accelerate development because developers don’t need to reinvent the wheel with every new application build. For example, if organizations build an app to handle data flows from multiple sources, they might find open source application programming interfaces (APIs) that eliminate the need to build key connectors from scratch. However, open source software is often a vector for security vulnerabilities. To properly secure applications, developers must be able to identify and eliminate these vulnerabilities. Applications built using microservices-based architecture can operate and interact across different cloud platforms. This diffusion provides greater flexibility, agility, and application resilience as organizations can easily connect and deploy applications in any environment. The challenge is that the apps often have multiple interdependencies that traditional security tools can’t easily track, monitor, or manage. Containers offer an ideal way to deploy and operate modern cloud apps, but they also present two main visibility challenges. First, the short lifespan of containers makes it difficult for traditional security tools to scan them in production environments. Second, containers are typically opaque to traditional security tools, which results in blind spots. Rapid development and iteration Modern cloud apps are typically developed using modern methodologies such as Agile and DevOps. The release cadence is rapid, sometimes daily or even multiple times per day. Unfortunately, traditional security testing and software composition analysis require significant time to return results. Also, too many “critical” issues are often flagged, requiring manual investigation for each issue. This process can delay deployments or cause developers to skip security testing to meet project deadlines. Indeed, according to recent research, 34% of surveyed CIOs reported that they must sacrifice code security to meet the demand for rapid innovation cycles. Why is cloud application security so critical? While cloud-native applications are transformational to businesses, their distributed nature also increases the attack surface. This provides bad actors with many new potential points of access to protected assets. It’s crucial to ensure that your organization has a robust cloud application security strategy to establish a strong security posture. Robust cloud application security is crucial to implement in your business. This is because attacks against application-level vulnerabilities are the most common type of attack. The financial services sector alone saw a surge in web application and API attacks of 257% from 2021 to 2022. Likewise, attacks on open source libraries have increased. Recent examples include the Heartbleed vulnerability in 2014, the attacks on Apache Struts in 2017, and Log4Shell in 2021. In these cases, vulnerabilities in open source libraries enabled attackers to compromise applications and cause chaos for thousands of organizations. Some organizations suffered ongoing revenue and reputation loss, along with reduced user trust. Interoperability also plays a critical role in cloud application security. The volume of connections leveraged by cloud applications and the use of APIs to communicate between microservices is ever-increasing. Organizations require improved ways to monitor and manage their application stack, no matter where it resides. Challenges of effective cloud application security Common challenges of securing cloud applications include the following: Difficulty identifying open-source vulnerabilities As mentioned earlier, about 70% of the codebase of modern applications are now made up of open source software. Much of open source software contains known vulnerabilities. Developer tools, such as Software Composition Analysis, often produce a large number of false positive alerts. These alerts tend to slow down development. Moreover, common production tools like network scanners, can’t correctly detect open-source vulnerabilities inside containers. Lack of security automation and DevSecOps maturity Security tools that require manual steps, configurations, and custom scripts slow down the pace of development. Tools that require time to run and produce results do the same. In a recent CISO survey, 86% of CISOs say automation and AI are critical for a successful DevSecOps practice and overcoming resource challenges. However, only 12% report having a mature DevSecOps culture. Consequently, 81% of CISOs say they’re concerned they will see more security vulnerability exploits if they don’t find a way to make DevSecOps work more effectively. Too many security point solutions Cloud application security tools only work if developers can integrate their findings. The same CISO research found that 97% said the use of too many point solutions for specific security tasks is causing problems. Another 75% reported that team silos and the proliferation of security point solutions throughout the DevSecOps lifecycle increase the risk of vulnerabilities slipping through to production. Modern development practices hamper zero-day vulnerability detection Although modern development tools — such as open source software and microservices-based application architecture — make applications more flexible, they also increase the threat horizon for vulnerabilities. In the CISO research, 68% of respondents said vulnerability management has become more difficult as the complexity of their software supply chain and cloud ecosystems has increased. Similarly, 76% said the time between discovering a zero-day attack and patching all instances of vulnerable software is a significant challenge to minimizing risk. Traditional security tools have a siloed view of vulnerabilities. These tools can’t properly assess the risks of microservices-based applications and they can’t see beyond cloud boundaries. As a result, these tools can’t give you a complete picture of your application. They also don’t let you enforce security policies consistently across boundaries. Instead, teams adopt multiple products — different products for different environments — and then stitch things together. The typical result is poor communication across tools and teams. Modern cloud application security with Dynatrace Due to the continuously evolving and accelerating pace of digital transformation, organizations are increasingly finding it challenging to keep up. While also ensuring secure, high-performing applications, organizations must evolve from traditional, manual security practices to a more intelligent, automated approach to cloud application security. Combining cloud application security and observability data into a unified analytics platform is beneficial for organizations to improve their overall application security posture. For organizations looking to secure their applications at runtime and ensure frictionless performance, Dynatrace can help address key challenges to deliver next-generation application security. Dynatrace OneAgent provides teams with an observability-driven approach to security monitoring, informing your teams of any vulnerabilities or attacks as they arise in real time. Dynatrace incorporates security into each phase of the SDLC, providing a unified platform for real-time vulnerability analysis and remediation task automation. Powered by causal AI, rooted in automation, and optimized to work within DevSecOps and Kubernetes frameworks, the Dynatrace platform can help bridge the gap between monolithic and microservices-based architectures in any cloud. Learn more about the issues facing CISOs around DevSecOps inefficiencies and cloud application security in the Dynatrace 2023 Global CISO Report.
Security researchers have found a new ransomware program dubbed Spora that can perform strong offline file encryption and brings several innovations to the ransom payment model. The malware has targeted Russian-speaking users so far, but its authors have also created an English version of their decryption portal, suggesting they will likely expand their attacks to other countries soon. Spora stands out because it can encrypt files without having to contact a command-and-control (CnC) server and does so in a way still allows for every victim to have a unique decryption key. Traditional ransomware programs generate an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) key for every encrypted file and then encrypts these keys with an RSA public key generated by a CnC server. Public key cryptography like RSA relies on key pairs made up of a public key and a private key. Whatever file is encrypted with one public key can only be decrypted with its corresponding private key. Most ransomware programs contact a command-and-control server after they're installed on a computer and request the generation of an RSA key pair. The public key is downloaded to the computer, but the private key never leaves the server and remains in the attackers' possession. This is the key that victims pay to get access to. The problem with reaching out to a server on the internet after installation of ransomware is that it creates a weak link for attackers. For example, if the server is known by security companies and is blocked by a firewall, the encryption process doesn't start. Some ransomware programs can perform so-called offline encryption, but they use the same RSA public key that's hard-coded into the malware for all victims. The downside with this approach for attackers is that a decryptor tool given to one victim will work for all victims because they share the same private key as well. The Spora creators have solved this problem, according to researchers from security firm Emsisoft who analyzed the program's encryption routine. The malware does contain a hard-coded RSA public key, but this is used to encrypt a unique AES key that is locally generated for every victim. This AES key is then used to encrypt the private key from a public-private RSA key pair that's also locally generated and unique for every victim. Finally, the victim's public RSA key is used to encrypt the AES keys that are used to encrypt individual files. In other words, the Spora creators have added a second round of AES and RSA encryption to what other ransomware programs have been doing until now. When victims want to pay the ransom, they have to upload their encrypted AES keys to the attackers' payment website. The attackers will then use their master RSA private key to decrypt it and return it back to the victim -- likely bundled in a decryptor tool. The decryptor will use this AES key to decrypt the victim's unique RSA private key that was generated locally and that key will then be used to decrypt the per-file AES keys needed to recover the files. In this way, Spora can operate without the need of a command-and-control server and avoid releasing a master key that will work for all victims, the Emsisoft researchers said in a blog post. "Unfortunately, after evaluating the way Spora performs its encryption, there is no way to restore encrypted files without access to the malware author’s private key." Other aspects of Spora also set it apart from other ransomware operations. For example, its creators have implemented a system that allows them to ask different ransoms for different types of victims. The encrypted key files that victims have to upload on the payments website also contain identifying information collected by the malware about the infected computers, including unique campaign IDs. This means that if the attackers launch a Spora distribution campaign specifically targeted at businesses, they will be able to tell when victims of that campaign will try to use their decryption service. This allows them to automatically adjust the ransom amount for consumers or organizations or even for victims in different regions of the world. Furthermore, in addition to file decryption, the Spora gang offers other "services" that are priced separately, such as "immunity," which ensures that the malware will not infect a computer again, or "removal" which will also remove the program after decrypting the files. They also offer a full package, where the victim can buy all three for a lower price. The payments website itself is well designed and looks professional. It has an integrated live chat feature and the possibility of getting discounts. From what the Emsisoft researchers observed, the attackers respond promptly to messages. All this points to Spora being a professional and well-funded operation. The ransom values observed so far are lower than those asked by other gangs, which could indicate the group behind this threat wants to establish itself quickly.
Metaverse promises a new immersive 3D virtual experience that can change the way we work, play, and interact in general. It uses both augmented and virtual reality to give users more interactive and real-world experiences. Metaverse can face security concerns ranging from headset hardware to privacy issues and affect people’s regular functions. Here we will discuss Cybersecurity in the metaverse. What is the metaverse? The metaverse is a virtual environment that is made up of digital representations where people have virtual identities. The metaverse uses technologies like virtual and augmented reality to aid engagements and interactions. The metaverse is a virtual world where individuals can perform any tasks such as gaming, partying, shopping and so on. Cybersecurity in the metaverse Cybersecurity is necessary to help secure the metaverse. The metaverse is not governed by any laws, jurisdiction, or boundaries which makes it vulnerable. Protecting oneself from attacks is a challenge when using the metaverse. The delicate nature of the metaverse and the data it contains offer many opportunities for cybercriminals. Users could be hacked during a voice or video call, or using an SMS. With the metaverse expanding, the ways in which cybercriminals can target one is also increasing. Attackers can lead you to disclose personal information and other identifiable details. The metaverse increases the chances of attacks. When you use an avatar to identify an individual, that personal information and data are vulnerable to duplication, theft, deletion, or tampering. As the metaverse grows, the need for cybersecurity also increases. The underlying system remains a target for data theft, but this is subject to change as the platform becomes popular. Six ways cyber security will shape metaverse Cybersecurity helps the metaverse become secure and safe. Some recommended changes to the metaverse are discussed below: Protection of individual identity in the metaverse Virtual IDs are the primary IDs in the metaverse. The metaverse also has the concept of an avatar that resembles the body of an individual in the physical world. Cybersecurity provides the proxy server which is an intermediary between a user and an internet gateway. This is an intermediary server that separates the websites that end users browse. Proxy servers offer different levels of functionality, security, and privacy, depending on your use case, needs, or company policy. Proxies such as residential proxies from blazing SEO can be used to protect the identity of the users in the metaverse by hiding the users’ IP addresses. It also helps to block malicious traffic and prevent the interception of confidential information. 2. Data protection and malware prevention in the metaverse Malware, which stands for ‘malicious software,’ refers to a type of computer program designed to infect a user’s computer and cause disruption in many. There are different forms of malware including viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, and more. All users need to know how to recognize and prevent all forms of malware. Cybersecurity can help the metaverse by providing a variety of antivirus software to prevent viruses, worms, and spyware that can infiltrate a user’s computer. When an attacker steals sensitive or personal information, the entire metaverse concept is destroyed. A virtual private network (VPN) provides privacy and anonymity by building a private network from a public internet connection. VPNs mask Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, making online actions virtually untraceable. Most importantly, VPN services establish secure and encrypted connections to provide higher privacy than secure WiFi hotspots. Cybersecurity provides the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) which helps to hide the user’s location, protect personal data, and hide IP addresses. It could be used to protect the data of the users in the metaverse. 3. Cybersecurity helps metaverse by enforcing best practices The metaverse is a virtual world without jurisdictions and laws. This can lead to an increase in security breaches. Cybersecurity ensures that some best practices are followed to keep the metaverse safe and secure. Some of these practices are ensuring the use of multi-factor authentication. Multi-factor authentication is a powerful feature that prevents unauthorized users from accessing sensitive data. It ensures the use of additional protection layers such as text validation, email validation, and time-based security code. Another best practice is to regularly hold cybersecurity awareness workshops to educate metaverse users. It helps to reduce cyber-attacks due to human error and negligence. One more essential practice is data backup. It is one of the best ways to protect your personal and business data from ransomware attacks. Ransomware is malicious software that metaverse users accidentally deploy by clicking on a malicious link. Another best practice is to avoid unknown emails, pop-ups and links. Malware infections are one of the most common cybersecurity threats facing businesses. Viruses, Trojan horses, spyware, tend to infect computer systems through similar media such as insecure pop-ups, spam emails, and downloads from unknown sources. While modern virus scanning and spam detection software is a great safety net, it is also important that all users are trained to understand the dangers of clicking on unusual links, pop-ups, or emails. 4. Cybersecurity helps prevent theft of Intellectual Property Intellectual property (IP) protection is important even in the metaverse. Protecting intellectual property is very difficult in the physical world, making it even more difficult to protect it in the metaverse. Intellectual property theft is the act of robbing metaverse users of their ideas, inventions, creative products, and other types of IP. This is done through methods such as theft, human error, and privilege abuse. A strong cybersecurity policy can help prevent identity theft in the metaverse. It ensures the protection of assets and sensitive data and helps set rules in the metaverse. 5. Cybersecurity ensures data privacy in the metaverse The metaverse can serve as a place of commerce where users in virtual reality can buy and interact with things that are not real. Many privacy concerns in the metaverse are related to the amount of data collected, much of which is sensitive information. The metaverse integrates different technologies such as VR, augmented reality (AR), complex reality (MR), these different sensors collect a lot of sensitive data. Protecting this data and analyzing it is an important feature for securing the metaverse. Cybersecurity provides encryption mechanisms that can be used to ensure the data privacy of metaverse users. Some of these encryption mechanisms are discussed below: - Symmetric encryption method: This is secret key encryption or secret key algorithm that requires the sender and receiver have access to the same key, the recipient must have the key before decrypting the message. - Public key cryptography: Another encryption mechanism is the asymmetric encryption method also known as public-key cryptography, which uses two keys, a public key, and a private key, in the encryption process. These are mathematically linked. The user uses one key to encrypt and the other key to decrypt. It doesn’t matter which one you choose first. - Hashing: Another important encryption mechanism that can be used to secure the metaverse is Hashing which creates a unique fixed-length signature on a record or message. Other encryption algorithms that can be used to secure the metaverse are: - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): It is a symmetric block cipher that uses 192 and 256-bit keys for very demanding encryption purposes. AES will ultimately become the standard for private data encryption. - Triple DES: It is the successor to the original Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm, developed for hackers who have found a way to break DES. - RSA: It is an asymmetric public key cryptographic algorithm that is the standard for encrypting information sent over the Internet. RSA encryption is robust and reliable because it creates a lot of gibberish that frustrates potential hackers and causes them to spend a lot of time and energy breaking into the system. 6. Cybersecurity ensures authentication in the metaverse Authentication in cybersecurity means guaranteeing and verifying a user’s identity. Before users can access the information stored on the network, they must prove their identity and seek permission to access the data. When a user logs on to the network, the user must provide unique credentials, including a username and password. This is a technique designed to protect your network from hacker intrusions. In the Metaverse, you create a digital version that you can move around. Digital identities, unlike the real world, use an encrypted root of trust rather than a human root of trust. Authentication of the metaverse users is very important to ensure that the correct user is logged into his or her account. Cybersecurity guarantees authentication in the metaverse by using SSO, multi-factor authentication, and consumer ID and access management (CIAM). Single sign-on (SSO) allows users to access different applications with a single set of credentials. SSO uses federation when users log in to distributions between different domains. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) uses a variety of authentication methods. When logging in using a username and password, the user is prompted to enter the one-time access code that the website sends to the user’s mobile phone. It provides a high level of security during the authentication step to improve security. Consumer ID and Access Management (CIAM) provides a variety of features such as customer registration, self-service account management, consent and configuration management, and other authentication features. The metaverse combines virtual and augmented reality. There is a vast scope for investment in this field right now, but everyone first wants cyberspace to be more secure before making a move in this direction. However, as mentioned, some cybersecurity challenges need immediate attention. Cybersecurity can transform the metaverse into a more secure platform in several ways discussed in this article such as ensuring data protection, malware prevention, protection of identity, prevention of intellectual property theft, and enforcing cybersecurity best practices.
Due diligence is the “process through which organizations proactively identify, assess, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and potential adverse impacts as an integral part of decision-making and risk management.” (ISO 20400:2017) The core concept of due diligence is about making informed decisions. A decision should be made based on sufficient information and justifications. If a decision-maker can’t do so, he or she doesn’t exercise due diligence. Shared Responsibility Model Trust, but verify The principle of “Trust, but verify” is borrowed from the political arena. However, when it comes to security, people may use it inconsistently. For example, some may argue “trust, but verify” is not enough; instead, we should never trust but always verify like “Zero Trust.” On the contrary, some other people consider trust is essential, and it is earned after frequent verification. Therefore, they align “trust, but verify” with “Zero Trust.” If we have subscribed to cloud services provisioned by a cloud service provider after thoughtful evaluation, we trust the services and the provider. However, we have to keep verifying those services and the provider. Reviewing SOC reports is one of the verification activities. Since we are still in the process of evaluating cloud services and shared responsibility, we are exercising due diligence and don’t trust them yet. Netflix is a good example of exercising the “trust, but verify” principle. As a customer of AWS, it trusts AWS but uses “Chaos Monkey” to verify AWS’s cloud services constantly and randomly. Netflix was one of the first places to make overall chaos engineering popular several years ago with a tool they called Chaos Monkey. It was designed to test the company’s Amazon Web Services infrastructure by constantly – and randomly – shutting down various production servers. This always-on feature is important because no single event will do enough damage or provide enough insight to harden your systems or find the weakest points in your infrastructure. Defense in Depth Defense in depth is a concept used in Information security in which multiple layers of security controls (defense) are placed throughout an information technology (IT) system. Its intent is to provide redundancy in the event a security control fails or a vulnerability is exploited that can cover aspects of personnel, procedural, technical and physical security for the duration of the system’s life cycle. Defense in depth is appropriate when designing controls and grouping them into layers to protect information assets. - Due Diligence - API Rants – Trust but verify - Trust, but Verify… - IDENTITY PROTECTION: TRUST BUT VERIFY - A Review of Intrusion Detection and Blockchain Applications in the Cloud: Approaches, Challenges and Solutions - Securing chaos: How Security Chaos Engineering tools can improve design and response - How Netflix pioneered Chaos Engineering
There are many signs of a healthy network, and one of the most important is low response times. High or long response times is a sign of an unhealthy network. Response times can be determined by capturing the traffic and measuring the time it takes for a client request to return a response from the server. There are two types of responses. One is a network response, or ACK, and the other is the application response, or data from the application. When a request goes out, the server will respond with an ACK as soon as it receives the request. The application response will be returned when the application is done processing the request and returns some data. An example of these transactions is shown below in the LiveWire Flow Visualizer. On the right, LiveWire has flagged the transaction as an HTTP Slow Response Time. Before looking at an individual flow for latency, LiveWire can be used to perform a network health assessment that can be performed at a higher level across a range of time. These measurements will help you determine if there is a performance problem on your network, and whether the network or the application is the problem. It is important that these tests are performed with real data on your network. Performing a Network Health Assessment with LiveWire LiveWire is software that can be installed on virtually any computer that is connected to the network, whether it is on-prem or in the cloud. LiveWire captures network traffic, and performs many different types of analysis. One of these is network and application latency, which is the basis for this high level network health assessment. To perform a network health assessment using LiveWire, first download the LiveWire Trial. You can find our installation guide here. Once LiveWire is installed and running, create a capture on the interface where the traffic of interest is. The capture options should have CTD enabled, which is the default, in order to capture to disk. Also, select the right adapter. Once the capture has been started, let it run for a little while to get a good sample of traffic. Go to the Forensics View and select a reasonable range of time, which would be less than a million packets or so. More packets are fine, but the more packets in the result, the longer the forensic analysis will take. Once the range of time is selected, hit the Forensic Search button at the top right. In the Forensic Search Dialog, name the forensic search something unique, and hit ok. Once the forensic search is done, click on the name, and the various analysis views will appear on the left. Select Compass from the list, and change the pulldown in the upper left of Compass to “2-way Latency”. The graph in Compass will show the application and network latency as separate data series over time. Under the graph is the legend with the Application and Network labels which can be used to turn each one on and off. Turning off one of them will cause the other scale up or down to fill the graph. On most networks the application latency is greater than the network latency. For example, if the application latency anywhere along the time range is over 1 second, the Y-axis in the graph will be at least 1 second. And if the highest network latency is .01 seconds, or 10 milliseconds, then you will hardly be able to see the network latency. Now, click on the application latency legend to turn it off, and the network latency will scale up so that the Y-axis is at least 10 milliseconds or greater. Typically, if your network latency is less than a second, then the network is doing fine. Ideally though, the network latency would be on average less than 10 milliseconds. As the network latency gets close to 1 second, and over, there may be something wrong with the network. Now turn the application latency back on in the legend. If there is high application latency, you will be able to see in the lists below what application, protocol, flow, and node has high latency. By clicking on the entries in the lists they will be displayed in the graph above over time. At this point you know if there is latency, whether the latency is the network or the application, and if it is the application, which application, and users are experiencing latency. Take some screenshots of these graphs and send them to the appropriate team, as proof of the source of the latency, who it is affecting, and when. From here, the Select Related Packets feature can be used to drill down to the packets, where more analysis can be done to determine the root cause. But most likely, the packets will have to be correlated by either the network team, or the application team with other information specific to the network architecture or the applications running it. Performing a network health assessment on a regular basis is important to the maintenance of your network, just like getting a checkup regularly from your doctor is important to your own health. Using LiveWire you are able to do a network health assessment as often as you like, whether it is everyday, or once a month. More ways to perform Network Health Assessments with LiveWire Using Compass to quickly determine if there is latency, and whether it is the network or the application is an easy and quick workflow, but there are many other types of analysis and workflows in LiveWire that can be used to perform a network health assessment, and to drill down into the specific health issues, and troubleshoot them. So stay tuned for more of these written and video guides from LiveAction.
For different reasons that can range from editorial changes to corrections, Marfeel partners may request that one of their Marfeel-produced AMP articles be invalidated or removed from AMP altogether. Because a publisher's AMP pages are hosted and served by Google, Marfeel must instruct Google's servers to invalidate the content or remove it depending on the publisher's request. The following are the specific steps Marfeel engineers follow, and what the partner must do on their end, depending on the action that was requested. Steps to invalidate AMP content - The Marfeel partner sends a request to [email protected] to have their Marfeel-produced AMP page invalidated. Marfeel engineers use the AMP update-cache or update-ping request which forces Google to cache the new AMP content on their servers. The request to cache new content to the article's URL would resemble the following: Steps to delete an AMP article - The Marfeel partner sends a request to have their Marfeel-produced AMP page removed from the AMP platform. The publisher must remove the AMP link reference from the article's HTML that resembles the following: Marfeel engineers use the AMP update-cache or update-ping request which forces Google to remove the article from their servers. The request would resemble the following:
The Portable Executable (PE) format is an executable file format used in 32-bit versions of Windows operating systems . PE is basically an extended version of the Unix COFF Computer viruses that infect PE files, such as CIH, often fill in the empty spaces within the file, so the file size does not grow.
Security researchers observed attackers using unofficial webpages in an attempt to target Russian financial institutions with the Geost banking Trojan. By reverse engineering a sample of Geost, Trend Micro learned that digital attackers primarily relied on unofficial webpages with randomly generated server hostnames to distribute the banking Trojan. As such, the malware specifically targeted Android users without access to the Google Play store and those inclined to search for programs not available on Google’s official Android marketplace. One sample discovered by Trend Micro arrived in an application with the name “установка,” which is Russian for “setting.” The app used the Google Play logo to trick users into downloading it from an obscure web server. Unsurprisingly, this program hid its logo upon successful installation. It then demanded that its victims grant it important administrator privileges, including the ability to access SMS messages for the purpose of receiving confirmation text messages from Russian banking services. Other Malware Threats Confronting Russian Banks Geost first attracted the security community’s attention in October 2019. At that time, Virus Bulletin published a research paper detailing the activities of the Trojan. This briefing revealed that the malware had infected 800,000 victims at the time of discovery. It’s important to note that Geost isn’t the first banking Trojan that’s targeted Russian financial institutions. Back in June 2019, for instance, Kaspersky Lab discovered that new variants of the Riltok Trojan family had expanded beyond their normal scope of Russian banks to include organizations in France, Italy and the United Kingdom. How to Defend Against the Geost Banking Trojan Security professionals can help their organizations defend against the Geost banking Trojan and similar threats by preventing employees from downloading apps from unofficial marketplaces onto their work devices. Infosec personnel should also invest in a unified endpoint management (UEM) solution for the purpose of automatically uninstalling infected mobile apps upon detection.
Is Your Cloud Provider Exposing Remnants of Your Data? Security researchers report that incorrectly configured hypervisors can lead to a separation of data issue in multi-tenant environments that can expose data remnants. However, you can prevent hosting your data on 'dirty disks.' Thu, May 10, 2012 CIO — If your organization uses a multi-tenant managed hosting service or Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud for some or all of your dataand you aren't following best practices by encrypting that datayou may be inadvertently exposing it. Last year, information security consultancy Context Information Security was tasked by a number of its clients, mostly banks and other high-end clients with serious security concerns, to determine whether the cloud was safe enough for their computing needs. Context studied four providers: Amazon, Rackspace, VPS.net and GigeNET Cloud. And in two of the four providersand potentially many othersit found a security vulnerability that allowed it to access remnant data left by other customers. "We were looking at the unallocated portions of the disk," says Michael Jordan, manager of research and development at Context. "We were able to look through it and started to see there was data in there. That data was hard disk data and it wasn't our hard disk data." Data Remnants Included Personally Identifiable Information The data Jordan and his team discovered included some personally identifiable information, including parts of customer databases and elements of system information, such as Linux shadow files (containing the system's password hashes). Jordan notes that the information wouldn't be evident to the typical user of cloud servers and would have to be sought. Moreover, he adds, the remnant data was randomly distributed and would not allow a malicious user to target a specific customer. But a malicious user who discovers it could harvest whatever unencrypted data it does contain. "After examining a brand new provisioned disk on one of the providers, some interesting and unexpected content was discovered," Jordan and James Forshaw, principal consultant at Context, wrote in a blog post about their discovery. "There were references to an install of WordPress and a MySQL configuration, even though the virtual server had neither installed. Expecting it to be perhaps just a 'dirty' OS image, a second virtual server was created and tested in the same way. Surprisingly, the data was completely different, in this case exposing fragments of a Website's customer database and of Apache logs which identified the server the data was coming from. This confirmed the data was not from our provisioned server." Incorrectly Configured Hypervisors to Blame The issue, Jordan says, was with the way the providers provisioned new virtual servers and how they allocated new storage space. On the front end, when clients create new virtual servers, they use the provider's website to select the operating system and amount of storage they require.
In today's interconnected digital landscape, communication has transcended geographical boundaries, enabling businesses to connect with clients, partners, and employees effortlessly. Hosted VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) phone systems have emerged as a game-changer, providing cost-effective and feature-rich solutions for modern communication needs. However, as with any technological advancement, ensuring privacy and security is paramount. In this blog, we'll delve into the importance of privacy in hosted VoIP communication channels and discuss effective strategies to safeguard sensitive information. Understanding the Privacy ChallengeHosted VoIP leverages the power of the internet to transmit voice and data packets, allowing seamless conversations across diverse devices. While this technology brings undeniable convenience, it also introduces potential vulnerabilities that malicious actors may exploit. Privacy concerns in hosted VoIP include: EavesdroppingAs data travels over the internet, unauthorized parties could intercept and listen to conversations, compromising sensitive information. Data BreachesVoIP systems store call logs, recordings, and contact details, making them attractive targets for cyberattacks. A breach could expose confidential data, leading to identity theft or corporate espionage. Call SpoofingHackers can manipulate caller IDs, posing as legitimate entities to deceive users and gain unauthorized access. Safeguarding Privacy in Hosted VoIP 1. Encryption is KeyImplement end-to-end encryption to scramble conversations into unreadable code during transmission. This ensures that even if intercepted, the data remains unintelligible to unauthorized individuals. 2. Multi-factor Authentication (MFA)Require users to provide multiple forms of verification before accessing the VoIP system. This adds an extra layer of security and prevents unauthorized logins. 3. Regular Software UpdatesKeep the VoIP software up to date with the latest security patches. Outdated software can expose vulnerabilities that attackers might exploit. 4. Network SecurityUtilize firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and virtual private networks (VPNs) to secure the network infrastructure through which VoIP traffic flows. 5. Strong Password PoliciesEnforce complex password creation and renewal policies for user accounts, minimizing the risk of unauthorized access. 6. User TrainingEducate users about phishing, social engineering, and other common attack vectors. Awareness is key to preventing human errors that could compromise security. 7. Vendor AssessmentWhen choosing a hosted VoIP provider, conduct thorough research into their security measures, certifications, and track record in safeguarding customer data. 8. Data Retention PoliciesEstablish clear data retention and disposal policies to limit the amount of stored data and reduce the impact of a potential breach. Blue Summit Hosted VoIP: Elevating Privacy and Security for Your CommunicationAt Blue Summit, we understand that the privacy and security of your communication are paramount. As a leading provider of Hosted VoIP phone systems, we are committed to ensuring that your sensitive information remains confidential and protected throughout your communication journey. Here's how Blue Summit stands out in safeguarding your privacy: 1. State-of-the-Art EncryptionAt the heart of our hosted VoIP solution is advanced end-to-end encryption. Every call, every message, every piece of data is encrypted before it leaves your device and is only decrypted at its destination. This means that even if intercepted, the data remains unreadable and unintelligible to unauthorized individuals. 2. Multi-Layered AuthenticationWe go beyond passwords to provide multi-factor authentication (MFA). With MFA, you'll need more than just a password to access your VoIP system. This added layer of security ensures that only authorized users can access your communication channels, minimizing the risk of unauthorized access. 3. Regular Security UpdatesOur dedicated team of experts continuously monitors the threat landscape and releases regular security updates to keep your VoIP system fortified against emerging vulnerabilities. We understand the importance of staying ahead of potential threats, and we're committed to providing you with the latest defence mechanisms. 4. Network FortressWe build a virtual fortress around your network infrastructure. Our robust firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and virtual private networks (VPNs) ensure that your VoIP traffic is shielded from unauthorized access and potential attacks. 5. User Training and SupportWe believe that a strong line of defence starts with informed users. We offer comprehensive user training to educate your team about best practices, common threats, and how to identify phishing attempts. Our support team is always available to address your questions and concerns, ensuring that you have the tools and knowledge to navigate the digital landscape securely. 6. Rigorous Vendor AssessmentWhen you choose Blue Summit, you're choosing a partner that prioritizes security. We rigorously assess our own security measures, certifications, and track record to provide you with a transparent view of our commitment to safeguarding your data. 7. Customized Data RetentionWe understand that different businesses have varying data retention needs. With Blue Summit, you have the flexibility to define data retention and disposal policies that align with your business requirements. This helps limit the amount of stored data and reduces the potential impact of a breach. ConclusionHosted VoIP phone systems offer a revolutionary approach to communication, streamlining operations and enhancing collaboration. However, the benefits come with a responsibility to prioritize privacy and security. By implementing robust encryption, user authentication, and network safeguards, businesses can confidently embrace hosted VoIP while safeguarding sensitive information. As technology continues to evolve, so too must our commitment to maintaining the integrity of our communication channels. Remember, in the digital age, privacy is not just an option – it's a necessity. At Blue Summit, we recognize the demand of unwavering dedication to privacy and security. Our Hosted VoIP solution is designed not only to elevate your communication but also to provide you with the peace of mind that your sensitive information is in safe hands. Experience the difference of Blue Summit's privacy-centric approach to communication – because your security is our priority. Blue Summit has collaborated with OdiTek Solutions, a frontline custom software development company. It is trusted for its high service quality and delivery consistency. Visit our partner's page today and get your business streamlined.
RTRTR uses two classes of components: units and targets. Units take data from somewhere and produce a single, constantly updated data set. Targets take the data set from exactly one other unit and serve it in some specific way. Both units and targets have a name — so that we can refer to them — and a type that defines which particular kind of unit or target this is. For each type, additional arguments need to be provided. Which these are and what they mean depends on the type. Units and targets can be wired together in any way to achieve your specific goal. This is done in a configuration file, which also specifies several general parameters for logging, as well as status and Prometheus metrics endpoints via the built-in HTTP server. The configuration file is in TOML format, which is somewhat similar to INI files. You can find more information on the TOML website. The configuration file starts out with a number of optional parameters to specify logging. The built-in HTTP server provides status information at the /status path and Prometheus metrics at the /metrics path. Note that details are provided for each unit and each target. # The minimum log level to consider. log_level = "debug" # The target for logging. This can be "syslog", "stderr", "file", or "default". log_target = "stderr" # If syslog is used, the syslog facility can be given. log_facility = "daemon" # If file logging is used, the log file must be given. log_file = "/var/log/rtrtr.log" # Where should the HTTP server listen on? http-listen = ["127.0.0.1:8080"] RTRTR currently has four types of units. Each unit gets its own section in the configuration. The name of the section, given in square brackets, starts with units. and is followed by a descriptive name you set, which you can later refer to from other units, or a target. The unit of the type rtr takes a feed of Validated ROA Payloads (VRPs) from a Relying Party software instance via the RTR protocol. Along with a unique name, the only required argument is the IP or hostname of the instance to connect to, along with the port. Because the RTR protocol uses sessions and state, we don’t need to specify a refresh interval for this unit. Should the server close the connection, by default RTRTR will retry every 60 seconds. This value is configurable wih the [units.rtr-unit-name] type = "rtr" remote = "validator.example.net:3323" It’s also possible to configure RTR over TLS, using the rtr-tls unit type. When using this unit type, there is an additional configuration option, cacerts, which specifies a list of paths to files that contain one or more PEM encoded certificates that should be trusted when verifying a TLS server rtr-tls unit also uses the usual set of web trust anchors, so this option is only necessary when the RTR server doesn’t use a server certificate that would be trusted by web browser. This is, for instance, the case if the server uses a self-signed certificate in which case this certificate needs to be added via this option. Most Relying Party software packages can produce the Validated ROA Payload set in JSON format as well, either as a file on disk or at an HTTP endpoint. RTRTR can use this format as a data source too, using units of the type Along with specifying a name, you must specify the URI to fetch the VRP set from, as well as the refresh interval in seconds. [units.json-unit-name] type = "json" uri = "http://validator.example.net/vrps.json" refresh = 60 any unit type is given any number of other units and picks the data set from one of them. Units can signal that they currently don’t have an up-to-date data set available, allowing the any unit to skip those. This ensures there is always an up-to-date data set available. any unit uses a single data source at a time. RTRTR does not attempt to make a union or intersection of multiple VRPs sets, to avoid the risk of making a route invalid that would otherwise be unknown. To configure this unit, specify a name, set the type to any and list the sources that should be used. Lastly, specify if a random unit should be selected every time it needs to switch or whether it should go through the list in order. [units.any-unit-name] type = "any" sources = [ "unit-1", "unit-2", "unit-3" ] random = false In some cases, you may want to override the global RPKI data set with your own local exceptions. You can do this by specifying route origins that should be filtered out of the output, as well as origins that should be added, in a file using JSON notation according to the SLURM standard specified in RFC 8416. You can refer to the JSON file you created with a unit of the type the source to which the exceptions should be applied, you must specify any of the other units you have created. Note that the files attribute is an array and can take multiple values as input. [units.slurm] type = "slurm" source = "source-unit-name" files = [ "/var/lib/rtrtr/local-expections.json" ] The Local Exceptions page in the Routinator documentation has more information on the format and syntax of SLURM files. RTRTR currently has two types of targets. As with units, each unit gets its own section in the configuration. And also here, the name of the section starts with targets. and is followed by a descriptive name you set, all enclosed in Targets of the type rtr let you serve the data you collected with your units via the RPKI-to-Router (RTR) protocol. You must give your target a name and specify the host name or IP address it should listen on, along with the port. As the RTR target can listen on multiple addresses, the listen argument is a list. Lastly, you must specify the name of the unit the target should receive its data [targets.rtr-target-name] type = "rtr" listen = [ "127.0.0.1:9001" ] unit = "source-unit-name" This target also supports TLS connections, via the rtr-tls type. This target has two additional configuration options. First, the option, which is a string value providing a path to a file containing the PEM-encoded certificate to be used as the TLS server certificate. And secondly, there is the key option, which provides a path to a file containing the PEM-encoded certificate to be used as the private key by the TLS server. Targets of the type http let you serve the collected data via HTTP, which is currently only possible in json format. You can us this data stream for monitoring, provisioning, your IP address management, or any other purpose that you require. To use this target, specify a name and a path, as well as the name of the unit the target should receive its data from. [targets.http-target-name] type = "http" path = "/json" format = "json" unit = "source-unit-name"
An IP Group in Microsoft Azure is a logical container of IP address ranges for private and public addresses. IP Groups allow you to group and manage IP addresses for Azure Firewall rules in the following ways: - As a source address in DNAT rules - As a source or destination address in network rules - As a source address in application rules An IP Group can have a single IP address, multiple IP addresses, one or more IP address ranges or addresses and ranges in combination. The IP Group allows you to define an IP address that can be used in conjunction with Azure Firewall, to allow or deny internal or external traffic from a perspective set of IP addresses. The following IPv4 address format examples are valid to use in IP Groups: - Single address: 10.0.0.0 - CIDR notation: 10.1.0.0/32 - Address range: 10.2.0.0-10.2.0.31 By default, the Azure Firewall blocks outbound and inbound traffic; however, you may want to enable (or block) traffic to and from specific countries - there is no built-in geo-filtering with Azure Firewall, as you can use other services, such as the Web Application Gateway and with the Application Gateway and Azure Front Door to block and allow access, and other third party services such as Cloudflare. This script can be adapted for any list of IP ranges; it doesn’t need to be country IP addresses. However, you may want to control access to and from specific countries (or other services) with Azure Firewall - this is where the IP Groups can be effective, and because we won’t be editing the Firewall directly - we won’t run into issues with delays without having to wait for the Azure Firewall policies to be updated. To solve the issue of creating the IP groups and finding and keeping the IP groups up-to-date with various countries’ IP ranges - I have created a PowerShell function to retrieve supported countries’ IP CIDR ranges and create the relevant IP groups. With IP Groups, there are a few things to keep in mind: - You can have 200 IP Groups per firewall with a maximum of 5000 individual IP addresses or prefixes per each IP Group. For a country like New Zealand, the 5000 limit for the address ranges is acceptable - but for other countries, like the United States or United Kingdom, this can be an issue, where the total IP ranges can grow to over 20k - to deal with this, the script will create multiple IP Groups, and append a number to the end. Suppose IPs are manually added to the groups. In that case, they won’t be added - the script will add in any different or new IP ranges, ignoring any current IP ranges (this means it won’t delete any IP ranges that are removed from the source IP list from IPDeny); however, I recommend that anything added outside of this script is kept in a separate IP group. As with any script, I recommend this is tested in a test environment first. Before we run it, we need a few prerequisites. The function assumes you have connected to Microsoft Azure and your relevant subscription. Before we import the function, I am going to check if any IP groups already exist quickly (this isn’t required) - but it’s a good opportunity to check that you are connected to your Azure subscription and that the AzIPGroup cmdlets exist - and whether you have any IP groups already existing. I have received no errors or existing IP groups in my subscription, so I will continue importing my function. The function can be found here: Note: Make sure your country matches the supported country shortcodes found here: IPBlock Aggregated. IPDeny is the source for the IP address list. Once saved to your computer, it’s time to import it into your active PowerShell terminal and run it (after you have verified you have connected to the correct Azure subscription). So I will navigate to the script and import it: cd D:\git . .\New-AzCountryIPGroup.ps1 New-AzCountryIPGroup The ‘New-AzCountryIPGroup’ Azure function relies on 4 parameters: Make sure that the values change to your environment; in my example, I am specifying an IP Group and Resource Group that doesn’t exist so that the script will create it for me - and the location I will be deploying to will be the Australia East region. New-AzCountryIPGroup -CountryCode NZ -IPGroupName IPGrpNZ -IPGroupRGName NetworkRG -IPGroupLocation AustraliaEast As you can see, the script created an Azure Resource Group and imported the New Zealand IP ranges to a new IP Group… Not required - but if I rerun it, it will simply override any IP addresses that are the same and add any new addresses to the same IP Group that already exists, as below: The Azure IP Group is visible in the Azure Portal as below: And a Tag was added to include the country: As New Zealand was under the 5000 limit, only one IP Group was needed, but if we change the Country Code to the US… It created 5 IP groups, each containing 5000 CIDR IP ranges, with the last containing the remaining IP address ranges. As you can see, it’s reasonably easy to create IP Groups containing a list of IP ranges for multiple countries quickly: Note: The script can also be found in my Public Git Repo here, feel free to recommend pull requests if you have anything to add or change.
Malware is a program or software created for the purpose of infiltrate, interfere with, or even damage the operating system on a computer device. In this study, researcher found problems in SMK Makmur 01 Cilacap. This study aimed to create 3-dimensional animated video of the dangers of malware with motion graphic techniques for teachers in SMK Makmur 01 Cilacap so that they will understand about malware. The method used in this research was observation, interview and literature study. System development method used was Suyanto method. This research began from the pre-production, production and post-production stages. The result of this research was 3-dimensional animated video of the dangers of malware using motion graphic.\| Keyword : Keywords: malware, animation, motion graphic, 3D.
Craig Williams, technical leader of Cisco's Threat Research Analysis and Communications (TRAC) team, delved into attackers' exploits in a Monday blog post. According to Williams, the group lures targets with malicious emails crafted to look like business invoices. Those who take the bait, or phishing emails crafted for specific company members, download malware via a malicious Microsoft Word attachment. When opened, the file is rigged to download a malicious executable, Williams wrote. The malware contacts several domains during this process, including a Dropbox cloud-based file-sharing service, where attackers host malware payloads. In email correspondence with SCMagazine.com, Williams explained that hackers leveraged a Microsoft programming language, Visual Basic for Applications, to lay their trap. “This is really an abused feature,” Williams said. “The attacks are using Visual Basic Scripting for Applications to cause an On-Open macro to fire when the victim opens the Word document. This will result in downloading an executable and launching it on the victim's machine. It's quite an old technique,” he added. Along with the Dropbox url, other domains the malware contacted, such as londonpaerl.co.uk (a close match for legitimate site, londonpearl.co.uk), were used to host backdoors, though Cisco blocked the malware from its clients. According to Williams, Cisco thwarted attacks from the group throughout May and June, though the majority of attacks occurred last month. The spear phishing campaign has, so far, targeted organizations in Europe, Williams wrote, adding that hackers were likely motivated by “monetary gain.” Next week, Cisco plans to divulge more information on the group's exploits, specifically the malware used by attackers and their obfuscation techniques, the company blog post said.
Plaintext has a few advantages over other formats. If ANSI-encoded, it's 126 KB. This is about 4.5 times smaller than the DOCX and about 6.9 times smaller than the most common PDF in circulation. This fact matters in many cases: for example, to permanently upload it to blockchains where fees increase with bytes. Plaintext won't infect your device, so it's far safer and more likely for people to read. A PDF can contain malware, and a few PDFs of the book have different file sizes. One version of the book attaches a malware payload that rewrites your master boot record. Text is one of the easiest forms of data to share, so as text the book can go into wider circulation and be read by more people. Through a simple copy and paste job it can reach different audiences it wouldn't have if it remained in the PDF and DOCX formats. Here are five mirrors. If some go down, others should remain. If you want to spread this across Voat, copy and paste this: Here's Tarrant's Christchurch manifesto, "The Great Replacement," as text. It's easier shared than a PDF or DOCX file, and with less [chance of malware](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/vigilantes-counter-christchurch-manifesto-with-weaponized-version/).
Aged Domains: the Silent Danger to Cybersecurity New Research Shows Why Dormant Domains Are More Risky than Newly Registered Ones. A new report shows that the number of malicious aged domains is growing and represents a risk to cybersecurity. Out of them, almost 22.3% of strategically aged domains are to some extent dangerous. Researchers discovered this based on the SolarWinds case, as the threat actors behind this famous attack used domains created years before starting their malicious activity. Experts from Palo Alto Networks’ Unit42 published a report after they investigated every day of the month of September 2021 tens of thousands of domains. One of the findings revealed in the paper shows that they identified almost 3.8% malicious domains, 19% potentially malicious domains, and 2% posing a risk to work environments. The statistics of the analyzed domains were also depicted in a diagram: The Reason Behind the Aged Domains Trend Researchers explain that Threat actors may register domains long before launching attacking campaigns on them. There are various motivations for this strategy. First of all, the longer life of aged domains can help them evade some reputation-based detectors. Secondly, C2 domains belonging to APTs can sometimes be inactive for years. During the dormant period, APT trojans only send limited “heartbeat” traffic to their C2 servers. Once the attackers decide which targets are valuable to them and start active exploits, the C2 domain will receive significantly more penetration traffic. (…) Therefore, it’s essential to keep monitoring domains’ activities and digging for threats behind aged domains associated with abnormal traffic increases. Usually, newly registered domains, also met under the acronym NRD, are more prone to be malicious and that’s why security solutions focus on them and consider these as being suspicious. Nevertheless, the experts underline the fact that the danger posed by aged domains exceeds by far the danger of newly registered ones. In some of the cases, these domains remained dormant for a period of 2 years before their DNS traffic met a rapid growth by 165 times, this fact pointing out that a cyberattack would happen. How to Identify a Malicious Domain? According to BleepingComputer, the sudden spike in a domain’s traffic indicates with no doubt its malicious nature, as the traffic for legitimate services that had their domains registered months or years before grows gradually. On the other hand, the content of illegitimate domains is normally not complete, controversial, or cloned and they also lack WHOIS registrant details. The DGA (domain generation algorithm) subdomain generation, that mechanism with the role of generating unique domain names and IP addresses, can also indicate an aged domain that was particularly created to serve malicious purposes. The Pegasus Spying Campaign Unit42 has identified a real case in September discovering the Pegasus spying campaign. This used two C2 domains. They were both registered back in 2019 and left dormant until July 2021. The researchers discovered this fact by means of the DGA subdomain detector which identified the growth in DNS traffic volumes as 56 times higher than normal. How Can Heimdal™ Help? Threats at the domain level are more frequent nowadays, that is why an efficient DNS traffic filtering like our Threat Prevention becomes indispensable for any company that wants to keep its critical assets well safeguarded. Our solution encompasses applied neural network modelling that helps in predicting future threats with a 96% accuracy. The product is based on code-autonomous endpoint DNS, and spots malicious URLs or processes, keeping cyberattacks away and closing off data leaking venues.
We are conducting a n\|u Humla session at Pune on "Malware Analysis". The quick one day session shall help beginner to build base foundation in malware analysis. This will be complete hands on workshop/session where attendees shall perform and learn to analyze malicious program. The platform for analysis shall be considered "Windows OS" and Windows based malware's. This session assume attendees with no or less prior experience in the subject. i. Some background on Windows Programming Model a. Basics on Windows programming using C/C++, Compilation/build process. b. Basics on Windows OS architecture. c. Basics on Intel x86 Assembly - Instructions and Code Pattern. ii. Discussion on "Malware analysis approach" a. Analysis based on "Properties" & "Behaviour" of computer program. b. Techniques used to analyze behavior - Static code analysis & Dynamic code analysis. c. Some thoughts on "Emulator based Automated Malware Analysis". iii. Introduction to required toolset a. Intro to PE/Hex editors b. Intro to Disassemblers and Debuggers c. Intro to SysInternals toolset d. Intro to Sandbox iv. Setting up Analysis Lab a. Discussion on building safe analysis lab with required toolkit b. We shall be distributing VMs with tools installed. v. Case study : Malcious backdoor a. Hands on analysis of malicious live windows backdoor and DoS (Deniel of Service) malware b. analyze technical details c. debug and trace behaviour in protected enviroment d. capture and analyze network activity. - General knowledge of computer and operating system fundamentals is required. - Some exposure to programming in X86 ASSEMBLY and C languages is required. What to Bring? - Laptop with admin rights. - VmWare Player/Virtual Box installed. Starts at Saturday July 25 2015, 10:10 AM. The sessions runs for about 6 hours.
(Note: %Program Files% is the default Program Files folder, usually C:\Program Files in Windows 2000(32-bit), Server 2003(32-bit), XP, Vista(64-bit), 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) and 10(64-bit) , or C:\Program Files (x86) in Windows XP(64-bit), Vista(64-bit), 7(64-bit), 8(64-bit), 8.1(64-bit), 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) and 10(64-bit).) This Ransomware does the following: It deletes shadow copies. This Ransomware appends the following extension to the file name of the encrypted files: It drops the following file(s) as ransom note: Minimum Scan Engine: 9.800 FIRST VSAPI PATTERN FILE: 17.278.08 FIRST VSAPI PATTERN DATE: 27 Dec 2021 VSAPI OPR PATTERN File: 17.279.00 VSAPI OPR PATTERN Date: 28 Dec 2021 Trend Micro Predictive Machine Learning detects and blocks malware at the first sign of its existence, before it executes on your system. When enabled, your Trend Micro product detects this malware under the following machine learning name: Before doing any scans, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10 users must disable System Restore to allow full scanning of their computers. Note that not all files, folders, and registry keys and entries are installed on your computer during this malware's/spyware's/grayware's execution. This may be due to incomplete installation or other operating system conditions. If you do not find the same files/folders/registry information, please proceed to the next step. Search and delete this file [ Learn More ] [ back ] There may be some files that are hidden. Please make sure you check the Search Hidden Files and Folders checkbox in the "More advanced options" option to include all hidden files and folders in the search result. To manually delete a malware/grayware file from an affected system: •For Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 (R2), Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2012 (R2): Open a Windows Explorer window. For Windows 7 and Server 2008 (R2) users, click Start>Computer. For Windows 8, 8.1, 10, and Server 2012 (R2) users, right-click on the lower-left corner of the screen,then click File Explorer. In the Search Computer/This PC input box, type: Once located, select the file then press SHIFT+DELETE to delete it. *Note: Read the following Microsoft page if these steps do not work on Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 (R2). Scan your computer with your Trend Micro product to delete files detected as Ransom.Win64.HIVE.YXBL1. If the detected files have already been cleaned, deleted, or quarantined by your Trend Micro product, no further step is required. You may opt to simply delete the quarantined files. Please check the following Trend Micro Support pages for more information:
Confiant, an agency for advertising security, discovered a number of malicious activity that involved distributed wallet apps. This allowed hackers to steal private keys and then acquire funds from users through backdoored imposter accounts. These apps are distributed by cloning legitimate websites, making it appear that the user is downloading an authentic app. Malicious Cluster Targets Web3 enabled Wallets like Metamask Hackers are getting more inventive when it comes to exploiting cryptocurrency users. Confiant, a company dedicated to analyzing the quality of ads as well as the security threats they might pose for internet users, has warned of a new type of attack affecting users of web3 wallets such as Metamask or Coinbase Wallet. Confiant referred to the cluster as “Seaflower” as it was one of the most advanced attacks of its type. These apps are almost identical to the original apps but have a codebase that allows hackers access to the seed phrases and funds. Distribution and Recommendations These apps are mostly distributed outside of regular app stores through links discovered by users using search engines like Baidu. According to investigators, the cluster is likely Chinese-derived due to the language in which code comments are written and other elements such as infrastructure location and services used. These apps’ links rank highly in search engines due to their clever handling of SEO optimizations. Users are tricked into thinking they are visiting the real site. These apps are sophisticated because of the way the code is hidden. This obscures much about how the system works. This backdoored app transmits seed phrases to remote locations at the same moment it is being built. This is the main attack vector of the Metamask imposter. Seaflower uses a similar attack vector for other wallets. Experts also offered a number of suggestions for keeping wallets safe on mobile devices. These backdoored apps are not available in app stores. Confiant recommends that users always use official Android and iOS stores to download these apps.
The source code must have secure default options ensuring secure failures in the application (try, catch/except; default for switches). The organization must ensure that its own systems and those of third parties are safe and fully comply with the functions for which they were implemented. For this, baselines must be implemented from the design and development phase, in order to avoid bad practices in the development cycles, e.g., the use of a conditional without a default option, which can cause unexpected behaviors in the system. The system’s source code is safer when good programming practices are implemented from the development stage, ensuring the portability and maintenance of the application. If a system is difficult to maintain, vulnerabilities are more prone to arise. Definition of baselines from design/architecture stages in order to guarantee the implementation of good programming practices in the development of the source code. Quality code and source code vulnerability scanners: These are tools that perform code revision using lexical and syntactical analyzers. They process it, suggest improvements and highlight possible vulnerabilities in the development stage. Using this kind of tools during the development process helps improve performance, detect excessively complex logic and detect potential security issues. Cause unexpected behaviors in the application. Leak sensitive information from unexpected errors. Layer: Application layer Asset: Source code Type of control: Recommendation CAPEC-24: Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow. In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e., the user input is let into the system unfiltered). CAPEC-28: Fuzzing. In this attack pattern, the adversary leverages fuzzing to try to identify weaknesses in the system. Fuzzing is a software security and functionality testing method that feeds randomly constructed input to the system and looks for an indication that a failure in response to that input has occurred. CWE-396: Declaration of Catch for Generic Exception. Catching overly broad exceptions promotes complex error handling code that is more likely to contain security vulnerabilities. CWE-397: Declaration of Throws for Generic Exception. Throwing overly broad exceptions promotes complex error handling code that is more likely to contain security vulnerabilities. CWE-478: Missing Default Case in Switch Statement. The code does not have a default case in a switch statement, which might lead to complex logical errors and resultant weaknesses. CWE-544: Missing Standardized Error Handling Mechanism. The software does not use a standardized method for handling errors throughout the code, which might introduce inconsistent error handling and resultant weaknesses. OWASP-ASVS v4.0.1 V4.1 General Access Control Design.(4.1.5) Verify that access controls fail securely including when an exception occurs. OWASP-ASVS v4.0.1 V6.2 Algorithms.(6.2.1) Verify that all cryptographic modules fail securely, and errors are handled in a way that does not enable Padding Oracle attacks. OWASP-ASVS v4.0.1 V7.4 Error Handling.(7.4.2) Verify that exception handling (or a functional equivalent) is used across the codebase to account for expected and unexpected error conditions. OWASP-ASVS v4.0.1 V7.4 Error Handling.(7.4.3) Verify that a "last resort" error handler is defined which will catch all unhandled exceptions. PCI DSS v3.2.1 - Requirement 6.5.5 Address common coding vulnerabilities in software-development processes such as improper error handling.
Windows Server 2012 - Resource Monitor Resource Monitor is a great tool to identify which program/service is using resources like program, applications, network connection and memory usages. To open Resource Monitor, go to Server Manage → Tools. Click on “Resource Monitor”, the First Section is “Overview”. It tells how much CPU is consuming every application and on the right side of the table, it monitors in real time the chart of CPU usage. The Memory tells how much memory every application is consuming and in the right side of the table it is being monitored in real time in the chart of CPU usage. The Disk tab splits it by the different hard drives. This will show the current Disk I/O and will show the disk usage per process. The network tab will show the processes and their network bytes sent and received. It will also show the current TCP connections and what ports are currently listening, IDs too.
The Service Logs are used to collect personal data based on the Cisco Email Security Appliance Data Sheet guidelines. The Service Logs are sent to the Cisco Talos Cloud service to improve Phishing detection. From AsyncOS 13.5 onwards, Service Logs replaces senderbase as the telemetry data that is sent to Cisco Talos Cloud service. The email gateway collects limited personal data from customer emails and offers extensive useful threat detection capabilities that can be coupled with dedicated analysis systems to collect, trend, and correlate observed threat activity. Cisco uses the personal data to improve your email gateway capabilities to analyze the threat landscape, provide threat classification solutions on malicious emails, and to protect your email gateway from new threats such as spam, virus, and directory harvest attacks.
The Azure company said that attackers used machine-learning clusters rented by customers for cryptocurrency mining at the customers’ expense Machine-learning tasks involve a tremendous amount of computing resources. The attackers took advantage of this fact and generated large amounts of the currency while the customers made use of the clusters. The misconfigured node made the attack easy for the attackers. Microsoft said, “the infected clusters were running Kubeflow, an open-source framework for machine-learning applications in Kubernetes, which is itself an open-source platform for deploying scalable applications across large numbers of computers. Compromised clusters were numbered in the “tens”. Many of them ran an image available from a public repository, ostensibly to save users the hassle of creating one themselves. Upon further inspection, Microsoft investigators discovered it contained code that surreptitiously mined the Monero Cryptocurrency.” Once investigators discovered the infected clusters, the next step was figuring out how the machines were compromised. The set-up of the system ensures that access to the administrator’s dashboard and control of Kubeflow is via istio ingress. Istio ingress is a gateway at the edge of the cluster network. It ensures that no unauthorized changes takes place in the cluster. Gaining access to the dashboard is just the first step. After this, the attackers explore several options for deploying a backdoor in the clusters. One of such options is the placing of a malicious image inside a Jupyter Notebook server. A Security-research software engineer in the Azure Security Center, Yossi Weizman; said that the users unknowingly change a setting, which invariably gives attackers access. In the post released on Wednesday, he wrote “we believe that some users chose to do it for convenience, without this action, accessing the dashboard requires tunneling through the Kubernetes API server and isn’t direct. By exposing the Service to the Internet, users can access the dashboard directly. However, this operation enables insecure access to the Kubeflow dashboard, allowing anyone to perform operations in Kubeflow, including deploying new containers in the cluster. Azure Security Center has detected multiple campaigns against Kubernetes clusters in the past that have a similar access vector; an exposed service to the Internet. However, this is the first time we have identified an attack that specifically targets Kubeflow environments specifically.” The company’s post gave users multiple techniques for checking if the clusters are vulnerable.
We love containers. They let us run many more server applications on the same hardware than virtual machines do. There's only one not so little problem with containers: Security. CoreOS's Clair addresses this concern by checking for software vulnerabilities in your containers. CoreOS the makers of Linux for massive server deployments and a container power in its own right, launched an early version of Clair, an open source container image security analyzer late last year. Today, CoreOS released Clair version 1.0 and it's ready for production workloads. Matthew Garrett, CoreOS's principal security software engineer, explained in an e-mail that "Vulnerabilities in software are an unfortunate fact of life, and it's vital that admins know about them as soon as possible and be able to apply fixes. Containers add additional security by strengthening the boundaries between applications, but existing ops tooling is frequently unaware of containers and unable to notify admins of potential issues." Clair does this, Quentin Machu, a CoreOS software engineer, explained, by providing an "an API-driven analysis service [Quay Security Scanning] that provides insight into the current vulnerabilities in your containers." It does this by checking every container image "and provides a notification of vulnerabilities that may be a threat, based on the vulnerability databases Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) maintained by Red Hat, Ubuntu, and Debian." For DevOps teams, Clair delivers. Machu said it offers "useful and actionable information about the vulnerabilities that threaten containers. Community feedback guided many of the latest Clair features, including the ability not only to reveal whether a vulnerability is present, but also offer the available patch or update to correct it. Additionally, the 1.0 release improves performance and extensibility, empowering developers and operations professionals to implement their own services around the Clair analyzer." With this version users can also add fixes and vulnerabilities. This is important because, a Clair-based analysis, indexed by CoreOS's Quay container registry determined that: - More than 70% of detected vulnerabilities could be fixed simply by updating the installed packages in these container images. - More than 80% of vulnerabilities rated High and Critical have known fixes that can be applied with a simple update to packages in these images. Patching. It's that's simple. As Machu observed, "Updating to the latest versions of installed software improves overall infrastructure security, which is why we deemed it important to analyze container images for security vulnerabilities as well as provide a clear path to updates mediating those issues that Clair uncovers. Container images are often infrequently updated, but with Clair security scanning, users can identify and update problematic images more easily." Clair 1.0 includes both better performance and more features. - Improved speed: By leveraging recursive queries, Clair emulates a graph-like database structure while maintaining the performance characteristics of a traditional SQL database. This has improved API responses in production by 3 orders of magnitude, from 30 seconds to 30 milliseconds. - Better usability. The new RESTful JSON API has been generalized and is more useful to developers. The previous API was tightly coupled to integrating with container registries, so the new API should help the community better integrate Clair with other work-flows and systems. - Name and version of the source package of the vulnerability. - The feature version(s) that fix the vulnerability, if they exist. - Metadata such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). When available, CVSS metadata provides the fundamental characteristics of the vulnerability such as means of access, whether authentication is required, and the impacts to confidentiality, integrity, or availability. - Flags the specific layer in the image that introduces the vulnerability to make applying patches even easier. CoreOS is intent on making Clair a true open-source project. While the company welcomes contributions to the core Clair repository, it's extensible components mean any company can maintain its own Clair extensions. Huawei, for example, has already contributed an extension to support the ACI container image format. If you're serious about container security, you seriously need to give Clair a try.
There is an untested part of GDPR here. IP Addresses can be personally identifying information if they are associated with other information (people’s identities). Web and firewall logs are are record of (some) internet activities and these activities can be deemed sensitive under GDPR. In IPFire’s case, the combination of DHCP records and the proxy logs allows internet browsing to be associated with an identified computer, which may or may not be a single individual’s computer. More information (from another database / source) is needed to make this personally identifying. If that “other information” is held within the same company / organisation, then there is the potential for the company / organisation to associate the internet activity with the individual and so the logs then contain potentially sensitive personal information (e.g. porn site browsing). If the other information is held elsewhere, then you’re into a GDPR grey area. There have been no test cases about whether combining databases from inside a company / organisation and outside it to identify individuals’ activities makes that personally sensitive information. If there is no database within the company / organisation which associates the computer with a person, then the trail runs cold there and it’s not personally identifying. This is unlikely within most organisations as they have, for instance, authentication systems which identify individuals and their computer or IP Address. The masquerading firewall (IPFire) assists in protecting such sensitive information from outside parties by combining all the internet activity of all the individuals into one IP Address externally, so reducing the likelihood that any request or pattern of internet activity can be associated with an individual. So, in summary, the firewall logs could be construed as personally identifying and the internet browsing activity could be sensitive so they’re best protected as if they were. But as this is a firewall, you’d hope the device is well protected against access and so the logs are secure. That should be enough, unless you’re extracting the logs and storing them elsewhere. In that case, you need to do whatever you need to do to protect that database.
Any firewall solution on ubuntu uses the same framework in the Linux kernel, and that only supports ips. So your firewall solution resolves hostnames when setting up rules, but unless that is redone quite frequently, using hostnames that point to changing IP’s will cause problems. In general: It’s a bad idea to uses hostnames in firewall rules (the software that does the resolving might make things less bad, but not all problems can be avoided), the major problem is that you need to have working DNS in order to set firewall rules, depending on specifics, that might mean nothing on the machine gets up if DNS is down - imaging this being on the DNS server. If the IPs change as some kind of load balancing scheme, but all IPs work, you can use the same workaround as I’ve used in a similar case: do a standard DNS lookup of the name, select one IP (if multiple are returned, add that to my firewall rules, and put the name into /etc/hosts to always resolve to that IP. Yes, that breaks the provider’s load balancing, but held against my security, I know what wins for me. (For GitLab we don’t have a firewall that restrictive.)
Presentation on theme: "Malware Repository Update David Dagon Georgia Institute of Technology"— Presentation transcript: Malware Repository Update David Dagon Georgia Institute of Technology Context OARC is contemplating the operation of a malware repository I report on the implementation of this repository –Design rationale –Demo –Other developments that I trust may be received as good news These slides expand on a previous talk w/ Paul Vixie at Defcon –Errors in both are my own Overview How malware is collected and shared now Malfease’s service-oriented repository –Automated unpacking –Header analysis Demonstration Policy considerations for OARCs operation Current Practices Numerous private, semi-public malware collections –Need trust to join (for some value of “trust”) –“Too much sharing” often seen as competitive disadvantage –Quotas often used Incomplete collections: reflect sensor bias –Darknet-based collection –IRC surveillance –Honeypot-based collection Shortcomings Malware authors know and exploit weaknesses in data collection Illuminating sensors –“Mapping Internet Sensors with Probe Response Attacks”, Bethencourt, et al., Usenix 2005 Automated victims updates –“Queen-bot” programs keep drones in 0-day window Queen-Bot Programs Malware authors use packers –Encrypted/obfuscated payloads –Small stub programs to inflate the payload Queen bots –Automate the creation of new keys, binaries –Each new packed program is different But the same semantic program –Compiler tricks used Dead code injected, idempotent statements introduced, register shuffling, etc. Queen bots therefore an instance of generative programming What are their uses? –Automated updating –Evasion of AV signatures How do they evade AV? –We need a rough conceptual model of malware lifecycle … Queen-Bot Programs: Indirect Evidence Malware Life Cycle A-day0-day D-dayR-day Four conceptual phases of malware life cycle: A-day: malware authored 0-day: release D-day: first opportunity for detection R-day: response (e.g., virus signature update) Malware Life Cycle A-day0-day D-dayR-day Recent AV goal: reduce response time AV update cycles previously measured weeks/days Now measured in hours/minutes (or should be) Malware Life Cycle A-day0-day D-dayR-day How to improve detection time... Given that... Malware authors avoid known sensors Repositories don’t share Sensor Illumination Technique –Malware authors compile single, unique virus; –Send to suspected sensor –Wait and watch for updates Sensor Illumination Virus Malware Life Cycle A-day0-day D-dayR-day Because of illumination and limited sharing, distance (0day, detection) is days, while distance (detection, response) is (ideally) hours. MinutesDays * Average order of time; anecdotes will vary Malware Life Cycle A-day0-day D-dayR-day MinutesDays A-day0-day D-dayR-day Bot runs for ~1/2 day, and updates to new, evasive binary UPDATE! Solution: Service-Oriented Repository Malfease uses hub-and-spoke model –Hub is central collection of malware –Spokes are analysis partners Hub: –Malware, indexing, search –Static analysis: header extraction, icons, libraries –Metainfo: longitudinal AV scan results Spoke: –E.g., dynamic analysis, unpacking Malware Repo Requirements Malware repos should not: –Help illuminate sensors –Serve as a malware distribution site Malware repo should: –Help automate analysis of malware flood –Coordinate different analysts (RE gurus, MX gurus, Snort rule writers, etc.) Approach: Service-Oriented Repository Repository allows upload of samples –Downloads restricted to classes of users Repository provides binaries and analysis –Automated unpacking –Win32 PE Header analysis –Longitudinal detection data What did the AV tool know, and when did it know it? –Soon: Malware similarity analysis, family tree Repository User Classes Unknown users –Scripts, random users, even bots Humans –CAPTCHA-verified Authenticated Users –Known trusted contributors Example: Search on icons All samples with matching icons Dynamic Analysis Unpacked binary Available for Download, Along with asm version Binary Analysis (Spoke) Example Motivation: find “key” information in malware Previously, binaries trivially yielded relevant information: strings samples/*.exe \| grep -i \ gmail gmail.com gmail.com... Binary Analysis (Spoke) Example Now, however, malware is packed –E.g., of 409 samples, 11% were trivially unpackable. Indicates high degree of packing For 81 non-packed samples, only 7 contained strings recognizable as mail addrs. Why such a low result for all samples? –Implies runtime data transformations Binary Analysis (Spoke) Example Address for WS2_32.dll:Send (and data for address) are constructed dynamically Spoke Example trace_irc=> select distinct from abusive_ where ilike '%gmail.com'; etc. etc. etc. Thus, malfease's collection is transformed to operationally relelvant feeds Policy Considerations Who gets access? –Anonymous upload: limited analysis –Registered upload: collection management –Trusted researcher: full search/full analysis –Does this approach meet OARC's approval? Branding (Spoke) opportunities –Analysis partners may offer/demo analysis services Policy Consideration Resources –All front-end code BSD licensed Spoke analysis tools may sport any license –Hardware and development courtesy of Damballa Coordination with other malware repos? –MIRT/PIRT –APWG OARC Resources So far, no cost to OARC –Hardware, dev work courtesy of Damballa We have until January 2007 to finish major work Needed OARC resources: –Blessing/acceptance A review/edit of policies –Mailing lists (one for dev, one for users) –Possible mirror –Feedback from members –Malware (send samples!) Conclusion Service-oriented repository See malfease.oarci.net for details Questions?
Your security systems can’t stop an attack unless they detect there is one, making file integrity monitoring (FIM), or the ability to automatically track changes to the environment, crucial in detection and prevention. This detection needs to be not only fast but deep enough to stop the likes of the SolarWinds Sunburst attack, which leveraged beaucoup lateral movement and a variety of live-off-the-land tactics, such as Windows powershell grabs, the deletion of digital trail files, privilege escalations, and system hijackings. In the following video, I demonstrate how the Atomic OSSEC file integrity monitoring and intrusion detection system (IDS) solution can provide defense in depth against a similar, simulated attack. File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) in Action FIM is a security model in which we track the changes on a system over time and associate those changes with the users that made them. It enables us to understand when changes have been made in a system. This is part of the security stack that we can call integrity. In the video, I simulate an attack on a web server, show the change that was made in real time, and the automatic response, including some machine learning logic applied at that time. Through FIM, you get alerts, can create artifacts of the incident, and, of course, revise what is being changed in the system as part of both an automatic and sustained response. You can look at the activity from the command line interface level first, look at the enemy code… or on a more dynamic GUI management console. Then, take measures to stop it fast, such as replacing infected files with new rules-based ones. Using the command line to show how quickly this is detected, we spot a web server with a vulnerable web application! And we can see artifacts associated with the change. Save the file and it becomes an artifact (see Figure 1). The file says: Who did it, what command did it, was it bash or shell?, and reveals the fact that the malware or hacker is deleting files to hide their trail. In this case, the hacker is using vulnerable PHP which they have exploited through remote code injection, a common method of attacking web targets. The malware tries to reproduce and spread. Atomic OSSEC immediately creates a vulnerability report that a Web server has created a file and has run it, which is suspicious activity. You can tell the code to delete the file. Now, you want to protect your system from this attack in the future, and from any possible lingering effects from the encounter. This means forensic analysis, where you look at the steps the hacker took to capture privileges and use those privileges. In essence, you study the code and behavior that was used to breach the surface and make in-roads. There may still be a lateral infection or vulnerabilities in your systems. You can create rules that if ‘parent user’ is Such and Such, then deny. This is all in a real time model. It’s deep and fast detection, plus security analysis in real time, enabling faster response. Atomicorp brings distributed but deep security against today’s sophisticated attacks. Our defense is in depth, layered from the microprocessor out to the physical layer. The Atomic OSSEC security solution works across Linux, Windows, MacOS, and additional operating systems, with security at the kernel level, also supporting legacy OSs like AIX and Solaris. Cloud-friendly, it comes with support for all the major cloud platform providers and more. Watch Atomic OSSEC FIM Detect and Stop a Web Attack Watch a FIM example at the command line level to see the real-time speed of Atomic OSSEC in comparison to timer-based systems. Visit our FIM page, and scroll down to Real-time File Integrity Monitoring and Intrusion Detection. Request the full FIM solution demo.
Meaning – Access control in the realm of computer security, is the process of ensuring that the classified files of an organisation, are only accessible to employees and admins who have the necessary clearance. The process of access control also exists on a personal level, where you can restrict access to certain files, if you are using a multi-user PC. The act of accessing data corresponds to viewing, editing, or in some cases, even downloading or saving it on a different device. Organisations and individuals around the world employ the process of access control, to maintain a level of secrecy around confidential data, and this in turn reduces the risk of data leaks and further undesirable consequences. Example of usage – “Data can only be accessed by managers and the CEO, as the organisation employs a strict access control policy.”
This post was written by Dean Suzuki, Solution Architect Manager. Customers who run Windows or Linux instances on AWS frequently ask, “How do I know if my disks are almost full?” or “How do I know if my application is using all the available memory and is paging to disk?” This blog helps answer these questions by walking you through how to set up monitoring to capture these internal performance metrics. If you open the Amazon EC2 console, select a running Amazon EC2 instance, and select the Monitoring tab you can see Amazon CloudWatch metrics for that instance. Amazon CloudWatch is an AWS monitoring service. The Monitoring tab (shown in the following image) shows the metrics that can be measured external to the instance (for example, CPU utilization, network bytes in/out). However, to understand what percentage of the disk is being used or what percentage of the memory is being used, these metrics require an internal operating system view of the instance. AWS places an extra safeguard on gathering data inside a customer’s instance so this capability is not enabled by default. To capture the server’s internal performance metrics, a CloudWatch agent must be installed on the instance. For Windows, the CloudWatch agent can capture any of the Windows performance monitor counters. For Linux, the CloudWatch agent can capture system-level metrics. For more details, please see Metrics Collected by the CloudWatch Agent. The agent can also capture logs from the server. The agent then sends this information to Amazon CloudWatch, where rules can be created to alert on certain conditions (for example, low free disk space) and automated responses can be set up (for example, perform backup to clear transaction logs). Also, dashboards can be created to view the health of your Windows servers. There are four steps to implement internal monitoring: - Install the CloudWatch agent onto your servers. AWS provides a service called AWS Systems Manager Run Command, which enables you to do this agent installation across all your servers. - Run the CloudWatch agent configuration wizard, which captures what you want to monitor. These items could be performance counters and logs on the server. This configuration is then stored in AWS System Manager Parameter Store - Configure CloudWatch agents to use agent configuration stored in Parameter Store using the Run Command. - Validate that the CloudWatch agents are sending their monitoring data to CloudWatch. The following image shows the flow of these four steps. In this blog, I walk through these steps so that you can follow along. Note that you are responsible for the cost of running the environment outlined in this blog. So, once you are finished with the steps in the blog, I recommend deleting the resources if you no longer need them. For the cost of running these servers, see Amazon EC2 On-Demand Pricing. For CloudWatch pricing, see Amazon CloudWatch pricing. If you want a video overview of this process, please see this Monitoring Amazon EC2 Windows Instances using Unified CloudWatch Agent video. Deploy the CloudWatch agent The first step is to deploy the Amazon CloudWatch agent. There are multiple ways to deploy the CloudWatch agent (see this documentation on Installing the CloudWatch Agent). In this blog, I walk through how to use the AWS Systems Manager Run Command to deploy the agent. AWS Systems Manager uses the Systems Manager agent, which is installed by default on each AWS instance. This AWS Systems Manager agent must be given the appropriate permissions to connect to AWS Systems Manager, and to write the configuration data to the AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store. These access rights are controlled through the use of IAM roles. Create two IAM roles IAM roles are identity objects that you attach IAM policies. IAM policies define what access is allowed to AWS services. You can have users, services, or applications assume the IAM roles and get the assigned rights defined in the permissions policies. To use System Manager, you typically create two IAM roles. The first role has permissions to write the CloudWatch agent configuration information to System Manager Parameter Store. This role is called CloudWatchAgentAdminRole. The second role only has permissions to read the CloudWatch agent configuration from the System Manager Parameter Store. This role is called CloudWatchAgentServerRole. For more details on creating these roles, please see the documentation on Create IAM Roles and Users for Use with the CloudWatch Agent. Attach the IAM roles to the EC2 instances Once you create the roles, you attach them to your Amazon EC2 instances. By attaching the IAM roles to the EC2 instances, you provide the processes running on the EC2 instance the permissions defined in the IAM role. In this blog, you create two Amazon EC2 instances. Attach the CloudWatchAgentAdminRole to the first instance that is used to create the CloudWatch agent configuration. Attach CloudWatchAgentServerRole to the second instance and any other instances that you want to monitor. For details on how to attach or assign roles to EC2 instances, please see the documentation on How do I assign an existing IAM role to an EC2 instance?. Install the CloudWatch agent Now that you have setup the permissions, you can install the CloudWatch agent onto the servers that you want to monitor. For details on installing the CloudWatch agent using Systems Manager, please see the documentation on Download and Configure the CloudWatch Agent. Create the CloudWatch agent configuration Now that you installed the CloudWatch agent on your server, run the CloudAgent configuration wizard to create the agent configuration. For instructions on how to run the CloudWatch Agent configuration wizard, please see this documentation on Create the CloudWatch Agent Configuration File with the Wizard. To establish a command shell on the server, you can use AWS Systems Manager Session Manager to establish a session to the server and then run the CloudWatch agent configuration wizard. If you want to monitor both Linux and Windows servers, you must run the CloudWatch agent configuration on a Linux instance and on a Windows instance to create a configuration file per OS type. The configuration is unique to the OS type. To run the Agent configuration wizard on Linux instances, run the following command: To run the Agent configuration wizard on Windows instances, run the following commands: cd "C:\Program Files\Amazon\AmazonCloudWatchAgent" Note for Linux instances: do not select to collect the collectd metrics in the agent configuration wizard unless you have collectd installed on your Linux servers. Otherwise, you may encounter an error. Review the Agent configuration The CloudWatch agent configuration generated from the wizard is stored in Systems Manager Parameter Store. You can review and modify this configuration if you need to capture extra metrics. To review the agent configuration, perform the following steps: - Go to the console for the System Manager service. - Click Parameter store on the left hand navigation. - You should see the parameter that was created by the CloudWatch agent configuration program. For Linux servers, the configuration is stored in: AmazonCloudWatch-linux and for Windows servers, the configuration is stored in: AmazonCloudWatch-windows. - Click on the parameter’s hyperlink (for example, AmazonCloudWatch-linux) to see all the configuration parameters that you specified in the configuration program. In the following steps, I walk through an example of modifying the Windows configuration parameter (AmazonCloudWatch-windows) to add an additional metric (“Available Mbytes”) to monitor. - Click the AmazonCloudWatch-windows - In the parameter overview, scroll down to the “metrics” section and under “metrics_collected”, you can see the Windows performance monitor counters that will be gathered by the CloudWatch agent. If you want to add an additional perfmon counter, then you can edit and add the counter here. - Press Edit at the top right of the AmazonCloudWatch-windows Parameter Store page. - Scroll down in the Value section and look for “Memory.” - After the “% Committed Bytes In Use”, put a comma “,” and then press Enter to add a blank line. Then, put on that line “Available Mbytes” The following screenshot demonstrates what this configuration should look like. - Press Save Changes. To modify the Linux configuration parameter (AmazonCloudWatch-linux), you perform similar steps except you click on the AmazonCloudWatch-linux parameter. Here is additional documentation on creating the CloudWatch agent configuration and modifying the configuration file. Start the CloudWatch agent and use the configuration In this step, start the CloudWatch agent and instruct it to use your agent configuration stored in System Manager Parameter Store. - Open another tab in your web browser and go to System Manager console. - Specify Run Command in the left hand navigation of the System Manager console. - Press Run Command - In the search bar, - Select Document name prefix - Select Equal - Specify AmazonCloudWatch (Note the field is case sensitive) - Press enter - Select AmazonCloudWatch-ManageAgent. This is the command that configures the CloudWatch agent. - In the command parameters section, - For Action, select Configure - For Mode, select ec2 - For Optional Configuration Source, select ssm - For optional configuration location, specify the Parameter Store name. For Windows instances, you would specify AmazonCloudWatch-windows for Windows instances or AmazonCloudWatch-linux for Linux instances. Note the field is case sensitive. This tells the command to read the Parameter Store for the parameter specified here. - For optional restart, leave yes - For Targets, choose your target servers that you wish to monitor. - Scroll down and press Run. The Run Command may take a couple minutes to complete. Press the refresh button. The Run Command configures the CloudWatch agent by reading the Parameter Store for the configuration and configure the agent using those settings. For more details on installing the CloudWatch agent using your agent configuration, please see this Installing the CloudWatch Agent on EC2 Instances Using Your Agent Configuration. Review the data collected by the CloudWatch agents In this step, I walk through how to review the data collected by the CloudWatch agents. - In the AWS Management console, go to CloudWatch. - Click Metrics on the left-hand navigation. - You should see a custom namespace for CWAgent. Click on the CWAgent Please note that this might take a couple minutes to appear. Refresh the page periodically until it appears. - Then click the ImageId, Instanceid hyperlinks to see the counters under that section. - Review the metrics captured by the CloudWatch agent. Notice the metrics that are only observable from inside the instance (for example, LogicalDisk % Free Space). These types of metrics would not be observable without installing the CloudWatch agent on the instance. From these metrics, you could create a CloudWatch Alarm to alert you if they go beyond a certain threshold. You can also add them to a CloudWatch Dashboard to review. To learn more about the metrics collected by the CloudWatch agent, see the documentation Metrics Collected by the CloudWatch Agent. In this blog, you learned how to deploy and configure the CloudWatch agent to capture the metrics on either Linux or Windows instances. If you are done with this blog, we recommend deleting the System Manager Parameter Store entry, the CloudWatch data and then the EC2 instances to avoid further charges. If you would like a video tutorial of this process, please see this Monitoring Amazon EC2 Windows Instances using Unified CloudWatch Agent video.
International Journal of Computer Science and Mobile Computing (IJCSMC) Creating and recognizing automatically the behavior profile of a user from the commands in a command line interface. Computer user behavior is represented as a sequence of UNIX commands. This sequence is transformed into a distribution of relevant subsequences in order to find out a profile that defines its behavior .The existing system novel evolving user behavior classifier is based on Evolving Fuzzy Systems and it takes into account the fact that the behavior of any user is not fixed, but is rather changing. Timely detection of computer system with intrusion is a problem that is receiving increasing attention.
The analysis of Nomad cross-chain bridge exploitation According to Go+ researcher Ben, at least 90M was hacked in Nomad cross-chain bridge exploitation. The exploitation is relatively simple: any operation can be interpreted as valid because of the wrong usage of Merkle root. This means anyone can copy&paste the hacker’s transaction to steal funds from the bridge. In this tx, the hacker just called process() in Replica.sol. Once you passed these three requires, the specified operations will be processed by NomadBridge.handle(). https://tools.blocksec.com/tx/eth/0xc4938e6f6368061194d076d44f73a8cae3a318b1ee7cf8b026abe10b7c206c2a All the requires passed. The first and third ones are obvious, so check the second one: acceptableRoot(messages[_messageHash]). messages[_messageHash] = 0x0, because the message was forged by the hacker(non-existent in this contract’s history). In a mapping, it will be 0 by default. LEGACY_XXXX = 1 or 2, irrelevant here. Next is confirmAt[_root], as long as it != 0 and < current block time then the check will pass. So what’s the value of confirmAt[0x0] ? Wrong initialisation param: confirmAt[_committedRoot] = 1. They passed _committedRoot = 0x0 while initialising the contract. So confirmAt[0x0]=1. Check passed. That is to say, anyone can forge any message to steal funds from the bridge. You can even copy&paste data from the hacker and modify the receiver.
Image Lock PEA protects photos, drawings, and documents in image format with a password. Thanks to the integrated viewer the images are never stored unencrypted on the hard disk, but are held only in memory. The Image Lock PEA uses functions to derive the key from the password, that protect also against attackers with a high budget. In addition to the confidentiality, an authenticated encryption protects the integrity and authenticity of the images. 1.025 Apr 2017 06:17 - Several images can be be shown by one PEA. You can either open the images separately or you can open a folder containing several images. Only the actually displayed image is decrypted and it is decrypted only in memory (RAM), not on your disk. - Minor changes in appearance and usability. 0.120 May 2016 16:38
Authors: Dario Forte (Guardia di finanza Milano) DFRWS USA 2002 Traffic analysis is used, among other things, to identify the addresses that a given IP Address seeks to contact. This technique may have various purposes, from simple statistical analysis to illegal interception. In response to this, researchers from the US Naval Research Laboratory conceived a system, dubbed “Onion Routing”, that eludes the above two operations.
The popularity of Kubernetes (K8s) as the defacto orchestration platform for the cloud is not showing any sign of pause. This graph, taken from the 2023 Kubernetes Security Report by the security company Wiz, clearly illustrates the trend: As adoption continues to soar, so do the security risks and, most importantly, the attacks threatening K8s clusters. One such threat comes in the form of long-lived service account tokens. In this blog, we are going to dive deep into what these tokens are, their uses, the risks they pose, and how they can be exploited. We will also advocate for the use of short-lived tokens for a better security posture.
Understanding Malware #1 This is a new section I am starting, where instead of reverse engineering malware, I will be demonstrating how certain malware works, at a source code level. Whilst someone malicious could easily take all of the information and put it into their own malware, they would have wasted quite a lot of time, and are not very good at blackhat activities. All of the information that I will be talking about on this site is freely available, from basic socket connections to DLL Injections – allowing any script kiddies to copy and paste malware. As none of the information will include extreme 1337 0dayz, most of their malware will get picked up by Anti Malware programs – just like using an unencoded meterpreter payload. The main reason I am creating this section is to teach people, who are interested in malware analysis, how malware works at a basic level, and what API calls to look out for when determining if something is in fact malicious. Without further ado, let us begin. #1: Basic Reverse TCP Connection A reverse TCP connection is used in a lot of remote access malware, in order to get through the firewall. A lot of System Administrators used to only block incoming connections on ports that were not important, such as port 4444, but they did not block outgoing connections. Due to this, attackers were able to gain remote access by having the victim connect back to their system. Now this is becoming a more well known technique, attackers are more and more frequently using HTTP, port 80, to communicate with the victim – this is because it is quite unlikely for a system administrator to block outgoing connections through port 80. In this example, I will be creating a very simple application in C for Windows, that connects to a server, sends a message, receives a message, and then exits. The server will be written in Python and run off of a Linux machine, although it would work on Windows. Setting Up a Template First, we need to import the necessary functions: As you can see, winsock2.h is imported. This is the most important import for this type of program, as it contains code required for communicating over the network. Whilst WinSock is important, you could use the default BSD socket headers, however you would require a Unix Emulation Library, such as CygWin, which allows you to use sys/socket.h. In this example I will be focusing on winsock.h. We also lay out two functions here; WinMain and nConnect_To_Server. WinMain is the entry point for Windows applications, however using main() works as well. nConnect_To_Server is the function which will be responsible for connecting to the server, sending and receiving, and then cleaning up. For WinMain I used a basic if statement to check the return value of nConnect_To_Server, and if it was 0 (successful connection), the program would print that the connection was successful. Otherwise, it would display that the connection. In a fully developed remote access tool, this would probably contain several functions before the connection routine, in order to check for any active analysis methods. Now we are finished with the WinMain function, we can move onto the connection function. First things first, when writing a program that utilizes WinSock for communication, you must initialize WinSock by calling WSAStartup. WSAStartup allows you to “request” what version of WinSock you want to use, which in this case is 2.0. It checks to see if WinSock is present on the machine, and then loads the DLL into the process. The information about the loaded WinSock DLL is stored in the &wsaData structure that we declared at the top. After WinSock has been initialized, we can create a Socket Descriptor, using socket(). This is what allows us to communicate over the network. The first argument, AF_INET, specifies that we want to communicate over IPv4, and SOCK_STREAM, which creates a reliable, two way byte stream between the client and the server. If the socket descriptor cannot be created, the return value is INVALID_SOCKET, and so the program checks for that and handles the error. We also store the attackers IP address and Port to connect to in serv_IP and serv_Port. Now we have created the socket descriptor, we can connect to the remote server using the connect() API call. However, before doing that, we must fill up the Serv_Addr structure with the IP address, Port, and the communication method that we use (IPv4). This will convert the remote address to a machine readable format. We then pass this structure and the socket descriptor we created to the connect() function, which will attempt to make a connection to the attackers machine. If it fails, it returns SOCKET_ERROR. If it does return SOCKET_ERROR, the program uses closesocket() in order to close the socket descriptor. Otherwise, the program continues execution. Now that we are successfully connected to the remote server, we can send and receive data. In order to send data, we can use the send() API call which takes 4 arguments. The first argument is the socket descriptor which we have created. The second is the data you want to send, and the third is the size (in bytes) of the data. The final argument allows you to set a flag that determines how the data is sent, but that is not important here, so we can set it to 0. If the send() fails, it will return SOCKET_ERROR, so we can use this to perform proper error handling by closing the socket and returning. The recv() call allows us to receive data from a socket descriptor and store it in a buffer. This call also takes 4 arguments; the socket descriptor, the buffer that will store the received data, the size of the data to be received, and the flags – which will be set to 0 again. As with send() and connect(), as SOCKET_ERROR is returned if the call fails. Finally, closesocket() is called, with the argument being the socket descriptor itself. It also returns SOCKET_ERROR if the call fails. Once the socket has been closed, we can simply use return 0; to signal that the function completed successfully. So now we have finished the code, we can go ahead and compile it – in this case I will be using GCC in order to compile the program. As it uses Windows API, this must be compiled on a Windows system. When compiling the code, if you use the regular: C:\MinGW\bin> gcc Client.c -o Client.exe You will receive the error shown in the image above. This is because you must link ws2_32 in order for the program to be able to use Winsock functions. To do this, just type: C:\MinGW\bin> gcc Client.c -o Client.exe -lws2_32 And we successfully managed to compile the code! If you want to run it, you will need to have a valid listener (server) to connect to, otherwise this will happen: If you don’t fancy coding your own server for this program, you can always use nc (netcat), which is nearly always installed on UNIX machines: All you have to do is set netcat to listen on port 4444, or whichever port you chose, and then start the client up. If you do want to create a simple server, here is a basic one in Python. Your main() function can be very simple, as it is just calling the connection function. You also only need to import one API in Python; socket. Here is the basic server/listener that first creates a socket descriptor, just like we did in C. It then binds the program to the host and port, so that no other application can listen on that port. The program then calls listen() which waits for a connection, and sock.accept() will accept the remote connection. recv() receives the message from the client, send() sends the message to the client, and close() closes the socket connection. This is in a try statement, so if there are any errors during runtime, it will exit and return 1. After starting this up and then running the client, we get this: So that is the end of the first post, hopefully you’ve learnt something from this – or it has refreshed your memory. If you want/don’t want to see more of these types of posts or you have any ideas on what I could talk about for the next one then feel free to DM me on Twitter (@0verfl0w_). If you still don’t understand how something works, the best place to go is MSDN, which is packed full of information about Windows API calls – one of (if not the) best place to go if you have any problems!
Igniting the Freeware File Comparison The freeware file comparison is included the whole turning point that accumulates the documents searching for the files that you need. When the free folder comparison tool is used, the files can also be arranged. Check additional information about freeware file comparison. The whole point of turning to freeware file comparison is to accumulate the multiple documents that search for the copying and pasting of the fragments of the text. As long as there are no suspicious findings then the reporting will be included in the plain text, HTML files as well as the numerous word processing that is connected to the format of the freeware directory comparison. As long as the Microsoft Word and the Word Perfect that is connected to the broken link will be accumulated to the component software. If you look into the freeware file comparison, you will see that there are advanced files as well as the different analysis tools that are used to analyze the changes between the revisions as mentioned in the files. When the revisions are included in the same file and folder, then these will be operated to analyze the program source files along with the other HTML documents that are connected to the MS-Word. When the documents operate further, then they can inhibit what they need from the item as planned and commanded by the software. When you enable the freeware file comparison to cover the enabling of the easy comparison files then you can just detect the differences as presented in the web pages. The various attacks are included in the changes and the deletion of the non-existing and identical content. When the freeware file comparison include the various color mark, then the source code can just be accessed and scrolled through the results. The free folder comparison tool will also compare the source code that is connected to the parallel scrolling that leads to the results that are automatically connected to the number line. The breaks can be eliminated, depending on the presentation of the software. As long as the freeware directory comparison cover up the content, then the various color markers will scroll through the results that are included in the possible source code as presented in the other materials that are connected to the various rights. The folder comparator that is used to connect the freeware file comparison to the program that come with the different directories structure actually depend on the course of the displayed files, depending on the same, new, removed and the changed. If there are available comments for the free folder comparison tool can always complement with the directories structure that are connected to the sub-directory of the course will display the files that come in the same and the new. When the comparisons for the directories and the files are rated, then the comparison will eventually start from there. The windows of the composed files can also accommodate the freeware directory comparison that allows the hotkeys that can insert and delete the different sections that are related to the composed file. The simple utility that are connected to the checksum files are based on the hash routine, depending on the freeware file comparison that are related to the actual basis of what is needed and what should be done. As long as the checkfile data can be loaded, the files will easily be determined and everything else will go forth.
Using Aggregate Control Effectiveness in the Real World This is my third post about Aggregate Control Effectiveness. In the first one, I introduced the concept and how it helps cybersecurity and risk teams decide on the controls that will optimize cyber posture. While we are comfortable evaluating individual control effectiveness, there is a need to understand how a change to an individual control affects the organization’s overall cyber posture. In my second post, I discussed how Aggregate Control Effectiveness helps resolve the tension between meeting compliance requirements and improving cyber posture. The former is about what practices and requirements you need to do, and the latter is about how you do it, i.e., the controls you actually implement. The discretion you have in selecting controls enables you to do both. As promised, this post provides a real-world example of how you can use Aggregate Control Effectiveness. I decided to use the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack for context. Management is surely asking, what are we doing to make sure this does not happen to us. To start, let’s take a closer look at the techniques and tools used by the DarkSide ransomware group. FireEye’s Mandiant team’s analysis is insightful. They map the steps and tools used by DarkSide to accomplish their double extortion – data exfiltration and data encryption. While Monaco Risk's Cyber Control Simulation (CCS) solution's external attacker templates are based on MITRE ATT&CK, we have no problem adjusting to Mandiant’s taxonomy which is very similar to ATT&CK. I built the table below by mapping each technique and tool Mandiant described to one or more controls that could be used to block or detect them. My purpose here is to show the wide variety of controls that could be strengthened or added to prevent an incident like this. You may have other controls in mind. Obviously, Darkside is just one of many ransomware groups. And ransomware is just one of many types of risks that management is concerned about. MITRE ATT&CK describes hundreds of techniques and sub-techniques which can be used in thousands or tens of thousands of different combinations. Therefore, making control decisions based on one specific ransomware group may not be the best approach. But it does provide a good illustration of how Monaco Risk's approach works. Rather than focus on one risk, ransomware, Monaco Risk uses all of the risks management is concerned about. Furthermore, CCS graphs most, if not all, attack paths through an organization from the initial threat action to attaining objective. While understanding that an organization has dozens, if not hundreds, of deployed controls, for a moment let’s look at the smaller number of controls that I identified above that could prevent or reduce the impact of the Colonial Pipeline incident. How would you decide how to allocate budget and prioritize investments among Email security, Multifactor Authentication, Vulnerability scanning / Patching cadence, endpoint agents, fine-grained network segmentation, configuration hardening, deception, DLP, and Backup/Recovery controls? All of these are reasonable choices. And even if you have enough budget for all of them, in what order should they be implemented? Our approach starts with analyzing your currently deployed controls to establish your baseline Aggregate Control Effectiveness. In addition, we provide several ways to visualize each control's impact on preventing those loss events. Then we run “what-if” scenarios for each alternative you are considering by calculating how it impacts Aggregate Control Effectiveness. We found some results that are counter-intuitive. Note, we are surely NOT saying just follow the results of our analyses, i.e., implement the controls with the highest impact on Aggregate Control Effectiveness. There are many factors within an organization that we are not modeling yet such as the relationship between the cybersecurity team, the risk management team, the IT team, and the various business units involved. But we are providing a starting point. Also, note that “what-if” scenarios can be run on multiple control choices. So if the top choice is not feasible, it’s possible that #2 and #4 are more feasible and have as much of an impact as the top choice. Then there is the compliance factor to consider. The reality is that compliance frameworks are important. In fact, we recommend that all organizations select a cybersecurity framework to drive their cybersecurity programs. More on this in another article. A key insight we realized is that meeting compliance requirements does not have to take budget away from improving cyber posture because you have wide discretion on how a specific compliance requirement is met. You can use Monaco Risk CCS to determine that a control for a particular compliance requirement may not have a significant impact on cyber posture. So using a lower cost control that is simpler to deploy might be the best answer here, leaving budget available for the controls that do have impact on cyber posture. Final point on establishing the baseline Aggregate Control Effectiveness. We do need inputs on the effectiveness of individual controls. These input values are set by a combination of subject matter expert opinions, and the results of one or more of the following: pen testing, red team exercises, Breach and Attack Simulation products, and Security Control Validation tools. In closing, I have attempted to show how we might use Monaco Risk’s CCS solution and services to assist an organization looking to decide which controls to implement to improve its cyber posture. For illustrative purposes, I used the techniques and tools used by DarkSide, as described by FireEye's Mandiant team, in the Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident. Does our approach seem reasonable? Please let me know if you have any questions.
Anomaly detection in industrial networks using machine learning: A roadmap With the advent of 21st Century, we stepped into the fourth industrial revolution of cyber physical systems. There is the need of secured network systems and intrusion detection systems in order to detect network attacks. Use of machine learning for anomaly detection in industrial networks faces challenges which restricts its large-scale commercial deployment. ADIN Suite proposes a roadmap to overcome these challenges with multi-module solution. It solves the need for real world network traffic, an adaptive hybrid analysis to reduce error rates in diverse network traffic and alarm correlation for semantic description of detection results to the network operator.
When running Standalone Error Detection on an application uploaded to a run time system, user cannot map errors being detected to the line in the source code. In order to map errors back to the source code line , the PDB's must be available as well has the path to the source code must be known to Error Detection. The pdb's can be uploaded to the same directory as the executable being profiled. The source file locations can be configured before starting a profiling session using the DevPartner Error Detection, General options. Under these options the user should be able to note the path to the source files in this location. then run a profiling session, to ensure the settings file is saved. A .DPbcd will be saved in that directory, which should enable the user to map the error back to the source file.
WHAT'S IN THIS CHAPTER? Managing security settings with the Office Trust Center Using Disabled mode Using Automation security Understanding Macro security in Access 2010 Creating and using digital signatures and certificates Creating and extracting signed packages Access Database Engine Expression Service Understanding Sandbox mode Now more than ever, you have to concern yourself with the security of your computer systems. One form of security — securing the information contained in and the intellectual property built into your databases — was discussed in Chapter 24. Another form of security has to do with preventing malicious attacks on your computers—attacks that can delete files, spread viruses, or otherwise disrupt your work. This chapter focuses on the security enhancements built into Access 2010, which help you protect your computer systems and your users' computer systems. In its efforts to make sure everything is secure, Microsoft had to deal with the fact that an Access database has a lot of power (something Access developers have known all along). And because of this power, someone who chooses to use Access maliciously can make an Access database perform destructive operations. In fact, that is the reason that Outlook does not allow Access database files to be sent as attachments. From a security perspective, an Access database file is essentially an executable. To curb this power, beginning with Access 2003, Microsoft made changes to Access ...
.SY_ File Extension File TypeCompressed SYS File What is an SY_ file? Compressed .SYS file sometimes used by application installers to reduce the size of installation files; similar to a .EX_ or .DL_ file and can be expanded back to a SYS file using the Microsoft Expand command line utility with the following syntax: expand file.sy_ file.sys NOTE: SY_ files also may just be renamed SYS files and therefore may not be compressed.
If you are looking for some help regarding preventing data loss protection, then particular number of things that you can know about the various things that could cause this. For instance, in case there is loss because of hardware failing, you should know that the can happen to some other computer rather than just those with GMP encryption mounted. In other words, the encryption is merely as solid as its poorest link. Therefore , it is vital to take wonderful care purchasing computers by places just like Best Buy or CompUSA in order to make sure that you aren’t buying something which has a weaker link in the encryption division. Apart from this, there are a few other things that may lead to data loss prevention at work, and in particular, with networked systems like those that will be implemented with GSM, CDMA, WLL and TDMA. These are considered as current systems given that they allow instantaneous synchronization of documents and files within just multiple users on a single network. However , should your company has a official intranet that is a part of a large system, then it could possibly be vulnerable to leaks due to the real-time nature of such systems. As a matter of fact, a lot more sensitive and classified information that you placed on these intranets, the greater danger that it could possibly be leaked into the wrong hands if https://tiptopdata.com/how-to-protect-your-privacy-on-the-internet proper info security policy is not applied. You should therefore try to prevent info leakage wherever possible, and this requires companies to be careful about what exactly they are storing troubles network and in the web server room. Because of this not only data but also email messages, photos and other sorts of personal and confidential facts that are sent over the internet should be encrypted ahead of being transmitted across networks. Apart from this, a corporate data break incident ought to be handled with great care, since it may have the potential to damage the entire network, which may no doubt always be very difficult to help repair in the least. Info security insurance plan needs to add a clause that states that in case of a heavy data breach incident, pretty much all employees on the organization would be required to go through a data security taxation.
This article describes a data-driven approach to improve the security of the Internet infrastructure. We identify the key vulnerabilities, and describe why the barriers to progress are not just technical, but embedded in a complex space of misaligned incentive, negative externalities, lack of agreement as to priority and approach, and missing leadership. We describe current trends in how applications are designed on the Internet, which leads to increasing localization of the Internet experience. Exploiting this trend, we focus on regional security rather than unachievable global security, and introduce a concept we call zones of trust. Motivation: Persistent Insecurity of the Internet Infrastructure We propose a path to measurably improve a particular set of Internet infrastructure security weaknesses. By Internet infrastructure we mean the Internet as a packet transport architecture: the transport/network layer protocols (Transmission Control Protocol [TCP]/Internet Protocol [IP]), the Internet routing protocol (Border Gateway Protocol [BGP]), and the naming protocol (Domain Name System [DNS]). Higher-layer security threats—such as malware, phishing, ransomware, fake news, and trolling—get enormous media attention. But the less publicized security concerns with the Internet as a packet transport layer can, and sometimes do, destabilize the foundation on which all higher-level activities occur, and facilitate execution of higher-layer malicious actions. It is the foundational nature of the packet transport layer that motivates our focus. The insecurity of the Internet infrastructure poses a threat to users, businesses, governments, and society at large. As a further point of concern, many of the known security flaws in these systems have persisted for decades. Insecurity persists for five entangled reasons: lack of agreement on appropriate protective measures; misaligned incentives and negative externalities; inability for relevant actors to coordinate actions—especially across national boundaries; the generality of the Internet as a service platform, which allows malicious actors great fluidity in their attacks; and information asymmetries that leave those who need to act without sufficient knowledge to inform planning and execution. While many of these considerations can apply to security challenges more broadly, the generality of the Internet, the tensions among the different sets of private-sector actors, and the lack of any effective mechanism for high-level direction-setting compound the problem. We do not imagine that these steps are going to make the Internet “secure,” if by that we mean free of risk. Risk is a part of living, and the Internet experience will be no exception. Our goal should be to reduce the risk to the level that users are not fearful of using the Internet, while preserving the core benefits of the Internet—the freedom from unnecessary constraint. A call for better security is aspirational. Any serious attempt to improve security must begin by defining it operationally: breaking the problem into actionable parts; carefully studying the constraints, capabilities, and incentives of the relevant actors; analyzing the merits and practicality of different approaches; and developing a strategy to achieve sufficient consensus to motivate progress. This set of steps is part of any serious system security analysis; our goal is to apply that line of reasoning to the Internet infrastructure layer. The Core Systems of the Internet and Their Flaws Figure 1 is a representation of the service layers of the Internet.1 The hourglass shape reflects the design goal of enabling great diversity in the underlying physical technology over which the Internet operates, and great diversity in the applications that run on top of it. The narrow waist plays an essential role in this model, not as a bottleneck, but as a set of common, well-specified protocols that provide a stable layer of packet transport reliable enough to sustain continual evolution and disruption in layers above and below the narrow waist. The greatest strengths of these protocols—well-specified, nonproprietary, and globally implemented—also makes it inherently challenging to improve the security of these layers, because significant changes require global agreement to the increased cost and complexity on the whole ecosystem. The function of the IP layer is to deliver packets of data.2 The IP specification states that a router should forward each packet toward its destination address as best it can. This specification says nothing about what else might happen to that packet. The Internet is composed of autonomous systems (AS) under independent control. An AS might engage in unexpected or unwanted behaviors, such as making a copy of a packet for inspection. End points cannot generally detect such behavior, and the design of the Internet cannot prevent it. Communicating end points protect themselves from unwelcome observation of their traffic by encrypting it. The IP specification does not include any ability for routers to police or control packets based on their contents. These layers ignore packet content by design. If higher-layer applications facilitate malicious activity such as delivery of malware, expecting the packet layer to identify and stop such packets is comparable to expecting a highway or traffic lights to stop trucks filled with explosives. The operation of the Internet as a packet carriage layer depends on several critical system elements. The hourglass model of the structure of the Internet, capturing the diversity of applications and technology, connected through common agreement on the standards for the core protocols. Internet (IP) addresses: every element communicating across the packet layer, that is, using IP protocols, including end points and routers, is assigned one or more addresses, so that packets can be delivered to it. The global routing protocol (the BGP),3 which propagates topology and routing policy information across 70K+ independent networks called autonomous systems. This information enables routers to correctly forward packets to their destinations. The transport protocol (TCP),4 which detects and corrects errors that occur as routers transmit packets across the Internet. Errors might include lost packets, packets with corrupted contents, duplicated or misordered packets, and so on. The role of this protocol is only at sending and receiving end points to detect and remediate these errors, for example, by retransmitting lost packets. TCP does not operate on packets as they pass through routers. As such, it is less susceptible to abusive manipulation by rogue elements in the network. The DNS, which translates human-meaningful names (like www.example.com) into IP addresses to which routers forward packets. If this system is working in a trustworthy manner, the user will obtain the correct IP address for the intended higher-layer service, for example, website, and will not be misled into going to unintended or malicious locations. The Certificate Authority (CA) system, which manages and distributes to user's encryption keys used for transport connections, so that they can confirm the identity of the party with which they are communicating. If this system is working correctly, the user receives a confirmation that the service at the end point receiving the packet is the service the user intended to reach. To simplify, if these systems are working correctly, the Internet as a packet forwarding system—its “plumbing” —is working correctly. Unfortunately, all of these systems suffer from known vulnerabilities, which attackers regularly exploit, despite decades of attempts to remediate them. Internet Addressing System (IP) The network layer of the Internet architecture is most fundamentally defined by IP addresses. IP addresses are an essential part of the Internet. Routers use destination IP addresses in the header of packets to choose the next hop to forward a packet toward its intended destination. The early designers of the Internet specified the current addressing format (IPv4) in 1981. This format allows for 4.2 billion 32-bit addresses.5 In the early 1990s it became clear that the world would require more addresses than fit into a 32-bit field. By then there was a standards organization: the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). After much deliberation, in 1998, the IETF standardized on a new addressing format (IPv6) that used 128-bit addresses.6 Unfortunately, the IETF decided to make the IPv6 protocol backward-incompatible with IPv4, which has greatly slowed if not doomed the transition to the IPv6 protocol. Although parts of the Internet are migrating to IPv6, those parts of the network must support conversion mechanism in order to communicate with any existing IPv4 network, so long as that network remains IPv4 only. The framework for allocating IP addresses is hierarchical. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) delegates' blocks of addresses to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which in turn allocate them to national registries or directly to autonomous systems that operate parts of the Internet. Because IPv4 address are scarce and in demand, an opaque market has emerged for buying and selling IPv4 addresses. There is no oversight of such transactions, which itself is a source of security vulnerabilities related to attribution of IP address ownership. A better-known vulnerability embedded in the network layer is the ability to spoof source IP addresses. To reach its destination, a packet must have the destination's IP address in its header. Similarly, if the destination is to return a packet to the original source in order to initiate two-way communication, the source address listed in the first packet must correspond to the actual source of the packet. But if a malicious source sends a packet to a destination using a fake source address, for example, one belonging to a third end point, the receiver of the packet will reply to that third end point's address rather than to the original sender. In fact, the receiver cannot respond to the original sender since it does not know the actual source; it trusts the authenticity of the source address field in the header. Malicious actors have exploited this vulnerability to mount a variety of attacks, for example, volumetric denial-of-service (DoS)7, resource exhaustion,8 cache poisoning,9 and impersonation.10 A volumetric DoS attack arises when an attacker can marshal enough traffic to overwhelm a destination or region of the network. An impersonation attack arises when an attacker uses a victim's address space to launch scanning or other activity likely to induce blocking of that address.11 Note that if an attacker can marshal enough distinct sources of traffic for a distributed denial-of-source attack, such as with a botnet, the attack may not need to use spoofed source addresses, although spoofing still offers the attacker the advantage of making attribution difficult if not impossible. Nonspoofed distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks arise not from design limitations of the network layer, but from persistent vulnerabilities in end points and applications that allow malicious actors to take over machines without the owners of those machines being aware of it. In the early days of the Internet, the designers appreciated this risk in principle but the idea of an attacker subverting perhaps hundreds of thousands of end points to malicious purposes seemed remote. Today, attacks that involve hundreds of thousands of machines, with tens of gigabits of malicious traffic, are regular events on the Internet. Because these attacks are rooted in a higher-layer vulnerability, we do not focus on them in this article. Internet Routing System (BGP) There are about 70K autonomous systems that make up the Internet today. Each AS may own a set of IP addresses, and every AS in the Internet must know how to forward packets to these addresses. The BGP is the mechanism that AS use to propagate this knowledge across the network topology. Addresses are organized into address blocks of various sizes, identified by the prefix (the first part) of the addresses in the block. Each AS uses BGP to announce to its directly connected neighbor AS the prefixes that it hosts. The receiving AS pass this announcement on to their neighbors, and so on, until (in principle) it reaches all parts of the Internet. As each AS passes an announcement along, it adds its own AS number to the announcement, so the form of the announcement is a series of AS numbers that describe the path (at the AS level) back to the AS owning the associated address block. The critical security flaw with BGP is well-known: a rogue autonomous system can announce a falsehood into the global routing system, that is, a false announcement that it hosts or is the path to a block of addresses that it does not have the authority to announce. Traffic addressed to that block may travel to the rogue AS, which can drop, inspect, or manipulate that traffic. The simplest form of the resulting harm is that traffic goes to the wrong part of the Internet, and is then (in the best case) discarded. This outcome leads to a loss of availability between the parties intending to communicate. A more pernicious kind of harm is that a rogue end point can mimic the behavior of the intended end point, and carry out an exchange that seems to the victim to be with a legitimate party. This attack can lead to theft of information such as user credentials, which the malicious actor can then exploit. It can also lead to the download of malicious software, or malware, onto the victim's computer. Another possible harm is that the malicious actor may launch some abusive traffic from addresses in that block, which are hard to trace and which may be associated with the owner of the block.12 News of some damaging route hijack episodes has appeared in the press or on mailing lists, but the overall level of hijacking is not clear, since victims have a disincentive to publicize that they have fallen victim to such attacks. However, recent work has characterized the extent of the problem. To understand the current level of abuse, and the importance of seeking ways to mitigate it, a team at MIT and CAIDA13 developed a scheme to identify malicious routing announcements based on their intrinsic characteristics. Working with five years of data curated by CAIDA, they demonstrated that there are autonomous systems that persist as malicious players in the Internet for years, issuing malicious routing announcements and deflecting (“hijacking”) traffic away from its intended destination. Using routing data and some machine learning (ML) tools, that team identified about 400 of the 70K active AS as highly likely serial hijackers, and another 400 that are probable hijackers. This BGP vulnerability has been known for decades: it was first documented in a predecessor of BGP in 1982.14 The fact that the vulnerability has persisted for so long is an indication of the difficulty of reaching resolution on a preferred path forward. The Internet standards community has debated and developed approaches to improve BGP security for at least two decades,15 but only recently has made what appears to be substantial progress on a small piece of the problem: origin validation (see the section “Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet Routing System (BGP)”). Domain Name System The DNS translates a name of the form www.example.com into an Internet destination address to use in the packet header to forward the packet. Structurally, the DNS is a hierarchical, distributed database with built-in redundancy. Assignment of responsibility for domains occurs through a process of delegation, in which an entity at a higher level in the hierarchy assigns responsibility for a subset of names to another party. The hierarchy starts at the root of the DNS, which delegates top-level domains (TLDs) such as .com, .net, .nl, and so on. These TLDs in turn delegate to second-level domains, which may further delegate parts of the name space. Administration of these delegations can be a complex task involving many stakeholders, most obviously registries, registrars, and registrants. A DNS registry administers a TLD. The registrar provides an interface between registrant and registry, managing purchase, renewal, changes, expiration, and billing. The registrant is the customer that registers a domain. Other players, for example, Cloudflare, may buy and host domain resources on behalf of registrants. The organization with overall responsibility for the stewardship of the DNS namespace is ICANN. Today, harms that leverage the DNS protocols and supply chain represent some of the most pernicious security threats on the Internet. Malicious actors can subvert existing names or register their own names by penetrating databases operated by either registries or registrars, and then use those names for malicious purposes. By penetrating a registry or registrar database, one can add invalid registrant information, or change the binding from a name to an address. Lack of oversight of the competitive for-profit DNS supply chain contributes to these security risks. But the complexity of the DNS also leads to misconfiguration of the name resolution mechanisms by owners of domain names, which can allow malicious actors to take control of them. Finally, and most challenging, is the registration of domain names intended for malicious use such as phishing or malware delivery. Every month, the ICANN reports the number of active domain names associated with abusive practices.16 Since the beginning of 2020, the numbers range from a low of 572K in July to a high of 926K in October. Some registrars support operational practices that seem tailored to the needs of malicious actors, such as automatic registration of bulk, meaningless domain names, the creation on demand of “look-alike” or “impersonation” names, or lax attention to capturing the identity of the registrant. However, the DNS is often only one component of malicious activities, and stakeholders disagree on whether the DNS is a suitable or effective system through which to combat them. Internet CA System The CA system plays a critical role in Internet security. When operating correctly, it provides a means for a user (typically via a web browser) to verify that a connection is to the intended destination–the correct banking site, for example, rather than a rogue copy. However, the CA system itself is vulnerable to attack and manipulation. Some certificate authorities may issue misleading certificates providing the wrong public key (the verification credential) to a user. The assumption behind the design of the current CA system was that all CA authorities would be trustworthy, even in a competitive for-profit environment with no oversight. Not surprisingly, this has proven false in practice. If an attacker can cause the issuance of an invalid certificate, whether by penetrating a CA and subverting it, paying an untrustworthy CA to issue such a certificate, or simply (and in particular for state-level attackers) working with a CA that acts as an agent of the state in issuing false certificates, an attacker can pretend to be an end point that it is not, even if the victim end point uses encryption and authentication to attempt to verify the identity of the other end. This attack complements DNS or BGP hijacks that bring traffic to that rogue end point, which then emulates the expected end point, even to the point of cryptographically identifying it as valid. Historical Roots of Insecurity Few people other than Internet historians know that the first Internet backbones were created to connect scientific researchers to high-performance computing facilities, and that the first general-purpose Internet backbone was funded by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) in the 1980s and 1990s. The National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET) backbone fostered the intermediate evolution of the TCP/IP protocols, as it allowed an operational network to scale to millions of users. In 1994, the US government decommissioned this backbone, and launched ambitious industrial policies to promote competition, and thus innovation, in the emerging Internet transport and domain name industries. The policy goal was to transition Internet communication services to the private sector, make it a commercial undertaking, and have competition be a substitute for regulation. But this transition left the world with an Internet architecture not prepared for all the malicious actors that would try to exploit its weaknesses. The original designers of the Internet understood that there would be malicious users on the Internet, and that those users might attack other end points. However, they concluded that it was not the job of the Internet to police the traffic sent across it. End points needed to take on the responsibility of protecting themselves. Otherwise, end points would be trusting the network to protect them, and it did not seem realistic to place that level of trust in the network itself. However, the designers did not assume adversaries would be operating parts of the infrastructure itself, and thus the protocols did not require authentication of addresses, routes, and names. Once it was clear how universal the Internet infrastructure would become, and that malicious actors would compromise parts of the infrastructure layers, the Internet engineering standards community spent years debating and proposing technical solutions to retrofit layers of authentication into these protocols.17 However, those various solutions have mostly not overcome the misaligned incentives that hinder deployment. In hindsight, it is easy to understand why profit-seeking firms may not be able to justify investment to enhance security. But that realization does not yield a clear path forward. A second challenge is that securing these central elements of the Internet requires some level of global governance to guarantee consistent interpretation of addresses and names. As part of the commercial transition, and “lessening the burdens of government,”18 the US government led the private sector in establishing ICANN as the private, multistakeholder organization responsible for global coordination of the Internet identifier systems for the infrastructure industry, including preserving their security and stability.19 Similar competitive market pressures that inhibit investment in security have challenged this multistakeholder model of governance of Internet identifiers.20 The history of failed security solutions teaches us that market forces and existing institutions alone will not remedy the harms that these vulnerabilities pose to the Internet, and to commerce that relies on it. Improving the security of these layers is not only a technical, but also a multidisciplinary challenge with many tensions among divergent stakeholder interests. This complexity applies to the development and deployment of risk-mitigation strategies, but also to understanding their effectiveness, or even to what extent defenses have been deployed. Given the fundamental architectural weaknesses of the IP suite, and the Internet's increasing status as critical infrastructure around the globe, we predict that society, and the governments that represent it, will not tolerate the continued circumstances that put so many unaware Internet users at risk. However, the lack of any significant governmental focus on the Internet for the last 25 years has left a daunting knowledge gap. Although data sources exist in various forms, knowledge is elusive, and where it emerges, often proprietary. Even if governments decide that intervention is indicated, they do not necessarily have enough knowledge to inform strategy. We believe the policy goal of governments should be to enable reliance on transparency, in this case regarding operational practices associated with trustworthy infrastructure, to minimize the need for stronger government interventions. If interventions are necessary, a similar level of transparency is necessary to inform them. Proposed Approach: Zones of Trust Past attempts to remediate these vulnerabilities have considered technical remedies, such as protocol enhancements. A purely technical approach has often proved unsuccessful. First, the global and multistakeholder nature of protocol development makes consensus difficult or impossible. More problematic, proposing, or even standardizing a new technology does not mean that actors will deploy it. Deployment is costly, can have undesirable side effects, or bring benefit only to others. The Internet ecosystem includes over 70K AS, more than 1500 DNS registries, all the sovereign countries of the world, billions of users, and uncounted application developers. Not all of them are equally trustworthy. Some may be actively malicious; some just have mutually adverse interests. Those who hope to improve Internet security must accept this situation and adapt to it. But this reality implies that they must scope their solutions carefully so that they depend only on the actors that are motivated to implement them. Lack of care in shaping the design process can actually allow actors with adverse interests to participate, which will doom it. The Internet is global, but that does not mean that solutions to security problems need to be global. The premise of our approach is that improving the security and trustworthiness of the Internet will require moving from approaches that require global agreement to approaches that can be incrementally deployed within regions of the Internet. More specifically, our experience of the last 30 years has convinced us that the path to better security does not lie in proposals for global changes to the Internet protocols, but in finding operational practices that regions of the Internet can implement to improve the security profile of those regions. This approach allows groups that choose to trust each other to define and circumscribe the systems they trust. It is more consistent with trust models in the physical world, where we accept that there are malicious actors, and we attempt to arrange circumstances to minimize our interaction with them, and to interact with potentially untrustworthy actors only in constrained ways. In this proposed approach, we call regions that embody a common sense of commitment and a decision to distance themselves from the global pool of bad actors a zone of trust. The basis for security inside the region is not technical constraints that prohibit bad actors and actions, but a collective decision by actors in the region to behave in more trustworthy ways. Critically, actors that make up a zone of trust must agree on steps that allow monitoring that zone of trust to detect misbehavior. The operational practices must be based on a trust-but-verify framework. The rules that define a zone of trust are not likely to be defined “top-down.” Zones of trust are likely to be transnational, and not amenable to creation by domestic regulation within one nation. While a set of like-minded nations might come together to draft regulations and practices, the current private sector dominance of the Internet ecosystem suggests that the rules will emerge “bottom-up,” as has happened in some cases—see our discussion of the CA system in the section “Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet CA System.” The success of a set of rules that define a zone of trust will depend on a set of checks and balances that respect the interests of the various legitimate actors. The leadership of a dominant actor may be an effective starting point for the creation of rules, so long as that powerful actor takes care that it not create rules that benefit itself. This idea is not new, even on the Internet. The premise of shared blocklists or threat intelligence is to exclude actors known to be untrustworthy from an otherwise trusted environment. Response Policy Zone (RPZ)21 is a technology to implement a customized DNS policy for recursive DNS resolvers to modify responses to DNS queries in order to block user access to malicious hosts. But scaling this aspiration beyond the scope of a few networks, including to broad regions of the world, requires a more rigorous, general, and measurement-based approach. We believe the current trends toward a flatter topology, accompanied by regionalization of connectivity to improve performance (see the section “Regionalization: The Evolving Character of the Internet”), provide a basis that facilitates our proposed approach. As users more commonly depend on only a region of the Internet infrastructure for what they do, operators can construct a more secure and trustworthy experience inside that region, by preventing, or at least hindering, actors outside that region from disrupting it. This approach requires identifying operational practices for which incremental deployment brings collective benefit to those groups who collectively deploy them. Groups who choose to explicitly trust each other can then define rules that protect the systems on which they depend. Importantly, these rules must include detection and management of violations. We emphasize that such regions may be topological rather than, or in addition to geographic. Also, different threats may imply/require different region shapes. For one threat, the region might be jurisdictional, for another a connected set of AS. So long as an activity operates within a zone of trust relative to the corresponding threat, the activity will benefit from enhanced security. With respect to the Internet addressing and routing systems, a zone of trust might be the set of interconnected regions (autonomous systems) that agree to verify address ownership of their customers, flag unverified announcements as coming from outside the zone, and reject announcements from outside the zone if they conflict with announcements from within the zone. With respect to the naming system (DNS), a trust zone might be defined by a commitment to block access to domains or URLs based on a determination that they host abusers, and only use registries and registrars that comply with operational practices to minimize and combat abuse. With respect to the CA system, the trust zone is currently defined by the providers of browsers, who determine that they will not trust (e.g., not use) certain certificate authorities. In summary, a sustainable zone of trust must have clear rules about acceptable behavior, a commitment to measurement to detect rule violation, a commitment to deal with rule violation, constraints that limit the ability of bad actors outside the zone of trust to disrupt its operation, and design of applications so that their dependencies stay within the zone in which they operate. This article elaborates on this idea, and explains why we believe a measurement-supported zone of trust approach is the best trajectory to deal with these security challenges at the Internet infrastructure layer and contribute to a more secure and trustworthy Internet experience. Elements of Our Approach Our approach depends not on understanding the details of individual attacks, but rather understanding the degrees of freedom that an attacker has. It depends on analysis, informed by detailed system knowledge, to understand where attackers have the least flexibility or the most vulnerability in the construction of attacks, with the goal of proposing operational practices that exploit these weak points in the attackers' options. Abstractly, this process would underpin any defense systems analysis—our goal here is to apply it to the Internet. The Generality of the Internet The Internet was designed to be a general-purpose platform suited to support a wide range of applications. This generality is part of what has made the Internet so successful. However, malicious actors exploit this generality as they maneuver to avoid detection and disruption. As one example, botmasters who take over vulnerable end points to build a botnet must devise a way to control these so-called zombie computers. Defenders try to disrupt these control systems, and botmasters exploit the generality of the Internet to devise new schemes to control their botnets. A botnet control system is, from the perspective of the Internet infrastructure, just another application, and the Internet was designed to support a wide range of applications as possible. Just as its generality is a boon to the innovator, it is a boon to the attacker. In the attempt to make the Internet more secure, this generality has two implications. The first is we must study the overall process by which the malicious activity executes, to find the points in that process where the attacker has the least flexibility. For many criminal activities, that point may have nothing to do with the technical character of the attack, but instead how money flows to the attacker. One must resist the temptation to put in place remedies that just chase the bad guys from place to place, if the result is mild inconvenience to the attackers but large cost to the defenders. The second implication of this generality is that barriers to malicious activity may risk collateral harm to legitimate activities, because the barrier may have to be broad in design to thwart the ability of the attacker to exploit the intrinsic generality of the Internet. This reality has been a point of great concern to many people responsible for operating Internet infrastructure. The core objective of the Internet is availability. Security by definition degrades availability because it raises protective barriers. The risk of collateral harm from an overbroad remedy is not restricted to security practices online—it can arise as well in the design of law. In fact, the balance of freedom and order is a fundamental and recurring challenge to society. The tension emerges here in particularly stark terms because the very specific goal of the Internet (be available and deliver data) and the goal of security (block things from happening) seem in direct contention. Since drawing a precise line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior is practically impossible, a push for better security must accept inconveniences for legitimate users, in the interest of minimizing room for malicious actors to maneuver. For this reason, many designers are uncomfortable deploying protective mechanisms that may block legitimate activity. Similarly, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which have the primary responsibility for realizing the availability of the Internet, resist mechanisms that accidentally block legitimate activities, because irate and confused users tend to call customer service, which generates costs for the ISP. Design of mechanisms that may cause collateral harm will work best when the user has the means to circumvent the mechanism by explicit action (e.g., the damage is inconvenience, not total prohibition), and the presence of the mechanism is visible to those legitimate users, so they can understand what happened and why. For example, some TLDs are relevant worldwide, others may be important only regionally. If a TLD with regional importance is infested with many names used for abusive purposes, requiring explicit acknowledgment of risk for users outside its primary region of utility might be quite acceptable. The Role of Measurement In tactical, real-time defense, defenders gather security-related data on what the bad guys are doing at a given moment. Maintainers of blocklists try to infer which address and naming resources attackers are using, on an ongoing basis. This data is evanescent. Interdiction and forensics may be useful to respond to ongoing attacks, but they do not shift the playing field toward the defenders. For example, defenders who attempt to deal with the registration of domain names for malicious purposes are locked in an endless battle with the malicious actors, who adapt to interdictions as fast as they appear. So long as the defenders only try to find the bad guys and chase them from where they currently are to some new place, the generality of the Internet works against the defenders. The role of data collection and analysis in our approach is central to the following more strategic objectives. We do not mean to trivialize these tasks by listing them as bullet points—these will be substantial research efforts. However, we believe that this is the viable path to tilting the playing field in favor of the defenders. Understanding malicious behavior in order to craft operational practices that hinder it. This objective requires modeling the scope of an adversary's options. Arguing that a practice will measurably improve security posture, for example, reduce an attack surface. Tracking actual levels of abuse so that we can make a plausible argument that levels of abuse are changing as we deploy new practices. While a given practice may not be easily linked causally to changing levels of abuse, if we cannot get data about levels of abuse, we are shooting in the dark when we claim progress. Understanding the baseline characteristics of traffic, including how application design is evolving, and the behavior of users invoking those applications. Establishing a set of operational practices that define the zone of trust requires balancing constraints on a range of acceptable options—to hinder the bad guys—against the risk of inhibiting innovation. This balance is practical only to the extent that applications continue to manifest regionalization behavior, but our approach builds on the forces inducing such regional structure. We discuss this trend in the section “Regionalization: The Evolving Character of the Internet.” Verification of compliance with accepted operational practices by actors that have committed to the practice. Many debates about operational practices occur in a context devoid of data. A core premise of our approach is that long-term gathering, curation, and analysis of data is critical to a methodical approach to improving these elements of security. Engagement with Stakeholders This approach targets turning technical knowledge derived from understanding system characteristics and ongoing data analysis into open, actionable knowledge that is relevant and meaningful to various actors in the ecosystem, including those responsible for protecting infrastructure. The design of proposed operational practices must rely on a pragmatic recognition of what various actors are willing and able to undertake. Developing an understanding of incentives, costs, and externalities is as important as developing an accurate model of system operation. This means a large component of such an effort must be transferring knowledge generated by this effort to policy development and cybercrime communities. Examples from the DNS abuse community include the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), the Mail, Messaging, Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG), and other operational and technical forums. Applying Measurement-Based Approach to Specific Problems Measurement and data analysis are a centerpiece of our approach. We next look at the specific security challenges we have outlined (see sections “Internet Addressing System (IP)” through “Internet CA System”), and show the roles of measurement in addressing them. Our approach focuses on finding enhanced operational practices that networks can deploy incrementally, rather than new protocols. In the section “Regionalization: The Evolving Character of the Internet,” we discuss how economically-driven trends in the Internet infrastructure provide additional underpinning for our proposed approach. Dedicated stakeholders have provided a head start in defining operational practices relevant to some of our challenges. For example, a group of network operators, facilitated by the Internet Society, have defined a set of operational practices that can prevent several types of addressing and routing abuse (see sections “Internet Addressing System (IP)” and “Internet Routing System (BGP)”). This code of conduct, launched in 2014, is called the Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) initiative.22 The MANRS initiative draws on well-established operational practices defined by the Internet standards or operational communities. The practices that MANRS currently requires are modest, but represent an excellent first step, and a natural target for some of the measurement and analysis that we undertake. Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet Addressing System One recommended MANRS practice is that ISPs prevent traffic with spoofed source IP address from leaving their network, also known as Source Address Validation (SAV). (Incentive misalignment of this practice represents a classic negative externality in the Internet infrastructure market: networks that allow spoofing save on their own operational costs, while imposing costs on others, in the form of attacks and attack risk). The IETF defined SAV as Best Current Practices (BCP) 38 and 84.23 These RFCs specify steps that an ISP should take to ensure that its customers do not abuse, even accidentally, the addressing scheme by sending invalid source addresses. Participation in the MANRS initiative requires that ISPs commit to implement SAV. Given that BCP 38 is accepted in principle by industry, an obvious role for measurement is to encourage increased uptake of the recommended practice by measuring compliance with the practice by ISPs. The measurement/policing challenge for SAV is that the point of measurement for a given ISP must be internal to that ISP. Thus, one requirement for compliance must be that an ISP that commits to implement BCP 38 must also commit to hosting one or more measurement points. This requirement illustrates the point that commitment to a set of practices must include a commitment to measurement to verify compliance. The Internet Society, in its role as facilitator of MANRS, has no independent measurement tools to verify compliance with the requirements. They currently depend on data from CAIDA to verify compliance with the MANRS requirement that operators do SAV. CAIDA and collaborators previously spent many years operating this capability in the Spoofer project:24 to prove to an independent third party that a given network has properly deployed SAV.25 CAIDA's Spoofer measurements found no evidence that MANRS participants who asserted a commitment to deploy SAV were any more likely to properly deploy it than others. This discovery is a quintessential example of how open knowledge is required to support deployment and assessment of the effectiveness of operational practices. This use of data also illustrates how the technical knowledge generated by measurement and data analysis must be transformed into actionable knowledge. The most common use of this tool so far has been to help operators diagnose their own SAV configurations, a function the private sector has understandably found no incentive to commercially offer. Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet Routing System (BGP) We have recently seen growing acceptance of a step toward better BGP security. The RIRs, which maintain databases of address block ownership, and the IP standards community (IETF) have developed a protocol for voluntary use of Route Origin Authorization (ROA), a mechanism to establish definitive authority to originate a specified prefix into the global routing system. Uptake of this technology is low, although growing. Globally, about 19% of the Internet address space is protected by ROAs as of January 2021.26 The MANRS code of conduct (see section “Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet CA System”) includes a requirement that member ISPs will check the BGP origin announcements of their customers to make sure that the AS and prefix are valid. Dropping BGP announcements that fail this test prevents simple forms of BGP hijack, that is, origin hijacks. However, as with SAV (section “Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet CA System”), there is no measurement effort to verify compliance with this requirement. This gap suggests an obvious next step: demonstrating how ROAs can improve security by identifying who/how/where networks use them. Once address owners register their addresses using ROAs, ISPs can use that information to detect and discard invalid routing announcements, that is, those inconsistent with an ROA. This step improves BGP security by preventing the acceptance and propagation of invalid source announcements. As another example of recent work that helps inform this approach, researchers have developed a method to track which ISPs are dropping invalid routes,27 and will continue to track this over time. Industry has indicated that this is useful actionable knowledge.28 A growing set of ISPs that drop invalid routes will create pressure on other ISPs to register their ROAs, and correct errors in registration, which can in turn motivate further adoption of dropping, creating a virtuous cycle toward improved routing security. Measurement to Reduce Abuse of DNS The DNS is more complex than BGP, and the path toward better security is less clear. There are more layers of operation, more players in the ecosystem, more tensions among them, and fundamentally more things to go wrong. In contrast to BGP, where the Internet Society launched the MANRS initiative to promote a set of operational practices that would reduce the attack surface for abusers of routing system vulnerabilities, there are no widely accepted recommendations for practices that would improve security. It is not clear who could play the role of developing and incentivizing operational norms. One candidate for this role is ICANN, with its significant responsibility for stewardship of the DNS supply industry. But there is growing evidence that security and consumer protection concerns have been a casualty of the multistakeholder model, where low-cost operational practices take priority over secure ones. Before we investigate the development of DNS operational practices, we must evaluate how to define, discover, quantify, and continuously monitor aspects and trends of DNS abuse, in order to find patterns of abusive behavior that can motivate operational practices. An equally important goal is to develop a model that illuminates the incentives of the various actors in the ecosystem, which requires understanding the money flows, contributions of the bad actors to the flows, and degrees of freedom for all parties. This is an ambitious, long-term goal. The starting point is to develop data collection infrastructure that enables mapping of trust dependencies, relationships among domains and name server infrastructure, and unintended attack surfaces that result from current operational practices. This effort is relevant to two classes of threat mentioned earlier: domains registered for legitimate use but exploited by miscreants for illegitimate purposes; and those explicitly registered for malicious use. Researchers have already explored the use of existing data sets (lists of domain names called zone files for different parts of the name hierarchy) to study operational practices reflected in those zone files, including anomalous patterns in the DNS that reflect suspicious or risky registrar or registrant behavior. Such patterns include orphan DNS name servers, bulk registrations,29 delayed registration of domains, and new, changed, or deleted domains/name servers, and their implications for resilience and large-scale vulnerabilities, that is, potential attack surfaces that encompass many domains.30 These relationships include DNS-specific associations, that is, other DNS record types, as well as more general Internet routing dependencies, such as IP address blocks announced by BGP, ROAs, autonomous systems, and registrar information. Another source of data relies on the same files to seed active measurements of DNS infrastructure. Three Dutch research institutions (SURFnet, SIDN Labs, and U. Twente), operate the OpenINTEL project, a system for comprehensive measurements of the global DNS.31 OpenINTEL uses ICANN's Centralized Zone Data Service files, and agreements with other registries, to drive DNS queries for all covered domain names once every 24 hours, covering over 232 million domains per day. OpenINTEL measurements using .com and .nl zones revealed that the vast majority of second-level domains in .com have name servers located in a single AS, while almost half of domains in the .nl zone have name servers in at least two AS. Topological diversity is important to protect against DoS attacks. Sustaining such data infrastructure is necessary to enable transparent and accountable evaluation and socialization of proposed operational practices such as the Internet Society has stewarded for the routing system. ICANN's Security and Stability Advisory Committee has for many years published documents on how to mitigate the many risks to security of a domain name in its lifecycle, and advised stakeholders, accordingly.32 The recommendations in these reports could serve as the basis for discussing a proposed code of conduct. A two-pronged strategy would prioritize implementation and support for technical capabilities to verify one's own (or others') compliance with proposed best practices, and to assess the attack surfaces from (often unintentional) failure to comply. A second prong would be to foster and participate in a cyclic feedback relationship between actionable knowledge that influences policy development and use of this knowledge to refine and inform technical knowledge used in DNS abuse technical communities. Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet CA System Data collection and analysis is critical to sustaining and improving the security of the CA system. Currently, the CA system is one of the better instruments of the systems we consider here. A consortium led by Google instituted a logging system for the CA system called Certificate Transparency (CT). The idea behind CT is that any authority issuing a certificate must also disclose it in a distributed public log that anyone can examine. CAs can still issue a rogue certificate but they cannot do it secretly. Designers of browsers are now being encouraged to check the CT log to see that a certificate is logged there before accepting it. Of course, owners of domain names (or others acting on their behalf) must check the CT logs to detect rogue certificates. Measurement and analysis to detect misbehavior is essential, since problems continue to arise. A detailed analysis of errors and inappropriate actions by Certificate Authorities33 classified 379 incidents of misbehavior by those authorities between 2008 and 2019, with causes including human error, lack of required auditing, system penetrations, and misconfigured or buggy software. They identified 30 probable or confirmed issuance of rogue certificates. The authors' high-level conclusions echo to some extent the conclusions about the DNS: Certificate Authorities are profit-seeking firms whose primary goal is to sell certificates. There is evidence that motivations of profitability can lead some actors to compromise the expectation that they will serve the public interest by operating at the highest level of integrity and quality. The CA system also has the most well-developed industry-led effort to discipline this market. The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum)34 designs and publishes guidelines regarding the issuance and management of digital certificates, and identifies CAs that do not conform. The various web browsers include a list of CAs that the browser will trust when verifying a query, and the developers of the different browsers have dropped many CAs from their list of trusted authorities, which means that when a user attempts to connect to a website that uses a certificate from one of these untrusted authorities, they will receive a warning message and have to take explicit steps to bypass the warning and proceed. There are several lessons we draw from study of the CA system. This work illustrates the value of data collection and analysis, both to understand the extent of the problem, and to provide support for proposals as to how to mitigate it. The CA/Browser Forum represents what seems to be a functioning bottom-up industry organization that has taken steps to improve security. The CA/Browser Forum has accepted the necessity of causing possible collateral harm to improve security. Certificates from untrusted authorities will either be rejected or trigger a warning to a user that they are about to engage in a potentially dangerous action. It is not clear what recourse a CA has if it is declared untrustworthy. Designers of systems like this, based on a private sector tribunal, have considerable latitude to determine the checks and balances and the rights of recourse. Regionalization: The Evolving Character of the Internet The vulnerabilities of the Internet identifier system have persisted for decades, and there is reason for skepticism that a focus only on collection of data, even if translated to actionable knowledge, will lead to substantial improvements in the integrity of the Internet identifier systems. A central element of our approach is to find solutions that do not require global consensus and implementation. Regional approaches (see the section “Proposed Approach: Zones of Trust”) will allow groups that decide they will choose to trust each other to define and control the systems on which they depend. We refer to regions that embody a common sense of commitment and a commitment to distance themselves from the global pool of bad actors as zones of trust. To be effective, this approach must include mechanisms to keep typical activities of users inside such a zone. An observation about the Internet's changing character gives us some confidence that we can find a path to success. We provide some evidence for this observation in the section “Measuring Regionalization.” The design goal of the Internet was and continues to be that any two machines anywhere on the Internet could freely communicate. A packet might cross several AS to reach its destination, but today most traffic traverses only one, in large part due to the goal of efficient delivery of high-volume content from large providers, for example, Netflix, Amazon, and YouTube, to access providers. Such content providers strive to stage their content in intermediate servers, and attach them directly to large broadband access providers at geographically distributed points. In this case, not only does the traffic need to cross only one service provider, but the traffic enters the access network at a point close to where it will exit to the consumer. Many application designers similarly use cloud platforms and associated services to host applications and content close to the users, thereby shortening the path data takes across the Internet, optimizing performance for users, infrastructure support cost for themselves, and improved resilience. In the United States, the largest cloud providers are Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Microsoft Azure. As an example, AWS organizes its cloud platform into regions, within which are availability zones for resilience. As of October 2020, AWS has 24 regions (three more announced) and 77 availability zones across the globe.35 An access network may connect to multiple of these regions and zones, so depending on the deployment scenario, traffic may originate and terminate at points on the access network that are relatively close to each other. One outcome of this evolutionary trajectory is that traffic on the public Internet becomes more localized; the role of the Internet becomes the consumer-facing mass-market access method to the larger Internet ecosystem, with more of the traffic exiting the public Internet onto these other platform assets as soon as possible. Measuring the degree to which the Internet experience has become more localized is challenging, because the degree to which a user's experience is localized will depend on where that user is within the Internet. A user attached to a large, US broadband access provider will probably have a much more localized experience than a user from the developing world. In addition, measuring the destination to which actual users go raises issues of data collection and privacy. As an initial exploration to assess how localized the Internet experience is becoming, we took two different datasets of popular destinations on the Internet, and measured how far away they were (in terms of the number of AS crossed to reach them) starting from the home location of one of us. This sort of exploration yields only anecdotal insight, and (as mentioned earlier) is highly colored by the fact that the origin used for the exploration was served by a well-connected US broadband access provider. For our first experiment, we started with the Cisco “umbrella list,”36 which lists the top one million URLs worldwide, and extracted the top 1000 second-level domain (SLD) names (names like google.com, or netflix.com). Based on its proprietary sampling methodology, Cisco infers these SLDs to be the most popular worldwide. They may not well represent the behavior of a typical US broadband user, but they provide an initial starting point. In November 2020, we used our local DNS resolver (on our residential broadband connection) to map each SLD (or a popular subdomain of the SLD) to an IP address. Of these 1000 SLDs, the associated address for 630 of them was in an AS directly connected to our access provider. In other words, the path from our home to the destination crossed the access provider and went directly to the AS hosting that address. Eighty-seven percent of those SLDs had addresses that were hosted on large cloud and CDN providers such as Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Akamai. This (again anecdotally) illustrates the migration of applications and services into the cloud. About 379 of the SLDs were reached by crossing multiple AS. (The sum of the two exceed 1000 since we reached a few SLDs directly as well as indirectly.) Seventy-six percent of the paths to these SLDs went through the traditional Tier 1 providers such as Level 3, Cogent, NTT, or Telia. Forty-nine of the SLDs were in China, reflecting the global nature of this list. Since the Cisco top one million list is worldwide, it may not be representative of a typical US broadband access network user experience. One could instrument a set of US users to see where their connections actually go, but that sort of research would raise serious privacy concerns. However, we can experiment on ourselves. The Firefox browser records a history of visited URLs, so one of us looked at the URLs visited from our own browser to see where we had been going. The browser logged 8791 URLs37 from which we extracted 1452 distinct domains. We could resolve all but 21 of them at the present time. We assume the others were no longer active or cannot be resolved for some other reason. Of those, we found 747 (52%) of those domains directly connected to our access network, and 754 by an indirect path. (The sum exceeds 1452 because again some were reached both directly and indirectly.) Again, 81% of the directly connected domains were hosted by a major CDN or cloud provider, illustrating the growing use of cloud services to host many websites. Beyond that 81%, most of the directly connected destinations were customers of the access provider. There were a total of 70 directly attached AS where the directly connected domains were hosted. For the domains that were reached by a path with more than one intermediate AS, 92% of the paths exited the access provider across one of the traditional Tier 1 transit providers. One further question relates to the character of the AS paths, especially the longer paths. The data here is sometimes ambiguous: the traceroute tool we use sometimes does not properly report all the autonomous systems along the path. But of the paths where we have a reasonable confidence that the data is correct, we found 43 domains that were four hops away (located within 20 different AS) and nine domains that were five hops away (located within two different AS). A few of these terminated outside the United States, but most of them went to a destination that was reached through a Tier 2 provider attached to the Tier 1 that was the exit path from the initial AS. For the set of URLs in this sample, we found no paths that were longer than 5 AS. Our high-level conclusion from these preliminary explorations is that many websites today are provisioned in a distributed and replicated way, which means that the path to them (at least across a major US broadband access provider) is a direct path from that access provider to the location of the website. On the other hand, connectivity via traditional transit providers seems to still be critical. About half of our observed connections depended on these paths. But these paths were still relatively short: they either crossed a Tier 1 provider to a directly connected customer or to a customer attached to a Tier 2 provider of that Tier 1 provider. Moving Content and Services to the Cloud An additional element of the observed regionalization of the Internet is the behavior of enterprise customers. Enterprise customers, as well as application developers, are moving to the cloud. To improve the performance and security of these enterprise systems, there are networks, distinct from the public Internet but often with global reach, that offer to connect enterprise locations to cloud locations. AWS, for example, partners with such providers, which they call Direct Connect Partners, as alternatives to the public Internet to reach AWS from enterprise sites. These alternative networks can offer better service commitments than the public Internet. Exactly because the Internet is composed of many interconnected AS, each operated by a separate firm, cooperation and coordination among these firms is required to ensure a specified level of performance. This level of coordination is hard to achieve among AS providers who are competitors at the same time that they interconnect. The service traditionally provided by the public Internet has been called best effort service—the collective set of AS do their best to deliver traffic, but make no specific commitment as to the performance or reliability. The cloud networks operated by AWS or Google, even though they may have global reach, are under the control of one firm that can engineer and manage its network to make stronger service commitments. Similarly, the third-party networks (like Amazon's Direct Connect Partners) that provide enterprise interconnect to cloud providers are operated by one entity, which can control network characteristics. Innovation in the cloud ecosystem provides new options for application designers, and how application designers choose to exploit these assets influences how the ecosystem evolves. This evolution is not a planned process, but an emergent phenomenon. A metrics-based zone of trust approach can leverage this evolutionary trend to improve the security of the Internet for most users, and importantly, without threatening the role of the public Internet in enabling permissionless innovation at the edge. As users increasingly depend on only a region of the Internet for what they do, that region can provide them a more secure and trustworthy experience by undertaking operational practices that prevent, or at least hinder, actors outside the region attempting to disrupt operations in the region. An important assumption underlying our proposal is that neither the process nor outcome will disrupt the globally interconnected character of the Internet. Two end points anywhere on the Internet can still exchange traffic directly. We distinguish this trajectory toward more local connections, which we call the regionalization of the Internet, from what has been called the Balkanization of the Internet, which implies deliberate disconnection of regions.38 Some countries are exploring the extent to which they can isolate their region from the global Internet. Such deliberate isolation is a different phenomenon from what we describe, which is the continuing enrichment of platform assets on which application developers depend, in a virtuous cycle with creative exploitation of platform assets by application designers to provide a better user experience. Of course, this movement toward the cloud could be reduced if the cloud ecosystem becomes more problematic for the application developer. It is important that the research community continue to track issues in the larger Internet ecosystem that might discourage application designers from locating there, such as lack of resilience, issues of security, or business issues. While there has so far only been limited discussion of “cloud neutrality,”39 by analogy to network neutrality, issues such as this could arise and push application designers in different directions. Leveraging Regionalization to Prevent Abuse of the Address Space The IP address space is administered regionally, with five RIRs responsible for address allocation in different parts of the globe. But it is used globally, and forcing a geographic structure on its use is an unnecessary and, in our view, harmful constraint. Global connectivity of the address space is a core value of the Internet's design. We think about regionalization in this context in the following way. A commitment by individual ISPs to implement SAV does not create a connected region. The requirement for security through regionalization derives from controlling the risk of harm that arises from a lack of SAV, which is increased ability for an attacker to carry out DDoS attacks. At the packet forwarding layer, the only obvious countermeasures to DDoS attacks are to block or dissipate the traffic. Regionalization may help this approach, although the tradeoffs merit consideration. First, while many Internet services are replicated in many regions, these services typically still have globally reachable addresses, and thus globally attackable addresses. But regionalization removes the need for global reachability of these replicas. An application provider may want some globally reachable service points for resilience, but restrict other instantiations of the service to one region. The first issue with this approach is that the back end control element of the application needs to reach (to manage) the distributed service points. But cloud-hosted service points could have two interfaces: one connecting to the public Internet but not globally reachable and one in the private cloud network, protected from attack. This pattern is used by some applications today, and might become more common in the future. Second, many critical Internet services today use anycast addressing, a technique that assigns the same address to many different distributed destinations. The Internet routing protocols then automatically take traffic to the closest instance, in terms of the routing path computation, of that address. With anycast-addressed services, DDoS attacks from bots in different parts of the world can only reach the nearest instance of the server, thus dissipating the attack. Third, if regionalization is empirically true then it implies that links connecting regions will be less important to most activities, thus operators could throttle (but not disable) them during an attack to keep bots outside the region from overwhelming services inside the region. This approach would degrade global connectivity of the region to preserve stable operation internal to the region, although presumably the DDoS attack itself is already degrading connectivity on those links. Operators might be able to throttle/block only those addresses under attack, as with many DDoS scrubbing services today. Leveraging Regionalization to Prevent Abuse of the Routing System In the section “Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet Routing System (BGP),” we described a measurement-based approach to prevent a simple form of BGP route hijacks: invalid source announcements. Hijackers can launch more sophisticated attacks, which involve an invalid path announcement. The general form of this attack is that the customer provides a BGP announcement with (perhaps several) AS numbers in the path, where the first is a valid origin (AS/prefix) and the last is the valid AS of the customer. In other words, the hijacker is asserting that it has customers, one of which is this AS, for which there is a valid AS/prefix ROA. To block this option for route hijacking, MANRS could tighten its operational practices over time. We envision an approach, which we call recursive MANRS, that requires that every MANRS-compliant ISP know which of its customers is also MANRS-compliant. This information will not change rapidly, so it should not be a burden for ISPs to track it. If the customer of a MANRS-compliant ISP is also MANRS-compliant, then that provider ISP can assume that the customer ISP has checked its own customers, and it can safely accept the path. If the ISP's customer does not participate in MANRS, the ISP should treat any BGP announcement from this customer as suspect. If the ISP receiving this suspect announcement from this customer has another route to the same origin that is not suspect, it should discard the suspect one independent of the AS path length. This is analogous to a “Know Your Customer (KYC)” operational practice: a MANRS-compliant AS treats BGP announcements from its customers differently depending on whether its customers were themselves MANRS-compliant. But for this practice to limit propagation of invalid path announcements, MANRS-compliant AS must be directly connected into a contiguous region. Recursive application of this rule means that an attacker's false path announcement will not succeed within the topological region circumscribed by that set of AS—a zone of trust for secure routing. Today, some MANRS members form an interconnected region, but other members are isolated from that region, because they connect to the Internet using transit providers that do not commit to being MANRS-compliant. Ongoing measurement and analysis is required to maintain open knowledge of the topology of MANRS members, and to identify prospective networks that would improve the connectivity of individual MANRS members to a directly connected cluster that represents a zone of trust. The emergence of a coherent region of directly connected MANRS AS creates a stronger industry incentive for additional AS to join MANRS. Customers are better protected from being misled by false BGP announcements if they connect to a MANRS-compliant transit provider, and a customer that is concerned that others will not forward its route announcements needs to connect to a MANRS-compliant transit provider. There is an alternative approach to preventing the propagation of invalid path announcements, called Autonomous System Provider Authorization, or ASPA.40 ASPA proposes a new, global, cryptographically signed database, perhaps stored in the same location as the ROA data, in which each AS records its transit providers. If all AS within a zone of trust have recorded an ASPA, then any AS within the zone that receives an invalid (hijack) route announcement can detect it. AS within the zone are then protected from hijacks based on invalid path announcements. In recursive MANRS, the knowledge of which providers an AS is using is implicit—the knowledge is not publicly recorded in a global database but results from business agreements between provider and customer AS. Since the data is not globally known, only a router at the point where a MANRS-compliant AS receives a route announcement from a noncompliant customer can perform the check. In ASPA, any router can perform the check. Recursive MANRS is thus an enhanced practice that all MANRS-compliant AS must implement. The advantage of recursive MANRS is that there is no global, public database. A database of that sort may be a substantial barrier to deployment, as it requires every AS to publicly disclose its potential transit providers, and it may be a target of malicious attack to corrupt the information. Corrupting the database could effectively drop an AS from the Internet. On the other hand, the global database may allow the detection (and blocking) of certain forms of route leaks. This discussion of preventing hijacks based on invalid path announcements illustrates that a given mechanism, for example, the use of ROAs, can play a role in a range of operational practices with different security outcomes. Simple dropping of route announcements where the ROA makes the route invalid will prevent invalid origin hijacks. Dropping route announcements according to the recursive MANRS rule additionally prevents invalid path hijacks. Of course, different operational practices may trigger different incentives by the various actors to deploy the practices. Leveraging Regionalization to Prevent Abuse of the DNS Improving the security of the DNS through the approach of regionalization is more complex than in the case of BGP, where the actors that commit to a code of conduct (such as MANRS or an enhanced MANRS) have an explicit topological relationship to each other. The DNS, as conceived, is global in its nature, and by design does not map onto the topology of the Internet. A domain name registered in any TLD can name a service hosted in any part of the Internet, and in principle a user in any part of the Internet might look up a name registered in any TLD. A zone-of-trust approach must find a creative way to regionalize this behavior. Imagine that a suitable group of experts, assembled so as not to include the bad guys in the group, defines a code of conduct for registries and registrars that reduces the incidence of registrations for malicious purposes, and improves the ability of law enforcement to identify the registrant. How can that first step lead to a zone of trust? One obvious but possibly over-aggressive answer is that for users that choose to be within a zone of trust with respect to the DNS, resolvers do not resolve names that are registered in registries/registrars that do not conform to the code of conduct. That is, those resolvers return some sort of error response to a DNS query about those names. This approach accepts the risk that legitimate services may become unavailable, at least if a zone of trust suddenly deployed such a mechanism. However, a well-orchestrated transition would notify providers of legitimate services that they need to register their service names inside a compliant name service. A service could have more than one domain name, and a service that desired a global reach might register several names, each valid inside a given zone of trust. Such a scheme would not eliminate all DNS-based malicious activity on the Internet. It would motivate malicious actors to try to get within the zone of trust, that is, to register names with providers that comply with the code of conduct. Thus, the code of conduct must include elements that make it harder for these actors to register names for malicious purposes, and easier to find out who they are. Users, or their tools, can also install exceptions to local blocking by recursive resolvers of DNS queries. Also, registries that agree to a code of conduct must be able to refuse registrations from registrars that do not comply with it,41 or else the zone of trust must require both registry and registrar information to assess whether a name is within the zone of trust. Leveraging Regionalization for the CA System We noted in the section “Measurement to Reduce Abuse of Internet CA System” that browser developers have been willing to remove many CAs from their list of trusted actors. Such removal can cause collateral harm in the form of inconvenience (or outright blockage) to users trying legitimately to get to websites with certificates issued by those CAs. However, many CAs seem to serve regional markets, and regional decisions about whether to trust a CA may balance the benefits and harms based on observed behavior of users in different regions. The Role of the Application in Creating and Exploiting a Zone of Trust Application behavior, for example, high-volume streaming, has moved the Internet toward its regionalized character, and in so doing provided a way to think about security at a regionalized level. But in a zone of trust, applications must take steps to remain within that zone, or take special action if they must go outside that zone. A study of design practices for modern applications is an important part of this proposal. Email is a quintessential example of a global application that is also a primary vector for malicious behavior. It may be the most challenging application to shape so that it has a regional character. We must consider all the security vulnerabilities that arise inside email and see how our region concept could be exploited to mitigate them. Summary Thoughts and Conclusions With respect to the various security challenges we identified, we described a zone of trust that can mitigate that concern within its scope. With respect to BGP, the zone of trust might be that set of interconnected autonomous systems that commit to the practices defined by MANRS: to verify that their customers are announcing valid blocks of addresses; to flag unverified announcements that come from outside the zone; and to reject announcements from outside the zone if they conflict with announcements from within the zone. Another zone might commit to the enhanced practices we called recursive MANRS. An AS utilizes that zone of trust by registering its ROAs and connecting to the Internet through a transit provider that is MANRS-compliant. An AS connected in this way will have a high level of assurance that the route to any other AS connected in this way will not be hijacked. In turn, applications that host their service points inside those AS are protected from hijacking. With respect to the DNS, the zone of trust is defined by the set of registrars and registries that agree to a code of conduct that makes those domains inhospitable to malicious users. Names in those domains are much less likely to be dangerous, avoiding (or cautiously treating) resolution of a name outside that zone of trust will diminish exposure to risk. Alternatively, a trust zone might be defined by a set of operators of recursive DNS resolvers that commit to block access to domains or URLs based on a determination that they host abusers, and to hold registries and registrars to a high level of operational performance. With respect to the CA system, the zone of trust is the set of CAs that are judged trustworthy. Our long-term goal is to foster the emergence of zones of trust within the Internet. With proper framing and shaping of incentives, these zones may emerge bottom-up in the existing ecosystem. Alternatively, governments may move to shape the regions of the Internet under their control. Individual governments, or even groups of governments, cannot impose global solutions. The ability to create regions of higher trust across national boundaries is central to any approach to governmental regulation or intervention to improve Internet infrastructure security. We have some understanding of the requirements for a zone of trust. A sustainable zone of trust requires five elements: Clear rules about acceptable behavior A commitment to measurement to detect rule violation A commitment to deal with rule violation Constraints on the ability of bad actors outside the zone to disrupt its operation Applications that limit their dependencies to the extent possible to the zone in which the application operates The concept of a zone of trust must be general. Different threats will call for zones of different shape and dimension. For one threat, the zone might be jurisdictional, for another the zone might be a connected set of AS. So long as an activity operates within a zone of trust defined for each threat, the zone will provide enhanced security. A key component is measurement to provide critical knowledge about topology and connectivity, the basis for validating commitments, and the state of deployment. Pursuit of this approach should include an international advisory team that includes policy makers, operators, and researchers to advise on the role of measurement and analysis in developing these operational procedures. Adapted from National Research Council. Postel, Internet Protocol. Rekhter, Lee, and Hares. Postel, Transmission Control Protocol. Postel, Internet Protocol. Deering and Hinden. Luckie, Beverly, Koga, et al., “Network Hygiene, Incentives.” This attack may seem to be an abuse of the addressing system, but it is the routing system that allows one user to appropriate another user's addresses. Spammers will hijack a small block of addresses, send a large volume of spam, and withdraw the hijack. This makes it seem as if the spam came from a legitimate sender. Testart, Richter, King, et al., “Profiling BGP Serial Hijackers.” For a survey of the history of proposed schemes to secure BGP, see Testart, “Reviewing a Historical Internet Vulnerability.” This data is reported in the monthly DAAR reports, which can be found at https://www.icann.org/octo-ssr/daar. Testart, “Reviewing a Historical Internet Vulnerability,” at footnote 16. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. ICANN Articles of Incorporation. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. ICANN Bylaws. Cute; Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Board Action on Competition. Vixie and Schryver. DNS Response Policy Zones; Vixie. Taking Back the DNS. Ferguson and Senie; Baker and Savola. Luckie, Keys, Koga, et al., Spoofer Source Address. Luckie, Beverly, Koga, et al., “Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regulation.” Testart, Richter, King, et al. “To Filter or not to Filter.” Lagerfeldt and Gustawsson. Piscitello and Strutt; Aaron. Akiwate, Jonker, Sommese, et al. Rijswijk-Deij, Jonker, Sperotto, and Pras. ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC). SSAC Advisory on Registrant Protection; ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC). SSAC Response to the new gTLD Subsequent. Serrano, Hadan, and Camp. It is not clear over what period of time this list was collected, but a sample of over eight thousand URLs seems like a reasonable sample for a first exploration. The term “balkanization” as applied to the Internet may have first been used in a 1997 paper by Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson. The term has been used since by many authors, usually to describe an undesirable outcome where the Internet splinters into disconnected regions. Aximov, Bogomazov, Bush, et al. Under current ICANN rules, registries may not discriminate in this fashion.
Cloudflare provides Managed Lists you can use in rule expressions. These lists are regularly updated. Managed IP Lists Use Managed IP Lists to access Cloudflare’s IP threat intelligence. Cloudflare provides the following Managed IP Lists: \|Display name\|\|Name in expressions\|\|Description\| \|Cloudflare Open Proxies\|\|IP addresses of known open HTTP and SOCKS proxy endpoints, which are frequently used to launch attacks and hide attackers identity.\| \|Cloudflare Anonymizers\|\|IP addresses of known anonymizers (Open SOCKS Proxies, VPNs, and TOR nodes).\| \|Cloudflare VPNs\|\|IP addresses of known VPN servers.\| \|Cloudflare Malware\|\|IP addresses of known sources of malware.\| \|Cloudflare Botnets, Command and Control Servers\|\|IP addresses of known botnet command-and-control servers.\|
Version 1.1 - 07.08.2017 The purpose of this document is to provide clean and simple diagrams of Security Gateway packet flow. Although there are quite a few SecureKnowledge articles for the matter and also some attempts on CheckMates to summarize the logical packet flows, it is quite hard to find straight forward explanation of the inspection and acceleration in a single document. The most challenging part is to come up with a unified diagram showing all possible packet flow paths, inspection and decision points. The author of this document, after several attempts to make it right, has decided to keep main packet flow diagram separate from Content Inspection block for sake of simplicity and better visual representation. The document is not intended to provide a full explanation of Gateway architecture, technological solutions and product structure rather than be a reference point for those who seek simplified and easy to grasp materials to start with. Multiple SKs and documents for the matter are listed in the References section of the document. Main packet flow The following diagram represents general packet flow through a Security Gateway. Diagram 1 - Overall GW Packet Flow In a nutshell, once packet is received by a Security Gateway, the very first decision is about whether is has to be decrypted. Depending on acceleration settings and abilities, both individual packets and full connections can be accelerated through SecureXL. If acceleration is not possible, the packet is inspected through FW policy. Only the first packet in the accepted connection goes through policy rulebase matched routine. FW inspection for further packet belonging to a connection which is already accepted by FW is relatively lightweight. It may be required to perform Content Inspection for the data flow of a specific connection. In this case packets will also go through Content Inspection block which is discussed below. Once all the required security checks are done, packet will be encrypted, if required, and finally forwarded out of the GW. Content Inspection is a complex process based on the data streaming capabilities of a Security Gateway. FW extracts a data content form individual packets and builds a stream which is being inspected by different security features: URL Filtering, Application Control, Anti-Bot, Content Awareness, SandBlast etc. A simplified logical view of such inspection is shown on the diagram below: Diagram 2 - Content Inspection Block To make it easier correlating it with the main packet flow, entry and exit point for the Content Inspection Block are shown here as well as on the Diagram 1. Content Inspection may decide to discard the packet. If that happens, the connection it belongs to will also be cut and removed from the connection table of FW kernel. If no negative security decision is made, packets will be forwarded normally. CoreXL and Acceleration Paths Before CoreXL coming into picture (pre-R65 versions), FW was only capable to perform a single CPU core based policy inspection. To leverage multi-core platforms, and to avoid a single CPU core to be a bottleneck, SecureXL was added. SecureXL is capable to offload particular part of security decisions and VPN encryption into separate computation devices: a different core or cores on the same chip or even to a CPU-on-a-card. With SecureXL certain connections could avoid FW path partially (packet acceleration) or completely (acceleration with templates) CoreXL helps GWs in leveraging multi-core platforms even better, allowing to use some CPU cores for acceleration and some others for FW and Content Inspection (fwk workers). With Content Inspection in the picture, today we can distinguish three so-called paths for the packet flow through a Security GW: - FW Path - Accelerated Path and - Medium Path Although CoreXL is out there for some years now, sometimes those terms can be misunderstood or misrepresented. Let's clarify what which path really means. The easiest way to do so is to use Diagram 1 and to see which parts of the packet flow is active for every case. FW Path is implored when acceleration is not possible. In this case each packet in the connection goes through FW Kernel Inspection section and sometimes through Content Inspection block, if policy requires that. This is how it looks: Diagram 3 - Firewall Path Flow Accelerated Path (previously also known as Fast Path) is active when a connection can be accelerated with a template through SecureXL device. In this case all individual packets within the connection will bypath both FW Kernel section an Content Inspection block: Diagram 4 - Accelerated Path Flow Note: Drop Templates acceleration fork is omitted from the SecureXL section of the diagram as it is not considered part of Accelerated Path. We use "Path" term only for packets forwarded through the FW. This term causes some confusion from time to time. Let's clarify what it means. Medium Path is a situation when opening and closing a connection is handled by SecureXL, while data flow needs some further inspection and hence goes through Content Inspection. In such case the full connection flow can be shown as follows: Diagram 5 - Medium Path Flow When Medium Path is available, TCP handshake is fully accelerated with SecureXL. Rulebase match is achieved for the first packet through an existing connection acceleration template. SYN-ACK and ACK packets are also fully accelerated. However, once data starts flowing, to stream it for Content Inspection, the packets will be now handled by a FWK instance. Any packets containing data will be sent to FWK for data extraction to build the data stream. RST, FIN and FIN-ACK packets once again are only handled by SecureXL as they do not contain any data that needs to be streamed. Questions and Answers This section is containing the most common questions and answers for the matter. Q: Why CoreXL is not on the diagrams? A: CoreXL is a mechanism to assign, balance and manage CPU cores. CoreXL SND makes a decision to "stick" particular connection going through FW or Medium Paths to a specific FWK instance. It is not part of the logical flow for a specific packet though.

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