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<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Nuwer 20(Rachel Nuwer; contributor for NYT, 6-1-2020, "Mass Extinctions Are Accelerating, Scientists Report," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/science/mass-extinctions-are-accelerating-scientists-report.html, accessed 11-30-2020//mrul) fulltext: We are in the midst of a mass extinction, many scientists have warned — this one driven not by a catastrophic natural event, but by humans. The unnatural loss of biodiversity is accelerating, and if it continues, the planet will lose vast ecosystems and the necessities they provide, including fresh water, pollination, and pest and disease control. On Monday, there was more bad news: We are racing faster and closer toward the point of collapse than scientists previously thought, according to research published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The extinction rate among terrestrial vertebrate species is significantly higher than prior estimates, and the critical window for preventing mass losses will close much sooner than formerly assumed — in 10 to 15 years. “We’re eroding the capabilities of the planet to maintain human life and life in general,” said Gerardo Ceballos, an ecologist at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and lead author of the new study. The current rate of extinctions vastly exceeds those that would occur naturally, Dr. Ceballos and his colleagues found. Scientists know of 543 species lost over the last 100 years, a tally that would normally take 10,000 years to accrue. “In other words, every year over the last century we lost the same number of species typically lost in 100 years,” Dr. Ceballos said. If nothing changes, about 500 more terrestrial vertebrate species are likely to go extinct over the next two decades alone, bringing total losses equivalent to those that would have taken place naturally over 16,000 years. To determine how many species are on the brink of extinction, Dr. Ceballos and co-authors Paul Ehrlich, a conservation biologist at Stanford University, and Peter Raven, an environmentalist at the Missouri Botanical Garden, turned to population data for 29,400 terrestrial vertebrate species compiled by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. Of those species, 515 — or 1.7 percent — are critically endangered, they found, with fewer than 1,000 individuals remaining. About half of these species comprise fewer than 250 individuals. The researchers also examined species with populations between 1,000 and 5,000. When the scientists added those 388 species to their original analysis, they found an 84 percent geographic overlap — largely in the tropics — with species in the critically endangered group. The loss of some will likely trigger a domino effect that sends others into a downward spiral, ultimately threatening entire ecosystems, the authors report. Dr. Ceballos compared this process to removing bricks from the wall of a house. “If you take one brick out, nothing happens — maybe it just becomes noisier and more humid inside,” he said. “But if you take too many out, eventually your house will collapse.” Conservationists, therefore, should consider all species with populations under 5,000 individuals to be in danger of extinction, Dr. Ceballos and his colleagues concluded. “This is a substantial increase in what we have typically thought of as endangered,” said Daniel Blumstein, an ecologist at the University of California, Los Angeles, who was not involved in the research. The new study also emphasizes the importance of protecting individual populations of animals, not just a species itself. Based on an analysis of the current and historical ranges of critically endangered species, the researchers calculated that more than 237,000 individual populations have disappeared since 1900. In a previous study, Dr. Ceballos and Dr. Ehrlich similarly found that 32 percent of 27,600 vertebrate species’ populations are declining around the world. As populations disappear from geographic areas, the species’ function there also disappears. The loss of honeybees in the United States, for example, would deal an economic blow of more than $15 billion, but the species itself would still survive elsewhere around the world. “The population declines of common species — top predators, large-bodied herbivores like the rhino, pollinators and others — have large effects on the way ecosystems function even when they are far from extinction,” said Rebecca Shaw, chief scientist at the World Wildlife Fund, who was not involved in the research. “Ceballos and his colleagues are telling us with scientific certainty that the survival of these species is linked to our own survival,” she added. Dr. Ehrlich emphasized that the study’s overall findings were almost certainly a gross underestimate of the true scope of the extinction problem. Their analysis did not take plants or aquatic or invertebrate species into account, and it included only approximately 5 percent of terrestrial vertebrates for which scientists have population data. The findings are “in fact what one would expect in the gathering biodiversity crisis,” said Thomas Lovejoy, an ecologist at George Mason University, who was not involved in the research. The paper “should be considered a major wake-up call while there is still time to make a difference.” That so few people are aware of the impending crisis, Dr. Lovejoy added, is a cause of the crisis itself. Many who are aware may simply feel the loss is not consequential. “People say, ‘What the hell of a difference does it make to me?’” Dr. Ehrlich said. But often the role of a particular plant or animal in an ecosystem has become apparent only after the species in question is gone. Passenger pigeons, for example, once numbered in the billions. Their voracious appetite for seeds limited population growth of other seed-eating species, including white-footed mice — the natural reservoir for the bacterium that causes Lyme disease. After the passenger pigeon’s extinction, white-footed mice populations exploded, and the risks to human health increased. The impacts of the passenger pigeon’s extinction, researchers wrote in Science, “are still being felt a century after the last passenger pigeon died.” As humans continue to encroach on nature and wildlife, Dr. Ceballos and his colleagues warn of a cascading series of impacts — including more frequent occurrences of new diseases and pandemics. The coronavirus that launched the pandemic originated in a wild animal, most scientists believe. “The vaccine for Covid-19 was natural habitat,” Dr. Ceballos said. “The pandemic is a great example of how badly we’ve treated nature.” With enough species losses, ecosystems will eventually fail, destabilizing economies and governments and triggering famine and refugee crises. But there are steps that can be taken now, Dr. Ceballos said. Habitat loss and wildlife trade are currently responsible for the brunt of the problem, whereas climate change has yet to unleash “the full tsunami” of its impacts, Dr. Ceballos said. To offset the most urgent wave of extinctions, he and his colleagues call for an immediate end to illegal wildlife trade. “There’s no way this can be continued, wiping out species and putting the whole of humanity in danger,” Dr. Ceballos said. “We can solve this immediate problem.” They also call for a halt to deforestation and a complete reform of the legal wildlife trade — one that prioritizes sustainability over profits. “The most fundamental problem is reducing the scale of the human enterprise, especially its consumptive demands on the biosphere,” Dr. Ehrlich said. Making these changes will require electing leaders who prioritize the environment, redistributing resources and slowing human population growth. To help organize these efforts, Dr. Ceballos and Dr. Ehrlich launched a new global initiative called Stop Extinction. The initiative aims to provide a framework for creating new national agreements, as well as tools for educating and activating the public about the unfolding extinction crisis. “All of us need to understand that what we do in the next five to 10 years will define the future of humanity,” Dr. Ceballos said.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The extinction of a few species <u>now</u> causes a domino effect collapsing <u>entire ecosystems</u>.</h4><p><strong>Nuwer 20</strong>(Rachel Nuwer; contributor for NYT, 6-1-2020, "Mass Extinctions Are Accelerating, Scientists Report," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/science/mass-extinctions-are-accelerating-scientists-report.html, accessed 11-30-2020//mrul)</p><p><u><mark>We are in the midst of</mark> a <strong>mass <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>, many scientists have warned — <u>this one driven not by a catastrophic natural event, but by humans. The <strong><mark>unnatural loss of biodiversity is accelerating</strong></mark>, and if it continues, the <strong><mark>planet will lose</mark> vast <mark>ecosystems</strong></mark> and the necessities they provide, including fresh water, pollination, and pest and <strong><mark>disease control</mark>.</strong> </u>On Monday, there was more bad news: <u>We are <strong><mark>racing</mark> faster and <mark>closer toward</mark> the point of <mark>collapse</strong></mark> than scientists previously thought, according to research published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.</u> The extinction rate among terrestrial vertebrate species is significantly higher than prior estimates, and the critical window for preventing mass losses will close much sooner than formerly assumed — in 10 to 15 years. “We’re eroding the capabilities of the planet to maintain human life and life in general,” said Gerardo Ceballos, an ecologist at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and lead author of the new study. The current rate of extinctions vastly exceeds those that would occur naturally, Dr. Ceballos and his colleagues found. Scientists know of 543 species lost over the last 100 years, a tally that would normally take 10,000 years to accrue. “In other words, every year over the last century we lost the same number of species typically lost in 100 years,” Dr. Ceballos said. If nothing changes, about 500 more terrestrial vertebrate species are likely to go extinct over the next two decades alone, bringing total losses equivalent to those that would have taken place naturally over 16,000 years. To determine how many species are on the brink of extinction, Dr. Ceballos and co-authors Paul Ehrlich, a conservation biologist at Stanford University, and Peter Raven, an environmentalist at the Missouri Botanical Garden, turned to population data for 29,400 terrestrial vertebrate species compiled by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. <u>Of those species, 515 — or </u>1.7 percent<u><strong> — are critically endangered</strong>, they found, with fewer than 1,000 individuals remaining. About half of these species comprise fewer than 250 individuals. </u>The researchers also examined species with populations between 1,000 and 5,000. When the scientists added those 388 species to their original analysis, they found an 84 percent geographic overlap — largely in the tropics — with species in the critically endangered group. <u><mark>The loss of some will</mark> likely <mark>trigger a <strong>domino effect</strong></mark> that sends others <mark>into a <strong>downward spiral</strong></mark>, ultimately <strong><mark>threatening</mark> <mark>entire ecosystems</u></strong></mark>, the authors report. Dr. Ceballos compared this process to removing bricks from the wall of a house. “<u>If you take one brick out, nothing happens — maybe it just becomes noisier and more humid inside,” he said. “But <strong><mark>if you take too many out</strong></mark>, eventually <strong><mark>your house will collapse</strong></mark>.” </u>Conservationists, therefore, should consider all species with populations under 5,000 individuals to be in danger of extinction, Dr. Ceballos and his colleagues concluded. “This is a substantial increase in what we have typically thought of as endangered,” said Daniel Blumstein, an ecologist at the University of California, Los Angeles, who was not involved in the research. The new study also emphasizes the importance of protecting individual populations of animals, not just a species itself. Based on an analysis of the current and historical ranges of critically endangered species, the researchers calculated that more than 237,000 individual populations have disappeared since 1900. In a previous study, Dr. Ceballos and Dr. Ehrlich similarly found that 32 percent of 27,600 vertebrate species’ populations are declining around the world. As populations disappear from geographic areas, the species’ function there also disappears. The loss of honeybees in the United States, for example, would deal an economic blow of more than $15 billion, but the species itself would still survive elsewhere around the world. “The <u>population declines of common species — top predators, large-bodied herbivores like <strong><mark>the rhino</strong></mark>, pollinators and others — <strong><mark>have large effects</strong></mark> <mark>on the way <strong>ecosystems function</strong></mark> even when they are far from extinction</u>,” said Rebecca Shaw, chief scientist at the World Wildlife Fund, who was not involved in the research. “Ceballos and his colleagues are telling us with scientific certainty that the survival of these species is linked to our own survival,” she added. Dr. Ehrlich emphasized that <u>the study’s overall findings were almost certainly a <strong>gross underestimate</strong> of the true scope of the <strong>extinction problem</u></strong>. Their analysis did not take plants or aquatic or invertebrate species into account, and it included only approximately 5 percent of terrestrial vertebrates for which scientists have population data. The findings are “in fact what one would expect in the gathering biodiversity crisis,” said Thomas Lovejoy, an ecologist at George Mason University, who was not involved in the research. The paper “should be considered a major wake-up call while there is still time to make a difference.” That so <u><strong><mark>few people</strong> are aware</mark> of the <strong>impending crisis</u></strong>, Dr. Lovejoy added, is a cause of the crisis itself. Many who are aware may simply feel the loss is not consequential. “People say, ‘What the hell of a difference does it make to me?’” Dr. Ehrlich said. But often the role of a particular plant or animal in an ecosystem has become apparent only after the species in question is gone. Passenger pigeons, for example, once numbered in the billions. Their voracious appetite for seeds limited population growth of other seed-eating species, including white-footed mice — the natural reservoir for the bacterium that causes Lyme disease. After the passenger pigeon’s extinction, white-footed mice populations exploded, and the risks to human health increased. The impacts of the passenger pigeon’s extinction, researchers wrote in Science, “are still being felt a century after the last passenger pigeon died.” <u>As humans continue to encroach on nature and wildlife, Dr. Ceballos and his colleagues warn of a cascading series of impacts — including <strong><mark>more frequent occurrences</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>new</mark> diseases and <mark>pandemics</u></strong></mark>. The coronavirus that launched the pandemic originated in a wild animal, most scientists believe. “The vaccine for Covid-19 was natural habitat,” Dr. Ceballos said. “<u>The pandemic is a <strong>great example</strong> of <strong>how badly we’ve treated nature.” </u></strong>With enough species losses, <u><strong><mark>ecosystems will eventually fail,</u></strong> d</mark>estabilizing economies and governments and <u><strong><mark>triggering</mark> <mark>famine and refugee crises</u></strong></mark>. But there are steps that can be taken now, Dr. Ceballos said. Habitat loss and wildlife trade are currently responsible for the brunt of the problem, whereas climate change has yet to unleash “the full tsunami” of its impacts, Dr. Ceballos said. <u><mark>To offset</mark> <mark>the</mark> most urgent <mark>wave of extinctions</mark>, he and his colleagues <mark>call for an</mark> <strong>immediate <mark>end to illegal wildlife trade</mark>. </u></strong>“There’s no way this can be continued, wiping out species and putting the whole of humanity in danger,” Dr. Ceballos said. “We can solve this immediate problem.” They also call for a halt to deforestation and a complete reform of the legal wildlife trade — one that prioritizes sustainability over profits. “The most fundamental problem is reducing the scale of the human enterprise, especially its consumptive demands on the biosphere,” Dr. Ehrlich said. Making these changes will require electing leaders who prioritize the environment, redistributing resources and slowing human population growth. To help organize these efforts, Dr. Ceballos and Dr. Ehrlich launched a new global initiative called Stop Extinction. The initiative aims to provide a framework for creating new national agreements, as well as tools for educating and activating the public about the unfolding extinction crisis. “All of us need to understand that what we do in the next five to 10 years will define the future of humanity,” Dr. Ceballos said. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Woody 18 – Editor at Business Insider covering military issues, defense policy, and foreign affairs. Christopher Woody, “The US Navy faces ‘a huge liability’ in countering one of Iran’s favourite and most dangerous weapons,” Business Insider Australia, 17 August 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/us-navy-faces-a-huge-liability-in-countering-irans-use-of-sea-mines-2018-8 fulltext: In the wake of President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the nuclear deal signed with Iran and five other countries in 2015, Tehran has responded with one of its most frequent threats: closing the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow channel in the Persian Gulf through which roughly 30% of world’s oil flows. “If Iran’s oil exports are to be prevented, we will not give permission for oil to be exported to the world through the Strait of Hormuz,” a Revolutionary Guards commander said in July. Coastal defences and naval vessels would have a big role in that effort, but it would most likely revolve around one of Iran’s favourite military assets: sea mines, a vicious weapon that presents an acute challenge for a US Navy that is shifting between old and new mine-countermeasure systems. Iran has laid mines at sea in past conflicts, and even these much less sophisticated weapons have disabled and nearly sunk US Navy warships. An asymmetric threat “As far back as the early 1980s, Iran was mining waters in the Gulf to prevent oil tankers from coming in or out of ports in the Arab part of the Gulf – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, etc. – and it has extensive experience in trying to also menace warships,” said Scott Savitz, a senior engineer at the Rand Corporation. Sea mines remain “a big part of the Iranian approach,” said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The sea mines Iran used at that time were relatively unsophisticated – the mine that almost sank the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts in 1988 was a World War I-era device – but mines it can deploy now are more advanced and more dangerous, with some warheads weighing nearly 2,500 pounds. As of 2012, Iran was believed to have grown its supply of sea mines from about 1,500 during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s to more than 6,000, according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That stockpile is not as vast as those of North Korea, China, or Russia, which also rely on anti-access or area-denial approaches to limit movement in contested areas, but it includes an array of mines, such as cheap, conventional ones and more advanced “smart mines,” which may be able to track multiple targets, discern different types of ships, and avoid detection by lurking on or near the seafloor. Advanced mines can be triggered by sound, pressure, or magnetic influence. But even conventional ones that require contact to detonate are a threat to US warships and other commercial vessels. Iran also has an array of ships to lay them – some can even be deployed through submarine torpedo tubes. Iran’s naval forces are no match for the US Navy, but sea mines are asymmetric weapons that a weaker side can use to foil a stronger opponent – even one with the world’s strongest navy. They can be deployed to deny access or freedom of movement and can be used to escalate tensions more incrementally than would a cruise-missile attack on an enemy warship. “The Iranians see [mines] as a good tool for them to be able to threaten to close the strait and do it in a way that they can threaten it and you don’t know that the mines are really there,” Clark said, “and then if they do have some mines out there, the damage they’re going to inflict is going to be more in terms of preventing people from freely going back and forth rather than having to kill a lot of people to make a point.” “You can threaten the use of mines and actually not have any out there,” Clark added. “However, a very small number of mines … in a place where someone’s likely to run into one, and then that damages a ship, and then you can say that you’ve got a much larger field, even though you may not.” Speed and scope The US has previously said attempts to deploy mines would draw a military response, but the Navy also has means to counter mines. The service keeps several of its 14 Avenger-class ships stationed in Bahrain all year. The ships are designed for anti-mine warfare, using sonar and video systems, cable cutters, and a mine-detonating device to neutralise mines. Their hulls are made of wood covered with fibreglass for lower magnetic resonance. The engines are also designed to lower the ships’ magnetic and acoustic signatures. This is exceedingly dangerous work for these ships and their explosive ordnance disposal teams, which involves getting close to lurking mines to find and neutralise them. The Avenger-class ships based in Bahrain are “immensely capable” and have multiple capabilities for and approaches to mine warfare, Rand’s Savitz said. They are lightly armed, however, and would require escorts. But the Avenger class is ageing, and the problem for the US Navy is that the mine threat looms as it struggles to move from those ships and the MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters that often accompany them to a newer platform that uses unmanned systems deployed aboard littoral combat ships. “The US is in this transition from a more traditional minesweeping approach, where a minesweeper goes out and either drags minesweeping equipment behind it that physically entangles the mines or sets them off by magnetic influence,” Clark said. “Now they’re transitioning to the use of unmanned vehicles to do a lot of this,” he added. “So they will have an unmanned ship drive out … sweep gear behind it to pick up mines, and they will have unmanned vehicles go around and hunt for mines that might be on the seafloor” or otherwise submerged. Littoral combat ships are already in service, and there’s been recent progress with LCS-based mine countermeasures, such as the Knifefish unmanned undersea vehicle and the helicopter-mounted Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. That progress, amid struggles with littoral combat ships, may mean these systems end up being deployed aboard other ships, Clark noted. But other cost overruns, delays, and malfunctions – like the cancellation of the Remote Minehunting System after nearly a billion dollars and almost two decades of work – have hindered the mine-countermeasure program. Mine-countermeasure systems in general “don’t get as much attention as they need,” Clark said. “It’s not a sexy part of the Navy.” Older systems, he said, “could’ve been replaced a long time ago, or at least improved before this became an issue.” The shift between older platforms and newer systems with limited capabilities is “a huge liability” for the Navy, Clark said. “They’re in the middle of this transition, so they don’t have these unmanned systems really completely tested out and fully fielded, and so there’s still a lot of the traditional sweep gear and traditional approaches,” he said. The Sea Dragon, which is the Navy’s oldest helicopter in service, was supposed to retire in 2005. But the service has yet to find a replacement for the heavy-lift helicopter, which can haul a variety of minesweeping gear and deploy anywhere in the world within 72 hours. The Avengers, introduced in the early 1990s, have also had their service lives extended, requiring upgrades. Those ships and helicopters remain capable, but they aren’t “scalable,” meaning they “can’t ramp it up when there’s a minefield,” Clark said. Those systems aren’t necessarily a problem because they’re old, he added, they’re “just limited in speed and scope.”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>U.S. minesweeping capabilities are <u>non-operational</h4><p></u><strong>Woody 18</strong> – Editor at Business Insider covering military issues, defense policy, and foreign affairs.</p><p>Christopher Woody, “The US Navy faces ‘a huge liability’ in countering one of Iran’s favourite and most dangerous weapons,” Business Insider Australia, 17 August 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/us-navy-faces-a-huge-liability-in-countering-irans-use-of-sea-mines-2018-8</p><p>In the wake of President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the nuclear deal signed with Iran and five other countries in 2015, <u><strong>Tehran has responded with one of its most frequent threats: <mark>closing the Strait</mark> of Hormuz</u></strong>, a narrow channel in the Persian Gulf through which roughly 30% of world’s oil flows.</p><p><u><strong>“If Iran’s oil exports are to be prevented, we will not give permission for oil to be exported to the world through the Strait of Hormuz,” a Revolutionary Guards commander said in July.</p><p></strong>Coastal defences and naval vessels would have a big role in that effort, but <strong>it <mark>would</mark> most likely <mark>revolve around</u></strong></mark> one of Iran’s favourite military assets: <u><strong><mark>sea mines</mark>, a vicious weapon <mark>that presents an acute challenge for a</mark> US <mark>Navy</strong></mark> that is shifting between old and new mine-countermeasure systems.</p><p><strong>Iran has laid mines at sea in past conflicts</strong>, and <strong>even these much <mark>less sophisticated weapons </mark>have <mark>disabled</mark> and nearly sunk US <mark>Navy </mark>war<mark>ships</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>An asymmetric threat</p><p>“<u>As far back as the early 1980s, Iran was mining waters in the Gulf to prevent oil tankers from coming in or out of ports in the Arab part of the Gulf</u> – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, etc. – and it has extensive experience in trying to also menace warships,” said Scott Savitz, a senior engineer at the Rand Corporation.</p><p><u><strong>Sea mines remain “a big part of the Iranian approach</strong>,” said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.</p><p></u>The sea mines Iran used at that time were relatively unsophisticated – the mine that almost sank the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts in 1988 was a World War I-era device – but <u><strong><mark>mines </mark>it can deploy now<mark> are more advanced and </mark>more <mark>dangerous</strong></mark>, with some warheads weighing nearly 2,500 pounds.</p><p>As of 2012, Iran was believed to have grown its supply of sea mines from about 1,500</u> during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s <u>to more than 6,000, according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.</p><p><strong>That <mark>stockpile</u></strong></mark> is not as vast as those of North Korea, China, or Russia, which also rely on anti-access or area-denial approaches to limit movement in contested areas, but it <u><strong><mark>includes </mark>an array of <mark>mines</mark>, such as cheap, conventional ones and more advanced “smart mines</strong>,” which may be able to track multiple targets, discern different types of ships, and avoid detection by lurking on or near the seafloor.</p><p></u>Advanced mines can be triggered by sound, pressure, or magnetic influence. But <u><strong><mark>even conventional ones that require contact to detonate are a threat to </mark>US war<mark>ships</mark> and other commercial vessels</strong>. Iran also has an array of ships to lay them</u> – some can even be deployed through submarine torpedo tubes.</p><p><u>Iran’s naval forces are no match for the US Navy, but <strong>sea mines are asymmetric weapons that a weaker side can use to foil a stronger opponent – even one with the world’s strongest navy. They can be deployed to deny access or freedom of movement and can be used to escalate tensions</u></strong> more incrementally than would a cruise-missile attack on an enemy warship.</p><p>“The Iranians see [mines] as a good tool for them to be able to threaten to close the strait and do it in a way that they can threaten it and you don’t know that the mines are really there,” Clark said, “and then if they do have some mines out there, the damage they’re going to inflict is going to be more in terms of preventing people from freely going back and forth rather than having to kill a lot of people to make a point.”</p><p>“You can threaten the use of mines and actually not have any out there,” Clark added. “However, a very small number of mines … in a place where someone’s likely to run into one, and then that damages a ship, and then you can say that you’ve got a much larger field, even though you may not.”</p><p>Speed and scope</p><p>The US has previously said attempts to deploy mines would draw a military response, but <u>the Navy</u> also <u>has means to counter mines</u>.</p><p><u>The service keeps several of its 14 Avenger-class ships stationed in Bahrain all year</u>.</p><p>The ships are designed for anti-mine warfare, using sonar and video systems, cable cutters, and a mine-detonating device to neutralise mines. Their hulls are made of wood covered with fibreglass for lower magnetic resonance. The engines are also designed to lower the ships’ magnetic and acoustic signatures. This is exceedingly dangerous work for these ships and their explosive ordnance disposal teams, which involves getting close to lurking mines to find and neutralise them.</p><p>The Avenger-class ships based in Bahrain are “immensely capable” and have multiple capabilities for and approaches to mine warfare, Rand’s Savitz said. They are lightly armed, however, and would require escorts.</p><p><u>But <strong>the Avenger class is ageing, and the</u></strong> problem for the US Navy is that the <u><strong>mine threat looms as it struggles to move from those ships</u></strong> and the MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters that often accompany them <u><strong>to a newer platform</strong> that uses unmanned systems deployed aboard littoral combat ships</u>.</p><p>“The US is in this transition from a more traditional minesweeping approach, where a minesweeper goes out and either drags minesweeping equipment behind i<u>t</u> that physically entangles the mines or sets them off by magnetic influence,” Clark said.</p><p>“Now they’re transitioning to the use of unmanned vehicles to do a lot of this,” he added. “So they will have an unmanned ship drive out … sweep gear behind it to pick up mines, and they will have unmanned vehicles go around and hunt for mines that might be on the seafloor” or otherwise submerged.</p><p>Littoral combat ships are already in service, and there’s<u> been recent progress with LCS-based mine countermeasures, such as the Knifefish unmanned undersea vehicle and the helicopter-mounted Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. That progress, amid struggles with littoral combat ships, may mean these systems end up being deployed aboard other ships, Clark noted.</p><p></u>But other <u><strong><mark>cost overruns, delays, and malfunctions</strong></mark> – like the cancellation of the Remote Minehunting System after nearly a billion dollars and almost two decades of work – <strong>have <mark>hindered</mark> the <mark>mine-countermeasure</mark> program</strong>.</p><p>Mine-countermeasure systems in general “don’t get as much attention as they need</u>,” Clark said. “It’s not a sexy part of the Navy.” <u>Older systems</u>, he said, “<u>could’ve been replaced</u> a long time ago, or at least improved <u>before this became an issue</u>.”</p><p><u><strong>The shift between older platforms and newer systems with limited capabilities is “a huge liability” for the Navy</u></strong>, Clark said.</p><p>“<u><strong><mark>They’re in </mark>the middle of <mark>this transition</mark>, <mark>so they don’t have these </mark>unmanned <mark>systems</u></strong></mark> really completely <u><strong><mark>tested </mark>out <mark>and </mark>fully <mark>fielded</u></strong>,</mark> and so there’s still a lot of the traditional sweep gear and traditional approaches,” he said.</p><p><u>The Sea Dragon</u>, which is the Navy’s oldest helicopter in service, <u>was supposed to retire in 2005. But the service has yet to find a replacement for the heavy-lift helicopter</u>, which can haul a variety of minesweeping gear and deploy anywhere in the world within 72 hours. <u>The Avengers</u>, introduced in the early 1990s, <u>have also had their service lives extended</u>, requiring upgrades.</p><p><u>Those <strong>ships and helicopters remain capable, but they</u></strong> aren’t “scalable,” meaning they “<u><strong>can’t ramp it up when there’s a minefield</u></strong>,” Clark said. Those systems aren’t necessarily a problem because they’re old, he added, they’re “just limited in speed and scope.”</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Strokan 14 (Sergey, political commentator with Russia's “Kommersant” Publishing House, "South Korea ‘knocking at Eurasian door’," 6/24, http://www.rt.com/op-edge/168116-south-korea-eurasian-door/) fulltext: South Korean President Park Geon-hye has ended a landmark trip to Central Asia, aimed at creating a huge single market to rival the EU and push for closer Eurasian energy cooperation. ‘Eurasian initiative’: Made in Korea If implemented, President Park’s project will deal a further blow to the already shattered Western policy of isolating Russia. Moreover, it will make Moscow a centerpiece of “Eurasian initiative,” a brainchild of South Korea’s first female president, which falls in line with President Putin’s own aspirations and integration initiatives on the post-Soviet space in the vast Asia-Pacific region. President Park’s six-day tour, which included her visits to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and brought a rich crop of multi-million energy and infrastructure contracts, has laid the groundwork for closer economic ties with the Central Asian nations, linking Asia with Europe. “We should connect energy infrastructure, such as a power networks, gas and oil pipelines in the region, and push for Eurasian energy cooperation in a win-win situation, such as jointly developing shale gas in China and oil and gas in East Siberia,” – President Park said last October at a conference, unveiling her “Eurasian initiative.” Already at that time, the South Korean leader called for the binding of Eurasian nations closer together by linking roads and railways for the construction of a multi-purpose logistics networks. The initiative features two things: building a “Silk Road Express” (SRX) and establishing vast energy networks. Apart from its huge oil and gas reserves, Russia’s role in the project, as it is seen in Seoul, is determined by its geography – Russia’s territory acquires a large part of Eurasia’s landmass. The proposed Trans-Siberian express will start from South Korea’s Busan and extend to London via North Korea and Russia. Once the SRX is connected, transportation time from South Korean Busan to locations in Europe will only take 14 days as opposed to the current 45 days, which involves travelling through the Suez Channel, according the South Korea’s National Unification Advisory Council. South Korean President Park Geon-hye believes that the new Eurasia will offer fresh opportunities for investment and job opportunities by becoming an integrated continent to lead future generations. Addressing the vast Korean diaspora President Park’s trip to Central Asia also served as an occasion to shed light on the possible role ethnic Koreans of the post-Soviet regions could assume in consolidating partnership between South Korea and the newly-independent states. About 400,000 ethnic Koreans live in the former Soviet republics, with more than 280,000 of them settling in the three nations, visited by the South Korean leader last week. Commenting on the issue, leading Korean media and political pundits say various measures should be implemented to help connect the descendants of Koreans who fled Japan’s colonial rule on the peninsula. One of the aims of President Park’s visit was to promote transnational “Korean identity” by revitalizing cultural ties and making it easier for ethnic Koreans from the region to visit and stay here. Russian Koreans are also set to play quite a role. It is reported that a number of ethnic Korean-Russians are seeking to enter South Korea form Moscow via the demilitarized zone of Panmunjom, to commemorate the 150th anniversary of migration to Russia. The first Korean settlers began fleeing to Russia in 1864. Later some of them were forcibly resettled in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other Soviet republics. As President Park came up with her “Eurasian initiative,” the Rally Organization Committee ( ROC) consisting of 40 Koreans from Russia came up with a plan to make the trip from Moscow to North Korean and then to South Korea’s Busan “to draw a line of unification.” It is reported that the committee wants the ethnic Korean-Russians delegation to visit the Gaeston Industrial Complex (GIC) in the border area and Panmunjom to “support peaceful relations and unification.” ROC wants the group to arrive in GIC on August 15, Independence Day. If permission is received from Pyongyang the trip may start as early as the first week of July, according to South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Korean Peninsula: a long way to peace and reconciliation Forging closer Central Asia economic ties and playing the “Korean diaspora” card can be seen as the key to making President Park’s “Eurasian Initiative” a reality and turning South Korea into one of the key players in the region. It must be noted that President Park has discussed the issue of the Trans-Siberian Railway with President Putin already twice last year. However, little progress has been made, so far mainly due to hostile inter-Korean ties. So, the future of the “Eurasia Initiative” largely depends on relations between the North and the South, and a wide range of related security and other issues. The situation in the Korean Peninsula and major security concerns emanating from the dangerous stand-off between South and North Korea has become a subject of ongoing debate, involving generations of political and public figures, experts and political pundits in the Asia-Pacific and far beyond. The discussion, often seen as an exchange of heated rhetoric between the parties involved was kick-started in the early 1950s. The Korean war – one of the most distinct moments in the global rivalry of the cold-war era split Korea into two hostile states. Nearly six decades after the major divisive line split the Korean Peninsula into two disjoined parts, the debate on the core existential question “How to handle the Korean crisis” has fitted well into the 21st century security agenda, with no quick solution in sight seen by the world powers involved in the six-party talks on the Korean crisis. International efforts aimed at bringing the North Korea hermit state to the negotiations table and making it abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs were never a diplomatic picnic. It was always a bumpy road, full of zigzags and dramatic turnarounds. In fact, very modest progress achieved in decades was largely overshadowed by muscle-flexing, missile tests and military drills, seen as the major deterrent instruments for the North. Complicating the negotiating process, the few genuine diplomatic efforts were plagued by the great powers’ hidden agendas and rivalry, a regional tug-of-war and the North Korean leaders’ desire to obtain deadly weapons and delivery systems at any cost. This was the case 40, 30, 20 years ago and this is how things stand now. With the Kim ruling dynasty in North Korea showing powerful survival instincts, with no signs that the bizarre regime will eventually collapse due to its mounting socio-economic problems, six-party diplomacy may well look like a futile exercise or cat-and-mouse play. While looking for renewed efforts to unravel the Korean riddle, or rather, untie the Korean knot, one must understand the very nature of the nuclear gamble, which has been staged by North Korea’s successive leaders. All hopes that the young North Korean leader might adopt a more conciliatory stance and start his reset policy with South Korea have failed. The expectations of rapprochement faded away last spring, when the region found itself on the brink of another large-scale military conflict. There is more than one reason to believe why the Korean peninsula risks remaining a powder keg for the world in coming years. The first reason is the common plain logic of the North Korean leadership. This logic is built on the notion that with the nuclear baton in its hand, it would never be attacked by the West and its Asia-Pacific allies. So, nuclear weapons are de-facto a guarantee that the hermit regime will never become a subject of outside military intervention, like in Libya or Syria. The new North Korean leader cited this reason while unveiling his ambitious nuclear arms development program last April. The second reason why nuclear arms are so dear to the hearts of North Korean leaders is rooted in the fact that they have already got used to regard nuclear threat as some sort of North Korean “strategic commodity,” effectively traded to the West to get much-needed rice, fuel and basic commodities in return. For the isolated North Korean economy, desperate for cash and technologies, the nuclear bomb is not only an instrument to deter neighbors, but also a major bread-winner. The nuclear cat-and-mouse game with the members of the six-party talks in recent years and decades has many times helped the North to get much-needed food stuffs, fuel for electric power plants, and more. The third reason why the WMD programs eventually became a “do-or-die” test North Korea is related to the very ideological foundation of the North Korean regime. Successive representatives of the Kim ruling dynasty were traditionally styling themselves as a living pinnacle of the Juche idea – North Korea’s official philosophy of self-reliance. Acquiring WMD is respectively seen by North Korean ideology as a necessary precondition for building the land of Juche – strong and prosperous, ready to show big teeth to the Americans and their allies. The escalating Ukrainian crisis, which has already led to major disruption internationally and caused the US and Russia to lock horns on many global issues, may cripple the six-party talks on the Korean crisis even further. However, the situation in the Korean Peninsula is a reminder that world powers should not be involved in zero sum games, but rather unite their efforts to meet the major threats and challenges, emanating from the North-South standoff. What is at stake is not only the “Eurasian Initiative” of President Park and the related integration plans, which may eventually change the face of Eurasia, but also the stability and security of the vast region, where Russia and South Korea are major players.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Successful implementation of the initiative solves Russian energy isolation and stabilizes Eurasia </h4><p>Strokan 14</strong> <u>(Sergey, political commentator with Russia's “Kommersant” Publishing House, "South Korea ‘knocking at Eurasian door’," 6/24, http://www.rt.com/op-edge/168116-south-korea-eurasian-door/)</p><p></u>South Korean President <u>Park</u> Geon-hye <u>has</u> ended a landmark trip to Central Asia, <u>aimed at creating a huge single market to rival the EU and push for closer Eurasian energy cooperation. ‘Eurasian initiative’: Made in Korea</u> <u><strong><mark>If implemented</u></strong></mark>, President <u><strong><mark>Park’s project will deal a further blow to the already shattered Western policy of isolating Russia</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, <u><mark>it will make Moscow a centerpiece of</mark> “<mark>Eurasian</mark> <mark>initiative</u></mark>,” a brainchild of South Korea’s first female president, which falls in line with President Putin’s own aspirations and integration initiatives on the post-Soviet space in the vast Asia-Pacific region. President Park’s six-day tour, which included her visits to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and brought a rich crop of multi-million energy and infrastructure contracts, has laid the groundwork for closer economic ties with the Central Asian nations, linking Asia with Europe. “We should connect energy infrastructure, such as a power networks, gas and oil pipelines in the region, and push for Eurasian energy cooperation in a win-win situation, such as jointly developing shale gas in China and oil and gas in East Siberia,” – President Park said last October at a conference, unveiling her “Eurasian initiative.” Already at that time, the South Korean leader called for the binding of Eurasian nations closer together by linking roads and railways for the construction of a multi-purpose logistics networks. <u><mark>The initiative features</mark> two things: building <mark>a “Silk Road Expre</mark>ss</u>” (SRX) <u><mark>and establishing vast energy networks</u></mark>. <u>Apart from its huge oil and gas reserves, Russia’s role in the project, as it is seen in Seoul, is determined by its geography – Russia’s territory acquires a large part of Eurasia’s landmass</u>. The proposed Trans-Siberian express will start from South Korea’s Busan and extend to London via North Korea and Russia. Once the SRX is connected, transportation time from South Korean Busan to locations in Europe will only take 14 days as opposed to the current 45 days, which involves travelling through the Suez Channel, according the South Korea’s National Unification Advisory Council. South Korean President Park Geon-hye believes that <u>the new Eurasia will offer fresh opportunities for investment and job opportunities by becoming an integrated continent to lead future generations.</u> Addressing the vast Korean diaspora President Park’s trip to Central Asia also served as an occasion to shed light on the possible role ethnic Koreans of the post-Soviet regions could assume in consolidating partnership between South Korea and the newly-independent states. About 400,000 ethnic Koreans live in the former Soviet republics, with more than 280,000 of them settling in the three nations, visited by the South Korean leader last week. Commenting on the issue, leading Korean media and political pundits say various measures should be implemented to help connect the descendants of Koreans who fled Japan’s colonial rule on the peninsula. One of the aims of President Park’s visit was to promote transnational “Korean identity” by revitalizing cultural ties and making it easier for ethnic Koreans from the region to visit and stay here. Russian Koreans are also set to play quite a role. It is reported that a number of ethnic Korean-Russians are seeking to enter South Korea form Moscow via the demilitarized zone of Panmunjom, to commemorate the 150th anniversary of migration to Russia. The first Korean settlers began fleeing to Russia in 1864. Later some of them were forcibly resettled in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other Soviet republics. As President Park came up with her “Eurasian initiative,” the Rally Organization Committee ( ROC) consisting of 40 Koreans from Russia came up with a plan to make the trip from Moscow to North Korean and then to South Korea’s Busan “to draw a line of unification.” It is reported that the committee wants the ethnic Korean-Russians delegation to visit the Gaeston Industrial Complex (GIC) in the border area and Panmunjom to “support peaceful relations and unification.” ROC wants the group to arrive in GIC on August 15, Independence Day. If permission is received from Pyongyang the trip may start as early as the first week of July, according to South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Korean Peninsula: a long way to peace and reconciliation Forging <u><mark>closer Central Asia</mark> economic <mark>ties</u></mark> and playing the “Korean diaspora” card <u><mark>can be seen as the key to making</u></mark> President <u><mark>Park’s “Eurasian Initiative” a reality</mark> and turning South Korea into one of the key players in the region</u>. It must be noted that President <u>Park has discussed the issue of the Trans-Siberian Railway with President Putin already</u> twice last year. However, <u>little progress has been made</u>, so far mainly due to hostile inter-Korean ties. So, the future of the “Eurasia Initiative” largely depends on relations between the North and the South, and a wide range of related security and other issues. The situation in the Korean Peninsula and major security concerns emanating from the dangerous stand-off between South and North Korea has become a subject of ongoing debate, involving generations of political and public figures, experts and political pundits in the Asia-Pacific and far beyond. The discussion, often seen as an exchange of heated rhetoric between the parties involved was kick-started in the early 1950s. The Korean war – one of the most distinct moments in the global rivalry of the cold-war era split Korea into two hostile states. Nearly six decades after the major divisive line split the Korean Peninsula into two disjoined parts, the debate on the core existential question “How to handle the Korean crisis” has fitted well into the 21st century security agenda, with no quick solution in sight seen by the world powers involved in the six-party talks on the Korean crisis. International efforts aimed at bringing the North Korea hermit state to the negotiations table and making it abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs were never a diplomatic picnic. It was always a bumpy road, full of zigzags and dramatic turnarounds. In fact, very modest progress achieved in decades was largely overshadowed by muscle-flexing, missile tests and military drills, seen as the major deterrent instruments for the North. Complicating the negotiating process, <u>the few genuine diplomatic efforts were plagued by the great powers’ hidden agendas </u>and rivalry, a regional tug-of-war and the North Korean leaders’ desire to obtain deadly weapons and delivery systems at any cost. This was the case 40, 30, 20 years ago and this is how things stand now. With the Kim ruling dynasty in North Korea showing powerful survival instincts, with no signs that the bizarre regime will eventually collapse due to its mounting socio-economic problems, six-party diplomacy may well look like a futile exercise or cat-and-mouse play. While looking for renewed efforts to unravel the Korean riddle, or rather, untie the Korean knot, one must understand the very nature of the nuclear gamble, which has been staged by North Korea’s successive leaders. All hopes that the young North Korean leader might adopt a more conciliatory stance and start his reset policy with South Korea have failed. The expectations of rapprochement faded away last spring, when the region found itself on the brink of another large-scale military conflict. There is more than one reason to believe why the Korean peninsula risks remaining a powder keg for the world in coming years. The first reason is the common plain logic of the North Korean leadership. This logic is built on the notion that with the nuclear baton in its hand, it would never be attacked by the West and its Asia-Pacific allies. So, nuclear weapons are de-facto a guarantee that the hermit regime will never become a subject of outside military intervention, like in Libya or Syria. The new North Korean leader cited this reason while unveiling his ambitious nuclear arms development program last April. The second reason why nuclear arms are so dear to the hearts of North Korean leaders is rooted in the fact that they have already got used to regard nuclear threat as some sort of North Korean “strategic commodity,” effectively traded to the West to get much-needed rice, fuel and basic commodities in return. For the isolated North Korean economy, desperate for cash and technologies, the nuclear bomb is not only an instrument to deter neighbors, but also a major bread-winner. The nuclear cat-and-mouse game with the members of the six-party talks in recent years and decades has many times helped the North to get much-needed food stuffs, fuel for electric power plants, and more. The third reason why the WMD programs eventually became a “do-or-die” test North Korea is related to the very ideological foundation of the North Korean regime. Successive representatives of the Kim ruling dynasty were traditionally styling themselves as a living pinnacle of the Juche idea – North Korea’s official philosophy of self-reliance. Acquiring WMD is respectively seen by North Korean ideology as a necessary precondition for building the land of Juche – strong and prosperous, ready to show big teeth to the Americans and their allies. The escalating Ukrainian crisis, which has already led to major disruption internationally and caused the US and Russia to lock horns on many global issues, may cripple the six-party talks on the Korean crisis even further. However, the situation in the Korean Peninsula is a reminder that world powers should not be involved in zero sum games, but rather unite their efforts to meet the major threats and challenges, emanating from the North-South standoff. <u><mark>What is at stake is not only the “Eurasian Initiative</mark>”</u> of President Park <u>and the related integration plans, which may eventually change the face of Eurasia, <strong><mark>but also the stability and security of the vast region</mark>, where Russia and South Korea are major players.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Brink Lindsey 21. Vice President, Niskanen Center; Writes for Brookings, “Why Intellectual Property and Pandemics Don’t Mix,” Brookings, June 3, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/06/03/why-intellectual-property-and-pandemics-dont-mix/, RJP, DebateDrills. fulltext: PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES AND DIRECT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT For pandemics and other public health emergencies, patents’ mix of costs and benefits is misaligned with what is needed for an effective policy response. The basic patent bargain, even when well struck, is to pay for more innovation down the road with slower diffusion of innovation today. In the context of a pandemic, that bargain is a bad one and should be rejected entirely. Here the imperative is to accelerate the diffusion of vaccines and other treatments, not slow it down. Giving drug companies the power to hold things up by blocking competitors and raising prices pushes in the completely wrong direction. What approach to encouraging innovation should we take instead? How do we incentivize drug makers to undertake the hefty R&D costs to develop new vaccines without giving them exclusive rights over their production and sale? The most effective approach during a public health crisis is direct government support: public funding of R&D, advance purchase commitments by the government to buy large numbers of doses at set prices, and other, related payouts. And when we pay drug makers, we should not hesitate to pay generously, even extravagantly: we want to offer drug companies big profits so that they prioritize this work above everything else, and so that they are ready and eager to come to the rescue again the next time there’s a crisis.It was direct support via Operation Warp Speed that made possible the astonishingly rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines and then facilitated a relatively rapid rollout of vaccine distribution (relative, that is, to most of the rest of the world). And it’s worth noting that a major reason for the faster rollout here and in the United Kingdom compared to the European Union was the latter’s misguided penny-pinching. The EU bargained hard with firms to keep vaccine prices low, and as a result their citizens ended up in the back of the queue as various supply line kinks were being ironed out. This is particularly ironic since the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine was developed in Germany. As this fact underscores, the chief advantage of direct support isn’t to “get tough” with drug firms and keep a lid on their profits. Instead, it is to accelerate the end of the public health emergency by making sure drug makers profit handsomely from doing the right thing.Patent law and direct support should be seen not as either-or alternatives but as complements that apply different incentives to different circumstances and time horizons. Patent law provides a decentralized system for encouraging innovation. The government doesn’t presume to tell the industry which new drugs are needed; it simply incentivizes the development of whatever new drugs that pharmaceutical firms can come up with by offering them a temporary monopoly. It is important to note that patent law’s incentives offer no commercial guarantees. Yes, you can block other competitors for a number of years, but that still doesn’t ensure enough consumer demand for the new product to make it profitable. DIRECT SUPPORT MAKES PATENTS REDUNDANT The situation is different in a pandemic. Here the government knows exactly what it wants to incentivize: the creation of vaccines to prevent the spread of a specific virus and other drugs to treat that virus. Under these circumstances, the decentralized approach isn’t good enough. There is no time to sit back and let drug makers take the initiative on their own timeline. Instead, the government needs to be more involved to incentivize specific innovations now. As recompense for letting it call the shots (pardon the pun), the government sweetens the deal for drug companies by insulating them from commercial risk. If pharmaceutical firms develop effective vaccines and therapies, the government will buy large, predetermined quantities at prices set high enough to guarantee a healthy return. For the pharmaceutical industry, it is useful to conceive of patent law as the default regime for innovation promotion. It improves pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to develop new drugs while leaving them free to decide which new drugs to pursue – and also leaving them to bear all commercial risk. In a pandemic or other emergency, however, it is appropriate to shift to the direct support regime, in which the government focuses efforts on one disease. In this regime, it is important to note, the government provides qualitatively superior incentives to those offered under patent law. Not only does it offer public funding to cover the up-front costs of drug development, but it also provides advance purchase commitments that guarantee a healthy return. It should therefore be clear that the pharmaceutical industry has no legitimate basis for objecting to a TRIPS waiver. Since, because of the public health crisis, drug makers now qualify for the superior benefits of direct government support, they no longer need the default benefits of patent support. Arguments that a TRIPS waiver would deprive drug makers of the incentives they need to keep developing new drugs, when they are presently receiving the most favorable incentives available, can be dismissed as the worst sort of special pleading. That said, it is a serious mistake to try to cast the current crisis as a morality play in which drug makers wear the black hats and the choice at hand is between private profits and public health. We would have no chance of beating this virus without the formidable organizational capabilities of the pharmaceutical industry, and providing the appropriate incentives is essential to ensure that the industry plays its necessary and vital role. It is misguided to lament that private companies are profiting in the current crisis: those profits are a drop in the bucket compared to the staggering cost of this pandemic in lives and economic damage. What matters isn’t the existence or size of the profits, but how they are earned. We have good reason to want drug makers to profit from vaccinating the world: the comparative price is minuscule, and the incentive effects are a vital safeguard of public health in the event of future crises. What we want to avoid at all costs is putting drug makers in the position where drug companies can profit from standing in the way of rapid global vaccination. That is why intellectual property rights need to be taken out of the equation. Vaccinating the world in any kind of reasonable time frame will require large-scale technology transfer to drug firms in other countries and rapid expansion of their production capacity. And looking beyond the current pandemic to the longer term, we need ample, redundant global vaccine production capacity that is widely distributed around the planet. To achieve these goals as rapidly as possible will require the active cooperation of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, which is why the direct support model now needs to be extended. What is needed now is an Operation Warp Speed for the world, in which we make it worth current vaccine producers’ while to share their know-how broadly and ramp up global capacity. Here again, we must recognize that the choice isn’t between people on the one hand and profits on the other. Rather, the key to good pandemic response policy is ensuring that incentives are structured so that drug company profit-seeking and global public health are well aligned. That means opting out of the default, decentralized patent bargain in favor of generous but well-focused direct government support.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The plan sets a precedent to <u>seamlessly </u>shift to a <u>direct support model</u> during pandemics--that solves future pandemics <u>but</u> avoids the innovation DA. </h4><p>Brink <strong>Lindsey 21</strong>. Vice President, Niskanen Center; Writes for Brookings, “Why Intellectual Property and Pandemics Don’t Mix,” Brookings, June 3, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/06/03/why-intellectual-property-and-pandemics-dont-mix/, RJP, <strong>DebateDrills</strong>. </p><p><u><strong>PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES AND DIRECT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT</p><p></strong><mark>For pandemics</mark> and other public health emergencies, <mark>patents’</mark> mix of <mark>costs and benefits is <strong>misaligned</strong></mark> with what is needed for an effective policy response.</u> <u><mark>The basic patent bargain</mark>, even when well struck, <mark>is</mark> to pay for more <mark>innovation down</mark> <mark>the road with <strong>slower diffusion of innovation today</strong></mark>. <mark>In the <strong>context of a pandemic</strong></mark>, that bargain is a bad one and should be rejected entirely.</u> <u>Here <mark>the imperative is to <strong>accelerate</strong></mark> the diffusion of vaccines and other treatments, not slow it down. Giving drug companies the power to hold things up by blocking competitors and raising prices pushes in the completely wrong direction.</p><p>What approach to encouraging innovation should we take instead? How do we incentivize drug makers to undertake the hefty R&D costs to develop new vaccines without giving them exclusive rights over their production and sale? <mark>The most effective approach</mark> during a public health crisis <mark>is</mark> <strong><mark>direct government support</u></strong></mark>: public funding of R&D, advance purchase commitments by the government to buy large numbers of doses at set prices, and other, related payouts. And when we pay drug makers, we should not hesitate to pay generously, even extravagantly: we want to offer drug companies big profits so that they prioritize this work above everything else, and so that they are ready and eager to come to the rescue again the next time there’s a crisis.<u><mark>It was direct support via <strong>Operation Warp Speed</strong> that made possible</mark> the astonishingly rapid development of <mark>COVID-19 vaccines</mark> and then facilitated a relatively rapid rollout of vaccine distribution </u>(relative, that is, to most of the rest of the world). And it’s worth noting that a major reason for the faster rollout here and in the United Kingdom compared to the European Union was the latter’s misguided penny-pinching. The EU bargained hard with firms to keep vaccine prices low, and as a result their citizens ended up in the back of the queue as various supply line kinks were being ironed out. This is particularly ironic since the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine was developed in Germany. As this fact underscores, the chief advantage of direct support isn’t to “get tough” with drug firms and keep a lid on their profits. Instead, it is to accelerate the end of the public health emergency by making sure drug makers profit handsomely from doing the right thing.<u>Patent law and direct support should be seen <strong>not as either-or alternatives but as complements</strong> that apply different incentives to different circumstances and time horizons</u>. <u>Patent law provides a decentralized system for encouraging innovation. The government doesn’t presume to tell the industry which new drugs are needed</u>; it simply incentivizes the development of whatever new drugs that pharmaceutical firms can come up with by offering them a temporary monopoly. It is important to note that patent law’s incentives offer no commercial guarantees. Yes, you can block other competitors for a number of years, but that still doesn’t ensure enough consumer demand for the new product to make it profitable. <u><strong>DIRECT SUPPORT MAKES PATENTS REDUNDANT </strong>The situation is different <mark>in a pandemic</mark>. Here the <mark>government knows exactly what it wants</mark> to incentivize: the <mark>creation of vaccines</mark> to prevent the spread of a specific virus and other drugs</u> to treat that virus. Under these circumstances, the decentralized approach isn’t good enough. <u><mark>There is no time to sit back and let drug makers <strong>take the initiative</strong></mark> on their own timeline.</u> Instead, the government needs to be more involved to incentivize specific innovations now. As recompense for letting it call the shots (pardon the pun), the government sweetens the deal for drug companies by insulating them from commercial risk. If pharmaceutical firms develop effective vaccines and therapies, the government will buy large, predetermined quantities at prices set high enough to guarantee a healthy return. For the pharmaceutical industry, <u>it is useful to conceive of patent law as the default regime for innovation promotion</u>. It improves pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to develop new drugs while leaving them free to decide which new drugs to pursue – and also leaving them to bear all commercial risk. <u><mark>In a pandemic</mark> or other emergency, however, it is appropriate to <strong><mark>shift to the direct support regime</strong></mark>, in which the government focuses efforts on one disease. In this regime, it is important to note, the government provides qualitatively <strong>superior</strong> incentives to those offered under patent law. Not only does it offer public funding to cover the up-front costs of drug development, but it also provides advance purchase commitments that guarantee a healthy return. </u>It should therefore be clear that <u>the <mark>pharma</mark>ceutical industry <mark>has <strong>no</mark> legitimate <mark>basis for objecting to a TRIPS waiver</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Since</mark>, because of the public health crisis, <mark>drug makers</mark> now <mark>qualify for</mark> the superior <mark>benefits of direct government support, they no longer</mark> need the default benefits of <mark>patent support</u></mark>. <u><mark>Arguments that a TRIPS waiver would deprive drug makers of</mark> the <mark>incentives</mark> they need to keep developing new drugs, when they are presently receiving the most favorable incentives available, <mark>can be <strong>dismissed as</mark> the worst sort of <mark>special pleading</mark>. </u></strong>That said, it is a serious mistake to try to cast the current crisis as a morality play in which drug makers wear the black hats and the choice at hand is between private profits and public health. We would have no chance of beating this virus without the formidable organizational capabilities of the pharmaceutical industry, and providing the appropriate incentives is essential to ensure that the industry plays its necessary and vital role. It is misguided to lament that private companies are profiting in the current crisis: those profits are a drop in the bucket compared to the staggering cost of this pandemic in lives and economic damage.<u> </u>What matters isn’t the existence or size of the profits, but how they are earned. We have good reason to want drug makers to profit from vaccinating the world: the comparative price is minuscule, and the incentive effects are a vital safeguard of public health in the event of future crises. What we want to avoid at all costs is putting drug makers in the position where drug companies can profit from standing in the way of rapid global vaccination. That is why intellectual property rights need to be taken out of the equation.<u> </u>Vaccinating the world in any kind of reasonable time frame will require large-scale technology transfer to drug firms in other countries and rapid expansion of their production capacity. And looking beyond the current pandemic to the longer term, we need ample, redundant global vaccine production capacity that is widely distributed around the planet. To achieve these goals as rapidly as possible will require the active cooperation of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, which is why the direct support model now needs to be extended. <u>What is needed now is an Operation Warp Speed for the world, in which we make it worth current vaccine producers’ while to share their know-how broadly and ramp up global capacity. </u>Here again, we must recognize that the choice isn’t between people on the one hand and profits on the other. Rather, <u><mark>the key to good pandemic response policy</mark> is ensuring that <strong><mark>incentives</mark> are structured</strong> so that drug company profit-seeking and global public health are <mark>well aligned</mark>. That means opting out of the default, decentralized patent bargain in favor of generous but well-focused direct government support.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Łukasz Kulesa 18, Research Director at the European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY REPORT, February 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17437.pdf fulltext: “Hybrid” scenarios: trigger for conflict? One can envisage a number of “hybrid” scenarios of Russia-NATO conflict where operations which started in the cyber, economic, criminal, or “active measure” domains, below the threshold of conflict, trigger a military response or are followed by the physical use of force. As noted in the discussion on the definitions of a conflict, the threshold between crisis and military conflict may not be explicitly stated or otherwise clear to all sides; and it may also be ignored during a crisis. This aspect is especially relevant in the current period of increased interference in the internal affairs of NATO countries attributed to Russia and of the high volume of information ‘warfare’ between Russia and NATO countries. Russia remains vigilant about foreign interference in its internal affairs and the threat of subversion leading to a severe destabilization of the regime. In the past, Moscow has made accusations about foreign sponsorship of Chechen and radical Islamic terrorists targeting Russia, and has alleged the existence of training camps on the territories of NATO states for activists planning colour revolutions in Ukraine and Belarus. In the extreme circumstances of a crisis, if the Russian leadership became convinced that a non-military campaign against it (which might also involve cyber activities and what Russia calls attempts to instigate colour revolutions) had intensified, this could lead to a military response. With regards to NATO, some of its members’ views mirror the Russian assessment that we are already in a state of conflict, in which the boundary between peace and war is blurred, and that their defences are being actively attacked through nonmilitary means. They are thus concerned about a scenario in which Russia initiates an attack that moves swiftly from non-military to military means. This scenario should be not dismissed. At the same time, one needs to be wary of interpreting all disturbing developments as part of a grand Russian plan culminating in a provocation or use of force. So there should be prudence before any country presses the “panic button” at the national or NATO / European Union level. There should also be close analysis of early warning indicators related to the gravity, intensity and diversity of incidents and to connections between them. The overall political context and state of the RussiaNATO relationship would also be important: what would be the political and strategic reasons for Russia to move from sub-threshold to abovethreshold activities? Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed? Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decisionmaking processes and interactions. Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks. Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict. The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation. With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia -NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial. Conflict termination Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not survive the first hours of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the other side’s willingness to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs, especially once both sides start committing their political capital and resources and the casualties accumulate. With regards to Russia, Moscow would most likely be approaching the conflict with a clearer concept of its war aims and thus develop better-formed views on conflict termination. It would seek to establish escalation dominance and confront NATO with a binary choice of either accepting defeat or further intensification of fighting. Such intensification might involve a move to the nuclear level, but Russia would also have conventional escalation options, such as conventional deep strikes. At the same time, it should be highlighted that Russia is unlikely to start a conflict which involves a high degree of uncertainty about its final outcome and carries a risk of military defeat. Russia cannot safely assume that US-led NATO would act with restraint, nor could it be sure that the Alliance would be ready to surrender and terminate a conflict early. For internal reasons Russia cannot afford to lose a “big war”, so the most prudent option would generally be not to initiate such a conflict in the first place. Such logic could, however, get lost in some of the hybrid scenarios and scenarios of an inadvertent outbreak of a conflict.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Hybrid war with Russia causes <u>extinction</u>.</h4><p>Łukasz <strong>Kulesa 18<u></strong>, Research Director at the European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY REPORT, February 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17437.pdf</p><p>“Hybrid” scenarios: trigger for conflict?</p><p>One can envisage a number of “<strong><mark>hybrid” scenarios</strong> of</u> <u><strong>Russia-NATO conflict</u></strong> <u>where operations</mark> which <mark>started in</mark> the <strong><mark>cyber</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>economic</u></strong>, <u><strong>criminal</u></strong>, <u>or</u> “<u><strong>active measure”</u></strong> <u><mark>domains</u></mark>, <u><strong>below the threshold of conflict</u></strong>, <u><mark>trigger</mark> a <strong><mark>military response</u></strong></mark> <u>or are followed by the <strong>physical use of force.</strong> </u>As noted in the discussion on the definitions of a conflict, <u><mark>the <strong>threshold</strong></mark> between <strong>crisis</strong> and military <strong>conflict</strong> <mark>may not</mark> be <strong>explicitly stated</u></strong> <u>or</u> otherwise <u><strong><mark>clear</mark> to all sides</u></strong>; <u>and it may also be <strong>ignored</strong> during a crisis</u>. <u>This aspect is especially relevant in the current period of <strong>increased interference</strong> in the internal affairs of NATO countries attributed to Russia and of the <strong>high volume of information ‘warfare’ </strong>between Russia and NATO countries. </p><p></u>Russia remains vigilant about foreign interference in its internal affairs and the threat of subversion leading to a severe destabilization of the regime. In the past, Moscow has made accusations about foreign sponsorship of Chechen and radical Islamic terrorists targeting Russia, and has alleged the existence of training camps on the territories of NATO states for activists planning colour revolutions in Ukraine and Belarus. In the extreme circumstances of a crisis, <u>if</u> the <u>Russian leadership became convinced that a non-military campaign against it</u> (which might also involve cyber activities and what Russia calls attempts to instigate colour revolutions) <u>had intensified, <mark>this could lead to</mark> a <strong><mark>military response.</p><p></strong></mark>With regards to NATO, some of its members’ views mirror the Russian assessment that we are <strong>already in a state of conflict,</u></strong> <u>in which the <strong>boundary</strong> between <strong>peace</strong> and <strong>war</strong> is <strong>blurred</u></strong>, <u>and that their defences are being <strong>actively attacked</u></strong> <u>through <strong>nonmilitary means.</u></strong> <u>They are thus concerned about a scenario in which Russia <strong>initiates an attack</u></strong> <u>that moves <strong>swiftly</u></strong> <u>from <strong>non-military to military means</u></strong>. This scenario should be not dismissed. At the same time, one needs to be wary of interpreting all disturbing developments as part of a grand Russian plan culminating in a provocation or use of force. So <u>there should be <strong>prudence</strong> before any country <strong>presses the “panic button”</u></strong> <u>at the </u>national or <u>NATO</u> / European Union <u>level. There should also be close analysis of early warning indicators related to the gravity, intensity and diversity of incidents and to connections between them. The overall political context and state of the RussiaNATO relationship would also be important: what would be the political and strategic reasons for Russia to move from sub-threshold to abovethreshold activities?</p><p><strong>Escalation</u></strong>: <u>Can a NATO - Russia conflict be <strong>managed</strong>?</p><p><mark>Once a conflict was under way, </mark>the <strong><mark>“fog of war</mark>”</strong> and <strong>rising unpredictability</strong> <mark>would</mark> <strong>inevitably <mark>set in</strong>,</mark> complicating the implementation of any <strong>predetermined theories</strong> of <strong>escalation</strong>, <strong>deescalation</strong> and <strong>inter-conflict management</strong>. The <strong>actual dynamics</strong> of a conflict and the <strong>perceptions of the stakes</u></strong> <u>involved are extremely <strong>difficult to predict</u></strong>. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decisionmaking processes and interactions.</p><p>Still, <u>Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be <strong>managed</strong> and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. </u>The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. <u>Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, <mark>Russia</mark> may assume that its threats of horizontal or <strong>vertical escalation</strong> could be particularly <strong>effective</u></strong>. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It <u><mark>would</mark> most likely try to <strong><mark>test</strong></mark> and <strong>exploit</strong> potential <strong><mark>divisions within the Alliance</u></strong></mark>, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks.</p><p><u>Any <mark>NATO-Russia conflict would</mark> <strong>inevitably <mark>have a nuclear dimension</mark>. </strong>The role of nuclear weapons as a <strong>tool for escalation control</u></strong> <u>for Russia has been thoroughly debated</u> by experts, <u>but when and how Russia might use</u> (and not merely showcase or activate) <u>nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an <strong>open question</u></strong>. <u>Beyond <strong>catch phrases </strong>such as “<strong>escalate to de-escalate”</u></strong> <u>or</u> “<u><strong>escalate to win</u></strong>” <u>there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use</u>. For example, <u>a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal</u>. It <u>could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one</u>. <u>Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect</u>. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. <u>These options might be used</u> <u>to</u> <u><strong>signal escalation</u></strong> and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses.</p><p>Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.</p><p><u>The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to</u> <u><strong>avoid a massive nuclear exchange</u></strong>. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. <u>But</u> <u><strong>too narrow an approach</u></strong> <u>could put <strong>too much restraint</strong> on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s <strong>stability</strong> may ultimately need to be <strong>threatened</strong> in order to <strong>force the leadership into terminating the conflict</u></strong>. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.</p><p>With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use.</p><p><u>Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the <strong>Cold War</strong> confrontation might be <strong>misleading</u></strong>. <u>The circumstances in which a Russia -NATO conflict would play out would be <strong>radically different</u></strong> from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, <u>instead of <strong>gradual</u></strong> (<u><strong>linear</u></strong>) <u>escalation or <strong>salami tactics escalation</u></strong>, <u><mark>it is possible to imagine</mark> <strong>surprizing</strong> “<strong><mark>leap frog”</mark> <mark>escalation</u></strong></mark>, <u>possibly connected with actions in <strong>different domains</u></strong> (<u>e.g. a <strong>cyberattack</strong> against</u> <u>critical infrastructure</u>). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial. </p><p>Conflict termination</p><p><u>Russian and NATO assumptions regarding <strong><mark>conflict termination</strong> would</mark> most <strong>likely <mark>not survive</mark> the <mark>first hours of</mark> an actual <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark>. <u>Both sides are capable of <strong>underestimating</strong> the</u> <u><strong>resolve</u></strong> <u>of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the</u> <u>other side’s <strong>willingness</strong> to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs,</u> <u>especially once both sides <strong>start committing their political capital</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>resources</u></strong> <u>and</u> the <u><strong>casualties accumulate</u></strong>.</p><p>With regards to Russia, Moscow would most likely be approaching the conflict with a clearer concept of its war aims and thus develop better-formed views on conflict termination. It would seek to establish escalation dominance and confront NATO with a binary choice of either accepting defeat or further intensification of fighting. Such intensification might involve a move to the nuclear level, but Russia would also have conventional escalation options, such as conventional deep strikes.</p><p>At the same time, <u>it should be highlighted that Russia is unlikely to start a conflict which involves a high degree of uncertainty</u> about its final outcome <u>and carries a risk of military defeat</u>. Russia cannot safely assume that US-led NATO would act with restraint, nor could it be sure that the Alliance would be ready to surrender and terminate a conflict early. For internal reasons Russia cannot afford to lose a “big war”, so the most prudent option would generally be not to initiate such a conflict in the first place. <u>Such logic could</u>, <u><strong>however</u></strong>, <u><strong>get lost</u></strong> <u><mark>in some</mark> of the <strong><mark>hybrid scenarios</u></strong></mark> <u>and scenarios of an <strong><mark>inadvertent outbreak</strong> of a conflict</u>.</p></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Ventrella 15 [Jeff. A graduate from the MIT Media Lab, Jeffrey is the founder of Wiggle Planet to develop mobile experiences that combine autonomous character animation with augmented reality. "Why Nick Bostrom is Wrong About the Dangers of Artificial Intelligence." https://ventrellathing.wordpress.com/2015/09/02/nick-bostrom-is-wrong-about-the-dangers-of-artificial-intelligence/] fulltext: Should We Be Terrified? In an article with the very subtle title, “You Should Be Terrified of Superintelligent Machines“, Bostrom says this: “An AI whose sole final goal is to count the grains of sand on Boracay would care instrumentally about its own survival in order to accomplish this.” Point taken. If we built an intelligent machine to do that, we might get what we asked for. Fifty years later we might be telling it, “we were just kidding! It was a joke. Hahahah. Please stop now. Please?” It will push us out of the way and keep counting…and it just might kill us if we try to stop it. Part of Bostrom’s argument is that if we build machines to achieve goals in the future, then these machines will “want” to survive in order to achieve those goals. “Want?” Bostrom warns against anthropomorphizing AI. Amen! In a TED Talk, he even shows a picture of the typical scary AI robot – like so many that have been polluting the air waves of late. He discounts this as anthropomorphizing AI. And yet Bostrom frequently refers to what an AI “wants” to do, the AI’s “preferences”, “goals”, even “values”. How can anyone be certain that an AI can have what we call “values” in any way that we can recognize as such? In other words, are we able to talk about “values” in any other context than a human one? From my experience in developing AI-related code for the past 20 years, I can say this with some confidence: it is senseless to talk about software having anything like “values”. By the time something vaguely resembling “value” emerges in AI-driven technology, humans will be so intertwingled with it that they will not be able to separate themselves from it. It will not be easy – or possible – to distinguish our values from “its” values. In fact, it is quite possible that we won’t refer to it at “it”. “It” will be “us”. Bostrom’s fear sounds like fear of the Other. That Disembodied Thing Again Let’s step out of the ivory tower for a moment. I want to know how that AI machine on Boracay is going to actually go about counting grains of sand. Many people who talk about AI refer to many amazing physical feats that an AI would supposedly be able to accomplish. But they often leave out the part about “how” this is done. We cannot separate the AI (running software) from the physical machinery that has an effect on the world – any more than we can talk about what a brain can do that has been taken out one’s head and placed on a table. It can jiggle. That’s about it. Once again, the Cartesian separation of mind and body rears its ugly head – as it were – and deludes people into thinking that they can talk about intelligence in the absence of a physical body. Intelligence doesn’t exist outside of its physical manifestation. Can’t happen. Never has happened. Never will happen. Ray Kurzweil predicted that by 2023 a $1,000 laptop would have the computing power and storage capacity of a human brain. When put in these terms, it sounds quite plausible. But if you were to extrapolate that to make the assumption that a laptop in 2023 will be “intelligent” you would be making a mistake. Many people who talk about AI make reference to computational speed and bandwidth. Kurzweil helped to popularize a trend for plotting computer performance along with with human intelligence, which perpetuates computationalism. Your brain doesn’t just run on electricity: synapse behavior is electrochemical. Your brain is soaking in chemicals provided by this thing called the bloodstream – and these chemicals have a lot to do with desire and value. And… surprise! Your body is soaking in these same chemicals. Intelligence resides in the bodymind. Always has, always will. So, when there’s lot of talk about AI and hardly any mention of the physical technology that actually does something, you should be skeptical. Bostrom asks: when will we have achieved human-level machine intelligence? And he defines this as the ability “to perform almost any job at least as well as a human”. I wonder if his list of jobs includes this:Intelligence is Multi-Multi-Multi-Dimensional Bostrom plots a one-dimensional line which includes a mouse, a chimp, a stupid human, and a smart human. And he considers how AI is traveling along this line, and how it will fly past humans. Intelligence is not one dimensional. It’s already a bit of a simplification to plot mice and chimps on the same line – as if there were some single number that you could extract from each and compute which is greater. Charles Darwin once said: “It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is most adaptable to change.” Is a bat smarter than a mouse? Bats are blind (dumber?) but their sense of echolocation is miraculous (smarter?) Is an autistic savant who can compose complicated algorithms but can’t hold a conversation smarter than a charismatic but dyslexic soccer coach who inspires kids to be their best? Intelligence is not one-dimensional, and this is ESPECIALLY true when comparing AI to humans. Plotting them both on a single one-dimensional line is not just an oversimplification. By plotting AI on the same line as human intelligence, Bostrom is committing anthropomorphism. AI cannot be compared apples-to-apples to human intelligence because it emerges from human intelligence. Emergent phenomena by their nature operate on a different plane than what they emerge from. WE HAVE ONLY OURSELVES TO FEAR BECAUSE WE ARE INSEPARABLE FROM OUR AI We and our AI grow together, side by side. AI evolves with us, for us, in us. It will change us as much as we change it. This is the posthuman condition. You probably have a smart phone (you might even be reading this article on it). Can you imagine what life was like before the internet? For half of my life, there was no internet, and yet I can’t imagine not having the internet as a part of my brain. And I mean that literally. If you think this is far-reaching, just wait another 5 years. Our reliance on the internet, self-driving cars, automated this, automated that, will increase beyond our imaginations. Posthumanism is pulling us into the future. That train has left the station. But…all these technologies that are so folded-in to our daily lives are primarily about enhancing our own abilities. They are not about becoming conscious or having “values”. For the most part, the AI that is growing around us is highly-distributed, and highly-integrated with our activities – OUR values. I predict that Siri will not turn into a conscious being with morals, emotions, and selfish ambitions…although others are not quite so sure. Okay – I take it back; Siri might have a bit of a bias towards Apple, Inc. Ya think? Giant Killer Robots There is one important caveat to my argument. Even though I believe that the future of AI will not be characterized by a frightening army of robots with agendas, we could potentially face a real threat: if military robots that are ordered to kill and destroy – and use AI and sophisticated sensor fusion to outsmart their foes – were to get out of hand, then things could get ugly. But with the exception of weapon-based AI that is housed in autonomous mobile robots, the future of AI will be mostly custodial, highly distributed, and integrated with our own lives; our clothes, houses, cars, and communications. We will not be able to separate it from ourselves – increasingly over time. We won’t see it as “other” – we might just see ourselves as having more abilities than we did before. Those abilities could include a better capacity to kill each other, but also a better capacity to compose music, build sustainable cities, educate kids, and nurture the environment. If my interpretation is correct, then Bolstrom’s alarm bells might be better aimed at ourselves. And in that case, what’s new? We have always had the capacity to create love and beauty … and death and destruction. To quote David Byrne: “Same as it ever was”. Maybe Our AI Will Evolve to Protect Us And the Planet Here’s a more positive future to contemplate: AI will not become more human-like – which is analogous to how the body of an animal does not look like the cells that it is made of. Billions of years ago, single cells decided to come together in order to make bodies, so they could do more using teamwork. Some of these cells were probably worried about the bodies “taking over”. And oh did they! But, these bodies also did their little cells a favor: they kept them alive and provided them with nutrition. Win-win baby! To conclude, I disagree with Bostrom: we should not be terrified. Terror is counter-productive to human progress.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Bostrom holistically wrong about tech and extinction </h4><p><strong>Ventrella 15</strong> [Jeff. A graduate from the MIT Media Lab, Jeffrey is the founder of Wiggle Planet to develop mobile experiences that combine autonomous character animation with augmented reality. "Why Nick Bostrom is Wrong About the Dangers of Artificial Intelligence."<u> https://ventrellathing.wordpress.com/2015/09/02/nick-bostrom-is-wrong-about-the-dangers-of-artificial-intelligence/]</p><p></u>Should We Be Terrified? In an article with the very subtle title, “<u>You Should Be Terrified</u> of Superintelligent Machines“, <u><strong>Bostrom</u></strong> <u>says</u> this: “An <u><strong>AI</u></strong> <u>whose sole final goal is to count the grains of sand on Boracay would care instrumentally about its own survival in order to accomplish this</u>.” Point taken. If we built an intelligent machine to do that, we might get what we asked for. Fifty years later we might be telling it, “we were just kidding! It was a joke. Hahahah. Please stop now. Please?” It will push us out of the way and keep counting…and it just might kill us if we try to stop it. Part of Bostrom’s argument is that if we build machines to achieve goals in the future, then these machines will “want” to survive in order to achieve those goals. “Want?” <u>Bostrom warns against anthropomorphizing <strong>AI</u></strong>. Amen! In a TED Talk, he even shows a picture of the typical scary AI robot – like so many that have been polluting the air waves of late. He discounts this as anthropomorphizing AI. And yet Bostrom frequently refers to what an AI “wants” to do, the AI’s “preferences”, “goals”, even “values”. How can anyone be certain that an AI can have what we call “values” in any way that we can recognize as such? In other words, are we able to talk about “values” in any other context than a human one? From my experience in developing AI-related code for the past 20 years, I can say this with some confidence: <u><strong>it is senseless to talk about software having anything like “values</u></strong>”. <u>By the time something vaguely resembling “value” emerges in AI-driven technology, humans will be so <strong>intertwingled</u></strong> <u>with it that they will not be able to <strong>separate themselves</u></strong> from it. <u>It will not be easy – or possible – to distinguish our values from “its” values</u>. In fact, it is quite possible that we won’t refer to it at “it”. “It” will be “us”. Bostrom’s fear sounds like fear of the Other. That Disembodied Thing Again Let’s step out of the ivory tower for a moment. I want to know how that AI machine on Boracay is going to actually go about counting grains of sand. Many people who talk about AI refer to many amazing physical feats that an AI would supposedly be able to accomplish. But they often leave out the part about “how” this is done. <u>We cannot separate the AI (</u>running software) <u>from the <strong>physical machinery</u></strong> that has an effect on the world – any more than we can talk about what a brain can do that has been taken out one’s head and placed on a table. It can jiggle. That’s about it. Once again, <u>the Cartesian <strong>separation of mind and bod</strong>y rears its <strong>ugly head</strong> </u>– as it were – <u>and deludes people into thinking that they can talk about <strong>intelligence</u></strong> in the absence of a physical body. Intelligence doesn’t exist outside of its physical manifestation. Can’t happen. Never has happened. Never will happen. Ray Kurzweil predicted that by 2023 a $1,000 laptop would have the computing power and storage capacity of a human brain. When put in these terms, it sounds quite plausible. But if you were to extrapolate that to make the assumption that a laptop in 2023 will be “intelligent” you would be making a mistake. Many people who talk about AI make reference to computational speed and bandwidth. Kurzweil helped to popularize a trend for plotting computer performance along with with human intelligence, which perpetuates computationalism. Your brain doesn’t just run on electricity: synapse behavior is electrochemical. <u>Your brain is soaking in chemicals provided by this thing called the bloodstream</u> – and these chemicals have a lot to do with desire and value. And… surprise! Your body is soaking in these same chemicals. <u><strong>Intelligence resides in the bodymind</strong>. Always has, always will</u>. So, <u>when there’s lot of talk about AI and hardly any mention of the physical technology that actually does something, you should be <strong>skeptical</u></strong>. <u>Bostrom asks: when will we have achieved human-level machine intelligence?</u> And he defines this as the ability “to perform almost any job at least as well as a human”. I wonder if his list of jobs includes this:Intelligence is Multi-Multi-Multi-Dimensional Bostrom plots a one-dimensional line which includes a mouse, a chimp, a stupid human, and a smart human. And he considers how AI is traveling along this line, and how it will fly past humans. <u><strong>Intelligence is not one dimensional</u></strong>. <u>It’s already a bit of a <strong>simplification</strong> to plot mice and chimps on the <strong>same line</u></strong> – as if there were some single number that you could extract from each and compute which is greater. Charles Darwin once said: “It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. <u>It is the one that is most adaptable to change</u>.” Is a bat smarter than a mouse? Bats are blind (dumber?) but their sense of echolocation is miraculous (smarter?) Is an autistic savant who can compose complicated algorithms but can’t hold a conversation smarter than a charismatic but dyslexic soccer coach who inspires kids to be their best? Intelligence is not one-dimensional, and this is ESPECIALLY true when comparing AI to humans. Plotting them both on a single one-dimensional line is not just an oversimplification. <u>By plotting AI on the same line as human intelligence<strong>, Bostrom is committing anthropomorphism</u></strong>. <u>AI cannot be compared apples-to-apples to human intelligence because it emerges from human intelligence</u>. Emergent phenomena by their nature operate on a different plane than what they emerge from. WE HAVE ONLY OURSELVES TO FEAR BECAUSE WE ARE INSEPARABLE FROM OUR AI We and our AI grow together, side by side. AI evolves with us, for us, in us. It will change us as much as we change it. <u><strong>This is the posthuman condition</u></strong>. <u>You probably have a smart phon</u>e (you might even be reading this article on it). Can you imagine what life was like before the internet? For half of my life, there was no internet, and yet I can’t imagine not having the internet as a part of my brain. And I mean that literally. If you think this is far-reaching, just wait another 5 years. Our reliance on the internet, self-driving cars, automated this, automated that, will increase beyond our imaginations. <u><strong>Posthumanism is pulling us into the future. That train has left the station. </strong>But…all these technologies that are so folded-in to our daily lives are primarily about enhancing our own abilities. They are not about <strong>becoming conscious</u></strong> or having “values”. For the most part, the AI that is growing around us is highly-distributed, and highly-integrated with our activities – OUR values. I predict that Siri will not turn into a conscious being with morals, emotions, and selfish ambitions…although others are not quite so sure. Okay – I take it back; Siri might have a bit of a bias towards Apple, Inc. Ya think? Giant Killer Robots There is one important caveat to my argument. Even though I believe that the future of AI will not be characterized by a frightening army of robots with agendas, we could potentially face a real threat: if military robots that are ordered to kill and destroy – and use AI and sophisticated sensor fusion to outsmart their foes – were to get out of hand, then things could get ugly. But with the exception of weapon-based AI that is housed in autonomous mobile robots, the future of AI will be mostly custodial, highly distributed, and integrated with our own lives; our clothes, houses, cars, and communications. We will not be able to separate it from ourselves – increasingly over time. We won’t see it as “other” – we might just see ourselves as having more abilities than we did before. Those abilities could include a better capacity to kill each other, but also a better capacity to compose music, build sustainable cities, educate kids, and nurture the environment. If my interpretation is correct, then Bolstrom’s alarm bells might be better aimed at ourselves. And in that case, what’s new? We have always had the capacity to create love and beauty … and death and destruction. To quote David Byrne: “Same as it ever was”. Maybe Our AI Will Evolve to Protect Us And the Planet Here’s a more positive future to contemplate: AI will not become more human-like – which is analogous to how the body of an animal does not look like the cells that it is made of. <u>Billions of years ago, single cells decided to come together in order to make bodies, so they could do more using teamwork.</u> <u>Some of these cells were probably worried about the bodies “<strong>taking over</u></strong>”. And oh did they! But, <u>these bodies also did their little cells a favor: they kept them alive and provided them with nutrition. <strong>Win-win baby</strong>! To conclude, I <strong>disagree with Bostrom: we should not be terrified.</strong> Terror is counter-productive to human progress.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Omotomilola et al 21 writes [Ikotun, Omotomilola, Department of Geographical and Historical Studies, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland Allwell Akhigbe, Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria and Samuel Okunade, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. "Sustainability of borders in a post-COVID-19 world." Politikon 48.2 (2021): 297-311.] TDI 7/4/2022 rc scarmo fulltext: Kukathas (2012) argues that since humans live in territorially defined spaces with recognised geographical boundaries recognised under international law, they do not inhabit a borderless world. Therefore, advocating for open borders does not connote an argument for the elimination of borders, but for changes in how borders are construed and how the existence of borders affects those who intend to cross them. Arguing, therefore, for open borders does not necessarily connote a call for increased immigration. It is a call for expunging restrictions on the movement of persons from one territory into another. Various reasons have been put up in support of immigration, free movement and consequently open borders. Firstly, based on ethical grounds, it is an interference in others’ affairs that needs to be justified. According to Benn (1988), good reasons need to be provided for denying anyone his freedom and the use of force to prevent anyone from acting. Some scholars from a materialist-Marxism point of view have criticised border restrictions in the light of promoting and reinforcing social injustices (Sassen 1988; Hess and Kasparek 2010; Brown 2014). The reason for this stance is that restriction on movement and across the borders impedes freedom most especially those of aliens who seek to travel for visitation, work, or for residency in a country where they would have gotten the opportunity to go to, and also because citizens of that particular country are prevented from associating and engaging with those aliens they would have loved to meet, make friends with, employ, and have relationships. Given the gains accrued to citizens and aliens from free movement, very sound reasons are needed to justify the prevention of doing so (Kukathas 2012). Secondly, looking from a global lens, the benefits are so immense with a world of open borders (Kukathas 2012). According to Carens (1987), from a liberal-utilitarian point of view, the benefits accrued to migrants far outweigh the disadvantages for citizens. Migrants can make ends meet while contributing to the growth and development of whichever country’s economy they find themselves, thus making it a win-win situation. This makes open borders a measure that creates greater collective utility. Therefore, this position makes it difficult to justify restrictions on migration as it can go a long way to reduce global poverty. This is because trade would create immense wealth which the poor would benefit from as they will be opportune to move to spaces that require their services more with higher remuneration. The poor societies will benefit through remittances from family members abroad, thus boosting the poorer economies. In this regard, both the rich and the poor would gain from the general prosperity, and notably, in this system, the poor gains more than the elites. According to Clemens (2011, 84), Gains from the elimination of migration barriers dwarf – the gains from eliminating other types of barriers. For the elimination of trade policy barriers and capital flow barriers, the estimated gains amount to less than a few per cent of world GDP. For labour mobility barriers, the estimated gains are often in the range of 50–150 per cent of world GDP. This shows that if gains from labour mobility would yield trillions of dollars that the poor economies across the globe would benefit from, substantial reasons need to be provided as justification for restricting the free movement of people. Thirdly, while it is apparent that immigration barriers and a threat of sanctions may discourage many from attempting to cross borders, millions will continue to make attempts (Kukathas 2012). The current reality has shown that despite the barrier and public rejection of migrants in North America and Western Europe, many still embark on such adventure (Okunade 2020). This move only puts unnecessary pressure on such states, and the process hits deep into their coffers with a less expected result. As noted by Cole (2000), controlled migration at the border may put a financial burden or political inconvenience on the state, which does not necessarily constitute a threat to its survival. This thought process provides an interesting perspective that needs further research even as it concerns migrants and the migration process. Regions across different continents have established protocols for free movement of persons, goods, and services; there is the Schengen Agreement in Europe, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on Free Movement and, the African Union Protocol on Free Movement within Africa. The Schengen Agreement was reached at a meeting attended by states such as Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in 1985 and was named after a small community in Luxemburg (European Commission 2016). The Agreement led to abolishing all barriers that inhibit free movement of persons, services, and capital among member states. This move was a bid to create a borderless region with a single external border to benefit member states and their citizens (European Commission 2016). Member states agreed to several rules to guide their conduct concerning the Treaty. Firstly, internal borders were abolished, and no member should restrict nationals’ movement from other member countries into their territory. This is because a single external border has been created with adequate policing to prevent external incursion. Secondly, the rules set out border control management within the region (European Commission 2016). The Schengen Border Code, for instance, allows member countries to tighten border controls as a result of the crisis; this comes a few years after the EU tightened its border policies as it dealt with the inflow of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing the Middle East and North African (MENA) region (Koerner and Boettcher 2020). The ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Goods, and Services relates to the West African region and predates the Schengen Agreement (Okunade and Ogunnubi 2018). The concept of ECOWAS was predicated on the success of the European Economic Community. The ECOWAS Protocol was adopted in 1979 in line with the objectives that established ECOWAS in 1975. The Protocol defines the right of Community citizens that is citizens of member states, to enter, live, and be established within the territory covered by the ECOWAS treaty. Okunade and Ogunnubi (2018) clearly explains the Treaty’s provisions, its implementation thus far and its failures. The African Union (AU) Protocol on Free Movement is the most recent Treaty signed by African leaders to facilitate continental integration and the realisation of Agenda 2063. It was a move to create a seamless border that will recognise a single passport for all African states, which will aid Africans’ free movement within the continent (Okunade and Ogunnubi 2019). According to Dick and Schraven (2019), the AU Protocol thus guarantees the establishment of an African Economic Community where its members have full right of movement, right of residence, and right of establishment within Africa. The gains of the Protocol, if fully implemented, are thoroughly reviewed by Okunade and Ogunnubi (2019). These Protocols explored above are prototypes of a move for a borderless region that aims to boost the economy and make opportunities abound for citizens of the community. The implementation process of these treaties has been challenged in a way or the other, howbeit, the outcomes have significantly been impactful and have outweighed projected pitfalls.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Studies confirm open borders double global GDP and correct for global poverty through growth, remittances, trade, and reductions in security costs.</h4><p><strong>Omotomilola et al 21 writes</strong> [Ikotun, Omotomilola, Department of Geographical and Historical Studies, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland Allwell Akhigbe, Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria and Samuel Okunade, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. "Sustainability of borders in a post-COVID-19 world." Politikon 48.2 (2021): 297-311.] TDI 7/4/2022 rc scarmo</p><p>Kukathas (2012) argues that since humans live in territorially defined spaces with recognised geographical boundaries recognised under international law, they do not inhabit a borderless world. Therefore, <u><strong>advocating for open borders</strong> does <strong>not </strong>connote <strong>an argument for the elimination of borders</strong>, but for changes in how borders are construed and how the existence of borders affects those who intend to cross them.</u> Arguing, therefore, for <u><strong>open borders does not necessarily</u></strong> connote a <u><strong>call for increased immigration</strong>. It is a call for expunging restrictions on the movement</u> of persons from one territory into another. Various reasons have been put up in support of immigration, free movement and consequently open borders. Firstly, based on ethical grounds, it is an interference in others’ affairs that needs to be justified. According to Benn (1988), good reasons need to be provided for denying anyone his freedom and the use of force to prevent anyone from acting. Some scholars from a materialist-Marxism point of view have criticised border restrictions in the light of promoting and reinforcing social injustices (Sassen 1988; Hess and Kasparek 2010; Brown 2014). The reason for this stance is that restriction on movement and across the borders impedes freedom most especially those of aliens who seek to travel for visitation, work, or for residency in a country where they would have gotten the opportunity to go to, and also because citizens of that particular country are prevented from associating and engaging with those aliens they would have loved to meet, make friends with, employ, and have relationships. Given the gains accrued to citizens and aliens from free movement, very sound reasons are needed to justify the prevention of doing so (Kukathas 2012).</p><p>Secondly, <u>looking from a global lens, the benefits are so immense with a world of open borders</u> (Kukathas 2012). According to Carens (1987<u>), from a liberal-utilitarian point of view, the benefits accrued to migrants far outweigh the disadvantages for citizens. <strong>Migrants</strong> can make ends meet while <strong>contributing to the growth and development</strong> of whichever country’s economy they find themselves, thus making it <strong>a win-win situation</strong>. </u>This makes open borders a measure that creates greater collective utility. Therefore, this position makes it difficult to justify restrictions on migration as <u>it can go a long way to <strong>reduce global poverty</u></strong>. This is <u>because trade would create immense wealth which the poor would benefit </u>from as they will be opportune to move to spaces that require their services more with higher remuneration. The <u>poor societies will benefit <strong>through remittances</strong> from family members abroad, thus <strong>boosting</strong> the <strong>poorer economies</u></strong>. In this regard, both the rich and the poor would gain from the general prosperity, and notably, in this system, the poor gains more than the elites. According to Clemens (2011, 84),</p><p><u>Gains from the elimination of migration barriers dwarf – the gains from eliminating other types of barriers.</u> For the elimination of trade policy barriers and capital flow barriers, the estimated gains amount to less than a few per cent of world GDP. <u><strong>For labour mobility barriers, the estimated gains are often in the range of 50–150 per cent of world GDP.</p><p></u></strong>This shows that if <u>gains from labour mobility would yield trillions of dollars that the poor economies across the globe would benefit from</u>, substantial reasons need to be provided as justification for restricting the free movement of people.</p><p>Thirdly, <u>while</u> it is apparent that <u>immigration barriers and a threat of sanctions may discourage many from attempting to cross borders, millions will continue to make attempts</u> (Kukathas 2012). The current reality has shown that <u>despite the barrier and public rejection of migrants</u> in North America and Western Europe, many still embark on such adventure (Okunade 2020). This move <u>only puts unnecessary pressure on such states, and the process hits deep into their coffers with a less expected result. </u>As noted by Cole (2000), controlled migration at the border may put a financial burden or political inconvenience on the state, which does not necessarily constitute a threat to its survival. This thought process provides an interesting perspective that needs further research even as it concerns migrants and the migration process.</p><p><u><strong>Regions across different continents have established protocols for free movement</strong> of persons, goods, and services</u>; there is <u>the Schengen Agreement in Europe</u>, <u>the</u> Economic Community of West African States (<u>ECOWAS</u>) Protocol on Free Movement <u>and</u>, the<u> African Union Protocol</u> on Free Movement <u>within Africa</u>. The Schengen Agreement was reached at a meeting attended by states such as Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in 1985 and was named after a small community in Luxemburg (European Commission 2016). The Agreement led to <u>abolishing all barriers that inhibit free movement of persons, services, and capital among member states</u>. This move was a bid to create a borderless region with a single external border to benefit member states and their citizens (European Commission 2016). <u>Member states agreed to several rules</u> to guide their conduct concerning the Treaty. Firstly<u>, internal borders were abolished, and no member should restrict nationals’ movement from other member countries into their territory</u>. This is because <u>a single external border has been created with adequate policing to prevent external incursion</u>. Secondly, the rules set out border control management within the region (European Commission 2016). <u>The</u> Schengen Border <u>Code</u>, for instance, <u>allows member countries to tighten border controls as a result of </u>the <u>crisis</u>; this comes a few years after the EU tightened its border policies as it dealt with the inflow of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing the Middle East and North African (MENA) region (Koerner and Boettcher 2020).</p><p>The ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Goods, and Services relates to the West African region and predates the Schengen Agreement (Okunade and Ogunnubi 2018). The concept of ECOWAS was predicated on the success of the European Economic Community. The ECOWAS Protocol was adopted in 1979 in line with the objectives that established ECOWAS in 1975. The Protocol defines the right of Community citizens that is citizens of member states, to enter, live, and be established within the territory covered by the ECOWAS treaty. Okunade and Ogunnubi (2018) clearly explains the Treaty’s provisions, its implementation thus far and its failures. The African Union (AU) Protocol on Free Movement is the most recent Treaty signed by African leaders to facilitate continental integration and the realisation of Agenda 2063. It was a move to create a seamless border that will recognise a single passport for all African states, which will aid Africans’ free movement within the continent (Okunade and Ogunnubi 2019). According to Dick and Schraven (2019), the AU Protocol thus guarantees the establishment of an African Economic Community where its members have full right of movement, right of residence, and right of establishment within Africa. The gains of the Protocol, if fully implemented, are thoroughly reviewed by Okunade and Ogunnubi (2019).</p><p>These Protocols explored above <u>are <strong>prototypes</strong> of a move <strong>for a borderless region</strong> that aims to boost the economy and make opportunities abound for citizens of the community.</u> The implementation process of these treaties has been challenged in a way or the other, howbeit<u>, the <strong>outcomes have significantly been impactful and have outweighed projected pitfalls.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Humphreys 6 (Ashlee, Northwestern University, “The Consumer as Foucauldian “Object of Knowledge””, Social Science Computer Review, Volume 24 Number 3, page 296-309, Sage)//trepka fulltext: The Cookie Surveillance on the Internet works in much the same way for tracking desire, but one should not overhastily assume that it controls consumer desire in the same way as the gaze of the tower (individuation from the surveillance is much more productive for creating desire). Surveillance does, however, play an important role in making the consumer an object of knowledge, in enabling individuation. Through cookies, files placed on each computer that serve to track and document Internet activity (e.g., purchases, name, address, and other information), surveillance is ever-present. The cookie used by Amazon.com, for example, is used to identify and greet the customer when she or he visits the site, then to literally bombard she or he with products that she or he might be interested in: sidebars of book reviews, lists (made by other, similar members) of CDs along a certain theme or genre, new releases from movie genres of the consumer’s previous choices. This is not, however, a covert practice—it is one that is encouraged by visitors and advertised by Amazon: “Get instant personalized recommendations based on your prior purchases the moment you log on” (Amazon.com, 2002a). Although consumers may not be aware of the extent or the machinations of this technology, they are continually made aware of Amazon’s presence as a watcher by the personalized feedback that Amazon provides. The log-on serves to instantly identify but also to instantly and continually track. Only, in this case, the continuous gaze from the tower is often welcomed because it is conflated with the gaze from other consumers. As evidence of this desire to be watched, customers contribute lists, reviews, and guides to Amazon.com, often developing personalities as a “top reviewer” or an expert on some domain of consumption. Integral to this practice is a process of rating others based on their contributions. Thus, one driving factor for both the desire to gaze and the desire to be gazed at is “scopophilia” and, more historically speaking, the rise of “image culture,” as Fredric Jameson (1998) identifies it. Now suddenly a hitherto baleful universal visibility that seemed to brook no utopian alternative is welcomed and reveled in for its own sake: this is the true moment of image society, in which human subjects henceforth exposed (according to Paul Willis) to bombardments of up to a thousand images a day (at the same time that their formerly private lives are thoroughly viewed and scrutinized, itemized, measured and enumerated, in data banks) begin to live a very different relationship to space and time, to existential experience as well as cultural consumption. (pp. 110-111) Thus, image culture inspires in consumers not only the desire to watch but also to be watched (Kozinets et al., 2004). Some compelling examples of this phenomenon include reality TV shows and the proliferation of personal, voyeuristic, 24-hour web cameras. In the specific case of Amazon.com, consumers exercise their desire to be watched through “Listmania!” a service offered by Amazon that allows consumers to display their preferences in a themed list to be looked at by other consumers and (implicitly) by Amazon.com. Of this practice, Amazon says, “Go ahead and create a favorite item list now to help other customers discover products that you enjoy. It’s free, democratic, and fun” (Amazon.com, 2004). Because consumers derive pleasure from being watched by other consumers, the gaze in general is welcomed, whereas the gaze from marketers in particular is seldom noticed or differentiated. Surveillance is so pervasive that it may not occur to consumers to care if they are being watched by marketers. They may assume, in many cases, that they always are being watched anyway. However, paranoia,Zizwould argue, is unwarranted as a metaphor because consumers in this paradigm, as evidenced by the shoppers at Amazon.com, want to be watched. We have not a culture of paranoids, as in the Panopticon, but a culture of narcissists. This narcissism, also noted by Kozinets et al. (2004), is one reasonZizargue that a refracted or prismatic Panopticon is a more apt metaphor than the obverse Panopticon. The obverse of the Panopticon, for Foucault, would be consumers looking back at marketers rather than the marketers looking at the consumers. The spectacle—consumers all fixing their gaze on some image or another—is not the obverse of the Panopticon; consumers do not look back at the marketer, they look to the image or other consumers. In the present case of the spectacle, the consumer not only is watched but is watched watching. This model of consumers being “watched watching” has three levels: marketers watching consumers, consumers gazing at an image, consumers gazing at other consumers (cf. Kozinets et al., 2004) and—admittedly the perspective of this essay—the consumer-researcher watching all of this watching. The refracted Panopticon is one of maximal scopophilia in which everyone gazes: The marketers watch consumers who watch other consumers, a cycle that only terminates with a consumer’s gaze at an image, to the degree that everything in this space is always already an image (Baudrillard, 1983; Derrida, 1978b). It is like two mirrors held up to one another. The image moves back and forth regressively, an infinite dialectic. As Jameson notes, “image society” created around consumption—and in fact almost indistinguishable from it (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995)—instills in the consumer a desire to be watched, but also to be watched watching. The image has become so revered in contemporary culture that some consumers not only feel compelled to gaze, they feel compelled to be gazed at. Here we can see how being watched has amplified and altered consumer agency. Consumers not only have the scopophilic desire to look at images but also the desire to be an image themselves. Thus, the spectacle as theorized by Debord (1967/1983) and Baudrillard (1983) is intricately linked with surveillance by way of scopophilia. The embracement of both surveillance and spectacle issue from the same source: image culture. To theorize further as to the cause of image culture itself would necessarily, as Jameson argues, be linked with the historical condition and the dynamics of global capital, a discussion that is beyond the scope of the present essay. In image culture, the embeddedness of the gaze, addressed earlier with regard to prisoners, recurs only in more advanced form. The gaze is internalized by controlling how consumers themselves see. An overly deterministic view might assert that consumers have so internalized the gaze that there is no resistance to it, that there is a continual performance of preferences, and that they never truly originate from the consumer. This view has the downside of neglecting human agency. If we subscribe to a more liberatory view, it could be argued that consumer preferences are co-constituted by both consumers and marketers through dialectic interchange that meets the needs of both groups. Unlike the case of the prisoner in the Panopticon, the gaze is welcomed because it serves a different, more indirect, even playful function of power than it did in the penal system. Here, surveillance is used, on the surface of it, to improve consumer satisfaction. Cookies are used to remember consumer preferences and information to make the process shopping faster and more pleasant. And what consumer (uncritically) would resist that? The practice of using cookies fulfills, to some degree, both the consumer and the marketer goals. These goals are for both constituencies local or instrumental goals; they do not call into question the orientation of more global goals. This kind of institutional rationality may thus benefit neither consumers nor companies on a larger, more global level (Weber, 1922/1968).<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The social relations governing society and the way our personality is constructed means we <u>want to be watched</u>, we <u>desire surveillance</u> --- that affirmative reforming <u>one program</u> can’t change that</h4><p><strong>Humphreys 6 </strong>(Ashlee, Northwestern University, “The Consumer as Foucauldian “Object of Knowledge””, Social Science Computer Review, Volume 24 Number 3, page 296-309, Sage)//trepka</p><p>The Cookie Surveillance on the Internet works in much the same way for tracking desire, but one should not overhastily assume that it controls consumer desire in the same way as the gaze of the tower (individuation from the surveillance is much more productive for creating desire). Surveillance does, however, play an important role in making the consumer an object of knowledge, in enabling individuation. Through cookies, files placed on each computer that serve to track and document Internet activity (e.g., purchases, name, address, and other information), <u><strong>surveillance</strong> is <strong>ever-present</u></strong>. The cookie used by Amazon.com, for example, is used to identify and greet the customer when she or he visits the site, then to literally bombard she or he with products that she or he might be interested in: sidebars of book reviews, lists (made by other, similar members) of CDs along a certain theme or genre, new releases from movie genres of the consumer’s previous choices. This is not, however, a covert practice—it is one that is encouraged by visitors and advertised by Amazon: “Get instant personalized recommendations based on your prior purchases the moment you log on” (Amazon.com, 2002a). Although consumers may not be aware of the extent or the machinations of this technology, they are continually made aware of Amazon’s presence as a watcher by the personalized feedback that Amazon provides. The log-on serves to instantly identify but also to instantly and continually track. Only, in this case, <u>the continuous gaze from the tower is often <strong>welcomed</u></strong> because it is conflated with the gaze from other consumers. <u>As evidence of this desire to be watched, customers contribute lists, reviews, and guides to Amazon.com, often developing personalities as a “top reviewer”</u> or an expert on some domain of consumption. Integral to this practice is a process of rating others based on their contributions. Thus, <u>one driving factor for both the desire to gaze and the desire to be gazed at is “<strong>scopophilia</u></strong>” and, more historically speaking, <u>the <strong>rise of “image culture</strong>,” </u>as Fredric Jameson (1998) identifies it. Now suddenly a hitherto baleful universal visibility that seemed to brook no utopian alternative is welcomed and reveled in for its own sake: this is the true moment of image society, in which human subjects henceforth exposed (according to Paul Willis) to bombardments of up to a thousand images a day (at the same time that their formerly private lives are thoroughly viewed and scrutinized, itemized, measured and enumerated, in data banks) begin to live a very different relationship to space and time, to existential experience as well as cultural consumption. (pp. 110-111) Thus, <u>image culture inspires in consumers not only the desire to watch but also to <strong>be watched</strong> </u>(Kozinets et al., 2004). <u>Some compelling examples of this phenomenon include</u> reality TV shows and <u>the proliferation of personal, voyeuristic, 24-hour web cameras</u>. In the specific case of Amazon.com, consumers exercise their desire to be watched through “Listmania!” a service offered by Amazon that allows consumers to display their preferences in a themed list to be looked at by other consumers and (implicitly) by Amazon.com. Of this practice, Amazon says, “Go ahead and create a favorite item list now to help other customers discover products that you enjoy. It’s free, democratic, and fun” (Amazon.com, 2004). Because consumers derive pleasure from being watched by other consumers, the gaze in general is welcomed, whereas the gaze from marketers in particular is seldom noticed or differentiated. Surveillance is so pervasive that it may not occur to consumers to care if they are being watched by marketers. They may assume, in many cases, that they always are being watched anyway. However, paranoia,Zizwould argue, is unwarranted as a metaphor because consumers in this paradigm, as evidenced by the shoppers at Amazon.com, want to be watched. <u>We have </u>not a culture of paranoids, as in the Panopticon, but <u>a <strong>culture of narcissists</u></strong>. <u>This narcissism</u>, also noted by Kozinets et al. (2004), <u>is one reasonZizargue that a refracted or prismatic Panopticon is a more apt metaphor than the obverse Panopticon</u>. The obverse of the Panopticon, for Foucault, would be consumers looking back at marketers rather than the marketers looking at the consumers. The spectacle—consumers all fixing their gaze on some image or another—is not the obverse of the Panopticon; consumers do not look back at the marketer, they look to the image or other consumers. In the present case of the spectacle, the consumer not only is watched but is watched watching<u>. This model of consumers being “watched watching” has three levels: marketers watching consumers, consumers gazing at an image, consumers gazing at other consumers</u> (cf. Kozinets et al., 2004) <u>and</u>—admittedly the perspective of this essay—<u>the consumer-researcher watching all of this watching</u>. The refracted Panopticon is one of maximal scopophilia in which everyone gazes: The marketers watch consumers who watch other consumers, a cycle that only terminates with a consumer’s gaze at an image, to the degree that <u>everything in this space is always already an image </u>(Baudrillard, 1983; Derrida, 1978b). <u>It is like two mirrors held up to one another</u>. The image moves back and forth regressively, an infinite dialectic. As Jameson notes, “<u>image society” created around consumption</u>—and in fact almost indistinguishable from it (Firat & Venkatesh, 1995)—<u>instills in the consumer a desire to be watched, but also to be watched watching.</u> The image has become so revered in contemporary culture that some consumers not only feel compelled to gaze, <u><strong>they feel compelled to be gazed at.</strong> Here we can see how being watched has amplified and altered consumer agency. Consumers not only have the scopophilic desire to look at images but also the desire to be an image themselves</u>. Thus, the spectacle as theorized by Debord (1967/1983) and Baudrillard (1983) is intricately linked with surveillance by way of scopophilia. <u>The embracement of both surveillance and spectacle issue from the same source: image cultur</u>e. To theorize further as to the cause of image culture itself would necessarily, as Jameson argues, be linked with the historical condition and the dynamics of global capital, a discussion that is beyond the scope of the present essay. <u>In image culture, the embeddedness of the gaze</u>, addressed earlier with regard to prisoners, <u>recurs only in more advanced form. The gaze is internalized by controlling how consumers themselves see.</u> An overly deterministic view might assert that consumers have so internalized the gaze that there is no resistance to it, that there is a continual performance of preferences, and that they never truly originate from the consumer. This view has the downside of neglecting human agency. If we subscribe to a more liberatory view, it could be argued that consumer preferences are co-constituted by both consumers and marketers through dialectic interchange that meets the needs of both groups. Unlike the case of the prisoner in the Panopticon, <u>the gaze is welcomed because it serves a</u> different, <u>more</u> indirect, even <u><strong>playful function of power</u></strong> than it did in the penal system. <u>Here, surveillance is used, <strong>on the surface</strong> of it, to <strong>improve </u></strong>consumer<u><strong> satisfaction</strong>. Cookies are used to remember consumer preferences and information to make the process shopping faster and more pleasant. And what consumer (uncritically) would resist that? The practice of using cookies fulfills, to some degree, both the consumer and the marketer goals. These goals are for both constituencies local or instrumental goals; they do not call into question the orientation of more global goals. This kind of institutional rationality may thus benefit neither consumers nor companies on a larger, more global level (Weber, 1922/1968).</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Berlant 11. Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, Cruel Optimism, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 33-6 fulltext: When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea - whatever. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form. In optimism, the subject leans toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter with their object.' 'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. What's cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object. One more thing: the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is, I think, usually something an analyst observes about someone's or some group's attachment to x, since usually that attachment exists without being an event, or even better, seems to lighten the load for someone/some group.^ But if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone/some group, even in disavowed fashion, the fear is that the loss of the object/scene of promising itself will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising or animating potency of an object/ scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. To understand cruel optimism, therefore, one must embark on an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But the condition of projected possibility, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) creates a fake present moment of intersubjectivity in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is made possible by the fantasy of you, laden with the x qualities I can project onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under the condition, and illusion, that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe is thus an indirect, unstable, physically impossible but phenomenologically vitalising movement of rhetorical animation that permits subjects to suspend themselves in the optimism of a potential occupation of the same psychic space of others, the objects of desire who make you possible (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that the conditions of the lush submerging of one consciousness into another require a double negation: of the speaker's boundaries, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; and of the spoken of, who is more or less a powerful mute placeholder providing an opportunity for the speaker's imagination of her/his/their flourishing. Of course psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible. It is a wish, a desire, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, a transaction that affirms you without, again, necessarily feeling good or accurate (it might idealise, it might affirm your monstrosity, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression. Political depression persists in affective judgments of the world's intractability - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - modes of what might be called detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in the problem of the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work, and which indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them; my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." Cruel optimism is, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as an analytic lever it is an incitement to inhabit and to track the affective attachment to what we call 'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless, and at the same time, find their conditions of possibility within it. My assumption is that the conditions of ordinary life in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, are conditions of the attrition or the wearing out of the subject, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ Cruel optimism is in this sense a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence, one that grows from a perception about the reasons people are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but choose to ride the wave of the system of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, and to misrecognise that promise as an achievement. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out by the promises that they have attached to in this world.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>As they inevitably read framework in the 2AC, you must ask yourself, why did they read this in debate, and whether or not their intentions were something a little more insidious.</h4><p><strong>Berlant 11.</strong> Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, Cruel Optimism, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 33-6</p><p><u><strong><mark>When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about</mark> a cluster of <mark>promises we want someone</mark> or something <mark>to make to us</mark> and make possible for us.</strong> This</u> cluster of promises <u>could be embedded in a <strong>person</strong>, a thing, an <strong>institution</strong>, a <strong>text</u></strong>, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, <u>a good idea - <strong>whatever</u></strong>. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as <u><mark>proximity to the object means proximity to </mark>the cluster of things that the object <mark>promises</u>,</mark> some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. <u><strong><mark>In other words, all attachments are optimistic</strong>. That does not mean</mark> that <mark>they</u> </mark>all <u><mark>feel optimistic</u></mark>: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. <u><mark>But</mark> the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form</u>. In optimism<mark>, <u><strong>the subject leans toward promises contained within the </u></strong></mark>present moment of the <u><strong>encounter with their <mark>object</mark>.' </strong><mark>'Cruel optimism' names</mark> a relation of <mark>attachment to</mark> compromised <mark>conditions of possibility</mark> <strong><mark>whose realisation is</mark> discovered either to be <mark>impossible</u></strong></mark>, sheer fantasy, <u><strong><mark>or</u></strong></mark> too possible, and <u><strong><mark>toxic</mark>. <mark>What's cruel</u></strong></mark> about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, <u><mark>is</mark> that the <mark>subjects</mark> who have x in their lives <mark>might not well endure the loss of their object</mark> or scene of desire, even though <strong><mark>its presence threatens their well-being</strong></mark>, because whatever the content of the <strong>attachment</strong> is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of<strong> what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world</u></strong>. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. <u><strong><mark>Cruel optimism is </mark>the condition of <mark>maintaining </mark>an<mark> attachment </mark>to a problematic object</u></strong>. One more thing: <u>the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is</u>, I think, usually <u>something an analyst observes about someone's</u> or some group's <u>attachment</u> to x, <u>since usually <strong><mark>that attachment</u></strong></mark> exists without being an event, or even better<u><strong>, <mark>seems to</mark> <mark>lighten the load for someone</u></strong></mark>/some group.^ But <u>if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone</u>/some group, even in disavowed fashion, <u>the fear is that the loss of the object</u>/scene of promising itself <u>will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything</u>. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But <u><strong>some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others:</strong> where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising</u> or animating <u>potency of an object</u>/ scene <u>of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place</u>. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. <u>One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire</u>/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. <u>To understand cruel optimism</u>, therefore, <u>one must embark on</u> an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as <u>a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into <strong>an</strong> <strong>enabling object that is also disabling</u></strong>. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, <u>in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought</u>. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But <u><mark>the condition of projected possibility</u></mark>, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) <u><mark>creates a <strong>fake</mark> present <mark>moment of intersubjectivity</strong></mark> in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is <mark>made possible by the fantasy</u> </mark>of you, <u>laden with the</u> x <u>qualities I can project</u> onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but <u><strong>it is actually a turning back</strong>, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker</u>, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under <u><mark>the</u> </mark>condition, and <u><mark>illusion</u>,</mark> that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe <u><mark>is</mark> thus <mark>an</mark> indirect, unstable, physically <mark>impossible </mark>but phenomenologically vitalising <mark>movement </mark>of rhetorical animation <mark>that permits subjects to suspend themselves </mark>in the <mark>optimism of</mark> a potential <mark>occupation of the same psychic space of others</mark>, the objects of desire who make you possible</u> (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that <u>the conditions of the lush <mark>submerging </mark>of <mark>one consciousness into another require a double negation: of the speaker's boundaries</u></mark>, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; <u><mark>and of the spoken of, who is</u></mark> more or less <u>a</u> powerful mute <u>placeholder <mark>providing</mark> an <mark>opportunity for the speaker's imagination</u></mark> of her/his/their flourishing. Of course <u><mark>psychoanalytically speaking <strong>all intersubjectivity is impossible</strong>. It is</mark> a</u> wish, a <u>desire</u>, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot <u>that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition</u> - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, <u><mark>a transaction that affirms you <strong>without,</u></strong> </mark>again<mark>, <u><strong>necessarily feeling good</u></strong></mark> or accurate (it might idealise, <u><mark>it might affirm</mark> your <mark>monstrosity</u></mark>, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, <u>Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment</u>, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression. Political depression persists in affective judgments of the world's intractability - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - modes of what might be called detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in the problem of the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work, and which indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them; my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." Cruel optimism is, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as an analytic lever it is an incitement to inhabit and to track the affective attachment to what we call 'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless, and at the same time, find their conditions of possibility within it. My assumption is that <u>the conditions of ordinary life</u> in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, <u>are conditions of the</u> attrition or the <u>wearing out of the subject</u>, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ <u><mark>Cruel optimism is</u></mark> in this sense <u>a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence</u>, one that grows from a perception about <u>the reasons people</u> are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but <u>choose <mark>to ride the wave of the system</mark> of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it</u>. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, <u><mark>and</u></mark> to <u><mark>misrecognise that</u></mark> promise <u><mark>as</mark> an <mark>achievement</u></mark>. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why <u><strong>these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out </u></strong>by the promises that they have attached to in this world.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Bradsher & Myers 18 (Keith Pulitzer prize business and economics reporter and the Shanghai bureau chief and Steven Lee diplomatic and national security correspondent, 8-14-2018, Trump’s Trade War Is Rattling China’s Leaders, No Publication, accessed: 8-15-2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/world/asia/china-trade-war-trump-xi-jinping-.html //ng fulltext: BEIJING — China’s leaders have sought to project confidence in the face of President Trump’s tariffs and trade threats. But as it becomes clear that a protracted trade war with the United States may be unavoidable, there are growing signs of unease inside the Communist political establishment. In recent days, officials from the Commerce Ministry, the police and other agencies have summoned exporters to ask about plans to lay off workers or shift supply chains to other countries. With stocks slumping and the currency dropping 9 percent against the dollar since mid-April, censors have been deleting a torrent of criticism online, some of it directed at President Xi Jinping’s leadership. State news outlets, by contrast, have sought to promote the official line, with the authorities restricting the use of the phrase “trade war.” Still, policy disputes over how to bolster the economy have at times spilled into the open, with the state media sometimes coming under attack for boasting about China’s economic strengths. If the trade war escalates — and Mr. Trump has shown no sign of backing down — some worry that the public’s faith in the economy could be shaken, exposing the nation to much more serious problems than a drop in exports. New economic data on Tuesday showed slower growth in investment and consumer spending, and there are fears that the financial crisis in Turkey could spread. China’s leaders have argued that they can outlast Mr. Trump in a trade standoff. Their authoritarian system can stifle dissent and quickly redirect resources, and they expect Washington to be gridlocked and come under pressure from voters feeling the pain of trade disruptions. But the Communist Party is vulnerable in its own way. It needs growth to justify its monopoly on power and is obsessed with preventing social instability. Mr. Xi’s strongman grip may be hindering effective policymaking, as officials fail to pass on bad news, defer decisions to him and rigidly carry out his orders, for better or worse. Beijing has already had to shift course once, edging away from threats to match American tariffs dollar for dollar. Confronting the possibility that the tariffs may remain for months or years and that Chinese access to the American market could tighten further, Mr. Xi does not appear to have settled on a strategy for limiting the damage or for persuading Mr. Trump to negotiate a deal. Some inside the government have argued China should be more aggressive and put Mr. Trump on the defensive, while others have proposed concessions to address American complaints, said Chen Dingding, a professor of international relations at Jinan University in the southern city of Guangzhou. He said the debate was “a healthy development” because it would “inform the public and make policymakers better.” Others said it reflects indecision or political weakness on the part of Mr. Xi, who seemed unassailable in March when the Communist leadership abolished the presidential term limit. “All of this coming together suggests Xi’s grip on authority has been loosened,” said Willy Wo-lap Lam, a longtime observer of Chinese politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “He’s unable to fill his function as the final arbiter who settles differences among his closest advisers.” It is unlikely Mr. Xi’s position is in any jeopardy. But the trade dispute, along with a scandal over tainted vaccines and protests over failed investments, have already emboldened some critics of his sweeping centralization of power. “The recent Sino-American trade war has, in particular, revealed underlying weaknesses and the soft underbelly of the system,” wrote Xu Zhangrun, a law professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, in a denunciation of Mr. Xi’s hard-line policies that was shared widely despite censorship. “All of this has only served to exacerbate a widespread sense of insecurity in society at large.” In public, the leadership has argued that China can weather the trade war with ease. A widely circulated study by economists at Tsinghua University estimated that the tariffs imposed so far and those threatened would trim only 0.3 percentage points from China’s growth rate, which has been running at a robust 6.7 percent. Even so, the government last month requested that dozens of research institutes and universities each submit analyses on how different regions and industrial sectors would be affected if the trade war worsened and what the impact would be on unemployment and the financial markets. China sold roughly $500 billion worth of goods to the United States last year, accounting for nearly a quarter of its total exports and about 4 percent of national economic production. If the United States imposes tariffs on all Chinese goods, even pessimistic Chinese economists contend the country might suffer only a 1 percent drop of output from lost exports. China so dominates some industries, such as smartphone manufacturing, that tariffs may not do much damage. In other industries, China might lose business to rivals like South Korea but find opportunities to export its goods to other markets. While factories that make price-sensitive electronics and other electrical products are already beginning to lose orders, China is so competitive across so many sectors that exports to the United States are actually still rising despite the relatively limited tariffs that have taken effect. Image The worst case for China, however, is that the trade war undermines economic confidence. The nation’s housing market teeters on a mountain of debt, and low-interest loans from state banks have built overcapacity in many industries. The worry is that prolonged trade tensions could cause money to rush out of China despite currency controls and prompt much bigger financial and economic troubles. Censors have quashed discussion of such scenarios. There also has been almost no news coverage of the substance of American complaints about China’s trade practices. Instead, the state news media have been ordered to stop mentioning Made in China 2025, the industrial plan to transform the country into a high-tech superpower that Washington has criticized as unfair and predatory. To the extent there has been finger-pointing in the establishment, the focus appears to be less on China’s trade practices than on its propaganda message. Some analysts have argued that the trade war could have been avoided if Beijing had refrained from triumphalist rhetoric about China’s rise as a global power. That rhetoric is closely associated with Mr. Xi himself. “There’s a lot of second-guessing about whether the great leader played his cards right,” said Jerome Cohen, faculty director of the United States-Asia Law Institute at New York University. A group of alumni from Tsinghua, one of China’s most prestigious universities, recently circulated a petition calling for the dismissal of a well-known economist on the faculty who is an ardent defender of Mr. Xi’s policies. They accused the scholar, Hu Angang, of misleading the leadership by arguing last year that China had already surpassed the United States as an economic and technological power. The petition appeared weeks after a series of articles in the official People’s Daily newspaper mocked scholars and pundits making similar boasts about China’s strength. “A slowing economy and friction with the United States provides an opportunity for people to push back,” said Trey McArver, a partner with Trivium China, a research consultancy in Beijing and London. As the trade dispute festers, Chinese business leaders have been circumspect, saying almost nothing about it publicly for fear of angering Beijing. It is clear, though, that they and government officials were caught off guard. Image “Outside of government negotiators, few people took this possibility very seriously until July 6,” said Yu Yongding, a prominent economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, referring to the date when tariffs on $34 billion of Chinese goods took effect. Scott Kennedy, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said the assumption that Beijing could avoid a trade war “suffused every conversation” he had with officials earlier this year. “They were wrong, and they are smarting over that, trying to find north and recalibrate,” he said. Tensions inside the government flared into the open last month when Xu Zhong, the research director of China’s central bank, published an essay rebuffing calls to bolster the economy by issuing more money. He castigated the Finance Ministry instead for a “dearth of effective fiscal policies,” referring to extra government spending and tax cuts.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Independently, trade war decks CCP legitimacy </h4><p><strong>Bradsher & Myers 18</strong> (Keith Pulitzer prize business and economics reporter and the Shanghai bureau chief and Steven Lee diplomatic and national security correspondent, 8-14-2018, Trump’s Trade War Is Rattling China’s Leaders, No Publication, accessed: 8-15-2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/world/asia/china-trade-war-trump-xi-jinping-.html //ng</p><p>BEIJING — <u>China’s leaders</u> have <u>sought to project confidence</u> <u>in</u> the <u>face</u> <u>of</u> President <u>Trump’s tariffs and trade threats.</u> But as <u><mark>it becomes clear that</mark> a protracted trade war</u> with the United States <u>may be unavoidable</u>, <u><mark>there are <strong>growing signs of unease</strong></mark> <mark>inside</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>Communist</u></mark> political <u><mark>establishment</u></mark>. In recent days, <u>officials from the Commerce Ministry</u>, the police and other agencies <u>have summoned exporters to </u>ask about plans to <u>lay off workers or shift supply chains</u> to other countries. <u><mark>With <strong>stocks slumping</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> the <u><strong>currency dropping 9 percent</u></strong> <u>against the dollar</u> since mid-April, censors have been deleting a torrent of criticism online, some of it directed at President Xi Jinping’s leadership. <u><mark>State</mark> news <mark>outlets</u></mark>, by contrast, have <u><mark>sought to promote</mark> <mark>the official line</u></mark>, <u>with</u> the <u>authorities</u> <u>restricting</u> the use of <u>the phrase “trade war.” </u>Still, policy disputes over how to bolster the economy have at times spilled into the open, with the state media sometimes coming under attack for boasting about China’s economic strengths. If the trade war escalates — and Mr. Trump has shown no sign of backing down — <u><mark>some</u></mark> <u><mark>worry</mark> that the <strong><mark>public’s faith</strong></mark> in the economy <strong><mark>could be shaken</strong>, exposing</mark> <mark>the nation to</mark> much more <mark>serious problems</u></mark> <u>than</u> a <u>drop</u> <u>in exports</u>. New economic data on Tuesday showed <u>slower growth in investment and consumer spending</u>, and <u>there are fears that the financial crisis in Turkey could spread. China’s leaders</u> have <u>argued</u> that <u>they can outlast</u> Mr. <u>Trump</u> in a trade standoff. <u><mark>Their authoritarian system</mark> can stifle dissent</u> <u>and</u> quickly <u>redirect</u> <u>resources</u>, <u>and they expect Washington to be gridlocked </u>and come under pressure from voters feeling the pain of trade disruptions. But <u>the Communist Party is vulnerable </u>in its own way. <u><strong>It <mark>needs growth to justify</u></strong></mark> <u>its</u> <u><mark>monopoly</mark> <mark>on</mark> <mark>power</u></mark> <u>and is obsessed with preventing social instability</u>. Mr. <u>Xi’s</u> <u>strongman</u> <u>grip may be hindering effective</u> <u>policymaking, as officials fail to pass on bad news, defer decisions to him and rigidly</u> <u>carry out </u>his <u>orders</u>, <u>for better or worse. </u>Beijing has already had to shift course once, edging away from threats to match American tariffs dollar for dollar. Confronting the possibility that the tariffs may remain for months or years and that Chinese access to the American market could tighten further, Mr. <u>Xi does not appear to have settled on a strategy for limiting</u> the <u>damage</u> or for persuading Mr. Trump to negotiate a deal. Some inside the government have argued China should be more aggressive and put Mr. Trump on the defensive, while others have proposed concessions to address American complaints, said Chen Dingding, a professor of international relations at Jinan University in the southern city of Guangzhou. He said the debate was “a healthy development” because it would “inform the public and make policymakers better.” <u>Others said it reflects</u> indecision or <u><strong>political weakness</u></strong> <u>on the part of</u> Mr. <u>Xi, </u>who seemed unassailable in March when the Communist leadership abolished the presidential term limit. “All of this coming together suggests Xi’s grip on authority has been loosened,” said Willy Wo-lap Lam, a longtime observer of Chinese politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “He’s unable to fill his function as the final arbiter who settles differences among his closest advisers.” It is unlikely Mr. Xi’s position is in any jeopardy. But <u><mark>the <strong>trade dispute,</u></strong> <u>along with</mark> a scandal over <strong><mark>tainted vaccines</u></strong></mark> and protests over failed investments, <u>have</u> already <u><strong><mark>emboldened</u></strong></mark> some <u><strong><mark>critics</strong></mark> of his sweeping centralization of power</u>. “<u><mark>The</u></mark> recent Sino-American <u><strong><mark>trade war</strong></mark> has</u>, in particular, <u><strong><mark>revealed</strong> underlying<strong> weaknesses</u></strong></mark> <u>and the soft underbelly <mark>of the system</u></mark>,” wrote Xu Zhangrun, a law professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, in a denunciation of Mr. Xi’s hard-line policies that was shared widely despite censorship. “<u>All of this has</u> only <u>served to exacerbate a <strong>widespread</strong> sense of <strong>insecurity</strong> in society at large.” </u>In public, the leadership has argued that China can weather the trade war with ease. A widely circulated study by economists at Tsinghua University estimated that the tariffs imposed so far and those threatened would trim only 0.3 percentage points from China’s growth rate, which has been running at a robust 6.7 percent. Even so, <u>the government last month requested</u> that <u>dozens of research institutes and universities</u> each <u>submit analyses on how different regions and industrial sectors would be affected</u> <u>if the trade war worsened</u> <u>and</u> what <u>the</u> <u>impact would be on unemployment and the financial markets. </u>China sold roughly $500 billion worth of goods to the United States last year, accounting for nearly a quarter of its total exports and about 4 percent of national economic production. If the United States imposes tariffs on all Chinese goods, even pessimistic Chinese economists contend the country might suffer only a 1 percent drop of output from lost exports. China so dominates some industries, such as smartphone manufacturing, that tariffs may not do much damage. In other industries, China might lose business to rivals like South Korea but find opportunities to export its goods to other markets. While factories that make price-sensitive electronics and other electrical products are already beginning to lose orders, China is so competitive across so many sectors that exports to the United States are actually still rising despite the relatively limited tariffs that have taken effect. Image <u><mark>The worst case for China</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>is</mark> that the <mark>trade war <strong>undermines economic confidence</strong></mark>. The nation’s housing market</u> <u>teeters</u> <u>on</u> <u>a mountain of</u> <u>debt</u>, <u>and</u> <u>low-interest loan</u>s from state banks have <u>built overcapacity in many industries</u>. The worry is that <u><mark>prolonged trade tensions</mark> could <mark>cause</u></mark> <u><mark>money to rush out of China despite</mark> currency <mark>controls</u></mark> and prompt much bigger financial and economic troubles. Censors have quashed discussion of such scenarios. There also has been almost no news coverage of the substance of American complaints about China’s trade practices. Instead, the state news media have been ordered to stop mentioning Made in China 2025, the industrial plan to transform the country into a high-tech superpower that Washington has criticized as unfair and predatory. To the extent there has been finger-pointing in the establishment, the focus appears to be less on China’s trade practices than on its propaganda message. Some analysts have argued that the trade war could have been avoided if Beijing had refrained from triumphalist rhetoric about China’s rise as a global power. That rhetoric is closely associated with Mr. Xi himself. “There’s a lot of second-guessing about whether the great leader played his cards right,” said Jerome Cohen, faculty director of the United States-Asia Law Institute at New York University. A group of alumni from Tsinghua, one of China’s most prestigious universities, recently circulated a petition calling for the dismissal of a well-known economist on the faculty who is an ardent defender of Mr. Xi’s policies. They accused the scholar, Hu Angang, of misleading the leadership by arguing last year that China had already surpassed the United States as an economic and technological power. The petition appeared weeks after a series of articles in the official People’s Daily newspaper mocked scholars and pundits making similar boasts about China’s strength. “<u>A slowing economy and friction with</u> <u>the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>provides</u> an <u>opportunity for people to push back,”</u> said Trey McArver, a partner with Trivium China, a research consultancy in Beijing and London. As the trade dispute festers, Chinese business leaders have been circumspect, saying almost nothing about it publicly for fear of angering Beijing. It is clear, though, that they and government officials were caught off guard. Image “Outside of government negotiators, few people took this possibility very seriously until July 6,” said Yu Yongding, a prominent economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, referring to the date when tariffs on $34 billion of Chinese goods took effect. Scott Kennedy, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said the assumption that Beijing could avoid a trade war “suffused every conversation” he had with officials earlier this year. “They were wrong, and they are smarting over that, trying to find north and recalibrate,” he said. <u>Tensions inside the government flared</u> into the <u>open last month when Xu Zhong,</u> the <u>research director of China’s central bank</u>, <u>published an essay</u> <u>rebuffing</u> <u>calls to </u>bolster the economy by <u>issuing more money. </u>He castigated the Finance Ministry instead for a “dearth of effective fiscal policies,” referring to extra government spending and tax cuts.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kitfeld 8/4 August 04, 2017 James Kitfeld “Trump’s Generals Are Trying to Save the World. Starting With the White House.” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/04/donald-trump-generals-mattis-mcmaster-kelly-flynn-215455 fulltext: By the end of last week, even President Donald Trump had apparently had enough of the self-inflicted chaos swirling around his White House. And the person he turned to fix it—instinctively, it seems—was a retired Marine Corps general. John Kelly, out of uniform for just a year after retiring as head of U.S. Southern Command, has been running the Department of Homeland Security since January. He’s a straight-talking and sometimes blunt man whose accent suggests his working-class Boston roots, and he enjoys a salty joke. Sources say Trump was already in the habit of asking him for advice on how to make the White House run more smoothly. Not since the early days of the Ford administration has a general served as White House chief of staff—and arguably not since the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, himself a retired general, have senior military officers wielded such influence at the top levels of an administration. Kelly forms a nexus of power with three other generals: Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a retired Marine general; Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Marine general; and national security adviser H.R. McMaster, still a uniformed lieutenant general in the Army — and a replacement for retired Lt. General Michael Flynn, who was fired after less than a month in the job. As the administration first took shape, the heavy military makeup of the administration’s national security and foreign affairs team — of its senior leadership, only Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is a civilian — raised serious questions about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. These concerns were exacerbated in February when Trump bragged his budget contained “one of the largest defense-spending increases in history,” and later when he handed a series of important new wartime authorities to the Pentagon, while proposing to slash the State Department budget by 30 percent. But during the first seven months of his administration, the generals have emerged as a fairly coherent bloc of foreign-policy thinkers whose views have put at least the most extreme fears of critics to rest. Through both experience and military education, the generals are pragmatic realists and internationalists, committed to the United States’ leadership role in the world. Internally, they’ve been a strong counterweight to the nationalist/populist faction in the White House led by chief strategist Steve Bannon, which was behind controversial Trump policies like the initial immigration ban, the rejection of the Paris Climate Change Accords, and potential steel tariffs that could yet spark a global trade war. Taken as a group, Trump’s generals have tended to see their mission as twofold: The first job is to correct what senior military officers see as the mistakes of the Obama administration, a hesitancy to use force or commit troops that many allies perceived as a retreat from traditional U.S. commitments in the world. The second job—and the far riskier one—is to mitigate the damage caused by their boss. An undisciplined and shoot-from-the-lip president, Trump has shown a proclivity for rattling allies with unexpected tweets and bullying phone calls. When he trumpets his “America first” foreign policy, it’s widely interpreted by allies as a fig leaf for isolationism and protectionism. The generals, with Tillerson as something of a junior partner—nicknamed the “axis of adults” by a number of establishment Republicans and conservative commentators—have become the reassurers-in-chief to the outside world. They’ve already persuaded Trump to back away from some of his most controversial foreign policy positions, including labeling NATO “obsolete,” moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, rescinding the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal, and reconsidering the venerable “One China” policy. And they’ve won some internal fights. McMaster, in particular, appears to be locked in battle with the nationalist faction: He has recently cleared out a number of senior national-security staffers associated with his predecessor Mike Flynn or seen as allied to Bannon; he’s fired Rich Higgins, the strategic-planning director who wrote a conspiracy-laced memo, as well as Intelligence Directorate head Ezra Cohen-Watnick, a Bannon ally who earlier this year secretly shared intelligence with Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Rep. Devin Nunes. For his troubles, McMaster is now under attack by Bannon’s former website, Breitbart, which is covering his “purge” with blazing headlines—though he appears to be enjoying some protection from the arrival of Kelly. Which suggests that the more interesting internal fight may be the one Kelly is just beginning, trying to both corral a deeply disjointed White House staff and temper Trump’s erratic day-to-day impulses. What’s at stake, in the minds of the generals, is something considerably larger than winning the internal Game of Thrones. In the back of his airplane returning from a recent trip to Asia, General Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told me that that the international order they were striving to protect was more volatile and unpredictable today than at any moment since World War II. “Today, we’re confronting simultaneous challenges posed by China, North Korea, Russia and Iran, as well as a natural disaster in Sri Lanka,” he said, referring to flooding that had recently displaced hundreds of thousands of people. “So, as I prepare for posture hearings in Congress, that’s a reminder that this is the world as it is, not the world as we might want it to be.” The world as it is also includes a global Islamist insurgency, U.S. combat operations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, and growing instability and state failure around the world, from Yemen to South Sudan to Venezuela. The defense of what author Robert Kagan calls “The World America Made” now depends on the success of Trump’s generals in the twin objectives of shaping a more muscular national security posture, and limiting the international blowback from an “America First” foreign policy of naked nationalism and mercantilism —even as their own commander-in-chief projects that face to the world. Why generals at all? Donald Trump, a flamboyant billionaire and reality-TV star who received multiple deferments from serving in Vietnam, might initially seem an unlikely boss for a clique of buttoned down military officers. But from his days at the New York Military Academy, Trump seems to have retained an innate respect for the uniform, and above all he likes tough guys. All of his top generals distinguished themselves in multiple combat tours, and Trump especially likes reminding Mattis of a former nickname he would just as soon retire, “Mad Dog.” For their part, the generals were qualified to step into a Trump administration in a way that few other national-security experts were: Experienced and worldly without being partisan or political, and thus not part of the “Washington swamp” that candidate Trump constantly promised to drain. By training, they innately respect the position of the commander-in-chief and the institution of the presidency, regardless of who holds it. And unlike many of the Republican defense and foreign policy experts in the Republican establishment, they hadn’t put their names on “Never Trump” proclamations during the campaign. Trump’s closest relationship was with none of his current generals, but with Flynn, a decorated combat veteran who served as the former intelligence chief for Joint Special Operations Command. The brash businessman and the maverick soldier had something in common: Both felt that America had lost the knack of “winning,” either in international trade or in the global fight against Islamist extremists. The two bonded on the campaign trail, and Flynn infamously spoke at the Republican National Convention, leading the crowd in chants of “Lock Her Up” in reference to Hillary Clinton. Flynn was eventually fired as Trump’s national security adviser for his entanglement with Russia, and is now a target of the FBI’s investigation—and his fall from grace presents a cautionary tale of the dangers military officers can face in entering the unfamiliar terrain of hyperpartisan politics, and the whirlpool of controversies constantly swirling around Trump. Flynn’s replacement was a surprising choice for an ahistorical president who puts a premium on obsequiousness and loyalty in his subordinates: McMaster is a warrior-scholar who distinguished himself in combat, but also wrote a book called “Dereliction of Duty,” a critique of generals who didn’t speak honestly enough to their civilian bosses during the Vietnam War. He had made a career out of independent thought and speaking truth to power. Mattis, similarly, has a scholarly reputation: a noted intellectual and keen student of history, Mattis sprinkles his conversations with references to Thucydides and the Peloponnesian war, Abraham Lincoln’s struggle to prepare the nation for the end of slavery, and the enduring lessons of the post-World War II Marshall Plan, fashioned by his predecessor George C. Marshall, the last retired general to serve as defense secretary. (Kelly reportedly caught the eye of Team Trump for reasons a little closer to the Trump campaign themes: In testimony, he gave before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2015, he argued that a porous southern border was a potentially “existential” national security threat.) Given that the Marine Corps is the smallest of the four major armed services, the Marines that rise to the level of general form an especially tight-knit clique. Kelly and Joint Chiefs Chairman Joe Dunford served under Mattis multiple times in combat in Iraq, close aides say, and the three talk frequently and meet often at national security meetings and retirement ceremonies. It was General Dunford who personally delivered the heartbreaking news to Kelly that his son, 2nd Lt. Robert Kelly, was killed in action in Afghanistan in 2011. As a group, Trump’s generals are united by bonds of friendship, common experience and wartime sacrifice. By the nature of their military education—and the U.S. military’s constant overseas deployments of the past two decades—they’re also well steeped in international relations, and deeply committed to the global alliance structure that the U.S. military built and maintained after World War II. Their wartime experiences have also made them sensitive to looming threats, whether from Islamist extremists, a hegemonic Iran, and especially a revanchist Russia that has targeted Western democracies as its enemies.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Generals restrain Trump</h4><p>Kitfeld 8/4</p><p></strong>August 04, 2017 James Kitfeld “Trump’s Generals Are Trying to Save the World. Starting With the White House.” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/04/donald-trump-generals-mattis-mcmaster-kelly-flynn-215455</p><p>By the end of last week, even President Donald Trump had apparently had enough of the self-inflicted chaos swirling around his White House. And the person he turned to fix it—instinctively, it seems—was a retired Marine Corps general. John Kelly, out of uniform for just a year after retiring as head of U.S. Southern Command, has been running the Department of Homeland Security since January. He’s a straight-talking and sometimes blunt man whose accent suggests his working-class Boston roots, and he enjoys a salty joke. Sources say Trump was already in the habit of asking him for advice on how to make the White House run more smoothly. Not since the early days of the Ford administration has a general served as White House chief of staff—and arguably not since the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, himself a retired general, have senior military officers wielded such influence at the top levels of an administration. Kelly forms a nexus of power with three other generals: Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a retired Marine general; Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Marine general; and national security adviser H.R. McMaster, still a uniformed lieutenant general in the Army — and a replacement for retired Lt. General Michael Flynn, who was fired after less than a month in the job. As the administration first took shape, the heavy military makeup of the administration’s national security and foreign affairs team — of its senior leadership, only Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is a civilian — raised serious questions about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. These concerns were exacerbated in February when Trump bragged his budget contained “one of the largest defense-spending increases in history,” and later when he handed a series of important new wartime authorities to the Pentagon, while proposing to slash the State Department budget by 30 percent. But during the first seven months of his administration, the <u><mark>generals</mark> have emerged as a fairly coherent bloc of foreign-policy thinkers whose views have put at least the most extreme fears of critics to rest</u>. <u>Through both experience and military education, the generals are pragmatic realists and internationalists</u>, committed to the United States’ leadership role in the world. <u>Internally, they’<mark>ve been a strong <strong>counterweight to the nationalist/populist faction</u></strong></mark> in the White House led by chief strategist Steve Bannon, which was behind controversial Trump policies like the initial immigration ban, the rejection of the Paris Climate Change Accords, and potential steel tariffs that could yet spark a global trade war. Taken as a group, <u><mark>Trump’s generals have tended</mark> to see their mission </u>as twofold: The first job is to correct what senior military officers see as the mistakes of the Obama administration, a hesitancy to use force or commit troops that many allies perceived as a retreat from traditional U.S. commitments in the world. The second job—and the far riskier one—is <u><strong><mark>to mitigate the damage</mark> caused by their boss</u></strong>. An undisciplined and shoot-from-the-lip president, Trump has shown a proclivity for rattling allies with unexpected tweets and bullying phone calls. When he trumpets his “America first” foreign policy, it’s widely interpreted by allies as a fig leaf for isolationism and protectionism. <u><mark>The generals</mark>, with Tillerson as something of a junior partner—<mark>nicknamed the “axis of adults</u></mark>” by a number of establishment Republicans and conservative commentators—<u><mark>have become the reassurers-in-chief</mark> to the outside world</u>. <u>They’ve already persuaded Trump to back away from some of his most controversial foreign policy positions</u>, including <u>labeling NATO “obsolete,” moving the U.S. Embassy</u> in Israel <u>to Jerusalem</u>, <u>rescinding</u> the <u>N</u>orth <u>A</u>merican <u>F</u>ree <u>T</u>rade <u>A</u>greement and the Iran nuclear deal, and reconsidering the venerable “One China” policy. And they’ve won some internal fights. McMaster, in particular, appears to be locked in battle with the nationalist faction: He has recently cleared out a number of senior national-security staffers associated with his predecessor Mike Flynn or seen as allied to Bannon; he’s fired Rich Higgins, the strategic-planning director who wrote a conspiracy-laced memo, as well as Intelligence Directorate head Ezra Cohen-Watnick, a Bannon ally who earlier this year secretly shared intelligence with Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Rep. Devin Nunes. For his troubles, McMaster is now under attack by Bannon’s former website, Breitbart, which is covering his “purge” with blazing headlines—though he appears to be enjoying some protection from the arrival of Kelly. Which suggests that the more interesting internal fight may be the one Kelly is just beginning, trying to both corral a deeply disjointed White House staff and temper Trump’s erratic day-to-day impulses. What’s at stake, in the minds of the generals, is something considerably larger than winning the internal Game of Thrones. In the back of his airplane returning from a recent trip to Asia, General Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told me that that the international order they were striving to protect was more volatile and unpredictable today than at any moment since World War II. “Today, we’re confronting simultaneous challenges posed by China, North Korea, Russia and Iran, as well as a natural disaster in Sri Lanka,” he said, referring to flooding that had recently displaced hundreds of thousands of people. “So, as I prepare for posture hearings in Congress, that’s a reminder that this is the world as it is, not the world as we might want it to be.” The world as it is also includes a global Islamist insurgency, U.S. combat operations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, and growing instability and state failure around the world, from Yemen to South Sudan to Venezuela. The defense of what author Robert Kagan calls “The World America Made” now depends on the success of Trump’s generals in the twin objectives of shaping a more muscular national security posture, and limiting the international blowback from an “America First” foreign policy of naked nationalism and mercantilism —even as their own commander-in-chief projects that face to the world. Why generals at all? Donald Trump, a flamboyant billionaire and reality-TV star who received multiple deferments from serving in Vietnam, might initially seem an unlikely boss for a clique of buttoned down military officers. But from his days at the New York Military Academy, <u><mark>Trump seems to have</mark> retained an <mark>innate respect for the uniform</mark>, and above all he likes tough guys</u>. All of his top generals distinguished themselves in multiple combat tours, and Trump especially likes reminding Mattis of a former nickname he would just as soon retire, “Mad Dog.” For their part<u>, the generals were qualified to step into a Trump administration in a way that few other national-security experts were</u>: <u>Experienced</u> and worldly <u>without being partisan or political, and thus not part of the “Washington swamp</u>” that candidate Trump constantly promised to drain. By training, they innately respect the position of the commander-in-chief and the institution of the presidency, regardless of who holds it. And unlike many of the Republican defense and foreign policy experts in the Republican establishment, they hadn’t put their names on “Never Trump” proclamations during the campaign. Trump’s closest relationship was with none of his current generals, but with Flynn, a decorated combat veteran who served as the former intelligence chief for Joint Special Operations Command. The brash businessman and the maverick soldier had something in common: Both felt that America had lost the knack of “winning,” either in international trade or in the global fight against Islamist extremists. The two bonded on the campaign trail, and Flynn infamously spoke at the Republican National Convention, leading the crowd in chants of “Lock Her Up” in reference to Hillary Clinton. Flynn was eventually fired as Trump’s national security adviser for his entanglement with Russia, and is now a target of the FBI’s investigation—and his fall from grace presents a cautionary tale of the dangers military officers can face in entering the unfamiliar terrain of hyperpartisan politics, and the whirlpool of controversies constantly swirling around Trump. Flynn’s replacement was a surprising choice for an ahistorical president who puts a premium on obsequiousness and loyalty in his subordinates: McMaster is a warrior-scholar who distinguished himself in combat, but also wrote a book called “Dereliction of Duty,” a critique of generals who didn’t speak honestly enough to their civilian bosses during the Vietnam War. He had made a career out of independent thought and speaking truth to power. Mattis, similarly, has a scholarly reputation: a noted intellectual and keen student of history, Mattis sprinkles his conversations with references to Thucydides and the Peloponnesian war, Abraham Lincoln’s struggle to prepare the nation for the end of slavery, and the enduring lessons of the post-World War II Marshall Plan, fashioned by his predecessor George C. Marshall, the last retired general to serve as defense secretary. (Kelly reportedly caught the eye of Team Trump for reasons a little closer to the Trump campaign themes: In testimony, he gave before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2015, he argued that a porous southern border was a potentially “existential” national security threat.) Given that the Marine Corps is the smallest of the four major armed services, the Marines that rise to the level of general form an especially tight-knit clique. Kelly and Joint Chiefs Chairman Joe Dunford served under Mattis multiple times in combat in Iraq, close aides say, and the three talk frequently and meet often at national security meetings and retirement ceremonies. It was General Dunford who personally delivered the heartbreaking news to Kelly that his son, 2nd Lt. Robert Kelly, was killed in action in Afghanistan in 2011. <u>As a group, Trump’s generals are united</u> by bonds of friendship, common experience and wartime sacrifice. <u>By the nature of their military education—and the U.S. military’s constant overseas deployments of the past two decades—<mark>they’re</mark> also well <mark>steeped in international relations, and <strong>deeply committed to the global alliance structure</strong></mark> that the U.S. military built</u> and maintained after World War II. Their wartime experiences have also made them sensitive to looming threats, whether from Islamist extremists, a hegemonic Iran, and especially a revanchist Russia that has targeted Western democracies as its enemies.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Roesler 19 Shannon Roesler, Robert S. Kerr, Jr. Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law, “Agency Reasons at the Intersection of Expertise and Presidential Preference”, 71 Administrative Law Review 491, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3493910, 2019//Lee fulltext: C. Interpreting Statutory Language—and Agency Interpretations—with Science in Mind Judicial review should also serve to check identity-protective reasoning in agencies’ interpretations of their statutory responsibilities. Rarely will agencies contradict statutory authority so clearly as to violate the plain meaning of the statute under the first step in a deferential Chevron analysis. But an agency interpretation of an environmental or public health statute that disregards policy-relevant science could easily be unreasonable under step two of Chevron. Another way in which deference doctrine could guard against motivated reasoning would be to consider whether an agency’s interpretation is informed by its expertise in deciding how much deference to afford that interpretation in the first place. This final Section briefly discusses both approaches and applies them to agency decisions subject to current litigation. Should a court decide that an agency’s interpretation is due Chevron deference, its analysis of whether the interpretation is reasonable should include an inquiry into whether the agency reasonably considered policy-relevant science, provided that the authorizing statute allows for such an inquiry. In other words, even if the statute does not direct the agency to review relevant scientific knowledge, consideration of policy-relevant science should be a default rule for interpreting statutes that regulate public health and environmental risks. Courts should presume that agencies must consider all relevant scientific evidence in the absence of clear intent to the contrary. A science-consideration default rule would look much like the cost-consideration default rule that the Court adopted in Michigan v. EPA.302 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia found the EPA’s interpretation of the words “appropriate and necessary” unreasonable because it did not include consideration of cost.303 He explained that because cost consideration is a long-established practice, “it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether ‘regulation is appropriate and necessary’ as an invitation to ignore cost.”304 As the examples below demonstrate, it would be similarly unreasonable to interpret language in environmental statutes in a manner that ignores relevant science.305 Another way to ensure consideration of policy-relevant science is to recognize its place within deference doctrine generally. If Chevron does not apply to the agency interpretation in a given case, the lesser deference afforded by Skidmore v. Swift & Co.306 would turn on factors tied to the agency as expert, rather than the agency as policymaker: “The weight of such a[n] [interpretive] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evi-dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”307 Indeed, in Barnhart v. Walton,308 Justice Breyer approached the threshold question of whether to apply Chevron deference by applying Skidmore-like factors.309 Writing for the Court, he concluded that Chevron applied in part because of the nature of the question and “related expertise of the Agency,” along with the consistency of the agency’s interpretation over time.310 Following this approach, when an agency applies policy-relevant science to an interpretation, that expertise entitles the agency interpretation to more deference either under the conventional Chevron framework or in terms of the Skidmore factors’ “power to persuade.”311 To be sure, courts should not use these approaches as a means of imposing their own judgments regarding science-policy issues. Both a background rule regarding science-consideration and a Barnhart recognition of expertise require a reviewing court to recognize the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge. Regulations that protect the environment and public health often rely on scientific knowledge that is uncertain in ways discussed above. Interpreting a statute to require certainty—even in the legal sense of more likely than not—misunderstands the scientific process and undercuts the agency’s ability to fulfill its statutory mandate. The classic case that illustrates how courts can fail to appreciate the fundamentally different nature of scientific knowledge is the “benzene” case, in which the Supreme Court struck down the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) 1 ppm exposure limit on benzene in the workplace.312 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, interpreted the statutory lan-guage that empowered OSHA to promulgate workplace standards “reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment” to require a showing that the standard is “reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment.”313 As the dissenting justices argued, the plurality’s interpretation of the statute failed to acknowledge the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge.314 Scientists must extrapolate from epidemiological and animal studies to make risk assessments; their conclusions necessarily incorporate trans-scientific judgments and uncertainties because they cannot conduct double-blind clinical studies that expose people to a known carcinogen.315 A court applying the science-consideration default rule would ask whether the agency considered the relevant scientific literature and used its expertise to further the statute’s purposes—in this case, the health and safety of workers. When viewed from this perspective, the agency’s decision to exercise precaution (because it could not identify a safe exposure limit) and set the limit based on economic feasibility is reasonable. Similarly, on the Barnhardt continuum, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to judicial deference because it is using its expertise to interpret the statute in light of scientific uncertainty. In regulating benzene in the workplace, OSHA was drawing on its expertise to make policy judgments protective of human health in face of scientific uncertainty. These kinds of informed judgments are entitled to deference. Conversely, when agency interpretations of environmental and public health statutes are not informed by relevant science or in keeping with statutory purposes, they are either due less deference or are unreasonable under step two of Chevron. For example, the EPA and Army Corps’ proposed rescission of the Obama Administration’s Clean Water Rule is unreasonable because it does not adequately consider scientific knowledge in determining the extent to which wetlands are covered by the phrase “waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act.316 The Obama-era interpretation of the Act’s coverage was based on a 400-page “connectivity report” that detailed scien-tific research on the connection between wetlands, including isolated wetlands, and downstream rivers, lakes, and streams.317 In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the current EPA and Army Corps accuse the previous administration of relying too much on science: “The agencies now believe that they previously placed too much emphasis on the information and conclusions of the Connectivity Report when setting jurisdictional lines in the 2015 Rule.”318 This alone might not constitute an unreasonable interpretation of the Clean Water Act, but failure to accurately represent the scientific research on water quality and wetlands would entitle the final rule to less deference.319<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Scientific presumption limits and balances deference – solve the Aff</h4><p>Roesler 19</p><p></strong>Shannon Roesler, Robert S. Kerr, Jr. Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law, “Agency Reasons at the Intersection of Expertise and Presidential Preference”, 71 Administrative Law Review 491, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3493910, 2019//Lee</p><p>C. <u>Interpreting</u> Statutory <u>Language—and Agency Interpretations—with Science </u>in Mind</p><p><u>Judicial review should also serve to check identity-protective reasoning in agencies’ interpretations of their statutory responsibilities. Rarely will agencies contradict statutory authority</u> so clearly as <u>to violate the plain</u> meaning of the statute<u> under the first step in</u> a deferential <u>Chevron</u> analysis. But <u>an agency interpretation of an environmental </u>or public health <u>statute that disregards policy-relevant science could easily be unreasonable under step two of Chevron. Another way in which deference doctrine could guard against motivated reasoning </u>would be to consider whether an agency’s interpretation <u>is informed by its expertise in deciding how much deference to afford that interpretation in the first place. This final Section briefly discusses both approaches and applies them to agency decisions subject to current litigation.</p><p><mark>Should a court decide that an agency’s interpretation is due Chevron </mark>deference,<mark> its analysis of whether the interpretation is reasonable should include</u></mark> an inquiry into whether the agency reasonably considered <u><strong>p<mark>olicy-relevant science</u></strong>,</mark> provided that the authorizing statute allows for such an inquiry. In other words<u>, <mark>even if the statute does not direct the agency to review relevant scientific knowledge, consideration of </mark>policy-relevant <mark>science<strong> should be a default rule</strong></mark> for interpreting statutes that regulate public health and environmental risks</u>.<u> Courts should presume that agencies must consider all relevant scientific evidence</u> in the <u>absence of clear intent to the contrary.</p><p>A science-consideration default rule would look much like the cost-consideration default rule </u>that the Court adopted in Michigan v. EPA.302 <u>Writing for the Court,</u> Justice <u>Scalia found the EPA’s interpretation of the words “appropriate and necessary” unreasonable because it did not include consideration of cost.</u>303 He explained that because cost consideration is a long-established practice, “it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether ‘regulation is appropriate and necessary’ as an invitation to ignore cost.”304 As <u>the examples below demonstrate, it would be similarly unreasonable to interpret language in environmental statutes in a manner <strong>that ignores relevant science</strong>.</u>305</p><p>Another way to ensure consideration of policy-relevant science is to recognize its place within deference doctrine generally. <u>If Chevron does not apply to the agency interpretation </u>in a given case,<u> the lesser deference afforded by Skidmore</u> v. Swift & Co.306 <u>would turn on factors tied to the agency as expert, rather than the agency as policymaker</u>: “The weight of such a[n] [interpretive] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evi-dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”307 Indeed, in Barnhart v. Walton,308 Justice <u>Breyer approached the threshold question of whether to apply Chevron deference by applying Skidmore-like factors</u>.309 Writing for the Court, <u>he concluded that Chevron applied in part because of the nature of the question and “related expertise of the Agency,” along with the consistency of the agency’s interpretation over time</u>.310 Following this approach,<u> when an agency applies policy-relevant science to an interpretation</u>, that expertise entitles <u>the agency interpretation to more deference either under the conventional Chevron framework or in terms of the Skidmore factors’ “power to persuade.</u>”311 </p><p><u>To be sure, courts <strong>should not use these approaches as a means of imposing their own judgments </strong>regarding science-policy issues</u>. Both a background rule regarding science-consideration and a Barnhart recognition of expertise require a reviewing court to recognize the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge.<u> Regulations that protect the environment and public health often rely on scientific knowledge that is uncertain in ways discussed above.</u> <u>Interpreting a statute to require certainty</u>—even in the legal sense of more likely than not—<u>misunderstands the scientific process and undercuts the agency’s ability to fulfill its statutory mandate.</p><p></u>The classic case that illustrates how courts can fail to appreciate the fundamentally different nature of scientific knowledge is the “benzene” case, in which the Supreme Court struck down the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) 1 ppm exposure limit on benzene in the workplace.312 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, interpreted the statutory lan-guage that empowered OSHA to promulgate workplace standards “reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment” to require a showing that the standard is “reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment.”313</p><p>As the dissenting justices argued, <u>the plurality’s interpretation of the statute failed to acknowledge the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge.</u>314 Scientists must extrapolate from epidemiological and animal studies to make risk assessments; their conclusions necessarily incorporate trans-scientific judgments and uncertainties because they cannot conduct double-blind clinical studies that expose people to a known carcinogen.315 A court applying the science-consideration default rule would ask whether the agency considered the relevant scientific literature and used its expertise to further the statute’s purposes—in this case, the health and safety of workers.</p><p><u>When viewed from this perspective, the agency’s decision to exercise precaution</u> (because it could not identify a safe exposure limit) <u>and set the limit based on economic feasibility is reasonable.</u> Similarly, on the Barnhardt continuum, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to judicial deference because it is using its expertise to interpret the statute in light of scientific uncertainty. In regulating benzene in the workplace, OSHA was drawing on its expertise to make policy judgments protective of human health in face of scientific uncertainty. These kinds of informed judgments are entitled to deference.</p><p>Conversely,<u> <mark>when agency interpretations of environmental </mark>and public health <mark>statutes are not informed by </mark>relevant <mark>science or </mark>in keeping<mark> with statutory purposes, they are either <strong>due less deference or are unreasonable under step two of Chevron</mark>.</u></strong> For example,<u> the EPA and Army Corps’ proposed rescission of the</u> Obama Administration’s <u>Clean Water Rule is unreasonable because it does not adequately consider scientific knowledge in determining the extent to which wetlands are covered by the phrase “waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act.</u>316 The Obama-era interpretation of the Act’s coverage was based on a 400-page “connectivity report” that detailed scien-tific research on the connection between wetlands, including isolated wetlands, and downstream rivers, lakes, and streams.317 In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the current EPA and Army Corps accuse the previous administration of relying too much on science: “<u>The agencies now believe that they previously placed <mark>too much emphasis on</mark> the <mark>information and conclusions of the Connectivity Report</mark> when setting jurisdictional lines in the 2015 Rule</u>.”318 <u>This alone <mark>might not constitute an unreasonable interpretation of the C</mark>lean <mark>W</mark>ater <mark>A</mark>ct<mark>, but <strong>failure to </mark>accurately <mark>represent </mark>the <mark>scientific research</mark> </strong>on water quality and wetlands would entitle the final rule to less deference</u>.319</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Chossudovsky 19 (Michel Chossudovsky is an award-winning author, Professor of Economics (Emeritus) at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal, “Pre-emptive Nuclear War: The Role of Israel in Triggering an Attack on Iran” June 14, 2019, GlobalResearch https://www.globalresearch.ca/pre-emptive-nuclear-war-role-israel-attack-iran/5677025, 3/22/20)//ww BJ fulltext: The Role of Israel There has been much debate regarding the role of Israel in initiating an attack against Iran. Israel is part of a military alliance. Tel Aviv is not a prime mover. It does not have a separate and distinct military agenda. Israel is integrated into the “war plan for major combat operations” against Iran formulated in 2006 by US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). In the context of large scale military operations, an uncoordinated unilateral military action by one coalition partner, namely Israel, is from a military and strategic point almost an impossibility. Israel is a de facto member of NATO. Any action by Israel would require a “green light” from Washington. An attack by Israel could, however, be used as “the trigger mechanism” which would unleash an all out war against Iran, as well retaliation by Iran directed against Israel. In this regard, there are indications that Washington might envisage the option of an initial (US backed) attack by Israel rather than an outright US-led military operation directed against Iran. The Israeli attack –although led in close liaison with the Pentagon and NATO– would be presented to public opinion as a unilateral decision by Tel Aviv. It would then be used by Washington to justify, in the eyes of World opinion, a military intervention of the US and NATO with a view to “defending Israel”, rather than attacking Iran. Under existing military cooperation agreements, both the US and NATO would be “obligated” to “defend Israel” against Iran and Syria. It is worth noting, in this regard, that at the outset of Bush’s second term, (former) Vice President Dick Cheney hinted, in no uncertain terms, that Iran was “right at the top of the list” of the “rogue enemies” of America, and that Israel would, so to speak, “be doing the bombing for us”, without US military involvement and without us putting pressure on them “to do it” (See Michel Chossudovsky, Planned US-Israeli Attack on Iran, Global Research, May 1, 2005): According to Cheney: “One of the concerns people have is that Israel might do it without being asked… Given the fact that Iran has a stated policy that their objective is the destruction of Israel, the Israelis might well decide to act first, and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards,” (Dick Cheney, quoted from an MSNBC Interview, January 2005) Commenting the Vice President’s assertion, former National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in an interview on PBS, confirmed with some apprehension, yes: Cheney wants Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to act on America’s behalf and “do it” for us: “Iran I think is more ambiguous. And there the issue is certainly not tyranny; it’s nuclear weapons. And the vice president today in a kind of a strange parallel statement to this declaration of freedom hinted that the Israelis may do it and in fact used language which sounds like a justification or even an encouragement for the Israelis to do it.” What we are dealing with is a joint US-NATO-Israel military operation to bomb Iran, which has been in the active planning stage since 2004. Officials in the Defense Department, under Bush and Obama, have been working assiduously with their Israeli military and intelligence counterparts, carefully identifying targets inside Iran. In practical military terms, any action by Israel would have to be planned and coordinated at the highest levels of the US led coalition. An attack by Israel would also require coordinated US-NATO logistical support, particularly with regard to Israel’s air defense system, which since January 2009 is fully integrated into that of the US and NATO. (See Michel Chossudovsky, Unusually Large U.S. Weapons Shipment to Israel: Are the US and Israel Planning a Broader Middle East War? Global Research, January 11,2009) Israel’s X band radar system established in early 2009 with US technical support has “integrate[d] Israel’s missile defenses with the U.S. global missile [Space-based] detection network, WWIII Scenariowhich includes satellites, Aegis ships on the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and land-based Patriot radars and interceptors.” (Defense Talk.com, January 6, 2009,) What this means is that Washington ultimately calls the shots. The US rather than Israel controls the air defense system: ”’This is and will remain a U.S. radar system,’ Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said. ‘So this is not something we are giving or selling to the Israelis and it is something that will likely require U.S. personnel on-site to operate.'” (Quoted in Israel National News, January 9, 2009). The US military oversees Israel’s Air Defense system, which is integrated into the Pentagon’s global system. In other words, Israel cannot launch a war against Iran without Washington’s consent. Hence the importance of the so-called “Green Light” legislation in the US Congress sponsored by the Republican party under House Resolution 1553, which explicitly supports an Israeli attakc on Iran: “The measure, introduced by Texas Republican Louie Gohmert and 46 of his colleagues, endorses Israel’s use of “all means necessary” against Iran “including the use of military force.” … “We’ve got to get this done. We need to show our support for Israel. We need to quit playing games with this critical ally in such a difficult area.”’ (See Webster Tarpley, Fidel Castro Warns of Imminent Nuclear War; Admiral Mullen Threatens Iran; US-Israel Vs. Iran-Hezbollah Confrontation Builds On, Global Research, August 10, 2010) In practice, the proposed legislation is a “Green Light” to the White House and the Pentagon rather than to Israel. It constitutes a rubber stamp to a US sponsored war on Iran which uses Israel as a convenient military launch pad. It also serves as a justification to wage war with a view to defending Israel. In this context, Israel could indeed provide the pretext to wage war, in response to alleged Hamas or Hezbollah attacks and/or the triggering of hostilities on the border of Israel with Lebanon. What is crucial to understand is that a minor “incident” could be used as a pretext to spark off a major military operation against Iran. Known to US military planners, Israel (rather than the USA) would be the first target of military retaliation by Iran. Broadly speaking, Israelis would be the victims of the machinations of both Washington and their own government. It is, in this regard, absolutely crucial that Israelis forcefully oppose any action by the Netanyahu government to attack Iran. Global Warfare: The Role of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global military operations are coordinated out of US Strategic Command Headquarters (USSTRATCOM) at the Offutt Air Force base in Nebraska, in liaison with the regional commands of the unified combatant commands (e.g.. US Central Command in Florida, which is responsible for the Middle East-Central Asian region, See map below) as well as coalition command units in Israel, Turkey, the Persian Gulf and the Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean. Military planning and decision making at a country level by individual allies of US-NATO as well as “partner nations” is integrated into a global military design including the weaponization of space. Under its new mandate, USSTRATCOM has a responsibility for “overseeing a global strike plan” consisting of both conventional and nuclear weapons. In military jargon, it is slated to play the role of “a global integrator charged with the missions of Space Operations; Information Operations; Integrated Missile Defense; Global Command & Control; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Global Strike; and Strategic Deterrence…. ” USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities include: “leading, planning, & executing strategic deterrence operations” at a global level, “synchronizing global missile defense plans and operations”, “synchronizing regional combat plans”, etc. USSTRATCOM is the lead agency in the coordination of modern warfare. In January 2005, at the outset of the military deployment and build-up directed against Iran, USSTRATCOM was identified as “the lead Combatant Command for integration and synchronization of DoD-wide efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction.” (Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War against Iran, Global Research, January 3, 2006). What this means is that the coordination of a large scale attack on Iran, including the various scenarios of escalation in and beyond the broader Middle East Central Asian region would be coordinated by USSTRATCOM. Map: US Central Command’s Area of Jurisdiction Tactical Nuclear Weapons directed against Iran Confirmed by military documents as well as official statements, both the US and Israel contemplate the use of nuclear weapons directed against Iran. In 2006, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) announced it had achieved an operational capability for rapidly striking targets around the globe using nuclear or conventional weapons. This announcement was made after the conduct of military simulations pertaining to a US led nuclear attack against a fictional country. (David Ruppe, Preemptive Nuclear War in a State of Readiness: U.S. Command Declares Global Strike Capability, Global Security Newswire, December 2, 2005) Continuity in relation to the Bush-Cheney era: President Obama has largely endorsed the doctrine of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons formulated by the previous administration. Under the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama administration confirmed “that it is reserving the right to use nuclear weapons against Iran” for its non-compliance with US demands regarding its alleged (nonexistent) nuclear weapons program. (U.S. Nuclear Option on Iran Linked to Israeli Attack Threat – IPS ipsnews.net, April 23, 2010). The Obama administration has also intimated that it would use nukes in the case of an Iranian response to an Israeli attack on Iran. (Ibid). Israel has also drawn up its own “secret plans” to bomb Iran with tactical nuclear weapons: “Israeli military commanders believe conventional strikes may no longer be enough to annihilate increasingly well-defended enrichment facilities. Several have been built beneath at least 70ft of concrete and rock. However, the nuclear-tipped bunker-busters would be used only if a conventional attack was ruled out and if the United States declined to intervene, senior sources said.”(Revealed: Israel plans nuclear strike on Iran – Times Online, January 7, 2007) Obama’s statements on the use of nuclear weapons against Iran and North Korea are consistent with post 9/11 US nuclear weapons doctrine, which allows for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the conventional war theater. Through a propaganda campaign which has enlisted the support of “authoritative” nuclear scientists, mini-nukes are upheld as an instrument of peace, namely a means to combating “Islamic terrorism” and instating Western style “democracy” in Iran. The low-yield nukes have been cleared for “battlefield use”. They are slated to be used against Iran and Syria in the next stage of America’s “war on Terrorism” alongside conventional weapons. “Administration officials argue that low-yield nuclear weapons are needed as a credible deterrent against rogue states. [Iran, Syria, North Korea] Their logic is that existing nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used except in a full-scale nuclear war. Potential enemies realize this, thus they do not consider the threat of nuclear retaliation to be credible. However, low-yield nuclear weapons are less destructive, thus might conceivably be used. That would make them more effective as a deterrent.” (Opponents Surprised By Elimination of Nuke Research Funds Defense News November 29, 2004) The preferred nuclear weapon to be used against Iran are tactical nuclear weapons (Made in America), namely bunker buster bombs with nuclear warheads (e.g. B61.11), with an explosive capacity between one third to six times a Hiroshima bomb. The B61-11 is the “nuclear version” of the “conventional” BLU 113. or Guided Bomb Unit GBU-28. It can be delivered in much same way as the conventional bunker buster bomb. (See Michel Chossudovsky, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO112C.html, see also http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=jf03norris) . While the US does not contemplate the use of strategic thermonuclear weapons against Iran, Israel’s nuclear arsenal is largely composed of thermonuclear bombs which are deployed and could be used in a war with Iran. Under Israel’s Jericho‐III missile system with a range between 4,800 km to 6,500 km, all Iran would be within reach. Conventional bunker buster Guided Bomb Unit GBU-27 B61 bunker buster bomb Radiactive Fallout The issue of radioactive fallout and contamination, while casually dismissed by US-NATO military analysts, would be devastating, potentially affecting a large area of the broader Middle East (including Israel) and Central Asian region. In an utterly twisted logic, nuclear weapons are presented as a means to building peace and preventing “collateral damage”. Iran’s nonexistent nuclear weapons are a threat to global security, whereas those of the US and Israel are instruments of peace” harmless to the surrounding civilian population“.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Israel-Iran conflict goes nuclear and draws in multiple great powers - <u>extinction</h4><p></u><strong>Chossudovsky 19</strong> (Michel Chossudovsky is an award-winning author, Professor of Economics (Emeritus) at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal, “Pre-emptive Nuclear War: The Role of Israel in Triggering an Attack on Iran” June 14, 2019, GlobalResearch https://www.globalresearch.ca/pre-emptive-nuclear-war-role-israel-attack-iran/5677025, 3/22/20)//ww BJ</p><p>The Role of Israel There has been much debate regarding the role of Israel in initiating an attack against Iran. Israel is part of a military alliance. Tel Aviv is not a prime mover. It does not have a separate and distinct military agenda. Israel is integrated into the “war plan for major combat operations” against Iran formulated in 2006 by US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). In the context of large scale military operations, an uncoordinated unilateral military action by one coalition partner, namely Israel, is from a military and strategic point almost an impossibility. Israel is a de facto member of NATO. Any action by Israel would require a “green light” from Washington. <u>An <mark>attack by Israel</mark> could,</u> however, <u><strong>be used as “the trigger mechanism” which would <mark>unleash</mark> an all out <mark>war against Iran</mark>, as well retaliation by Iran directed against Israel. </u></strong>In this regard, there are indications that Washington might envisage the option of an initial (US backed) attack by Israel rather than an outright US-led military operation directed against Iran. <u>The Israeli attack –although led in close liaison with the Pentagon and NATO– would be <mark>presented</mark> to public opinion as a <mark>unilateral decision</mark> by Tel Aviv. It would then be <mark>used by Washington</mark> to <mark>justify</u></mark>, in the eyes of World opinion, <u><strong>a <mark>military intervention</mark> of the <mark>US and NATO</mark> with a view to “defending Israel”, rather than attacking Iran</u></strong>. Under existing military cooperation agreements, both the US and NATO would be “obligated” to “defend Israel” against Iran and Syria. It is worth noting, in this regard, that at the outset of Bush’s second term, (former) Vice President Dick Cheney hinted, in no uncertain terms, that Iran was “right at the top of the list” of the “rogue enemies” of America, and that Israel would, so to speak, “be doing the bombing for us”, without US military involvement and without us putting pressure on them “to do it” (See Michel Chossudovsky, Planned US-Israeli Attack on Iran, Global Research, May 1, 2005): According to Cheney: “<u>One of the concerns people have is that <mark>Israel</mark> might <mark>do</mark> it <mark>without being asked</mark>… Given the fact that <mark>Iran</mark> has a stated policy that their <mark>objective</mark> <mark>is</mark> the <mark>destruction of Israel</u></mark>, the Israelis might well decide to act first, and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards,” (Dick Cheney, quoted from an MSNBC Interview, January 2005) Commenting the Vice President’s assertion, former National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in an interview on PBS, confirmed with some apprehension, yes: Cheney wants Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to act on America’s behalf and “do it” for us: “<u><mark>Iran</mark> I think is more ambiguous. And there the <mark>issue</mark> is certainly not tyranny; it’s <mark>nuclear weapons</u></mark>. And the vice president today in a kind of a strange parallel statement to this declaration of freedom hinted that the Israelis may do it and in fact used language which sounds like a justification or even an encouragement for the Israelis to do it.” What we are dealing with is a joint US-NATO-Israel military operation to bomb Iran, which has been in the active planning stage since 2004. Officials in the Defense Department, under Bush and Obama, have been working assiduously with their Israeli military and intelligence counterparts, carefully identifying targets inside Iran. In practical military terms, any action by Israel would have to be planned and coordinated at the highest levels of the US led coalition. An attack by Israel would also require coordinated US-NATO logistical support, particularly with regard to Israel’s air defense system, which since January 2009 is fully integrated into that of the US and NATO. (See Michel Chossudovsky, Unusually Large U.S. Weapons Shipment to Israel: Are the US and Israel Planning a Broader Middle East War? Global Research, January 11,2009) Israel’s X band radar system established in early 2009 with US technical support has “integrate[d] Israel’s missile defenses with the U.S. global missile [Space-based] detection network, WWIII Scenariowhich includes satellites, Aegis ships on the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and land-based Patriot radars and interceptors.” (Defense Talk.com, January 6, 2009,) What this means is that Washington ultimately calls the shots. The US rather than Israel controls the air defense system: ”’This is and will remain a U.S. radar system,’ Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said. ‘So this is not something we are giving or selling to the Israelis and it is something that will likely require U.S. personnel on-site to operate.'” (Quoted in Israel National News, January 9, 2009). The US military oversees Israel’s Air Defense system, which is integrated into the Pentagon’s global system. In other words, Israel cannot launch a war against Iran without Washington’s consent. Hence the importance of the so-called “Green Light” legislation in the US Congress sponsored by the Republican party under House Resolution 1553, which explicitly supports an Israeli attakc on Iran: “The measure, introduced by Texas Republican Louie Gohmert and 46 of his colleagues, endorses Israel’s use of “all means necessary” against Iran “including the use of military force.” … “We’ve got to get this done. We need to show our support for Israel. We need to quit playing games with this critical ally in such a difficult area.”’ (See Webster Tarpley, Fidel Castro Warns of Imminent Nuclear War; Admiral Mullen Threatens Iran; US-Israel Vs. Iran-Hezbollah Confrontation Builds On, Global Research, August 10, 2010) In practice, the proposed legislation is a “Green Light” to the White House and the Pentagon rather than to Israel. It constitutes a rubber stamp to a US sponsored war on Iran which uses Israel as a convenient military launch pad. It also serves as a justification to wage war with a view to defending Israel. In this context, Israel could indeed provide the pretext to wage war, in response to alleged Hamas or Hezbollah attacks and/or the triggering of hostilities on the border of Israel with Lebanon. <u><strong>What is crucial to understand is that a <mark>minor “incident</mark>” could be used as a <mark>pretext</mark> to spark off a <mark>major military operation</mark> against Iran</u></strong>. Known to US military planners, <u>Israel</u> (rather than the USA) <u>would be the first target of military retaliation by Iran</u>. Broadly speaking, Israelis would be the victims of the machinations of both Washington and their own government. It is, in this regard, absolutely crucial that Israelis forcefully oppose any action by the Netanyahu government to attack Iran. Global Warfare: The Role of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global military operations are coordinated out of US Strategic Command Headquarters (USSTRATCOM) at the Offutt Air Force base in Nebraska, in liaison with the regional commands of the unified combatant commands (e.g.. US Central Command in Florida, which is responsible for the Middle East-Central Asian region, See map below) as well as coalition command units in Israel, Turkey, the Persian Gulf and the Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean. Military planning and decision making at a country level by individual allies of US-NATO as well as “partner nations” is integrated into a global military design including the weaponization of space. Under its new mandate, USSTRATCOM has a responsibility for “overseeing a global strike plan” consisting of both conventional and nuclear weapons. In military jargon, it is slated to play the role of “a global integrator charged with the missions of Space Operations; Information Operations; Integrated Missile Defense; Global Command & Control; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Global Strike; and Strategic Deterrence…. ” USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities include: “leading, planning, & executing strategic deterrence operations” at a global level, “synchronizing global missile defense plans and operations”, “synchronizing regional combat plans”, etc. USSTRATCOM is the lead agency in the coordination of modern warfare. In January 2005, at the outset of the military deployment and build-up directed against Iran, USSTRATCOM was identified as “the lead Combatant Command for integration and synchronization of DoD-wide efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction.” (Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War against Iran, Global Research, January 3, 2006). What this means is that the coordination of a large scale attack on Iran, including the various scenarios of escalation in and beyond the broader Middle East Central Asian region would be coordinated by USSTRATCOM. Map: US Central Command’s Area of Jurisdiction Tactical Nuclear Weapons directed against Iran Confirmed by military documents as well as official statements, <u>both the <mark>US and Israel contemplate</mark> the <mark>use of nuclear weapons</mark> directed against Iran</u>. In 2006, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) announced it had achieved an operational capability for rapidly striking targets around the globe using nuclear or conventional weapons. This announcement was made after the conduct of military simulations pertaining to a US led nuclear attack against a fictional country. (David Ruppe, Preemptive Nuclear War in a State of Readiness: U.S. Command Declares Global Strike Capability, Global Security Newswire, December 2, 2005) Continuity in relation to the Bush-Cheney era: President Obama has largely endorsed the doctrine of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons formulated by the previous administration. Under the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama administration confirmed<u> “that it is reserving the <mark>right</mark> to <mark>use nuclear weapons against Iran</mark>” for its non-compliance with US demands</u> regarding its alleged (nonexistent) nuclear weapons program. (U.S. Nuclear Option on Iran Linked to Israeli Attack Threat – IPS ipsnews.net, April 23, 2010). The Obama administration has also intimated that <u><strong>it would <mark>use nukes</mark> in the case of an <mark>Iranian response</mark> to an <mark>Israeli attack on Iran</u></strong></mark>. (Ibid). Israel has also drawn up its own “secret plans” to bomb Iran with tactical nuclear weapons: “<u><mark>Israel</mark>i military <mark>commanders believe conventional strikes</mark> may <mark>no</mark> longer be <mark>enough</mark> to <mark>annihilate</mark> increasingly well-defended <mark>enrichment facilities</mark>.</u> Several have been built beneath at least 70ft of concrete and rock. However, the nuclear-tipped bunker-busters would be used only if a conventional attack was ruled out and if the United States declined to intervene, senior sources said.”(Revealed: Israel plans nuclear strike on Iran – Times Online, January 7, 2007) Obama’s statements on the use of nuclear weapons against Iran and North Korea are consistent with post 9/11 US nuclear weapons doctrine, which allows for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the conventional war theater. Through a propaganda campaign which has enlisted the support of “authoritative” nuclear scientists, mini-nukes are upheld as an instrument of peace, namely a means to combating “Islamic terrorism” and instating Western style “democracy” in Iran. The <u>low-yield <mark>nukes</mark> have been <mark>cleared</mark> for “<mark>battlefield use</u></mark>”. <u>They are slated to be used against Iran</u> and Syria in the next stage of America’s “war on Terrorism” alongside conventional weapons. “Administration officials argue that low-yield nuclear weapons are needed as a credible deterrent against rogue states. [Iran, Syria, North Korea] Their logic is that existing nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used except in a full-scale nuclear war. Potential enemies realize this, thus they do not consider the threat of nuclear retaliation to be credible. However, low-yield nuclear weapons are less destructive, thus might conceivably be used. That would make them more effective as a deterrent.” (Opponents Surprised By Elimination of Nuke Research Funds Defense News November 29, 2004) The preferred nuclear weapon to be used against Iran are tactical nuclear weapons (Made in America), namely bunker buster bombs with nuclear warheads (e.g. B61.11), with an explosive capacity between one third to six times a Hiroshima bomb. The B61-11 is the “nuclear version” of the “conventional” BLU 113. or Guided Bomb Unit GBU-28. It can be delivered in much same way as the conventional bunker buster bomb. (See Michel Chossudovsky, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO112C.html, see also http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=jf03norris) . While the US does not contemplate the use of strategic thermonuclear weapons against Iran, <u>Israel’s nuclear arsenal is largely composed of <mark>thermonuclear bombs</mark> which are deployed and could be <mark>used in</mark> a <mark>war</mark> with Iran</u>. Under Israel’s Jericho‐III missile system with a range between 4,800 km to 6,500 km, <u>all Iran would be within reach</u>. Conventional bunker buster Guided Bomb Unit GBU-27 B61 bunker buster bomb Radiactive Fallout <u>The issue of <mark>radioactive fallout and contamination</u></mark>, while casually dismissed by US-NATO military analysts, <u><strong>would be <mark>devastating</u></strong></mark>, potentially affecting a large area of the broader Middle East (including Israel) and Central Asian region. In an utterly twisted logic, nuclear weapons are presented as a means to building peace and preventing “collateral damage”. Iran’s nonexistent nuclear weapons are a threat to global security, whereas those of the US and Israel are instruments of peace” harmless to the surrounding civilian population“.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Beyersdorf 19 [Brian, 2019; “Regulating the “Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in History”: Disclosure Requirements in Online Political Advertisements After the 2016 Election,” California Law Review, pp. 1061-1100, http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/9-Beyersdorf-final.pdf //©B] fulltext: A Legal Framework: Disclosure for Online Political Ads The Act lays a foundation for a future legal framework governing online political ads. The Act can be broken down into four general elements. First, it limits the scope of the regulation to paid communication.271 Second, it mandates disclaimers in online political ads to indicate who paid for the ad.272 Third, it requires platforms to maintain a record of online political ads.273 Fourth, it aims to prevent foreign nationals from interfering with elections.274 The legislation answers many of the questions that the FEC has struggled with for years. Elements of the Honest Ads Act First, the Act focuses on regulating paid Internet communication by expanding the definitions of two key terms. It broadens the term “public communication” to encompass “paid Internet” or “paid digital communication.”275 This amendment brings online political ads under the current regulatory regime. It also broadens the term “electioneering communication” to cover “qualified Internet or digital communication,” which means “any communication which is placed or promoted for a fee on an online platform.”276 Second, the Act mandates the inclusion of disclaimers in online political ads. It requires online political ads to have a disclaimer that states the name of the person who paid for the ad.277 Ads must also provide platform users the ability to access legally required information “without receiving or viewing any additional material other than such required information.”278 Third, the Act requires the collection of records for online political ads. It directs online platforms with more than 50 million visitors or users to maintain a publicly accessible database of all ads placed by a person whose political ad purchases on the platform exceed $500 a year.279 The records kept “would footnote omitted include a copy of the ad, the audience targeted, the views, and the time of first and last display, as well as the name and contact information of the purchaser.” Finally, the Act seeks to preempt foreign meddling in elections. It requires online platforms to “make reasonable efforts” to prevent a foreign national from purchasing an online advertisement directly or indirectly. The Necessity of the Act The Act’s disclosure requirements are key to bringing transparency to online political advertising, especially if the FEC fails to overcome its partisan divide and is unable to promulgate a rule regulating online political ads. Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has upheld such disclosure requirements to ensure the integrity of elections. Even though Silicon Valley tech companies have voluntarily adopted the basic tenets of the Act, Congress should still pass the Act. Silicon Valley has implemented policies that bring more transparency to online political advertising, but these policies remain imperfect. The Act’s required disclaimers play a significant role in promoting transparency and protecting the democratic process. Professor Yochai Benkler argues that disclaimers are necessary because people “assess the credibility of any statement in the context of what [they] think the agenda of the speaker is.”282 Disclaimers are especially important as online ads increasingly target individual users.283 Unlike TV and newspaper ads, which are highly visible, targeted ads may not receive as much publicity or news coverage to correct misinformation or disinformation.284 Disclaimers can provide “a baseline defense against messaging that is highly tailored” to manipulate people.285 However, as Professor Nathaniel Persily points out, disclaimers on a political ad can occasionally take the dubious form of “Paid for by Americans for America.”286 The purchaser is able to hide its true identity “behind a pleasant sounding, patriotic name, and the main donors to such organizations are often difficult to discover.”287 The expenditure “is, in a literal sense, unaccountable,” and the public cannot “hold the speakers to account for substance or tone.”288 Still, disclaimers are a starting point and at least alert users to stay vigilant when they see a disclaimer. As the Court stated in Citizens United, “At the very least, footnote omitted [disclaimer and disclosure requirements can] avoid confusion by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political party.” Mandating that online platforms establish an archive of online political ads allows the public to oversee and keep campaigns accountable. According to Benkler, online platforms already collect the data the Act requires, and the cost of establishing a public database “is incrementally trivial by comparison to the investments these companies have made in developing their advertising base and their capacities to deliver viewers to advertisers.” A publicly accessible database “would allow campaigns to be each other’s watchdogs—keeping each other somewhat more honest and constrained.” Moreover, the general public, journalists, and nonprofits would be able to monitor campaigns, report on their practices, recognize foreign interference, and help uncover manipulators of public opinion. In short, this significant provision would provide “near-real time accountability for lies and manipulation.” Some critics believe archiving every promoted tweet or Facebook ad for public search would require a massive amount of work that may not lead to greater transparency. As one journalist commented, “It’s difficult to imagine Joe Public digging through this vast archive of at least tens of thousands of messages, analyzing targeting patterns.” Nevertheless, journalists and the public can still rely on archives to locate suspicious ads. Leading up to the 2018 midterm elections, journalists called on the public to report suspicious ads to their periodicals and highlighted Facebook’s searchable archive. The Supreme Court has long upheld such disclosure requirements from Buckley in 1976 to Citizens United in 2010. While mandatory disclosure can substantially infringe the exercise of First Amendment rights, disclosure requirements serve three governmental interests: (1) providing information to voters, (2) discouraging corruption, and (3) facilitating enforcement of campaign footnote omitted laws. In 2010, the Court upheld the same disclosure requirements specified in the Honest Ads Act but for broadcast television and radio under BCRA, stating that such requirements “provide the electorate with information and ‘insure that the voters are fully informed’ about the person or group speaking.” In May 2018, Facebook, Google, and Twitter began to implement their own proposed disclosure rules to promote transparency on their online platforms despite FEC and congressional inaction. All three voluntarily adopted the basic tenets of the Honest Ads Act. They now require political ads to include “Paid for by” disclaimers, host searchable archives of political ads, and require advertisers to verify their identity and location.300 Even though Silicon Valley tech companies have voluntarily adopted the basic tenets of the Act, their early efforts at self-policing have been flawed, underscoring the need for regulation. Facebook is a case in point. In late October 2018, Vice News and Business Insider tested Facebook’s political advertising rules and exposed its flaws. In one test, Vice News posed as 100 senators to buy and run political ads on Facebook, “including ads ‘Paid for by’ by Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer.” Facebook approved every ad, demonstrating that “anyone can buy an ad identified as ‘Paid for by’ by a major footnote omitted U.S. politician.” Furthermore, Facebook approved these ads “to be shared from pages for fake political groups . . . .” These vulnerabilities in Facebook’s political advertising system showcase that self-regulation alone is unlikely to bring greater transparency and protect elections from foreign meddling. Facebook may not be fit enough to police itself. Thus, in the absence of effective FEC regulations, the Act is necessary to bring greater transparency to these online platforms and deter foreign activity in elections. With the Act, the government can enforce these disclosure requirements by taking legal action and punishing violators.305 Furthermore, “not all Internet platforms are likely to agree to a common set of reforms” or voluntarily adopt the basic tenets of the Act. Regulation rather than selfregulation is needed to maintain a level playing field for all online platforms and ensure that they adhere to disclosure requirements. However, as noted below, regulating online political ads alone is likely insufficient to uphold the integrity of elections. In some contexts, Washington, D.C. may still have to rely on Silicon Valley to provide accurate information to the electorate.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Plan solves – disclaimer requirements <u>mandate</u> transparency and <u>archives</u> solve back for campaign accountability </h4><p><strong>Beyersdorf 19</strong> [Brian, 2019; “Regulating the “Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in History”: Disclosure Requirements in Online Political Advertisements After the 2016 Election,” California Law Review, pp. 1061-1100, http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/9-Beyersdorf-final.pdf //©B]</p><p>A Legal Framework: Disclosure for Online Political Ads <u><mark>The</mark> Act lays a <mark>foundation</mark> <mark>for</mark> a future <mark>legal framework</mark> <mark>governing</mark> online political <mark>ads</u>.</mark> The Act can be broken down into four general elements. First, <u><strong>it limits the scope of the regulation to paid communication</u></strong>.271 Second, <u><strong>it <mark>mandates</mark> <mark>disclaimers</mark> <mark>in</mark> online political <mark>ads</mark> to indicate who paid for the ad.</u></strong>272 Third, it <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> <mark>platforms</mark> <mark>to</mark> <mark>maintain</mark> a <mark>record of online political ads</u></strong></mark>.273 Fourth, <u><strong>it aims to prevent foreign nationals from interfering with elections</u></strong>.274 The legislation answers many of the questions that the FEC has struggled with for years. Elements of the Honest Ads Act First, <u>the Act focuses on regulating paid Internet communication by expanding the definitions of two key terms. It broadens the term “public communication” to encompass “paid Internet” or “paid digital communication.”</u>275 This amendment brings online political ads under the current regulatory regime. It also broadens the term “electioneering communication” to cover “qualified Internet or digital communication,” which means “any communication which is placed or promoted for a fee on an online platform.”276 Second, <u><strong>the Act <mark>mandates</mark> the <mark>inclusion of disclaimers</mark> <mark>in</mark> online political <mark>ads</u></strong></mark>. It <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> online political <mark>ads to have a disclaimer that states the name</mark> <mark>of</mark> the <mark>person</mark> who paid for the ad</u></strong>.277 Ads must also provide platform users the ability to access legally required information “without receiving or viewing any additional material other than such required information.”278 Third, <u>the <mark>Act <strong>requires</mark> the collection of records for online political ads</strong>. It directs online <mark>platforms</mark> with more than 50 million visitors or users <mark>to maintain a publicly accessible</mark> <mark>database</mark> <mark>of</mark> all <mark>ads</mark> <mark>placed</mark> by a person whose political ad purchases on the platform exceed $500 a year</u>.279 The records kept “would <strong>footnote omitted</strong> include a copy of the ad, the audience targeted, the views, and the time of first and last display, as well as the name and contact information of the purchaser.” Finally, the Act seeks to preempt foreign meddling in elections. It requires online platforms to “make reasonable efforts” to prevent a foreign national from purchasing an online advertisement directly or indirectly. The Necessity of the Act The Act’s <u><strong><mark>disclosure</mark> <mark>requirements</mark> are <mark>key to</mark> bringing <mark>transparency</mark> to online political advertising</u></strong>, especially <u><strong>if the FEC fails to overcome its partisan divide and is unable to promulgate a rule regulating online political ads</u></strong>. Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has upheld such disclosure requirements to ensure the integrity of elections. Even though Silicon Valley tech companies have voluntarily adopted the basic tenets of the Act, Congress should still pass the Act. Silicon Valley has implemented policies that bring more transparency to online political advertising, but these policies remain imperfect. The Act’s <u><strong><mark>required</mark> <mark>disclaimers</mark> <mark>play</mark> a <mark>significant</mark> <mark>role in promoting transparency and</mark> protecting <mark>the democratic process</u></strong></mark>. Professor Yochai Benkler argues that disclaimers are necessary because <u><strong>people “assess the credibility of any statement in the context of what [they] think the agenda of the speaker is.</u></strong>”282 Disclaimers are especially important as online ads increasingly target individual users.283 Unlike TV and newspaper ads, which are highly visible, targeted ads may not receive as much publicity or news coverage to correct misinformation or disinformation.284 <u><strong>Disclaimers can provide “a baseline defense against messaging that is highly tailored” to manipulate people</u></strong>.285 However, as Professor Nathaniel Persily points out, disclaimers on a political ad can occasionally take the dubious form of “Paid for by Americans for America.”286 The purchaser is able to hide its true identity “behind a pleasant sounding, patriotic name, and the main donors to such organizations are often difficult to discover.”287 The expenditure “is, in a literal sense, unaccountable,” and the public cannot “hold the speakers to account for substance or tone.”288 Still, disclaimers are a starting point and at least alert users to stay vigilant when they see a disclaimer. As the Court stated in Citizens United, “At the very least, <strong>footnote omitted</strong> [disclaimer and disclosure requirements can] avoid confusion by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political party.” <u><mark>Mandating</mark> that online platforms establish <mark>an archive of online political ads</mark> <mark>allows</mark> the <mark>public to oversee and keep campaigns accountable</u></mark>. According to Benkler, <u><strong>online <mark>platforms</mark> <mark>already collect the data</mark> the Act requires, and the cost of establishing a public database “is incrementally trivial by comparison to the investments these companies have made in developing their advertising base and their capacities to deliver viewers to advertisers</u></strong>.” A publicly accessible database “would allow campaigns to be each other’s watchdogs—keeping each other somewhat more honest and constrained.” Moreover, <u><mark>the</mark> general <mark>public</mark>, journalists, and nonprofits <mark>would</mark> be able to <mark>monitor</mark> <mark>campaigns</mark>, report on their practices, recognize foreign interference, <mark>and</mark> help <mark>uncover manipulators of public opinion.</mark> In short, this significant provision would provide “near-real time accountability for lies and manipulation.” </u>Some critics believe archiving every promoted tweet or Facebook ad for public search would require a massive amount of work that may not lead to greater transparency. As one journalist commented, “It’s difficult to imagine Joe Public digging through this vast archive of at least tens of thousands of messages, analyzing targeting patterns.” Nevertheless, journalists and the public can still rely on archives to locate suspicious ads. Leading up to the 2018 midterm elections, journalists called on the public to report suspicious ads to their periodicals and highlighted Facebook’s searchable archive. The Supreme Court has long upheld such disclosure requirements from Buckley in 1976 to Citizens United in 2010. While mandatory disclosure can substantially infringe the exercise of First Amendment rights, disclosure requirements serve three governmental interests: (1) providing information to voters, (2) discouraging corruption, and (3) facilitating enforcement of campaign <strong>footnote omitted</strong> laws. In 2010, the Court upheld the same disclosure requirements specified in the Honest Ads Act but for broadcast television and radio under BCRA, stating that such requirements “provide the electorate with information and ‘insure that the voters are fully informed’ about the person or group speaking.” In May 2018, Facebook, Google, and Twitter began to implement their own proposed disclosure rules to promote transparency on their online platforms despite FEC and congressional inaction. All three voluntarily adopted the basic tenets of the Honest Ads Act. They now require political ads to include “Paid for by” disclaimers, host searchable archives of political ads, and require advertisers to verify their identity and location.300 Even though Silicon Valley tech companies have voluntarily adopted the basic tenets of the Act, their early efforts at self-policing have been flawed, underscoring the need for regulation. Facebook is a case in point. In late October 2018, Vice News and Business Insider tested Facebook’s political advertising rules and exposed its flaws. In one test, Vice News posed as 100 senators to buy and run political ads on Facebook, “including ads ‘Paid for by’ by Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer.” Facebook approved every ad, demonstrating that “anyone can buy an ad identified as ‘Paid for by’ by a major <strong>footnote omitted </strong>U.S. politician.” Furthermore, Facebook approved these ads “to be shared from pages for fake political groups . . . .” These vulnerabilities in Facebook’s political advertising system showcase that self-regulation alone is unlikely to bring greater transparency and protect elections from foreign meddling. Facebook may not be fit enough to police itself. Thus, <u><strong>in the absence of effective FEC regulations, <mark>the Act is necessary to bring</mark> greater <mark>transparency</mark> <mark>to</mark> these <mark>online platforms</mark> </u></strong>and deter foreign activity in elections<u><strong>. With the Act, the government can enforce these disclosure requirements by taking legal action and punishing violator</u></strong>s.305 Furthermore, “not all Internet platforms are likely to agree to a common set of reforms” or voluntarily adopt the basic tenets of the Act. <u><strong><mark>Regulation</mark> rather than selfregulation <mark>is needed</mark> to maintain a level playing field for all online platforms and ensure that they adhere to disclosure requirements</u></strong>. However, as noted below, regulating online political ads alone is likely insufficient to uphold the integrity of elections. In some contexts, Washington, D.C. may still have to rely on Silicon Valley to provide accurate information to the electorate.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Halperin 10-26 - senior political analyst for Time magazine, Time.com, and MSNBC and serves as a board member on the New Hampshire Institute of Politics at Saint Anselm College fulltext: (Mark, “The Most Likely Next President Is Hillary Clinton,” http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-10-26/the-most-likely-next-president-is-hillary-clinton) A virulent strain of Clinton Derangement Syndrome, which scientists and Republicans thought had been wiped out at the end of the last century, is now afflicting millions of conservative Americans. Some Republicans so detest Hillary Clinton they are badly underestimating how likely she is, at this point in the campaign, to be America’s 45th president. Their denial is just as strong now as it was a month ago, before Clinton began a run of political victories that have enhanced her prospects, all while the roller derby/demolition derby that is the Republican nomination contest has continued to harm the GOP’s chances of winning back the White House. To be sure, nothing ever happens in a linear or tidy fashion with the Clintons; she is certain to add more chapters to the Perils of Hillary saga before Election Day 2016. Bernie Sanders could still upend her in Iowa, New Hampshire, or both, which could throw the nomination battle into unadulterated bedlam. Even if Clinton is nominated, a strong Republican candidate could absolutely defeat her next November, with victory as simple as the party putting forth a nominee who is more likeable to voters and better on television. Indeed, many elite and grassroots Republicans believe Clinton’s personality, which they can’t stand, will keep her out of the Oval Office no matter what. But October has been good to Clinton: a glittering debate performance, the decision of potential rival Joe Biden not to run (greatly simplifying her path to the nomination), the vanquishing of Republicans during her daylong Benghazi hearing, and a solid turn at the Iowa Democratic Party’s Jefferson-Jackson dinner Saturday night. All have improved Clinton’s odds of cruising into the White House twelve months hence, and have thrown into sharper relief some of the advantages she has had all along. To state the obvious, Clinton faces two tasks to become commander-in-chief: get enough delegates to beat Sanders and then sew up 270 electoral votes. The more easily she can complete her first mission (especially compared to the wooly nomination battle of her eventual Republican opponent), the more easily achievable will be her second goal. Here, then, are some of the advantages the Democratic frontrunner has now, many of which have been ignored or discounted by the people who want to beat her so badly they can’t think straight: Hillary has shown she can handle Bernie Sanders, despite his plucky persona, raw grassroots appeal, and authentic authenticity. The Vegas debate and Clinton’s improved poll standing has given her and her team a revived notion that Sanders will end up a nuisance rather than a real threat. She has confidence she can face him down in the three debates remaining before Iowa. Without Biden in the race, Clinton is not going to have to play three-dimensional chess and can focus her energies on Sanders alone. Bernie has shown he doesn’t quite understand how to play big moments in the big leagues. First the debate and now the Jefferson-Jackson dinner—Sanders prepared more for both evenings than the organic Vermonter normally would for any political event, but even his advisers concede that neither occasion represented the kind of performance that Sanders will eventually have to present if he is going to stop the prohibitive front-runner. He was very strong Saturday night but aides say they are still having trouble fully convincing him that not all campaign events are created equal. Hillary Clinton speaks at the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Saturday, Oct. 24, 2015. Hillary Clinton speaks at the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Saturday, Oct. 24, 2015. Daniel Acker/Bloomberg Hillary is getting better at managing (and shaking off) the personal pang of her likability deficit. At the J-J dinner, in her recent television interviews, and in her Benghazi testimony, she is showing more of her real self (even the all-too-human tetchy, the airily dismissive, the lordly—without knee-jerk defensiveness or wide-eyed guile), and not getting tied in knots over how she is coming off. While this version of Hillary is still nails-on-a-chalkboard to her conservative critics, it is a huge improvement over the recent past and probably enough to win under the right circumstances. Biden’s withdrawal means Clinton will lock up even more commitments from the Democratic establishment, giving her even more super delegates and making it easier to bounce back if Sanders wins Iowa, New Hampshire, or both. I reported in August that Clinton’s camp already had in hand private commitments from enough of the elected and party officials who are automatic delegates to the national convention next summer (so-called super delegates) that she was one fifth of her way to the nomination. That number has increased significantly in recent weeks and will go up now that Biden has passed on the race. This allows Team Clinton to make a robust argument about her inevitability and gives it a squadron of surrogates from the left, center, and right of the Democratic Party to wound Sanders, buck her up if she stumbles, and, eventually, argue that the senator should get out of the competition if she wins early. Hillary has massive support from labor unions. The party’s most important constituency group in terms of ground troops and campaign resources is now moving decisively towards Clinton, also giving her more working-class cred and undermining one of Sanders’ strongest rhetorical plays—that she is out of touch with the economic grassroots. And long-invested unions will provide her important foot soldiers in the general election battlegrounds, as they have since time began for Democratic presidential nominees. Hillary could be the de facto Democratic nominee by Feb. 8. Her team privately believes that, given the way expectations have been set up, even narrow wins in the two first-voting contests would not be discounted. Clinton has robust field operations in both states and could diligently grind her way to victories. Even Sanders’ top aides acknowledge that, barring other factors, it could be game, set, match if Hillary starts the voting year with twin wins, giving Brooklyn ample incentive to go all in there and try to put it away early. Hillary Clinton waves to supporters with husband Bill Clinton, former U.S. president, at the conclusion of the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Saturday, Oct. 24, 2015. Hillary Clinton waves to supporters with husband Bill Clinton, former U.S. president, at the conclusion of the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Saturday, Oct. 24, 2015. Daniel Acker/Bloomberg Hillary’s husband now seems fired up and ready to go. Although a little rusty over the weekend in Iowa in his 2015 campaign trail debut, accounts from aides to both Clintons suggest the former president has learned lessons from his performance eight years ago, when he arguably hurt his wife’s chances as much as he helped her. He has been kept in the loop on the campaign’s thinking, receives polling information on a regular basis, and has participated in some strategy discussions with the team. The campaign seems happy with him, and he seems happy with the campaign, and that is a big change from 2008. Both campaign chairman John Podesta and campaign manager Robby Mook have good and confident relationships with the FPOTUS, who seems less ambivalent than last time about becoming the First Lad. Hillary’s campaign is much less tense and fractious than was the 2008 team. There are fraught moments in Brooklyn, as in any campaign, and Clinton’s donors can get restive awfully quick, but this year’s model is one of relative peace and tranquility. Zen masters Podesta, Mook, and communications chief Jennifer Palmieri set the “been there, done that, seen that, dealt with that” sensibility. Hillary’s team at last is convincing rich Democrats to come around to the super-PAC game. Clinton loyalist Guy Cecil is now topping Priorities USA and he has brought in a new cast of folks to supplement holdovers such as Paul Begala, Jim Messina, and Harold Ickes, all of whom have experience rubbing shoulders with the mega-wealthy and prying seven-figure checks out of their hands. Cecil knows how to leverage hot buttons like the Koch brothers and the threat of more conservative Supreme Court justices and unified GOP control of Washington to maintain momentum and encourage the participation of those previously reluctant to muck about in the big money world that many liberals despise and disdain. Hillary has a first-class opposition research team that is saving nuggets to use once Republicans pick their nominee. Oppo veteran Christina Reynolds heads an operation that can afford to play a long game, teasing out incremental research in conjunction with allies such as the Democratic National Committee but knowing full well that holding back powerful tidbits until the late spring or summer, when the eventual Republican nominee will be most vulnerable, is supremely smart. The research operations of the Republican presidential campaigns, on the other hand, are currently focused on each other (although the independent group America Rising is hoping to make up the gap). The Republican nominee is more likely to emerge bloodied, broke, and behind. A nominating calendar and delegate rules designed to avoid the kind of extended intra-party fight that crippled Mitt Romney’s general election effort will almost certainly be no match for a fifteen candidate field, a number of whom can make a decent argument that they’ll win the prize. The ferociousness and deep pockets of gladiators Donald Trump and Ted Cruz and the possibility that the party establishment will end up intervening with tens of millions of dollars in negative TV spots means a long, gory slog that might not find resolution until after the national convention in Cleveland in mid-July. (Of course, if Trump is ultimately the nomination victor, then “broke” should not be a factor.) As the nominee, Hillary will effectively control the DNC and will exercise free rein over the convention. Even with Sanders a remaining foe, Hillaryland is coordinating fundraising with the national and state parties, strategizing about installing allies at the party headquarters in DC, and gaming out what the Philly convention will look like. If Clinton is the standard bearer, make no mistake: Brooklyn will convert the DNC into its wholly owned subsidiary and will take over every jot and tittle of convention planning and execution. This type of control typically leads to less friction and a smoother running enterprise, including on-message convention speakers. Republicans are erroneously convinced they can beat Clinton solely with talk of Benghazi, e-mails, and other controversies that have nothing to do with the economy and the real lives of real people. Nowhere does the Fox News-Rush Limbaugh echo chamber more hurt Republican chances of beating Clinton than in the politics of scandal and controversy. To paraphrase the famous line attributed to Pauline Kael: everyone who conservatives know think the Clintons should be in prison. The problem is that swing voters don’t share that view in sufficient numbers to actually warrant banking a victory on placing those arguments front and center. Kevin McCarthy’s acknowledgement that the Benghazi committee was set up to damage Clinton politically has not just polluted the select committee’s efforts; it also means that one of the most effectively tried-and-true Team Clinton defenses (that any controversy that swirls around her is a ginned up political attack because Republicans don’t want to talk about real issues) has got legs straight through next November. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton waits to testify before the House Select Committee on Benghazi on Capitol Hill in Washington on Oct. 22, 2015. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton waits to testify before the House Select Committee on Benghazi on Capitol Hill in Washington on Oct. 22, 2015. Photographer: SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images Hillary is ready for the debates. She won’t have as many debates in which to hone her skills as the eventual GOP nominee, but she has many other edges, including her 2008 experience; the fact that going forward she will face only one or two opponents—rather than nine or so—on the debate stage (much closer to the dynamics in a general election); her professionalized and experienced debate prep team (many of whom worked the same gig for Barack Obama); and her own fearsome, dogged, and scrupulous preparation. Hillary’s pollster knows how to find issues that test 80-20 or 70-30, and the candidate knows how to translate them on the stump. While Republican presidential candidates thrash around competing to see who can be the most anti-immigrant, pro-tax cuts for the wealthy, anti-abortion and gay marriage, and pro-climate change-denying, Clinton’s pollster and strategist Joel Benenson is busy finding topics she can talk about in a general election that garner overwhelming support from the public across the political spectrum and will put the GOP nominee on the defensive. Nothing makes a Clinton running for president more confident and effective than having mainstream boldface issues to use as a cudgel. Obama’s approval rating is holding at a level that would make Clinton’s path much easier. Yes, the economy is not going gangbusters. Yes, ObamaCare is not universally popular (to say the least). Yes, the world is filled with dangerous hot spots and looming, chilling threats. But barring some major change in his fortune, Obama’s current approval rating of around 46% is likely to sustain through Election Day, a high enough figure, history suggests, to keep him from being a drag on his party’s nominee and chosen successor.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Clinton will take the White House now---Obama needs to <u>maintain approval</u> to avoid dragging her down</h4><p><strong>Halperin 10-26</strong> - senior political analyst for Time magazine, Time.com, and MSNBC and serves as a board member on the New Hampshire Institute of Politics at Saint Anselm College</p><p>(Mark, “The Most Likely Next President Is Hillary Clinton,” http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-10-26/the-most-likely-next-president-is-hillary-clinton)</p><p>A virulent strain of Clinton Derangement Syndrome, which scientists and Republicans thought had been wiped out at the end of the last century, is now afflicting millions of conservative Americans. Some <u>Republicans</u> so detest Hillary Clinton they <u>are badly underestimating how likely she is</u>, at this point in the campaign, <u>to be America’s 45th president. Their denial is</u> just as <u>strong</u> now as it was a month ago, before Clinton began a run of political victories that have enhanced her prospects, all while the roller derby/demolition derby that is the Republican nomination contest has continued to harm the GOP’s chances of winning back the White House. To be sure, nothing ever happens in a linear or tidy fashion with the Clintons; she is certain to add more chapters to the Perils of Hillary saga before Election Day 2016. Bernie Sanders could still upend her in Iowa, New Hampshire, or both, which could throw the nomination battle into unadulterated bedlam. Even if Clinton is nominated, a strong Republican candidate could absolutely defeat her next November, with victory as simple as the party putting forth a nominee who is more likeable to voters and better on television. Indeed, many elite and grassroots Republicans believe Clinton’s personality, which they can’t stand, will keep her out of the Oval Office no matter what. But October has been good to Clinton: <u>a glittering <mark>debate performance</mark>, the decision of</u> potential rival Joe <u><mark>Biden not to run</u></mark> (greatly simplifying her path to the nomination), <u>the vanquishing of Republicans during her daylong <mark>Benghazi hearing</mark>, and a <mark>solid turn at</u></mark> the <u><mark>Iowa</u></mark> Democratic Party’s Jefferson-Jackson dinner Saturday night. <u>All have <mark>improved Clinton’s odds</mark> of cruising into the White House twelve months hence</u>, and have thrown into sharper relief some of the advantages she has had all along. To state the obvious, Clinton faces two tasks to become commander-in-chief: get enough delegates to beat Sanders and then sew up 270 electoral votes. The more easily she can complete her first mission (especially compared to the wooly nomination battle of her eventual Republican opponent), the more easily achievable will be her second goal. Here, then, are some of the advantages the Democratic frontrunner has now, many of which have been ignored or discounted by the people who want to beat her so badly they can’t think straight: <u><mark>Hillary</mark> has shown she <mark>can handle Bernie</mark> Sanders</u>, despite his plucky persona, raw grassroots appeal, and authentic authenticity. The Vegas debate and Clinton’s improved poll standing has given her and her team a revived notion that Sanders will end up a nuisance rather than a real threat. She has confidence she can face him down in the three debates remaining before Iowa. <u>Without Biden in the race, Clinton is not going to have to play three-dimensional chess</u> and can focus her energies on Sanders alone. <u>Bernie has shown he doesn’t quite understand how to play big moments in the big leagues</u>. First the debate and now the Jefferson-Jackson dinner—Sanders prepared more for both evenings than the organic Vermonter normally would for any political event, but even his advisers concede that neither occasion represented the kind of performance that Sanders will eventually have to present if he is going to stop the prohibitive front-runner. He was very strong Saturday night but aides say they are still having trouble fully convincing him that not all campaign events are created equal. Hillary Clinton speaks at the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Saturday, Oct. 24, 2015. Hillary Clinton speaks at the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Saturday, Oct. 24, 2015. Daniel Acker/Bloomberg <u><mark>Hillary is getting better at managing</u></mark> (and shaking off) the personal pang of <u>her <mark>likability</mark> deficit</u>. At the J-J dinner, in her recent television interviews, and in her Benghazi testimony, she is showing more of her real self (even the all-too-human tetchy, the airily dismissive, the lordly—without knee-jerk defensiveness or wide-eyed guile), and not getting tied in knots over how she is coming off. While this version of Hillary is still nails-on-a-chalkboard to her conservative critics, it is a huge improvement over the recent past and probably enough to win under the right circumstances. Biden’s withdrawal means Clinton will lock up even more commitments from the Democratic establishment, giving her even more super delegates and making it easier to bounce back if Sanders wins Iowa, New Hampshire, or both. I reported in August that Clinton’s camp already had in hand private commitments from enough of the elected and party officials who are automatic delegates to the national convention next summer (so-called super delegates) that she was one fifth of her way to the nomination. That number has increased significantly in recent weeks and will go up now that Biden has passed on the race. This allows Team Clinton to make a robust argument about her inevitability and gives it a squadron of surrogates from the left, center, and right of the Democratic Party to wound Sanders, buck her up if she stumbles, and, eventually, argue that the senator should get out of the competition if she wins early. Hillary has massive support from labor unions. The party’s most important constituency group in terms of ground troops and campaign resources is now moving decisively towards Clinton, also giving her more working-class cred and undermining one of Sanders’ strongest rhetorical plays—that she is out of touch with the economic grassroots. And long-invested unions will provide her important foot soldiers in the general election battlegrounds, as they have since time began for Democratic presidential nominees. <u>Hillary could be the de facto Democratic nominee by Feb. 8</u>. Her team privately believes that, given the way expectations have been set up, even narrow wins in the two first-voting contests would not be discounted. Clinton has robust field operations in both states and could diligently grind her way to victories. Even Sanders’ top aides acknowledge that, barring other factors, it could be game, set, match if Hillary starts the voting year with twin wins, giving Brooklyn ample incentive to go all in there and try to put it away early. Hillary Clinton waves to supporters with husband Bill Clinton, former U.S. president, at the conclusion of the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Saturday, Oct. 24, 2015. Hillary Clinton waves to supporters with husband Bill Clinton, former U.S. president, at the conclusion of the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Saturday, Oct. 24, 2015. Daniel Acker/Bloomberg Hillary’s husband now seems fired up and ready to go. Although a little rusty over the weekend in Iowa in his 2015 campaign trail debut, accounts from aides to both Clintons suggest the former president has learned lessons from his performance eight years ago, when he arguably hurt his wife’s chances as much as he helped her. He has been kept in the loop on the campaign’s thinking, receives polling information on a regular basis, and has participated in some strategy discussions with the team. The campaign seems happy with him, and he seems happy with the campaign, and that is a big change from 2008. Both campaign chairman John Podesta and campaign manager Robby Mook have good and confident relationships with the FPOTUS, who seems less ambivalent than last time about becoming the First Lad. <u><mark>Hillary’s campaign is</mark> much <mark>less</u></mark> tense and <u><mark>fractious</u></mark> than was the 2008 team. There are fraught moments in Brooklyn, as in any campaign, and Clinton’s donors can get restive awfully quick, but this year’s model is one of relative peace and tranquility. Zen masters Podesta, Mook, and communications chief Jennifer Palmieri set the “been there, done that, seen that, dealt with that” sensibility. <u>Hillary’s team at last is <mark>convincing rich Democrats to come around</mark> to the super-PAC game</u>. Clinton loyalist Guy Cecil is now topping Priorities USA and he has brought in a new cast of folks to supplement holdovers such as Paul Begala, Jim Messina, and Harold Ickes, all of whom have experience rubbing shoulders with the mega-wealthy and prying seven-figure checks out of their hands. Cecil knows how to leverage hot buttons like the Koch brothers and the threat of more conservative Supreme Court justices and unified GOP control of Washington to maintain momentum and encourage the participation of those previously reluctant to muck about in the big money world that many liberals despise and disdain. Hillary has a first-class opposition research team that is saving nuggets to use once Republicans pick their nominee. Oppo veteran Christina Reynolds heads an operation that can afford to play a long game, teasing out incremental research in conjunction with allies such as the Democratic National Committee but knowing full well that holding back powerful tidbits until the late spring or summer, when the eventual Republican nominee will be most vulnerable, is supremely smart. The research operations of the Republican presidential campaigns, on the other hand, are currently focused on each other (although the independent group America Rising is hoping to make up the gap). The Republican nominee is more likely to emerge bloodied, broke, and behind. A nominating calendar and delegate rules designed to avoid the kind of extended intra-party fight that crippled Mitt Romney’s general election effort will almost certainly be no match for a fifteen candidate field, a number of whom can make a decent argument that they’ll win the prize. The ferociousness and deep pockets of gladiators Donald Trump and Ted Cruz and the possibility that the party establishment will end up intervening with tens of millions of dollars in negative TV spots means a long, gory slog that might not find resolution until after the national convention in Cleveland in mid-July. (Of course, if Trump is ultimately the nomination victor, then “broke” should not be a factor.) As the nominee, Hillary will effectively control the DNC and will exercise free rein over the convention. Even with Sanders a remaining foe, Hillaryland is coordinating fundraising with the national and state parties, strategizing about installing allies at the party headquarters in DC, and gaming out what the Philly convention will look like. If Clinton is the standard bearer, make no mistake: Brooklyn will convert the DNC into its wholly owned subsidiary and will take over every jot and tittle of convention planning and execution. This type of control typically leads to less friction and a smoother running enterprise, including on-message convention speakers. <u>Republicans are erroneously convinced they can beat Clinton solely with talk of Benghazi, e-mails, and other controversies</u> that have nothing to do with the economy and the real lives of real people. Nowhere does the Fox News-Rush Limbaugh echo chamber more hurt Republican chances of beating Clinton than in the politics of scandal and controversy. To paraphrase the famous line attributed to Pauline Kael: everyone who conservatives know think the Clintons should be in prison. The problem is that swing voters don’t share that view in sufficient numbers to actually warrant banking a victory on placing those arguments front and center. Kevin McCarthy’s acknowledgement that the Benghazi committee was set up to damage Clinton politically has not just polluted the select committee’s efforts; it also means that one of the most effectively tried-and-true Team Clinton defenses (that any controversy that swirls around her is a ginned up political attack because Republicans don’t want to talk about real issues) has got legs straight through next November. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton waits to testify before the House Select Committee on Benghazi on Capitol Hill in Washington on Oct. 22, 2015. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton waits to testify before the House Select Committee on Benghazi on Capitol Hill in Washington on Oct. 22, 2015. Photographer: SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images Hillary is ready for the debates. She won’t have as many debates in which to hone her skills as the eventual GOP nominee, but she has many other edges, including her 2008 experience; the fact that going forward she will face only one or two opponents—rather than nine or so—on the debate stage (much closer to the dynamics in a general election); her professionalized and experienced debate prep team (many of whom worked the same gig for Barack Obama); and her own fearsome, dogged, and scrupulous preparation. Hillary’s pollster knows how to find issues that test 80-20 or 70-30, and the candidate knows how to translate them on the stump. While Republican presidential candidates thrash around competing to see who can be the most anti-immigrant, pro-tax cuts for the wealthy, anti-abortion and gay marriage, and pro-climate change-denying, Clinton’s pollster and strategist Joel Benenson is busy finding topics she can talk about in a general election that garner overwhelming support from the public across the political spectrum and will put the GOP nominee on the defensive. Nothing makes a Clinton running for president more confident and effective than having mainstream boldface issues to use as a cudgel. <u>Obama’s approval rating is holding at a level that would make Clinton’s path much easier. Yes, the economy is not going gangbusters. Yes, ObamaCare is not universally popular</u> (to say the least). <u>Yes, the world is filled with dangerous hot spots and looming, chilling threats</u>. <u><strong>But <mark>barring some major change</u></strong></mark> in his fortune, <u><mark>Obama’s current</mark> <mark>approval</mark> rating</u> of around 46% <u><mark>is likely to sustain through Election Day</u></mark>, <u>a <mark>high enough</mark> figure</u>, history suggests, <u><mark>to keep him from</mark> <mark>being a drag on</mark> <mark>his party’s nominee</mark> and chosen successor</u>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hunt 2015 - postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan Rand CorpJonathan, "Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow," Aug 5, foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/ fulltext: The U.S. explosions that devastated Hiroshima and, three days later, the city of Nagasaki, seared an aversion to nuclear weapons into the Japanese psyche, embodied by people like Sumiteru Taniguchi. But although Japan never developed nuclear weapons, this aversion has not kept Japan out of the business of nuclear weapons altogether: Its advanced civilian nuclear program helped it recruit the United States and its nuclear deterrent as its guardians in the 1960s and 1970s. With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops for Japan’s commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread, especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the global nuclear watchdog — on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEA’s voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs’ enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki — in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities’ populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel — the Lucky Dragon — one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies — Godzilla. One year later, Japan’s parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet Japanese leaders’ renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japan’s prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their country’s national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw “no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”) After China’s first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson “that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them.” He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were “nonsense.” Why then did Japan not build atomic bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after China’s nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, “if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense.” These reassurances seemed to have their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons,” he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of Japan’s nuclear posture. When Sato’s former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japan’s acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Ford’s reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida — who hails from Hiroshima — renewed calls to “accelerate nuclear disarmament” at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to “witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings.” And yet, Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function “more proactively” in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal “would not necessarily violate” the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shinta ro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyang’s provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if Tokyo invoked North Korea’s nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea — trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result. Hibakusha have educated Japan and humanity about the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of the generational changes facing Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign policies. As Japan assumes a more active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to rethink its nuclear options. With some experts promoting “tailored” proliferation to U.S. allies to counter China’s rise, U.S.-Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has afforded Tokyo the security necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them. With Japan’s nuclear restraint no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the nuclear pacts struck decades ago will become ever more consequential.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>A weak alliance causes Japan to RAPIDLY NUCLEARIZE and trigger an arms race, way faster than AFF solvency</h4><p><strong>Hunt 2015</strong> - postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan Rand CorpJonathan, "Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow," Aug 5, foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/</p><p>The U.S. explosions that devastated Hiroshima and, three days later, the city of Nagasaki, seared an aversion to nuclear weapons into the Japanese psyche, embodied by people like Sumiteru Taniguchi. But although Japan never developed nuclear weapons, this aversion has not kept Japan out of the business of nuclear weapons altogether: Its advanced civilian nuclear program helped it recruit the United States and its nuclear deterrent as its guardians in the 1960s and 1970s. <u>With</u> the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and <u>Japanese society gradually leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind</u>, however, <u><mark>the security alliance with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops</mark> for Japan’s commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament<mark>. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia</mark>. If <mark>Japan pursued nuclear weapons,</u> <u>it would upend efforts to restrict their spread, especially in East Asia</mark>.</u> With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club<u>, Japan has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the I</u>nternational<u> A</u>tomic <u>E</u>nergy<u> A</u>gency — the global nuclear watchdog <u>— on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing</u>. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEA’s voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs’ enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki — in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities’ populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel — the Lucky Dragon — one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies — Godzilla. One year later, Japan’s parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet <u>Japanese leaders’ renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been absolute.</u> In private remarks, many of Japan’s prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their country’s national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw “no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”) After China’s first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson “that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them.” He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were “nonsense.” Why then did<u> Japan not build atomic bombs</u> in the 1960s? Mainly <u>because the United States offered to share its own<mark>.</mark> </u>Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after China’s nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, “if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense.” <u>These reassurances seemed to have their intended effect</u>. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons,” he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of Japan’s nuclear posture. When Sato’s former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japan’s acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Ford’s reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida — who hails from Hiroshima — renewed calls to “accelerate nuclear disarmament” at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to “witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings.” And yet, <u><mark>Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its military restraint.</u></mark> Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function “more proactively” in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo <u>Abe is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II</u>. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal “would not necessarily violate” the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shinta</p><p>ro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyang’s provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if Tokyo invoked North Korea’s nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, <u><mark>if Japan wanted to, it could probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to five years.</mark> Faced with an existential crisis,</u> however, <u>those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking.</u> For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea — trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result. Hibakusha have educated Japan and humanity about the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of the generational changes facing Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign policies. As Japan assumes a more active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to rethink its nuclear options. With some experts promoting “tailored” proliferation to U.S. allies to counter China’s rise, U.S.-Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has afforded Tokyo the security necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them<mark>. <u></mark>With Japan’s nuclear restraint no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the nuclear pacts struck decades ago will become ever more consequential</u>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Alleslev 19. Leona Alleslev-Krofchak is a Canadian politician and former military officer who served as the member of Parliament (MP) for Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill; “NATO ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: REBUILDING CAPABILITY, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE”; October 13, 2019; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) Special report; https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-10/REPORT%20150%20STC%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20-%20ANTI-SUBMARINE%20WARFARE.pdf //BY fulltext: III. THE RUSSIAN SUBMARINE THREAT TO NATO A. SUBMARINES IN RUSSIA’S STRATEGY 15. Russia’s submarines must be placed in the context of the larger strategic picture, as submarines play a vital role in this respect. Russia’s grand strategy remains to reclaim its status as a great power on the global stage. A key pillar of this effort is a substantial military modernisation premised on high levels of defence spending. Russia does not publish reliable, transparent figures on this spending. According to one of the most reliable estimates, the level of defence spending has fallen slightly since its high point in 2015, when Russia spent 4.83% of its GDP on defence. Still, in 2018, it remained high at 4% (IISS, 2019). Regardless, Russian military spending, including on submarines, does not need to be high to achieve effective asymmetric effects, as should become clear below. 16. Alongside military modernisation, Russia continues to seek political and military buffer zones in what it calls its ‘near abroad’. For one, Russia pursues hybrid and asymmetric tactics to create strategic uncertainty and localised surprises (Metrick and Hicks, 2018). Additionally, its leadership pursues targeted tactical overmatch by creating anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) ‘bubbles’ (Metrick and Hicks, 2018). Russia’s northern shores and the Baltic and Black Seas are critical links in this A2/AD approach. 17. Russia’s maritime strategy seeks to fulfil several fundamental goals, most prominently the provision and protection of its submarine-based nuclear deterrent, the defence of its homeland, and increasing Russia’s power, influence, and economic strength (Allport, 2018). As an important consequence, the Russian navy continues to prioritise a) the replacement of its submarines equipped with nuclear warheads, b) strengthening its naval forces for conventional anti-surface 150 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin 4 warfare and land attack (Allport, 2018), and c) improving its capabilities for asymmetric and maritime hybrid operations. 18. Overall, Russia’s naval capabilities still remain “vastly inferior to the collective power of the Alliance” (Allport, 2018). As in other domains, Moscow seeks to compensate by maximising its asymmetric strengths – often to great effect. That is one reason Russia also turns to maritime hybrid tactics, “to turn its weak hand into a strong one”, notes Admiral James G. Stavridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (Stavridis, 2018). In hybrid scenarios, Russia could employ the full range of military and civilian capabilities and operate as ambiguously as possible (Stavridis, 2018). Submarines are well suited for hybrid tactics, as they can create deniable effects and conduct seabed operations. 19. In particular, Allied defence leaders have sounded warnings that Russia could tap or sever undersea communication cables (see Box 1 and Map 2). Its vessels have been spotted near these cables, perhaps to map the network. Although designed with redundancy in mind, the tapping or severing of undersea communication cables could be extremely consequential for transatlantic and intra-European communications. If Russia or any other state could tap into this network, it could covertly gain intelligence of strategic importance, for example on financial streams, trading data, and classified military or government information. The international trading and financial systems are critically dependent on this network. A disruption would have massive and immediate effects on economic markets (BBC, 2017; Stavridis, 2018). As Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House has argued, Russia has learnt from its Crimea campaign: “physical access to the communications infrastructure and telecommunications” was the key to information dominance (BBC, 2017). 20. Currently, no truly effective systems for monitoring undersea cable networks exist (Analytic Exchange Progam, 2017). Hence, a key advantage of disrupting undersea cables lies in deniability. A 2008 incident illustrates this. No bad actor was behind the near-simultaneous cutting of undersea cables from the Middle East to Europe and Asia. A ship dragging an anchor and an undersea landslide were responsible. However, if this happened to cables crucial for the Allies, how could they be sure a state was behind this (Smith and Hendrix, 2017)? Even if one Ally had good intelligence, would it be able to share enough to convince others? And what would happen if this took place at critical points in time? One senior interlocutor during the recent STCTTS visit to the United Kingdom said that Russia could lay mines near these cables. If they were detonated at the right time, the Alliance could lose a war before it would even start. It is time for NATO to come up with a good answer. 21. With Moscow’s revived focus on submarines, two classic Cold War concepts of operations have made a return when it comes to the North Atlantic: ‘bastions’ and ‘bastion defence’ (Olsen, 2018). Bastions are those maritime zones where Russia concentrates its at-sea nuclear deterrent. Naturally, Russia wants to keep these strategic submarines safe and thus heavily protects these bastions. Russia’s European bastion is centred on its northern shores (see Map 3). Beyond the bastion, a defensive perimeter of bastion defence stretches all the way to the so-called Greenland-Iceland-UK gap (GIUK gap). One reason the GIUK gap is important to Russia is the fact that, from this line onwards, US assets equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles can hit vital targets in Russia (Allport, 2018). Russia cannot challenge the Alliance for control of the North Atlantic (Olsen, 2018). Thus, Russian naval assets, most importantly tactical submarines, would seek to deny access to Allied vessels venturing beyond the gap in times of crisis or war (Olsen, 2018). 22. Not every element of Russian maritime strategy, naval modernisation, and operational activities should be seen as inherently threatening. After all, the Russian military was at a particularly low point when it initiated modernisation efforts. Reasonable experts differ on whether Russia’s evolving maritime posture is defensively or offensively oriented. Some argue that Russia’s maritime strategy and posture is defensive at its core (Allport, 2018). Others read Moscow’s actions as geared towards the offensive (Olsen, 2018). 150 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin 5 23. The Rapporteur would agree with the latter. One basic problem of Russia’s strategy is that actions Russia would (want to) perceive as defensive – denying access beyond the GIUK gap to protect its nuclear arsenal – should be seen as a strategic challenge to the Alliance – threatening the transatlantic link. Box 1: Notable quotes on the threat against undersea cables 24. Another element in Russia’s naval modernisation also points towards an offensively oriented posture: the new Kalibr-3M14 long-range precision-guided missiles which can target both surface vessels and land targets from as far as 1,500 to 2,500 kilometres. As a result, Russian submarines not only present a threat to the transatlantic link; they can now also deny access to Alliance littorals in support of the much broader A2/AD threat (Tamnes, 2018). Kalibr missiles could hold critical nodes deep in Alliance territory at risk, even when on station in the Barents and White Seas. Indeed, Russia has tested launching these missiles from their home base, significantly reducing the time to launch (O’Dwyer, 2019). If the upper estimate holds true, a submarine in the White Sea could place a Kalibr on NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at least 13 Allied capitals (see also Map 4). In a crisis or war, Russian submarines could target critical disembarkation ports for troop reinforcements and potentially even North Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Sunak, 2017): “Recent reports make clear that Russian submarine forces have undertaken detailed monitoring and targeting activities in the vicinity of North Atlantic deep-sea cable infrastructure.” Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK Ministry of Defence (Peach, 2017): “There is a new risk to our way of life that is the vulnerability of the cables that crisscross the seabed.” Arnor Sigursjonsson, Director General of the Defence Directorate in Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2018 (Willet, 2018): “[Undersea cables] are not only linking Iceland to Europe and to North America, but they are the linkages between North America and Europe directly, south of Iceland […]. If you manage to disrupt those, that will have major consequences globally<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Effective detection and intel sharing deter cuts</h4><p><strong>Alleslev 19</strong>. Leona Alleslev-Krofchak is a Canadian politician and former military officer who served as the member of Parliament (MP) for Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill; “NATO ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: REBUILDING CAPABILITY, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE”; October 13, 2019; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) Special report; https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-10/REPORT%20150%20STC%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20-%20ANTI-SUBMARINE%20WARFARE.pdf<u><strong> //BY</p><p></u></strong>III. THE <u>RUSSIAN SUBMARINE THREAT TO NATO</u> A. <u>SUBMARINES IN RUSSIA’S STRATEGY</u> 15. <u>Russia’s submarines must be placed in the <strong>context of the larger strategic picture</strong>, as submarines play a vital role in </u>this respect. <u>Russia’s</u> <u>grand strategy </u>remains<u> to <strong>reclaim its status as a great power</strong> on the global stage</u>. <u>A key pillar</u> of this effort <u>is</u> a substantial military modernisation premised on high levels of defence spending. Russia does not publish reliable, transparent figures on this spending. According to one of the most reliable estimates, the level of defence spending has fallen slightly since its high point in 2015, when Russia spent 4.83% of its GDP on defence. Still, in 2018, it remained high at 4% (IISS, 2019). Regardless, Russian military spending, including on <u>submarines</u>, does not need to be high to achieve effective asymmetric effects, as should become clear below. 16. Alongside military modernisation, Russia continues to seek political and military buffer zones in what it calls its ‘near abroad’. For one, <u>Russia pursues hybrid and asymmetric tactics to create strategic uncertainty and localised surprises</u> (Metrick and Hicks, 2018). Additionally, its leadership pursues targeted tactical overmatch by creating anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) ‘bubbles’ (Metrick and Hicks, 2018). Russia’s northern shores and the Baltic and Black Seas are critical links in this A2/AD approach. 17. <u>Russia’s maritime strategy</u> seeks to <u>fulfil</u> several fundamental goals, most prominently the <u>provision</u> and protection <u>of</u> its <u>submarine-based nuclear deterrent</u>, the defence of its homeland, and increasing Russia’s power, influence, and economic strength (Allport, 2018). As an important consequence, the Russian navy continues to prioritise a) the <u>replacement of its submarines equipped with nuclear warheads</u>, b) <u>strengthening its naval forces for conventional anti-surface</u> 150 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin 4 warfare and land attack (Allport, 2018), <u>and c) improving its capabilities for asymmetric and maritime hybrid operations.</u> 18. Overall, Russia’s naval capabilities still remain “vastly inferior to the collective power of the Alliance” (Allport, 2018). As in other domains, Moscow seeks to compensate by maximising its asymmetric strengths – often to great effect. That is one reason Russia also turns to maritime hybrid tactics, “to turn its weak hand into a strong one”, notes Admiral James G. Stavridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (Stavridis, 2018). In hybrid scenarios, Russia could employ the full range of military and civilian capabilities and operate as ambiguously as possible (Stavridis, 2018). Submarines are well suited for hybrid tactics, as they can create deniable effects and conduct seabed operations. 19. In particular, <u>Allied defence leaders have sounded warnings</u> <u><strong>that Russia could tap or sever undersea communication cables</u></strong> (see Box 1 and Map 2). <u>Its vessels have been spotted near these cables</u>, perhaps to map the network. <u><strong>Although designed with redundancy in mind, </strong>the tapping or<strong> severing of undersea communication cables could be extremely consequential </strong>for transatlantic and intra-European communications</u>. <u>If Russia</u> or any other state <u>could tap into this network,</u> <u>it could covertly gain intelligence</u> <u><strong>of strategic importance</u></strong>, for example on financial streams, trading data, and classified military or government information. The international trading and financial systems are critically dependent on this network. A disruption would have massive and immediate effects on economic markets (BBC, 2017; Stavridis, 2018). As Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House has argued, Russia has learnt from its Crimea campaign: “physical access to the <u>communications infrastructure and telecommunications</u>” was the <u><strong>key to information dominance</u></strong> (BBC, 2017). 20. <u>Currently, <strong>no truly effective systems for monitoring undersea cable networks exist</u></strong> (Analytic Exchange Progam, 2017). <u>Hence, a key advantage of disrupting undersea cables lies in deniability</u>. A 2008 incident illustrates this. No bad actor was behind the <u>near-simultaneous cutting of undersea cables</u> from the Middle East to Europe and Asia. A ship dragging an anchor and an undersea landslide were responsible. However, if this <u>happened to cables crucial for the Allies, how could they be sure a state was behind this</u> (Smith and Hendrix, 2017)? <u>Even if one Ally had <strong>good intelligence</strong>, <strong>would it be able to share enough</u></strong> to convince others? <u>And what would happen if this took place at critical points in time</u>? One senior interlocutor during the recent STCTTS visit to the United Kingdom said that Russia could lay mines near these cables. If they were detonated at the right time, <u><strong>the Alliance could lose a war before it would even start</u></strong>. <u><strong>It is time for NATO to come up with a good answer.</u></strong> 21. With Moscow’s revived focus on submarines, two classic Cold War concepts of operations have made a return when it comes to the North Atlantic: ‘bastions’ and ‘bastion defence’ (Olsen, 2018). Bastions are those maritime zones where Russia concentrates its at-sea nuclear deterrent. Naturally, Russia wants to keep these strategic submarines safe and thus heavily protects these bastions. Russia’s European bastion is centred on its northern shores (see Map 3). Beyond the bastion, a defensive perimeter of bastion defence stretches all the way to the so-called Greenland-Iceland-UK gap (GIUK gap). One reason the GIUK gap is important to Russia is the fact that, from this line onwards, US assets equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles can hit vital targets in Russia (Allport, 2018). Russia cannot challenge the Alliance for control of the North Atlantic (Olsen, 2018). Thus, Russian naval assets, most importantly tactical submarines, would seek to deny access to Allied vessels venturing beyond the gap in times of crisis or war (Olsen, 2018). 22. Not every element of Russian maritime strategy, naval modernisation, and operational activities should be seen as inherently threatening. After all, the Russian military was at a particularly low point when it initiated modernisation efforts. Reasonable experts differ on whether Russia’s evolving maritime posture is defensively or offensively oriented. Some argue that Russia’s maritime strategy and posture is defensive at its core (Allport, 2018). Others read Moscow’s actions as geared towards the offensive (Olsen, 2018). 150 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin 5 23. The Rapporteur would agree with the latter. One basic problem of Russia’s strategy is that actions Russia would (want to) perceive as defensive – denying access beyond the GIUK gap to protect its nuclear arsenal – should be seen as a strategic challenge to the Alliance – threatening the transatlantic link. Box 1: Notable quotes on the threat against undersea cables 24. Another element in Russia’s naval modernisation also points towards an offensively oriented posture: the new Kalibr-3M14 long-range precision-guided missiles which can target both surface vessels and land targets from as far as 1,500 to 2,500 kilometres. As a result, <u>Russian submarines</u> <u>not only present a threat to the transatlantic link</u>; <u>they can now also deny access to Alliance littorals in support of the much broader A2/AD threat</u> (Tamnes, 2018). Kalibr missiles could hold critical nodes deep in Alliance territory at risk, even when on station in the Barents and White Seas. Indeed, Russia has tested launching these missiles from their home base, significantly reducing the time to launch (O’Dwyer, 2019). If the upper estimate holds true, a submarine in the White Sea could place a Kalibr on NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at least 13 Allied capitals (see also Map 4). In a crisis or war, Russian submarines could target critical disembarkation ports for troop reinforcements and potentially even North Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Sunak, 2017): “<u>Recent reports make clear that Russian submarine forces have undertaken detailed monitoring and targeting activities in the vicinity of North Atlantic deep-sea cable infrastructure</u>.” Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK Ministry of Defence (Peach, 2017): “<u><strong>There is a new risk to our way of life</u></strong> <u>that is the vulnerability of the cables that crisscross the seabed.”</u> Arnor Sigursjonsson, Director General of the Defence Directorate in Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2018 (Willet, 2018): “[<u>Undersea cables</u>] are not only linking Iceland to Europe and to North America, but they <u>are the linkages between North America and Europe</u> directly, south of Iceland […]. If <u>you manage to disrupt those, that will have <strong>major consequences globally</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Özcan 14 - Gülden Özcan, Sociology PhD Student at Carleton University, and Dr. Ersin Elgür, Department of Philosophy at Dicle University, Critical Legal Thinking, 10-6-2014 ["A Taste for the Secret: Interview with Mark Neocleous", http://criticallegalthinking.com/2014/10/06/taste-secret-interview-mark-neocleous/, 10-5-2016] JRB fulltext: Mark Neocleous (MN): There is a tension at the heart of academia for anyone trying to produce radical work. On the one hand, we need the time and space to think, read, discuss and write, and academia is therefore still a good place for anyone trying to do these things. As a form of wage labour — and we must never forget that being an academic is still, despite everything, a form of wage-labour — being an academic allows far more autonomy than almost any other job in the world: being an academic enables one to escape a huge amount of the kind of discipline that other wage-laborers face on a day to day basis. On the other hand, academia is a space that is ‘disciplined’ in a completely different way: it is a space dominated by disciplines, which in turn are meant to discipline us. The disciplines exercise discipline. This poses a major problem for developing radical thought within academia. Think of how Marx is taught, often to students in their first year of their study as one approach to the discipline they are studying. Marx gets taught as a ‘sociologist’ and is found wanting, Marx is taught as offering a ‘method in politics’ and is found wanting, Marx is taught as an ‘approach to history’ and is found wanting, and on it goes. Of course, it is not surprising that he is found wanting in all of these fields, because he never set out to be any of those things. But the University seeks to train us to be one of those things. And so Marx’s attempt to grasp the nature of the social totality runs against the very idea of the University, which wants us to think not about totality but only about one of its fragments: politics, history, economics, law, and so on. At the same time, Marx’s project was ‘the ruthless critique of all that exists’, as he put it in 1844. This is why the concept ‘critique’ is in the title or subtitle of so many of Marx’s texts: the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right and the critique of critical criticism in the 1840s, the critique of political economy presented in Capital, the critique of the Gotha Programme. But the last thing the University wants is to be the site of the ruthless critique of all that exists. It doesn’t want critique and it doesn’t want to examine the totality. All of which might explain why Marx never made it as an academic. But maybe we can get at the same point another way, but briefly thinking about someone who did make it as an academic and who did so by having the discipline imposed on him, namely Max Weber. Weber is no radical — quite the opposite, of course — but his experience is symptomatic of the problem which radicals do need to deal with. Think for a moment of Weber’s biography: he writes a PhD on medieval trading companies and their legal principles. He then works on Roman agrarian history and its law. He then starts training for the Bar, but also teaches law in Berlin. In 1894 he takes up the Chair in Political Economy at Freiburg, moving to Political Science at Heidelberg a couple of years later. He writes some more on agrarian history and then a work on the Protestant ethic. At this point his personal health problems mean that his career stutters and flounders, coming to a standstill for a period. Much later, in 1918 and having recovered from the ill-health, he becomes Chair of Political Economy in Vienna. Note the way he identifies himself in the speech he gives in Munich in 1918, called ‘science as a vocation’: he begins by referring to ‘we political economists’. Even before his death he still thought of himself as Professor of Economics. So what do we have? A biography which covers agrarian history, law, political economy. A biography that can tell the story of the most of his life without once using the word ‘sociologist’. Yet what is the ‘official knowledge’ about Max Weber learnt by every first year student in the social sciences? That he is a sociologist. Weber has been defined as a sociologist, even Canonised by the discipline — Saint Max of Sociology! — regardless of the fact that he worked across law, political economy, history, politics. Weber himself would have recognized this for what it was: a product of the power of classification that takes place within disciplinary practice. This is a practice in which the University system labels us, trains us, and shapes us into one discipline rather than another, making us become a Professor of some discipline or another and thereby internalizing the very thing from which we should be trying to break free. Weber’s career coincided with the solidification of the disciplinary system that we now take for granted, which really got set in place somewhere in the last couple of decades of the nineteenth and first couple of decades of the twentieth century. Academic disciplinarity is a product of the development of the modern University, circa 1870 through to World War One. This is the same period in which one sees the emergence of so many professional-disciplinary academic bodies. Just look at the dates in which the first professional disciplinary associations were established in the US: the American Historical Association in 1884, the American Economic Association in 1885, the American Philosophical Association in 1900, the American Political Science Association in 1903. This coincides with and correlates with the formation and consolidation of a departmental system of administration which replicates and reinforces the disciplinary divide. Thus the rise of the modern university and emergence of modern academic disciplines were part of same phenomenon of ‘professionalization’ of disciplinarity. It is a little ironic that one of the reasons Weber became so well-established within sociology is for his work on the iron cage of bureaucratic discipline, and yet one thing that permeates his work is his insights into the ways in which this iron cage destroys people trying to work against it but having to exist within it. Inside and against the discipline machine is not a pleasant place to be; Weber really did think it could destroy people. And who does it destroy most? Anyone trying to do radical work. The whole system is designed to act as a blockage on radical intellectual labour. Althusser would say, yes, that’s why the educational apparatus is the most important ideological state apparatus. Maybe we can put it slightly differently and say that the University system is designed to pacify intellectuals. Having read our Foucault, we know that ‘discipline’ refers to a branch of knowledge or teaching but also to training: self-control as well as external control, methods of obedience, orders as the commands of authority and orders as structures of power. The disciplines monopolize the production of knowledge in their field, and thus discipline the producers of ideas and arguments. Hence the idea of the ‘disciples’: disciples are always followers of the rules established by the leaders within the power structure of the disciplinary group, but who then also reinforce the discipline. The problem with trying to be a radical within and against the discipline machine that is the modern University is that one is always fighting this fight. ‘Polemics’, as you mention, are more often than not polemical because they disrupt disciplinary norms. And the even bigger problem is that too many radicals who might produce some powerful and polemical work end up producing uninteresting stuff within and for their own discipline. The lessons of the discipline are learnt, repeated, and repeated again, and failure to play this game, failure to be part of a discipline and failure to reinforce that discipline’s disciplinary norms, leads to punishment. And what do most academics fear most? Expulsion from the disciplinary group and with that the destruction of one’s disciplinary identity. In that sense independent entities such as Kampfplatz are crucial to radical and polemical work. As you know, I am part of the Editorial Collective of the journalRadical Philosophy, and we also aim to do the same. The journal was established in the early 1970s precisely as a polemic against the way philosophy was taught in British Universities: as sterile, apolitical, analytical philosophy. So the journal as a whole has always intended to treat philosophy itself as a space of battle, but also a space where other political battles could be carried out. But I have to tell you that sometimes it is a struggle, precisely because of some of the reasons I just gave. First, because a lot of writers hold back from being too polemical in case they upset too many people, but also because a lot of academics have succumbed to a certain kind of publishing treadmill, which satisfies their employers and helps their careers. This is no doubt one of the reasons why independent journals are in decline, selling out to large corporate publishing houses, which then sell the journal at inflated prices to Universities. This should be a warning of how difficult it might be for Kampfplatz. I wish you a lot of luck.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Your portable skills can’t solve: Academia suppresses radical thought because it does not want to be seen as a critique against everything else. Vote neg on presumption under your ROB. </h4><p><strong>Özcan 14 - Gülden Özcan, Sociology PhD Student at Carleton University, and Dr. Ersin Elgür, Department of Philosophy at Dicle University, Critical Legal Thinking, 10-6-2014</strong> ["A Taste for the Secret: <strong>Interview with Mark Neocleous</strong>", http://criticallegalthinking.com/2014/10/06/taste-secret-interview-mark-neocleous/, 10-5-2016] JRB</p><p><strong>Mark Neocleous (MN):</strong> <u><mark>There is a tension at the heart of academia for anyone trying to produce radical work. </u></mark>On the one hand, we need the time and space to think, read, discuss and write, and academia is therefore still a good place for anyone trying to do these things. As a form of wage labour — and we must never forget that being an academic is still, despite everything, a form of wage-labour — being an academic allows far more autonomy than almost any other job in the world: being an academic enables one to escape a huge amount of the kind of discipline that other wage-laborers face on a day to day basis. On the other hand, <u><mark>academia is a space that is ‘disciplined’ </u></mark>in a completely different way: it is a space dominated by disciplines, which in turn are meant to discipline us. The disciplines exercise discipline. <u>This poses a major problem for developing radical thought within academia</u>. Think of how Marx is taught, often to students in their first year of their study as one approach to the discipline they are studying. Marx gets taught as a ‘sociologist’ and is found wanting, Marx is taught as offering a ‘method in politics’ and is found wanting, Marx is taught as an ‘approach to history’ and is found wanting, and on it goes. Of course, it is not surprising that he is found wanting in all of these fields, because he never set out to be any of those things. But the University seeks to train us to be one of those things. And so Marx’s attempt to grasp the nature of the social totality runs against the very idea of the University, which wants us to think not about totality but only about one of its fragments: politics, history, economics, law, and so on. At the same time, Marx’s project was ‘the ruthless critique of all that exists’, as he put it in 1844. This is why the concept ‘critique’ is in the title or subtitle of so many of Marx’s texts: the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right and the critique of critical criticism in the 1840s, the critique of political economy presented in Capital, the critique of the Gotha Programme. But <u><mark>the last thing the University wants is to be the site of the ruthless critique of all that exists. It doesn’t want critique and it doesn’t want to examine the totality</u></mark>. All of which might explain why Marx never made it as an academic. But maybe we can get at the same point another way, but briefly thinking about someone who did make it as an academic and who did so by having the discipline imposed on him, namely Max Weber. Weber is no radical — quite the opposite, of course — but his experience is symptomatic of the problem which radicals do need to deal with. Think for a moment of Weber’s biography: he writes a PhD on medieval trading companies and their legal principles. He then works on Roman agrarian history and its law. He then starts training for the Bar, but also teaches law in Berlin. In 1894 he takes up the Chair in Political Economy at Freiburg, moving to Political Science at Heidelberg a couple of years later. He writes some more on agrarian history and then a work on the Protestant ethic. At this point his personal health problems mean that his career stutters and flounders, coming to a standstill for a period. Much later, in 1918 and having recovered from the ill-health, he becomes Chair of Political Economy in Vienna. Note the way he identifies himself in the speech he gives in Munich in 1918, called ‘science as a vocation’: he begins by referring to ‘we political economists’. Even before his death he still thought of himself as Professor of Economics. So what do we have? A biography which covers agrarian history, law, political economy. A biography that can tell the story of the most of his life without once using the word ‘sociologist’. Yet what is the ‘official knowledge’ about Max Weber learnt by every first year student in the social sciences? That he is a sociologist. Weber has been defined as a sociologist, even Canonised by the discipline — Saint Max of Sociology! — regardless of the fact that he worked across law, political economy, history, politics. Weber himself would have recognized this for what it was: a product of the power of classification that takes place within disciplinary practice. This is a practice in which the University system labels us, trains us, and shapes us into one discipline rather than another, making us become a Professor of some discipline or another and thereby internalizing the very thing from which we should be trying to break free. Weber’s career coincided with the solidification of the disciplinary system that we now take for granted, which really got set in place somewhere in the last couple of decades of the nineteenth and first couple of decades of the twentieth century. Academic disciplinarity is a product of the development of the modern University, circa 1870 through to World War One. This is the same period in which one sees the emergence of so many professional-disciplinary academic bodies. Just look at the dates in which the first professional disciplinary associations were established in the US: the American Historical Association in 1884, the American Economic Association in 1885, the American Philosophical Association in 1900, the American Political Science Association in 1903. This coincides with and correlates with the formation and consolidation of a departmental system of administration which replicates and reinforces the disciplinary divide. Thus the rise of the modern university and <u><mark>emergence of modern academic disciplines </u></mark>were part of same phenomenon of ‘professionalization’ of disciplinarity. It is a little ironic that one of the reasons Weber became so well-established within sociology is for his work on the iron cage of bureaucratic discipline, and yet one thing that permeates his work is his insights into the ways in which this iron cage <u><mark>destroys people trying to work against it but having to exist within it. </u></mark>Inside and against the discipline machine is not a pleasant place to be; Weber really did think it could destroy people. <u>And who does it destroy most? Anyone trying to do radical work. <mark>The whole system is designed to act as a blockage on radical intellectual labour</u></mark>. Althusser would say, yes, that’s why the educational apparatus is the most important ideological state apparatus. Maybe we can put it slightly differently and say that the University system is <u>designed to pacify intellectuals</u>. Having read our Foucault, we know that ‘discipline’ refers to a branch of knowledge or teaching but also to training: self-control as well as external control, methods of obedience, orders as the commands of authority and orders as structures of power. The disciplines monopolize the production of knowledge in their field, and thus discipline the producers of ideas and arguments. Hence the idea of the ‘disciples’: disciples are always followers of the rules established by the leaders within the power structure of the disciplinary group, but who then also reinforce the discipline. The problem with trying to be a radical within and against the discipline machine that is the modern University is that one is always fighting this fight. ‘Polemics’, as you mention, are more often than not polemical because they disrupt disciplinary norms. And the even bigger problem is that <u><mark>too many radicals who might produce some powerful and polemical work end up producing uninteresting stuff within and for their own discipline. The lessons of the discipline are learnt, repeated, and repeated again, and failure to play this game</u></mark>, failure to be part of a discipline and failure to reinforce that discipline’s disciplinary norms, <u><mark>leads to punishment</u></mark>. And what do most academics fear most? Expulsion from the disciplinary group and with that the destruction of one’s disciplinary identity. In that sense independent entities such as Kampfplatz are crucial to radical and polemical work. As you know, I am part of the Editorial Collective of the journalRadical Philosophy, and we also aim to do the same. The journal was established in the early 1970s precisely as a polemic against the way philosophy was taught in British Universities: as sterile, apolitical, analytical philosophy. So the journal as a whole has always intended to treat philosophy itself as a space of battle, but also a space where other political battles could be carried out. But I have to tell you that sometimes it is a struggle, precisely because of some of the reasons I just gave. First, because a lot of writers hold back from being too polemical in case they upset too many people, but also because a lot of academics have succumbed to a certain kind of publishing treadmill, which satisfies their employers and helps their careers. This is no doubt one of the reasons why independent journals are in decline, selling out to large corporate publishing houses, which then sell the journal at inflated prices to Universities. This should be a warning of how difficult it might be for Kampfplatz. I wish you a lot of luck.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Sotiris 15. Nov. 13; Panagiotis Sotiris; Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy, and Communication and Media @ University of Athens, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophical and Social Studies @ University of Crete, Department of Psychology @ Panteion University, Department of Sociology @ University of the Aegean; “The Realism of Audacity: Rethinking Revolutionary Strategy Today”; http://salvage.zone/online-exclusive/the-realism-of-audacity-rethinking-revolutionary-strategy-today //YS 11.14.15 fulltext: Unfortunately, historical experience shows both the catalytic and indispensable aspect of the insurrectionary sequence and the difficulty to initiate a process of transformation afterwards: mass civil unrest can lead to a regime crisis, but then the question is what comes next. Nor is the answer the imaginary ‘October’ of a supposedly Leninist insurrectionary sequence, which is the definition many tendencies of the anticapitalist Left propose for a revolution for which conditions are [is] never ripe enough. Here, strategy is replaced by an anti-capitalist verbalism that feels more comfortable with failure, since this justifies the position that from the beginning it was determined that nothing could change. Of course, enumerating problems is not a substitute for an answer to open questions. This can only be a collective process of reflection and self-criticism. However, we can discuss some starting points for a rethinking of revolutionary strategy today. We need a fresh conceptualisation that [to] combines the question of government with something close to a permanent dual power strategy. Dual power in this reading is not a question of catastrophic equilibrium and antagonistic coexistence of two competing state forms. Rather, it refers to the new forms of popular power, self-management, worker’s control, [and] solidarity and coordination that are resisting the counterattacks of state apparatuses and capital even after the arrival of the left to government. A war of position is necessary both before and after the seizure of power, as a continuous process of struggles, collective experimentation, forms of power from below, new social configurations, along with deep institutional changes, in the form of a Constituent Process. In this reading dual power is not only about worker’s councils or soviets. It is also about self-managed enterprises, and solidarity clinics and popular assemblies. It is about looking carefully at the new forms of organisation that have emerged in movements like 15M or the ‘Squares’ as collective political forms that in certain aspects transcend the social/political division. In such a perspective there is no ‘moment’ of passage from ‘radical governance’ to ‘socialist transformation’, only an uneven and contradictory process that will face counter attacks and perhaps also what Georges Labica called the ‘impossibility of ‘non-violence’. We need a new practice of politics. Any attempt towards radical transformation must base itself upon the short-circuit between politics and economics that Etienne Balibar suggests is at the heart of the Marxian project, treating the economy as terrain of political intervention and experimentation, insisting that movements representing the working classes have a say in politics, initiating novel forms of democracy from below. This also includes what Lenin described as a Cultural Revolution, or Gramsci as ethico-political reform, the emergence of new forms of mass political intellectuality and a new collective ethos of participation. Again, we can start by the formative and learning experiences in the movements, the ways they have facilitated the emergence of new forms of thinking and new ethics of solidarity and resistance. Rebuilding the United Front cannot be a repetition. Nor can it be simply a regroupment. We need an ‘epistemological break’ in our thinking of both the front and party. The Modern Prince can only be the result of a process of recomposition and profound transformation, learning also from the experiences of political self-organisation in contemporary movements. We have to learn from our mistakes and be profoundly self-critical avoiding all forms of arrogant know-all mentality, bureaucratic thinking, and theoretical laziness. So far, we have failed to create the kind of laboratory of a new politics that was needed, that kind of democratic political process, non-sectarian dialogue, collective experimentation, creative militancy. Regarding the Greek case, we can see the beginning of the problem in the inability of the forces of the Left that realised the necessity of rupture regarding debt and the Eurozone, to initiate in 2010-11 a process of a new front incorporating the new forms of organisation emerging from the movement. We must confront this task of recomposition, transformation and experimentation because otherwise the elements, practices, experiences that could be part of potential new historical block will remain dispersed and disintegrated. Antonio Gramsci has always insisted that historical changes take the form also of molecular changes. The notion of the ‘molecular’ refers to the multifarious, complex, over-determined, non-teleological and non-deterministic character of historical process. Gramsci’s famous ‘Autobiographical Note’ from Notebook 15, is not only a personal meditation on molecular transformation –contemplating his own life in prison, the choice he made not to flee the country, and how disaster can affect one person – but also a small treatise on molecular changes in periods of defeat, [shows] the small changes that in the end lead to a new relation of forces. His observations have, I think, a certain resonance in countries like Greece: the truth is that the person of the fifth year is not the same as in the fourth, the third, the second, the first and so on; one has a new personality, completely new, in which the years that have passed have in fact demolished one’s moral braking system, the resistive forces that characterised the person during the first year.[2] This means that any process of recomposition of the radical Left must be attentive to this molecular aspect. New forms of movement [for] organisation[s], especially in relation to social strata that lack any form of representation (unemployed, precarious etc), new democratic practices in movements, forms of political self-organisation, new forms of coordination and solidarity, expanding the experimentation with forms of self-management, creating alternatives forms of (counter)information, organising new forms of militant research are more urgent than ever. They also enable us to rethink political organisation under this prism of a necessary molecular recomposition, of collective democratic processes for the elaboration of alternatives, of a collective new practice of politics. Communist or revolutionary politics are in the last instance about subterranean currents that came to the surface only in critical moments, because they are dispersed, fragmented, ruptured, the results of encounters that did not last. The challenge is exactly to have the ‘slow impatience’ to learn from defeat, to regroup, to experiment, to rethink all aspects of the conjuncture, from the molecular to the ‘integral’, to ‘organise good encounters’ (Deleuze) and bring these subterranean currents to the surface. The tragic defeat of the Greek Left, opens a period of necessary self-criticism, reflexion and experimentation with new forms of political fronts, organisations and coordination along with all the necessary effort to rebuild the resistance to the new wave of neoliberal reforms, fight collective despair and resignation and bring back confidence to the ability to change things. It is will not be easy and it will be like trying to build a ship when you are already out in rough sea. However, it is the only way to continue to say NO. No to pessimism, no to surrender, no to defeat.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Our counter-revolution fuses reform and criticism simultaneously to create a strategy of Dual Power. The state is inevitable – the question is how to use it.</h4><p><strong>Sotiris 15</strong>. Nov. 13; Panagiotis Sotiris; Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy, and Communication and Media @ University of Athens, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophical and Social Studies @ University of Crete, Department of Psychology @ Panteion University, Department of Sociology @ University of the Aegean; “The Realism of Audacity: Rethinking Revolutionary Strategy Today”; http://salvage.zone/online-exclusive/the-realism-of-audacity-rethinking-revolutionary-strategy-today<u><strong> //YS 11.14.15</p><p></u></strong>Unfortunately, <u>historical experience shows</u> both <u>the</u> catalytic and <u>indispensable aspect of the insurrectionary sequence and the <strong>difficulty</strong> to initiate</u> a process of <u>transformation afterwards</u>: mass civil unrest can lead to a regime crisis, but then <u><strong><mark>the question is what comes next.</mark> </u></strong>Nor is the answer the imaginary ‘October’ of a supposedly Leninist insurrectionary sequence, which is the definition many tendencies of the anticapitalist Left propose for a <u><mark>revolution</u></mark> for which conditions are <u><mark>[is] never ripe</u></mark> enough. <u>Here, strategy is replaced by a</u>n <u>anti-capitalist verbalism that feels more comfortable with failure, since this justifies the position that from the beginning it was determined that nothing could change. </u>Of course, <u><strong>enumerating problems is not a substitute for an answer to open questions.</u></strong> This can only be a collective process of reflection and self-criticism. However, <u><strong>we can discuss</u></strong> some starting points for a rethinking of revolutionary <u><strong>strategy</u></strong> today. <u><mark>We need </u></mark>a fresh conceptualisation that <u><mark>[to] combine</u></mark>s <u><mark>the</u></mark> question of <u><mark>government</u></mark> with something close <u><mark>to a</u></mark> permanent <u><mark>dual power strategy.<strong> Dual power</u></strong></mark> in this reading is not a question of catastrophic equilibrium and antagonistic coexistence of two competing state forms. Rather, it <u><strong><mark>refers to</mark> the new forms of <mark>popular power</mark>, self-management, worker’s control, <mark>[and] solidarity</mark> and coordination <mark>that</mark> are <mark>resist</u></strong></mark>ing <u><strong><mark>the counterattacks of state apparatuses</mark> and capital <mark>even after the arrival of the left to government. A war</mark> of position <mark>is necessary both before and after</mark> the seizure of power, <mark>as a continuous process</mark> of struggles, collective experimentation, forms of power from below, new social configurations, along with deep institutional changes, in the form of a Constituent Process.</u></strong> In this reading dual power is not only about worker’s councils or soviets. <u><mark>It is</u></mark> also <u><mark>about self-managed enterprises</mark>, and solidarity clinics and popular assemblies.</u> It is about looking carefully at the new forms of organisation that have emerged in movements like 15M or the ‘Squares’ as collective political forms that in certain aspects transcend the social/political division. In such a perspective <u>there is no ‘moment’ of passage from ‘radical governance’ to ‘socialist transformation’, only an uneven and contradictory process that will face counter attacks</u> and perhaps also what Georges Labica called the ‘impossibility of ‘non-violence’. <u><strong>We need a new practice of politics. Any</u></strong> attempt towards <u><strong>radical transformation must base itself upon the short-circuit between politics and economics</u></strong> that Etienne Balibar suggests is <u><strong>at the</u></strong> <u><strong>heart of the Marxian project</u></strong>, treating the economy as terrain of political intervention and experimentation, insisting that movements representing the working classes have a say in politics, initiating novel forms of democracy from below. <u>This</u> also <u>includes</u> what Lenin described as <u><strong>a Cultural Revolution</u></strong>, or Gramsci <u><strong>as ethico-political reform, </strong>the emergence</u> of new forms <u>of mass political intellectuality</u> and <u>a new collective ethos of participation.</u> Again, <u>we</u> can <u>start by</u> the formative and <u>learning experiences</u> in the movements, the ways they have facilitated the emergence of new forms of thinking <u>and new ethics of solidarity and resistance. <strong>Rebuilding the United Front cannot be a repetition. Nor can it be simply a regroupment.</u></strong> <u><strong>We need an ‘epistemological break’ in our thinking </u></strong>of both the front and party. The Modern Prince can only be the result of a process of recomposition and profound transformation, learning also from the experiences of political self-organisation in contemporary movements. <u><strong><mark>We have to learn from our mistakes and</u></strong></mark> be profoundly self-critical <u><strong><mark>avoid</u></strong></mark>ing <u><strong>all forms of arrogant <mark>know-all mentality, bureaucratic thinking, and theoretical laziness.</u></strong></mark> So far, we have failed to create the kind of laboratory of a new politics that was needed, that kind of democratic political process, non-sectarian dialogue, collective experimentation, creative militancy. Regarding the Greek case, we can see the beginning of the problem in the inability of the forces of the Left that realised the necessity of rupture regarding debt and the Eurozone, to initiate in 2010-11 a process of a new front incorporating the new forms of organisation emerging from the movement. <u><strong>We must confront this task of</u></strong> recomposition, <u><strong>transformation and experimentation because otherwise</u></strong> the elements, practices, <u><strong>experiences</u></strong> that could be part of potential new historical block <u><strong>will remain dispersed and disintegrated. </u></strong>Antonio Gramsci has always insisted that historical changes take the form also of molecular changes. <u>The notion of the ‘molecular’</u> refers to the multifarious, <u>complex, over-determined, non-teleological and non-deterministic character of historical process</u>. Gramsci’s famous ‘Autobiographical Note’ from Notebook 15, is not only a personal meditation on molecular transformation –contemplating his own life in prison, the choice he made not to flee the country, and how disaster can affect one person – but also a small treatise on molecular changes in periods of defeat, <u><strong>[shows] the small changes</u></strong> that in the end <u><strong>lead to a new relation of forces. </u></strong>His observations have, I think, a certain resonance in countries like Greece: the truth is that the person of the fifth year is not the same as in the fourth, the third, the second, the first and so on; one has a new personality, completely new, in which the years that have passed have in fact demolished one’s moral braking system, the resistive forces that characterised the person during the first year.[2] This means that <u><strong>any</u></strong> process of <u><strong>recomposition of the radical Left must be attentive to this molecular aspect.</u></strong> New forms of movement <u>[for] organisation[s]</u>, especially in relation to social strata <u>that lack</u> any form of <u>representation</u> (unemployed, precarious etc), <u>new democratic practices</u> in movements, forms <u>of political self-organisation, new forms of coordination and solidarity, expanding the <mark>experimentation</mark> with forms of self-management, creating alternatives forms of (counter)information, organising new forms of militant research are more urgent than ever. <strong>They</strong> also <strong><mark>enable us to rethink</strong></mark> political organisation under this prism of a necessary molecular recomposition, of collective <strong>democratic processes for the elaboration of <mark>alternatives</strong></mark>, of a collective new practice of politics. </u>Communist or revolutionary politics are in the last instance about subterranean currents that came to the surface only in critical moments, because they are dispersed, fragmented, ruptured, the results of encounters that did not last. <u><strong>The challenge is</u></strong> exactly <u><strong>to have</u></strong> the <u><strong>‘slow impatience’ to learn from defeat, to regroup, to experiment, to rethink all aspects</u></strong> of the conjuncture, from the molecular to the ‘integral’, <u><strong>to ‘organise good encounters’ (Deleuze) and bring these subterranean currents to the surface. </u></strong>The tragic defeat of the Greek Left, opens a period of necessary self-criticism, reflexion and experimentation with new forms of political fronts, organisations and coordination along with all the necessary effort to rebuild the resistance to the new wave of neoliberal reforms, fight collective despair and resignation and bring back confidence to the ability to change things. <u><strong>It</u></strong> is <u><strong>will not be easy</u></strong> and it will be like trying to build a ship when you are already out in rough sea. <u><strong>However, <mark>it is the only way to continue to say NO</mark>. No to pessimism, no <mark>to surrender, no to defeat.</p></u></strong></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kaplan ’15 [Jerry; August 4; an American computer scientist, author, futurist, and entrepreneur, pioneer in the field of pen computing and tablet computers, Computer and Information Science PhD at the University of Pennsylvania; Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to Wealth and Work in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, “Outroduction: Welcome to Your Children’s Future,” Ch. 10] fulltext: But this is a dangerous path to tread. There are certain rights that will seem appropriate to ascribe to artificial persons in the short run, but these can wreak havoc on human society in the long run. The most critical of these are the rights to enter into contracts and to own assets. These rights seem pedestrian enough—after all, corporations can do both of these things. But the real risk arises because of an easily overlooked difference between corporations and synthetic intellects—synthetic intellects are capable of taking action on their own, while corporations require people to act as their agents. There’s nothing to stop a synthetic intellect, whether enshrined in law as an artificial person or crudely wrapped in a corporate shell, from outcompeting us at our own game. Such entities could amass vast fortunes, dominate markets, buy up land, own natural resources, and ultimately employ legions of humans as their nominees, fiduciaries, and agents—and that’s in the happy event that they deign to use us at all. The slave becomes the master. You might think this is nutty. After all, someone has to own and therefore control these infernal machines. But this is not correct. Ambitious entrepreneurs and moguls—groups not known for a lack of ego—can preserve self-managing and self-regulating versions of their enterprises for generations to come through existing legal vehicles like trusts. History is replete with examples of tycoons who constrain their heirs’ control of their empires long after their own demise (for example, the John D. Rockefeller family trusts). Want to keep that inheritance? Hands off Granddaddy’s automated money machine. It gets worse. The heirs in question can be the entity itself. If an artificial person can own assets, it can own other artificial persons. One robot can purchase and operate a fleet of its own kind. But most frightening is the prospect of an artificial person owning itself. A corporation can’t do this because it requires people to direct it and act on its behalf—someone has to be there to turn on the lights and sign the contracts. But a synthetic intellect isn’t subject to this same constraint. In fact, there’s a management concept that many companies aspire to called a “dark factory,” meaning a facility that is so completely automated that there’s no reason to waste money on lights. Add the ability to negotiate and enter into contracts, and the artificial person is off to the races. In principle it can purchase itself and continue to function, in a new age twist on the concept of a management buyout. Strange as this may seem, there’s a precedent in American history—slaves, who were otherwise considered property, could “self-purchase” their own freedom. Needless to say this was quite difficult, but not impossible. In fact, by 1839 nearly half the population of former slaves in Cincinnati, Ohio, were freedmen by virtue of purchasing themselves.17 This scenario doesn’t require much in the way of intelligence for the artificial person. It doesn’t have to be conscious, self-aware, or generally intelligent the way humans are. It just has to be self-sustaining and, ideally, able to adapt to changing circumstances, as simple viruses do today. So what happens next? After that, things do get a little weird. Our lives continue to improve as these entities offer us sufficient bang for our bucks to entice us to do business with them. But our share of the improvements may pale in comparison to the value created. The accumulated assets may wind up entombed in invisible reservoirs of resources or untouchable offshore accounts, to be used for no apparent purpose or benefit to humanity, and with no one the wiser. They could literally reverse-mine gold, hiding it back in the ground, in a misguided attempt to squirrel away capital to tide them over in case of hard times, consistent with the goals established for them by their long-forgotten frugal creators. The storied robot Armageddon of book and film won’t actually unfold as a military conflict. Machines will not revolt and take up arms to challenge our dominance. Instead, it will be a slow and insidious takeover of our economy, barely perceptible as we willingly cede control to seemingly beneficial synthetic intellects. As we learn to trust these systems to transport us, introduce us to potential mates, customize our news, protect our property, monitor our environment, grow, prepare, and serve our food, teach our children, and care for our elderly, it will be easy to miss the bigger picture. They will offer us the minimum required to keep us satisfied while pocketing the excess profits, just as any smart businessperson does. The first glimmers of this are already visible. Bitcoins, for instance. It’s a new currency that exists solely in cyberspace and isn’t controlled by anyone. It was invented by an anonymous person or entity named Satoshi Nakamoto. No one may know who—or what—he is, but it’s clear that he doesn’t control the production, management, or value of his creation. Despite halfhearted attempts to regulate or legitimize bitcoins, neither do governments. Or anyone else, for that matter. As long as they can be converted to and from other assets of value—whether legally or illegally anywhere in the world—bitcoins will continue to exist and find adherents. What’s not clear is whether “Nakamoto-san,” whoever or whatever he is, is profiting from the invention. It’s entirely possible that a private stash of bitcoins is growing in value, unseen and in secret. The entity that originated the concept may have billions of dollars in private bitcoins sequestered in an electronic file somewhere. (As of this writing, the total market value of all bitcoins is around $5 billion.) But the potential of the technology underlying bitcoins goes far beyond simple currencies. The concept is now being expanded to include enforceable, unbreakable contracts between anonymous parties.18 So in the future, it’s entirely possible for you to be hired, paid, and fired by someone or something whose identity you don’t know. Why would you tolerate this? For the money, of course. Computer viruses are another example of feral computer programs. They reproduce and sometimes even mutate to avoid detection. Regardless of how they started out, they often aren’t controlled by anyone. The term life today is reserved for biological creatures, but to properly understand these systems, we will need to expand its common meaning to include certain classes of electronic and mechanical entities. Our relationship with them will be more akin to our relationship with horses than cars: powerful (and beautiful) independent creatures capable of speeds and feats exceeding human abilities, but potentially dangerous if not managed and maintained with care. It’s also possible that they will be more parasitic than symbiotic, like raccoons. As far as I can tell, raccoons don’t offer us anything of value in return for feeding them—they simply exploit a weakness in our system of garbage collection for their own benefit. The problem is that the less there is a “human in the loop,” the less opportunity we have to influence, much less put a stop to, whatever directive or goal these entities were established to pursue. Synthetic intellects have the same potential for danger as genetically modified organisms, which can spread if even one seed inadvertently gets loose. Once that happens, there’s no going back. And that’s why we have to be very careful what we do over the next few decades. Just as we have put in place what we hope are reasonable controls for biological research of certain types, we are going to have to institute corresponding controls for what sorts of synthetic intellects and forged laborers we will permit to be created, used, and sold.19<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Leads to AI property rights, which <u>alone</u> is an s-risk.</h4><p><strong>Kaplan ’15</strong> [Jerry; August 4; an American computer scientist, author, futurist, and entrepreneur, pioneer in the field of pen computing and tablet computers, Computer and Information Science PhD at the University of Pennsylvania; Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to Wealth and Work in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, “Outroduction: Welcome to Your Children’s Future,” Ch. 10]</p><p>But this is a dangerous path to tread. <u>There are <strong>certain <mark>rights</strong> that</mark> will <strong><mark>seem</strong> appropriate to ascribe to a</mark>rt<mark>i</mark>ficial persons in the <strong>short run</strong>, but these</u> can <u><strong><mark>wreak havoc</strong> on</mark> human <mark>society</u></mark> in the long run. The most critical of these are <u>the <mark>rights to</mark> enter into <mark>contracts and</mark> to own <mark>assets</u></mark>.</p><p>These rights <u><strong><mark>seem</strong> pedestrian</mark> enough—after all, corporations</u> can <u>do both of these things. But the real risk arises because of an <strong>easily overlooked difference</strong> between corporations and synthetic intellects</u>—synthetic intellects are capable of taking action on their own, while <u>corporations <strong>require</strong> people to act as their agents. <mark>There’s <strong>nothing</strong> to stop</mark> a <mark>synthetic intellect</mark>, whether <strong><mark>enshrined</strong> in law as a</mark>n artificial <mark>person or</mark> <strong>crudely <mark>wrapped</strong> in a corporate shell, from <strong>outcompeting</strong> us</mark> at our <strong>own game</u></strong>. Such <u>entities could amass vast fortunes, dominate markets, buy up land, own natural resources, and ultimately employ legions of humans as their</u> nominees, fiduciaries, and <u>agents—and <mark>that’s in the <strong>happy event</u></strong></mark> that <u><mark>they <strong>deign to use us at all</u></strong></mark>. The slave becomes the master.</p><p>You might think this is nutty. After all, someone has to own and therefore control these infernal machines. But this is not correct. Ambitious entrepreneurs and moguls—groups not known for a lack of ego—can preserve self-managing and self-regulating versions of their enterprises for generations to come through existing legal vehicles like trusts. History is replete with examples of tycoons who constrain their heirs’ control of their empires long after their own demise (for example, the John D. Rockefeller family trusts). Want to keep that inheritance? Hands off Granddaddy’s automated money machine.</p><p>It gets worse. The heirs in question can be the entity itself. <u>If an artificial person can <strong>own assets</strong>, it can own <strong>other</strong> artificial persons</u>. One robot can purchase and operate a fleet of its own kind. But most frightening is the prospect of an artificial person owning itself. A corporation can’t do this because it requires people to direct it and act on its behalf—someone has to be there to turn on the lights and sign the contracts. But a synthetic intellect isn’t subject to this same constraint. In fact, there’s a management concept that many companies aspire to called a “dark factory,” meaning a facility that is so completely automated that there’s no reason to waste money on lights. Add the ability to negotiate and enter into contracts, and the artificial person is off to the races. In principle it can purchase itself and continue to function, in a new age twist on the concept of a management buyout.</p><p>Strange as this may seem, <u>there’s</u> a <u><strong>precedent</strong> in American history—slaves, who were otherwise</u> considered <u>property, could “self-purchase” their own freedom</u>. Needless to say this was quite difficult, but not impossible. In fact, <u>by 1839</u> nearly <u>half the </u>population of <u>former slaves in Cincinnati</u>, Ohio, <u>were freedmen by virtue of purchasing themselves</u>.17</p><p>This scenario doesn’t require much in the way of intelligence for the artificial person. It doesn’t have to be conscious, self-aware, or generally intelligent the way humans are. It just has to be self-sustaining and, ideally, able to adapt to changing circumstances, as simple viruses do today.</p><p>So what happens next? After that, things do get a little weird. Our lives continue to improve as these entities offer us sufficient bang for our bucks to entice us to do business with them. But <u>our share of the improvements</u> may <u><strong>pale</strong> in comparison to the value <strong>created</u></strong>. The <u><mark>accumulated assets</u></mark> may <u>wind up <strong><mark>entombed</strong> in <strong>invisible reservoirs</strong></mark> of resources <mark>or <strong>untouchable</mark> offshore <mark>accounts</strong></mark>, to be <mark>used for <strong>no</mark> apparent purpose</strong> or <strong><mark>benefit to humanity</u></strong></mark>, and with no one the wiser. <u>They could <strong>literally reverse-mine gold</strong>, hiding it <strong>back</strong> in the ground, in a misguided attempt to <strong>squirrel away capital</u></strong> <u>to tide them over in case of hard times</u>, consistent with the goals established for them by their long-forgotten frugal creators.</p><p>The storied robot Armageddon of book and film won’t actually unfold as a military conflict. Machines will not revolt and take up arms to challenge our dominance. Instead, <u>it will be <mark>a <strong>slow and insidious takeover</u></strong></mark> of our economy, <u>barely perceptible <mark>as we</mark> <strong>willingly <mark>cede control</strong></mark> to <strong>seemingly beneficial</strong> synthetic intellects</u>. As we learn to trust these systems to transport us, introduce us to potential mates, customize our news, protect our property, monitor our environment, grow, prepare, and serve our food, teach our children, and care for our elderly, it will be easy to miss the bigger picture. <u><mark>They will offer us the <strong>minimum</u></strong></mark> required to keep us satisfied <u>while pocketing the <strong>excess profits</u></strong>, just as any smart businessperson does.</p><p>The first glimmers of this are already visible. Bitcoins, for instance. It’s a new currency that exists solely in cyberspace and isn’t controlled by anyone. It was invented by an anonymous person or entity named Satoshi Nakamoto. No one may know who—or what—he is, but it’s clear that he doesn’t control the production, management, or value of his creation. Despite halfhearted attempts to regulate or legitimize bitcoins, neither do governments. Or anyone else, for that matter. As long as they can be converted to and from other assets of value—whether legally or illegally anywhere in the world—bitcoins will continue to exist and find adherents. What’s not clear is whether “Nakamoto-san,” whoever or whatever he is, is profiting from the invention. It’s entirely possible that a private stash of bitcoins is growing in value, unseen and in secret. The entity that originated the concept may have billions of dollars in private bitcoins sequestered in an electronic file somewhere. (As of this writing, the total market value of all bitcoins is around $5 billion.) But the potential of the technology underlying bitcoins goes far beyond simple currencies. The concept is now being expanded to include enforceable, unbreakable contracts between anonymous parties.18 So in the future, it’s entirely possible for you to be hired, paid, and fired by someone or something whose identity you don’t know. Why would you tolerate this? For the money, of course.</p><p>Computer viruses are another example of feral computer programs. They reproduce and sometimes even mutate to avoid detection. Regardless of how they started out, they often aren’t controlled by anyone.</p><p>The term life today is reserved for biological creatures, but to properly understand these systems, we will need to expand its common meaning to include certain classes of electronic and mechanical entities. Our relationship with them will be more akin to our relationship with horses than cars: powerful (and beautiful) independent creatures capable of speeds and feats exceeding human abilities, but potentially dangerous if not managed and maintained with care.</p><p>It’s also possible that they will be more parasitic than symbiotic, like raccoons. As far as I can tell, raccoons don’t offer us anything of value in return for feeding them—they simply exploit a weakness in our system of garbage collection for their own benefit.</p><p>The problem is that the less there is a “human in the loop,” the less opportunity we have to influence, much less put a stop to, whatever directive or goal these entities were established to pursue. <u>Synthetic intellects</u> have the same potential for danger as genetically modified organisms, which <u>can spread <mark>if</mark> <strong>even <mark>one seed</strong></mark> inadvertently <mark>gets loose</mark>. Once that happens, <mark>there’s <strong>no going back</u></strong></mark>. And that’s why we have to be very careful what we do over the next few decades. Just as we have put in place what we hope are reasonable controls for biological research of certain types, we are going to have to institute corresponding controls for what sorts of synthetic intellects and forged laborers we will permit to be created, used, and sold.19</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: K. M. Gopakumar 15, legal advisor and senior researcher with the Third World Network, “Twenty years of TRIPS agreement and access to medicine: a development perspective,” Indian Journal of International Law 55, 367–404 2015, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40901-016-0022-7 fulltext: The two decades of TRIPS show clearly that the compulsory product patent regime succeeded in increasing the monopoly of pharmaceutical TNCS in new medicine market. The product patent regime has put curbs on the availability of generic versions of new medicines. The failure of patent system resulted in the call for fresh look at the role of patent and public policy. Two economists argue that ‘‘…public policy should aim to decrease patent monopolies gradually but surely, and ultimate goal should be the abolition of patents.’’107 Another academic notes: ‘‘Even pharmaceutical and biotech companies usually do not need more than about a decade of monopoly power to encourage their very large investments in new drugs.’’108 There is an urgent need to interrogate the international IP regime in general and patent protection for pharmaceuticals in particular, which does not reflect the health and development needs of people, especially those living in developing countries. The Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS released in 2014, an initiative of the Max Plank Institute for Innovation and Competition on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the TRIPS notes four major developments that require accommodating the law to changed circumstances. First, the ‘historically unprecedented numbers of patents filings and grants’ create problems such as backlogs at patent offices, patent thickets, market entry barriers and increased litigation that ultimately generate impediments to research and commercialisation. The result is rising costs of monitoring patents and legal uncertainty, limiting the economic freedom of market participants, which in turn affects consumer welfare and distorts competition. Thus ‘the overall social benefits of innovation are reduced while an imbalance emerges between those able to cope with the resulting insecurities and related costs, such as multinational enterprises with their own patent departments, and those who cannot, such as small and medium sized enterprises or individual inventors.’109 Second, the new technologies like biotechnology, business methods and computer science as well as standard setting, strategic patenting and non-practising entities all affect the functioning of the patent system as a regulatory institution. Third, the role of patents in corporate management has undergone a change from a defensive means to protect research and development outcomes to become strategic assets to influence the conditions of competition. Fourth, the industrialised countries have tilted the balance in the patent regime towards right holders by reducing the burden for the patent applicants such as expanded scope of patentability, lower eligibility standards and reduced fees, as well as extending the rights of patent owners such as longer term of patent, harsher sanctions, strengthened ways for private and public enforcement. Therefore, the Declaration states: ‘the patent system faces increasing friction with ancillary public policy goals, such as protecting the environment, preserving biodiversity or ensuring affordable access to medicines.’110 Against this background there is an urgent need to review the TRIPS patent regime, especially the compulsory product patent protection. The Agreement itself contains provisions to review its implementation. Article 71.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides mandatory review of the implementation of this Agreement after the expiration of the transitional period referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 65. Hence this review was to initiate in 2010. According to Art.71.1: The Council shall, having regard to the experience gained in its implementation, review it two years after that date, and at identical intervals thereafter. The Council may also undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new developments, which might warrant modification or amendment of this Agreement. There is a fear that the review may result in an opposite result if developed countries use the opportunity of review to push for TRIPS plus amendments using the second sentence of Article 71.1. However, Para 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration clearly defines the mandate of the review. It states, ‘‘The Council may also undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new developments, which might warrant modification or amendment of this Agreement.’’111 However, so far no WTO Member State submitted any proposal in this regard. It is important for developing countries to propose amendment of the compulsory product patent protection in the light of experiences under 20 years of TRIPS Patent Regime. Echoing the same sentiment, the UNDP-appointed Global Commission on HIV and the Law observed the ‘TRIPS has failed to encourage and reward the kind of innovation that makes more effective pharmaceutical products available to the poor, including for neglected diseases. Countries must, therefore, develop, agree and invest in new systems that genuinely serve this purpose, prioritising the most promising approaches including a new pharmaceutical R&D treaty and the promotion of open source discovery.’112 Further, the Commission recommended that: The UN Secretary-General must convene a neutral, high-level body to review and assess proposals and recommend a new intellectual property regime for pharmaceutical products. Such a regime should be consistent with international human rights law and public health requirements, while safeguarding the justifiable rights of inventors. Such a body should include representation from the High Commissioner on Human Rights, WHO, WTO, UNDP, UNAIDS and WIPO, as well as the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, key technical agencies and experts, and private sector and civil society representatives, including people living with HIV. This re-evaluation, based on human rights, should take into account and build on efforts underway at WHO, such as its Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation, and Intellectual Property and the work of its Consultative Expert Working Group. Pending this review, the WTO Members must suspend TRIPS as it relates to essential pharmaceutical products for low- and middle-income countries.113 As part of the implementation of the recommendation UN SecretaryGeneral has established a 16-member High Level Panel on Access to Medicines. This Panel is to review and assess various proposals and make recommendation to ‘‘remedy the policy incoherence between international human rights law and trade rules in the context of access and health technologies.’’114 It is expected to look at a new IP regime, which can ensure both access and innovation as recommended by the Global Commission on HIV/AIDS. The incoherence between trade law and human rights law cannot be addressed by using flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. As long as an international obligation to provide product patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions exists, the above-mentioned incoherence is also to exist. Therefore, it is important to restructure the TRIPS and TRIPS plus IP regime, which not only prevent the access to affordable medicine, but also failed to deliver access to R&D needs of developing countries. There is a need to provide enough policy space for countries to design their patent laws, especially to fulfill their human right obligations on right to health and right to science. Scrapping of the compulsory product patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement is critical to serve this purpose.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>[2] Monopolies powered by patent law cause global health inequality.</h4><p>K. M. <strong>Gopakumar 15</strong>, legal advisor and senior researcher with the Third World Network, “Twenty years of TRIPS agreement and access to medicine: a development perspective,” Indian Journal of International Law 55, 367–404 2015, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40901-016-0022-7</p><p><u>The two <mark>decades of TRIPS show</mark> clearly that the compulsory product <mark>patent regime</mark> succeeded in <strong><mark>increasing the monopoly of pharmaceutical TNCS</strong></mark> in new medicine market</u>. The product patent regime has put curbs on the availability of generic versions of new medicines. The failure of patent system resulted in the call for fresh look at the role of patent and public policy. Two economists argue that ‘‘…public policy should aim to decrease patent monopolies gradually but surely, and ultimate goal should be the abolition of patents.’’107 Another academic notes: ‘‘Even pharmaceutical and biotech companies usually do not need more than about a decade of monopoly power to encourage their very large investments in new drugs.’’108 <u>There is an <mark>urgent need to interrogate</mark> the <mark>international IP regime</mark> in general and patent protection for pharmaceuticals in particular, <strong><mark>which </u></strong></mark>does not<u><strong> <mark>reflect</strong></mark> the <mark>health</mark> and development <mark>needs of people</mark>, especially those living <strong><mark>in developing countries</u></strong></mark>. The Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS released in 2014, an initiative of the Max Plank Institute for Innovation and Competition on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the TRIPS notes four major developments that require accommodating the law to changed circumstances. First, the ‘historically unprecedented numbers of patents filings and grants’ create problems such as backlogs at patent offices, patent thickets, market entry barriers and increased litigation that ultimately generate impediments to research and commercialisation. <u>The result is rising costs of monitoring <mark>patents</mark> and legal uncertainty, <mark>limiting</mark> the <mark>economic freedom</mark> of market participants, which in turn <strong><mark>affects consumer welfare and distorts competition</strong></mark>. Thus ‘the overall <strong><mark>social benefits of innovation </mark>are <mark>reduced</strong></mark> while <mark>an imbalance emerges</mark> between those able to cope with the resulting insecurities and related costs, such as multinational enterprises with their own patent departments, and those who cannot, such as small and medium sized enterprises or individual inventors</u>.’109 Second, the new technologies like biotechnology, business methods and computer science as well as standard setting, strategic patenting and non-practising entities all affect the functioning of the patent system as a regulatory institution. Third, the role of patents in corporate management has undergone a change from a defensive means to protect research and development outcomes to become strategic assets to influence the conditions of competition. <u>Fourth, the <mark>industrialised countries</mark> have <strong><mark>tilted the balance</strong></mark> in the patent regime towards right holders by reducing the burden for the patent applicants such as expanded scope of patentability, lower eligibility standards and reduced fees, as well as extending the rights of patent owners such as longer term of patent, harsher sanctions, strengthened ways for private and public enforcement</u>. Therefore, the Declaration states: ‘the patent system faces increasing friction with ancillary public policy goals, such as protecting the environment, preserving biodiversity or ensuring affordable access to medicines.’110 Against this background there is an urgent need to review the TRIPS patent regime, especially the compulsory product patent protection. The Agreement itself contains provisions to review its implementation. Article 71.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides mandatory review of the implementation of this Agreement after the expiration of the transitional period referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 65. Hence this review was to initiate in 2010. According to Art.71.1: The Council shall, having regard to the experience gained in its implementation, review it two years after that date, and at identical intervals thereafter. The Council may also undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new developments, which might warrant modification or amendment of this Agreement. There is a fear that the review may result in an opposite result if developed countries use the opportunity of review to push for TRIPS plus amendments using the second sentence of Article 71.1. However, Para 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration clearly defines the mandate of the review. It states, ‘‘The Council may also undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new developments, which might warrant modification or amendment of this Agreement.’’111 However, so far no WTO Member State submitted any proposal in this regard. It is important for developing countries to propose amendment of the compulsory product patent protection in the light of experiences under 20 years of TRIPS Patent Regime. <u>Echoing the same sentiment, the UNDP-appointed Global Commission on HIV and the Law observed the ‘<mark>TRIPS</mark> has <strong><mark>failed to encourage and reward</strong></mark> the kind of <strong><mark>innovation</strong></mark> that makes more effective pharmaceutical products available to the poor, including for neglected diseases</u>. Countries must, therefore, develop, agree and invest in new systems that genuinely serve this purpose, prioritising the most promising approaches including a new pharmaceutical R&D treaty and the promotion of open source discovery.’112 Further, the Commission recommended that: The UN Secretary-General must convene a neutral, high-level body to review and assess proposals and recommend a new intellectual property regime for pharmaceutical products. Such a regime should be consistent with international human rights law and public health requirements, while safeguarding the justifiable rights of inventors. Such a body should include representation from the High Commissioner on Human Rights, WHO, WTO, UNDP, UNAIDS and WIPO, as well as the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, key technical agencies and experts, and private sector and civil society representatives, including people living with HIV. This re-evaluation, based on human rights, should take into account and build on efforts underway at WHO, such as its Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation, and Intellectual Property and the work of its Consultative Expert Working Group. <u>Pending this review, the WTO Members <strong>must suspend TRIPS</strong> as it relates to essential <strong>pharmaceutical products</strong> for low- and middle-income countries</u>.113 As part of the implementation of the recommendation UN SecretaryGeneral has established a 16-member High Level Panel on Access to Medicines. This Panel is to review and assess various proposals and make recommendation to ‘‘remedy the policy incoherence between international human rights law and trade rules in the context of access and health technologies.’’114 It is expected to look at a new IP regime, which can ensure both access and innovation as recommended by the Global Commission on HIV/AIDS. <u>The <mark>incoherence between trade law and human rights</mark> law <strong><mark>cannot be addressed</strong></mark> <mark>by</mark> using flexibilities in the <strong><mark>TRIPS</strong></mark> Agreement</u>. As long as an international obligation to provide product patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions exists, the above-mentioned incoherence is also to exist. <u>Therefore, it is <mark>important to restructure</mark> the <strong><mark>TRIPS</strong></mark> and TRIPS plus IP regime, <mark>which</mark> not only <mark>prevent</mark> the <strong><mark>access to affordable medicine</strong></mark>, but also <mark>failed to deliver</mark> access to <strong><mark>R&D needs of developing countries</u></strong></mark>. There is a need to provide enough policy space for countries to design their patent laws, especially to fulfill their human right obligations on right to health and right to science. Scrapping of the compulsory product patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement is critical to serve this purpose.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kumar 17 Vinod Kumar (Associate Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India), 2017, The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Movers, Shakers and Spoilers. Resurgence of Nuclear Power, 39–70. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 WJ fulltext: What are the trends that indicate the prospects of a renaissance happening, especially since earlier signs, like in the USA, did not end in fruitful outcomes? A handful of global indicators could be highlighted to support the assumption that a renaissance might be in the offing in the global nuclear industry, though with inherent challenges. First, the hopes of revival in many established nuclear bases such as USA and Russia even as some European nations such as UK, France and the Scandinavians have reposed faith in nuclear power, which also indicates a revisiting of phase-out policies in the industrial world. Second, the massive confidence that the developing world has placed on nuclear energy as evident from the numerous expansion plans of those nations with the existing nuclear energy infrastructure, as also the decision of many small and emerging economies to make their plunge into nuclear energy. Third is a host of systematic factors that has the potential to drive the renaissance, including the galloping pace of reactor technology development, best practices emerging in civil nuclear liability laws, increasing access of insurance and risk management tools, and above all the imperative of nations to promote clean fuel to meet climate change mitigation targets. 3.3.1 Industrial World Still Relies on Nuclear Energy While the US revival efforts have been ongoing since the beginning of the mil- lennium despite numerous constraints, Russia is on a faster pace in expanding its nuclear energy infrastructure with notable advances made in launching its Generation-III fast neutron reactors as well as in ensuring its technological footprint in emerging markets through exports of its VVER light water reactors (NewEurope 2016). Besides its existing tally of 36 operating reactors with a total capacity of 27,000 MW, Russia plans to add one large reactor per year till 2028, with around 22 planned units running up to around 21,000 MW capacity, alongside an equal number earmarked for exports (WNA 2016f). As for Europe, where feasibility of nuclear power continues to remain in popular debate, countries that have preferred to retain nuclear power are announcing new projects or seeking to replace ageing ones with new units. The UK, with plans to retire half of 15 operational reactors by middle of next decade, has opted for a foreign-funded consortium model to kick off its Hinkley Point nuclear project, with Chinese and French state-run energy firms as collaborators (BBC 2016; Riley and Mullen 2016). This is beside an intended plan to allow the China General Nuclear Corporation to build a nuclear plant at Bradwell, as agreed during the Chinese President’s visit in October 2015. France, which is heavily nuclear energy-dependent, is seemingly weighing on Areva’s Generation-III European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) not just to display its continuing reliance on nuclear energy but also to establish its international standing as a nuclear supplier and technology incubator. Despite reported timeline delays and cost outruns (Guardian 2016), the EPRs at Flamanville plant in France, Olkiluoto-3 in Finland as well as the proposed project at UK’s Hinkley symbolise a renewed thrust across Europe for nuclear power, as also the role played by other new-generation reactors in this renewal. On the other hand, the actual relevance of the nuclear industry in Europe is in the comparatively nascent economies in Scandinavia, especially Finland and Sweden, which have preferred to retain nuclear as a power source and probably delay or avoid a total transition to renewable means. Along with unit 5, which is currently under con- struction, Finland is planning further expansion for units 6 and 7 in Olkiluoto (WNA 2016d). Another project, run by Fennovoima, is under construction to set up a VVER-1200 reactor and has a unique model of co-ownership by Rusatom Overseas (Milne 2016b). Sweden, on the other hand, produces 40% of its electricity from nine existing reactors and plans to replace the ageing ones with an ambitious plan of 10 new reactors (Milne 2016a). However, Sweden’s contribution to the nuclear revival is more significant. The nation not just revised its earlier plan, finalised in 1980s, to close nuclear and forego life extension of reactors, but removed a tax from 2017 that discriminates against nuclear power while subsides wind and biomass to progress towards the goal to total renewable energy by 2040. A certain fillip to nuclear energy, this reversal also means that stringent anti-nuclear sentiments that prevailed in Scandinavia following the Fukushima incident, and phase-out models like Germany’s Energiewende, has given way to more realistic approaches towards nuclear energy. In Europe, these revival signs could be signs of an impending renaissance as it ignites fresh life into the industry. 3.3.2 Developing World as the Catalyst At the other end of the spectrum, an expectant renaissance in nuclear energy is all about ‘a great leap forward’ for many countries in the developing world for whom access to sustainable means of energy is closely linked to the economic progress and upliftment of their societies. Nuclear energy has traditionally been an elitist preserve with the developed and the industrial world always controlling the technology and restricting access through non-proliferation structures including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and supplier cartels like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even those countries in underdeveloped regions with major uranium deposits, like in some African countries, could not harness the economic potential of their natural resources owing to the domination and control of advanced nations over the affairs of the atom, and its normative structures. Consequently, very few countries in the third world have been successful in establishing a nuclear industry that could be on par with their peers in the developed world. Even those who managed to set up a comparatively active base—such as India, China or Brazil—had perennial struggles with the development of reactor and reprocessing technologies, access to fissile materials or in dealing with denial regimes over attempts to develop indigenous capabilities or gaining strategic autonomy that mismatched with the global norms perpetuated by the Western-oriented liberal security community. The renaissance, therefore, for the developing world is about the establishment of robust nuclear industries, uninterrupted access to nuclear fuel cycles and fissile materials, and meeting major developmental, economic and climate change targets by placing nuclear at the centre of their energy security missions. In practice, this could also mean that the epicentre of the global nuclear industry could be shifting to the developing world, especially the bases in Asia, who could shape the future norms, best practices and structures for this domain. According to estimates of the World Nuclear Association, around 45 countries are at various stages or plans for nuclear energy programmes, with 32 of them being in Asian region (WNA 2016e). This includes Albania, Italy, Serbia, Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Belarus, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Ireland (in Europe); Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Namibia (in Africa); and Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay (in Americas). The gravity of the Asian shift is marked by the fact that nuclear projects in some subregions in Asia such as the Middle East and East Asia will be almost the same number or more than those planned in the above two regions. For example, 14 states in the Middle East (UAE and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan) have plans for setting up nuclear plants.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Nuclear zero stops it -- strong anti-proliferation norms block access to nuclear material and reactor development</h4><p>Kumar 17</p><p><u></strong>Vinod Kumar (Associate Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India), 2017, The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Movers, Shakers and Spoilers. Resurgence of Nuclear Power, 39–70. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 WJ</p><p><mark>What</mark> are the <mark>trends</mark> that <mark>indicate</mark> the prospects of <mark>a renaissance</mark> happening</u>, especially since earlier signs, like in the USA, did not end in fruitful outcomes? A handful of <u>global indicators could be highlighted to support the assumption that a renaissance might be in the offing in the global nuclear industry</u>, though <u>with inherent challenges</u>. First, the hopes of <u><mark>revival in many</mark> established nuclear <mark>bases</mark> such as USA and Russia</u> even as some European nations such as UK, France and the Scandinavians <u><mark>have reposed faith</mark> in nuclear power</u>, which also indicates a revisiting of phase-out policies in the industrial world. Second, the <u>massive confidence that the developing world has placed on nuclear energy as evident from the numerous expansion plans of those nations with the existing nuclear energy infrastructure</u>, as also the decision of many small and emerging economies to make their plunge into nuclear energy. Third is <u><mark>a host of systematic factors</mark> that <mark>has the potential to drive the renaissance</u></mark>, <u>including the galloping pace of reactor technology development</u>, best practices emerging in civil nuclear liability laws, increasing access of insurance and risk management tools, and <u>above all the imperative of nations to promote clean fuel to meet climate change mitigation targets.</p><p></u>3.3.1 Industrial World Still Relies on Nuclear Energy</p><p>While the US revival efforts have been ongoing since the beginning of the mil- lennium despite numerous constraints, <u>Russia is on a faster pace in expanding its nuclear energy infrastructure</u> with notable advances made in launching its Generation-III fast neutron reactors as well as in ensuring its technological footprint in emerging markets through exports of its VVER light water reactors (NewEurope 2016). Besides its existing tally of 36 operating reactors with a total capacity of 27,000 MW, Russia plans to add one large reactor per year till 2028, with around 22 planned units running up to around 21,000 MW capacity, alongside an equal number earmarked for exports (WNA 2016f).</p><p>As <u>for Europe, where feasibility of nuclear power continues to remain in popular debate, countries that have preferred to retain nuclear power are announcing new projects</u> or seeking to replace ageing ones with new units. The UK, with plans to retire half of 15 operational reactors by middle of next decade, has opted for a foreign-funded consortium model to kick off its Hinkley Point nuclear project, with Chinese and French state-run energy firms as collaborators (BBC 2016; Riley and Mullen 2016). This is beside an intended plan to allow the China General Nuclear Corporation to build a nuclear plant at Bradwell, as agreed during the Chinese President’s visit in October 2015. <u>France</u>, which is heavily nuclear energy-dependent, <u>is seemingly weighing on Areva’s Generation-III European Pressurised Reactors</u> (EPR) not just to display its continuing reliance on nuclear energy but also <u>to establish its international standing as a nuclear supplier and technology incubator</u>.</p><p>Despite reported timeline delays and cost outruns (Guardian 2016), the EPRs at Flamanville plant in France, Olkiluoto-3 in Finland as well as the proposed project at UK’s Hinkley symbolise a renewed thrust across Europe for nuclear power, as also the role played by other new-generation reactors in this renewal. On the other hand, the actual relevance of the nuclear industry in Europe is in the comparatively nascent economies in Scandinavia, especially Finland and Sweden, which have preferred to retain nuclear as a power source and probably delay or avoid a total transition to renewable means. Along with unit 5, which is currently under con- struction, Finland is planning further expansion for units 6 and 7 in Olkiluoto (WNA 2016d). Another project, run by Fennovoima, is under construction to set up a VVER-1200 reactor and has a unique model of co-ownership by Rusatom Overseas (Milne 2016b).</p><p>Sweden, on the other hand, produces 40% of its electricity from nine existing reactors and plans to replace the ageing ones with an ambitious plan of 10 new reactors (Milne 2016a). However, Sweden’s contribution to the nuclear revival is more significant. The nation not just revised its earlier plan, finalised in 1980s, to close nuclear and forego life extension of reactors, but removed a tax from 2017 that discriminates against nuclear power while subsides wind and biomass to progress towards the goal to total renewable energy by 2040. A certain fillip to nuclear energy, this reversal also means that stringent anti-nuclear sentiments that prevailed in Scandinavia following the Fukushima incident, and phase-out models like Germany’s Energiewende, has given way to more realistic approaches towards nuclear energy. In Europe, these revival signs could be signs of an impending renaissance as it ignites fresh life into the industry.</p><p>3.3.2 Developing World as the Catalyst</p><p>At the other end of the spectrum, <u>an expectant renaissance in nuclear energy is all about ‘a <strong>great leap forward</u></strong>’ <strong>for</strong> many <strong>countries in the developing world for whom access to sustainable means of energy is closely linked to the economic progress and upliftment of their societies.</strong> <strong><mark>Nuclear energy has traditionally been</strong></mark> an <strong><mark>elitist</strong></mark> preserve <strong><mark>with the developed and the industrial world</mark> always <mark>controlling the tech</mark>nology <mark>and restricting</strong></mark> <u><mark>access through non</u><strong>-proliferation</mark> structures</strong> including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) <strong><mark>and supplier cartels</strong></mark> like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even those countries in <strong><mark>underdeveloped regions</strong></mark> <u>with <strong>major uranium deposits</strong>, like in some African countries,</u> <strong><mark>could not harness</mark> the <mark>economic potential</mark> of their natural resources <mark>owing to the domination</mark> and control <mark>of advanced nations over the</mark> affairs <u></strong>of the <mark>atom, and its <strong>normative structures</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Consequently, very few countries in the third world have been successful in establishing a nuclear industry that could be on par with their peers in the developed world. <u>Even <mark>those who managed</mark> to set up a comparatively active base</u>—such as India, China or Brazil—<u><mark>had perennial struggles with the development of</mark> reactor and reprocessing <mark>technologies</u>, <u><strong>access to fissile materials</strong> or</mark> in <mark>dealing with <strong>denial regimes</strong></mark> <mark>over attempts to develop indigenous capabilities</mark> or gaining strategic autonomy <mark>that mismatched with the global norms</mark> perpetuated <mark>by the Western-oriented liberal security community</u></mark>. <u><mark>The renaissance</u></mark>, therefore, for the developing world <u><mark>is about</mark> the establishment of robust nuclear industries, <strong><mark>uninterrupted access to nuclear fuel</mark> <mark>cycles and fissile materials</strong></mark>, and meeting major developmental, economic and climate change targets</u> by placing nuclear at the centre of their energy security missions. In practice, this could also mean that <u><mark>the epicentre</mark> of the global nuclear industry <mark>could be shifting to the developing world</mark>, especially the bases in Asia, who could shape the future norms</u>, best practices and structures for this domain. According to estimates of the World Nuclear Association, around 45 countries are at various stages or plans for nuclear energy programmes, with 32 of them being in Asian region (WNA 2016e). This includes Albania, Italy, Serbia, Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Belarus, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Ireland (in Europe); Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Namibia (in Africa); and Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay (in Americas). The gravity of the Asian shift is marked by the fact that nuclear projects in some subregions in Asia such as the Middle East and East Asia will be almost the same number or more than those planned in the above two regions. For example, 14 states in the Middle East (UAE and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan) have plans for setting up nuclear plants.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Fierke 16 -- K.M. Fierke is a Professor of International Relations in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews. “Security as ethics: an orthogonal rotation from egoism to compassion” Ethical Security Studies pg 213-223 fulltext: The participants in the dialogue agreed that Buddhism shares much in common with Western science. Both are committed to enquiry and investigation and probing beneath surface appearances, as well as notions that certain levels of reality only become accessible through special techniques of investigation (Harrington, in Davidson and Harrington 2002: 19). Both traditions have also sought to recognise and address human suffering. Having said this, they rest on fundamentally different assumptions about the means and ends of enquiry. Western science has sought solutions to human suffering through objective knowledge and manipulation of the material world, with significant results – particularly in the area of medicine – but these successes are often morally ambiguous, not least the creation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. For Buddhism, knowledge of reality is associated with self-transformation and the liberation of practitioners, and an underlying assumption that all life within the universe is connected. It assumes that the transformation of human suffering is not only possible but an ethical imperative. 5 Buddhist ethics rests on a distinction between conventional reality, in which we are bound up in the desires of our egoistic selves, and a more ultimate reality within an entangled and compassionate universe. The conventional reality, referred to as samsara, is understood to be a realm of illusions, which turns more positivist notions of ‘reality’ (as equal to conventional reality) on their head. The ethical choice can be said to arise out of the continuous oscillation and uncertainty at the intersection of these two potentials. It is from the conscious recognition of our ultimate entanglement and relationality with others that the potential not only for the liberation of the self but also for a ‘logic of compassion’ emerges (Rinpoche 2008). Within this logic, self-grasping and self-cherishing, i.e. egoism, are understood to be not only the root of harm to others, but also to ourselves (Rinpoche 2008: 192). As Sogyal Rinpoche, author of The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying (2008: 194), states: Self-grasping creates self-cherishing, which in turn creates an ingrained aversion to harm and suffering. However, harm and suffering have no objective existence; what gives them their existence and their power is our aversion to them. When you understand this, you understand then that it is our aversion, in fact, that attracts to us every negativity and obstacle that can possibly happen to us, and fills our lives with nervous anxiety, expectation and fear. Wear down that aversion by wearing down the self-grasping mind and its attachment to a non-existent self, and you will wear down any hold on you that any obstacle or negativity can have. For how can you attack someone or something that is just not there? It is compassion, then that is the best protection; it is also, as the great masters of the past have always known, the source of all healing. This ethical agency is radical in its focus on intentionality and consciousness on the one hand, 6 and on the other, on the smallest thoughts or actions which may have far-reaching if less than obvious or immediate consequences as they reverberate throughout this web of relationality, thereby multiplying one potential or another. The Buddhist concept of ‘dependent origination’ 7 highlights the extent to which all things and events arise in dependence on a complex web of interrelated causes and conditions, and that nothing exists by itself, that there can be no whole without parts and without a whole there can be no concept of parts, and that all phenomena lack an independent identity (e.g. the child presupposes the parent, as action and agent presuppose on another) (Dalai Lama 2006: 37–38). This has implications for ethics, as the Dalai Lama (ibid.: 33) notes, in so far as actions that are suffused with compassion will automatically be ethical. An ethical act is a non-harming act (ibid.: 76). As early as the 1930s Niels Bohr (1958) 8 identified a family resemblance between Eastern wisdom and quantum physics, a connection that has been reinforced by numerous physicists, biologists and philosophers since (see e.g. Capra 1991[1975]; Braden 2007; Chopra 1989). Some have even argued that quantum physics is rediscovering insights that have been known within other systems of thought for millennia (Braden 2007). From the perspective of a materialist worldview it is difficult to see either as anything other than slightly ‘wacky’. Chacko highlights the extent to which not only mainstream and critical security studies but also the post-colonial critiques of them rely on an intellectual Euro-centrism and assumptions about the distinctiveness of the West. In looking toward the possibilities of recovering the particular cosmologies and epistemes of those who have been dispossessed – what Chacko refers to as decolonial thought – she looks, among others, at Gandhi’s ahimsa (nonviolence) and its relationship to the strategy of Satyragraha (truth force) developed in the context of the campaign to decolonise India. Ahimsa assumes a relationality that would potentially bring about what Gandhi referred to as a ‘uniting of hearts’. The focus of his ethics, like that of the Dalai Lamai, is on the moral transformation of both the self and the other, which rests on an assumption that we are embedded in webs of relationality. The potential for nonviolence arises from an awareness that compassion, or suffering with others, is a logical extension of this entanglement. As Chacko notes, Gandhi sought to disrupt the connection between politics, power and violence that is so characteristic of modern traditions. In the process he rejected the extension of Galilean and Newtonian laws to human relations, as well as rejecting the assumptions of the atomised-individualist social contract which are at the core of modern political theory. Ahimsa relies on the notion that transformation of the other also requires transformation of the self. To think about ethical choice and moral transformation from this perspective implies a different standard of measurement, or a different understanding of what measurement is or does. The Double Slit experiment, one of the most famous in quantum physics, suggested that an object is changed through the act of observation and measurement. In the social world, Wendt argues, language use represents a form of measurement that transforms the object of observation. As he states, ‘In language, what brings about a concept’s collapse from potential meanings into an actual one is a speech act, which may be seen as a measurement that puts it into a context, with both words and potential listeners’ (Wendt 2015: 217). At the level of language, this notion of measurement is useful for thinking about different approaches to security as ethics. In a more conventional approach to security (at home with Newtonian science), danger is external and measured in terms of objective threats, which rests on a distinction between us and them. From the perspective of Ontological Security, as discussed by Browning, this relates to a ‘dark side’ (Steele 2013), where the desire for certainty and predictability in order to ward off anxiety can sustain conflict insofar as it reinforces certainty about the identity of self and other. Browning loosens the centrality of order and identity, and places greater emphasis on the capacity of the subject for self-reflexivity and adaptability. From this perspective, the identification of difference need not be mutually exclusive, or necessarily placed within an adversarial relationship. Gestures of friendship, for instance, rely on an active appreciation of difference, as can be seen in cases from the Nordic security community to the European Union, where communities that were previously in conflict with one another have transformed the terms of their difference. In this respect, our naming of ‘reality’ establishes emergent potentials. It is common knowledge that the European Community was established to increase economic interdependence and reduce the likelihood of future wars, given the bloody history of Europe. Starting with the orthogonal rotation, this can be seen as radical ethical choice to rename the potential for relationality within the European context, and the subsequent enactment of one future rather than another. The ancient Taoist thinker Wang Chen (Sawyer 1999) highlighted the extent to which the tendency to conceptualise, along with desire, are the causes of suffering in the world insofar as they establish oppositions, distinctions and hierarchies. As he (Sawyer 1999: 19) states: As soon as things have names and people have emotions, right and wrong, other and self already exist in their midst, love and hate will arise and attack each other. When love and hate arise and attack each other, warfare will flourish… While we cannot step outside our language and, as Wendt notes, language is, in a quantum world, central to our entanglement with others, the oppositions inherent in language can be approached from a different angle. Post-structuralists have long argued that in using language we establish hierarchies of meaning, which they then set out to deconstruct. From a Taoist perspective, as explored for instance by Lily Ling (2013), yin and yang are interdependent oppositions, which contain a creative potential which arises from the presence of each in the other. Taoist military strategy, going back to Sun Tzu (Sun Tzu and Rim Sun 2007), highlighted the potential for manipulating these oppositions in order, if at all possible, to achieve one’s objectives without recourse to force. 9 As suggested by Wibben in her discussion of narrative, whether we use the specific language of security or abandon it, there are potentials for renarrating our entanglement in such a way that highlights – and thus instantiates – a radical ethics of relationality, rather than assuming that we are determined by material circumstances to reproduce conflict and war.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The universe is fundamentally empty – the only certainties in life are uncertainty and relationality – the aff’s aversion to death is a form of self-grasping that is the root of all harm </h4><p><strong>Fierke 16</strong> -- K.M. Fierke is a Professor of International Relations in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews. “Security as ethics: an orthogonal rotation from egoism to compassion” Ethical Security Studies pg<u> 213-223</p><p></u>The participants in the dialogue agreed that Buddhism shares much in common with Western science. Both are committed to enquiry and investigation and probing beneath surface appearances, as well as notions that certain levels of reality only become accessible through special techniques of investigation (Harrington, in Davidson and Harrington 2002: 19). Both traditions have also sought to recognise and address human suffering. Having said this, they rest on fundamentally different assumptions about the means and ends of enquiry. <u>Western science has sought solutions to human suffering through objective knowledge and manipulation of the material world, with significant results – particularly in the area of medicine – but these successes are often morally ambiguous</u>, not least the creation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. For Buddhism, knowledge of reality is associated with self-transformation and the liberation of practitioners, and an underlying assumption that all life within the universe is connected. It assumes that the transformation of human suffering is not only possible but an ethical imperative. 5 Buddhist ethics rests on a distinction between conventional reality, in which we are bound up in the desires of our egoistic selves, and a more ultimate reality within an entangled and compassionate universe. The <u>conventional reality, referred to as samsara, is understood to be a realm of illusions</u>, which turns more positivist notions of ‘reality’ (as equal to conventional reality) on their head. The ethical choice can be said to arise out of the continuous oscillation and uncertainty at the intersection of these two potentials. <u>It is <mark>from</mark> the <mark>conscious recognition of </mark>our ultimate <mark>entanglement and relationality</mark> with others that <mark>the potential</mark> not only <mark>for </mark>the <mark>liberation of the self</mark> but also for a ‘logic of compassion’ <mark>emerges</mark> (Rinpoche 2008). Within this logic, <mark>self-grasping and</mark> self-cherishing, i.e. <mark>egoism, are</mark> understood to be not only <mark>the root of harm</u></mark> to others, but also to ourselves (Rinpoche 2008: 192). As Sogyal Rinpoche, author of The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying (2008: 194), states<mark>: <u></mark>Self-grasping creates self-cherishing, which in turn creates an ingrained aversion</u> to harm and suffering. However, <u><strong>harm and suffering have no objective existence;</u></strong> <u>what gives them their existence and their power is our aversion to them.</u> When you understand this, you understand then that it is our <u><mark>aversion</u></mark>, in fact, that attracts to us every negativity and obstacle that can possibly happen to us, and <u><mark>fills </mark>our <mark>lives with </mark>nervous <mark>anxiety, expectation and fear. Wear down</u></mark> that <u><mark>aversion by wearing down</mark> the self-grasping mind and its <mark>attachment </mark>to a non-existent self, and you will wear down any hold on you</u> that any obstacle or negativity can have. For how can you attack someone or something that is just not there? It is <u><mark>compassion</mark>, then that <mark>is</u></mark> the best protection; it is also, as the great masters of the past have always known, <u><strong><mark>the source of all healing</u></strong></mark>. This ethical agency is radical in its focus on intentionality and consciousness on the one hand, 6 and on the other, on the smallest thoughts or actions which may have far-reaching if less than obvious or immediate consequences as they reverberate throughout this web of relationality, thereby multiplying one potential or another. The Buddhist concept of ‘dependent origination’ 7 highlights the extent to which <u><mark>all things and events arise in dependence on a complex web of interrelated causes and conditions</mark>,</u> and that nothing exists by itself, that there can be no whole without parts and without a whole there can be no concept of parts, and that all phenomena lack an independent identity (e.g. the child presupposes the parent, as action and agent presuppose on another) (Dalai Lama 2006: 37–38). This has implications for ethics, as the Dalai Lama (ibid.: 33) notes, in so far as actions that are suffused with compassion will automatically be ethical. An ethical act is a non-harming act (ibid.: 76). As early as the 1930s Niels Bohr (1958) 8 identified a family resemblance between Eastern wisdom and quantum physics, a connection that has been reinforced by numerous physicists, biologists and philosophers since (see e.g. Capra 1991[1975]; Braden 2007; Chopra 1989). Some have even argued that <u><mark>quantum physics is rediscovering insights</mark> that have been known within other systems of thought for millennia</u> (Braden 2007). From the perspective of a materialist worldview it is difficult to see either as anything other than slightly ‘wacky’. Chacko highlights the extent to which not only mainstream and critical security studies but also the post-colonial critiques of them rely on an intellectual Euro-centrism and assumptions about the distinctiveness of the West. In looking toward the possibilities of recovering the particular cosmologies and epistemes of those who have been dispossessed – what Chacko refers to as decolonial thought – she looks, among others, at Gandhi’s ahimsa (nonviolence) and its relationship to the strategy of Satyragraha (truth force) developed in the context of the campaign to decolonise India. Ahimsa assumes a relationality that would potentially bring about what Gandhi referred to as a ‘uniting of hearts’. The focus of his ethics, like that of the Dalai Lamai, is on the moral transformation of both the self and the other, which rests on an assumption that we are embedded in webs of relationality. The<u><mark> potential for nonviolence arises from </mark>an <strong><mark>awareness</strong> that compassion, </mark>or suffering with others, <mark>is a logical extension of </mark>this <mark>entanglement</u></mark>. As Chacko notes, Gandhi sought to disrupt the connection between politics, power and violence that is so characteristic of modern traditions. In the process he rejected the extension of Galilean and Newtonian laws to human relations, as well as rejecting the assumptions of the atomised-individualist social contract which are at the core of modern political theory. Ahimsa relies on the notion that transformation of the other also requires transformation of the self. To think about ethical choice and moral transformation from this perspective implies a different standard of measurement, or a different understanding of what measurement is or does. The Double Slit experiment, one of the most famous in quantum physics, suggested that an object is changed through the act of observation and measurement. In the social world, Wendt argues, language use represents a form of measurement that transforms the object of observation. As he states, ‘In language, what brings about a concept’s collapse from potential meanings into an actual one is a speech act, which may be seen as a measurement that puts it into a context, with both words and potential listeners’ (Wendt 2015: 217). At the level of language, this notion of measurement is useful for thinking about different approaches to security as ethics. In a more conventional approach to security (at home with Newtonian science), danger is external and measured in terms of objective threats, which rests on a distinction between us and them. From the perspective of <u>Ontological Security, as discussed by Browning, this relates to a ‘dark side’ (Steele 2013), where the <mark>desire for certainty and predictability </mark>in order <mark>to ward off anxiety </mark>can <mark>sustain conflict </mark>insofar as it reinforces certainty about the identity of self and other.</u> Browning loosens the centrality of order and identity, and places greater emphasis on the capacity of the subject for self-reflexivity and adaptability. From this perspective, the identification of difference need not be mutually exclusive, or necessarily placed within an adversarial relationship. Gestures of friendship, for instance, rely on an active appreciation of difference, as can be seen in cases from the Nordic security community to the European Union, where communities that were previously in conflict with one another have transformed the terms of their difference. In this respect, our naming of ‘reality’ establishes emergent potentials. It is common knowledge that the European Community was established to increase economic interdependence and reduce the likelihood of future wars, given the bloody history of Europe. Starting with the orthogonal rotation, this can be seen as radical ethical choice to rename the potential for relationality within the European context, and the subsequent enactment of one future rather than another. The ancient Taoist thinker Wang Chen (Sawyer 1999) highlighted the extent to which the tendency to conceptualise, along with desire, are the causes of suffering in the world insofar as they establish oppositions, distinctions and hierarchies. As he (Sawyer 1999: 19) states: As soon as things have names and people have emotions, right and wrong, other and self already exist in their midst, love and hate will arise and attack each other. When love and hate arise and attack each other, warfare will flourish… While we cannot step outside our language and, as Wendt notes, language is, in a quantum world, central to our entanglement with others, the oppositions inherent in language can be approached from a different angle. Post-structuralists have long argued that in using language we establish hierarchies of meaning, which they then set out to deconstruct. From a Taoist perspective, as explored for instance by Lily Ling (2013), yin and yang are interdependent oppositions, which contain a creative potential which arises from the presence of each in the other. Taoist military strategy, going back to Sun Tzu (Sun Tzu and Rim Sun 2007), highlighted the potential for manipulating these oppositions in order, if at all possible, to achieve one’s objectives without recourse to force. 9 As suggested by Wibben in her discussion of narrative, whether we use the specific language of security or abandon it, <u><mark>there are potentials for renarrating</mark> our <mark>entanglement in</mark> such <mark>a way that highlights – and</mark> thus <mark>instantiates – a radical ethics of relationality, </mark>rather than assuming that we are determined by material circumstances to reproduce conflict and war.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hughes 19—(fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research). Hughes, Coleman. 2019. “The Case for Black Optimism.” The Quillette. September 28, 2019. https://quillette.com/2019/09/28/the-case-for-black-optimism/. The narrative of doom and gloom, however, is misleading. Though it has gone largely unnoticed, black Americans have been making rapid progress along most important dimensions of well-being since the turn of the millennium. fulltext: Let’s start with incarceration. Without doubt, there is plenty of reason to be pessimistic about the U.S. prison system. America incarcerates a larger proportion of its citizens than any nation on earth. Black Americans, at 13 percent of the U.S. population, made up one-third of the nation’s incarcerated population in 2017. To make matters worse, conditions inside many prisons are ill-suited for rehabilitation. Alabama’s state prisons, for instance, are so rife with violence and sexual assault that Trump’s Justice Department has charged them with violating the eighth amendment to the constitution, which bans “cruel and unusual punishments.” Nevertheless, there are reasons to be optimistic. From 2001 to 2017, the incarceration rate for black men declined by 34 percent. Even this statistic, however, understates progress by lumping black Americans of all ages together. When you look at age-specific incarceration outcomes, you find two opposing trends: Older black Americans are doing slightly worse than previous generations, but younger black Americans are doing better—so much better that they more than offset, in statistical terms, the backslide of their elders. To put the speed and size of the trend in perspective, between my first day of Kindergarten in 2001 and my first legal drink in 2017, the incarceration rate for black men aged 25–29, 20–24, and 18–19 declined, respectively, by 56 percent, 60 percent, and 72 percent. For young black women, the story is similar: a 59 percent drop for those aged 25–29, a 43 percent drop for those aged 20–24, and a 69 percent drop for those aged 18–19. As a result of the divergent generational trendlines, the black prison population is not only shrinking; it’s aging too. In 2017, nearly three in ten black male prisoners were 45 years of age or older, up from one in ten in 2001. That may not seem like good news, but it is. The incarceration trendline for young blacks in the recent past predicts the trendline for all blacks in the near future. So the fact that the post-2001 incarceration decline for blacks in general was entirely caused by the plunging incarceration rate for young blacks in particular suggests that, as generational turnover occurs, the black prison population will not only continue to shrink, but will shrink at an accelerating rate. To paraphrase the economist Rick Nevin, our prison system may be overflowing today, but the “pipeline” to prison is already starting to run dry. The great incarceration decline for black youth has been matched by a decline in teenage motherhood. Between 2001 and 2017, the birth rate for black women aged 15–19 declined by 63 percent. In fact, the black teenage birth rate in 2017 was lower than the white teenage rate as recently as 2002. Nor has progress been confined to the younger generation. Between 1999 and 2015, the mortality rate for black Americans aged 65 and over shrank by 29 percent for cancer, 31 percent for diabetes, and 43 percent for heart disease. What’s more, all of those percentage drops were larger than the drops experienced by comparable whites over the same period. As deaths from disease have plummeted, black lives have extended. In 2017, black female life expectancy was 78.5 years, up from 75.1 years in 2000. Life expectancy for black men increased from 68.2 to 71.9 years over the same timespan. Not only are black Americans healthier and longer-lived than they were two decades ago, they’re also more educated. Between the 1999–2000 and 2016–2017 school years, the number of black students who earned bachelor’s degrees increased by 82 percent, from 108,018 to 196,300. Over the same period, the number of associate’s and master’s degrees awarded to black students more than doubled, rising from 60,208 to 129,874, and 36,606 to 89,577, respectively (population growth accounts for some, but not all or even most, of this growth). 2018 census data showed that 37 percent of black Americans aged 25–34 had some kind of college degree. If black America were its own country, that would place it in between Germany (31 percent) and Spain (43 percent) in terms of educational attainment. What’s more, the economist Raj Chetty has found that black women, though less likely to attend college than white women, are now more likely to attend college than white men from similar socioeconomic backgrounds. Along with more education has come more upward mobility. The Federal Reserve recently reported that over 60 percent of blacks at every level of educational attainment say they’re doing better financially than their parents—a higher percentage than either whites or Hispanics. And although black men still lag behind white men in terms of upward mobility, Chetty has found that black women now go on to earn slightly higher incomes than white women from similar socioeconomic backgrounds. All told, there is more than enough data with which to tell an optimistic story about the recent history of black America. However, the same data that justify this optimism can appear to justify pessimism if you look at it differently. Recall, for instance, the 72 percent drop in the incarceration rate for black men aged 18–19 from 2001 to 2017. Framed as such, it looks like progress. But here’s the same data framed differently: In 2001, black men aged 18–19 were nine times more likely to be behind bars than comparable white men. By 2017, they were twelve times more likely to be behind bars. Framed as such, it looks like regress. This particular framing effect is just one example in a larger pattern: The evidence against racial progress tends to compare black-white gaps today to black-white gaps in the past. Here, white metrics are used as benchmarks against which to measure black progress. By contrast, the evidence in favor of progress tends to compare black metrics today against black metrics in the past. White metrics do not enter the equation. Crucially, the same data can often be made to look like either progress or regress depending on which framework is chosen. The question of black progress, therefore, is less a matter of weighing the reality of progress against the reality of regress than it is a matter of looking at the same reality through two different lenses. Through one lens, progress means reducing the size of black-white racial gaps; let’s call this the gap-lens. But through another lens, progress means improving black outcomes relative to where they were in the past; let’s call this the past-lens. The rationale for choosing the gap-lens is this: if not for our racist history, the racial gaps we observe today would not exist. That history includes not only two and a half centuries of chattel slavery, but also the many and varied Jim Crow era policies, from school segregation to redlining, that prevented blacks from taking advantage of the American dream. To measure the width of a racial gap, this view holds, is to measure the depth of America’s failure to redress that history. What’s more, if we fail to close statistical gaps between blacks and whites, then we would be surrendering ourselves to live in a permanently racially-stratified society, a society in which—even if everyone were doing better than their parents—whites would hold more economic power than blacks in perpetuity. Though the rationale behind it is powerful, the gap-lens, taken to its logical end, borders on the absurd. Imagine we had a button that doubled the amount of everything good for each racial group and halved the rate of everything bad—so, black wealth doubles, white wealth doubles, black incarceration is halved, white incarceration is halved, and so on. As we pressed the button repeatedly, America would increasingly approach utopia. Yet the racial gaps—that is, the ratios between black and white outcomes—would remain unchanged. Therefore, viewed through the gap-lens, we will have made no progress at all. Indeed, any amount of black progress can become invisible when viewed through the gap-lens, given sufficient white progress. That’s a problem. A framework for progress that, under certain conditions, would not recognize the difference between our current world and a quasi-utopia seems, frankly, to miss the point of the word. The gap-lens also relies on the dubious presumption that white outcomes are the best benchmark against which to measure black outcomes. One reason this presumption fails is that the median white American is a full decade older than the median black American. Thus, comparing all blacks to all whites on any outcome that varies with age—for instance, incarceration or wealth—is comparing apples to oranges. More importantly, when we compare black outcomes to white outcomes and blame all of the gaps on institutional racism, we treat American society as if it were a simple 8th-grade science experiment: white people are treated as the “control group”; black people are treated as the “experimental group”; and the “independent variable,” applied only to blacks, is institutional racism. On this oversimplified paradigm, we could reasonably assume that all racial outcome gaps are caused by institutional racism. But reality is more complex. Black Americans and white Americans are unique groups of people with different histories, different demographics, and different sociological characteristics. Such confounding variables make it overly simplistic to pin all racial gaps on institutional racism. Despite such flaws, the gap-lens is the default lens through which many scholars and journalists view black America today. Whether it’s wealth, incarceration, or education, the habit of framing black metrics relative to white metrics is so deeply ingrained that it seems naïve to obsserve that we do not view other racial groups this way. Which is to say, when we ask whether white Americans have made progress, we compare whites not against some other group but against themselves at an earlier point in time. Why, then, do we treat the analysis of black America differently? For many, the answer lies in history. It makes sense to analyze black America with a unique lens precisely because black Americans trail a unique history of oppression. There is no way to acknowledge that ugly history, in this view, without looking directly at the gaps caused by it. I understand this rationale, and have some sympathy with it. However, it ignores the downsides associated with focusing on racial gaps. There is a spectrum of possible outcomes in multi-ethnic societies with violent, segregated conflict at one end, and peaceful, integrated cooperation at the other. Somewhere in between lies a circumstance, neither disastrous nor ideal, in which members of different racial groups are encouraged to measure themselves against one another, generating racial envy and resentment. Americans in general, and black Americans in particular, currently exist in such a circumstance. Yet because it is the water in which we swim, it is difficult to recognize that such racial tensions are not the inevitable consequence of living in a racially disparate society. It is easier to see the role played by the commentariat in generating racial tensions by looking at situations in which such tensions were absent. For example, in his essay, “The Politics of a Multiethnic Society,” the late Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer made the following observation about European immigrant groups in the American Northeast: If these groups had analyzed the statistics, they might have found much to grouse about. Since the Irish dominated electoral politics, all other groups were by that token “deprived.” Since the Jews were the most successful in terms of high occupational status, all the others were by that token “deprived.” Yet that is not the way the political debate went, and all the European ethnic groups believed they had done well in America, and there is scarcely a one that bears grievances. The key observation in Glazer’s analysis is not that these ethnic groups were successful (though they were), but that they believed they were successful. Implied in that observation is the idea that a group of people can be doing quite well but can nevertheless be made to believe the opposite—so long as they are habitually compared to other groups in the media. It’s a truism that a single person suffers when he measures himself by the yardstick of another, particularly when the other person had various advantages and head starts that he lacked. In a similar way, by forever measuring blacks against an improper yardstick, the gap-lens, though intended as a way of acknowledging the unique history of oppression blacks have endured, in effect punishes them twice for it. To be sure, there are circumstances in which it makes sense to define progress in terms of closing racial gaps. For instance, having political leaders who reflect the population in terms of race and ethnicity is, everything else held equal, good for the social fabric of a multi-ethnic society. To that end, I’m not arguing that we should abolish the use of the gap-lens in every case. I’m arguing that, in the great majority of cases, the past-lens yields a more useful picture of the state of black America. Which is to say, black progress can be understood independent of white progress and celebrated on its own terms. What do we gain by acknowledging progress? For one thing, ignorance of how much progress blacks have made in recent years leads many to mistakenly believe American institutions are so racist that nothing short of complete overhaul would suffice to repair them. The fact that those very same institutions have allowed for, if not ushered in, huge amounts of progress for black people in recent years suggests a more sober-minded approach. We should not burn the system down. We should reform it one increment at a time.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u>Data</u> proves—progress is occurring <u>AND</u> institutions aren’t immutable.</h4><p><u><strong>Hughes 19</u></strong>—(fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research). Hughes, Coleman. 2019. “<u><strong>The Case for Black Optimism</u></strong>.” The Quillette. September 28, 2019. https://quillette.com/2019/09/28/the-case-for-black-optimism/<u><strong>.</p><p>The narrative of doom and gloom</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>is misleading. </u></strong>Though it has gone largely unnoticed, <u><strong><mark>black Americans have been making rapid progress</mark> along most important dimensions of well-being since the turn of the millennium.</p><p>Let’s start with incarceration.</u></strong> Without doubt, there is plenty of reason to be pessimistic about the U.S. prison system. America incarcerates a larger proportion of its citizens than any nation on earth. Black Americans, at 13 percent of the U.S. population, made up one-third of the nation’s incarcerated population in 2017. To make matters worse, conditions inside many prisons are ill-suited for rehabilitation. Alabama’s state prisons, for instance, are so rife with violence and sexual assault that Trump’s Justice Department has charged them with violating the eighth amendment to the constitution, which bans “cruel and unusual punishments.”</p><p>Nevertheless, there are reasons to be optimistic. <u><strong>From 2001 to 2017, the <mark>incarceration </mark>rate <mark>for black men declined </mark>by 34 percent. </u></strong>Even this statistic, however, understates progress by lumping black Americans of all ages together. When you look at age-specific incarceration outcomes, you find two opposing trends: Older black Americans are doing slightly worse than previous generations, but younger black Americans are doing better—so much better that they more than offset, in statistical terms, the backslide of their elders. To put the speed and size of the trend in perspective, between my first day of Kindergarten in 2001 and my first legal drink in 2017, the incarceration rate for black men aged 25–29, 20–24, and 18–19 declined, respectively, by 56 percent, 60 percent, and 72 percent. <u><strong>For young black women, the story is similar: a 59 percent drop for those aged 25–29, a 43 percent drop for those aged 20–24, and a 69 percent drop for those aged 18–19.</p><p></u></strong>As a result of the divergent generational trendlines, the black prison population is not only shrinking; it’s aging too. In 2017, nearly three in ten black male prisoners were 45 years of age or older, up from one in ten in 2001. That may not seem like good news, but it is. The incarceration trendline for young blacks in the recent past predicts the trendline for all blacks in the near future. So the fact that the post-2001 incarceration decline for blacks in general was entirely caused by the plunging incarceration rate for young blacks in particular suggests that, as generational turnover occurs, the black prison population will not only continue to shrink, but will shrink at an accelerating rate. To paraphrase the economist Rick Nevin, our prison system may be overflowing today, but the “pipeline” to prison is already starting to run dry.</p><p>The great incarceration decline for black youth has been matched by a decline in teenage motherhood. Between 2001 and 2017, the birth rate for black women aged 15–19 declined by 63 percent. In fact, the black teenage birth rate in 2017 was lower than the white teenage rate as recently as 2002.</p><p>Nor has progress been confined to the younger generation. Between 1999 and 2015, <u><strong><mark>the mortality rate </mark>for black Americans aged 65 and over <mark>shrank</mark> by 29 percent <mark>for cancer, </mark>31 percent for<mark> diabetes, and </mark>43 percent for <mark>heart disease.</u></strong></mark> What’s more, all of those percentage drops were larger than the drops experienced by comparable whites over the same period. As deaths from disease have plummeted, black lives have extended. In 2017, black female life expectancy was 78.5 years, up from 75.1 years in 2000. Life expectancy for black men increased from 68.2 to 71.9 years over the same timespan.</p><p>Not only are black Americans healthier and longer-lived than they were two decades ago, they’re also more educated. <u><strong>Between the 1999–2000 and 2016–2017 school years</u></strong>, the number of <u><strong>black <mark>students who earned</mark> bachelor’s <mark>degrees increased</mark> by <mark>82 percent</mark>, from 108,018 to 196,300.</u></strong> Over the same period, <u><strong>the number of associate’s and master’s degrees awarded to black students more than doubled</u></strong>, rising from 60,208 to 129,874, and 36,606 to 89,577, respectively (population growth accounts for some, but not all or even most, of this growth). 2018 census data showed that 37 percent of black Americans aged 25–34 had some kind of college degree. If black America were its own country, that would place it in between Germany (31 percent) and Spain (43 percent) in terms of educational attainment. What’s more, the economist Raj Chetty has found that black women, though less likely to attend college than white women, are now more likely to attend college than white men from similar socioeconomic backgrounds.</p><p>Along with more education has come more upward mobility. The Federal Reserve recently reported that over <u><strong><mark>60 percent</mark> of blacks at every level of educational attainment <mark>say they’re </mark>doing <mark>better financially than their parents</mark>—a higher percentage than either whites or Hispanics. </u></strong>And although black men still lag behind white men in terms of upward mobility, Chetty has found that black women now go on to earn slightly higher incomes than white women from similar socioeconomic backgrounds.</p><p>All told, there is more than enough <u><strong>data</u></strong> with which to <u><strong>tell an optimistic story about the recent history of black America.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>However</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the same data</mark> that justify this optimism <mark>can</mark> <mark>appear to justify pessimism</mark> if you look at it differently.</u></strong> Recall, for instance, the 72 percent drop in the incarceration rate for black men aged 18–19 from 2001 to 2017. Framed as such, it looks like progress. But <u><strong>here’s the same data framed differently: In 2001, black men aged 18–19 were nine times more likely to be behind bars than comparable white men. </u></strong>By 2017, they were twelve times more likely to be behind bars. Framed as such, it looks like regress.</p><p>This particular framing effect is just one example in a larger pattern: The <u><strong>evidence against racial progress tends to compare black-white gaps today to black-white gaps in the past.</u></strong> Here, <u><strong>white metrics are used as benchmarks against which to measure black progress.</u></strong> By contrast, the evidence in favor of progress tends to compare black metrics today against black metrics in the past. White metrics do not enter the equation. Crucially, the same data can often be made to look like either progress or regress depending on which framework is chosen.</p><p><u><strong>The question of black progress</u></strong>, therefore, <u><strong>is</u></strong> less <u><strong>a matter of weighing the reality of progress against the reality of regress than it is a matter of looking at the same reality through two different lenses<mark>. </mark>Through <mark>one lens</mark>, progress means <mark>reducing </mark>the size of black-white <mark>racial gaps</mark>; </u></strong>let’s call this the gap-lens. But through another lens, progress means improving black outcomes relative to where they were in the past; let’s call this the past-lens.</p><p>The rationale for choosing the gap-lens is this: if not for our racist history, the racial gaps we observe today would not exist. That history includes not only two and a half centuries of chattel slavery, but also the many and varied Jim Crow era policies, from school segregation to redlining, that prevented blacks from taking advantage of the American dream. To measure the width of a racial gap, this view holds, is to measure the depth of America’s failure to redress that history. What’s more, if we fail to close statistical gaps between blacks and whites, then we would be surrendering ourselves to live in a permanently racially-stratified society, a society in which—even if everyone were doing better than their parents—whites would hold more economic power than blacks in perpetuity.</p><p><u><strong>Though the rationale behind it is powerful, the gap-lens, taken to its logical end, <mark>borders on the absurd. </mark>Imagine we had a button that doubled the amount of everything good for each racial group and halved the rate of everything bad—so, black wealth doubles, white wealth doubles, black incarceration is halved, white incarceration is halved, and so on. As we pressed the button repeatedly, America would increasingly approach utopia. Yet the racial gaps—that is, the ratios between black and white outcomes—would remain unchanged.</u></strong> Therefore, viewed through the gap-lens, we will have made no progress at all. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>any</mark> amount of <mark>black progress can be</u></strong></mark>come <u><strong><mark>invisible</mark> when viewed <mark>through the gap-lens, given sufficient white progress.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>That’s a problem</u></strong>. A framework for progress that, under certain conditions, would not recognize the difference between our current world and a quasi-utopia seems, frankly, to miss the point of the word.</p><p><u><strong>The gap-lens also relies on <mark>the dubious presumption that white outcomes are the best benchmark</mark> against which to measure black outcomes. </u></strong>One reason this presumption fails is that <u><strong><mark>the median white </mark>American <mark>is a </mark>full <mark>decade older than the median black American.</mark> Thus, comparing all blacks to all whites on any outcome that varies with age—for instance, incarceration or wealth—is comparing apples to oranges.</p><p></u></strong>More importantly, <u><strong>when we compare black outcomes to white outcomes</u></strong> and blame all of the gaps on institutional racism, <u><strong>we treat American society as if it were a simple 8th-grade science experiment: white people are treated as the “control group”; black people are treated as the “experimental group”; and the “independent variable,” applied only to blacks</u></strong>,<u><strong> is institutional racism.</u></strong> <u><strong>On this oversimplified paradigm, we could reasonably assume that all racial outcome gaps are caused by institutional racism. But reality is more complex.</u></strong> Black Americans and white Americans are unique groups of people with different histories, different demographics, and different sociological characteristics. Such <u><strong><mark>confounding variables make it overly simplistic</mark> to pin all racial gaps on institutional racism.</p><p>Despite such flaws, the gap-lens is the default lens through which many scholars and journalists view black America today.</u></strong> Whether it’s wealth, incarceration, or education, the habit of framing black metrics relative to white metrics is so deeply ingrained that it seems naïve to obsserve that we do not view other racial groups this way. Which is to say, when we ask whether white Americans have made progress, we compare whites not against some other group but against themselves at an earlier point in time. Why, then, do we treat the analysis of black America differently?</p><p>For many, the answer lies in history. It makes sense to analyze black America with a unique lens precisely because black Americans trail a unique history of oppression. There is no way to acknowledge that ugly history, in this view, without looking directly at the gaps caused by it.</p><p>I understand this rationale, and have some sympathy with it. However, it ignores the downsides associated with focusing on racial gaps. There is a spectrum of possible outcomes in multi-ethnic societies with violent, segregated conflict at one end, and peaceful, integrated cooperation at the other. Somewhere in between lies a circumstance, neither disastrous nor ideal, in which members of different racial groups are encouraged to measure themselves against one another, generating racial envy and resentment. Americans in general, and black Americans in particular, currently exist in such a circumstance. Yet because it is the water in which we swim, it is difficult to recognize that such <u><strong>racial tensions are not the inevitable consequence of living in a racially disparate society.</p><p></u></strong>It is easier to see the role played by the commentariat in generating racial tensions by looking at situations in which such tensions were absent. For example, in his essay, “The Politics of a Multiethnic Society,” the late Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer made the following observation about European immigrant groups in the American Northeast:</p><p>If these groups had analyzed the statistics, they might have found much to grouse about. Since the Irish dominated electoral politics, all other groups were by that token “deprived.” Since the Jews were the most successful in terms of high occupational status, all the others were by that token “deprived.” Yet that is not the way the political debate went, and all the European ethnic groups believed they had done well in America, and there is scarcely a one that bears grievances.</p><p>The key observation in Glazer’s analysis is not that these ethnic groups were successful (though they were), but that they believed they were successful. Implied in that observation is the idea that a group of people can be doing quite well but can nevertheless be made to believe the opposite—so long as they are habitually compared to other groups in the media. It’s a truism that a single person suffers when he measures himself by the yardstick of another, particularly when the other person had various advantages <u><strong>and head starts that he lacked. In a similar way, by forever measuring blacks against an improper yardstick, the gap-lens, though intended as a way of acknowledging the unique history of oppression blacks have endured, in effect punishes them twice for it.</p><p></u></strong>To be sure, there are circumstances in which it makes sense to define progress in terms of closing racial gaps. For instance, having political leaders who reflect the population in terms of race and ethnicity is, everything else held equal, good for the social fabric of a multi-ethnic society. To that end, <u><strong>I’m not arguing that we should abolish the use of the gap-lens in every case. I’m arguing that, in the great majority of cases, the past-lens yields a more useful picture of the state of black America.</u></strong> Which is to say, <u><strong><mark>black progress can be </mark>understood independent of white progress and <mark>celebrated</mark> on its own terms.</p><p></u></strong>What do we gain by acknowledging progress? For one thing, <u><strong><mark>ignorance</mark> of how much progress blacks have made in recent years <mark>leads many to mistakenly believe</mark> American <mark>institutions are so racist</mark> that <mark>nothing short of</mark> complete <mark>overhaul</mark> would <mark>suffice</mark> to repair them.</u></strong> The fact that <u><strong><mark>those</mark> very same <mark>institutions have</mark> </u></strong>allowed for, if not<u><strong> <mark>ushered in</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>huge </mark>amounts of <mark>progress </mark>for black people <mark>in recent years</mark> suggests a more sober-minded approach.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We should not burn the system down</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>We should reform it one increment at a time</u></strong>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133] fulltext: Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades. Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Primacy solves <u>every threat</u> – reject old defense that ignores the <u>convergence</u> of unstable alliances, rogue states, and the emergence of <u>great power competition</u> – decline causes <u>arms races</u> and <u>land grabs</u> that escalate </h4><p><strong>Brands 18</strong> [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]</p><p><u><strong>Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none</u></strong>. Since the Cold War, <u><strong><mark>America</mark> has <mark>committed to</mark> having</u></strong> <u><strong>overwhelming military <mark>primacy</mark>. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 </p><p></u></strong>From the early 1990s, for example, the <u><strong>United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and <mark>maintained</mark> peerless global <mark>power-projection</mark> capabilities</u></strong>.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. <u><strong>primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas <mark>strategic regions</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>Europe, East Asia, the Middle East</u></strong>. <u><strong>From thrashing Saddam</u></strong> Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military <u><strong>during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.</p><p></u></strong>This <u><strong><mark>military dominance</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>has constituted the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>hard-power backbone</mark> of an ambitious global strategy. </u></strong>After the Cold War, U.S.<u><strong> policymakers committed to <mark>averting</mark> a return to the <mark>unstable multipolarity</mark> of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order.</u></strong> <u><strong>They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to <mark>suppressing</mark> international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear <mark>proliferation</mark>, and catastrophic <mark>terrorism</mark>. </u></strong>And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, <u><strong>they understood the</u></strong> <u><strong>centrality</u></strong> <u><strong>of military preponderance. </p><p>Washington would need the <mark>military power</u></strong> <u><strong>necessary to underwrite</mark> worldwide <mark>alliance commitments</mark>. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch</u></strong> <u><strong>versus any potential</u></strong> <u><strong>great-power rival. </u></strong>It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, <u><strong>because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.</p><p>American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. </p><p></u></strong>Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, <u><strong>the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that <mark>if Washington cut back too far</mark>, its <mark>primacy would erode</mark> to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Alliances</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>would</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>lose credibility</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>stability</mark> of key regions would be <mark>eroded</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>rivals</mark> would be <mark>emboldened</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>international <mark>crises</mark> would <mark>go unaddressed</u></strong></mark>. American <u><strong>primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy</u></strong>. <u><strong>It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.</u></strong>9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more<u><strong> recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.</p><p></u></strong>THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for <u><strong>two decades <mark>after the Soviet collapse</mark>, the world was characterized by remarkably <mark>low levels of great-power competition</mark>, <mark>high</mark> levels of <mark>security</mark> in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power.</u></strong> During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, <u><strong>the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.</p><p></u></strong>First, <u><strong>great-power <mark>military competition is back</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The world’s two leading authoritarian powers</u></strong>—<u><strong><mark>China</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>are seeking</mark> regional <mark>hegemony</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions</u></strong>. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems<u><strong>, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria</u></strong>.10 <u><strong>China</u></strong>, meanwhile, <u><strong>has carried out a buildup of historic proportions,</u></strong> with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, <u><strong>these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial</u></strong> (<u><strong>A2/AD) tools</u></strong> <u><strong>necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf</u></strong>. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; <u><strong>Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. </p><p></u></strong>Second, the <u><strong>international outlaws are no longer so weak.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>North Korea’s</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing <mark>nuclear arsenal</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States</u></strong>.12 <u><strong><mark>Iran</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>remains a</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear threshold state,</u></strong> one <u><strong>that continues to <mark>develop</mark> ballistic <mark>missiles</mark> and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East</u></strong>. <u><strong>The Islamic State</u></strong>, for its part, <u><strong>is headed for defeat, but has displayed</u></strong> <u><strong>military capabilities unprecedented</u></strong> <u><strong>for any terrorist group,</u></strong> <u><strong>and shown that</u></strong> <u><strong>counterterrorism</u></strong> <u><strong>will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. </u></strong>Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but<u><strong> the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades.</p><p></u></strong>Third, <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>democratization of technology</u></strong> <u><strong>has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways</u></strong>. The spread of <u><strong>antisatellite</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>cyberwarfare</u></strong> <u><strong>capabilities</u></strong>; <u><strong>the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states</u></strong>. <u><strong>As such technologies</u></strong> “<u><strong>proliferate worldwide</u></strong>,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “<u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>technology</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>capability gaps</u></strong> <u><strong>between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast</u></strong>.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, <u><strong>fourth-generation systems</u></strong> (such as F-15s and F-16s) <u><strong>may provide decreasing utility</u></strong> <u><strong>against even non-great-power competitors</u></strong>, <u><strong>and far more fifth-generation <mark>capabilities</mark> may be <mark>needed to perpetuate American overmatch</u></strong>.</p></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Bryant 12 - R. Bryant, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Loyola University in Chicago, 2012 fulltext: (“Underpants Gnomes: A Critique of the Academic Left,” Larval Subjects—Levi R. Bryant’s philosophy blog, November 11th, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/) I must be in a mood today–half irritated, half amused–because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage–and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion–it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ [YouTube video omitted]¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ [YouTube video omitted]¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ? (Question Mark)¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary–it is–but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The 1AC focused on critiquing a <u>problem</u>, not on prescribing and explaining a <u>solution</u> – that precludes material changes towards their impacts</h4><p><strong>Bryant 12</strong> - R. Bryant, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Loyola University in Chicago, 2012 </p><p>(“Underpants Gnomes: A Critique of the Academic Left,” Larval Subjects—Levi R. Bryant’s philosophy blog, November 11th, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)</p><p>I must be in a mood today–half irritated, half amused–because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ <u><strong>What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right?</u></strong> At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage–and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion–it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, <u><strong><mark>the academic left falls prey to</mark> its own</u></strong> form of <u><strong><mark>abstraction. It’s good at</mark> carrying out <mark>critiques</mark> that denounce various social formations, <mark>yet very poor at</mark> <mark>proposing</mark> any sort of <mark>realistic</mark> constructions of <mark>alternatives</u></strong></mark>. This because <u><strong><mark>it thinks</mark> <mark>abstractly</mark> in its own way, <mark>ignoring</mark> how <mark>networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes</mark> of attraction <mark>would have to be remade to create a workable alternative</u></strong></mark>. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ [YouTube video omitted]¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ [YouTube video omitted]¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with <u><strong><mark>the</mark> academic left</u></strong>. Our <u><strong><mark>plan seems to be</mark> as follows:¶ <mark>Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique</mark>¶ <mark>Phase 2:</mark> ? (<mark>Question Mark</mark>)¶ <mark>Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!</mark>¶ Our problem is that <mark>we seem</mark> perpetually <mark>stuck at phase 1 without</mark> ever <mark>explaining</mark> what is to be done at <mark>phase 2</mark>. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques</u></strong> nonetheless. <u><strong>In order to reach phase 3, <mark>we have to produce new collectives</mark>. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet <mark>this is where everything begins to fall apart</u></strong></mark>. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us <u><strong>Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition</u></strong> (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). <u><strong>This type of <mark>“revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary</mark> and capitalist <mark>because they</mark> do more to <mark>drive people into</mark> the embrace of <mark>reigning ideology</mark> than to undermine reigning ideology. <mark>These</mark> are the <mark>people</mark> that <mark>keep Rush Limbaugh in business</mark>. Well done!</u></strong>¶<u> </u>But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. <u><strong>Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. <mark>We</mark> almost <mark>never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured</mark>, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and <mark>when we do</mark>, our critique-intoxicated <mark>cynics</mark> and skeptics immediately <mark>jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things </mark>contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and <mark>are doomed to fail. How</u></strong></mark>, I wonder, <u><strong><mark>are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals?</mark> We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc.</u></strong>, etc., etc.¶ <u><strong><mark>What are your proposals</mark>? How will you meet these problems? <mark>How will you navigate</mark> the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of <mark>infrastructure</mark>?</u></strong> Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? <u><strong><mark>Today we are </mark>so <mark>intellectually bankrupt on these points</mark> that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization</u></strong>. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. <u><strong>Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans?</u></strong> But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead <u><strong><mark>we’re</mark> like underpants gnomes, <mark>saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of</mark> just <mark>how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives</u></strong></mark>. Masturbation.¶ <u><strong>“Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. <mark>We need less critique</mark> not because critique isn’t important or necessary</u></strong>–it is–<u><strong>but <mark>because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe</mark>. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? <mark>What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. </mark>Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that</u></strong>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Sanderson and Cox ’21 — [Matthew R, Stan R; 17 May 2021; Social Scientist at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas; Research Scholar in Ecosphere Studies at The Land Institute in Salina, Kansas; Foreign Policy, “Big Agriculture Is Leading to Ecological Collapse,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/17/big-industrialized-agriculture-climate-change-earth-systems-ecological-collapse-policy/; Accessed 10 September 2021] fulltext: Today, there is more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere than at any point in the past 3.6 million years. On April 5, atmospheric carbon dioxide exceeded 420 parts per million—marking nearly the halfway point toward doubling the carbon dioxide levels measured prior to the Industrial Revolution, a mere 171 years ago. Even amid a pandemic-induced economic shutdown—during which global annual emissions dropped 7 percent—carbon dioxide and methane levels set records in 2020. The last time Earth held this much carbon dioxide in its atmosphere, sea levels were nearly 80 feet higher and the planet was 7 degrees Fahrenheit warmer. The catch: Homo sapiens did not yet exist. Change is in the air. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines announced climate change is “at the center of the country’s national security and foreign policy.” Business-as-usual is no longer a viable strategy as more institutions consider a future that will look and feel much different. In this context, it is striking to read a recent piece in Foreign Policy arguing “big agriculture is best.” “Big agriculture is best” cannot be an argument supported by empirical evidence. By now, it is vitally clear that Earth systems—the atmosphere, oceans, soils, and biosphere—are in various phases of collapse, putting nearly one-half of the world’s gross domestic product at risk and undermining the planet’s ability to support life. And big, industrialized agriculture—promoted by U.S. foreign and domestic policy—lies at the heart of the multiple connected crises we are confronting as a species. The litany of industrial agriculture’s toll is long and diverse. Consider the effects of industrial animal agriculture, for example. As of this writing, animal agriculture accounts for 14.5 percent of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions annually. It is also the source of 60 percent of all nitrous oxide and 50 percent of all methane emissions, which have 36 times and 298 times, respectively, the warming potential of carbon dioxide. As industrial animal agriculture has scaled up, agricultural emissions of methane and nitrous oxide have been going in one direction only: up. Efforts to scale industrial agriculture are undermining the planet’s capacity to support life at more local scales too. Consider Brazil, home to the Amazon Rainforest, which makes up 40 percent of all remaining rainforest and 25 percent of all terrestrial biodiversity on Earth. Forest loss and species extinctions have only increased as industrial agriculture has scaled up in Brazil. Farmers are burning unprecedented amounts of forest to expand their operations in pursuit of an industrial model. In August 2019, smoke blocked the sun in São Paulo, Brazil, 2,000 miles away from the fires in the state of Amazonas. In India, the pace of agricultural industrialization is hastening as indicated by rising agricultural production and declining employment in agriculture, which now accounts for less than one-half of India’s workforce. Agriculture has been scaled with all the tools of the Green Revolution: a high-input farming system comprised of genetically modified seeds and accompanying synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. As agriculture has industrialized in India, the use of pesticides and fertilizers has risen as well. Although it has become more difficult to breathe the air in Brazil, it has become harder to find clean freshwater in India, where pesticide contamination is rising. There, the costs of the industrial agriculture model are plainly ecological and human: Unable to drink the water or pay back the loans they took out to finance their transition to industrial farming, an alarming number of Indian farmers are drinking pesticides instead. Almost a quarter-million Indian farmers have died by suicide since 2000, and 10,281 farmers and farm laborers killed themselves in 2019 alone. In Punjab, the country’s breadbasket, environmental destruction coexists with a raging opioid epidemic ensnaring nearly two-thirds of households in the state. If the events in Brazil and India sound familiar to U.S. readers, it is because there are analogous stories in the United States—where industrial agriculture is rendering entire landscapes uninhabitable. The U.S. Corn Belt, which spans the region from Ohio to Nebraska, produces 75 percent of the country’s corn, but around 35 percent of the region has completely lost its topsoil. Industrial agriculture has been pursued with special zeal in Iowa, where there are 25 million hogs and 3 million people. There, water from the Raccoon River enters the state capital of Des Moines—home to 550,000 people—with nitrates, phosphorus, and bacteria that have exceeded federal safe water drinking standards. At a larger scale, nutrient runoff from industrial agriculture in the U.S. Midwest has created an annual dead zone—a hypoxic area low in or devoid of oxygen—that is the size of Massachusetts. The ecological consequences of industrial agriculture manifest alongside a growing human toll. Rural communities are experiencing rising suicide rates, especially among young people, along with increases in “deaths of despair” from alcohol and drugs—an expanding human dead zone. Although tragic, these outcomes are neither inevitable nor natural. They are outcomes of U.S. policy choices. Industrialized agriculture has been a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II era. Under the guise of development for all and the mantra of “feed the world,” the United States has used policy to dump surplus grain in low-income countries—undermining markets for smallholder farmers—and cultivate foreign markets as importers of high-input, industrial agriculture technologies to scale agriculture. At home, federal policy since the 1970s has explicitly promoted scaling industrial agriculture through the “get big or get out” imperative. Society did not arrive at this precipice because agriculture was too small or because industrialized agriculture respected the laws of physics. Instead, we are peering into an abyss of systemic socioecological collapse because every effort has been made to use industrialization to break through all known ecological and human limitations to scaling agriculture. Industrial agriculture simplifies ecosystems, rendering us more vulnerable to threats. Transformative policies will be required to pull us back from the edge. As a start, the United States could set an example for the Global North with a 50-year farm bill. The bill would promote ecosystem diversification and increased resilience by reducing acreage of annual grain crops from 70 percent to 10 percent or less of all cropland while scaling up perennial crops to 80 percent of farmland. The remaining 10 percent would be allocated to other crops, including a diverse array of locally produced vegetables and fruits. Soil and water-conserving perennial varieties of rice, wheat, legumes, and other food-grain crops—which are now being developed—could serve as components of diverse, perennial, multispecies communities of food crops that replicate how nature functions. The bill would promote a transition to smaller, more diverse farm operations as agricultural diversification will work most effectively not on vast, uniform acreages but as mosaics made up of many modest-sized farms. The bill would be an important step toward returning home as a species that once again lives within context—within limits, perennially. Our collective pursuit of “big is best” led us out of context to our peril. In the face of multiple cascading socioecological crises, Candide, published by the French writer Voltaire in 1759, shows us a way forward. Candide, the book’s protagonist, is mentored by Pangloss, a professor who holds a Leibnizian optimism about the world that justifies the status quo as being “all for the best” in the “best of all possible worlds.” At the end of Candide and Pangloss’s travels, which laid all forms of disaster on them, the two encounter an old farmer who is casually taking in the fresh air at his home. The farmer invites them into his house, where they eat and drink well. “You must have a vast and magnificent estate,” Candide said to the farmer. “I have only twenty acres,” replied the farmer. “I and my children cultivate them; our labor preserves us from three great evils—weariness, vice, and want.” Candide and the professor return to a small farm, and when the professor begins to philosophize again about how “all is for the best” in the “best of all possible worlds,” Candide responds, “All that is very well, but let us cultivate our garden.” As Candide stresses, it is vital to move away from abstract, monocultural arguments proposing business-as-usual as the best practice for all toward more practical work in more locally attuned, diversified agricultures that respect limits—both ecological and human. It is time to scale down agriculture and enhance our resilience to coming disruptions. The transitions will not be easy. We do not yet live in the best of all worlds, but things can be otherwise than as they are. We will need new agricultures and new policies to support them abroad and at home. Let us cultivate our gardens.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>US subsidy policy exports <u>industrial ag</u> globally, but the plan solves by facilitating a <u>global transition</u> to sustainability. </h4><p><strong>Sanderson and Cox ’21</strong> — [Matthew R, Stan R; 17 May 2021; Social Scientist at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas; Research Scholar in Ecosphere Studies at The Land Institute in Salina, Kansas; Foreign Policy, “Big Agriculture Is Leading to Ecological Collapse,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/17/big-industrialized-agriculture-climate-change-earth-systems-ecological-collapse-policy/<u><strong>; Accessed 10 September 2021]</p><p></u></strong>Today, <u>there is <strong>more carbon dioxide</strong> in the atmosphere than</u> at <u>any point in the past 3.6 million years</u>. On April 5, <u>atmospheric <mark>carbon dioxide exceeded <strong>420 p</strong></mark>arts <strong><mark>p</strong></mark>er <strong><mark>m</strong></mark>illion</u>—marking nearly the halfway point toward doubling the carbon dioxide levels measured prior to the Industrial Revolution, a mere 171 years ago. <u>Even amid</u> a pandemic-induced <u>economic shutdown</u>—during which global annual emissions dropped 7 percent—<u>carbon dioxide and methane levels set records in 2020</u>. The <u><mark>last time Earth held this</mark> much</u> carbon dioxide in its atmosphere, <u>sea levels were nearly 80 feet higher and the planet was 7 degrees Fahrenheit warmer.</u> The catch: <u><strong><mark>Homo sapiens did not</mark> yet <mark>exist</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Change is in the air. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines announced <u>climate change is</u> “at <u>the center of</u> the country’s <u>national security and foreign policy</u>.” <u>Business-as-usual is no longer</u> a<u> viable </u>strategy as more <u>institutions consider a future that will look</u> and feel much <u>different.</u> In this context, it is striking to read a recent piece in Foreign Policy arguing “big agriculture is best.”</p><p><u>“Big agriculture is best” cannot be</u> an argument <u>supported by empirical evidence.</u> By now, <u>it is</u> vitally <u>clear that Earth systems</u>—the atmosphere, oceans, soils, and biosphere—<u>are in</u> various <u>phases of collapse</u>, <u>putting</u> nearly one-<u>half of</u> the world’s <u><strong>g</strong>ross <strong>d</strong>omestic <strong>p</strong>roduct at risk and undermining the planet’s ability <strong>to support life</u></strong>. And <u>big</u>, <u><strong><mark>industrialized ag</mark>riculture</u></strong>—promoted by U.S. foreign and domestic policy—<u><mark>lies at the <strong>heart</strong> of</mark> the multiple <strong>connected <mark>crises</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>we are confronting as a species.</p><p></u></strong>The litany of <u>industrial agriculture’s toll is long and diverse.</u> Consider the effects of industrial animal agriculture, for example. As of this writing, <u><mark>animal ag</mark>riculture <mark>accounts for <strong>14.5 percent</strong> of</u></mark> total <u><mark>anthropogenic <strong>g</strong></mark>reen<strong><mark>h</strong></mark>ouse <strong><mark>g</strong></mark>as <strong><mark>emissions</strong></mark> annually.</u> It is also <u>the source of <mark>60 percent of</u></mark> all <u><strong><mark>nitrous oxide</strong></mark> and <mark>50</mark> percent <mark>of</u></mark> all <u><strong><mark>methane</strong></mark> emissions</u>, which have <u><mark>36</mark> times <mark>and 298 times</u></mark>, respectively, <u>the warming potential of <mark>carbon dioxide</mark>. <mark>As industrial</u></mark> animal <u><mark>ag</mark>riculture</u> has <u><strong><mark>scaled up</strong></mark>,</u> agricultural <u><mark>emissions</u></mark> of methane and nitrous oxide <u><mark>have been going</u></mark> in one direction only: <u><strong><mark>up.</p><p></strong></mark>Efforts to scale industrial agriculture are undermining</u> the planet’s capacity to support <u>life at</u> more <u><strong>local scales</u></strong> too. Consider <u>Brazil</u>, home to the Amazon Rainforest, which <u>makes up 40 percent of</u> all remaining <u>rainforest and 25 percent of</u> all <u>terrestrial biodiversity</u> on Earth. <u><strong><mark>Forest loss</strong> and <strong>species extinctions</u></strong></mark> have only <u><mark>increased as industrial ag</mark>riculture</u> has <u><mark>scaled up</mark> in Brazil. Farmers are burning unprecedented</u> amounts of <u>forest to expand</u> their operations in pursuit of <u>an industrial model.</u> In August 2019, <u>smoke blocked the sun in São Paulo</u>, Brazil<u>, 2,000 miles away from the fires in</u> the state of Amazonas.</p><p><u>In India</u>, the pace of <u>agricultural industrialization is hastening</u> as <u>indicated by rising agricultural production and <strong>declining employment</strong> in agriculture</u>, which now accounts for less than one-half of India’s workforce. Agriculture has been scaled with all the tools of the Green Revolution: a high-input farming system comprised of genetically modified seeds and accompanying synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. As agriculture has industrialized in India, <u>the <mark>use of <strong>pesticides</strong> and <strong>fertilizers</strong> has risen</u></mark> as well.</p><p>Although <u>it has become more difficult to breathe</u> the air <u>in Brazil</u>, <u>it has become harder to find clean freshwater in India</u>, where <u><strong>pesticide contamination is rising</u></strong>. There, the costs of the industrial agriculture model are plainly ecological and human: Unable to drink the water or pay back the loans they took out to finance their transition to industrial farming, <u>an alarming number of Indian farmers are drinking pesticides</u> instead. <u>Almost a <strong>quarter-million</strong> Indian farmers</u> have <u><strong>died by suicide</strong> since 2000</u>, and 10,281 farmers and farm laborers killed themselves in 2019 alone. <u>In Punjab</u>, the country’s breadbasket, <u>environmental <strong>destruction coexists</strong> with a raging opioid epidemic ensnaring nearly two-thirds of households</u> in<u> the state.</p><p></u>If the events in Brazil and India sound familiar to U.S. readers, it is because there are analogous stories in the United States—where industrial agriculture is rendering entire landscapes uninhabitable. <u><mark>The U.S. Corn Belt</u></mark>, which spans the region from Ohio to Nebraska, produces 75 percent of the country’s corn, but around 35 percent of the region <u>has completely <strong><mark>lost its topsoil.</u></strong></mark> Industrial agriculture has been pursued with special zeal in Iowa, where there are 25 million hogs and 3 million people. There, <u>water from the Raccoon River enters</u> the state capital of <u>Des Moines</u>—home to 550,000 people—<u>with nitrates, phosphorus, and bacteria that</u> have <u><strong>exceeded</strong> federal safe water drinking <strong>standards</strong>.</p><p></u>At a larger scale, <u>nutrient runoff</u> from industrial agriculture in the U.S. Midwest has <u>created an annual <strong>dead zone</u></strong>—a hypoxic area low in or devoid of oxygen—that is the size of Massachusetts. The ecological consequences of industrial agriculture manifest alongside a growing human toll. <u>Rural communities are experiencing </u>rising suicide rates, especially among young people, <u>along with increases in “deaths of despair”</u> from alcohol and drugs—an expanding human dead zone.</p><p>Although tragic, <u>these outcomes are neither inevitable nor natural. They are outcomes of <strong>U.S. policy choices.</u></strong> Industrialized agriculture has been a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II era. <u>Under the</u> guise of development for all and the <u><strong>mantra</strong> of “feed the world,” the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates</u> has <u>used policy to <strong>dump surplus grain</strong> in low-income countries—undermining</u> markets for <u>smallholder farmers</u>—<u>and</u> cultivate <u>foreign markets</u> as importers of high-input, industrial agriculture technologies to scale agriculture. At home, <u>federal policy since the</u> 19<u><strong>70s</u></strong> has <u>explicitly promoted <strong>scaling industrial agriculture</u></strong> through the “get big or get out” imperative.</p><p>Society did not arrive at this precipice because agriculture was too small or because industrialized agriculture respected the laws of physics. Instead, we are peering into an abyss of systemic socioecological collapse because every effort has been made to use industrialization to break through all known ecological and human limitations to scaling agriculture.</p><p><u>Industrial agriculture <strong>simplifies</strong> ecosystems</u>, <u>rendering us</u> more <u>vulnerable</u> to threats. <u><strong><mark>Transformative policies</strong> will be <strong>required</strong></mark> to pull us back from the edge</u>. As a start, <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>could <strong>set an example</u></strong></mark> for the Global North <u><mark>with a 50-year farm bill<strong></mark>.</p><p></strong>The bill would promote ecosystem <strong>diversification</strong> and</u> increased <u><strong>resilience</strong> by <mark>reducing acreage of annual grain crops from 70</u></mark> percent <u><mark>to 10 percent</mark> or less</u> of all cropland <u><mark>while scaling up perennial crops</mark> to 80 percent</u> of farmland. <u>The remaining</u> 10 percent <u>would be allocated to other crops</u>, including a diverse array of locally produced vegetables and fruits. <u><strong>Soil and water-conserving</strong> </u>perennial varieties of rice, wheat, legumes, and other food-grain crops—which are now being developed—<u>could serve</u> as components of diverse, perennial, multispecies <u>communities</u> of food crops that replicate how nature functions. <u><mark>The bill would promote</mark> a <strong>transition</strong> to <mark>smaller</u></mark>, more <u><strong><mark>diverse farm operations</u></strong></mark> as <u>agricultural diversification will work</u> most effectively not <u>on</u> vast, uniform acreages but as mosaics made up of <u><strong>many modest-sized farms.</p><p></u></strong>The bill would be an important step toward returning home as a species that once again lives within context—within limits, perennially. Our collective pursuit of “big is best” led us out of context to our peril.</p><p>In the face of multiple cascading socioecological crises, Candide, published by the French writer Voltaire in 1759, shows us a way forward. Candide, the book’s protagonist, is mentored by Pangloss, a professor who holds a Leibnizian optimism about the world that justifies the status quo as being “all for the best” in the “best of all possible worlds.”</p><p>At the end of Candide and Pangloss’s travels, which laid all forms of disaster on them, the two encounter an old farmer who is casually taking in the fresh air at his home. The farmer invites them into his house, where they eat and drink well. “You must have a vast and magnificent estate,” Candide said to the farmer. “I have only twenty acres,” replied the farmer. “I and my children cultivate them; our labor preserves us from three great evils—weariness, vice, and want.” Candide and the professor return to a small farm, and when the professor begins to philosophize again about how “all is for the best” in the “best of all possible worlds,” Candide responds, “All that is very well, but let us cultivate our garden.”</p><p>As Candide stresses, <u>it is <strong>vital</strong> to <strong>move away</strong> from</u> abstract, <u>monocultural</u> arguments proposing <u>business-as-usual</u> as the best <u>practice</u> for all toward more practical work in more locally attuned, diversified agricultures that respect limits—both ecological and human. <u>It is time to scale down agriculture and <strong>enhance our resilience</u></strong> to coming disruptions. The transitions will not be easy. We do not yet live in the best of all worlds, but things can be otherwise than as they are. <u><mark>We</mark> will <mark>need <strong>new ag</mark>ricultures</strong> and <strong>new <mark>policies</strong></mark> to support them <strong><mark>abroad and at home</mark>.</strong> </u>Let us cultivate our gardens.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Zanotti, 17—Associate Professor Department of Political Science, Virginia Tech (Laura, “Reorienting IR: Ontological Entanglement, Agency, and Ethics,” International Studies Review, January 13, 2017, dml) fulltext: In this article, I have argued that in order for IR to remain politically relevant and critical, we must rethink and reflect on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of the discipline. I then explored how onto-epistemologies, ethics, and political agency are interlinked. Ontologies of entanglement tend to embrace complex conceptualizations of causality and the morphogenetic properties of what exist. In a quantum world, ontological cuts happen in practices. This worldview invites a reconsideration of the way we justify and address political decisions and ethical action beyond the universalism supported by atomistic ontologies and the stifling limits imposed by substantialist-structuralism. As Nick Onuf has argued, “In a straightened world, as in a world in turmoil, talk of universal principles rings hollow… In such a world, positional ethics is the best we can hope for” (Onuf forthcoming, quoted with permission). A quantum reconceptualization of our being in the world and our relation to matter calls for a profound sense of modesty, as well as for the central role of responsibility for taking political decisions. In an entangled world that is not governed by theoretically detectable, linear, and immutable laws of history, but instead by intra-agential processes, the conditions of possibility for political agency are rooted in the morphogenetic properties of practices. Taking responsibility for critically questioning what exists without the hubris of assuming our ability to ordain outcomes displays an affinity with Foucault’s methodological and political project. In this vein, ethical guidelines may not be grounded on abstractions stemming from the solitary ruminations of an individual’s mind. Prudence, responsibility, and practices of cultivation of the self offer pathways to overcome the limitations of the Kantian categorical imperative by which universal prescriptions are the main way of validating ethical choices. As Patomäki has shown, universalism may elicit exclusionary and violent practices. Moreover, as Connolly has argued, the nostalgia for a slowly moving world regulated by linear relations of causality and characterized by certainty and stability may be the root of fundamentalism. Furthermore, if we accept Barad’s position that we are “of the world” and not above the world, theorizing looks more like a practice endowed with performative political effects than a quest for the discovery of the “true nature” of what exists. Therefore, intellectual undertakings are a form of political agency and come with great responsibility. Such responsibility requires the need for exercising prudence in making truth statements about what is universally good or naturally inevitable. Assumptions about linearity of causal relations, universal laws of history, or ontological properties of entities yield two problematic effects. On the one hand, they may stifle political imagination; on the other hand, they could encourage actions based upon abstract prescriptions rather than upon careful diagnosis of the forces that obtain in the situation at hand. In an entangled world, there are no externalities. Arguments that divert responsibility by basing political choices upon abstract principles or aspirations and, as a result, that treat what happens on the ground as “unintended consequences” or “collateral damage,” are ethically thin and politically dangerous. In fact, unintended consequences may well be the result of irresponsible political decision-making that does not include a competent assessment of the practical configurations that constitute the context of action and the means necessary to achieve stated goals. Such attitudes, Amoureux and Steele (2014) have suggested, have led to disastrous initiatives, such as the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. Likewise, Kennedy (2006) has shown that the bland rhetoric of jus in bello that provides standardized criteria regarding the number of acceptable civilian casualties (conveniently called collateral damage) produces the effect of diverting responsibility from those who conduct war while assuaging their consciences concerning the injuries and deaths their choices are inflicting. Kennedy (2004) has also shown that as a result of the preference for universal normativity, the human rights profession (which he calls “the invisible college”) is more concerned with protecting abstract norms than with acting politically so as to devise viable solutions to specific problems. Universal norms and bureaucratic routines play a major role in prescribing and justifying UN peacekeeping interventions. As Jean Marie Guehénno argued more than a decade ago, strategies of international intervention based upon assumptions of causal linearity and invariance may amount to hubris. Norms and rules can also offer grounds for appeasement. The massacres that occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s provide examples of how, by uncritically following institutionalized rules, United Nations peacekeepers permitted atrocities. UN employees are not cold-blooded monsters or extremely callous individuals. They follow norms and rules, key examples of which include the principle of “impartiality,” Security Council mandates, and “rules of engagement.” By doing so, however, they have often fallen short of considering the possible consequences of decisions in specific situations. The United Nations’ failure to take action to prevent the Rwanda and Srebrenica genocide testifies to the fact that following universal norms (i.e., the imperative to preserve impartiality) and bureaucratic reasoning (i.e., the rules of engagement prescribing not to intervene to disarm any party of the conflict) set the stage for avoiding a careful assessment of what was at stake on the eve of the massacres. These ways of reasoning also appeased consciences for not making decisions accountable to the people in danger (Zanotti 2014). Significantly, the lack of prudence that derives from broad overgeneralizations and reliance on abstractions, rather than careful consideration of what the case demands, threatens more self-defeating outcomes in peacekeeping and international politics. This is why a careful reflection of the ways our political choices are validated ontologically and epistemologically is of paramount practical importance. Seven decades ago, Carr (1946) advocated the need for conceptualizing political agency and ethics in a way that addresses both the limits of the idealist illusion regarding the possibility to transform reality through acts of will as well as the realist persuasion about the inescapable subordination of actors to external conditions. Both of these positions, Carr pointed out, lead to self-defeating outcomes and stifle political imagination because they focus on general abstractions, failing to take into consideration what conditions and political opportunity actually obtain in specific historical configurations. Here I have proposed that an ontology of entanglement fosters an ethic of engagement and activism along the lines suggested by Foucault and opens up possibilities for political action. In this ontological horizon, what qualifies as meaningful agency is not stifled by the structuralist commitment to the stabilizing effects of structures (like in Waltz’s) or by the inescapable features of an oppressive and alienating social order that dispossess subjects of their humanity and reduces them to “bare life” (as in Agamben). Instead, micropolitical interventions, parrēsia, and the cultivation of a particular kind of character, while not revolutionizing the status quo, may be relevant to triggering social change. Importantly, ontologies of entanglement also raise the bar for adjudicating the ethical validity of political choices. Radical assumption of responsibility drastically limits what is acceptable as “unintended consequences.” This is important for the way international organizations make decisions regarding international peacekeeping interventions and for the way politicians decide to wage war. Ethically and politically sound decision-making cannot be based mainly upon the apodictic recognition of universal rules of behavior, abstract aspirations, or overarching theories of the functioning of society. They must also include careful analysis of how clusters of causes may generate effects in the specific contexts at hand and take responsibility for the ontological cuts our initiatives operate and for the morphogenetic processes they may set off.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Consequentialism is key to political efficacy— this is disctinct from util -- refusing to assume responsibility for their starting point ensures political <u>disaster</h4><p></u><strong>Zanotti, 17</strong>—Associate Professor Department of Political Science, Virginia Tech (Laura, “Reorienting IR: Ontological Entanglement, Agency, and Ethics,” International Studies Review, January 13, 2017, dml)</p><p>In this article, I have argued that in order for IR to remain politically relevant and critical, we must rethink and reflect on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of the discipline. I then explored how <u><mark>onto-epistemologies, ethics, and political agency are <strong>interlinked</u></strong></mark>. Ontologies of entanglement tend to embrace complex conceptualizations of causality and the morphogenetic properties of what exist. In a quantum world, ontological cuts happen in practices. <u>This</u> worldview <u>invites a <strong>reconsideration</strong> of the way we <strong>justify</u></strong> and address <u><strong>political decisions</strong> and <strong>ethical action</strong> beyond the <strong>universalism</strong> supported by atomistic ontologies and the <strong>stifling limits</strong> imposed by substantialist-structuralism</u>. As Nick Onuf has argued, “In a straightened world, as <u>in a world in turmoil, talk of universal principles <strong>rings hollow</u></strong>… <u>In such a world, positional ethics is the <strong>best we can hope for</strong>” (Onuf forthcoming, quoted with permission).</p><p>A quantum reconceptualization of our being in the world and our relation to matter calls for a <strong>profound sense of modesty</strong>, as well as for the <strong>central role of responsibility</strong> for taking political decisions. <mark>In an entangled world</mark> that is <strong><mark>not governed</strong> by <strong>theoretically detectable</strong>, <strong>linear</strong>, and <strong>immutable laws</strong></mark> of history, but instead by <strong>intra-agential processes</strong>, the conditions of possibility for <mark>political agency are rooted in</u></mark> the morphogenetic properties of <u><strong><mark>practices</u></strong></mark>. Taking responsibility for critically questioning what exists without the hubris of assuming our ability to ordain outcomes displays an affinity with Foucault’s methodological and political project. In this vein, <u><mark>ethical guidelines <strong>may not be grounded on abstractions</strong> stemming from the solitary ruminations of an individual’s mind</u></mark>. <u>Prudence, responsibility</u>, and practices of cultivation of the self <u>offer pathways to <strong>overcome the limitations</strong> of </u>the Kantian categorical imperative by which <u><strong>universal prescriptions</u></strong> are the main way of validating ethical choices. As Patomäki has shown, <u>universalism may elicit <strong>exclusionary</strong> and <strong>violent practices</u></strong>. Moreover, as Connolly has argued, <u>the nostalgia for a slowly moving world regulated by <strong>linear relations of causality</strong> and characterized by <strong>certainty</strong> and <strong>stability</strong> may be the <strong>root of fundamentalism</strong>.</p><p></u>Furthermore, <u>if we accept</u> Barad’s position <u>that we are “<strong>of the world</strong>” and not <strong>above the world</strong>, theorizing looks more like a practice endowed with <strong>performative political effects</strong> than a <strong>quest</strong> for the discovery of the “<strong>true nature</strong>” of what exists</u>. Therefore, <u><mark>intellectual undertakings are a <strong>form of political agency</strong> and come with <strong>great responsibility</strong>.</mark> Such responsibility <strong><mark>requires</strong></mark> <mark>the need for <strong>exercising prudence</strong> in making truth statements about what is <strong>universally good</strong> or <strong>naturally inevitable</strong>.</mark> Assumptions about</u> linearity of causal relations, <u><strong><mark>universal</u></strong></mark> laws of history, or <u><strong><mark>ontological properties</u></strong></mark> of entities <u><mark>yield</u></mark> two <u><strong><mark>problematic effects</strong>.</mark> On the one hand, they may <strong>stifle political imagination</strong>; on the other hand, they could encourage actions based upon <strong>abstract prescriptions</strong> rather than upon <strong>careful diagnosis</strong> of the forces that obtain in the situation at hand. In an entangled world, <strong>there are no externalities</strong>. <mark>Arguments that <strong>divert responsibility</strong> by basing political choices upon <strong>abstract principles</strong> or <strong>aspirations</strong></mark> and</u>, as a result, <u>that <mark>treat <strong>what happens on the ground</strong> as “<strong>unintended consequences</strong>” or “<strong>collateral damage</strong>,” are <strong>ethically thin</strong> and <strong>politically dangerous</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>In fact, <u><strong>unintended consequences</strong> may well be the result of <strong>irresponsible political decision-making</strong> that does not include a <strong>competent assessment</strong> of the <strong>practical configurations</strong> that constitute the <strong>context of action</strong> and the <strong>means necessary</strong> to achieve stated goals. Such <mark>attitudes</u></mark>, Amoureux and Steele (2014) have suggested, <u>have <mark>led to</mark> <strong>disastrous initiatives</strong>, such as the <strong>Bush administration’s <mark>invasion of Iraq</u></strong></mark>. Likewise, Kennedy (2006) has shown that <u>the</u> bland <u>rhetoric</u> of jus in bello that provides standardized criteria regarding the number of acceptable civilian casualties (conveniently called collateral damage) <u>produces the effect of <strong>diverting responsibility</strong> from those who conduct war while <strong>assuaging their consciences</strong> concerning the injuries and deaths their choices are inflicting</u>. Kennedy (2004) has also shown that <u>as a result of the preference for <strong>universal normativity</strong>, the</u> human rights <u>profession</u> (which he calls “the invisible college”) <u>is more concerned with <strong>protecting abstract norms</strong> than with <strong>acting politically</strong> so as to <strong>devise viable solutions</strong> to <strong>specific problems</strong>.</p><p></u>Universal norms and bureaucratic routines play a major role in prescribing and justifying UN peacekeeping interventions. As Jean Marie Guehénno argued more than a decade ago, strategies of international intervention based upon assumptions of causal linearity and invariance may amount to hubris. Norms and rules can also offer grounds for appeasement. The massacres that occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s provide examples of how, by uncritically following institutionalized rules, United Nations peacekeepers permitted atrocities. UN employees are not cold-blooded monsters or extremely callous individuals. They follow norms and rules, key examples of which include the principle of “impartiality,” Security Council mandates, and “rules of engagement.” By doing so, however, they have often fallen short of considering the possible consequences of decisions in specific situations. The United Nations’ failure to take action to prevent the Rwanda and Srebrenica genocide testifies to the fact that following universal norms (i.e., the imperative to preserve impartiality) and bureaucratic reasoning (i.e., the rules of engagement prescribing not to intervene to disarm any party of the conflict) set the stage for avoiding a careful assessment of what was at stake on the eve of the massacres. These ways of reasoning also appeased consciences for not making decisions accountable to the people in danger (Zanotti 2014).</p><p>Significantly, <u>the <strong>lack of prudence</strong> that derives from <strong>broad overgeneralizations</strong> and <strong><mark>reliance on abstractions</strong>, <strong>rather</strong> than <strong>careful consideration</strong> of <strong>what the case demands</strong>, threatens <strong>more self-defeating outcomes</strong> in peacekeeping and international politics</mark>. This is why a <strong>careful reflection</strong> of the ways our political choices are <strong>validated ontologically</strong> and <strong>epistemologically</strong> is of <strong>paramount practical importance</u></strong>. Seven decades ago, Carr (1946) advocated the need for conceptualizing political agency and ethics in a way that addresses both the limits of the idealist illusion regarding the possibility to transform reality through acts of will as well as the realist persuasion about the inescapable subordination of actors to external conditions. Both of <u><mark>these positions</u></mark>, Carr pointed out, <u><mark>lead to <strong>self-defeating outcomes</strong></mark> and <strong>stifle political imagination</strong> because they <strong>focus on general abstractions</strong>, <strong>faili<mark>ng</strong> to take into consideration what conditions and political opportunity <strong>actually obtain</strong> in <strong>specific historical configurations</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>Here I have proposed that <u><mark>an ontology of entanglement fosters an <strong>ethic of engagement</strong> and <strong>activism</u></strong></mark> along the lines suggested by Foucault and opens up possibilities for political action. In this ontological horizon, <u>what qualifies as meaningful agency is <strong>not stifled</strong> by</u> the structuralist commitment to the stabilizing effects of structures (like in Waltz’s) or by <u>the <strong>inescapable features</strong> of an <strong>oppressive</strong> and <strong>alienating social order</strong> that <strong>dispossess subjects of their humanity</strong> and <strong>reduces them to “bare life”</u></strong> (as in Agamben). Instead, <u><mark>micropolitical interventions</u></mark>, parrēsia, and the cultivation of a particular kind of character, <u><strong>while not revolutionizing the status quo</strong>, <mark>may be relevant to <strong>triggering social change</u></strong></mark>. Importantly, <u>ontologies of entanglement also <strong>raise the bar</strong> for <strong>adjudicating</strong> the <strong>ethical validity of political choices</strong>. <mark>Radical assumption of responsibility <strong>drastically limits what is acceptable</strong> as “<strong>unintended consequences</strong></mark>.” This is <strong>important</strong> for</u> the way international organizations make decisions regarding international peacekeeping interventions and for <u><strong>the way politicians decide to wage war</strong>. <strong><mark>Ethically</strong> and <strong>politically sound</strong> decision-making</mark> <strong>cannot</strong> be based mainly upon</u> the apodictic recognition of universal rules of behavior, <u><strong>abstract aspirations</strong>, or <strong>overarching theories</strong> of the functioning of society. They <mark>must</mark> also <mark>include <strong>careful analysis</strong> of how</u></mark> clusters of <u><mark>causes</mark> may <strong><mark>generate effects</strong> in the <strong>specific contexts</strong> at hand and <strong>take responsibility</strong> for</u></mark> the ontological cuts <u>our <mark>initiatives</u></mark> operate <u><mark>and</mark> for the</u> morphogenetic <u><mark>processes they may set off</mark>.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Bessler ‘16 (John, Associate Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law , “The Inequality of America's Death Penalty: A Crossroads for Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 487, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/22/) fulltext: But in this second decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Supreme Court now finds itself at a crossroads as regards the punishment of death. It can let it continue, or it can say no more--no more will the United States of America engage in state-sanctioned killing. "The most profound consequence of the Court's failure to address the issue of race in its capital jurisprudence," the Steikers aptly note, "is that the unjust influence of race in the capital punishment process continues unchecked." 292 As they explain in their book: More broadly, the Court's failure to address forthrightly the death penalty's racialized history and current practice has disserved the Court in its role as chronicler of history and social and political practices. Had the Court framed its constitutional regulation of capital punishment against the backdrop of antebellum codes, lynchings, mob-dominated trials, and disparate enforcement patterns, the Court would have done a much better job of explaining why the American death penalty deserved the sustained attention of the American judiciary. This would have been true even if the Court ultimately had framed its doctrines in nonracial terms. 293 VI. Conclusion The death penalty's racial and gender bias is clear. 294 Congressman John Conyers once took note of the "gender [566] discrimination" associated with capital sentencing, 295 and Professor Elizabeth Rapaport--a law professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law--has written of the "chivalrous disinclination to sentence women to die." While articulating her "chivalry" theory, she simultaneously posits an "evil woman" hypothesis to explain "the gender stereotyping that has historically dehumanized despised female murderers" and resulted in their execution when they violate "sex role expectations" (e.g., by killing their children or husbands). 296 The Washington, D.C.-based Death Penalty Information Center, documenting the racial prejudice in the death penalty's administration, also cites study after study showing that killers of whites are much more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of blacks. In the modern era, the statistics for those [567] executed for interracial homicides are particularly telling. While 20 people have been executed for interracial homicides involving a white defendant and a black victim, an exponentially higher number of people--282--have been executed where the defendant was black and the victim was white. 297 Such discrimination calls for a remedy, and in the case of the death penalty, the only remedy that will suffice is the death penalty's abolition. In "Matters of Strata," Professor Goldfarb emphasizes that "when race, gender, and class play an explanatory role in decisions about who receives a death sentence, under the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence those decisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment." 298 And her perceptive essay, in tracing Joseph Giarratano's case and the ideologies and long history of discrimination undergirding the death penalty that "undermine" its legitimacy, 299 makes clear that, as a society, we need "to find other approaches." 300 Just as the U.S. Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 301 held in the 1940s that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants attempting to bar minorities from ownership or occupancy of real property violated due process and equal protection principles, a wholly arbitrary and discriminatory death penalty regime--one still in place in the twenty-first century--should not be tolerated. 302 A government [568] should not involve itself with such a cruel and torturous punishment--one that, throughout American history, has been imbibed with racial discrimination, gender inequities, malice and hatred, and lottery-like arbitrariness. 303 In their 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 304 Justice Stephen Breyer--joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg--called for a "full briefing" on whether capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment and concluded that it is "highly likely" that it does. 305 In a subsequent speech in Chicago, Illinois, Justice Ginsburg--in talking about their dissenting opinion in Glossip--specifically highlighted the death penalty's arbitrariness, telling her audience: "Factors that should not affect imposition of the death penalty, studies documented, often do, prime among those factors, race and geography." 306 "Ultimately," she said, "the considerations Justice Breyer discussed at length may bring us back to the years 1972-76, when no executions took place in the United States." 307 Already, the American death penalty is actively [569] used in only a small fraction of U.S. counties. 308 As Emily Bazelon wrote for the New York Times Magazine in 2016: "A new geography of capital punishment is taking shape, with just 2 percent of the nation's counties now accounting for a majority of the people sitting on death row." 309 In State v. Santiago, 310 the Connecticut Supreme Court declared that state's death penalty unconstitutional. In doing so, it held that "the eighth amendment is offended not only by the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, but also by the greater evils of racial discrimination and other forms of pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed." 311 As that court emphasized: "Unfortunately, numerous studies have found that '[e]rrors can and have been made repeatedly in the trial of death penalty cases because of poor representation, racial prejudice, prosecutorial misconduct, or simply the presentation of erroneous evidence.'" 312 "A study of all death sentences in the United States in the two decades following Furman," it pointed out, "found 'extremely high error rates' . . . ; with at least two thirds of capital sentences eventually overturned on appeal." 313 "Statistical analyses studies," it added, "have demonstrated to a near certainty that innocent Americans have been and will continue to be executed in the post-Furman era." 314 As the court concluded after compiling all of the evidence: "To the extent that the ultimate punishment is imposed on an offender on the basis [570] of impermissible considerations such as his, or his victim's, race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status, rather than the severity of his crime, his execution does not restore but, rather, tarnishes the moral order." 315 Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court will soon follow suit, looking to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Connecticut and other judicial systems around the world that have already outlawed the punishment of death. Way back in 1995, South Africa's Constitutional Court--in the wake of apartheid's demise--declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional as a "cruel, inhuman or degrading" punishment. 316 Ironically, the President of the Court, Arthur Chaskalson, in writing for South [571] Africa's highest court, looked to the reasoning of an American case--Furman v. Georgia--to support the propositions that "[a]t every stage of the process there is an element of chance" and that "poverty, race and chance play roles in the outcome of capital cases and in the final decision as to who should live and who should die." 317 If the present-day U.S. Supreme Court would only return to its own roots--Furman's denunciation of the death penalty as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 318 --the American legal system could finally uproot a barbaric, discriminatory practice rooted in the Dark Ages and the institution of slavery.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Only a<u> complete abolishment </u>of the death penalty can remedy the state’s <u>racist murder</u> of innocents</h4><p><strong>Bessler ‘16</strong> (John, Associate Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law , “The Inequality of America's Death Penalty: A Crossroads for Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 487, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/22/)</p><p>But in this second decade of the twenty-first century, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> U.S. Supreme <u><strong><mark>Court</u></strong></mark> now finds itself at a crossroads as regards the punishment of death. It can let it continue, or it <u><strong><mark>can say</u></strong></mark> no more--<u><strong><mark>no more</mark> will</u></strong> the United States of <u><strong>America engage in <mark>state-sanctioned killing</u></strong></mark>. <u>"The most profound consequence of the Court's failure to address the issue of race in its capital jurisprudence,"</u> the Steikers aptly note, <u>"is that <strong><mark>the unjust influence of race in</mark> the <mark>capital punishment</mark> process <mark>continues unchecked</mark>."</u></strong> 292 As they explain in their book: More broadly, <u><mark>the Court's failure to address</mark> forthrightly <mark>the</mark> death penalty's <mark>racialized history and current practice has disserved the Court in its role as chronicler of history and social and political practices</u></mark>. Had the Court framed its constitutional regulation of capital punishment against the backdrop of antebellum codes, lynchings, mob-dominated trials, and disparate enforcement patterns, the Court would have done a much better job of explaining why the American death penalty deserved the sustained attention of the American judiciary. This would have been true even if the Court ultimately had framed its doctrines in nonracial terms. 293 VI. Conclusion The death penalty's racial and gender bias is clear. 294 Congressman John Conyers once took note of the "gender [566] discrimination" associated with capital sentencing, 295 and Professor Elizabeth Rapaport--a law professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law--has written of the "chivalrous disinclination to sentence women to die." While articulating her "chivalry" theory, she simultaneously posits an "evil woman" hypothesis to explain "the gender stereotyping that has historically dehumanized despised female murderers" and resulted in their execution when they violate "sex role expectations" (e.g., by killing their children or husbands). 296 <u>The</u> Washington, D.C.-based <u>Death Penalty Information Center, documenting the racial prejudice in the death penalty's administration</u>, also <u>cites <strong><mark>study after study show</mark>ing <mark>that killers of whites are</mark> much <mark>more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of blacks</u></strong></mark>. In the modern era, the statistics for those [567] executed for interracial homicides are particularly telling. <u>While <mark>20 people have been executed for interracial homicides involving a white defendant and a black victim</mark>, an exponentially higher number of people--<mark>282--have been executed where the defendant was black and the victim was white</mark>.</u> 297 <u><strong><mark>Such discrimination calls for a remedy</mark>, and</u></strong> in the case of the death penalty, <u><strong><mark>the only remedy that will suffice is the death penalty's abolition</mark>.</u></strong> In "Matters of Strata," <u>Professor Goldfarb emphasizes that "when race, gender, and class play an explanatory role in decisions about who receives a death sentence, under the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence those decisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment."</u> 298 And her perceptive essay, in tracing Joseph Giarratano's case and the ideologies and long history of discrimination undergirding the death penalty that "undermine" its legitimacy, 299 makes clear that, <u>as a society, we need "to find other approaches."</u> 300 Just as the U.S. Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 301 held in the 1940s that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants attempting to bar minorities from ownership or occupancy of real property violated due process and equal protection principles, <u>a wholly arbitrary and discriminatory death penalty regime</u>--one still in place in the twenty-first century--<u>should not be tolerated</u>. 302 A <u><strong><mark>government</u></strong></mark> [568] <u><strong><mark>should not involve itself with such a cruel and torturous punishment</mark>--one that, throughout American history, has been imbibed with racial discrimination, gender inequities, malice and hatred, and lottery-like arbitrariness</u></strong>. 303 In their 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 304 Justice Stephen Breyer--joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg--called for a "full briefing" on whether capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment and concluded that it is "highly likely" that it does. 305 In a subsequent speech in Chicago, Illinois, Justice Ginsburg--in talking about their dissenting opinion in Glossip--specifically highlighted the death penalty's arbitrariness, telling her audience: "Factors that should not affect imposition of the death penalty, studies documented, often do, prime among those factors, race and geography." 306 "Ultimately," she said, "the considerations Justice Breyer discussed at length may bring us back to the years 1972-76, when no executions took place in the United States." 307 Already, the American death penalty is actively [569] used in only a small fraction of U.S. counties. 308 As Emily Bazelon wrote for the New York Times Magazine in 2016: "A new geography of capital punishment is taking shape, with just 2 percent of the nation's counties now accounting for a majority of the people sitting on death row." 309 In State v. Santiago, 310 <u>the Connecticut Supreme Court declared that state's death penalty unconstitutional</u>. In doing so, it held that "the eighth amendment is offended not only by the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, but also by the greater evils of racial discrimination and other forms of pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed." 311 As that court emphasized: "Unfortunately, numerous studies have found that '[e]rrors can and have been made repeatedly in the trial of death penalty cases because of poor representation, racial prejudice, prosecutorial misconduct, or simply the presentation of erroneous evidence.'" 312 <u><strong>"<mark>A study of all death sentences in the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>in the</mark> two <mark>decades following Furman</u></strong></mark>," it pointed out, <u><strong>"<mark>found 'extremely high error rates'</mark> . . . ; <mark>with at least two thirds of capital sentences eventually overturned on appeal</mark>."</u></strong> 313 <u>"Statistical analyses studies,"</u> it added, <u>"have demonstrated to <strong>a near certainty that innocent Americans have been and will continue to be executed in the post-Furman era."</u></strong> 314 <u>As <mark>the court concluded</mark> after compiling all of the evidence: "To the extent <mark>that the</mark> ultimate <mark>punishment is imposed on an offender on the basis</u></mark> [570] <u>of impermissible considerations such as his, or his <mark>victim's, race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status, rather than the severity of his crime, his execution does not restore but, rather, tarnishes the moral order</mark>."</u> 315 <u><strong><mark>Hopefully, the</u></strong></mark> U.S. <u><strong><mark>Supreme Court will soon follow suit, looking to</u></strong></mark> the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of <u><strong><mark>Connecticut and other</mark> judicial <mark>systems</mark> around the world <mark>that have</mark> already <mark>outlawed the punishment of death</mark>.</u></strong> Way back <u>in 1995, South Africa's Constitutional Court--in the wake of apartheid's demise--declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional as a "cruel, inhuman or degrading" punishment.</u> 316 <u>Ironically, the President of the Court</u>, Arthur Chaskalson, in writing for South [571] Africa's highest court, <u>looked to the reasoning of</u> an American case--<u>Furman</u> v. Georgia--<u>to support the propositions that "[a]t every stage of the process there is an element of chance" and that "poverty, race and chance play roles in the outcome of capital cases and in the final decision as to who should live and who should die."</u> 317 <u><strong>If the</u></strong> present-day U.S. Supreme <u><strong>Court would only return to its own roots--Furman's denunciation of the death penalty as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments</u></strong> 318 --<u><strong>the American legal system could finally uproot a barbaric, discriminatory practice rooted in the Dark Ages and the institution of slavery.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Roberto Piergentili 21, Institute of Molecular Biology and Pathology, Italian National Research Council, 2021 “CRISPR-Cas and Its Wide-Ranging Applications: From Human Genome Editing to Environmental Implications, Technical Limitations, Hazards and Bioethical Issues,” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8143109/ fulltext: If embryos are to be ascribed personhood status, then they are entitled to have their inalienable human rights upheld. If, on the other hand, they are deemed as something in between, i.e., less than human beings but more than mere pools of cells, what moral rights should they have acknowledged, if any? Certainly, some point out that the first experiments using CRISPR to edit human embryos occurred in 2015, and since then, only few teams around the world have focused on the process and its potential [85], but recent studies have highlighted an underappreciated risk of CRISPR–Cas9 editing: if embryos are deemed to have the right to at least some degree of legal safeguards, such safety concerns are likely to significantly inform the ongoing debate on the matter. In light of such major unsolved controversies, some have called for an international moratorium on all embryo editing [88,89], and some countries, including Canada, already have policies that ban human-embryo gene editing, irrespective of whether or not the edited embryo would be meant for implantation [90]. In the United States and Britain, on the other hand, an intermediate regulatory approach has been chosen. The US Food and Drug Administration views any use of CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing in humans as gene therapy, regulated by the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). Clinical studies of gene therapy in human beings therefore require the submission of an investigational new drug application (IND) before they can be legally initiated in the United States. In addition, marketing gene therapy products calls for the submission and approval of a biologics license application (BLA). As a result of such requirements and restrictions, operating a private lab, with private funds, and conducting nonclinical, human gene therapy research is not illegal. Nonetheless, marketing such therapeutic options in the US would require FDA approval in terms of clinical studies and marketing. As far as it could be determined, no instances exist of a germline gene therapy product in the US; only somatic cell gene therapy products have been granted approval; currently, federal law prevents the FDA from reviewing or approving any application involving manipulated human embryos [91]. Again, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between embryo editing for research purposes and the implantation of such edited embryos, which is ethically far more contentious. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the use of genome editing in embryos for the purpose of implantation is banned, albeit gene editing on discarded IVF embryos is lawful, provided that such embryos are destroyed immediately afterwards. In vitro culture of human embryos beyond 14 days after onset of embryo creation, i.e., after the appearance of the primitive streak, is prohibited: such a ban is enshrined in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Acts of 1990 and 2008 [92]. In Italy, specific provisions in law 40/2004 recognize the embryo as having rights from the moment of fertilization [93]. The law prohibits the use of embryos for any research unless it is specifically aimed towards improving the therapeutic and medical condition of the embryo itself [94,95]. Critics have pointed out the apparent paradox behind such a restriction, considering that in vivo embryos can be terminated up to 24 weeks through voluntary termination of pregnancy [96]. Some may in fact find it confusing that embryo research is required to stop so much earlier, particularly in light of the fact that it is arguably more ethically sustainable to use abandoned supernumerary embryos for research purposes that could benefit humanity, than to just dispose of them. While abortion ethics is beyond the scope of this review, it is worth pointing out that in these two scenarios, different fundamental goals are in play: legal termination of pregnancy stems from the need to uphold the right of women to have a choice and be in control of their body, whereas in vitro embryo research does not entail that issue. As for embryo experimentation, such intermediate regulatory approaches bear witness to the current uncertainty as to how strictly such techniques ought to be regulated, for the purpose of striking a balance between upholding bioethics precepts and fostering scientific progress for the common good. Nonetheless, nations with more lax, ambiguous or nonspecific regulatory frameworks governing new biomedical technologies may result in a worrisome “maverick” scientific environment in which untested techniques are made available. That has been found to be the case with mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT), a form of nuclear transfer used as a germline therapy and believed to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial diseases and increase the likelihood of success in pregnancies [97]. Although MRT is banned in many countries due to its still dubious safety, clinics in Spain, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, and Israel have been found to offer the procedure [98]. That said, and irrespective of how individual countries decide to govern such techniques, the issue of whether scientists should seek to edit human embryos to prevent genetic diseases is controversial in itself, because the genomic change which it creates is permanent and may be passed down for generations. Even if embryo experimentation should be deemed justified, by virtue of its potential benefit to the embryo itself and others, embryos obviously cannot grant informed consent, but are still liable to experience life-altering consequences which can extend throughout their lifetimes and affect future generations as well. Besides, as mentioned earlier on, the enforcement and practice of both ethical precepts and legal provisions are inextricably linked to a set of notions that are hardly carved in stone and universally acknowledged. Hence, the time at which a human life (whether embryo or fetus) is deemed a fully-fledged human being has far-reaching ramifications that encompass the crucial realms of health care, law- and policy making and the inalienable right of individual autonomy of all humans [99]. There are no easy answers in our ever more culturally and ethically diverse societies: one-size-fits-all approaches seem doomed to fail, yet finding common ground is vital. If human embryos are to be deemed human beings with full personhood status, major implications ensue. That is the perspective espoused by Catholic doctrine, best exemplified by the late Pope John Paul II, who in 1995 famously stated that “the mere probability that a human person is involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo” [100]. That approach does not differentiate between embryos edited for research purposes and edited embryos to be implanted. Conversely, prominent philosophers such as Kant, Locke and Fletcher have laid out criteria for identifying personhood closely tied to self-awareness, the capability to relate to others, self-control, rationality, and the use of memory, among others [101,102,103,104]. On the other hand, all such complexities and apparently irreconcilable views notwithstanding, there is no denying that banning or constraining research on human embryos could put a damper on scientific progress and stymie the development of therapies that could defeat currently untreatable diseases. Would that not be a moral and ethical imperative outweighing previously reported concerns? Again, no easy answers.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Embryonic personhood collapses <u>bio-medical innovation</u>. Impact is <u>uncurable</u> disease spread. </h4><p>Roberto<strong> Piergentili 21</strong>, Institute of Molecular Biology and Pathology, Italian National Research Council, 2021 “CRISPR-Cas and Its Wide-Ranging Applications: From Human Genome Editing to Environmental Implications, Technical Limitations, Hazards and Bioethical Issues,” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8143109/</p><p><u><mark>If embryos are</mark> to be <strong><mark>ascribed personhood</mark> status</strong>, then <mark>they are entitled to</mark> have their</u> <u><strong><mark>inalienable</u></strong></mark> human <u><mark>rights</mark> upheld</u>. If, on the other hand, they are deemed as something in between, i.e., less than human beings but more than mere pools of cells, what moral rights should they have acknowledged, if any? Certainly, some point out that the first <u>experiments <mark>using CRISPR to edit</u></mark> human <u><mark>embryos</mark> occurred in 2015</u>, and since then, only few teams around the world have focused on the process and its potential [85], but recent studies have highlighted an underappreciated risk of CRISPR–Cas9 editing: <u>if embryos are deemed to have the right to</u> at least some degree of <u>legal</u> <u>safeguards</u>, <u>such</u> safety <u>concerns are likely to significantly <mark>inform the</u></mark> ongoing <u><mark>debate</u></mark> on the matter. In light of such major unsolved controversies, some have called for an international moratorium on all embryo editing [88,89], and some countries, including Canada, already have policies that ban human-embryo gene editing, irrespective of whether or not the edited embryo would be meant for implantation [90]. In the United States and Britain, on the other hand, an intermediate regulatory approach has been chosen. The US Food and Drug Administration views any use of CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing in humans as gene therapy, regulated by the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). Clinical studies of gene therapy in human beings therefore require the submission of an investigational new drug application (IND) before they can be legally initiated in the United States. In addition, marketing gene therapy products calls for the submission and approval of a biologics license application (BLA). As a result of such requirements and restrictions, operating a private lab, with private funds, and conducting nonclinical, <u><mark>human gene therapy research is not illegal</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Nonetheless</u></strong></mark>, marketing such therapeutic options in the US would require FDA approval in terms of clinical studies and marketing. As far as it could be determined, no instances exist of a germline gene therapy product in the US; only somatic cell gene therapy products have been granted approval; currently, federal law prevents the FDA from reviewing or approving any application involving manipulated human embryos [91]. Again, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between embryo editing for research purposes and the implantation of such edited embryos, which is ethically far more contentious. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the use of genome editing in embryos for the purpose of implantation is banned, albeit gene editing on discarded IVF embryos is lawful, provided that such embryos are destroyed immediately afterwards. In vitro culture of human embryos beyond 14 days after onset of embryo creation, i.e., after the appearance of the primitive streak, is prohibited: such a ban is enshrined in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Acts of 1990 and 2008 [92]. In Italy, specific provisions in law 40/2004 recognize the embryo as having rights from the moment of fertilization [93]. The law prohibits the use of embryos for any research unless it is specifically aimed towards improving the therapeutic and medical condition of the embryo itself [94,95]. Critics have pointed out the apparent paradox behind such a restriction, considering that in vivo embryos can be terminated up to 24 weeks through voluntary termination of pregnancy [96]. Some may in fact find it confusing that embryo research is required to stop so much earlier, particularly in light of the fact that it is arguably more ethically sustainable to use abandoned supernumerary embryos for research purposes that could benefit humanity, than to just dispose of them. While abortion ethics is beyond the scope of this review, it is worth pointing out that in these two scenarios, different fundamental goals are in play: legal termination of pregnancy stems from the need to uphold the right of women to have a choice and be in control of their body, whereas in vitro embryo research does not entail that issue. As for embryo experimentation, such intermediate regulatory approaches bear witness to the current uncertainty as to how strictly such techniques ought to be regulated, for the purpose of striking a balance between upholding bioethics precepts and fostering scientific progress for the common good. Nonetheless, nations with more lax, ambiguous or nonspecific regulatory frameworks governing new biomedical technologies may result in a worrisome “maverick” scientific environment in which untested techniques are made available. That has been found to be the case with mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT), a form of nuclear transfer used as a germline therapy and believed to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial diseases and increase the likelihood of success in pregnancies [97]. Although MRT is banned in many countries due to its still dubious safety, clinics in Spain, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, and Israel have been found to offer the procedure [98]. That said, and irrespective of how individual countries decide to govern such techniques, <u><mark>the issue</mark> of whether scientists should seek to edit human embryos to prevent genetic diseases <mark>is <strong>controversial</u></strong></mark> in itself, because the genomic change which it creates is permanent and may be passed down for generations. Even if embryo experimentation should be deemed justified, by virtue of its potential benefit to the embryo itself and others, <u><strong><mark>embryos</u></strong></mark> obviously <u><strong><mark>cannot</mark> <mark>grant informed consent</u></strong></mark>, but are still liable to experience life-altering consequences which can extend throughout their lifetimes and affect future generations as well. Besides, as mentioned earlier on, the enforcement and practice of both ethical precepts and legal provisions are inextricably linked to a set of notions that are hardly carved in stone and universally acknowledged. Hence, <u><mark>the time at which a</mark> human life</u> (whether <u><strong><mark>embryo or fetus</u></strong></mark>) <u><mark>is</mark> deemed</u> a fully-fledged <u><strong><mark>human</u></strong></mark> being <u><mark>has <strong>far-reaching ramifications</strong> that encompass</mark> the crucial realm</u>s<u> of <strong><mark>health care</u></strong></mark>, law- and policy making and the inalienable right of individual autonomy of all humans [99]. There are no easy answers in our ever more culturally and ethically diverse societies: one-size-fits-all approaches seem doomed to fail, yet finding common ground is vital. <u><mark>If human embryos are</mark> to be <mark>deemed</mark> </u>human beings with full <u><strong><mark>personhood</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>status</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>major implications ensue</u></strong></mark>. That is the perspective espoused by Catholic doctrine, best exemplified by the late Pope John Paul II, who in 1995 famously stated that “the mere probability that a human person is involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo” [100]. That approach does not differentiate between embryos edited for research purposes and edited embryos to be implanted. Conversely, prominent philosophers such as Kant, Locke and Fletcher have laid out criteria for identifying personhood closely tied to self-awareness, the capability to relate to others, self-control, rationality, and the use of memory, among others [101,102,103,104]. On the other hand, all such complexities and apparently irreconcilable views notwithstanding, there is no denying that banning or <u><mark>constraining</u> <u>research</mark> <mark>on human embryos could put a <strong>damper on scientific progress</strong> and <strong>stymie</mark> the <mark>development of therapies</strong> that could defeat currently <strong>untreatable diseases</u></mark>. Would that not be a moral and ethical imperative outweighing previously reported concerns? Again, no easy answers.</p></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: King 2014 - Nottingham Trent UniversityDaniel, "The possibilities and perils of critical performativity: Learning from four case studies," Scandinavian Journal of Management Volume 31, Issue 2, June 2015, Pages 255–265 fulltext: This makes CMS as a discipline poorer in two key regards. Firstly without the suggestions of alternatives it potentially might be seen as irrelevant (Walsh & Weber, 2002) as it is unable to make an impact on existing management practices (Reedy & Learmonth, 2009). Secondly the relentless drive towards critiquing all aspects of management practice, including humanising management or practices within alternative organizations (Kleinman, 1996) might put a perceived limit on the action that a practitioner can take. Whilst arguably theoretically ‘correct’ or pure (a position that du Gay, 1998 calls a form of secular holiness), this view potentially destroys the ground for any positive action as all alternatives and actions are able to be critiqued, nothing is beyond reproach, and could, even, potentially by co-opted or produce oppressive power-relations (as an example see Kleinman, 1996). As case study one demonstrates, continual negative critique can make practitioners feel guilty about any actions they engage in as it always provides the illusion that there is something better than the existing way of organizing but continually refuses to offer any suggestions of how to produce it. Consequently rather than being emancipatory, as is CMS’ espoused ambition (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992b), this negative critique could be seen as immobilizing, debilitating and ultimately destructive to any positive action, leaving few possibilities for positive or creative action and ultimately leading to despair (see King & Learmonth, 2014). At the heart of the negative critique is what Sedgwick (2007) describes as theorizing as a form of “paranoia”. Seeking to protect the theorist against any surprises, the critical theorist wants to know everything in advance, to be ‘right’, beyond reproach, and cannot cope with the unknown or incongruous (see Gibson-Graham, 2006b for a discussion). It has three key characteristics, fuelled by a “righteous anger” firstly its subject is that of the victim (the oppressed, duped, controlled or co-opted), secondly its mentality is that of judgement (the critique standing over others, finding fault with their actions, theories or practices) and thirdly its response is that of protest (saying what is wrong and requesting alternative action) (Gibson-Graham, 2006b). This negative critique has what Nietzsche (1990) calls the victim mentality, one of revenge, which blames others but refuses to put into action anything new. This negative ‘paranoid’ critique crushes alternatives by stifling creativity by seeing problems and wanting to know, in advance, the right way to act. As Gibson-Graham have argued, for alternatives to emerge a new sensibility to theorizing and practice is required. This view, which they call the “politics of the affirmative” and the “politics of the possible”, sets out to explore new practices and possibilities for action (Gibson-Graham, 2008). Rather than knowing in advance what to do, or seeking to find the correct, unimpeachable action, the politics of the possible explores and acts on what can be done in a given situation. It focuses on emergent ideas, on the here and now, on what can enable action. However, as Gibson-Graham argue, this “orientation towards possibility does not deny the forces that militate against it – forces that may work to undermine, constrain, destroy, or sideline our attempts to research economic futures … [rather it] encourages us to deny these forces a fundamental, structural, or universal reality and to instead identify them as contingent outcomes of ethical decisions, political projects, and sedimented localized practices, continually pushed and pulled by other determinations” (2006b, p. xxxi). The sensibility of the politics of the possible, therefore, rather than dismissing alternatives because they might lead to co-option or produce oppressive power-relations, instead sees them as openings of ethical choices for action and thus focuses on what can be achieved. This, it could be argued, reduces the guilt that practitioners or activists might experience. The politics of the possible presents a number of opportunities for CMS, to facilitate the production of alternatives. It would require an alternative way of thinking, a new vision of what critical thinking is about. Such an approach would not mean making blueprints for change, rather, working alongside practitioners to explore and enhance alternatives, coping with and even embracing some of the struggles that arise when engaging in critical practice ( Gibson-Graham, 2006a, Gibson-Graham, 2006b and Gibson-Graham, 2008). One such way could be working with practitioners and activists to develop campaigns or new practices around the dilemmas that practitioners face (see case studies 1 and 2). Academics, working in Business Schools, can provide legitimacy and institutional resources for campaigns. CMS academics could also work directly in organizational practice to rethink existing practices in new, creative and empowering ways (see case study 4). Also, in doing so, engagement can provide the openings for new theoretical developments and understandings of practice. The critical scholar can also work as a form of translator (see case study 4), taking ideas from one arena (such as social movement theory) and then trying to place them in the context of another (such as the voluntary sector). The CMS scholar therefore works as what Grey and Willmott (2002) call a node within a network, a relay point cross-fertilising ideas from one situation to another. Indeed CMS does not have a monopoly on alternatives, as many of the ideas that I have worked with the World Education have their origins in New Social Movements (Maeckelbergh, 2009). Working with groups, such as World Education, it is possible to put new ideas into their agenda, opening up possibilities for new practices. CMS academics could also learn from other fields who are aiming to engage with organizational practice. Areas such as Radical and Feminist Geography (Chatterton et al., 2010, Gibson-Graham, 2006a, Gibson-Graham, 2006b and Kindon et al., 2007), and Urban Anthropology (Lyon-Callo, 2004 and Lyon-Callo and Hyatt, 2003) have more experience of working with and engaging in organizational practice. Working with and learning from such fields can provide the opportunities to develop a deeper understanding of engaged critical practice and performative knowledge. Conclusion; towards a mature engaged and performative CMS This paper has empirically explored the possibilities and perils of critical performativity and engagement in practice by CMS academics. Currently this debate is polarized around whether one should be for or against engagement, for or against producing performative knowledge. Such a split is largely based around the assumption that there is a right approach to these challenges, which, if worked out in advance, will produce positive intervention and transformation of organizational practice. This paper, however, by directly exploring the possibilities and perils of engaging with organizational practice, argues that although there are a number of possibilities to produce transformation in organizational practice, at the same time, engagement and performative knowledge can also be messy and confusing. Whilst engagement with practice always carries with it the danger of co-option, such potential difficulties, should not be seen as prohibitive, but as a normal part of engagement (Gibson-Graham, 2006b). The critical academic therefore has two options, either to withdraw, for fear that the actions which are taken might lead to compromise, or to find ways to live with and transform these power-relations and challenges which come with engagement. As other fields have shown (Chatterton et al., 2010, Gibson-Graham, 2006b and Kindon et al., 2007), such tensions are in fact integral to any engagement. By engaging in organizational practice and/or producing performative knowledge the critical academic will be placed in potentially difficult situations as an intrinsic part of any engagement. The ability to cope with these tensions therefore is part of the maturity that will come with greater engagement with organizational practice (Gibson-Graham, 2008). Consequently by learning how to engage and cope with these dilemmas, these numerous small scale interventions that can have a positive impact on how small (or even large) organizations are run. Working alongside practitioners, particularly within alternative organizations, the CMS academic has many opportunities to intervene and gradually work with others to change the way organizations are run. As this paper has argued, small scale interventions provide the starting point for attempts by CMS to struggle around and seek to change management practice towards more progressive ends. Not only is this more realistic that the grand transformations that CMS academics sometimes call for (e.g. Walsh & Weber, 2002), as it is potentially more achievable given CMS’ stage of development (Phillips, 2006). As I have sought to argue in this paper, by embracing the “politics of the possible” (Gibson-Graham, 2006b), there are multiple opportunities for critical scholars to engage in practice and struggle alongside others to generate alternative ways of living and working.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>State good- we can examine the tensions between it and other strategies for engagement at multiple levels. </h4><p><strong>King 2014</strong> - Nottingham Trent University<u>Daniel, "The possibilities and perils of critical performativity: Learning from four case studies," Scandinavian Journal of Management Volume 31, Issue 2, June 2015, Pages 255–265</p><p></u>This makes CMS as a discipline poorer in two key regards. Firstly <u>without the suggestions of alternatives it potentially might be seen as irrelevant </u>(Walsh & Weber, 2002) <u>as it is unable to make an impact on existing management practices</u> (Reedy & Learmonth, 2009). Secondly the relentless drive towards critiquing all aspects of management practice, including humanising management or practices within alternative organizations (Kleinman, 1996) might put a perceived limit on the action that a practitioner can take. <u>Whilst arguably theoretically ‘correct’ or pure</u> (a position that du Gay, 1998 calls a form of secular holiness), <u>this view potentially destroys the ground for any positive action as all alternatives and actions are able to be critiqued,</u> <u>nothing is beyond reproach</u>, and could, even, <u>potentially by co-opted or produce oppressive power-relations</u> (as an example see Kleinman, 1996). As case study one demonstrates<u>, continual negative critique can make practitioners feel guilty about <strong>any actions they engage </strong>in as it always provides the illusion that there is something better than the existing way of organizing but continually refuses to offer any suggestions of how to produce it.</u> Consequently rather than being emancipatory, as is CMS’ espoused ambition (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992b), this negative critique could be seen as immobilizing, debilitating and ultimately destructive to any positive action, leaving few possibilities for positive or creative action and ultimately leading to despair (see King & Learmonth, 2014). At the heart of the negative critique is<u> </u>what Sedgwick (2007) describes as theorizing as a form of “paranoia”. <u>Seeking to protect the theorist against any surprises, <strong>the <mark>critical theorist wants to know everything in advance, to be ‘right’, beyond reproach</strong></mark>, and cannot cope with the unknown or incongruous</u> (see Gibson-Graham, 2006b for a discussion). <u>It has three </u>key <u>characteristics, fuelled by a “righteous anger” firstly its subject is that of the victim</u> (the oppressed, duped, controlled or co-opted), secondly <u>its mentality is that of judgement</u> (the critique standing over others, <u><strong><mark>finding fault with their actions, theories or practices</u></strong></mark>) and thirdly its response is that of protest (saying what is wrong and requesting alternative action) (Gibson-Graham, 2006b). This negative critique has what Nietzsche (1990) calls the victim mentality, one of revenge, which blames others but refuses to put into action anything new. This negative ‘paranoid’ critique crushes alternatives by stifling creativity by seeing problems and wanting to know, in advance, the right way to act. As Gibson-Graham have argued, <u>for alternatives to emerge a new sensibility to theorizing and practice is required</u>. This view, which they call <u>the “politics of the affirmative” and the “politics of the possible”, sets out to explore new practices and possibilities for action</u> (Gibson-Graham, 2008). <u>Rather than knowing in advance what to do, </u>or seeking to find the correct, unimpeachable action, <u><strong>the <mark>politics of the possible explores and acts on what can be done in a given situation</u></strong></mark>. It focuses on emergent ideas, on the here and now, on what can enable action. However, as Gibson-Graham argue<u>, this “orientation towards possibility does not deny the forces that militate against it</u> – forces that may work to undermine, constrain, destroy, or sideline our attempts to research economic futures … [<u>rather it] encourages us to deny these forces a fundamental, structural, or universal reality and to instead identify them <strong>as <mark>contingent outcomes of ethical decisions</strong></mark>, political projects, and sedimented localized practices, continually pushed and pulled by other determinations”</u> (2006b, p. xxxi). <u>The sensibility of the politics of the possible, </u>therefore, <u>rather than dismissing alternatives because they might lead to co-option or produce oppressive power-relations</u>, <u>instead sees them as openings of ethical choices for action and thus focuses on what can be achieved.</u> This, it could be argued, reduces the guilt that practitioners or activists might experience. The politics of the possible presents a number of opportunities for CMS, to facilitate the production of alternatives. It would require an alternative way of thinking, a new vision of what critical thinking is about<u>. Such an approach would not mean making blueprints for change, rather, working alongside practitioners to explore and enhance alternatives, coping with and even embracing some of the struggles that arise when engaging in critical practice</u> ( Gibson-Graham, 2006a, Gibson-Graham, 2006b and Gibson-Graham, 2008). One such way could be working with practitioners and activists to develop campaigns or new practices around the dilemmas that practitioners face (see case studies 1 and 2<u><strong>).</u></strong> Academics, working in Business Schools, can provide legitimacy and institutional resources for campaigns. CMS <u>academics could also work directly in organizational practice to rethink existing practices in new, creative and empowering ways</u> (see case study 4). Also, in doing so, <u>engagement can provide the openings for new theoretical developments and understandings of practice. </u>The critical scholar can also work as a form of translator (see case study 4), <u>taking ideas from one arena</u> (such as social movement theory) <u>and then trying to place them in the context of another</u> (such as the voluntary sector). The CMS scholar therefore works as what Grey and Willmott (2002) call a node within a network, a relay point cross-fertilising ideas from one situation to another. Indeed CMS does not have a monopoly on alternatives, as many of the ideas that I have worked with the World Education have their origins in New Social Movements (Maeckelbergh, 2009). Working with groups, such as World Education, it is possible to put new ideas into their agenda, opening up possibilities for new practices. CMS academics could also learn from other fields who are aiming to engage with organizational practice. Areas such as Radical and Feminist Geography (Chatterton et al., 2010, Gibson-Graham, 2006a, Gibson-Graham, 2006b and Kindon et al., 2007), and Urban Anthropology (Lyon-Callo, 2004 and Lyon-Callo and Hyatt, 2003) have more experience of working with and engaging in organizational practice. <u>Working with and learning from such fields can provide the opportunities to develop a deeper understanding of engaged critical practice and performative knowledge</u>. Conclusion; towards a mature engaged and performative CMS This paper has empirically explored the possibilities and perils of critical performativity and engagement in practice by CMS academics. <u><strong>Currently this <mark>debate is polarized around whether one should be for or against engagement</u></strong>,</mark> for or against producing performative knowledge. S<u>uch a split is largely based around the assumption that there is a right approach to these challenges,</u> which, <u>if worked out in advance, will produce positive intervention and transformation of organizational practice</u>. This paper, however, by directly exploring the possibilities and perils of engaging with organizational practice, argues that although there are a number of possibilities to produce transformation in organizational practice, at the same time, engagement and performative knowledge can also be messy and confusing. <u>Whilst engagement with practice always carries with it the danger of co-option</u>, such potential difficulties, <u>should not be seen as prohibitive, but as a normal part of engagement</u> (Gibson-Graham, 2006b). <u>The critical academic therefore has two options, either to withdraw, for fear that the actions which are taken might lead to compromise, or to find ways to live with and transform these power-relations and challenges which come with engagement</u>. As other fields have shown (Chatterton et al., 2010, Gibson-Graham, 2006b and Kindon et al., 2007), <u><strong><mark>such tensions are in fact integral to any engagement</u></strong></mark>. <u>By engaging in organizational practice and/or producing performative knowledge the critical academic will be placed in potentially difficult situations as an intrinsic part of any engagement.</u> The ability to cope with these tensions therefore is part of the maturity that will come with greater engagement with organizational practice (Gibson-Graham, 2008). Consequently by learning how to engage and cope with these dilemmas, these numerous small scale interventions that can have a positive impact on how small (or even large) organizations are run. Working alongside practitioners, particularly within alternative organizations, the CMS academic has many opportunities to intervene and gradually work with others to change the way organizations are run. As this paper has argued, small scale interventions provide the starting point for attempts by CMS to struggle around and seek to change management practice towards more progressive ends. Not only is this more realistic that the grand transformations that CMS academics sometimes call for (e.g. Walsh & Weber, 2002), as it is potentially more achievable given CMS’ stage of development (Phillips, 2006). As I have sought to argue in this paper, <u>by <mark>embracing</mark> the “<mark>politics of the possible”</u> (</mark>Gibson-Graham, 2006b<u>), there are <mark>multiple opportunities for critical scholars to engage in practice and struggle alongside others to generate alternative ways of living and working.</p></u></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Escalante 18 (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/) fulltext: I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The alternative is to affirm the dual power <u>model of the Communist Party</u> – only the Party can provide <u>effective accountability mechanisms</u> to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and <u>mobilize marginalized communities</u>, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation</h4><p><strong>Escalante 18</strong> (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/)</p><p>I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that <u><mark>base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing</mark>, and that <mark>party organizing can allow this</mark> emerging <mark>movement to solidify into a</mark> powerful <mark>revolutionary socialist tendency</mark> in the United States. </u>One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that <u>the current state of the left in the United States is one in which <mark>revolution is not currently possible.</u></mark> There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. <u>The base building emphasis on <mark>dual power responds</mark> directly to this insight. <mark>By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we</mark> are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can <mark>offer</mark> the oppressed <mark>relief from</mark> the horrific conditions of <mark>capitalism.</u></mark> Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? <u>If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? </u>Put simply: <u><strong><mark>in order to mobilize the base</mark> which base builders hope to create, <mark>we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.</u></strong> <u>It is not enough to</mark> simply <mark>meet</mark> peoples <mark>needs.</mark> Rather, <mark>we must build</mark> the <mark>institutions of dual power</mark> in the name of communism.</u> <u>We <strong>must refuse</strong> <strong>covert front organizing and instead have</strong> a public face as a communist party. </u>When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. <u>We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making.</u> <u><mark>The party model creates internal methods for <strong>holding party members accountable</strong></mark>, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, <mark>and for educating party members</mark> in communist theory and praxis.</u> A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. <u>Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation.</u> A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that <u>our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. </u>Furthermore<mark>, <u><strong>party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions</mark>.</u></strong> <u>It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. </u>In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such <u><strong>accountability is crucial</strong>.</u> <u>As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. </u>Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, <u>individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror.</u> Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. <u>The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. </u>The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. <u>It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party,</u> but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, <u>it ought to become clear that</u> <u><strong><mark>a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement</mark>.</u></strong> Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. <u>I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation.</u> The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Stubbs, 19 --- director of the ACLU’s Capital Punishment Project (3/28/19, Cassy Stubbs, Jeremy Stahl interviewer - Slate senior editor, “Is the Tide Finally Turning on the Death Penalty? The momentum gained at the state level might be enough to break through on the federal level,” https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/momentum-to-abolish-death-penalty-growing.html, accessed on 4/5/2020, JMP) fulltext: As recently as three years ago, California voters rejected a ballot measure to end the death penalty, but earlier this month California Gov. Gavin Newsom announced he was ordering a moratorium on executions in the largest state in the country.* Newsom’s order would offer a reprieve to the state’s 737 death row inmates, making it a landmark day in the history of death penalty abolition in this country. This is just one event in the quiet revolution against the death penalty that is happening across the country, says Cassy Stubbs, director of the ACLU’s Capital Punishment Project. The governor in Colorado, which already has an effective moratorium in place, has been pushing legislators to make a permanent decision about the state’s death penalty before 2021. In New Hampshire, the state Senate is due to vote on a measure abolishing the death penalty that already passed the House by a veto-proof majority. In Ohio, Republican Gov. Mike DeWine put an effective halt to the state’s death sentences earlier this year. It’s all part of a nationwide trend that Stubbs sees as altering the landscape of the death penalty in this country in a way that has not happened in decades. I spoke with Stubbs last week about these events and how the case for abolition is playing out in courts and statehouses throughout the United States. The conversation has been condensed for length and clarity. Jeremy Stahl: What background do you think is important for people to understand about Newsom’s announcement and the broader picture surrounding the death penalty in the United States? Cassy Stubbs: This year feels like a turning point for the death penalty. Last year, obviously, Washington abolished the death penalty. That was a big victory. But I think what’s kind of unique right now is that we see a lot of different camps moving in the same direction at the same time. For example, there’s the pope coming out with the strongest statement in history about the death penalty and the church’s view of the death penalty. We see there are conservative groups that are really becoming concerned about the death penalty from a religious and moral perspective—and also from cost—while at the same time you have the Democratic Party announcing that [abolition is] part of their platform. Kamala Harris just talked about how the death penalty is never appropriate in any case in her view. Newsom just issued that powerful defense about why we can no longer stand behind the death penalty and it is morally incumbent on us to break from this when it’s been shown to be so racially biased and inherently discriminatory and unfairly applied. This kind of full-spectrum attack on the death penalty is just reaching a noise level that, to me, at least it feels very different than I’ve seen in over a decade, in terms of a critical mass of voices. There was [also] kind of a trajectory [where] we saw a number of governors do things that were good on the death penalty, like issue stays or moratoriums or commutations, and then survive political attacks. We saw that the electorate was no longer voting on the death penalty. There was not the kind of backlash against folks who came out saying “we need death penalty reform” that we had seen in the 1980s. That was the first stage. Now, we’re really in this new phase where we see people both from the right and the left aggressively promoting death penalty repeal. Who are you thinking of when you talk about recent politicians who have not necessarily faced a backlash? We saw the governor of Colorado [John Hickenlooper] was targeted around the death penalty and was re-elected [in 2014], despite his granting of reprieves on the death penalty and despite [an effective] moratorium on the death penalty in Colorado. We saw in Oregon, Gov. Kate Brown was re-elected [last year] with a moratorium on the death penalty. We saw in Kansas, the Kansas state judges had been very robust in their review and had appropriately overturned death sentences that [we believe] violated the U.S. Constitution on a pretty regular basis, and they got attacked for that and they survived those challenges. We saw it in the Washington state Supreme Court, which [last year] wrote this really sweeping opinion finding racial bias in the application of the death penalty under the Washington state Constitution. They issued that opinion right before the judicial elections, which in the lore of litigator strategy, you’d never expect a state court to issue a big decision right before judicial elections. There’s no backlash. What are some of the states where you see potential for the next big moves on this issue? Ohio is another example where there has been this legal injection litigation for some time that has been really bogged down in questions of whether or not the defendant has shown and proposed a better way—a less painful way—of killing himself. A lot of the lethal injection litigation has lost sight of the fact that there’s this enormous compelling record that we are carrying out executions with a drug, midazolam, that is in fact leading to torture of prisoners in a number of states. We just saw the [Republican] governor of Ohio [Mike DeWine] say, we’re not going to do this. We have this huge [death] row in California, a row that I think is so much bigger than any other row in the country. So [Newsom’s] announcement all alone would be a major development in the history of the death penalty in America. But the fact is that it’s happening at the same time you have a state like Ohio moving forward with a moratorium, and you have a state like Pennsylvania that’s got a large [death] row [moving ahead] with a moratorium. You’re talking a lot about state-level action. Is that because action at the federal level is such a heavy lift? For advocates of abolition, it seems to me that recent decisions from the Supreme Court may not have been so inspiring. I’m talking about that recent case before the Supreme Court, where the court let Domineque Ray be executed in Alabama despite being denied access to his imam, and the court deciding not to rule on the religious discrimination question there. There is a lot of movement in states and by state executives and state courts, and I think that’s in part because we haven’t seen enough movement from the U.S. Supreme Court yet. But that does not mean that I am in any way giving up on federal courts, or giving up on the U.S. Supreme Court abolishing the death penalty. I do think that is coming. The Jones case was this case out of California where the federal district court found the death penalty in California unconstitutional because of the incredibly broken nature of California’s death penalty and the delays there—it’s just absolutely arbitrary who might get executed in California. At the same time, there was a federal court in New Hampshire that ruled the death penalty unconstitutional a number of years ago. Those cases ultimately did not stand, but the merits of those cases did not actually reach the Supreme Court. I think that when you look at the benchmarks that the Supreme Court has set forward for whether or not the death penalty today is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, the evolving standard of decency says let’s look at what’s happening in the states. Let’s look at the number of executions, let’s look at the trends, let’s look at the new death sentences. All of those are moving in the same direction. It is just an incredible downward-sloping number. We certainly would not have predicted where we are today in terms of the low number of new death sentences, the low number of executions each year. There is an incredible showing, I think, under the Eighth Amendment, and it is just a matter of time before the Supreme Court is going to take one of these cases. I think if you look at the Supreme Court’s record, it has issued a number of opinions where we’ve seen that it is concerned about some of these same things that Newsom was talking about, some of these same things that the Washington state Supreme Court was talking about. Now, we were very dismayed, and I would not ever defend the Supreme Court’s allowing Ray’s execution to go forward. I think that that was a coming together of some of the worst ways in which the death penalty plays out, including the fact that, because of the way that Supreme Court rules work under [deadline] of an execution, it’s very difficult to get a claim heard that you would otherwise normally get heard. So they had enough votes to hear the briefing and make a reasoned decision on the merits of the religious discrimination that was going on in that case, but they didn’t have enough votes to stop the execution because of the way the state rule works. Time and time again, super important legal issues don’t get a real hearing because the push for finality and moving to execution just ends up outweighing decency and justice. So that was really a setback, and discouraging, but I think that we’ve seen from this court over the years—even though they rule against a claim that is brought on the eve of execution, that doesn’t tell you how they would rule on the merits of the claim.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>States can abolish the death penalty AND the Court will eventually model it based on the evolving standard of decency</h4><p><strong>Stubbs, 19</strong> --- director of the ACLU’s Capital Punishment Project (3/28/19, Cassy Stubbs, Jeremy Stahl interviewer - Slate senior editor, “Is the Tide Finally Turning on the Death Penalty? <u><strong>The <mark>momentum gained at the state level might be enough to break through on the federal level</u></strong></mark>,” https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/momentum-to-abolish-death-penalty-growing.html, accessed on 4/5/2020, JMP)</p><p>As recently as three years ago, California voters rejected a ballot measure to end the death penalty, but earlier this month California <u>Gov.</u> Gavin <u>Newsom announced he was ordering a moratorium on executions in the largest state in the country</u>.* Newsom’s order would offer a reprieve to the state’s 737 death row inmates, making it a landmark day in the history of death penalty abolition in this country.</p><p><u><strong>This is just one event <mark>in the quiet revolution against the death penalty</mark> that <mark>is happening across the country</u></strong></mark>, says Cassy Stubbs, director of the ACLU’s Capital Punishment Project. The governor in Colorado, which already has an effective moratorium in place, has been pushing legislators to make a permanent decision about the state’s death penalty before 2021. In New Hampshire, the state Senate is due to vote on a measure abolishing the death penalty that already passed the House by a veto-proof majority. In Ohio, Republican Gov. Mike DeWine put an effective halt to the state’s death sentences earlier this year. It’s all part of a nationwide trend that Stubbs sees as altering the landscape of the death penalty in this country in a way that has not happened in decades. I spoke with Stubbs last week about these events and how <u><strong><mark>the case for abolition is playing out in courts and statehouses</mark> throughout the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. The conversation has been condensed for length and clarity.</p><p>Jeremy Stahl: What background do you think is important for people to understand about Newsom’s announcement and the broader picture surrounding the death penalty in the United States?</p><p>Cassy Stubbs: This year feels like a turning point for the death penalty. Last year, obviously, Washington abolished the death penalty. That was a big victory. But I think what’s kind of unique right now is that we see a lot of different camps moving in the same direction at the same time. For example, there’s the pope coming out with the strongest statement in history about the death penalty and the church’s view of the death penalty. We see there are conservative groups that are really becoming concerned about the death penalty from a religious and moral perspective—and also from cost—while at the same time you have the Democratic Party announcing that [abolition is] part of their platform.</p><p>Kamala Harris just talked about how the death penalty is never appropriate in any case in her view. Newsom just issued that powerful defense about why we can no longer stand behind the death penalty and it is morally incumbent on us to break from this when it’s been shown to be so racially biased and inherently discriminatory and unfairly applied. This kind of full-spectrum attack on the death penalty is just reaching a noise level that, to me, at least it feels very different than I’ve seen in over a decade, in terms of a critical mass of voices.</p><p>There was [also] kind of a trajectory [where] we saw a number of governors do things that were good on the death penalty, like issue stays or moratoriums or commutations, and then survive political attacks. We saw that the electorate was no longer voting on the death penalty. There was not the kind of backlash against folks who came out saying “we need death penalty reform” that we had seen in the 1980s. That was the first stage. Now, we’re really in this new phase where we see people both from the right and the left aggressively promoting death penalty repeal.</p><p>Who are you thinking of when you talk about recent politicians who have not necessarily faced a backlash?</p><p>We saw the governor of Colorado [John Hickenlooper] was targeted around the death penalty and was re-elected [in 2014], despite his granting of reprieves on the death penalty and despite [an effective] moratorium on the death penalty in Colorado. We saw in Oregon, Gov. Kate Brown was re-elected [last year] with a moratorium on the death penalty. We saw in Kansas, the Kansas state judges had been very robust in their review and had appropriately overturned death sentences that [we believe] violated the U.S. Constitution on a pretty regular basis, and they got attacked for that and they survived those challenges. We saw it in the Washington state Supreme Court, which [last year] wrote this really sweeping opinion finding racial bias in the application of the death penalty under the Washington state Constitution. They issued that opinion right before the judicial elections, which in the lore of litigator strategy, you’d never expect a state court to issue a big decision right before judicial elections. There’s no backlash.</p><p>What are some of the states where you see potential for the next big moves on this issue?</p><p>Ohio is another example where there has been this legal injection litigation for some time that has been really bogged down in questions of whether or not the defendant has shown and proposed a better way—a less painful way—of killing himself. A lot of the lethal injection litigation has lost sight of <u>the fact that there’s this enormous compelling record that we are carrying out executions with a drug, midazolam, that is in fact leading to torture of prisoners in a number of states. We just saw the [Republican] governor of Ohio [Mike DeWine] say, we’re not going to do this.</p><p></u>We have this huge [death] row in California, a row that I think is so much bigger than any other row in the country. So <u>[Newsom’s] announcement all alone would be a major development in the history of the death penalty in America. But the fact is that it’s <strong>happening at the same time</strong> you have a state like <mark>Ohio</mark> moving forward with a moratorium, <mark>and</mark> you have a state like <mark>Pennsylvania</mark> that’s got a large [death] row [<mark>moving ahead] with a moratorium</mark>.</p><p>You’re talking a lot about state-level action. Is that because action at the federal level is such a heavy lift?</u> For advocates of abolition, it seems to me that recent decisions from the Supreme Court may not have been so inspiring. I’m talking about that recent case before the Supreme Court, where the court let Domineque Ray be executed in Alabama despite being denied access to his imam, and the court deciding not to rule on the religious discrimination question there.</p><p><u>There is a lot of movement in states and by state executives and state courts, and I think that’s in part because we haven’t seen enough movement from the</u> U.S. <u>Supreme Court yet</u>. But <u><strong>that does not mean that I am</u></strong> in any way <u><strong>giving up on federal courts, or</u></strong> giving up on the U.S. <u><strong>Supreme Court</u></strong> abolishing the death penalty. I do think that is coming.</p><p><u><strong>The Jones case was this case out of California where the federal district court found the death penalty in California unconstitutional because of the incredibly broken nature of California’s death penalty and the delays there—it’s just absolutely arbitrary who might get executed in California. At the same time, there was a federal court in New Hampshire that ruled the death penalty unconstitutional a number of years ago. Those cases ultimately did not stand, but the merits of those cases did not actually reach the Supreme Court.</p><p></u></strong>I think that <u><mark>when you look at the</mark> benchmarks that the</u> Supreme <u>Court has set forward for whether or not the death penalty today is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, <strong><mark>the evolving standard of decency</mark> says let’s look at what’s happening in the states</strong>. Let’s look at <mark>the number of executions</mark>, let’s look at the trends, let’s look at the <mark>new death sentences</mark>. All of those are moving in the same direction. It <mark>is</mark> just <mark>a</mark>n incredible <mark>downward-slop</mark>ing number.</p><p></u>We certainly would not have predicted where we are today in terms of the low number of new death sentences, the low number of executions each year. <u><strong>There is an incredible showing</u></strong>, I think, <u><strong>under the Eighth Amendment, and <mark>it is just a matter of time before the Supreme Court is going to take one of these cases</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>I think <u>if you look at the Supreme Court’s record, it has issued a number of opinions where we’ve seen that it is concerned about some of these same things that Newsom was talking about, some of these same things that the Washington state Supreme Court was talking about.</p><p></u>Now, <u>we were very dismayed, and I would not ever defend the Supreme Court’s allowing Ray’s execution to go forward</u>. I think that that was a coming together of some of the worst ways in which the death penalty plays out, including the fact that, <u>because of the way that Supreme Court rules work under [deadline] of an execution, it’s very difficult to get a claim heard that you would otherwise normally get heard</u>. So they had enough votes to hear the briefing and make a reasoned decision on the merits of the religious discrimination that was going on in that case, but they didn’t have enough votes to stop the execution because of the way the state rule works. Time and time again, super important legal issues don’t get a real hearing because the push for finality and moving to execution just ends up outweighing decency and justice. So that was really a setback, and discouraging, but I think that <u>we’ve seen from this court over the years—<strong>even though they rule against a claim that is brought on the eve of execution, that doesn’t tell you how they would rule on the merits of the claim</u></strong>. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Gerber 10 – (David Gerber, Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, B.A. from Trinity College, M.A. from Yale University, and J.D. from the University of Chicago, Awarded the Degree of Honorary Doctor of Laws by the University of Zurich, Former Visiting Professor at the Law Schools of the University of Pennsylvania, Northwestern University, and Washington University; published 2010, Oxford University Press, “Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization,“ doa: 11-4-2021) doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228225.001.0001 fulltext: a. Criteria for goals The most obvious criteria for goals is that they must be sufficiently attractive to induce and maintain commitment from all necessary participants in the process. As we have seen, however, there is a broad range of goals in existing systems, which means that the goals of the project will have to be relatively general and flexible, becoming more specifically defined through experience along the pathway. A project which assumes that a single conception of competition law favored by one or two participants at a particular point in time will be accepted and implemented by all participants is unlikely to attract widespread commitment. Goals must also be ‘graspable’ or ‘interpretable.’ The language must identify the range of possible interpretations. If it does not, it cannot represent a common goal, and it cannot maintain support. In negotiating international agreements, it is common for parties intentionally to choose language that is too vague to guide actual decision making. That may be appropriate for other types of agreement, but it would be inconsistent with the long-term orientation of a commitment strategy. The project’s goals must also be ‘shared’ or ‘shareable’. Where goals are shared, each participant has an interest in the effective pursuit of the goals by other participants. For example, the goal of increasing consumer welfare (as understood in neoclassical economics) is shareable, because any increase in consumer welfare on a global market benefits consumers across the market, regardless of state boundaries. In contrast, the goal of protecting a set of producers in one country would presumably not be shareable, as it relates only to those specific producers and those who benefit from their success.¹² Finally, the agreed goals will have to be perceived as ‘fair’ by all types of participants. Goals that are likely to give significant advantages and gains to some participants (such as highly-industrialized countries) and to cause net harm to others (eg developing countries) cannot attract widespread support. At a minimum, therefore, fairness is likely to require that all participants have a reasonable prospect of benefit. Given the non-linear nature of economic development, however, it cannot require that all benefit equally. b. Goal structure Goals will have to be related to each other in ways that guide the development of national systems. As an example of such a structure, we use three goals which, if applied together, might form the basis of a global competition law strategy. Th ere may be others, but my purpose here is merely to illustrate how such a goal structure might look. The basic concept is that participants would eventually all have approximately the same goals for competition law, at least insofar as it is applied to global markets. In order to achieve that result, national competition law goals would be expected to fi t within a range of goals that narrows over time. Given that national goals often vary considerably, this process will take time and affect some countries more than others. The basic goals would be set out at the time of agreement, but the pathway concept would allow variation over time on the basis of input from the participants. The most basic goal of all competition laws is to deter anti-competitive conduct. Definitions of ‘anticompetitive’ vary, however, and the concept is notoriously difficult to operationalize in legal decision making. By itself, therefore, this goal is too broad. A second goal could give further guidance—protecting the process of competition from private restraints. The idea is contained in some form in all competition law systems, and thus it provides another shared basis for a pathway strategy. Although there can be uncertainty about the edges of the concept, it makes clear that the competitive process itself is the focus of the project, thus further limiting the set of acceptable national goals. Th e goal of providing durable benefits to consumers could further limit the acceptable range of goals. Again, virtually all competition law systems seek to protect the consumer, so it can also provide a basis for commitment. Together, a package of goals such as this might provide a viable basic goal framework. c. Potential problem areas The history of competition law development points to three potential problem areas in developing an acceptable goal structure. One is whether non-economic goals should be part of such a project. Competition laws have often pursued political and social goals in addition to their economic goals. In post-war Europe and in Japan, for example, competition law was often explicitly or implicitly intended to support democratic development. Experience with competition law has, however, revealed the difficulties of using competition law for non-economic goals, and the general trend has been to eliminate them. Given that a multinational project for competition law creates obligations for not one state, but many, such goals are likely to be incompatible with its objectives. A second potentially difficult issue involves the goal of consumer welfare (in the sense of neoclassical economics). US officials and scholars (as well as many European competition officials) now generally assume that consumer welfare should provide the only goal of competition law, but many outside the US do not accept this view. Given that US support is likely to be necessary for the success of any global competition law project, this creates a potentially serious basis for conflict. Th ere may, however, be ways to minimize this conflict. For example, the consumer welfare standard is based on the application of price theory to a unified market. It does not take into account the existence of political borders. Th is at least calls into question whether it can be effective as the sole goal in a competition law strategy in which national boundaries play a central role. Moreover, the consumer welfare standard is most effectively used for short-run analysis, but a pathway project depends on maintaining political commitment over time. Those who favor consumer welfare as the sole goal of competition law may, therefore, be willing to broaden their range of acceptable goals, at least over the near term, in order to obtain the benefits of the project. Another potential obstacle involves the goal of economic development. As we have seen, many countries have used competition law as a tool for development. Moreover, developing countries have often argued that economic development should be a goal of competition law, because economic development can be expected to create additional competitors as well as broader markets and thus enhance competition in the long run.¹³ Many kinds of policies may, however, be seen as supporting economic development, and thus identifying it as a goal for a pathway project gives little guidance. In addition, such a goal could easily be used to justify policies that are inconsistent with competition goals. In a pathway strategy, however, there may be no need for developing countries to insist on development as a goal, because the strategy provides flexibility in the timing of obligations and allows obligations regarding norms to be phased in over time. It is thus itself development-oriented. Most, perhaps all, of the arguments supporting development as a goal can be satisfied through the long-term orientation of the pathway concept. In a pathway context, goals must guide the construction of the process and provide incentives to support it. Accordingly, in formulating goals that can perform this function effectively, the objective should be to articulate a set of goals that is specific enough to achieve commitment from states that prefer a narrow conception of goals, but broad enough to attract commitment from those who have a broader vision of goals. Each will have to accommodate the other. This can be justified if it supports a process that gives both groups most of what they want or is at least superior to its alternatives. 4. Commitment in norm-setting Th e pathway concept requires that participants eventually restrict the norms that they apply to global markets. Th is narrowing of acceptable norms would have to be phased in over time, depending on factors in a country’s economy and political system as well as on the capacity and experience of its institutions. Some norms may be required early in the process, whereas others may be phased in as the project’s benefits are demonstrated and working relationships are created. a. Potential obstacles Two issues are likely to be prominent in reaching agreement on substantive norms. One is the role of economics. Recall that economics plays two basic roles in competition law: one is to interpret data, the other is to provide norms or standards of conduct. Our concern here is with its normative role. In the US, that role is central. There are few ‘rules’ that are based solely on the characteristics of the conduct itself. Legal decisions usually focus on economic analysis of the actual or probable effects of the conduct under the circumstances of a specific case. Economics here plays a normative role. It determines the lawfulness of the conduct. As we have seen, the European Commission has recently moved toward this view, at least in most areas of competition law. Th is normative role for economics is, however, rare in other competition law systems. It creates a degree of legal uncertainty that few countries have accepted. In these systems, conduct is typically deemed unlawful where the conduct itself has specified characteristics or relatively specific effects, without requiring full analysis of its economic consequences in each specific case. A full effects-based economic analysis is expensive, and many countries do not have the resources to perform such an analysis. In the near term, therefore, it probably cannot be required as part of a global competition law strategy. Divergence in views about the role of economics is thus likely to present challenges for any global competition law agreement, but one value of a pathway strategy is that it may be able to develop uses of economics that can bridge the gap. For example, officials and experts from participating countries could together develop common scenarios in which anti-competitive effects can be presumed or excluded.¹⁴ National competition officials and courts would be free to apply their laws according to their own procedures, but the scenarios would serve as guidelines for their decisions. Moreover, the group may eventually even include an obligation that national decision makers give reasons for reaching conclusions that are inconsistent with these scenarios. This may be a way of reducing concerns in the US and Europe about inadequate economic analysis and also meeting the demands of other systems for greater legal security. The issue of whether norms should apply equally to all participants may also be an obstacle to agreement. It has created significant difficulties in previous discussions of global competition law, and it continues to be a major part of discussions in the area. Developing countries often argue that for historical and other reasons fi rms located in their countries have had limited opportunity to grow and to become competitive on global markets. As a result, if they are subjected to competition from larger foreign fi rms, they will have little chance of success, and global markets will forever be dominated by firms from a few countries. Th is, they claim, justifies what is often called ‘special and differential treatment’ for them. Other states have generally been unwilling to accept such treatment in the context of competition law.¹⁵ This issue is likely to be critical to competition law development, but the pathway concept may be uniquely positioned to accommodate it, because that strategy allows norms to be phased in over time, depending on factors such as the economic conditions in the participant state. A developing country’s obligations could thus automatically be tailored to its level of economic development, and differential treatment would gradually be eliminated over time. b. Specific types of norms—cartels A brief review of the main categories of norms illustrates some of these issues. The treatment of cartels could serve as a starting point and foundation for a pathway strategy. There is widespread agreement that cartels are generally harmful, and most, if not all, competition laws either prohibit them or contain norms intended to deter them. The economic harms from cartels are usually obvious, and even relatively low-cost deployment of economic analysis can identify them. This means that there may be little difficulty in requiring competition law systems to prohibit cartels. This would allow states to develop experience with the project and to develop trust, knowledge pathways, and feedback loops—all of which can provide momentum for further commitment. Above all, enforcement in the area can be expected to generate benefits that would further support the project.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Export cartels are a <u>key starting point</u> for broader multilateral cooperation that <u>guarantees enforcement</h4><p></u><strong>Gerber 10</strong> – (David Gerber, Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, B.A. from Trinity College, M.A. from Yale University, and J.D. from the University of Chicago, Awarded the Degree of Honorary Doctor of Laws by the University of Zurich, Former Visiting Professor at the Law Schools of the University of Pennsylvania, Northwestern University, and Washington University; published 2010, Oxford University Press, “Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization,“ doa: 11-4-2021) doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228225.001.0001</p><p>a. Criteria for goals</p><p>The most obvious criteria for <u><strong><mark>goals</u></strong></mark> is that they <u><strong><mark>must be</mark> sufficiently <mark>attractive </mark>to induce and maintain commitment</u></strong> from all necessary participants in the process. As we have seen, however, <u><strong>there is a broad range of goals in existing systems, which means</u></strong> that the goals of <u><strong>the project will have to be <mark>relatively general</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and flexible</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>becoming more specifically defined through experience along the pathway. <mark>A</mark> project which assumes that a <mark>single conception of competition law</mark> favored by one or two participants at a particular point in time will be accepted and implemented by all participants <mark>is unlikely to attract</mark> widespread <mark>commitment. </mark>Goals must also be ‘graspable’ or ‘interpretable.’</u></strong> The language must identify the range of possible interpretations. If it does not, it cannot represent a common goal, and it cannot maintain support. In negotiating international agreements, it is common for parties intentionally to choose language that is too vague to guide actual decision making. That may be appropriate for other types of agreement, but it would be inconsistent with the long-term orientation of a commitment strategy.</p><p>The project’s goals must also be ‘shared’ or ‘shareable’. Where goals are shared, each participant has an interest in the effective pursuit of the goals by other participants. For example, the goal of increasing consumer welfare (as understood in neoclassical economics) is shareable, because any increase in consumer welfare on a global market benefits consumers across the market, regardless of state boundaries. In contrast, the goal of protecting a set of producers in one country would presumably not be shareable, as it relates only to those specific producers and those who benefit from their success.¹²</p><p>Finally, the agreed goals will have to be perceived as ‘fair’ by all types of participants. Goals that are likely to give significant advantages and gains to some participants (such as highly-industrialized countries) and to cause net harm to others (eg developing countries) cannot attract widespread support. At a minimum, therefore, fairness is likely to require that all participants have a reasonable prospect of benefit. Given the non-linear nature of economic development, however, it cannot require that all benefit equally.</p><p>b. Goal structure</p><p>Goals will have to be related to each other in ways that guide the development of national systems. As an example of such a structure, we use three goals which, if applied together, might form the basis of a global competition law strategy. Th ere may be others, but my purpose here is merely to illustrate how such a goal structure might look.</p><p>The basic concept is that participants would eventually all have approximately the same goals for competition law, at least insofar as it is applied to global markets. In order to achieve that result, national competition law goals would be expected to fi t within a range of goals that narrows over time. Given that national goals often vary considerably, this process will take time and affect some countries more than others. The basic goals would be set out at the time of agreement, but the pathway concept would allow variation over time on the basis of input from the participants.</p><p><u><strong>The most basic goal of all competition laws is to deter anti-competitive conduct. <mark>Definitions of ‘anticompetitive’</mark> vary, however, and the concept <mark>is</mark> notoriously <mark>difficult to operationalize</mark> in legal decision making<mark>. By itself</mark>, therefore, <mark>this</mark> goal <mark>is too broad.</mark> </u></strong>A second goal could give further guidance—protecting the process of competition from private restraints. The idea is contained in some form in all competition law systems, and thus it provides another shared basis for a pathway strategy. Although there can be uncertainty about the edges of the concept, it makes clear that the competitive process itself is the focus of the project, thus further limiting the set of acceptable national goals. Th e goal of providing durable benefits to consumers could further limit the acceptable range of goals. Again, virtually all competition law systems seek to protect the consumer, so it can also provide a basis for commitment. Together, a package of goals such as this might provide a viable basic goal framework.</p><p>c. Potential problem areas</p><p>The history of competition law development points to three potential problem areas in developing an acceptable goal structure. One is whether non-economic goals should be part of such a project. Competition laws have often pursued political and social goals in addition to their economic goals. In post-war Europe and in Japan, for example, competition law was often explicitly or implicitly intended to support democratic development. Experience with competition law has, however, revealed the difficulties of using competition law for non-economic goals, and the general trend has been to eliminate them. Given that a multinational project for competition law creates obligations for not one state, but many, such goals are likely to be incompatible with its objectives.</p><p>A second potentially difficult issue involves the goal of consumer welfare (in the sense of neoclassical economics). US officials and scholars (as well as many European competition officials) now generally assume that consumer welfare should provide the only goal of competition law, but many outside the US do not accept this view. Given that US support is likely to be necessary for the success of any global competition law project, this creates a potentially serious basis for conflict. Th ere may, however, be ways to minimize this conflict. For example, the consumer welfare standard is based on the application of price theory to a unified market. It does not take into account the existence of political borders. Th is at least calls into question whether it can be effective as the sole goal in a competition law strategy in which national boundaries play a central role. Moreover, the consumer welfare standard is most effectively used for short-run analysis, but a pathway project depends on maintaining political commitment over time. Those who favor consumer welfare as the sole goal of competition law may, therefore, be willing to broaden their range of acceptable goals, at least over the near term, in order to obtain the benefits of the project.</p><p>Another potential obstacle involves the goal of economic development. As we have seen, many countries have used competition law as a tool for development. Moreover, developing countries have often argued that economic development should be a goal of competition law, because economic development can be expected to create additional competitors as well as broader markets and thus enhance competition in the long run.¹³ Many kinds of policies may, however, be seen as supporting economic development, and thus identifying it as a goal for a pathway project gives little guidance. In addition, such a goal could easily be used to justify policies that are inconsistent with competition goals. In a pathway strategy, however, there may be no need for developing countries to insist on development as a goal, because the strategy provides flexibility in the timing of obligations and allows obligations regarding norms to be phased in over time. It is thus itself development-oriented. Most, perhaps all, of the arguments supporting development as a goal can be satisfied through the long-term orientation of the pathway concept.</p><p>In a pathway context, goals must guide the construction of the process and provide incentives to support it. Accordingly, in formulating goals that can perform this function effectively, the objective should be to articulate a set of goals that is specific enough to achieve commitment from states that prefer a narrow conception of goals, but broad enough to attract commitment from those who have a broader vision of goals. Each will have to accommodate the other. This can be justified if it supports a process that gives both groups most of what they want or is at least superior to its alternatives.</p><p>4. Commitment in norm-setting</p><p>Th e pathway concept requires that participants eventually restrict the norms that they apply to global markets. Th is narrowing of acceptable norms would have to be phased in over time, depending on factors in a country’s economy and political system as well as on the capacity and experience of its institutions. Some norms may be required early in the process, whereas others may be phased in as the project’s benefits are demonstrated and working relationships are created.</p><p>a. Potential obstacles</p><p>Two issues are likely to be prominent in reaching agreement on substantive norms. One is the role of economics. Recall that economics plays two basic roles in competition law: one is to interpret data, the other is to provide norms or standards of conduct. Our concern here is with its normative role. In the US, that role is central. There are few ‘rules’ that are based solely on the characteristics of the conduct itself. Legal decisions usually focus on economic analysis of the actual or probable effects of the conduct under the circumstances of a specific case. Economics here plays a normative role. It determines the lawfulness of the conduct. As we have seen, the European Commission has recently moved toward this view, at least in most areas of competition law.</p><p>Th is normative role for economics is, however, rare in other competition law systems. It creates a degree of legal uncertainty that few countries have accepted. In these systems, conduct is typically deemed unlawful where the conduct itself has specified characteristics or relatively specific effects, without requiring full analysis of its economic consequences in each specific case. A full effects-based economic analysis is expensive, and many countries do not have the resources to perform such an analysis. In the near term, therefore, it probably cannot be required as part of a global competition law strategy.</p><p>Divergence in views about the role of economics is thus likely to present challenges for any global competition law agreement, but one value of a pathway strategy is that it may be able to develop uses of economics that can bridge the gap. For example, officials and experts from participating countries could together develop common scenarios in which anti-competitive effects can be presumed or excluded.¹⁴ National competition officials and courts would be free to apply their laws according to their own procedures, but the scenarios would serve as guidelines for their decisions. Moreover, the group may eventually even include an obligation that national decision makers give reasons for reaching conclusions that are inconsistent with these scenarios. This may be a way of reducing concerns in the US and Europe about inadequate economic analysis and also meeting the demands of other systems for greater legal security.</p><p>The issue of whether norms should apply equally to all participants may also be an obstacle to agreement. It has created significant difficulties in previous discussions of global competition law, and it continues to be a major part of discussions in the area. Developing countries often argue that for historical and other reasons fi rms located in their countries have had limited opportunity to grow and to become competitive on global markets. As a result, if they are subjected to competition from larger foreign fi rms, they will have little chance of success, and global markets will forever be dominated by firms from a few countries. Th is, they claim, justifies what is often called ‘special and differential treatment’ for them. Other states have generally been unwilling to accept such treatment in the context of competition law.¹⁵</p><p>This issue is likely to be critical to competition law development, but the pathway concept may be uniquely positioned to accommodate it, because that strategy allows norms to be phased in over time, depending on factors such as the economic conditions in the participant state. A developing country’s obligations could thus automatically be tailored to its level of economic development, and differential treatment would gradually be eliminated over time.</p><p>b. Specific types of norms—cartels</p><p>A brief review of the main categories of norms illustrates some of these issues. <u><strong>The treatment of <mark>cartels</mark> could <mark>serve as a starting point</mark> and foundation <mark>for</mark> a <mark>pathway strategy</mark>. <mark>There is widespread agreement</mark> that <mark>cartels </mark>are generally harmful, and</u></strong> most, if not <u><strong>all</u></strong>, <u><strong>competition laws either prohibit them or contain norms intended to deter them. The <mark>economic harms</mark> from cartels <mark>are</mark> usually <mark>obvious</mark>, and even relatively <mark>low-cost</mark> deployment of economic <mark>analysis can identify them</mark>. This means that there may be little difficulty in requiring competition law systems to prohibit cartels.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This would allow states to develop experience</u></strong></mark> with the project <u><strong>and to develop <mark>trust</mark>, <mark>knowledge</mark> pathways, <mark>and feedback loops</mark>—all of <mark>which</mark> can <mark>provide momentum for further commitment</mark>.</u></strong> Above all, enforcement in the area can be expected to generate benefits that would further support the project.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: John GEYMAN 17, MD, professor emeritus of family medicine at the University of Washington School of Medicine in Seattle, served as chairman of the Department of Family Medicine from 1976 to 1990 [“Crisis in U.S. Health Care: Corporate Power Still Blocks Reform,” International Journal of Health Services, Published Online: October 3, 2017, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries] fulltext: The ACA brought improved health care for many Americans, providing new coverage for some 16 million people through the exchanges and expansion of Medicaid in 31 states, dropping the numbers of uninsured from 49 million to about 28 million people, and establishing some limited insurance reforms. Insurers were banned from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions and were required to allow children to remain on their parents’ policies until age 26. Despite these advances, many problems remain with the ACA, including lack of cost or price containment, increasing unaffordability of insurance and care, restricted access through narrow networks without adequate regulation, high administrative overhead (five times that of traditional Medicare), a Medicaid coverage gap in 19 states that refused to expand Medicaid, and failure of most insurance co-ops intended to give consumers more options. The three programs intended to stabilize insurance premiums in revamped markets—reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment—all failed to contain premiums and resulted in market instability and a flurry of lawsuits, with many insurers leaving markets that were not sufficiently profitable.15 Two Competing GOP Bills The American Health Care Act in the House The House debate over the AHCA revealed the GOP party to be bitterly divided over such issues as to what essential health benefits should be covered, how to retain such popular provisions of the ACA as banning insurers from denying coverage on the basis of preexisting conditions and coverage for women’s reproductive health care, and how to avoid a powerful backlash from some 22 million people losing coverage under a deregulated “free market” approach. The bill was also a giveaway to the rich, with an average tax cut for the wealthiest 400 of $7 million.16 When the bill was pulled from the House floor, public support for the plan was only 17%, while President Trump’s popularity was just 37%.17 The CBO projected that insurance premiums in 2018 would increase by 15 to 20%, that federal Medicaid spending would drop by $880 billion over the coming decade, and that 52 million Americans would be uninsured in 2026.18 The Better Care Reconciliation Act in the Senate The BCRA is similar in many ways to the AHCA, especially in making huge cuts in federal spending on safety net Medicaid programs ($772 billion for the BCRA and $834 billion for the AHCA) and in cutting federal subsidies for low- and moderate-income families ($424 in the BCRA and $276 in the AHCA). The Senate bill would provide $541 billion in tax benefits for the wealthy vs. $664 billion in the House bill. Both bills would cut the federal deficit—by more than $300 billion by 2026 in the Senate bill vs. $119 billion in the House bill. As with the AHCA, the BCRA would lead to 22 million Americans becoming uninsured.19 Either bill would hit low-income people hard, with those living in rural areas most disadvantaged by consequences such as the closing of hundreds of rural hospitals.20 An NPR/PBS Newshour/Marist poll in late June found that only 18% of registered voters approved of the Senate’s health bill.21 Republicans were trying to promise, in a disingenuous way, that their bills would provide all Americans with “universal access” and more choice at less cost, clearly a lie since deregulating insurers would be a new bonanza for insurers and there can be no access if it is unaffordable. Their longer-term goal is to further privatize both Medicare and Medicaid. Caught in their dilemma of having no replacement plan, Republican leaders are trying to avoid being blamed for their proposed policies as President Trump waits for the ACA “to explode,” thereby shifting blame to the Democrats. Single-Payer Expanded and Improved Medicare for All Act This proposal, as national health insurance, is the only way that all Americans will ever achieve universal coverage of health care, wherever they live and regardless of their health status or income. Under national health insurance (NHI) and its current bill (H.R. 676) in the House, they will have free choice of physicians and hospitals without copayments or other out-of-pocket costs at the point of service. Benefits include physician and hospital care, outpatient care, dental and vision services, rehabilitation, long-term care, home care, mental health care, and prescription drugs. Private insurers will be banned from providing duplicative coverage to the public program. The public financing system will be coupled with a private delivery system, whereby budgets with hospitals and other facilities will be negotiated annually, physicians will be paid on a negotiated fee system, and prices of prescription drugs will be negotiated (as the Veterans Administration has done for years, getting discounts of more than 40% based on bulk purchasing). NHI will be funded through an equitable system of progressive taxes, with 95 [percent] % of taxpayers paying less than they do now for insurance and care. Much of today’s bureaucracy in health care will be eliminated, saving $503 billion a year on reduced administrative overhead; an additional $113 billion will be saved annually by negotiating drug prices.22Table 1 compares these three reform alternatives. Today’s Crisis in U.S. Health Care Despite significant progress under the ACA, these markers show that the nation’s health care system is still in a crisis mode. • Access to care is still a barrier for 28 million uninsured as well at least 30 million people who are underinsured. • Annual deductibles over $5,000 have become common, together with rising copayments, coinsurance, surprise bills, and other out of-pocket expenses. • Churning of coverage is endemic in the ACA’s marketplace, with 43% of returning consumers switching plans in the federal exchange in 2015, often forcing a change of physicians and available hospitals.23 • In a system without significant price controls, the ACA has provided no significant cost containment, as health care stocks on Wall Street have soared. • The combined annual cost of insurance and care now exceeds $25,000 for typical families of four, way beyond their budgets in view of the median annual family income of $53,800. • According to a 2014 report from the Commonwealth Fund, almost 30% of privately insured, working-age Americans with deductibles at least 5% of their annual income did not go to a doctor for a medical problem because of costs.24 • Medical bankruptcies still affect more than one million people each year, despite most having had insurance before their illness or accident. • A one-year cost of cancer drugs often exceeds $200,000, and many patients have to choose between forgoing treatment and bankruptcy.25 • With no physician workforce plan in force, the nation’s primary care shortage continues to get worse, as is also the case with psychiatry; less than 10% of U.S. medical school graduates enter family medicine today, while a majority of internists and pediatricians reject primary care in favor of subspecialty practice. • As a result of the decline of primary care physicians, fragmentation and depersonalization of care are now the norm, with continuity of care difficult to attain. • Since many psychiatric hospital beds have been closed in recent decades, jails now house 10 times more mentally ill people than state mental hospitals26; only 4 in 10 jails offer them psychiatric medications.27 • Quality of care is mediocre for much of the population; medical errors account for about 250,000 deaths each year,28 while a recent study of 22 million hospital admissions found that patients are three times more likely to die in the worst hospitals and have 13 times as many medical complications compared to the best hospitals.29 • Cross-national studies by the Commonwealth Fund have shown for years that the United States performs at or near the bottom among 11 advanced countries in access, efficiency, equity, and quality of health care.30 • Faced with uncertainty in the health insurance markets, many insurers are exiting the market for 2018, leaving more than 1,370 counties in the United States with only one available insurer on the ACA exchanges.31<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Only <u>single-payer</u> solves universal coverage and costs.</h4><p>John <strong>GEYMAN 17</strong>, MD, professor emeritus of family medicine at the University of Washington School of Medicine in Seattle, served as chairman of the Department of Family Medicine from 1976 to 1990 [“Crisis in U.S. Health Care: Corporate Power Still Blocks Reform,” International Journal of Health Services, Published Online: October 3, 2017, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]</p><p><u><mark>The ACA</mark> brought improved health care for many</u> Americans, <u>providing new coverage for some 16 million people through</u> the <u>exchanges and expansion of Medicaid</u> in 31 states, <u>dropping the numbers of uninsured</u> from 49 million <u>to</u> about <u>28 million people, and establishing some limited insurance reforms</u>. Insurers were banned from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions and were required to allow children to remain on their parents’ policies until age 26.</p><p>Despite these advances, <u>many problems remain</u> with the ACA, <u>including lack of cost</u> or price <u>containment, increasing unaffordability of insurance and care, restricted access through narrow networks</u> without adequate regulation, <u>high administrative overhead</u> (<u>five times that of</u> traditional <u>Medicare</u>), <u>a Medicaid coverage gap in 19 states</u> that refused to expand Medicaid, <u>and failure of most insurance co-ops intended to give consumers more options. The three programs intended to stabilize insurance premiums in revamped markets</u>—reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment—<u>all <mark>failed to contain premiums and resulted in <strong>market instability</strong></mark> and a flurry of lawsuits, with many insurers leaving markets that were not sufficiently profitable</u>.15</p><p>Two Competing GOP Bills</p><p>The American Health Care Act in the House</p><p>The House debate over the AHCA revealed the GOP party to be bitterly divided over such issues as to what essential health benefits should be covered, how to retain such popular provisions of the ACA as banning insurers from denying coverage on the basis of preexisting conditions and coverage for women’s reproductive health care, and how to avoid a powerful backlash from some 22 million people losing coverage under a deregulated “free market” approach. The bill was also a giveaway to the rich, with an average tax cut for the wealthiest 400 of $7 million.16 When the bill was pulled from the House floor, public support for the plan was only 17%, while President Trump’s popularity was just 37%.17 The CBO projected that insurance premiums in 2018 would increase by 15 to 20%, that federal Medicaid spending would drop by $880 billion over the coming decade, and that 52 million Americans would be uninsured in 2026.18</p><p>The Better Care Reconciliation Act in the Senate</p><p>The BCRA is similar in many ways to the AHCA, especially in making huge cuts in federal spending on safety net Medicaid programs ($772 billion for the BCRA and $834 billion for the AHCA) and in cutting federal subsidies for low- and moderate-income families ($424 in the BCRA and $276 in the AHCA). The Senate bill would provide $541 billion in tax benefits for the wealthy vs. $664 billion in the House bill. Both bills would cut the federal deficit—by more than $300 billion by 2026 in the Senate bill vs. $119 billion in the House bill. As with the AHCA, the BCRA would lead to 22 million Americans becoming uninsured.19 Either bill would hit low-income people hard, with those living in rural areas most disadvantaged by consequences such as the closing of hundreds of rural hospitals.20 An NPR/PBS Newshour/Marist poll in late June found that only 18% of registered voters approved of the Senate’s health bill.21</p><p>Republicans were trying to promise, in a disingenuous way, that their bills would provide all Americans with “universal access” and more choice at less cost, clearly a lie since deregulating insurers would be a new bonanza for insurers and there can be no access if it is unaffordable. Their longer-term goal is to further privatize both Medicare and Medicaid.</p><p>Caught in their dilemma of having no replacement plan, Republican leaders are trying to avoid being blamed for their proposed policies as President Trump waits for the ACA “to explode,” thereby shifting blame to the Democrats.</p><p><u><mark>Single-Payer</mark> Expanded and Improved Medicare for All Act</p><p>This proposal, as <strong>national health insurance</strong>, <mark>is the only way</u></mark> that <u><mark>all</mark> Americans <mark>will</mark> ever <mark>achieve</mark> universal <mark>coverage</u></mark> of health care, <u>wherever they live and regardless of their health status or income. <mark>Under</mark> national health insurance (<mark>NHI</mark>)</u> and its current bill (H.R. 676) in the House, <u><mark>they</mark> will <mark>have</mark> free <mark>choice of physicians</mark> and hospitals <strong><mark>without copayments</strong></mark> or other</u> out-of-pocket <u>costs at the point of service. Benefits include physician and hospital care, outpatient care, dental and vision services, rehabilitation, long-term care, home care, mental health care, and prescription drugs. <mark>Private insurers will be banned from</mark> providing <mark>duplicative coverage</mark> to the public program</u>. The <u>public financing</u> system <u>will be coupled with</u> a <u>private delivery</u> system, <u>whereby <mark>budgets</mark> with hospitals and other facilities will be <mark>negotiated annually</mark>, physicians will be paid on a negotiated fee system, and prices of prescription drugs will be negotiated</u> (<u>as the V</u>eterans <u>A</u>dministration <u>has done for years</u>, getting discounts of more than 40% based on bulk purchasing).</p><p><u>NHI will be <mark>funded through</mark> an equitable system of <strong><mark>progressive taxes</strong>, with 95 [percent]</mark> % of taxpayers <mark>paying less</mark> than they do now for insurance and care. Much of today’s <mark>bureaucracy</u></mark> in health care <u>will be <mark>eliminated, saving</mark> $<mark>503 billion</mark> a year <mark>on reduced</mark> administrative <mark>overhead</mark>; an additional $<mark>113 billion</mark> will be saved</u> annually <u><mark>by negotiating drug prices</u></mark>.22Table 1 compares these three reform alternatives.</p><p>Today’s Crisis in U.S. Health Care</p><p>Despite significant progress under the ACA, these markers show that <u><mark>the</mark> nation’s <mark>health</mark> care <mark>system is</mark> still <mark>in</mark> a <strong><mark>crisis mode</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>• <u>Access to care is</u> still <u>a barrier for 28 million uninsured as well at least <strong>30 million</strong> people who are <strong>underinsured</u></strong>.</p><p>• <u>Annual deductibles over $5,000 have become common, together with rising copayments</u>, coinsurance, surprise bills, <u>and other out of-pocket expenses</u>. </p><p>• <u>Churning of coverage is endemic in the ACA’s marketplace, with 43% of returning consumers switching plans</u> in the federal exchange in 2015, often <u>forcing a change of physicians and available hospitals</u>.23</p><p>• In a system without significant price controls, <u>the ACA has provided <strong>no</strong> significant <strong>cost containment</strong>, as health care stocks</u> on Wall Street <u>have soared</u>.</p><p>• <u>The</u> combined <u>annual cost of <mark>insurance</u></mark> and care now <u><mark>exceeds</mark> $<mark>25,000 for</mark> typical <mark>families</mark> of four, way beyond</u> their budgets in view of <u>the median annual family income of $53,800</u>.</p><p>• <u>According to a 2014 report from the Commonwealth Fund, almost <mark>30% of privately insured</mark>, working-age Americans with deductibles at least 5% of their annual income <mark>did not go to a doctor</mark> for a medical problem <strong><mark>because of costs</u></strong></mark>.24</p><p>• <u><strong><mark>Medical bankruptcies</strong></mark> still <mark>affect more than <strong>one million</mark> people each year</u></strong>, despite most having had insurance before their illness or accident.</p><p>• A one-year cost of cancer drugs often exceeds $200,000, and many patients have to choose between forgoing treatment and bankruptcy.25</p><p>• <u>With no physician workforce plan in force, the nation’s primary care shortage continues to get worse</u>, as is also the case with psychiatry; <u>less than 10% of U.S. medical school graduates enter family medicine today, while a majority of internists and pediatricians reject primary care in favor of subspecialty practice</u>.</p><p>• As a result of the decline of primary care physicians, <u><mark>fragmentation and depersonalization of care are</mark> now <mark>the norm</mark>, with continuity of care difficult to attain</u>.</p><p>• Since many psychiatric hospital beds have been closed in recent decades, jails now house 10 times more mentally ill people than state mental hospitals26; only 4 in 10 jails offer them psychiatric medications.27</p><p>• <u>Quality of care is mediocre for much of the population; <mark>medical errors account for</mark> about <strong><mark>250,000 deaths </mark>each year</u></strong>,28 <u>while a recent study of 22 million hospital admissions found that patients are three times more likely to die in the worst hospitals and have 13 times as many medical complications compared to the best hospitals</u>.29</p><p>• <u>Cross-national studies by the Commonwealth Fund have shown for years that the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>performs at or near the bottom among 11 advanced countries in access, efficiency, equity, and quality of health care</u>.30</p><p>• <u>Faced with uncertainty in the health insurance markets, many <mark>insurers are <strong>exiting</strong></mark> the market for 2018, <mark>leaving more than 1,370 counties</mark> in the U</u>nited States <u><mark>with <strong>only one</strong></mark> available insurer on the ACA exchanges</u>.31</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Smith ‘21 — Professor emeritus of philosophy at Iowa State University, PhD State University of New York at Stony Brook, B.A. Boston College and additional graduate work at the University of Tübingen and University of Munich. (Tony; Published: March/April 2021; "The Deadly Metabolic Rift"; Against the Current No. 211; https://againstthecurrent.org/atc211/the-deadly-metabolic-rift/)//CYang fulltext: (1) There is indeed “an existential crisis in the human relation to the earth.” (1) Over the last 10,000 years planetary conditions fluctuated within relatively narrow and stable boundaries. The entire history of settled human civilizations has unfolded in this “Holocene” period of our planet’s life. This period has now concluded. In a number of areas crucially important to humanity, these boundaries have been (or are about to be) transgressed: climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, changes in land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. (244) Human activity is the main causal factor explaining this development, leading earth scientists to refer to the new period as the “Anthropocene.” The authors of an important study cited by Foster and Clark warn that if the upper-range of projections of global warming were to occur it “would severely challenge the viability of contemporary human societies.”(1) When we recall how little has been done to prevent increased global warming, and how y-it is only one of the numerous planetary transformations imposing comparable risks on human societies, talk of an “existential threat” is fully warranted. (2) There is no “technological fix” for this existential crisis. The more intelligent representatives of capital do not deny that serious environmental challenges must be faced. For them, however, this is best done by working with capitalist markets and not against them. A carbon tax on polluting firms would give companies a strong market incentive to lower their costs by using technologies requiring fewer carbon emissions. Having to purchase rights to release carbon into the atmosphere in carbon markets would supposedly have the same effect, in their view. There are also calls for the state to support firms undertaking massive geoengineering projects, such as sending aerosols into the upper atmosphere to reflect away the sun’s rays before they increase the planet’s surface temperature. Another proposal is to install technologies capable of extracting and sequestering significant amounts of carbon from the atmosphere. As Foster and Clark remind us, technological change in capitalism tends to develop “greener” technologies without any special spur. Over the course of the industrial revolution, for example, each succeeding generation of steam engines became “greener” over time, burning less coal per unit of output than the one before. The total amount of coal burned in England increased nonetheless. (245) This “Jevons paradox” (named after the British political economist who first brought it to attention) is easily explained: the increase in the number of units produced overwhelmed the reduction of coal use per unit, leading to more coal being burned overall. Is there any reason to think that introducing technologies “greener” than those employed today won’t have a similarly paradoxical result? Investors in the stock market, whose pricing of oil companies’ stocks assumes that the last drop of oil in the ground will be profitably extracted, do not seem to think so. (243-4) Engineering Disaster Regarding geoengineering projects, Foster and Clark repeat the warning of many scientists that such unprecedented technological experiments would almost surely have pernicious consequences as harmful as the harms they are supposed to alleviate. (278) Further, their massive scale would leave few resources for other social needs. An infrastructure capable of handling annual throughput 70 percent larger than that handled currently by the global crude oil industry would be required, along with ridiculous quantities of water — 130 billion tons annually just to capture and store U.S. emissions. (280) Far from being a step towards socialism (as some techno-utopians of the left hold), government funded geoengineering would simply solidify an environmental industrial complex alongside the military industrial complex, the pharmaceutical industrial complex, and other complexes of big capital. (281-2) Finally, once again, climate change is only one way in which present environmental trends will soon “severely challenge the viability of contemporary human societies.” In all the other cases too the sorts of technologies that have been developed, and the ways they have been used, have been part of the story of how we got to the present “existential crisis.” Unless we figure out why that has been the case and eliminate that reason, to think we will be saved by technologies is to indulge in fantasy. (3) Capitalism is the fundamental cause of the existential crisis in the relation between humans and the earth. All living beings appropriate resources from their environment and all generate wastes back into their surroundings. For a species to successfully occupy an environmental niche, the rate at which it depletes resources from its ecosystem must correspond to the rate they are replenished, and the rate it generates wastes must be aligned with the rate wastes can be processed. When the social forms of capitalism are in place, neither condition is met, creating the metabolic rift between human society and its environment. Capitalist market societies are distinguished from other societies in that products generally take the form of commodities sold for a profit. Any capitalist producers who do not attempt to make as much profit as possible, as fast as possible, will find themselves losing market share to those who do, if not forced out of existence altogether. Making as much profit as possible, as fast as possible, generally means producing and selling as many commodities as possible, as fast as possible. This accelerated temporality is in tension with the temporality of our environment; resources tend to be depleted at a faster rate than they can be replenished, and wastes generated at a faster rate than they can be processed. From this standpoint the “Jevons Paradox” is less a paradox than a general description of how capitalism works. Any environmental benefits from technologies using fewer natural resources or generating fewer wastes per unit of production necessarily tends to be overwhelmed by the increase in the number of commodities produced in response to the “Grow or die!” imperative so ruthlessly imposed by the demands of capital accumulation. From Local to Global Destruction In the early phases of capitalist development, environmental destruction was relatively localized. After a handful of centuries of global expansion, it has sucked in resources from the natural world and spewed out wastes on a global scale, creating a fundamental rift in the metabolic relationship between human beings and the earth that is our home.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>That causes <u>environmental extinction</u>---<u>depletion</u> and <u>waste</u> crisis <u>outpace technological gains</u>. </h4><p><strong>Smith ‘21</strong> — Professor emeritus of philosophy at Iowa State University, PhD State University of New York at Stony Brook, B.A. Boston College and additional graduate work at the University of Tübingen and University of Munich. (Tony; Published: March/April 2021; "The Deadly Metabolic Rift"; Against the Current No. 211; https://againstthecurrent.org/atc211/the-deadly-metabolic-rift/)//CYang</p><p>(1) <u><mark>There is</mark> indeed</u> “<u><mark>an <strong>existential crisis</strong></mark> in</u> the <u>human relation to</u> the <u>earth</u>.” (1) Over the last 10,000 years planetary conditions fluctuated within relatively narrow and stable boundaries. The entire history of settled human civilizations has unfolded in this “Holocene” period of our planet’s life.</p><p>This period has now concluded. In a number of areas crucially important to humanity, these <u><mark>boundaries have been</u></mark> (or are about to be) <u><mark>transgressed: <strong>climate</mark> change</strong>, <mark>ocean acidification</mark>, <strong>stratospheric <mark>ozone depletion</strong>, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use</mark>, changes in land</u> use, <u><mark>biodiversity</mark> loss, <strong>atmospheric <mark>aerosol</mark> loading</strong>, <mark>and chemical pollution</u></mark>. (244)</p><p><u>Human activity is the <strong>main causal factor</strong> explaining this</u> development, leading earth scientists to refer to the new period as the “Anthropocene.”</p><p>The authors of an important study cited by Foster and Clark warn that <u>if</u> the upper-range of projections of <u>global warming</u> were to occur <u>it</u> “<u>would <strong>severely challenge</u></strong> the <u>viability of contemporary human societies</u>.”(1) When we recall how little has been done to prevent increased global warming, and how y-it is only one of the numerous planetary transformations imposing comparable risks on human societies, <u>talk of</u> an “<u>existential threat</u>” <u>is <strong>fully warranted</u></strong>.</p><p>(2) <u><mark>There is no</u></mark> “<u><strong><mark>tech</mark>nological <mark>fix</u></strong></mark>” <u>for this existential crisis</u>. The more intelligent representatives of capital do not deny that serious environmental challenges must be faced. For them, however, this is best done by working with capitalist markets and not against them.</p><p>A carbon tax on polluting firms would give companies a strong market incentive to lower their costs by using technologies requiring fewer carbon emissions. Having to purchase rights to release carbon into the atmosphere in carbon markets would supposedly have the same effect, in their view.</p><p>There are also calls for the state to support firms undertaking massive geoengineering projects, such as sending aerosols into the upper atmosphere to reflect away the sun’s rays before they increase the planet’s surface temperature. Another proposal is to install technologies capable of extracting and sequestering significant amounts of carbon from the atmosphere.</p><p>As Foster and Clark remind us, technological change in capitalism tends to develop “greener” technologies without any special spur. Over the course of the industrial revolution, for example, each succeeding generation of steam engines became “greener” over time, burning less coal per unit of output than the one before. The total amount of coal burned in England increased nonetheless. (245)</p><p>This “<u><strong><mark>Jevons paradox</u></strong></mark>” (named after the British political economist who first brought it to attention) <u><mark>is <strong>easily explained</strong>: the increase in</u> </mark>the <u>number of <mark>units produced <strong>overwhelmed</strong> the <strong>reduction</mark> of coal use</strong> <mark>per unit</u></mark>, leading to more coal being burned overall.</p><p>Is there <u>any reason to think</u> that introducing <u>technologies</u> “<u>greener</u>” than those employed today <u>won’t have</u> a similarly <u>paradoxical result</u>? <u>Investors</u> in the stock market, whose pricing of oil companies’ stocks assumes that the last drop of oil in the ground will be profitably extracted, <u>do not</u> seem to <u>think so</u>. (243-4)</p><p>Engineering Disaster</p><p>Regarding <u><mark>geoengineering</mark> projects</u>, Foster and Clark repeat the warning of many scientists that such <u><strong>unprecedented technological experiments</strong> would</u> almost <u><mark>surely have <strong>pernicious consequences</strong></mark> as harmful as</u> the <u>harms they</u> are <u>supposed to alleviate</u>. (278)</p><p>Further, their <u><strong>massive <mark>scale</u></strong></mark> would <u><mark>leave few resources for <strong>other</mark> social <mark>needs</u></strong></mark>. An infrastructure capable of handling annual throughput 70 percent larger than that handled currently by the global crude oil industry would be required, along with ridiculous quantities of water — 130 billion tons annually just to capture and store U.S. emissions. (280)</p><p><u><mark>Far from</u></mark> being <u>a <mark>step towards socialism</u></mark> (<u>as</u> some <u><strong>techno-utopians</u></strong> of the left <u>hold</u>), <u>government funded <mark>geoengineering</u></mark> would <u><strong>simply <mark>solidify</strong></mark> an <mark>environmental industrial complex</u></mark> alongside the military industrial complex, the pharmaceutical industrial complex, <u>and</u> other complexes of <u>big capital</u>. (281-2)</p><p>Finally, once again, climate change is only one way in which present environmental trends will soon “severely challenge the viability of contemporary human societies.” In all the other cases too the sorts of <u><mark>technologies</mark> that have been developed</u>, and the ways they have been used, have been <u><mark>part of the</mark> story of</u> how we got to <u>the <strong>present</u></strong> “<u><strong><mark>existential crisis</u></strong></mark>.”</p><p>Unless we figure out why that has been the case and eliminate that reason, <u>to think we will be saved by technologies is to <strong>indulge in fantasy</u></strong>.</p><p>(3) <u><mark>Capitalism is the</mark> <strong>fundamental <mark>cause</strong></mark> of the existential crisis</u> in the relation between humans and the earth. All living beings appropriate resources from their environment and all generate wastes back into their surroundings. <u><mark>For a species</mark> to successfully occupy</u> an <u>environmental niche, the <mark>rate at which it <strong>depletes resources</u></strong></mark> from its ecosystem <u><mark>must correspond to</u></mark> the <u><mark>rate they are <strong>replenished</strong>, and</u></mark> the <u>rate it generates <mark>wastes must be aligned with</u></mark> the <u><mark>rate</mark> wastes can be processed</u>.</p><p><u><mark>When</u> </mark>the <u>social <mark>forms of capitalism are in place, <strong>neither</mark> condition <mark>is met</strong>, creating the metabolic rift </mark>between human society and</u> its <u>environment</u>.</p><p>Capitalist market societies are distinguished from other societies in that products generally take the form of commodities sold for a profit. Any capitalist producers who do not attempt to make as much profit as possible, as fast as possible, will find themselves losing market share to those who do, if not forced out of existence altogether.</p><p><u><mark>Making as <strong>much</mark> profit as possible</strong>, <mark>as fast as possible</u></mark>, generally means <u>producing and selling as many commodities as possible, as fast as possible</u>. This <u><strong>accelerated temporality</strong> <mark>is in tension with the temporality of our environment; resources</u> </mark>tend to be <u><mark>deplete</mark>d at a faster rate</u> than <u>they can be replenished, and <mark>wastes generate</mark>d at</u> a <u>faster rate than they can be processed</u>.</p><p>From this standpoint the “<u><mark>Jevons Paradox</u></mark>” <u><mark>is</u></mark> less a paradox than <u><mark>a</mark> </u>general <u><mark>description of </mark>how <mark>capitalism </mark>works. <strong>Any <mark>environmental benefits</u></strong></mark> from technologies <u>using fewer</u> natural <u>resources or generating fewer wastes</u> per unit of production <u>necessarily <mark>tend</mark>s <mark>to be <strong>overwhelmed</strong> by</u></mark> the <u>increase in</u> the number of <u>commodities produced in response to the</u> “<u><strong><mark>Grow or die</strong></mark>!</u>” <u><mark>imperative</u> </mark>so <u><strong>ruthlessly imposed</strong> by</u> the <u>demands of capital accumulation</u>.</p><p>From Local to Global Destruction</p><p>In the early phases of <u>capitalist development</u>, environmental destruction was relatively localized. After a handful of centuries of global expansion, it has <u>sucked in resources from the natural world and spewed</u> out <u>wastes on a <strong>global scale</strong>, creating</u> a <u><strong>fundamental rift</strong> in the metabolic relationship between human beings and</u> the <u>earth</u><strong> that is our home.</p></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Rominger 16 – Alan Rominger, PhD Candidate in Nuclear Engineering at North Carolina State University, Software Engineer at Red Hat, Former Nuclear Engineering Science Laboratory Synthesis Intern at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, BS in Nuclear Engineering from North Carolina State University, “The Extreme Version of the Technological Singularity”, Medium 11-6, https://medium.com/@AlanSE/the-extreme-version-of-the-technological-singularity-75608898eae5 fulltext: In a fundamentally accurate interpretation of the singularity, there is no such thing as post-singularity. It is this point that I would like to re-focus attention back to. People who talk about post-singularity time are ignoring the basic principle of what an asymptote is. It’s not something that increases rapidly, and then increases more rapidly over time. A true asymptote increases so rapidly that it reaches infinity in finite time. I find this even more relevant as people have become concerned about Artificial Intelligence, and essentially, killer robots. The “paperclip” story is a common fallback anecdote about an AI designed to make paperclips. It goes in some steps something like: We design an AI to optimize paperclip production The AI improves up to the ability of self-enhancement AI’s pace of improvement becomes self-reinforcing, becomes god-like All humans are killed, rest of universe turned into paperclips Here, somewhere around step number 3, the “singularity” happens in its watered-down format. No true singularity happened in this story. So let’s indulge that possibility just a little bit. To take a particular point in the paperclip-ization of the universe, let’s consider the years after the AI becomes an inter-stellar space-faring entity. Now, it’s entirely reasonable to assume that it acts as Von Neumann probes. If it can reach Alpha Centauri at all, then it can multiply to exploit all of the resources in that solar system within a short period of time, due to the multiplication times for nanotechnology, yada yada. As a simple observation, the vast majority of the solar system’s energy and mass lie in the star itself. This would then imply that the AI indulges itself in star-lifting, and uses the contents of the star in fusion power plants. This process is partially rate-limited, but not to an extreme extent. The energy liberated in the use of fusion power to make paperclips would be on the scale of a supernova (in fact, vastly exceed it). As long as the AI is not operating a scrith-based society, it is also temperature-limited. This means that it will not only star-lift, but disperse the pieces in as wide of a range as possible. Given the enormous industrial capabilities of the AI, pieces of the star will mutually fan outward in all directions at once at highly relativistic speeds (although a large fraction of mass will be left in-place, because the specific energy of the fusion reaction is insufficient to move all the mass at high speeds). The most interesting detail of this process is just how defined and fast of a time-frame that it can happen in. The energy consumption rate is plainly and obviously limited by the relativistic expansion of material into space. There’s hardly any observation that matters other than a spherical boundary expanding into the galactic neighborhood at relativistic speed. If the AI is truly smart, then we might as well assume that this process is basically trivial to it. Its nature is to optimize and break-through any limit that restricts the number of paperclips made. So sure, expansion would happen at this mundane rate for a while, and this rate is very well-defined. Moving between stars in the local group at relativistic speed is simply a matter of decades, and there’s hardly anything else to say about the matter. This is where the concept of a singularity in the proper sense becomes interesting. What optimization does a multi-star, multi-supernova-power-consuming race of AI find? Clearly, this is the point at which they would be irresistibly tempted to test the limits of physics on a level that humans have not yet been able to probe. The entire game from that point on is a matter of what limitations on expansion yet-unknown laws of physics place on industrial expansion. It’s also very likely that whatever transition happens at this point redefines, fundamentally, the basic concepts of time and space. Let’s reformulate that story of the AI paperclip maker. We design an AI to optimize paperclip production The AI improves up to the ability of self-enhancement AI’s pace of improvement becomes self-reinforcing, becomes god-like Time ends. Something else begins? There are many valid-sounding possibilities for the 5th step. The AI creates new baby universes from black holes. Maybe not exactly in this way. Perhaps the baby universes have to be created in particle accelerators, which is obvious to the AI after it solves the string theory problems of how our universe is folded. There’s also no guarantee that whatever next step is involved can be taken without destroying the universe that we live in. Go ahead, imagine that the particle accelerators create a new universe but trigger the vacuum instability in our own. In this case, it’s entirely possible that the AI carefully plans and coordinates the death of our universe. For a simplistic example, let’s say that after lifting the 10 nearest stars, the AI realizes the most efficient ways to stimulate the curved dimensions on the Planck scale to create baby universes. Next, it conducts an optimization study to balance the number of times this operation can be performed with gains from further expansion. Since its plans begin to largely max-out once the depth of the galactic disk is exploited, I will assume that its go-point is somewhere around the colonization of half of the milky way. At this point, a coordinated experiment is conducted throughout all of the space. Each of these events both create a baby universe and trigger an event in our own universe which destroys the meta-stable vacuum that we live in. Billions of new universes are created, while the space-time that we live in begins to unravel in a light-speed front emanating out from each of the genesis points. There is an interesting energy-management concept that comes from this. A common problem when considering exponential galactic growth of star-lifted fusion power is that the empty space begins to get cooked from the high temperature radiated out into space. If the end-time of the universe was known in advance, this wouldn’t be a problem because one star would not absorb the radiation from the neighbor star until the light had time to propagate that distance at the speed of light. That means that the radiators can pump out high-temperature radiation into nice and normal 4-Kelvin space without concerns of boiling all the industrial machinery being used. Industrial activities would be tightly restricted until the “prepare-point”, when an energy bonanza happens so that the maximum number of baby-universe produces can be built. So the progress goes in phases. Firstly, there is expansion, next there is preparation, then there is the final event and the destruction of our universe There is one more modification that can be made. These steps could be applied to an intergalactic expansion if new probes could temporarily outrun the wave-front of the destruction of the universe if proper planning is conducted. Then it could make new baby universes in new galaxies, just before the wave-front reaches them. This might all happen within a few decades of 100 years in relative time from the perspective of someone aboard one of the probes. That is vaguely consistent with my own preconceptions of the timing of an asymptotic technological singularity in our near future. So maybe we should indulge this thinking. Maybe there won’t be a year 2,500 or 3,000. Maybe our own creations will have brought about an end to the entire universe by that time, setting in motion something else beyond our current comprehension. Another self-consistent version of this story is that we are, ourselves, products of a baby universe from such an event. This is also a relatively good, self-consistent, resolution to the Fermi Paradox, the Doomsday argument, and the Simulation argument. 6.11<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>That obliterates the Universe.</h4><p><u>Rominger 16</u> –</strong> Alan Rominger, PhD Candidate in Nuclear Engineering at North Carolina State University, Software Engineer at Red Hat, Former Nuclear Engineering Science Laboratory Synthesis Intern at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, BS in Nuclear Engineering from North Carolina State University, “The Extreme Version of the Technological Singularity”, Medium 11-6, https://medium.com/@AlanSE/the-extreme-version-of-the-technological-singularity-75608898eae5</p><p>In a fundamentally accurate interpretation of the singularity, there is no such thing as post-singularity. It is this point that I would like to re-focus attention back to. People who talk about post-singularity time are ignoring the basic principle of what an asymptote is. It’s not something that increases rapidly, and then increases more rapidly over time. <u>A true asymptote increases <strong>so rapidly</strong> that it reaches <strong>infinity</strong> in finite time</u>. I find this even more relevant as <u>people have become concerned about <strong>A</u></strong>rtificial <u><strong>I</u></strong>ntelligence, and essentially, killer robots. <u>The “paperclip” story is a common</u> fallback <u>anecdote about an AI designed to make paperclips. It goes in some steps something like:</p><p>We design an AI to optimize paperclip production</p><p>The AI improves up to the ability of self-enhancement</p><p>AI’s <strong>pace</strong> of improvement becomes <strong>self-reinforcing</strong>, becomes god-like</p><p><strong>All humans are killed</strong>, <strong>rest of universe turned into paperclips</p><p></u></strong>Here, somewhere around step number 3, the “singularity” happens in its watered-down format. No true singularity happened in this story. So let’s indulge that possibility just a little bit. To take a particular point in the paperclip-ization of the universe, let’s consider the years after the AI becomes an inter-stellar space-faring entity. Now, <u>it’s entirely reasonable to assume that it acts as <strong>Von Neumann probes</u></strong>. If it can reach Alpha Centauri at all, then <u>it can multiply to exploit all of the resources</u> in that solar system <u>within a <strong>short period of time</strong>, due to the <strong>multiplication times</strong> for nanotechnology</u>, yada yada. As a simple observation, the vast majority of the solar system’s energy and mass lie in the star itself. This would then imply that <u>the AI indulges itself in star-lifting</u>, and uses the contents of the star in fusion power plants. This process is partially rate-limited, but not to an extreme extent. <u>The energy liberated</u> in the use of fusion power to make paperclips <u>would be on the scale of a supernova</u> (in fact, vastly exceed it). As long as the AI is not operating a scrith-based society, it is also temperature-limited. This means that it will not only star-lift, but disperse the pieces in as wide of a range as possible. Given the enormous industrial capabilities of the AI, pieces of the star will mutually fan outward in all directions at once at highly relativistic speeds (although a large fraction of mass will be left in-place, because the specific energy of the fusion reaction is insufficient to move all the mass at high speeds). The most interesting detail of this process is just how defined and fast of a time-frame that it can happen in. The energy consumption rate is plainly and obviously limited by the relativistic expansion of material into space. There’s hardly any observation that matters other than a spherical boundary expanding into the galactic neighborhood at relativistic speed. If the AI is truly smart, then we might as well assume that this process is basically trivial to it. <u>Its nature is to</u> optimize and <u><strong>break-through</strong> any limit</u> that restricts the number of paperclips made. So sure, expansion would happen at this mundane rate for a while, and this rate is very well-defined. <u>Moving between stars</u> in the local group at relativistic speed <u>is simply a matter of <strong>decades</u></strong>, and there’s hardly anything else to say about the matter. This is where the concept of a singularity in the proper sense becomes interesting. What optimization does a multi-star, multi-supernova-power-consuming race of <u>AI</u> find? Clearly, this is the point at which they <u>would be irresistibly tempted to test the limits of physics on a level that humans have not yet been able to probe</u>. The entire game from that point on is a matter of what limitations on expansion yet-unknown laws of physics place on industrial expansion. It’s also very likely that whatever transition happens at this point redefines, fundamentally, the basic concepts of time and space.</p><p>Let’s reformulate that story of the AI paperclip maker.</p><p>We design an AI to optimize paperclip production</p><p>The AI improves up to the ability of self-enhancement</p><p>AI’s pace of improvement becomes self-reinforcing, becomes god-like</p><p>Time ends.</p><p>Something else begins?</p><p>There are many valid-sounding possibilities for the 5th step. <u>The AI creates new baby universes from black holes</u>. Maybe not exactly in this way. Perhaps the baby universes have to be created in particle accelerators, which is obvious to the AI after it solves the string theory problems of how our universe is folded. There’s also no guarantee that whatever next step is involved can be taken without destroying the universe that we live in. Go ahead, imagine that the particle accelerators create a new universe but trigger the vacuum instability in our own. In this case, it’s entirely possible that the AI carefully plans and coordinates the death of our universe. For a simplistic example, let’s say that after lifting the 10 nearest stars, the AI realizes the most efficient ways to stimulate the curved dimensions on the Planck scale to create baby universes. Next, it conducts an optimization study to balance the number of times this operation can be performed with gains from further expansion. Since its plans begin to largely max-out once the depth of the galactic disk is exploited, I will assume that its go-point is somewhere around the colonization of half of the milky way. At this point, <u>a coordinated experiment is conducted throughout all of the space. Each</u> of these events both create a baby universe and trigger an event in our own universe which <u>destroys the meta-stable vacuum that we live in</u>. Billions of new universes are created, while <u>the space-time that we live in begins to <strong>unravel in a light-speed front</strong> emanating out from each of the genesis points</u>. There is an interesting energy-management concept that comes from this. A common problem when considering exponential galactic growth of star-lifted fusion power is that the <u><strong>empty space begins to get cooked</strong> from the high temperature radiated out into space</u>. If the end-time of the universe was known in advance, this wouldn’t be a problem because one star would not absorb the radiation from the neighbor star until the light had time to propagate that distance at the speed of light. That means that the radiators can pump out high-temperature radiation into nice and normal 4-Kelvin space without concerns of boiling all the industrial machinery being used. Industrial activities would be tightly restricted until the “prepare-point”, when an energy bonanza happens so that the maximum number of baby-universe produces can be built. So the progress goes in phases. Firstly, there is expansion, next there is preparation, then there is the final event and the destruction of our universe There is one more modification that can be made. These steps could be applied to an intergalactic expansion if new probes could temporarily outrun the wave-front of the destruction of the universe if proper planning is conducted. Then it could make new baby universes in new galaxies, just before the wave-front reaches them. <u>This might all happen <strong>within</u></strong> a few decades of <u><strong>100 years</u></strong> in relative time from the perspective of someone aboard one of the probes. That is vaguely consistent with my own preconceptions of the timing of an asymptotic technological singularity in our near future. So maybe we should indulge this thinking. Maybe <u>there won’t be a year 2,500 or 3,000</u>. Maybe <u><strong>our own creations will have brought about an end to the entire universe</strong> by that time</u>, setting in motion something else beyond our current comprehension. Another self-consistent version of this story is that we are, ourselves, products of a baby universe from such an event. This is also a relatively good, self-consistent, resolution to the Fermi Paradox, the Doomsday argument, and the Simulation argument.</p><p>6.11</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kerrane Evan 22, U.S. Army strategic intelligence officer and holds a PhD in politics and international relations from Swansea University, 3/1/22, “Moscow's Strategic Culture Russian Militarism in an Era of Great Power Competition,” https://muse.jhu.edu/article/851420 fulltext: Militarism as Strategic Culture The Ukraine crisis of 2014 became the defining moment of the post-Soviet Russo-Western relationship to date. Western governments, particularly the European Union, were taken aback by Moscow's seemingly unprovoked act of aggression. The West could not understand how a potential economic agreement with Ukraine could result in Russian force. The pending EU Association Agreement, opposed by the Kremlin, brought no NATO tanks to the Russian border, nor did the eventual collapse of the pro-Russian government in Kyiv bring NATO security forces into Ukraine. Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky write that Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea "were a shock to the politics and security of Europe as a whole."13 However, the authors argue, "when examined in the context of Russia strategic culture, they should not have come as a surprise."14 Elias Götz argues for a complex approach to understanding Russia, writing "decision-maker influences, domestic political conditions, ideas, and geopolitical imperatives all matter, to some extent, but they play different roles and carry different weight in the various approaches."15 For Moscow, the interplay between structural balance of power struggles and the perception of adversaries is best understood through the lens of militarism and the militarization of Russian foreign policy within the near abroad. While many Russian scholars place great weight on the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, these writers tend to address [End Page 72] the head of state in isolation from the greater Russian society.16 However, this runs counter to the "large residual degree of continuity" strategic culture provides.17 Instead, the Kremlin is better understood as a symptom of Russian strategic culture than simply acting at the behest of a charismatic leader. In this sense, Putin is more a product of Russia than Russia is a product of Putin. Additionally, the structural origins of realist international relations theory fail to address the nuances of Russian policy within the near abroad. Was the 2008 Russo-Georgian War the result of an existential threat to Russian security? Was Georgia really on the brink of NATO accession? If John Mearsheimer's offensive realism accurately describes Moscow's actions, always pursuing regional hegemony and an edge over rivals, why did the Kremlin withdraw from Georgia?18 After such a sound defeat over Tbilisi, notwithstanding several identified equipment failures, why settle for merely the autonomous zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Was the West, fully committed to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, actually prepared to challenge Moscow from turning Tbilisi into a puppet state? The answers to these questions are not found in either understanding of a personality-driven Kremlin by Putin scholars or structural balance of power theories.19 Instead, the understanding of the Kremlin's lens is found within Russian militarism. The argument here is not that balance of power realities or Putin's choice between policies "A" or "B" is somehow not an essential means of understanding Russian policy. Instead, as Götz contends, they all play a role in the ultimate outcome. However, militarism helps place these choices into the context of a specific Russian strategic culture. Militarism serves as the guiding mechanism for how Russian strategic culture, in the writing of Elizabeth Kier, "screens out some parts of reality while magnifying others."20 It is the understanding of how Russia perceives the world and looks to engage specific threats. Importantly, this construct helps in the understanding of what is essential to Russia in terms of national security interests. Structural realism focuses on the interaction between states and the powers that influence state action. However, state perception is left to an understanding of the rational actor, operating within bounded rationalism. This concept, of course, begs the question of what is rational to the actor? Perception of one state may appear irrational to the other, a common theme of Western and Russian policy makers. This concept is evident within the defensive realist notion of a security dilemma, generally understood as a misperception by one state about the intent of another, which leads to military buildups and an increased potential for war. Of this phenomena, Barry R. Posen writes of states, "The nature of their situation compels them to take the steps they do."21 But the situation "compelling" a state to act is not entirely accurate. As previously discussed, perception is, in part, a function of state bias and belief systems. There is no certainty of action based on an external phenomenon. Instead, the action or policy choice results from how the state perceives the event. Militarism, as a bias manifested from strategic culture, serves as a bridge between the third and the second image and offers insight into state biases and [End Page 73] beliefs that influence how states perceive the world. While the essence of a security dilemma forms from a fundamental misunderstanding of an adversary's intentions, defensive realism offers little in how these beliefs manifest. Instead, Robert Jervis' "spiral model" of the security dilemma depicts status quo powers in fear of each other.22 Within this model there is a tragic escalation of tensions as states perceive others as revisionist powers, but in actuality they are absent any nefarious intent. As each state takes measures to increase their security, their actions decrease the security of the other state, locking each into a cycle of self-defeating self-protection. The condition, it seems, is a by-product of the system, and therefore the state is practically powerless to prevent it. However, perception is far from universal across states as strategic cultures influence how states perceive events. In general terms, Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby define militarism as "the social and international relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, organized political violence" and "is an abiding and defining characteristic of world politics."23 While scholars engage militarism through several lenses, militarism is understood as an institutionalization of war and conflict for this article's purposes. For Moscow, it is conceptualized as the development of a strategic culture within the Kremlin, which creates a bias toward the offense, particularly toward the near abroad. Nick Megoran writes militarism is "the glorification of war as a good in itself, rather than simply as a means to an end."24 It is vital for the purposes of this study on Russian militarism not to hold the term war in the literal sense. Instead, in the Russian context, war is understood as both military force and political dominance. This conceptualization is particularly crucial in discussions of Moscow's so-called hybrid warfare within the near abroad as an instrument of regional fear and respect. As discussed in further detail in the next section, the Kremlin's desire to dominate the near abroad drives Russian policy more than any singular strategic objective. In this sense, war becomes an end unto itself and not simply a means of achieving strategic goals. Institutional militarism is the study of the "relations between military and political institutions, and particularly on situations where the former are deemed to exert excessive influence over the latter."25 Recent events in Myanmar, with the military junta's return, represent the extreme case where the military also serves as the political regime. However, in many instances, the civil-military relationship and the power of military or security elites are more nuanced. Stavrianakis and Selby explain that in nonliberal democracies, particularly in authoritarian systems, "there may be no clear distinction between civilian and military elites, and where the norm of an apolitical military may not apply."26 Furthermore, many post-Communist states failed to transition away from these influences, and the close relationships between security and political elites remain. Moscow faced a similar occurrence when the chaos of the 1990s ended under Vladimir Putin's rise to power and subsequent turn away from democratization in favor of a regime more reminiscent of the Soviet past. The question remains: How does militarism influence state decision making? [End Page 74] In other words, how does this phenomenon at the second image affect state actions at the third? To address this question, the institutionalization of militarism and military buildups, or militarization, are perhaps the most quantifiable components of militarism. For the latter, possessing superior military capabilities over those you wish to impose power leads states to rely more heavily on strength than diplomacy. An overpowering force reduces the risk of conflict to the stronger state, thereby removing the use of force from a means of last resort and elevating it to a primary diplomatic tool. Institutional militarism becomes evident when states emplace security elites at the top echelons of state decision making. These individuals' suspicious mindset influences the collective perception of the state on the international system and threats to state security. In this perception, the world is filled with revisionist powers seeking to gain an advantage within a zero-sum game. As a result of the institutionalized role of militarism in the system and the glorification of the security apparatus, the state relies heavily on the use of force. David Kinsella writes, "The term 'militarism' is commonly used to describe a disposition or proclivity to behave in a particular way, namely, to employ military over non-military means of conflict resolution."27 Militarism induces a bias toward military engagement, or coercive threats, over diplomatic means of conflict resolution. This phenomenon occurs by cultivating a suspicious mindset into state decision making and a proclivity toward the use of force in responding to international disputes. To these states, war, or the use of force, is a first option rather than means of last resort. Importantly, this returns this discussion to the third image, or state action, as militarism results in a bias toward the offense. Militarism's role in the state's perception leads decision makers to rely on force as the primary means of diplomacy. From a realist paradigm, this perception of state capabilities alters the construct of the offense-defense balance. Stephen van Evera's concept of offense-defense theory possesses two variants: the true capabilities of the state and the perceived capabilities.28 When states possess or perceive an offensive advantage, they are less likely to negotiate terms to avoid conflict, resulting in an increase in the potential for war.29 Here, militarism's influence as a source of bias in state decision making directly influences how states engage the international system. In this case, perception of the other is no longer entirely abstract or based on state subconscious or a collective belief of threats. Instead, militarism emerges as a strategic culture of power glorification through the institutionalization of security elites into state decisions. In Putin's Russia, the siloviki's influence acts as both a symptom and a cause of this phenomenon. This section explored how militarism offers a mechanism for the study of bias and belief in how these forces influence a state's global perception. Furthermore, militarism can be understood as a form of strategic culture, operating as a set of beliefs that drive state decision making at the highest levels. The institutionalization of militarism, through the standing of security elites, coupled [End Page 75] with a cultural glorification of power, creates a bias toward the use of force. In Russia, this emerges as a desire to dominate the near abroad and post-Soviet space. The following section explores how Russian militarism helps explain why the Kremlin is quick to use force and coercion in the region. Moscow's strategic culture promotes the narrative of a nation surrounded by hostile powers seeking to destroy the state. This concept is best articulated in John Mearsheimer's 2014 Foreign Affairs article describing a Russia under siege by the West.30 However, this third image interpretation of Russia falls short in explaining why the Kremlin perceives itself encircled by hostile powers. Moscow's development of hybrid warfare, clandestine political operations, coercive diplomacy, and the use of economic pressures all point to the influence of militarism as Russian strategic culture. Russian Strategic Culture Following the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russian academic Fyodor Lukyanov, the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy and research director at the Kremlin-supported Valdai Discussion Club, gave testimony before the United Kingdom's House of Lords. He stated "that there is a deep belief in Russian political culture that Russia can achieve anything geopolitically only through military means—through being very offensive."31 Lukyanov's statement reflects the tenets of militarism, a bias toward the offense and a preference for military conflict over diplomatic alternatives. This section aims to establish an understanding of the Russian strategic culture through three primary questions. First, how did Russian militarism emerge within the context of the Putin regime, and how does this conceptualization influence Moscow's perception of the international environment? Second, in what ways has Russian militarism influenced how the Kremlin perceives an adversary's action? Once the article addresses these questions, the author can then focus on how this strategic culture perceives the changing global environment and, importantly, its role in a multipolar world.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>1. <u>EMPIRICS</u> and <u>INTERNAL DOCUMENTS</u> prove Russia is defensive realist.</h4><p>Kerrane <strong>Evan 22</strong>, U.S. Army strategic intelligence officer and holds a PhD in politics and international relations from Swansea University, 3/1/22, “Moscow's Strategic Culture Russian Militarism in an Era of Great Power Competition,” https://muse.jhu.edu/article/851420</p><p>Militarism as Strategic Culture</p><p>The <u>Ukraine</u> crisis of 2014 <u>became</u> the <u><strong>defining moment</u></strong> of the post-Soviet Russo-Western relationship to date. Western governments, particularly the European Union, were taken aback by Moscow's seemingly unprovoked act of aggression. The <u>West could <strong>not understand</u></strong> how a potential economic agreement with Ukraine could result in <u>Russian force</u>. The pending EU Association Agreement, opposed by the Kremlin, brought no NATO tanks to the Russian border, nor did the eventual collapse of the pro-Russian government in Kyiv bring NATO security forces into Ukraine. Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky write that Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea "were a shock to the politics and security of Europe as a whole."13 <u><strong>However</u></strong>, the authors argue, "<u>when examined in</u> the <u>context of Russia <strong>strategic culture</strong>, they should not</u> have <u>come as a surprise</u>."14</p><p>Elias Götz argues for a complex approach to understanding Russia, writing "decision-maker influences, domestic political conditions, ideas, and geopolitical imperatives all matter, to some extent, but they play different roles and carry different weight in the various approaches."15 For Moscow, the <u>interplay between</u> structural <u><strong>balance of power</strong> struggles and</u> the <u><strong>perception</u></strong> of adversaries <u>is best understood through</u> the lens of militarism and the militarization of Russian foreign policy within the <u><strong>near abroad</strong>. While many</u> Russian scholars <u>place</u> great <u>weight on</u> the Russian president, Vladimir <u><strong>Putin</u></strong>, these <u>writers tend to address</u> [End Page 72] <u>the head of state in <strong>isolation</u></strong> from the greater Russian society.16 <u><strong>However</strong>, this <strong>runs counter</strong> to</u> the "<u>large residual degree of <strong>continuity</u></strong>" <u>strategic culture provide</u>s.17 Instead, the <u>Kremlin is better understood as</u> a <u><strong>symptom</strong> of Russian strategic culture than</u> simply <u>acting at </u>the <u>behest of a charismatic <strong>leader</u></strong>. In this sense, Putin is more a product of Russia than Russia is a product of Putin.</p><p>Additionally, the structural origins of <u><strong>realist</u></strong> international relations <u>theory fail to address the <strong>nuances</u></strong> of Russian policy within the near abroad. Was the 2008 Russo-Georgian War the result of an existential threat to Russian security? Was Georgia really on the brink of NATO accession? <u>If</u> John Mearsheimer's <u><strong>offensive realism</u></strong> accurately <u>describes Moscow's actions, always pursuing</u> regional <u><strong>hegemony</u></strong> and an edge over rivals, <u><strong>why</strong> did the Kremlin withdraw from <strong>Georgia</strong>?</u>18 <u>After such a sound defeat over <strong>Tbilisi</u></strong>, notwithstanding several identified equipment failures, <u><strong>why settle</strong> for merely the autonomous zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia?</u> Was the West, fully committed to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, actually prepared to challenge Moscow from turning Tbilisi into a puppet state? The answers to <u>these questions are <strong>not found</strong> in</u> either <u>understanding</u> of a <u><strong>personality-driven</strong> Kremlin</u> by Putin scholars <u>or structural <strong>balance of power</u></strong> theories.19 Instead, the understanding of the Kremlin's lens is found within Russian militarism. The argument here is not that balance of power realities or Putin's choice between policies "A" or "B" is somehow not an essential means of understanding Russian policy. Instead, as Götz contends, they all play a role in the ultimate outcome. However, militarism helps place these choices into the context of a specific Russian strategic culture. Militarism serves as the guiding mechanism for how Russian strategic culture, in the writing of Elizabeth Kier, "screens out some parts of reality while magnifying others."20 It is the understanding of how Russia perceives the world and looks to engage specific threats. Importantly, this construct helps in the understanding of what is essential to Russia in terms of national security interests.</p><p>Structural <u><strong>realism</u></strong> focuses on the interaction between states and the powers that influence state action. However, state perception is <u>left to an understanding</u> of the <u><strong>rational actor</strong>, operating within <strong>bounded rationalism</strong>. This</u> concept, of course, <u>begs the question of what is <strong>rational</strong> to the actor? Perception of one</u> state <u>may appear <strong>irrational</strong> to</u> the <u>other</u>, a common theme of Western and Russian policy makers. This <u>concept is evident</u> with<u>in</u> the <u><strong>defensive realist</strong> notion of a <strong>security dilemma</u></strong>, generally <u>understood as a misperception by one state about</u> the <u>intent</u> of another, <u>which leads to</u> military buildups and an increased potential for <u><strong>war</u></strong>. Of this phenomena, Barry R. Posen writes of states, "The nature of their situation compels them to take the steps they do."21 But the situation "compelling" a state to act is not entirely accurate. As previously discussed, perception is, in part, a function of state bias and belief systems. There is no certainty of action based on an external phenomenon. Instead, the action or policy choice results from how the state perceives the event.</p><p>Militarism, as a bias manifested from strategic culture, serves as a bridge between the third and the second image and offers insight into state biases and [End Page 73] beliefs that influence how states perceive the world. While the essence of a security dilemma forms from a fundamental misunderstanding of an adversary's intentions, defensive realism offers little in how these beliefs manifest. Instead, Robert Jervis' "<u><strong>spiral model</u></strong>" <u>of</u> the <u>security dilemma depicts <strong>status quo powers</strong> in <strong>fear</u></strong> of each other.22 Within this model <u>there is a tragic <strong>escalation</strong> of tensions as states <strong>perceive</strong> others as <strong>revisionist</u></strong> powers, <u>but in actuality they are <strong>absent</strong> any <strong>nefarious intent</u></strong>. As each state takes measures to increase their security, their actions decrease the security of the other state, <u>locking each into a cycle of <strong>self-defeating</strong> self-protection</u>. The condition, it seems, is a by-product of the system, and therefore the state is practically powerless to prevent it. However, perception is far from universal across states as strategic cultures influence how states perceive events.</p><p>In general terms, Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby define militarism as "the social and international relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, organized political violence" and "is an abiding and defining characteristic of world politics."23 While scholars engage militarism through several lenses, militarism is understood as an institutionalization of war and conflict for this article's purposes. For Moscow, it is conceptualized as the development of a strategic culture within the Kremlin, which creates a bias toward the offense, particularly toward the near abroad. Nick Megoran writes militarism is "the glorification of war as a good in itself, rather than simply as a means to an end."24 It is vital for the purposes of this study on Russian militarism not to hold the term war in the literal sense. Instead, in the Russian context, war is understood as both military force and political dominance. This conceptualization is particularly crucial in discussions of Moscow's so-called hybrid warfare within the near abroad as an instrument of regional fear and respect. As discussed in further detail in the next section, the Kremlin's desire to dominate the near abroad drives Russian policy more than any singular strategic objective. In this sense, war becomes an end unto itself and not simply a means of achieving strategic goals.</p><p>Institutional militarism is the study of the "relations between military and political institutions, and particularly on situations where the former are deemed to exert excessive influence over the latter."25 Recent events in Myanmar, with the military junta's return, represent the extreme case where the military also serves as the political regime. However, in many instances, the civil-military relationship and the power of military or security elites are more nuanced. Stavrianakis and Selby explain that in nonliberal democracies, particularly in authoritarian systems, "there may be no clear distinction between civilian and military elites, and where the norm of an apolitical military may not apply."26 Furthermore, many post-Communist states failed to transition away from these influences, and the close relationships between security and political elites remain. Moscow faced a similar occurrence when the chaos of the 1990s ended under Vladimir Putin's rise to power and subsequent turn away from democratization in favor of a regime more reminiscent of the Soviet past.</p><p>The question remains: How does militarism influence state decision making? [End Page 74] In other words, how does this phenomenon at the second image affect state actions at the third? To address this question, the institutionalization of militarism and military buildups, or militarization, are perhaps the most quantifiable components of militarism. For the latter, possessing superior military capabilities over those you wish to impose power leads states to rely more heavily on strength than diplomacy. An overpowering force reduces the risk of conflict to the stronger state, thereby removing the use of force from a means of last resort and elevating it to a primary diplomatic tool. Institutional militarism becomes evident when states emplace security elites at the top echelons of state decision making. These individuals' suspicious mindset influences the collective perception of the state on the international system and threats to state security. In this perception, the world is filled with revisionist powers seeking to gain an advantage within a zero-sum game. As a result of the institutionalized role of militarism in the system and the glorification of the security apparatus, the state relies heavily on the use of force.</p><p>David Kinsella writes, "The term 'militarism' is commonly used to describe a disposition or proclivity to behave in a particular way, namely, to employ military over non-military means of conflict resolution."27 <u>Militarism</u> induces a bias toward military engagement, or coercive threats, over diplomatic means of conflict resolution. This phenomenon occurs by <u><strong>cultivat</u></strong>ing <u>a <strong>suspicious mindset</u></strong> into state decision making <u>and</u> a <u>proclivity toward the <strong>use of force</u></strong> in responding to international disputes. To these states, <u>war</u>, or the use of force, <u>is a <strong>first option</strong> rather than means of <strong>last resort</u></strong>. Importantly, this returns this discussion to the third image, or state action, as militarism results in a bias toward the offense.</p><p>Militarism's role in the state's perception leads decision makers to rely on force as the primary means of diplomacy. From a realist paradigm, this perception of state capabilities alters the construct of the offense-defense balance. Stephen van Evera's concept of offense-defense theory possesses two variants: the true capabilities of the state and the perceived capabilities.28 When states possess or perceive an offensive advantage, they are less likely to negotiate terms to avoid conflict, resulting in an increase in the potential for war.29 Here, militarism's influence as a source of bias in state decision making directly influences how states engage the international system. In this case, perception of the other is no longer entirely abstract or based on state subconscious or a collective belief of threats. Instead, militarism emerges as a strategic culture of power glorification through the institutionalization of security elites into state decisions. In Putin's Russia, the siloviki's influence acts as both a symptom and a cause of this phenomenon.</p><p>This section explored how militarism offers a mechanism for the study of bias and belief in how these forces influence a state's global perception. Furthermore, militarism can be understood as a form of strategic culture, operating as a set of beliefs that drive state decision making at the highest levels. The institutionalization of militarism, through the standing of security elites, coupled [End Page 75] with a cultural glorification of power, creates a bias toward the use of force. In Russia, this emerges as a desire to dominate the near abroad and post-Soviet space. The following section explores how Russian militarism helps explain why the <u>Kremlin is quick to <strong>use force</strong> and <strong>coercion</u></strong> in the region. <u>Moscow's strategic culture promotes</u> the <u>narrative of</u> a <u>nation surrounded by <strong>hostile powers</strong> seeking to <strong>destroy</strong> the state</u>. This concept is best articulated in John Mearsheimer's 2014 Foreign Affairs article <u>describing</u> a <u>Russia <strong>under siege</strong> by</u> the <u>West</u>.30 However, this third image interpretation of Russia falls short in explaining why the <u>Kremlin perceives itself <strong>encircled</strong> by hostile powers</u>. Moscow's <u>development of <strong>hybrid warfar</strong>e</u>, clandestine <u><strong>political op</u></strong>eration<u><strong>s</u></strong>, coercive diplomacy, <u>and</u> the use of <u><strong>economic pressures</u></strong> all point to the influence of militarism as Russian strategic culture.</p><p>Russian Strategic Culture</p><p>Following the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russian academic Fyodor Lukyanov, the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy and research director at the Kremlin-supported Valdai Discussion Club, gave testimony before the United Kingdom's House of Lords. He stated "that <u>there is a <strong>deep belief</strong> in Russian political culture that Russia can achieve <strong>anything</u></strong> geopolitically only <u>through <strong>military</strong> means</u>—through being very offensive."31 Lukyanov's statement reflects the tenets of militarism, a bias toward the offense and <u>a preference for <strong>military conflict</strong> over</u> diplomatic <u>alternatives</u>. This section aims to establish an understanding of the Russian strategic culture through three primary questions. First, how did Russian militarism emerge within the context of the Putin regime, and how does this conceptualization influence Moscow's perception of the international environment? Second, in what ways has Russian militarism influenced how the Kremlin perceives an adversary's action? Once the article addresses these questions, the author can then focus on how this strategic culture perceives the changing global environment and, importantly, its role in a multipolar world.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Harney 2018 (Stefano Harney – Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, co-founder of the School for Study, PhD from the University of Cambridge, “Stefano Harney on Statistical to Logistical Populations”, transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4194KRpqqM – ERW) fulltext: You've written recently about what you call adjustable populations as distinct from statistical populations, tell us what you mean by logistical populations. S.H.: Yes, certainly I think that traditionally we've understood the university as a place that produced experts in statistics of various kinds across entire range of disciplines from sociology to the hard sciences and those experts in statistics were largely involved as Foucault teaches us in producing statistical populations and the idea behind the statistical population is that we can calibrate more and more finally all the time productivity possibilities for that subject to that population. I think we're seeing a shift now away from statistical experts towards what we might call logistical experts and that is indicative of a general movement in capital away from the notion of relative surplus-value here which was the notion that that gets enforced through statistical populations where what we're doing is finding new and innovative ways to make finer and finer choices inside our productivity that increase that productivity to a notion of an absolute surplus tie against something we thought we left behind because the resistance to it because of the exhaustion of the human body but with logistics which we see populating Business Studies and capital in a new and ever-increasing ways what we're also seeing is the production of logistical populations and logistical subjectivity and the university is aiding that by producing what I would call just a class for experts and if you want to understand what logistical expert is all you need to do is think about the way in which increasingly today we justify our work not by the content of it we don't say well we're teaching this poem because there are things in this poem that we think will remove the student or will open the student in certain kinds of way we say no there's a skill in reading a poem a transferable skill a skill that can be plugged in somewhere else a skill that can be adapted a skill that can flow and connect somewhere else and when we start to use that logic we begin to make ourselves into logistical experts and in logistics what happens is that what previously seemed to be the barriers that required us to produce relative surplus-value required us to innovate inside certain barriers there was a limit to what the human body could do there was a limit to what we thought science could do suddenly we break that open through accessing the pre individual through accessing or breaking down the border between the organic and the inorganic the border between culture and language the border between the body and the non-body the border between finance and Industry the borders that we know are constantly following a globalization more generally in that there is a constant a constant set of imperatives to try to connect what previously seemed like it couldn't be connected and this occurs at the most technical levels and it just successor as a subject in business schools and in economics in and in capital more generally as it's practice but it also exists in the way that we produce subjectivity so in university today we produce this kind of research active subjectivity I mean that in the most degraded sense of someone who's constantly producing their own set of knowledge is for plugging those knowledges in in different ways and settings kind of flexibility that occurs not just at the level of what we articulate in communication but at all that Wilson level of the body and the level below of the single body and above it so under those circumstances what we're beginning to see is a shift from the statistical population to a logistical population with that we're seeing other kinds of shifts which are not so good for the University and in which better are connected in any way so for instance today increasingly we're seeing a defunding of the university well why is that happening if at the same time we're we're making ourselves useful as logistical experts and I think the answer to that is that increasingly both capital and state believe that they can access research outside of the formal structures of institutions like universities if you look at research parks today around the world they're largely dying except for a few places like China but even there we're gonna see a shift occurring already a shift away from the idea that we have to invest in that way in order to get research in order to get innovation and instead as every day in business we're moving towards open innovation in which essentially what we do is we go directly to these communities of practice directly to these associations and affinities and remind them for the innovation and the research that they are producing often for their own purposes and often specifically against the capital but we mined them right there in other words the main upkeep these days for research and development occurs not in the research part and certainly not in the newly defunded universities but rather in the in the body so as christian marathi says it's up to us to maintain the upkeep of the of the major productivity machine that what used to be our main vehicle relative surplus the new machine now becomes also possibly a machine for absolute surplus it becomes the possibility that our body can be broken down that our communication and our sociality can be broken down and recombined in ways which previously we couldn't imagine allowing for new logistical populations new just possibilities that connect in all kinds of ways that adapt so if you like today the logistical subject is that subject you can walk into any situation and can plug this hand in there and that foot in there and this tongue in some other socket and become a laboring conduit for things that previously seemed incongruous things that previously seemed like they couldn't flow through each other begin to flow through each other under this logistical logic if you like and the universities are very much a part of that but they're not going to benefit from it because simultaneously that very subject is is understood to be the research and development subject the subject who also is going to produce the next innovation in that in that logistics and therefore both capital in the state looking directly and putting directly on us as leaving bodies all the burden of research and development and its upkeep and its reproduction and and in that sense logistical populations represent a kind of deepening of the the bio bargain but at the same time they present a new set of resistances and a new set of possibilities of autonomous living because now we were introduced to the notion that friction the noticing that's staying in place the notion even of a kind of essence however strategic we might say that is becomes a way of resisting or producing some other kind of community so rather than our trying to escape in a certain kind of way that mirror that mirrors that logistics movement now it's the friction it's the fact that you come into a community and you can't get out again it's the fact that certain kinds of waves of being are sticky that they don't allow for the swift passing through translation commiseration but instead produced the story and redirect misuse what comes in through the logistical imperatives we we begin to seen that all kinds of new ways but also some very old ways so for instance in the perfect example is this President Obama he's the ultimate logistical subject because although he has blackness but this is his kind of blackness allows for flow through and out it doesn't resist and say there's something about being part of the black community or something about what everybody sont called you know the consent not to be a single being that comes out of the history of blackness which prevents smooth logistics not in Obama he's dedicated to proving that things do flow through him and yet both older conceptions of solidarity of stickiness like blackness of the fact that doesn't seem to go away he's become new forms of solidarity and resistance in the face of logistical populations but also there are emerging forms at the same time that develop new migrant forms in which somehow the migrant never integrates never fully becomes the logistical subject continues to provide some sort of resistance to that so even as we have to be worried about logistics well because it's destroying the University good or a bad thing we can leave that to to further to pay but certainly because the deepens in us the way in which capital flows through us at the same time I think we can also begin to understand areas which previously we saw maybe is not that political sticking staying remaining as becoming increasingly political certain insistence is on being a certain way and continuing to be a certain way things that we often would run away from in the past now we could be in begin to see the power of us in these circumstances so for me that's the significance of logistical populations.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Their skills and technical precision offense cast the subject as a sponge, an enlightened conduit capable of absorbing administrative knowledges and translating them somewhere outside. It is this corporatization of both the body and the mind that lies at the heart of logistical violence, ensuring that they become bloodthirsty supply-chain managers. </h4><p><strong>Harney 2018 </strong>(Stefano Harney – Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, co-founder of the School for Study, PhD from the University of Cambridge, “Stefano Harney on Statistical to Logistical Populations”, transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4194KRpqqM<u> – ERW)</p><p></u>You've written recently about what you call adjustable populations as distinct from statistical populations, tell us what you mean by logistical populations. S.H.: Yes, certainly I think that traditionally we've understood the university as a place that produced experts in statistics of various kinds across entire range of disciplines from sociology to the hard sciences and those experts in statistics were largely involved as Foucault teaches us in producing statistical populations and the idea behind the statistical population is that we can calibrate more and more finally all the time productivity possibilities for that subject to that population. <u><strong>I think we're seeing a shift now away from statistical experts towards what we might call logistical experts</u></strong> <u>and that is indicative of a general movement in capital away from the notion of relative surplus-value</u> here which was the notion that that gets enforced through statistical populations where what we're doing is finding new and innovative ways to make finer and finer choices inside our productivity that increase that productivity to a notion of an absolute surplus tie against something we thought we left behind because the resistance to it because of the exhaustion of the human body but <u>with logistics which we see populating Business Studies and capital in a new and ever-increasing ways what we're also seeing is <strong><mark>the production of logistical populations</strong></mark> and logistical subjectivity and <strong><mark>the university is aiding that by producing what I would call just a class for experts</u></strong></mark> and <u>if you want to understand what logistical expert is all you need to do is think about the way in which increasingly today we justify our work not by the content of it we don't say well we're teaching this poem because there are things in this poem that we think will remove the student or will open the student in certain kinds of way we say no <strong><mark>there's a skill</mark> </strong>in reading a poem <strong><mark>a transferable skill</mark> a skill <mark>that can be plugged</mark> <mark>in somewhere else</mark> <mark>a skill that can be adapted</mark> <mark>a skill that can flow</mark> and connect somewhere else</u></strong> and <u><strong><mark>when we start to use that logic we</mark> begin to <mark>make ourselves into logistical experts</u></strong></mark> and in logistics what happens is that <u><strong><mark>what previously seemed to be the barriers</u></strong></mark> that required us to produce relative surplus-value required us to innovate inside certain barriers there was a limit to what the human body could do there was a limit to what we thought science could do <u><strong><mark>suddenly we break</mark> that open through accessing the pre individual through accessing or breaking down the border between the organic and the inorganic the border between culture and language the border between the body and the non-body the border between finance and Industry</u></strong> the borders that we know are constantly following a globalization more generally in that <u><mark>there is a constant a constant set of imperatives</u></mark> to try to connect what previously seemed like it couldn't be connected <u>and this occurs at the most technical levels</u> and it just successor as a subject in business schools and in economics in and in capital more generally as it's practice but <u>it also exists in the way that we produce subjectivity so <strong><mark>in university</mark> today <mark>we produce</mark> this kind of <mark>research active subjectivity</strong></mark> I mean that in the most degraded sense of someone who's constantly producing their own <mark>set of knowledge</u></mark> <u><strong>is <mark>for plugging those knowledges in in different ways</u></strong></mark> and <u>settings kind of <mark>flexibility</mark> that occurs not just <mark>at the level</mark> <mark>of</mark> what we articulate in <mark>communication</mark> but at</u> all <u>that</u> Wilson <u>level of the body</u> and the level below of the single body and above it so under those circumstances what we're beginning to see is a shift from the statistical population to a logistical population with that we're seeing other kinds of shifts which are not so good for the University and in which better are connected in any way so for instance today increasingly we're seeing a defunding of the university well why is that happening if at the same time we're we're making ourselves useful as logistical experts and I think the answer to that is that increasingly both capital and state believe that they can access research outside of the formal structures of institutions like universities if you look at research parks today around the world they're largely dying except for a few places like China but even there we're gonna see a shift occurring already a shift away from the idea that we have to invest in that way in order to get research in order to get innovation and instead as every day in business we're moving towards open innovation in which essentially what we do is we go directly to these communities of practice directly to these associations and affinities and remind them for the innovation and the research that they are producing often for their own purposes and often specifically against the capital but we mined them right there in other words <u>the main upkeep these days for <mark>research and development occurs</mark> not in the research part and certainly not in the newly defunded universities but rather in the <strong><mark>in the body</u></strong></mark> so as christian marathi says <u><strong><mark>it's up to us to maintain the upkeep of the of the major productivity machine</u></strong></mark> that what used to be our main vehicle relative <u><mark>surplus</u></mark> the new machine now becomes also possibly a machine for absolute surplus it <u><mark>becomes the possibility that our body can be broken down</mark> that our communication and our sociality can be broken down <mark>and recombined in ways which previously we couldn't imagine</mark> allowing for new logistical populations</u> new just possibilities that connect in all kinds of ways that adapt so if you like today the logistical subject is that subject you can walk into any situation and can plug this hand in there and that foot in there and this tongue in some other socket and become <u><strong><mark>a laboring conduit</strong></mark> for things that previously seemed incongruous things that previously seemed like they couldn't flow through each other begin to flow through each other under this logistical logic</u> if you like and the universities are very much a part of that but they're not going to benefit from it because simultaneously that very subject is is understood to be the research and development subject the subject who also is going to produce the next innovation in that in that logistics and therefore both capital in <u><strong><mark>the state looking directly and putting directly on us</mark> as leaving bodies all <mark>the burden of research and development</mark> <mark>and its upkeep and its reproduction</u></strong></mark> and and <u>in that sense <mark>logistical populations represent a kind of deepening</mark> of the the bio bargain <mark>but at the same time they present a new set of resistances</mark> and a <mark>new</mark> set of <mark>possibilities of autonomous living</mark> because now we were introduced to <strong>the notion that friction</u></strong> <u><strong>the noticing that's staying in place the notion even of a kind of essence however strategic we might say that is becomes a way of resisting or producing some other kind of community</u></strong> so rather than our trying to escape in a certain kind of way that mirror that mirrors that logistics movement now <u><strong><mark>it's the friction</mark> it's the fact that you come into a community and you can't get out</u></strong> again <u><strong>it's the fact that <mark>certain kinds of waves of being are sticky</mark> that <mark>they don't allow for the swift passing through</mark> translation commiseration</u></strong> <u>but instead produced the story and redirect misuse what comes in through the logistical imperatives </u>we we begin to seen that all kinds of new ways but also some very old ways so for instance in the perfect example is this President Obama he's the ultimate logistical subject because although he has blackness but this is his kind of blackness allows for flow through and out it doesn't resist and say there's something about being part of the black community or something about what everybody sont called you know the consent not to be a single being that comes out of the history of blackness which prevents smooth logistics not in Obama he's dedicated to proving that things do flow through him and yet both older conceptions of solidarity of <u><strong><mark>stickiness</mark> like blackness</u></strong> of the fact that <u><strong><mark>doesn't seem to go away</u></strong></mark> he's become <u>new forms of solidarity and resistance in the face of logistical populations</u> but also <u>there are emerging forms at the same time that develop new migrant forms</u> <u>in which somehow the migrant never integrates never fully becomes the logistical subject continues to provide some sort of resistance to that</u> so even as we have to be worried about <u><strong><mark>logistics</u></strong></mark> well because it's destroying the University good or a bad thing we can leave that to to further to pay but certainly because the <u><strong><mark>deepens in us the way in which capital flows through us</u></strong></mark> at the same time I think we can also begin to understand areas which previously we saw maybe is not that political sticking staying remaining as becoming increasingly political certain <u>insistence is on being a certain way and continuing to be a certain way things that we often would run away from in the past now we could be in begin to see the power of us in these circumstances so for me that's the significance of logistical populations. </p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Chen ’15 --- Chen Jie is a journalist and editor with The Xinhua News Agency. This evidence internally cites Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy and Jeffery Schott, senior fellow at the PIIE. The PIIE is The Peterson Institute for International Economics, and is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - “China, U.S. pin high hopes on Xi's visit for breakthrough in BIT talks” - Source: Xinhua- Sept 20th - http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2015-09/20/content_6689649.htm fulltext: The two countries confirmed the BIT negotiations as "a top priority" in their economic relationship, hoping to further boost economic cooperation and achieve a win-win result through investment liberalization. Officials and experts from both sides believe that a high-standard BIT will not only benefit the top two economies in terms of boosting mutual investment and job opportunities, but also conduce to the global economy. Nathan Sheets, undersecretary for international affairs at the U.S. Treasury, stressed the benefits that U.S. investors will harvest. "Such an agreement could be a game changer in terms of unlocking new opportunities and leveling the playing field for U.S. firms and investors," he said in April. "A high-standard BIT, with strong provisions for market openings and equal treatment, would greatly benefit the commercial relationship," U.S.-China Business Council President John Frisbie said two months later. Geoffrey Sant, special counsel of Dorsey & Whitney LLP, spoke out his similar opinion in a recent interview with Xinhua. "A BIT would be extremely beneficial to both nations by more closely intertwining the two nations' economies," he said. "Chinese investors in the United States will benefit from U.S. growth, and U.S. investors in China will benefit from Chinese growth." Such a treaty will help address a number of investment concerns of the United States and China, and investors from both countries will get better access to each other's markets, said Yukon Huang, former World Bank's country director for China and senior associate with the Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy, has seen some other advantages the treaty will bring about to the two countries. China and the United States are complementary in many areas, especially in capital, Li told Xinhua recently. The United States needs large capital for infrastructure construction so as to prompt its economic recovery, while China, with relatively abundant funds, has already become a net exporter of capital, he said. Also, the Chinese government has been following a strategy of "going out" to encourage firms to invest overseas. On a broader scale, the China-U.S. relationship cries out for a stabilizer to address sensitive and complicated issues emerging in the development of bilateral ties, the Chinese economist said, adding that the BIT will serve as such a stabilizer in the future. HIGH HOPES FROM BOTH SIDES The BIT talks started in 2008 when China and the United States sought to increase mutual investment. But little progress had been made before they agreed in 2013 to conduct negotiations on the basis of pre-establishment national treatment with the negative list approach, which outlines sectors closed to foreign investment. 　　A new phase of talks opened in June, as the two sides made an "important milestone" exchange of initial offers of negative lists. Last month, negotiators discussed profoundly the pending second negative lists in Beijing at the 20th round of BIT talks. 　　Xi's state visit to the United States, the first since he took office in 2013, has been regarded widely as a golden opportunity to make major advancement in the negotiations, as the issue is expected to top the agenda of a planned meeting between Xi and his U.S. host, President Barack Obama. 　　Ahead of the summit, government officials and scholars, among others, from both countries expressed optimism about a positive result in the BIT talks. 　　Chinese Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao said in June that China hopes to conclude the negotiations under the Obama administration, which will end in January 2017. Zhu voiced the hope that the second negative list offers will produce substantial improvement so that the two heads of state could confirm "major progress" at their summit and give further clear instructions to both negotiating teams to move on. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew believed that the summit could inject new momentum to the BIT talks. "I think the fact that there's a leaders' meeting happening will focus all of the efforts to make progress for that," he said earlier. U.S.-China Business Council President John Frisbie has urged both governments to "double their efforts to advance the negotiations" on the treaty as much as possible before Xi's visit. David Denoon, New York University professor of Politics & Economics and director of NYU Center on U.S.-China Relations, echoed Frisbie in a recent interview with Xinhua. "The two of them (Xi and Obama) can cooperate together to reach some agreements here. Also, I think the bilateral investment treaty should move as far as possible," he said. It would be "a very healthy thing" if the two leaders could show some real progress towards reaching the treaty, said Fred Bergsten, a senior fellow and director emeritus at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). "President Xi's visit is an important step, maybe a final one, to push ahead with the BIT talks, as both leaders have strong willingness to achieve a breakthrough," said Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy. The Chinese expert predicted that Obama "will make a big issue on international affairs, including the BIT," as the end of "his presidential term" is approaching. JOINT EFFORTS TO CRACK NUTS Though both sides share a strong aspiration for a treaty to facilitate and boost bilateral investment, the BIT negotiations have by no means advanced as smoothly as expected given complicated situations. Further unremitting efforts from both countries are called for to crack the hardest nuts -- to hammer out shorter and better negative lists from both sides, among other difficulties. Denoon said "there are many areas on the negative list in China and many areas on the negative list in this country," adding "how to get a good trade among those is not easy to work on." The negative list approach, generally viewed as more liberal to foreign investment, means that all sectors are open to foreign investment except those listed, while the positive list approach, adopted by China for many years, means that only listed sectors are accessible to foreign investment. Zhang Xiangchen, Chinese deputy international trade representative and assistant minister of commerce, told reporters in June that "the negative list issue is more difficult for China," as it "represents a new challenge" and will "fundamentally change the foreign investment administration regime in China." To produce the negative list and speed up the process of the negotiations, China has done tremendous work. An inter-ministerial mechanism in the State Council have been established, and "tens of thousands of laws, regulations and rules" governing foreign investment with the positive list approach have been reviewed, according to the official. For the United States, aside from an improved negative list, its investment environment for Chinese enterprises calls for urgent improvement. Many Chinese companies have been put to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency organization tasked to review foreign investors' acquisition activities in the country, for national security reasons. The number of Chinese companies subject to such reviews is disproportionately high considering China's relatively small investment scale in the United States. As a result, Chinese firms are facing rising uncertainties and restraints when investing in the U.S. soil. Jeffery Schott, senior fellow at the PIIE, said there is a need to improve the transparency of the CFIUS. "What the BIT can do is to increase the transparency of the CFIUS procedure to ensure that it is a narrowed focus." China hopes that the U.S. side could treat Chinese enterprises equally, remove its discriminating practices, and drop the wrong hypothesis that all Chinese investments have a governmental background with untold political and military motives, Li said.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Not predictable - one solvency advocate that lists 4 conditions justifies 15 different combinations and affs—for example you could condition changes in CFIUS review on reduction of the negative list</h4><p>Chen ’15 --- </strong>Chen Jie is a journalist and editor with The Xinhua News Agency. This evidence internally cites Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy and Jeffery Schott, senior fellow at the PIIE. The PIIE is The Peterson Institute for International Economics, and is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - “China, U.S. pin high hopes on Xi's visit for breakthrough in BIT talks” - Source: Xinhua- Sept 20th - http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2015-09/20/content_6689649.htm</p><p><u><strong>The two countries confirmed the BIT negotiations as "a top priority"</u></strong> in their economic relationship, hoping to further boost economic cooperation and achieve a win-win result through investment liberalization. <u><strong>Officials and experts from both sides believe that a high-standard BIT</u></strong> <u><strong>will </u></strong>not only <u><strong>benefit the top two economies </u></strong>in terms of boosting mutual investment and job opportunities, but also conduce to the global economy. Nathan Sheets, undersecretary for international affairs at the U.S. Treasury, stressed the benefits that U.S. investors will harvest. "Such an agreement could be a game changer in terms of unlocking new opportunities and leveling the playing field for U.S. firms and investors," he said in April. "<u><strong>A high-standard BIT, with strong provisions for market openings</u></strong> and equal treatment, <u><strong>would greatly benefit the commercial relationship</u></strong>," U.S.-China Business Council President John Frisbie said two months later. Geoffrey Sant, special counsel of Dorsey & Whitney LLP, spoke out his similar opinion in a recent interview with Xinhua. "A BIT would be extremely beneficial to both nations by more closely intertwining the two nations' economies," he said. "Chinese investors in the United States will benefit from U.S. growth, and U.S. investors in China will benefit from Chinese growth." Such a treaty will help address a number of investment concerns of the United States and China, and investors from both countries will get better access to each other's markets, said Yukon Huang, former World Bank's country director for China and senior associate with the Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy, has seen some other advantages the treaty will bring about to the two countries. China and the United States are complementary in many areas, especially in capital, Li told Xinhua recently. The United States needs large capital for infrastructure construction so as to prompt its economic recovery, while China, with relatively abundant funds, has already become a net exporter of capital, he said. Also, the Chinese government has been following a strategy of "going out" to encourage firms to invest overseas. On a broader scale, the China-U.S. relationship cries out for a stabilizer to address sensitive and complicated issues emerging in the development of bilateral ties, the Chinese economist said, adding that the BIT will serve as such a stabilizer in the future. <u><strong>HIGH HOPES FROM BOTH SIDES </u></strong>The BIT talks started in 2008 when China and the United States sought to increase mutual investment. But little progress had been made before they agreed in 2013 to conduct negotiations on the basis of pre-establishment national treatment with the negative list approach, which outlines sectors closed to foreign investment. 　　A new phase of talks opened in June, as the two sides made an "important milestone" exchange of initial offers of negative lists. Last month, negotiators discussed profoundly the pending second negative lists in Beijing at the 20th round of BIT talks. 　　Xi's state visit to the United States, the first since he took office in 2013, has been regarded widely as a golden opportunity to make major advancement in the negotiations, as the issue is expected to top the agenda of a planned meeting between Xi and his U.S. host, President Barack Obama. 　　Ahead of the summit, government <u><strong>officials and scholars</u></strong>, among others<u><strong>, from both countries expressed optimism about a positive result in </u></strong>the <u><strong>BIT talks.</u></strong> 　　Chinese Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao said in June that <u><strong>China hopes to conclude the negotiations under the Obama administration</u></strong>, <u><strong>which will end in January 2017.</u></strong> Zhu voiced the hope that the second negative list offers will produce substantial improvement so that the two heads of state could confirm "major progress" at their summit and give further clear instructions to both negotiating teams to move on. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew believed that the summit could inject new momentum to the BIT talks. "I think the fact that there's a leaders' meeting happening will focus all of the efforts to make progress for that," he said earlier. U.S.-China Business Council President John Frisbie has urged both governments to "double their efforts to advance the negotiations" on the treaty as much as possible before Xi's visit. David Denoon, New York University professor of Politics & Economics and director of NYU Center on U.S.-China Relations, echoed Frisbie in a recent interview with Xinhua. "The two of them (<u><strong>Xi and Obama</u></strong>) <u><strong>can cooperate together to reach some agreements here.</u></strong> Also, <u><strong>I think the bilateral investment treaty should move as far as possible</u></strong>," he said. It would be "a very healthy thing" if the two leaders could show some real progress towards reaching the treaty, said Fred Bergsten, a senior fellow and director emeritus at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). "President Xi's visit is an important step, maybe a final one, to push ahead with the BIT talks, as both leaders have strong willingness to achieve a breakthrough," said Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy. The Chinese expert predicted that Obama "will make a big issue on international affairs, including the BIT," as the end of "his presidential term" is approaching. <u><strong>JOINT EFFORTS TO CRACK NUTS </u></strong>Though both sides share a strong aspiration for a treaty to facilitate and boost bilateral investment, the BIT negotiations have by no means advanced as smoothly as expected given complicated situations. <u><strong>Further</u></strong> unremitting <u><strong>efforts from both countries are called for to crack the hardest nut</u></strong>s -- to hammer out <u><strong>shorter and better negative lists</u></strong> from both sides, among other difficulties. Denoon said "<u><strong>there are many areas on the negative list in China</u></strong> and many areas on the negative list in this country," adding "<u><strong>how to get a good trade </u></strong>among those<u><strong> is not easy</u></strong> to work on." The negative list approach, generally viewed as more liberal to foreign investment, means that all sectors are open to foreign investment except those listed, while the positive list approach, adopted by China for many years, means that only listed sectors are accessible to foreign investment. Zhang Xiangchen, Chinese deputy international trade representative and assistant minister of commerce, told reporters in June that "<u><strong><mark>the negative list </mark>issue <mark>is</mark> </u></strong>more <u><strong><mark>difficult for China</u></strong></mark>," as it "represents a new challenge" and will "fundamentally change the foreign investment administration regime in China." To produce the negative list and speed up the process of the negotiations, China has done tremendous work. An inter-ministerial mechanism in the State Council have been established, and "tens of thousands of laws, regulations and rules" governing foreign investment with the positive list approach have been reviewed, according to the official. <u><strong>For the <mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates, aside from an improved negative list, <u><strong>its <mark>investment environment for Chinese enterprises calls for urgent improvement.</strong></mark> <strong>Many <mark>Chinese companies have been put to the</mark> Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States</u></strong> (<u><strong><mark>CFIUS</u></strong></mark>), an inter-agency organization tasked to<u><strong><mark> review </u></strong></mark>foreign investors' acquisition activities in the country, <u><strong>for national security reasons. The number of Chinese companies subject to such reviews is disproportionately high</u></strong> considering China's relatively small investment scale in the United States. <u><strong>As a result, Chinese firms are facing rising uncertainties</u></strong> and restraints <u><strong>when investing in the U.S. soil. Jeffery Schott, senior fellow at the PIIE, said</u></strong> <u><strong>there is a need to improve the transparency of the CFIUS</u></strong>. "<u><strong>What the BIT can do is to increase the transparency of the CFIUS procedure to ensure that it is a narrowed focus</u></strong>." <u><strong><mark>China hopes that the U.S.</u></strong></mark> side <u><strong><mark>could treat Chinese enterprises equally</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>remove its discriminating practices</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and drop the wrong hypothesis that</u></strong> <u><strong>all Chinese investments have</u></strong> a governmental background with untold <u><strong>political and military motives,</u></strong> Li said.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Pan 12, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and a member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. He held visiting positions at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Peking University, Fudan University and the University of Macau, and was an Endeavour Research Fellow at the Australian Studies Centre, Peking University between October 2016 and February 2017. He is on the editorial board of Series in International Relations Classics (World Affairs Press, Beijing)., (Chengxin, “Of fears and fantasies: neocolonial desire in Western self/Other imagination” in Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise) //CHC-DS fulltext: The China Threat as a Construction of Otherness With its contribution to the Western/American self-imagination, the ‘China threat’ paradigm is also a construction of Otherness. This is not primarily because this paradigm portrays China as a threat. Rather, it is because in its quest for certain knowledge about China, it has sought to deny Chinese subjectivities, to impose upon China a fixed subjectivity, or to reduce its subjectivities to a singular, homogeneous whole. These discursive tactics of denial, imposition and reduction vis-à-vis Chinese subjectivities are some of the hallmarks of Othering. These ‘Othering’ strategies are easily identifiable in many common arguments of the ‘China threat’ paradigm. Capability-based arguments, for instance, openly bypass Chinese concerns and subjectivities by focusing squarely on its material capabilities, as if China as an international actor could be reduced to its defence spending and military hardware alone. From this perspective, China’s power status becomes the sole starting point for understanding its international relations. Its power—especially military power—metonymically passes as China per se. One of the most dominant components of the China debate has been predictably the ‘assessment of China’s overall future military power’. 52 The following questions, for example, ‘[Is] China a rising power, and if so, how fast and in what direction [is it headed]?’ 53 have been a standard opening gambit in numerous IR analyses on China. John Fairbank once told us that ‘as we phrase questions, so we get answers’. 54 Capability-based representations of China are not completely oblivious to intentions, but they insist that intentions are merely epiphenomenal to capabilities. As Bernstein and Munro claim, ‘China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy’. If one takes China’s military capabilities as a point of departure, it is no surprise that the built-in answer is the China threat. 55 Drawing on their assessment of China’s military power, they confidently declare what China’s ‘real’ goal is: ‘China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia…. Its goal is to ensure that no country in its region… will act without first taking China’s interests into prime consideration’.56 When it comes to China’s professed goals and objectives, they dismiss them as propaganda out of hand. As the argument goes, ‘China’s peace offensive was a tactical move’, which does not change the fundamental nature of its hegemonic ambition.57 Unlike capability-based discourses, intention-based approaches to China’s rise look at its civilisational characteristics and strategic culture, among other things. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order and Johnston’s Cultural Realism, both examined briefly in the previous chapter, readily come to mind as representatives of the latter approaches. Departing from structural realists’ almost exclusive focus on military capabilities, Huntington’s book engages with the history, ideas, values, and customs of the Sinic civilisation. Yet, the conclusions of his culture-informed analysis turn out to be not much different to those of the capability-based discourses. His book treats civilisations as essentially distinctive, self-contained entities, and sees cultural differences between the West and China in essentialist, absolute and mutually exclusive terms. Based on Edward Friedman’s claim that ‘what is authentically Chinese’ is ‘patriarchal, nativistic, and authoritarian’, Huntington painted a stark contrast with what is ‘authentically’ Western, a unique combination of ‘universal’ values such as the rule of law, social pluralism, and individualism.58 In this way, cultural differences between China and the US become a fixed dichotomy of particularity versus universality. To the extent that he believed that ‘Civilizations are the biggest “we” within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other “thems” out there’, to invoke this kind of cultural identity, as he himself acknowledged, is to define ‘the state’s place in world politics, its friends, its enemies’. 59 In Cultural Realism, Johnston similarly promises to move beyond the structuralist, capability-based explanation of China’s strategic behaviour. With a close reading of ‘the classic texts in Chinese strategic thought’ and asking how its strategic culture may provide an insight into Chinese foreign policy, Thus, by drawing a cultural ‘fault line’ between self and Other, Huntington’s grand theory is nothing short of a more totalising construction of Otherness than the conventional state-centric argument is usually capable of. In his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, the threatening quality of the Sinic civilisation is not only imposed on China proper, but also on the so-called ‘Sinic cultural area’ of East Asia as a whole (though with the convenient exclusion of Japan). 60 his efforts are in many ways commendable, for rarely have Western scholars bothered to go to such great lengths to gauge China’s intentions. What is problematic with his analysis, though, is that he is convinced in advance that there is a single Chinese strategic culture.61 Even as his survey does come across two major strategic cultures, namely, the ConfucianMencian paradigm and the parabellum paradigm, Johnston views the former as essentially an ideal type of strategic culture with a largely symbolic role in influencing strategic options.62 Thus, despite Johnston’s worthy attempt to understand China on its own cultural terms, the quest for certainty rooted in the Western self-imagination remains at play. Such a quest, among other things, dictates that his notion of strategic culture be ‘empirically testable’. To that end, Johnston insists on positively specifying ‘what the scope and content of strategic culture is and what it is not’. Consequently, he suggests that there remains essentially one singular Chinese strategic culture, the parabellum paradigm, which then becomes the strategic culture in China. 63 Hence, he ends up with a conception of strategic culture defined by ‘questions about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of conflict with the enemy, and the efficacy of violence in dealing with the adversary’. 64 Certainly, these questions are both relevant and important to any study of strategic culture. But they beg another question: Why should strategic culture be reduced to those questions alone? By directing one’s attention to questions about war, conflict, and violence while brushing aside other kinds of questions (e.g., about peace, reconciliation, and benevolence) that are equally relevant and integral to strategic culture, one is not simply engaging in an objective study of strategic culture, but rather participating in a selective and reductionist discursive practice. In limiting his study to a narrow set of questions about war, conflict, and violence, Johnston both reduces Chinese strategic culture to the use of strategic force, and declares the ‘irrelevance (to behavior)’ of the Confucian-Mencian stress on benevolence, righteousness, and virtue as a basis for security and harmony.65 Indeed, he goes to some considerable lengths to count China’s use of force against Mongols raiding within Ming territory as evidence of Chinese realpolitik aggressiveness.66 As a result, for all his repeated qualification that strategic culture is historically contingent and may be (un)learned, Johnston’s interpretation of the historical records in the Ming dynasty does not leave much room for contingency. The reader is left with the impression that realpolitik thinking is intrinsic to Chinese strategic culture, which is precisely an impression China specialist Warren Cohen walks away with: If Johnston’s analysis of China’s strategic culture is correct—and I believe it is— generational change will not guarantee a kinder, gentler China. Nor will the ultimate disappearance of communism in Beijing. The powerful China we have every reason to expect in the twenty-first century is likely to be as aggressive and expansionist as China has been whenever it has been the dominant power in Asia.67 Aided in part by Johnston’s findings, Cohen was able to spend just ‘a few minutes’ lecturing a visitor from Singapore (who did not view Chinese foreign policy as so ‘aggressive and expansionist’) on the subject of ‘the history of the Chinese empire’ and ‘thousands of years of attacks on China’s neighbors’. To wrap up his lecture, he prescribed that visitor a reading: Johnston’s Cultural Realism. 68 Another, perhaps cruder, tactic of Othering in the ‘China threat’ paradigm involves neither an analysis of China’s military capabilities nor its intentions. Rather, it follows a deductive logic based more explicitly on an either/or dichotomy in the Western/American quest for absolute certainty and security: either China guarantees absolute peace for the United States, or it cannot but be treated as a threat. The reasoning of Betts and Christensen’s abovementioned article serves as a good example here: If the PLA remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely…. Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences…. [And] U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. 69 Of course, they could not get, nor do they expect, affirmative answers from China to any of those relentless quests for absolute certainty. Consequently, their conclusion has to be certainty in a negative form—the China threat: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island…. This is true because of geography; because of America’s reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China’s capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense.70 At this point, neither China’s capabilities nor intentions seem to really matter; the China threat has already been predetermined by the either/or logic. Because of this, some ‘China threat’ theorists see no irony or paradox in justifying the policy of containing China not in spite of, but on the very basis of China’s current weakness. For instance, Mearsheimer wrote in 2001 that ‘China is still far away from having enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony, so it is not too late for the United States to reverse the course and do what it can to slow China’s rise’. 71 In brief, by representing China as a monolithic whole, dismissing its subjectivities, and/or imposing onto it a singular, fixed subjectivity of power politics, the ‘China threat’ paradigm acts as a discursive construction of an objectified Other. Cast as an Other and threatening object, China by definition lacks the kind of rationality and subjectivity that are characteristic of the Western knowing subject. Nor is it eligible to have its own security concern, which may explain why there exists a ‘severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China’s [own] security concerns in the current debate’. Here, it is evident that the China threat is an Othering effect of Western/American colonial desire from which China cannot escape no matter what its capabilities or intentions might be. This China insight may have the much-prized virtue of analytical parsimony, but it does not occur to those theorists that such logic could be used to describe any country, including the US. 72 Even when it is allowed for some security interests, it is alleged that it often has no idea what those interests are. 73 Lucian Pye once argued that China is such an erratic state that it acts ‘in ways that seem perversely self-damaging in the eyes of those who believe they have that country’s interests at heart’.74 Perhaps it is at this level that the Othering effect of the ‘China threat’ paradigm is most devastating.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The construction of <u>the Chinese Other</u> is a discursive practice which marks China as a <u>monolithic threat</u>, denying <u>Chinese subjectivities</u> and creating a <u>fixed dichotomy</u> of the West and East.</h4><p><strong>Pan 12</strong>, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and a member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. He held visiting positions at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Peking University, Fudan University and the University of Macau, and was an Endeavour Research Fellow at the Australian Studies Centre, Peking University between October 2016 and February 2017. He is on the editorial board of Series in International Relations Classics (World Affairs Press, Beijing)., (Chengxin, “Of fears and fantasies: neocolonial desire in Western self/Other imagination” in Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise) //CHC-DS </p><p>The China Threat as a Construction of Otherness </p><p>With its contribution to the Western/American self-imagination, <u><strong>the ‘China threat’ paradigm is</u></strong> also <u><strong>a construction of Otherness</u></strong>. This is not primarily because this paradigm portrays China as a threat. Rather, it is because <u>in its quest for certain knowledge about China, it has sought to <strong>deny Chinese subjectivities, to impose upon China a fixed subjectivity, or to reduce its subjectivities to a singular, homogeneous whole</u></strong>. <u>These discursive tactics of denial, imposition and reduction vis-à-vis Chinese subjectivities are some of the hallmarks of Othering</u>. These ‘Othering’ strategies are easily identifiable in many common arguments of the ‘China threat’ paradigm. <u>Capability-based arguments</u>, for instance, <u>openly bypass Chinese concerns and subjectivities by focusing squarely on its material capabilities, as if China as an international actor could be reduced to its defence spending and military hardware alone</u>. From this perspective, <u>China’s</u> power status becomes the sole starting point for understanding its international relations. Its power—especially <u>military power</u>—<u>metonymically passes as China per se</u>. One of the most dominant components of the China debate has been predictably the ‘assessment of China’s overall future military power’. 52 The following questions, for example, ‘[Is] China a rising power, and if so, how fast and in what direction [is it headed]?’ 53 have been a standard opening gambit in numerous IR analyses on China. John Fairbank once told us that ‘as we phrase questions, so we get answers’. 54 <u><strong>Capability-based representations</u></strong> of China are not completely oblivious to intentions, but they <u>insist that intentions are merely epiphenomenal to capabilities</u>. As Bernstein and Munro claim, ‘China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy’. <u>If one takes China’s military capabilities as a point of departure, it is no surprise that the built-in answer is the China threat</u>. 55 Drawing on their assessment of China’s military power, they confidently declare what China’s ‘real’ goal is: ‘China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia…. Its goal is to ensure that no country in its region… will act without first taking China’s interests into prime consideration’.56 <u>When it comes to China’s professed goals and objectives, they dismiss them as propaganda out of hand</u>. As the argument goes, ‘China’s peace offensive was a tactical move’, which does not change the fundamental nature of its hegemonic ambition.57 Unlike capability-based discourses, intention-based approaches to China’s rise look at its civilisational characteristics and strategic culture, among other things. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order and Johnston’s Cultural Realism, both examined briefly in the previous chapter, readily come to mind as representatives of the latter approaches. Departing from structural realists’ almost exclusive focus on military capabilities, Huntington’s book engages with the history, ideas, values, and customs of the Sinic civilisation. Yet, the conclusions of his culture-informed analysis turn out to be not much different to those of the capability-based discourses. His book treats civilisations as essentially distinctive, self-contained entities, and sees cultural differences between the West and China in essentialist, absolute and mutually exclusive terms. Based on Edward Friedman’s claim that <u>‘what is authentically Chinese’ is ‘patriarchal, nativistic, and authoritarian’</u>, Huntington painted a stark contrast with <u>what is ‘authentically’ Western, a unique combination of ‘universal’ values such as the <strong>rule of law</strong>, <strong>social pluralism</strong>, and <strong>individualism</u></strong>.58 In this way, <u>cultural differences between China and the US become a <strong>fixed dichotomy</strong> of particularity versus universality</u>. To the extent that he believed that ‘Civilizations are the biggest “we” within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other “thems” out there’, to invoke this kind of cultural identity, as he himself acknowledged, is to define ‘the state’s place in world politics, its friends, its enemies’. 59 In Cultural Realism, Johnston similarly promises to move beyond the structuralist, capability-based explanation of China’s strategic behaviour. With a close reading of ‘the classic texts in Chinese strategic thought’ and asking how its strategic culture may provide an insight into Chinese foreign policy, Thus, by drawing a cultural ‘fault line’ between self and Other, Huntington’s grand theory is nothing short of a more totalising construction of Otherness than the conventional state-centric argument is usually capable of. In his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, the threatening quality of the Sinic civilisation is not only imposed on China proper, but also on the so-called ‘Sinic cultural area’ of East Asia as a whole (though with the convenient exclusion of Japan). 60 his efforts are in many ways commendable, for rarely have Western scholars bothered to go to such great lengths to gauge China’s intentions. What is problematic with his analysis, though, is that he is convinced in advance that there is a single Chinese strategic culture.61 Even as his survey does come across two major strategic cultures, namely, the ConfucianMencian paradigm and the parabellum paradigm, Johnston views the former as essentially an ideal type of strategic culture with a largely symbolic role in influencing strategic options.62 Thus, despite Johnston’s worthy attempt to understand China on its own cultural terms, the quest for certainty rooted in the Western self-imagination remains at play. Such a quest, among other things, dictates that his notion of strategic culture be ‘empirically testable’. To that end, Johnston insists on positively specifying ‘what the scope and content of strategic culture is and what it is not’. Consequently, he suggests that there remains essentially one singular Chinese strategic culture, the parabellum paradigm, which then becomes the strategic culture in China. 63 Hence, he ends up with a conception of strategic culture defined by ‘questions about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of conflict with the enemy, and the efficacy of violence in dealing with the adversary’. 64 Certainly, these questions are both relevant and important to any study of strategic culture. But they beg another question: Why should strategic culture be reduced to those questions alone? <u>By directing one’s attention to questions about war, conflict, and violence while brushing aside other kinds of questions</u> (<u>e.g.,</u> about <u>peace, reconciliation, and benevolence</u>) <u>that are equally relevant and integral to strategic culture, one is not simply engaging in an objective study of strategic culture, but rather participating in a <strong>selective and reductionist discursive practice</u></strong>. In limiting his study to a narrow set of questions about war, conflict, and violence, Johnston both reduces Chinese strategic culture to the use of strategic force, and declares the ‘irrelevance (to behavior)’ of the Confucian-Mencian stress on benevolence, righteousness, and virtue as a basis for security and harmony.65 Indeed, he goes to some considerable lengths to count China’s use of force against Mongols raiding within Ming territory as evidence of Chinese realpolitik aggressiveness.66 As a result, for all his repeated qualification that strategic culture is historically contingent and may be (un)learned, Johnston’s interpretation of the historical records in the Ming dynasty does not leave much room for contingency. The reader is left with the impression that realpolitik thinking is intrinsic to Chinese strategic culture, which is precisely an impression China specialist Warren Cohen walks away with: If Johnston’s analysis of China’s strategic culture is correct—and I believe it is— generational change will not guarantee a kinder, gentler China. Nor will the ultimate disappearance of communism in Beijing. The powerful China we have every reason to expect in the twenty-first century is likely to be as aggressive and expansionist as China has been whenever it has been the dominant power in Asia.67 Aided in part by Johnston’s findings, Cohen was able to spend just ‘a few minutes’ lecturing a visitor from Singapore (who did not view Chinese foreign policy as so ‘aggressive and expansionist’) on the subject of ‘the history of the Chinese empire’ and ‘thousands of years of attacks on China’s neighbors’. To wrap up his lecture, he prescribed that visitor a reading: Johnston’s Cultural Realism. 68 Another, perhaps cruder, tactic of Othering in the ‘China threat’ paradigm involves neither an analysis of China’s military capabilities nor its intentions. Rather, <u>it follows a deductive logic based more explicitly on an either/or dichotomy in the Western/American quest for absolute certainty and security: either China guarantees absolute peace for the United States, or it cannot but be treated as a threat</u>. The reasoning of Betts and Christensen’s abovementioned article serves as a good example here: If the PLA remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely…. Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences…. [And] U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. 69 Of course, they could not get, nor do they expect, affirmative answers from China to any of those relentless quests for absolute certainty. Consequently, their conclusion has to be certainty in a negative form—the China threat: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island…. This is true because of geography; because of America’s reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China’s capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense.70 At this point, <u><strong>neither China’s capabilities nor intentions seem to really matter;</u></strong> <u>the China threat has already been predetermined by the <strong>either/or logic</u></strong>. Because of this, some <u>‘China threat’ theorists see no irony or paradox in justifying the policy of containing China not in spite of, but on the very basis of China’s current weakness</u>. For instance, Mearsheimer wrote in 2001 that ‘China is still far away from having enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony, so it is not too late for the United States to reverse the course and do what it can to slow China’s rise’. 71 In brief, <u>by</u> <u><strong>representing China as a monolith</strong>ic whole</u>, <u><strong>dismissing its subjectivities</u></strong>, <u>and/or imposing onto it a singular, fixed subjectivity of power politics, the ‘China threat’ paradigm acts as a <strong>discursive construction of an objectified Other</u></strong>. <u>Cast as an Other and threatening object, China by definition lacks the kind of rationality and subjectivity that are characteristic of the Western knowing subject</u>. Nor is it eligible to have its own security concern, which may explain why there exists a ‘severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China’s [own] security concerns in the current debate’. Here, <u>it is evident that the China threat is an <strong>Othering effect of Western/American colonial desire</strong> from which China cannot escape no matter what its capabilities or intentions might be</u>. This China insight may have the much-prized virtue of analytical parsimony, but it does not occur to those theorists that such logic could be used to describe any country, including the US. 72 Even when it is allowed for some security interests, it is alleged that it often has no idea what those interests are. 73 Lucian Pye once argued that China is such an erratic state that it acts ‘in ways that seem perversely self-damaging in the eyes of those who believe they have that country’s interests at heart’.74 Perhaps it is at this level that the Othering effect of the ‘China threat’ paradigm is most devastating.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Melton 19 fulltext: (Michelle, 1-7, 3L@HarvardLaw, FormerAssocFellowClimatePolicy@CNAS, https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-ii-how-big-threat-climate) The U.S. national security establishment has been increasingly vocal that climate change is a national security threat—and the U.S. is not alone in this regard. But exactly how serious is this threat? How concerned should policymakers be? Assessing the magnitude of the national security threat posed by climate change requires addressing the antecedent issue of timing. Climate change is unfolding—for now—in a relatively linear, gradual way, and as a result, the magnitude of the threat depends on the time horizon. The national security implications of climate change are different between now and 2050, between now and 2100, and between now and 2300. At least until 2050, and possibly for decades after, climate change will remain a creeping threat that will exacerbate and amplify existing, structural global inequalities. While the developed world will be negatively affected by climate change through 2050, the consequences of climate change will be felt most acutely in the developing world. The national security threats posed by climate change to 2050 are likely to differ in degree, not kind, from the kinds of threats already posed by climate change. For the next few decades, climate change will exacerbate humanitarian crises—some of which will result in the deployment of military personnel, as well as material and financial assistance. It will also aggravate natural resource constraints, potentially contributing to political and economic conflict over water, food and energy. The question for the next 30 years is not “can humanity survive as a species with 1.5°C or 2°C of warming,” but, “how much will the existing disparities between the developed and developing world widen, and how long (and how successfully) can these widening political/economic disparities be sustained?” The urgency of the climate threat in the next few decades will depend, to a large degree, on whether and how much the U.S. government perceives a widening of these global inequities as a threat to U.S. national security. By contrast, if emissions continue to creep upward (or if they do not decline rapidly), by 2100 climate-related national security threats could be existential. The question for the next hundred years is not, “are disparities politically and economically manageable?” but, “can the global order, premised on the nation-state system, itself based on territorial sovereignty, survive in a world in which substantial swathes of territory are potentially uninhabitable?” National Security Consequences of Climate Change to 2050 Scientists can predict the consequences of climate change to 2050 with some measure of certainty. (Beyond that date, the pace and magnitude of climate change—and therefore, the national security threat posed by it—depend heavily on the level of emissions in the coming years, as I have explained.) There is relative agreement across modeled climate scenarios that the world will likely warm, on average, at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by about 2050—but perhaps as soon as 2030. This level of warming is likely to occur even if the world succeeds in dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as even the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report implicitly admits. In other words, a certain amount of additional warming—at least 1.5°C, and probably more than that—is presumptively unavoidable. Looking ahead to 2050, it can be said with relative confidence that the national security consequences of climate change will vary in degree, not in kind, from the national security threats already facing the United States. This is hardly good news. Even small differences in global average temperatures result in significant environmental changes, with attendant social, economic and political consequences. By 2050, climate change will wreak increasing havoc on human and natural systems—predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world—with attenuated but profound consequences for national security. In particular, changes in temperature, the hydrological cycle and the ranges of insects will impact food availability and food access in much of the world, increasing food insecurity. Storms, flooding, changes in ocean pH and other climate-linked changes will damage infrastructure and negatively impact labor productivity and economic growth in much of the world. Vector-borne diseases will also become more prevalent, as climate change will expand the geographic range and intensity of transmission of diseases like malaria, West Nile, Zika and dengue fever, and cholera. Rising public health challenges, economic devastation and food insecurity will translate into an increased demand for humanitarian assistance provided by the military, increased migration—especially from tropical and subtropical regions—and geopolitical conflict. Long-term trends such as declining food security, coupled with short-term events like hurricanes, could sustain unprecedented levels of migration. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe portends the kinds of population movements that will only accelerate in the coming decades: people from Africa, Southwest and South Asia and elsewhere crossing land and water to reach Europe. For the United States, this likely means greater numbers of people seeking entry from both Central America and the Caribbean. Such influxes are not unprecedented, but they are unlikely to abate and could increase in volume over the next few decades, driven in part by climate change-related food insecurity, climate change-related storms and also by economic and political instability. Food insecurity, economic losses and loss of human life are also likely to exacerbate existing political tensions in the developing world, especially in regions with poor governance and/or where the climate is particularly vulnerable to warming (e.g., the Mediterranean basin). While the Arab Spring had many underlying causes, it also coincided with a period of high food prices, which arguably contributed to the protests. In some situations, food insecurity, economic losses and public health crises, combined with weak and ineffectual governance, could precipitate future conflicts of this kind—although it will be difficult to know where and when without more precise local studies of both underlying political dynamics and the regionally-specific impacts of climate change. 2100 and Beyond While the national security impacts of climate change to 2050 are likely to be costly and disruptive for the U.S. military—and devastating for many people around the world—at some point after 2050, if warming continues at its current pace, changes to the climate could fundamentally reshape geopolitics and possibly even the current nation-state basis of the current global order. To be clear, both the ultimate level of warming and its attendant political consequences is highly speculative, for the reasons I explained in my last post. Nonetheless, we do know that the planet is currently on track for at least 3-4°C of warming by 2100. The “known knowns” of higher levels of warming—say, 3°C—are frightening. At that 3°C of warming, for example, scientists project that there will be a nearly 70 percent decline in wheat production in Central America and the Caribbean, 75 percent of the land area in the Middle East and more than 50 percent in South Asia will be affected by highly unusual heat, and sea level rise could displace and imperil the lives hundreds of millions of people, among other consequences. But even higher levels of warming are physically possible within this century. At these levels of warming, some regions of the world would be literally uninhabitable, likely resulting in the depopulation of the tropics, to say nothing of the consequences of sea-level rise for economically important cities such as Amsterdam and New York. Even if newly warmed regions of the far north could theoretically accommodate the resulting migrants, this presumes that the political response to this unprecedented global displacement would be orderly and conflict-free borders on fantasy. The geopolitical consequences of significant levels of warming are severe, but if these changes occur in a linear way, at least there will be time for human systems to adjust. Perhaps more challenging for national security is the possibility that the until-now linear changes give way to abrupt and irreversible ones. Scientists forecast that, at higher levels of warming—precisely what level is speculative—humanity could trigger catastrophic, abrupt and unavoidable consequences to the ecosystem. The IPCC has considered nine such abrupt changes; one example is the potential shutting down of the Indian summer monsoon. Over a billion people are dependent upon the Indian monsoon, which provides parts of South Asia with about 80 percent of its annual rainfall; relatively minor changes in the monsoon in either direction can cause disasters. In 2010, a wetter monsoon led to the catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, which directly affected 20 million people; a drier monsoon in 2002 led to devastating drought. Studies suggest that the Indian summer monsoon has two stable states: wet (i.e., the current state) and dry (characterized by low precipitation over the subcontinent). At some point, if warming continues, the monsoon could abruptly shift into the second, “dry” state, with catastrophic consequences for over a billion people dependent on monsoon-fed agriculture. The IPCC suggests that such a state-shift is “unlikely”—that is, there is a 10 to 33 percent chance that a state-shift will happen in the 21st century—but scientists also have relatively low confidence in their understanding of the underlying mechanisms in this and other large-scale natural systems. The consequences of abrupt, severe warming for national security are obvious in general, if unclear in the specifics. In 2003, the Defense Department asked a contractor to explore such a scenario. The resulting report outlined the offensive and defensive national security strategies countries may adopt if faced with abrupt climate change, and highlighted the increased risk of inter- and intra-state conflict over natural resources and immigration. Although the report may be off in its imagined timeframe (positing abrupt climate change by 2020), the world it conjures is improbable but not outlandish. If the Indian monsoon were to switch to dry state, and a billion people were suddenly without reliable food sources, for example, it is not clear how the Indian government would react, assuming it would survive in its current form. Major wars or low-intensity proxy conflicts seem likely, if not inevitable, in such a scenario.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u><strong>Climate change is an existential threat and risk multiplier – disease, resource wars, geopolitical shift, and non-linear changes.</h4><p>Melton 19</p><p></u></strong>(Michelle, 1-7, 3L@HarvardLaw, FormerAssocFellowClimatePolicy@CNAS<u><strong>, https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-ii-how-big-threat-climate)</p><p></u></strong>The U.S. national security establishment has been increasingly vocal that <u>climate change is a national security threat</u>—and the U.S. is not alone in this regard. But exactly how serious is this threat? How concerned should policymakers be? Assessing the magnitude of the national security threat posed by climate change requires addressing the antecedent issue of timing. Climate change is unfolding—for now—in a relatively linear, gradual way, and as a result, the magnitude of the threat depends on the time horizon. The national security implications of climate change are different between now and 2050, between now and 2100, and between now and 2300. At least until 2050, and possibly for decades after, <u><mark>climate change will remain a</mark> creeping <mark>threat that will <strong>exacerbate and amplify</strong></mark> existing, structural global <mark>inequalities</u></mark>. While the developed world will be negatively affected by climate change through 2050, <u>the consequences of climate change will be felt most acutely in the developing world</u>. The national security threats posed by climate change to 2050 are likely to differ in degree, not kind, from the kinds of threats already posed by climate change. For the next few decades, <u><mark>climate change will exacerbate <strong>humanitarian crises</u></strong></mark>—some of which will result in the deployment of military personnel, as well as material and financial assistance. <u>It will</u> also <u>aggravate natural resource constraints</u>, potentially <u><mark>contributing to</mark> </u>political and economic <u><strong><mark>conflict over water, food and energy.</mark> </u></strong>The question for the next 30 years is not “can humanity survive as a species with 1.5°C or 2°C of warming,” but, “how much will the existing disparities between the developed and developing world widen, and how long (and how successfully) can these widening political/economic disparities be sustained?” The urgency of the climate threat in the next few decades will depend, to a large degree, on whether and how much the U.S. government perceives a widening of these global inequities as a threat to U.S. national security. By contrast, <u>if emissions continue to creep upward</u> (or if they do not decline rapidly), by 2100 <u><mark>climate</u></mark>-related national security <u><mark>threats could be <strong>existential</u></strong></mark>. <u>The question</u> for the next hundred years <u>is</u> not, “are disparities politically and economically manageable?” but, “<u>can the global order, premised on </u>the nation-state system, itself based on<u> territorial sovereignty, survive in a world in which substantial swathes of territory are</u> potentially <u>uninhabitable?</u>” National Security Consequences of Climate Change to 2050 Scientists can predict the consequences of climate change to 2050 with some measure of certainty. (Beyond that date, the pace and magnitude of climate change—and therefore, the national security threat posed by it—depend heavily on the level of emissions in the coming years, as I have explained.) There is relative agreement across modeled climate scenarios that the world will likely warm, on average, at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by about 2050—but perhaps as soon as 2030. This level of warming is likely to occur even if the world succeeds in dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as even the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report implicitly admits. In other words, a certain amount of additional warming—at least 1.5°C, and probably more than that—is presumptively unavoidable. Looking ahead to 2050, it can be said with relative confidence that <u>the national security consequences of climate change will vary in degree, not in kind, from the </u>national security <u>threats already facing the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><strong>This is hardly good news</u></strong>. <u><mark>Even small differences in</mark> global average <mark>temperatures result </mark>in <strong>significant environmental changes, with attendant <mark>social, economic and political consequences</u></strong></mark>. By 2050, <u><mark>climate change will wreak</mark> increasing <mark>havoc</mark> on human and natural systems</u>—predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world—<u><mark>with</u></mark> attenuated but <u><strong>profound <mark>consequences for national security</mark>. </u></strong>In particular, <u>changes in temperature</u>, the hydrological cycle and the ranges of insects <u>will impact food availability</u> and food access in much of the world, <u>increasing food insecurity</u>. <u>Storms, flooding, changes in ocean pH</u> and other climate-linked changes <u>will damage infrastructure and</u> negatively <u>impact labor productivity <mark>and <strong>economic growth</strong></mark> in much of the world</u>. Vector-borne <u><strong><mark>diseases will</mark> also <mark>become more prevalent</mark>,</u></strong> <u>as climate change will expand the geographic range and intensity of transmission of diseases</u> like malaria, West Nile, Zika and dengue fever, and cholera. <u>Rising public health challenges, economic devastation and <mark>food insecurity will translate into</u></mark> an increased demand for humanitarian assistance provided by the military, <u>increased migration</u>—especially from tropical and subtropical regions—<u><strong>and <mark>geopolitical conflict</u></strong></mark>. Long-term trends such as declining food security, coupled with short-term events like hurricanes, could sustain unprecedented levels of migration. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe portends the kinds of <u>population movements that will only accelerate in the coming decades</u>: people from Africa, Southwest and South Asia and elsewhere crossing land and water to reach Europe. For the United States, this likely means greater numbers of people seeking entry from both Central America and the Caribbean. <u>Such influxes</u> are not unprecedented, but they are unlikely to abate and <u>could increase in volume over the next few decades</u>, <u>driven</u> in part <u>by </u>climate change-related <u>food insecurity</u>, climate change-related <u>storms and</u> also by <u>economic and political instability</u>. <u><mark>Food insecurity, economic losses and loss of</mark> human <mark>life</mark> are also likely to <strong><mark>exacerbate existing</mark> political <mark>tensions</u></strong></mark> in the developing world, especially in regions with poor governance and/or where the climate is particularly vulnerable to warming (e.g., the Mediterranean basin). While the Arab Spring had many underlying causes, it also coincided with a period of high food prices, which arguably contributed to the protests. In some situations, <u>food insecurity, economic losses and public health crises, combined with weak <mark>and</mark> ineffectual governance, could precipitate <mark>future conflicts</u></mark> of this kind—although it will be difficult to know where and when without more precise local studies of both underlying political dynamics and the regionally-specific impacts of climate change. 2100 and Beyond While the national security impacts of climate change to 2050 are likely to be costly and disruptive for the U.S. military—and devastating for many people around the world—at some point after 2050, <u>if warming continues at its current pace, <mark>changes to the climate could <strong>fundamentally reshape geopolitics</strong> and</mark> possibly even the current nation-state basis of <strong>the current global order</u></strong>. To be clear, both the ultimate level of warming and its attendant political consequences is highly speculative, for the reasons I explained in my last post. Nonetheless, we do know that the planet is currently on track for at least 3-4°C of warming by 2100. The “known knowns” of higher levels of warming—say, 3°C—are frightening. At that 3°C of warming, for example, <u>scientists project that there will be a nearly 70 percent decline in wheat production</u> in Central America and the Caribbean, <u>75 percent of the land</u> area <u>in the Middle East and more than 50 percent in South Asia will be affected by highly unusual heat</u>, <u>and sea level rise could displace and imperil the lives hundreds of millions of people</u>, among other consequences. But even higher levels of warming are physically possible within this century. At these levels of warming, <u><mark>some <strong>regions</mark> of the world <mark>would be literally uninhabitable</u></strong></mark>, likely resulting in the depopulation of the tropics, to say nothing of the consequences of sea-level rise for economically important cities such as Amsterdam and New York. Even if newly warmed regions of the far north could theoretically accommodate the resulting migrants, this presumes that the political response to this unprecedented global displacement would be orderly and conflict-free borders on fantasy. The <u>geopolitical consequences of significant levels of warming are severe</u>, but if these changes occur in a linear way, at least there will be time for human systems to adjust. Perhaps more challenging for national security is the possibility that <u><strong>the until-now linear <mark>changes give way to abrupt and irreversible ones</mark>.</u></strong> Scientists forecast that, <u>at higher levels of warming</u>—precisely what level is speculative—<u><strong><mark>humanity could trigger catastrophic</mark>, abrupt and <mark>unavoidable consequences</mark> to the ecosystem</u></strong>. The IPCC has considered nine such abrupt changes; one example is <u>the potential shutting down of the Indian summer monsoon. </u>Over a billion people are dependent upon the Indian monsoon, which provides parts of South Asia with about 80 percent of its annual rainfall; relatively minor changes in the monsoon in either direction can cause disasters. In 2010, a wetter monsoon led to the catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, which directly affected 20 million people; a drier monsoon in 2002 led to devastating drought. Studies suggest that the Indian summer monsoon has two stable states: wet (i.e., the current state) and dry (characterized by low precipitation over the subcontinent). At some point, if warming continues, the monsoon could abruptly shift into the second, “dry” state, <u>with catastrophic consequences for over a billion people dependent on monsoon-fed agriculture.</u> The IPCC suggests that such a state-shift is “unlikely”—that is, there is a 10 to 33 percent chance that a state-shift will happen in the 21st century—but scientists also have relatively low confidence in their understanding of the underlying mechanisms in this and other large-scale natural systems. The <u>consequences of</u> abrupt, severe <u>warming for national security are obvious</u> in general, if unclear in the specifics. In 2003, the <u>Defense Department</u> asked a contractor to explore such a scenario. The resulting <u>report outlined</u> the offensive and defensive national security strategies countries may adopt if faced with abrupt climate change, and highlighted the <u><strong>increased risk of inter- and intra-state conflict</strong> over natural resources and immigration.</u> Although the report may be off in its imagined timeframe (positing abrupt climate change by 2020), the world it conjures is improbable but not outlandish. If the Indian monsoon were to switch to dry state, and a billion people were suddenly without reliable food sources, for example, it is not clear how the Indian government would react, assuming it would survive in its current form. <u><strong><mark>Major wars</u></strong> </mark>or low-intensity proxy conflicts <u><strong><mark>seem</mark> likely, if not <mark>inevitable</mark>, in such a scenario.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Barnes and Cooper 1/14 [Julian E Barnes---17 years reporting, NYT Nat Sec Reporter & Helene Cooper---NYT Pentagon Correspondent, part of team that won a Pulitzer for international reporting during Libya ebola epidemic, 2019, NYT, Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html?module=inline] fulltext: WASHINGTON — There are few things that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia desires more than the weakening of NATO, the military alliance among the United States, Europe and Canada that has deterred Soviet and Russian aggression for 70 years. Last year, President Trump suggested a move tantamount to destroying NATO: the withdrawal of the United States. Senior administration officials told The New York Times that several times over the course of 2018, Mr. Trump privately said he wanted to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Current and former officials who support the alliance said they feared Mr. Trump could return to his threat as allied military spending continued to lag behind the goals the president had set. In the days around a tumultuous NATO summit meeting last summer, they said, Mr. Trump told his top national security officials that he did not see the point of the military alliance, which he presented as a drain on the United States. At the time, Mr. Trump’s national security team, including Jim Mattis, then the defense secretary, and John R. Bolton, the national security adviser, scrambled to keep American strategy on track without mention of a withdrawal that would drastically reduce Washington’s influence in Europe and could embolden Russia for decades. Now, the president’s repeatedly stated desire to withdraw from NATO is raising new worries among national security officials amid growing concern about Mr. Trump’s efforts to keep his meetings with Mr. Putin secret from even his own aides, and an F.B.I. investigation into the administration’s Russia ties. A move to withdraw from the alliance, in place since 1949, “would be one of the most damaging things that any president could do to U.S. interests,” said Michèle A. Flournoy, an under secretary of defense under President Barack Obama. “It would destroy 70-plus years of painstaking work across multiple administrations, Republican and Democratic, to create perhaps the most powerful and advantageous alliance in history,” Ms. Flournoy said in an interview. “And it would be the wildest success that Vladimir Putin could dream of.” Retired Adm. James G. Stavridis, the former supreme allied commander of NATO, said an American withdrawal from the alliance would be “a geopolitical mistake of epic proportion.” “Even discussing the idea of leaving NATO — let alone actually doing so — would be the gift of the century for Putin,” Admiral Stavridis said. Senior Trump administration officials discussed the internal and highly sensitive efforts to preserve the military alliance on condition of anonymity. After the White House was asked for comment on Monday, a senior administration official pointed to Mr. Trump’s remarks in July when he called the United States’ commitment to NATO “very strong” and the alliance “very important.” The official declined to comment further. American national security officials believe that Russia has largely focused on undermining solidarity between the United States and Europe after it annexed Crimea in 2014. Its goal was to upend NATO, which Moscow views as a threat. Russia’s meddling in American elections and its efforts to prevent former satellite states from joining the alliance have aimed to weaken what it views as an enemy next door, the American officials said. With a weakened NATO, they said, Mr. Putin would have more freedom to behave as he wishes, setting up Russia as a counterweight to Europe and the United States. An American withdrawal from the alliance would accomplish all that Mr. Putin has been trying to put into motion, the officials said — essentially, doing the Russian leader’s hardest and most critical work for him. When Mr. Trump first raised the possibility of leaving the alliance, senior administration officials were unsure if he was serious. He has returned to the idea several times, officials said increasing their worries. Mr. Trump’s dislike of alliances abroad and American commitments to international organizations is no secret. The president has repeatedly and publicly challenged or withdrawn from a number of military and economic partnerships, from the Paris climate accord to an Asia-Pacific trade pact. He has questioned the United States’ military alliance with South Korea and Japan, and he has announced a withdrawal of American troops from Syria without first consulting allies in the American-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State. NATO had planned to hold a leaders meeting in Washington to mark its 70th anniversary in April, akin to the 50-year celebration that was hosted by President Bill Clinton in 1999. But this year’s meeting has been downgraded to a foreign ministers gathering, as some diplomats feared that Mr. Trump could use a Washington summit meeting to renew his attacks on the alliance. Leaders are now scheduled to meet at the end of 2019, but not in Washington. Mr. Trump’s threats to withdraw had sent officials scrambling to prevent the annual gathering of NATO leaders in Brussels last July from turning into a disaster. Senior national security officials had already pushed the military alliance’s ambassadors to complete a formal agreement on several NATO goals — including shared defenses against Russia — before the summit meeting even began, to shield it from Mr. Trump. But Mr. Trump upended the proceedings anyway. One meeting, on July 12, was ostensibly supposed to be about Ukraine and Georgia — two non-NATO members with aspirations to join the alliance. Accepted protocol dictates that alliance members do not discuss internal business in front of nonmembers. But as is frequently the case, Mr. Trump did not adhere to the established norms, according to several American and European officials who were in the room. He complained that European governments were not spending enough on the shared costs of defense, leaving the United States to carry an outsize burden. He expressed frustration that European leaders would not, on the spot, pledge to spend more. And he appeared not to grasp the details when several tried to explain to him that spending levels were set by parliaments in individual countries, the American and European officials said. Then, at another leaders gathering at the same summit meeting, Mr. Trump appeared to be taken by surprise by Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary general. Backing Mr. Trump’s position, Mr. Stoltenberg pushed allies to increase their spending and praised the United States for leading by example — including by increasing its military spending in Europe. At that, according to one official who was in the room, Mr. Trump whipped his head around and glared at American officials behind him, surprised by Mr. Stoltenberg’s remarks and betraying ignorance of his administration’s own spending plans. Mr. Trump appeared especially annoyed, officials in the meeting said, with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and her country’s military spending of 1 percent of its gross domestic product. By comparison, the United States’ military spending is about 4 percent of G.D.P., and Mr. Trump has railed against allies for not meeting the NATO spending goal of 2 percent of economic output. At the summit meeting, he surprised the leaders by demanding 4 percent — a move that would essentially put the goal out of reach for many alliance members. He also threatened that the United States would “go its own way” in 2019 if military spending from other NATO countries did not rise. During the middle of a speech by Ms. Merkel, Mr. Trump again broke protocol by getting up and leaving, sending ripples of shock across the room, according to American and European officials who were there. But before he left, the president walked behind Ms. Merkel and interrupted her speech to call her a great leader. Startled and relieved that Mr. Trump had not continued his berating of the leaders, the people in the room clapped. In the end, the NATO leaders publicly papered over their differences to present a unified front. But both European leaders and American officials emerged from the two days in Brussels shaken and worried that Mr. Trump would renew his threat to withdraw from the alliance. Similarly, just when officials think the issue of NATO membership has been settled, Mr. Trump again brings up his desire to leave the alliance. Any move by Mr. Trump against NATO would most likely invite a response by Congress. American policy toward Russia is the one area where congressional Republicans have consistently bucked Mr. Trump, including with new sanctions on Moscow and by criticizing his warm July 16 news conference with Mr. Putin in Helsinki, Finland. Members of NATO may withdraw after a notification period of a year, under Article 13 of the Washington Treaty. Such a delay would give Congress time to try blocking any attempt by Mr. Trump to leave. “It’s alarming that the president continues to falsely assert that NATO does not contribute to the overall safety of the United States or the international community,” said Senator Jeanne Shaheen, a New Hampshire Democrat who is among the lawmakers who support legislation to stop Mr. Trump from withdrawing from the military alliance. “The Senate knows better and stands ready to defend NATO.” NATO’s popularity with the public continues to be strong. But the alliance has become a more partisan issue, with Democrats showing strong enthusiasm and Republican support softening, according to a survey by the Ronald Reagan Institute. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Washington’s ambassador to NATO and a former Republican senator, has sought to build support for the alliance in Congress, including helping to organize a bipartisan group of backers. But even if Congress moved to block a withdrawal, a statement by Mr. Trump that he wanted to leave would greatly damage NATO. Allies feeling threatened by Russia already have extreme doubts about whether Mr. Trump would order troops to come to their aid. In his resignation letter last month, Mr. Mattis specifically cited his own commitment to America’s alliances in an implicit criticism of Mr. Trump’s principles. Mr. Mattis originally said he would stay through the next NATO meeting at the end of February, but Mr. Trump pushed him out before the new year. Acting Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan is believed to support the alliance. But he has also pointedly said he thinks that the Pentagon should not be “the Department of No” to the president. European and American officials said the presence of Mr. Mattis, a former top NATO commander, had reassured allies that a senior Trump administration official had their back. His exit from the Pentagon has increased worries among some European diplomats that the safety blanket has now been lost.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Trump <u>will</u> pull out of NATO---its <u>not</u> just a campaign promise and Mattis departure means he’s <u>unconstrained</u> </h4><p><strong>Barnes and Cooper 1/14</strong> [Julian E Barnes---17 years reporting, NYT Nat Sec Reporter & Helene Cooper---NYT Pentagon Correspondent, part of team that won a Pulitzer for international reporting during Libya ebola epidemic, 2019, NYT, Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html?module=inline]</p><p>WASHINGTON — There are few things that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia desires more than the weakening of NATO, the military alliance among the United States, Europe and Canada that has deterred Soviet and Russian aggression for 70 years.</p><p><u>Last year, President Trump suggested a move tantamount to destroying NATO: the withdrawal of the United States.</p><p><mark>Senior</mark> administration <mark>officials told</mark> The New York Times</u> that <u><mark>several times over the course of 2018</mark>, Mr. <mark>Trump privately said he wanted to <strong>withdraw</strong></mark> <mark>from</u></mark> the <u><mark>N</mark>orth <mark>A</mark>tlantic <mark>T</mark>reaty <mark>O</mark>rganization</u>. Current and former officials who support the alliance said they feared Mr. <u><mark>Trump could <strong>return to</mark> <mark>his threat</strong> as</mark> allied <mark>military spending</mark> <mark>continued to lag</mark> behind the goals the president had set.</p><p></u>In the days around a tumultuous NATO summit meeting last summer, they said, Mr. <u><mark>Trump told his</mark> top national security <mark>officials that he did not see the point of the</mark> military <mark>alliance</u></mark>, which he presented as a drain on the United States.</p><p>At the time, Mr. <u>Trump’s</u> national security <u>team</u>, <u>including</u> Jim <u><strong><mark>Mattis</u></strong></mark>, then the defense secretary, <u><mark>and</u></mark> John R. <u><strong><mark>Bolton</u></strong></mark>, the national security adviser, <u><mark>scrambled to keep</mark> American <mark>strategy on track</u></mark> without mention of a withdrawal that would drastically reduce Washington’s influence in Europe and could embolden Russia for decades.</p><p>Now, <u>the president’s</u> repeatedly stated <u>desire</u> to withdraw from NATO <u>is raising new worries among national security officials</u> amid growing concern about Mr. Trump’s efforts to keep his meetings with Mr. Putin secret from even his own aides, and an F.B.I. investigation into the administration’s Russia ties.</p><p>A move to withdraw from the alliance, in place since 1949, “would be one of the most damaging things that any president could do to U.S. interests,” said Michèle A. Flournoy, an under secretary of defense under President Barack Obama.</p><p>“It would destroy 70-plus years of painstaking work across multiple administrations, Republican and Democratic, to create perhaps the most powerful and advantageous alliance in history,” Ms. Flournoy said in an interview. “And it would be the wildest success that Vladimir Putin could dream of.”</p><p>Retired Adm. James G. Stavridis, the former supreme allied commander of NATO, said an American withdrawal from the alliance would be “a geopolitical mistake of epic proportion.”</p><p>“Even discussing the idea of leaving NATO — let alone actually doing so — would be the gift of the century for Putin,” Admiral Stavridis said.</p><p><u>Senior</u> Trump administration <u>officials discussed the <strong>internal and highly sensitive efforts</strong> to preserve the military alliance on condition of anonymity</u>.</p><p>After the White House was asked for comment on Monday, a senior administration official pointed to Mr. Trump’s remarks in July when he called the United States’ commitment to NATO “very strong” and the alliance “very important.” The official declined to comment further.</p><p>American national security officials believe that Russia has largely focused on undermining solidarity between the United States and Europe after it annexed Crimea in 2014. Its goal was to upend NATO, which Moscow views as a threat.</p><p>Russia’s meddling in American elections and its efforts to prevent former satellite states from joining the alliance have aimed to weaken what it views as an enemy next door, the American officials said. <u>With a weakened NATO</u>, they said, Mr. <u>Putin would have <strong>more freedom</strong> to behave as he wishes</u>, setting up Russia as a counterweight to Europe and the United States.</p><p><u>An American withdrawal from the alliance would accomplish all that Mr. Putin has been trying to put into motion, the officials said — essentially, doing the Russian leader’s hardest and most critical work for him.</p><p><mark>When</u></mark> Mr. <u><mark>Trump first raised the possibility</u></mark> of leaving the alliance, senior <u>administration <mark>officials <strong>were unsure if he was serious</strong></mark>.</u> <u><mark>He has <strong>returned to the idea</strong> several times</u></mark>, <u>officials said increasing their worries.</p><p></u>Mr. Trump’s dislike of alliances abroad and American commitments to international organizations is no secret.</p><p>The president has repeatedly and publicly challenged or withdrawn from a number of military and economic partnerships, from the Paris climate accord to an Asia-Pacific trade pact. He has questioned the United States’ military alliance with South Korea and Japan, and he has announced a withdrawal of American troops from Syria without first consulting allies in the American-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State.</p><p><u>NATO had planned to hold a leaders meeting in Washington to mark its 70th anniversary </u>in April, akin to the 50-year celebration that was hosted by President Bill Clinton in 1999. But <u><strong><mark>this year’s meeting has been downgraded to a foreign ministers gathering</u></strong></mark>, <u>as</u> some <u><mark>diplomats feared</mark> that </u>Mr. <u><mark>Trump</mark> <mark>could use a Washington summit meeting to renew his attacks</u></mark> on the alliance.</p><p>Leaders are now scheduled to meet at the end of 2019, but not in Washington.</p><p>Mr. Trump’s threats to withdraw had sent officials scrambling to prevent the annual gathering of NATO leaders in Brussels last July from turning into a disaster.</p><p>Senior national security officials had already pushed the military alliance’s ambassadors to complete a formal agreement on several NATO goals — including shared defenses against Russia — before the summit meeting even began, to shield it from Mr. Trump.</p><p>But Mr. Trump upended the proceedings anyway. One meeting, on July 12, was ostensibly supposed to be about Ukraine and Georgia — two non-NATO members with aspirations to join the alliance.</p><p>Accepted protocol dictates that alliance members do not discuss internal business in front of nonmembers. But as is frequently the case, Mr. Trump did not adhere to the established norms, according to several American and European officials who were in the room.</p><p>He complained that European governments were not spending enough on the shared costs of defense, leaving the United States to carry an outsize burden. He expressed frustration that European leaders would not, on the spot, pledge to spend more. And he appeared not to grasp the details when several tried to explain to him that spending levels were set by parliaments in individual countries, the American and European officials said.</p><p>Then, at another leaders gathering at the same summit meeting, Mr. Trump appeared to be taken by surprise by Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary general.</p><p>Backing Mr. Trump’s position, Mr. Stoltenberg pushed allies to increase their spending and praised the United States for leading by example — including by increasing its military spending in Europe. At that, according to one official who was in the room, Mr. Trump whipped his head around and glared at American officials behind him, surprised by Mr. Stoltenberg’s remarks and betraying ignorance of his administration’s own spending plans.</p><p><u>Mr. Trump appeared especially annoyed, officials in the meeting said, with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and her country’s military spending of 1 percent of its gross domestic product.</p><p></u>By comparison, the United States’ military spending is about 4 percent of G.D.P., and Mr. Trump has railed against allies for not meeting the NATO spending goal of 2 percent of economic output. At the summit meeting, he surprised the leaders by demanding 4 percent — a move that would essentially put the goal out of reach for many alliance members. <u><mark>He</mark> also <mark>threatened</mark> that <mark>the</mark> United <mark>States would “go its own way” <strong>in 2019</strong></mark> if military spending from other NATO countries did not rise.</p><p></u>During the middle of a speech by Ms. Merkel, Mr. Trump again broke protocol by getting up and leaving, sending ripples of shock across the room, according to American and European officials who were there. But before he left, the president walked behind Ms. Merkel and interrupted her speech to call her a great leader. Startled and relieved that Mr. Trump had not continued his berating of the leaders, the people in the room clapped.</p><p>In the end, the NATO leaders publicly papered over their differences to present a unified front. But both European leaders and American officials emerged from the two days in Brussels shaken and worried that Mr. Trump would renew his threat to withdraw from the alliance.</p><p>Similarly, <u>just when officials think the issue of NATO membership <strong>has been settled</u></strong>, Mr. <u>Trump again brings up his desire to <strong>leave the alliance</u></strong>.</p><p>Any move by Mr. Trump against NATO would most likely invite a response by Congress. American policy toward Russia is the one area where congressional Republicans have consistently bucked Mr. Trump, including with new sanctions on Moscow and by criticizing his warm July 16 news conference with Mr. Putin in Helsinki, Finland.</p><p>Members of NATO may withdraw after a notification period of a year, under Article 13 of the Washington Treaty. Such a delay would give Congress time to try blocking any attempt by Mr. Trump to leave.</p><p><u>“It’s alarming that the president continues to falsely assert that NATO does not contribute to the overall safety of the United States or the international community,” said Senator Jeanne Shaheen, a New Hampshire Democrat who is among the lawmakers who support legislation to stop Mr. Trump from withdrawing from the military alliance. “The Senate knows better and stands ready to defend NATO.”</p><p>NATO’s popularity with the public continues to be strong</u>. But <u><mark>the alliance has become a more <strong>partisan issue</strong></mark>, <mark>with Democrats showing</mark> strong <mark>enthusiasm and <strong>Republican support softening</strong></mark>, according to a survey by the Ronald Reagan Institute.</p><p>Kay Bailey Hutchison, Washington’s ambassador to NATO and a former Republican senator, has sought to build support for the alliance in Congress, including helping to organize a bipartisan group of backers.</p><p></u>But even if Congress moved to block a withdrawal, <u>a statement by Mr. Trump that he wanted to leave would <strong>greatly damage NATO</u></strong>. <u>Allies feeling threatened</u> by Russia already <u>have extreme doubts about whether Mr. Trump would order troops to come to their aid.</p><p></u>In his resignation letter last month, Mr. Mattis specifically cited his own commitment to America’s alliances in an implicit criticism of Mr. Trump’s principles. Mr. Mattis originally said he would stay through the next NATO meeting at the end of February, but Mr. Trump pushed him out before the new year.</p><p>Acting Defense Secretary Patrick M. <u><mark>Shanahan</u></mark> is believed to support the alliance. But he has also pointedly said he <u><mark>thinks that the Pentagon should not be “<strong>the Department of No</strong></mark>”<strong> to the president.</p><p></strong>European and American officials said the presence of Mr. <mark>Mattis</u></mark>, a former top NATO commander, <u>had <mark>reassured allies</u></mark> that a senior Trump administration official had their back. <u><mark>His exit</mark> from the Pentagon has <mark>increased worries among</mark> some <mark>European diplomats that <strong>the safety blanket has</mark> now <mark>been lost.</p></u></strong></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jonas 22 – Jonas, Ashley, graduated from Nebraska-Lincoln focusing on global studies and environmental studies. "Climate Change Adaptation, Migration, and Promising Developments for Pacific Island States" (2022). Honors Theses, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 459. gordon fulltext: One of the major impacts of climate change that is pertinent to SIDS is the threat of sea-level rise. How does climate change result in sea-level rise? Because greenhouse gases maintain heat in the atmosphere, the oceans, too, are absorbing heat and warming the surface waters (EPA, n.d.-b). Basically, heat expands water molecules, known as thermal expansion, thus the sea level rises when the oceans are warmer (Bangladesh Red Crescent Society et al. [IFRC], 4 2021). Another contributor to sea-level rise is the accumulation of water from glaciers, which are melting at an accelerated rate (Leal-Arcas, 2012). Albedo is a term used to refer to the proportion of sunlight reflecting off a surface on the earth; unfortunately, the ice-albedo feedback loop is positive and perpetuates atmospheric heat absorption and warming. As fewer white surfaces, like ice, are present to reflect the sun’s radiation, more sunlight is absorbed by the earth. This heat absorption contributes to further loss of Arctic sea ice, snow cover, and permafrost and, consequently, more sea-level rise (IPCC, 2021). Sea-level rise has more than doubled in the past couple of decades compared to rates throughout the entire 20th century (Lindsey, 2020). Rising ocean levels pose a threat to island nations in particular because many of them contain low-lying coral atolls, some of which fail to peak 5 meters above sea level (Aung et al., 2009; OCHA, n.d.; The World Bank Group & The Asian Development Bank, 2021; Yamada et al., 2017).1 The very existence of these islands’ territories is in danger if the sea level continues to rise at this rate, and some islands in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Solomon Islands have already succumbed to the Pacific2 (Albert et al., 2016; Nunn et al., 2017). Greenhouse gas emissions are impacting climate patterns to the point that some places may become uninhabitable. Locke claims, “As climate change intensifies, and food and water supplies become more unreliable, populations will undoubtedly respond by migrating. . .” (2009, p. 178). It is generally accepted that about 200 million people worldwide will face climate-induced displacement by mid-century (Campbell, 2014). A large portion of these migrants will originate from Pacific SIDS because of their disproportionate vulnerability to the effects of climate change and lower levels of development (Campbell, 2014). Development here refers to life expectancy, access to safe potable water, sustainable income, and education. SIDS are likely to experience greater threats from natural disasters as part of these changing patterns in climate. Additionally, island communities are highly reliant on their natural resources and the ocean for their health, economy, and culture. Climate change is already impacting these aspects of islanders' lives. Higher sea levels are damaging to the shorelines of islands as the waves’ constant movement erodes the ecological state of the coast and exacerbates the risk of storm surge (Campbell, 2014). The elevated risk of flooding feeds saltwater into agricultural fields and contaminates them (Campbell, 2014; Janif et al., 2016; Locke 2009). Salinized soil is not conducive to the growth of crops, resulting in stagnant crop yields. Agriculture and fishing comprises an average of about 16.9% of GDP in Pacific SIDS (The World Bank, 2020). Much of the arable land on islands like Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru have already been devastated and contain little organic-rich topsoil (Curtain & Dornan, 2019). Furthermore, rising saltwater infiltrates potable drinking water supplies, which are already scarce in countries like Tuvalu and Kiribati (Campbell, 2014; Leal-Arcas, 2012; Locke 2009). Drinking this contaminated water has serious health impacts and can cause salt poisoning and dehydration. Rising sea level is a threat for many, as about 40% of the world’s population is situated within 100 kilometers of a coastline; however, it stands as a greater threat for SIDS, which have much fewer resources and more to lose to the ocean, including food and drinking water (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2007). When saltwater diminishes crop yields and contaminates freshwater supplies, islanders are forced to adapt to these conditions. They resort to importing foods that are highly processed with refined sugars and lacking in fiber for nourishment (Locke, 2009). Rather than a natural diet based entirely off the foods grown on the island, residents of Kiribati and Tuvalu have altered their diets and inadvertently exposed themselves to more health problems, such as diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, stroke, and cancer (Locke, 2009). Moreover, these island communities are seeing significant impacts on their fishing communities. Warmer ocean temperatures and ocean acidity have resulted in significant coral bleaching (Campbell, 2014). Climate change is acidifying the oceans because atmospheric carbon dioxide dissolves in the ocean (EPA, n.d.-b). Coral reefs provide a critical ecosystem for fish populations and biodiversity, but they are quickly vanishing due to climate change (Leal-Arcas, 2012). Further, the fish are becoming diseased with ciguatera poisoning when they continue to consume micro-algaes of bleached coral, which causes serious illnesses in humans (Ainge Roy, 2019). Like the plunging agricultural yields, the loss of fish populations affects an integral part of the economy and diet of people in SIDS. There is a range of different weather patterns that will become more common as climate change sets in, such as droughts and periods of extended rainfall. Scientists estimate that there will be an increase in the frequency and severity of intense rainfalls associated with the increase in evaporation in warmer environments (Campbell, 2014; IPCC, 2021; Leal-Arcas, 2012). Tropical cyclones, which have already hit Pacific Island Countries (PICs) hard in recent years, are expected to increase in intensity as well (Campbell, 2014; IPCC, 2021).3 Severe cyclones cause great infrastructural damage as well as coastal erosion and agricultural destruction on the islands. These states are still struggling with standards of development and climate change is only exacerbating this (Kelman, 2011, 2014; Locke, 2009).4 The environmental impacts of climate change disasters coupled with rapid urbanization and food insecurity has resulted in the need for urgent solutions, including migration. Internal migration is often preferred over transnational migration for many reasons including preservation of culture, language, and economic viability, so islanders are moving to urban capital cities in PICs when the impacts amass (Locke, 2009). Cultural preservation allows for the agency and resiliency of a community through a common language, values, and well-being. Many of the islands like Vanuatu, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands are seeing accelerated population growth, resulting in a growing population of youth that has nowhere to work (Campbell, 2014; Curtain & Dornan, 2019; International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2020). Couple that with waste management issues, gender inequalities, and health issues and persisting development problems result (IPCC, 2021; Locke, 2009). According to the IPCC, cities are more vulnerable due to the urban heat island effect—the increased energy and heat associated with the replacement of natural vegetation with concrete, buildings, and surfaces that absorb heat (EPA, n.d.-d)—and are more prone to flooding because of drainage issues (2021). It is easy to see that the impacts of climate change are being put on people who are already marginalized in a global society.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Warming is <u>existential</u>. Open migration is a necessary, <u>urgent solution</u>.</h4><p><strong>Jonas 22</strong> – Jonas, Ashley, graduated from Nebraska-Lincoln focusing on global studies and environmental studies. "Climate Change Adaptation, Migration, and Promising Developments for Pacific Island States" (2022). Honors Theses, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 459. gordon</p><p><u>One of the major impacts of climate change</u> that is pertinent to SIDS <u>is the threat of <strong><mark>sea-level rise</u></strong></mark>. How does climate change result in sea-level rise? <u><mark>Because greenhouse gases</mark> maintain heat in the atmosphere, the oceans, too, are <mark>absorbing heat</mark> and warming the surface waters</u> (EPA, n.d.-b). Basically, <u><strong>heat <mark>expands water molecules</u></strong></mark>, known as thermal expansion, <u>thus the sea level rises when the oceans are warmer</u> (Bangladesh Red Crescent Society et al. [IFRC], 4 2021). Another contributor to sea-level rise is the accumulation of water from glaciers, which are melting at an accelerated rate (Leal-Arcas, 2012). Albedo is a term used to refer to the proportion of sunlight reflecting off a surface on the earth; unfortunately, the ice-albedo feedback loop is positive and perpetuates atmospheric heat absorption and warming. As fewer white surfaces, like ice, are present to reflect the sun’s radiation, more sunlight is absorbed by the earth. This heat absorption contributes to further loss of Arctic sea ice, snow cover, and permafrost and, consequently, more sea-level rise (IPCC, 2021). <u>Sea-level rise has <strong><mark>more than doubled</strong> in</mark> the past couple of <mark>decades</mark> compared to rates throughout the <strong>entire 20th century</u></strong> (Lindsey, 2020). Rising ocean levels pose a threat to island nations in particular because many of them contain low-lying coral atolls, some of which fail to peak 5 meters above sea level (Aung et al., 2009; OCHA, n.d.; The World Bank Group & The Asian Development Bank, 2021; Yamada et al., 2017).1 <u>The <strong>very existence</strong> of these islands’ territories is in danger if the sea level continues to rise at this rate</u>, and some islands in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Solomon Islands have already succumbed to the Pacific2 (Albert et al., 2016; Nunn et al., 2017). <u>Greenhouse gas <mark>emissions</mark> are <mark>impacting <strong>climate patterns</strong></mark> to the point that some <mark>places</mark> may become <strong><mark>uninhabitable</strong></mark>.</u> Locke claims, “<u>As</u> climate change intensifies, and <u><strong><mark>food and water supplies</strong> </mark>become more <strong><mark>unreliable</strong>, populations will</mark> undoubtedly <strong><mark>respond by migrating</u></strong></mark>. . .” (2009, p. 178). It is generally accepted that about 200 million people worldwide will face climate-induced displacement by mid-century (Campbell, 2014). <u>A large portion of these migrants will originate from Pacific SIDS because of their disproportionate vulnerability to the effects of climate change and lower levels of development</u> (Campbell, 2014). Development here refers to life expectancy, access to safe potable water, sustainable income, and education. SIDS are likely to experience greater threats from natural disasters as part of these changing patterns in climate. Additionally, island communities are highly reliant on their natural resources and the ocean for their health, economy, and culture. Climate change is already impacting these aspects of islanders' lives. <u>Higher sea levels are damaging to the shorelines of islands as the waves’ constant movement <strong>erodes the ecological state</strong> of the coast and exacerbates the risk of <strong>storm surge</u></strong> (Campbell, 2014). The elevated risk of <u>flooding feeds saltwater into <strong>agricultural fields</strong> and <strong>contaminates them</u></strong> (Campbell, 2014; Janif et al., 2016; Locke 2009). Salinized soil is not conducive to the growth of crops, resulting in stagnant crop yields. Agriculture and fishing comprises an average of about 16.9% of GDP in Pacific SIDS (The World Bank, 2020). <u>Much of the <strong>arable land</strong> on islands like Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru have already been <strong>devastated</strong> and contain little <strong>organic-rich topsoil</u></strong> (Curtain & Dornan, 2019). Furthermore, rising saltwater infiltrates potable drinking water supplies, which are already scarce in countries like Tuvalu and Kiribati (Campbell, 2014; Leal-Arcas, 2012; Locke 2009). Drinking this contaminated water has serious health impacts and can cause salt poisoning and dehydration. Rising sea level is a threat for many, as about 40% of the world’s population is situated within 100 kilometers of a coastline; however, it stands as a greater threat for SIDS, which have much fewer resources and more to lose to the ocean, including food and drinking water (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2007). When saltwater diminishes crop yields and contaminates freshwater supplies, islanders are forced to adapt to these conditions. They resort to importing foods that are highly processed with refined sugars and lacking in fiber for nourishment (Locke, 2009). Rather than a natural diet based entirely off the foods grown on the island, residents of Kiribati and Tuvalu have altered their diets and inadvertently exposed themselves to more health problems, such as diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, stroke, and cancer (Locke, 2009). Moreover, these island communities are seeing <u>significant impacts on</u> their <u><strong>fishing communities</u></strong>. Warmer ocean temperatures and ocean acidity have resulted in significant coral bleaching (Campbell, 2014). <u><mark>Climate</mark> change is <strong><mark>acidifying</mark> the <mark>oceans</strong></mark> because atmospheric carbon dioxide dissolves in the ocean (EPA, n.d.-b). <mark>Coral reefs</mark> provide a <strong><mark>critical ecosystem</strong> </mark>for fish populations and <strong>biodiversity</strong>, <mark>but</mark> they are <mark>quickly vanishing </mark>due to <strong>climate change</strong> </u>(Leal-Arcas, 2012). Further, the fish are becoming diseased with ciguatera poisoning when they continue to consume micro-algaes of bleached coral, which causes serious illnesses in humans (Ainge Roy, 2019). Like the plunging agricultural yields, the loss of fish populations affects an integral part of the economy and diet of people in SIDS. <u>There is a range of different <strong>weather patterns</strong> that will become more common as climate change sets in, such as <strong>droughts</strong> and periods of <strong>extended rainfall</strong>.</u> Scientists estimate that there will be an increase in the frequency and severity of intense rainfalls associated with the increase in evaporation in warmer environments (Campbell, 2014; IPCC, 2021; Leal-Arcas, 2012). Tropical cyclones, which have already hit Pacific Island Countries (PICs) hard in recent years, are expected to increase in intensity as well (Campbell, 2014; IPCC, 2021).3 <u>Severe cyclones cause great infrastructural damage as well as coastal erosion and agricultural destruction</u> on the islands. These states are still struggling with standards of development and climate change is only exacerbating this (Kelman, 2011, 2014; Locke, 2009).4 <u>The <strong><mark>environmental impacts</strong></mark> of climate change disasters <mark>coupled with</mark> <strong>rapid urbanization</strong> and <strong><mark>food insecurity</strong></mark> has <mark>resulted in the need for <strong>urgent</mark> solutions</strong>, including <strong><mark>migration</strong></mark>.</u> Internal migration is often preferred over transnational migration for many reasons including preservation of culture, language, and economic viability, so islanders are moving to urban capital cities in PICs when the impacts amass (Locke, 2009). Cultural preservation allows for the agency and resiliency of a community through a common language, values, and well-being. Many of the islands like Vanuatu, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands are seeing accelerated population growth, resulting in a growing population of youth that has nowhere to work (Campbell, 2014; Curtain & Dornan, 2019; International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2020). Couple that with waste management issues, gender inequalities, and health issues and persisting development problems result (IPCC, 2021; Locke, 2009). According to the IPCC, cities are more vulnerable due to the urban heat island effect—the increased energy and heat associated with the replacement of natural vegetation with concrete, buildings, and surfaces that absorb heat (EPA, n.d.-d)—and are more prone to flooding because of drainage issues (2021). It is easy to see that the impacts of climate change are being put on people who are already marginalized in a global society.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: NSNWs = non-strategic (i.e., low-yield and short-range) nuclear weapons fulltext: TNWs = tactical nuclear weapons Dr. Peter Brookes, 3-5-2022, Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 3-5-2022, "Russia’s Small Nukes are a Big Problem for European Security", Monitor Strategic, https://ispaim.mapn.ro/webroot/fileslib/upload/files/Monitor%20Strategic/ms122022.pdf#page=47, KL With Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, now is a good time to take note of a little-spoken-of, but glaring, imbalance between America’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals—and how it could affect stability in Europe and the interests of the United States and those of its European allies and partners. If asked, many Americans and Europeans probably believe that the United States and Russia are pretty evenly matched in terms of the number of nuclear weapons both sides have in their arsenals. While their beliefs are entirely understandable, they are not completely correct Under the 2010 bilateral New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—also known as New START—the United States and Russia have a similar number of deployed strategic (i.e., high-yield and long-range) nuclear weapons: 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads each.1 But not all of Washington’s or Moscow’s nuclear weapons are covered by New START. Indeed, Russia has nearly a 10:1 advantage over the United States and NATO in non-strategic (i.e., low-yield and short-range) nuclear weapons (NSNWs).2 Assessments based on open sources estimate that Russia has about 2,000 NSNWs. It is similarly assessed that the United States and NATO have about 200 NSNWs in their arsenal.3 It is postulated that half of those U.S.-NATO weapons are located in the United States and half are based in Europe as part of NATO’s nuclear forces.4 While capable of significant destruction, these tactical nuclear weapons are lower in yield – or explosive power – and are meant for use on the battlefield against military installations or troop and equipment concentrations as opposed for use against counterforce or countervalue targets such as ICBM missile fields, command and control nodes, and or population centers (e.g., cities). It is believed that Russia can deploy these weapons on multiple tactical systems including dual-capable short-range or theater ballistic missiles, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles.5 Indeed, it is expected that Russia’s new hypersonic weapons may be dual-capable (i.e., conventional or nuclear armed) as well.6 Major nuclear weapons states, including Russia, have said that a nuclear war could never be won and therefore should never be fought. However, there are deep concerns among policy makers and security analysts outside Russia about whether Moscow fully embraces that idea or if it is just convenient diplomatic rhetoric. Also of increasing concern is a Russian military doctrine associated with battlefield nuclear weapons known as “escalate to deescalate.” This topic is of particularly interest right now with the war in Ukraine ongoing since late February 2022. According to the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): “Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be the principal threats to its contemporary geopolitical ambitions. Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.”7 The NPR further asserts that: “Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Some in the United States refer to this as Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. “Deescalation” in this sense follows from Moscow’s mistaken assumption of Western capitulation on terms favorable to Moscow.”8 Though the Russians seemingly refute the existence of this doctrine by its American name at least, some sources assert that the policy may actually have been developed in the late 1990s, when now-Russian President Vladimir Putin was chairman of the Russian National Security Council under President Boris Yeltsin.9 The idea behind escalate to deescalate is that Russia might employ one tactical nuclear weapon (or more) during a conventional conflict with NATO forces for the purposes of preventing a defeat, consolidating territorial gains, or even freezing a conflict in place without the prospect of further fighting. Indeed, because of the large, nearly 10:1 disparity between the number of Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, Moscow may think a nuclear response from NATO is not a credible threat due to Russia’s asymmetric advantage. Other factors may also play a role in Russian calculations, including a perception that NATO’s large membership would have difficulty finding a political-military consensus on an appropriate response, including a nuclear option. An example of the potential use of this Russian nuclear doctrine in a hypothetical scenario might be helpful here: Moscow attacks one—or all—of the Baltic States with its conventional forces to establish control over some, or all, of these nations’ territory, returning them to Russia’s control as they were in the Soviet era. Invoking Article V, NATO responds with conventional forces to protect and restore the sovereignty of these three allied states. Concerned about the inferiority of its conventional forces in this fight against the allied powers, Moscow then contemplates exploding a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon somewhere in theater as a warning of Russia’s potential escalation from the conventional to the nuclear domain of warfare, including the potential future use of high-yield, strategic nuclear weapons. In Moscow’s eyes, perhaps NATO will become concerned about the possible escalation of the fighting from the conventional to the nuclear—especially Russia’s potential use of more powerful nuclear weapons against European and American cities. In response, NATO may consider pausing its counteroffensive against Russian forces in the Baltics. Indeed, Moscow may misperceive that if NATO does not have sufficient tactical nuclear weapon capabilities to respond in kind, it would be inclined to seek de-escalation rather than launch a strategic nuclear weapon at Russia and risk moving further up the escalation ladder—a response that could lead to all-out nuclear war. Using its tactical nuclear weapon advantage over NATO and having strategic nuclear parity with Washington, Moscow could threaten additional low-yield nuclear strikes unless fighting ends on Russia’s terms. Ideally for Moscow, NATO might decide that there is no good option available to respond and chooses to cease hostilities, locking in Moscow’s ill-gotten gains in the Baltics. With these political-military calculations in mind, Russia takes a chance on the expected NATO response and explodes a 10-kiloton tactical nuclear weapon near or in the European theater. As a result, nuclear deterrence fails for the first time in history not due to the use of strategic nuclear weapons that so many people are aware of, but the imbalance of battlefield nuclear weapons between NATO and Russia.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Baltic war goes nuclear. Nuclear disparity and escalate-to-deescalate make it likely.</h4><p>NSNWs = non-strategic (i.e., low-yield and short-range) nuclear weapons </p><p>TNWs = tactical nuclear weapons</p><p>Dr. Peter<strong> Brookes</strong>,<strong> </strong>3-5-20<strong>22</strong>, Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 3-5-2022, "Russia’s Small Nukes are a Big Problem for European Security", Monitor Strategic, https://ispaim.mapn.ro/webroot/fileslib/upload/files/Monitor%20Strategic/ms122022.pdf#page=47, KL</p><p>With Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, now is a good time to take note of a little-spoken-of, but glaring, imbalance between America’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals—and how it could affect stability in Europe and the interests of the United States and those of its European allies and partners.</p><p>If asked, many Americans and Europeans probably believe that the United States and Russia are pretty evenly matched in terms of the number of nuclear weapons both sides have in their arsenals. While their beliefs are entirely understandable, they are not completely correct</p><p>Under the 2010 bilateral New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—also known as New START—the United States and Russia have a similar number of deployed strategic (i.e., high-yield and long-range) nuclear weapons: 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads each.1 But not all of Washington’s or Moscow’s nuclear weapons are covered by New START.</p><p>Indeed, <u>Russia has nearly a <strong>10:1</strong> advantage over the United States and NATO in</u> non-strategic (i.e., low-yield and short-range) nuclear weapons (<u><strong>NSNWs</u></strong>).2</p><p>Assessments based on open sources estimate that <u>Russia has</u> about <u><strong>2,000</strong> NSNWs</u>. It is similarly assessed that <u>the United States and NATO have</u> about <u><strong>200</u></strong> NSNWs in their arsenal.3 It is postulated that half of those U.S.-NATO weapons are located in the United States and half are based in Europe as part of NATO’s nuclear forces.4</p><p><u>While capable of <strong>significant destruction</strong>, these <strong>t</strong>actical <strong>n</strong>uclear <strong>w</strong>eapon<strong>s</strong> are lower in yield</u> – or explosive power – <u>and are meant for use on the battlefield against <strong>military</strong> installations or troop and equipment concentrations</u> as opposed for use against counterforce or countervalue targets such as ICBM missile fields, command and control nodes, and or population centers (e.g., cities).</p><p>It is believed that <u>Russia can deploy these weapons on <strong>multiple</strong> tactical systems including <strong>dual-capable</strong> short-range or theater <strong>ballistic</strong> missiles, <strong>torpedoes</strong>, and <strong>anti-ship</strong> missiles</u>.5 Indeed, it is expected that <u>Russia’s new <strong>hypersonic</strong> weapons may be dual-capable</u> (i.e., conventional or nuclear armed) <u>as well</u>.6</p><p>Major nuclear weapons states, including Russia, have said that a nuclear war could never be won and therefore should never be fought. However, there are deep concerns among policy makers and security analysts outside Russia about whether Moscow fully embraces that idea or if it is just convenient diplomatic rhetoric.</p><p>Also <u>of <strong>increasing concern</strong> is a Russian <strong>military doctrine</strong> associated with battlefield nuclear weapons known as</u> “<u><strong>escalate to deescalate</u></strong>.” This topic is of particularly interest right now with the war in Ukraine ongoing since late February 2022. According to the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR):</p><p>“Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be the principal threats to its contemporary geopolitical ambitions. <u>Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the</u> potential <u><strong>coercive</strong> and <strong>military</strong> uses of nuclear weapons</u>. <u>It</u> mistakenly <u>assesses that</u> the threat of nuclear escalation or actual <u><strong>first use</strong> of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms <strong>favorable</strong> to Russia</u>. <u>These</u> mistaken <u>perceptions <strong>increase</strong> the prospect for <strong>dangerous miscalculation</u></strong> <u>and <strong>escalation</u></strong>.”7</p><p>The NPR further asserts that:</p><p>“Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Some in the United States refer to this as Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. “Deescalation” in this sense follows from Moscow’s mistaken assumption of Western capitulation on terms favorable to Moscow.”8</p><p>Though the Russians seemingly refute the existence of this doctrine by its American name at least, some sources assert that the policy may actually have been developed in the late 1990s, when now-Russian President Vladimir Putin was chairman of the Russian National Security Council under President Boris Yeltsin.9</p><p>The idea behind escalate to deescalate is that <u>Russia might employ one <strong>t</strong>actical <strong>n</strong>uclear <strong>w</strong>eapon</u> (or more) <u>during a <strong>conventional</strong> conflict with NATO forces for the purposes of <strong>preventing</strong> a defeat,</u> <u><strong>consolidating</strong> territorial gains</u>, <u>or even <strong>freezing</strong> a conflict</u> in place without the prospect of further fighting.</p><p>Indeed, because of the large, nearly 10:1 disparity between the number of Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, Moscow may think a nuclear response from NATO is not a credible threat due to Russia’s asymmetric advantage. Other factors may also play a role in Russian calculations, including a perception that NATO’s large membership would have difficulty finding a political-military consensus on an appropriate response, including a nuclear option.</p><p>An example of the potential use of this Russian nuclear doctrine in a hypothetical scenario might be helpful here:</p><p><u>Moscow attacks</u> one—or all—of <u>the <strong>Baltic States</strong> with its <strong>conventional</strong> forces to establish control over some</u>, or all, <u>of these nations’ territory</u>, returning them to Russia’s control as they were in the Soviet era. <u>Invoking <strong>A</strong>rticle <strong>V</strong>, NATO responds with conventional forces</u> to protect and restore the sovereignty of these three allied states.</p><p>Concerned about the inferiority of its conventional forces in this fight against the allied powers, <u>Moscow then contemplates exploding a</u> low-yield <u><strong>t</strong>actical <strong>n</strong>uclear <strong>w</strong>eapon somewhere in theater as a <strong>warning</u></strong> of Russia’s potential escalation from the conventional to the nuclear domain of warfare, including the potential future use of high-yield, strategic nuclear weapons.</p><p>In Moscow’s eyes, perhaps NATO will become concerned about the possible escalation of the fighting from the conventional to the nuclear—especially Russia’s potential use of more powerful nuclear weapons against European and American cities. In response, NATO may consider pausing its counteroffensive against Russian forces in the Baltics.</p><p>Indeed, <u>Moscow may <strong>misperceive</u></strong> <u>that</u> if <u>NATO does not have <strong>sufficient</strong> tactical nuclear weapon capabilities to respond in kind</u>, it would be inclined to seek de-escalation rather than launch a strategic nuclear weapon at Russia and risk moving further up the escalation ladder—a <u>response</u> that <u>could lead to <strong>all-out nuclear war</u></strong>.</p><p>Using its tactical nuclear weapon advantage over NATO and having strategic nuclear parity with Washington, Moscow could threaten additional low-yield nuclear strikes unless fighting ends on Russia’s terms. Ideally for Moscow, NATO might decide that there is no good option available to respond and chooses to cease hostilities, locking in Moscow’s ill-gotten gains <u>in the Baltics</u>.</p><p>With these political-military calculations in mind, Russia takes a chance on the expected NATO response and explodes a 10-kiloton tactical nuclear weapon near or in the European theater. As a result, nuclear deterrence fails for the first time in history not due to the use of strategic nuclear weapons that so many people are aware of, but the imbalance of battlefield nuclear weapons between NATO and Russia.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Escalante 18 (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/) fulltext: I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The alternative is to affirm the dual power <u>model of the Communist Party</u> – only the Party can provide <u>effective accountability mechanisms</u> to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and <u>mobilize marginalized communities</u>, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation</h4><p><strong>Escalante 18</strong> (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/<u><mark>)</p><p></u></mark>I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that <u><mark>base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing</mark>, and that <mark>party organizing can allow this</mark> emerging <mark>movement to solidify into a</mark> powerful <mark>revolutionary socialist tendency</mark> in the United States. </u>One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that <u>the current state of the left in the United States is one in which <mark>revolution is not currently possible.</u></mark> There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. <u>The base building emphasis on <mark>dual power responds</mark> directly to this insight. <mark>By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we</mark> are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can <mark>offer</mark> the oppressed <mark>relief from</mark> the horrific conditions of <mark>capitalism.</u></mark> Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? <u>If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? </u>Put simply: <u><strong><mark>in order to mobilize the base</mark> which base builders hope to create, <mark>we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.</u></strong> <u>It is not enough to</mark> simply <mark>meet</mark> peoples <mark>needs.</mark> Rather, <mark>we must build</mark> the <mark>institutions of dual power</mark> in the name of communism.</u> <u><mark>We <strong>must refuse</strong></mark> <strong><mark>covert front organizing and instead have</strong> a public face as a communist party.</mark> </u>When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. <u>We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose <mark>membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making.</u></mark> <u>The party model creates internal methods for <strong><mark>holding party members accountable</strong>, </p><p>unifying</mark> party member <mark>action</mark> around democratically determined goals, <mark>and for educating</mark> party members in communist theory and praxis.</u> A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. <u>Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation.</u> A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that <u>our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The <mark>formal structures</mark> provided by a democratic centralist party model <mark>allow individual locals to have a voice </mark>in open debate, <mark>but also</mark> allow for <mark>a unified strategy</mark> to emerge from democratic consensus. </u>Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>party organizing allows for</mark> local organizations and individual <mark>organizers to be held accountable</mark> for their actions.</u></strong> <u>It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades <mark>with</mark> a formal organizational <mark>unity working together to sharpen</mark> each others <mark>strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas</mark> and actions. </u>In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such <u><strong><mark>accountability is crucial</strong>.</u></mark> <u>As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. </u>Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, <u>individual base building <mark>organizations ought to adopt</mark> party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside <mark>recruitment</mark> into their organizations, <mark>education</mark> of community members <mark>in communist theory and praxis, and</mark> the establishment of armed and <mark>militant party cadres capable of defending</mark> dual power <mark>institutions from state terror.</u></mark> Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. <u>The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. </u>The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. <u>It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party,</u> but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, <u>it ought to become clear that</u> <u><strong><mark>a unified national party will</mark> have to <mark>be the long term goal</mark> of the base building movement.</u></strong> Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. <u>I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation.</u> The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jon Kelvey, 22 (Jon Kelvey is a science writer and studied cognitive neuroscience at UC Berkeley, 1-3-2022, accessed on 7-10-2022, Inverse, “KESSLER SYNDROME: HOW RUNAWAY SPACE JUNK COULD TRAP HUMANS ON EARTH”, https://www.inverse.com/science/what-is-kessler-syndrome, HBisevac) ISS = International Space Station fulltext: When you’re screaming through the void faster than a speeding bullet, any traffic you encounter might as well be made of, well, speeding bullets. Defensive driving is recommended. Hazardous space debris has twice threatened the International Space Station recently. On or around November 12, a debris field generated by a Russian military anti-satellite missile, or ASAT test, sent ISS crew members — including Russian cosmonauts — to shelter in the station’s Dragon and Soyuz spacecraft in case they needed to evacuate, while on December 2, the station maneuvered around a chunk of a defunct American Pegasus rocket. No one was hurt in either case, and the risks were hardly novel — the ISS has maneuvered around space debris more than 30 times since 1999. But it’s also a problem that’s almost guaranteed to worsen given worrying trends in the militarization of space and the fact that all signs point to ever more objects being launched into space every year. Take into consideration mega-constellations like SpaceX’s Starlink, for which “the plan is to launch 100,000 active satellites in the next few years,” Jonathan McDowell, a Harvard astrophysicist who has been tracking satellites on the side for more than a decade, tells Inverse. “The collision rate grows as the square of the number of satellites. If you have 10 times as many satellites, you will have 100 times as many collisions.” And the thing is, space debris is not simply the detritus of old space missions. A satellite stricken by orbital debris becomes debris itself, which can then hit another satellite, creating debris that can strike another, and so on. It’s a chain reaction known as Kessler Syndrome, and while it doesn’t take place in the half-hour time frame as dramatized in the movie Gravity, the result may be the same: no more outer space for anybody. “At least some models suggest that, yeah, it's already underway,” McDowell says, “it's just going to take a century to play out.” SPACE JUNK BASICS It’s a good thing the sky is so big, because humans have flung a lot of things up there. And every bit of it, from large spacecraft to tiny pieces of cloth, are careening around at 17,500 miles-per-hour or faster. At those speeds, even collisions between somewhat small objects can be catastrophic. “The unit I like to use is a megajoule, which is the kinetic energy of a one-ton truck hitting you at 100 miles an hour,” McDowell says. Collisions between small satellites can generate tens of thousands of megajoules of kinetic energy, while even tiny pieces of debris still pack enough of a punch to drill bullet holes in the ISS and other space assets. The Hubble Space Telescope carries a Whipple shield, for instance, a sort of bulletproof vest to absorb the energy of more minor debris impacts. It’s an imperfect solution, “smaller” being relative and “big” being game over. “If you get hit by a big enough piece of debris, [a Whipple shield] is not gonna be enough,” McDowell says. “And if something comes down the telescope aperture and hits the Hubble mirror, that’s also not good.” The good news is that organizations that track debris, such as the US Space Command, have a pretty good handle on the big stuff in orbit — anything from multi-ton dead satellites to debris 10 centimeters across. “The trackable debris we follow as individual objects, and we’re tracking about 40,000 objects, of which 5,000 or so are working satellites and the rest is junk,” McDowell says. “If you look at stuff down to just one centimeter, there’s probably a million of those. But we don’t really know because they’re too small.” There are two main sources of space debris at the moment, the primary being old rocket stages still in orbit decades after the delivery of their payload. “The fuel and the oxidizer get together because the seals fail,” McDowell says, “And they go bang.” The secondary source is military anti-satellite tests, he says, which generate debris clouds that can persist for decades. But if a Kessler Syndrome cascade is already underway, and continues apace unmitigated, eventually the most significant source of space debris will be the pulverized remains of satellites, spacecraft, and space stations dashed upon rocks of our own making. A HISTORY OF SPACE JUNKING AND SPACE PUNKING Putting aside the occasional meteor shower, space debris is an entirely human creation — satellites don’t launch themselves. But not all space debris is created equally. Many objects are merely byproducts of early space exploration, while the birth of others was more intentional. For example, while Russia has drawn international criticism for its ASAT test in November, in the early 1960s, it was the Soviet Union who accused the United States of purposefully polluting the spaceways. Between 1961 and 1963, the United States launched almost half a billion copper needles into low-Earth orbit, Caltech historian of technology Lisa Ruth Rand tells Inverse. Called Project West Ford, it was an attempt to create an artificial ionosphere for long-range radio communications in case a US-USSR nuclear war disrupted other means. The Soviets were not amused, and accused the US of “trying to destroy all space so that no one else could use it, out of spite,” Rand says. Both the Soviet Union and the United States developed and tested anti-satellite missile technologies in the 1970s and 80s, creating orbital debris and leading to a lull in ASAT tests until 2007, when China used an ASAT to destroy an old weather satellite. The US used an ASAT missile to destroy a spy satellite that failed after its launch in 2008, and India launched a small satellite in January of 2019 only to shoot it down with an ASAT in March 2019. The next and most recent ASAT test to actually destroy a satellite in space was the Russian test in November, and all four of the tests created debris, some of which will remain in orbit for years to come. “Most of the debris from the Russian ASAT will be down on a timescale of like five years, and the rest of it will be down on the timescale of 10 to 20 years, which, it’s still not good,” McDowell says. “For the Chinese ASAT, which was up at a higher altitude, more like 900 kilometers, some of that debris is likely going to be up there for many decades.” Such intentional creation of space debris seems irrational and irresponsible given how problematic incidental space debris already is. A 2009 collision between an Iridium communications satellite and a defunct Russian satellite over Siberia first turned Rand on to studying space debris as a research focus while in grad school, and for every impact, there are many more close calls. In 2012, for instance, a defunct Soviet Kosmos satellite threatened the Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope and presented its operators with a tough decision, Rand says. “Either light up thrusters that had been dormant for years, that were cold and could blow the whole works,” or hope the debris would pass further from Fermi than projected, such predictions always coming as probabilities rather than certainties. She says that the operators ultimately opted to risk using the thrusters, and the space telescope moved, and all was fine, but it was still a risky situation. And such situations are not always improved when all satellites involved are still live and operational. In September 2019, Rand says, a Starlink satellite and an ESA satellite almost collided when operators at SpaceX failed to check their email and missed some urgent missives from their counterparts at ESA. And over the summer of 2021, McDowell recently tweeted, the Chinese space station twice dodged Starlink satellites that may have passed within 1 kilometer of the station. “These are the kinds of close calls are happening a lot and increasingly more as the number of objects in outer space increases,” Rand says. “The number of functioning satellites in space is just exploding. It’s huge. It’s getting bigger and bigger every day.” WHAT IS KESSLER SYNDROME AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? In some ways, the Kessler Syndrome is like a slow-moving zombie apocalypse. (In George Romero’s classic Night of the Living Dead, Rand notes, it’s theorized a contaminated satellite returning from Venus triggers the zombie rise.) The space debris chain reaction converts otherwise operational space assets into further navigational hazards. “It’s an unwanted weaponizing of a valuable object into something that becomes dangerous,” Rand says. Had the Fermi telescope thrusters failed, “that would have been the loss of a major scientific instrument and cultural heritage artifact that had become a series of projectiles.” And the threat of losing space assets means the Kessler Syndrome has a costly impact long before the chain reaction has progressed enough to prevent access to space. More satellites in space mean more potential collisions, which means more satellites — and space stations — making more frequent evasive maneuvers to avoid further collisions, all of which can interrupt operations and cost operators money by decreasing the lifespan of their satellites. Every Starlink satellite has a limited amount of krypton propellant onboard for maneuvering around debris and Chinese space stations, for instance, and when the tank is near empty, it’s time for that satellite’s long fiery goodbye bow in the upper atmosphere — failure to do so just increases the problem by adding another dead satellite. “Space is big,” Rand says, “but once things start to collide, it becomes rapidly small.” Rapidly, but not linearly. Unfortunately, if the Kessler cascade is already underway, it will take years to reach a point where it’s happening in what humans perceive as “real-time.” By then, it may be too late. “On a timescale of decades, you’ll have to dodge more and more often, and eventually you won’t be able to dodge anymore because the traffic is so bad,” McDowell says. Adding the caveat that it’s just his back-of-the-envelope math, he says, “we are probably exceeding the carrying capacity of low Earth orbit right now.” The consequence of full bore Kessler syndrome allowed to run its course would be to negate the sci-fi ambitions of people like Elon Musk. To proscribe humans from the cosmos and limit our future to that of a one-planet species for many lifetimes — physically and intellectually. The space debris could ruin ground-based astronomy, too, hemming in our minds as well as our rockets. “It would mean to basically close ourselves off from the rest of the cosmos,” Rand says. “That the endgame of the space age is not so much humanity becoming cosmopolitan, becoming multi-planetary, becoming part of the universe, but instead making it so that we just can’t leave anymore.”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Debris <u>compounds</u>---remains of spacecraft or rocks <u>cascades</u> and <u>multiplies</u> which <u>closes off space</u>.</h4><p>Jon <strong>Kelvey, 22</strong> (Jon Kelvey is a science writer and studied cognitive neuroscience at UC Berkeley, 1-3-2022, accessed on 7-10-2022, Inverse, “KESSLER SYNDROME: HOW RUNAWAY SPACE JUNK COULD TRAP HUMANS ON EARTH”, https://www.inverse.com/science/what-is-kessler-syndrome, HBisevac) ISS = International Space Station</p><p>When you’re screaming through the void faster than a speeding bullet, any traffic you encounter might as well be made of, well, speeding bullets. Defensive driving is recommended.</p><p><u>Hazardous space <mark>debris</u></mark> has twice <u>threatened the</u> <u><strong>I</u></strong>nternational <u><strong>S</u></strong>pace <u><strong>S</u></strong>tation recently. On or around November 12, a debris field generated by a Russian military anti-satellite missile, or ASAT test, sent ISS crew members — including Russian cosmonauts — to shelter in the station’s Dragon and Soyuz spacecraft in case they needed to evacuate, while on December 2, the station maneuvered around a chunk of a defunct American Pegasus rocket.</p><p>No one was hurt in either case, and the risks were hardly novel — the ISS has maneuvered around space debris more than 30 times since 1999. But <u>it’s</u> also <u>a <mark>problem</mark> that’s</u> almost <u><strong><mark>guaranteed</strong> to <strong>worsen</strong></mark> given worrying trends</u> in the militarization of space <u>and the fact that all signs point to <strong>ever more</strong> objects being launched</u> into space every year.</p><p>Take into consideration mega-constellations like SpaceX’s Starlink, for which “the plan is to launch 100,000 active satellites in the next few years,” Jonathan McDowell, a Harvard astrophysicist who has been tracking satellites on the side for more than a decade, tells Inverse. “The collision rate grows as the square of the number of satellites. If you have 10 times as many satellites, you will have 100 times as many collisions.”</p><p>And the thing is, space debris is not simply the detritus of old space missions. A satellite stricken by orbital debris becomes debris itself, which can then hit another satellite, creating debris that can strike another, and so on. It’s a chain reaction known as <u><strong><mark>Kessler Syndrome</u></strong></mark>, and while it doesn’t take place in the half-hour time frame as dramatized in the movie Gravity, the <u><mark>result may</mark> be the same</u>: <u><strong><mark>no more</mark> outer <mark>space for anybody</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>“At least some models suggest that, yeah, it's already underway,” McDowell says, “it's just going to take a century to play out.”</p><p>SPACE JUNK BASICS</p><p>It’s a good thing the sky is so big, because humans have flung a lot of things up there. And every bit of it, from large spacecraft to tiny pieces of cloth, are careening around at 17,500 miles-per-hour or faster. At those speeds, even collisions between somewhat small objects can be catastrophic.</p><p>“The unit I like to use is a megajoule, which is the kinetic energy of a one-ton truck hitting you at 100 miles an hour,” McDowell says. Collisions between small satellites can generate tens of thousands of megajoules of kinetic energy, while even tiny pieces of debris still pack enough of a punch to drill bullet holes in the ISS and other space assets. The Hubble Space Telescope carries a Whipple shield, for instance, a sort of bulletproof vest to absorb the energy of more minor debris impacts.</p><p>It’s an imperfect solution, “smaller” being relative and “big” being game over.</p><p>“If you get hit by a big enough piece of debris, [a Whipple shield] is not gonna be enough,” McDowell says. “And if something comes down the telescope aperture and hits the Hubble mirror, that’s also not good.”</p><p>The good news is that organizations that track debris, such as the US Space Command, have a pretty good handle on the big stuff in orbit — anything from multi-ton dead satellites to debris 10 centimeters across.</p><p>“The trackable debris we follow as individual objects, and we’re tracking about 40,000 objects, of which 5,000 or so are working satellites and the rest is junk,” McDowell says. “If you look at stuff down to just one centimeter, there’s probably a million of those. But we don’t really know because they’re too small.”</p><p>There are two main sources of space debris at the moment, the primary being old rocket stages still in orbit decades after the delivery of their payload. “The fuel and the oxidizer get together because the seals fail,” McDowell says, “And they go bang.”</p><p>The secondary source is military anti-satellite tests, he says, which generate debris clouds that can persist for decades.</p><p>But <u>if a Kessler Syndrome cascade</u> is already <u>underway</u>, and continues apace unmitigated, <u>eventually the most significant source of space debris will be the <strong>pulverized remains</strong> of </u>satellites, <u>spacecraft</u>, and space stations <u>dashed upon <strong>rocks</strong> of our <strong>own making</u></strong>.</p><p>A HISTORY OF SPACE JUNKING AND SPACE PUNKING</p><p>Putting aside the occasional meteor shower, space debris is an entirely human creation — satellites don’t launch themselves.</p><p>But not all space debris is created equally. Many objects are merely byproducts of early space exploration, while the birth of others was more intentional.</p><p>For example, while Russia has drawn international criticism for its ASAT test in November, in the early 1960s, it was the Soviet Union who accused the United States of purposefully polluting the spaceways.</p><p>Between 1961 and 1963, the United States launched almost half a billion copper needles into low-Earth orbit, Caltech historian of technology Lisa Ruth Rand tells Inverse. Called Project West Ford, it was an attempt to create an artificial ionosphere for long-range radio communications in case a US-USSR nuclear war disrupted other means.</p><p>The Soviets were not amused, and accused the US of “trying to destroy all space so that no one else could use it, out of spite,” Rand says.</p><p>Both the Soviet Union and the United States developed and tested anti-satellite missile technologies in the 1970s and 80s, creating orbital debris and leading to a lull in ASAT tests until 2007, when China used an ASAT to destroy an old weather satellite.</p><p>The US used an ASAT missile to destroy a spy satellite that failed after its launch in 2008, and India launched a small satellite in January of 2019 only to shoot it down with an ASAT in March 2019.</p><p>The next and most recent ASAT test to actually destroy a satellite in space was the Russian test in November, and all four of the tests created debris, some of which will remain in orbit for years to come.</p><p>“Most of the debris from the Russian ASAT will be down on a timescale of like five years, and the rest of it will be down on the timescale of 10 to 20 years, which, it’s still not good,” McDowell says. “For the Chinese ASAT, which was up at a higher altitude, more like 900 kilometers, some of that debris is likely going to be up there for many decades.”</p><p>Such intentional creation of space debris seems irrational and irresponsible given how problematic incidental space debris already is. A 2009 collision between an Iridium communications satellite and a defunct Russian satellite over Siberia first turned Rand on to studying space debris as a research focus while in grad school, and for every impact, there are many more close calls.</p><p>In 2012, for instance, a defunct Soviet Kosmos satellite threatened the Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope and presented its operators with a tough decision, Rand says. “Either light up thrusters that had been dormant for years, that were cold and could blow the whole works,” or hope the debris would pass further from Fermi than projected, such predictions always coming as probabilities rather than certainties.</p><p>She says that the operators ultimately opted to risk using the thrusters, and the space telescope moved, and all was fine, but it was still a risky situation.</p><p>And such situations are not always improved when all satellites involved are still live and operational. In September 2019, Rand says, a Starlink satellite and an ESA satellite almost collided when operators at SpaceX failed to check their email and missed some urgent missives from their counterparts at ESA.</p><p>And over the summer of 2021, McDowell recently tweeted, the Chinese space station twice dodged Starlink satellites that may have passed within 1 kilometer of the station.</p><p>“These are the kinds of close calls are happening a lot and increasingly more as the number of objects in outer space increases,” Rand says. “The number of functioning satellites in space is just exploding. It’s huge. It’s getting bigger and bigger every day.”</p><p>WHAT IS KESSLER SYNDROME AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?</p><p>In some ways, <u>the <strong>Kessler Syndrome</strong> is like a <strong>slow-moving zombie apocalypse</u></strong>. (In George Romero’s classic Night of the Living Dead, Rand notes, it’s theorized a contaminated satellite returning from Venus triggers the zombie rise.) <u>The space debris chain reaction converts otherwise operational space assets into <strong>further navigational hazards</u></strong>. “It’s an unwanted weaponizing of a valuable object into something that becomes dangerous,” Rand says. Had the Fermi telescope thrusters failed, “th<u>at would have been the loss of a <strong>major scientific instrument</u></strong> and cultural heritage artifact that had become a series of projectiles.”</p><p>And the threat of losing space assets means the <u>Kessler Syndrome</u> has a costly impact long before the <u>chain reaction has progressed enough to <strong>prevent access</strong> to space</u>.</p><p>More satellites in space mean more potential collisions, which means more satellites — and space stations — making more frequent evasive maneuvers to avoid further collisions, all of which can interrupt operations and cost operators money by decreasing the lifespan of their satellites. Every Starlink satellite has a limited amount of krypton propellant onboard for maneuvering around debris and Chinese space stations, for instance, and when the tank is near empty, it’s time for that satellite’s long fiery goodbye bow in the upper atmosphere — failure to do so just increases the problem by adding another dead satellite.</p><p>“<u>Space is big</u>,” Rand says, “<u>but once things start to collide</u>, <u>it becomes <strong>rapidly small</u></strong>.”</p><p>Rapidly, but not linearly. Unfortunately, if the Kessler cascade is already underway, it will take years to reach a point where it’s happening in what humans perceive as “real-time.” By then, it may be too late.</p><p>“On a timescale of decades, you’ll have to dodge more and more often, and <u>eventually you won’t be able to dodge anymore because the traffic is so bad</u>,” McDowell says. Adding the caveat that it’s just his back-of-the-envelope math, he says, “we are probably exceeding the carrying capacity of low Earth orbit right now.”</p><p>The <u>consequence of full bore Kessler syndrome allowed to run its course would be to negate</u> the <u><strong>sci-fi ambitions</strong> </u>of people like Elon Musk. <u>To <strong>proscribe</strong> humans from the <strong>cosmos</strong> and <strong>limit</strong> our future to that of a <strong>one-planet species</strong> for many lifetimes</u> — physically and intellectually. The space debris could ruin ground-based astronomy, too, hemming in our minds as well as our rockets.</p><p>“<u>It would</u> mean to basically <u>close ourselves off from the rest of the cosmos</u>,” Rand says. “That the endgame of the space age is not so much humanity becoming cosmopolitan, becoming multi-planetary, becoming part of the universe, but instead making it so that we just can’t leave anymore.”</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Skordas 18 [Achilles; 7-12-22; Professor of International Law at the University of Copenhagen; “The Missing Link in Migration Governance: An Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice,” https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-missing-link-in-migration-governance-an-advisory-opinion-by-the-international-court-of-justice/] brett fulltext: As the world currently faces the worst migration crisis since WWII in terms of destabilization potential, due to the combined effects of the wars in Libya and Syria, and poverty in the Sahel, it is time to consider the challenges and benefits of the potential involvement of the ICJ in the global efforts of migration management and international protection. There are three questions to discuss, (a) necessity, (b) feasibility and (c) contribution of a potential ICJ ruling. (a) Necessity The involvement of the ICJ is necessary in view of clarifying and adapting core elements of the principle of non-refoulement to the contemporary conditions of migration management. This function cannot be fulfilled on a universal level by any other jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional mechanism. In the first place, non-refoulement should be interpreted in view of the principles of burden-sharing and solidarity. Non-refoulement may be the core principle of the Refugee Convention, but due to the time that has elapsed since the adoption of the Convention, state practice has undergone a rapid change, which has not always been free of controversy. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the concept of safe third country and safe country of origin, and the modalities of relocating refugees through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, depending on the reception capacities and financial resources of the States involved. Second, these issues cannot be authoritatively answered by alternative mechanisms. The system of the Refugee Convention does not include a quasi-judicial body of independent experts selected through a transparent procedure with the authority to decide disputes and to adopt General Comments similar to other human rights bodies (for instance, the Human Rights Committee). The UNHCR is an agency exercising international public authority with limited power of adjudication, and only in cases of Refugee Status Determination, but its activities and standpoints are characterized by a blend of law, policy, and pragmatism. The ExCom Conclusions and the UNHCR Guidelines are soft law instruments or expert opinions, but not authoritative interpretations of international law. Last, but not least, the monitoring and reporting mechanism under Arts. 35 and 36 of the Refugee Convention falls short of the system later agreed for human rights treaties. The lack of a system of authentic interpretation on a universal level is responsible for the absence of generally accepted standards for the interpretation of non-refoulement and burden-sharing. The gap has been partially filled by national courts and by the CJEU that interpret the Refugee Convention through the lenses of their own constitutional systems and national or supranational interests. From the perspective of the Convention, however, these interpretations appear as discontinued interpretative alternatives that may inform our understanding of the universal rules, but are not authentic interpretations that draw a line between past and future. Furthermore, States, civil society organizations and the UNHCR engage in a continuous struggle for the semantic domination of the Convention, amplifying the indeterminacy of the rules. As a result, the evolution of non-refoulement as a universal principle cannot reach crystallization points, but, instead, the fundamentally normative character of the principle gives way to a more open principle, which becomes increasing incapable of stabilizing normative expectations. Thus, policies (and politics) tend to displace law, instead of being structurally coupled to it. To prevent any misunderstanding, I do not argue that the Refugee Convention should homogenize refugee protection across the world. Such an enterprise would not only be counterproductive, but would contradict the rationale of regionalization of international law that enables local jurisdictions to adapt the rules to the local conditions. Instead, I argue that regionalization presupposes a minimal but well-circumscribed center of gravity holding the system together. A clear understanding of the principle of non-refoulement as treaty law and as customary international law applicable to refugees and persons fleeing war and human rights violations is necessary in order to preserve the constitutional basis of the universal system of protection. (b) Feasibility There are different prospects for activating the Court via an application by a State or via a request for an advisory opinion. A State may apply against another State for alleged violations of the Refugee Convention or of the customary principle of non-refoulement. The chances that a State might decide to use this avenue are slim. The applicant must have a strong interest in the outcome of such a case, engage in a long and complex judicial contest, and possibly harm, at least temporarily, its relations with the respondent. Moreover, the ICJ has interpreted the existence of a ‘dispute’ as a condition of its jurisdiction rather narrowly in the recent cases Georgia v. Russian Federation (2011) and Marshall Islands v. UK (2016). The applicant must establish that a bilateral dispute exists, and it is not sufficient to provide evidence of its existence through general statements in international fora. Thus, the Court excluded in principle the possibility of an actio popularis that would serve the international interest. Finally, even if the existence of a bilateral dispute could be established, it is in no way certain that it would focus on the issues of major significance for the international community; it would probably be tailored to the specifics of that dispute. More promising would be a request for an advisory opinion by the UN General Assembly. The feasibility problems here are of a broader political order, because the UN Member States should be convinced to adopt a resolution requesting an advisory opinion. State and non-state actors would initially hesitate to take such an initiative because they would be unwilling to assume the procedural risk. Civil society and UNHCR would probably fear a conservative opinion that would restrict refugee rights. States would fear that the ICJ would revisit the Convention in a more liberal spirit. The fact is that nobody can predict the outcome of an advisory opinion. The Court has been occasionally ‘conservative’, as in the Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, or ‘progressive’, as in the Opinion on the Construction of a Wall. Thus, indeed, the procedural risk is not negligible. The main actors would prefer to carry on the contest on refugee rights v. state sovereignty and, if they lose a battle, they can hope to fight another day. A realistic possibility for a mobilization in the General Assembly would be to create a ‘coalition of the most heavily burdened’, e.g. Europe and Africa, arguing for global burden-sharing as a principle of international law, to be applied alongside the principle of non-refoulement. (c) Contribution: Advancing migration governance The advancement of migration governance will benefit first and foremost migrants and refugees, because the ICJ would be given the opportunity to clarify the discretion of States with regard to the management of inflows and would formulate the corresponding guarantees for refugee rights. So far, the legal discussion on non-refoulement has been focusing on the paradigm of access to the territory of the host country, whilst the real problem is the prevention of return to the country of origin and the granting of effective protection to groups of persons through a variety of policy instruments. The clash of these two alternatives is already taking place, but in a rather ‘crude’ manner. Civil society organizations demand freedom of access for migrants and refugees towards their desired destinations, even as the EU externalizes or refuses protection without a clear understanding of the concept of the safe third country or non-refoulement. By interpreting the Refugee Convention and customary international law, the ICJ can be expected to review non-refoulement and interlinked rights taking the flanking principles of burden-sharing and solidarity into account. The protection of refugees cannot depend on circumstance, but should be based on a system of regional and global distribution of various categories of burdens and costs. As the global refugee crisis is a matter affecting international peace and security, it is obvious that the P5 and other major powers should play a pivotal role in the global protection system. Non-refoulement cannot be interpreted as a static obligation of states to protect refugees who choose or happen to arrive in their territories, but has to be embedded in a transnational (regional and/or global) migration management context. This is also the meaning of the efforts currently undertaken by the UN General Assembly on the two global compacts on refugees and migration (New York Declaration 2016). Notwithstanding these efforts, the envisaged compact on refugees should not be conceived as a policy instrument separate from the Convention, but as a framework for its implementation, enabling a variety of migration management policies. The combined effect of an advisory opinion and the compact would strengthen normative expectations on international protection and would enable an adaptation of the Convention to the requirements of the time. The recent departure of the United States from the consultations on the global compacts (see The Guardian) makes such a linkage ever more apposite, because it would strengthen normative expectations at a crucial juncture for international relations. Moreover, even if some states can be expected to reject a potential advisory opinion as formally non-binding, its authoritative character will have a long-term impact on the domestic legal systems and on international practice. The ICJ should recognize the obligation of States to enter into arrangements for migration management and their broad discretion with regard to the choice of the appropriate means, and should indicate the ‘minimum standards’ compatible with the Convention and human rights law, including the determination of the concept of safe third countries and the legal status of those intercepted on the high seas. The Court could be expected to decide that protection in the region of origin of the refugees would not violate the Convention per se (see Hathaway and Neve, already in 1997), that the relocation of refugees would not, in principle, require their consent, and that all states should participate in regional, trans-regional or global agreements on burden-sharing either through financial contributions or through relocation and resettlement. Moreover, protection in situations of mass inflow could have a temporary character and would not lead necessarily to resettlement. The Opinion would also clarify the obligations of states with regard to the social and economic rights of beneficiaries of international protection. An advisory opinion by the ICJ responding to an ‘honest’ and open request by the General Assembly could help establish a global consensus on the fundamentals of a ‘minimum protection order’. It would transform our perceptions on the Refugee Convention from a static to a dynamic instrument and would facilitate regional or global arrangements for the resettlement, relocation, temporary protection and return of refugees, and on the efficient use of limited financial resources. A precedent shows that the ICJ can be effective in that regard. In the Haya de la Torre case (1951), a non-binding suggestion by the Court had a prima facie invisible, but in the medium term positive, outcome. The ICJ suggested that the parties should find ‘a practical and satisfactory solution by seeking guidance from those considerations of courtesy and good neighborliness which, in matters of asylum, have always held a prominent place in the relations between the Latin-American republics’ (p. 83). Thus, the Court nudged these States to conclude the Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum in 1954.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>ICJ <u>says yes</u>, has <u>precedent</u> and it’ll <u>revitalize</u> ICJ jurisprudence.</h4><p><strong>Skordas 18</strong> [Achilles; 7-12-22; Professor of International Law at the University of Copenhagen; “The Missing Link in Migration Governance: An Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice,” https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-missing-link-in-migration-governance-an-advisory-opinion-by-the-international-court-of-justice/] brett</p><p><u><mark>As the world</mark> currently <mark>faces</mark> the worst <strong><mark>migration crisis</strong></mark> since WWII in terms of <strong>destabilization potential</u></strong>, due to the combined effects of the wars in Libya and Syria, and poverty in the Sahel, <u>it is time to <mark>consider</u></mark> the challenges and benefits of the potential <u>involvement of the <strong><mark>ICJ</strong></mark> in</u> the <u><strong>global</u></strong> efforts of <u><strong>migration</u></strong> management and international protection. There are three questions to discuss, (a) necessity, (b) feasibility and (c) contribution of a potential ICJ ruling.</p><p>(a) Necessity</p><p>The involvement of <u>the <strong>ICJ is necessary</strong> in view of clarifying and <strong>adapting core elements</strong> of the principle of <strong>non-refoulement</strong> to the contemporary conditions of <strong>migration management</u></strong>. This <u>function cannot be fulfilled on a <strong>universal level</strong> by any other jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional mechanism</u>.</p><p>In the first place, <u><strong>non-refoulement</strong> should be interpreted in view of the principles of <strong>burden-sharing</strong> and <strong>solidarity</u></strong>. Non-refoulement may be <u>the core principle of the <strong>Refugee Convention</u></strong>, but due to the time that has elapsed since the adoption of the Convention, state practice has undergone a rapid change, which has not always been free of controversy. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the concept of safe third country and safe country of origin, and the modalities of relocating refugees through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, depending on the reception capacities and financial resources of the States involved.</p><p>Second, these <u>issues cannot be authoritatively answered by <strong>alternative mechanisms</u></strong>. The system of the Refugee Convention does not include a quasi-judicial body of independent experts selected through a transparent procedure with the authority to decide disputes and to adopt General Comments similar to other human rights bodies (for instance, the Human Rights Committee). The UNHCR is an agency exercising international public authority with limited power of adjudication, and only in cases of Refugee Status Determination, but its activities and standpoints are characterized by a blend of law, policy, and pragmatism. The ExCom Conclusions and the UNHCR Guidelines are soft law instruments or expert opinions, but not authoritative interpretations of international law. Last, but not least, the monitoring and reporting mechanism under Arts. 35 and 36 of the Refugee Convention falls short of the system later agreed for human rights treaties.</p><p>The lack of a system of authentic interpretation on a universal level is responsible for the absence of generally accepted standards for the interpretation of non-refoulement and burden-sharing. The gap has been partially filled by national courts and by the CJEU that interpret the Refugee Convention through the lenses of their own constitutional systems and national or supranational interests. From the perspective of the Convention, however, these interpretations appear as discontinued interpretative alternatives that may inform our understanding of the universal rules, but are not authentic interpretations that draw a line between past and future. Furthermore, States, civil society organizations and the UNHCR engage in a continuous struggle for the semantic domination of the Convention, amplifying the indeterminacy of the rules. As a result, the evolution of non-refoulement as a universal principle cannot reach crystallization points, but, instead, the fundamentally normative character of the principle gives way to a more open principle, which becomes increasing incapable of stabilizing normative expectations. Thus, policies (and politics) tend to displace law, instead of being structurally coupled to it.</p><p>To prevent any misunderstanding, I do not argue that the Refugee Convention should homogenize refugee protection across the world. Such an enterprise would not only be counterproductive, but would contradict the rationale of regionalization of international law that enables local jurisdictions to adapt the rules to the local conditions. Instead, I argue that regionalization presupposes a minimal but well-circumscribed center of gravity holding the system together. A clear understanding of the principle of non-refoulement as treaty law and as customary international law applicable to refugees and persons fleeing war and human rights violations is necessary in order to preserve the constitutional basis of the universal system of protection.</p><p>(b) Feasibility</p><p><u>There are different prospects for activating the Court</u> via an application by a State or <u>via a request for an <strong>advisory opinion</u></strong>. A State may apply against another State for alleged violations of the Refugee Convention or of the customary principle of non-refoulement. The chances that a State might decide to use this avenue are slim. The applicant must have a strong interest in the outcome of such a case, engage in a long and complex judicial contest, and possibly harm, at least temporarily, its relations with the respondent. Moreover, the ICJ has interpreted the existence of a ‘dispute’ as a condition of its jurisdiction rather narrowly in the recent cases Georgia v. Russian Federation (2011) and Marshall Islands v. UK (2016). The applicant must establish that a bilateral dispute exists, and it is not sufficient to provide evidence of its existence through general statements in international fora. Thus, the Court excluded in principle the possibility of an actio popularis that would serve the international interest. Finally, even if the existence of a bilateral dispute could be established, it is in no way certain that it would focus on the issues of major significance for the international community; it would probably be tailored to the specifics of that dispute.</p><p>More promising would be a <u><strong>request</u></strong> for an advisory opinion <u>by the UN General Assembly</u>. The feasibility problems here are of a broader political order, because <u>the <strong>UN Member States</strong> should be convinced to adopt a resolution requesting an <strong><mark>advisory opinion</u></strong></mark>. State and non-state actors would initially hesitate to take such an initiative because they would be unwilling to assume the procedural risk. Civil society and UNHCR would probably fear a conservative opinion that would restrict refugee rights. States would fear that the ICJ would revisit the Convention in a more liberal spirit.</p><p>The fact is that <u>nobody can predict the outcome of an advisory opinion</u>. <u>The Court has been</u> occasionally ‘conservative’, as in the Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, or <u>‘progressive’</u>, <u>as in the Opinion on the <strong>Construction of a Wall</u></strong>. Thus, indeed, the procedural risk is not negligible. The <u>main actors would prefer to carry on the contest on refugee rights v. state sovereignty</u> and, if they lose a battle, they can hope to fight another day. A <u><strong>realistic possibility</u></strong> for a mobilization in the General Assembly <u>would be to create a ‘coalition of the most heavily burdened’, e.g. Europe and Africa</u>, <u><mark>arguing for</u></mark> <u><strong>global <mark>burden-sharing</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>as a principle</mark> of <strong>i</strong>nternational <strong>law</u></strong>, to be <u>applied alongside the principle of <strong>non-refoulement</u></strong>.</p><p>(c) Contribution: <u><strong>Advancing migration governance</p><p></u></strong>The advancement of migration governance will benefit first and foremost migrants and refugees, because <u>the ICJ would be given the opportunity to clarify the discretion of States with regard to the <strong>management of inflows</strong> and would formulate the <strong>corresponding guarantees</strong> for <strong>refugee rights</u></strong>. So far, <u>the legal discussion on non-refoulement has been focusing on the paradigm of access to the territory of the host country, whilst the real problem is the prevention of return to the country of origin and the granting of effective protection to groups of persons through a variety of policy instruments</u>. The clash of these two alternatives is already taking place, but in a rather ‘crude’ manner. <u><strong>Civil society organizations</u></strong> <u><mark>demand freedom</mark> of access <mark>for <strong>migrants</u></strong></mark> and refugees <u>towards their desired destinations</u>, <u>even as the EU</u> externalizes or <u><strong>refuses protection</u></strong> <u>without a clear understanding of the concept of</u> the safe third country or <u><strong>non-refoulement</u></strong>.</p><p>By <u>interpreting the</u> <u><strong>Refugee Convention</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>c</u></strong>ustomary <u><strong>i</u></strong>nternational <u><strong>l</u></strong>aw, <u>the ICJ can be expected to review non-refoulement and interlinked rights taking the flanking principles of burden-sharing and solidarity into account</u>. The protection of refugees cannot depend on circumstance, but should be based on a system of regional and global distribution of various categories of burdens and costs. As the global refugee crisis is a matter affecting international peace and security, it is obvious that the P5 and other major powers should play a pivotal role in the global protection system.</p><p>Non-refoulement cannot be interpreted as a static obligation of states to protect refugees who choose or happen to arrive in their territories, but has to be embedded in a transnational (regional and/or global) migration management context. This is also the meaning of the efforts currently undertaken by the UN General Assembly on the two global compacts on refugees and migration (New York Declaration 2016). Notwithstanding these efforts, <u>the envisaged compact</u> on refugees should not be conceived as a policy instrument separate from the Convention, but as <u>a framework for</u> its <u><strong>implementation</u></strong>, enabling a variety of migration management policies. The combined effect of an <u><strong>advisory opinion</u></strong> and the compact <u>would</u> strengthen normative expectations on international protection and would <u>enable an adaptation of the Convention to the requirements of the time</u>. The recent departure of the United States from the consultations on the global compacts (see The Guardian) makes such a linkage ever more apposite, because <u>it would <strong><mark>strengthen normative expectations</strong></mark> at a crucial juncture for <strong>i</strong>nternational <strong>r</strong>elations</u>. Moreover, <u>even if some states can be expected to reject a potential <strong>advisory opinion</strong> as formally non-binding, its <strong>authoritative character</strong> will have a long-term impact on the domestic legal systems and on <strong>international practice</u></strong>.</p><p>The ICJ should recognize the obligation of States to enter into arrangements for migration management and their broad discretion with regard to the choice of the appropriate means, and should indicate the ‘minimum standards’ compatible with the Convention and human rights law, including the determination of the concept of safe third countries and the legal status of those intercepted on the high seas. The Court could be expected to decide that protection in the region of origin of the refugees would not violate the Convention per se (see Hathaway and Neve, already in 1997), that the relocation of refugees would not, in principle, require their consent, and that all states should participate in regional, trans-regional or global agreements on burden-sharing either through financial contributions or through relocation and resettlement. Moreover, protection in situations of mass inflow could have a temporary character and would not lead necessarily to resettlement. <u>The Opinion would also clarify the obligations of states with regard to the</u> social and economic rights of <u><strong>beneficiaries of international protection</u></strong>.</p><p><u>An advisory opinion</u> by the ICJ <u>responding to an ‘honest’ and open request by the General Assembly could help <mark>establish</mark> a <strong><mark>global consensus</strong></mark> on the fundamentals of a ‘minimum protection order’</u>. It would transform our perceptions on the Refugee Convention from a static to a dynamic instrument and would <u>facilitate regional or global arrangements for the resettlement, relocation, temporary protection and return of refugees, and on the efficient use of limited financial resources</u>. A <u><strong>precedent shows that the ICJ can be effective in that regard</u></strong>. <u><strong>In the Haya de la Torre case</u></strong> (1951), a non-binding <u>suggestion by the Court had a prima facie invisible, but in the medium term positive, outcome</u>. The ICJ suggested that the <u><strong>parties should find ‘a practical and satisfactory solution by seeking guidance from those considerations <mark>of courtesy and good neighborliness</mark> which, <mark>in matters of asylum</mark>, have always held a prominent place in the relations between the Latin-American republics’</u></strong> (p. 83). Thus, <u>the Court nudged these States to conclude the Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum in 1954</u>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Bahng 17, Aimee Bahng is an American academic. She is a professor of gender and women's studies at Pomona College in Claremont, California. Her previous denial of tenure at Dartmouth College sparked widespread protests about discrimination against racial minorities in academia., (Aimee, “Introduction: On Speculation Fiction, Finance, and Futurity” in Migrant Futures: Decolonizing Speculation in Financial Times, Duke University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤 fulltext: This book puts into conversation speculative finance and speculative fiction as two forms of extrapolative figuration that participate in the cultural production of futurity. To put these two seemingly disparate arenas of narrative production into conversation, I largely use the methodologies of an emerging field that could be called critical finance studies in conjunction with a longer standing field called feminist science studies, which trained me to beware of the “god trick of seeing everything from nowhere” purveyed by the seemingly pure, objective vision of scientific and capitalist realism.6 It is indeed a god trick to get people to mistake prophecy for truth, notional figure for value, or futurity for the future. As a lifetime student of the power of narrative to alter reality, or at least perceptions of it, I have often been awed by fiction’s nearly magical actuarial potency. By approaching both speculative finance and speculative fiction as narrative productions, I emphasize the performativity of economics and therefore the potential power of the literary imagination to call forth new political economies, ways of living, and alternative relational structures; and different sorts of subjects into the world. I use the term “futurity” to highlight the construction of the future and denaturalize its singularity, while maintaining an emphasis on how narrative constructions of the future play a significant role in materializing the present. “Extrapolation,” for example, is the name for the mathematical modeling practice economists use to predict future commodity prices and investment trends based on data compiled in databases such as the crb Commodity Yearbook, Wharton Research Data Services, as well as Global Financial Data Solutions. At the same time, science fiction studies might first associate extrapolation with the eponymous academic journal, which publishes scholarly essays on science fiction (also called extrapolative or speculative fiction). Migrant Futures investigates how we narrate futurity across various platforms, from speculative fiction to financial speculation. How do our stories of the future chart the ways we invest—financially, politically, ideologically, and intellectually—in the present? How do the logics of preemption break across the shores of financial securitization, military preparedness, and scientific projection? These are some of the questions taken up by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, cultural theorists, and other scholars contributing to an interdisciplinary examination of financialization.7 Most notably, Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee assert the social construction of financial derivatives—a social construction that, like race, nonetheless has profound material effects on people’s livelihoods, state politics, and international conflicts. LiPuma and Lee call derivatives “socially imaginary objects” and assert “the social construction of the various types of derivatives.”8 They also emphasize the “abstract symbolic violence” that speculative capital wreaks on the world—“symbolic in the sense that it is not accomplished physically by means of military force or colonialism, though it may, of course, engender the conditions (such as impoverishment) that precipitate violent crime and warfare” and “abstract in the sense that it never appears directly; rather it mediates and stands behind local realities—such as interest rates, food costs, and the price of petroleum.”9 One poignant example that LiPuma and Lee provide is the effect of presidential elections on the global economy. In the case of the 2002 Brazilian presidential election, for example, when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Worker’s Party was projected to win, “the principal players in the Latin American financial markets started to sell and short the Brazilian currency.”10 Electoral projections produced economic reality. As Migrant Futures headed into the final stages of production, the United States has witnessed the election of Donald Trump as its president. On the evening of November 8, 2016, as people watched the results come in, they also noted the Dow Jones falling precipitously. By morning, though, markets seemed to have leveled out, and the futures markets in U.S. Steel and private prisons in particular were looking quite good, indeed. This last example, when read through the burgeoning body of critical work in prison abolition movements, yokes the abstract violence of finance capitalism to more overt manifestations of state violence as exacted through the police force disproportionately on black and brown, queer and trans bodies in the United States. Predicated on prediction, the algorithmic models used in the financial sector as well as by insurance companies often count on the movements of legible and calculable subjects. Financial speculation, extrapolation, and prediction rely on mathematical models and probabilistic logics to transform quantitative data into a narrative arc. By plotting points along a line on a graph and deriving meaning from those data, these narratives require a rendering of a trajectory. Though that rendering often takes shape in the visual field of graphic representation, financial forecasters produce extrapolative fiction when they functionally convert data into an interpretive arc, to be articulated and narrativized in and beyond the graphic form. Econometrics extrapolates from data collected by the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and Index of Consumer Expectations, for example, which reduce sentiment and expectation to numeric values in an attempt to measure and then advise for or against hedging uncertain futures. This “datafication” is also a rendering of data into fiction or statistical narrative, which Kathleen Woodward has characterized as “the preeminent expression of late capitalism.”11 Financial speculation produces a kind of speculative fiction, and despite its overtures to fact over fiction, it both contributes to and is affected by a broader cultural production of futurity. By reading the social construction of financial derivatives alongside more readily recognizable forms of speculative fiction, Migrant Futures asks if another mode of speculation is possible, one that is not immediately captured by the anxious gatherings of risk.12 If finance is, as Max Haiven characterizes it, “capitalism’s imagination,” wherein neoliberal financialization “comes at the expense of the radical imagination,” I locate a primary site of radical imagination in migrant futures that shift the site of emergency away from terror toward deportation, attend to alternative pockets of wonder such as feminist fabulation rather than defense strategy think tanks, and speculate worlds that demand new onto-epistemological ways of being and thinking. Launching this examination are fundamental questions about who narrates these futurities and what kinds of subject positions play out in these projected temporal landscapes. Implicitly, the project interrogates who stands to profit from and who risks extinction in prevailing narratives about the future. The principal players in the derivatives markets are multinational corporations, international agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, investment banks, and hedge funds that pool the investments of wealthy clients—basically, everyone but individuals and nations.13 The funds of the four largest U.S. participants—JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs—represent more than 30 percent of the total global derivatives market.14 Furthermore, the fundamental governance of the global financial system has been dominated entirely by U.S. and European economic interests, though countries with clearly emerging market economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, have demanded a seat at the rule-making table.15 The financial colonization of the future builds on preexisting disparities of wealth held over from earlier histories of empire and neocolonial enterprises that break at the fault line between what has been called the Global North and South. Meanwhile, mass migrations of the undocumented, unbanked, and state-less workers move in and out of geopolitical spaces, the nuances and histories of their displacement and precarity flattened by statistical aggregation. They are migrant noncitizens, outliers, most of whom hail from the Global South and have slipped beyond even “dividual” statistical legibility.16 In the calculus of risk, the unmeasurable uncertainty of this statistical undercommons generates some friction, some disruption of the would-be-unflappable promises of securitization. The economist Frank Knight, in his interrogation of risk, distinguishes calculable probability (risk) from the “absolute unpredictability of things” (true uncertainty).17 In the risk-uncertainty dialectic, sheer uncertainty invites profit seekers to convert profoundly unknowable states into probabilistic forecasts, to fold uncertainty back into risk practices—yet uncertainty cuts loose from risk discourse’s capture, eluding containment and quantification. While true uncertainty might refuse the grid of intelligibility that securitization would foist upon it, it remains knowable as lived experience, felt and negotiated perhaps most profoundly by those held in “the waiting-room of history.” As he describes this imaginary waiting room in Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests that the “modern, European idea of history. . . came to non-European peoples in the 19th century as somebody’s way of saying ‘not yet’ to somebody else.”18 In the context of finance capitalism, though, the inhabitants of the waiting room are in fact being written out of the future. What would it mean to reconfigure that marginalization from European notions of progress, modernity, history, and futurity? What alternative futurities emerge from those living beyond the purview of statistical projection? If the abstraction of populations into calculated risks and algorithmic approximations of lived experiences produces for state and international regulatory institutions “a legible and administratively convenient format,”19 queer and trans theorists have been particularly helpful in thinking through a politics that does not simply demand inclusion in that system. A 2015 special issue of Transgender Studies Quarterly, for example, takes aim at the “imperative to be counted,” which becomes “another form of normativizing violence that trans subjects can encounter.”20 Census Bureau and National Health Statistics data that feed U.S. biopolitical regimes of population regulation work to regularize a population and “flatten its zoetic confusions of movement and form, of time and space, of doing and being, into neat two-dimensional axes specifying static properties and numbers.”21 Population regulation and public health discourse, insofar as they share statistical methods with financial models of speculating on risk, could very well move toward three-dimensional models using differential geometry and statistical mechanics to predict volatility.22 But no matter how nuanced and complex the models get, Paisley Currah and Susan Stryker’s provocation to consider how trans disrupts configurations of “statistical citizenship” opens up a queering of speculation and perhaps even a queering of statistical data as numerical or categorical, discrete or continuous, nominal or ordinal.23 By “queering speculation,” I refer to a host of reconfigurations of our relationships to the “financialization of daily life” and the manifestation of a “risk society”—which is to say a normative investment in quantitative data to project futurity.24 When José Muñoz asserts that “the future is queerness’s domain,” he posits a horizon of potentiality. Though that horizon might invoke Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and therefore asks us to contend with Heidegger’s Nazism, Muñoz’s articulation of a not yet draws more compellingly not only on Giorgio Agamben’s formulation but also on Ernst Bloch’s theorization of indeterminacy. Muñoz’s presentation of the not yet of queer futurity suggests a way to seize the not yet of European historicity as described in Chakrabarty’s waiting-room scenario. In Muñoz’s words, “we are left waiting but vigilant in our desire for another time that is not yet here.” Queer futurity offers a model for transforming the waiting room into a horizon. As it moves through examples of queer art, performance, and other queer utopian expressions, Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia looks to the realm of the open-ended gesture as an alternative to the way other forms of speculation attempt to pull that horizon of the future into the present for profit.25 By enjambing these two formulations of the not yet—one that seeks to illuminate histories of empire and exclusion, and another that insists on futurity as an opening up rather than a closing down—I want to consider the relationship between the waiting room and the horizon. For it is precisely in the exile’s relation to time—the point at which one is pushed out of what could be called straight time, settler time, or the profitable time of compound interest—that one can glimpse the horizon of the not yet, where not yet manifests itself not as a decree of foreclosure but as an embrace of the unknown. Building on the work of C. L. R. James, Muñoz writes: “To call for this notion of the future in the present is to summon a refunctioned notion of utopia in the service of subaltern politics.”26<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Narrative constructions of the future <u>materialize</u> the way we invest in the present. Their seemingly objective predictions <u>calculate subjects</u> into knowability while simultaneously rendering <u>data into fiction</u>, unleashing <u>abstract symbolic violence</u> onto the world. Our uncertainty <u>disrupts securitization</u> and embraces the <u>knowable as lived experience</u>, creating a <u>horizon of the not yet</u> for <u>non-White futurities</u>. </h4><p><strong>Bahng 17</strong>, Aimee Bahng is an American academic. She is a professor of gender and women's studies at Pomona College in Claremont, California. Her previous denial of tenure at Dartmouth College sparked widespread protests about discrimination against racial minorities in academia., (Aimee, “Introduction: On Speculation Fiction, Finance, and Futurity” in Migrant Futures: Decolonizing Speculation in Financial Times, Duke University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤</p><p>This book puts into conversation speculative finance and speculative fiction as two forms of extrapolative figuration that participate in the cultural production of futurity. To put these two seemingly disparate arenas of narrative production into conversation, I largely use the methodologies of an emerging field that could be called critical finance studies in conjunction with a longer standing field called feminist science studies, which trained me to <u><strong>beware of</u></strong> <u>the</u> “<u><strong>god trick of seeing everything from nowhere</u></strong>” <u><strong>purveyed by the seemingly pure, objective vision of scientific and capitalist realism</u></strong>.6 <u>It is indeed a god trick to get people to mistake prophecy for truth, notional figure for value, or futurity for the future</u>. <u>As</u> a lifetime student of <u>the power of narrative to</u> <u><strong>alter reality</u></strong>, or at least perceptions of it, I have often been awed by fiction’s nearly magical actuarial potency. By approaching both speculative finance and speculative fiction as narrative productions, I emphasize the performativity of economics and therefore the potential power of the literary imagination to call forth new political economies, ways of living, and alternative relational structures; and different sorts of subjects into the world.</p><p>I use the term “futurity” to highlight the construction of the future and denaturalize its singularity, while maintaining an emphasis on how <u>narrative constructions of the future play a significant role in materializing the present</u>. “Extrapolation,” for example, is the name for the mathematical modeling practice economists use to predict future commodity prices and investment trends based on data compiled in databases such as the crb Commodity Yearbook, Wharton Research Data Services, as well as Global Financial Data Solutions. At the same time, science fiction studies might first associate extrapolation with the eponymous academic journal, which publishes scholarly essays on science fiction (also called extrapolative or speculative fiction). Migrant Futures investigates how <u>we narrate futurity across various platforms, from speculative fiction to financial speculation</u>. How do <u>our stories of the future chart the ways we <strong>invest—</u></strong>financially, <u><strong>politically, ideologically, and intellectually—in the present</u></strong>? How do the<u> logics of preemption break across the shores of</u> financial <u><strong>securitization, military preparedness, and scientific projection</u></strong>? These are some of the questions taken up by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, cultural theorists, and other scholars contributing to an interdisciplinary examination of financialization.7</p><p>Most notably, Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee assert the social construction of financial derivatives—a <u>social construction</u> that, <u>like race</u>, nonetheless <u>has profound material effects on people’s livelihoods, state politics, and international conflicts</u>. LiPuma and Lee call derivatives <u>“socially imaginary objects”</u> and <u>assert</u> “the social construction of the various types of derivatives.”8 They also emphasize the “<u><strong>abstract symbolic violence</u></strong>” <u>that speculative capital wreaks on the world</u>—“symbolic in the sense that it is not accomplished physically by means of military force or colonialism, though it may, of course, engender the conditions (such as impoverishment) that precipitate violent crime and warfare” and “<u>abstract in the sense that it never appears directly; rather it mediates and stands behind local realities</u>—such as interest rates, food costs, and the price of petroleum.”9 One poignant example that LiPuma and Lee provide is the effect of presidential elections on the global economy. In the case of the 2002 Brazilian presidential election, for example, when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Worker’s Party was projected to win, “the principal players in the Latin American financial markets started to sell and short the Brazilian currency.”10 Electoral projections produced economic reality. As Migrant Futures headed into the final stages of production, the United States has witnessed the election of Donald Trump as its president. On the evening of November 8, 2016, as people watched the results come in, they also noted the Dow Jones falling precipitously. By morning, though, markets seemed to have leveled out, and the futures markets in U.S. Steel and private prisons in particular were looking quite good, indeed. This last example, when read through the burgeoning body of critical work in prison abolition movements, yokes the abstract violence of finance capitalism to more overt manifestations of state violence as exacted through the police force disproportionately on black and brown, queer and trans bodies in the United States.</p><p><u><strong>Predicated on prediction</u></strong>, the <u>algorithmic models</u> used in the financial sector as well as by insurance companies often <u>count on the movements of</u> <u><strong>legible and calculable subjects</u></strong>. Financial <u><strong>speculation</u></strong>, <u><strong>extrapolation</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>prediction</u></strong> <u>rely on</u> mathematical models <u>and probabilistic logics to transform quantitative data into a</u> <u><strong>narrative arc</u></strong>. By plotting points along a line on a graph and deriving meaning from those data, these <u>narratives require a rendering of a trajectory</u>. Though that rendering often takes shape in the visual field of graphic representation, financial <u>forecasters produce</u> <u><strong>extrapolative fiction</u></strong> <u>when they functionally convert data into an interpretive arc, to be articulated and narrativized</u> in and beyond the graphic form. Econometrics extrapolates from data collected by the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and Index of Consumer Expectations, for example, which reduce sentiment and expectation to numeric values in an attempt to measure and then advise <u>for or against hedging uncertain futures</u>. This “<u><strong>datafication</u></strong>” <u>is also a</u> <u><strong>rendering of data into fiction</u></strong> or statistical narrative, which Kathleen Woodward has characterized <u>as “the preeminent expression of late capitalism.”</u>11 Financial speculation produces a kind of speculative fiction, and despite its overtures to fact over fiction, <u>it both contributes to and is affected by a broader cultural production of futurity</u>. By reading the social construction of financial derivatives alongside more readily recognizable forms of speculative fiction, <u>Migrant Futures asks if another mode of speculation is possible, one that is not immediately captured by the anxious gatherings of risk</u>.12 If finance is, as Max Haiven characterizes it, “capitalism’s imagination,” wherein neoliberal financialization “comes at the expense of the radical imagination,” I locate <u>a primary site of</u> <u><strong>radical imagination</u></strong> <u>in migrant futures that shift the site of emergency away from <strong>terror</strong> toward deportation, attend to alternative pockets of wonder such as feminist fabulation rather than</u> <u><strong>defense strategy think tanks</strong>,</u> <u>and speculate worlds that <strong>demand new onto-epistemological ways of being and thinking</u></strong>.</p><p><u>Launching this examination are fundamental questions about</u> <u><strong>who narrates these futurities</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>what kinds of subject positions play out</u></strong> <u>in these projected temporal landscapes</u>. Implicitly, <u>the project</u> <u><strong>interrogates</u></strong> <u>who stands to profit from and</u> <u><strong>who risks extinction</u></strong> <u>in prevailing narratives about the future</u>. The principal players in the derivatives markets are multinational corporations, international agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, investment banks, and hedge funds that pool the investments of wealthy clients—basically, everyone but individuals and nations.13 The funds of the four largest U.S. participants—JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs—represent more than 30 percent of the total global derivatives market.14 Furthermore, the fundamental governance of the global financial system has been dominated entirely by U.S. and European economic interests, though countries with clearly emerging market economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, have demanded a seat at the rule-making table.15 The financial <u>colonization of the future builds on preexisting disparities of wealth</u> held over <u>from</u> earlier <u>histories of empire and neocolonial enterprises that break at the fault line between what has been called the <strong>Global North and South</u></strong>.</p><p>Meanwhile, mass <u>migrations of the undocumented, unbanked, and state-less workers move in and out of geopolitical spaces, the nuances and histories of their displacement and precarity <strong>flattened by statistical aggregation</u></strong>. They are <u>migrant noncitizens, outliers</u>, most of whom hail <u>from the Global South</u> and have slipp<u>ed beyond even “dividual” statistical legibility</u>.16 <u><strong>In the calculus of risk</u></strong>, <u>the unmeasurable uncertainty of this statistical undercommons generates</u> some friction, some <u>disruption of</u> the would-be-unflappable <u>promises of<strong> securitization</u></strong>. The economist Frank Knight, in his interrogation of risk, distinguishes calculable probability (risk) from the “absolute unpredictability of things” (true uncertainty).17 In the risk-uncertainty dialectic, <u>sheer uncertainty invites profit seekers to convert profoundly unknowable states into probabilistic forecasts, to fold uncertainty back into risk practices—yet</u> <u><strong>uncertainty cuts loose from risk discourse’s capture</u></strong>, <u>eluding containment and quantification</u>. While true uncertainty might <u>refuse the grid of intelligibility that securitization would foist upon it,</u> it remains <u><strong>knowable as lived experience</u></strong>, felt and negotiated perhaps most profoundly by those held in “the waiting-room of history.” As he describes this imaginary waiting room in Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests that the “modern, European idea of history. . . came to non-European peoples in the 19th century as somebody’s way of saying ‘not yet’ to somebody else.”18 In the context of finance capitalism, though, the <u>inhabitants</u> of the waiting room are in fact <u>being written out of the future</u>. What would it mean to reconfigure that marginalization from European notions of progress, modernity, history, and futurity? <u>What alternative futurities emerge from those living beyond the purview of statistical projection?</p><p></u>If the abstraction of populations into calculated risks and algorithmic approximations of lived experiences produces for state and international regulatory institutions “a legible and administratively convenient format,”19 queer and trans theorists have been particularly helpful in thinking through a politics that does not simply demand inclusion in that system. A 2015 special issue of Transgender Studies Quarterly, for example, takes aim at the “imperative to be counted,” which becomes “another form of normativizing violence that trans subjects can encounter.”20 Census Bureau and National Health Statistics data that feed U.S. biopolitical regimes of population regulation work to regularize a population and “flatten its zoetic confusions of movement and form, of time and space, of doing and being, into neat two-dimensional axes specifying static properties and numbers.”21 Population regulation and public health discourse, insofar as they share statistical methods with financial models of speculating on risk, could very well move toward three-dimensional models using differential geometry and statistical mechanics to predict volatility.22 But no matter how nuanced and complex the models get, Paisley Currah and Susan Stryker’s provocation to consider how trans disrupts configurations of “statistical citizenship” opens up a queering of speculation and perhaps even a queering of statistical data as numerical or categorical, discrete or continuous, nominal or ordinal.23 By “queering speculation,” I refer to a host of reconfigurations of our relationships to the “financialization of daily life” and the manifestation of a “risk society”—which is to say a normative investment in quantitative data to project futurity.24</p><p>When José Muñoz asserts that “the future is queerness’s domain,” he posits a horizon of potentiality. Though that horizon might invoke Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and therefore asks us to contend with Heidegger’s Nazism, Muñoz’s articulation of a not yet draws more compellingly not only on Giorgio Agamben’s formulation but also on Ernst Bloch’s theorization of indeterminacy. Muñoz’s presentation of the not yet of queer futurity suggests a way to seize the not yet of European historicity as described in Chakrabarty’s waiting-room scenario. In Muñoz’s words, “we are left waiting but vigilant in our desire for another time that is not yet here.” Queer futurity offers a model for transforming the waiting room into a horizon. As it moves through examples of queer art, performance, and other queer utopian expressions, Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia looks to the realm of the open-ended gesture as an alternative to the way other forms of speculation attempt to pull that horizon of the future into the present for profit.25</p><p>By <u>enjambing</u> these <u>two formulations of the not yet—one that seeks to illuminate histories of empire and exclusion, and another that insists on futurity as an opening up rather than a closing down—</u>I want to consider the relationship between the waiting room and the horizon. For <u>it is precisely in the exile’s</u> <u><strong>relation to time</u></strong>—<u>the point at which one is pushed out of</u> what could be called <u>straight time, settler time, or</u> the <u>profitable time</u> of compound interest<u>—that one can glimpse the horizon of the not yet</u>, where not yet manifests itself not as a decree of foreclosure but <u>as an</u> <u><strong>embrace of the unknown</u></strong>. Building on the work of C. L. R. James, Muñoz writes: “To call for this notion of the future in the present is <u>to summon a refunctioned notion of utopia in the service of subaltern politics</u>.”26</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Pugh 10 - Senior Academic Fellow, Director ‘The Spaces of Democracy and the Democracy of Space’ network, Department of Geography, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University (Jonathan, “The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis, Relevance and the State” Globalizations March–June 2010, Vol. 7, Nos. 1–2, pp. 289–301) fulltext: In this polemical piece I have just been talking about how, following an ethos of radicalism as withdrawal from the state, some from the radical Left were incapable of being able to respond to the new stakes of radical politics. In particular, they were not found at the state, where the passive public turned to resolve the crisis. I will now go on to examine how in recent years significant parts of the radical Left have also tended to prioritise raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities, over capturing state power. I am going to say that it is important to create this awareness. However, in an effort to draw attention to the stakes of politics as we find them now, post-2008, I will also point out that we should not place too much faith in this approach alone.∂ Against the backdrop of what I have just been saying, it is important to remember that while much attention is focused upon President Obama, in many other parts of the world the Right and fundamentalism are gaining strength through capturing state power. The perception that the USA has changed is accompanied by a sense of relief among many radicals. However, the European Elections of 2009, the largest trans-national vote in history, heralded a continent-wide shift to the Right (and far Right) in many places—in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portgual, Slovenia, Spain, Romania, as just some examples (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Despite Obama’s election and a near depression, neo-liberalism continues to be implemented through a world spanning apparatus of governmental and intergovernmental organisations, think tanks and trans-national corporations (Massey, 2009; Castree, 2009). The power of the Right in countries like Iran, while checked, remains unchallenged by the Left. Albertazzi et al. (2009) draw attention to how a disconnected Left is leaving power in the hands of the Right in many other countries nationally, like Italy for example. Reflecting upon contemporary radical politics, the British Labour politician Clare Short (2009, p. 67) concludes:∂ In the fog of the future, I see a rise of fascistic movements . . . I am afraid it will all get nastier before we see a rise in generous, radical politics, but I suspect that history is about to speed up in front of our eyes and all who oppose the radicalisation of fear, ethnic hatred, racialism and division have to be ready to create a new movement that contains the solutions to the monumental historical problems we currently face.∂ So, the stakes of politics are clear. The Right is on the rise. Neo-liberal ideology is still dominant. How is the Left responding to these stakes? I have already discussed how some from the radical Left are placing too much faith in civil society organisations that seek to withdraw from the state. I will now turn to how others have too much faith in the power of raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities.∂ Post-crisis, the increasing popularity of David Chandler’s (2004, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) work reflects the sense that radicals too often celebrate the ethical individual as a radical force, at the expense of wider representational programmes for change. His central argument is that this leaves radicals impotent. Chandler (2009a, p. 78–79) says that many radicals∂ argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones— there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society.∂ In one way, Chandler’s reflective insight here is not particularly unique. Many others also seem to think that radicals today are too isolated and disengaged (Martin, 2009).5 Neither is it particularly original to say that there is too much emphasis upon creativity and spontaneity (what Richard Sennett, 2004, calls ‘social jazz’), and not enough upon representational politics. Indeed, go to many radical blogs and you find radicals themselves constantly complaining about how it has become too easy to sign up to ethical web petitions, email complaints, join a variety of ethical causes, without actually developing the political programmes themselves that matter. So it is not Chandler’s point about radicals being disengaged from instrumental politics that concerns me here. It is his related point—that there has been a flight into ethics, away from political accountability and responsibility that I find intriguing. Personal statements of ethical awareness have become particularly important within radical politics today. It is therefore interesting to note, as I will now discuss, that we have been here before.∂ In his earlier writings Karl Marx (1982) criticised the German Idealists for retreating into ethics, instead of seizing the institutions of power that mattered for themselves. Unwilling to express their self-interests politically through capturing power, the Idealists would rather make statements about their ethical awareness. Such idealism, along with an unwillingness to be held accountable for political power, often goes hand in hand. For Marx, it is necessary to feel the weight, but also the responsibility of power.∂ Chandler argues that, just as when the early Marx critiqued German Idealism, we should now be drawing attention to the pitfalls of the flights to ethics today. He says:∂ In the case of the German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, squeezed between the remnants of the ancien re´gime and the developing industrial proletariat, which explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. (Chandler, 2007, p. 717)∂ Today we are witnessing a renewed interest in ethics (Laı¨di, 1998; Badiou, 2002). Fragmented, many radicals retreat into abstract ethical slogans like ‘another world is possible’, ‘global human rights’, or ‘making poverty history’. As discussed above, we are also of course seeing the return of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. While I think we should not attack the ethical turn for its values, as many of these around environmental issues and human rights are admirable, it is equally important to say that the turn to ethics seems to reflect a certain lack of willingness to seize power and be held accountable to it. For the flight to ethics, as it often plays out in radical politics today, seems to be accompanied by scepticism toward representational politics.∂ Continuing with this theme for a moment, Slavoj Z ˇ izˇek (2008) also sheds some more light upon why ethics (when compared to representational politics) has become so important to the Left in recent years. He says that many of us (he is of course writing for the Left) feel that we are unable to make a real difference through representational politics on a larger scale, when it comes to the big political problems of life. Z ˇ izˇek (2008, p. 453) talks of this feeling that ‘we cannot ever predict the consequences of our acts’; that nothing we do will ‘guarantee that the overall outcome of our interactions will be satisfactory’. And he is right to make this point. Today, our geographical imaginations are dominated by a broader sense of chaos and Global Complexity (Urry, 2003; Stengers, 2005).∂ These ways of thinking, deep in the psyche of many radicals on the Left may be one other reason why so many have retreated into ethics. When we do not really believe that we can change the world through developing fine detailed instruments, capturing the state, or predictive models, we are naturally more hesitant. It is better to try and raise ethical awareness instead. Whereas in the past power was something to be won and treasured, something radicals could use to implement a collective ideology, today, with the risk posed by representation in fragmented societies, top-down power often becomes a hazard, even an embarrassment, for many on the Left (Laı¨di, 1998). This is, as I have already discussed, where the Right and neo-liberal ideologues are seizing the opportunity of the moment.∂ Putting what I have just said another way, there is a need to be clear, perhaps more so in these interdisciplinary times—ethics and politics (particularly representational politics) are different. Of course they are related. You cannot do politics without an ethical perspective. But my point here is that the Right and neo-liberal ideologues will not simply go away if the Left adopt or raise awareness of alternative ethical lifestyles. The Right are willing to capture state power, particularly at this time when the state is increasingly powerful. When we compare the concerted political programme of neo-liberalism, first developed by Reagan, Thatcher, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, multi-national banks, and the G20, as just some of many examples, ethical individuals across the world offer some counter-resistance. But the 2008 crisis, and the response of protests like the Alternative G20, demonstrated how weak ethical resistance is in the face of the institutions of the neo-liberal economy.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Their suicide is not transgressive—it just cedes power to the right</h4><p><strong>Pugh 10 </strong>- Senior Academic Fellow, Director ‘The Spaces of Democracy and the Democracy of Space’ network, Department of Geography, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University (Jonathan, “The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis, Relevance and the State” Globalizations March–June 2010, Vol. 7, Nos. 1–2, pp. 289–301)</p><p>In this polemical piece I have just been talking about how, following an ethos of radicalism as withdrawal from the state, some from the radical Left were incapable of being able to respond to the new stakes of radical politics. In particular, they were not found at the state, where the passive public turned to resolve the crisis. I will now go on to examine how in recent years significant <u><strong>parts of the radical Left have also tended to prioritise raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities, over capturing state power</u></strong>. I am going to say that it is important to create this awareness. However, in an effort to draw attention to the stakes of politics as we find them now, post-2008, I will also point out that <u><strong>we should not place too much faith in this approach</u></strong> alone.∂ Against the backdrop of what I have just been saying, it is important to remember that while much attention is focused upon President Obama, in many other parts of the world <u><strong>the Right and fundamentalism are gaining strength through capturing state power</u></strong>. The perception that the USA has changed is accompanied by a sense of relief among many radicals. However, the European Elections of 2009, the largest trans-national vote in history, heralded a continent-wide shift to the Right (and far Right) in many places—in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portgual, Slovenia, Spain, Romania, as just some examples (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Despite Obama’s election and a near depression, neo-liberalism continues to be implemented through a world spanning apparatus of governmental and intergovernmental organisations, think tanks and trans-national corporations (Massey, 2009; Castree, 2009). The power of the Right in countries like Iran, while checked, remains unchallenged by the Left. Albertazzi et al. (2009) draw attention to how a disconnected Left is leaving power in the hands of the Right in many other countries nationally, like Italy for example. Reflecting upon contemporary radical politics, the British Labour politician Clare Short (2009, p. 67) concludes:∂ In the fog of the future, I see a rise of fascistic movements . . . I am afraid it will all get nastier before we see a rise in generous, radical politics, but I suspect that history is about to speed up in front of our eyes and all who oppose the radicalisation of fear, ethnic hatred, racialism and division have to be ready to create a new movement that contains the solutions to the monumental historical problems we currently face.∂ So, the stakes of politics are clear. The Right is on the rise. Neo-liberal ideology is still dominant. How is the Left responding to these stakes? I have already discussed how some from the radical Left are placing too much faith in civil society organisations that seek to withdraw from the state. I will now turn to how others have too much faith in the power of raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities.∂ Post-crisis, the increasing popularity of David Chandler’s (2004, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) work reflects the sense that radicals too often celebrate the ethical individual as a radical force, at the expense of wider representational programmes for change. His central argument is that this leaves radicals impotent. Chandler (2009a, p. 78–79) says that many radicals∂ argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; <u><strong>these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones— there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide</u></strong>, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing <u><strong>are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society.∂ </u></strong>In one way, Chandler’s reflective insight here is not particularly unique. Many others also seem to think that radicals today are too isolated and disengaged (Martin, 2009).5 Neither is it particularly original to say that <u><strong>there is too much emphasis upon creativity and spontaneity</u></strong> (what Richard Sennett, 2004, calls ‘social jazz’), <u><strong>and not enough upon representational politics</u></strong>. Indeed, go to many radical blogs and you find radicals themselves constantly complaining about how <u><strong>it has become too easy to sign up to ethical web petitions, email complaints, join a variety of ethical causes, without actually developing the political programmes themselves that matter</u></strong>. So it is not Chandler’s point about radicals being disengaged from instrumental politics that concerns me here. It is his related point—that <u><strong>there has been a flight into ethics, away from political accountability</u></strong> and responsibility that I find intriguing. Personal statements of ethical awareness have become particularly important within radical politics today. It is therefore interesting to note, as I will now discuss, that we have been here before.∂ In his earlier writings Karl Marx (1982) criticised the German Idealists for retreating into ethics, instead of seizing the institutions of power that mattered for themselves. Unwilling to express their self-interests politically through capturing power, the Idealists would rather make statements about their ethical awareness. Such idealism, along with an unwillingness to be held accountable for political power, often goes hand in hand. For Marx, it is necessary to feel the weight, but also the responsibility of power.∂ Chandler argues that, just as when the early Marx critiqued German Idealism, we should now be drawing attention to the pitfalls of the flights to ethics today. He says:∂ In the case of the German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, squeezed between the remnants of the ancien re´gime and the developing industrial proletariat, which explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. (Chandler, 2007, p. 717)∂ Today we are witnessing a renewed interest in ethics (Laı¨di, 1998; Badiou, 2002). Fragmented, many radicals retreat into abstract ethical slogans like ‘another world is possible’, ‘global human rights’, or ‘making poverty history’. As discussed above, we are also of course seeing the return of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. While I think we should not attack the ethical turn for its values, as many of these around environmental issues and human rights are admirable, it is equally important to say that <u><strong>the turn to ethics seems to reflect a certain lack of willingness to seize power and be held accountable to it.</u></strong> For the flight to ethics, as it often plays out in radical politics today, seems to be accompanied by scepticism toward representational politics.∂ Continuing with this theme for a moment, Slavoj Z ˇ izˇek (2008) also sheds some more light upon why ethics (when compared to representational politics) has become so important to the Left in recent years. He says that many of us (he is of course writing for the Left) feel that we are unable to make a real difference through representational politics on a larger scale, when it comes to the big political problems of life. Z ˇ izˇek (2008, p. 453) talks of this feeling that ‘we cannot ever predict the consequences of our acts’; that nothing we do will ‘guarantee that the overall outcome of our interactions will be satisfactory’. And he is right to make this point. Today, our geographical imaginations are dominated by a broader sense of chaos and Global Complexity (Urry, 2003; Stengers, 2005).∂ These ways of thinking, deep in the psyche of many radicals on the Left may be one other reason why so many have retreated into ethics. <u><strong>When we do not really believe that we can change the world through developing fine detailed instruments, capturing the state, or predictive models, we are naturally more hesitant</u></strong>. It is better to try and raise ethical awareness instead. Whereas in the past power was something to be won and treasured, something radicals could use to implement a collective ideology, today, with the risk posed by representation in fragmented societies, top-down power often becomes a hazard, even an embarrassment, for many on the Left (Laı¨di, 1998). <u><strong>This is</u></strong>, as I have already discussed, <u><strong>where the Right and neo-liberal ideologues are seizing the opportunity of the moment</u></strong>.∂ Putting what I have just said another way, there is a need to be clear, perhaps more so in these interdisciplinary times—ethics and politics (particularly representational politics) are different. Of course they are related. You cannot do politics without an ethical perspective. But my point here is that <u><strong>the Right</u></strong> and neo-liberal ideologues <u><strong>will not simply go away if the Left</u></strong> <u><strong>adopt</u></strong> or raise awareness of <u><strong>alternative ethical lifestyles.</u></strong> <u><strong>The Right are willing to capture state power, particularly at this time when the state is increasingly powerful</u></strong>. When we compare the concerted political programme of neo-liberalism, first developed by Reagan, Thatcher, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, multi-national banks, and the G20, as just some of many examples, ethical individuals across the world offer some counter-resistance. But the 2008 crisis, and the response of protests like the Alternative G20, demonstrated how weak ethical resistance is in the face of the institutions of the neo-liberal economy.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Hammes 20 [Thomas X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. His doctorate is in Modern History from Oxford University. He served thirty years in the U.S. Marine Corps and is the author of three book – the latest is Deglobalization and International Security. Hammes has published over 170 articles and lectures extensively on the future of conflict, emerging technology, strategy, and insurgency in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East., June 2020, “An Affordable Defense of Asia”, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/An-Affordable-Defense-of-Asia-Report.pdf, Accessed 12-13-20] LHSSN fulltext: Autonomy: A Requirement The key to employing swarms of small, smart weapons is autonomy. It will be impossible for human operators to control each of the hundreds, or even thousands, of weapons systems that must be employed in a near-peer fight. This leads us to the ongoing discussion about the level of autonomy the United States can build into its new weapons systems. Human Rights Watch notes that the level of autonomy granted to weapons systems can vary greatly. Its categorization is worth quoting at length: “Robotic weapons, which are unmanned, are often divided into three categories based on the amount of human involvement in their actions: ¡ Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force only with a human command; ¡ Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots’ actions; and ¡ Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction.”49 Human-in-the-loop is the method the United States has used for its drone missions against terrorists and insurgents. A person must physically “pull the trigger” before the weapon can fire. This is clearly the preferred method when there is time. Unfortunately, the fact is that in high-intensity engagements such as a naval fight with multiple sub- and super-sonic missiles, drones, aircraft, and surface targets, humans cannot analyze and understand the information fast enough to successfully defend their units. The US Navy developed the autonomous mode for the Aegis Combat System and the Phalanx close-in weapons systems as the only way to defend against these types of attacks. The rapidly improving capabilities of both drones and missiles means many, if not most, engagements in a near-peer fight will be conducted at machine speed. The second approach, human-on-the-loop, attempts to compensate for human limitations by limiting the human to monitoring the weapon and intervening only if it is making a mistake. This concept allows the system to operate at machine speed, but also accepts that humans will be too slow to analyze all of the system’s actions in a high-tempo engagement. Thus, the human will either not intervene in time to prevent a mistake, or will intervene and fatally slow the system.50 Human-out-of-the-loop is not yet technically feasible. This would assume artificial intelligence designed, built, programmed, positioned, and employed the weapon. Even a simple land mine requires human input to determine what triggers it, where it is placed, and when it is activated. Despite Human Rights Watch’s inaccurate definition, all existing weapons require human input, even if a human is not actively monitoring the weapon at the time of employment. The third category is really “human-starts-the-loop” and not “human-out-of-the-loop.” No currently existing autonomous systems can execute a mission “without any human input or interaction.” All weapons systems still require humans to design them, position them, and determine the algorithms the system will use when activated—by a human. Thus, until Skynet becomes sentient, even fully “autonomous” systems such as the Aegis require a great deal of human input. However, this approach has an enormous advantage over the others. Since human input takes place before the fight starts, humans have sufficient time to think through the actions necessary to make the weapons most likely to perform in accordance with legal and ethical considerations. “Human-starts-the-loop” has been in use since the armed forces fielded heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, Captor smart sea mines, Patriot Missile System, Aegis Combat System in its auto-special or autonomous mode, Harpy drones, close-in weapons systems, and advanced torpedoes. These systems fully comply with current DoD policy that states, “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operations to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”51 In fact, the United States and several other nations have operated weapons using the “human-starts-the loop” concept for decades. It is particularly disturbing that limiting the discussion to human-in-the-loop and human-on-the-loop avoids the ethical and moral responsibility to both the United States and its potential opponents. Neither system will work in time-critical engagements; in essence, this is a discussion about which failed system to assign to killing humans. Further, the discussion does not include the moral and ethical responsibility to protect US and allied service personnel in a near-peer fight. Rather than trying to overcome the fundamental shortcomings of the first two approaches, the United States must accept the reality that a system based on the human-starts-the-loop concept is the only approach that allows US forces to defend themselves in time-critical engagements. It is the best approach to minimize human limitations, while maximizing the probability that autonomous weapons meet legal and ethical standards. It will not be perfect, but that is not the proper measure. The proper measure is whether it is better than a human at executing the task in accordance with ethics, law, and the moral imperative to take care of one’s own people while minimizing collateral damage. Obviously, the key factor is getting the parameters right, from design through to weapons launch. For passive weapons, parameters range from setting an anti-tank mine to only destroy heavy vehicles to building sophisticated algorithms that enable a smart sea mine to match the magnetic, acoustic, and pressure signatures unique to a certain type of target. Even for these passive systems, artificial intelligence can already make finer distinctions and use a higher number of variables for confirmation of the target than a human can. The same logic extends to offensive systems, which are rapidly becoming more capable. Designers understand they will have to operate in a communications-denied environment, and are striving to dramatically increase the onboard capability to properly identify a target and engage a target without human intervention after launch. In fact, the increasing range and capability of many new weapons virtually eliminate the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. For instance, new anti-air or anti-ship missiles can kill a target hundreds of miles away. Why would this be considered defensive while a smart, autonomous weapon that kills the same target sitting at an airfield or port at a lesser range would not be? As always, each conflict will have its own training requirements, rules of engagement (ROE), political factors, and strategic objectives. Clearly, a conflict with China presents a much different threat to the US Navy than conflict in the Persian Gulf. Thus, a ship sailing far out in the Pacific will establish different ROE and engagement triggers than one operating inside the tight waters of the Gulf. Similarly, the guidance for that same ship will change as it closes with China’s coastline. As engagement times decrease, autonomous defensive systems, by necessity, must have fewer restrictions. Just as important as the algorithms built into each system is individual operator and crew training concerning when to activate the autonomous mode. What conditions determine when an operator may shift the system to fully autonomous? Who in the crew makes that decision? Does it change under different conditions? What key indicators show that the changing tactical situation requires a change in the concept of employment? This is no longer a purely theoretical discussion. Autonomous weapons are being fielded by an increasing number of nations, and even by armed groups around the world. Rather than continuing this increasingly artificial and irrelevant debate on the level of required human supervision after launch, the United States needs to focus on refining the weapons and sensor designs, and the guidance provided to operators and systems prior to launch. Constant experimentation, testing, and training is the only way to provide reasonable confidence that autonomous systems will engage within the desired ethical, legal, operational, strategic, and political parameters. It is time to get on with it.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u><strong>Fully autonomous weapons are uniquely key.</h4><p>Hammes 20</p><p></u></strong>[Thomas X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. His doctorate is in Modern History from Oxford University. He served thirty years in the U.S. Marine Corps and is the author of three book – the latest is Deglobalization and International Security. Hammes has published over 170 articles and lectures extensively on the future of conflict, emerging technology, strategy, and insurgency in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East., June 2020, “An Affordable Defense of Asia”, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/An-Affordable-Defense-of-Asia-Report.pdf, Accessed 12-13-20] LHSSN</p><p>Autonomy: A Requirement <u><mark>The key to employing swarms of small, smart weapons is autonomy</mark>. <mark>It will be impossible for human</mark> operators <mark>to control each</mark> of the hundreds, or even thousands, of weapons systems that must be employed in a near-peer fight.</u> This leads us to the ongoing discussion about the level of autonomy the United States can build into its new weapons systems. Human Rights Watch notes that the level of autonomy granted to weapons systems can vary greatly. Its categorization is worth quoting at length: “Robotic weapons, which are unmanned, are often divided into three categories based on the amount of human involvement in their actions: ¡ Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force only with a human command; ¡ Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots’ actions; and ¡ Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction.”49 Human-in-the-loop is the method the United States has used for its drone missions against terrorists and insurgents. A person must physically “pull the trigger” before the weapon can fire. This is clearly the preferred method when there is time. Unfortunately, the fact is that <u><mark>in high-intensity engagements</mark> such as a naval fight with multiple sub- and super-sonic missiles, drones, aircraft, and surface targets, <mark>humans cannot analyze</mark> and understand <mark>the information fast enough</mark> to successfully defend their units. The US Navy developed the autonomous mode for the Aegis Combat System and the Phalanx close-in weapons systems as the only way to defend against these types of attacks. The rapidly improving capabilities of both drones and missiles means <mark>many, if not most, engagements</mark> in a near-peer fight <mark>will be conducted at machine speed</u></mark>. The second approach, human-on-the-loop, attempts to compensate for human limitations by limiting the human to monitoring the weapon and intervening only if it is making a mistake. This concept allows the system to operate at machine speed, but also accepts that <u>humans will be too slow to analyze all of the system’s actions in a high-tempo engagement.</u> Thus, the human will either not intervene in time to prevent a mistake, or will intervene and fatally slow the system.50 Human-out-of-the-loop is not yet technically feasible. This would assume artificial intelligence designed, built, programmed, positioned, and employed the weapon. Even a simple land mine requires human input to determine what triggers it, where it is placed, and when it is activated. Despite Human Rights Watch’s inaccurate definition, <u><mark>all existing weapons require human input</u></mark>, even if a human is not actively monitoring the weapon at the time of employment. The third category is really “human-starts-the-loop” and not “human-out-of-the-loop.” No currently existing autonomous systems can execute a mission “without any human input or interaction.” All weapons systems still require humans to design them, position them, and determine the algorithms the system will use when activated—by a human. Thus, until Skynet becomes sentient, <u><mark>even fully “autonomous” systems</mark> such as the Aegis require a great deal of human input.</u> However, <u>this approach has an enormous advantage over the others. <mark>Since human input takes place before the fight starts, humans have sufficient time to think through</mark> the <mark>actions</mark> necessary to make the weapons most likely to perform in accordance with legal and ethical considerations.</u> “Human-starts-the-loop” has been in use since the armed forces fielded heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, Captor smart sea mines, Patriot Missile System, Aegis Combat System in its auto-special or autonomous mode, Harpy drones, close-in weapons systems, and advanced torpedoes. These systems fully comply with current DoD policy that states, “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operations to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”51 In fact, the United States and several other nations have operated weapons using the “human-starts-the loop” concept for decades. It is particularly disturbing that limiting the discussion to human-in-the-loop and human-on-the-loop avoids the ethical and moral responsibility to both the United States and its potential opponents. Neither system will work in time-critical engagements; in essence, this is a discussion about which failed system to assign to killing humans. Further, the discussion does not include the moral and ethical responsibility to protect US and allied service personnel in a near-peer fight. <u>Rather than trying to overcome the fundamental shortcomings of the first two approaches, <mark>the United States must accept</mark> the reality <mark>that</mark> a system based on the <mark>human-starts-the-loop</mark> concept <mark>is the only approach that allows US forces to defend themselves in time-critical engagements</u></mark>. It is the best approach to minimize human limitations, while maximizing the probability that autonomous weapons meet legal and ethical standards. It will not be perfect, but that is not the proper measure. The proper measure is whether it is better than a human at executing the task in accordance with ethics, law, and the moral imperative to take care of one’s own people while minimizing collateral damage. Obviously, the key factor is getting the parameters right, from design through to weapons launch. For passive weapons, parameters range from setting an anti-tank mine to only destroy heavy vehicles to building sophisticated algorithms that enable a smart sea mine to match the magnetic, acoustic, and pressure signatures unique to a certain type of target. Even for these passive systems, artificial intelligence can already make finer distinctions and use a higher number of variables for confirmation of the target than a human can. The same logic extends to offensive systems, which are rapidly becoming more capable. Designers understand they will have to operate in a communications-denied environment, and are striving to dramatically increase the onboard capability to properly identify a target and engage a target without human intervention after launch. In fact, <u>the <mark>increasing range and capability</mark> of many new weapons virtually <mark>eliminate the distinction between offensive and defensive</mark> weapons.</u> For instance, new anti-air or anti-ship missiles can kill a target hundreds of miles away. Why would this be considered defensive while a smart, autonomous weapon that kills the same target sitting at an airfield or port at a lesser range would not be? As always, each conflict will have its own training requirements, rules of engagement (ROE), political factors, and strategic objectives. Clearly, <u>a <mark>conflict with China presents a much different threat</mark> to the US Navy <mark>than</mark> conflict in <mark>the Persian Gulf</mark>. Thus, <mark>a ship sailing far out in the Pacific will establish different ROE and engagement triggers</mark> than one operating inside the tight waters of the Gulf.</u> Similarly, the guidance for that same ship will change as it closes with China’s coastline. <u><mark>As engagement times decrease, autonomous defensive systems</mark>, by necessity, <mark>must have fewer restrictions</mark>. Just as important as the algorithms built into each system is individual operator and crew training concerning when to activate the autonomous mode. </u>What conditions determine when an operator may shift the system to fully autonomous? Who in the crew makes that decision? Does it change under different conditions? What key indicators show that the changing tactical situation requires a change in the concept of employment? This is no longer a purely theoretical discussion. Autonomous weapons are being fielded by an increasing number of nations, and even by armed groups around the world. Rather than continuing this increasingly artificial and irrelevant debate on the level of required human supervision after launch, the United States needs to focus on refining the weapons and sensor designs, and the guidance provided to operators and systems prior to launch. Constant experimentation, testing, and training is the only way to provide reasonable confidence that autonomous systems will engage within the desired ethical, legal, operational, strategic, and political parameters. It is time to get on with it. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Henderson 15 – prof of political science @ University of Victoria fulltext: (Phil, ‘Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism,’ Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement) Facing assertive indigenous presences within settler colonial spaces, settlers must answer the legitimate charge that their daily life – in all its banality – is predicated upon the privileges produced by ongoing genocide. The jarring nature of such charges offers an irreconcilable challenge to settlers qua settlers.64 Should these charges become impossible to ignore, they threaten to explode the imago of settler colonialism, which had hitherto operated within the settler psyche in a relatively smooth and benign manner. This explosion is potentiated by the revelation of even a portion of the violence that is required to make settler life possible. If, for example, settlers are forced to see ‘their’ beach as a site of murder and ongoing colonization, it becomes more difficult to sustain it within the imaginary as a site of frivolity.65 As Brown writes, in the ‘loss of horizons, order, and identity’ the subject experiences a sense of enormous vulnerability.66 Threatened with this ‘loss of containment', the settler subject embarks down the road to psychosis.67 Thus, to parlay Brown's thesis to the settler colonial context, the uncontrollable rage that indigenous presences induce within the settler is not evidence of the strength of settlers, but rather of a subject lashing out on the brink of its own dissolution. This panic – this rabid and insatiable anger – is always already at the core of the settler as a subject. As Lorenzo Veracini observes, the settler necessarily remains in a disposition of aggression ‘even after indigenous alterities have ceased to be threatening'.68 This disposition results from the precarity inherent in the maintenance of settler colonialism's imago, wherein any and all indigenous presences threaten subjective dissolution of the settler as such. Trapped in a Gordian Knot, the very thing that provides a balm to the settler subject – further development and entrenchment of the settler colonial imago – is also what panics the subject when it is inevitably contravened.69 We might think of this as a process of hardening that leaves the imago brittle and more susceptible to breakage. Their desire to produce a firm imago means that settlers are also always already in a psychically defensive position – that is, the settler's offensive position on occupied land is sustained through a defensive posture. For while settlers desire the total erasure of indigenous populations, the attendant desire to disappear their own identity as settlers necessitates the suppression of both desires, if the subject's reliance on settler colonial power structure is to be psychically naturalized. Settlers’ reactions to indigenous peoples fit, almost universally, with the two ego defense responses that Sigmund Freud observed. The first of these defenses is to attempt a complete conversion of the suppressed desire into a new idea. In settler colonial contexts, this requires averting attention from the violence of dispossession; as such, settlers often suggest that they aim to create a ‘city on the hill’.70 Freud noted that the conversion defense mechanism does suppress the anxiety-inducing desire, but it also leads to ‘periodic hysterical outbursts'. Such is the case when settlers’ utopic visions are forced to confront the reality that the gentile community they imagine is founded in and perpetuates irredeemable suffering. A second type of defense is to channel the original desire's energy into an obsession or a phobia. The effects of this defense are seen in the preoccupation that settler colonialism has with purity of blood or of community.71 As we have already seen, this obsession at once solidifies the power of the settler state, thereby naturalizing the settler and simultaneously perpetuating the processes of erasing indigenous peoples. Psychic defenses are intended to secure the subject from pain, and whether that pain originates inside or outside the psyche is inconsequential. Because of the threat that indigeneity presents to the phantasmatic wholeness of settler colonialism, settlers must always remain suspended in a state of arrested development between these defensive positions. Despite any pretensions to the contrary, the settler is necessarily a parochial subject who continuously coils, reacts, disavows, and lashes out, when confronted with his dependency on indigenous peoples and their territory. This psychic precarity exists at the core of the settler subject because of the unending fear of its own dissolution, should indigenous sovereignty be recognized.72 Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’.73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject. Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Debate is first and foremost a site of subject formation. In light of this, we must center the centuries long genocidal structure that forms how we think and exist. The affirmative’s affective intervention is essential to destabilize the stability of a settler psyche that otherwise coheres itself by pushing this violence out of the picture. Anything else is to sustain the ongoing violence of dispossession. </h4><p>Henderson 15 – prof of political science @ University of Victoria</p><p></strong>(Phil, ‘Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism,’ Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement)</p><p>Facing assertive indigenous presences within settler colonial spaces,<u> <mark>settlers must answer the</mark> legitimate <mark>charge that <strong>their daily life – in all its banality – is predicated upon</u></strong></mark> the privileges produced by <u><strong><mark>ongoing genocide</u></strong></mark>. <u>The jarring nature of <mark>such charges offer</mark>s <mark>an irreconcilable challenge</mark> to settlers</u> <u>qua settlers.</u>64 <u>Should <mark>these charges</mark> become impossible to ignore, they <mark>threaten to explode</u></mark> the imago of settler colonialism, which had hitherto operated within <u><mark>the settler psyche</u></mark> in a relatively smooth and benign manner. <u>This</u> explosion <u>is potentiated <mark>by the <strong>revelation of</u></strong></mark> even a portion of <u><strong>the <mark>violence</strong></mark> that is <mark>required to make settler life possible</u></mark>. If, for example, settlers are forced to see ‘their’ beach as a site of murder and ongoing colonization, it becomes more difficult to sustain it within the imaginary as a site of frivolity.65 As Brown writes, in the ‘loss of horizons, order, and identity’ <u><mark>the subject experiences</mark> a sense of <mark>enormous <strong>vulnerability</mark>.66 </p><p></u></strong>Threatened with this ‘loss of containment', the settler subject embarks down the road to psychosis.67 Thus, to parlay Brown's thesis to the settler colonial context, the uncontrollable rage that indigenous presences induce within the settler is not evidence of the strength of settlers, but rather of a subject lashing out on the brink of its own dissolution. <u>This panic</u> – this rabid and insatiable anger – <u>is always already at the core of the settler</u> as a <u>subject</u>. As Lorenzo Veracini observes, the settler necessarily remains in a disposition of aggression ‘even after indigenous alterities have ceased to be threatening'.68 <u>This disposition results from the <strong>precarity</strong> inherent in the maintenance of</u> settler colonialism's imago, wherein any and all indigenous presences threaten subjective dissolution of <u>the settler as such</u>. Trapped in a Gordian Knot, the very thing that provides a balm to the settler subject – further development and entrenchment of the settler colonial imago – is also what panics the subject when it is inevitably contravened.69 We might think of this as a process of hardening that leaves the imago brittle and more susceptible to breakage. Their desire to produce a firm imago means that <u><mark>settlers are</u></mark> also <u><mark>always already</mark> in a <mark>psychically defensive</mark> position – that is, the settler's offensive position on occupied land is sustained through a defensive posture</u>. For <u>while settlers desire the total erasure of indigenous populations, <mark>the</mark> attendant <mark>desire to disappear their own identity as settlers necessitates</mark> the <strong><mark>suppression</mark> of both desires</u></strong>, <u><mark>if the subject's reliance on settler</mark> colonial <mark>power</mark> structure <mark>is to be <strong>psychically naturalized</strong></mark>. </u>Settlers’ reactions to indigenous peoples fit, almost universally, with the two ego defense responses that Sigmund Freud observed. The first of these defenses is to attempt a complete conversion of the suppressed desire into a new idea. In settler colonial contexts, <u><mark>this requires <strong>averting attention from the violence of dispossession</strong></mark>; as such, <mark>settlers</mark> often <mark>suggest that they</mark> aim to <strong><mark>create a ‘city on the hill’</mark>.</u></strong>70 Freud noted that the conversion defense mechanism does suppress the anxiety-inducing desire, but it also leads to ‘periodic hysterical outbursts'. Such is the case when settlers’ utopic visions are forced to confront the reality that the gentile community they imagine is founded in and perpetuates irredeemable suffering. A second type of defense is to channel the original desire's energy into an obsession or a phobia. The effects of this defense are seen in the preoccupation that settler colonialism has with purity of blood or of community.71 As we have already seen, <u><mark>this</mark> obsession at once <mark>solidifies the power of the</mark> settler <mark>state, thereby naturalizing the settler and</u></mark> simultaneously perpetuating the processes of <u><mark>erasing indigenous peoples</u></mark>. Psychic defenses are intended to secure the subject from pain, and whether that pain originates inside or outside the psyche is inconsequential. <u>Because of the threat that indigeneity presents to the phantasmatic wholeness of settler colonialism, settlers must always remain</u> suspended in a state of arrested development between these <u>defensive</u> positions. Despite any pretensions to the contrary, the settler is necessarily a parochial subject who continuously coils, reacts, disavows, and lashes out, when confronted with his dependency on indigenous peoples and their territory. This psychic precarity exists at the core of the settler subject because of the unending fear of its own dissolution, should indigenous sovereignty be recognized.72 Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that <u><strong><mark>decolonization must include an analysis of the</mark> dominant ‘self-disciplining <mark>colonial subject</mark>’</u></strong>.73 However, as <u><mark>this discussion</u></mark> of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies <u><mark>must</mark> also examine and <mark>cultivate the </mark>ways in which settler subjects <strong>fail to be totally disciplined</strong>. Evidence of this <strong>incompletion</strong> is apparent in the</u> subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the <u><strong><mark>instability at the core of the settler subject</u></strong></mark>, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from <u>Rifkin's</u>. His <u>phenomenology falls into the trap</u> that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that <u>of assuming a successful internalization of norms</u>. From <u>the psychoanalytical perspective</u>, the ‘unconscious constantly <u>reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.</u>74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. <u>Thus, <mark>the process of <strong>subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized</u></strong></mark> as others might suggest.75 Because of <u><mark>this precarity</u></mark>, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also <u><mark>provides an avenue by which</mark> the process of <mark>settler colonialism can be <strong>subverted</strong> – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider</mark>. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to</u> pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to <u><strong>decenter settler mythologies</strong> built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples</u>.76 <u><mark>The cultivation of these cracks is a <strong>necessary part of decolonizing work</strong>, as it continues to <strong>panic and</mark> thus to <mark>destabilize settler subjects.</mark> </strong><mark>Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments</u></mark> like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 <u><mark>it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices</u></mark>, presences, <u><mark>and <strong>speech acts</u></strong></mark>. Goeman correctly observes that <u><mark>the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’</mark> are what <strong><mark>give settler spaces their meaning</strong></mark>, as they provide a degree of naturalness to the settler</u> imago and its <u>psychic investments</u>.78 As such, <u><mark>to <strong>disrupt the ease of these repetitions</strong> is</mark> at once to <strong>striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism</strong> and also <mark>to <strong>disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject</strong></mark>.</u> <u>Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance',</u> which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts <u>panic</u> the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This <u>reveals to the settler</u>, if only fleetingly, <u>the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. <mark>While such practices may not overthrow the</mark> settler colonial <mark>system, they do <strong>subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples</mark> who refuse erasure.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Couttenier et. al ‘13 fulltext: Couttenier, Mathieu, et al. The Wild West Is Wild: The Homicide Resource Curse. †University of Lausanne, University of New South Wales and Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Dec. 2013, www.aeaweb.org/conference/2014/retrieve.php?pdfid=298. Lindale PP Why is the homicide rate in the United States more than four times higher than in Western Europe or other neo-Europes, such as Australia?1 Elias (1994)’s civilizing process roots the decline in homicide in the development of a Weberian state, which enforces agreed settlements and monopolizes violence, making violence both superfluous and ineffective. 2 In sharp contrast with this view, Anderson and Hill (1979, 2004) argue that self-interest suffices to sustain a peaceful order, even in anarchy. In the “Not So Wild Wild West”, they argue that the private enforcement of property rights in the West of the United States in the 19th century provides just the demonstration. A closer look at the evidence in this study reveals that while a private order of property rights order there was, peace there was not. The circumstances of mineral discoveries in the United States provide the ideal natural experiment to examine the relationship between state development and interpersonal violence. Mineral discoveries generally occurred after the state was established, but they preceded the state in more than a third of cases. Incorporation of large swathes of territory in the West occurred at the same time as an intense mineral rush, but for independent, geopolitical reasons according to Davis (1972). Motivated by the fact that in the United States, contrary to most countries, individuals own mineral rights, private prospectors flocked the country, irrespective of whether the state was already in place or not.3 It is therefore not farfetched to assume that mineral discovery was independent of the precise timing of state development in the very place of discovery. We take advantage of the respective timings of state development and mineral discovery in order to test the civilizing process hypothesis. We track more than 4,500 mineral discoveries across counties and time, and we match discoveries with historical county formation from the Atlas of Historical County Boundaries. Our measure of state development consists of the territorial status of the place of discovery: colony or state, in which case we consider that discovery postdates the establishment of the state; territory or unorganized land, in which case we consider that the discovery predates the state. We regress measures of crime today on the presence of minerals and on our measure of whether formal state institutions were in place at the time of the discovery. Our analysis is at the county level and controls for state fixed effects throughout. We also study the historical relationship between violence and mineral discovery. Our results give unambiguous support to the civilizing process. Counties that experienced mineral discoveries before the state was established exhibit higher levels of homicide and assaults, to this day. Mineral discoveries are associated with about 200 additional assaults and murders per 100, 000 people in 2000 in these early mining counties – a 40% increase at the mean. By contrast, no effect is observed if discoveries occurred after the state was established. Our first difference approach rules out that our results are due to differences between mining and non mining areas. However, early and late mining counties may differ along characteristics that also affect crime, thereby jeopardizing our identification strategy. A particular concern is that late mining counties simply have older institutions and older institutions are associated with less crime. To address this concern, we control for the initial date of county creation as well as hisrorical population density, which was the main driver of county incorporation. We control for numerous other historical and contemporary county characteristics that may affect crime, such as income, education, ethnic fragmentation, population density, and the presence of women. Early and late mining counties do not differ from one another along any of these characteristics. In addition, the inclusion of state fixed effects remove the influence of any unobserved heterogeneity across states related to mineral discovery and to state incorporation. In robustness tests, we restrict our attention to discoveries that occur within 5 or 10 year windows of each other and avoid comparing older and more recent discoveries. We also restrict our analysis to counties within arbitrarily defined geographic areas, as well as to neighboring counties only. Moreover, even if the timing of incorporation was endogenous, this should work against our main result, as the state should be more likely to develop in resource-rich areas. Another potential concern is that territorial status may reflect not only political but also economic and social development of a county. The robustness to the inclusion of a battery of historical economic and social development indicators described above alleviates this concern. One last concern is that miners were negatively selected. To threaten our identification, miners should have been able to self select on the basis of the precise timing of the first discovery relative to state incorporation, within a given state. This seems farfetched in the context of the mineral rush that was taking place. Moreover, according to Clay and Jones (2008), miners were positively selected; they more educated and more likely to be white collar workers compared with the rest of the population. We next turn to the mechanisms that underlie the persistence of violence, more than a hundred years after the state was established in most places. Violence and intimidation that are effective in early mining counties enable the violent party to accumulate rents. Rents then provide the incentives and the financial means to corrupt and shape the nascent political institutions .4 . We find direct evidence that the persistence of our homicide resource curse is partly explained by a political resource curse, namely by enduring lower quality of judicial institutions. Relying on Epstein et al. (2001)’s state panel of judicial quality indicators since the mid 19th century, we find that in states that were fully incorporated only after some minerals had been discovered, discoveries are associated, yearly, with a to reduction in between 2% and 5% decrease in various indicators of the independence of state judges. To the best of our knowledge, our findings document for the first time the existence of a homicide resource curse, which, like the other resource curses, is conditional on the quality of initial institutions. To our motivating question, we offer an answer that consists of a combination of the tardiness of the civilizing process in the United States compared to Europe, and of the shock due to natural resource discovery, which, as we show, further delayed the civilizing process.5 However, only violent crime as opposed to property crime is affected, historically and today. A private order of property rights did emerge even in the absence of the state, as documented in Anderson and Hill (1979, 2004) but also in Clay and Wright (2005). However, in the absence of third party enforcement, the security of property rights was enforced by high levels of interpersonal violence. The first contribution of the paper is to the literature on the resource curse and on how initial endowments shape institutions in the long run (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2002 and Rajan and Zingales 2006). How natural resources affect development outcomes depends on the quality of institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006), and resources have further deleterious effects on institutional quality (Brollo et al. 2013).6,7 A sizeable literature also finds a positive relationship between natural resources, in particular oil, and civil conflict (see Ross 2006 for a partial review). We focus on privately rather than publicly owned resources and interpersonal rather than political violence. The most closely related paper is Buonanno et al. (2012), which shows that a resource windfall in the context of weak formal property right gave rise to the Sicilian mafia. Our work differs from theirs in two ways. First, we abstract from the organizational form that may have substituted for formal, state-based property rights enforcement. Second, and more importantly, we also study the counterfactual situation in which the resource windfall occurs in the presence of strong formal institutions. Our contribution to the literature on interpersonal violence is two-fold. We consider a rather encompassing definition of formal enforcement – whether there is state at all –, and confirm prior evidence that enforcement deters crime and particularly violent crime (Levitt 1997, Kessler and Levitt 1999, and Draca et al. 2011). Our interpretation is that the security of property rights is ensured even in the absence of the state, but by high levels of interpersonal violence. The second contribution is to highlight the importance of reputation as a driver of violence. We review the theoretical background on this in Section 2. A related paper is Grosjean (2013), which finds that the culture of violence among 18th century Scots-Irish immigrants only persisted in areas of the United States where the formal rule of law was weak. The underlying assumption is that this group was prone to violence because it came from lawless areas and relied on easily stolen resources (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). This paper precisely demonstrates how the combination of weak formal institutions and easily appropriable resources spurs violence in the first place.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>This state combats <u>infinite violence</u> from the state of nature – empirically proven </h4><p>Couttenier et. al ‘13</p><p><u><strong>Couttenier, Mathieu, et al. The Wild West Is Wild: The Homicide Resource Curse. †University of Lausanne, University of New South Wales and Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Dec. 2013, www.aeaweb.org/conference/2014/retrieve.php?pdfid=298. Lindale PP </p><p></u></strong>Why is the homicide rate in the United States more than four times higher than in Western Europe or other neo-Europes, such as Australia?1 Elias (1994)’s civilizing process roots the decline in homicide in the development of a Weberian state, which enforces agreed settlements and monopolizes violence, making violence both superfluous and ineffective. 2 In sharp contrast with this view, Anderson and Hill (1979, 2004) argue that self-interest suffices to sustain a peaceful order, even in anarchy. In the “Not So Wild Wild West”, they argue that the private enforcement of property rights in the West of the United States in the 19th century provides just the demonstration. A closer look at the evidence in this study reveals that while a private order of property rights order there was, peace there was not. <u><strong>The circumstances of <mark>mineral discoveries</mark> in the United States <mark>provide the ideal</mark> natural <mark>experiment to</mark> <mark>examine</mark> the relationship between <mark>state development and</mark> interpersonal <mark>violence</mark>.</u></strong> Mineral discoveries generally occurred after the state was established, but they preceded the state in more than a third of cases. Incorporation of large swathes of territory in the West occurred at the same time as an intense mineral rush, but for independent, geopolitical reasons according to Davis (1972). Motivated by the fact that in the United States, contrary to most countries, individuals own mineral rights, private prospectors flocked the country, irrespective of whether the state was already in place or not.3 It is therefore not farfetched to assume that mineral discovery was independent of the precise timing of state development in the very place of discovery. We take advantage of the respective timings of state development and mineral discovery in order to test the civilizing process hypothesis.<u><strong> <mark>We track more than 4,500 mineral discoveries</mark> across counties and time, <mark>and</mark> we <mark>match</mark> discoveries with historical county <mark>formation from</mark> the Atlas of Historical <mark>County Boundaries</mark>. </u></strong>Our measure of state development consists of the territorial status of the place of discovery: colony or state, in which case we consider that discovery postdates the establishment of the state; territory or unorganized land, in which case we consider that the discovery predates the state. We regress measures of crime today on the presence of minerals and on our measure of whether formal state institutions were in place at the time of the discovery. <u><strong>Our analysis is at the county level and controls for state fixed effects throughout. </u></strong>We also study the historical relationship between violence and mineral discovery. <u><strong><mark>Our results give unambiguous support to the civilizing process. Counties that experienced mineral discoveries before the state</mark> was established <mark>exhibit higher </mark>levels of <mark>homicide and assaults</mark>, to this day. Mineral discoveries are associated with about 200 additional assaults and murders per 100, 000 people in 2000 in these early mining counties <mark>– a 40% increase </mark>at the mean. By contrast, <mark>no effect is observed </mark>if discoveries occurred <mark>after the state </mark>was established. </u></strong>Our first difference approach rules out that our results are due to differences between mining and non mining areas. However, early and late mining counties may differ along characteristics that also affect crime, thereby jeopardizing our identification strategy. A particular concern is that late mining counties simply have older institutions and older institutions are associated with less crime. To address this concern, we control for the initial date of county creation as well as hisrorical population density, which was the main driver of county incorporation. We control for numerous other historical and contemporary county characteristics that may affect crime, such as income, education, ethnic fragmentation, population density, and the presence of women. Early and late mining counties do not differ from one another along any of these characteristics. In addition, the inclusion of state fixed effects remove the influence of any unobserved heterogeneity across states related to mineral discovery and to state incorporation. In robustness tests, we restrict our attention to discoveries that occur within 5 or 10 year windows of each other and avoid comparing older and more recent discoveries. We also restrict our analysis to counties within arbitrarily defined geographic areas, as well as to neighboring counties only. Moreover, even if the timing of incorporation was endogenous, this should work against our main result, as the state should be more likely to develop in resource-rich areas. Another potential concern is that territorial status may reflect not only political but also economic and social development of a county. The robustness to the inclusion of a battery of historical economic and social development indicators described above alleviates this concern. One last concern is that miners were negatively selected. To threaten our identification, miners should have been able to self select on the basis of the precise timing of the first discovery relative to state incorporation, within a given state. This seems farfetched in the context of the mineral rush that was taking place. Moreover, according to Clay and Jones (2008), miners were positively selected; they more educated and more likely to be white collar workers compared with the rest of the population. We next turn to the mechanisms that underlie the persistence of violence, more than a hundred years after the state was established in most places. Violence and intimidation that are effective in early mining counties enable the violent party to accumulate rents. Rents then provide the incentives and the financial means to corrupt and shape the nascent political institutions .4 . We find direct evidence that the persistence of our homicide resource curse is partly explained by a political resource curse, namely by enduring lower quality of judicial institutions. Relying on Epstein et al. (2001)’s state panel of judicial quality indicators since the mid 19th century, we find that in states that were fully incorporated only after some minerals had been discovered, discoveries are associated, yearly, with a to reduction in between 2% and 5% decrease in various indicators of the independence of state judges. <u><strong>To the best of our knowledge, <mark>our findings document</mark> for the first time the existence of <mark>a homicide</mark> resource <mark>curse</mark>, which, like the other resource curses, is <mark>conditional on the quality of</mark> initial <mark>institutions</mark>.</u></strong> To our motivating question, we offer an answer that consists of a combination of the tardiness of the civilizing process in the United States compared to Europe, and of the shock due to natural resource discovery, which, as we show, further delayed the civilizing process.5 However, only violent crime as opposed to property crime is affected, historically and today. A private order of property rights did emerge even in the absence of the state, as documented in Anderson and Hill (1979, 2004) but also in Clay and Wright (2005). <u><strong>However, <mark>in the absence of</mark> third party <mark>enforcement</mark>, the <mark>security</mark> of property rights <mark>was enforced by</mark> high levels of interpersonal <mark>violence</u></strong></mark>. The first contribution of the paper is to the literature on the resource curse and on how initial endowments shape institutions in the long run (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2002 and Rajan and Zingales 2006). How natural resources affect development outcomes depends on the quality of institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006), and resources have further deleterious effects on institutional quality (Brollo et al. 2013).6,7 A sizeable literature also finds a positive relationship between natural resources, in particular oil, and civil conflict (see Ross 2006 for a partial review). We focus on privately rather than publicly owned resources and interpersonal rather than political violence. The most closely related paper is Buonanno et al. (2012), which shows that a resource windfall in the context of weak formal property right gave rise to the Sicilian mafia. Our work differs from theirs in two ways. First, we abstract from the organizational form that may have substituted for formal, state-based property rights enforcement. Second, and more importantly, we also study the counterfactual situation in which the resource windfall occurs in the presence of strong formal institutions. Our contribution to the literature on interpersonal violence is two-fold. We consider a rather encompassing definition of formal enforcement – whether there is state at all –, and confirm prior evidence that enforcement deters crime and particularly violent crime (Levitt 1997, Kessler and Levitt 1999, and Draca et al. 2011). Our interpretation is that the security of property rights is ensured even in the absence of the state, but by high levels of interpersonal violence. The second contribution is to highlight the importance of reputation as a driver of violence. We review the theoretical background on this in Section 2.<u><strong> A related paper is Grosjean (2013), which finds that the culture of <mark>violence</mark> among 18th century Scots-Irish immigrants <mark>only persisted in areas</mark> of the United States <mark>where</mark> <mark>the</mark> formal rule of <mark>law was weak</mark>. The underlying assumption is that this group was prone to violence because it came from lawless areas and relied on easily stolen resources</u></strong> (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). <u><strong>This paper precisely demonstrates how the combination of <mark>weak</mark> formal <mark>institutions</mark> and easily appropriable resources <mark>spurs violence in the first place.</p></u></strong></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Mollow 15 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015. Anna Mollow received her Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, where she was an Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar and a UC Dissertation-Year Fellow. She is the coeditor, with Robert McRuer, of Sex and Disability (Duke UP, 2012) and the coeditor, with Merri Lisa Johnson, of DSM-CRIP (Social Text Online, 2013). Anna has published numerous articles on disability, queerness, feminism, race, and fatness. Her essays have appeared, or are forthcoming, in African American Review, Body Politics: Zeitschrift für Körpergeschichte, Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, The Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States, The Disability Studies Reader, Michigan Quarterly Review, the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Critical and Cultural Theory, Disability Studies Quarterly, Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Culture, Autostraddle, Everyday Feminism, and Huffington Post. // WHSRS and Lex VM] fulltext: Tropes of disability are also present in what Edelman reads as Jean Baudrillard‟s “panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation,” in which sex is described as devolving into a “useless function” and humans are distinguished (unsuccessfully, Edelman argues) from “the order of the virus” (qtd. in Edelman 64, 62).111 Edelman‟s apt reading of these remarks by Baudrillard in relation to what was once called “the gay plague,” as well as his own plays on the word “bent,” suggest that it can be difficult, in homophobic and ableist culture, to distinguish between queerness and disability (62, 90).112 Anti-queer religious leaders, Edelman notes, characterize queer sexualities as “unhealthy” and “ugly,” and “ministries of hope” offer cures to those who have “grown sick-to-death of being queer” (91, 47). 113 Against the “pathology” or “social disease” as which queerness is diagnosed, queer-baiting of children, Edelman argues, functions as a form of “antigay immunization,” while the narrative of A Christmas Carol serves as an annual “booster shot” (143, 19, 49). These repetitive references to disability suggest that not only queerness but also disability might be a fitting name for what Edelman, alluding to the death drive, calls “the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order” (25). Indeed, disability metaphors are often the closest approximations that Edelman can find for the “unnameable” death drive (25). The terms that Edelman uses to describe the death drive include “wound,” “fracture,” “stupid enjoyment,” “mindless violence,” “lifeless machinery,” “senseless compulsion,” “disfiguration,” and a “shutdown of life‟s vital machinery” (No Future 22; “Kid” 28; No Future 38, 23, 27, 38, 37, 44). Although these signifiers do not directly refer to specific impairments, they do, taken together, evoke the physical and mental injury and dysfunction as which disability is commonly understood. And then there is Edelman‟s term “sinthomosexuality,” a neologism formed by “grafting, at an awkward join,” the word “sexuality” onto Lacan‟s term “sinthome.” With its “awkward” “grafting,” the word “sinthomosexuality” embodies disability at the level of the letter.114 Etymologically, too, Edelman‟s term harkens back to disability: “sinthome” is an archaic way of spelling the French word for “symptom” (qtd. in Edelman 33). The root meaning of “sinthomosexuality,” then, is something like “symptom-sexuality.” However, Lacan‟s “sinthome” means more than simply “symptom”: it refers, Edelman explains, to “the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real” (35). The sinthome is the only means by which the subject can access the Symbolic order of meaning production; but paradoxically, because each subject‟s sinthome is arbitrary and meaningless (as individual as a fingerprint), the sinthome also threatens the Symbolic order to which it provides access (36). Both this access and this threat are figured as disability. In order to be constituted as a subject and to take one‟s place within the Symbolic order, one must be metaphorically blind: the cost of subjectivity is “blindness to this determination by the sinthome,” “blindness to the arbitrary fixation of enjoyment responsible for [the subject‟s] consistency,” “blindness” to the functioning of the sinthome (Edelman 36, 38). The alternative to subjectivity as disability would be, according to remarks that Edelman attributes to Lacan, “radical psychotic autism” (qtd. in Edelman 37).115 That is, whatever might alleviate our constitutive “blindness” by exposing “the sinthome as meaningless knot” must effect a “disfiguration” (Edelman 38), the consequences of which would be “pure autism” (Žižek 81, qtd. in Edelman 38). On the one side, blindness; on the other, disfiguration, psychosis, autism: when it comes to recognizing the senselessness of one‟s sinthome, it seems we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t. This is why I have proposed that the “death drive”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identity- shattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that makes that disabling turn, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “disability is everywhere,...once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a familiar cultural fantasy: cure ‟em (as Dickens might hope) or kill ‟em (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by 72 Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text? A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema. Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? At first glance, the answer to the latter question might seem to be “everyone.” Certainly, multitudes of moviegoers appear to enjoy our culture‟s annual recitations of Tiny Tim‟s pity inducing tale. If it can be fun to perform pity, perhaps this is because pity gives a boost to the ego of the pitying person. “You are broken, and I am whole,” the pitier says to the one who is pitied. “I look down on you because you suffer.” Naturally, disabled people resist performing this service for the nondisabled. “Spare us your pity,” we say, because pity is felt to be demeaning. 73 Yet an incoherence structures this familiar account of pity: if pity fortifies the ego of the subject who feels it, then why do people so often resist feeling pity? Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won‟t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim. It‟s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity. Edelman argues that compassion (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) is fundamentally narcissistic (73). When we call ourselves compassionate, we think we‟re feeling for the other; but, Edelman contends, we‟re really only feeling for ourselves (83). That is, compassion involves projecting one‟s own ego onto the object of one‟s compassion. In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive – cementing an order of <u>signification</u> that relies upon ableist value systems.</h4><p><strong>Mollow 15</strong> [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015. Anna Mollow received her Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, where she was an Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar and a UC Dissertation-Year Fellow. She is the coeditor, with Robert McRuer, of Sex and Disability (Duke UP, 2012) and the coeditor, with Merri Lisa Johnson, of DSM-CRIP (Social Text Online, 2013). Anna has published numerous articles on disability, queerness, feminism, race, and fatness. Her essays have appeared, or are forthcoming, in African American Review, Body Politics: Zeitschrift für Körpergeschichte, Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, The Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States, The Disability Studies Reader, Michigan Quarterly Review, the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Critical and Cultural Theory, Disability Studies Quarterly, Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Culture, Autostraddle, Everyday Feminism, and Huffington Post. // WHSRS and Lex VM]</p><p>Tropes of disability are also present in what Edelman reads as Jean Baudrillard‟s “panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation,” in which sex is described as devolving into a “useless function” and humans are distinguished (unsuccessfully, Edelman argues) from “the order of the virus” (qtd. in Edelman 64, 62).111 Edelman‟s apt reading of these remarks by Baudrillard in relation to what was once called “the gay plague,” as well as his own plays on the word “bent,” suggest that it can be difficult, in homophobic and ableist culture, to distinguish between queerness and disability (62, 90).112 Anti-queer religious leaders, Edelman notes, characterize queer sexualities as “unhealthy” and “ugly,” and “ministries of hope” offer cures to those who have “grown sick-to-death of being queer” (91, 47). 113 Against the “pathology” or “social disease” as which queerness is diagnosed, queer-baiting of children, Edelman argues, functions as a form of “antigay immunization,” while the narrative of A Christmas Carol serves as an annual “booster shot” (143, 19, 49). These repetitive references to disability suggest that not only queerness but also <u><mark>disability</mark> might be a <mark>fitting</mark> name <mark>for</mark> what Edelman, alluding to the death drive, calls <mark>“the remainder of the <strong>Real internal to the Symbolic order</strong>”</mark> (25). Indeed, disability metaphors are often the closest approximations that Edelman can find for the “unnameable” death drive (25). The terms that Edelman uses to describe the death drive include “wound,” “fracture,” “stupid enjoyment,” “mindless violence,” “lifeless machinery,” “senseless compulsion,” “<strong>disfiguration</u></strong>,” and a “shutdown of life‟s vital machinery” (No Future 22; “Kid” 28; No Future 38, 23, 27, 38, 37, 44). Although <u>these <mark>signifiers</mark> do not directly refer to specific impairments, they do, taken together, <mark>evoke</mark> the physical and mental injury and dysfunction as which <mark>disability</u></mark> is commonly understood. And then there is Edelman‟s term “sinthomosexuality,” a neologism formed by “grafting, at an awkward join,” the word “sexuality” onto Lacan‟s term “sinthome.” With its “awkward” “grafting,” the word <u><strong>“sinthomosexuality” embodies disability</u></strong> at the level of the letter.114 Etymologically, too, Edelman‟s term harkens back to disability: “sinthome” is an archaic way of spelling the French word for “symptom” (qtd. in Edelman 33). The root meaning of “sinthomosexuality,” then, is something like “symptom-sexuality.” However, Lacan‟s “sinthome” means more than simply “symptom”: <u>it refers, Edelman explains, to “<strong>the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real</strong>” (35). <mark>The sinthome</mark> is the only means by which the subject <mark>can access the Symbolic</mark> order of meaning production; <mark>but</mark> paradoxically, <mark>because each</mark> subject‟s sinthome <mark>is</mark> arbitrary and meaningless (as <mark>individual</mark> as a fingerprint), the sinthome <mark>also threatens</mark> the Symbolic order to which <mark>it</mark> provides access (36). Both this access and this threat are figured as disability. In order <mark>to be constituted as a subject</u></mark> and to take one‟s place within the Symbolic order, <u><mark>one must be</mark> metaphorically <mark>blind</mark>: the cost of subjectivity is “blindness <mark>to</mark> this determination by the sinthome,” “blindness to <mark>the</mark> arbitrary <strong><mark>fixation of enjoyment</u></strong></mark> responsible for [the subject‟s] consistency,” “blindness” <u><mark>to</mark> the functioning of the sinthome (Edelman 36, 38). The alternative to subjectivity as disability would be, according to remarks that Edelman attributes to Lacan, “radical psychotic autism” (qtd. in Edelman 37).115 That is, whatever might <strong><mark>alleviate</mark> our constitutive <mark>“blindness”</strong></mark> by exposing “the sinthome as meaningless knot” <mark>must effect</mark> a “<strong>disfiguration</u></strong>” (Edelman 38), the <u>consequences of which would be</u> “pure autism” (Žižek 81, qtd. in Edelman 38). <u><strong>On the one side, blindness; on the other, disfiguration, <mark>psychosis</mark>, autism</u></strong>: <u><strong>when</strong> it comes to recognizing the senselessness of one‟s sinthome, it seems <strong><mark>we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t.</u></strong></mark> This is why I have proposed that <u><mark>the “death drive”</mark>—a force that <mark>has less to do with</mark> literal <mark>death than</mark> with a strange persistence of life in death, or of <mark>death in life</mark> (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of <mark>which disability is</mark> often <mark>supposed to consist</u></mark>)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as <u>“<mark>nondisabled</mark>” must <mark>know</u></mark> that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that <u>a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or <mark>a</mark> precedent-setting legal <mark>decision could change our status</u></mark> in ways over <u>which we have no control whatsoever.</u> If it is obvious why most <u>nondisabled people resist this</u> line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of <u>this resistance</u> be <u>attributable to <mark>a fear that</u></mark>, in the car crash or other identity- shattering event, it might be <u><mark>the driver</mark>‟s own hand that <mark>makes that disabling turn</u></mark>, that is, that the driver might be <u>driven by an impulse</u>, unwanted and <u>unconscious</u>, toward something <u>beyond the principles of</u> pleasure and <u>health</u>? Applying the name <u>“<mark>the</mark> disability <mark>drive</mark>” to this “beyond” <mark>affords insight into</mark> the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “<strong><mark>sources of fear and fascination</mark> for able-bodied people</strong>,</u> who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “disability is everywhere,...once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: <u><strong><mark>this</mark> ego-undoing psychic force <mark>shapes</mark> the <mark>subjectivities</u></strong></mark> of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a familiar cultural fantasy: cure ‟em (as Dickens might hope) or kill ‟em (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by 72 Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text? A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema. Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? At first glance, the answer to the latter question might seem to be “everyone.” Certainly, multitudes of moviegoers appear to enjoy our culture‟s annual recitations of Tiny Tim‟s pity inducing tale. If it can be fun to perform pity, perhaps this is because pity gives a boost to the ego of the pitying person. “<u><strong><mark>You are broken, and I am whole</strong></mark>,” the pitier says to the one who is pitied. <strong>“I look down on you <mark>because you suffer</mark>.</u></strong>” Naturally, disabled people resist performing this service for the nondisabled. “Spare us your pity,” we say, because pity is felt to be demeaning. 73 Yet an incoherence structures this familiar account of pity: if pity fortifies the ego of the subject who feels it, then why do people so often resist feeling pity? Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won‟t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim. It‟s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity. Edelman argues that <u><strong><mark>compassion</strong></mark> (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) <strong><mark>is</mark> fundamentally <mark>narcissistic</strong></mark> (73). When <mark>we</mark> call ourselves compassionate, we <mark>think we‟re feeling for the other; but</mark>, Edelman contends, we‟re really <mark>only</mark> feeling <mark>for ourselves</mark> (83). That is, compassion involves <strong><mark>projecting one‟s own ego onto the object</mark> </strong>of one‟s compassion.</u> In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Cheeseman & Bruce 1996 (Graeme, Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales, and Robert, Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin university, “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers”, p. 5-8, MT) fulltext: This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The alternative is to vote negative – interrogating justifications and rejecting security is key to successful policies</h4><p>Cheeseman & Bruce 1996 (Graeme, Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales, and Robert, Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin university, “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers”, p. 5-8, MT)</p><p>This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. <u>The inability to give meaning</u> to global changes <u>reflects</u> partly <u>the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts</u>, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that <u><strong>debate will be furthered only through a</u></strong> long overdue <u><strong>critical re-evaluation</u></strong> of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. <u>This is not a </u>conventional <u>policy </u>book; <u><strong>nor should it be,</strong> in the sense of offering </u>policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of <u>neat </u>alternative <u>solutions, in familiar </u>language and <u>format</u>, to problems they pose. <u>This expectation <strong>is</strong> in itself <strong>a considerable part of the problem</u></strong> to be analysed. <u>It is</u>, however, a book <u>about policy</u>, one <u>that questions <strong>how problems are framed</strong> by policy-makers</u>. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how <u>security policy </u>is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that <u>needs to be problematised</u>. <u>If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it.</u> <u><strong>Before</strong> engaging in the <strong>policy debate</strong> the <strong>critics need to reframe the</strong> </u>basic<u> <strong>terms of reference</u></strong>. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 <u>The demand,</u> tacit or otherwise, <u>that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion </u>and analysis <u>ignores a <strong>three thousand year old tradition</u></strong> commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly <u><strong>integral</strong> to </u>the Western tradition of <u>democratic<strong> </strong>dialogue</u>. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good <u>society must</u> have within it <u>some way of critically assessing its knowledge </u>and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how <u>theory is <strong>integral</strong> to </u>the practice of security analysis and <u>policy prescription</u>. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that <u>terms and concepts </u>– state <u>sovereignty</u>, <u>balance of power, </u>security, <u>and so on – are </u>contested and <u>problematic</u>, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. <u>Critical analysis which shows how particular </u>kinds of <u>theoretical presumptions can </u>effectively <u><strong>exclude vital areas of political life</u></strong> from analysis <u>has <strong>direct practical implications</strong> for policy-makers</u>, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to <u>alternative theoretical possibilities</u> which <u>might <strong>better serve</u></strong> an Australian community pursuing <u>security and prosperity</u> in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, <u>attention</u> needs <u>to</u> be paid to the <u>words and the</u> <u>thought processes</u> of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) <u>is a <strong>necessary prelude</strong> to a </u>genuine<u> search for alternative policies. <strong>First </strong>comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, <strong>then </strong>specific policies may follow.</u> As Jim George argues in the following chapter, <u><strong>we need to look not so much at contending policies</u></strong> as they are made for us <u>but at <strong>challenging ‘the discursive process</strong> which gives</u> [favoured <u>interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and </u>which<u> direct</u> [Australia’s] <u>policy</u>/analytical/military <u>responses’</u>. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kelz, ‘19 – Rosine Kelz has a PhD in phil & a research associate for the Inst. Of Advanced Sust. Studies fulltext: (“Thinking about future/democracy: towards a political theory of futurity”, Sustainability x Springer, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11625-019-00697-6, Vol. 14 Issue 4, pp. 905-913, 07-2019, Accessed: 09-18-2021, Hari) recut Today, representative politics are often perceived as being primarily concerned with short-term goals. Moreover, the future appears to be pre-determined by economic or technological necessities. This ‘closing’ of the future, however, becomes increasingly problematic in the face of global existential crises, such as environmental depletion and climate change. These catastrophic developments could only be mitigated by immediate, decisive political interventions, which would amount to systemic changes that redirect technological research and economic activities. This article seeks to outline how political theory and philosophy can contribute to “(re-)Politicizing the Future”. I argue that political thought should take temporality, and in particular futurity, as a central conceptual and methodological concern. Drawing on the works of prominent twentieth century thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Stanley Cavell, and Jacques Derrida, I want to develop a deepened analytical understanding of the possibility for a ‘future directed’ political thought which highlights intrinsic connections between sustainability and democracy. Introduction Politics is concerned with the future—this seems to be too obvious to need stating. Whether in debates about the building of a new road, the overhaul of national pension systems, or the forging of transnational agreements on climate change mitigation, all these disparate forms of political decision-making carry implicit or explicit visions of preferable futures. For many, however, this truism sounds increasingly hollow. It appears as if representative politics in contemporary liberal-capitalist countries is concerned primarily with short-term goals. Even social movements are often criticized for lacking positive visions of a future that would radically difer from the current status-quo. Western societies seem to have lost their abilities to imagine utopian futures (Habermas 1985: 7). The disappearance of possible futures that would be profoundly diferent from the present has been propagated as both a political reality and a normative standpoint since at least the early 1980s, and is often linked to the rise of neoliberal forms of government (see, e.g., Fukuyama 1992; Séville 2017). From Margaret Thatcher’s famous proclamation that ‘There is no Alternative’ to current austerity reforms, the political future is presented as pre-determined by economic or technological necessities. This ‘closing’ of the future at frst sight would seem to be at odds with the obvious acceleration of late modern societies, where things appear to be in constant fux. However, while acceleration and rapid change are often regarded as hallmarks of modernity, these are highly uneven and aporetic processes. Some theorists argue that the acceleration of other parts of society leads to a ‘hyper-accelerated standstill’ or to ‘polar inertia’ in the political sphere (see, e.g., Rosa 2003: 17, 21). In the face of rapid movements and shifts in areas such as fnancial markets or scientifc research, representative democratic politics appears to have lost the ability to actively steer social developments. The need for future directed political action and thinking, however, becomes ever more pressing. From the extraction of fossil fuels and the use of nuclear power to genome editing—the use of contemporary technologies has consequences which stretch far into the future. At the same time, capacities for modeling and thus anticipating the possible efects of actions on a global scale have increased rapidly in the past decades. We are currently confronted with dystopian scenarios of environmental depletion and a rapidly changing climate, but current liberal democratic governments often seem to lack the political will to implement systemic changes that would make it possible to avoid the most disastrous pathways. Even though there is thus an obvious need to theorize how politics relates to the creation of future(s), current political theory often appears strangely uninterested in the temporal character of the political sphere. What is called for, then, is political thought that contributes to a project of actively (re-)politicizing societal and political notions of the future. As the ‘Politicizing the Future’ project members argue, this would involve a number of diverse practices which enable the proliferation of multiple alternative possible futures in the present. These practices are intrinsically linked to the pluralization and deepening of democratic processes. However, even though one explicit normative goal of this project is to ‘open up’ the realm of thinkable futures, not all visions of future are equally valued. The normative dimension also entails a notion of strong sustainability, allowing for future generations to exist in a world with a livable natural and just social environment. Thus, Politicizing the Future involves a ‘de-colonization’ of the future, where present people have to refrain from using up resources and creating ecological and socio-political issues that would disadvantage those who come after them (Knappe et al. 2018, this issue). The aim of this article is, therefore, twofold. First, I want to show that there are resources in political and moral thought to highlight the importance of temporality and futurity, which can be useful for current debates in sustainability studies. Second, this paper seeks to further explore the normative connections between futurity, democracy, and sustainability, which are proposed by the members of the ‘Politicizing the Future’ project. The notion of (political) contingency is an excellent starting point to explore the connections between a commitment to an open future and the concept of democracy. By political contingency, I mean the simple fact that even though the way a society is organized is not random, it could always be otherwise (Marchart 2010: 80). As political systems are created by overlapping processes, whose beginnings cannot be clearly determined and whose developments do not follow necessary pathways, contingency is a feature of any form of societal organization. However, many forms of rule disavow their own contingency. Often, they seek to afrm their own necessity and immutability by appealing to something outside of the realm of politics, as, for example, a doctrine of divine right, or the unyielding laws of the market. By contrast, the idea of democracy presupposes its own contingent political foundation. Making contingency explicit, in turn, allows for a continuous renegotiation of possible futures. Moreover, as I will discuss in Section I, affirming contingency entails a specifc relationship to the past—and to the role of history in understanding the present and the future—that enables us to learn from past events without understanding history as determining the future. Section II concentrates on the notion that the concept of democracy is closely linked to a particular understanding of futurity. A democratic commitment to an open future, in turn, also implies a commitment to at least a “thin” notion of sustainability. In Section III, the relationship between democracy and sustainability is explored further. I argue that while a societal turn to more sustainable social and economic practices would involve the willingness of individuals to make substantive changes in their daily lives, these commitments are political in nature. Instead of sliding into a neoliberal logic of individualized ‘sustainable consumption’, what is called for is an understanding of moral autonomy that involves a deepening of shared, democratic practices.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Prefer <u>sustainable political commitment</u>. The <u>existential</u> crisis of climate change necessitates a consideration of <u>temporality</u> and <u>futurity</u> – debates about <u>decisive</u> political interventions to fight for <u>decolonization</u> of the future should be your utmost priority. Structural claims that refuse contingency foreclose the possibility of <u>renegotiating relationships</u> and <u>opening up</u> possible futures. </h4><p><strong>Kelz, ‘19</strong> – Rosine Kelz has a PhD in phil & a research associate for the Inst. Of Advanced Sust. Studies</p><p>(“Thinking about future/democracy: towards a political theory of futurity”, Sustainability x Springer, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11625-019-00697-6, Vol. 14 Issue 4, pp. 905-913, 07-2019, Accessed: 09-18-2021, Hari) recut</p><p>Today, <u>representative politics</u> <u>are</u> often <u>perceived as being</u> primarily <u>concerned with</u> <u><strong>short-term goals</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><mark>the future appears to be pre-determined</u> <u>by</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>economic</mark> or technological <mark>necessities</u></strong>. <u>This</u> <u><strong>‘closing’</mark> of the future,</u></strong> <u>however</u>, <u><mark>becomes</u></mark> increasingly <u><strong><mark>problematic</u></strong> <u>in the face of</mark> <strong>global <mark>existential crises</u></strong>,</mark> <u>such as</u> <u><strong><mark>environmental depletion</u></strong> <u>and <strong>climate change</u></strong></mark>. <u>These catastrophic developments</u> <u><mark>could</u> <u>only be mitigated by</u> <u><strong>immediate, decisive political</mark> <mark>interventions</u></strong></mark>, <u>which</u> <u>would amount to systemic changes</u> <u>that</u> <u><strong>redirect technological research</u></strong> <u>and economic activities</u>. This article seeks to outline how political theory and philosophy can contribute to “(re-)Politicizing the Future”. I argue that <u><mark>political thought should <strong>take temporality</u></strong>, <u>and</u></mark> in particular <u><strong><mark>futurity</u></strong>, <u>as a</u> <u><strong>central conceptual and</mark> <mark>methodological concern</u></strong>.</mark> <u>Drawing on</u> the works of prominent twentieth century thinkers such as Hannah <u>Arendt</u>, Stanley <u>Cavell</u>, <u>and</u> Jacques <u>Derrida</u>, <u>I want to develop a</u> <u><strong>deepened analytical understanding</u></strong> <u>of the possibility for a <strong>‘future directed’ political thought</u></strong> <u>which highlights</u> <u>intrinsic connections between</u> <u><strong>sustainability and democracy</u></strong>. Introduction Politics is concerned with the future—this seems to be too obvious to need stating. Whether <u>in debates</u> <u>about</u> <u>the building of a <strong>new road</u></strong>, the overhaul of national pension systems, or <u><mark>the forging of <strong>transnational agreements</u></strong> <u>on</u> <u><strong>climate change mitigation</u></strong></mark>, <u>all</u> these <u>disparate forms of political decision-making carry implicit</u> <u>or explicit</u> <u>visions of preferable futures</u>. For many, however, this truism sounds increasingly hollow. It appears as if representative politics in contemporary liberal-capitalist countries is concerned primarily with short-term goals. Even <u><mark>social movements</u> <u>are</u></mark> <u><strong>often <mark>criticized</u></strong> <u>for</u> <u>lacking positive visions</mark> of a future</u> <u>that would</u> <u><strong>radically difer</u></strong> <u>from the current status-quo</u>. Western societies seem to have lost their abilities to imagine utopian futures (Habermas 1985: 7). <u>The</u> <u><strong>disappearance of possible futures</u></strong> that would be profoundly diferent from the present has been propagated as both a political reality and a normative standpoint since at least the early 1980s, <u>and is often linked to</u> <u>the rise of</u> <u><strong>neoliberal forms of government</u></strong> (see, e.g., <u>Fukuyama</u> 1992; <u>Séville</u> 2017). From Margaret <u>Thatcher’s <mark>famous</u> <u>proclamation that</u> <u><strong>‘There is no Alternative’ </strong>to current</mark> austerity <mark>reforms</u>, <u>the political future is presented as pre-determined</u> <u>by</u> <u>economic</mark> or technological <mark>necessities</u></mark>. <u>This</u> ‘<u>closing’</u> of the future at frst sight <u>would seem to be at odds with</u> <u>the</u> obvious <u><strong><mark>acceleration</u></strong></mark> <u>of late modern societies</u>, where <u>things appear to be in <strong>constant fux</u></strong>. However, <u>while acceleration and rapid change are</u> often <u>regarded as <mark>hallmarks</mark> of modernity</u>, <u>these <mark>are</u> <u><strong>highly uneven</mark> and aporetic processes</u></strong>. Some theorists argue that <u>the acceleration</u> <u>of</u> <u>other parts of society</u> <u>leads to</u> a ‘<u>hyper-accelerated standstill’</u> <u>or</u> to ‘<u>polar inertia’</u> <u><strong><mark>in the political sphere</u></strong></mark> (see, e.g., <u>Rosa</u> 2003: 17, 21). <u>In the face of rapid movements</u> <u>and shifts in</u> areas such as <u>fnancial markets or scientifc research</u>, <u>representative democratic politics</u> <u>appears to have lost the ability to actively steer social developments</u>. <u><mark>The need for</u> <u><strong>future directed political action and thinking</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><mark>becomes</u> <u><strong>ever more pressing</u></strong></mark>. <u>From the extraction of fossil fuels and the use of nuclear power to genome editing</u>—<u><mark>the use of</u> <u>contemporary technologies has</u> <u><strong>consequences</u></strong> <u>which stretch</u></mark> <u><strong>far <mark>into the future</u></strong></mark>. At the same time, <u>capacities for modeling and</u> thus <u>anticipating the possible efects of actions</u> on a global scale <u>have increased rapidly in the past decades</u>. <u><mark>We are</u></mark> currently <u><mark>confronted</u> <u>with</u> <u><strong>dystopian scenarios of environmental depletion</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> <u>a</u> <u><strong>rapidly changing climate</u></strong>, <u>but</u> current liberal democratic <u><mark>governments</u></mark> often seem to <u><mark>lack the political will</mark> to implement</u> <u>systemic changes</u> that would make it possible to avoid the most disastrous pathways. Even though <u>there is</u> thus <u>an</u> <u><strong>obvious need</u></strong> <u>to theorize how politics relates to the creation of future(s),</u> <u><mark>current political theory</u></mark> often <u><mark>appears</u></mark> <u><strong>strangely <mark>uninterested</u></strong> <u>in</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>temporal character of the political sphere</u></strong></mark>. What is called for, then, is <u><mark>political thought that</u> <u>contributes to</mark> a project of</u> actively <u><strong><mark>(re-)politicizing societal and</mark> <mark>political notions</u></strong></mark> <u>of the future</u>. As the ‘Politicizing the Future’ project members argue, <u>this would involve</u> a number of <u>diverse practices</u> <u>which</u> <u>enable the proliferation</u> <u>of</u> <u>multiple alternative possible</u> <u>futures in the present</u>. <u><mark>These practices are</u></mark> intrinsically <u><mark>linked to</mark> the <mark>pluralization and</u> <u>deepening of democratic processes</u></mark>. However, <u>even though one explicit</u> normative <u>goal of</u> this project is to <u>‘open up’ the realm of thinkable futures</u>, <u>not all visions of future are</u> <u>equally valued</u>. <u>The <mark>normative dimension</u></mark> <u>also</u> <u><mark>entails a notion</u> <u>of</u> <u><strong>strong sustainability</u></strong>, <u>allowing for <strong>future generations</u></strong> <u>to exist in a world with</u> <u>a</u> <u><strong>livable natural</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>just social environment</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>Politicizing the Future</u></strong> <u>involves</u></mark> a <u><strong><mark>‘de-colonization’ of the future</u></strong></mark>, <u>where</u> <u><mark>present people</mark> have to <mark>refrain from using up</mark> <mark>resources</u> <u>and</u> <u>creating</u> <u><strong>ecological</mark> and socio-political <mark>issues</u></strong> <u>that would disadvantage those who come after them</u></mark> (Knappe et al. 2018, this issue). The aim of this article is, therefore, twofold. First, I want to show that <u>there are resources in</u> <u><strong>political and moral thought </strong>to highlight the importance of</u> <u><strong>temporality and futurity</u></strong>, <u>which can be <strong>useful for current debates</u></strong> <u>in sustainability</u> <u>studies</u>. Second, <u>this paper seeks to further explore the normative connections between</u> <u><strong>futurity</u></strong>, <u><strong>democracy</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>sustainability</u></strong>, which are proposed by the members of the ‘Politicizing the Future’ project. <u>The</u> <u>notion of (political) <mark>contingency is an excellent</mark> <mark>starting point to explore</u></mark> the <u>connections between a <strong><mark>commitment to an open future </strong>and</u></mark> <u>the</u> <u><strong>concept of <mark>democracy</u></strong></mark>. <u>By political contingency</u>, <u>I mean</u> the simple fact that even though <u>the way a <mark>society </mark>is organized is not random</u>, <u>it</u> <u><mark>could</u> <u><strong>always be otherwise</u></strong></mark> (<u>Marchart</u> 2010: 80). <u>As</u> <u><mark>political systems are</mark> <mark>created by</u> <u><strong>overlapping processes</u></strong>, <u></mark>whose</u> <u>beginnings</u> <u><strong>cannot be clearly determined</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u>whose developments do not follow</u> <u>necessary pathways</u>, <u>contingency</u> <u>is a feature of</u> <u><strong>any form of societal organization</u></strong>. However, many forms of rule disavow their own contingency. Often, they seek to afrm their own necessity and immutability by appealing to something outside of the realm of politics, as, for example, a doctrine of divine right, or the unyielding laws of the market. By contrast, <u>the idea of democracy presupposes</u> <u>its own contingent political foundation</u>. <u><mark>Making</u> <u>contingency</u> <u><strong>explicit</u></strong></mark>, in turn, <u><mark>allows for a <strong>continuous renegotiation</strong> <strong>of possible futures</strong></mark>.</u> Moreover, as I will discuss in Section I, <u>affirming contingency</u> <u>entails a</u> <u><strong>specifc relationship to the past</u></strong>—<u>and to the role of history</u> <u>in</u> <u>understanding the present and the future</u>—<u>that <mark>enables us to</u> <u><strong>learn from past</mark> events</u></strong> <u><mark>without</u> <u>understanding history as</u> <u><strong>determining the future</u></strong></mark>. Section II concentrates on the notion that the concept of <u>democracy is closely linked to a particular understanding of futurity</u>. A democratic commitment to an open future, in turn, also implies a <u><strong><mark>commitment to</strong></mark> at least a “thin” notion of <strong><mark>sustainability</u></strong></mark>. In Section III, the relationship between democracy and sustainability is explored further. I argue that while a societal turn to more sustainable social and economic practices would involve the willingness of individuals to make substantive changes in their daily lives, these commitments are political in nature. <u><mark>Instead of</mark> sliding into</u> a <u><mark>neoliberal logic of individualized ‘sustainable consumption’</u></mark>, <u>what is called for</u> <u>is an</u> <u>understanding of</u> <u><strong><mark>moral autonomy</u></strong></mark> <u>that <mark>involves</mark> a</u> <u><strong><mark>deepening</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>shared, democratic practices</u></strong></mark>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Weiss 15—Visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, and a former professor of applied mathematics and engineering at Brown and the University of Maryland [Leonard, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 75-87] fulltext: If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping. Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their “trade.” If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008: Nuclear terrorism … turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies, allegations of coverups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26) The three ways terrorists might get a nuke To illustrate in more detail how fear has distorted the threat of nuclear terrorism, consider the three possibilities for terrorists to obtain a nuclear weapon: steal one; be given one created by a nuclear weapon state; manufacture one. None of these possibilities has a high probability of occurring. Stealing nukes. Nothing is better protected in a nuclear weapon state than the weapons themselves, which have multiple layers of safeguards that, in the United States, include intelligence and surveillance, electronic locks (including so-called “permissive action links” that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), gated and locked storage facilities, armed guards, and teams of elite responders if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that most weapon states have such protections, and there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, the likelihood of an unauthorized agent secretly planning a theft, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection is extremely low—but it isn’t impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider. The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were “loose nukes” in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 “suitcase nukes” that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes. Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists “inherit” nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover, Pakistan is not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis are known to have received major international assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, and have a sophisticated nuclear security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012). However, the weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.) Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it’s also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, it cannot be sure the weapon will be used by the terrorist group as intended. Second, the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This is a powerful deterrent to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event. Although these first two ways in which terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapon have very small probabilities of occurring (there is no available data suggesting that terrorist groups have produced plans for stealing a weapon, nor has there been any public information suggesting that any nuclear weapon state has seriously considered providing a nuclear weapon to a sub-national group), the probabilities cannot be said to be zero as long as nuclear weapons exist. Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan. But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the construction of an implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult technical problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional technical complications present themselves. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But even if one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered at some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. More likely, according to one well-known weapon designer,4 would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the device.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>No WMD or escalation</h4><p><strong>Weiss 15</strong>—Visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, and a former professor of applied mathematics and engineering at Brown and the University of Maryland [Leonard, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April, Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 75-87]</p><p>If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. <u>Although there has been much commentary on</u> <u>the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed</u> in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), <u>and some terrorists</u> no doubt <u>desire to obtain such weapons, <mark>evidence of any</mark> terrorist <mark>group working seriously toward</mark> the <mark>theft </mark>of nuclear weapons <mark>or</mark> the acquisition of such weapons by <mark>other means is</mark> virtually <mark>nonexistent. This</mark> </u>may be due to a combination of reasons. <u>Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder</u>: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping.</p><p>Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their “trade<u>.” If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder <mark>is not going to help them, </mark>and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable</u>, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. <u>The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional <mark>weapons; it requires significant time</mark>, planning, <mark>resources, and expertise, with no guarantees</mark> that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished</u>. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:</p><p>Nuclear terrorism … turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies, allegations of coverups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26)</p><p>The three ways terrorists might get a nuke</p><p>To illustrate in more detail how fear has distorted the threat of nuclear terrorism, <u>consider the three possibilities for terrorists to obtain a nuclear weapon: steal one; be given one created by a nuclear weapon state; manufacture one. None of these possibilities has a high probability of occurring.</p><p></u>Stealing nukes. <u><mark>Nothing is better protected</mark> in a nuclear weapon state <mark>than</mark> the <mark>weapons themselves, which have multiple layers</mark> of safeguards that</u>, in the United States, <u>include intelligence and surveillance, electronic locks</u> (including so-called “permissive action links” that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), <u>gated and locked storage facilities, armed guards, and teams of elite responders if an attempt at theft were to occur</u>. We know that <u>most weapon states have such protections, and <mark>there is no reason to believe </mark>that such <mark>protections are missing in the remaining states</mark>,</p><p> since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, the likelihood of an unauthorized agent secretly planning a theft, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons</u> with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection <u>is extremely low</u>—but it isn’t impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider.</p><p>The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were “loose nukes” in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 “suitcase nukes” that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes.</p><p>Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, <u>Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate</u> for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists “inherit” nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover, <u><mark>Pakistan is not about to collapse, and</mark> the Pakistanis are known to have <mark>received major international assistance</mark> in technologies for protecting their weapons from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, <mark>and</mark> have a <mark>sophisticated</mark> nuclear <mark>security</mark> structure in place</u> (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012).</p><p>However, <u>the weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such times</u> (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.)</p><p>Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it’s also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution<u><strong> of US opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear activities.</p><p></strong>Acquiring nukes</u> as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. <u>There are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely</u>: First, <u>once <mark>a</mark> weapon <mark>state</mark> loses control of a weapon, it <mark>cannot be sure the weapon will be used</mark> by the terrorist group <mark>as intended</u></mark>. Second, <u>the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation</u> (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. <u><mark>This is a powerful deterrent</mark> to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event.</p><p></u>Although these first two ways in which terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapon have very small probabilities of occurring (there is no available data suggesting that terrorist groups have produced plans for stealing a weapon, nor has there been any public information suggesting that any nuclear weapon state has seriously considered providing a nuclear weapon to a sub-national group), the probabilities cannot be said to be zero as long as nuclear weapons exist.</p><p><u>Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an appropriate amount of</u> one of the two most popular <u>materials</u> for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade <u><mark>plutonium</u></mark> is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and <u><mark>is</mark> very <mark>highly protected</u></mark> until it is inserted in a weapon. <u><mark>Reactor</mark>-grade <mark>plutonium</u></mark>, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense <u>is a more attractive target</u> for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan.</p><p>But <u>terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device <mark>would require</mark> the construction of an implosion weapon,</u> requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, <u><mark>a notoriously difficult technical problem</u></mark>. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, <u>the use of reactor-grade plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design</u>. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional <u>technical complications present themselves</u>. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But <u><mark>even if one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered</mark> at some stage</u> (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), <u>translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. More likely</u>, according to one well-known weapon designer,4 <u>would be the death of</u> the person or <u>persons in the attempt to build the device</u>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Rusdesill 18—Dakota S. Rusdesill, a professor at the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, scholar, teacher, and practitioner of legislation and national security law and policy, “Trump’s Secret Order on Pulling the Cyber Trigger”, Lawfare Blog, https://www.lawfareblog.com/trumps-secret-order-pulling-cyber-trigger, August 29, 2018//Lee fulltext: A second trend evident in President Trump’s change to the decision process for cyber operations is one that has been apparent during the last several presidencies. That is the secret law problem: use of legal authorities that are classified or otherwise unpublished. As my review of the public record in all three branches found, secret law is a limited but important exception to the norm of publication of the law. Media accounts indicate that Obama established the interagency cyber-operations decision process through a presidential directive, a type of document that like an executive order has legal force. Absent congressional or judicial action, it takes one presidential order to repeal or replace another—which is what Trump appears to have done. And like the superseded Obama order, Trump has kept his directive classified. It is inevitably problematic in a republic of popular sovereignty for the president—or any other government actor—to be able to change law and policy without public notice. Use of secret law removes the accountability provided by public scrutiny. Add in decreased interagency review, and agencies will inevitably be tempted to perceive even more latitude to act, and to flexibly interpret their secret authorities. Here, the secret law in question concerns who in the executive branch can authorize cyber operations—which are notoriously hard to contain in the internet age, and (as the Wall Street Journal story indicated) could have domestic ramifications. As my study “Coming to Terms with Secret Law” explored, one can imagine situations in which, for operational security reasons, the nation decides to tolerate some amount of secret law. For example, it makes sense to keep secret a legal authorization to execute a specific cyber intrusion (at least initially) so as not to tip off the target. But what Trump just altered is something else—the order establishing the overall executive branch decision process for pulling the cyber trigger. Presumably, no particular operations are mentioned in Trump’s order. And it is already a matter of public law that the president and Defense Department have legal authority to conduct cyber operations (more on that below). No matter who is in the White House, it is not clear why a decision process order—and therefore who is accountable for cyber operations—should be kept from the public. If we are rightly uncomfortable with secret law, then either it should be abolished, or else we need some rules of the road for living with it. I will mention here applications of several especially relevant principles and rules for permitting some limited amount of secret law on the cyber decision process. For example, our legal system’s presumption against secret law should be reflected in early declassification. The date for automatic declassification of documents with legal force should be earlier than for secret documents generally. Similarly, any secret law should carry a fairly near-term sunset date. In the meantime, transparency would be improved by releasing an unclassified summary or redacted version of Trump’s new cyber order, as Congress in the 2015 USA Freedom Act stipulated for significant legal interpretations by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Additionally, publication of a brief notice in the Federal Register would ensure that any new secret presidential directive or other non-published legal authority would be only a “shallow secret”—the secret’s exact contents remain hidden, but the fact of creation of the secret law, its creator, general subject matter (“cyber operations”), and effective date and sunset dates would be known to the public. (In contrast, a “deep secret” keeps both the secret and its existence unknown.) The Federal Register notice would avoid the hazards of relying on leaks. Such a published “bell ringer” would allow enough public awareness to track secret legal documents, to have a sense for how much secret law the government is creating, and to know how often the government changes the secret rules it writes for itself regarding its growing cyber capabilities. The public could then ask their congressional representatives to go behind the curtain and have a look—without compromising classified sources, methods or information. Either in Public Law or in the classified legislative addenda that Congress gives the force of law, lawmakers could then rein in the president or an agency if members of Congress did not like what they saw. Legislated Rules for Cyber Operations Trump’s efforts to push responsibility down the chain of command and his use of secret law come in the context of a third trend: congressional efforts in Public Law to organize legal authorities, decisions and reporting regarding cyber operations. Congress, too, is providing greater latitude for action at the agency level. In Section 954 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress affirmed that the Defense Department “upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace” subject to the law of armed conflict and War Powers Resolution. Based on media accounts, it sounds like Obama’s order on cyber decision process—and, even more so, Trump’s order—represent delegations of this authority. Subsequent NDAAs underscored the Defense Department’s authority and stipulated 48-hour and quarterly reporting requirements at the agency level. According to Section 1642 of the most recent NDAA (for 2019, signed Aug. 13, and named for the late John McCain), if the “National Command Authority” (the president and the secretary of defense) determines that Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran are conducting an “ongoing campaign of attacks … in cyberspace, including attempting to influence American elections,” the military can “take appropriate and proportional action in foreign cyberspace” in response. In Section 1632 of the new NDAA, Congress stipulates that “clandestine military activity or operation in cyberspace” shall be considered a “traditional military activity.” This provides an exception to the covert action statute and the decision and reporting obligations that prior law assigns specifically to the president. (For more on the recent NDAA’s important cyber provisions, read Bobby Chesney’s terrific analysis). As I argue in my scholarship, statutes of this kind on cyber operations amount to constitutional “Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Along with appropriations and other constitutional powers, this Article I, section 8, clause 14 power also gives Congress authority—in the context of the Youngstown-centered separation of powers doctrine—to structure the executive branch decision-making process. As it did in the covert action statute, Congress could place more responsibility on the president personally for decision and reporting regarding cyber operations. In the wake of the Trump White House’s controversial elimination of the position of National Security Council cyber coordinator, for example, Congress could codify in statute for cyber operations an analogue to the requirement for NSC review of all proposed and ongoing covert actions found in Sections 1.2(a) and (b) of Executive Order 12333 (2008). Congress could also stipulate greater public reporting of the guidelines, processes and legal documents that structure executive branch decision-making and accountability regarding cyber operations. * Congress’s legislative productivity overall has declined during this century as its dysfunction has worsened. But Congress regularly legislates on national security: the NDAAs, intelligence authorization acts and defense appropriations bills still get passed. Congress has so far provided the Defense Department both latitude for action and some important rules for cyber operations, and lawmakers could just as easily use congressional powers to manage the decision devolution and secret law trends spurred onward by President Trump’s reported cyber order. With the Joint Chiefs of Staff warning that permanent U.S. “global cyberspace superiority is not possible due to the complexity of cyberspace,” the country needs swift decisions on cyber operations. It also needs good decisions. And the public must be able to hold elected officials accountable for use of cyber weapons that are uniquely hard to control in a computer-dependent, networked world. In this context, Trump’s reported order offers more agency-level agility and freedom, but also potentially less responsibility for the president and less coordination among the multiple executive branch actors with cyber equities. And the newest decision-process rules from the president remain classified, without any readily evident reason to conclude that they need to be hidden from the public. These considerations suggest that Congress should give greater focus to decision devolution and secret law, along with how they operate together. Congress must also be willing to legislate new decision processes and operational rules to get the balance right among speed and agility, interagency coordination, presidential accountability, secrecy and transparency.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Congressional checks are key to deliberate usage of OCOs that are secretive under the Executive</h4><p><strong>Rusdesill 18</strong>—Dakota S. Rusdesill, a professor at the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, scholar, teacher, and practitioner of legislation and national security law and policy, “Trump’s Secret Order on Pulling the Cyber Trigger”, Lawfare Blog, https://www.lawfareblog.com/trumps-secret-order-pulling-cyber-trigger<u>, August 29, 2018//Lee </p><p><mark>A</u></mark> second <u><mark>trend</u></mark> <u>evident in </u>President <u><mark>Trump’s change</mark> to the decision <mark>process for cyber operations</mark> is one that has been apparent during the last several presidencies</u>.<u> That is <mark>the<strong> secret law problem</mark>: </strong>use of legal <mark>authorities</mark> that <mark>are classified</mark> or otherwise <strong><mark>unpublished</strong></mark>.</u> As my review of the public record in all three branches found, <u>secret law is a limited but important exception to the norm of publication of the law. </u>Media accounts indicate that <u>Obama established the interagency cyber-operations decision process through a presidential directive</u>, a type of document that like an executive order has legal force. <u><strong><mark>Absent congressional or judicial action</mark>,</strong> it takes one presidential order to repeal or replace another</u>—<u>which is what Trump appears to have done. </u>And like the superseded Obama order, Trump has kept his directive classified. It is inevitably problematic in a republic of popular sovereignty for the president—or any other government actor—to be able to change law and policy without public notice. <u><mark>Use of secret law <strong>removes</mark> the <mark>accountability</strong></mark> provided <mark>by</mark> public <mark>scrutiny</mark>.</u> <u>Add in decreased interagency review, and agencies will inevitably be tempted to perceive even more latitude to act, <mark>and to flexibly interpret their secret authorities.</u></mark> Here, the secret law in question concerns who in the executive branch can authorize cyber operations—which are notoriously hard to contain in the internet age, and (as the Wall Street Journal story indicated) could have domestic ramifications. As my study “Coming to Terms with Secret Law” explored, one can imagine situations in which, for operational security reasons, the nation decides to tolerate some amount of secret law. For example, it makes sense to keep secret a legal authorization to execute a specific cyber intrusion (at least initially) so as not to tip off the target. But what Trump just altered is something else—the order establishing the overall executive branch decision process for pulling the cyber trigger. Presumably, no particular operations are mentioned in Trump’s order. And it is already a matter of public law that the president and Defense Department have legal authority to conduct cyber operations (more on that below). No matter who is in the White House, it is not clear why a decision process order—and therefore who is accountable for cyber operations—should be kept from the public. <u>If we are rightly uncomfortable with secret law, then either it should be abolished, or else we need some rules of the road for living with it</u>. I will mention here applications of several especially relevant principles and rules for permitting some limited amount of secret law on the cyber decision process. For example, <u>our legal system’s presumption against secret law should be reflected in early declassification</u>. The date for automatic declassification of documents with legal force should be earlier than for secret documents generally. Similarly, any secret law should carry a fairly near-term sunset date. In the meantime, transparency would be improved by releasing an unclassified summary or redacted version of Trump’s new cyber order, as Congress in the 2015 USA Freedom Act stipulated for significant legal interpretations by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Additionally, publication of a brief notice in the Federal Register would ensure that any new secret presidential directive or other non-published legal authority would be only a “shallow secret”<u>—the secret’s exact contents remain hidden, but the fact of creation of the secret law, its creator, general subject matter (“cyber operations”), and effective date and sunset dates would be known to the public. </u>(In contrast, a “deep secret” keeps both the secret and its existence unknown.) The Federal Register notice would avoid the hazards of relying on leaks. Such a published “bell ringer” would allow enough public awareness to track secret legal documents, to have a sense for how much secret law the government is creating, and to know how often the government changes the secret rules it writes for itself regarding its growing cyber capabilities. The public could then ask their congressional representatives to go behind the curtain and have a look—without compromising classified sources, methods or information. <u>Either in Public Law or in the classified legislative addenda that Congress gives the force of law, lawmakers could then rein in the president or an agency if members of Congress did not like what they saw. </u>Legislated Rules for Cyber Operations <u>Trump’s efforts to push responsibility down the chain of command and his use of secret law come in the context of a</u> third <u>trend: congressional efforts in Public Law to organize legal authorities, decisions and reporting regarding cyber operations. Congress, too, is providing greater latitude for action at the agency level. </u>In Section 954 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress affirmed that the Defense Department “upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace” subject to the law of armed conflict and War Powers Resolution. Based on media accounts, it sounds like Obama’s order on cyber decision process—and, even more so, Trump’s order—represent delegations of this authority. Subsequent NDAAs underscored the Defense Department’s authority and stipulated 48-hour and quarterly reporting requirements at the agency level. According to Section 1642 of the most recent NDAA (for 2019, signed Aug. 13, and named for the late John McCain), if the “National Command Authority” (the president and the secretary of defense) determines that Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran are conducting an “ongoing campaign of attacks … in cyberspace, including attempting to influence American elections,” the military can “take appropriate and proportional action in foreign cyberspace” in response. In Section 1632 of the new NDAA, Congress stipulates that “clandestine military activity or operation in cyberspace” shall be considered a “traditional military activity.” This provides an exception to the covert action statute and the decision and reporting obligations that prior law assigns specifically to the president. (For more on the recent NDAA’s important cyber provisions, read Bobby Chesney’s terrific analysis). As I argue in my scholarship, statutes of this kind on cyber operations amount to constitutional “Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Along with appropriations and other constitutional powers, this Article I, section 8, clause 14 power also gives Congress authority—in the context of the Youngstown-centered separation of powers doctrine—to structure the executive branch decision-making process. As it did in the covert action statute, Congress could place more responsibility on the president personally for decision and reporting regarding cyber operations. In the wake of the Trump White House’s controversial elimination of the position of National Security Council cyber coordinator, for example, Congress could codify in statute for cyber operations an analogue to the requirement for NSC review of all proposed and ongoing covert actions found in Sections 1.2(a) and (b) of Executive Order 12333 (2008). <u><mark>Congress could</mark> also <mark>stipulate</mark> greater <mark>public reporting of the guidelines</mark>, processes and legal documents that structure executive branch decision-making and accountability regarding cyber operations.</u> * <u><mark>Congress’s</mark> legislative <strong><mark>productivity</strong> overall has <strong>declined</strong></mark> during this century </u>as its dysfunction has worsened.<u> <mark>But Congress</mark> regularly <mark>legislates</mark> <mark>on national security</mark>: the NDAAs, intelligence authorization acts and defense appropriations bills still get passed. <mark>Congress has </mark>so far <mark>provided</mark> <mark>the Defense Department</mark> both <mark>latitude for action</mark> and some important rules <mark>for cyber operations</u>,</mark> <u><mark>and</u></mark> lawmakers <u><mark>could</mark> just as easily <mark>use congressional powers<strong> to manage </strong>the decision</mark> devolution <mark>and secret law trends</mark> spurred onward by President Trump’s reported cyber order.</u><strong> </strong>With the Joint Chiefs of Staff warning that permanent U.S. “global cyberspace superiority is not possible due to the complexity of cyberspace,”<u> the <mark>country needs swift decisions on cyber operations.<strong> It also needs good decisions</mark>.</u></strong> And the public must be able to hold elected officials accountable for use of cyber weapons that are uniquely hard to control in a computer-dependent, networked world. In this context, Trump’s reported order offers more agency-level agility and freedom, but also potentially less responsibility for the president and less coordination among the multiple executive branch actors with cyber equities. <u>And the newest decision-process rules from the president remain classified, without any readily evident reason to conclude that they need to be hidden from the public. </u>These considerations suggest tha<u>t Congress should give greater focus to decision devolution and secret law, along with how they operate together. <mark>Congress must also be willing to legislate</u></mark> new decision <u><mark>processes</mark> <mark>and</mark> operational rules to get the <mark>balance</mark> right among <mark>speed and agility</mark>, interagency coordination, presidential <mark>accountability</mark>, secrecy <mark>and transparency.</p></u></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Gomez 15 Eric Gomez 8-6-2015 “Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait” http://cimsec.org/deep-accommodation-best-option-preventing-war-taiwan-strait/18128 (independent analyst and recent Master’s graduate of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University)//Elmer fulltext: History has shown that emerging great powers and established or declining great powers are likely to fight major wars in order to determine the balance of power in the international system. There is considerable fear that the U.S. and China are heading towards great power conflict. As Christopher Layne argues, there are “several important — and unsettling — parallels between the Anglo-Germany relationship during the run-up to 1914 and the unfolding Sino-American relationship.” The headline-grabbing dispute in the South China Sea offers an excellent example of one of the several flashpoints that could spark a larger conflict between the U.S. and China. But the probability of great power conflict between the U.S. and China can be reduced if the two states can find ways to better manage interactions in flashpoint areas. The oldest flashpoint, and the area most important for Chinese domestic politics, is the Taiwan Strait. In 1972, the Shanghai Communique stated that the so-called Taiwan question was the most important issue blocking the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China. This question has yet to be solved, mostly because Taiwan has been able to deter attack through a strong indigenous defense capability backed up by American commitment. The status quo in the Taiwan Strait will be unsustainable as China continues to improve its military capabilities and adopt more aggressive military strategies. If the U.S. wants to avert a war with China in the Taiwan Strait, it must start looking for an alternative to the status quo. Taiwan’s strategy of economic accommodation with China under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has brought about benefits. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan to deepen its military and political accommodation with China. This would be a difficult pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it could offer the most sustainable deterrent to armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For years, Taiwan’s de facto independence from China has relied on a qualitatively superior, defense-focused military that could prevent the landing of a large Chinese force on the island. The growing power of the Chinese military, especially its naval and missile forces, has begun eroding this qualitative advantage. Indeed, some observers have already concluded that “the days when [Taiwan] forces had a quantitative and qualitative advantage over [China] are over.” Taiwan still possesses a formidable military and could inflict high costs on an attacking Chinese force, but ultimately American intervention would likely be necessary to save Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack. Military intervention by the U.S. on the behalf of Taiwan would be met with formidable Chinese resistance. China’s anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] strategy complicates the U.S.’s ability to project power in the Taiwan Strait. China’s latest maritime strategy document, released in May of this year, states that China’s navy will start shifting its focus further offshore to include open seas protection missions. Such a shift implies an aspirational capability to keep intervening American forces away from Taiwan. American political leaders have not given up on Taiwan, and the 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy places a premium on reassuring allies of America’s commitments. However, the fact that China’s improving military capabilities will make an American military intervention on behalf of Taiwan more and more costly must not be ignored. The best option for preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait is deepening the strategy of accommodation that Beijing and Taipei have already started. According to Baohui Zhang, accommodation “relies on expanding common interests, institutionalizing dialogues, promoting security confidence-building and offering assurances to establish mutual trust.” The Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan has tried to use accommodation as a way to lock in the status quo and avoid conflict, but their efforts have been met with more and more popular backlash in Taiwan. China’s military strategy document does acknowledge that “cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed.” If Taiwan is serious about accommodation as a means of deterring military conflict, then it should cease purchasing military equipment from the U.S. Stopping the arms purchases would send a clear message to Beijing that Taiwan is interested in deeper accommodation. A halt in arms sales would also benefit U.S.-Chinese relations by removing a “major stumbling block for developing bilateral military-to-military ties.” This is certainly a very controversial proposal, and would likely be very difficult to sell to the Taiwanese people, but as I’ve already explained the status quo is becoming more and more untenable. There are two important things to keep in mind about this proposal which mitigate fears that this is some kind of appeasement to China. First, halting U.S. arms sales does not mean that Taiwan’s self-defense forces would cease to exist. China may be gaining ground on Taiwan militarily, but the pain that Taiwan could inflict on an attacking force is still high. China may be able to defeat Taiwan in a conflict, but the losses its military would take to seize the island would significantly hamper its ability to use its military while it recovers from attacking Taiwan. Second, there is an easily identifiable off-ramp that can be used by Taiwan if the policy is not successful. Stopping arms purchases is meant to be a way of testing the water. If the Chinese respond positively to the decision by offering greater military cooperation with Taiwan or some form of political concessions then Beijing signals its commitment to the accommodation process. On the other hand, if the Chinese refuse to follow through and meet Taiwan halfway then Beijing signals that it is not actually committed to accommodation. Taiwan would then resume purchasing American weapons with the knowledge that it must find some other way to prevent conflict. Accommodation by giving up American arms sales is a tough pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it simply does not have many other viable alternatives to preventing conflict. Taiwan could pursue acquiring nuclear weapons, but this would be met by American opposition and would likely trigger a pre-emptive attack by China if the weapons program were discovered. Taiwan could try to avert conflict by increasing military spending to forestall, but this would be difficult to sustain so long as China’s economy and military spending is also growing. Analysts at CSBA have argued for deterrence through protraction, which advocates employing asymmetric guerrilla-style tactics to prevent China from achieving air and sea dominance. This has the highest likelihood of success of the three alternatives mentioned in this paragraph, but it still relies on intervention by outside powers to ultimately save the day. Taiwan’s military deterrent will not be able to prevent a Chinese attempt to change the status quo by force for much longer. Any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would likely involve a commitment of U.S. forces and could lead to a major war between the U.S. and China. Accommodation could be the best worst option that Taiwan, and the U.S., has for preventing a war with China. Announcing an end to American weapons purchases could bring Taiwan progress on negotiations with China if successful while still providing off-ramps that Taiwan could take if unsuccessful. I admit, the idea of accommodation does have its flaws, and more work needs to be done to flesh out this idea. I hope that this idea of deep accommodation will add to the discussion about the management of the Taiwan Strait issue. The status quo won’t last forever, and a vigorous debate will be needed to arrive at the best possible solution.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Ending Taiwan Arm Sales is key to <u>accommodation</u> – any other option fails since China cares <u>way more</u> than the US. </h4><p><strong>Gomez 15</strong> Eric Gomez 8-6-2015 “Deep Accommodation: The Best Option for Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait” http://cimsec.org/deep-accommodation-best-option-preventing-war-taiwan-strait/18128 (independent analyst and recent Master’s graduate of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University)//Elmer </p><p><u>History has shown that emerging great powers and established or declining great powers are likely to fight major wars in order to determine the balance of power </u>in the international system. There is considerable fear that the U.S. and China are heading towards great power conflict. As Christopher Layne argues, <u>there are “several important — and unsettling — parallels between the Anglo-Germany relationship during the run-up to 1914 and the unfolding Sino-American relationship.”</u> The headline-grabbing dispute in the South China Sea offers an excellent example of one of the several flashpoints that could spark a larger conflict between the U.S. and China. <u>But the probability of great power conflict between the U.S. and China can be reduced if the two states can find ways to better manage interactions in flashpoint areas. <mark>The</mark> oldest flashpoint, and the <mark>area most important for Chinese </mark>domestic <mark>politics, is </mark>the <mark>Taiwan </mark>Strait. I</u>n 1972, the Shanghai Communique stated that the so-called Taiwan question was the most important issue blocking the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China. This question has yet to be solved, mostly because Taiwan has been able to deter attack through a strong indigenous defense capability backed up by American commitment. <u><mark>The status quo in the</mark> Taiwan <mark>Strait <strong>will be unsustainable</strong> </mark>as China continues to improve its military capabilities</u> <u>and adopt more aggressive military strategies</u>. <u>If the U.S. wants to avert a war with China in the Taiwan Strait, it must start looking for an alternative to the status quo</u>. Taiwan’s strategy of economic accommodation with China under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has brought about benefits. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan to deepen its military and political accommodation with China. This would be a difficult pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it could offer the most sustainable deterrent to armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For years, Taiwan’s de facto independence from China has relied on a qualitatively superior, defense-focused military that could prevent the landing of a large Chinese force on the island. <u>The growing power of the Chinese military, especially its naval and missile forces, has begun eroding this qualitative advantage. Indeed, some observers have already concluded that “the days when [Taiwan] forces had a quantitative and qualitative advantage over [China] are over</u>.” Taiwan still possesses a formidable military and could inflict high costs on an attacking Chinese force, but ultimately American intervention would likely be necessary to save Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack. <u><mark>Military intervention by the U.S.</mark> on the behalf of Taiwan <mark>would be met with formidable Chinese resistance</mark>. China’s anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] strategy complicates the U.S.’s ability to project power in the Taiwan Strait.</u> China’s latest maritime strategy document, released in May of this year, states that China’s navy will start shifting its focus further offshore to include open seas protection missions. Such a shift implies an aspirational capability to keep intervening American forces away from Taiwan. American political leaders have not given up on Taiwan, and the 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy places a premium on reassuring allies of America’s commitments. However, the fact that China’s improving military capabilities will make an American military intervention on behalf of Taiwan more and more costly must not be ignored. <u><strong><mark>The best option</strong> for preventing a war</mark> in the Taiwan Strait <mark>is <strong>deepening the strategy of accommodation</strong></mark> that Beijing and Taipei have already started</u>. <u>According to Baohui Zhang, accommodation “relies on expanding common interests, institutionalizing dialogues, promoting security confidence-building and offering assurances <mark>to establish mutual trust</u></mark>.” The Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan has tried to use accommodation as a way to lock in the status quo and avoid conflict, but their efforts have been met with more and more popular backlash in Taiwan. China’s military strategy document does acknowledge that “cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed.” <u>If Taiwan is serious about accommodation as a means of deterring military conflict, then it should cease purchasing military equipment from the U.S</u>. Stopping the arms purchases would send a clear message to Beijing that Taiwan is interested in deeper accommodation. <u><mark>A halt in arms sales would</mark> also <mark>benefit U.S.-Chinese relations by removing a</mark> </u>“<u><strong><mark>major stumbling block for developing bilateral military</mark>-to-military <mark>ties</u></strong></mark>.” This is certainly a very controversial proposal, and would likely be very difficult to sell to the Taiwanese people, but as I’ve already explained the status quo is becoming more and more untenable. There are two important things to keep in mind about this proposal which mitigate fears that this is some kind of appeasement to China. First, <u>halting U.S. arms sales does not mean that Taiwan’s self-defense forces would cease to exist</u>. <u>China may be gaining ground on Taiwan militarily, but the pain that Taiwan could inflict on an attacking force is still high.</u> <u>China may be able to defeat Taiwan in a conflict, but the losses its military would take to seize the island would significantly hamper its ability to use its military while it recovers</u> from attacking Taiwan. <u>Second, there is an easily identifiable off-ramp that can be used by Taiwan if the policy is not successful.</u> <u>Stopping arms purchases is meant to be a way of testing the water. If the Chinese respond positively</u> to the decision <u>by offering</u> greater military <u>cooperation</u> with Taiwan <u>or some form of political</u> <u>concessions</u> <u>then Beijing signals its commitment to the accommodation process</u>. On the other hand, <u>if the Chinese refuse to follow through and meet Taiwan halfway then Beijing signals that it is not actually committed to accommodation</u>. Taiwan would then resume purchasing American weapons with the knowledge that it must find some other way to prevent conflict. <u>Accommodation by giving up American arms sales is a tough pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it simply does not <strong>have many other viable alternatives to preventing conflict</u></strong>. Taiwan could pursue acquiring nuclear weapons, but this would be met by American opposition and would likely trigger a pre-emptive attack by China if the weapons program were discovered. <u>Taiwan could try to avert conflict by increasing military spending to forestall, but this would be difficult to sustain so long as China’s economy and military spending is also growing</u>. Analysts at CSBA have argued for <u>deterrence through protraction, which advocates employing asymmetric guerrilla-style tactics</u> to prevent China from achieving air and sea dominance. This has the highest likelihood of success of the three alternatives mentioned in this paragraph, but it <u>still relies on intervention by outside powers to ultimately save the day. Taiwan’s military deterrent will not be able to prevent a Chinese attempt to change the status quo by force for much longer</u>. <u><mark>Any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would</mark> likely involve a commitment of U.S. forces and could <mark>lead <strong>to a major war between the U.S. and China</u></strong></mark>. <u>Accommodation could be the best worst option that Taiwan, and the U.S., has for preventing a war with China. Announcing <mark>an end to American weapons purchases could bring</mark> Taiwan progress on <mark>negotiations with China</mark> if successful while still providing off-ramps that Taiwan could take if unsuccessful</u>. I admit, the idea of accommodation does have its flaws, and more work needs to be done to flesh out this idea. I hope that this idea of deep accommodation will add to the discussion about the management of the Taiwan Strait issue. The status quo won’t last forever, and a vigorous debate will be needed to arrive at the best possible solution. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Koslowski 12 (Rey, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Informatics at the University at Albany, State University of New York, “Immigration, Crime and Terrorism”, Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor eds. Oxford Handbook on International Migration (Oxford University Press, 2012), 2012, https://www.albany.edu/~rk289758/documents/Koslowski_Immigration_Crime_Terrorism_OUP_handbook.pdf) TDI fulltext: Contrary to assumptions of many prominent international relations scholars (e.g. Waltz 1979; Mearshiemer 2005) that states with sufficient military capabilities are the only actors of significance in world politics, a handful of people crossing unarmed into another country can have tremendous consequences for international security, as the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 amply demonstrated. The world’s most powerful states are now threatened by the possibility of asymmetric warfare by non-state actors armed with weapons of mass destruction (Allison 2004). Homeland security officials are preparing for distributed simultaneous attacks of suicidal terrorists arriving in airports posing as tourists who then infect themselves with smallpox and spread it to unsuspecting crowds at major tourist attractions. Strategies of nuclear deterrence that dominated international security policy and theories in the second half of the 20th century no longer apply when the opponent is not a state that can be threatened with retaliation but rather a suicidal individual. The prospect of terrorists being smuggled into target states was considered as a potential threat in some law enforcement circles but it was not until after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington and the Mar. 11, 2003 attacks in Madrid that policymakers began viewing human smuggling as a security threat in a qualitatively different way. For example, it became clear that terrorists could take clandestine routes that transnational criminal organizations use to smuggle illegal migrants into the US. The 9/11 Commission staff detailed linkages between human smugglers and Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in need of travel facilitation (9/11 Commission 2004a, 61). Investigations into the Madrid bombing produced reports demonstrating that Ansar alIslam, an al Qaeda-affiliated group linked to the attack, has been running a human smuggling and document fraud operation to fund terrorist actions as well as to smuggle its own members into countries like Spain and Iraq (Simpson, Crawford and Johnson 2004). As intelligence screening and visa security is tightened so as to stop terrorists from entering legally with valid visas, the threat of clandestine entry of terrorists using smuggling organizations increases and with it international cooperation to combat terrorist travel. Within weeks of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the UN Security Council “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,” issued resolution 1373 (2001) on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts that included a provision that “all States shall:…Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents” (UN 2001). The Security Council established a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in 2004 to strengthen and coordinate the process of monitoring the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). Although much of the political discourse linking migration to terrorism in response to the Sept. 11th attacks was wrongheaded and way off the mark, this is not to say that those who live outside of the country of their birth or nationality for more than one year (i.e. migrants) have had nothing to do with terrorism. In a certain sense, many cases of terrorism can be understood as emigrant participation in homeland politics that becomes violent. Moreover, some terrorists, including some of the 9/11 hijackers, joined terrorist organizations while residing outside of their country of nationality. The combination of international migration, advances in transportation and communications technology and spreading democratization fosters a “globalization of the domestic politics” of many states (Koslowski 2005). The scope and scale of emigrant political participation in homeland politics is increasing in today’s world as growing ranks of migrants from an increasing number of source countries living in a greater number of host countries produce evermore and increasingly varied diasporas. The globalization of domestic politics can also entail violence between contending parties of a domestic political struggle taking place abroad. Such conflicts may be between factions opposed to the home country government, as when Turkish groups fought one another in Germany and the rest of Europe (Abadan-Unat 1997). Emigrant political groups may also directly target diplomatic institutions or personnel of the home state government. On June 24, 1993, Kurdish nationalists, believed to be coordinated by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), kidnapped 30 people and attacked Turkish businesses and government offices in 29 European cities. The German government responded by outlawing the PKK and other Kurdish nationalist groups as “terrorist organizations,” raiding offices, arresting suspected members and deporting them. Similarly, the attacks of al Qaeda on U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and East Africa in the 1990s can be understood as part of a globalized intra-Saudi conflict between Osama Bin Laden and the Saudi monarchy that began in 1990 when Bin Laden condemned for allowing U.S. military to be stationed in Saudi Arabia during and after the Gulf War. When al Qaeda joined forces with Ayman al Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1998, the conflict became less of a domestic Saudi conflict and more of an intraArab, intra-Muslim world conflict between radical proponents of Islamic fundamentalism and more secular western-oriented governments supported by the U.S. In such cases, parties to the conflict often view these actions in terms of the continuation of domestic political struggles abroad whereas the host countries in which this struggle takes place label it “international terrorism.” Just as Clausewitz defined war as “politics by other means,” depending on one’s perspective, certain forms of international terrorism may be considered transnational diasporic politics by other means. There are also many very important cases of migrants who have become terrorists. For example, Osama bin Laden is one of the world’s 191 million migrants and has been a migrant for most of the past 30 years. Born in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden spent the better part of a decade in Afghanistan before co-founding al Qaeda in Afghanistan during 1988. After assuming unrivalled leadership of al Qaeda, he accepted Sudanese political leader Hassan al Turabi’s invitation in 1989 to move the organization to Sudan. Bin Laden, himself, moved back to his native Saudi Arabia but within a year, he ran afoul of the Saudi government, which then took actions to silence him, including seizing his Saudi passport. In April 1991, bin Laden slipped out of the country and moved to Sudan where he had purchased property and then began setting up a variety of businesses. The rich Saudi immigrant not only engaged in major Sudanese road building projects but supported a series of operations against US military and diplomatic installations abroad. After the Saudi monarchy revoked bin Laden’s citizenship and froze his financial assets, external pressure on the Sudanese government to clamp down on bin Laden mounted and he eventually opted, in May 1996, to move his family and closest supporters to Jallabad, Afghanistan, where he and his entourage were allowed to stay by local political leaders and, eventually, as guests of the Taliban, once they gained control of most of the country. Bin Laden primarily resided in Afghanistan until the US-led invasion and, by most accounts; he is now an illegal migrant in Pakistan. Although none of the 9/11 hijackers were immigrants to the US, Mohamed Atta and several other hijackers lived outside of their countries of birth or nationality for several years before launching the attacks and, therefore, were also part of the world’s migrant population. Atta moved from his native Egypt to Germany in 1992, where he studied urban planning and worked part-time, receiving his masters degree in 1999. Marwan al Shehi, a national of the United Arab Emirates, received a military scholarship to study in Germany and first entered the country in 1996. Lebanese national Ziad Jarrah enrolled in a German junior college in 1996. These men, who piloted three of the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11, were members of the so-called “Hamburg cell.” Although the three entered Germany on temporary residence permits and were not considered immigrants by the German government, they could possibly have gone on to further education and professional careers in Germany and become permanent residents. Indeed, US State Department consular officers in Berlin basically treated them for visa purposes as if they were permanent residents or German citizens because they resided in Germany for more than two years, learned the relatively difficult language of German, matriculated to a German University and, therefore, did not present a significant “risk” to immigrate to the US due to their strong ties to Germany (9/11 Commission 2004a, 118). As this case illustrates, immigrants in one state could become security risks as travelers to another state.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Immigration is a pipeline for terrorism – reducing restrictions causes Bio and WMD use</h4><p><strong>Koslowski 12</strong> (Rey, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Informatics at the University at Albany, State University of New York, “Immigration, Crime and Terrorism”, Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor eds. Oxford Handbook on International Migration (Oxford University Press, 2012), 2012, https://www.albany.edu/~rk289758/documents/Koslowski_Immigration_Crime_Terrorism_OUP_handbook.pdf) TDI</p><p>Contrary to assumptions of many prominent international relations scholars (e.g. Waltz 1979; Mearshiemer 2005) that states with sufficient military capabilities are the only actors of significance in world politics, <u><strong>a handful of <mark>people crossing unarmed into another country</mark> can <mark>have tremendous consequences for</mark> international <mark>security</mark>, as the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 amply demonstrated</u></strong>. <u><strong>The world’s most powerful <mark>states</mark> <mark>are</mark> now <mark>threatened by the possibility of asymmetric warfare</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>by non-state actors armed with w</mark>eapons of <mark>m</mark>ass<mark> d</mark>estruction</u></strong><mark> (</mark>Allison 2004). Homeland security officials are preparing for <u><strong>distributed simultaneous attacks of suicidal terrorists arriving in airports posing as tourists who then infect themselves with smallpox</u></strong> <u><strong>and spread it to unsuspecting crowds at major tourist attractions. Strategies of <mark>nuclear deterrence</u></strong></mark> that dominated international security policy and <u><strong>theories </u></strong>in the second half of the 20th century <u><strong><mark>no longer</mark> <mark>apply</u></strong></mark> when the opponent is not a state that can be threatened with retaliation but rather a suicidal individual.</p><p><u><strong>The prospect of terrorists being smuggled into target states was considered as a potential threat in some law enforcement circles but it was not until after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington and the Mar. 11, 2003 attacks in Madrid that policymakers began viewing human smuggling as a security threat in a qualitatively different way</u></strong>. For example, it became clear that <u><strong><mark>terrorists</mark> could <mark>take clandestine routes that</mark> <mark>transnational criminal organizations use to smuggle </mark>illegal <mark>migrants</u></strong></mark> into the US. The 9/11 <u><strong>Commission staff detailed linkages between human smugglers and Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in need of travel facilitation</u></strong> (9/11 Commission 2004a, 61). <u><strong>Investigations into the Madrid bombing produced reports demonstrating that Ansar alIslam, an al Qaeda-affiliated group linked to the attack, has been running a human smuggling and document fraud operation to fund terrorist actions</u></strong> <u><strong>as well as to smuggle its own members into countries like Spain and Iraq</u></strong> (Simpson, Crawford and Johnson 2004).</p><p>As intelligence screening and visa security is tightened so as to stop terrorists from entering legally with valid visas, the threat of clandestine entry of terrorists using smuggling organizations increases and with it international cooperation to combat terrorist travel. Within weeks of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the UN Security Council “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,” issued resolution 1373 (2001) on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts that included a provision that “all States shall:…Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents” (UN 2001). The Security Council established a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in 2004 to strengthen and coordinate the process of monitoring the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).</p><p>Although much of the political discourse linking migration to terrorism in response to the Sept. 11th attacks was wrongheaded and way off the mark, <u><strong>this is not to say that those who live outside of the country of their birth or nationality for more than one year (i.e. migrants) have had nothing to do with terrorism</u></strong>. In a certain sense, many cases of terrorism can be understood as emigrant participation in homeland politics that becomes violent. Moreover, some terrorists, including some of the 9/11 hijackers, joined terrorist organizations while residing outside of their country of nationality.</p><p>The combination of international migration, advances in transportation and communications technology and spreading democratization fosters a “globalization of the domestic politics” of many states (Koslowski 2005). <u><strong><mark>The scope and</mark> <mark>scale of emigrant political participation in homeland politics is increasing</mark> in today’s world as growing ranks of migrants from an increasing number of source countries living in a greater number of host countries produce evermore and increasingly varied diasporas</u></strong>. The globalization of domestic politics can also entail violence between contending parties of a domestic political struggle taking place abroad. <u><strong>Such conflicts may be between factions opposed to the home country government, as when Turkish groups fought one another in Germany and the rest of Europe</u></strong> (Abadan-Unat 1997). Emigrant political groups may also directly target diplomatic institutions or personnel of the home state government. On June 24, 1993, <u><strong>Kurdish nationalists</u></strong>, believed to be coordinated by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), <u><strong>kidnapped 30 people and attacked Turkish businesses and government offices in 29 European cities</u></strong>. The German government responded by outlawing the PKK and other Kurdish nationalist groups as “terrorist organizations,” raiding offices, arresting suspected members and deporting them. Similarly, the attacks of al Qaeda on U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and East Africa in the 1990s can be understood as part of a globalized intra-Saudi conflict between Osama Bin Laden and the Saudi monarchy that began in 1990 when Bin Laden condemned for allowing U.S. military to be stationed in Saudi Arabia during and after the Gulf War. <u><strong>When al Qaeda joined forces with Ayman al Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1998, the conflict became less of a domestic Saudi conflict and more of an intraArab, intra-Muslim world conflict between radical proponents of Islamic fundamentalism and more secular western-oriented governments supported by the U.</u></strong>S. In such cases, parties to the conflict often view these actions in terms of the continuation of domestic political struggles abroad whereas the host countries in which this struggle takes place label it “international terrorism.” Just as Clausewitz defined war as “politics by other means,” depending on one’s perspective, certain forms of international terrorism may be considered transnational diasporic politics by other means.</p><p><u><strong><mark>There are</mark> also <mark>many</mark> very important <mark>cases of migrants who </mark>have <mark>become terrorists</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u><strong>Osama bin Laden is one of the world’s 191 million migrants and has been a migrant for most of the past 30 years. Born in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden spent the better part of a decade in Afghanistan before co-founding al Qaeda in Afghanistan during 1988. After assuming unrivalled leadership of al Qaeda, he accepted Sudanese political leader Hassan al Turabi’s invitation in 1989 to move the organization to Sudan. Bin Laden, himself, moved back to his native Saudi Arabia but within a year, he ran afoul of the Saudi government, which then took actions to silence him, including seizing his Saudi passport. In April 1991, bin Laden slipped out of the country and moved to Sudan where he had purchased property and then began setting up a variety of businesses. The rich Saudi immigrant not only engaged in major Sudanese road building projects but supported a series of operations against US military and diplomatic installations abroad. After the Saudi monarchy revoked bin Laden’s citizenship and froze his financial assets, external pressure on the Sudanese government to clamp down on bin Laden mounted and he eventually opted, in May 1996, to move his family and closest supporters to Jallabad, Afghanistan, where he and his entourage were allowed to stay by local political leaders and, eventually, as guests of the Taliban, once they gained control of most of the country. Bin Laden primarily resided in Afghanistan until the US-led invasion and, by most accounts; he is now an illegal migrant in Pakistan.</p><p></u></strong>Although none of the 9/11 hijackers were immigrants to the US, <u><strong>Mohamed Atta and several other hijackers lived outside of their countries of birth or nationality for several years before launching the attacks and, therefore, were also part of the world’s migrant population</u></strong>. Atta moved from his native Egypt to Germany in 1992, where he studied urban planning and worked part-time, receiving his masters degree in 1999. <u><strong>Marwan al Shehi, a national of the United Arab Emirates, received a military scholarship to study in Germany and first entered the country in 1996.</u></strong> Lebanese national Ziad Jarrah enrolled in a German junior college in 1996. <u><strong>These men, who piloted three of the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11, were members of the so-called “Hamburg cell.” Although the three entered Germany on temporary residence permits</u></strong> and were not considered immigrants by the German government, <u><strong>they could possibly have gone on to further education and professional careers in Germany and become permanent residents</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><strong>US State Department consular officers in Berlin basically treated them for visa purposes as if they were permanent residents</u></strong> or German citizens because they resided in Germany for more than two years, learned the relatively difficult language of German, matriculated to a German University and, therefore, did not present a significant “risk” to immigrate to the US due to their strong ties to Germany (9/11 Commission 2004a, 118). As this case illustrates, <u><strong><mark>immigrants</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>one state could become security risks as travelers to another state</mark>.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: SHANNON ROESLER, 19 - Robert S. Kerr, Jr. Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law (“AGENCY REASONS AT THE INTERSECTION OF EXPERTISE AND PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES” ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [71:3, http://www.administrativelawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ALR-71.3_Roesler_Book-PDF.pdf //DH fulltext: C. Interpreting Statutory Language—and Agency Interpretations—with Science in Mind Judicial review should also serve to check identity-protective reasoning in agencies’ interpretations of their statutory responsibilities. Rarely will agencies contradict statutory authority so clearly as to violate the plain meaning of the statute under the first step in a deferential Chevron analysis. But an agency interpretation of an environmental or public health statute that disregards policy-relevant science could easily be unreasonable under step two of Chevron. Another way in which deference doctrine could guard against motivated reasoning would be to consider whether an agency’s interpretation is informed by its expertise in deciding how much deference to afford that interpretation in the first place. This final Section briefly discusses both approaches and applies them to agency decisions subject to current litigation. Should a court decide that an agency’s interpretation is due Chevron deference, its analysis of whether the interpretation is reasonable should include an inquiry into whether the agency reasonably considered policy-relevant science, provided that the authorizing statute allows for such an inquiry. In other words, even if the statute does not direct the agency to review relevant scientific knowledge, consideration of policy-relevant science should be a default rule for interpreting statutes that regulate public health and environmental risks. Courts should presume that agencies must consider all relevant scientific evidence in the absence of clear intent to the contrary. A science-consideration default rule would look much like the cost-consideration default rule that the Court adopted in Michigan v. EPA.302 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia found the EPA’s interpretation of the words “appropriate and necessary” unreasonable because it did not include consideration of cost.303 He explained that because cost consideration is a long-established practice, “it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether ‘regulation is appropriate and necessary’ as an invitation to ignore cost.”304 As the examples below demonstrate, it would be similarly unreasonable to interpret language in environmental statutes in a manner that ignores relevant science.305 Another way to ensure consideration of policy-relevant science is to recognize its place within deference doctrine generally. If Chevron does not apply to the agency interpretation in a given case, the lesser deference afforded by Skidmore v. Swift & Co.306 would turn on factors tied to the agency as expert, rather than the agency as policymaker: “The weight of such a[n] [interpretive] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evi dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”307 Indeed, in Barnhart v. Walton,308 Justice Breyer approached the threshold question of whether to apply Chevron deference by applying Skidmore-like factors.309 Writing for the Court, he concluded that Chevron applied in part because of the nature of the question and “related expertise of the Agency,” along with the consistency of the agency’s interpretation over time.310 Following this approach, when an agency applies policy-relevant science to an interpretation, that expertise entitles the agency interpretation to more deference either under the conventional Chevron framework or in terms of the Skidmore factors’ “power to persuade.”311 To be sure, courts should not use these approaches as a means of imposing their own judgments regarding science-policy issues. Both a background rule regarding science-consideration and a Barnhart recognition of expertise require a reviewing court to recognize the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge. Regulations that protect the environment and public health often rely on scientific knowledge that is uncertain in ways discussed above. Interpreting a statute to require certainty—even in the legal sense of more likely than not—misunderstands the scientific process and undercuts the agency’s ability to fulfill its statutory mandate. The classic case that illustrates how courts can fail to appreciate the fundamentally different nature of scientific knowledge is the “benzene” case, in which the Supreme Court struck down the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) 1 ppm exposure limit on benzene in the workplace.312 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, interpreted the statutory language that empowered OSHA to promulgate workplace standards “reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment” to require a showing that the standard is “reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment.”313 As the dissenting justices argued, the plurality’s interpretation of the statute failed to acknowledge the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge.314 Scientists must extrapolate from epidemiological and animal studies to make risk assessments; their conclusions necessarily incorporate trans-scientific judgments and uncertainties because they cannot conduct double-blind clinical studies that expose people to a known carcinogen.315 A court applying the science-consideration default rule would ask whether the agency considered the relevant scientific literature and used its expertise to further the statute’s purposes—in this case, the health and safety of workers. When viewed from this perspective, the agency’s decision to exercise precaution (because it could not identify a safe exposure limit) and set the limit based on economic feasibility is reasonable. Similarly, on the Barnhardt continuum, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to judicial deference because it is using its expertise to interpret the statute in light of scientific uncertainty. In regulating benzene in the workplace, OSHA was drawing on its expertise to make policy judgments protective of human health in face of scientific uncertainty. These kinds of informed judgments are entitled to deference. Conversely, when agency interpretations of environmental and public health statutes are not informed by relevant science or in keeping with statutory purposes, they are either due less deference or are unreasonable under step two of Chevron. For example, the EPA and Army Corps’ proposed rescission of the Obama Administration’s Clean Water Rule is unreasonable because it does not adequately consider scientific knowledge in determining the extent to which wetlands are covered by the phrase “waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act.316 The Obama-era interpretation of the Act’s coverage was based on a 400-page “connectivity report” that detailed scientific research on the connection between wetlands, including isolated wetlands, and downstream rivers, lakes, and streams.317 In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the current EPA and Army Corps accuse the previous administration of relying too much on science: “The agencies now believe that they previously placed too much emphasis on the information and conclusions of the Connectivity Report when setting jurisdictional lines in the 2015 Rule.”318 This alone might not constitute an unreasonable interpretation of the Clean Water Act, but failure to accurately represent the scientific research on water quality and wetlands would entitle the final rule to less deference.319 Another example of a proposed rule that affects regulatory science is EPA’s proposed rule entitled “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science.”320 This rule would require that the scientific data underlying policy-relevant scientific studies “are publicly available in a manner sufficient for independent validation.”321 Scientists and legal scholars have objected to this rule as unnecessary and contrary to best scientific practices because it would preclude the use of valid scientific studies based on data that is unavailable due to confidentiality agreements with study participants or the proprietary interests of investigators.322 As a comment submitted by law faculty argues, the statutory provisions upon which the EPA relies in the rulemaking only authorize the EPA to establish research programs.323 None of the provisions speak to the nature of a study’s underlying data. Indeed, the data disclosure requirement would seriously limit the EPA’s ability to rely on the best available scientific evidence in fulfilling its mission to protect public health and the environment. It is therefore unreasonable in light of the background principle of science consideration and entitled to little deference under Barnhart given the agency’s failure to employ its expertise. The last example is from the ESA litigation regarding the dusky gopher frog, a case that made it all the way to the Supreme Court this past term.324 The ESA lists the dusky gopher frog as an endangered species.325 Consistent with statutory directives, FWS designated “habitat” of the endangered frog that it was “considered to be critical habitat.”326 Landowners whose property fell within the designation challenged FWS’s decision.327 A key issue in the case involves the ESA’s provision defining “critical habitat.” The ESA contains a definition of “critical habitat” that includes areas occupied by the species and areas currently not occupied by the species if the agency deems “such areas essential for the conservation of the species.”328 The word “habitat” is not separately defined. The landowners argued that FWS could not designate their land as “habitat” because it is currently not occupied by the frog and the frog could not survive on the land in its current condition.329 The Supreme Court held that although “critical habitat” is defined in the statute, it is a “subset” of the larger category of “habitat,” which the statute does not define.330 Because the Fifth Circuit had relied on the “critical habitat” definition and had not interpreted the term “habitat,” the Court remanded the case, signaling that the appellate court should consider whether the term “habitat” contains a “habitability requirement.”331 Recognizing a background, or default, rule requiring FWS to interpret “habitat” with relevant science in mind would help resolve this case. FWS’s interpretation allows for the designation of “habitat” that is unoccupied and currently unsuitable for the species precisely because this is what is scientifically sound for the recovery of the species. As scientists argued in an amicus brief before the Court, “habitat” should be defined according to scientific understanding rather than a general dictionary definition because “habitat may vary in quality over space and time.”332 For this reason, “habitat” should not be interpreted in a static way, but at a “landscape scale” that acknowledges the dynamic nature of habitat and species conservation.333 A definition that does not include unoccupied lands or lands in need of restoration would undermine FWS’s ability to fulfill its conservation mission under the ESA.334 To ensure the recovery of a species, FWS must be able to plan on larger spatial and temporal scales. In short, FWS’s scientific understanding of “habitat” is not likely a product of political preferences but is instead a result of expert judgment and therefore entitled to deference. CONCLUSION Reason giving has a long history in administrative law. That history reflects the changes in the structure and extent of the administrative state, as well as changes in conceptions of scientific knowledge and rationality. A contemporary model of agency decisionmaking must balance the reality of increased presidential influence against congressional mandates to protect public health and the environment. A realistic model that acknowledges that agencies are political decision makers subject to motivated reasoning provides a foundation upon which to build doctrines of judicial review that keep political influence from swallowing expert judgment. Although the line between science and policy is not clear, courts can identify the “danger signals” of motivated reasoning in reviewing an agency’s record. When these “danger signals” are present, hard-look review can discern whether an agency’s discussions of policy-relevant science are predetermined by presidential preferences. Similarly, the adoption of a science-consideration presumption in interpreting environmental and public health statutes would provide a check on motivated reasoning and reduce the likelihood that presidential preferences will undermine legislative directives.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The plan creates a <u>default science presumption</u> in judicial review – that checks <u>motivated reasoning</u> </h4><p>SHANNON <strong>ROESLER, 19</strong> - Robert S. Kerr, Jr. Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law (“AGENCY REASONS AT THE INTERSECTION OF EXPERTISE AND PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES” ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [71:3, http://www.administrativelawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ALR-71.3_Roesler_Book-PDF.pdf //DH</p><p>C. Interpreting Statutory Language—and Agency Interpretations—with Science in Mind Judicial review should also serve to check identity-protective reasoning in agencies’ interpretations of their statutory responsibilities. Rarely will agencies contradict statutory authority so clearly as to violate the plain meaning of the statute under the first step in a deferential Chevron analysis. But <u>an <mark>agency interpretation </mark>of an environmental or public health statute<mark> that disregards </mark>policy-relevant <mark>science could </mark>easily<mark> be unreasonable under step two of Chevron</mark>.</u> Another way in which <u>deference doctrine could guard against motivated reasoning would be to consider whether an agency’s interpretation is informed by its expertise in deciding how much deference to afford</u> that interpretation in the first place. This final Section briefly discusses both approaches and applies them to agency decisions subject to current litigation. Should a <u>court</u> decide that an agency’s interpretation is due Chevron deference, its <u>analysis of whether the interpretation is reasonable should include an inquiry into whether the agency reasonably considered policy-relevant science</u>, provided that the authorizing statute allows for such an inquiry. In other words, even if the statute does not direct the agency to review relevant scientific knowledge, <u><mark>consideration of </mark>policy-relevant <mark>science should be a <strong>default rule</strong> for</mark> interpreting statutes that regulate public health and <mark>environmental risks</mark>. Courts should presume that agencies must consider all relevant scientific evidence</u> in the absence of clear intent to the contrary. <u>A science-consideration default rule would look much like the cost-consideration default rule that the Court adopted in Michigan v. EPA</u>.302 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia found the EPA’s interpretation of the words “appropriate and necessary” unreasonable because it did not include consideration of cost.303 He explained that because cost consideration is a long-established practice, “it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether ‘regulation is appropriate and necessary’ as an invitation to ignore cost.”304 As the examples below demonstrate, it would be similarly unreasonable to interpret language in environmental statutes in a manner that ignores relevant science.305 Another way to ensure consideration of policy-relevant science is to recognize its place within deference doctrine generally. <u>If Chevron does not apply to the agency interpretation in a given case, the lesser deference afforded by Skidmore</u> v. Swift & Co.306 <u>would turn on factors tied to the agency as expert, rather than the agency as policymaker</u>: “The weight of such a[n] [interpretive] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evi dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”307 Indeed, in Barnhart v. Walton,308 Justice Breyer approached the threshold question of whether to apply Chevron deference by applying Skidmore-like factors.309 Writing for the Court, he concluded that Chevron applied in part because of the nature of the question and “related expertise of the Agency,” along with the consistency of the agency’s interpretation over time.310 Following this approach, <u>when an agency applies policy-relevant <mark>science</mark> to an interpretation, that expertise <mark>entitles the agency interpretation to <strong>more deference</strong></mark> either <mark>under</mark> the conventional <mark>Chevron</mark> framework or in terms of the Skidmore factors’ “power to persuade.”</u>311 To be sure, <u>courts should not use these approaches as a means of imposing their own judgments regarding science-policy issues</u>. Both a background rule regarding science-consideration and a Barnhart recognition of expertise require a reviewing court to recognize the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge. <u>Regulations that protect the environment and public health often rely on scientific knowledge that is uncertain </u>in ways discussed above. <u>Interpreting a statute to require certainty</u>—even in the legal sense of more likely than not—<u>misunderstands the scientific process and undercuts the agency’s ability to fulfill its statutory mandate.</u> The classic case that illustrates how courts can fail to appreciate the fundamentally different nature of scientific knowledge is the “benzene” case, in which the Supreme Court struck down the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) 1 ppm exposure limit on benzene in the workplace.312 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, interpreted the statutory language that empowered OSHA to promulgate workplace standards “reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment” to require a showing that the standard is “reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment.”313 As the dissenting justices argued, the plurality’s interpretation of the statute failed to acknowledge the nature of scientific inquiry and knowledge.314 Scientists must extrapolate from epidemiological and animal studies to make risk assessments; their conclusions necessarily incorporate trans-scientific judgments and uncertainties because they cannot conduct double-blind clinical studies that expose people to a known carcinogen.315 <u>A court applying the science-consideration default rule would ask whether the agency considered the relevant scientific literature </u>and used its expertise to further the statute’s purposes—in this case, the health and safety of workers. When viewed from this perspective, the agency’s decision to exercise precaution (because it could not identify a safe exposure limit) and set the limit based on economic feasibility is reasonable. Similarly, on the Barnhardt continuum, <u>the agency’s interpretation is entitled to judicial deference because it is using its expertise to interpret the statute in light of scientific uncertainty</u>. In regulating benzene in the workplace, OSHA was drawing on its expertise to make policy judgments protective of human health in face of scientific uncertainty. These kinds of informed judgments are entitled to deference. Conversely<u>, when agency interpretations of environmental and public health statutes are not informed by relevant science</u> or in keeping with statutory purposes, <u>they are either due less deference or are unreasonable under step two of Chevron.</u> For example, <u><mark>the</mark> EPA and Army Corps’ proposed <mark>rescission of</u></mark> <u>the</u> Obama Administration’s <u><strong><mark>C</mark>lean<mark> W</mark>ater<mark> R</mark>ule</u></strong><mark> <u></mark>is unreasonable because it <mark>does not </mark>adequately<mark> consider scientific knowledge</mark> in determining the extent to which wetlands are covered by the phrase “waters of the United States</u>” in the Clean Water Act.316 <u>The Obama</u>-era <u>interpretation of the Act’s coverage was based on a 400-page “connectivity report” that detailed scientific research on the connection between wetlands, including isolated wetlands, and downstream rivers, lakes, and streams</u>.317 In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the current EPA and Army Corps accuse the previous administration of relying too much on science: “The agencies now believe that they previously placed too much emphasis on the information and conclusions of the Connectivity Report when setting jurisdictional lines in the 2015 Rule.”318 This alone might not constitute an unreasonable interpretation of the Clean Water Act, but <u><mark>failure to accurately represent the scientific research on water</mark> quality and wetlands <strong><mark>would entitle the final rule to less deference</u></strong></mark>.319 Another example of a proposed rule that affects regulatory science is EPA’s proposed rule entitled “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science.”320 This rule would require that the scientific data underlying policy-relevant scientific studies “are publicly available in a manner sufficient for independent validation.”321 Scientists and legal scholars have objected to this rule as unnecessary and contrary to best scientific practices because it would preclude the use of valid scientific studies based on data that is unavailable due to confidentiality agreements with study participants or the proprietary interests of investigators.322 As a comment submitted by law faculty argues, the statutory provisions upon which the EPA relies in the rulemaking only authorize the EPA to establish research programs.323 None of the provisions speak to the nature of a study’s underlying data. Indeed, the data disclosure requirement would seriously limit the EPA’s ability to rely on the best available scientific evidence in fulfilling its mission to protect public health and the environment. It is therefore unreasonable in light of the background principle of science consideration and entitled to little deference under Barnhart given the agency’s failure to employ its expertise. The last example is from the ESA litigation regarding the dusky gopher frog, a case that made it all the way to the Supreme Court this past term.324 The ESA lists the dusky gopher frog as an endangered species.325 Consistent with statutory directives, FWS designated “habitat” of the endangered frog that it was “considered to be critical habitat.”326 Landowners whose property fell within the designation challenged FWS’s decision.327 A key issue in the case involves the ESA’s provision defining “critical habitat.” The ESA contains a definition of “critical habitat” that includes areas occupied by the species and areas currently not occupied by the species if the agency deems “such areas essential for the conservation of the species.”328 The word “habitat” is not separately defined. The landowners argued that FWS could not designate their land as “habitat” because it is currently not occupied by the frog and the frog could not survive on the land in its current condition.329 The Supreme Court held that although “critical habitat” is defined in the statute, it is a “subset” of the larger category of “habitat,” which the statute does not define.330 Because the Fifth Circuit had relied on the “critical habitat” definition and had not interpreted the term “habitat,” the Court remanded the case, signaling that the appellate court should consider whether the term “habitat” contains a “habitability requirement.”331 Recognizing a background, or default, rule requiring FWS to interpret “habitat” with relevant science in mind would help resolve this case. FWS’s interpretation allows for the designation of “habitat” that is unoccupied and currently unsuitable for the species precisely because this is what is scientifically sound for the recovery of the species. As scientists argued in an amicus brief before the Court, “habitat” should be defined according to scientific understanding rather than a general dictionary definition because “habitat may vary in quality over space and time.”332 For this reason, “habitat” should not be interpreted in a static way, but at a “landscape scale” that acknowledges the dynamic nature of habitat and species conservation.333 A definition that does not include unoccupied lands or lands in need of restoration would undermine FWS’s ability to fulfill its conservation mission under the ESA.334 To ensure the recovery of a species, FWS must be able to plan on larger spatial and temporal scales. In short, FWS’s scientific understanding of “habitat” is not likely a product of political preferences but is instead a result of expert judgment and therefore entitled to deference. CONCLUSION Reason giving has a long history in administrative law. That history reflects the changes in the structure and extent of the administrative state, as well as changes in conceptions of scientific knowledge and rationality. A contemporary model of agency decisionmaking must balance the reality of increased presidential influence against congressional mandates to protect public health and the environment. <u><mark>A </mark>realistic<mark> <strong>model </strong>that acknowledges that agencies are political decision makers</mark> subject to motivated reasoning <mark>provides a <strong>foundation</mark> </strong>upon which <strong><mark>to build</mark> <mark>doctrines of judicial review</strong> that <strong>keep political influence from swallowing expert judgment</strong>.</u></mark> Although the line between science and policy is not clear, courts can identify the “danger signals” of motivated reasoning in reviewing an agency’s record. <u>When</u> these “<u>danger signals” are present, hard-look review can discern whether an agency’s discussions of policy-relevant science are predetermined by presidential preferences</u>. Similarly, <u>the adoption of <mark>a science-consideration presumption</u></mark> in interpreting environmental and public health statutes <u><mark>would </mark>provide a <strong><mark>check</mark> on <mark>motivated reasoning</strong> </mark>and reduce the likelihood that presidential preferences will undermine legislative directives. </p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: King ’18 [Tiffany Lethabo King is associate professor of women's, gender, and sexuality studies at Georgia State University. “Racial Ecologies: Black Landscapes in Flux.” Racial Ecologies. Chapter 4. Edited by Leilani Nishime and Kim D Hester Williams. University of Washington Press. 2018. ISBN 978-0-295-74371-4. //shree] fulltext: As early as 1997, scholars like Saidiya Hartman were theorizing and elaborating the significance of Black fungibility – of Black bodies and the idea of Blackness as fungible – for thinking about how slavery and its afterlife imagines Black people. In Scenes of Subjection, Hartman applies the political-economic term fungibility to the elasticity and exchangeability of Black bodies. She argues that the enslaved embody the abstract “interchangeability and replaceability” endemic to the definition of commodity. But unlike a strict political economic framework’s emphasis on the one to one exchangeability of a commodity-form, Hartman’s Black body has figurative and metaphorical value. Explaining this elasticity and fluidity, Hartman defines fungibility’s relationship to Blackness by stating that “the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the project of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values. While the theorization of Black fungibility begins in the violence of slavery, Black scholars have transformed Black openness, elasticity, and fungibility into a resource. Following the tradition of the enslaved, Black scholars have been able to use Blackness’s capacity for flux and change into an opportunity for flight. This chapter experiments with reading an eighteenth-century map of the coast of South Carolina and Georgia that depicts Black people cultivating indigo through the lens of fungibility rather than labor. This experiment asks the reader to consider what new ways of seeing and thinking emerge if fungibility becomes the focus. In the words of Mart Stewart, William de Brahm’s 1757 Map of the South Carolina and Georgia “has gained a reputation as the first ‘scientific’ or ‘modern’ map of southeastern North America.” It became the standard source for geographic knowledge of the British colonies in North America. Measuring approximately four feet by four feet, the map is an arresting and imposing work split diagonally by a rendition of the coastline of southern North Carolina, all of South Carolina, and Georgia. Land and sea appear to occupy approximately equal areas of the map. The cartouche, placed in bottom right corner of the map (in the Atlantic Ocean), is a large-scale etching that effectively zooms in on daily activity on the shores of the Atlantic. The cartouche is elaborately detailed and animated by the motions of the enslaved, a coastline, the sea, ships in the distance, foliage, plant life, and a multistage depiction of indigo processing. To the left of the cartouche, anchoring the map, is a legend listing the owners of property (land and slaves). The map labels identify different kinds of territories, units of property, soil types, larger geographic units like the ocean, and colonial boundaries. Most important, this text supports the overall story told by the cartouche. READING A MAP IN MOTION I read de Brahm’s map against the grain (yet within the context of colonial orders) in order to illuminate the ways that both nature (plant and nonhuman life) and Black bodies (and ideas of Blackness) needed to be rendered as open and moving processes before they could be represented as ontologically fixed. I draw on literature from environmental history as well as methods from postcolonial visual analysis to trace the conventions that transform the renderings and representations on the map from fixed and inert, already knowable objects into dynamic processes. Rather than view the map as simply a representation of plants, ocean, shoreline, and Black laboring bodies on a plantation, I reimagine and re-present the map as a scene of motion, movement, and flux that have not yet been given fixed borders or placed in colonial categories. Rereading de Brahm’s map attends to a temporary epistemic break, or stop gap, in which Black bodies, nonhuman plant life, and other natural matter function as symbols of transition and flux. The natural sciences that emerged during the European Enlightenment ordered people’s perceptions – their ideas of what it was possible to see and think. Cartesianism distinguishes between human (culture) and nonhuman biomatter (nature). Further, human and nonhuman organisms are imagined as inert objects rather than interrelated, dynamic, ever-changing systems. Recently, the environmental historian Mart Steward has intervened in the fields of environmental history and critical cartography by reading the eighteenth-century plantation scene in the de Brahm map as a colonial landscape in process. This chapter extends on this important visual and spatial analysis but also contends with the forgotten landscape of Blackness. I extend upon Stewart’s work in taking the depictions of Black bodies on the plantation as depictions of figures and bodies in process. Commissioned in 1753 by British subjects and settlers and completed in 1757, de Brahm’s map depicts a number of dynamic landscapes: the ocean, the flora and fauna, Black enslaved figures in motion, and the process of turning the Indigofera plant into dye. In Stewart’s words, this map, like many others of this century depicting British territories, “both described and hoped for an agenda of development.” My visual analysis maps the imagination and the epistemological systems that the conquistadores and settlers relied on to create spatial representations of empire. I also show how the Cartesian landscape in de Brahm’s map and the figures within it had to be thrown into a state of flux (movement, process, and boundlessness) before they could be imagined as inert forms that could be captured and fixed in space. Paradoxically, the need to render life forms as discrete, knowable, containable, and fixed simultaneously required them to be represented as unstable and unchanging. Cartesianism’s fixed boundaries are a colonial ruse: boundaries continually need to be made malleable and thrown into flux in order for them to be reorganized and reconstituted with new, humanist boundary markers. Mart Stewart notes that de Brahm, “a student of alchemy and a natural philosopher,” understood that every “landscape was always in a process of change and transformation, and each statement about it was conditional.” I also use de Brahm’s map as an ideal place to situate and interpret Blackness and Black bdies as processes or representations of states of change. Of particular importance to this analysis is the cultivation and processing of indigo dye that is represented in the map’s cartouche. The kinetic energy and process of indigo dye cultivation – in which enslaved Black and fungible bodies, the cell of plants, lye, and water are juxtaposed and thrown into motion. Thinking about this map in this fashion enables a way of seeing and imagining Blackness as a set of ecotones, or transitional processes: water yielding to shore, shore to clearing, clearing to plantation, plantation to indigo processing site, indigo processing site to moving Black bodies, moving Black bodies to indigo dye. This visual sensibility and perspective undermine coloniality’s visual imperative to categorize all living and nonliving matter as discrete, countable objects. If objects cannot be visualized and understood as discrete elements, the empiricist grounding of humanism and its distinctions is undermined. For example, I argue that de Brahm’s map depicts Black forms not as human workers but as states of process. Reading Black fungibility as flux is to read it as opacity. If the Black figure on the plantation landscape is obscure and not yet known, it can elude certain forms of representation that attempt to fix it in space and time. Black forms on the landscape are yet to be understood rather than always already known. A focus on process and states of change (things that can’t be pinned down) also exposes the colonial ruse of empiricism – by exposing the “Black” phantasmic or imaginary – within hegemonic visual regimes. My scrutiny of the imaginative and speculative nature of eighteenth-century cartography, an emerging science, reveals the fiction of empiricism and its production of the idea of truth through an accounting of the “real.” The imaginative landscapes of this eighteenth-century map reveal that there was not necessarily a discrete, inert, and visible catalogue of real bodies, nature, and land that could be truly captured and known. Therefore, Black bodies, nonhuman life forms, and the ways they were categorized through humanist forms of Cartesianism can be called into question. The categories of human and nonhuman laborer, plant, land, animal, and other forms of life, and the boundaries between them become suspect political projects. Black bodies function outside these categories and simultaneously call into question the borders placed around them.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Black lives are <u>necessarily geographic</u>, but struggle with discourses that <u>erase</u> and <u>despatialize</u> their sense of place. Cartesian spatial imaginaries, starting with William de Brahm’s original map of the American plantation, reinforce an episteme of <u>cartographic</u> coherence that renders nature <u>inert</u>, <u>knowable</u>, and <u>self-evident</u>. This visual imperative posits Black ecotones as <u>fungible</u> – an empty vessel to project the conquistador’s ideas, desires, and values in the afterlife of slavery.</h4><p><strong>King ’18</strong> [Tiffany Lethabo King is associate professor of women's, gender, and sexuality studies at Georgia State University. “Racial Ecologies: Black Landscapes in Flux.” Racial Ecologies. Chapter 4. Edited by Leilani Nishime and Kim D Hester Williams. University of Washington Press. 2018. ISBN 978-0-295-74371-4. //shree]</p><p>As early as 1997, <u>scholars like Saidiya Hartman were <mark>theorizing</u></mark> and elaborating the significance of Black fungibility – of Black bodies and the idea of <u><mark>Blackness as <strong>fungible</u></strong></mark> – <u>for <mark>think</mark>ing <mark>about how <strong>slavery</strong> and its <strong>afterlife</strong> imagines Black people</u></mark>. In Scenes of Subjection, <u>Hartman applies the political-economic term fungibility to the <strong><mark>elasticity</strong> and <strong>exchangeability</strong></mark> of Black bodies</u>. <u>She argues that the enslaved <mark>embody</mark> the abstract “interchangeability and replaceability” endemic to <mark>the</mark> definition of <mark>commodity</u></mark>. But unlike a strict political economic framework’s emphasis on the one to one exchangeability of a commodity-form, Hartman’s Black body has figurative and metaphorical value. Explaining this elasticity and fluidity, Hartman defines fungibility’s relationship to Blackness by stating that “<u>the <mark>fungibility</mark> of the commodity <mark>makes the captive</mark> body <mark>an</mark> abstract and <strong><mark>empty</strong> vessel</mark> vulnerable <mark>to</mark> the <mark>project</mark> of <strong><mark>others’</strong></mark> feelings, <strong><mark>ideas</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>desires</strong></mark>, <mark>and <strong>values</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>While the theorization of Black fungibility begins in the violence of slavery, Black scholars have transformed Black openness, elasticity, and fungibility into a resource. Following the tradition of the enslaved, Black scholars have been able to use Blackness’s capacity for flux and change into an opportunity for flight. This chapter experiments with reading an eighteenth-century map of the coast of South Carolina and Georgia that depicts Black people cultivating indigo through the lens of fungibility rather than labor. This experiment asks the reader to consider what new ways of seeing and thinking emerge if fungibility becomes the focus.</p><p>In the words of Mart Stewart, <u>William <mark>de Brahm</mark>’s 1757 Map of the South Carolina and Georgia “has gained a reputation <mark>as the first</mark> ‘scientific’ or ‘<strong><mark>modern</strong></mark>’ <mark>map</u></mark> of southeastern North America.” <u>It <mark>became</mark> the <mark>standard</mark> source <mark>for <strong>geographic</strong> knowledge of</mark> the British <mark>colonies in</mark> North <mark>America</u></mark>. <u>Measuring</u> approximately <u>four feet by four feet</u>, <u>the map is an <mark>arresting</u></mark> and imposing <u>work</u> split diagonally by a rendition of the coastline of southern North Carolina, all of South Carolina, and Georgia. Land and sea appear to occupy approximately equal areas of the map.</p><p>The cartouche, placed in bottom right corner of the map (in the Atlantic Ocean), is a large-scale etching that effectively zooms in on daily activity on the shores of the Atlantic. The cartouche is <u>elaborately detailed and animated by the motions of <mark>the <strong>enslaved</strong></mark>, a <strong><mark>coastline</strong></mark>, the sea, ships in the distance, <strong><mark>foliage</strong></mark>, plant life, <mark>and</mark> a multistage depiction of <strong><mark>indigo</strong></mark> processing. To the left of the cartouche, anchoring the map, is a legend <mark>listing</mark> the <strong><mark>owners of property</u></strong></mark> (<u>land and slaves</u>). The map labels identify different kinds of territories, units of property, soil types, larger geographic units like the ocean, and colonial boundaries. Most important, this text supports the overall story told by the cartouche.</p><p>READING A MAP IN MOTION</p><p><u>I read de Brahm’s map against the grain</u> (yet within the context of colonial orders) in order to illuminate the ways that both nature (plant and nonhuman life) and Black bodies (and ideas of Blackness) needed to be rendered as open and moving processes before they could be represented as ontologically fixed. I draw on literature from environmental history as well as methods from postcolonial visual analysis to trace the conventions that transform the renderings and representations on the map from fixed and inert, already knowable objects into dynamic processes. Rather than view the map as simply a representation of plants, ocean, shoreline, and Black laboring bodies on a plantation, <u>I reimagine and re-present the map as a scene of motion</u>, movement, and flux <u>that have not yet been given fixed borders or placed in colonial categories</u>.</p><p>Rereading <u><mark>de Brahm’s map</u></mark> attends to a temporary epistemic break, or stop gap, in which Black bodies, nonhuman plant life, and other natural matter function as symbols of transition and flux. The natural sciences <u>that emerged during the European Enlightenment <mark>ordered</mark> people’s perceptions</u> – <u>their ideas of <mark>what</mark> it <strong><mark>was possible</strong> <strong>to</mark> see and think</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Cartesianism</strong> distinguishes between <strong>human</u></strong></mark> (<u><mark>culture</u></mark>) <u><mark>and <strong>nonhuman</strong></mark> biomatter</u> (<u><strong><mark>nature</u></strong></mark>). Further, <u>human and nonhuman organisms are <mark>imagined as <strong>inert objects</strong> rather than <strong>interrelated</u></strong></mark>, dynamic, <u>ever-changing systems</u>.</p><p>Recently, the environmental historian <u>Mart Steward has intervened in</u> the fields of environmental history and <u>critical cartography by reading <mark>the</mark> eighteenth-century <strong><mark>plantation</strong></mark> scene <mark>in the de Brahm map as a <strong>colonial landscape</strong></mark> in process</u>. This chapter extends on this important visual and spatial analysis but also contends with the forgotten landscape of Blackness. I extend upon Stewart’s work in taking the depictions of Black bodies on the plantation as depictions of figures and bodies in process.</p><p>Commissioned in 1753 by British subjects and settlers and completed in 1757, de Brahm’s map depicts a number of dynamic landscapes: the ocean, the flora and fauna, Black enslaved figures in motion, and the process of turning the Indigofera plant into dye. In Stewart’s words, <u>this map, like many others of this century depicting British territories, “both <strong>described</strong> and <strong><mark>hoped</strong> for an <strong>agenda of development</strong></mark>.”</u> <u>My visual analysis maps <strong>the imagination and the epistemological systems <mark>that</mark> the <mark>conquistadores</u></strong></mark> and settlers <u><strong><mark>relied on to create spatial representations of empire</u></strong></mark>. I also show how the Cartesian landscape in de Brahm’s map and the figures within it had to be thrown into a state of flux (movement, process, and boundlessness) before they could be imagined as inert forms that could be captured and fixed in space.</p><p>Paradoxically, <u>the need <mark>to render <strong>life</mark> forms <mark>as discrete</mark>, <mark>knowable</mark>, containable, <mark>and fixed</u></strong></mark> simultaneously required them to be represented as unstable and unchanging. Cartesianism’s fixed boundaries <u><mark>are a <strong></mark>colonial <mark>ruse</u></strong></mark>: boundaries continually need to be made malleable and thrown into flux in order for them to be reorganized and reconstituted with new, humanist boundary markers. Mart Stewart notes that de Brahm, “a student of alchemy and a natural philosopher,” understood that every “landscape was always in a process of change and transformation, and each statement about it was conditional.”</p><p>I also use de Brahm’s map as an ideal place to situate and interpret Blackness and Black bdies as processes or representations of states of change. Of particular importance to this analysis is the cultivation and processing of indigo dye that is represented in the map’s cartouche. The kinetic energy and process of indigo dye cultivation – in which enslaved Black and fungible bodies, the cell of plants, lye, and water are juxtaposed and thrown into motion.</p><p>Thinking about this map in this fashion enables a way of seeing and <u><mark>imagining <strong>Blackness as</mark> a set of <mark>ecotones</u></strong></mark>, or transitional processes<u><mark>: water yielding to shore</u></mark>, <u>shore <mark>to clearing</u></mark>, <u>clearing <mark>to plantation</u></mark>, plantation <u>to indigo processing site</u>, indigo processing site <u><mark>to</mark> moving Black <mark>bodies</u></mark>, moving Black bodies to indigo dye. This visual sensibility and perspective <u><mark>undermine <strong>coloniality’s</strong> <strong>visual</strong> <strong>imperative</strong> to <strong>categorize</strong></mark> all living and nonliving matter as discrete, countable objects</u>. If objects cannot be visualized and understood as discrete elements, the empiricist grounding of humanism and its distinctions is undermined. For example, I argue that de Brahm’s map depicts Black forms not as human workers but as states of process. <u><mark>Reading Black</mark> fungibility <mark>as flux is to <strong>read it as opacity</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>If the <strong>Black</strong> figure on the plantation</mark> landscape <mark>is</mark> obscure and <strong><mark>not yet known</strong></mark>, <mark>it can <strong>elude</strong></mark> certain forms of representation <mark>that attempt to <strong>fix</strong> it</mark> in space and time. Black forms on the landscape are yet to be understood rather than always already known. </p><p></u>A focus on process and states of change (things that can’t be pinned down) also exposes the colonial ruse of empiricism – by <u><mark>exposing the</mark> <strong>“<mark>Black</mark>” phantasmic or <mark>imaginary</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong><mark>within</strong> hegemonic</mark> visual <mark>regimes</u></mark>. My scrutiny of the imaginative and speculative nature of eighteenth-century cartography, an emerging science, <u><mark>reveals the <strong>fiction</strong> of</mark> empiricism and its production of the idea of truth through an accounting of <mark>the</mark> “<strong><mark>real</strong></mark>.”</u> The imaginative landscapes of this eighteenth-century map reveal that there was not necessarily a discrete, inert, and visible catalogue of real bodies, nature, and land that could be truly captured and known. Therefore, Black bodies, nonhuman life forms, and the ways they were categorized through humanist forms of Cartesianism can be called into question. <u>The <strong><mark>categories</strong> of human and nonhuman</mark> laborer</u>, <u>plant</u>, land, <u><mark>animal</u></mark>, and other forms of life, <u><mark>and</u></mark> the <u><mark>boundaries</mark> between them <mark>become</mark> <strong><mark>suspect</strong></mark> political projects</u>. <u>Black bodies function outside these categories and simultaneously call into question the borders placed around them.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Denkenberger 21 [David Denkenberger, Anders Sandberg, Ross John Tieman, and Joshua M. Pearce, * assistant professor of mechanical engineering at University of Alaska Fairbanks, “Long-term cost-effectiveness of interventions for loss of electricity/industry compared to artificial general intelligence safety,” 2021, European Journal of Futures Research, Vol. 9, Issue 1, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40309-021-00178-z, EA] fulltext: Civilization relies on a network of highly interdependent critical infrastructure (CI) to provide basic necessities (water, food, shelter, basic goods), as well as complex items (computers, cars, space shuttles) and services (the internet, cloud computing, global supply chains), henceforth referred to as industry. Electricity and the electrical infrastructure that distributes it plays an important role within industry, providing a convenient means to distribute energy able to be converted into various forms of useful work. Electricity is one component of industry albeit a critical one. Industry provides the means to sustain advanced civilization structures and the citizens that inhabit them. These structures play a critical role in realizing various futures by allowing humanity to discover and utilize new resources, adapt to various environments, and resist natural stressors. Though industry is capable of resisting small stressors, a sufficiently large event can precipitate cascading failure of CI systems, resulting in a collapse of industry. If one does not temporally discount the value of future people, the long-term future (thousands, millions, or even billions of years) could contain an astronomically large amount of value [18]. Events capable of curtailing the potential of civilization (existential risks, such as human extinction or an unrecoverable collapse) would prevent such futures from being achieved, implying reducing the likelihood of such events is of the utmost importance [100]. Reducing the prevalence of existential risks factors; events, systemic structures, or biases which increase the likelihood of extinction but do not cause extinction by themselves is also highly valuable. Complete collapse or degraded function of industry would drastically reduce humanity’s capacity to coordinate and deploy technology to prevent existential risks, representing an existential risk factor. Consequently, interventions preventing loss of industry, reducing the magnitude of impacts, or increasing speed of recovery could be extremely valuable. Existential risk research is, by nature, future focused, requiring the investigation of events that have not yet occurred. Futures studies methodologies are often applied to uncover salient trends or events, and explore potential causal structures [54, 123]. Probabilistic modeling techniques can then be used to determine the likelihood of such events occurring, including adequate treatment of uncertainty [101]. The cost-effectiveness modeling approach outlined in this paper is an example of this, attempting to assess the marginal utility of losing industry interventions on improving the long-term future. This approach could guide future efforts to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of interventions for different risks, existential or otherwise. More practically, this research can inform prioritization efforts of industrialized countries by providing estimates of the cost of global industrial collapse, and the utility of resilience interventions. This is relevant to the European Union which has a highly industrialized economy, providing $2.3 Trillion USD of the $13.7 Trillion USD global total of value add manufacturing [122]. The EU has shifted toward a more proactive foresight approach about natural and man-made disasters, noting the importance of rare high-impact events, systemic risks, and converging trends requiring better data and forecasting to drive a more ambitious crisis management system [47]. Still, it is clear that most academic and institutional emphasis has been on “ordinary” rather than extreme disasters, and risks from industry to the public and environment rather than widespread failures of industrial services causing harm. The integrated nature of the electric grid, which is based on centralized generation makes the entire system vulnerable to disruption.1 There are a number of anthropogenic and natural catastrophes that could result in regional-scale electrical grid failure, which would be expected to halt the majority of industries and machines in that area. A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) caused by a nuclear weapon could disable electricity over part of a continent [16, 48, 66, 93]. This could destroy the majority of electrical grid infrastructure, and as fossil fuel extraction and industry is reliant on electricity [49], industry would be disabled. Similarly, solar storms have destroyed electrical transformers connected to long transmission lines in the past [117]. The Carrington event in 1859 damaged telegraph lines, which was the only electrical infrastructure in existence at the time. It also caused Aurora Borealis that was visible in Cuba and Jamaica [70]. This could potentially disable electrical systems at high latitudes, which could represent 10% of electricity/industry globally. Though solar storms may last less than the 12 h that would be required to expose the entire earth with direct line of sight, the earth’s magnetic field lines redirect the storm to affect the opposite side of the earth [117]. Lastly, both physical [6, 8, 69, 89, 111] and cyber attacks [3, 63, 90, 96, 118, 128, 130] could also compromise electric grids. Physical attacks include traditional acts of terrorism such as bombing or sabotage [130] in addition to EMP attacks. Significant actors could scale up physical attacks, for example by using drones. A scenario could include terrorist groups hindering individual power plants [126], while a large adversary could undertake a similar operation physically to all plants and electrical grids in a region. Unfortunately, the traditional power grid infrastructure is simply incapable of withstanding intentional physical attacks [91]. Damage to the electric grid resulting in physical attack could be long lasting, as most traditional power plants operate with large transformers that are difficult to move and source. Custom rebuilt transformers require time for replacement ranging from months and even up to years [91]. For example, a relatively mild 2013 sniper attack on California’s Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) substation, which injured no one directly, was able to disable 17 transformers supplying power to Silicon Valley. Repairs and improvements cost PG&E roughly $100 million and lasted about a month [10, 102]. A coordinated attack with relatively simple technology (e.g., guns) could cause a regional electricity disruption. However, a high-tech attack could be even further widespread. The Pentagon reports spending roughly $100 million to repair cyber-related damages to the electric grid in 2009 [57]. There is also evidence that a computer virus caused an electrical outage in the Ukraine [56]. Unlike simplistic physical attacks, cyber attackers are capable of penetrating critical electric infrastructure from remote regions of the world, needing only communication pathways (e.g., the Internet or infected memory sticks) to install malware into the control systems of the electric power grid. For example, Stuxnet was a computer worm that destroyed Iranian centrifuges [73] to disable their nuclear industry. Many efforts are underway to harden the grid from such attacks [51, 63]. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security responded to ~ 200 cyber incidents in 2012 and 41% involved the electrical grid [103]. Nations routinely have made attempts to map current critical infrastructure for future navigation and control of the U.S. electrical system [57]. The electric grid in general is growing increasingly dependent upon the Internet and other network connections for data communication and monitoring systems [17, 112, 118, 127, 135]. Although this conveniently allows electrical suppliers management of systems, it increases the susceptibility of the grid to cyber-attack, through denial of webpage services to consumers, disruption to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) operating systems, or sustained widespread power outages [3, 72, 118, 120]. Thus global or regional loss of the Internet could have similar implications.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Grid security is an <u>impact filter</u>.</h4><p><strong>Denkenberger 21</strong> [David Denkenberger, Anders Sandberg, Ross John Tieman, and Joshua M. Pearce, * assistant professor of mechanical engineering at University of Alaska Fairbanks, “Long-term cost-effectiveness of interventions for loss of electricity/industry compared to artificial general intelligence safety,” 2021, European Journal of Futures Research<u>, Vol. 9, Issue 1, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40309-021-00178-z, EA]</p><p><mark>Civilization <strong>relies</strong> <strong>on</u></strong></mark> a network of <u>highly interdependent <strong>critical</strong> <strong><mark>infrastructure</u></strong></mark> (CI) <u>to provide basic necessities</u> (water, food, shelter, basic goods), as well as complex items (computers, cars, space shuttles) and services (the internet, cloud computing, global supply chains), henceforth referred to as industry. <u>Electricity and</u> the electrical <u>infrastructure</u> that distributes it plays an important role within industry, providing a convenient means to distribute energy able to be converted into various forms of useful work. Electricity <u>is one component of industry albeit</u> a <u><strong>critical</u></strong> one. <u>Industry provides the means to <strong>sustain</u></strong> advanced <u><strong>civilization structures</u></strong> and the citizens that inhabit them. <u>These</u> structures <u>play a critical role in realizing</u> various <u>futures by allowing humanity to discover and utilize new resources, adapt to</u> various <u>environments, and resist natural stressors.</p><p></u>Though industry is capable of resisting small stressors,<u> a sufficiently <mark>large event</mark> can <mark>precipitate <strong>cascading failure</strong></mark> of CI systems, resulting in</u> a <u><mark>collapse</mark> of industry</u>. If one does not temporally discount the value of future people, the long-term future (thousands, millions, or even billions of years) could contain an astronomically large amount of value [18]. Events capable of curtailing the potential of civilization (existential risks, such as human extinction or an unrecoverable collapse) would prevent such futures from being achieved, implying reducing the likelihood of such events is of the utmost importance [100]. <u>Reducing</u> the prevalence of <u>existential risks factors</u>; events, systemic structures, or biases <u>which increase the likelihood of extinction but do not cause extinction</u> by <u>themselves is</u> also <u><strong>highly valuable</u></strong>. Complete <u>collapse</u> or degraded function <u>of industry would <strong>drastically <mark>reduce</mark> humanity’s <mark>capacity</strong> to <strong>coordinate</strong> </mark>and <strong>deploy</strong> <strong><mark>tech</mark>nology</strong> <mark>to <strong>prevent</strong> <strong>existential</strong> <strong>risks</strong></mark>, representing an <strong>existential</strong> <strong>risk factor.</u></strong> Consequently, interventions preventing loss of industry, reducing the magnitude of impacts, or increasing speed of recovery could be extremely valuable.</p><p>Existential risk research is, by nature, future focused, requiring the investigation of events that have not yet occurred. Futures studies methodologies are often applied to uncover salient trends or events, and explore potential causal structures [54, 123]. Probabilistic modeling techniques can then be used to determine the likelihood of such events occurring, including adequate treatment of uncertainty [101]. The cost-effectiveness modeling approach outlined in this paper is an example of this, attempting to assess the marginal utility of losing industry interventions on improving the long-term future. This approach could guide future efforts to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of interventions for different risks, existential or otherwise. More practically, this research can inform prioritization efforts of industrialized countries by providing estimates of the cost of global industrial collapse, and the utility of resilience interventions. This is relevant to the European Union which has a highly industrialized economy, providing $2.3 Trillion USD of the $13.7 Trillion USD global total of value add manufacturing [122]. The EU has shifted toward a more proactive foresight approach about natural and man-made disasters, noting the importance of rare high-impact events, systemic risks, and converging trends requiring better data and forecasting to drive a more ambitious crisis management system [47]. Still, it is clear that most academic and institutional emphasis has been on “ordinary” rather than extreme disasters, and risks from industry to the public and environment rather than widespread failures of industrial services causing harm.</p><p>The integrated nature of <u>the</u> electric <u>grid</u>, which is <u>based on <strong>centralized</strong> <strong>generation</strong> <mark>makes the </mark>entire <mark>system vulnerable</mark> to disruption.</u>1 There are <u>a number of</u> anthropogenic and natural <u>catastrophes</u> that <u>could result in</u> regional-scale electrical <u>grid failure</u>, which would be expected to halt the majority of industries and machines in that area. A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) caused by a nuclear weapon could disable electricity over part of a continent [16, 48, 66, 93]. This could destroy the majority of electrical grid infrastructure, and as fossil fuel extraction and industry is reliant on electricity [49], industry would be disabled. Similarly, <u><strong>solar</strong> <strong>storms</u></strong> have <u>destroyed electrical transformers connected to <strong>long transmission lines</strong> in the past</u> [117]. The Carrington event in 1859 damaged telegraph lines, which was the only electrical infrastructure in existence at the time. It also caused Aurora Borealis that was visible in Cuba and Jamaica [70]. This could potentially disable electrical systems at high latitudes, which could represent 10% of electricity/industry globally. Though solar storms may last less than the 12 h that would be required to expose the entire earth with direct line of sight, the earth’s magnetic field lines redirect the storm to affect the opposite side of the earth [117]. Lastly, <u>both physical</u> [6, 8, 69, 89, 111] and <u>cyber attacks</u> [3, 63, 90, 96, 118, 128, 130] <u>could</u> also <u><mark>compromise</mark> electric <mark>grids</mark>. Physical attacks include</u> traditional acts of terrorism such as <u><strong>bombing</strong> or <strong>sabotage</strong> </u>[130]<u> in addition to EMP attacks.</u> Significant actors could scale up physical attacks, for example by using drones. A scenario could include terrorist groups hindering individual power plants [126], while a large adversary could undertake a similar operation physically to all plants and electrical grids in a region. Unfortunately, <u>the traditional power grid</u> infrastructure <u>is</u> simply <u><strong>incapable</strong> of withstanding intentional physical attacks</u> [91]. Damage to the electric grid resulting in physical attack could be long lasting, as most <u>traditional power plants operate with <strong>large transformers</strong> that are difficult to <strong>move</strong> and <strong>source</strong>.</u> Custom <u>rebuilt transformers require time for replacement</u> ranging from months and even <u>up to years</u> [91]. For example, a relatively mild 2013 sniper attack on California’s Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) substation, which injured no one directly, was able to disable 17 transformers supplying power to Silicon Valley. Repairs and improvements cost PG&E roughly $100 million and lasted about a month [10, 102]. A coordinated attack with relatively simple technology (e.g., guns) could cause a regional electricity disruption. However, <u>a high-tech attack could be even further widespread. </u>The Pentagon reports spending roughly $100 million to repair cyber-related damages to the electric grid in 2009 [57]. There is also evidence that a computer virus caused an electrical outage in the Ukraine [56]. Unlike simplistic physical attacks, <u>cyber attackers are capable of penetrating critical electric infrastructure from remote regions of the world, needing only communication pathways</u> (e.g., the Internet or infected memory sticks) <u>to install malware into the</u> control systems of the electric power <u>grid</u>. For example, Stuxnet was a computer worm that destroyed Iranian centrifuges [73] to disable their nuclear industry. Many efforts are underway to harden the grid from such attacks [51, 63]. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security responded to ~ 200 cyber incidents in 2012 and 41% involved the electrical grid [103]. Nations routinely have made attempts to map current critical infrastructure for future navigation and control of the U.S. electrical system [57].</p><p><u>The electric grid</u> in general <u>is</u> growing <u>increasingly dependent upon <mark>the Internet and</mark> other network <mark>connections</mark> for data communication and monitoring</u> systems [17, 112, 118, 127, 135]. Although <u>this</u> conveniently allows electrical suppliers management of systems, it <u><mark>increases</mark> the <mark>susceptibility</mark> of the grid to cyber-attack</u>, through denial of webpage services to consumers, disruption to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) operating systems, or sustained widespread power outages [3, 72, 118, 120]. Thus global or regional loss of the Internet could have similar implications.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jaishankar 16 Dhruva Jaishankar 9-12-2016 "Indian Ocean region: A pivot for India’s growth" https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/indian-ocean-region-a-pivot-for-indias-growth/ (Former Brookings ExpertDirector, US Initiative - Observer Research FoundationNon-Resident Fellow - Lowy Institute)//Elmer fulltext: The Indian Ocean matters today, arguably more than ever. It is a major conduit for international trade, especially energy. Its littoral is vast, densely populated, and comprised of some of the world’s fastest growing regions. The Ocean is also a valuable source of fishing and mineral resources. And yet its governance and security are under constant threat of being undermined, whether by non-state actors such as pirates, smugglers, and terrorists, or by furtive naval competition between states. The Indian Ocean basin is of particular importance for India, as the region’s most populous country and geopolitical keystone. Although India has long been preoccupied by continental considerations, it has recently begun to re-evaluate its priorities. India’s Indian Ocean Region strategy—which in only just taking shape—conforms closely to global priorities for preserving the Ocean as a shared resource: an important channel for trade, a sustainable resource base, and a region secure from heightened military competition, non-state actors, and catastrophic natural disasters. Achieving these objectives will require further investments in capacity, greater transparency and confidence-building measures, and enhanced institutional cooperation. Strategic Crucible The Indian Ocean is important for three reasons. First, it enjoys a privileged location at the crossroads of global trade, connecting the major engines of the international economy in the Northern Atlantic and Asia-Pacific. This is particularly important in an era in which global shipping has burgeoned. Today, the almost 90,000 vessels in the world’s commercial fleet transport 9.84 billion tonnes per year. This represents an almost four-fold increase in the volume of commercial shipping since 1970.[1] The energy flows through the Indian Ocean are of particular consequence. Some 36 million barrels per day—equivalent to about 40 per cent of the world’s oil supply and 64 per cent of oil trade—travel through the entryways into and out of the Indian Ocean, including the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb.[2] But the Indian Ocean is more than just a conduit for commerce. The Ocean’s vast drainage basin is important in its own right, home to some two billion people. This creates opportunities, especially given the high rates of economic growth around the Indian Ocean rim, including in India, Bangladesh, Southeast Asia, and Eastern and Southern Africa. However, the densely populated littoral is also vulnerable to natural or environmental disasters. Two of the most devastating natural disasters in recent memory occurred in the Indian Ocean rim: the 2004 tsunami that killed 228,000 people, and Cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar in 2008 and took 138,300 lives.[3] Finally, the Indian Ocean is rich in natural resources. Forty per cent of the world’s offshore oil production takes place in the Indian Ocean basin.[4] Fishing in the Indian Ocean now accounts for almost 15 per cent of the world’s total and has increased some 13-fold between 1950 and 2010 to 11.5 million tonnes. Aquaculture in the region has also grown 12-fold since 1980. Although global fishing is reaching its natural limitations, the Indian Ocean may be able to sustain increases in production. Mineral resources are equally important, with nodules containing nickel, cobalt, and iron, and massive sulphide deposits of manganese, copper, iron, zinc, silver, and gold present in sizeable quantities on the sea bed. Indian Ocean coastal sediments are also important sources of titanium, zirconium, tin, zinc, and copper. Additionally, various rare earth elements are present, even if their extraction is not always commercially feasible.[5] The challenges of securing the free passage of trade and energy, ensuring the sustainable and equitable exploitation of fishing and mineral resources, and managing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations would be daunting enough even if the Indian Ocean was not so contested. Beginning in 2005, pirates operating mostly from Somalia began to hijack commercial ships with alarming regularity, with such incidents peaking in 2010. Following global attention and the growing notoriety of Somali piracy, a series of steps were taken by industry and various governments. These included naval operations, transnational coordination, and security measures taken by the shipping industry. These developments resulted in a sharp drop in incidents in 2012. Nonetheless, as late as 2012, maritime piracy was costing the global economy between $5.7 and $6.1 billion, the bulk of which was borne by industry.[6] Non-state actors such as pirates are not the only entities contesting the Indian Ocean. With an eye on securing trade routes, resource rights, and commercial interests, the naval forces of maritime states in the Indian Ocean region and beyond are becoming increasingly active. India’s Importance in the Indian Ocean The Indian Ocean holds particular importance for India, as the littoral’s most populous country. Indeed, for the rest of the Ocean’s littoral states, and even those outside the region, India’s leadership role will be important in determining the strategic future. India is geographically located at the Ocean’s centre, and has over 7,500 kilometres of coastline. “India is at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in a speech in Mauritius in 2015. “The Indian Ocean Region is at the top of our policy priorities.”[7] The Ocean has long been a key determining factor of India’s cultural footprint, with people, religion, goods, and customs spreading from India to Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia and vice-versa. India’s approach after independence was initially defined by the British withdrawal from east of Suez and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi calls for a zone of peace.[8] Only after the late 1990s, under the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh, did the possibilities of openings in and around the Indian Ocean come to be seriously contemplated.[9] Today, 95 per cent of India’s trade by volume and 68 per cent of trade by value come via the Indian Ocean.[10] Additionally, 3.28 million barrels per day—or nearly 80 per cent of India’s crude oil requirement—is imported by sea via the Indian Ocean. Taking into account India’s offshore oil production and petroleum exports, India’s sea dependence for oil is about 93 per cent, according to the Indian Navy.[11] India is also the fourth-largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with about 45 per cent coming by sea.[12] Moreover, India is heavily dependent on the resources of the Indian Ocean. India captured 4.1 million tonnes of fish in 2008, placing it sixth in the world and its fishing and aquaculture industries employ some 14 million people.[13] Fisheries and aquaculture industries are also a major source of exports. India’s maritime exports grew 55 times in volume between 1962 and 2012 and fisheries exports now account for Rs. 16,600 crore or about $2.5 billion.[14] Mineral resource extraction is also important. In 1987, India received exclusive rights to explore the Central Indian Ocean and has since explored four million square miles and established two mining sites. In 2013, the Geological Survey of India acquired a deep sea exploration ship Samudra Ratnakar from South Korea, boosting its survey capabilities.[15] In 2014, the International Seabed Authority issued licenses for the Indian Ocean ridge, opening up new opportunities for deep seabed mining. This region is estimated to have massive reserves of manganese, as well as cobalt, nickel, and copper, all of which are scarce on Indian soil. However, such deep sea exploration will require further investments in remotely operated vehicles and processing facilities.[16] Finally, there is a strong security dimension to India’s engagement<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Secure Indian Ocean is <u>key to India’s global leadership</u> and preserves <u>fishing resources</h4><p></u><strong>Jaishankar 16</strong> Dhruva Jaishankar 9-12-2016 "<u><strong><mark>Indian Ocean region: A pivot for India’s growth</u></strong></mark>" https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/indian-ocean-region-a-pivot-for-indias-growth/ (Former Brookings ExpertDirector, US Initiative - Observer Research FoundationNon-Resident Fellow - Lowy Institute)//Elmer</p><p><u><mark>The Indian Ocean matters </mark>today, arguably <strong><mark>more than ever.</strong></mark> It is a major <mark>conduit for </mark>international <mark>trade</mark>, especially energy. Its littoral is vast, densely populated, and comprised of some of the world’s fastest growing regions. The Ocean is also a <mark>valuable source of fishing </mark>and mineral <mark>resources</mark>. And yet <mark>its </mark>governance and <mark>security </mark>are <mark>under </mark>constant <mark>threat </mark>of being undermined, whether <mark>by non-state actors </mark>such as pirates, smugglers, and terrorists, <mark>or </mark>by furtive <mark>naval competition </mark>between states. The Indian Ocean basin is of particular importance for India, as the region’s most populous country and geopolitical keystone</u>. <u>Although India has long been preoccupied by continental considerations, it has recently begun to re-evaluate its priorities</u>. India’s Indian Ocean Region strategy—which in only just taking shape—conforms closely to global priorities for preserving the Ocean as a shared resource: an important channel for trade, a sustainable resource base, and a region secure from heightened military competition, non-state actors, and catastrophic natural disasters. Achieving these objectives will require further investments in capacity, greater transparency and confidence-building measures, and enhanced institutional cooperation. Strategic Crucible The Indian Ocean is important for three reasons. <u>First, it enjoys a privileged location at the crossroads of global trade, connecting the major engines of the international economy in the Northern Atlantic and Asia-Pacific. This is particularly important in an era in which global shipping has burgeoned</u>. Today, the almost 90,000 vessels in the world’s commercial fleet transport 9.84 billion tonnes per year. This represents an almost four-fold increase in the volume of commercial shipping since 1970.[1] The energy flows through the Indian Ocean are of particular consequence. Some 36 million barrels per day—equivalent to about 40 per cent of the world’s oil supply and 64 per cent of oil trade—travel through the entryways into and out of the Indian Ocean, including the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb.[2] <u>But the Indian Ocean is more than just a conduit for commerce. The Ocean’s vast drainage basin is important in its own right, home to some two billion people</u>. This creates opportunities, especially given the high rates of economic growth around the Indian Ocean rim, including in India, Bangladesh, Southeast Asia, and Eastern and Southern Africa. However, the densely populated littoral is also vulnerable to natural or environmental disasters. Two of the most devastating natural disasters in recent memory occurred in the Indian Ocean rim: the 2004 tsunami that killed 228,000 people, and Cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar in 2008 and took 138,300 lives.[3] Finally, the Indian Ocean is rich in natural resources. Forty per cent of the world’s offshore oil production takes place in the Indian Ocean basin.[4] <u><mark>Fishing in the Indian Ocean </mark>now <mark>accounts for </mark>almost <strong><mark>15 per cent of the world’s total</strong> </mark>and has increased some 13-fold between 1950 and 2010 to 11.5 million tonnes. Aquaculture in the region has also grown 12-fold since 1980. Although global fishing is reaching its natural limitations, the Indian Ocean may be <strong><mark>able to sustain increases in production</strong></mark>.</u> Mineral resources are equally important, with nodules containing nickel, cobalt, and iron, and massive sulphide deposits of manganese, copper, iron, zinc, silver, and gold present in sizeable quantities on the sea bed. Indian Ocean coastal sediments are also important sources of titanium, zirconium, tin, zinc, and copper. Additionally, various rare earth elements are present, even if their extraction is not always commercially feasible.[5] <u>The challenges of securing the free passage of trade and energy, ensuring the sustainable and equitable exploitation of fishing and mineral resources, and managing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations would be daunting enough even if the Indian Ocean was not so contested. Beginning in 2005, pirates operating mostly from Somalia began to hijack commercial ships with alarming regularity, with such incidents peaking in 2010. Following global attention and the growing notoriety of Somali piracy, a series of steps were taken by industry and various governments</u>. These included naval operations, transnational coordination, and security measures taken by the shipping industry. These developments resulted in a sharp drop in incidents in 2012. Nonetheless, as late as 2012, maritime piracy was costing the global economy between $5.7 and $6.1 billion, the bulk of which was borne by industry.[6] Non-state actors such as pirates are not the only entities contesting the Indian Ocean. With an eye on securing trade routes, resource rights, and commercial interests, the naval forces of maritime states in the Indian Ocean region and beyond are becoming increasingly active. India’s Importance in the Indian Ocean <u>The <mark>Indian Ocean holds</mark> particular <strong><mark>importance for India</strong></mark>, as the littoral’s most populous country. Indeed, for the rest of the Ocean’s littoral states, and even those outside the region, India’s <mark>leadership role </mark>will be important in <strong><mark>determining the strategic</strong> </mark>future. India is geographically located at the Ocean’s centre, and has over 7,500 kilometres of coastline. “India is at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean</u>,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in a speech in Mauritius in 2015. “The Indian Ocean Region is at the top of our policy priorities.”[7] <u>The Ocean has long been a <mark>key </mark>determining <strong><mark>factor of India’s cultural footprint,</strong></mark> with people, religion, goods, and customs spreading from India to Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia and vice-versa</u>. India’s approach after independence was initially defined by the British withdrawal from east of Suez and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi calls for a zone of peace.[8] Only after the late 1990s, under the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh, did the possibilities of openings in and around the Indian Ocean come to be seriously contemplated.[9] <u>Today, 95 per cent of India’s trade by volume and 68 per cent of trade by value come via the Indian Ocean</u>.[10] Additionally, 3.28 million barrels per day—or nearly 80 per cent of India’s crude oil requirement—is imported by sea via the Indian Ocean. Taking into account India’s offshore oil production and petroleum exports, India’s sea dependence for oil is about 93 per cent, according to the Indian Navy.[11] India is also the fourth-largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with about 45 per cent coming by sea.[12] Moreover, India is heavily dependent on the resources of the Indian Ocean. <u>India captured 4.1 million tonnes of fish in 2008, placing it sixth in the world and its fishing and aquaculture industries employ some 14 million people.[13] Fisheries and aquaculture industries are also a major source of exports</u>. India’s maritime exports grew 55 times in volume between 1962 and 2012 and fisheries exports now account for Rs. 16,600 crore or about $2.5 billion.[14] Mineral resource extraction is also important. In 1987, India received exclusive rights to explore the Central Indian Ocean and has since explored four million square miles and established two mining sites. In 2013, the Geological Survey of India acquired a deep sea exploration ship Samudra Ratnakar from South Korea, boosting its survey capabilities.[15] In 2014, the International Seabed Authority issued licenses for the Indian Ocean ridge, opening up new opportunities for deep seabed mining. This region is estimated to have massive reserves of manganese, as well as cobalt, nickel, and copper, all of which are scarce on Indian soil. However, such deep sea exploration will require further investments in remotely operated vehicles and processing facilities.[16] <u>Finally, there is a <strong><mark>strong security dimension to India’s engagement</strong> </p></u></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Bozuwa 18 Johanna Bozuwa (co-manager of the Climate and Energy Program in The Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Her work focuses on the transition from the extractive, fossil-fuel economy to resilient and equitable communities based on renewable energy sources and energy democracy. She first worked with The Democracy Collaborative as a master’s student while conducting research on how public ownership of electric utilities can be used as a strategy for energy democracy. Johanna received her M.Sc. in sustainable innovation from Utrecht University in the Netherlands. She also has a B.A. in environmental policy from Barnard College, where she was an Athena Scholar for Women’s Leadership. She has organized around climate in both the United States and the Netherlands and most recently worked on divestment campaigns for pension funds, universities, and cultural institutions alongside such groups as Fossil Free NL and BothENDS. She was previously an Earth Science Information Partners (ESIP) Fellow, working to bridge the gap between scientists and society), 4-26-2018, "Shovel Ready Green Jobs: The Job Guarantee and Climate Resiliency," TheNextSystem.org, https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/shovel-ready-green-jobs-job-guarantee-and-climate-resiliency, SJBE fulltext: Building off the work of Sandy Darity, Darrick Hamilton, Pavlina Tcherneva, and other advocates, US Senators Bernie Sanders, Cory Booker, and Kirsten Gillibrand have all announced or supported plans for a federally-funded job guarantee for any worker who “wants or needs one” in the United States. Under this plan, every American would be entitled to a $15 an hour job, with benefits, through the program. But a key question people are asking is: what would these jobs be? What kind of socially necessary work can be connected to the jobs guarantee, and how would this work as the economy improves and people leave their guaranteed jobs for traditional employment? One answer is that a temporary influx of federally funded workers could be extremely useful as we prepare for the continuing onset of climate change, now locked in thanks to our collective inability to limit emissions. Climate change puts increasing pressure on our already-crumbling infrastructure in the United States—higher seas, more rain, and bigger storms are coming for our cities and towns, and we are woefully unprepared. In addition to effectively eliminating unemployment, the job guarantee could mobilize an army of workers to build the climate-resilient nation we desperately need—from renewables deployment to infrastructure retrofitting. Particularly, the workers could be fundamental in deploying green infrastructure projects for water management to dramatically improve public health and climate resiliency. Crucially, because these projects often do not require high skill levels and have low requirements for capitalization, they are a perfect fit to absorb a temporary wave of jobs guarantee workers. This answers a key concern from job guarantee skeptics like Jonathan Chait, who in an article suggesting the job guarantee could be “a huge mistake,” bemoans that unlike in the days of the FDR’s employment infrastructure program, the WPA, “these days, not a lot of construction work can be done with just shovels.” What Chait doesn’t realize is that some of the most effective strategies for dealing with stormwater are literally shovel-ready. Our cities are concrete jungles barely built to deal with small fluctuations in water, let alone the extreme weather patterns associated with climate change. Just look at Houston during Hurricane Harvey in fall 2017. White-capped waves surged on Houston’s interstate, transformed into a roaring river with over nine trillion gallons of water. All of Houston’s concrete meant that the water had nowhere to go—a common problem in our cities’ urban sprawl. On top of that, much of the stormwater infrastructure in the United States was built in the early 1900s. Over 40 million people are served by combined sewer systems that discharge raw sewage directly into our waterways and contaminate precious drinking water when only a few inches of rain hit the ground. Green infrastructure harnesses natural systems to divert stormwater before it even reaches the sewer system. It attempts to restore wetlands, plant trees to soak up water, and eliminate impermeable surfaces like concrete. Creating more green spaces can also dramatically lower asthma rates, endemic in low income communities; alleviate the urban heat island effect, key in a warming climate; and produce spaces for communities to congregate. Desperate Need for Investment In order to upgrade our stormwater infrastructure, the EPA estimates we would need to invest at least $270 billion over the next 25 years, the majority spent in the next five years to deal with the most urgent projects. In other words, we need rapid and expansive mobilization for green infrastructure. With Darity, Hamilton, and Paul estimating a $543 billion annual cost for a federal job guarantee in their CBPP analysis, this means we could could potentially absorb a fairly significant share—perhaps even as high as five percent—of federal job guarantee jobs dealing just with the stormwater crisis. The EPA provides cities with some funding through its Clean Water State Revolving Fund, but it is not nearly enough. Capital projects and maintenance for water management can be some of the costliest for municipalities trying to comply with federal standards. The jobs guarantee could go a long way in providing means for municipalities to deal with their stormwater through an activated labor force—particularly those on coastlines and prone to flooding. Why Green Infrastructure Jobs? Green infrastructure, with its low threshold for entry, is well positioned for job guarantee projects. Most of the projects can be done by someone with little previous training and yields well to on-the-job learning. The majority of openings would require a high school diploma or less, for example, to maintain green spaces or construct a bioswale. At the onset, green infrastructure could use a huge influx of workers to overhaul our cities on the short term—for example, pulling up miles of impermeable surfaces and planting native species in thousands of medians. (There’s a historical precedent here—FDR, responding to the Depression and the Dust Bowl, used the WPA and associated efforts like the soil erosion service to plant 220 million trees in seven years). Our 21st century effort to meet our own combined ecological and economic crisis could also create longer-term work for relatively smaller groups of workers through the consistent maintenance, like weeding, required to make sure the projects still deliver benefits long after installation. While many workers could be employed with little previous training, there is also room for upward momentum. Bernie Sanders’ plan proposes Job Training Centers, which could help to transition workers to higher paid opportunities. Cities are already starting to groom such a new green infrastructure workforce. DC’s Water Utility has started a certification program as part of the District’s Infrastructure Academy that reaches out specifically to underemployed populations, facilitates their apprenticeships, and then requires a certain number of its employees and contractor’s employees be certified under the program. The job guarantee could set up similar programs so that it both provides comfortable jobs with benefits to any American as well as avenues to advancement. Furthermore, $15 an hour workers with benefits could revolutionize construction and landscaping sector hiring practices. A notoriously underpaid and unstable career, particularly for immigrant workers, providing access to guaranteed jobs could shift the norm towards better paid jobs with benefits. Private firms would have to offer jobs that were at least as good as a guaranteed job. Building Economic and Climate Resilience Low income communities are often the first and hardest hit by climate change because of their lack of access to economic stability. The jobs guarantee could create a dual benefit of economic and climate resilience by tackling green infrastructure without much worker training—answering a key objection of job guarantee skeptics. Why not provide good, green jobs while building the infrastructure we need to weather the storms that climate change will send our way?<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The plan solves – a federal jobs guarantee reinvigorates green infrastructure and is the necessary adaptation</h4><p><strong>Bozuwa 18</strong> Johanna Bozuwa (co-manager of the Climate and Energy Program in The Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Her work focuses on the transition from the extractive, fossil-fuel economy to resilient and equitable communities based on renewable energy sources and energy <u><strong>democracy. She first worked with The Democracy Collaborative as a master’s student while conducting research on how public ownership of electric utilities can be used as a strategy for energy democracy. Johanna received her M.Sc. in sustainable innovation from Utrecht University in the Netherlands. She also has a B.A. in environmental policy from Barnard College, where she was an Athena Scholar for Women’s Leadership. She has organized around climate in both the United States and the Netherlands and most recently worked on divestment campaigns for pension funds, universities, and cultural institutions alongside such groups as Fossil Free NL and BothENDS. She was previously an Earth Science Information Partners (ESIP) Fellow, working to bridge the gap between scientists and society), 4-26-2018, "Shovel Ready Green Jobs: The Job Guarantee and Climate Resiliency," TheNextSystem.org, https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/shovel-ready-green-jobs-job-guarantee-and-climate-resiliency, SJBE</p><p>Building off the work of Sandy Darity, Darrick Hamilton, Pavlina Tcherneva, and other advocates, US Senators Bernie Sanders, Cory Booker, and Kirsten Gillibrand have all announced or supported plans for <mark>a federally-funded job guarantee</mark> for any worker who “wants or needs one” in the United States.</u></strong> Under this plan, every American would be entitled to a $15 an hour job, with benefits, through the program. But a key question people are asking is: what would these jobs be? What kind of socially necessary work can be connected to the jobs guarantee, and how would this work as the economy improves and people leave their guaranteed jobs for traditional employment? <u><strong>One answer is that a temporary influx of federally funded workers <mark>could be extremely useful as we prepare for</mark> the continuing onset of <mark>climate change, </mark>now locked in thanks to our collective inability to limit emissions. <mark>Climate change puts increasing pressure on our </mark>already-<mark>crumbling infrastructure</mark> in the United States—<mark>higher seas, more rain, and bigger storms</mark> are coming for our cities and towns, and we are woefully unprepared. In addition to effectively eliminating unemployment, <mark>the job guarantee could mobilize</mark> an army of <mark>workers </mark>to build the climate-resilient nation we desperately need—<mark>from renewables deployment to infrastructure retrofitting</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Particularly, the workers could be <mark>fundamental in deploying green infrastructure projects</mark> for water management <mark>to</mark> dramatically <mark>improve</mark> public health and <mark>climate resiliency</mark>. Crucially, because these projects often do not require high skill levels and have low requirements for capitalization, they are a perfect fit to absorb a temporary wave of jobs guarantee workers.</u></strong> This answers a key concern from job guarantee skeptics like Jonathan Chait, who in an article suggesting the job guarantee could be “a huge mistake,” bemoans that unlike in the days of the FDR’s employment infrastructure program, the WPA, “these days, not a lot of construction work can be done with just shovels.” What Chait doesn’t realize is that some of the most effective strategies for dealing with stormwater are literally shovel-ready. Our cities are concrete jungles barely built to deal with small fluctuations in water, let alone the extreme weather patterns associated with climate change. Just look at Houston during Hurricane Harvey in fall 2017. White-capped waves surged on Houston’s interstate, transformed into a roaring river with over nine trillion gallons of water. All of Houston’s concrete meant that the water had nowhere to go—a common problem in our cities’ urban sprawl. On top of that, much of the stormwater infrastructure in the United States was built in the early 1900s. Over 40 million people are served by combined sewer systems that discharge raw sewage directly into our waterways and contaminate precious drinking water when only a few inches of rain hit the ground.<u><strong> Green infrastructure harnesses natural systems to divert stormwater before it even reaches the sewer system. It attempts to restore wetlands, plant trees to soak up water, and eliminate impermeable surfaces like concrete. Creating more green spaces can also dramatically lower asthma rates, endemic in low income communities; alleviate the urban heat island effect, key in a warming climate; and produce spaces for communities to congregate. </u></strong>Desperate Need for Investment <u><strong>In order to upgrade our stormwater infrastructure, the EPA estimates we would need to invest at least $270 billion over the next 25 years, the majority spent in the next five years to deal with the most urgent projects. In other words, we need rapid and expansive mobilization for green infrastructure</u></strong>. With Darity, Hamilton, and Paul estimating a $543 billion annual cost for a federal job guarantee in their CBPP analysis, this means we could could potentially absorb a fairly significant share—perhaps even as high as five percent—of federal job guarantee jobs dealing just with the stormwater crisis. The EPA provides cities with some funding through its Clean Water State Revolving Fund, but it is not nearly enough. Capital projects and maintenance for water management can be some of the costliest for municipalities trying to comply with federal standards. The jobs guarantee could go a long way in providing means for municipalities to deal with their stormwater through an activated labor force—particularly those on coastlines and prone to flooding. Why Green Infrastructure Jobs? Green infrastructure, with its low threshold for entry, is well positioned for job guarantee projects. Most of the projects can be done by someone with little previous training and yields well to on-the-job learning. The majority of openings would require a high school diploma or less, for example, to maintain green spaces or construct a bioswale. <u><strong>At the onset<mark>, green infrastructure could use a huge influx of workers to overhaul our cities on the short term</mark>—for example, pulling up miles of impermeable surfaces and planting native species in thousands of medians.</u></strong> (There’s a historical precedent here—FDR, responding to the Depression and the Dust Bowl, used the WPA and associated efforts like the soil erosion service to plant 220 million trees in seven years). <u><strong>Our 21st century effort to meet our own combined ecological and economic crisis <mark>could also create longer-term work</mark> for relatively smaller groups of workers through the consistent maintenance, like weeding, <mark>required to make sure the projects still deliver benefits </mark>long <mark>after installation</mark>. While many workers could be employed with little previous training, there is also room for upward momentum. Bernie Sanders’ plan proposes Job Training Centers, which could help to transition workers to higher paid opportunities</u></strong>. Cities are already starting to groom such a new green infrastructure workforce. DC’s Water Utility has started a certification program as part of the District’s Infrastructure Academy that reaches out specifically to underemployed populations, facilitates their apprenticeships, and then requires a certain number of its employees and contractor’s employees be certified under the program. The job guarantee could set up similar programs so that it both provides comfortable jobs with benefits to any American as well as avenues to advancement. Furthermore, $15 an hour workers with benefits could revolutionize construction and landscaping sector hiring practices. A notoriously underpaid and unstable career, particularly for immigrant workers, providing access to guaranteed jobs could shift the norm towards better paid jobs with benefits. Private firms would have to offer jobs that were at least as good as a guaranteed job. Building Economic and Climate Resilience <u><strong>Low income communities are often the first and hardest hit by climate change because of their lack of access to economic stability. The jobs guarantee could create a dual benefit of economic and climate resilience by tackling green infrastructure without much worker training—answering a key objection of job guarantee skeptics. <mark>Why not provide</mark> good, <mark>green jobs while building the infrastructure we need to weather</mark> the storms that <mark>climate change</mark> will send our way?</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Panagopoulos 13 [Dr. Costas Panagopoulos is professor of political science and interim chair in the Department of Political Science in the College of Social Sciences and Humanities at Northeastern University, where he was previously director of big data and quantitative initiatives. A leading expert on campaigns and elections, voting behavior, political psychology, campaign finance, and experimental research, Dr. Panagopoulos has been part of the Decision Desk team at NBC News since the 2006 election cycle. He is also editor of American Politics Research, a peer-reviewed journal published by Sage. “Extrinsic Rewards, Intrinsic Motivation and Voting.” The Journal of Politics 75(01). January 2013. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259430768_Extrinsic_Rewards_Intrinsic_Motivation_and_Voting] fulltext: Incentives and Prosocial Motivation Economists and psychologists have often disagreed about the impact of rewards on behavior. For the most part, economists believe incentives promote effort and performance, a view buttressed by considerable empirical evidence (Lazear 2000). The notion that rewards serve as ‘‘positive reinforcers’’ for a desired behavior is central in economics (Lazear 2000). Such selective incentives are commonly viewed as an effective way to overcome dilemmas of rationality that often erect barriers to collective action (Olson 1965). In psychology, the effects of rewards have been disputed. ‘‘Dissonance theorists’’ argue that rewards may actually impair performance (Deci 1975; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Deci and Ryan 1985). Proponents of ‘‘self-determination theory’’ distinguish two basic forms of motivation. Intrinsic motivation refers to doing something because it is inherently satisfying or enjoyable, while extrinsic motivation refers to doing something because it leads to a separable outcome (like receiving a reward; Ryan and Deci 2000). Because people must experience perceived competence (self-efficacy) as well as self-determined (autonomy) behavior for intrinsic motivation to be sustained or enhanced (Ryan and Deci 2000), incentives often backfire because, in some conditions, individuals feel externally motivated actions are nonautonomous. The impact of rewards has been hotly debated in psychology, but evidence is mounting in support of the view that external stimuli depress intrinsic motivation.3 A comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental results (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999) finds that, ‘‘virtually every type of expected tangible reward made contingent on task performance [undermines] intrinsic motivation,’’ because people experience them as controllers of their behavior (Ryan and Deci 2000, 59). Thus, extrinsic incentives have a perverse effect, depressing intrinsic motivation, a phenomenon known as crowding out. Recent field experiments in political science that break down vote motivation into its intrinsic and extrinsic components find that extrinsic social incentives to vote, generated by public surveillance, boosts electoral participation considerably (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008, 2010), but material incentives per se are not investigated. I view voting as prosocial behavior; that is to say, an action that benefits a collective at a personal cost to oneself. The probability that one voter affects the outcome is statistically miniscule, while the costs associated with voting (traveling to a voting booth, standing in line to vote, investing in information gathering about the election) are nonnegligible. Scholars assert that such seemingly irrational behavior can be stimulated by selective incentives that may include material benefits (Olson 1065). Early models (see Andreoni 2007) supported the intuition that prosocial behavior will respond to rewards, but evidence of crowding out has also been detected across a wide range of such activities. As early as 1970, a study of blood donation cautioned that monetary compensation might undermine the sense of civic duty (Titmuss 1970). Similarly, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that Israeli school children who were rewarded with a share of donations they solicited collected less than those who were paid nothing at all. To better understand the potential to crowd out voting through incentives, it is helpful to disentangle possible motives for voting. External incentives can affect individuals who were previously motivated to participate based on a desire to contribute to a public good. Using survey data collected in Switzerland, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) asked if respondents would allow a nuclear waste facility to be situated near them. Without any incentives offer, 50.8% of respondents agreed. This figure dropped to 24.6% when compensation was offered. In fact, declines in support for the proposal were detected regardless of the level of compensation.4 The introduction of incentives seems to have strengthened the perception the project was undesirable.5 If there is incomplete information about the value and stakes of the election, incentives can provide signals about the value of the desired behavior. Citizens may also be motivated to participate in elections for other reasons. In a study of the Swedish population, Back, Teorell, and Westholm (2011) found that the main reason for taking part in political activity was not for collective interests (such as the desire to influence policy), but for selective interests, such as self-expression and the entertainment value of participation. Voting as self-expression puts the activity under the umbrella of intrinsically motivated behavior, that is to say, behavior driven by the need to satisfy innate psychological needs for competence and autonomy (Deci and Ryan 2000). According to Deci (1980), perceptions of personal (as opposed to external) control satisfy these needs and provide the main difference between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated behaviors. Exhibiting high morale in an environment with prescribed rules, fines, and incentives would be superfluous. Motivation crowding out occurs when explicit rewards are perceived as controlling, a phenomenon termed the overjustification effect (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973). The issue of self-identity has only been explored recently in economics. In Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), individuals are modeled as agents who are not perfectly informed about the kind of person they are and believe that others (principals) know them better. External incentives act as a signal of their personal (in)competence.6 Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) showed that students who were offered a small amount of money to take a quiz do worse than those who were not offered compensation, but the authors found that performance improved with larger rewards. Behavior can send signals about one’s character (such as altruism, self-determination, or self-esteem) not only to external observers but also to the individual herself (Be´nabou and Tirole 2006). Monetary incentives for casting a ballot introduce signals of materialism to the act of voting, which previously only sent positive signals about one’s civic mindedness. When the reduction of positive image benefit is larger than the utility gained from monetary compensation, crowding out occurs. Recent lab experiments seem to confirm this mechanism (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2007), but little evidence exists from the field that has traced out the relationship between levels of electoral participation and monetary incentives. Another possibility is that incentives may affect political participation by shifting attention away from the collective or selective incentives, as described by Back, Teorell, and Westholm (2011), to the opportunity cost of time. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) provide empirical support for this idea in an experiment conducted at a day care center; the authors found that the introduction of a fine for late pickups actually increased incidences of lateness, reasoning that the fine turns the obligation to be timely from a moral obligation into a monetary relationship.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Appealing to <u>intrinsic, prosocial motivation</u> is key to effective civic engagement </h4><p><strong>Panagopoulos 13</strong> [Dr. Costas Panagopoulos is professor of political science and interim chair in the Department of Political Science in the College of Social Sciences and Humanities at Northeastern University, where he was previously director of big data and quantitative initiatives. A leading expert on campaigns and elections, voting behavior, political psychology, campaign finance, and experimental research, Dr. Panagopoulos has been part of the Decision Desk team at NBC News since the 2006 election cycle. He is also editor of American Politics Research, a peer-reviewed journal published by Sage. “Extrinsic Rewards, Intrinsic Motivation and Voting.” The Journal of Politics 75(01). January 2013. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259430768_Extrinsic_Rewards_Intrinsic_Motivation_and_Voting]</p><p><u><mark>Incentives and <strong>Prosocial Motivation</strong></mark> </u>Economists and psychologists have often disagreed about the impact of rewards on behavior. For the most part, economists believe incentives promote effort and performance, a view buttressed by considerable empirical evidence (Lazear 2000). The notion that rewards serve as ‘‘positive reinforcers’’ for a desired behavior is central in economics (Lazear 2000). Such <u><strong>selective incentives</strong> are commonly viewed as an effective way to overcome <strong>dilemmas of rationality </strong>that often erect barriers to <strong>collective action</u></strong> (Olson 1965). In psychology, <u>the effects of rewards have been disputed</u>. ‘‘Dissonance theorists’’ argue that rewards may actually impair performance (Deci 1975; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Deci and Ryan 1985). <u>Proponents of ‘‘<strong>self-determination</strong> theory’’ distinguish <strong>two</strong> basic forms of <strong>motivation</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Intrinsic</mark> motivation</u></strong> refers to <u>doing something because it is <strong><mark>inherently satisfying</strong></mark> or <strong>enjoyable</u></strong>, <u>while <strong><mark>extrinsic</mark> motivation</strong> refers to doing something because it <mark>leads to a <strong>separable outcome</u></strong></mark> (like receiving a reward; Ryan and Deci 2000). <u>Because people</u> must <u>experience perceived <strong>competence</u></strong> (<u><strong>self-efficacy</u></strong>) <u>as well as self-determined (<strong>autonomy</u></strong>) <u>behavior for <strong>intrinsic motivation</strong> to be </u>sustained or <u><strong>enhanced</u></strong> (Ryan and Deci 2000), <u><mark>incentives</u></mark> often <u><mark>backfire </mark>because</u>, in some conditions, <u><mark>individuals feel</mark> <strong>externally motivated</strong> actions are <strong><mark>nonautonomous</u></strong></mark>. The impact of rewards has been hotly debated in psychology, but <u>evidence is mounting in support of the view that external stimuli <strong>depress intrinsic motivation</u></strong>.3 <u>A comprehensive meta-analysis</u> of experimental results (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999) <u>finds that, ‘‘virtually <strong><mark>every type of expected tangible reward</strong></mark> made contingent on task performance [<strong><mark>undermines</strong>] <strong>intrinsic motivation</u></strong></mark>,<u>’’ because people experience them as <strong>controllers</strong> of their <strong>behavior</u></strong> (Ryan and Deci 2000, 59). Thus, <u>extrinsic incentives have a <strong>perverse effect</u></strong>, <u>depressing <strong>intrinsic motivation</u></strong>, a phenomenon <u>known as <strong>crowding out</u></strong>. Recent field experiments in political science that break down vote motivation into its intrinsic and extrinsic components find that extrinsic social incentives to vote, generated by public surveillance, boosts electoral participation considerably (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008, 2010), but material incentives per se are not investigated. <u>I view <mark>voting as <strong>prosocial behavior</u></strong></mark>; that is to say, <u><mark>an action that <strong>benefits a collective</strong></mark> at a <strong>personal cost</strong> </u>to oneself. The probability that one voter affects the outcome is statistically miniscule, while the costs associated with voting (traveling to a voting booth, standing in line to vote, investing in information gathering about the election) are nonnegligible. Scholars assert that such seemingly irrational behavior can be stimulated by selective incentives that may include material benefits (Olson 1065). Early models (see Andreoni 2007) supported the intuition that prosocial behavior will respond to rewards, but <u>evidence of <strong>crowding out </strong>has also been detected across a wide range of</u> such <u>activities</u>. As early as 1970, <u>a study of <strong><mark>blood donation</strong> cautioned</mark> that <strong><mark>monetary compensation</strong></mark> might <strong><mark>undermine</strong> </mark>the sense of <strong><mark>civic duty</u></strong></mark> (Titmuss 1970). Similarly, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that <u><mark>Israeli</mark> school <mark>children </mark>who were <mark>rewarded with </mark>a share of <mark>donations they solicited collected <strong>less</strong></mark> <mark>than those</mark> who were <mark>paid <strong>nothing</mark> at all</u></strong>. <u>To better understand the potential to <strong>crowd out </strong>voting through <strong>incentives</u></strong>, <u>it is helpful to disentangle <strong>possible motives</strong> for <strong>voting</u></strong>. <u><mark>External incentives</u></mark> can <u><mark>affect individuals who were <strong>previously motivated</strong></mark> to participate based on a <strong>desire to contribute</strong> to a public good</u>. Using survey data collected in Switzerland, <u>Frey</u> and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) <u><mark>asked</mark> if <mark>respondents would allow a nuclear</mark> waste <mark>facility</mark> to be situated near them.</u> <u><mark>Without</mark> any <mark>incentives</u></mark> offer, <u><mark>50.8% of respondents agreed</u></mark>. <u>This figure <strong><mark>dropped to 24.6%</strong> when <strong>compensation was offered</u></strong></mark>. In fact, <u><mark>declines in support</mark> for the proposal <mark>were detected <strong>regardless</mark> of the <mark>level of compensation</u></strong>.</mark>4 The introduction of <u><strong>incentives</strong> seems to have <strong>strengthened</strong> the perception the project was <strong>undesirable</u></strong>.5 <u>If there is <strong><mark>incomplete information</strong> about </mark>the <strong>value and <mark>stakes</strong> of the <strong>election</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>incentives</strong></mark> can <mark>provide signals</mark> about the value of the <strong>desired behavior</u></strong>. Citizens may also be motivated to participate in elections for other reasons. In a study of the Swedish population, Back, Teorell, and Westholm (2011) found that the main reason for taking part in political activity was not for collective interests (such as the desire to influence policy), but for selective interests, such as self-expression and the entertainment value of participation. Voting as self-expression puts the activity under the umbrella of intrinsically motivated behavior, that is to say, behavior driven by the need to satisfy innate psychological needs for competence and autonomy (Deci and Ryan 2000). According to Deci (1980), perceptions of personal (as opposed to external) control satisfy these needs and provide the main difference between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated behaviors. Exhibiting high morale in an environment with prescribed rules, fines, and incentives would be superfluous. <u>Motivation crowding out occurs when <strong>explicit rewards</strong> are perceived as <strong>controlling</strong>, a phenomenon termed the <strong>overjustification</strong> effect</u> (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973). The issue of self-identity has only been explored recently in economics. In Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), individuals are modeled as agents who are not perfectly informed about the kind of person they are and believe that others (principals) know them better. External incentives act as a signal of their personal (in)competence.6 Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) showed that students who were offered a small amount of money to take a quiz do worse than those who were not offered compensation, but the authors found that performance improved with larger rewards. Behavior can send signals about one’s character (such as altruism, self-determination, or self-esteem) not only to external observers but also to the individual herself (Be´nabou and Tirole 2006). <u><strong><mark>Monetary incentives</strong></mark> for casting a ballot <mark>introduce <strong>signals of materialism</u></strong> <u></mark>to the act of voting, which previously only sent <strong>positive signals</strong> about</u> one’s <u><strong>civic mindedness</u></strong>. When the reduction of positive image benefit is larger than the utility gained from monetary compensation, crowding out occurs. Recent lab experiments seem to confirm this mechanism (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2007), but little evidence exists from the field that has traced out the relationship between levels of electoral participation and monetary incentives. Another possibility is that <u><mark>incentives</u></mark> may <u><strong>affect political participation</strong> by <mark>shift</mark>ing<mark> attention away from</mark> the <strong><mark>collective</mark> or selective <mark>incentives</u></strong></mark>, as described by Back, Teorell, and Westholm (2011), <u><mark>to </mark>the <strong><mark>opportunity cost of time</u></strong></mark>. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) provide empirical support for this idea in an experiment conducted at a day care center; the authors found that the introduction of a fine for late pickups actually increased incidences of lateness, reasoning that the fine turns the obligation to be timely from a moral obligation into a monetary relationship. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: J.L Mackie, Australian Philosopher, The subjectivity of values, 1977, ///AHS PB fulltext: [First] The Argument from Relativity The argument from relativity has as its premiss the wellknown variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people ’ s adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. Of course, the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete, less rigid, than that of which it leads them to approve. This is not to say that moral judgements are purely conventional. Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short, the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. But there is a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society – such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has called different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness. It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. To take this line the moral objectivist has to stay that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true, but only derivatively and contingently – if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right. And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls “ideals” or, less kindly, ‘fanaticism’. That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force. [Second] The Argument from Queerness Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness. This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of nonnatural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a ‘faculty of moral intuition’. Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premisses or forms of argument or both. When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. Indeed, the best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? This is an important counter to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even begin to do that here, though I have undertaken some parts of the task elsewhere. I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness. This queerness does not consist simply in the fact that ethical statements are ‘unverifiable’. Although logical positivism with its verifiability theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false. Plato ’ s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something ’ s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it. Or we should have something like Clarke ’ s necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such- andsuch an action somehow built into it. The need for an argument of this sort can be brought out by reflection on Hume ’ s argument that ‘reason’ – in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning – can never be an ‘influencing motive of the will’. Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent upon desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, he would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it? How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Ethical Pluralism is true: There is not one universal moral truth, and instead each agent acts on their own conception of the good.</h4><p>J.L <u><strong>Mackie</u></strong>, Australian Philosopher, The subjectivity of values, <u><strong>1977</u></strong>, ///AHS PB</p><p><u><strong><mark>[First</mark>] The Argument from Relativity</u></strong> The argument from relativity has as its premiss <u><strong>the wellknown variation in moral codes</u></strong> from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation <u><strong>is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality</u></strong>, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: <u><strong><mark>radical differences between</mark> first order <mark>moral judgements make it difficult to treat</mark> those judgements <mark>as</mark> apprehensions of <mark>objective truths</u></strong></mark>. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. <u><strong>Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people ’ s adherence to and participation in different ways of life</u></strong>. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that <u><strong>people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy</u></strong>. Of course, the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete, less rigid, than that of which it leads them to approve. This is not to say that moral judgements are purely conventional. Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short, the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual <u><strong><mark>variations in</mark> the <mark>moral codes are more readily explained by</mark> the hypothesis <mark>that they reflect ways of life than by</mark> the hypothesis that <mark>they</mark> express <mark>perceptions, most of them</mark> seriously inadequate and <mark>badly distorted, of objective values</u></strong></mark>. But there is <u><strong>a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society</u></strong> – such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has called different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness. It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. <u><strong>To take this line the moral objectivist has to stay that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true, but only derivatively and contingently – if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right.</u></strong> And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls “ideals” or, less kindly, ‘fanaticism’. That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force. <u><strong><mark>[Second] </mark>The Argument from Queerness</u></strong> Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness. This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. <u><strong><mark>If there were objective values</mark>, then <mark>they would be</mark> entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, <mark>utterly different from anything else in the universe</mark>. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else</u></strong>. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of nonnatural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a ‘faculty of moral intuition’. Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premisses or forms of argument or both. When we ask the awkward question, <u><strong>how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer</u></strong>, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. Indeed, the best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? This is an important counter to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even begin to do that here, though I have undertaken some parts of the task elsewhere. I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness. <u><strong>This queerness does not consist simply in the fact that ethical statements are ‘unverifiable’</u></strong>. Although logical positivism with its verifiability theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. <u><strong>The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false</u></strong>. Plato ’ s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something ’ s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. <u><strong>Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it</u></strong>. Or we should have something like Clarke ’ s necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such- andsuch an action somehow built into it. The need for an argument of this sort can be brought out by reflection on Hume ’ s argument that ‘reason’ – in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning – can never be an ‘influencing motive of the will’. Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent upon desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, he would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. <u><strong>Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. <mark>What is the connection between </mark>the natural fact that <mark>an action </mark>is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – <mark>and the moral fact that it is wrong?</mark> It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity</u></strong>. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. <u><strong><mark>The wrongness must</mark> somehow <mark>be ‘consequential’</mark> or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. <mark>But</mark> just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And <mark>how do we know</mark> the relation that it signifies</u></strong>, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it? How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Pummer 15 (Pummer, Theron. Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. "Moral Agreement on Saving the World". http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/. 18 May 2015. Accessed 23 Jan 2018 SM) fulltext: There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Moral disagreement means preventing extinction</h4><p><u><strong>Pummer 15</u></strong> (Pummer, Theron. Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. "Moral Agreement on Saving the World". http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/. 18 May 2015. Accessed 23 Jan 2018 SM)</p><p>There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing <u><strong><mark>it is reasonable to agree</u></strong></mark> on right now, <u><strong><mark>whatever</u></strong></mark> general <u><strong><mark>moral view we adopt</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong><mark>that it is very important to reduce</u></strong></mark> the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such <u><strong><mark>existential risks</u></strong></mark> is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. <u><strong><mark>Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than</u></strong></mark> the goodness of <u><strong><mark>consequences</u></strong></mark> or outcomes; it <u><strong><mark>is not the</u></strong></mark> view that <u><strong><mark>the latter don’t matter</u></strong></mark>. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk<u><strong><mark>. We should</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>take into account moral uncertainty</u></strong></mark>. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. <u><strong><mark>Even if they were 90% sure</u></strong></mark> that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), <u><strong><mark>they would have</u></strong></mark> pretty <u><strong><mark>strong reason</u></strong></mark>, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, <u><strong><mark>to reduce existential risk.</u></strong></mark> Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Whittington 18 (Keith E, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University, “R.I.P. Congressional War Power”, Lawfare, 4/20, https://www.lawfareblog.com/rip-congressional-war-power) DB fulltext: President Donald Trump has ordered significant military strikes against assets of the Assad regime in Syria. Trump asserted that the use of military force was necessary “to establish a strong deterrent against the production, spread, and use of chemical weapons,” a goal that is “a vital national security interest of the United States.” It is easy to agree that the United States should want to deter nations from using chemical weapons, and it is also reasonable to think that a military response might be a necessary and appropriate measure to shore up international law—and norms—against the use of such weapons. Moreover, the combined actions of the United States, the United Kingdom and France could credibly be regarded as surgical and limited, with minimal risk to American lives and only a modest risk of escalation. Being low-risk and reasonably justifiable should not be enough, however. The Constitution does not empower the president to conduct military strikes against foreign governments whenever they would advance American national security interests with relatively low risk. The Constitution directs the president to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States” and places him as commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States. The president has reasonably been understood to have the necessary authority to repel a sudden attack on the United States, its people, or its forces abroad. But Congress alone has the constitutional authority “to declare war.” Congress did not authorize the use of military force against the Syrian government. Even the administration did not try to draw on the elastic terms of the 2001 and 2002 authorizations for use of military force (AUMF) to justify the Syrian strikes. Passed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2001 AUMF gave congressional permission for military action in Afghanistan and against the al-Qaeda terrorist group and its allies wherever they might be found. The 2002 AUMF empowered the president to take military action against the Iraqi government. Together, those resolutions have underwritten military actions from Afghanistan and Iraq, to Yemen and the Philippines, to Somalia and Niger. Publicly, Defense Secretary James Mattis contended, “as our commander in chief, the president has the authority under Article II of the Constitution to use military force overseas to defend important U.S. national interests,” though privately Mattis was apparently more skeptical about the president’s authority to act against the Syrian government without prior congressional approval. Of course, Article II does not say anything at all about the president’s authority to defend important national security interests. Nonetheless, the Trump administration had earlier pointed to the president’s constitutional authority to act “in the vital national security and foreign policy interests of the United States” to provide the legal basis for air strikes against a Syrian base in 2017. The Obama administration contended that “sufficiently important national interests,” such as “preserving regional stability” and maintaining the “credibility” of the U.N. Security Council, were sufficient to authorize presidentially initiated military action to overthrow the government of Libya, so long as that action was not expected to be too “extensive.” In the cases of Haiti and Bosnia, the Clinton administration pointed to the president’s authority to deploy troops abroad at will as adequate so long as the military operation was expected to fall short of war “in the constitutional sense.” The George H.W. Bush administration made similar claims to justify its ill-fated military adventures in Somalia. Even as the aims and targets of the military operations in the Middle East have evolved over more than a decade, the president has declined to seek—and Congress has declined to provide—a new authorization for the use of force that might provide clearer authority to act against ISIS or against hostile powers in Syria, including the Syrian government itself. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Corker has previously warned that Congress should not “risk undermining the legal foundation for this critical fight” by opening up a partisan battle over proper scope of the international war on terror, but more recently has unveiled a proposed updated AUMF. House Speaker Paul Ryan has resisted bipartisan efforts to revisit the authorization for the use of military force. Plenty of Republican legislators, at least, seem to think the president had ample authority to act on his own without the need for members of Congress to go on record directing the president to take any particular action. As the president pondered the American response to the chemical weapons attack in Syria, Corker himself seemed bogged down in negotiating an updated AUMF in the Senate and waived off congressional action as unnecessary in the case of “surgical” strikes against the Syrian government. The escalating tensions in Syria are not sudden or unexpected. The United States is not responding to an assault on its own forces in the region. The United States is only claiming to send a signal to the Syrian government and the international community in response to a chemical weapons attack a week ago. In the days following the chemical weapons attack, the United States has had time to present its case to the United Nations, and the president has apparently had time to send out a series of ominous tweets threatening Assad. The president had time to go to Congress as well. House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell had time to move an authorization for the use of military force through their legislative chambers. No one bothered to do so. As storm clouds gathered, Congress watched as if it were a bystander, irrelevant to national decisions of whether to initiate a military attack against a foreign government. Instead, House Speaker Paul Ryan specifically announced that he “won’t get ahead of the president” and thought that Trump already had whatever legal authority he might need “to do what he may or may not do.” I have argued before that constitutional crises can be of two types. Crises of operation can occur when the constitutional rules and procedures do not provide the resources to resolve a political conflict. Crises of fidelity can occur when constitutional provisions are regarded as no longer authoritative or binding. Such crises have been exceedingly rare in the United States. In particular, crises of fidelity have been rare because the constitutional text is quite spare, the opportunities for creative interpretations are plentiful, and the desire to keep faith with the Constitution is strong. Better to be an innovative constitutional interpreter than a constitutional apostate. Nonetheless, faithful and conscientious constitutional actors should do more than pay mere lip service to the text. Congress is abdicating its constitutional responsibilities to determine whether the United States should make war on other nations when it makes no effort to take advantage of the ample time available to it to deliberate on how the United States should respond to the use of chemical weapons by a rogue regime and when it makes no effort to develop a collective response to presidential threats to use military force against foreign governments with which the United States is not already at war. The executive branch is indicating the irrelevance of Congress to the warmaking process when it announces that the president’s Article II authority should be understood to include the power to initiate military force against foreign nations whenever he deems American national interests to be at stake.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Trump is pursuing a broad unitary executive – lasting precedent is enough to maintain flex – Congress ceding power broadly </h4><p><strong>Whittington 18</strong> (Keith E, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University, “R.I.P. Congressional War Power”, Lawfare, 4/20, https://www.lawfareblog.com/rip-congressional-war-power) DB</p><p>President Donald <u>Trump has ordered significant military strikes against assets of the Assad regime in Syria</u>. <u>Trump asserted that the use of military force was necessary “to establish a strong deterrent against the production, spread, and use of chemical weapons,” a goal that is “a vital national security interest of the United States.”</u> It is easy to agree that the United States should want to deter nations from using chemical weapons, and it is also reasonable to think that a military response might be a necessary and appropriate measure to shore up international law—and norms—against the use of such weapons. Moreover, the combined actions of the United States, the United Kingdom and France could credibly be regarded as surgical and limited, with minimal risk to American lives and only a modest risk of escalation. Being low-risk and reasonably justifiable should not be enough, however. The Constitution does not empower the president to conduct military strikes against foreign governments whenever they would advance American national security interests with relatively low risk. The Constitution directs the president to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States” and places him as commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States. The president has reasonably been understood to have the necessary authority to repel a sudden attack on the United States, its people, or its forces abroad. But Congress alone has the constitutional authority “to declare war.” <u><mark>Congress did not authorize</mark> the use of <mark>military force against the Syrian government</u></mark>. <u>Even the administration did not try to draw on the elastic terms of the 2001 and 2002 authorizations for use of military force (AUMF) to justify the Syrian strikes</u>. Passed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2001 AUMF gave congressional permission for military action in Afghanistan and against the al-Qaeda terrorist group and its allies wherever they might be found. The 2002 AUMF empowered the president to take military action against the Iraqi government. Together, those resolutions have underwritten military actions from Afghanistan and Iraq, to Yemen and the Philippines, to Somalia and Niger. Publicly, Defense Secretary James Mattis contended, “as our commander in chief, the president has the authority under Article II of the Constitution to use military force overseas to defend important U.S. national interests,” though privately Mattis was apparently more skeptical about the president’s authority to act against the Syrian government without prior congressional approval. Of course, <u>Article II does not say anything at all about the president’s authority to defend important national security interests</u>. Nonetheless, the Trump administration had earlier pointed to the president’s constitutional authority to act “in the vital national security and foreign policy interests of the United States” to provide the legal basis for air strikes against a Syrian base in 2017. <u>The <mark>Obama</mark> administration <mark>contended</mark> that “sufficiently important <mark>national interests</mark>,” such as “preserving regional stability” and maintaining the “credibility” of the U.N. Security Council, <mark>were sufficient to authorize presidentially initiated military action</mark> to overthrow the government of Libya, so long as that action was not expected to be too “extensive.” In the cases of Haiti and Bosnia, the <mark>Clinton</mark> administration <mark>pointed to the president’s authority to deploy troops abroad at will</mark> as adequate so long as the military operation was expected to fall short of war “in the constitutional sense.” The George H.W. <mark>Bush</mark> administration <mark>made similar claims</mark> to justify its ill-fated military adventures in Somalia</u>. Even as the aims and targets of the military operations in the Middle East have evolved over more than a decade, <u><mark>the president has declined to seek—and Congress has declined to provide—a new authorization for the use of force</mark> that might provide clearer authority to act against ISIS or against hostile powers in Syria, including the Syrian government itself</u>. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Corker has previously warned that Congress should not “risk undermining the legal foundation for this critical fight” by opening up a partisan battle over proper scope of the international war on terror, but more recently has unveiled a proposed updated AUMF. <u>House Speaker Paul <mark>Ryan has resisted bipartisan efforts to revisit the authorization for the use of military force</u></mark>. <u>Plenty of Republican legislators, at least, seem to think the president had ample authority to act on his own without the need for members of Congress to go on record directing the president to take any particular action</u>. As the president pondered the American response to the chemical weapons attack in Syria, Corker himself seemed bogged down in negotiating an updated AUMF in the Senate and waived off congressional action as unnecessary in the case of “surgical” strikes against the Syrian government. The escalating tensions in Syria are not sudden or unexpected. The United States is not responding to an assault on its own forces in the region. The United States is only claiming to send a signal to the Syrian government and the international community in response to a chemical weapons attack a week ago. In the days following the chemical weapons attack, the United States has had time to present its case to the United Nations, and the president has apparently had time to send out a series of ominous tweets threatening Assad. The president had time to go to Congress as well. House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell had time to move an authorization for the use of military force through their legislative chambers. No one bothered to do so. As storm clouds gathered, <u><mark>Congress watched as if it were a bystander</mark>, irrelevant to national decisions of whether to initiate a military attack against a foreign government</u>. Instead, <u>House Speaker Paul Ryan specifically announced that he “won’t get ahead of the president” and thought that Trump already had whatever legal authority he might need “to do what he may or may not do.”</u> I have argued before that constitutional crises can be of two types. Crises of operation can occur when the constitutional rules and procedures do not provide the resources to resolve a political conflict. Crises of fidelity can occur when constitutional provisions are regarded as no longer authoritative or binding. Such crises have been exceedingly rare in the United States. In particular, crises of fidelity have been rare because the constitutional text is quite spare, the opportunities for creative interpretations are plentiful, and the desire to keep faith with the Constitution is strong. Better to be an innovative constitutional interpreter than a constitutional apostate. Nonetheless, faithful and conscientious constitutional actors should do more than pay mere lip service to the text. <u>Congress is abdicating its constitutional responsibilities to determine whether the United States should make war on other nations when it makes no effort to take advantage of the ample time available to it to deliberate on how the United States should respond to the use of chemical weapons by a rogue regime and when it makes no effort to develop a collective response to presidential threats to use military force against foreign governments with which the United States is not already at war</u>. <u><mark>The executive branch is indicating the irrelevance of Congress to the warmaking </mark>process when it announces that the president’s Article II authority should be understood to include the power to initiate military force against foreign nations whenever he deems American national interests to be at stake</u>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Nicholas Borroz 17, PhD Candidate in Management and International Business at the University of Auckland, Director of GlobalWonks, previously a business intelligence consultant; and Hunter Marston, political analyst in Washington, DC, worked in the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon and the Vahu Development Institute, 2017, “How Trump can Avoid War with China,” Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies, 4(3), pp. 613-620 /jpb fulltext: The early actions of the Trump administration, however, reveal a more nuanced view than these hawkish statements would suggest. China critics like Bannon have seen their influence wane, Tillerson has moderated his bellicose statements, and Spicer has lost credibility. Furthermore, Trump came around to endorse the One China policy before he met Chinese President Xi Jinping as a concession following his phone call with Tsai. These shifts indicate the Trump administration will pursue a more mature China policy than initially indicated. That said, radical views still exist at the highest level of US government. Moreover, Chinese actions continue to touch a nerve among the American policymaking community. International relations scholars John Mearsheimer and Robert Kagan affirm that the United States and China are inexorably drifting closer to a destructive confrontation. This momentum is due to China’s ability and willingness to reshape the international order are increasing, just as the United States’ capacity to preserve the status quo is declining. The threat of superpower conflict is alarming, but an important fact to remember is that tensions were already rising before Trump took office. No doubt Trump and his team have accelerated escalation, but it is one that was also taking place under then-President Barack Obama. During his tenure, Obama’s administration implemented the ‘Pivot to Asia,’ a major foreign policy push to develop economic, diplomatic, and military ties in Asia. In the end, civilian branches of government faltered on key policy fronts, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), although the military made great advances. The United States under Obama significantly expanded its network of security partners. It signed a strategic partnership with Singapore in 2012, and in December 2015 elevated that relationship to an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The Pentagon secured the rotation of 2500 US Marines in Australia, while the Philippines and the United States upheld an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, allowing the deployment of American troops on Philippine territory. The United States furthermore deepened security cooperation with Indonesia and Vietnam. The pivot also extended to Northeast Asia, where the Obama administration agreed to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in South Korea. Although THAAD was designed to defend against potential missile strikes from North Korea, China nevertheless perceived this as an incursion within its strategic domain. North Korea continues to be an issue of contention, as Trump has linked US–China trade relations to Beijing’s ability to curb North Korea’s weapons program. Just as Trump is following in Obama’s footsteps, however, so too did Obama continue many of the policies of his predecessor George W. Bush, who oversaw increased confrontation with China. In fact, the Bush administration faced an early and extreme escalation in tensions when an American EP-3 spy plane collided with a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force jet over waters near China. The Bush years also saw the successful conclusion of a civil nuclear agreement with India in 2008, much to China’s chagrin. In Southeast Asia, the Bush administration prioritized security ties as part of its global war on terror.1 Bush furthermore formed a ‘Quad,’ a fourparty security network linking the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Beijing’s leaders perceived this as one more aspect of an American containment strategy aimed at checking China’s power. All told, the opening years of the 21st century have seen a serious decline in the relationship between China and the United States. When China seized an American underwater drone in the months before Trump took office, it was a sobering reminder of what is occurring: conflict between China and the United States is becoming more likely. Optimists would contend that the two sides resolved the aforementioned drone incident quickly and peacefully via diplomatic channels. And although military encounters at sea have increased, there are also more military-to-military contacts and other communication mechanisms to mitigate potential escalations. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in our current era of globalization, trade and cultural exchange would hinder the likelihood of any conflict between China and the United States of going ‘hot.’ These ties mean that it is in both countries’ interest to avoid a war, which would entail catastrophic costs to both sides. Top decision-makers in government cite this view. The Chinese Foreign Minister, for instance, recently stated that, ‘there cannot be conflict between China and the United States because both will lose, and both sides cannot afford that.’ Others note the cordial relations Trump and Xi struck in Mar-a-Lago during their first meeting in April. Although this argument is superficially reassuring, one must remember that cool rationality is rarely a major factor in nations’ decisions to go to war. If it were, the United States would likely not have decided to attack Iraq in the aftermath of September 11. There was no immediate linkage between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, as was commonly believed. Rather, fear and misinformation got the best of the American people and policymakers. Before discounting a Sino-American war as unlikely, one must also remember that war is a perennial feature of international relations. There is no reason to expect that this generation of humanity has achieved such a level of enlightenment that war between China and the United States will not happen. To quote the arch-realist thinker Mearsheimer, ‘the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s own survival…States facing this incentive are fated to clash as each competes for advantages over the others.’ 2 As China gains power, Mearsheimer argues, it is bound to conflict with the United States. Steven Pinker’s appeals to ‘the better angels of our nature’ 3 notwithstanding, humankind has yet to find durable solutions to the tragedy of interstate war. Despite all this, even if war is unlikely, China and the United States appear to at least be heading towards a cooling of relations in which there is little constructive communication between them, and in which other countries are forced to take sides. As countries like Thailand and the Philippines line up to strike deals with Beijing, there has already been a fair amount of handwringing in Washington that the United States is ‘losing’ its allies in Southeast Asia. These concerns have grown since Trump scrapped the TPP, thereby giving China an opportunity to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. Moreover, even if the two sides manage to avoid war, there would still be a high degree of instability. There would remain a constant risk of triggering explosive conflict, and proxy struggles would likely occur along the borders of competing influence. As the Cold War has taught, these proxy conflicts would not necessarily be minor—one has only to recall the Vietnam War. The situation could be much worse, however, if tensions between China and the United States were to ignite a full-on confrontation. Hugh White states this most eloquently in his book, The China Choice. As White rightfully points out, even if there are many constraints in place that make a hot war unlikely, this does not mean one can dismiss the possibility altogether. It is in fact morally irresponsible to rule out the possibility of war. This is because if a war between the United States and China were to occur, it could easily be the largest such conflict in world history. If, in the event that a conflict escalates to the point of using nuclear weapons, it is not hyperbolic to say such a conflict would be catastrophic. There is good reason the so-called doomsday clock was sped up after Trump’s inauguration. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists now says humanity is two and a half minutes away from ‘midnight,’ a euphemism for how long it would take humankind to self-destruct.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Extinction </h4><p>Nicholas <strong>Borroz 17</strong>, PhD Candidate in Management and International Business at the University of Auckland, Director of GlobalWonks, previously a business intelligence consultant; and Hunter Marston, political analyst in Washington, DC, worked in the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon and the Vahu Development Institute, 2017, “How Trump can Avoid War with China,” Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies, 4(3), pp. 613-620 /jpb</p><p>The <u>early actions of</u> the <u>Trump</u> administration, however, <u>reveal a <strong>more nuanced view</strong> than</u> these <u>hawkish statements</u> would <u>suggest</u>. China critics like Bannon have seen their influence wane, Tillerson has moderated his bellicose statements, and Spicer has lost credibility. Furthermore, Trump came around to endorse the One China policy before he met Chinese President Xi Jinping as a concession following his phone call with Tsai. These shifts indicate the Trump administration will pursue a more mature China policy than initially indicated. That said, radical views still exist at the highest level of US government. Moreover, Chinese actions continue to touch a nerve among the American policymaking community.</p><p>International relations scholars John Mearsheimer and Robert Kagan affirm that <u><mark>the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>and China are</u></mark> inexorably <u><mark>drifting closer to</u></mark> a <u>destructive <mark>confrontation</u></mark>. This momentum is <u><mark>due to <strong>China’s ability</mark> and willingness <mark>to reshape</mark> the <mark>international order</strong></mark> are increasing</u>, just as the United States’ capacity to preserve the status quo is declining.</p><p>The threat of superpower conflict is alarming, but an important fact to remember is that tensions were already rising before Trump took office. No doubt Trump and his team have accelerated escalation, but it is one that was also taking place under then-President Barack Obama. During his tenure, Obama’s administration implemented the ‘Pivot to Asia,’ a major foreign policy push to develop economic, diplomatic, and military ties in Asia. In the end, civilian branches of government faltered on key policy fronts, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), although the military made great advances.</p><p>The United States under Obama significantly expanded its network of security partners. It signed a strategic partnership with Singapore in 2012, and in December 2015 elevated that relationship to an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The Pentagon secured the rotation of 2500 US Marines in Australia, while the Philippines and the United States upheld an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, allowing the deployment of American troops on Philippine territory. The United States furthermore deepened security cooperation with Indonesia and Vietnam.</p><p>The pivot also extended to Northeast Asia, where the Obama administration agreed to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in South Korea. Although THAAD was designed to defend against potential missile strikes from North Korea, China nevertheless perceived this as an incursion within its strategic domain. North Korea continues to be an issue of contention, as Trump has linked US–China trade relations to Beijing’s ability to curb North Korea’s weapons program.</p><p>Just as Trump is following in Obama’s footsteps, however, so too did Obama continue many of the policies of his predecessor George W. Bush, who oversaw increased confrontation with China. In fact, the Bush administration faced an early and extreme escalation in tensions when an American EP-3 spy plane collided with a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force jet over waters near China. The Bush years also saw the successful conclusion of a civil nuclear agreement with India in 2008, much to China’s chagrin. In Southeast Asia, the Bush administration prioritized security ties as part of its global war on terror.1 Bush furthermore formed a ‘Quad,’ a fourparty security network linking the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Beijing’s leaders perceived this as one more aspect of an American containment strategy aimed at checking China’s power. </p><p>All told, the opening years of the 21st century have seen a serious decline in the relationship between China and the United States. When China seized an American underwater drone in the months before Trump took office, it was a sobering reminder of what is occurring: conflict between China and the United States is becoming more likely.</p><p>Optimists would contend that the two sides resolved the aforementioned drone incident quickly and peacefully via diplomatic channels. And although military encounters at sea have increased, there are also more military-to-military contacts and other communication mechanisms to mitigate potential escalations. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in our current era of globalization, trade and cultural exchange would hinder the likelihood of any conflict between China and the United States of going ‘hot.’ These ties mean that <u>it is in both countries’ interest to avoid a war</u>, which would entail catastrophic costs to both sides. Top decision-makers in government cite this view. The Chinese Foreign Minister, for instance, recently stated that, ‘there cannot be conflict between China and the United States because both will lose, and both sides cannot afford that.’ Others note the cordial relations Trump and Xi struck in Mar-a-Lago during their first meeting in April.</p><p>Although this argument is superficially reassuring, <u>one must remember</u> that cool <u><strong>rationality is rarely a major factor in nations’ decisions to go to war</u></strong>. If it were, the United States would likely not have decided to attack Iraq in the aftermath of September 11. There was no immediate linkage between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, as was commonly believed. Rather, fear and misinformation got the best of the American people and policymakers.</p><p>Before discounting a Sino-American war as unlikely, one must also remember that war is a perennial feature of international relations. <u>There is no reason to expect</u> that this generation of humanity has achieved such a level of enlightenment that <u>war between China and the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>will not happen</u>. To quote the arch-realist thinker Mearsheimer, ‘the <u>great powers</u> that shape the international system fear each other and <u>compete for power</u> as a result. Indeed, <u>their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power</u> over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s own survival…States facing this incentive are fated to clash as each competes for advantages over the others.’ 2 <u><mark>As China gains power</u></mark>, Mearsheimer argues, <u><mark>it is bound to conflict with the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates. Steven Pinker’s appeals to ‘the better angels of our nature’ 3 notwithstanding, humankind has yet to find durable solutions to the tragedy of interstate war.</p><p>Despite all this, even if war is unlikely, China and the United States appear to at least be heading towards a cooling of relations in which there is little constructive communication between them, and in which other countries are forced to take sides. As countries like Thailand and the Philippines line up to strike deals with Beijing, there has already been a fair amount of handwringing in Washington that the United States is ‘losing’ its allies in Southeast Asia. These concerns have grown since Trump scrapped the TPP, thereby giving China an opportunity to expand its influence in Southeast Asia.</p><p>Moreover, even if the two sides manage to avoid war, there would still be a high degree of instability. There would remain a constant risk of triggering explosive conflict, and proxy struggles would likely occur along the borders of competing influence. As the Cold War has taught, these proxy conflicts would not necessarily be minor—one has only to recall the Vietnam War.</p><p><u><mark>The situation could be</mark> much <mark>worse</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>if tensions</u></mark> between China and the United States <u>were to <mark>ignite</mark> a <strong><mark>full-on confrontation</u></strong></mark>. Hugh White states this most eloquently in his book, The China Choice. As White rightfully points out, <u>even if there are</u> many <u>constraints</u> in place <u>that make a hot war unlikely, this does not mean one can dismiss the possibility</u> altogether. It is in fact morally irresponsible to rule out the possibility of war. This is because if a <u><mark>war</mark> between the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and China</u> were to occur, it <u><mark>could</mark> <strong>easily <mark>be the largest</mark> such <mark>conflict in</mark> world <mark>history</strong>. If</mark>,</u> in the event that a <u><mark>conflict escalates to</u></mark> the point of <u>using <mark>nuclear weapons</u></mark>, it is not hyperbolic to say <u>such a <mark>conflict would be</u></mark> catastrophic. There is good reason the so-called <u><mark>doomsday</u></mark> clock was sped up after Trump’s inauguration. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists now says humanity is two and a half minutes away from ‘midnight,’ a euphemism <u><mark>for</u></mark> how long it would take <u><strong><mark>humankind</mark> to self-destruct.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Davis 17 [Sasha Davis (2017): Sharing the struggle: constructing transnational solidarity in global social movements, Space and Polity, DOI: 10.1080/13562576.2017.1324255] mads fulltext: The new base on Jeju Island is but one base in the often-shifting military alignment of the United States and its allies. While the new base in Jeju is relatively small, other islands in the Asia-Pacific region like Okinawa, Guåhan, O’ahu (Hawai’i), as well as sites on the mainlands of South Korea and Japan host US ‘Main Operating Bases’ which contain large and permanent concentrations of US military units. Despite continued US military interventions in the Middle East and Central Asia – and the unsettled relations between the US and Russia over the Ukraine – the Obama administration maintained a doctrine known as the ‘Pivot-to-Asia’ which involved the repositioning of US military force toward the periphery of East Asia to face a resurgent China (Clinton, 2011; Davis, 2015; Kajihiro, 2013). This has resulted in the construction of new bases (such as on Jeju and in Henoko, Okinawa), the expansion of existing bases on Guåhan and O’ahu, as well as more US use of Australian, Philippine and Singaporean bases (see regional map in Figure 3). Due to political concerns, and the negative consequences of living day-to-day next to bases, these new military arrangements have sparked protests at sites across the region (Davis, 2015; Kirk, 2008; Lutz, 2009; McCormack & Norimatsu, 2012; Natividad & Kirk, 2010; Shigematsu & Camacho, 2010). These military bases are ostensibly constructed to provide ‘national security’ for the US and their allies as well as for supply-chain security for the movement of trade throughout the Asia-Pacific region (Cowen, 2014). They are, however, also sites of practices that undermine the everyday feelings of security in the communities that host them (Ireland, 2010; Kirk, 2008; Lutz, 2006, 2009; McCaffrey, 2002; Vine, 2009; Warf, 1997). As scholars of feminist geopolitics and critical security studies have pointed out, military bases promote a ‘security’ that appeals to so-called ‘realist’ military and state-centric conceptualizations of security, while undermining the daily security of bodies that must endure the violences these bases project into distant warzones as well as release locally in the form of environmental contamination, noise, violations of local sovereignties and increased incidence of sexual assaults (Booth, 2005; Brown & Staeheli, 2003; Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Enloe, 2007; Jones & Sage, 2010). More personcentric views of security have informed social movements that reject the imposition of bases within communities on two fronts: as violent instruments of war and power projection, as well as institutions that locally create contamination, raise risk of sexual assault, and commandeer land that could be used for development, recreation, housing or other purposes. It would therefore be inaccurate to portray these social movements near bases as either movements with local grievances (environmental, sovereignty, sexual violence) reaching out for external solidarity, or as local manifestations of reactions against global grievances (war, imperialism). These movements are simultaneously both (Loyd, 2012). There are two important points that follow from this. The first is that it demonstrates the utility of using geographic approaches which characterize social movements as ‘translocal assemblages’ which recognize the simultaneity of place-based protests and the spatially stretched networks and circulations of people, ideas and resources in which they are embedded (McFarlane, 2009). Furthermore, this approach is useful because it also recognizes the discursive-material nature of these translocal activist connections (Baird, 2015; Davies, 2012; Legg, 2009; McFarlane, 2009). The second point, discussed below, is that this ontological view of the inseparability of the global and local, as well as the inseparability of the material and discursive, supports the epistemological position that people in these far-flung places ought to develop a shared critical consciousness (conscientização). Put more simply, the fact that researchers and activists consider the global and local as intrinsically tied together means that oppression is produced at all scales, and therefore activists must simultaneously organize across space as well as in place. Before getting to this important second point, however, it is first worth expanding the discussion here on the geographic approach of examining social movements as translocal assemblages. Trans-national social movements have long been portrayed as networks of individuals and civil society organizations, but more recent scholarship stresses that social movements can productively be analyzed using the logic of assemblages as theorized by Gilles Deleuze (Baird, 2015; Davies, 2012; Legg, 2009; McFarlane, 2009). While the distinction between a network and an assemblage may appear to be a fine point, there are important implications for how scholars and activists understand these movements and their potential. The first insight of the assemblage approach is that rather than looking at the connections between activists or places as mere conduits between active ‘nodes,’ viewing social movements as assemblages stresses that the ‘nodes’ (activists, places, and the movements themselves) are constructed relationally through the performance of their translocal dialogues, relations and actions. It is not a question of how movements ‘scale-up’ (or down) to accomplish goals. Rather, as McFarlane emphasizes, these movements are, in an essential way, already translocal and are constructed from spatially stretched inter-relationships from their beginnings (2009). This view is supported by one Hawai’i activist who said of organizing within Hawai’i, ‘We need to learn about each other’s struggles and be transnational and transcultural within place.’ (personal communication, 2014, emphasis added). As several scholars have pointed out, it is not so much that solidarities and transnational movements for decolonization, peace and justice are constructed by merely connecting separated individuals that already hold similar values, but rather that solidarity actively emerges from translocal performances of care and shared experience (Brown & Yaffe, 2014; Featherstone, 2012). In this way, the interview respondents in this study support the findings in the academic literature that emphasize that ‘collective identity’ in social movements is not something which is pre-exiting between communities in similar circumstances. Instead, collective identity, critical consciousness, and solidarity are the outcomes of interaction (Davis, 2017; Fominaya, 2010; Melucci, 1995; Routledge, 1996). Another key insight of the assemblage approach to social movements is that the connections between activists are theorized to be not merely ideational, but material, emotional and visceral as well (Bosco, 2007; Hayes-Conroy & Hayes-Conroy, 2013; Hayes-Conroy & Martin, 2010). As can be gleaned from the above discussion of protests on Jeju Island, the activism there is not just about dialogue and ideas. It is an intensely physical, emotional and spiritual experience. The one hundred prostrations in the morning, the performance of the Catholic mass while being carried off by police, the dancing in the streets, the eating together afterwards: these are not just the results of solidarity, the solidarity arises through these bodily performances. This is something that organizers are very aware of and that they attempt to promote. As is more fully discussed in the following section, several activists articulated that translocal social movements are built (as a discursive-material assemblage) through these shared experiences that are at once informational, emotional and visceral. This brings the discussion to the other important aspect of the ‘translocal assemblage’ approach: namely that the ontological view of a translocally-connected world promotes an associated epistemic and pedagogical approach to the conduct of the activism itself. The contention that the world is ontologically ‘assemblage-like’ encourages activist approaches that focus on the transnational connections and circulations of these movements. Activist attempts to cultivate a Freirean critical consciousness of shared oppression arise out of the ontological position that processes of both oppression and liberation are simultaneously and inseparably operating at local and global scales. In other words, activists drawing on the principles of assemblage theory (sometimes quite explicitly referencing the academic work on these perspectives) hold that whether people are in South Korea, Okinawa or the US, they are all enmeshed and entangled in pervasive shared processes of oppression. Furthermore, this view encourages activists to not just emphasize the larger socio-political contexts of local grievances to bring about critical consciousness, but also to direct their organizing on proactively and explicitly changing those larger contexts that affect local grievances. A good example of these tendencies can be seen in the activities of the ‘Inter-Island Solidarity for Peace’ group that formed in 2014 with members from Jeju, Okinawa and Taiwan. The objectives of the group extend beyond blocking the construction of specific military projects in the region to the promotion of other modalities of security in Asia and the Pacific. The group’s vision is that the most effective long-term strategy to contest the construction of bases in the region is to promote the development of a different system of international relations in East Asia. While the group focuses on supporting opponents of militarization on the three islands, it also has a broader aim of cultivating more transnational connections and creating more peaceful relationships between the islands on the edge of East Asia. The ‘Inter-Island Solidarity for Peace’ group optimistically and explicitly articulates the principle that non-state actors on small islands, when linked in solidarity, can create ‘another kind of geography’ for the whole region. At the group’s second annual ‘Peace for the Sea’ camp in 2015 in Okinawa (the first was in Jeju in 2014, the third in Taiwan in 2016) they issued the following communiqué that demonstrates their view of the recent US shift of more military resources to the area, but also addresses their vision for more peaceful geographies in the region based on the construction of a different kind of social assemblage: We fully understand that this shift [the US military pivot-to-Asia] will not bring about greater human security but will instead yield the conditions for a far greater risk of war and tremendous environmental destruction. We further recognize that these changes have been fueled by the global weapons industry, which reaps enormous profits from increased military tension and conflict, while ordinary people and the wider ecosystem suffer the inevitable consequences. We cannot leave this work to political leaders and governments, which largely answer to corporate interests and the military-industrial complex. We challenge the prevailing assumptions behind the current configuration of geopolitics that takes for granted the precedence of nation-states, military interests, and capitalist accumulation. We will instead create another kind of geography. Through our Peace for the Sea Camp and similar projects, we are already creating alternative political communities based on a sustainable economy, the ethics of coexistence, and our shared responsibility to preserve peace. (quoted in Paik, 2015) While this communiqué describes the vision the activists on these islands have for more peaceful geographies in the region, in the following sections this article will delve more deeply into how these activist groups attempt to construct regional and global relationships of solidarity to accomplish these goals. By examining the spatiality of contemporary social movements, such as the ones seen in Jeju and Okinawa, I contend that both researchers and activists can gain a better understanding of how solidarity is constructed and performed both in place and across space.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>We affirm decolonization – only place-based resistance occurring on multiple scales can actively work to reconstruct geographical spaces on local and global levels</h4><p><strong>Davis 17</strong> [Sasha Davis (2017): Sharing the struggle: constructing transnational solidarity in global social movements, Space and Polity, DOI: 10.1080/13562576.2017.1324255] mads</p><p>The new base on Jeju Island is but one base in the often-shifting military alignment of the United States and its allies. While the new base in Jeju is relatively small, other islands in the Asia-Pacific region like Okinawa, Guåhan, O’ahu (Hawai’i), as well as <u>sites on the mainlands of South Korea and Japan host US ‘Main Operating Bases’ which contain large and permanent concentrations of US military units</u>. Despite continued US military <u>interventions</u> in the Middle East and Central Asia – <u>and the unsettled relations between the US and Russia over the Ukraine – the Obama administration maintained a doctrine known as the ‘Pivot-to-Asia’ which involved the repositioning of US military force toward the periphery of East Asia to face a resurgent China</u> (Clinton, 2011; Davis, 2015; Kajihiro, 2013). <u>This has resulted in the construction of new bases</u> (such as on Jeju and in Henoko, Okinawa), <u>the expansion of existing bases</u> on Guåhan and O’ahu, <u>as well as more US use of</u> Australian, <u>Philippine</u> and Singaporean <u>bases</u> (see regional map in Figure 3). <u>Due to political concerns, and the negative consequences of living day-to-day next to bases, these new military arrangements have sparked protests at sites across the region</u> (Davis, 2015; Kirk, 2008; Lutz, 2009; McCormack & Norimatsu, 2012; Natividad & Kirk, 2010; Shigematsu & Camacho, 2010). These <u>military bases are</u> ostensibly <u>constructed to provide ‘national security’ for the US and their allies as well as for supply-chain security for the movement of trade throughout the Asia-Pacific</u> <u>region</u> (Cowen, 2014). <u>They are</u>, however, also <u>sites of practices that undermine the everyday feelings of security in the communities that host them</u> (Ireland, 2010; Kirk, 2008; Lutz, 2006, 2009; McCaffrey, 2002; Vine, 2009; Warf, 1997). As scholars of feminist geopolitics and critical security studies have pointed out, <u><strong>military bases promote a ‘security’ that appeals to</u></strong> so-called ‘<u>realist’ military and <strong>state-centric conceptualizations of security</strong>, while <strong>undermining</strong> the daily security of <strong>bodies</strong> that must endure the violences these bases project into distant warzones as well as release locally in the form of environmental contamination, noise, violations of local sovereignties and increased incidence of sexual assaults</u> (Booth, 2005; Brown & Staeheli, 2003; Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Enloe, 2007; Jones & Sage, 2010). More <u>personcentric views of security have informed social movements that reject the imposition of bases within communities on two fronts: as violent instruments of war and power projection, as well as institutions that locally create contamination, raise risk of sexual assault, and commandeer land that could be used for development, recreation, housing or other purposes</u>. <u>It would</u> therefore <u>be inaccurate to portray these</u> social <u>movements</u> near bases <u>as either movements with local grievances</u> (environmental, sovereignty, sexual violence) <u>reaching out for external solidarity, or as local manifestations of reactions against global grievances</u> (war, imperialism). <u>These movements are simultaneously both</u> (Loyd, 2012). There are two important points that follow from this. The first is that <u>it demonstrates the utility of using geographic approaches which characterize social movements as ‘<strong>translocal assemblages’</strong> which recognize the simultaneity of place-based protests and the spatially stretched networks and circulations of people, ideas and resources in which they are embedded</u> (McFarlane, 2009). Furthermore, <u>this approach</u> is useful because it also <u>recognizes the discursive-material nature of these translocal activist connections</u> (Baird, 2015; Davies, 2012; Legg, 2009; McFarlane, 2009). The second point, discussed below, is that <u>this ontological view of the <strong>inseparability of the global and local</strong>, as well as the inseparability of the <strong>material and discursive</strong>, supports the epistemological position that people in these far-flung places ought to develop a shared critical consciousness</u> (conscientização). Put more simply, <u>the fact that researchers and activists consider the global and local as intrinsically tied together means that oppression is produced at all scales, and therefore activists must simultaneously organize across space as well as in plac</u>e. Before getting to this important second point, however, it is first worth expanding the discussion here on the geographic approach of examining social movements as translocal assemblages. <u>Trans-national social movements have long been portrayed as networks of individuals and civil society organizations, but more recent scholarship stresses that social movements can productively be analyzed using the logic of assemblages</u> as theorized by Gilles Deleuze (Baird, 2015; Davies, 2012; Legg, 2009; McFarlane, 2009). While the distinction between a network and an assemblage may appear to be a fine point, there are important implications for how scholars and activists understand these movements and their potential. The first insight of <u>the assemblage approach is that rather than looking at the connections between activists or places as mere conduits between active ‘nodes,’ viewing social movements as assemblages stresses that the ‘nodes’ (activists, places, and the movements themselves) are constructed relationally through the performance of their <strong>translocal dialogues, relations and actions</u></strong>. <u><strong>It is not a question of how movements ‘scale-up’</u></strong> (or down<u><strong>) to accomplish goals</u></strong>. Rather, as McFarlane emphasizes, <u>these movements</u> <u>are</u>, in an essential way, <u>already translocal and are constructed from spatially stretched inter-relationships from their beginnings</u> (2009). This view is supported by one Hawai’i activist who said of organizing within Hawai’i, ‘We need to learn about each other’s struggles and be transnational and transcultural within place.’ (personal communication, 2014, emphasis added). As several scholars have pointed out, <u>it is not so much that solidarities and transnational movements for decolonization, peace and justice are constructed by merely connecting separated individuals that already hold similar values, but rather that solidarity actively emerges from translocal performances of care and shared experience</u> (Brown & Yaffe, 2014; Featherstone, 2012). In this way, the interview respondents in this study support the findings in the academic literature that emphasize that ‘collective identity’ in social movements is not something which is pre-exiting between communities in similar circumstances. Instead, <u>collective identity, critical consciousness, and solidarity are the outcomes of interaction</u> (Davis, 2017; Fominaya, 2010; Melucci, 1995; Routledge, 1996). Another key insight of the assemblage approach to social movements is that the <u>connections between activists are theorized to be not merely ideational, but <strong>material</strong>, <strong>emotional</strong> and <strong>visceral</strong> as well </u>(Bosco, 2007; Hayes-Conroy & Hayes-Conroy, 2013; Hayes-Conroy & Martin, 2010). As can be gleaned from the above discussion of protests on Jeju Island, the <u>activism there is not just about dialogue and ideas. It is an intensely physical, emotional and spiritual experience</u>. The one hundred prostrations in the morning, the performance of the Catholic mass while being carried off by police, the dancing in the streets, the eating together afterwards: <u>these are not just the results of solidarity, the solidarity arises through these bodily performances. This is something that organizers are very aware of and that they attempt to promote</u>. As is more fully discussed in the following section, <u>several activists articulated that translocal social movements are built (as a discursive-material assemblage) through these shared experiences that are at once informational, emotional and visceral.</u> This brings the discussion to the other important aspect of the ‘translocal assemblage’ approach: namely that <u>the ontological view of a translocally-connected world promotes an associated epistemic and pedagogical approach to the conduct of the activism itself</u>. <u>The contention that the world is ontologically ‘assemblage-like’ encourages activist approaches that focus on the transnational connections and circulations of these movements</u>. <u>Activist attempts to cultivate</u> a Freirean <u>critical consciousness of shared oppression arise out of the ontological position that processes of both oppression and liberation are simultaneously and inseparably operating at local and global scales</u>. In other words, activists drawing on the principles of assemblage theory (sometimes quite explicitly referencing the academic work on these perspectives) hold that <u><strong>whether people are in South Korea, Okinawa or the US, they are all enmeshed and entangled in pervasive shared processes of oppression</u></strong>. Furthermore, this view encourages activists to not just emphasize the larger socio-political contexts of local grievances to bring about critical consciousness, but also to direct their organizing on proactively and explicitly changing those larger contexts that affect local grievances. <u>A good example</u> of these tendencies <u>can be seen in the activities of the ‘Inter-Island Solidarity for Peace’ group that formed in 2014 with members from Jeju, Okinawa and Taiwan</u>. The <u>objectives of the group extend beyond blocking the construction of specific military projects in the region to the promotion of other modalities of security in Asia and the Pacific. The group’s vision is that the most effective long-term strategy to contest the construction of bases in the region is to <strong>promote the development of a different system of international relations in East Asia</u></strong>. While the group focuses on supporting opponents of militarization on the three islands, <u>it</u> also <u>has a broader aim of cultivating more transnational connections and creating more peaceful relationships between the islands on the edge of East Asia. The ‘Inter-Island Solidarity for Peace’ group optimistically and explicitly articulates the principle that <strong>non-state actors on small islands, when linked in solidarity, can create ‘another kind of geography’ for the whole region</strong>.</u> At the group’s second annual ‘Peace for the Sea’ camp in 2015 in Okinawa (the first was in Jeju in 2014, the third in Taiwan in 2016) they issued the following communiqué that demonstrates their view of the recent US shift of more military resources to the area, but also addresses their vision for more peaceful geographies in the region based on the construction of a different kind of social assemblage: We fully understand that this shift [the US military pivot-to-Asia] will not bring about greater human security but will instead yield the conditions for a far greater risk of war and tremendous environmental destruction. We further recognize that these changes have been fueled by the global weapons industry, which reaps enormous profits from increased military tension and conflict, while ordinary people and the wider ecosystem suffer the inevitable consequences. We cannot leave this work to political leaders and governments, which largely answer to corporate interests and the military-industrial complex. We challenge the prevailing assumptions behind the current configuration of geopolitics that takes for granted the precedence of nation-states, military interests, and capitalist accumulation. <u>We will instead create another kind of geography. Through our Peace for the Sea Camp and similar projects, we are already creating alternative political communities based on a sustainable economy, the ethics of coexistence, and our shared responsibility to preserve peace</u>. (quoted in Paik, 2015) While this communiqué describes the vision the activists on these islands have for more peaceful geographies in the region, in the following sections this article will delve more deeply into how these activist groups attempt to construct regional and global relationships of solidarity to accomplish these goals. By examining the spatiality of contemporary social movements, such as the ones seen in Jeju and Okinawa, I contend that both researchers and activists can gain a better understanding of how solidarity is constructed and performed both in place and across space.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kroenig 15 (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015) fulltext: The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>5] Nuclear war </h4><p><strong>Kroenig 15</strong> (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies<u>, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015)</p><p><mark>The spread of <strong>nuclear weapons</strong> poses</mark> at least six <strong><mark>severe threats</strong> </mark>to international peace and security <mark>including</mark>: <strong><mark>nuclear war</strong></mark>, <strong>nuclear <mark>terrorism</strong>, global</mark> and</u> <u>regional <mark>instability</mark>, constrained US freedom of action, <strong><mark>weakened alliances</strong></mark>, and further nuclear proliferation.</u> Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why <u>we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation</u>. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War <u>The greatest threat</u> posed by the spread of nuclear weapons <u>is nuclear war. The <strong>more states</strong> in possession of nuclear weapons</u>, <u>the <strong>greater the probability</strong> that somewhere, someday, there will be a <strong>catastrophic nuclear</strong> war.</u> To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. <u><mark>Before</mark> reaching a state of <strong><mark>MAD</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>new</mark> nuclear <mark>states </mark>go through a <strong>transition</strong> period in which they<mark> <strong>lack</strong></mark> a secure-<strong><mark>second strike</strong> </mark>capability</u>. In this context, <u>one or both states might believe that <mark>it has an <strong>incentive</strong> to <strong>use</strong></mark> nuclear weapons <strong><mark>first</u></strong></mark>. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, <u>given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike</u>. Similarly, <u>Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force</u>. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, <u>the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a</u> <u>splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might</u>, therefore, <u>decide to launch <mark>a <strong>preventive</mark> nuclear <mark>strike</strong></mark> to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. </u>Indeed, <u>this</u> <u><strong>incentive</u></strong> <u>might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that <mark>emphasizes</mark> <strong>preemptive action</strong>.</u> Second, <u>the state with a small and vulnerable</u> nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, <u>might feel <strong><mark>use </mark>th<mark>em or lose </mark>th<mark>em pressures</u></strong></mark>. That is, <u>in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed</u>. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, <u>nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack</u>.49 If there are advantages to striking first, <u>one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second</u>. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, <u><strong>there is still a risk of nuclear war</u></strong>. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. <u>Iran’s theocratic government</u>, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it <u>contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war,</u> knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, <u>nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders</u> <u>still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries</u>. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, <u><mark>leaders</mark> can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.</u>52 <u><strong>They can <mark>initiate a nuclear crisis</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>By playing </mark>these risky games of nuclear <strong><mark>brinkmanship</strong></mark>, <mark>states </mark>can <strong><mark>increase the risk of nuclear war</strong></mark> in an attempt <strong>to force a less resolved adversary</strong> to <strong>back down.</u></strong> Historical <u>crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them</u>, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, <u>have <strong>come close</u></strong>. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 <u>When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads</u>, such as Iran and Israel, <u>with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that <strong>a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange</u></strong>. Nuclear Terrorism <u>The <mark>spread</mark> of nuclear weapons also <strong><mark>increases the risk of nuclear terror</mark>ism</u></strong>.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin <u>Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire</u> <u>nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West</u>.55 <u>Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56</u> Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 <u><strong>Analysts</u></strong> <u>have pointed out</u> the tremendous<u><strong> hurdles</u></strong> <u>that terrorists would have to overcome</u> <u>in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58</u> <u><strong>Nevertheless</u></strong>, <u>as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will <strong>eventually fall into terrorist hands increases</u></strong>. <u>States could intentionally <strong>transfer nuclear weapons</u></strong>, <u>or</u> the fissile material required to build them, <u>to terrorist groups</u>. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, <u>as</u> nuclear <u><strong>weapons spread</u></strong>, <u>the probability that a leader might someday <strong>purposely arm a terrorist group increases</u></strong>. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, <u>a <strong>new nuclear state</strong>, with <strong>underdeveloped security</strong> procedures, might be vulnerable to <strong>theft</strong>, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists.</u> There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, <u>a nuclear-armed state could collapse</u>, <u>resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem</u>. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. <u><strong>Regional Instability </strong>The spread of <mark>nuclear weapons</mark> also <strong><mark>embolden</mark>s <mark>nuclear powers</u></strong>, <u>contributing to <strong>regional instability</u></strong></mark>. <u>States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct</u> <u>military attack from other states, but <mark>states with <strong>nuclear weapons</strong> </mark>can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive</u> <u>to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy</u>. In this way, n<u>uclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to <mark>engage in <strong>lower-level aggression</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 <u><strong>Historically</u></strong>, we have seen that <u>the <strong>spread of nuclear weapons</strong> has emboldened their possessors and contributed to <strong>regional instability</u></strong>. <u>Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear</u>-<u>weapon states</u> and that <u>this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.</u>61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A <u>nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy</u>. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, <u><strong>we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East.</u></strong> <u>And in a poly-nuclear Middle East</u> with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, <u><strong><mark>any</strong> </mark>one of those <strong><mark>crises</strong> could result in a <strong>catastrophic nuclear exchange</strong></mark>.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Joshua Shifrinson 17, Assistant Professor of International Affairs with the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University, “Time to Consolidate NATO?”, The Washington Quarterly, 40:1, pp. 109-123 fulltext: Finally, American policymakers can pursue a third option by preparing for the day after the shaky foundations of the United States' security guarantees are revealed while nominally maintaining existing American commitments. This may be a difficult task and rife with risks, but may be the best option available. The aftermath of a crisis—such as a Russian invasion of the Baltics which the United States opts not to escalate, a fait accompli akin to the Russian seizure of Crimea, or a limited seizure of Baltic territory that NATO did not fully contest—is liable to see pervasive questions from remaining allies over the future of American security guarantees. Such questions are likely to be overlaid with domestic U.S. disputes over who "lost" the ally or territory, alongside pressures from vested interest groups to showcase U.S. resolve to its remaining partners. Although it cannot eliminate these issues, preparation can ameliorate post-crisis dilemmas through a combination of public diplomacy, private engagement, and unilateral strategizing. Day-after preparations consist of two elements. First, policymakers must be prepared to offer remaining partners compelling explanations as to why the United States de facto abandoned one or more allies. Again, questions over the future credibility of American security guarantees would abound in a post-abandonment world. Still, this environment is also likely to see a growing sense of an even-more pressing Russian threat. Among critical allies, policymakers should be prepared to use this renewed sense of a Russian threat to beat back questions over the future of the American pacifier. States, after all, tend to balance in the face of external threats while husbanding resources to address those threats at the most propitious time and place. Hence, American policymakers can use post-abandonment fears of Russia to (1) reinforce solidarity among remaining NATO members, (2) remind remaining allies that the United States now has a proportionally larger interest in guaranteeing their security, and (3) explain prior American abandonment by pointing out the limited utility and difficulties of acting in those particular episodes. Just as General Omar Bradley warned that a war against China over Korea in 1951 would have been "the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place," so should future leaders be prepared to argue that defending all of Eastern Europe at unlimited cost would be "the wrong operation, at the wrong time, in the wrong place."[40] Second, and relatedly, U.S. policymakers must work among themselves to cultivate a domestic base of support to resist pressures to stand firm on every remaining commitment. This requires not only discussions inside the U.S. government to outline the steps that should be taken after abandoning states such as the Baltics and Poland, but also quietly reaching out to key stakeholders in the think tank, university, NGO, and media communities. Like conversations within the alliance, discussions should involve plans and procedures for (1) managing expectations going forward and (2) using the Russian threat to buttress the newly-circumscribed alliance, all while (3) calibrating the United States' political-military response. The objective throughout should be to generate thinking so that, if the American credibility bluff is called, U.S. strategists would have guidelines in place to shape a cohesive response focused on truly vital interests and backed by the requisite political support. Of course, preparing for the day-after leaves open the question of where to draw the line regarding future abandonment. This is not so much an issue of managing European concerns—so long as European actors feel threatened by Russia, they have reasons to seek American backing and overlook prior U.S. abandonment—so much as the United States itself considering what its interests in Europe entail and where the boundary falls in defending them. There is no hard and fast answer, since the solution will change over time depending on NATO and Russian capabilities, and Eastern Europe's value to the United States in light of the distribution of power. Still, given Russia's relative geographic isolation, economic and military weaknesses, and the European distribution of power, a NATO that simply contained all the states that were in the organization in 1991 seems to be more than enough. Even this "rump" NATO would enjoy significant defense in depth, control the majority of Europe's economic and military potential, and encompass most of the United States' main European trading partners. Again, recognizing that this division exists does not mean ex ante abandoning NATO members beyond this line; after all, doing so might otherwise invite a Russian test of American resolve, or steps by regional allies to precipitate a crisis and try to reverse American retrenchment. Nevertheless, it does call for U.S. policymakers to shape their internal plans and preparations in light of NATO's two-tier status. To be clear, none of these options are politically palatable. Moreover, any effort to adjust the United States' NATO commitments will be at once contentious and politically expensive given the central role support for the alliance has played in post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy debates.[41] Strategic stability, however, has never been easy. Insofar as the United States is a member of NATO to ensure its own well-being—and it cannot be otherwise—policymakers would thus be better served getting ahead of the looming transatlantic crisis rather than wishing away the problem. Ultimately, at a moment when the U.S. security guarantee is no longer credible for all of NATO, it is necessary to recalibrate the American role in continental security affairs. The Commitment Myth Today Proponents of the status quo will contend that the cure outlined here is worse than the disease. Having undertaken commitments to defend Eastern Europe, the United States cannot fail to back its allies lest it ruin its credibility, encourage nuclear proliferation among insecure states throughout Europe (and potentially beyond), and destroy NATO. To do this so the logic goes, the United States should deploy forces to Eastern Europe that ensure that the United States has escalation dominance in the conventional and nuclear realms to deter Russia in peacetime, or force Russia to back down during a crisis. And, since Russia would risk its own destruction by threatening states backed by American nuclear guarantees, preparing to abandon parts of Eastern Europe is unnecessary since deterrence—provided the United States is able and willing to escalate—can hold.[42] These arguments are flawed. In a world of robust second-strike nuclear forces, escalation dominance can, at best, limit the damage that the United States faces; it will not be zero. Moreover, in the net assessment of the interests at stake, Russia would win out: Eastern Europe is important to the United States for what it might say about U.S. credibility, but matters to Russian territorial security, national identity, and the political survival of Russia's leaders. Combined, asymmetry of interests and high costs means that it is neither easy to deter Russia, even if a fuller range of military tools were available, nor a game American policymakers are likely to play. Simply put, if a crisis erupts, the balance of interests and resolve would favor Russia no matter what assets are at the United States' disposal. Abandoning certain allies may actually increase the credibility of remaining U.S. security guarantees. As importantly, the notion that U.S. credibility will collapse and nuclear proliferation take off if the United States backs away from existing NATO commitments rests on shaky foundations. As research by Professor Daryl Press highlights, allies and adversaries tend to see higher credibility in a state's promises the more a state's interests are engaged in the issue at hand and the greater its capacity to advance or protect these interests.[43] Thus, even if the United States abandons certain allies, American credibility would remain intact provided the United States has an interest in the security of remaining partners and the means to protect them. If anything, abandoning certain allies may actually increase the credibility of American security guarantees to remaining NATO members, since the more aggressive Russia becomes and further west it moves, the proportionally larger the American stake is in remaining allies and the stronger the American incentive is in holding the line. Added to the reality that Central–West European states are apt to be even more interested in obtaining allies if Russia expands, then the dangers of the United States backing down are much reduced. Counterintuitively, a shrunken NATO recently witness to some American abandonment and growing fears of Russia may actually be a NATO in which the American commitment becomes more—not less—credible. Time to Consolidate NATO For nearly 30 years, American policymakers pushed NATO enlargement as a way of consolidating the United States' Cold War victory. They did so seemingly convinced that the United States would never have to do that for which NATO was originally intended—fight a war against an adversary capable of hurting the United States.[44] Today, a variety of changes render war a possibility, calling into question the credibility of American pledges undertaken at the height of the post-Cold War era. Though many analysts seek means to make the American promise to all NATO members credible, there are good reasons to doubt whether any American pledge to commit national suicide for allies of dubious importance will truly be viable. Instead of struggling against the reality, a sounder course would recognize NATO's two-tiered status and accommodate U.S. diplomacy to this situation. The key is not necessarily to preventively change formal American security commitments. Instead, the United States must prepare politically and diplomatically for the possibility that some state might call the American security bluff, while accepting the constraints this risk imposes on American foreign policy. Carrying out these steps will, in turn, require both careful coordination throughout the U.S. government and foreign policy establishment, alongside efforts to sustain relationships with those states deemed vital to American interests. If successful, this course may ultimately allow for a more cohesive American policy vis-à-vis Europe and Russia, while reducing the dangers of brinksmanship and crises in the first place. Trading Toledo for Tallinn is not credible—but U.S. strategists can still minimize the fallout from three decades of NATO enlargement that has left the United States exposed in an increasingly conflictual Europe.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u>Clarification</u> that <u>formal commitments</u> are unchanged <u>contains the spillover</u>, which <u>preserves assurance</u>. </h4><p>Joshua <strong>Shifrinson 17</strong>, Assistant Professor of International Affairs with the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University, “Time to Consolidate NATO?”, The Washington Quarterly, 40:1, pp. 109-123</p><p>Finally, <u>American <mark>policymakers can</mark> pursue a third option by <strong><mark>prep</strong></mark>aring <mark>for <strong>the day after</strong></mark> the <strong>shaky foundations</strong> of the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates' security guarantees are revealed while <strong>nominally maintaining</strong> existing American commitments. This</u> may be a difficult task and rife with risks, but <u><mark>may be <strong>the best option available</strong>. The <strong>aftermath</strong></mark> of a crisis—such as a <strong>Russian invasion</strong> of the Baltics which the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates <strong><mark>opts not to escalate</strong></mark>, a fait accompli akin to</u> the Russian seizure of <u><strong>Crimea</strong>, or a <strong>limited seizure</strong> of Baltic territory that NATO <strong>did not fully contest</strong>—is liable to see pervasive questions from remaining allies</u> over the future of American security guarantees. Such questions are likely to be overlaid with domestic U.S. disputes over who "lost" the ally or territory, alongside pressures from vested interest groups to showcase U.S. resolve to its remaining partners. <u>Although it cannot eliminate these issues, <strong><mark>preparation</strong> </mark>can <strong><mark>ameliorate post-crisis dilemmas</strong> through</mark> a combination of <strong>public <mark>diplomacy</strong></mark>, private <strong>engagement</strong>, and unilateral <strong>strategizing</u></strong>. <u>Day-after preparations consist of two elements. First, <mark>policymakers must</mark> be prepared to <strong><mark>offer</strong></mark> remaining partners compelling <strong><mark>explanations</strong></mark> as <mark>to why the <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates de facto <mark>abandoned</mark> one or more <mark>allies</u></mark>. Again, questions over the future credibility of American security guarantees would abound in a post-abandonment world. Still, this environment is also likely to see a growing sense of an even-more pressing Russian threat. Among critical allies, policymakers should be prepared to use this renewed sense of a Russian threat to beat back questions over the future of the American pacifier. States, after all, tend to balance in the face of external threats while husbanding resources to address those threats at the most propitious time and place. Hence, American <u>policymakers can use post-abandonment fears of Russia to (1) <strong>reinforce solidarity</strong> among remaining NATO members, (2) <mark>remind</mark> remaining <mark>allies</mark> that <mark>the <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates now <mark>has a</mark> proportionally <strong><mark>larger interest</strong> in</mark> <strong>guaranteeing <mark>their security</strong></mark>, and (3) <mark>explain </mark>prior American abandonment <mark>by pointing out</mark> the <strong><mark>limited utility</strong> </mark>and <strong>difficulties of acting</strong> in those particular episodes</u>. Just as General Omar Bradley warned that a war against China over Korea in 1951 would have been "the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place," so should future leaders be prepared to argue that defending all of Eastern Europe at unlimited cost would be "the wrong operation, at the wrong time, in the wrong place."[40] Second, and relatedly, U.S. policymakers must work among themselves to cultivate a domestic base of support to resist pressures to stand firm on every remaining commitment. This requires not only discussions inside the U.S. government to outline the steps that should be taken after abandoning states such as the Baltics and Poland, but also quietly reaching out to key stakeholders in the think tank, university, NGO, and media communities. Like conversations within the alliance, <u>discussions should involve plans and procedures for</u> (1) managing expectations going forward and (2) using the Russian threat to buttress the newly-circumscribed alliance, all while (3) <u>calibrating the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates<strong>'</strong> <strong>political-military response</u></strong>. The objective throughout should be to generate thinking so that, <u><strong><mark>if</strong> the</mark> American credibility <strong><mark>bluff is called</strong></mark>, U.S. strategists would <mark>have <strong>guidelines in place</strong> to shape a <strong></mark>cohesive <mark>response</u></strong></mark> focused on truly vital interests and backed by the requisite political support. Of course, <u>preparing for the day-after leaves open the question of where to <strong>draw the line</u></strong> regarding future abandonment. <u>This is not so much an issue of <strong>managing European concerns</u></strong>—so long as European actors feel threatened by Russia, they have reasons to seek American backing and overlook prior U.S. abandonment—<u>so much as the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates itself considering what its interests in Europe entail and where the boundary falls in defending them</u>. There is no hard and fast answer, since the solution will change over time depending on NATO and Russian capabilities, and Eastern Europe's value to the United States in light of the distribution of power. Still, <u>given Russia's <strong>relative geographic isolation</strong>, <strong>economic</strong> and <strong>military weaknesses</strong>, and the European <strong>distribution of power</strong>, a NATO that <strong>simply contained</strong> all the states that were in the <strong>org</strong>anization in 19<strong>91</strong> seems to be <strong>more than enough</u></strong>. Even this "rump" NATO would enjoy significant defense in depth, control the majority of Europe's economic and military potential, and encompass most of the United States' main European trading partners. Again, <u>recognizing that this division exists <strong>does not</strong> mean ex ante <strong>abandoning NATO members</strong> beyond this line</u>; after all, <u>doing so</u> might otherwise <u>invite a <strong>Russian test</strong> of <strong>American resolve</strong>, or steps by</u> regional <u>allies to <strong>precipitate a crisis</u></strong> and try to reverse American retrenchment. Nevertheless, <u>it does call for U.S. <mark>policymakers </mark>to <mark>shape</mark> their <strong><mark>internal plans</u></strong></mark> and preparations in light of NATO's two-tier status. To be clear, none of these options are politically palatable. Moreover, any effort to adjust the United States' NATO commitments will be at once contentious and politically expensive given the central role support for the alliance has played in post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy debates.[41] Strategic stability, however, has never been easy. Insofar as the United States is a member of NATO to ensure its own well-being—and it cannot be otherwise—policymakers would thus be better served getting ahead of the looming transatlantic crisis rather than wishing away the problem. Ultimately, at a moment when the U.S. security guarantee is no longer credible for all of NATO, it is necessary to recalibrate the American role in continental security affairs. The Commitment Myth Today Proponents of the status quo will contend that the cure outlined here is worse than the disease. Having undertaken commitments to defend Eastern Europe, the United States cannot fail to back its allies lest it ruin its credibility, encourage nuclear proliferation among insecure states throughout Europe (and potentially beyond), and destroy NATO. To do this so the logic goes, the United States should deploy forces to Eastern Europe that ensure that the United States has escalation dominance in the conventional and nuclear realms to deter Russia in peacetime, or force Russia to back down during a crisis. And, since Russia would risk its own destruction by threatening states backed by American nuclear guarantees, preparing to abandon parts of Eastern Europe is unnecessary since deterrence—provided the United States is able and willing to escalate—can hold.[42] These arguments are flawed. In a world of robust second-strike nuclear forces, escalation dominance can, at best, limit the damage that the United States faces; it will not be zero. Moreover, in the net assessment of the interests at stake, Russia would win out: Eastern Europe is important to the United States for what it might say about U.S. credibility, but matters to Russian territorial security, national identity, and the political survival of Russia's leaders. Combined, asymmetry of interests and high costs means that it is neither easy to deter Russia, even if a fuller range of military tools were available, nor a game American policymakers are likely to play. Simply put, if a crisis erupts, the balance of interests and resolve would favor Russia no matter what assets are at the United States' disposal. Abandoning certain allies may actually increase the credibility of remaining U.S. security guarantees. As importantly, the notion that U.S. credibility will collapse and nuclear proliferation take off if the United States backs away from existing NATO commitments rests on shaky foundations. As research by Professor Daryl Press highlights, allies and adversaries tend to see higher credibility in a state's promises the more a state's interests are engaged in the issue at hand and the greater its capacity to advance or protect these interests.[43] Thus, even if the United States abandons certain allies, American credibility would remain intact provided the United States has an interest in the security of remaining partners and the means to protect them. If anything, abandoning certain allies may actually increase the credibility of American security guarantees to remaining NATO members, since the more aggressive Russia becomes and further west it moves, the proportionally larger the American stake is in remaining allies and the stronger the American incentive is in holding the line. Added to the reality that Central–West European states are apt to be even more interested in obtaining allies if Russia expands, then the dangers of the United States backing down are much reduced. Counterintuitively, a shrunken NATO recently witness to some American abandonment and growing fears of Russia may actually be a NATO in which the American commitment becomes more—not less—credible. Time to Consolidate NATO For nearly 30 years, American policymakers pushed NATO enlargement as a way of consolidating the United States' Cold War victory. They did so seemingly convinced that the United States would never have to do that for which NATO was originally intended—fight a war against an adversary capable of hurting the United States.[44] Today, a variety of changes render war a possibility, calling into question the credibility of American pledges undertaken at the height of the post-Cold War era. Though many analysts seek means to make the American promise to all NATO members credible, there are good reasons to doubt whether any American pledge to commit national suicide for allies of dubious importance will truly be viable. Instead of struggling against the reality, a sounder course would recognize NATO's two-tiered status and accommodate U.S. diplomacy to this situation. <u><mark>The key is <strong>not</strong></mark> necessarily <mark>to</mark> preventively <mark>change <strong>formal</strong></mark> American <mark>security commitments</mark>. Instead, the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates must <mark>prepare</mark> politically and diplomatically <mark>for the possibility</mark> that <mark>some state might <strong>call the</u></strong></mark> American security <u><strong><mark>bluff</u></strong></mark>, while accepting the constraints this risk imposes on American foreign policy. Carrying out these steps will, in turn, require both careful coordination throughout the U.S. government and foreign policy establishment, alongside <u><mark>efforts to sustain relationships</u></mark> with those states deemed vital to American interests. If successful, this course may ultimately <u><mark>allow for</mark> a <strong>more <mark>cohesive</strong> American policy</mark> vis-à-vis Europe and Russia, while <strong><mark>reducing</strong> </mark>the <mark>dangers of <strong>brinksmanship</strong> and <strong>crises</strong></mark> in the first place</u>. Trading Toledo for Tallinn is not credible—but <u><mark>U.S. strategists </mark>can</u> still <u><strong><mark>minimize</strong> the fallout </mark>from</u> three decades of <u>NATO enlargement that has left the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates <strong>exposed</u></strong> in an increasingly conflictual Europe.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Marceti 3/25/19 [Branko Marcetic is a staff writer at Jacobin magazine and a 2019-2020 Leonard C. Goodman Institute for Investigative Reporting fellow. "Closing the Russiagate." https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/03/russiagate-donald-trump-mueller-report] fulltext: Russiagate and the Mueller investigation do have another legacy, however: facilitating an alarming rightward shift on foreign policy and national security. The scandal may have failed to remove Trump from office, but it’s been expertly used by its promoters to rehabilitate some of the worst actors in these fields, and to advance the aggressive, militarized foreign policy for which they’ve long jockeyed. In this climate, anything less than bellicose hostility to Russia has been cast as criminal and treasonous. The mere idea of Trump holding a summit with Putin — an entirely routine step for the two leading nuclear powers, one that was unusual only in how long it took to happen under Trump — sent the media and politicians into a hysterical frenzy the likes of which have not been seen since since the days of the “war on terror,” with prominent figures accusing Trump of “treason” and calling for a cyberattack on Russia that would have destroyed countless innocent people’s lives. In fact it may well have been the constant, hyperbolic accusations that Trump was a Russian “asset” or Manchurian candidate directly controlled by Putin, casually trotted out in the pages of mainstream news publications and on network news shows, that led Trump to overcompensate, sending arms to the neo-Nazi-infected Ukrainian government for the first time, a step Obama spent years resisting. Such pressure may well have also pushed him to withdraw from successive Cold War-era weapons treaties and to scuttle further talks with Putin, ominous developments that any future Democratic president must urgently reverse. “Russiagate,” and Trump more generally, has been very good for the CIA. With a figure as reviled as Trump attacking it, the agency — its reputation damaged thanks to its involvement in torture and role in selling the Iraq War — used this martyrdom to renew its public standing. Same with the FBI. These agencies, both of which have perpetrated the overthrow of democratically elected governments, abetted war crimes, and at times carried out violent campaigns to stamp out domestic, left-wing dissent — have rebranded as the only things standing between democracy and Russian-made tyranny. For the first time since at least 2002, the CIA enjoys a higher approval rating among Democrats than Republicans. Cable news has increasingly come to resemble state media, with former national security officials, some of whom have lied under oath, and right-wing ex-government officials becoming paid talking heads for news channels. Some of those officials, as hostile to press freedom and civil liberties as Trump, have become minor media personalities, making far-fetched insinuations about Trump and Russia to cheers and applause from liberal audiences. A small number of journalists have raised alarm about this, to little avail. The Trump-Russia scandal has been particularly profitable for MSNBC, the “liberal” news network that has begun skewing older, whiter, and more right-wing under Trump. But no figure better represents the network’s transformation than Rachel Maddow, who rode the scandal to sky-high ratings on the back of wall-to-wall “coverage” of what even the Washington Post has termed conspiracy theories about Putin’s alleged control of Trump. Maddow, who once upon a time wrote a book about the US’s unsustainable global military presence and ran segments excoriating the GOP for wanting to remain in Iraq, has become one of the most watched, most warlike voices on television. Whether on Syria, North Korea, Afghanistan, or Syria again, Maddow has adopted conspiratorial speculation and mouthed the same kind of pro-war and anti-diplomacy talking points she once derided, in between bouts of Glenn Beck-style fake crying for the sake of Robert Mueller. When Trump floated pulling US troops from South Korea — thus reducing the very sort of military overreach Maddow had once spent her career attacking — this played into Putin’s hands. So did pulling troops out of Syria, of course, as well as conducting diplomacy with Russia. It’s a strange coincidence that any path leading away from military escalation was a Putin plot. Perhaps most alarming for anyone reading this is the way Trump-Russia has been weaponized against the Left, as commentator after commentator warned it would. It took little time for the Washington Post to join a neocon-led effort to smear anti-establishment media outlets as being in some way compromised by Russian influence. The Daily Beast charged that Putin had “cultivated dupes, fellow travelers, and purblind fools among plenty of American progressives,” who “whether by accident or design” had “facilitated” Trump’s rise. In one of the more galling pieces of misreporting on the scandal, MSNBC’s Ari Melber joined a chorus of voices falsely claiming Bernie Sanders’s campaign was helped by Russia, largely on the back of a single quote he misrepresented and that his team never checked (the segment, of course, is still up on MSNBC’s site). This idea remains an article of faith for some high-profile liberals. When Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador began his rise, commentators quickly began insinuating he was assisted by Russia. One could go on and on. There’s a reason the Left has been warning about McCarthyism 2.0. This anti-left hostility manifested itself in growing efforts at censorship, too. Censoring the web has been a goal since at least the years of the “war on terror,” with debate raging about the efficacy and propriety of scrubbing videos of al-Qaeda and ISIS to prevent radicalization. The panic over Russia, driven in large part by Mueller’s own investigation, has helped foster a worldwide push to empower governments and corporations to crack down on internet speech, a push that has more often than not targeted anti-establishment voices and outlets on the Left whose critiques of US foreign policy happen to overlap with those of Russia or other rival powers. At the same time, some of the country’s most extreme and discredited right-wing figures have ridden the Trump-Russia wave to rehabilitation. Max Boot, a neocon who believes the US should set up an outright, British-style empire, used the Trump-Russia scandal to land a column at one of the country’s most prominent newspapers, where he recently called for a foreign policy modeled on the Native American genocide. Bill Kristol, who like Boot helped fan the flames for the Iraq War nearly two decades ago, has been embraced by liberals for his opposition to Trump’s friendliness to Putin, using his rehabilitation to attack left-of-center outlets and commentators deviating from establishment foreign policy. David Frum, another figure instrumental in the selling of the Iraq War, has likewise used the scandal to beef up his public standing. The Iraq connection is not a coincidence. That, too, was a sensational tale fed by anonymous government and intelligence officials to a media that, caught up in a nationalistic panic after a foreign attack (a figurative one, in today’s case), swallowed it largely uncritically, while more skeptical voices were sidelined. These parallels are worth noting not just for how striking they are, but for how history was repeated so soon after the media swore “never again” in the wake of the epic fiasco that was the Iraq War. If the media fails to properly reckon with its failures again this time — if the media figures who fanned the flames of panic and innuendo for ratings simply move on as if nothing happened — the risk of something like this happening again is high. This, above all else, is the Trump-Russia scandal’s greatest legacy: the delegitimization of peaceful diplomacy and a lurch to increased hostility in US-Russia relations — developments eagerly sought by the national security “blob” that pushed the conspiracy theories — coupled with new methods to censor and delegitimize political movements challenging the status quo. And most likely, this is only just the beginning.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The Russian threat paradigm is <u>liberal panic</u> that is <u>strategically reenacts</u> cold war hysteria to maintain <u>global militarism</u> and <u>shut down</u> leftist dissent to military <u>overreach</u> – their moralizing is <u>lifeblood</u> of genocidal nation building </h4><p><strong>Marceti 3/25<u></strong>/19 [Branko Marcetic is a staff writer at Jacobin magazine and a 2019-2020 Leonard C. Goodman Institute for Investigative Reporting fellow. "Closing the Russiagate." https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/03/russiagate-donald-trump-mueller-report]</p><p></u>Russiagate and the Mueller investigation do have another legacy, however: facilitating an alarming rightward shift on foreign policy and national security. <u>The scandal may have failed to remove Trump</u> from office, <u>but <mark>it’s been expertly used</mark> by its <strong>promoters</u></strong> <u><mark>to rehabilitate</mark> some of <mark>the <strong>worst actors</mark> in these fields</u></strong>, <u><mark>and</mark> to <mark>advance</mark> the <mark>aggressive, militarized foreign policy</mark> for which they’ve <strong>long jockeyed</strong>.</p><p></u>In this climate, <u><mark>anything less than</mark> <strong>bellicose <mark>hostility</u></strong></mark> to Russia <u><mark>has been cast as</mark> <strong>criminal</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>treasonous</u></strong></mark>. <u>The mere idea of Trump holding a summit with Putin</u> — an entirely routine step for the two leading nuclear powers, one that was unusual only in how long it took to happen under Trump — <u>sent the media and politicians into a <strong>hysterical frenzy</u></strong> the likes of which have not been seen since since the days of the “war on terror,” with prominent figures accusing Trump of “treason” and calling for a cyberattack on Russia that would have destroyed countless innocent people’s lives.</p><p><u>In fact it may well have been the constant, hyperbolic accusations that Trump was a Russian “asset” or Manchurian candidate directly controlled by Putin, casually trotted out in the pages of mainstream news publications and on network news shows, that led Trump to overcompensate, sending arms to the neo-Nazi-infected Ukrainian government for the first time, a step Obama spent years resisting. Such pressure may well have also pushed him to withdraw from successive Cold War-era weapons treaties and to scuttle further talks with Putin, ominous developments that any future Democratic president must urgently reverse.</p><p></u>“<u><strong><mark>Russiagate</u></strong></mark>,” and Trump more generally, <u><mark>has been</mark> very <mark>good for the <strong>CIA</u></strong></mark>. With a figure as reviled as Trump attacking it, <u><mark>the agency</u></mark> — its reputation damaged thanks to its involvement in torture and role in selling the Iraq War — <u><mark>used this martyrdom to <strong>renew</strong> its</u></mark> <u><strong>public <mark>standing</u></strong>. <u>Same with the</u> <u><strong>FBI</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>These agencies</u></mark>, both of which have <u><mark>perpetrated</u></mark> the <u><mark>overthrow of </mark>democratically elected <strong><mark>governments</u></strong></mark>, abetted <u><strong><mark>war crimes</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> at times carried out <u><strong>violent <mark>campaigns</u></strong> <u>to stamp out</mark> domestic, left-wing <mark>dissent</mark> — <mark>have rebranded as</mark> <mark>the</mark> only <mark>things standing between <strong>democracy</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>Russian</u></strong></mark>-made <u><strong><mark>tyranny</u></strong></mark>. For the first time since at least 2002, <u>the CIA enjoys a <strong>higher approval rating</u></strong> <u>among Democrats than <strong>Republicans</strong>.</p><p></u>Cable news has increasingly come to resemble state media, with former national security officials, some of whom have lied under oath, and right-wing ex-government officials becoming paid talking heads for news channels. Some of those officials, as hostile to press freedom and civil liberties as Trump, have become minor media personalities, making far-fetched insinuations about Trump and Russia to cheers and applause from liberal audiences. A small number of journalists have raised alarm about this, to little avail. The Trump-Russia scandal has been particularly profitable for MSNBC, the “liberal” news network that has begun skewing older, whiter, and more right-wing under Trump. But no figure better represents the network’s transformation than Rachel Maddow, who rode the scandal to sky-high ratings on the back of wall-to-wall “coverage” of what even the Washington Post has termed conspiracy theories about Putin’s alleged control of Trump.</p><p><u><strong>Maddow</u></strong>, who once upon a time wrote a book about the US’s unsustainable global military presence and ran segments excoriating the GOP for wanting to remain in Iraq, <u>has become one of the most watched, <strong>most warlike voices</u></strong> on television. Whether on Syria, North Korea, Afghanistan, or Syria again, <u><mark>Maddow</mark> has <mark>adopted</u> <u><strong>conspiratorial speculation</u></strong> <u>and mouthed</mark> the same</u> kind of <u><strong><mark>pro-war</u></strong></mark> and <u><strong><mark>anti-diplomacy</u></strong> <u>talking</mark> points she once <strong>derided</u></strong>, in between bouts of Glenn Beck-style fake crying for the sake of Robert Mueller. <u>When Trump floated pulling US troops from South Korea</u> — thus reducing the very sort of military overreach Maddow had once spent her career attacking — <u>this <strong>played into Putin’s hands</u></strong>. <u>So did pulling troops out of</u> <u><strong>Syria</u></strong>, of course, <u>as well as conducting <strong>diplomacy</u></strong> with Russia. It’s a strange coincidence that any path leading away from military escalation was a Putin plot.</p><p><u><strong>Perhaps most alarming for anyone reading this is the way Trump-Russia has been weaponized against the Left, as commentator after commentator warned it would. It took little time for the Washington Post to join a neocon-led effort to smear anti-establishment media outlets as being in some way compromised by Russian influence. The Daily Beast charged that Putin had “cultivated dupes, fellow travelers, and purblind fools among plenty of American progressives,” who “whether by accident or design” had “facilitated” Trump’s rise.</p><p></u></strong>In one of the more galling pieces of misreporting on the scandal, MSNBC’s Ari Melber joined a chorus of voices falsely claiming Bernie Sanders’s campaign was helped by Russia, largely on the back of a single quote he misrepresented and that his team never checked (the segment, of course, is still up on MSNBC’s site). This idea remains an article of faith for some high-profile liberals. When Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador began his rise, commentators quickly began insinuating he was assisted by Russia. One could go on and on. <u>There’s a reason <mark>the Left has been warning about</u> <u><strong>McCarthyism 2.0</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>This anti-left hostility manifested itself in growing efforts at censorship, too. Censoring the web has been a goal since at least the years of the “war on terror,” with debate raging about the efficacy and propriety of scrubbing videos of al-Qaeda and ISIS to prevent radicalization. <u><mark>The <strong>panic</u></strong></mark> over Russia, driven in large part by Mueller’s own investigation, has <u><mark>helped</mark> <mark>foster a <strong>worldwide push</u></strong> <u>to</mark> empower governments</u> and corporations <u>to <strong><mark>crack down on</mark> internet <mark>speech</strong></mark>, a push <mark>that</mark> has more often than not <strong><mark>targeted anti-establishment</mark> voices</strong> and <strong><mark>outlets on the Left</strong></mark> whose critiques of US foreign policy happen to <strong>overlap with those of Russia</u></strong> or other rival powers.</p><p>At the same time, some of the country’s most extreme and discredited right-wing figures have ridden the Trump-Russia wave to rehabilitation. <u><strong><mark>Max Boot</u></strong></mark>, a neocon who believes the US should set up an outright, British-style empire, <u><mark>used</mark> the Trump-<strong><mark>Russia</strong></mark> scandal <mark>to land a column</mark> at one of the country’s most <strong>prominent newspapers</u></strong>, <u><mark>where he</u></mark> recently <u><mark>called for</mark> a <mark>foreign policy modeled on</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>Native</mark> American <mark>genocide</u></strong></mark>. Bill <u><strong><mark>Kristol</u></strong></mark>, <u>who like Boot <mark>helped fan the flames for</mark> the <strong><mark>Iraq</mark> War</u></strong> nearly two decades ago, <u><mark>has been <strong>embraced by liberals</u></strong></mark> <u>for his opposition to Trump’s friendliness to Putin</u>, using his rehabilitation to attack left-of-center outlets and commentators deviating from establishment foreign policy. David Frum, another figure instrumental in the selling of the Iraq War, has likewise used the scandal to beef up his public standing.</p><p>The Iraq connection is not a coincidence. That, too, was a sensational tale fed by anonymous government and intelligence officials to a media that, caught up in a nationalistic panic after a foreign attack (a figurative one, in today’s case), swallowed it largely uncritically, while more skeptical voices were sidelined. These parallels are worth noting not just for how striking they are, but for how history was repeated so soon after the media swore “never again” in the wake of the epic fiasco that was the Iraq War. If the media fails to properly reckon with its failures again this time — if the media figures who fanned the flames of panic and innuendo for ratings simply move on as if nothing happened — the risk of something like this happening again is high.</p><p><u><mark>This</mark>, above all else, <mark>is the</mark> Trump-<strong><mark>Russia scandal’s greatest legacy</u></strong></mark>: <u><mark>the delegitimization of</mark> <strong>peaceful <mark>diplomacy</u></strong> <u>and a lurch to</mark> increased <strong><mark>hostility in</mark> US-Russia <mark>relations</u></strong></mark> — <u>developments eagerly sought <mark>by the <strong>national security “blob” that pushed</mark> the <mark>conspiracy theories</u></strong> — <u>coupled with</mark> new <mark>methods to</u> <u><strong>censor</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>delegitimize</mark> political <mark>movements</u></strong></mark> challenging the status quo. And most likely, this is only just the beginning.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Huessy 14 (Peter, President @ GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense and national security consulting firm, "The Diplomacy of Missile Defense," 7/10, http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/the-diplomacy-of-missile-defense) fulltext: Reports from the Middle East are that ISIS, the terrorist group occupying portions of both Syria and Iraq, has paraded a Scud missile, probably with a range of upwards of 300 kilometers. More worrisome have been parallel reports that areas controlled by ISIS in Syria are also knows areas where chemical weapons shells have gone missing. At the other end of the spectrum, the North Koreans-now understood to be the missile builders for Iran---launched a satellite in a southerly direction that managed to orbit an object over the United States. And both China and Russia continue to turn out sea and land based systems that will soon reach many hundreds of new rockets. Critics of missile defense say we should go slow. They assert North Korea and Iran have not yet tested missiles of sufficient range to reach New York or Washington or Los Angeles. And so we are assured we have plenty of time to build defenses if such threats materialize. Like defending The World Trade Center and civil aviation only after the threat is obvious. Or defending against EMP after the grid has been taken down. Critics also assert that even should such threats arise, no leader in Pyongyang or Tehran will launch a strike against an American city because seeing where the rocket originates, we would return fire, missile for missile, and obliterate the offending state entity. Deterrence, it is asserted, especially our nuclear deterrent, is sufficient for now to deter the Kim dynasty in North Korea or the mullahs and Supreme Leader in Iran. But if the US deterrent capability-some 1550 countable deployed strategic nuclear warheads-- is in the eyes of these leaders sufficient to NOW deter their use of ballistic missiles against the United States, why are they building such arsenals of ballistic missiles of increasing range and why are they developing nuclear weapons-confirmed by North Korea and alleged with respect to Iran-to place on such missiles? Here the critics of missile defense have to engage in some sleight of hand. The folks in Tehran and Pyongyang are deterring the US, not the other way around. They worry we-the United States-- will attack them. And not being able to match our conventional capability, the theory goes, they have developed nuclear weapons-or are developing in the case of Iran-to offset such US capability. In short, as critics argue, Iran and North Korea are deterring the US and thus the US missile defenses appear to both counties as part of an elaborate plot to develop the capability to strike at both countries with impunity as our missile defenses makes us immune from retaliatory attack. What's wrong with this picture? Everything. North Korea and Iran have been actively at war with the United States and its allies since 1953 and 1979 respectively. We are protecting both our homeland and our allies from the aggression of Tehran and North Korea. There are some 200 countries in the world-why are North Korea and Iran deemed rightfully able to build nuclear weapons outside the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty which they voluntarily signed onto which prohibits them from doing so? When everyone else obeys the rules? In short, the missile defense critics have to turn the world upside down and make the US into the aggressor. Now the US liberation of Iraq and Afghanistan supposedly gives some credence to this view. Iran and North are next, right? Hardly. Let's examine the facts. First, Afghanistan's Taliban had to be taken down as co-perpetrators of 9-11. Second, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 was standing US policy that grew out of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, his support of terrorism including providing safe harbor for two of the terror master minds of the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and his history of WMD development and use. Also Iran and North Korea began their nuclear weapons programs roughly at the same time-- in 1988-89-long before 9-11 and the subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. And both were state sponsors of terror against the US which is the predicate to US involvement with both states. Missile defense thus must be examined beyond the simple idea that these two rogue states are really simply defending themselves. They have been and are at war with the United States and ballistic missile developments are a key factor in that effort. Let's examine this more thoroughly. It is assumed a small nuclear arsenal deployed by North Korea is a reasonable reaction to a possible US invasion. But would a DPRK nuclear arsenal of 6-12 weapons really stop the US from invading North Korea and would their absence give the US a green light? In the nearly half a century since the Korean War when Pyongyang had no nuclear weapons, when did the US ever use military force against North Korea-we did not after the USS Pueblo was captured and her crew tortured, not after American soldiers were murdered in the DMZ and not after a civilian airliner was blown up in the Gulf of Siam. So too with Iran. Tehran is directly and explicitly connected to the terror attacks at the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, Lockerbie, Khobar Towers, the African embassies, and 9-11. In short, Iran has been complicit in the death of thousands of Americans. Iran is defending itself from what, again? When has the US used military force against Iran despite thousands of Americans having been murdered by Tehran's rulers? Once, when President Ronald Reagan reflagged the Kuwait oil tankers and stopped Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping. Period. So let's start with the right basis for looking at this issue. If deterrence including nuclear deterrence is all that the US needs to deter Iran and North Korea, why do they continue to attack the US and its allies, commit widespread terrorism against the US and its allies, and seek both ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons? What if such weapons are for blackmail, coercion and terror? And in fact the threatened use of such missiles is sufficient for their objectives providing top cover for covert terrorism? Sure we know where their missiles will be launched from, but only if they are launched from a readily discoverable base. What if launched from the ocean from a freighter in an EMP mode? North Korea threatens to launch missiles or explode nuclear devices. It then promises to desist for a price. If paid sufficiently in oil or rice. Protection money it's called. And billions have been paid to Pyongyang since 1994. Iran uses its missiles as top cover to extend its terrorist ways throughout the Middle East, not the least of which has been their killing of hundreds of Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002. Missiles thus serve Iran and North Korea without ever having to be launched. Missile defenses for the US and its allies could render this blackmail inoperable. Missile defenses would give diplomatic weight to a US and allied refusal to be blackmailed or coerced by Iran or North Korea. Iran also uses missiles as terror threats through its solely owned subsidiaries Hamas and Hezbollah. It routinely threatens to launch rockets against US allies and assets in the Gulf. Iran obviously remains undeterred to carry out its terrorist activities. Thus is it not obvious that its offensive missile capability especially if mated with nuclear weapons-would give it an increasing hegemonic role in the Persian Gulf and beyond. We are seeing the diplomatic and military benefits of missile defense with the current situation in Israel. Missile defense allows Israel (and its allies including the US) the opportunity to engage in a measured response to the rockets being fired at Israeli cities. From midnight on Tuesday morning to noon the next day-12 hours-130 rockets were fired from Gaza onto Israel Lives can be saved. Targets can be better selected. Diplomacy can also be allowed to work. More importantly, a missile defense of the United States capable of shooting down dozens of missiles can keep crises or conflicts from escalating. Similarly a missile defense system consisting of 3-4 sites and 100+ interceptors in the US could be very effective against limited strikes and thus also prevent a crisis or conflict from escalating to the use of nuclear weapons. For example, even if unable to stop 100-200 warheads aimed at the United States, missile defenses proposed here-space, land or sea-based-- can stop such attacks below that number especially threats of blackmail or coercion. To be effective--in the face of solid American and allied missile defenses (here Canada should be taken up on its exploration of joining a US defense system)-- a threatened nuclear attack by an adversary would have to involve a fairly sizeable number of warheads, raising the specter of triggering Armageddon. That has always been a part of US policy even throughout the Cold War. Force an adversary to have to risk everything or as an alternative leave the nuclear weapons at home. Just as in a crisis we can put more submarines to sea, place our bombers on strip alert and make our ICBMs mobile, missile defenses raise the bar to the use of such weapons. Given the limited arsenal of North Korea and the prospects of such an arsenal being developed by Iran, US and allied missile defenses must be deployed in a timely fashion in anticipation of such expanding threats. Having such a capable and effective defense also simultaneously can deter the threatened use of nuclear weapons by other adversaries, whether in Europe, the Asian Pacific or the Persian Gulf, by having the ability from a multitude of areas to be able to shoot down the bad guy's missiles. That is genuine deterrence.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Effective missile defense deters nuclear war AND global conflict escalation</h4><p>Huessy 14 </strong>(Peter, President @ GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense and national security consulting firm, "The Diplomacy of Missile Defense," 7/10, http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/the-diplomacy-of-missile-defense)</p><p>Reports from the Middle East are that <u><mark>ISIS</u></mark>, the terrorist group occupying portions of both Syria and Iraq, <u>has <mark>paraded a Scud missile</u></mark>, probably with a range of upwards of 300 kilometers. More worrisome have been parallel reports that <u>areas controlled by ISIS in Syria are</u> also knows <u>areas where <mark>chemical weapons shells have gone missing</u></mark>. At the other end of the spectrum, the <u><mark>North Koreans</u></mark>-now understood to be the missile builders for Iran---<u><mark>launched a satellite</u></mark> in a southerly direction that managed to orbit an object over the United States. And both <u><mark>China and Russia continue to turn out sea and land based systems</u></mark> that will soon reach many hundreds of new rockets. <u><mark>Critics of missile defense say we should go slow</u></mark>. They assert North Korea and Iran have not yet tested missiles of sufficient range to reach New York or Washington or Los Angeles. And so <u><mark>we are assured we have plenty of time to build defenses</mark> if such threats </u>materialize. Like defending The World Trade Center and civil aviation only after the threat is obvious. Or <u><strong><mark>defending against EMP after the grid has been taken down</u></strong></mark>. Critics also assert that even should such threats arise, no leader in Pyongyang or Tehran will launch a strike against an American city because seeing where the rocket originates, we would return fire, missile for missile, and obliterate the offending state entity. Deterrence, it is asserted, especially our nuclear deterrent, is sufficient for now to deter the Kim dynasty in North Korea or the mullahs and Supreme Leader in Iran. But <u><mark>if the US deterrent capability</u></mark>-some 1550 countable deployed strategic nuclear warheads-- <u><mark>is</mark> in the eyes of these leaders <mark>sufficient to NOW deter their use of ballistic missiles</u></mark> against the United States, <u><mark>why are they building such arsenals</mark> of ballistic missiles of increasing range</u> and why are they developing nuclear weapons-confirmed by North Korea and alleged with respect to Iran-to place on such missiles? Here the critics of missile defense have to engage in some sleight of hand. The folks in Tehran and Pyongyang are deterring the US, not the other way around. They worry we-the United States-- will attack them. And not being able to match our conventional capability, the theory goes, they have developed nuclear weapons-or are developing in the case of Iran-to offset such US capability. <u>In short, as <mark>critics argue,</mark> Iran and North Korea are deterring the US and thus <mark>the US missile defenses appear to both counties as part of an elaborate plot to develop the capability to strike at both countries with impunity as our missile defenses makes us immune from retaliatory attack. What's wrong with this picture? Everything.</u></mark> North Korea and Iran have been actively at war with the United States and its allies since 1953 and 1979 respectively. We are protecting both our homeland and our allies from the aggression of Tehran and North Korea. There are some 200 countries in the world-why are North Korea and Iran deemed rightfully able to build nuclear weapons outside the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty which they voluntarily signed onto which prohibits them from doing so? When everyone else obeys the rules? In short, the missile defense critics have to turn the world upside down and make the US into the aggressor. Now the US liberation of Iraq and Afghanistan supposedly gives some credence to this view. Iran and North are next, right? Hardly. Let's examine the facts. First, Afghanistan's Taliban had to be taken down as co-perpetrators of 9-11. Second, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 was standing US policy that grew out of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, his support of terrorism including providing safe harbor for two of the terror master minds of the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and his history of WMD development and use. Also Iran and North Korea began their nuclear weapons programs roughly at the same time-- in 1988-89-long before 9-11 and the subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. And both were state sponsors of terror against the US which is the predicate to US involvement with both states. Missile defense thus must be examined beyond the simple idea that these two rogue states are really simply defending themselves. They have been and are at war with the United States and ballistic missile developments are a key factor in that effort. Let's examine this more thoroughly. It is assumed a small nuclear arsenal deployed by North Korea is a reasonable reaction to a possible US invasion. But would a DPRK nuclear arsenal of 6-12 weapons really stop the US from invading North Korea and would their absence give the US a green light? In the nearly half a century since the Korean War when Pyongyang had no nuclear weapons, when did the US ever use military force against North Korea-we did not after the USS Pueblo was captured and her crew tortured, not after American soldiers were murdered in the DMZ and not after a civilian airliner was blown up in the Gulf of Siam. So too with Iran. Tehran is directly and explicitly connected to the terror attacks at the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, Lockerbie, Khobar Towers, the African embassies, and 9-11. In short, Iran has been complicit in the death of thousands of Americans. Iran is defending itself from what, again? When has the US used military force against Iran despite thousands of Americans having been murdered by Tehran's rulers? Once, when President Ronald Reagan reflagged the Kuwait oil tankers and stopped Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping. Period. So let's start with the right basis for looking at this issue. If deterrence including nuclear deterrence is all that the US needs to deter Iran and North Korea, why do they continue to attack the US and its allies, commit widespread terrorism against the US and its allies, and seek both ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons? What if such weapons are for blackmail, coercion and terror? And in fact the threatened use of such missiles is sufficient for their objectives providing top cover for covert terrorism? Sure we know where their missiles will be launched from, but only if they are launched from a readily discoverable base. What if launched from the ocean from a freighter in an EMP mode? North Korea threatens to launch missiles or explode nuclear devices. It then promises to desist for a price. If paid sufficiently in oil or rice. Protection money it's called. And billions have been paid to Pyongyang since 1994. Iran uses its missiles as top cover to extend its terrorist ways throughout the Middle East, not the least of which has been their killing of hundreds of Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002. Missiles thus serve Iran and North Korea without ever having to be launched. Missile defenses for the US and its allies could render this blackmail inoperable. Missile defenses would give diplomatic weight to a US and allied refusal to be blackmailed or coerced by Iran or North Korea. Iran also uses missiles as terror threats through its solely owned subsidiaries Hamas and Hezbollah. It routinely threatens to launch rockets against US allies and assets in the Gulf. Iran obviously remains undeterred to carry out its terrorist activities. Thus is it not obvious that its offensive missile capability especially if mated with nuclear weapons-would give it an increasing hegemonic role in the Persian Gulf and beyond. We are seeing the diplomatic and military benefits of missile defense with the current situation in Israel. Missile defense allows Israel (and its allies including the US) the opportunity to engage in a measured response to the rockets being fired at Israeli cities. From midnight on Tuesday morning to noon the next day-12 hours-130 rockets were fired from Gaza onto Israel Lives can be saved. Targets can be better selected. Diplomacy can also be allowed to work. More importantly, <u><mark>a missile defense of the United States capable of shooting down dozens of missiles <strong>can keep crises or conflicts from escalating</u></strong></mark>. Similarly <u><mark>a missile defense system</u></mark> consisting of 3-4 sites and 100+ interceptors in the US <u><mark>could be very effective against limited strikes and</u></mark> thus also <u><strong><mark>prevent a crisis or conflict from escalating to the use of nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. For example, even if unable to stop 100-200 warheads aimed at the United States, missile defenses proposed here-space, land or sea-based-- can stop such attacks below that number especially threats of blackmail or coercion. To be effective--in the face of solid American and allied missile defenses (here Canada should be taken up on its exploration of joining a US defense system)-- a threatened nuclear attack by an adversary would have to involve a fairly sizeable number of warheads, raising the specter of triggering Armageddon. That has always been a part of US policy even throughout the Cold War. Force an adversary to have to risk everything or as an alternative leave the nuclear weapons at home. Just as in a crisis we can put more submarines to sea, place our bombers on strip alert and make our ICBMs mobile, <u><mark>missile defenses raise the bar to</mark> the <mark>use</mark> of such weapons</u>. Given the limited arsenal of North Korea and the prospects of such an arsenal being developed by Iran, US and allied missile defenses must be deployed in a timely fashion in anticipation of such expanding threats. <u>Having</u> such <u>a capable and <mark>effective defense</u></mark> also <u>simultaneously <mark>can deter the threatened use of nuclear weapons by other adversaries,</mark> whether in Europe, the Asian Pacific or the Persian Gulf, <mark>by having the ability</u></mark> from a multitude of areas to be able <u><mark>to shoot down</u></mark> the bad guy's <u><mark>missiles. <strong>That is genuine deterrence</u></strong></mark>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Tanaka 19 [Stefan Tanaka is a professor of Communication at UC – San Diego. He is primarily a historian whose work focuses on modern Japan. His earlier work focused on the ways that history, pasts, and time were configured to define Japan's world and itself. Recently that inquiry has shifted to history as a technology of communication. “Asia: A Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” in Critique and Cosmos: After Masao Miyoshi, boundary 2: an international journal of literature and culture. Vol 46, Iss 3. August 2019 //tjb] fulltext: The difficulty of untangling this riddle is located in the conflation within the word Asia, of a relational idea with notions of absolute space (geography) and absolute time (history). In his 1925 Lowell Lectures, Alfred North Whitehead inquired into the place of science in human understand- ing and exposed the role of time and space as central elements in the mechanistic nature of thought, an epistemology that existed since the seventeenth century and that, in his words, we could “neither live with nor live without” ([1925] 1967: 50). He called this a “Fallacy of Misplaced Con- creteness” (51). Whitehead, here, recognized that our current understand- ing of time and space has been superseded, and he sought another way to understand our world. We need to question whether Asia, too, is a “misplaced concreteness” that conscribes us.4 Asia is foundational to the global knowledge system we inhabit; moreover, this system has been built upon principles and ideas that grounded the rise of the liberal-internationalist world during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet at the same time, discoveries of special relativity and thermodynamics relegated many mechanistic notions, such as Newton’s absolute time and absolute space, to classical science. Nevertheless, we still use formalized structures where allegorical accounts comfortably reiterate preconceived forms. After more than thirty-five years since Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) (Miyoshi was Said’s close friend), various fields have written much, from the early critiques of deconstruction and post-everything, beginning with poststructuralism, to today, where it seems we are no longer re-ing but now un-ing everything. I do not mean to belittle these efforts; my own work fits within some of them. Yet I have been impressed that we always seem to reiterate what has been stated earlier. The forgetting that is a part of our knowledge industry is rather remarkable. This is particularly true in the case of Asian studies, where the idea of Asia keeps its subfields (Japanese studies, Chinese studies, South Asian studies, etc.) within the Orient; area studies has become a discipline that disciplines its objects. This is the impossibility. We have recognized this to an extent. Simplistically, the nouns have changed from Orient to Asia, and we celebrate that we are in a post-Orientalist phase. Yet the structure of meaning remains despite statements that we know better. We now use Asia as if we have escaped the Orientalist frame. But have we? Unpacking this is harder than simply changing nouns. Unless we develop an understanding of the conflation of relational place and chronological time in how we understand ourselves and others, Asia will continue to be the Orient. Asia is an accepted “reality”; it is the name of a continent. Yet schol- ars also understand that Asia is a Western appellation that now applies to this geographical area. But this connection between idea and geography is frequently contested and indeed is rather recent.5 We can trace the idea of Asia back to the ancient Greeks (who often lived in the geographical region now identified as Asia); for Herodotus, Asia was the land to the east (today, we would call this Anatolia or the Middle East). It is a realm that emerged in the imagination of the ancient Greeks. This Asia is identical with the Ori- ent, an other of a West. But interestingly, even for Herodotus, Asians did not inhabit this land; Scythians, Persians, and the like did. Moreover, people in this Asia did not identify themselves as Asian. They were of a particular community, region, or empire; today they are from particular nations. The word Asia (yaxiya) was introduced to the western Pacific by the Jesuits in the seventeenth century. When we move farther east to Tokugawa society, what we now call China was referred to as shinkoku (the characters for Qing and country), and one appellation for the people was tōjin (the characters for Tang and person).t In one eighteenth-century school of scholars (kokugaku), the use of chūka (middle kingdom) was countered with iteki (barbarian). Chūka was not a place but a condition that was the opposite of iteki. But today, Asia is not just a relational designation, an over there from the ancient Greece or the West. Beginning in the eighteenth century, Asia was located onto a chronology of becoming; it gained temporality. Montesquieu discusses Asia as a static antithesis to the dynamic Europe; Voltaire recognizes it as the beginning of civilization, but one that had never advanced; and Hegel locates Asia (the “Oriental World”) as the first stage in the evolution of universal history (Hegel 1956). This shift fixed Asia as a repetitive “gesture of exclusion” that is constantly invoked to reinforce what Certeau refers to as the “same,” in this case, the superiority of the West. I invoke Hegel for two reasons. First, he is central in the making of history, more accurately, the spread of historical thinking. Second, his history is the incorporation, the synchronization, of the world into one history, the natural- ization of this gesture of exclusion. Rebecca Karl points out that it was not until the late nineteenth century that Asia gained meaning as an autono- mous geographical place (1998: 1098–101). D. Graham Burnett calls this synchronized world a geochronocultural tableau (2003: 18).6 In this synchronization, Asia becomes spatialized time, a space frozen in the flow of a new historical way of thinking.7 The recurrence of Asia as Orient, I believe, is from the naturalization of this homogeneous time. This spatialized time is produced from a conflation between the idea of the Orient, the Newtonian notion of time as absolute and external to humans, and geography. This returns us to the epigraph from Marx, about man being an incarnation of time (Lukács 1971: 89).8 Asia is both a creation of this time as well as a container for such time. Certeau describes the cen- trality of time in the objectification of ideas such as the idea of Asia: “For three centuries maybe the objectification of the past has made of time the unreflected category of a discipline that never ceases to use it as an instru- ment of classification” (1986: 216). Even though it has been described as “empty” (Benjamin 1968: 261–64), absolute time plays an active role in our knowledge system. History has classified Asia as the first stage, as forever past. Asia shifted from a relational appellation to a fixed place in the ordering of the world. This unified history—the synchronization of the world— depends on the idea of an absolute time for its veracity and uses geography to conflate idea with places to make it “real.” At this point, a detour is necessary. It is important to mention briefly the history of time and the history of history.9 For my purpose in this essay, it is important to point out that our current understanding of time and of history arose between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The work of Sir Isaac Newton punctuated the abstraction of chronological time from human society in Europe and was a critical move in the rise of science, technology, and capitalism. The turn to a singular, linear chronology became common from the seventeenth century, when Dionysius Petavius, working from Joseph Scaliger’s Julian period, proposed the BC/AD system for reckoning years (Wilcox 1987: 203–8; Grafton 2002).10 A global or universal time emerged in the nineteenth century; in 1884, the International Meridian Conference organized the globe according to one time (synchronized to the Greenwich meridian), divided into twenty-four zones. Accep- tance occurred slowly over the next several decades. The emergence of modern history and its application to the world should be seen in relation to this transformation of time. On the one hand, this mechanical time offered a way for intellectuals such as Hegel to unify the myriad places of the world into one system. It is important to point out that this ordering is far from neutral; chronological time serves as a naturalized metric to emplot and measure development and progress. On the other hand, it provided a new metric for evaluating and ordering informa- tion. Events were now verified by dates; seriality, not situatedness, became the common mode of ordering information, and some collective singular (usually the nation-state) became the subject of history, replacing deeds of exemplary figures. Finally, these changes were occurring simultaneously as the European world was discovering science, mapping (and claiming) the world, and creating new wealth. In short, our understanding of time and history is the foundation of capitalism, liberalism, and imperialism.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>Their construction of what is called the People’s Republic of China is simply a renaming of what was once and is the Orient which has become Asia, assuring an imposition of Newtonian space-time that solidifies our trajectory towards the future as a coterminous line that disciplines us as subjects and reinforces Western superiority by ontologizing a particular system of knowledge </h4><p>Tanaka 19 </strong>[Stefan Tanaka is a professor of Communication at UC – San Diego. He is primarily a historian whose work focuses on modern Japan. His earlier work focused on the ways that history, pasts, and time were configured to define Japan's world and itself. Recently that inquiry has shifted to history as a technology of communication. “Asia: A Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” in Critique and Cosmos: After Masao Miyoshi, boundary 2: an international journal of literature and culture. Vol 46, Iss 3. August 2019 //tjb]</p><p><u><strong>The difficulty of untangling this riddle is located in <mark>the conflation within the word Asia</mark>, <mark>of a relational idea with notions of absolute space</mark> (geography) <mark>and absolute time</mark> (history).</u></strong> <u>In his 1925 Lowell Lectures, Alfred North Whitehead inquired into the place of science in human understand- ing and exposed the role of time and space as central elements in the mechanistic nature of thought, an epistemology that existed since the seventeenth century and that, in his words, we could “neither live with nor live without</u>” ([1925] 1967: 50). <u>He called this a “Fallacy of Misplaced Con- creteness”</u> (51). Whitehead, here, recognized that our current understand- ing of time and space has been superseded, and he sought another way to understand our world. <u><strong>We need to question whether Asia, too, <mark>is a “misplaced concreteness” that conscribes us</u></strong>.</mark>4 <u><strong><mark>Asia is foundational to the global knowledge system</mark> we inhabit; moreover, this system has been <mark>built upon principles</mark> and ideas <mark>that grounded</mark> the rise of <mark>the liberal-internationalist world</mark> during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries<mark>.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Yet</mark> at the same time, <mark>discoveries of special relativity and thermodynamics relegated many mechanistic notions, such as Newton’s absolute time and absolute space, to classical science.</u></strong></mark> Nevertheless, we still use formalized structures where allegorical accounts comfortably reiterate preconceived forms. After more than thirty-five years since Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) (Miyoshi was Said’s close friend), various fields have written much, from the early critiques of deconstruction and post-everything, beginning with poststructuralism, to today, where it seems we are no longer re-ing but now un-ing everything. I do not mean to belittle these efforts; my own work fits within some of them. Yet <u><strong>I have been impressed that <mark>we always seem to reiterate</mark> what has been stated earlier<mark>.</mark> <mark>The forgetting</mark> that is a part <mark>of our knowledge industry is</mark> rather <mark>remarkable.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>This is particularly true in the case of Asian studies, where <mark>the idea of Asia keeps</mark> its subfields (Japanese studies, <mark>Chinese studies</mark>, South Asian studies, etc.) <mark>within the Orient; area studies has become a discipline that disciplines its objects.</u></strong></mark> This is the impossibility. We have recognized this to an extent. <u><strong>Simplistically, <mark>the nouns have changed from Orient to Asia</mark>, and we celebrate that we are in a post-Orientalist phase<mark>.</mark> <mark>Yet the structure of meaning remains</mark> despite statements that we know better<mark>.</mark> </u></strong>We now use Asia as if we have escaped the Orientalist frame. But have we? <u><strong>Unpacking this is harder than simply changing nouns.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Unless we develop an understanding of the conflation of relational place and chronological time in how we understand ourselves and others, Asia will continue to be the Orient.</mark> Asia is an accepted “reality”; it is the name of a continent. </u></strong>Yet schol- ars also understand that Asia is a Western appellation that now applies to this geographical area. But this connection between idea and geography is frequently contested and indeed is rather recent.5 We can trace the idea of Asia back to the ancient Greeks (who often lived in the geographical region now identified as Asia); for Herodotus, Asia was the land to the east (today, we would call this Anatolia or the Middle East). It is a realm that emerged in the imagination of the ancient Greeks. This Asia is identical with the Ori- ent, an other of a West. But interestingly, even for Herodotus, Asians did not inhabit this land; Scythians, Persians, and the like did. Moreover, people in this Asia did not identify themselves as Asian. They were of a particular community, region, or empire; today they are from particular nations. <u><strong>The word Asia (yaxiya) was introduced to the western Pacific by the Jesuits in the seventeenth century. When we move farther east to Tokugawa society, <mark>what we now call China was referred to as shinkoku </mark>(the characters for Qing and country), <mark>and one appellation for the people was tōjin </mark>(the characters for Tang and person).t</u></strong> In one eighteenth-century school of scholars (kokugaku), the use of chūka (middle kingdom) was countered with iteki (barbarian). Chūka was not a place but a condition that was the opposite of iteki. <u><strong>But today, Asia is not just a relational designation, an over there from the ancient Greece or the West. Beginning in the eighteenth century, <mark>Asia was located onto a chronology of becoming; it gained temporality.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Montesquieu discusses Asia as a static antithesis to the dynamic Europe; Voltaire recognizes it as the beginning of civilization, but one that had never advanced; and Hegel locates Asia (the “Oriental World”) as the first stage in the evolution of universal history</u></strong> (Hegel 1956). <u><strong><mark>This shift fixed Asia as a repetitive “gesture of exclusion” that is constantly invoked to reinforce</mark> what Certeau refers to as the “same,” in this case, <mark>the superiority of the West.</u></strong></mark> I invoke Hegel for two reasons. First, he is central in the making of history, more accurately, the spread of historical thinking. Second, his history is the incorporation, the synchronization, of the world into one history, the natural- ization of this gesture of exclusion. Rebecca Karl points out that it was not until the late nineteenth century that Asia gained meaning as an autono- mous geographical place (1998: 1098–101). D. Graham Burnett calls this synchronized world a geochronocultural tableau (2003: 18).6 <u><strong>In this synchronization, <mark>Asia becomes spatialized time, a space frozen in the flow of a new historical way of thinking.</u></strong></mark>7 <u><strong>The recurrence of Asia as Orient, I believe, is from the naturalization of this homogeneous time. This <mark>spatialized time is produced from a conflation between the idea of the Orient, the Newtonian notion of time as absolute and external to humans, and geography.</u></strong></mark> This returns us to the epigraph from Marx, about man being an incarnation of time (Lukács 1971: 89).8 <u><strong>Asia is both a creation of this time as well as a container for such time</u></strong>. Certeau describes the cen- trality of time in the objectification of ideas such as the idea of Asia: “For three centuries maybe the objectification of the past has made of time the unreflected category of a discipline that never ceases to use it as an instru- ment of classification” (1986: 216). <u><strong>Even though it has been described as “empty”</u></strong> (Benjamin 1968: 261–64), <u><strong><mark>absolute time plays an active role in our knowledge system.</mark> History has classified Asia as the first stage, as forever past. <mark>Asia shifted from a relational appellation to a fixed place in the ordering of the world.</mark> This unified history—<mark>the synchronization of the world</mark>— <mark>depends on the idea of an absolute time for its veracity and uses geography to conflate idea with places to make it “real.”</u></strong></mark> At this point, a detour is necessary. It is important to mention briefly the history of time and the history of history.9 <u><strong>For my purpose in this essay, it is important to point out that our current understanding of time and of history arose between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The work of Sir Isaac <mark>Newton punctuated the abstraction of chronological time from human society in Europe and was a critical move in the rise of science, technology, and capitalism.</u></strong></mark> The turn to a singular, linear chronology became common from the seventeenth century, when Dionysius Petavius, working from Joseph Scaliger’s Julian period, proposed the BC/AD system for reckoning years (Wilcox 1987: 203–8; Grafton 2002).10 <u><strong>A global or universal time emerged in the nineteenth century; in 1884, the International Meridian Conference organized the globe according to one time (synchronized to the Greenwich meridian), divided into twenty-four zones.</u></strong> Accep- tance occurred slowly over the next several decades. The emergence of modern history and its application to the world should be seen in relation to this transformation of time. <u><strong>On the one hand, this mechanical time offered a way for intellectuals such as Hegel to unify the myriad places of the world into one system. It is important to point out that this ordering is far from neutral; <mark>chronological time serves as a naturalized metric to emplot and measure development and progress.</u></strong></mark> On the other hand, it provided a new metric for evaluating and ordering informa- tion. <u><strong>Events were now verified by dates; <mark>seriality, not situatedness, became the common mode of ordering information, and</mark> some collective singular (usually <mark>the nation-state</mark>) <mark>became the subject of history</mark>, replacing deeds of exemplary figures<mark>.</u></strong></mark> Finally, these changes were occurring simultaneously as the European world was discovering science, mapping (and claiming) the world, and creating new wealth. In short, our understanding of time and history is the foundation of capitalism, liberalism, and imperialism. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Justin Massie 9, doctoral candidate in the department of political studies at Queen's University and associate researcher at the Canada Research Chair in Canadian foreign and defence policy at l'Université du Québec à Montréal, Summer 2009, “Making sense of Canada's "irrational" international security policy: A tale of three strategic cultures,” International Journal, Vol. 64, No. 3, p. 625-645 fulltext: Identity saliency is the core organizing principle underlying strategic culture. The hierarchical organization of state identities – that is, the relative importance of a particular identity in a given situation - provides the basis for the value selection process, and hence for consistent strategic behaviour. From a constructivist perspective, seeking relevance within alliances is not an irrational international security policy; it merely reflects the values and identities underlying a strategic rationale. Let us first consider the proposition that Canada's primary strategic goal is to be relevant in Washington. Canada's relationship with the United States is arguably the backbone of its foreign and defence policy. Many (implicit or explicit) identity-based conceptualizations of the Canadian-American relationship have focused on the degree of political independence the Canadian government enjoys vis-à-vis Washington. On one side are those who argue that political independence - the capacity to choose and act - is the primary value of Canada's international security policy, epitomized by Ottawa's leadership in the establishment of the International Criminal Court and its refusal to formally support the Iraq War. The result would be a balancing national strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Others contend that Canada's contribution to international security through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), coalitions of the willing, and United Nations peace operations amount to supporting and strengthening American hegemony. In other words, Canada is bandwagoning with the United States. The real issue, however, is not whether Canada has (or should have) adopted what detractors call a naive, Utopian, romanticized approach aimed at defying the United States, or a realist, interest-based, bandwagoning defence strategy. In fact, what is at stake in this debate is the hierarchical position of two contending external state identities and their corresponding interests. Canada's internal, corporate identity as a North American country has indeed generated two seemingly dichotomous (some would say schizophrenic) external identities: Canada as a sovereign state and Canada as a reliable neighbour of the United States. The former valued safeguarding (at least appearances of) national control and authority over policy, territory, and people (including the military), while the latter valued reassuring the US that Canada is not a direct or indirect threat to US national security. The resulting strategic culture can be best characterized as "soft-bandwagoning."16 The relative saliency of each of these two identities provides an explanation for most of Canada's continental security and defence policy. Sovereignty has historically been Canada's most salient state identity in relation to the defence of North America. More than "defence against help," it is about securing the image of a sovereign state neighbouring the US.17 This is mostly the result of longstanding concerns, real and imagined, about inordinate pressure from the US on Canadian sovereignty. It is also because Canada benefits from America's involuntary security guarantee, provided it contributes only modestly to continental defence and security. Though most evident during the Cold War, there are no reasons why these concerns do not apply to real or imagined contemporary threats posed by great powers, rogue states, and terrorist organizations. Moreover, fully reassuring the United States is an impossible task. As political scientist Frank Harvey aptly observed, "[n]o matter what Ottawa has accomplished so far, the next failure will create the overwhelming impression (even if false) that more could and should have been done.... [I]t really doesn't matter... how much we've enhanced border security while protecting the free flow of goods and services." In other words, none of Canada's efforts towards continental security and defence "will carry much weight in Washington after the next failure, whether or not these programs are essential, produced significant successes in the past, or ultimately contribute to saving lives after the next attack."18 Furthermore, it would necessitate a tremendous and unbearable amount of resources for Canada to effectively and independently secure its own territory. Thus Canada's continentalist strategic culture has traditionally consisted of a minimal contribution to continental defence and security, supplying greater efforts when pressured by Washington to do more. This allows Canada to play a marginal, yet not insignificant, role in continental defence and ensures the recognition of Canadian sovereignty. Canada's continental soft-bandwagoning does not, however, prevent potential violations of Canadian sovereignty by the United States. Nor does it provide discernible material benefits, such as influence over US continental defence strategy. Indeed, the argument that Canada's seat at the table allows it to influence Washington is unfounded. Canada simply lacks the ability to make the United States do something it would rather not do. Nor does Canada have an alternative continental defence strategy to present to Washington. Most defence analysts thus conclude that Canada's primary motivation is to reassure, not influence, Washington. Given that perfect reliability is impossible, and that Canada's contribution to continental defence has not stopped the US from criticizing Ottawa's laxity, Canada's continental defence strategy is mostly about the psychological benefits of sovereignty protection and alliance relevancy. Martin's "no" to ballistic missile defence is a prime example of Canada's soft-bandwagoning continental defence strategy. Canada is playing a de facto part in missile defence, thanks to an August 2004 agreement allowing NORAD to continue transmitting missile warning and assessment data to missile defence command and control. Nonetheless, during the 2006 federal elections, Martin repeatedly claimed a Conservative government would have Canada "join" the missile defence program. Although Conservative leader Stephen Harper did not formally commit to reversing the Liberals' refusal to endorse the program, he did specify under what conditions Canada would formally "participate." He claimed that if North Korea - or any other "rogue state," one can presume - were to develop the capacity to strike North America with a nuclear weapon, he would reconsider Canada's position on missile defence.19 Therefore, the successful development of Pyongyang's strike capability could incite the Conservative government to negotiate greater Canadian participation in ballistic missile defence. Such a decision could represent a historic breaking point for Canada's continental strategic culture, therefore it is unlikely. The ballistic missile issue has been framed - with great resonance in Québec - as one involving the protection of Canadian sovereignty. According to Martin, Harper's position amounts to saying "c'est à Washington de faire la politique internationale du Canada."20 The Liberal party's 2008 electoral platform built on the same line of argument, stating proudly that Canada had acted on principle and taken a "stand contrary to the policies and wishes of other governments."21<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Bilateral BMD would be the breaking point for Canadian defense sovereignty. That’s their biggest motivator. </h4><p>Justin <strong>Massie 9</strong>, doctoral candidate in the department of political studies at Queen's University and associate researcher at the Canada Research Chair in Canadian foreign and defence policy at l'Université du Québec à Montréal, Summer 2009, “Making sense of Canada's "irrational" international security policy: A tale of three strategic cultures,” International Journal, Vol. 64, No. 3, p. 625-645</p><p><u><mark>Identity saliency is the core</mark> organizing principle <mark>underlying strategic culture</u></mark>. The hierarchical organization of state identities – that is, the relative importance of a particular identity in a given situation - provides the basis for the value selection process, and hence for consistent strategic behaviour. From a constructivist perspective, <u>seeking relevance within alliances is not an irrational international security policy; it merely reflects</u> the <u>values and identities underlying a strategic rationale</u>.</p><p>Let us first consider the proposition that <u>Canada's primary strategic goal is to be <strong>relevant in Washington</strong>. Canada's relationship with the <strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>is</u> arguably <u>the backbone of its foreign and defence policy</u>. Many (implicit or explicit) <u><mark>identity</mark>-based <mark>conceptualizations of</mark> the <mark>Canadian-American <strong>relations</strong></mark>hip have <mark>focused on</mark> the <mark>degree of</mark> political <mark>independence</u></mark> the Canadian government enjoys <u>vis-à-vis Washington</u>. On <u>one side</u> are those who <u>argue</u> that <u><strong>political <mark>independence</u></strong></mark> - <u>the capacity to choose and act - <mark>is the <strong>primary value</strong></mark> of Canada's international security policy, epitomized by</u> Ottawa's leadership in the establishment of the International Criminal Court and its refusal to formally support the Iraq War. The result would be a balancing national strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Others contend that Canada's contribution to international security through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), coalitions of the willing, and United Nations peace operations amount to supporting and strengthening American hegemony. In other words, Canada is bandwagoning with the United States.</p><p>The real issue, however, is not whether Canada has (or should have) adopted what detractors call a naive, Utopian, romanticized approach aimed at defying the United States, or a realist, interest-based, bandwagoning defence strategy. In fact, what is at stake in this debate is the hierarchical position of two contending external state identities and their corresponding interests. Canada's internal, corporate identity as a North American country has indeed generated two seemingly dichotomous (some would say schizophrenic) external identities: Canada as a sovereign state and Canada as a reliable neighbour of the United States. The former valued safeguarding (at least appearances of) national control and authority over policy, territory, and people (including the military), while the latter valued reassuring the US that Canada is not a direct or indirect threat to US national security. The resulting strategic culture can be best characterized as "soft-bandwagoning."16 </p><p>The <u>relative saliency of each of these two identities provides an explanation for most of Canada's continental security and defence policy. <strong><mark>Sovereignty has</mark> historically <mark>been</mark> Canada's <mark>most salient</mark> state identity</strong> in relation to the defence of North America</u>. More than "defence against help," <u>it is about <strong>securing the image of a sovereign state</strong> neighbouring the US</u>.17 This is mostly the result of longstanding concerns, real and imagined, about inordinate pressure from the US on Canadian sovereignty. It is also because Canada benefits from America's involuntary security guarantee, provided it contributes only modestly to continental defence and security. Though most evident during the Cold War, there are no reasons why these concerns do not apply to real or imagined contemporary threats posed by great powers, rogue states, and terrorist organizations.</p><p>Moreover, fully reassuring the United States is an impossible task. As political scientist Frank Harvey aptly observed, "[n]o matter what Ottawa has accomplished so far, the next failure will create the overwhelming impression (even if false) that more could and should have been done.... [I]t really doesn't matter... how much we've enhanced border security while protecting the free flow of goods and services." In other words, none of Canada's efforts towards continental security and defence "will carry much weight in Washington after the next failure, whether or not these programs are essential, produced significant successes in the past, or ultimately contribute to saving lives after the next attack."18 Furthermore, it would necessitate a tremendous and unbearable amount of resources for Canada to effectively and independently secure its own territory. Thus Canada's continentalist strategic culture has traditionally consisted of a minimal contribution to continental defence and security, supplying greater efforts when pressured by Washington to do more. This allows Canada to play a marginal, yet not insignificant, role in continental defence and ensures the recognition of Canadian sovereignty.</p><p>Canada's continental soft-bandwagoning does not, however, prevent potential violations of Canadian sovereignty by the United States. Nor does it provide discernible material benefits, such as influence over US continental defence strategy. Indeed, the argument that Canada's seat at the table allows it to influence Washington is unfounded. Canada simply lacks the ability to make the United States do something it would rather not do. Nor does Canada have an alternative continental defence strategy to present to Washington. Most defence analysts thus conclude that Canada's primary motivation is to reassure, not influence, Washington. Given that perfect reliability is impossible, and that Canada's contribution to continental defence has not stopped the US from criticizing Ottawa's laxity, Canada's continental defence strategy is mostly about the psychological benefits of sovereignty protection and alliance relevancy.</p><p><u>Martin's "<mark>no" to <strong>b</strong></mark>allistic <strong><mark>m</strong></mark>issile <strong><mark>d</strong></mark>efence <mark>is a <strong>prime example</strong></mark> of Canada's soft-bandwagoning continental defence strategy</u>. Canada is playing a de facto part in missile defence, thanks to an August 2004 agreement allowing NORAD to continue transmitting missile warning and assessment data to missile defence command and control. Nonetheless, during the 2006 federal elections, <u>Martin</u> repeatedly <u>claimed a Conservative government would have Canada "join" the missile defence program</u>. Although Conservative leader Stephen Harper did not formally commit to reversing the Liberals' refusal to endorse the program, he did specify under what conditions Canada would formally "participate." He claimed that <u>if North Korea</u> - or any other "rogue state," one can presume - <u>were to develop the capacity to strike North America</u> with a nuclear weapon, he would reconsider Canada's position on missile defence.19 Therefore, the successful development of Pyongyang's strike capability could incite the Conservative government to negotiate <u>greater Canadian <mark>participation in <strong>b</strong></mark>allistic <strong><mark>m</strong></mark>issile <strong><mark>d</strong></mark>efence</u>.</p><p>Such a decision <u><mark>could represent a</mark> <strong>historic <mark>breaking point for Canada's</mark> continental <mark>strategic culture</strong>, therefore</mark> it <mark>is unlikely. The</mark> ballistic missile <mark>issue has been framed</mark> - with great resonance in Québec - <mark>as</mark> one involving the <strong><mark>protection of</mark> Canadian <mark>sovereignty</u></strong></mark>. According to Martin, Harper's position amounts to saying "c'est à Washington de faire la politique internationale du Canada."20 <u>The Liberal party's</u> 2008 electoral <u>platform built on the</u> same line of <u><strong>arg</strong>ument</u>, stating proudly that <u>Canada had <strong>acted on principle</strong> and taken a "stand <strong>contrary to the</u></strong> policies and <u><strong>wishes of other governments</u></strong>."21</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: McCluskey 8 (Martha McCluskey 8, Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar @ SUNY Buffalo Law, How Queer Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy, Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-15) fulltext: Queer theory's anti-moralism works together with its anti-statism to advance not simply "politics," but a specific vision of good "politics" seemingly defined in opposition to progressive law and morality. This anti-statist focus distinguishes queer theory from other critical legal theories that bring questions of power to bear on moral ideals of justice. Kendall Thomas (2002), for example, articulates a critical political model that sees justice as a problem of "power, antagonism, and interest," (p. 86) involving questions of how to constitute and support individuals as citizens with interests and actions that count as alternative visions of the public. Thomas contrasts this political model of justice with a moral justice aimed at discovering principles of fairness or institutional processes based in rational consensus and on personal feelings of respect and dignity. Rather than evaluating the moral costs and benefits of a particular policy by analyzing its impact in terms of harm or pleasure, Thomas suggests that a political vision of justice would focus on analyzing how policies produce and enhance the collective power of particular "publics" and "counterpublics" (pp. 91—5). From this political perspective of justice, neoliberal economic ideology is distinctly moral, even though it appears to be anti-moralist and to reduce moral principles to competition between self-interested power. Free-market economics rejects a political vision of justice, in this sense, in part because of its expressed anti-statism: it turns contested normative questions of public power into objective rational calculations of private individual sensibilities. Queer theory's similar tendency to romanticize power as the pursuit of individualistic pleasure free from public control risks disengaging from and disdaining the collective efforts to build and advance normative visions of the state that arguably define effective politics. Brown and Halley (2002), for instance, cite the Montgomery bus boycott as a classic example of the left's problematic march into legalistic and moralistic identity politics. In contrast, Thomas (2002) analyzes the Montgomery bus boycott as a positive example of a political effort to constitute a black civic public, even though the boycott campaign relied on moral language to advance its cause, because it also emphasized and challenged normative ideas of citizenship (p. 100, note 14). By glorifying rather than deconstructing the neoliberal dichotomy between public and private, between individual interest and group identity, and between demands for power and demands for protection, queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism plays into a right-wing double bind. In the current conservative political context, the left appears weak both because its efforts to use state power get constructed as excessively moralistic (the feminist thought police, or the naively paternalistic welfare state) and also because its efforts to resist state power get constructed as excessively relativist (promoting elitism and materialism instead of family values and community well-being). The right, on the other hand, has it both ways, asserting its moralism as inherent private authority transcending human subjectivity (as efficient market forces, the sacred family, or divine will) and defending its cultivation of self-interested power as the ideally virtuous state and market (bringing freedom, democracy, equality to the world by exercising economic and military authoritarianism). From Egalitarian Politics to Renewed Conservative Identity Queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism risks not only reinforcing right-wing ideology, but also infusing that ideology with energy from renewed identity politics. Susan Fraiman (2003) analyzes how queer theory (along with other prominent developments in left academics and culture) tends to construct left resistance as a radical individualism modeled on the male "teen rebel, defined above all by his strenuous alienation from the maternal" (p. xii). Fraiman observes that this left vision relies on "a posture of flamboyant unconventionality [that] coexists with highly conventional views of gender [and] is, indeed, articulated through them" (p. xiii). Fraiman links recent left contempt for feminism to a romantic vision of "coolness ... epitomized by the modem adolescent boy in his anxious, self-conscious and theatricalized will to separate from the mother" who is by definition uncool—controlling, moralistic, sentimental and not sexy. (p. xii). Even though queer theory distinguishes itself from feminism by repudiating dualistic ideas of gender, its anti-foundationalism covertly promotes an essentialist "binary that puts femininity, reproduction, and normativity on the one hand, and masculinity, sexuality, and queer resistance on the other" (p. 147). This binary permeates queer theory's condemnation of "governance feminism." (Brown and Halley, 2002; Wiegman, 2004) a vague category mobilizing images of the frumpy, overbearing, unexciting, unfunny, and not-so-smart "schoolmarm" (Halley, 2002) whose authority will naturally be undermined when real "men" appear on the scene. Suggesting the importance of gender conventions to the term's power, similar phrases do not seem to have gained comparable academic currency as a way to deride the complex regulatory impact of other specific uses of state authority -for instance postmodernists do not seem to widely denounce "governance anti-racism," "governance socialism," "governance populism," "governance environmentalism" or "governance masculinism" (though Brown and Halley do criticize progressive law reform more generally with the term "governance legalism" (p. 11)). Queer attraction to an adolescent masculinist idea of the "cool' dovetails smoothly with the identity politics of the right. Right-wing politics and culture similarly condemn progressive and feminist policies with the term "nanny state" (McCluskey, 2000; 2005a). The "nanny state" epithet enlists femaleness or femininity as shorthand to make some government authority feel bad to those comfortable with or excited by a masculinist moral order, it adds to this sentimental power by coding the maternal authority to be resisted as a "nanny" (rather than simply a "mommy"), enlisting identities of class, age—and perhaps race and nationality—to enhance uncritical suspicions of disorder and illegitimacy. The "nanny state" slur tells us that a rougher and tougher neoliberal state, market, and family will bring the grown-up pleasures, freedom, and power that are the mark and privilege of ideal manhood. The "nanny state" is not an isolated example of the use of gender identity to disparage progressive or even centrist policies that are not explicitly identified as feminist or gender-related. For example, "girlie-man" gained currency in the 2004 presidential election to disparage opposition to George W. Bush's right-wing economic and national security policies (Grossman and McClain, 2004), and and in 2008 critics of presidential candidate Barack Obama similarly linked him to disparaging images of femininity (Campanile 2008; Faludi 2008). These terms open a window into the connections between economic libertarianism and moral fundamentalism. Libertarianism's anti-statism and anti-moralism requires sharp distinctions between public and private, morality and power, individual freedom and social coercion. The problem, if we assume these distinctions are not self-evident facts, is that libertarianism must refer covertly to some external value system to draw its lines. Identity conventions have long helped to do this work, albeit in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. Power appears weak, deceptive, illegitimate, manipulative, controlling, undisciplined, oppressive, exceptional, or naive if it is feminized; but strong, self-satisfying, public-serving, protective, orderly, rational, and a normal exercise of individual freedom if it is masculinized. Conventional political theory and culture identifies legitimate authority with an idea of a masculine power aimed at policing supposedly weaker or subordinate others. A state that publicly depends on and promotes such power enhances rather than usurps private freedom and security in citizenship, market, and family, according to the traditional theory of the patriarchal household as model for the state (see Dubber, 2005). Queer theory updates this pre-modern political ideology into smart postmodernism and transgressive politics by re-casting its idealized masculine power in the image of a youthful and sexy disdain for feminized concerns about social, bodily, or material limits and support. In her challenge to this queer romanticization of "coolness," Fraiman (2003) instead urges a feminism that will "question a masculinity overinvested in youth, fearful of the mutable flesh, and on the run from intimacy ... [to] claim, in its place, the jouissance of a body that is aging, pulpy, no longer intact... a subject who is tender-hearted ... who is neither too hard nor too fluid for attachment; who does the banal, scarcely narratable, but helpful things that moms' do" (p. 158). Feminist legal theory concerned with economic politics adds to this alternative vision an ideal that advances and rewards the pleasure, power, and public value of the things done by some of those moms' nannies (McCluskey, 2005a)—or by the many others engaged in the work (both paid and unpaid) that sustains and enhances others' pleasure and power in and out of the home (McCluskey, 2003a; Young, 2001). One means toward that end would be to make the domestic work (and its play and pleasure) conventionally treated as both banal or spiritual (see Roberts, 1997b) deserving of a greater share of state and market material rewards and resources on a more egalitarian basis, as Fineman's (2004) vision would do.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>The aff cedes the political and falls into a right-wing double bind—leaves right wing to determine its politics</h4><p>McCluskey 8 </strong>(Martha<strong> </strong>McCluskey 8, Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar @ SUNY Buffalo Law, How Queer Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy, Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-15)</p><p><u><mark>Queer theory's</mark> anti-moralism works together with its anti-statism to <mark>advance</u></mark> not simply "politics," but <u><mark>a specific vision of good "politics" seemingly defined in opposition to progressive law and morality</u></mark>. This anti-statist focus distinguishes queer theory from other critical legal theories that bring questions of power to bear on moral ideals of justice. Kendall Thomas (2002), for example, articulates a critical political model <u>that sees justice as a problem of "power, antagonism, and interest,"</u> (p. 86) involving questions of how to constitute and support individuals as citizens with interests and actions that count as alternative visions of the public. Thomas contrasts this political model of justice with a moral justice aimed at discovering principles of fairness or institutional processes based in rational consensus and on personal feelings of respect and dignity. Rather than evaluating the moral costs and benefits of a particular policy by analyzing its impact in terms of harm or pleasure, Thomas suggests that a political vision of justice would focus on analyzing how policies produce and enhance the collective power of particular "publics" and "counterpublics" (pp. 91—5). <u>From this political perspective of justice, neoliberal economic ideology is distinctly moral,</u> even though it appears to be anti-moralist and to reduce moral principles to competition between self-interested power. <u>Free-market economics rejects a political vision of justice</u>, in this sense, in part<strong> <u></strong>because of its expressed anti-statism</u><strong>: <u></strong>it turns contested normative questions of public power into objective rational calculations of private individual sensibilities.</u> <u><strong><mark>Queer theory's</u></strong></mark> similar <u><strong><mark>tendency to romanticize power</mark> as the pursuit of individualistic pleasure free from public control <mark>risks disengaging from and disdaining the collective efforts to build and advance normative visions of the state that arguably define effective politics</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Brown</u> and Halley (2002), for instance, <u>cite the Montgomery bus boycott as a</u> classic <u>example of the left's problematic march into</u> legalistic and <u>moralistic identity politics</u>. In contrast, Thomas (2002) analyzes the Montgomery bus boycott as a positive example of a political effort to constitute a black civic public, even though the boycott campaign relied on moral language to advance its cause, because it also emphasized and challenged normative ideas of citizenship (p. 100, note 14). <u>By glorifying rather than deconstructing the neoliberal dichotomy between public and private, between individual interest and group identity, and between demands for power and demands for protection, <mark>queer theory</mark>'s anti-statism and anti-moralism <mark>plays into a <strong>right-wing double bind</u></strong></mark>. <u>In the current conservative political context, the left appears weak</u> both <u>because its efforts to use state power get constructed as excessively moralistic</u> (the feminist thought police, or the naively paternalistic welfare state) and also <strong>because <u></strong>its efforts to resist state power get constructed as excessively relativist</u><strong> (<u></strong>promoting elitism and materialism instead of family values and community well-being</u><strong>). <u></strong>The right</u>, on the other hand<strong>, <u></strong>has it both ways, asserting its moralism as inherent private authority transcending human subjectivity (as efficient market forces, the sacred family, or divine will) and defending its cultivation of self-interested power as the ideally virtuous state and market (bringing</u> freedom, democracy, <u>equality</u> to the world <u>by exercising economic</u> and military <u>authoritarianism</u>). From Egalitarian Politics to Renewed Conservative Identity <u><mark>Queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism risks</u><strong> <u></strong>not only</u><strong> <u></strong>reinforcing right-wing ideology</u><strong>, <u></strong>but also</u><strong> <u>infusing</strong> <strong>that ideology with energy from renewed identity politics</u></strong></mark>. Susan Fraiman (2003) analyzes how <u>queer theory</u> (along with other prominent developments in left academics and culture) <u>tends to construct left resistance as a radical individualism modeled on the male "teen rebel,</u> defined above all by his strenuous alienation from the maternal" (p. xii). Fraiman observes that <u>this left vision relies on "a posture of</u> flamboyant <u>unconventionality [that] <strong>coexists with highly conventional views of gender [and] is</u></strong>, indeed, <u><strong>articulated through them</u></strong>" (p. xiii). <u>Fraiman links recent left contempt for feminism to a romantic vision of "coolness</u> ... epitomized by the modem <u>adolescent boy</u> in his anxious, self-conscious and <u>theatricalized will to separate from the mother" who is by definition uncool—controlling, moralistic, sentimental and not sexy</u>. (p. xii). <u>Even though <mark>queer theor</mark>y distinguishes itself from feminism by repudiating dualistic ideas of gender, its anti-foundationalism</u> <u><strong><mark>covertly promotes an essentialist "binary that puts femininity, reproduction, and normativity on the one hand, and masculinity, sexuality, and queer resistance on the other</mark>"</u></strong> (p. 147). <u>This binary permeates queer theory's condemnation of "governance feminism."</u><strong> </strong>(Brown and Halley, 2002; Wiegman, 2004) <u>a vague category mobilizing images of the</u> frumpy, overbearing, unexciting, unfunny, and <u>not-so-smart "schoolmarm"</u> (Halley, 2002) <u>whose authority will naturally be undermined when real "men" appear on the scene.</u> Suggesting the importance of gender conventions to the term's power, similar phrases do not seem to have gained comparable academic currency as a way to deride the complex regulatory impact of other specific uses of state authority -for instance postmodernists do not seem to widely denounce "governance anti-racism," "governance socialism," "governance populism," "governance environmentalism" or "governance masculinism" (though Brown and Halley do criticize progressive law reform more generally with the term "governance legalism" (p. 11)). <u>Queer attraction to an adolescent masculinist idea of the "cool' dovetails smoothly with the identity politics of the right</u><strong>. <u></strong>Right-wing politics and culture similarly condemn progressive and feminist policies with the term "nanny state"</u> (McCluskey, 2000; 2005a). The "nanny state" epithet <u>enlists</u> femaleness or <u>femininity</u> as shorthand to make some government authority feel bad to those comfortable with or excited by a masculinist moral order, it adds to this sentimental power by coding the maternal authority to be resisted as a "nanny" (rather than simply a "mommy"), enlisting identities of class, age—and perhaps race and nationality—to enhance uncritical suspicions of disorder and illegitimacy. T<strong>h<u></strong>e "nanny state" slur tells us that a rougher and tougher neoliberal state, market, and family will bring the grown-up pleasures, freedom, and power that are the mark and privilege of ideal manhood</u>. The "nanny state" is not <u>an</u> isolated<strong> <u></strong>example of the use of gender identity to disparage progressive or even centrist policies that are not explicitly identified as feminist or gender-related</u>. For example, "girlie-man" gained currency in the 2004 presidential election to disparage opposition to George W. Bush's right-wing economic and national security policies (Grossman and McClain, 2004), and and in 2008 critics of presidential candidate Barack Obama similarly linked him to disparaging images of femininity (Campanile 2008; Faludi 2008). <u><mark>These terms open a window into the connections between economic libertarianism and moral fundamentalism</mark>.</u> Libertarianism's anti-statism and anti-moralism requires sharp distinctions between public and private, morality and power, individual freedom and social coercion. The problem, if we assume these distinctions are not self-evident facts, is that libertarianism must refer covertly to some external value system to draw its lines. <u>Identity conventions have long helped to do this work</u>, albeit in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. Power appears weak, deceptive, illegitimate, manipulative, controlling, undisciplined, oppressive, exceptional, or naive if it is feminized; but strong, self-satisfying, public-serving, protective, orderly, rational, and a normal exercise of individual freedom if it is masculinized. <u>Conventional political theory and culture identifies legitimate authority with an idea of a masculine power aimed at policing</u> supposedly weaker or <u>subordinate others. A state that</u> publicly depends on and <u>promotes such power</u><strong> <u></strong>enhances</u> rather than usurps <u>private freedom and security in citizenship, market,</u> and family, <u>according to the traditional theory of the patriarchal household as model for the state</u> (see Dubber, 2005). <u><mark>Queer theory updates this pre-modern political ideology</mark> into smart postmodernism and transgressive politics <mark>by</u> <u><strong>re-casting its idealized masculine power in the image of a </mark>youthful and sexy <mark>disdain for feminized concerns about social, bodily, or material limits and support</u></strong></mark>. In her challenge to this queer romanticization of "coolness," Fraiman (2003) instead urges a feminism that will "question a masculinity overinvested in youth, fearful of the mutable flesh, and on the run from intimacy ... [to] claim, in its place, the jouissance of a body that is aging, pulpy, no longer intact... a subject who is tender-hearted ... who is neither too hard nor too fluid for attachment; who does the banal, scarcely narratable, but helpful things that moms' do" (p. 158). Feminist legal theory concerned with economic politics adds to this alternative vision an ideal that advances and rewards the pleasure, power, and public value of the things done by some of those moms' nannies (McCluskey, 2005a)—or by the many others engaged in the work (both paid and unpaid) that sustains and enhances others' pleasure and power in and out of the home (McCluskey, 2003a; Young, 2001). One means toward that end would be to make the domestic work (and its play and pleasure) conventionally treated as both banal or spiritual (see Roberts, 1997b) deserving of a greater share of state and market material rewards and resources on a more egalitarian basis, as Fineman's (2004) vision would do.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Jill Bellamy van Aalst 13, CEO of Warfare Technology Analytics, Advises Business and Government Clients on Biological Warfare and Bio-Defense within the EU and NATO, Develops and Runs Biological and Nuclear War-Games for EU MoD and NATO states, Subject Matter Expert on the Syrian and Iranian Biological Weapon Complex, “Hezbollah’s UAV Biological Weapon Capability: A Game Changer?”, New English Review, June 2013, http://www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfm/frm/140408/sec_id/140408 fulltext: In the shadow of this biological weapons are less well understood. Syria’s biological weapons programs run out of the Syrian Scientific Research (SSRC) in Damascus have not been the focus of much media attention. That despite these weapons are far more dangerous and more likely to be deployed. Perhaps less clear is Syria’s close relationship and support of Hezbollah and Hezbollah’s arsenal of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The merging of Syria’s biological weapon program with Hezbollah and/or Iran’s UAV programs could create an international public health emergency more catastrophic than a natural outbreak. In an article by Arie Egozie entitled “Israel F-16 downs another Hezbollah UAV,” Egozie notes: An Israeli air force F-16 has shot down an unmanned air vehicle launched from Lebanon by Hezbollah militants. The threat was detected over the Mediterranean Sea on 25 April 2013 and was destroyed shortly after by an air-to-air missile. The encounter occurred at 13:30 local time, and an air force helicopter transporting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for an official visit to the north of the country landed as fighters scrambled. Israel's latest interception of a UAV is the fifth such action to have been performed by its air force in the past decade. Ababil Iranian UAV launch ready Iran is believed to have supplied Hezbollah with 12 Ababil UAVs.3 The Ababil carries an 88 pound conventional payload, with a range of approximately 150 miles. Given the unique characteristics of UAV’s it is conceivable that Hezbollah, under orders from Iran, and provided with advanced technology could deploy biological weapons utilizing this platform. Historic Precedence Concern over the use of UAV’s as a possible platform for deploying biological weapons is not new. According to a classified version of the October 2001 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Iraq was “working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.”4 The NIE judged that the UAVs were “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents.” Further, it declared that “Baghdad’s UAVs could threaten Iraq’s neighbours, US forces in the Persian Gulf and if brought into the United States, the US Homeland.”5 The unique characteristics of biological weapons put immediate geographic targets at risk. Due to lengthy incubation periods, rDNA, synthetic biology, transmissibility, and virulence could place the global community as a whole at residual risk. Ironically, the casualty risk to Israel from a UAV mounted with BW may actually be rather negligible compared to the likely impact on the larger global community. This is especially acute with regard to regions with limited health care infrastructures and low or non-existent bio-defence capabilities. Could Hezbollah Acquire a UAV BW Capability? Biological and nuclear weapons fall into the highest level of WMD threat, because their effect, for a given low weight, is far greater than for chemical and radiological weapons.6 As a consequence, they were given a priority, comparable to that given nuclear weapons.7 Hezbollah has acquired almost every type of conventional weapon Iran has ever produced and works closely with Syria. As Hezbollah is considered by some to run their own laboratories in Lebanon, it is likely that Syria has already transferred weaponized biological agents to these labs. To put the threat Hezbollah’s potential BW program poses and the possible use of their current UAV stockpile as a deployment platform into clearer focus, in 2005, France's Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin, at an Interpol bio-terrorism conference held in Lyon, emphasized that nowadays terrorists are highly likely to use weapons of mass destruction including biological weapons. Given Hezbollah’s possible laboratories, they could easily maintain an advanced BW capability. Hezbollah’s state sponsorship by both Syria and Iran vastly increase their ability to successfully deploy BW using UAV’s. Why a Biological Weapon Payload Poses a Unique Risk Weaponizing biological agents suitable for a UAV payload requires stabilization and field testing techniques which are available to nearly all national military defence laboratories such as those that exist today in Syria and Iran. Technical thresholds such as stabilization, field testing and dispersal are factors which determine not only kill ratios of a weaponized agent, but the success rate a terrorist group or organization is likely to achieve. Hezbollah’s BW capability should be considered as synonymous with that of Iran. In this sense it would be far more lethal, more likely to go global and produce pandemic disease. On the technical side, Hezbollah has been trained by Iran’s Quds forces in Sudan on BW. The type of BW is likely to be highly advanced, not a homemade version of anthrax collected from soil samples. Additionally, BW received from Syrian programs running at the SSRC in Damascus, is technically very sophisticated. Iran would have the capability to provide Hezbollah with technical mounting of UAV’s with BW. Moreover, in contrast to a conventional payload which may present issues of accuracy, a biological payload does not. Technical Considerations regarding Hezbollah’s BW Mounted UAV’s It is important to understand the advanced technical knowledge Iran and Syria possess both in terms of their BW Complex and mounting a UAV BW payload. A New Yorker article notes ‘the vast majority of drones in the United States will probably be used for agriculture. Drones can be used to more precisely spray crops, keep track of growth rates and hydration, and identify possible outbreaks of disease before they spoil a harvest.’8 Among advanced BW agents, stabilization and deployment are significant issues due to the sensitivity of biological agents to environmental factors, not only during storage but during application.9 Stabilization is problematic due to the susceptibility of organisms to inactivation of biochemical compounds in the environment. The loss of viability can result from exposure to high physical and chemical stress environments such as high surface area at air-water interfaces, (frothing), extreme temperatures or pressures, high salt concentrations, dilution, and or exposure to specific inactivating agents.10 Stabilization of the BW agent for mounting, requires initial concentration of the agent; freeze drying (lyophilisation particularly related to anthrax), spray drying, formulation into solids, liquid or gas solutions; and deep freezing.11 Exact technical methods of concentration include: vacuum filtration, ultrafiltration, precipitation, and centrifugation. Freeze drying is the preferred method for long-term storage of bacterial cultures because freeze-dried cultures can be easily rehydrated and cultured via conventional means.12 Global Security. Org. offers an interesting analysis and details further the technical threshold which Iran and Syria have overcome: A toxin agent is most effective when prepared as a freeze-dried powder and encapsulated. Such encapsulation, however, is not necessary for weaponization. Infectious biological agents are generally stabilized and then spray dried.13 Under appropriate meteorological conditions and with an aerosol generator delivering 1-5 micron particle-size droplets, a single aircraft can disperse 100 kg of anthrax over a 300 km 2 area and theoretically cause 3 million deaths in a population density of 10,000 people per km2. The mean lethal inhalator dosage is 10 nanograms. Hezbollah’s BW Scenarios for mass casualty bio-terrorism It is unlikely Hezbollah or either of their state sponsors would choose b. anthracis (anthrax), to use in a drone attack on Israel. It is more likely they would consider highly pathogenic strains of transmissible Category A or B agents. It is also likely they have war-gamed each scenario utilizing UAV’s as the delivery platform. The use of a UAV would likely increase probability of consistent dissemination and stability of the agent.14 Aerosolization of biological agents using spray devices is the method of choice since the extreme physical conditions associated with explosive dissemination can completely inactivate the biological agent. (Aerosol dispersal allows for control of particle size and density to maximize protection from environmental degradation and uptake of the enclosed biological agents in the lungs of targeted populations.)15 Dissemination efficiency rates of aerosol delivery systems are in the range of 40-60 percent. Cruise missiles, aircraft carrying gravity bombs or spray attachments, and fixed-wing or rotor craft with attached sprayers are all vehicles for delivery of biological agents. The delivery of biological agents by explosive devices is much less efficient (~1-5 percent).16 The preferred approach is dispersion via the use of a pressurized gas in a submunition. Other preferred platforms from an efficiency standpoint include small rotary-wing vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft fitted with spray tanks, drones, bomblets, cruise missiles, and high-speed missiles with bomblet warheads. The Syrian biological weapons program, run primarily out of the SSRC in Damascus, Cerin, Homs and Aleppo, are designed to be highly agile and compartmentalized. They utilize such technologies which are far superior to maintaining and continually upgrading a BW stockpile. For this reason, Syria, Iran and other nations who now run BW programs generally do not stockpile these weapons. The lack of a stockpile, even the lack of signatures on UAV mounted payloads, makes it far more difficult to identify, than during the Cold War Era. Additionally, the weaponized agents Syria and Iran possess are sophisticated. Much of their expertise is gleaned from joint scientific research and development between Syria, Iran and North Korea. The technical obstacles faced by non-state sponsored terrorist organizations does not exist for Hezbollah or Hamas. Unfortunately, in most major transit hubs current detection technologies are not going to pick up what either Syria, Iran or others are working on today. Detection technology has not been able to keep pace with advances in the life sciences. Even multi-agent analysis is complicated by interferences between assays and the large number of BW probes.17 Moreover if a UAV BW payload was launched from Lebanon, detection in airports, train and bus stations would be a moot point. Drones, especially swarms loaded with BW, would have an increased chance of success particularly if some were targeted on unpopulated areas. It is worth noting that due to biological weapons’ unique characterises, a relatively light payload could produce exceptionally high kill ratios compared to a chemical warhead. It is the quality not the quantity that counts. Thus making small drones the ideal deployment platform for BW. Should Hezbollah decide to arm their arsenal of Ababil UAV’s18 or other drones, with biological warfare agents and target Israel, perhaps using a swarm of UAV’s, the likely and unfortunate casualties will be populations in nations who do not possess a bio-defence infrastructure. These are states that do not have the economic means to stockpile vaccines and medical counter-measures, who do not have the laboratory capacity or the health care capacity to conduct mass casualty care. With several BW agents such as smallpox, incubation periods can be lengthy. Some incubation periods would be over three weeks, transmission could occur several kilometres downwind given good meteorological conditions. This means a drone could lay down BW in an unpopulated area. The BW payload, should the drone be destroyed, could go undetected until populations become symptomatic. Lengthy incubation periods mean silent transmission which would come in waves. As A-symptomatic civilians travel to other regions of Israel and internationally. A war game, called Atlantic Storm, illustrates the existential risk to the global community from BW verses chemical or nuclear weapons. Should Hezbollah use a highly transmissible and virulent pathogen, it is still the international community and not necessarily Israel, who will bear the brunt of mortality and economic costs. It is therefore the international community who must confront this increasing threat. Future drone technology trends will no doubt make them more tempting for use as BW platforms. As drones get smaller, making detection more difficult, small amounts of BW which could produce high kill ratios, may well be the technology of future BW warfare.19<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Hezbollah would use <u>bioweapons</u> – extinction </h4><p>Jill Bellamy <strong>van Aalst 13</strong>, CEO of Warfare Technology Analytics, Advises Business and Government Clients on Biological Warfare and Bio-Defense within the EU and NATO, Develops and Runs Biological and Nuclear War-Games for EU MoD and NATO states, Subject Matter Expert on the Syrian and Iranian Biological Weapon Complex, “Hezbollah’s UAV Biological Weapon Capability: A Game Changer?”, New English Review, June 2013, http://www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfm/frm/140408/sec_id/140408</p><p>In the shadow of this biological weapons are less well understood. Syria’s biological weapons programs run out of the Syrian Scientific Research (SSRC) in Damascus have not been the focus of much media attention. That despite these weapons are far more dangerous and more likely to be deployed. Perhaps less clear is Syria’s close relationship and support of Hezbollah and Hezbollah’s arsenal of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. <u>The <mark>merging</mark> of <strong><mark>Syria’s bio</strong></mark>logical <strong><mark>weapon program</strong> with <strong>Hezbollah</strong></mark> and</u>/or <u><strong>Iran’s UAV programs</strong> could <mark>create <strong>a</strong></mark>n international public <mark>health emergency</mark> <strong>more catastrophic than a natural outbreak</u></strong>. In an article by Arie Egozie entitled “Israel F-16 downs another Hezbollah UAV,” Egozie notes: An Israeli air force F-16 has shot down an unmanned air vehicle launched from Lebanon by Hezbollah militants. The threat was detected over the Mediterranean Sea on 25 April 2013 and was destroyed shortly after by an air-to-air missile. The encounter occurred at 13:30 local time, and an air force helicopter transporting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for an official visit to the north of the country landed as fighters scrambled. Israel's latest interception of a UAV is the fifth such action to have been performed by its air force in the past decade. Ababil Iranian UAV launch ready Iran is believed to have supplied Hezbollah with 12 Ababil UAVs.3 The Ababil carries an 88 pound conventional payload, with a range of approximately 150 miles. Given the unique characteristics of UAV’s it is conceivable that Hezbollah, under orders from Iran, and provided with advanced technology could deploy biological weapons utilizing this platform. Historic Precedence <u>Concern over the use of UAV’s as a possible platform for deploying biological weapons is not new</u>. <u>According to a <strong>classified</u></strong> version of the October 2001 <u><strong>US National Intelligence Estimate</u></strong> (NIE) Iraq was “working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.”4 The NIE judged that <u>the UAVs were “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents</u>.” Further, it declared that “Baghdad’s UAVs could threaten Iraq’s neighbours, US forces in the Persian Gulf and if brought into the United States, the US Homeland.”5 The unique characteristics of biological weapons put immediate geographic targets at risk. <u><mark>Due to <strong>lengthy incubation periods</strong>, <strong>rDNA</strong>, <strong>syn</mark>thetic <mark>bio</mark>logy</strong><mark>, <strong>transmissibility</strong>, and <strong>virulence</strong></mark> could <strong><mark>place the glob</mark>al community <mark>as a whole at</mark> residual <mark>risk</strong></mark>. Ironically, the casualty risk to Israel from a UAV mounted with BW may actually be rather negligible compared to the likely impact on the larger global community</u>. This is <u><mark>especially</mark> acute</u> with regard to regions <u><mark>with <strong>limited health</mark> care <mark>infrastructures</strong> and</mark> low or <strong><mark>non-existent bio-defence</strong></mark> capabilities</u>. Could Hezbollah Acquire a UAV BW Capability? Biological and nuclear weapons fall into the highest level of WMD threat, because their effect, for a given low weight, is far greater than for chemical and radiological weapons.6 As a consequence, they were given a priority, comparable to that given nuclear weapons.7 Hezbollah has acquired almost every type of conventional weapon Iran has ever produced and works closely with Syria. As Hezbollah is considered by some to run their own laboratories in Lebanon, it is likely that Syria has already transferred weaponized biological agents to these labs. To put the threat <u><mark>Hezbollah’s</u></mark> potential BW program poses and the possible use of their current UAV stockpile as a deployment platform into clearer focus, in 2005, France's Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin, at an Interpol bio-terrorism conference held in Lyon, emphasized that nowadays <u>terrorists are <strong>highly <mark>likely to use</mark> weapons of mass destruction including <mark>bio</mark>logical <mark>weapons</u></strong></mark>. <u>Given Hezbollah’s possible laboratories, they <strong>could easily maintain an advanced BW capability</u></strong>. Hezbollah’s <u><strong><mark>state sponsorship by</mark> both <mark>Syria</mark> and Iran <mark>vastly increase</mark> their ability to <mark>success</mark>fully deploy BW using UAV’s</u></strong>. Why a Biological Weapon Payload Poses a Unique Risk Weaponizing biological agents suitable for a UAV payload requires stabilization and field testing techniques which are available to nearly all national military defence laboratories such as those that exist today in Syria and Iran. Technical thresholds such as stabilization, field testing and dispersal are factors which determine not only kill ratios of a weaponized agent, but the success rate a terrorist group or organization is likely to achieve. Hezbollah’s BW capability should be considered as synonymous with that of Iran. In this sense it would be far more lethal, more likely to go global and produce pandemic disease. On the technical side, Hezbollah has been trained by Iran’s Quds forces in Sudan on BW. The type of BW is likely to be highly advanced, not a homemade version of anthrax collected from soil samples. Additionally, BW received from Syrian programs running at the SSRC in Damascus, is technically very sophisticated. Iran would have the capability to provide Hezbollah with technical mounting of UAV’s with BW. Moreover, in contrast to a conventional payload which may present issues of accuracy, a biological payload does not. Technical Considerations regarding Hezbollah’s BW Mounted UAV’s It is important to understand the advanced technical knowledge Iran and Syria possess both in terms of their BW Complex and mounting a UAV BW payload. A New Yorker article notes ‘the vast majority of drones in the United States will probably be used for agriculture. Drones can be used to more precisely spray crops, keep track of growth rates and hydration, and identify possible outbreaks of disease before they spoil a harvest.’8 Among advanced BW agents, stabilization and deployment are significant issues due to the sensitivity of biological agents to environmental factors, not only during storage but during application.9 Stabilization is problematic due to the susceptibility of organisms to inactivation of biochemical compounds in the environment. The loss of viability can result from exposure to high physical and chemical stress environments such as high surface area at air-water interfaces, (frothing), extreme temperatures or pressures, high salt concentrations, dilution, and or exposure to specific inactivating agents.10 Stabilization of the BW agent for mounting, requires initial concentration of the agent; freeze drying (lyophilisation particularly related to anthrax), spray drying, formulation into solids, liquid or gas solutions; and deep freezing.11 Exact technical methods of concentration include: vacuum filtration, ultrafiltration, precipitation, and centrifugation. Freeze drying is the preferred method for long-term storage of bacterial cultures because freeze-dried cultures can be easily rehydrated and cultured via conventional means.12 Global Security. Org. offers an interesting analysis and details further the technical threshold which Iran and Syria have overcome: A toxin agent is most effective when prepared as a freeze-dried powder and encapsulated. Such encapsulation, however, is not necessary for weaponization. Infectious biological agents are generally stabilized and then spray dried.13 Under appropriate meteorological conditions and with an aerosol generator delivering 1-5 micron particle-size droplets, a single aircraft can disperse 100 kg of anthrax over a 300 km 2 area and theoretically cause 3 million deaths in a population density of 10,000 people per km2. The mean lethal inhalator dosage is 10 nanograms. Hezbollah’s BW Scenarios for mass casualty bio-terrorism It is unlikely Hezbollah or either of their state sponsors would choose b. anthracis (anthrax), to use in a drone attack on Israel. It is more likely they would consider highly pathogenic strains of transmissible Category A or B agents. It is also likely they have war-gamed each scenario utilizing UAV’s as the delivery platform. The use of a UAV would likely increase probability of consistent dissemination and stability of the agent.14 Aerosolization of biological agents using spray devices is the method of choice since the extreme physical conditions associated with explosive dissemination can completely inactivate the biological agent. (Aerosol dispersal allows for control of particle size and density to maximize protection from environmental degradation and uptake of the enclosed biological agents in the lungs of targeted populations.)15 Dissemination efficiency rates of aerosol delivery systems are in the range of 40-60 percent. Cruise missiles, aircraft carrying gravity bombs or spray attachments, and fixed-wing or rotor craft with attached sprayers are all vehicles for delivery of biological agents. The delivery of biological agents by explosive devices is much less efficient (~1-5 percent).16 The preferred approach is dispersion via the use of a pressurized gas in a submunition. Other preferred platforms from an efficiency standpoint include small rotary-wing vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft fitted with spray tanks, drones, bomblets, cruise missiles, and high-speed missiles with bomblet warheads. The Syrian biological weapons program, run primarily out of the SSRC in Damascus, Cerin, Homs and Aleppo, are designed to be highly agile and compartmentalized. They utilize such technologies which are far superior to maintaining and continually upgrading a BW stockpile. For this reason, Syria, Iran and other nations who now run BW programs generally do not stockpile these weapons. The lack of a stockpile, even the lack of signatures on UAV mounted payloads, makes it far more difficult to identify, than during the Cold War Era. Additionally, the weaponized agents Syria and Iran possess are sophisticated. Much of their expertise is gleaned from joint scientific research and development between Syria, Iran and North Korea. The technical obstacles faced by non-state sponsored terrorist organizations does not exist for Hezbollah or Hamas. Unfortunately, in most major transit hubs current detection technologies are not going to pick up what either Syria, Iran or others are working on today. Detection technology has not been able to keep pace with advances in the life sciences. Even multi-agent analysis is complicated by interferences between assays and the large number of BW probes.17 Moreover if a UAV BW payload was launched from Lebanon, detection in airports, train and bus stations would be a moot point. Drones, especially swarms loaded with BW, would have an increased chance of success particularly if some were targeted on unpopulated areas. It is worth noting that due to biological weapons’ unique characterises, a relatively light payload could produce exceptionally high kill ratios compared to a chemical warhead. It is the quality not the quantity that counts. Thus making small drones the ideal deployment platform for BW. Should Hezbollah decide to arm their arsenal of Ababil UAV’s18 or other drones, with biological warfare agents and target Israel, perhaps using a swarm of UAV’s, the likely and unfortunate casualties will be populations in nations who do not possess a bio-defence infrastructure. These are states that do not have the economic means to stockpile vaccines and medical counter-measures, who do not have the laboratory capacity or the health care capacity to conduct mass casualty care. With several BW agents such as smallpox, incubation periods can be lengthy. Some incubation periods would be over three weeks, transmission could occur several kilometres downwind given good meteorological conditions. This means a drone could lay down BW in an unpopulated area. The BW payload, should the drone be destroyed, could go undetected until populations become symptomatic. <u>Lengthy incubation periods mean silent transmission which would come in waves. As <strong><mark>A-symptomatic</strong> civilians <strong>travel</strong></mark> to other regions of Israel and <strong><mark>internationally</strong>. A</mark> war game, called Atlantic Storm, illustrates the <strong><mark>existential risk</mark> to the global community</strong> from BW verses chemical or nuclear weapons. Should Hezbollah use a highly transmissible and virulent pathogen, it is still the international community and not necessarily Israel, who will bear the brunt of mortality and economic costs. It is therefore the international community who must confront this increasing threat. Future drone technology trends will no doubt make them more tempting for use as BW platforms. As drones get smaller, making detection more difficult, small amounts of BW which could produce high kill ratios, may well be the technology of future BW warfare.19</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Pifer et al 10, Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth M. Pollack, May 2010, Date Accessed: 11-20-2017, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges” Brookings Foreign Policy, Arms Control Series, Paper 3, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf fulltext: The United States has at times recognized this reality. It publicly committed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, unless the latter are allied with nuclear powers in wartime operations (and now has aligned its NSAs to non-nuclear weapon states in compliance with the NPT). Yet American policy had not been consistent. Even while making such NSA commitments at various points, the United States has also sought to retain nuclear weapons as an explicit deterrent against other, nonnuclear forms of weapons of mass destruction, as a matter of targeting policy and nuclear weapons doctrine.106 There was an element of hypocrisy in this previous American pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states when combined with a willingness to consider using nuclear weapons in response to a biological (or even chemical) attack. Others noted this contradiction and chastised the United States for it. One thoughtful and well-argued study in the 1990s asserted that nuclear weapons should never be used against biological (or chemical) threats or in retaliation for such attacks. In considering the possibility of an extremely destructive biological agent that killed as many as nuclear weapons might, the authors wrote that “… it would be technically and operationally difficult to achieve such high numbers of casualties with biological weapons, and no nation is known to possess weapons so effective.”107 It is a good reason that, as a normal matter of policy, the United States should not plan on any nuclear response to attacks by lesser types of weapons of mass destruction, especially the types of attacks that might be anticipated today or that have been witnessed in the recent past (for example, the chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s).108 From this standpoint, the Nuclear Posture Review reached a sound conclusion on responding to a BW or CW attack. But this argument is perhaps more persuasive for the technologies of the present rather than a hypothetical situation in the future; things could change over time. That is the crux of the challenge for future policy and doctrine regarding whether nuclear weapons should have a future purpose of helping deter advanced biological attack. Biological weapons could become much more potent in coming decades. Biological knowledge certainly is advancing rapidly. To take one metric, the number of genetic sequences on file, a measure of knowledge of genetic codes for various organisms, grew from well under five million in the early 1990s to 80 million by 2006.109 The number of countries involved in biological research is growing rapidly as well. What about 25 to 50 years from now, a day that current policymakers must contemplate when considering lasting changes to doctrine as well as the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons-free world? As of 2008, more than 160 states had ratified and acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but one of its weaknesses is the lack of verification measures. One can naturally hope that better monitoring and verification concepts will be developed in the biological field—just as they must clearly be improved in the nuclear realm if abolition is ever to be feasible even on its own more narrow terms.110 But these techniques will be very hard to devise, and probably rather imperfect in their ability to provide timely warning. One can try various forms of direct as well as indirect monitoring—the latter including looking for mismatches between the numbers of trained scientists and professional positions available to them in a given country, or a mismatch between the numbers of relevant scientists and associated publications.111 Big disparities could suggest hidden programs. One can also build up disease surveillance systems and create rapid-response BW investigation teams to look into any suspected development of illicit pathogens or any outbreak of associated disease.112 But the United States will still need a good deal of luck to discover many hypothetical biological weapons programs. Any countries bent on cheating will have a good chance of success in hiding their associated research and production facilities. For Americans, who long led the way in biology, it is sobering and important to remember that even today, at least half of all important biological research is already done abroad. It often takes place in small facilities that are very hard if not impossible to identify from remote sensing.113 For such reasons, it is eminently possible that an advanced “bug”—perhaps an influenza-born derivative of smallpox resilient against currently available treatments, for example—could be developed by a future aggressor state. Such a bug could combine the contagious qualities of the flu with the lethality of very severe diseases.114 This could dramatically alter the calculations of BW use. It is such a prospect that led University of Maryland scholar John Steinbruner to note “One can imagine killing more people with an advanced pathogen than with the current nuclear weapons arsenals.”115 The state developing this BW agent might simultaneously develop a vaccine against the new disease and use that vaccine to inoculate its own people. It might then use the biological pathogen as a weapon, or a threat, against another country. That could be a country it was interested in conquering; it could also threaten use against the United States and broader international community, to deter other countries from coming to the rescue of another state being attacked directly by the aggressor (analogous to how Saddam Hussein would have liked to deter the U.S.-led coalition from coming to Kuwait’s aid in 1990-1991). If the United States faced the prospect of millions of its own citizens, or hundreds of thousands of its own troops, becoming sick as it considered a response to aggression, and its only recourse was conventional retaliation, its range of options could be limited. Indeed, the very troops called on to carry out the retaliation might become vulnerable to the disease, jeopardizing their physical capacity to execute the conventional operation. Perhaps they could be wellprotected on the battlefield, once suited up, but they could be vulnerable before deployment, along with the rest of the American population. A potential adversary, seeing these possibilities, might find the concept of such an advanced pathogen very appealing. Would there be a clear and definitive policy or moral argument against the use of a nuclear weapon in retaliation for a BW attack that killed hundreds of thousands—or even millions—of Americans? If the origin of the attack could be identified, as it might well be under numerous scenarios like the one sketched above, and if huge numbers of American civilians had been targeted, the case for restraint would be hard to make. At the least, it might be no stronger than the case for absorbing a nuclear weapons strike and choosing not to retaliate. What if the United States thought a biological attack by an aggressor imminent? Or what if it had already suffered one attack and others seemed possible? In such circumstances, there could be potential value in a nuclear retaliatory threat against the belligerent state, warning that any future use of biological attacks against the American people or U.S. allies might produce a nuclear response.116 In his classic book on just and unjust war, Michael Walzer asserted that “Nuclear war is and will remain morally unacceptable, and there is no case for its rehabilitation.” He also argues “Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war. They are the first of mankind’s technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world.” This would seem to argue (since biological weapons of certain types predated nuclear technologies) that in fact nuclear deterrent threats could never be justifiable against a biological attack. However, the logic of Walzer’s overall case against nuclear weapons is based explicitly on their indiscriminate and extreme effects—characteristics that advanced biological pathogens, which did not exist when he wrote the above words, would share. It is hard to argue that nuclear deterrence of an adversary’s possible use of an advanced pathogen that could kill a million or even ten million is less justifiable than the use of nuclear deterrence against an adversary’s nuclear arms.117 Indeed, it is possible that a nuclear response to such a biological attack might be conducted in a more humane way than the BW attack. Nuclear responses might target military bases and command headquarters, for example. To be sure, civilians would also be at risk in such a nuclear attack, but in proportionate terms a nuclear retaliatory blow could well cause a smaller fraction of casualties among innocent civilian populations than would a biological pathogen.118 U.S. policymakers had to bear in mind what is possible, at least theoretically, with advanced engineered pathogens. As Steinbruner notes, in discussing the contagiousness of certain flu-borne ailments, “One strain infected an estimated 80 percent of the world’s population in a sixmonth period. Normally the incidence of disease among those infected is relatively low, as is the mortality rate of those who contract the disease. However, aviary strains of the virus have killed virtually all of the birds infected, which suggests the possibility of highly lethal human strains as well.”119 It was these kinds of considerations that led the Nuclear Posture Review to incorporate a hedge with regard to biological weapons. While U.S. policy now is not to respond with nuclear weapons for a CW or BW attack by a non-nuclear weapons state, the U.S. government retained the option to reconsider nuclear retaliation with regard to BW if there were major advances in biotechnology that were put to use for BW purposes. But the other side of the argument is not inconsequential, either. Advanced biological pathogens may never be developed; nuclear weapons already have been not only developed but mass-produced and used. Retaining the threat of nuclear retaliation based on hypothetical concerns about possible future developments with biological agents that are far from inevitable may be unnecessary and unjustified. Surely it would be seen as cynical in the eyes of some, as a barely veiled attempt to find an excuse to maintain dependence on nuclear arms, and could undercut the value of the policy change in reducing the relevance of nuclear weapons. Moreover, if a biological weapon with mass casualty features ever were developed and utilized to devastating effect, the United States would not be constrained in its retaliatory options in any event. If a million Americans, Germans, Italians or Japanese were killed by a superbug, it would be hard to imagine a particularly strong international criticism if Washington reversed its previous pledges and responded with nuclear arms. If necessary, this point could be conveyed privately through diplomatic channels to U.S. allies in advance, as a way of shoring up the credibility of the American extended deterrent even as the formal role of nuclear weapons was publicly constrained by announcement of a new doctrine. This could offer a way to avoid allowing the unlikely and extreme scenario of horrific biological attack to stand in the way of the more immediate agenda of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Lack of <u>retal</u> and upward <u>pressures</u> means <u>bioterror</u> causes quick <u>nuclear escalation</h4><p></u><strong>Pifer et al 10</strong>, Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth M. Pollack, May 2010, Date Accessed: 11-20-2017, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges” Brookings Foreign Policy, Arms Control Series, Paper 3, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf</p><p>The United States has at times recognized this reality. It publicly committed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, unless the latter are allied with nuclear powers in wartime operations (and now has aligned its NSAs to non-nuclear weapon states in compliance with the NPT). Yet American policy had not been consistent. Even while making such NSA commitments at various points, <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates has also <mark>sought</mark> to retain <mark>nuclear weapons as</mark> an explicit <mark>deterrent against</mark> </u>other, <u><strong>nonnuclear forms of weapons</u></strong> of mass destruction, as a matter of targeting policy and nuclear weapons doctrine.106 There was an element of hypocrisy in this previous American pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states when combined with a <u>willingness to</u> consider <u>using nuclear weapons in response to <strong><mark>a biological</u></strong></mark> (or even chemical) <u><strong><mark>attack</u></strong></mark>. Others noted this contradiction and chastised the United States for it. One thoughtful and well-argued study in the 1990s asserted that nuclear weapons should never be used against biological (or chemical) threats or in retaliation for such attacks. In considering the possibility of an extremely destructive biological agent that killed as many as nuclear weapons might, the authors wrote that “… it would be technically and operationally difficult to achieve such high numbers of casualties with biological weapons, and no nation is known to possess weapons so effective.”107 It is a good reason that, as a normal matter of policy, the United States should not plan on any nuclear response to attacks by lesser types of weapons of mass destruction, especially the types of attacks that might be anticipated today or that have been witnessed in the recent past (for example, the chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s).108 From this standpoint, the Nuclear Posture Review reached a sound conclusion on responding to a BW or CW attack. But this argument is perhaps more persuasive for the technologies of the present rather than a hypothetical situation in the future; things could change over time. That is the crux of the challenge for future policy and doctrine regarding whether nuclear weapons should have a future purpose of helping deter advanced biological attack. <u><strong>Biological <mark>weapons could become</mark> <mark>much more potent</mark> in coming decades</u></strong>. Biological knowledge certainly is advancing rapidly. To take one metric, the number of genetic sequences on file, a measure of knowledge of genetic codes for various organisms, grew from well under five million in the early 1990s to 80 million by 2006.109 The number of countries involved in biological research is growing rapidly as well. What about 25 to 50 years from now, a day that current policymakers must contemplate when considering lasting changes to doctrine as well as the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons-free world? As of 2008, more than 160 states had ratified and acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but one of its weaknesses is the lack of verification measures. One can naturally hope that better monitoring and verification concepts will be developed in the biological field—just as they must clearly be improved in the nuclear realm if abolition is ever to be feasible even on its own more narrow terms.110 But these techniques will be very hard to devise, and probably rather imperfect in their ability to provide timely warning. One can try various forms of direct as well as indirect monitoring—the latter including looking for mismatches between the numbers of trained scientists and professional positions available to them in a given country, or a mismatch between the numbers of relevant scientists and associated publications.111 Big disparities could suggest hidden programs. One can also build up disease surveillance systems and create rapid-response BW investigation teams to look into any suspected development of illicit pathogens or any outbreak of associated disease.112 But the United States will still need a good deal of luck to discover many hypothetical biological weapons programs. Any countries bent on cheating will have a good chance of success in hiding their associated research and production facilities. For Americans, who long led the way in biology, it is sobering and important to remember that even today, at least <u>half of all important biological research is already done abroad</u>. It often takes place in small facilities that are very hard if not impossible to identify from remote sensing.113 For such reasons, it is <u>eminently possible that <mark>an advanced “bug</mark>”</u>—perhaps an influenza-born derivative of smallpox resilient against currently available treatments, for example—<u><strong><mark>could be developed by a</mark> future <mark>aggressor state</u></strong></mark>. Such a bug could <u>combine the contagious qualities of the flu with the lethality of very severe diseases</u>.114 This could <u>dramatically alter the calculations of BW use</u>. It is such a prospect that led University of Maryland scholar John Steinbruner to note “One can imagine killing more people with an advanced pathogen than with the current nuclear weapons arsenals.”115 The <u><strong><mark>state</strong></mark> developing this BW agent <strong><mark>might simultaneously develop a vaccine</strong></mark> against the new disease and use that vaccine to inoculate its own people</u>. It might then use the biological pathogen as a weapon, or a threat, against another country. That could be a country it was interested in conquering; it could also threaten use against the United States and broader international community, to deter other countries from coming to the rescue of another state being attacked directly by the aggressor (analogous to how Saddam Hussein would have liked to deter the U.S.-led coalition from coming to Kuwait’s aid in 1990-1991). <u><mark>If the <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <strong><mark>faced</strong></mark> the prospect of <mark>millions of its own citizens, or</u></mark> hundreds of thousands of <u>its own <mark>troops, becoming sick</u></mark> as it considered a response to aggression, and its only recourse was conventional retaliation, <u><strong>its <mark>range of options could be limited</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, the <u>very <mark>troops called on to carry out</mark> the <mark>retal</mark>iation might <strong><mark>become vulnerable</strong></mark> to the disease</u>, jeopardizing their physical capacity to execute the conventional operation. Perhaps they could be wellprotected on the battlefield, once suited up, but they could be <u>vulnerable before deployment,</u> along with the rest of the American population. A potential adversary, seeing these possibilities, might find the concept of such an advanced pathogen very appealing. Would there be a clear and definitive policy or moral argument against the use of a nuclear weapon in retaliation for a BW attack that killed hundreds of thousands—or even millions—of Americans? If the origin of the attack could be identified, as it might well be under numerous scenarios like the one sketched above, and if <u>huge numbers of American civilians had been targeted, <strong>the <mark>case for restraint would be hard</mark> to make</u></strong>. At the least, it might be no stronger than the case for absorbing a nuclear weapons strike and choosing not to retaliate. What if the United States thought a biological attack by an aggressor imminent? Or what if it had already suffered one attack and others seemed possible? In such circumstances, there could be potential value in a nuclear retaliatory threat against the belligerent state, warning that any future use of biological attacks against the American people or U.S. allies might produce a nuclear response.116 In his classic book on just and unjust war, Michael Walzer asserted that “Nuclear war is and will remain morally unacceptable, and there is no case for its rehabilitation.” He also argues “Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war. They are the first of mankind’s technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world.” This would seem to argue (since biological weapons of certain types predated nuclear technologies) that in fact nuclear deterrent threats could never be justifiable against a biological attack. However, the logic of Walzer’s overall case against nuclear weapons is based explicitly on their indiscriminate and extreme effects—characteristics that advanced biological pathogens, which did not exist when he wrote the above words, would share. It is hard to argue that nuclear deterrence of an adversary’s possible use of an advanced pathogen that could kill a million or even ten million is less justifiable than the use of nuclear deterrence against an adversary’s nuclear arms.117 Indeed, it is possible that a nuclear response to such a biological attack might be conducted in a more humane way than the BW attack. Nuclear responses might target military bases and command headquarters, for example. To be sure, civilians would also be at risk in such a nuclear attack, but in proportionate terms a nuclear retaliatory blow could well cause a smaller fraction of casualties among innocent civilian populations than would a biological pathogen.118 U.S. policymakers had to bear in mind what is possible, at least theoretically, with advanced engineered pathogens. As Steinbruner notes, in discussing the contagiousness of certain flu-borne ailments, “One strain infected an estimated 80 percent of the world’s population in a sixmonth period. Normally the incidence of disease among those infected is relatively low, as is the mortality rate of those who contract the disease. However, aviary strains of the virus have killed virtually all of the birds infected, which suggests the <u>possibility of highly lethal human strains</u> as well.”119 It was these kinds of considerations that led the Nuclear Posture Review to incorporate a hedge with regard to biological weapons. While U.S. policy now is not to respond with nuclear weapons for a CW or BW attack by a non-nuclear weapons state, the U.S. government retained the option to reconsider nuclear retaliation with regard to BW if there were major advances in biotechnology that were put to use for BW purposes. But the other side of the argument is not inconsequential, either. Advanced biological pathogens may never be developed; nuclear weapons already have been not only developed but mass-produced and used. Retaining the threat of nuclear retaliation based on hypothetical concerns about possible future developments with biological agents that are far from inevitable may be unnecessary and unjustified. Surely it would be seen as cynical in the eyes of some, as a barely veiled attempt to find an excuse to maintain dependence on nuclear arms, and could undercut the value of the policy change in reducing the relevance of nuclear weapons. Moreover, if a biological weapon with mass casualty features ever were developed and utilized to devastating effect, the United States would not be constrained in its retaliatory options in any event. If a million Americans, Germans, Italians or Japanese were killed by a superbug, it would be <u><mark>hard to imagine a</mark> particularly strong <mark>international criticism if Washington</u></mark> reversed its previous pledges and <u><strong><mark>responded with nuclear arms</u></strong></mark>. If necessary, this point could be conveyed privately through diplomatic channels to U.S. allies in advance, as a way of shoring up the credibility of the American extended deterrent even as the formal role of nuclear weapons was publicly constrained by announcement of a new doctrine. This could offer a way to avoid allowing the unlikely and extreme scenario of horrific biological attack to stand in the way of the more immediate agenda of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Wright ‘20 fulltext: THOMAS WRIGHT is Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, “The Folly of Retrenchment”, Foreign Affairs, April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/folly-retrenchment (BJN) President Donald Trump has questioned the utility of the United States’ alliances and its forward military presence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He has displayed little regard for a shared community of free societies and is drawn to authoritarian leaders. So far, Trump’s views are not shared by the vast majority of leading Republicans. Almost all leading Democrats, for their part, are committed to the United States’ traditional role in Europe and Asia, if not in the Middle East. Trump has struggled to convert his worldview into policy, and in many respects, his administration has increased U.S. military commitments. But if Trump wins reelection, that could change quickly, as he would feel more empowered and Washington would need to adjust to the reality that Americans had reconfirmed their support for a more inward-looking approach to world affairs. At a private speech in November, according to press reports, John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, even predicted that Trump could pull out of NATO in a second term. The receptiveness of the American people to Trump’s “America first” rhetoric has revealed that there is a market for a foreign policy in which the United States plays a smaller role in the world. Amid the shifting political winds, a growing chorus of voices in the policy community, from the left and the right, is calling for a strategy of global retrenchment, whereby the United States would withdraw its forces from around the world and reduce its security commitments. Leading scholars and policy experts, such as Barry Posen and Ian Bremmer, have called on the United States to significantly reduce its role in Europe and Asia, including withdrawing from NATO. In 2019, a new think tank, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, set up shop, with funding from the conservative Charles Koch Foundation and the liberal philanthropist George Soros. Its mission, in its own words, is to advocate “a new foreign policy centered on diplomatic engagement and military restraint.” Global retrenchment is fast emerging as the most coherent and ready-made alternative to the United States’ postwar strategy. Yet pursuing it would be a grave mistake. By dissolving U.S. alliances and ending the forward presence of U.S. forces, this strategy would destabilize the regional security orders in Europe and Asia. It would also increase the risk of nuclear proliferation, empower right-wing nationalists in Europe, and aggravate the threat of major-power conflict. This is not to say that U.S. strategy should never change. The United States has regularly increased and decreased its presence around the world as threats have risen and ebbed. Even though Washington followed a strategy of containment throughout the Cold War, that took various forms, which meant the difference between war and peace in Vietnam, between an arms race and arms control, and between détente and an all-out attempt to defeat the Soviets. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States changed course again, expanding its alliances to include many countries that had previously been part of the Warsaw Pact. Likewise, the United States will now have to do less in some areas and more in others as it shifts its focus from counterterrorism and reform in the Middle East toward great-power competition with China and Russia. But advocates of global retrenchment are not so much proposing changes within a strategy as they are calling for the wholesale replacement of one that has been in place since World War II. What the United States needs now is a careful pruning of its overseas commitments—not the indiscriminate abandonment of a strategy that has served it well for decades. RETRENCHMENT REDUX Support for retrenchment stems from the view that the United States has overextended itself in countries that have little bearing on its national interest. According to this perspective, which is closely associated with the realist school of international relations, the United States is fundamentally secure thanks to its geography, nuclear arsenal, and military advantage. Yet the country has nonetheless chosen to pursue a strategy of “liberal hegemony,” using force in an unwise attempt to perpetuate a liberal international order (one that, as evidenced by U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, is not so liberal, after all). Washington, the argument goes, has distracted itself with costly overseas commitments and interventions that breed resentment and encourage free-riding abroad. Critics of the status quo argue that the United States must take two steps to change its ways. The first is retrenchment itself: the action of withdrawing from many of the United States’ existing commitments, such as the ongoing military interventions in the Middle East and one-sided alliances in Europe and Asia. The second is restraint: the strategy of defining U.S. interests narrowly, refusing to launch wars unless vital interests are directly threatened and Congress authorizes such action, compelling other nations to take care of their own security, and relying more on diplomatic, economic, and political tools. In practice, this approach means ending U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, withdrawing U.S. forces from the Middle East, relying on an over-the-horizon force that can uphold U.S. national interests, and no longer taking on responsibility for the security of other states. As for alliances, Posen has argued that the United States should abandon the mutual-defense provision of NATO, replace the organization “with a new, more limited security cooperation agreement,” and reduce U.S. commitments to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On the question of China, realists have split in recent years. Some, such as the scholar John Mearsheimer, contend that even as the United States retrenches elsewhere, in Asia, it must contain the threat of China, whereas others, such as Posen, argue that nations in the region are perfectly capable of doing the job themselves. Since Trump’s election, some progressive foreign policy thinkers have joined the retrenchment camp. They diverge from other progressives, who advocate maintaining the United States’ current role. Like the realists, progressive retrenchers hold the view that the United States is safe because of its geography and the size of its military. Where these progressives break from the realists, however, is on the question of what will happen if the United States pulls back. While the realists favoring retrenchment have few illusions about the sort of regional competition that will break out in the absence of U.S. dominance, the progressives expect that the world will become more peaceful and cooperative, because Washington can still manage tensions through diplomatic, economic, and political tools. The immediate focus of the progressives is the so-called forever wars—U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the broader war on terrorism—as well as the defense budget and overseas bases. Although the progressives have a less developed vision of how to implement retrenchment than the realists, they do provide some guideposts. Stephen Wertheim, a co-founder of the Quincy Institute, has called for bringing home many of the U.S. soldiers serving abroad, “leaving small forces to protect commercial sea lanes,” as part of an effort to “deprive presidents of the temptation to answer every problem with a violent solution.” He argues that U.S. allies may believe that the United States has been inflating regional threats and thus conclude that they do not need to increase their conventional or nuclear forces. Another progressive thinker, Peter Beinart, has argued that the United States should accept Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, a strategy that would include abandoning Taiwan. IS LESS REALLY MORE? The realists and the progressives arguing for retrenchment differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments. This is a false promise, for a number of reasons. First, retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at too high a price—and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although pulling back would invite regional security competition, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because regional rivals would check one another. This is a perilous gambit, however, because regional conflicts often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might thus end up drawing the United States back in after it has left—resulting in a much more dangerous venture than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war. A U.S. pullback from Europe or Asia is more likely to embolden regional powers. The progressives’ view of regional security is similarly flawed. These retrenchers reject the idea that regional security competition will intensify if the United States leaves. In fact, they argue, U.S. alliances often promote competition, as in the Middle East, where U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has emboldened those countries in their cold war with Iran. But this logic does not apply to Europe or Asia, where U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. A U.S. pullback from those places is more likely to embolden the regional powers. Since 2008, Russia has invaded two of its neighbors that are not members of NATO, and if the Baltic states were no longer protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it is conceivable that Russia would test the boundaries with gray-zone warfare. In East Asia, a U.S. withdrawal would force Japan to increase its defense capabilities and change its constitution to enable it to compete with China on its own, straining relations with South Korea. The second problem with retrenchment involves nuclear proliferation. If the United States pulled out of NATO or ended its alliance with Japan, as many realist advocates of retrenchment recommend, some of its allies, no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Unlike the progressives for retrenchment, the realists are comfortable with that result, since they see deterrence as a stabilizing force. Most Americans are not so sanguine, and rightly so. There are good reasons to worry about nuclear proliferation: nuclear materials could end up in the hands of terrorists, states with less experience might be more prone to nuclear accidents, and nuclear powers in close proximity have shorter response times and thus conflicts among them have a greater chance of spiraling into escalation. Third, retrenchment would heighten nationalism and xenophobia. In Europe, a U.S. withdrawal would send the message that every country must fend for itself. It would therefore empower the far-right groups already making this claim—such as the Alternative for Germany, the League in Italy, and the National Front in France—while undermining the centrist democratic leaders there who told their populations that they could rely on the United States and NATO. As a result, Washington would lose leverage over the domestic politics of individual allies, particularly younger and more fragile democracies such as Poland. And since these nationalist populist groups are almost always protectionist, retrenchment would damage U.S. economic interests, as well. Even more alarming, many of the right-wing nationalists that retrenchment would empower have called for greater accommodation of China and Russia. A fourth problem concerns regional stability after global retrenchment. The most likely end state is a spheres-of-influence system, whereby China and Russia dominate their neighbors, but such an order is inherently unstable. The lines of demarcation for such spheres tend to be unclear, and there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not seek to move them outward over time. Moreover, the United States cannot simply grant other major powers a sphere of influence—the countries that would fall into those realms have agency, too. If the United States ceded Taiwan to China, for example, the Taiwanese people could say no. The current U.S. policy toward the country is working and may be sustainable. Withdrawing support from Taiwan against its will would plunge cross-strait relations into chaos. The entire idea of letting regional powers have their own spheres of influence has an imperial air that is at odds with modern principles of sovereignty and international law.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Trump election causes global retrenchment – multiple scenarios for nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Wright ‘20</strong> </p><p>THOMAS WRIGHT is Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, “The Folly of Retrenchment”, Foreign Affairs, April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/folly-retrenchment (BJN)</p><p>President Donald Trump has questioned the utility of the United States’ alliances and its forward military presence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He has displayed little regard for a shared community of free societies and is drawn to authoritarian leaders. So far, Trump’s views are not shared by the vast majority of leading Republicans. Almost all leading Democrats, for their part, are committed to the United States’ traditional role in Europe and Asia, if not in the Middle East. <u><mark>Trump has struggled to convert his worldview into</mark> <mark>policy</u></mark>, and in many respects, <u>his administration has increased U.S. military commitments</u><mark>. <u><strong>But if Trump wins</mark> reelection, <mark>that could change</mark> quickly</u></strong>, as <u><mark>he would feel more empowered</u></mark> and Washington would need to adjust to the reality that Americans had reconfirmed their support for a more inward-looking approach to world affairs. At a private speech in November, according to press reports, John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, even predicted that <u><mark>Trump could</mark> <strong>pull out of NATO</u></strong> in a second term. The receptiveness of the American people to <u>Trump’s “America first” rhetoric</u> has revealed that there is a market for a foreign policy in which the United States plays a smaller role in the world.</p><p>Amid the shifting political winds, a growing chorus of voices in the policy community, from the left and the right, <u>is <mark>call</mark>ing <mark>for</mark> a strategy of <strong><mark>global retrenchment</u></strong></mark>, <u>whereby the United States would withdraw its forces from around the world and reduce its security commitments<strong>. Leading scholars and policy experts, such as Barry Posen and Ian Bremmer, have called on the United States to significantly reduce its role in Europe and Asia, including withdrawing from NATO. In 2019, a new think tank, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, set up shop, with funding from the conservative Charles Koch Foundation and the liberal philanthropist George Soros. Its mission, in its own words, is to advocate “a new foreign policy centered on diplomatic engagement and military restraint.”</p><p></strong>Global retrenchment</u> is fast emerging as the most coherent and ready-made alternative to the United States’ postwar strategy. Yet pursuing it <u>would be a <strong>grave mistake</u></strong>. <u>By dissolving U.S. alliances and ending the forward presence</u> of U.S. forces, <u><mark>this</mark> strategy <mark>would <strong>destabilize</mark> the <mark>regional security orders</u></strong></mark> in Europe and Asia. <u>It would</u> also <u>increase the risk of <strong>nuclear proliferation</strong>, empower right-wing <strong>nationalists</u></strong> in Europe, <u>and aggravate the threat of <strong>major-power conflict. </p><p></u></strong>This is not to say that U.S. strategy should never change. The United States has regularly increased and decreased its presence around the world as threats have risen and ebbed. Even though Washington followed a strategy of containment throughout the Cold War, that took various forms, which meant the difference between war and peace in Vietnam, between an arms race and arms control, and between détente and an all-out attempt to defeat the Soviets. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States changed course again, expanding its alliances to include many countries that had previously been part of the Warsaw Pact.</p><p>Likewise, the United States will now have to do less in some areas and more in others as it shifts its focus from counterterrorism and reform in the Middle East toward great-power competition with China and Russia. But <u>advocates of global retrenchment are not so much proposing changes within a strategy as they are calling for the <strong>wholesale replacement</u></strong> <u>of one that has been in place since World War II. What the United States needs now is</u> a careful pruning of its <u>overseas commitments</u>—<u><strong>not</u></strong> the <u><strong>indiscriminate abandonment</u></strong> of a strategy that has served it well for decades. </p><p>RETRENCHMENT REDUX</p><p>Support for retrenchment stems from the view that the United States has overextended itself in countries that have little bearing on its national interest. According to this perspective, which is closely associated with the realist school of international relations, the United States is fundamentally secure thanks to its geography, nuclear arsenal, and military advantage. Yet the country has nonetheless chosen to pursue a strategy of “liberal hegemony,” using force in an unwise attempt to perpetuate a liberal international order (one that, as evidenced by U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, is not so liberal, after all). Washington, the argument goes, has distracted itself with costly overseas commitments and interventions that breed resentment and encourage free-riding abroad. </p><p>Critics of the status quo argue that the United States must take two steps to change its ways. The first is retrenchment itself: the action of withdrawing from many of the United States’ existing commitments, such as the ongoing military interventions in the Middle East and one-sided alliances in Europe and Asia. The second is restraint: the strategy of defining U.S. interests narrowly, refusing to launch wars unless vital interests are directly threatened and Congress authorizes such action, compelling other nations to take care of their own security, and relying more on diplomatic, economic, and political tools. </p><p>In practice, <u>this approach means ending U.S. military operations</u> in Afghanistan, <u>withdrawing U.S. forces</u> from the Middle East, <u>relying on an over-the-horizon force that can uphold U.S. national interests, and no longer taking on responsibility for the security of other states</u>. As for alliances, Posen has argued that the United States should abandon the mutual-defense provision of NATO, replace the organization “with a new, more limited security cooperation agreement,” and reduce U.S. commitments to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On the question of China, realists have split in recent years. Some, such as the scholar John Mearsheimer, contend that even as the United States retrenches elsewhere, in Asia, it must contain the threat of China, whereas others, such as Posen, argue that nations in the region are perfectly capable of doing the job themselves.</p><p>Since Trump’s election, some progressive foreign policy thinkers have joined the retrenchment camp. They diverge from other progressives, who advocate maintaining the United States’ current role. Like the realists, progressive retrenchers hold the view that the United States is safe because of its geography and the size of its military. Where these progressives break from the realists, however, is on the question of what will happen if the United States pulls back. While the realists favoring retrenchment have few illusions about the sort of regional competition that will break out in the absence of U.S. dominance, the progressives expect that the world will become more peaceful and cooperative, because Washington can still manage tensions through diplomatic, economic, and political tools. The immediate focus of the progressives is the so-called forever wars—U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the broader war on terrorism—as well as the defense budget and overseas bases.</p><p>Although the progressives have a less developed vision of how to implement retrenchment than the realists, they do provide some guideposts. Stephen Wertheim, a co-founder of the Quincy Institute, has called for bringing home many of the U.S. soldiers serving abroad, “leaving small forces to protect commercial sea lanes,” as part of an effort to “deprive presidents of the temptation to answer every problem with a violent solution.” He argues that U.S. allies may believe that the United States has been inflating regional threats and thus conclude that they do not need to increase their conventional or nuclear forces. Another progressive thinker, Peter Beinart, has argued that the United States should accept Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, a strategy that would include abandoning Taiwan.</p><p><u>IS LESS REALLY MORE?</p><p></u>The realists and the progressives arguing for <u><mark>retrenchment</u></mark> differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they <u>share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments. </p><p><strong>This <mark>is a false promise</mark>, for a number of reasons</u></strong>. First, <u>retrenchment would worsen regional security</u> competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at too high a price—and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although <u><mark>pulling back would invite regional security competition</u></mark>, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because <u>regional rivals</u> would <u>check one another</u>. This <u><strong>is a perilous gambit</u></strong>, however, <u>because <mark>regional conflicts</mark> often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might</u> thus <u><mark>end up drawing the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>back in</mark> after it has left</u>—<u><strong><mark>resulting in a much more dangerous venture</u></strong></mark> than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist <u><strong>retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war. </p><p></strong>A U.S. pullback</u> from Europe or Asia <u>is more likely to</u> <u>embolden regional powers.</p><p></u>The progressives’ view of regional security is similarly flawed. These retrenchers reject the idea that regional security competition will intensify if the United States leaves. In fact, they argue, U.S. alliances often promote competition, as in the Middle East, where U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has emboldened those countries in their cold war with Iran. But this logic does not apply to Europe or Asia, where U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. <u>A U<mark>.S. pullback</mark> from those places <mark>is</mark> more <mark>likely to embolden</mark> the <mark>regional powers</u>.</mark> Since 2008, <u>Russia has invaded two of its neighbors that are not members of NATO, and if the Baltic states were no longer protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it is conceivable that <strong><mark>Russia would test</mark> the boundaries <mark>with gray-zone warfare</u></strong></mark>. In East Asia, <u>a U.S. withdrawal would force Japan to increase its defense capabilities and change its constitution to enable it to compete with China on its own, straining relations with South Korea.</p><p>The second problem with retrenchment involves <strong>nuclear proliferation</u></strong>. <u><mark>If the United States pulled out</mark> of NATO or ended its alliance with Japan</u>, as many realist advocates of retrenchment recommend, some of its <u><mark>allies</mark>, no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella</u>, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> be tempted to <u><strong><mark>acquire</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark> of their own. Unlike the progressives for retrenchment, the realists are comfortable with that result, since they see deterrence as a stabilizing force. Most Americans are not so sanguine, and rightly so. <u>There are <mark>good reasons to worry</mark> about nuclear proliferation</u>: <u><strong><mark>nuclear</u></strong></mark> materials could end up in the hands of <u><strong><mark>terrorists</u></strong></mark>, states with less experience might be more prone to <u><strong>nuclear <mark>accidents</u></strong></mark>, and nuclear powers in close proximity have <u><strong><mark>shorter response times</u></strong></mark> <u>and thus</u> <u><strong><mark>conflicts</u></strong></mark> among them have a greater chance of <u><strong><mark>spiraling into escalation</strong></mark>.</p><p>Third, <mark>retrenchment would <strong>heighten nationalism</mark> and xenophobia</u></strong>. In Europe, a U.S. withdrawal would send the message that every country must fend for itself. It would therefore empower the far-right groups already making this claim—such as the Alternative for Germany, the League in Italy, and the National Front in France—while undermining the centrist democratic leaders there who told their populations that they could rely on the United States and NATO. As a result, <u>Washington would lose leverage over the domestic politics of individual allies, particularly younger and more fragile democracies</u> such as Poland. And since <u>these nationalist populist groups are almost always protectionist, retrenchment <mark>would <strong>damage U.S. economic interests</u></strong>,</mark> as well. Even more alarming, <u>many of the right-wing nationalists that retrenchment would empower have called for greater accommodation of China and Russia.</p><p>A fourth problem concerns regional stability after global retrenchment. The <mark>most likely</mark> end</u> state is a spheres-of-influence system, <u>whereby <strong><mark>China and Russia dominate their neighbors</u></strong></mark>, but <u><mark>such an order is <strong>inherently unstable</mark>.</u></strong> The lines of demarcation for such spheres tend to be unclear, and there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not seek to move them outward over time. Moreover, <u>the United States cannot simply grant other major powers a sphere of influence</u>—the countries that would fall into those realms have agency, too. <u>If the United States ceded Taiwan to China</u>, for example, <u>the Taiwanese people could say no</u>. The current U.S. policy toward the country is working and may be sustainable. <u>Withdrawing support from Taiwan against its will <mark>would <strong>plunge cross-strait</mark> relations <mark>into chaos</strong></mark>.</u> <u>The entire idea of letting regional powers have their own spheres of influence has an imperial air that is at odds with modern principles of sovereignty and international law.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Glaser 18 (Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington. “A Realist Perspective on the Constructivist Project” in Mariano E. Bertucci, Jarrod Hayes, and Patrick James eds. Constructivism Reconsidered. University Michigan Press. 181-196. fulltext: Wendt’s effort to explore the possibility that international anarchy can produce a much wider range of outcomes than is suggested by Waltz is a productive move. Whether extensive security cooperation is possible under anarchy is the central question posed by structural IR theories. Moreover, a variety of historical examples that run counter to Waltz’s claim about the persistent presence of competition—including restraint and cooperation between powerful states, and substantial military capabilities that do not generate substantial insecurity—indicate the need for a more encompassing theory. Wendt’s focus on social variables, however, masks the potential of structural realist and rational theories to explain variation in states’ policies under anarchy and thereby incorrectly suggests that realist theories are incapable of explaining broad and basic variation in states’ strategies in the face of anarchy. In fact, Wendt is explicit on this critical issue: The real question is whether the fact of anarchy creates a tendency for all such interactions to realize a single logic at the macro-level. In the Neorealist view they do: anarchies are inherently self-help systems that tend to produce military competition, balances of power, and war. Against this I argue that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles—enemy, rival, and friend—dominate the system.19 To appreciate why structural realism can explain and predict cooperation but that this possibility is overlooked by Waltz, we need to return to his core argument. It turns out that the logic of Waltz’s arguments requires the introduction of another variable: a state’s information about the opposing state’s motives. Waltz holds that although states may have motives beyond security, their international behavior can be understood largely by assuming that they are seeking only security. If, however, all states knew that all the other states were security seekers (and if all states knew that this is what the others knew), then the international system should not generate competition. This uncertainty about the opposing state’s type lies at the core of the security dilemma, and, closely related, the security dilemma lies at the center of structural realism’s ability to explain competition.20 If states did not face a security dilemma, security seekers could always achieve their core objective while adopting policies that avoided generating competition. Once the importance of uncertainty about motives is made explicit, including it as a variable is the natural next step for the rational theory. A key point for our discussion here is that structural realism, or at the least the more general rational theory that logically flows from it, is no longer a purely material theory. This matters because it means that distinguishing realist and constructivist theories in terms of material versus ideational arguments—a broad category that is typically understood to include information, norms, and causal ideas—no longer creates a sharp divide. The implications reach beyond mere characterizations and definitions, however. Including information about motives as a key variable in a rational realist theory opens the door to arguments that address much of the terrain also covered by Wendt’s structural constructivism. More specifically, the rational realist theory (1) explores the nature of interactions that can enable states to revise their assessments of the opposing state’s type and thereby generate more cooperative or more competitive policies, providing a more straightforward explanation than Wendt’s changes in interests, (2) explains international cooperation under anarchy as a result of information in combination with material factors instead of Wendt’s focus on identities, and (3) shows that Wendt has both exaggerated and underestimated the potential for international cooperation, the former by underplaying the role of material factors in constraining states’ choices and the latter by relying on states’ collective interests instead of pure security seeking, which is more neutral regarding cooperation. The remainder of this section sketches these points.21 First, the realist theory provides an alternative explanation of how states’ interactions can influence their relationship and, in turn, their behavior. Wendt argues that interaction between states is the key to their understandings of self and other, and that interactions play a central role in determining whether the international system is competitive or cooperative. He holds that interaction cannot play this important role in realist theories, because “realists would probably argue that each should act on the basis of worst-case assumptions about the other’s intentions, justifying such an attitude as prudent in view of the possibility of death from making a mistake.”22 This is a reasonable reading of Waltz; since he barely touches on a possible role for information about the opposing side, assuming the worst can be seen as implicitly running through his formulation. Offensive realism makes fully explicit the requirement for states to assume the worst about opposing states.23 Contrary to this position, however, rational states should not assume the worst when facing uncertainty about their adversary’s motives and intentions. Instead, at least from a standard expected utility perspective, a state should consider the probability that the opposing state is a revisionist/greedy type as opposed to status quo/security type. The state should also consider the danger if the opposing state is a greedy type; many types of cooperation would not put the state at great risk, that is, death is not always, or even usually, the cost of misjudging the adversary’s motives. These arguments lie at the core of the rationalist realist theory that includes information as a key variable defining a state’s international environment, which in turn enables the theory to fully integrate the security dilemma into its arguments. Given this realist formulation, states’ interactions can influence their understanding (their information) of the opposing state’s motives. When a state takes an action that would be more likely to be taken by a security-seeking state than by a greedy state, the opposing state should positively update its prior estimate of the probability that the state has security motives. Because states have an incentive to mislead adversaries, the opposing state should only find useful information when the state’s action is costly, that is, when the state’s action is a “costly signal.” This occurs when a specific cooperative action would be more costly for a greedy state than for a security-seeking state. Wendt describes a similar process of interaction but emphasizes different changes and relies on different types of arguments— symbolic interactionism—not rational updating made possible by costly signals. His arguments describe how states’ interactions can change their interests and identities, which in turn support cooperation in anarchy. The rationalist explanation has the advantage of greater simplicity—it holds interests constant, does not involve the creation of social structures, and does not require changes in interests—while appearing to explain essentially the same international phenomenon. Second, the rational realist theory explains that anarchy can generate a variety of outcomes—including various degrees of competition, cooperation, and mixtures of the two—that have much in common with Wendt’s three anarchies. According to the rational theory, whether a securityseeking state should choose cooperation over competition depends on both material variables, which include the state’s power and offensedefense variables, and information variables, which capture what a state knows about its adversary’s motives.24 Material variables largely determine the military capabilities a state can acquire, given the opposing state’s ability to build military forces of its own. They determine the types of military missions that states will be able to perform and their relative prospects for performing them successfully. Information variables influence a state’s expectations about its adversary’s behavior, including reactions to the state’s own policies. The theory explains that when defense has the advantage—that is, when holding territory or maintaining the capabilities required for deterrence are relatively easy—states can achieve high levels of security without engaging in intense competition. When offense and defense are distinguishable—that is, when the forces that support offensive missions would contribute less (or more) to defensive missions—states may be able to choose forces and strategies that signal benign motives and to use arms control to increase the feasibility of defensive force postures. Information variables also influence the prospects for cooperation. A state that believes the opposing state is likely to be a security seeker should be more willing to run the risks of restraint and cooperation. These strategies have the potential to generate positive political spirals, which can in turn make states willing to choose military strategies that pose smaller risks to others’ security. In short, the rationalist theory describes the conditions under which anarchy can produce cooperative international security policies and relatively peaceful international politics. It both corrects Waltz’s conclusion about the general tendency for anarchy to generate competition and shows that Wendt’s social structure is unnecessary to produce this result. Again, the rationalist theory has the advantage of being more straightforward, less complex, and more parsimonious than Wendt’s constructivist alternative. Third, and related, the rationalist theory shows that Wendt is both too pessimistic and too optimistic, in different ways, about the prospects for cooperation under anarchy. On the pessimistic side, the rationalist theory shows that cooperation is possible without introducing “friends,” that is, states that have collective identities in which they value each other’s security as well as their own. According to the rational realist argument, the states’ international situation is doing most of the work; nonfriends—security seekers that do not value others’ security—have fundamental preferences that are relatively neutral between cooperation and competition. In contrast, collective identities and altruistic preferences play a central role in the constructivist argument, and it views them as necessary for deep cooperation. My point here is not that considering the impact of collective identities is analytically flawed, but that relying on collective identities to make extensive cooperation possible is a significantly weaker finding regarding the potential of anarchy to allow and support cooperation. If, as seems likely, pure security seekers are much more common than friends, then Wendt is pessimistic about cooperation under anarchy, in that he finds the possibility of cooperation existing under narrower, less common conditions. At the same time, however, Wendt is overly optimistic about the prospects for cooperation because he fails to adequately incorporate the constraints that information and material factors can impose on states’ policies. A strength of the rational realist theory is that it explicitly explains how both material variables and information variables influence the prospects for cooperation, and how they interact. In contrast, Wendt’s social theory does not bring in material factors and thereby implicitly ignores the constraints they could impose. Wendt is partially correct in arguing that “History matters. Security dilemmas are not acts of God; they are effects of practice.”25 States, however, do not get to choose their history at the time they are making forward-looking decisions. Of course, in the past they did have partial control over it via the policy choices they made, although these were constrained by information and material factors. At the time of a new choice, however, the past and its related history are fixed and thereby impose severe constraints on states’ practice/choices. Their interactions may start under information conditions that prevent them from overcoming material conditions that make cooperative policies too risky. Moreover, these information conditions could reflect previous material conditions that required the security-seeking state to compete, thereby signaling greedy motives, which contributed to the initial information from which the states begin this round of interaction. Consequently, although certainty or near certainty that the opposing state is a security seeker could be sufficient to eliminate the security dilemma under even very dangerous material conditions, states will not always have this information. Moreover, a state can face material conditions—for example, offense dominance—that make cooperation too risky, even when the state believes that adversary is probably a security-seeking state. In short, states can face constraints that require them to choose competitive policies, which can make the security dilemma still more severe and cooperation a still worse option.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><u>Rational realism</u> is the best way to understand state behavior.</h4><p><strong>Glaser 18</strong> (Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington. “A Realist Perspective on the Constructivist Project” in Mariano E. Bertucci, Jarrod Hayes, and Patrick James eds. Constructivism Reconsidered. University Michigan Press. 181-196.</p><p>Wendt’s effort to explore the possibility that international anarchy can produce a much wider range of outcomes than is suggested by Waltz is a productive move. Whether extensive security cooperation is possible under anarchy is the central question posed by structural IR theories. Moreover, a variety of historical examples that run counter to Waltz’s claim about the persistent presence of competition—including restraint and cooperation between powerful states, and substantial military capabilities that do not generate substantial insecurity—indicate the need for a more encompassing theory. <u>Wendt’s <mark>focus on <strong>social variables</strong></mark>, however, <strong><mark>masks</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>the potential of</mark> <strong>structural <mark>realist</mark> and rational <mark>theories</strong> to explain variation in</mark> states’ <mark>policies under anarchy and</u></mark> thereby <u><strong><mark>incorrectly suggests</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>that <strong>realist theories</strong> are incapable of explaining</mark> broad and basic <mark>variation</mark> in states’ strategies in the face of anarchy</u>. In fact, Wendt is explicit on this critical issue:</p><p>The real question is whether the fact of anarchy creates a tendency for all such interactions to realize a single logic at the macro-level. In the Neorealist view they do: anarchies are inherently self-help systems that tend to produce military competition, balances of power, and war. Against this I argue that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles—enemy, rival, and friend—dominate the system.19</p><p><u>To appreciate why <strong>structural <mark>realism</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>can <strong>explain</strong> and <strong>predict</strong></mark> <strong><mark>coop</strong></mark>eration but that this possibility is overlooked by Waltz, we need to return to his core argument</u>. It turns out that the logic of <u>Waltz’s arguments requires</u> the <u>introduction of another variable: a state’s information about the <strong>opposing state’s motives</u></strong>. Waltz holds that although states may have motives beyond security, their international behavior can be understood largely by assuming that they are seeking only security. If<u>,</u> however, <u>all states knew that all the other states were security seeker</u>s (and if all states knew that this is what the others knew), <u>then the international system should not generate competition</u>. This <u><strong><mark>uncertainty</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>about the</mark> <strong><mark>opposing state’s type</strong> lies at <strong>the core of the security dilemma</strong></mark>, and</u>, closely related, <u>the security dilemma lies at the center of structural realism’s ability to explain competition</u>.20 If states did not face a security dilemma, security seekers could always achieve their core objective while adopting policies that avoided generating competition. <u>Once the importance of uncertainty about motives is made explicit, including it as a variable is the natural next step for the rational theory.</p><p></u>A key point for our discussion here is that <u>structural <mark>realism</u></mark>, or at the least the more general rational theory that logically flows from it, <u><mark>is <strong>no longer a purely material theory</u></strong></mark>. <u>This matters because it means that <mark>distinguishing realist and constructivist theories in</mark> terms of <mark>material versus ideational arguments</mark>—a broad category that is typically understood to include information, norms, and causal ideas—<strong><mark>no longer creates a sharp divide</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>The implications reach beyond mere characterizations and definitions, however. <u><mark>Including</mark> <strong><mark>info</mark>rmation <mark>about motives</strong></mark> as a key variable in a rational realist theory <strong><mark>opens the door to</mark> arguments</strong> that address much of the terrain also covered by</u> Wendt’s <u>structural <mark>constructivism</u></mark>. More specifically, <u>the rational realist theory</u> (1) <u>explores the nature of interactions that</u> can <u>enable states to revise</u> their <u>assessments of the opposing state’s type and</u> thereby <u>generate more cooperative or</u> more <u>competitive policies, providing a <strong>more straightforward explanation</u></strong> than Wendt’s changes in interests, (2) <u>explains international <strong><mark>coop</strong></mark>eration <mark>under anarchy as a</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>result</mark> <mark>of</mark> <mark>info</mark>rmation</u></strong> <u>in combination <mark>with</mark> <strong><mark>material factors</strong> instead of</mark> Wendt’s focus on <strong><mark>identities</u></strong></mark>, and (3) shows that <u>Wendt</u> has <u>both <strong>exaggerated</strong> and <strong>underestimated</u></strong> <u>the potential for international cooperation, the former by underplaying the role of material factors in constraining states’ choices and the latter by relying on states’ collective interests instead of pure security seeking, which is more neutral regarding cooperation</u>. The remainder of this section sketches these points.21</p><p>First, the realist theory provides an alternative explanation of how states’ interactions can influence their relationship and, in turn, their behavior. Wendt argues that interaction between states is the key to their understandings of self and other, and that interactions play a central role in determining whether the international system is competitive or cooperative. He holds that interaction cannot play this important role in realist theories, because “realists would probably argue that each should act on the basis of worst-case assumptions about the other’s intentions, justifying such an attitude as prudent in view of the possibility of death from making a mistake.”22 This is a reasonable reading of Waltz; since he barely touches on a possible role for information about the opposing side, assuming the worst can be seen as implicitly running through his formulation. Offensive realism makes fully explicit the requirement for states to assume the worst about opposing states.23 Contrary to this position, however, rational states should not assume the worst when facing uncertainty about their adversary’s motives and intentions. Instead, at least from a standard expected utility perspective, a state should consider the probability that the opposing state is a revisionist/greedy type as opposed to status quo/security type. The state should also consider the danger if the opposing state is a greedy type; many types of cooperation would not put the state at great risk, that is, death is not always, or even usually, the cost of misjudging the adversary’s motives. These arguments lie at the core of the rationalist realist theory that includes information as a key variable defining a state’s international environment, which in turn enables the theory to fully integrate the security dilemma into its arguments.</p><p>Given this realist formulation, states’ interactions can influence their understanding (their information) of the opposing state’s motives. When a state takes an action that would be more likely to be taken by a security-seeking state than by a greedy state, the opposing state should positively update its prior estimate of the probability that the state has security motives. <u>Because states have an <strong>incentive to mislead adversaries</u></strong>, <u>the opposing state should only find useful information</u> when the state’s action is costly, that is, <u>when the state’s action is a <strong>“costly signal.”</u></strong> <u>This occurs when a specific cooperative action would be more costly for a greedy state than for a security-seeking state</u>. Wendt describes a similar process of interaction but emphasizes different changes and relies on different types of arguments— symbolic interactionism—not rational updating made possible by costly signals. His arguments describe how states’ interactions can change their interests and identities, which in turn support cooperation in anarchy. The rationalist explanation has the advantage of greater simplicity—it holds interests constant, does not involve the creation of social structures, and does not require changes in interests—while appearing to explain essentially the same international phenomenon.</p><p>Second, the rational realist theory explains that anarchy can generate a variety of outcomes—including various degrees of competition, cooperation, and mixtures of the two—that have much in common with Wendt’s three anarchies. According to the rational theory, whether a securityseeking state should choose cooperation over competition depends on both material variables, which include the state’s power and offensedefense variables, and information variables, which capture what a state knows about its adversary’s motives.24 Material variables largely determine the military capabilities a state can acquire, given the opposing state’s ability to build military forces of its own. They determine the types of military missions that states will be able to perform and their relative prospects for performing them successfully.</p><p>Information variables influence a state’s expectations about its adversary’s behavior, including reactions to the state’s own policies. The theory explains that when defense has the advantage—that is, when holding territory or maintaining the capabilities required for deterrence are relatively easy—states can achieve high levels of security without engaging in intense competition. When offense and defense are distinguishable—that is, when the forces that support offensive missions would contribute less (or more) to defensive missions—states may be able to choose forces and strategies that signal benign motives and to use arms control to increase the feasibility of defensive force postures. Information variables also influence the prospects for cooperation. A state that believes the opposing state is likely to be a security seeker should be more willing to run the risks of restraint and cooperation. These strategies have the potential to generate positive political spirals, which can in turn make states willing to choose military strategies that pose smaller risks to others’ security.</p><p>In short, <u>the <strong>rationalist theory</strong> describes the conditions under which anarchy can produce cooperative international security policies and relatively peaceful international politics</u>. <u>It</u> both <u>corrects Waltz’s conclusion about the general tendency for anarchy to generate competition and shows that Wendt’s social structure is unnecessary to produce this result</u>. Again, <u>the rationalist theory has the advantage of being <strong>more straightforward</strong>, <strong>less complex</strong>, and <strong>more parsimonious</u></strong> than Wendt’s constructivist alternative.</p><p>Third, and related, the rationalist theory shows that Wendt is both too pessimistic and too optimistic, in different ways, about the prospects for cooperation under anarchy. On the pessimistic side, the rationalist theory shows that cooperation is possible without introducing “friends,” that is, states that have collective identities in which they value each other’s security as well as their own. According to the rational realist argument, the states’ international situation is doing most of the work; nonfriends—security seekers that do not value others’ security—have fundamental preferences that are relatively neutral between cooperation and competition. In contrast, collective identities and altruistic preferences play a central role in the constructivist argument, and it views them as necessary for deep cooperation. <u>My point here is not that considering the impact of collective identities is analytically flawed, but that relying on collective identities to make extensive cooperation possible is a significantly weaker finding regarding the potential of anarchy to allow and support cooperation</u>. If, as seems likely, <u><strong><mark>pure security seekers</strong> are <strong>much more common than friends</u></strong></mark>, then Wendt is pessimistic about cooperation under anarchy, in that he finds the possibility of cooperation existing under narrower, less common conditions.</p><p>At the same time, however, <u><mark>Wendt is <strong>overly optimistic</strong> about</mark> the <mark>prospects for <strong>coop</strong></mark>eration because <mark>he fails to adequately incorporate</mark> the <mark>constraints that</mark> <strong><mark>info</strong></mark>rmation <mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>material factors</strong></mark> can <mark>impose on</mark> states’ <mark>policies</u></mark>. <u><mark>A <strong>strength</strong> of the</mark> <strong>rational <mark>realist theory</strong></mark> is that <mark>it <strong></mark>explicitly <mark>explains</strong></mark> <mark>how</mark> <mark>both</mark> material <mark>variables</mark> and information variables <mark>influence</mark> the <mark>prospects for</mark> <strong><mark>coop</strong></mark>eration, and how they interact</u>. In contrast, <u>Wendt’s social theory <strong>does not</strong> bring in material factors and</u> thereby <u><strong>implicitly ignores</u></strong> the <u><strong>constraints</strong> they</u> could <u>impose</u>. Wendt is partially correct in arguing that “History matters<u>. Security dilemmas are not acts of God; they are effects of practice</u>.”25 <u><mark>States</u></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>do not get to choose</mark> their <mark>history</strong> at the time they are making</mark> forward-looking <mark>decisions</u></mark>. Of course, in the past they did have partial control over it via the policy choices they made, although these were constrained by information and material factors. At the time of a new choice, however, <u>the past and its related history are fixed and</u> thereby <u>impose severe constraints on states’ practice/choices</u>. <u>Their interactions may start under information conditions that prevent them from overcoming material conditions that make cooperative policies too risky</u>. Moreover, these information conditions could reflect previous material conditions that required the security-seeking state to compete, thereby signaling greedy motives, which contributed to the initial information from which the states begin this round of interaction. Consequently, <u>although certainty or near certainty that the opposing state is a security seeker could be sufficient to eliminate the security dilemma under even very dangerous material conditions, states will not always have this information</u>. Moreover, <u>a state can face material conditions</u>—for example, <u><strong>offense dominance</u></strong>—<u>that make cooperation <strong>too risky</u></strong>, even when the state believes that adversary is probably a security-seeking state. In short, <u><mark>states</mark> can <strong><mark>face constraints</strong> that <strong>require</strong> them to choose <strong>competitive policies</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>which</mark> can <strong><mark>make the security dilemma</mark> still more <mark>severe</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>coop</strong></mark>eration <mark>a</mark> <strong>still <mark>worse option</u></strong></mark>.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Baker, PhD Candidate in English, 17 (Oliver, Research focuses on the intersecting histories of settler colonialism, racial capitalism, white supremacy, and class in American literature and culture. In particular, his dissertation examines how the early literary fictions of Native, Mexican, and African American writers from 1848-1940 represent economic dispossession from the other side of colonial difference, June 2017, “Democracy, Class, and White Settler Colonialism”, Public Journal, Volume 28, Number 55, pp. 144-53, jwm) fulltext: Indigenous Dispossession, Indigeneity, and Indianness One of the principal insights of settler colonial studies and Indigenous critical theory is to conceptualize the dispossession of Indigenous peoples as an ongoing structural violence constitutive of capitalist accumulation and the liberal state form. As Patrick Wolfe emphasizes, settler colonialism is understood as a “structure rather than an event” that dispossess the lands, resources, and bodies of Indigenous peoples.6 Unlike franchise colonialism, in which colonized populations are exploited for their labour or are positioned in an interdependent economic relationship of uneven development, settler colonialism dispossesses Indigenous peoples through genocide and erasure. Put simply, the settler colonies of North America are premised on eliminating Indigenous peoples. That Indigenous peoples exist today is not because settler societies decided to include them; it is because Indigenous peoples have resisted and survived despite the best efforts of settler colonialism to destroy and decimate them. In recent years, settler state policies have shifted away from a strategy of direct violence and forced assimilation—mostly in response to the political threat posed by the anticolonial nationalisms of the mid-twentieth century—and toward what Glen Coulthard describes as a politics of “colonial recognition,” in which settler societies promise greater accommodation and recognition of Indigenous groups but only to the extent that claims of sovereignty or demands for decolonization go unheard and remain disavowed.7 A politics of colonial recognition also calls for reconciliation and healing between settlers and Indigenous peoples as a way to mend what is believed to be a racial or cultural conflict rather than a struggle over land and sovereignty. While settler societies might affirm the diversity of Indigenous cultures or even lament past incidents of colonial violence, centuries-old structures and institutions of dispossession remain in place. These can be witnessed today in the underdevelopment of tribal economies that encourages the privatization of (or the attempt to dissolve) tribally-held land and resources; neoliberal policies that slash public services and deregulate predatory credit and loan industries, while funding entrepreneurial “self-help” initiatives in Indian country; the use of state and police violence to brutalize, incarcerate, and murder unsheltered and working poor Indigenous peoples whose presence “off the reservation” in border towns is seen as a threat and danger to the property and flows of capital of settler society; extraction industries that destructively seek to unearth and/or transport fossil fuels on or through tribal lands; and the ongoing refusal of federal governments to honour the treaties, land claims, and rights to self-determination of the Indigenous nations of North America. A second key analytic of settler colonial studies and Indigenous critical theory is the concept of Indigeneity. Although defined in various ways, for this essay’s purposes Indigeneity can be described as the social category of persons whose ways of life, forms of knowing, and modes of being depend upon originary relationships to land bases that Euro-American settlers have enclosed and continue to occupy. Because Indigenous peoples claim originary ties to these land bases, their presence or attempt to live on and through them challenges the legitimacy of settler society. As a social category constituted through elimination and genocide, Indigeneity should be understood as distinct from, for example, the category of the wage labourer that is structured by proletarianization and hegemony. If wage labourers, whether employed or unemployed, are structurally included in the marketplace where their labour power is exploited, the marketplace itself and the liberal state form that upholds it are nonetheless premised on the elimination of Indigenous peoples altogether. The ideological framework that mediates, legitimates, and reproduces Indigenous dispossession and its category of Indigeneity is the colonial and racial grammar of what Jodi Byrd calls “Indianness.”8 The Indian came to be a social ontology in which Indigenous peoples were understood as savage, ancient, living fossils of early humanity, stuck outside of time and space in a state of nature. The Indian was and continues to be both abjected and romanticized in settler culture as a person who exists in a state of natural warfare, instability, and conflict, while also appearing liberated from the constraints and alienation of modern life. In this state of nature, the Indian is understood to lack the capacity to labour productively, possess property, or enter into social contracts. Through such meanings, the Indian emerges as the outside or Other to Euro-American forms of liberal democracy, selfhood, and civil society.9 As Byrd emphasizes, “European modernity hinges upon Indians as the necessary antinomy through which the New World—along with civilization, freedom, sovereignty, and humanity—comes to have meaning, structure, and presence.” 10 The Indian, in short, became the figure of the un-sovereign through which it was understood that the Indian might occupy but could never possess the ability or right to own lands or possess selfhood.11 The dispossession of Indigenous lands, resources, and bodies thus came to be seen less as a form of theft than the natural transition from “savage” communalism to civilized market society. Today, Indianness continues, as Byrd puts it, to “transit U.S. empire,” or put into motion, facilitate, and cohere the United States' settler imperial project that reaches around the world.12 It is through Indianness that settlers come to view the lands, resources, and bodies of the earth as spaces and objects of a barren wilderness (terra nullius) freely available for expropriation. The current and future populations living in spaces of the lands and controlling the resources that US settler imperialism attempts to seize or control are, as Byrd explains, made “Indian” or abjected as mindless terrorist-savages whose confrontation with the agents of enclosure is understood not as an attempt to resist and survive colonization, occupation, and genocide, but an irrational attack against society, civilization, humanity, and the forces of modern progress. In short, Indianness is what legitimates the process of primitive accumulation or what David Harvey calls "accumulation by dispossession," which is central to the formation, expansion, and dominance of global finance capitalism.13 What an understanding, then, of settler colonialism, Indigeneity, and Indianness demonstrates concerning the question of alliance-building among oppressed groups today is that political organizing through the spaces of the democratic commons or the identity of the settler wage labourer supports rather than disrupts the colonization of Indigenous peoples of North America. In the case of the democratic commons, calls for preserving and expanding the public institutions and spaces of liberal democracy in order to cultivate more radical and progressive forms of democracy is a demand not to undo or transform but to uphold the settler colonial state. As Byrd argues, “one reason why a ‘post racial’ and just democratic society is a lost cause in the United States is that it is always already conceived through the prior disavowed and misremembered colonization of Indigenous lands that cannot be ended by further inclusion or more participation.”14 Coulthard echoes this point, showing that “in liberal settler states…the ‘commons’ not only belong to somebody…they also deeply inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior.”15 While it should be acknowledged that the democratic commons historically has served an important role in cultivating and producing emancipatory modes of analysis and forms of social belonging, such gains have nonetheless always depended upon the colonization of Indigenous peoples. Any defence, then, of the democratic commons today must at the same time defend Indigenous sovereignty. This means rethinking how groups relate in the spaces of the commons in ways that do not perpetuate liberal democracy's colonial project of building public institutions and democratic spaces through the seizure, theft, and colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and resources. Class-first models of a renewed workers’ movement also risk reproducing colonial dispossession when they fail to recognize that the Indian and the settler wage labourer are structurally distinct categories of oppression. The former is constituted by dispossession through elimination, while the latter is structured by exploitation through hegemony. Even though exploited, settler wage labourers nonetheless come to experience their status in settler colonialism as a place of refuge and protection from dispossession and abjection. The role of the settler state is to ensure and safeguard the settler wage labourer’s right not only to possess but not to be dispossessed of property, even if the only property the wage labourer possesses is labour power. In fact, possessing labour power as a commodity to sell on the market indexes the settler wage labourer’s right and ability to enter the social contract and find security from the forms of structural exclusion naturalized in the position of the Indian. Such a status explains why, when neoliberal forms of precarious labour and exclusions from waged life increasingly target settler wage labourers, they are felt and represented as abnormal, undeserving, and, more importantly, grievable occurrences. The dispossession of settlers challenges the symbolic and material consistency of settler societies that are premised on dispossessing colonial peoples in order to reward and advantage settlers of all classes. Settler society retains and reproduces its coherence as the promised site of settler sovereignty, possession, and rights by figuring the neoliberal dispossession of settlers as the exception to be overcome if only because Indigenous dispossession remains the norm to be reproduced and repeated. The grievability of neoliberal dispossession, heard today in the refrain that globalization has “abandoned the white working class,” depends upon the ungrievability and normalization of Indigenous dispossession that, in the narratives not only of manifest destiny but also the democratic commons and normative socialist futures, is depicted and accepted as a natural, inevitable, and necessary process. One of the limits, then, of calling for solidarity through the political identity of the wage labourer is that, in settler colonialism, what organized settler wage labourers demand is not necessarily an end to exploitation but the freedom, protection, and refuge from structural dispossession and exclusion that are normalized and naturalized in the social and racial ontologies of the Indian. Movements on behalf of settler labourers risk ending in reform rather than revolution precisely because they do not so much seek to confront capital as they seek refuge and protection within and through it.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>The affirmative simply understands the native as another wage worker, but neglects the ontological register of Indianness that exists outside the metaphysical plane of labor </h4><p>Baker, PhD Candidate in English, 17</p><p></strong>(Oliver, Research focuses on the intersecting histories of settler colonialism, racial capitalism, white supremacy, and class in American literature and culture. In particular, his dissertation examines how the early literary fictions of Native, Mexican, and African American writers from 1848-1940 represent economic dispossession from the other side of colonial difference, June 2017, “Democracy, Class, and White Settler Colonialism”, Public Journal, Volume 28, Number 55, pp. 144-53, jwm<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>Indigenous Dispossession, Indigeneity, and Indianness <u>One of the principal insights of settler colonial studies and Indigenous critical theory is to conceptualize the dispossession of Indigenous peoples as an ongoing structural violence constitutive of capitalist accumulation and the liberal state form</u>. As Patrick Wolfe emphasizes, settler colonialism is understood as a “structure rather than an event” that dispossess the lands, resources, and bodies of Indigenous peoples.6 Unlike franchise colonialism, in which colonized populations are exploited for their labour or are positioned in an interdependent economic relationship of uneven development, <u>settler colonialism dispossesses Indigenous peoples through genocide and erasure</u>. Put simply, the settler colonies of North America are premised on eliminating Indigenous peoples. That Indigenous peoples exist today is not because settler societies decided to include them; it is because <u>Indigenous peoples have resisted and survived despite the best efforts of settler colonialism to destroy and decimate them</u>. In recent years, <u>settler state policies have shifted away from a strategy of direct violence and forced assimilation</u>—mostly in response to the political threat posed by the anticolonial nationalisms of the mid-twentieth century—and <u>toward what Glen Coulthard describes as a politics of “colonial recognition,” in which settler societies promise greater accommodation and recognition of Indigenous groups but only to the extent that claims of sovereignty or demands for decolonization go unheard and remain disavowed</u>.7 A politics of colonial recognition also calls for reconciliation and healing between settlers and Indigenous peoples as a way to mend what is believed to be a racial or cultural conflict rather than a struggle over land and sovereignty. While settler societies might affirm the diversity of Indigenous cultures or even lament past incidents of colonial violence, centuries-old structures and institutions of dispossession remain in place. These can be witnessed today in <u>the underdevelopment of tribal economies that encourages the privatization of (or the attempt to dissolve) tribally-held land and resources; neoliberal policies that slash public services and deregulate predatory credit and loan industries</u>, while funding entrepreneurial “<u>self-help” initiatives in Indian country; the use of state and police violence to brutalize, incarcerate, and murder unsheltered and working poor Indigenous peoples whose presence “off the reservation” in border towns is seen as a threat and danger to the property and flows of capital of settler society</u>; <u>extraction</u> industries <u>that</u> destructively <u>seek to unearth and/or transport fossil fuels on or through tribal lands</u>; <u><strong>and the ongoing refusal of federal governments to honour the treaties, land claims, and rights to self-determination of the Indigenous nations</u></strong> of North America. A second key analytic of settler colonial studies and Indigenous critical theory is the concept of Indigeneity. Although defined in various ways, for this essay’s purposes Indigeneity can be described as the social category of persons whose ways of life, forms of knowing, and modes of being depend upon originary relationships to land bases that Euro-American settlers have enclosed and continue to occupy. <u>Because Indigenous peoples claim originary ties to these land bases, their presence or attempt to live on and through them challenges the legitimacy of settler society</u>. As a social category constituted through elimination and genocide<u>, Indigeneity should be understood as distinct from, for example, the category of the wage labourer that is structured by proletarianization and hegemony</u>. If <u>wage labourers</u>, whether employed or unemployed, <u>are structurally included in the marketplace where their labour power is exploited</u>, <u><strong>the marketplace itself and the liberal state</u></strong> form <u><strong>that upholds it are</u></strong> nonetheless <u><strong>premised on the elimination of Indigenous peoples altogether</u></strong>. The ideological framework that mediates, legitimates, and reproduces Indigenous dispossession and its category of Indigeneity is the colonial and racial grammar of what Jodi Byrd calls “Indianness.”8 The <u><strong>Indian came to be a social ontology in which Indigenous peoples were understood as savage, ancient, living fossils of early humanity, stuck outside of time and space in a state of nature</u></strong>. The Indian was and continues to be both abjected and romanticized in settler culture as a person who exists in a state of natural warfare, instability, and conflict, while also appearing liberated from the constraints and alienation of modern life. In this state of nature, <u>the Indian is understood to lack the capacity to labour productively, possess property, or enter into social contracts.</u> Through such meanings, <u>the Indian emerges as the outside</u> or Other <u>to Euro-American forms of liberal democracy, selfhood, and civil society</u>.9 As Byrd emphasizes, “European modernity hinges upon Indians as the necessary antinomy through which the New World—along with civilization, freedom, sovereignty, and humanity—comes to have meaning, structure, and presence.” 10 The Indian, in short, became the figure of the un-sovereign through which it was understood that the Indian might occupy but could never possess the ability or right to own lands or possess selfhood.11 <u>The dispossession of Indigenous lands, resources, and bodies thus came to be seen less as a form of theft than the natural transition from “savage” communalism to civilized market society.</u> Today, Indianness continues, as Byrd puts it, to “transit U.S. empire,” or put into motion, facilitate, and cohere the United States' settler imperial project that reaches around the world.12 It is <u>through Indianness that settlers come to view the lands, resources, and bodies of the earth as spaces and objects of a barren wilderness (terra nullius) freely available for expropriation.</u> The current and future populations living in spaces of the lands and controlling the resources that US settler imperialism attempts to seize or control are, as Byrd explains, made “<u>Indian” or abjected as mindless terrorist-savages whose confrontation with the agents of enclosure is understood not as an attempt to resist and survive colonization, occupation, and genocide, but an irrational attack against society, civilization, humanity, and the forces of modern progress</u>. In short, <u><strong>Indianness is what legitimates the process of primitive accumulation or what David Harvey calls "accumulation by dispossession," which is central to the formation, expansion, and dominance of global finance capitalism.</u></strong>13 What an understanding, then, of <u>settler colonialism, Indigeneity, and Indianness demonstrates concerning the question of alliance-building among oppressed groups</u> today is that <u>political organizing through the spaces of the democratic commons or the identity of the settler wage labourer supports rather than disrupts the colonization of Indigenous peoples of North America</u>. In the case of the democratic commons, <u>calls for preserving and expanding the public institutions and spaces of liberal democracy in order to cultivate more radical and progressive forms of democracy is a demand</u> not to undo or transform but <u>to uphold the settler colonial state</u>. As Byrd argues, “one reason why a ‘post racial’ and just democratic society is a lost cause in the United States is that it is always already conceived through the prior disavowed and misremembered colonization of Indigenous lands that cannot be ended by further inclusion or more participation.”14 Coulthard echoes this point, showing that “in liberal settler states…the ‘commons’ not only belong to somebody…they also deeply inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior.”15 While it should be acknowledged that the <u>democratic commons</u> historically has served an important role in cultivating and producing emancipatory modes of analysis and forms of social belonging, such gains have nonetheless <u>always depended upon the colonization of Indigenous peoples. Any defence, then, of the democratic commons today must at the same time defend Indigenous sovereignty</u>. This means rethinking how groups relate in the spaces of the commons in ways that do not perpetuate liberal democracy's colonial project of building public institutions and democratic spaces through the seizure, theft, and colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and resources. <u><strong>Class-first models of a renewed workers’ movement also risk reproducing colonial dispossession when they fail to recognize that the Indian and the settler wage labourer are structurally distinct categories of oppression.</u></strong> <u>The former is constituted by dispossession through elimination, while the latter is structured by exploitation through hegemony.</u> Even though exploited, <u>settler wage labourers nonetheless come to experience their status in settler colonialism as a place of refuge and protection from dispossession and abjection</u>. The role of <u>the settler state is to ensure and safeguard the settler wage labourer’s right not only to possess but not to be dispossessed of property, even if the only property the wage labourer possesses is labour power</u>. In fact, <u>possessing labour power as a commodity to sell on the market indexes the settler wage labourer’s right and ability to enter the social contract and find security from the forms of structural exclusion naturalized in the position of the Indian</u>. Such a status explains why, when neoliberal forms of precarious labour and exclusions from waged life increasingly target settler wage labourers, they are felt and represented as abnormal, undeserving, and, more importantly, grievable occurrences. <u>The dispossession of settlers challenges the symbolic and material consistency of settler societies that are premised on dispossessing colonial peoples in order to reward and advantage settlers of all classe</u>s. Settler <u>society retains and reproduces its coherence as the promised site of settler sovereignty, possession, and rights by figuring the neoliberal dispossession of settlers as the exception to be overcome if</u> only <u>because</u> <u><strong>Indigenous dispossession remains the norm to be reproduced and repeated.</u></strong> The grievability of neoliberal dispossession, heard today in the refrain that globalization has “abandoned the white working class,” depends upon the ungrievability and normalization of Indigenous dispossession that, in the narratives not only of manifest destiny but also the democratic commons and normative socialist futures, is depicted and accepted as a natural, inevitable, and necessary process. One of the limits, then, of calling for solidarity through the political identity of the wage labourer is that, <u>in settler colonialism, what organized settler wage labourers demand is not necessarily an end to exploitation but the freedom, protection, and refuge from structural dispossession and exclusion that are normalized and naturalized in the social and racial ontologies of the Indian</u>. <u><strong>Movements on behalf of settler labourers risk ending in reform rather than revolution precisely because they do not so much seek to confront capital as they seek refuge and protection within and through it.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101 fulltext: My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Presenting the 1AC’s value as dependent on the recognition of the critic reduces the revolutionary nature of the act—fails to produce meaningful change and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy ---vote Negative to decline affirmation</h4><p><strong>Phillips 99 </strong>– Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101</p><p><u>My concern</u> with this movement <u>centers around an issue that</u> Sloop and Ono <u>seem to take as a given, namely, the <strong>role of the critic</u></strong>. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, <u>the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world</u>. Beyond <u>licensing the critic to engage in political struggle</u>, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not <u>only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as <strong>objects of investigation</strong>. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, <strong>the critic</strong> is positioned as the <strong>active agent of change</strong> and the out-law discourse becomes <strong>merely instrumental</strong>. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. </u>Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. <u>Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic <strong>contradicts</u></strong> not only <u>the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses</u> (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What <u>Sloop and Ono fail to offer</u> is <u>an adequate argument for "<strong>taking public speaking out of the streets</strong> and <strong>studying it in the classroom</strong>, for treating it less as an <strong>expression of protest</strong>"</u> (Wander 1983, 3) <u>and more as an <strong>object for analysis</strong> and <strong>reproduction</strong> within the <strong>political economy of the academy</u></strong>. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. <u>Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing <strong>whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place</u></strong>. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) <u>Hidden out-law discourses may have <strong>good reasons to stay hidden</u></strong>. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But <u>are we to believe that</u> all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the <u>members of out-law communities are prepared to be <strong>brought into the arena of public surveillance</u></strong> in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, <u>perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of <strong>legitimacy</strong> on the out-law community. <strong>Nonetheless</strong>, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially <strong>destructive</strong>. In an effort to <strong>siphon the political energy</strong> of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately <strong>destroy</strong> the dissatisfaction that serves as a <strong>cathexis</strong> for these out-law discourses</u>. It seems possible that <u>academic recognition might <strong>take the place</strong> of struggle for material opportunities</u> (see Fraser 1997). <u>But, will academic legitimation create <strong>any material changes</strong> in the conditions of out-law communities?</u> I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. <u>For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an <strong>interested party</strong>, discerning</u> (and at times disputing) <u>the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the <strong>hidden</u></strong>, aberrant <u>texts</u> of the out-law <u>and <strong>"rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible"</u></strong> (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, <u>these entanglings of power</u> (political ends) <u>and knowledge</u> (epistemic ends) <u>are inevitable</u>. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. <u><strong>Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy</u></strong>. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: https://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-losing-ground/story?id=51418574 fulltext: NOTIFICATIONS INTERESTS Customize your news by choosing the topics that interest you. We'll notify you here about the important stories. Turn on desktop notifications for breaking news? LOG IN VIDEO LIVE SHOWS ISIS may be losing ground, but that doesn't mean it's gone By SARAH KOLINOVSKY Nov 27, 2017, 9:03 PM ET PHOTO: Soldiers from Syrian Democratic Forces write Daesh in Arabic on the ground in an area they liberated earlier at the old town of Raqqa where they are carrying out an offensive to retake Raqqa from the Islamic State fighters, Oct. 5, 2017. Asmaa Waguih/Polaris COMING UPA look at how ISIS is recruiting young Americans through the internet Email Just as the U.S. military and its coalition partners have seen success in the ground fight against ISIS in its so-called caliphate, ISIS has claimed responsibility for dozens of terrorist attacks abroad this year, killing hundreds of people. As ISIS fighters flee territory they have lost in Iraq and Syria, counterterrorism experts and officials say, the next phase of ISIS-bred terrorism has begun. Just this week, a massacre at a mosque in Egypt killed more than 300 people, and eyewitnesses reported seeing dozens of attackers carrying the notorious ISIS flags at the scene. Earlier in November, ISIS-inspired suspect Sayfullo Saipov drove a truck onto a busy pedestrian and bike path on New York’s West Side Highway, killing eight people. And with the holidays approaching, ISIS propaganda sites have recently threatened to attack Christmas markets in the U.K. and France, after an attack at a Berlin Christmas market last year. These types of attacks are unlikely to come to an end soon. “While the ISIS presence in the physical world may becoming more decentralized and diffuse, their presence in the digital world is still robust, influencing disaffected people in Europe and the U.S. to take up their cause,” said John Cohen, a former Department of Homeland Security counterterrorism coordinator who is now an ABC News consultant PHOTO: People walk outside a mosque that was attacked in the northern city of Arish, Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, Nov. 24, 2017.STR/EPA People walk outside a mosque that was attacked in the northern city of Arish, Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, Nov. 24, 2017. As ISIS adapts to losing territory, experts say, we can expect to see strategy shifts in these three key areas: ISIS in the caliphate With the fall of Raqqa in Syria, ISIS’ de facto capital, the terrorist group has been denied its so-called caliphate or state. The Syrian Democratic Forces, an alliance of Kurdish and Arab militias backed by the U.S., proclaimed victory on Oct. 20, marking liberation for the city, which had been under ISIS rule since 2014. ISIS’ Iraqi capital, Mosul, fell in July. Though fighting continues in some pockets, these major victories spell the end of the conventional ground war against ISIS, according to defense officials. However, given the six-year civil war raging in Syria, the status quo may not last for long. Multiple parties are vying for dominance in the region, including Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s Russian-backed forces and the Kurds in northern Syria. Given all the upheaval, an ISIS resurgence or the emergence of a successor organization is not an impossibility. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights recorded ISIS retaking a town from Syrian regime forces in Homs province, for example. PHOTO: Fighters of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) march past destroyed buildings as they celebrate victory and liberation of Raqqa from the Islamic State militants, in Raqqa, Syria, Oct. 17, 2017. Erik De Castro/Reuters Fighters of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) march past destroyed buildings as they celebrate victory and liberation of Raqqa from the Islamic State militants, in Raqqa, Syria, Oct. 17, 2017. more + In addition, ISIS fighters, many of them foreign fighters who were attracted to the caliphate from across the globe, attempted to escape the battle. Though the U.S.-led coalition fighting ISIS recommended that no ISIS fighters be allowed to leave Raqqa in the final days of the battle, coalition spokesman Col. Ryan Dillon recently told reporters that he cannot say “with a 100 percent certainty that every single fighter was identified coming out of Raqqa.” An agreement to evacuate civilians from Raqqa to prevent civilian casualties in the final days of the fight could have presented an opportunity for some ISIS fighters to escape the city. Though the Syrian Democratic Forces set up a screening process for all males of ISIS fighting age, Dillon admitted that some fighters possibly fell through the cracks of that screening process. ISIS in the US and the West If foreign fighters did escape Raqqa, they could look to return to their homes. Counterterrorism experts say many foreign fighters went to Iraq and Syria from Europe, which remains vulnerable to attacks like those in Manchester, England; Nice, France; and Paris. “Many European Muslims integrate poorly into their broader communities, which discourages them from cooperating with intelligence and law enforcement services,” said Daniel Byman, a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, in testimony before Congress this year. Furthermore, intelligence capabilities across European nations vary. While those of some, like the United Kingdom and France, are strong, those of others, like Belgium, are underfunded and underdeveloped. PHOTO: Injured people are evacuated from the scene of a militant attack on a mosque in Bir al-Abd in the northern Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, Nov. 24, 2017. AP Injured people are evacuated from the scene of a militant attack on a mosque in Bir al-Abd in the northern Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, Nov. 24, 2017. more + Although the United States has seemed less vulnerable to attacks because of its distance from the conflict and security efforts at home, according to Byman, some experts say some of the Trump administration’s policies could alienate Muslim Americans from cooperating with the intelligence community and police. Actions like Executive Order 13769, commonly referred to as the Muslim ban, “increase the allure of the Islamic State and other groups that claim that the West is at war with Islam,” Byman said. Cohen warned that efforts to counter social media propaganda have often failed in the United States. “We have found that those who have carried out attacks in the name of ISIS have done so because of their own psychological conditions, rather than their adoption of the narrative,” he explained. Mental health professionals have worked with the Department of Homeland Security to identify psychologically vulnerable populations and address underlying issues and causes. New hubs for ISIS Foreign fighters who don’t return to the United States or Europe might look for areas with little to no governance or porous borders for an opportunity to regroup and resurge. Countries in central and southern Africa in particular offer safe havens because of the lack of U.S. counterterrorism presence there. Just last month, an ISIS affiliate ambushed a team of soldiers in Niger, killing four. PHOTO: A member of the Syrian Democratic Forces carries bombs they use to destroy IEDs as they clear the stadium where it was the last stand for Islamic State fighters before most fighters handed in and left Raqqa, Syria on Oct. 18, 2017.Asmaa Waguih/Polaris A member of the Syrian Democratic Forces carries bombs they use to destroy IEDs as they clear the stadium where it was the last stand for Islamic State fighters before most fighters handed in and left Raqqa, Syria on Oct. 18, 2017.more + Libya, Yemen, Somalia and Egypt all offer attractive possibilities, given the lack of strong governance in those countries. “What we saw in Niger and what we saw in Egypt is a harbinger of things to come — more aggressive attacks by regional extremist groups because their ranks have been filled by hardened, fully formed fighters fleeing from Iraq and Syria,” said Cohen.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>ISIS still fighting</h4><p>https://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-losing-ground/story?id=51418574</p><p>NOTIFICATIONS</p><p>INTERESTS</p><p>Customize your news by choosing the topics that interest you. We'll notify you here about the important stories.</p><p>Turn on desktop notifications for breaking news?</p><p>LOG IN</p><p>VIDEO</p><p>LIVE</p><p>SHOWS</p><p> </p><p>ISIS may be losing ground, but that doesn't mean it's gone</p><p>By SARAH KOLINOVSKY Nov 27, 2017, 9:03 PM ET</p><p> </p><p>PHOTO: Soldiers from Syrian Democratic Forces write Daesh in Arabic on the ground in an area they liberated earlier at the old town of Raqqa where they are carrying out an offensive to retake Raqqa from the Islamic State fighters, Oct. 5, 2017. Asmaa Waguih/Polaris</p><p>COMING UPA look at how ISIS is recruiting young Americans through the internet</p><p>Email</p><p>Just as the U.S. military and its coalition partners have seen success in the ground fight against ISIS in its so-called caliphate, ISIS has claimed responsibility for dozens of terrorist attacks abroad this year, killing hundreds of people. As ISIS fighters flee territory they have lost in Iraq and Syria, counterterrorism experts and officials say, the next phase of ISIS-bred terrorism has begun.</p><p>Just this week, a massacre at a mosque in Egypt killed more than 300 people, and eyewitnesses reported seeing dozens of attackers carrying the notorious ISIS flags at the scene. Earlier in November, ISIS-inspired suspect Sayfullo Saipov drove a truck onto a busy pedestrian and bike path on New York’s West Side Highway, killing eight people. And with the holidays approaching, ISIS propaganda sites have recently threatened to attack Christmas markets in the U.K. and France, after an attack at a Berlin Christmas market last year.</p><p>These types of attacks are unlikely to come to an end soon. “While the ISIS presence in the physical world may becoming more decentralized and diffuse, their presence in the digital world is still robust, influencing disaffected people in Europe and the U.S. to take up their cause,” said John Cohen, a former Department of Homeland Security counterterrorism coordinator who is now an ABC News consultant</p><p>PHOTO: People walk outside a mosque that was attacked in the northern city of Arish, Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, Nov. 24, 2017.STR/EPA</p><p>People walk outside a mosque that was attacked in the northern city of Arish, Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, Nov. 24, 2017.</p><p>As ISIS adapts to losing territory, experts say, we can expect to see strategy shifts in these three key areas:</p><p>ISIS in the caliphate</p><p>With the fall of Raqqa in Syria, ISIS’ de facto capital, the terrorist group has been denied its so-called caliphate or state. The Syrian Democratic Forces, an alliance of Kurdish and Arab militias backed by the U.S., proclaimed victory on Oct. 20, marking liberation for the city, which had been under ISIS rule since 2014. ISIS’ Iraqi capital, Mosul, fell in July. Though fighting continues in some pockets, these major victories spell the end of the conventional ground war against ISIS, according to defense officials.</p><p>However, given the six-year civil war raging in Syria, the status quo may not last for long. Multiple parties are vying for dominance in the region, including Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s Russian-backed forces and the Kurds in northern Syria.</p><p>Given all the upheaval, an ISIS resurgence or the emergence of a successor organization is not an impossibility. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights recorded ISIS retaking a town from Syrian regime forces in Homs province, for example.</p><p>PHOTO: Fighters of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) march past destroyed buildings as they celebrate victory and liberation of Raqqa from the Islamic State militants, in Raqqa, Syria, Oct. 17, 2017. Erik De Castro/Reuters</p><p>Fighters of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) march past destroyed buildings as they celebrate victory and liberation of Raqqa from the Islamic State militants, in Raqqa, Syria, Oct. 17, 2017. more +</p><p>In addition, ISIS fighters, many of them foreign fighters who were attracted to the caliphate from across the globe, attempted to escape the battle.</p><p>Though the U.S.-led coalition fighting ISIS recommended that no ISIS fighters be allowed to leave Raqqa in the final days of the battle, coalition spokesman Col. Ryan Dillon recently told reporters that he cannot say “with a 100 percent certainty that every single fighter was identified coming out of Raqqa.”</p><p>An agreement to evacuate civilians from Raqqa to prevent civilian casualties in the final days of the fight could have presented an opportunity for some ISIS fighters to escape the city. Though the Syrian Democratic Forces set up a screening process for all males of ISIS fighting age, Dillon admitted that some fighters possibly fell through the cracks of that screening process.</p><p>ISIS in the US and the West</p><p>If foreign fighters did escape Raqqa, they could look to return to their homes. Counterterrorism experts say many foreign fighters went to Iraq and Syria from Europe, which remains vulnerable to attacks like those in Manchester, England; Nice, France; and Paris.</p><p>“Many European Muslims integrate poorly into their broader communities, which discourages them from cooperating with intelligence and law enforcement services,” said Daniel Byman, a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, in testimony before Congress this year. Furthermore, intelligence capabilities across European nations vary. While those of some, like the United Kingdom and France, are strong, those of others, like Belgium, are underfunded and underdeveloped.</p><p>PHOTO: Injured people are evacuated from the scene of a militant attack on a mosque in Bir al-Abd in the northern Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, Nov. 24, 2017. AP</p><p>Injured people are evacuated from the scene of a militant attack on a mosque in Bir al-Abd in the northern Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, Nov. 24, 2017. more +</p><p>Although the United States has seemed less vulnerable to attacks because of its distance from the conflict and security efforts at home, according to Byman, some experts say some of the Trump administration’s policies could alienate Muslim Americans from cooperating with the intelligence community and police.</p><p>Actions like Executive Order 13769, commonly referred to as the Muslim ban, “increase the allure of the Islamic State and other groups that claim that the West is at war with Islam,” Byman said.</p><p>Cohen warned that efforts to counter social media propaganda have often failed in the United States. “We have found that those who have carried out attacks in the name of ISIS have done so because of their own psychological conditions, rather than their adoption of the narrative,” he explained. Mental health professionals have worked with the Department of Homeland Security to identify psychologically vulnerable populations and address underlying issues and causes.</p><p>New hubs for ISIS</p><p>Foreign fighters who don’t return to the United States or Europe might look for areas with little to no governance or porous borders for an opportunity to regroup and resurge.</p><p>Countries in central and southern Africa in particular offer safe havens because of the lack of U.S. counterterrorism presence there. Just last month, an ISIS affiliate ambushed a team of soldiers in Niger, killing four.</p><p>PHOTO: A member of the Syrian Democratic Forces carries bombs they use to destroy IEDs as they clear the stadium where it was the last stand for Islamic State fighters before most fighters handed in and left Raqqa, Syria on Oct. 18, 2017.Asmaa Waguih/Polaris</p><p>A member of the Syrian Democratic Forces carries bombs they use to destroy IEDs as they clear the stadium where it was the last stand for Islamic State fighters before most fighters handed in and left Raqqa, Syria on Oct. 18, 2017.more +</p><p>Libya, Yemen, Somalia and Egypt all offer attractive possibilities, given the lack of strong governance in those countries.</p><p>“What we saw in Niger and what we saw in Egypt is a harbinger of things to come — more aggressive attacks by regional extremist groups because their ranks have been filled by hardened, fully formed fighters fleeing from Iraq and Syria,” said Cohen.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: (I can clarify anything in cross) fulltext: Shapiro 10 [Alan N. Shapiro (born 23 April 1956 in Brooklyn, New York) is an American science fiction and media theorist. He is a lecturer and essayist in the fields of science fiction studies, media theory, posthumanism, French philosophy, creative coding, technological art, sociology of culture, social choreography, software theory, robotics, artificial, and futuristic and transdisciplinary design, Hypermodernism, Hyperreality, Posthumanism, “Home Datenschutz About Impressum Baudrillard and Trek-nology (Or Everything I Know I Learned From Watching Star Trek and Reading Jean Baudrillard), by Alan N. Shapiro” October 10th, 2010, http://www.alan-shapiro.com/baudrillard-and-trek-nology-or-everything-i-know-i-learned-from-watching-star-trek-and-reading-jean-baudrillard/]/ lm We should be greatly mistaken were we to view science fiction as an escape from everyday reality: on the contrary, it is an extrapolation from the irrational tendencies of that reality through the free exercise of narrative invention.2 I. Introduction It was my childhood in New York in the late 1960s. As a good Jew, I was supposed to acquire a Jewish education. But instead I loved Star Trek. Everything I know I learned from watching Star Trek. Among other things, I learned to love science. This made me a good American. So I went to the elite technology university. But I didn’t like the complicity of science with the Vietnam War that existed there. So I dropped out. I was radicalized. I then went to the elite humanities university. But the American radical thinkers were all Marxists. Then I read Jean Baudrillard’s book The Mirror of Production. I grasped that Marx was not radical enough.3 Everything I know I learned from reading Baudrillard. Later I tried to practice a compromise between technology and the humanities known as sociology. Then I read Baudrillard’s book In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities. There he says that sociologists, just like marketing executives and politicians, want to socialize the masses. But the masses resist by going silent and “playing dead.”4 They disappear into over-consumption and fandom. The disappearing act of today is techno-culture, or more precisely, Star Trek. Star Trek is the most prevalent “icon” of techno-culture. Physicists, engineers, computer programmers, graphic artists, and media practitioners are its adamant fans. But the Star Trek industry neutralizes Star Trek‘s original creativity. It programs an automatic system of endless simulated differences, to ensure that viewers will never be able to see any true other. That is why I read Star Trek against Star Trek. Through doubling and decentering, I parodistically map Baudrillard’s system of thought onto Star Trek.5 On two levels, there is an uncanny resemblance between Baudrillard and Star Trek. First, there is an exact correspondence between Baudrillard’s keywords and the principles of “The Original Series” Star Trek episodes: radical uncertainty, recognition of otherness, accident and surprise of technology, symbolic exchange, the dual relationship. Second, there are the pataphysical science fiction technologies: the transporter, warp speed, time travel, the Holodeck. These Trek-nologies are based on quantum physics uncertainty and chaos theory complexity. By applying pressure at both ends – Star Trek as literature, Star Trek as wily technologies – there is a double-strategy of adding a little “critical theory” real and speaking only in this “fatal theory” futuristic language. Now please follow me to explore strange new worlds in outer space. Let us consider a few Star Trek episodes and technologies up close, starting with virtual reality. II. Treknology The Holodeck is the most famous virtual reality system, created in the 1990s for the series Star Trek: The Next Generation. But this post-television technology merely brings to fruition total visual information and leads to the end of aesthetic illusion. By contrast, the invention of virtual reality in the original Star Trek episodes of the 1960s artistically embodies Baudrillard’s principles of radical uncertainty, the vital illusion, and the surprise of technology. In the episode “Shore Leave,” Captain Kirk and Dr. McCoy enter the virtual reality system of the Amusement Park Planet by chance and without knowing what it is. They encounter mysterious and enchanting physical appearances from their daydreams which play on the tension between real and imaginary. At the beginning of the episode, McCoy leads an away team scouting a planet with no apparent life-forms. He is alone for just a moment when a four-foot tall white rabbit appears, then disappears again into a deep hole in the ground. Dumbfounded, the Doctor motions towards the hole when Alice (from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland) appears and asks if he has seen a large white rabbit come along. At the same time, Kirk sees an old schoolmate named Finnegan whom he owes a day of reckoning. Kirk runs after Finnegan. When he at last catches up with him, it occurs to Kirk that he has no idea how Finnegan has gotten here. Captain’s Log, Stardate 3025.8: “We are seeing things that cannot possibly exist, yet they are undeniably real.” The episode “A Taste of Armageddon” is a perfect parallel to Baudrillard’s thesis in The Gulf War Did Not Take Place that “we are no longer in an Aristotelean logic of passage from the virtual to the actual, but in a hyperreal logic of deterrence of the real by the virtual.”6 The explanation of Anan-Seven of the Planetary Division of Control to Captain Kirk is interrupted by an air raid siren. “Vendikar is attacking.” A Council chamber wall slides open to reveal a War Room, filled with mainframe computers and illuminated graphs. Anan tells Kirk that a vicious onslaught has just been carried out by the ruthless adversary. A half-million people were killed. In spite of all the talk of annihilation, scans by Yeoman Tamura’s tricorder indicate no bomb blasts or radiation disturbances anywhere on the planet. The War of the Worlds is waged entirely by computer simulation. After a cyberwar program determines which inhabitants have been terminated in a given virtual explosion, “deaths are registered.” The designated victims have twenty-four hours to report to a disintegration machine. As in America’s wars, those who actually die are the Data Trash ejected by the war video game.7 These shadow-people furnish the necessary dose of reality-effect. The hyperreal simulation of war is above all a method of domination of Western citizens by their states and institutional elites, embedded in the power system of the virtual spaces of the media. America is a simulacral power engaged in the simulacrum of war, using the Other as a convenient alibi for its perfect crime. To practice a radical “after sociology” “after Baudrillard,” we must bring together critical theory and fatal theory. As Rex Butler says in his indispensable book Jean Baudrillard: The Defence of the Real, we must devise a way of writing about a system that follows its internal logic to the end, adds nothing to it, yet inverts it entirely. This écriture is totally specific to each system examined.8 In the case of Star Trek, we must unify Star Trek as literature and Star Trek as wily technologies. Later, in the context of the most famous Trek-nology – the transporter, I demonstrate how these two analyses come together. Before getting into the implications of “beam me up Scotty,” I want to briefly discuss two other Trek-nologies: time travel and warp speed. The latter is the Star Trek synonym for faster-than-light speed. III. Real (Pata)physics A surprising amount of theoretical physics research is directed towards establishing the scientific prerequisites for time travel. As defined by Alfred Jarry, whom Baudrillard often cites with good humor, pataphysics is the painstaking elaboration of imaginary scientific solutions, expressed in persuasive language.9 “Exotic theories” about the workability of time travel are today furiously debated in serious physics journals. About fifteen new scholarly papers a year are published on the subject.10 … IV. Evil Protects Us … The necessary accident of the duplicate Kirk turns a questioning spotlight on the “essence” or punctum of the transporter, which is the absolutist phantasmagoria of total knowledge of a person captured in a digital pattern image or quantum physics snapshot of their subatomic particles. It is the dream of a human being understandable entirely through her information, identical to herself, and leading a completely knowable existence. As Baudrillard writes: Evil protects us from the worst-case scenario… We are traditionally sensitive to the threat which the ‘forces of Evil’ pose for the Good, whereas it is the threat posed by the forces of Good which is the fateful threat to the world of the future. …We are on course for the perfect crime, perpetrated by Good and in the name of Good, for the implacable perfection of the technical, artificial universe which will see the accomplishment of all our desires, of a world unified by the elimination of all anti-bodies. This is our negentropic phantasm of total information. That all matter should become energy and all energy information. …That all genes should be operational…11 V. Conclusion … Baudrillard admonished the Simulationist and Appropriationist artists of the 1980s (Richard Prince, Sherrie Levine and Peter Halley), who sought legitimacy for their works by making reference to his writings on simulation, simulacra, and the end of the real.12 But the referent has “long ago” been substituted by the sign. “If you take Baudrillard seriously,” he told them, then “you must forget Baudrillard.”13 Academic attempts at “applying deconstruction” have also seemed notoriously contrived. By identifying Star Trek as a “media precognition” of Baudrillard (as Stefan Höltgen commented earlier at this symposium); and by writing about “what I love”; via a mutual anagrammatizing that finally renders Baudrillard and Star Trek indistinguishable; and through performing the illusion, joy, poetics, irony, disappearance and Trojan horse strategies outlined in Baudrillard’s essay “Radical Thought,” I have engaged in an experiment to cross over from French theory to American hyper-reality.14 I hope I have avoided the missteps of the Simulationist artists in my effort to contribute to an understanding of the emergence of the “Baudrillard turn.”<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Thus, I affirm that the appropriation of Star Trek by Jeff Bezos is unjust – Star Trek is the ultimate metaphor for the hyperreal, as each reboot represented a copy of a copy, but the launch of William Shatner represents the final break where Reality and Sci-Fi collide – my reading of Star Trek produces a glitch in the matrix of hyperreality.</h4><p>(I can clarify anything in cross)</p><p><strong>Shapiro 10</strong> [Alan N. Shapiro (born 23 April 1956 in Brooklyn, New York) is an American science fiction and media theorist. He is a lecturer and essayist in the fields of science fiction studies, media theory, posthumanism, French philosophy, creative coding, technological art, sociology of culture, social choreography, software theory, robotics, artificial, and futuristic and transdisciplinary design, Hypermodernism, Hyperreality, Posthumanism, “Home Datenschutz About Impressum Baudrillard and Trek-nology (Or Everything I Know I Learned From Watching Star Trek and Reading Jean Baudrillard), by Alan N. Shapiro” October 10th, 2010, http://www.alan-shapiro.com/baudrillard-and-trek-nology-or-everything-i-know-i-learned-from-watching-star-trek-and-reading-jean-baudrillard/]/ lm</p><p><u>We should be greatly mistaken</u> were we <u>to view science fiction as an escape from everyday reality</u>: <u>on the contrary, it is an extrapolation from the irrational tendencies of that reality through the free exercise of narrative invention.2</p><p>I. Introduction</p><p></u>It was my childhood in New York in the late 1960s. As a good Jew, I was supposed to acquire a Jewish education. But instead <u><mark>I loved Star</mark> <mark>Trek</u></mark>. Everything I know I learned from watching Star Trek. Among other things, <u>I learned to love science. This made me a good American. So I went to the elite technology university</u>. But I didn’t like the complicity of science with the Vietnam War that existed there. So I dropped out. <u>I was radicalized</u>. I then went to the elite humanities university. <u>But the American radical thinkers were all Marxists</u>. <u>Then I read</u> Jean <u>Baudrillard’s</u> book <u>The Mirror of Production</u>. I grasped that <u>Marx was not radical enough</u>.3 Everything I know I learned from reading Baudrillard. Later I tried to practice a compromise between technology and the humanities known as sociology. Then I read Baudrillard’s book In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities. There he says that <u>sociologists, just like marketing executives and politicians, want to socialize the masses</u>. <u>But the masses resist </u>by going silent and “playing dead.”4 <u>They disappear into over-consumption and fandom</u>.</p><p><u>The disappearing act of today is techno-culture, or more precisely, Star Trek</u>. Star Trek is the most prevalent “icon” of techno-culture. Physicists, engineers, computer programmers, graphic artists, and media practitioners are its adamant fans. <u><mark>But the Star Trek industry neutralizes Star Trek‘s original creativity</u></mark>. <u>It programs an automatic system of endless simulated differences, to ensure that viewers will never be able to see any true other</u>. <u><mark>That is why I read Star Trek against Star Trek</u></mark>. <u>Through doubling and decentering, <mark>I parodistically map Baudrillard’s system of thought onto Star Trek</u></mark>.5 <u>On two levels, there is an uncanny resemblance between Baudrillard and Star Trek</u>. <u>First</u>, <u>there is an exact correspondence between Baudrillard</u>’s keywords <u>and </u>the principles of “<u><mark>The</mark> <mark>Original Series”</mark> Star Trek episodes</u>: <u>radical uncertainty, recognition of otherness, accident and surprise of technology, symbolic exchange, the dual relationship.</u> <u>Second</u>, <u>there are</u> the <u>pataphysical science fiction technologies</u>: <u>the <mark>transporter, warp speed, time travel, the Holodeck</u></mark>. <u>These Trek-nologies are <mark>based on</mark> <mark>quantum</mark> physics <mark>uncertainty and chaos theory</mark> complexity</u>. By applying pressure at both ends – <u>Star Trek as literature, Star Trek as wily technologies</u> – <u>there is a double-strategy of adding a little “critical theory” real and <mark>speaking</mark> only <mark>in this “fatal theory” futuristic language</mark>.</u> Now please follow me to explore strange new worlds in outer space. <u>Let us consider</u> a few <u>Star Trek episodes</u> and technologies up close, <u>starting with virtual reality.</p><p>II. Treknology</p><p>The Holodeck is the most famous virtual reality system</u>, created in the 1990s for the series Star Trek: The Next Generation. But <u>this post-television technology merely brings to fruition total visual information and leads to the end of aesthetic illusion</u>. By contrast, <u><mark>the invention of virtual reality in the original Star Trek</mark> episodes of the 1960s <mark>artistically embodies Baudrillard’s principles of radical uncertainty</mark>, the vital illusion, and the surprise of technology</u>.</p><p><u>In the episode “Shore Leave,” <mark>Captain Kirk and Dr. McCoy enter the virtual reality</mark> system</u> of the Amusement Park Planet by chance and without knowing what it is. <u><mark>They encounter mysterious</mark> and enchanting physical <mark>appearances</mark> from their daydreams <mark>which play on the tension between real and imaginary</u></mark>. At the beginning of the episode, <u>McCoy</u> leads an away team scouting a planet with no apparent life-forms. He <u>is alone for just a moment when a four-foot tall white rabbit appears, then disappears again into a deep hole in the ground</u>. Dumbfounded, the Doctor motions towards the hole when Alice (from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland) appears and asks if he has seen a large white rabbit come along. At the same time, <u>Kirk sees an old schoolmate named Finnegan whom he owes a day of reckoning</u>. Kirk runs after Finnegan. When he at last catches up with him, it occurs to Kirk that he has no idea how Finnegan has gotten here. <u><mark>Captain’s Log, Stardate 3025.8:</u> <u>“We are seeing things that cannot possibly exist, yet they are undeniably real.”</p><p></mark>The episode “A Taste of Armageddon” is a perfect parallel to Baudrillard’s thesis in The Gulf War Did Not Take Place</u> that “<u>we are no longer in an Aristotelean logic of passage from the virtual to the actual, but in a hyperreal logic of deterrence of the real by the virtual</u>.”6 The explanation of Anan-Seven of the Planetary Division of Control to Captain Kirk is interrupted by an air raid siren. “Vendikar is attacking.” A Council chamber wall slides open to reveal a War Room, filled with mainframe computers and illuminated graphs. <u>Anan tells Kirk that a vicious onslaught has just been carried out by the ruthless adversary. A half-million people were killed. In spite of all the talk of annihilation, scans by Yeoman Tamura’s tricorder indicate no bomb blasts or radiation disturbances anywhere on the planet</u>. <u>The War of the Worlds is waged entirely by computer simulation</u>. After a cyberwar program determines which inhabitants have been terminated in a given virtual explosion, “deaths are registered.” The designated victims have twenty-four hours to report to a disintegration machine. <u>As in America’s wars, <mark>those who actually die are the Data Trash ejected by the war video game</u></mark>.7 <u>These shadow-people furnish the necessary dose of reality-effect</u>. <u><mark>The hyperreal simulation of war is</mark> above all <mark>a method of domination of Western</mark> citizens by their <mark>states and</mark> institutional <mark>elites</mark>, embedded in the power system of the virtual spaces of the media</u>. <u><mark>America is a simulacral power engaged in the simulacrum of war, using the Other as a convenient alibi for its perfect crime</mark>.</p><p>To practice a radical “after sociology” “after Baudrillard,” we must bring together critical theory and fatal theory</u>. As Rex Butler says in his indispensable book Jean Baudrillard: The Defence of the Real, <u>we must devise a way of writing about a system that follows its internal logic to the end, adds nothing to it, yet inverts it entirely</u>. This écriture is totally specific to each system examined.8 <u>In the case of Star Trek, we must unify Star Trek as literature and Star Trek as wily technologies</u>. Later, in the context of the most famous Trek-nology – the transporter, I demonstrate how these two analyses come together. Before getting into the implications of “<u>beam me up Scotty,” I want to briefly discuss two other Trek-nologies: time travel and warp speed. The latter is the Star Trek synonym for faster-than-light speed.</p><p>III. Real (Pata)physics</p><p>A surprising amount of theoretical physics research is directed towards establishing the scientific prerequisites for time travel</u>. As defined by Alfred Jarry, whom <u>Baudrillard often cites with good humor, pataphysics is the painstaking elaboration of imaginary scientific solutions, expressed in persuasive language.</u>9 “<u>Exotic theories” about the workability of time travel are today furiously debated in serious physics journals.</u> About fifteen new scholarly papers a year are published on the subject.10</p><p><u>…</p><p>IV. Evil Protects Us</p><p>…</p><p>The necessary accident of the duplicate Kirk turns a questioning spotlight on the “essence” or punctum of the transporter</u>, which is the absolutist phantasmagoria of total knowledge of <u>a person captured in a digital pattern image or quantum physics snapshot of their subatomic particles</u>. It is the dream of a human being understandable entirely through her information, identical to herself, and leading a completely knowable existence. As <u>Baudrillard writes:</p><p></u>Evil protects us from the worst-case scenario… We are traditionally sensitive to the threat which the ‘forces of Evil’ pose for the Good, whereas it is the threat posed by the forces of Good which is the fateful threat to the world of the future. …<u>We are on course for the perfect crime, perpetrated by Good and in the name of Good, for the implacable perfection of the technical, artificial universe which will see the accomplishment of all our desires, of a world unified by the elimination of all anti-bodies. This is our negentropic phantasm of total information. That all matter should become energy and all energy information. …That all genes should be operational…11</p><p>V. Conclusion</p><p>…</p><p>Baudrillard admonished the Simulationist and Appropriationist artists of the 1980s</u> (Richard Prince, Sherrie Levine and Peter Halley), <u>who sought legitimacy for their works by making reference to his writings on simulation, simulacra, and the end of the real</u>.12 But the referent has “long ago” been substituted by the sign. “If you take Baudrillard seriously,” he told them, then “you must forget Baudrillard.”13 Academic attempts at “applying deconstruction” have also seemed notoriously contrived. <u><mark>By identifying Star Trek as a “media precognition” of Baudrillard</u></mark> (as Stefan Höltgen commented earlier at this symposium); <u>and by writing about “what I love”; via a mutual anagrammatizing that finally renders Baudrillard and Star Trek indistinguishable</u>; <u><mark>and through performing the illusion, joy, poetics,</mark> irony, disappearance and Trojan horse <mark>strategies outlined in Baudrillard’s</mark> essay “<mark>Radical Thought</mark>,” <mark>I</mark> have engaged in an experiment to cross over from French theory to American hyper-reality.</u>14 I hope I have <u><mark>avoid</mark>ed <mark>the missteps of the Simulationist</mark> artist<mark>s</mark> </u>in my effort <u><mark>to contribute to an understanding of</mark> the emergence of the “<mark>Baudrillard</mark> turn.”</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Perkovich 13 [George, Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program and Nuclear Policy Program, PhD from University of Virginia, Do Unto Others: Toward A Defensible Nuclear Doctrine, p. 73-8, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/do_unto_others.pdf] fulltext: The nuclear taboo is reified in the widespread view among decisionmakers that a nuclear weapon is not just another weapon and is not merely defined by its physical destructiveness. As former secretary of state and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell said in the aftermath of the 2002 Indian-Pakistani military standoff, which many feared would lead to nuclear war, the nuclear bomb “is not just another weapon in a toolbox of weapons. It crosses a line that the world does not want to see crossed in 2002. And the condemnation that would go against whichever country did it would be worldwide and it would be immediate.”56 Norms may seem soft, but they matter. The Nobel-laureate strategist Thomas Schelling has said the evolution of the nuclear taboo is “as important as the development of nuclear arsenals.”57 The United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel could use nuclear weapons to destroy non-nuclear adversaries with relative ease and without fear of retaliation, but they have not. A strong political-moral injunction—a taboo—creates the perception among decisionmakers that it would be beyond the pale to initiate use of nuclear weapons against a state that poses no similar-scale threat, even if one could do so without risk of being destroyed in return. This does not mean that officials, strategists, and citizens of nucleararmed states refrain from thinking and talking about using nuclear weapons. Taboos exist precisely because people are tempted to do the taboo thing, and sometimes they talk about it. If the temptation were not great, there would not be a need for inhibition as strong as a taboo. The tension between temptation and inhibition can be seen in the ways that American officials obfuscate the question of first use in U.S. nuclear policy. Of course, the nuclear taboo is backed by unsurpassed hard power. The nuclear taboo is against first use. It is a moral-political deterrent backed by a physical threat. The consequence of breaking it most likely would be nuclear retaliation. It would be naive to gainsay the degree to which prudential, hard-power calculations have contributed to the nonuse of nuclear weapons since 1945. But rather than disprove the reality of a taboo against first use, acknowledging the inhibiting effects of the fear of retaliation reinforces the reasons why the taboo emerged in the first place. Particular acts are taboo precisely because they are so dangerous to the species. The taboo against nuclear first use has at least one major implication that is inadequately recognized and discussed: actors have a corollary obligation not to incite someone to break the taboo. If the nuclear-firstuse taboo has been constructed and strengthened over the past sixtyseven years, its continuation will be augmented by conscious efforts to inculcate the underlying imperative for states (and nonstate actors) to forbear from threatening the survival of other nations. Such threats are inherent in the use of nuclear weapons and also in the sorts of massive aggression that could trigger legitimate nuclear use. Limiting the scale and destructiveness of warfare is a long project of civilization, as Steven Pinker has recorded in his massive study The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined.58 Efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons would be strengthened by explicitly promoting the underlying intolerability of conducting aggression on a scale that would threaten the survival of any nation. Aggression in any form is illegitimate, of course, as recognized by the UN Charter. But aggression often is not easy to define. Lower-scale forms of it unfortunately are not rare. There is strategic, political, and moral meaning in distinguishing among scales and types of aggression. This is what the laws of just war, humanitarian law, the genocide convention, and treaties, such as those banning chemical and biological weapons, do. The singular potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons invites efforts to specifically anathematize violence of a scale that threatens another state’s survival because the dangers of nuclear war and massive aggression are causally almost inseparable. Focusing international attention on the taboo against the first use of nuclear weapons and actions that could cause the taboo to be broken would be more than a rhetorical initiative. There are observable, important actions and policies that states can take to demonstrate their commitment not to threaten the survival of others, even while retaining capabilities and policies for lower-level warfare. Policies declaring nuclear use only in response to existential threats would provide a benchmark for other states and international experts to evaluate whether the overall military forces, doctrines, and behaviors of states are consistent with declaratory policy. States could clarify that they have no demand or policy to annihilate any other people or, more pertinently, to initiate conflict to forcibly remove a nation or state from disputed territory. (This is the basic logic on which the United States, China, and Taiwan have based their security relations since 1979. The injunction against using force to “resolve” territorial disputes is now salient in East and Southeast Asia.) Correspondingly, states could acquire and deploy conventional forces in quantity and quality that convey defensive intentions and are unsuitable for invading, occupying, and incorporating the sovereign territory controlled by others. States could conduct military exercises that reflect their intentions not to operate military forces scaled and directed to threaten the survival of their neighbors or others. Such policy declarations and actions would still leave open possibilities of military initiative, including a sort that some would call aggression. The point here is that in working from the objective of reinforcing the taboo against nuclear first use and other threats to survival, states could design a realistic web of policies and actions to pursue this objective. Indeed, in some ways, this is what NATO and Moscow did in the period between 1987 and the 1999 Kosovo intervention, when Russian politics turned noncooperative in response to the perceived overassertiveness of NATO. One of the missed opportunities of this period, and one of the reasons why the cooperation did not last, was that neither side renounced its preemptive first-use doctrine and force postures and encouraged the other to follow suit. The United States and Russia reduced and limited conventional and nuclear forces, increased transparency, managed the peaceful realignment of Russia’s relations with its former satellite states, and generally changed history in a previously unimaginably positive way. But they did not get out from under the threat of nuclear first use—preemptive or otherwise. The fact that the two countries’ nuclear relationship appears tragically anachronistic to many in both societies suggests that it still could be changed, perhaps with more encouragement from others. Debates over nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and disarmament, including in the context of NPT Review Conferences, often focus narrowly on nuclear weapons and not enough on the threats to security that animate the acquisition and potential use of these weapons. President Obama, as the single most influential figure in global nuclear affairs, could advance the purpose of his 2009 Prague speech by inviting explicit international debate on the role of nuclear weapons and the shared responsibility of all states not to cause these weapons to be used. Obama’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, which challenged and perhaps surprised its audience by reminding them that war is sometimes necessary and can be just, is a good benchmark. He could do this in relation to whatever nuclear policy he chooses to declare, but the recommended formulation would invite international attention to the threshold-crossing effects of threatening the survival of another nation and the global interest in perpetuating the taboo against the first use of nuclear weapons.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Limiting nuclear use reinvigorates the taboo – solves <u>international perception</u> of the threat of first use. </h4><p><strong>Perkovich 13</strong> [George, Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program and Nuclear Policy Program, PhD from University of Virginia, Do Unto Others: Toward A Defensible Nuclear Doctrine, p. 73-8, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/do_unto_others.pdf]</p><p><u><strong>The</u></strong> nuclear <u><strong>taboo is reified in the widespread view among decisionmakers that <mark>a nuc</u></strong></mark>lear weapon <u><strong><mark>is not just another weapon</u></strong></mark> and is not merely <u><strong>defined by</u></strong> its <u><strong>physical destructiveness</u></strong>. As former secretary of state and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell said in the aftermath of the 2002 Indian-Pakistani military standoff, which many feared would lead to nuclear war, the nuclear bomb “is not just another weapon in a toolbox of weapons. It crosses a line that the world does not want to see crossed in 2002. And the condemnation that would go against whichever country did it would be worldwide and it would be immediate.”56</p><p><u><strong><mark>Norms</u></strong></mark> may seem soft, but they <u><strong><mark>matter</u></strong></mark>. The Nobel-laureate strategist Thomas <u><strong>Schelling</u></strong> has <u><strong>said</u></strong> the <u><strong>evolution of the</u></strong> nuclear <u><strong>taboo is “as important as</u></strong> the <u><strong>development of nuclear arsenals</u></strong>.”57 The United <u><strong><mark>States</u></strong></mark>, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel <u><strong><mark>could use nuc</u></strong></mark>lear weapon<u><strong><mark>s to destroy non-nuc</mark>lear <mark>adversaries</mark> with</u></strong> relative <u><strong>ease</u></strong> and without fear of retaliation, <u><strong><mark>but they have not</u></strong></mark>. A strong political-moral injunction—<u><strong><mark>a taboo</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>creates</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>perception</u></strong></mark> among decisionmakers that <u><strong><mark>it would be beyond the pale to</mark> initiate <mark>use</u></strong></mark> of nuclear weapons <u><strong>against a state that poses no similar</u></strong>-scale <u><strong>threat</u></strong>, even if one could do so without risk of being destroyed in return.</p><p>This does not mean that officials, strategists, and citizens of nucleararmed states refrain from thinking and talking about using nuclear weapons. Taboos exist precisely because people are tempted to do the taboo thing, and sometimes they talk about it. If the temptation were not great, there would not be a need for inhibition as strong as a taboo. The tension between temptation and inhibition can be seen in the ways that American officials obfuscate the question of first use in U.S. nuclear policy.</p><p>Of course, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> nuclear <u><strong><mark>taboo is backed by</mark> unsurpassed hard power. The nuclear taboo is against first use</u></strong>. It is <u><strong>a moral-political deterrent backed by a <mark>physical threat</u></strong></mark>. The consequence of breaking it most likely would be nuclear retaliation. It would be naive to gainsay the degree to which prudential, hard-power calculations have contributed to the nonuse of nuclear weapons since 1945. But rather than disprove the reality of a taboo against first use, acknowledging the inhibiting effects of the fear of retaliation reinforces the reasons why the taboo emerged in the first place. Particular acts are taboo precisely because they are so dangerous to the species.</p><p><u><strong>The taboo</u></strong> against nuclear first use <u><strong>has</u></strong> at least <u><strong>one major implication</u></strong> that is <u><strong>inadequately</u></strong> recognized and <u><strong>discussed: <mark>actors have a</u></strong></mark> corollary <u><strong><mark>obligation not to incite</mark> someone <mark>to break the taboo</u></strong></mark>. If the nuclear-firstuse <u><strong><mark>taboo</u></strong></mark> has been constructed and strengthened over the past sixtyseven years, its <u><strong>continuation <mark>will be augmented by</mark> conscious <mark>efforts to inculcate the</mark> underlying <mark>imperative</mark> for states</u></strong> (and nonstate actors) <u><strong><mark>to forbear from threatening</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>survival</mark> of other nations</u></strong>. Such threats are inherent in the use of nuclear weapons and also in the sorts of massive aggression that could trigger legitimate nuclear use.</p><p>Limiting the scale and destructiveness of warfare is a long project of civilization, as Steven Pinker has recorded in his massive study The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined.58 Efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons would be strengthened by explicitly promoting the underlying intolerability of conducting aggression on a scale that would threaten the survival of any nation.</p><p>Aggression in any form is illegitimate, of course, as recognized by the UN Charter. But aggression often is not easy to define. Lower-scale forms of it unfortunately are not rare. There is strategic, political, and moral meaning in distinguishing among scales and types of aggression. This is what the laws of just war, humanitarian law, the genocide convention, and treaties, such as those banning chemical and biological weapons, do. The singular potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons invites efforts to specifically anathematize violence of a scale that threatens another state’s survival because the dangers of nuclear war and massive aggression are causally almost inseparable.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Focusing</u></strong></mark> international <u><strong><mark>attention on the taboo</mark> against</u></strong> the <u><strong>first use</u></strong> of nuclear weapons <u><strong>and actions that</u></strong> could <u><strong>cause the taboo to be broken <mark>would be more than</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong><mark>rhetorical</u></strong></mark> initiative. <u><strong>There are observable</u></strong>, important <u><strong>actions</u></strong> and policies that <u><strong>states</u></strong> can <u><strong>take to demonstrate</u></strong> their <u><strong>commitment not to threaten</u></strong> the <u><strong>survival</u></strong> of others, even while retaining capabilities and policies for lower-level warfare.</p><p>Policies declaring nuclear use only in response to existential threats would provide a benchmark for other states and international experts to evaluate whether the overall military forces, doctrines, and behaviors of states are consistent with declaratory policy.</p><p>States could clarify that they have no demand or policy to annihilate any other people or, more pertinently, to initiate conflict to forcibly remove a nation or state from disputed territory. (This is the basic logic on which the United States, China, and Taiwan have based their security relations since 1979. The injunction against using force to “resolve” territorial disputes is now salient in East and Southeast Asia.)</p><p>Correspondingly, <u><strong><mark>states could</mark> acquire and <mark>deploy conventional forces</mark> in quantity and quality <mark>that convey defensive intentions</mark> and are <mark>unsuitable for invading</mark>, occupying, and incorporating</u></strong> the <u><strong>sovereign territory controlled by <mark>others. States could conduct military exercises that reflect</u></strong></mark> their <u><strong><mark>intentions not to</mark> operate military forces</u></strong> scaled and directed <u><strong>to <mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>survival of their <mark>neighbors</u></strong></mark> or others.</p><p><u><strong>Such</u></strong> policy <u><strong><mark>declarations</u></strong></mark> and actions would <u><strong><mark>still leave open</u></strong></mark> possibilities of military initiative, including a sort that some would call <u><strong><mark>aggression</u></strong></mark>. The point here is that <u><strong><mark>in working from</mark> the objective of <mark>reinforcing the taboo</mark> against nuclear first use</u></strong> and other threats to survival, <u><strong><mark>states could design</mark> a <mark>realistic</mark> web of <mark>policies</u></strong></mark> and actions <u><strong>to pursue this</u></strong> objective. Indeed, <u><strong>in some ways, <mark>this is what NATO and Moscow did</u></strong></mark> in the period <u><strong>between 1987 and</u></strong> the 19<u><strong>99</u></strong> Kosovo intervention, when Russian politics turned noncooperative in response to the perceived overassertiveness of NATO. One of the missed opportunities of this period, and one of the reasons why the <u><strong><mark>coop</mark>eration <mark>did not last</u></strong></mark>, was that <u><strong><mark>neither</mark> side <mark>renounced</mark> its preemptive <mark>first-use</mark> doctrine</u></strong> and force postures and encouraged the other to follow suit. The United States and Russia reduced and limited conventional and nuclear forces, increased transparency, managed the peaceful realignment of Russia’s relations with its former satellite states, and generally changed history in a previously unimaginably positive way. But they did not get out from under the threat of nuclear first use—preemptive or otherwise. The fact that the two countries’ nuclear relationship appears tragically anachronistic to many in both societies suggests that it still could be changed, perhaps with more encouragement from others.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Debates</u></strong></mark> over nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and disarmament, including in the context of NPT Review Conferences, often <u><strong><mark>focus narrowly on nuc</u></strong></mark>lear weapon<u><strong><mark>s and not</mark> enough <mark>on</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>threats</mark> to security</u></strong> that animate the acquisition and potential use <u><strong>of these weapons. <mark>President</u></strong></mark> Obama, as the single most influential figure in global nuclear affairs, <u><strong><mark>could</u></strong></mark> advance the purpose of his 2009 Prague speech by <u><strong><mark>invit</mark>ing explicit international <mark>debate on the role of</u></strong> <u><strong>nuc</u></strong></mark>lear weapon<u><strong><mark>s and</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>shared <mark>responsibility</mark> of</u></strong> all <u><strong>states <mark>not to cause</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong>weapons to be used</u></strong>. Obama’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, which challenged and perhaps surprised its audience by reminding them that war is sometimes necessary and can be just, is a good benchmark. He could do this in relation to whatever nuclear policy he chooses to declare, but the recommended formulation would invite international attention to the threshold-crossing effects of threatening the survival of another nation and the global interest in perpetuating the taboo against the first use of nuclear weapons.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Adam Garfinkle 18. Adam Garfinkle is editor of The American Interest. “The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs,” The American Interest. 9-3-2018. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs/ fulltext: The reasons for wanting to suppress such regional security competitions have been several. First, competitions between and among allies—Turkey and Greece, for example, over Cyprus—were thought to provide opportunities for adversaries to divide alliances and complicate alliance management.1 Second, competitions could breed local arms races, and thus invite ambient insecurity and raise the costs of any crises gotten out of hand. Third, some arms races could lead to weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation, threatening the global security commons in general and generating a more dangerous world overall for the United States, as webmaster of the system, to manage. From the U.S. point of view, minimizing the number and size of wars and minimizing WMD proliferation constituted an act of doing good and doing well simultaneously: It was valuable for most others even as it was also valuable for the United States at the pinnacle of the postwar pecking order. The Cold War is over, but the imperative to limit WMD proliferation remains—and so back to the Turkish situation we must go. Consider that Turkey sits in a regional environment in which states armed with nuclear weapons, or prospectively armed with nuclear weapons, are abundant. If a statesman or military planner sits in a swivel chair in Ankara and rotates 360° around, he can barely catch his breath between identifying actors capable of targeting Turkey with nuclear weapons: Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, the United States both from its homeland and from other points in Europe, and of course prospectively Iran.2 Now, the logic of the security dilemma is such that in the absence of the credible U.S. provision of extended deterrence, Turkey would feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons. That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite its formidable engineering and scientific capacities, illustrates the stability of Turkish trust in U.S. protection—until recently—and the ability of both sides to bracket the core security relationship away from various disagreements. As with other nuclear-armed states, should Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers. But of course if Turkey, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection in one way or another, developed nuclear weapons for such a purpose, other regional states would probably feel obliged to develop or otherwise acquire their own weapons, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.3 They have already practiced that way of thinking in reaction to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, of course. Indeed, that kind of hedging behavior is exactly what analysts have discussed for many years now as the so-called N+ danger inherent in the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. It is not just the danger posed by Iranian nuclear weapons, bad enough as that would be, but the mousetrap effect of proliferation that would likely drive other states to want such an insurance policy: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria, and so on. Now, some observers have argued that nuclear weapons are really not very important after all. If the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as China, France, and the United Kingdom, survived the Cold War without any nuclear use, it must be because deterrence is easy and hence stable, since all rational people know that the weapons are unusable save for the since-become-impossible exception of a state holding a monopoly over them. One well-known scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argued persistently that the more nuclear the weapons the better—because they would sober everyone up and lead to more stability and fewer wars. Happily, those with actual government responsibility did not agree. It is unspeakably lazy thinking to glibly superimpose the U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence experience onto places like the Middle East. It is, after all, one thing to maintain stable deterrence when there are only two, or a small number of, nuclear powers, and quite another to maintain stable deterrence when the number of nuclear actors gets larger and becomes somewhat open-ended as more states lean that way. Under such conditions it becomes much more difficult to calculate what a sufficient deterrent is, and so efforts to make sure of having “enough” can touch off a multilateral arms competition in which sufficiency becomes an ever-moving target, almost impossible to hit. At the same time it becomes much more difficult to imagine crisis stability if one or more states resort to launch-on-warning deployment postures, which are more likely when young arsenals are small and unprotectable against preemptive attack. Other important potential differences between U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence and potential multiparty deterrence in the Middle East exist, too. Let us note just three. First, U.S. and Soviet arsenals displayed clear lines of civil-military authority in highly institutionalized state systems, but many Middle Eastern countries lack both such clear lines of authority and highly institutionalized arrangements, being instead looser and more personalized by nature. Second, it was taken for granted that both U.S. and Soviet leaderships cared about the safety of their populations, a necessary assumption for effective deterrence. But in some heterogeneous and authoritarian Middle Eastern countries this premise may not so surely apply—think both Iraq and Syria under minoritarian (and coincidentally Ba‘athi) leadership, both of which committed mass murder against its own citizens. And third, U.S.-Soviet deterrence operations became inextricably bound up in the minds of observers with intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems. The result is that some people today think that if missiles can be limited in one way or another, then the dangers of nuclear weapons, even if they come to exist, would be much mitigated. This is delusional because it is technologically obtuse. You need intercontinental ballistic missiles if you’re trying to shoot a warhead across an ocean. But if your enemy target is not across an ocean, but, as in the Middle East, quite nearby, airplanes are immensely less expensive and more reliable as delivery systems. The basic point is that in both theory and practice, there is little difference between the proliferation stimulating effects of a Turkish nuclear weapons breakout and an Iranian one. So if the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership unravels, logic does indeed suggest a Turkish effort to develop its own nuclear capabilities. (Of course, the same kinds of pressures pertain to other key countries were they to lose, one way or another, their U.S. nuclear umbrellas, including Germany, Japan, South Korea, and others.) If that happens, the Turkish government could probably develop deliverable nuclear warheads at least on its side of the ocean within two to three years. If the Iranian government had thought for its own good reasons to avoid overt testing and breakout postures once the nuclear deal expires by calendar or “is expired” by volition, a Turkish bomb would make that posture far more difficult to justify. One could therefore imagine a situation of twinned or near-simultaneous breakouts of Turkish and Iranian nuclear weapons even a mere three, four, or five years from now. The shock to the region would be profound, and possibly very dangerous.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The plan’s Article 5 limitation causes Turkey prolif.</h4><p>Adam <strong>Garfinkle 18</strong>. Adam Garfinkle is editor of The American Interest. “The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs,” The American Interest. 9-3-2018. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs/</p><p>The reasons for wanting to suppress such regional security competitions have been several. <u>First, <strong><mark>competitions between</strong></mark> and among <mark>allies</mark>—<strong>Turkey and Greece</u></strong>, for example, over Cyprus—<u>were thought to <strong>provide opportunities</u></strong> for adversaries <u><strong>to <mark>divide alliances</strong></mark> and complicate alliance management.</u>1 <u>Second, <strong>competitions</u> </strong>could <u><strong><mark>breed local arms races</strong>, and</u></mark> thus <u>invite ambient insecurity <strong>and raise the costs of any crises</u></strong> gotten out of hand. <u>Third, some <strong>arms races</strong> could <strong><mark>lead to</strong></mark> w</u>eapons-of-<u>m</u>ass-<u>d</u>estruction <u><strong><mark>proliferation</strong></mark>, threatening the global security commons</u> in general <u>and <strong>generating a more dangerous world</u></strong> overall <u>for the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, as webmaster of the system, <u>to manage.</u> From the U.S. point of view, <u>minimizing</u> the number and size of <u>wars and</u> minimizing <u>WMD proliferation constituted an act of doing good</u> and doing well simultaneously: <u>It was valuable for most others even as it was also valuable for the United States</u> at the pinnacle of the postwar pecking order.</p><p>The Cold War is over, but <u><strong>the imperative to limit</strong> WMD <strong>proliferation remains</strong>—and so back to the Turkish situation we must go.</u> Consider that <u><strong><mark>Turkey</mark> sits <mark>in</strong> a</mark> regional <strong><mark>environment</mark> in <mark>which states</mark> armed</u></strong> with nuclear weapons, <u><strong>or prospectively <mark>armed with nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s, are abundant.</strong></mark> If a statesman</u> or military planner sits in a swivel chair in Ankara and <u>rotates 360°</u> around, <u>he can barely catch his breath between identifying actors capable of targeting Turkey with nuclear weapons: <strong><mark>Russia</mark>, Pakistan, <mark>India, Israel,</mark> France, the U</strong>nited <strong>K</strong>ingdom, <strong>the U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates both from its homeland and from other points in Europe, <strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> of course prospectively <u><strong><mark>Iran.</u></strong></mark>2</p><p>Now, <u>the</u> logic of the <u>security dilemma is such that <strong><mark>in the absence of</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>credible</mark> U.S.</u></strong> provision of <u>extended <strong><mark>deterrence, Turkey</strong></mark> <strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> feel pressure to <u><strong><mark>develop</strong></mark> its own <strong><mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s. That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite</mark> its <mark>formidable</strong></mark> engineering and scientific <strong><mark>capacities, illustrates</mark> the stability of <mark>Turkish trust in U.S. protection</strong></mark>—until recently—<strong><mark>and the ability</mark> of both sides <mark>to bracket the</u></strong></mark> core <u><strong><mark>security relationship away from</mark> various <mark>disagreements.</u></strong></mark> As with other nuclear-armed states, should Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers.</p><p>But of course <u><mark>if Turkey</mark>, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection</u> in one way or another, <u><mark>developed nuclear weapons</u></mark> for such a purpose, <u><strong><mark>other regional states would</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>feel obliged to</strong></mark> develop or otherwise <strong><mark>acquire their own weapons</u></strong></mark>, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.3 <u><strong>They have already practiced that way of thinking</strong> in reaction <strong>to</strong> the possibility of an <strong>Iranian nuclear breakout</u></strong>, of course.</p><p>Indeed, <u>that kind of hedging behavior is</u> exactly <u>what analysts have discussed</u> for many years now <u>as <mark>the</mark> so-called <strong><mark>N+ danger</strong></mark> </u>inherent in the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. <u>It <mark>is not just</mark> the <mark>danger posed by Iran</mark>ian nuclear weapons</u>, bad enough as that would be, <u>but <strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>mousetrap effect</mark> of proliferation that <mark>would </mark>likely <mark>drive</mark> other states</strong> to want such an insurance policy: <strong><mark>Saudi Arabia</mark>, the <mark>UAE, Egypt, Algeria</u></strong></mark>, and so on.</p><p>Now, some observers have argued that nuclear weapons are really not very important after all. If the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as China, France, and the United Kingdom, survived the Cold War without any nuclear use, it must be because deterrence is easy and hence stable, since all rational people know that the weapons are unusable save for the since-become-impossible exception of a state holding a monopoly over them. One well-known scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argued persistently that the more nuclear the weapons the better—because they would sober everyone up and lead to more stability and fewer wars. Happily, those with actual government responsibility did not agree. It is unspeakably lazy thinking to glibly superimpose the U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence experience onto places like the Middle East. It is, after all, one thing to maintain stable deterrence when there are only two, or a small number of, nuclear powers, and quite another to maintain stable deterrence when the number of nuclear actors gets larger and becomes somewhat open-ended as more states lean that way. Under such conditions it becomes much more difficult to calculate what a sufficient deterrent is, and so efforts to make sure of having “enough” can touch off a multilateral arms competition in which sufficiency becomes an ever-moving target, almost impossible to hit. At the same time it becomes much more difficult to imagine crisis stability if one or more states resort to launch-on-warning deployment postures, which are more likely when young arsenals are small and unprotectable against preemptive attack. Other important potential differences between U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence and potential multiparty deterrence in the Middle East exist, too. Let us note just three. First, U.S. and Soviet arsenals displayed clear lines of civil-military authority in highly institutionalized state systems, but many Middle Eastern countries lack both such clear lines of authority and highly institutionalized arrangements, being instead looser and more personalized by nature. Second, it was taken for granted that both U.S. and Soviet leaderships cared about the safety of their populations, a necessary assumption for effective deterrence. But in some heterogeneous and authoritarian Middle Eastern countries this premise may not so surely apply—think both Iraq and Syria under minoritarian (and coincidentally Ba‘athi) leadership, both of which committed mass murder against its own citizens. And third, U.S.-Soviet deterrence operations became inextricably bound up in the minds of observers with intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems. The result is that some people today think that if missiles can be limited in one way or another, then the dangers of nuclear weapons, even if they come to exist, would be much mitigated. This is delusional because it is technologically obtuse. You need intercontinental ballistic missiles if you’re trying to shoot a warhead across an ocean. But if your enemy target is not across an ocean, but, as in the Middle East, quite nearby, airplanes are immensely less expensive and more reliable as delivery systems.</p><p>The basic point is that in both theory and practice, there is little difference between the proliferation stimulating effects of a Turkish nuclear weapons breakout and an Iranian one. <u>So if the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership unravels, logic</u> does indeed <u>suggest a Turkish effort to develop its own nuclear capabilities.</u> (Of course, <u><strong>the same</strong> kinds of <strong>pressures pertain to other key countries were they to lose</u></strong>, one way or another, <u><strong>their</strong> U.S. nuclear <strong>umbrellas</u></strong>, including <u><strong>Germany, Japan, South Korea</strong>, and others<strong>.)</p><p></u></strong>If that happens, <u><mark>the <strong>Turkish government could</strong></mark> probably <strong><mark>develop</mark> </strong>deliverable <strong>nuclear <mark>warheads</u></strong></mark> at least on its side of the ocean <u><strong><mark>within two</strong></mark> to three <strong><mark>years.</strong> If</mark> the <mark>Iran</mark>ian government <mark>had thought</u></mark> for its own good reasons <u><mark>to avoid</mark> overt</u> testing and <u><mark>breakout posture</u></mark>s once the nuclear deal expires <u>by calendar or “is expired”</u> by volition, <u><mark>a Turkish bomb would make that</mark> posture</u> far more <u><mark>difficult to justify</mark>. One could</u> therefore <u><mark>imagine</u></mark> a situation of <u><strong><mark>twinned</strong></mark> or</u> near-<u>simultaneous <strong><mark>breakouts of Turkish and Iranian nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong>a mere <mark>three</u></strong></mark>, four, or five <u><strong><mark>years from now.</strong> The <strong>shock</strong></mark> to the region <strong><mark>would be</mark> profound, and</strong> possibly <strong><mark>very dangerous.</p></u></strong></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Williams 17 fulltext: (Joseph, political writer for US News, “The Battle for the Judiciary” https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2017-08-02/democrats-take-aim-at-trumps-judicial-appointments) When Senate Republicans linked arms to keep former President Barack Obama from replacing the late Justice Antonin Scalia on the Supreme Court, irate Democrats said the extraordinary move was the capstone of a 16-month GOP campaign: Stop Obama from filling vacancies on the federal bench, by any means necessary. Besides depriving the president of an opportunity to shape the lower courts, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell's gambit denied Obama his right to create, among other things, a left-leaning feeder system for future Supreme Court nominees. The blockade seemed to pay big dividends: When President Donald Trump won the White House, he inherited more than 100 judicial vacancies McConnell forced Obama to leave behind. The GOP's well-laid plans to move the federal courts to the right, however, has been ambushed by the Democrats' counterattack. Using the political equivalent of guerrilla warfare – insisting on following arcane legislative rules, withholding approval of home-state nominees and generally throwing sand in the Senate machinery – the minority party has ground Republicans' judicial agenda to a halt. Those tactics have kept Trump and his Senate allies from addressing a judicial system with so many vacancies that legal experts on both sides have called it a crisis. "We have the Democrats playing politics and putting up huge roadblocks to confirmation," says Carrie Severino, chief counsel and policy director of the conservative Judicial Crisis Network. "They're attempting to use every procedural tactic that they can to block [Trump's] judges." A Trump administration official complained to The Washington Times earlier this month that Democrats are dragging their feet. "The administration has been seeking consultation from home-state [Democratic] senators [who represent the nominees] for months – even as senators frequently fail to return our calls, don't respond to our inquiries and otherwise avoid our constant overtures," the official said. Severino says the Democrats have stalled or blocked some two dozen nominees, including some who had won bipartisan praise. The stalling, she says, is apparent "if you look at the numbers of the roll-call votes that they've required and the amount of time they've required – 30 hours of debate – on candidates that historically were just voice votes" easily confirmed. "The party in the minority has dug in its heels," Severino says, "and tried to throw as many wrenches in the works" as possible. At the same time, the Democrats are attempting to make Damien Schiff, a nominee for a judgeship on the somewhat obscure U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the poster boy for what they say is the Republicans' far-right agenda for the courts. Besides his membership in conservative legal organizations and involvement in like-minded causes, they point to Schiff's acid-tongued critique of Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court's swing justice, as "a judicial prostitute." "Schiff is absolutely not fit to serve as a federal judge. He disparages sitting Supreme Court Justices, environmental advocates, and progressive scholars," according to a 21-page dossier on him by the liberal Alliance for Justice. "He believes that the role of judges is not to apply law to facts and decide cases without bias, but to be a 'catalyst to real reform' that would upend the 'excrescences of the New Deal and Great Society eras.'" Nan Aron, AFJ's president, says outnumbered Senate Democrats, stripped of the filibuster, are using every tool at their disposal to stop the GOP from remaking the federal judiciary with nominees out of the mainstream of American values. "The fact that some judges are so extreme is succeeding in galvanizing both Democrats and progressive constituencies to prioritize" Trump's judicial agenda. "For me that's the biggest thing," Aron says. But Trump isn't giving up and seems intent on filling the vacancies. "Through July 14, roughly a week shy of Trump's six-month anniversary in office, he had nominated 18 people for district judgeship vacancies, 14 for circuit courts and the Court of Federal Claims, and 23 for US attorney slots," according to a Business Insider report. "During that same timeframe in President Barack Obama's first term, Obama had nominated just four district judges, five appeals court judges, and 13 US attorneys. In total, Trump nominated 55 people, and Obama just 22." The intense pace notwithstanding, however, just four of Trump's judicial nominees have actually won Senate approval for the federal bench. That includes the confirmation of Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch. And the bulk of them are highly conservative, hand-picked and vetted by conservative legal think tanks like the Heritage Foundation. The online magazine Slate.com dubbed them "polemicists in robes," noting some would get lifetime appointments if confirmed. "This will be the single most important legacy of the Trump administration," Sen. Chris Coons, a Delaware Democrat and member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, told Business Insider. If conservatives have their way, he said, the Senate would "put judges on circuit courts all over the country, district courts all over the country, that will, given their youth and conservatism, will have a significant impact on the shape and trajectory of American law for decades." Coons could have been referring to Schiff, a senior attorney specializing in environmental law at the Pacific Legal Foundation, a California-based conservative nonprofit. In addition to his impolitic remarks about Kennedy, Schiff also "'strongly disagree[d]' with the high court's decision striking down prosecution of gay people under sodomy laws," Ronald A. Klain, a former White House aide under Obama, wrote in The Washington Post. "Another [Trump nominee] equated the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, upholding a woman's right to choose to have an abortion, to the court's 19th-century Dred Scott finding that black people could not be U.S. citizens. Another advocated an Alabama law that denied counsel to death-row inmates." The judicial nominee who compared abortion to the Scott decision is John Bush, a controversial conservative blogger who writes about politics and the law. On July 20, the Senate confirmed him to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on a 51-47 party-line vote. "It's alarming, the backgrounds of the people who have been nominated," says Caroline Fredrickson, president of the liberal American Constitution Society. "They reflect the interests that [Federalist Society official] Leonard Leo expressed: 'Making the federal courts unrecognizable.' I think we're all scared about what that means." Leo, the Federalist Society's executive vice president and well-connected in conservative circles, shepherded the Supreme Court nominations of Chief Justice John Roberts as well as Samuel Alito and Gorsuch through the Senate. Last fall, Leo gave then-candidate Trump a list of 21 conservative jurists selected for the high court, including Gorsuch; the president vowed to select Supreme Court nominees from the list. While White House shakeups and the fight to repeal the Affordable Care Act have grabbed headlines, the low-key battle over the judiciary is extremely important, Fredrickson says. "The judicial nominations reflect our future as a nation for decades," and could determine the direction of abortion and gay rights, she says. "For that reason, people need to be paying attention and I do think that as we move off some of these national debates we can focus people's energy on our judicial structure and some of the damage that's being done" under Trump. Aron says she believes the debate over healthcare – and the fact that some Republican senators allied with Democrats to fight off the GOP's attempts to repeal a popular government program – could become a watershed moment in the fight over Trump's nominees. "It's important to note that the political winds are shifting," she says. "That, with Trump's poll numbers continuing to decline, greater numbers of individuals will want the courts to stand as a check on his excesses. The more people come to understand what courts and judges do, we believe, the more they will begin to weigh in on judgeships" and pressure Republicans. But Severino says the Democrats' strategy is undermining the court system, as well as blatantly hypocritical and is "gumming up" a legislative system that should work more efficiently. "It isn't doing a good service to the American people," she says. Still, even some top Republicans admit that Democrats are serving up some payback for similar drag-and-delay tactics the GOP deployed against Obama's judicial nominees. "We became pretty good at it ourselves," Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, McConnell's top ally, told The New York Times last week. But he and other Republicans say Democrats have kicked it up a notch against the Trump administration; by one GOP estimate, at the current pace it would take Republicans 11 years to fill all the leftover Obama vacancies. Though Severino acknowledges Republicans slowed things to a crawl during Obama's second term, they had that right, she says, because voters made them the Senate majority in 2014. Minority Democrats, she says, are thwarting voters who put Trump in the White House and kept the GOP in control of the Senate.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4><strong>There’s no risk of court packing -- democrats will push back against it</h4><p>Williams 17</p><p></strong>(Joseph, political writer for US News, “The Battle for the Judiciary” <u>https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2017-08-02/democrats-take-aim-at-trumps-judicial-appointments)</p><p><mark>When </mark>Senate <mark>Republicans linked </mark>arms <mark>to keep </mark>former President Barack <mark>Obama from replacing </mark>the late Justice Antonin <mark>Scalia </mark>on the Supreme Court, irate Democrats said the extraordinary move was the capstone of a 16-month GOP campaign</u>: Stop Obama from filling vacancies on the federal bench, by any means necessary. Besides depriving the president of an opportunity to shape the lower courts, Senate Majority Leader Mitch <u><mark>McConnell's gambit denied Obama his right to create</mark>, among other things, <mark>a left-leaning </mark>feeder system for future Supreme <mark>Court </mark>nominees. The blockade seemed to pay big dividends: When President Donald Trump won the White House</u>, he inherited more than 100 judicial vacancies McConnell forced Obama to leave behind. <u><mark>The GOP's </mark>well-laid <mark>plans to move the federal courts to the right</mark>, however, <mark>has been ambushed by the Democrats' counterattack. </mark>Using <mark>the political equivalent of guerrilla warfare </mark>– insisting on <mark>following arcane </mark>legislative <mark>rules</mark>, <mark>withholding approval </mark>of home-state nominees <mark>and </mark>generally <mark>throwing sand in the Senate machinery </mark>– the minority party has ground Republicans' judicial agenda to a halt. <mark>Those tactics have kept Trump and his </mark>Senate <mark>allies from addressing a judicial system with </mark>so many <mark>vacancies </mark>that legal experts on both sides have called it a crisis</u>. "<u>We have </u>the <u><mark>Democrats </mark>playing politics and <mark>put</mark>ting <mark>up </mark>huge <mark>roadblocks </u></mark>to confirmation," says Carrie Severino, chief counsel and policy director of the conservative Judicial Crisis Network. "<u>They</u>'re attempting to <u>use <mark>every </mark>procedural <mark>tactic that they can to block [Trump's] judges</mark>." </u>A Trump administration official complained to The Washington Times earlier this month that Democrats are dragging their feet. "The administration has been seeking consultation from home-state [Democratic] senators [who represent the nominees] for months – even as senators frequently fail to return our calls, don't respond to our inquiries and otherwise avoid our constant overtures," the official said. Severino says the <u><mark>Democrats have </mark>stalled or <mark>blocked some two dozen nominees</mark>,</p><p></u> including some who had won bipartisan praise. <u><mark>The stalling,</mark> she says<mark>, is apparent "if you look at the numbers</mark> of the roll-call votes that they've required <mark>and </mark>the amount of <mark>time they've required </mark>– 30 hours of debate – on candidates that historically were just voice votes" easily confirmed. "<mark>The party in the minority has dug in its heels</u></mark>," Severino says, "<u><mark>and tried to throw</mark> as many <mark>wrenches in the works</u></mark>" as possible. At the same time, the Democrats are attempting to make Damien Schiff, a nominee for a judgeship on the somewhat obscure U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the poster boy for what they say is the Republicans' far-right agenda for the courts. Besides his membership in conservative legal organizations and involvement in like-minded causes, they point to Schiff's acid-tongued critique of Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court's swing justice, as "a judicial prostitute." "Schiff is absolutely not fit to serve as a federal judge. He disparages sitting Supreme Court Justices, environmental advocates, and progressive scholars," according to a 21-page dossier on him by the liberal Alliance for Justice. "He believes that the role of judges is not to apply law to facts and decide cases without bias, but to be a 'catalyst to real reform' that would upend the 'excrescences of the New Deal and Great Society eras.'" Nan Aron, AFJ's president, says outnumbered Senate Democrats, stripped of the filibuster, are using every tool at their disposal to stop the GOP from remaking the federal judiciary with nominees out of the mainstream of American values. "The fact that some judges are so extreme is succeeding in galvanizing both Democrats and progressive constituencies to prioritize" Trump's judicial agenda. "For me that's the biggest thing," Aron says. But Trump isn't giving up and seems intent on filling the vacancies. "Through July 14, roughly a week shy of Trump's six-month anniversary in office, he had nominated 18 people for district judgeship vacancies, 14 for circuit courts and the Court of Federal Claims, and 23 for US attorney slots," according to a Business Insider report. "During that same timeframe in President Barack Obama's first term, Obama had nominated just four district judges, five appeals court judges, and 13 US attorneys. In total, Trump nominated 55 people, and Obama just 22." <u>The intense pace notwithstanding, however, <mark>just four of Trump's judicial nominees have actually won Senate approval </mark>for the federal bench</u>. That includes the confirmation of Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch. And the bulk of them are highly conservative, hand-picked and vetted by conservative legal think tanks like the Heritage Foundation. The online magazine Slate.com dubbed them "polemicists in robes," noting some would get lifetime appointments if confirmed. "This will be the single most important legacy of the Trump administration," Sen. Chris Coons, a Delaware Democrat and member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, told Business Insider<u>. If conservatives have their way, he said, the Senate would "put judges on circuit courts all over the country, district courts all over the country, that will, given their youth and conservatism, will have a significant impact on the shape and trajectory of American law for decades.</u>" Coons could have been referring to Schiff, a senior attorney specializing in environmental law at the Pacific Legal Foundation, a California-based conservative nonprofit. In addition to his impolitic remarks about Kennedy, Schiff also "'strongly disagree[d]' with the high court's decision striking down prosecution of gay people under sodomy laws," Ronald A. Klain, a former White House aide under Obama, wrote in The Washington Post. "Another [Trump nominee] equated the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, upholding a woman's right to choose to have an abortion, to the court's 19th-century Dred Scott finding that black people could not be U.S. citizens. Another advocated an Alabama law that denied counsel to death-row inmates." The judicial nominee who compared abortion to the Scott decision is John Bush, a controversial conservative blogger who writes about politics and the law. On July 20, the Senate confirmed him to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on a 51-47 party-line vote. "It's alarming, the backgrounds of the people who have been nominated," says Caroline Fredrickson, president of the liberal American Constitution Society. "They reflect the interests that [Federalist Society official] Leonard Leo expressed: 'Making the federal courts unrecognizable.' I think we're all scared about what that means." Leo, the Federalist Society's executive vice president and well-connected in conservative circles, shepherded the Supreme Court nominations of Chief Justice John Roberts as well as Samuel Alito and Gorsuch through the Senate. Last fall, Leo gave then-candidate Trump a list of 21 conservative jurists selected for the high court, including Gorsuch; the president vowed to select Supreme Court nominees from the list. While White House shakeups and the fight to repeal the Affordable Care Act have grabbed headlines, <u><mark>the </u></mark>low-key <u><mark>battle over the judiciary is extremely important</u></mark>, Fredrickson says. "The judicial nominations reflect our future as a nation for decades," and could determine the direction of abortion and gay rights, she says. "For that reason, people need to be paying attention and I do think that as we move off some of these national debates we can focus people's energy on our judicial structure and some of the damage that's being done" under Trump. Aron says she believes the debate over healthcare – and <u>the fact that </u>some <u><mark>Republican senators allied with Democrats to fight off the GOP</u></mark>'s attempts to repeal a popular government program – <u>could become a watershed moment in the fight over Trump's nominees. </u>"It's important to note that the political winds are shifting," she says. "That, <u><mark>with Trump's poll numbers continuing to decline, greater numbers of individuals will want the courts to stand as a check on his excesses</u></mark>. The more people come to understand what courts and judges do, we believe, the more they will begin to weigh in on judgeships" and pressure Republicans. But Severino says the Democrats' strategy is undermining the court system, as well as blatantly hypocritical and is "gumming up" a legislative system that should work more efficiently. "It isn't doing a good service to the American people," she says. Still, even some top Republicans admit that Democrats are serving up some payback for similar drag-and-delay tactics the GOP deployed against Obama's judicial nominees. "We became pretty good at it ourselves," <u>Sen. John Cornyn </u>of Texas, McConnell's top ally, told The New York Times last week. But he <u>and other Republicans say <mark>Democrats have kicked it up a notch against the Trump administration</mark>; by one GOP estimate, at the current pace <mark>it would take Republicans 11 years to fill all the </mark>leftover <mark>Obama vacancies</mark>.</u> Though Severino acknowledges Republicans slowed things to a crawl during Obama's second term, they had that right, she says, because voters made them the Senate majority in 2014. Minority Democrats, she says, are thwarting voters who put Trump in the White House and kept the GOP in control of the Senate.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Mills 12 (Charles, PhD from the University of Toronto, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, City University of New York; “Occupy Liberalism! Or Ten reasons why Liberalism Cannot Be Retrieved for Radicalism (And Why They’re All Wrong),” Radical Philosophy Review, 15(2), 305-323, 2012) fulltext: 2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—I (Macro) The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. (So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points: people were shaped by society and society (post-"primitive communism") was class-dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But whatever candidates are put forward, the key claim is that a liberal frame-work cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships. But this evasive ontology, which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage—viz., that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another—is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression: the absolutism it opposed in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the Nazism and Stalinism it opposed in the twentieth century. Liberalism's failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism's conceptual apparatus. In the preface to her recent Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd makes a striking point: that hers is the first book-length treatment of the subject in the analytic tradition.' Philosophy, the discipline whose special mandate it is to illuminate justice and injustice for us, has had very little to say about injustice and oppression because of the social background of the majority of its thinkers. In political theory and political philosophy, the theorists who developed the dominant varieties of liberalism have come overwhelmingly from the hegemonic groups of the liberal social order (bourgeois white males). So it is really not surprising that, given this background, their socio-political and epistemic standpoint has tended to reproduce rather than challenge group privilege. Consider Rawls, famously weak on gender and with next to nothing to say about race. Rawlsian "ideal theory," which has dominated mainstream political philosophy for the last four decades, marginalizes such concerns not contingently but structurally. If your focus from the start is principles of distributive justice for a "well-ordered society," then social oppression cannot be part of the picture, since by definition an oppressive society is not a well-ordered one. As Cudd points out, A Theory of justice "leaves injustice virtually untheorized," operating on the assumption "that injustice is merely the negation of justice."9 But radically unjust societies—those characterized by major rather than minor deviations from ideality—will be different from just societies not merely morally but metaphysically. What Cudd calls "non-voluntary social groups" will be central to their makeup, so that a conceptualization of such groups must be central to any adequate account of social oppression: "without positing social groups as causally efficacious entities, we cannot explain oppression:' Contra the conventional wisdom in radical circles, however, she is insistent that the ontology of such groups can be explained "[using] current social science, in the form of cognitive psychology and modern economic theory, and situat[ing] itself in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal political philosophy."9 Identifying "intentionalist" and "structuralist" approaches as the two broad categories of competing theorizations of social groups, she recommends as the best option a compatibilist position, holding that while all action is intentionally guided, many of the constraints within which we act are socially determined and beyond the control of the currently acting individual; to put a slogan on it, intentions dynamically interact within social structures.... My theory of nonvoluntary social groups fits the description of what Philip Pettit calls "holistic individualism," which means that the social regularities associated with nonvoluntary social groups supervene on intentional states, and at the same time, group membership in these and voluntary social groups partly constitutes the intentional states of individuals. If Cudd is right, then, such a theorization can indeed be developed with-in a liberal framework, using the resources of analytic social and normative theory. But such a development of the theory is not merely permissible, but should be seen as mandatory, given liberalism's nominal commitment to individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism. These values simply cannot be achieved unless the obstacles to their realization are identified and theorized. Social-democratic (left) liberalism, feminist liberalism, black liberalism, all historically represent attempts to take these structural realities into account for the purposes of rethinking dominant liberalism." They are attempts to get right, to map accurately, the actual ontology of the societies for which liberalism is prescribing principles of justice. What Cudd's book demonstrates is that it is the ignoring of this ontology of group domination that is the real betrayal of the liberal project. A well-ordered society will not have nonvoluntary social groups as part of its ontology. So the path to the "realistic utopia" Rawls is supposedly outlining would crucially require normative prescriptions for eliminating such groups. That no such guidelines are offered is undeniably an indictment of ideal-theory liberal-ism, which is thereby exposed as both epistemologically and ontologically inadequate. But that does not rule out a reconceptualized liberalism, a non-Ideal-theory liberalism that, starting from a different social metaphysic, requires a different normative strategy for theorizing justice. 3. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology-11 (Micro) But (it will be replied) liberalism suffers from a deeper theoretical inadequacy. Even if it may be conceded that liberal theory can recognize oppression at the macro-level, it will be argued that its individualism prevents it from recognizing how profoundly, at the micro-level, individuals are shaped by structures of social oppression. Class, race, and gender belongings penetrate deeply into the ontology of the individual in ways rendered opaque (it will be claimed) by liberalism's foundational individualism. But what those seeking to retrieve liberalism would point out is that we need to distinguish different senses of "individualism." The individualism that is foundational to liberalism is a normative individualism (as in the Gray quote above), which makes individuals rather than social collectivities the locus of value. But that does not require any denial that individuals are shaped in their character (the "second nature" famously highlighted by left theory) by oppressive social forces and related group memberships. Once the first two criticisms have been refuted—that liberal individuals cannot be "social;' and that the involuntary group memberships central to the social in oppressive societies cannot be accommodated within a liberal frame-work—then this third criticism collapses with them also. One can without inconsistency affirm both the value of the individual and the importance of recognizing how the individual is socially molded, especially when the environing social structures are oppressive ones. As already noted, dominant liberalism tends to ignore or marginalize such constraints, assuming as its representative figures individuals not merely morally equal, but socially recognized as morally equal, and equi-powerful rather than group-differentiated into the privileged and the subordinated. But this misleading normative and descriptive picture is a function of a political agenda complicit with the status quo, not a necessary implication of liberalism's core assumptions. A revisionist, radical liberalism would make the analysis of group oppression, the denial of equal standing to the majority of the population, and their impact on the individual's ontology, a theoretical priority. Thus Cudd's book, after explicating the ontology of involuntary groups, goes on to detail the various different ways, through violence, economic constraint, discrimination, group harassment, and the internalization of psychological oppression, that the subordinated are shaped by group domination. But nothing in her account is meant to imply either that they thereby cease to be individuals, or that their involuntary group memberships preclude a normative liberal condemnation of the injustice of their treatment.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Liberalism is the <u>only</u> set of values capable of meaningfully criticizing oppression <u>and</u> creating a normative theorization of justice. Their criticism is of dominant varieties of liberalism, <u>not</u> its core tenets.</h4><p><strong>Mills 12</strong> (Charles, PhD from the University of Toronto, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, City University of New York; “Occupy Liberalism! Or Ten reasons why Liberalism Cannot Be Retrieved for Radicalism (And Why They’re<u><strong> All Wrong),” Radical Philosophy Review, 15(2), 305-323, 2012)</p><p></u></strong>2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—I (Macro) The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. (So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points: people were shaped by society and society (post-"primitive communism") was class-dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. <u>Today <mark>radicals</u></mark> would <u><mark>demand a </mark>richer <mark>ontology that </mark>can <mark>accommodate</mark> the realities of gender and <mark>racial oppression</u></mark> also. But <u>whatever candidates are put forward, the key claim is that a liberal frame-work cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination</u>. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships. But <u>this evasive <mark>ontology</u></mark>, <u>which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage</u>—viz., <u>that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another</u>—<u><mark>is <strong>n</mark>o<mark>t </mark>a definitional <mark>constituent of liberalism</u></strong></mark>. <u>Liberalism</u> has certainly <u>recognized</u> <u>some</u> kinds of <u>oppression</u>: the <u>absolutism</u> it opposed <u>in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries</u>, the <u>Nazism</u> and <u>Stalinism</u> it opposed in the twentieth century. <u><mark>Liberalism's failure to </mark>systematically <mark>address structural oppression</mark> in supposedly liberal-democratic societies <mark>is a contingent artifact </mark>of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, <strong><mark>not </mark>an <mark>intrinsic </mark>feature of liberalism's conceptual apparatus</u></strong>. In the preface to her recent Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd makes a striking point: that hers is the first book-length treatment of the subject in the analytic tradition.' Philosophy, the discipline whose special mandate it is to illuminate justice and injustice for us, has had very little to say about injustice and oppression because of the social background of the majority of its thinkers. In political theory and political philosophy, the theorists who developed the dominant varieties of liberalism have come overwhelmingly from the hegemonic groups of the liberal social order (bourgeois white males). So it is really not surprising that, given this background, their socio-political and epistemic standpoint has tended to reproduce rather than challenge group privilege. Consider Rawls, famously weak on gender and with next to nothing to say about race. Rawlsian "ideal theory," which has dominated mainstream political philosophy for the last four decades, marginalizes such concerns not contingently but structurally. If your focus from the start is principles of distributive justice for a "well-ordered society," then social oppression cannot be part of the picture, since by definition an oppressive society is not a well-ordered one. As Cudd points out, A Theory of justice "leaves injustice virtually untheorized," operating on the assumption "that injustice is merely the negation of justice."9 But radically unjust societies—those characterized by major rather than minor deviations from ideality—will be different from just societies not merely morally but metaphysically. What Cudd calls "non-voluntary social groups" will be central to their makeup, so that a conceptualization of such groups must be central to any adequate account of social oppression: "without positing social groups as causally efficacious entities, we cannot explain oppression:' Contra the conventional wisdom in radical circles, however, she is insistent that the ontology of such groups can be explained "[using] current social science, in the form of cognitive psychology and modern economic theory, and situat[ing] itself in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal political philosophy."9 <u>Identifying "intentionalist" and "structuralist" approaches as the two broad categories of competing theorizations of social groups, she recommends</u> as the best option <u>a compatibilist position, holding that while all action is intentionally guided, many of the constraints within which we act are socially determined and beyond the control of the currently acting individual</u>; to put a slogan on it, <u>intentions <strong>dynamically interact within social structures</strong>.</u>... My theory of nonvoluntary social groups fits the description of what Philip Pettit calls "holistic individualism," which means that the social regularities associated with nonvoluntary social groups supervene on intentional states, and at the same time, <u>group membership</u> in these and voluntary social groups <u>partly constitutes the intentional states of individuals</u>. If Cudd is right, then, <u>such a theorization can indeed be developed with-in a liberal framework</u>, <u>using the resources of analytic social and normative theory.</u> But <u>such a development</u> of the theory is not merely permissible, but <u>should be seen as mandatory</u>, <u>given liberalism's nominal commitment to individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism</u>. These values simply cannot be achieved unless the obstacles to their realization are identified and theorized. <u><mark>Social-democratic</u></mark> (left) <u>liberalism</u>, <u><mark>feminist</mark> liberalism</u>, <u><mark>black liberalism</u></mark>, all historically represent attempts to take these structural realities into account for the purposes of rethinking dominant liberalism." <u>They are attempts to</u> get right, to <u><mark>map</mark> accurately</u>, <u><mark>the</mark> actual <mark>ontology of the societies </mark>for which liberalism is prescribing principles of justice</u>. What Cudd's book demonstrates is that it is the ignoring of this ontology of group domination that is the real betrayal of the liberal project. A well-ordered society will not have nonvoluntary social groups as part of its ontology. So <u>the path to the "realistic utopia" Rawls is supposedly outlining would crucially require normative prescriptions for eliminating such groups</u>. That no such guidelines are offered is undeniably an indictment of ideal-theory liberal-ism, which is thereby exposed as both epistemologically and ontologically inadequate. But <u>that does not rule out a reconceptualized liberalism</u>, a non-Ideal-theory <u><strong><mark>liberalism</u></strong></mark> that, starting from a different social metaphysic, <u><strong><mark>requires a </mark>different <mark>normative strategy for theorizing justice</u></strong></mark>. 3. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology-11 (Micro) But (it will be replied) liberalism suffers from a deeper theoretical inadequacy. Even if it may be conceded that liberal theory can recognize oppression at the macro-level, <u>it will be argued that its individualism prevents it from recognizing how profoundly</u>, at the micro-level, <u>individuals are shaped by structures of social oppression</u>. <u>Class, race, and gender belongings penetrate deeply into the ontology of the individual in ways rendered opaque</u> (it will be claimed) <u>by</u> <u>liberalism's foundational individualism</u>. But what those seeking to retrieve liberalism would point out is that <u><strong>we need to distinguish different senses of "individualism</u></strong>." <u>The individualism that is foundational to <mark>liberalism is </mark>a <strong><mark>normative individualism</u></strong></mark> (as in the Gray quote above), <u>which makes individuals rather than social collectivities the locus of value</u>. But <u><mark>that does n</mark>o<mark>t </mark>require any <mark>deni</mark>al <mark>that individuals are shaped </mark>in their character</u> (the "second nature" famously highlighted by left theory) <u><mark>by oppressive </mark>social <mark>forces</mark> and related group memberships</u>. Once the first two criticisms have been refuted—that liberal individuals cannot be "social;' and that the involuntary group memberships central to the social in oppressive societies cannot be accommodated within a liberal frame-work—then this third criticism collapses with them also. <u>One can without inconsistency affirm both the value of the individual and the importance of recognizing how the individual is socially molded</u>, <u>especially when the environing social structures are oppressive ones</u>. As already noted, dominant liberalism tends to ignore or marginalize such constraints, assuming as its representative figures individuals not merely morally equal, but socially recognized as morally equal, and equi-powerful rather than group-differentiated into the privileged and the subordinated. <u>But <mark>this misleading </mark>normative and descriptive <mark>picture is a function of a </mark>political <mark>agenda</mark> complicit with the status quo</u>, <u><mark>not</mark> a necessary implication of <strong><mark>liberalism's core assumptions</u></strong></mark>. <u>A revisionist, <mark>radical liberalism would make </mark>the analysis of <mark>group oppression</u></mark>, <u>the denial of equal standing to the majority of the population,</u> <u>and their impact on the individual's ontology</u>, <u><strong><mark>a theoretical priority</u></strong></mark>. Thus Cudd's book, after explicating the ontology of involuntary groups, goes on to detail the various different ways, through violence, economic constraint, discrimination, group harassment, and the internalization of psychological oppression, that the subordinated are shaped by group domination. But <u>nothing</u> in her account <u>is meant to imply</u> either that they thereby cease to be individuals, or <u>that their involuntary group memberships <strong>preclude a normative liberal condemnation of the injustice of their treatment. </p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Patel 14 – PhD in Curriculum Development at Boston College [Lisa (Leigh) Patel (2014), Countering Coloniality in Educational Research: From Ownership to Answerability, Educational Studies, 50:4, 357-377, DOI: 10.1080/00131946.2014.924942, Accesed via Taylor Francis Online] fulltext: Settler colonization trains people to see each other, the land, and knowledge as property, to be in constant insatiable competition for limited resources. For the vantage of the settler, the focus becomes maintaining those property rights, and all others are positioned in relative locations around that center, being erased from visibility or antithetically supporting the settler center while never being able to achieve its status. But even a cursory understanding of cognition, culture, and consciousness tells us that, as Bakhtin (1986) theorized, our ideas, our words, have all been said before. He put it like this: Every utterance must be regarded as primarily a response to preceding utterances of the given sphere [we understand the word ‘response’ here in the broadest sense]. Each utterance refutes affirms, supplements, and relies upon the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into account ... . Therefore, each kind of utterance is filled with various kinds of responsive reactions to other utterances of the given sphere of speech communication. (91) Bakhtin meant response not only in the literal sense of what was just uttered before, but in a much farther-reaching sense, including people near and far in myriad contexts. Responses involve speakers and listeners. There is an answerability in the roles we have with each other. How we interact is not just about that specific moment and context, but echoes across contexts. It’s related to poststructural feminist theorizations of subjectivity (e.g., Ahmed 2006; Grosz 1994), in that the ways that we come into being in space and time, how we carry ourselves and act, are dynamic mixtures of affordances that have been shaped by and echo longstanding yet not sealed histories (Gordon 1994). Our social locations and histories have an impact on not just what we say but how we say it, and what meanings are made of our utterances. Considering educational research’s role in the perpetuation of settler-slave-Indigenous relationships, those of us employed as educational researchers are answerable to these deep trajectories. Given these deep trajectories, research and researchers who have succeeded, have been validated through settler colonial structures of schooling and, consequentially, also have contributed to creating a science that reflects misunderstandings about race, class, and gender (Jordan-Young 2011). Educational researchers must, as one example, answer to ways in which the field has allowed for learning to be lost in the pursuit of test score-driven achievement. Answerability means that we have responsibilities as speakers, listeners, and those responsibilities include stewardship of ideas and learning, not ownership. As educational researchers, how can we become and stay fundamentally answerable to the core endeavor of learning, not test score production or unachievable achievement in a stratified society? Learning, like all practices, is conducted in context so cannot be seen as a cordoned off space that is not subject to settler colonial relations. Rather, learning is fundamentally about coming into being and altering that being; in other words, it is a subjective act. Coming into being is, in essence, about being-in-relation. Therefore, the study, theorizing, and praxis of learning is the space our integrity should hold and where it has, instead, shown the most discipline-specific manifestations of settler colonialism. How educational research serves learning provides a place to more fully embody decolonial stances, as it has the potential to materially alter how educational research is conducted and for what purposes. I propose a repositioning toward learning, an alteration of researching bodies in places. For this, I must draw on work largely outside educational research. In her study of the places of learning found in media, architecture, and pedagogy, Ellsworth (2005) draws attention to the fundamentally transitional space that is learning. Rather than how the tradition of schooling has materially designed conditions for the transmittal and disciplined mimicry of expert knowledge, and educational research has, in turn and in cahoots, truncated learning to be measureable achievement, meant to be predicted, Ellsworth encourages the reader to think about the conditions that make learning possible but still unpredictable. She follows the traditions of thinkers like Grosz (1995), Massumi (1995), and Winnicott (1989), who attend to the social self as one in constant motion, constantly reconfiguring itself, learning, in relation to time, space, and materiality. She wrote: Learning never takes place in the absence of bodies, emotions, place, time, sound, image, self-experience, history. It always detours through memory, forgetting, desire, fear, pleasure, surprise, rewriting. And because learning takes place in relation, its detours take us up to and sometimes across the boundaries of habit, recognition, and the socially constructed identities within our selves. (Ellsworth 2005, 55) Through several examples, Ellsworth draws our attention to, in part, the interior changes involved in spaces designed for pedagogy. For example, in discussing how the Civil Rights Museum in Birmingham sets up exterior conditions for interior alterity, Ellsworth (2005) writes, “Such places of learning implicate bodies in pedagogy in ways that the field of education has seldom explored. As they do this, they encourage and challenge us to move away from understanding the learning self merely through notions of cognition, psychology, or phenomenology or as being subjected to ideology” (6). Core to this framing is learning as a constant becoming and unbecoming, a constant inquiry and coordinate-taking, which sounds a lot like what research is supposed to be. Such a stance opens up spaces to depart from paradigms that theorize freedom, here to learn, as defined relative to restrictions, as in freedom from, but rather freedom as expansive, as in freedom to (Grosz 2010). Learning and knowledge, then, are better approached, particularly in the name of decolonization, as fundamentally quixotic, even wild (Sandoval 2008). Consider another example of learning, also imbued with research, this one from choreography. In 2009, an actor named Gregg Mozgala started to work with choreographer Tamar Rogoff (Genzlinger 2009). Mozgala has cerebral palsy, and Rogoff has no formal understanding of the biology, neuroscience, or physical therapy knowledges of cerebral palsy. But their way of working together and taking cues from his body, rather than working around it, altered deeply his way of being with his body. And what they did was use the principles of research—looking, inquiring, keeping track, and doing it all over again constantly. Like the pauses noted at the start of this article, meaning making and performance was interrupted, slowed down, with observation and bio feedback to return again. This created the space for learning and knowledge production. More specifically, Rogoff introduced Mozgala to a tension-releasing shaking technique. They began doing intensive oneon-one sessions of body work, Ms. Rogoff using her knowledge of the body and dance-training techniques to help Mr. Mozgala find individual bones, muscles, and tendons that he had thought were just collateral damage of the cerebral palsy. Much of this, in the medical field, would be understood to be evidence of neuroplasticity, and although it certainly is, it also speaks fundamentally to what research is. It is contextual, it is about constant coordination of self with other, self within self, and it is in constant motion. I offer these extra-educational examples not to barter in tacit antiintellectualism or to imply that deep, rigorous, discipline-specific study is unimportant, but to promote a radical reconfiguration of being and being-inrelation to knowledge and learning, to foreground “a politics of liberation rather than a politics of recognition” (A. Smith 2010, para 31). If we are to be other than owners invested in settler colonialism, educational research needs a radical restructuring of its relationship to knowledge. Rather than property, we should see knowledge, and more specifically knowledge about learning, as what we are answerable to. We should see ourselves as stewards not of specific pieces of knowledge, but rather of the productive and generative spaces that allow for finding knowledge. To be sure, this is not a new thought or appeal. Much of postmodern and poststructural thought embraces the idea that human practices are much more complex than can be predicted through fine-tuned measurements. Rather, my appeal is that we cease to see the problem in educational research as the lack of application of these ideologies. The problem is not simply one of failure to execute postmodernist or poststructural thought in practice, as these epistemologies do not, in and of themselves, include a critique of the genealogies of coloniality. Interrogating the logics of settler colonialism frees us to counter those logics. It also demands a productively more precise articulation of researcher reflexivity in relation to settler colonial structures. This kind of being-in-relation addresses and destabilizes potentially deterministic readings of settler colonial structures as some being settlers and others not, which in turn runs the danger of locating responsibility to counter coloniality partial rather than pervasive. Spivak (1990) addressed the less useful pauses that some of her White male students expressed when they had come to grips with their social locations, pauses that were more self-serving than answerable to structures of coloniality. She explained: I say to them: ‘Why not develop a certain degree of rage against the history that has written such an abject script for you that you are silenced?’ Then you begin to investigate what it is that silences you, rather than take this very deterministic position. ... From this position, then, I say you will of course not speak in the same way about the Third World material, but if you make it your task not only to learn what is going on there through language, through specific programmes of study, but also at the same time through a historical critique of your position as the investigating person, then you will see that you have earned the right to criticize, and you will be heard. (62–63).<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Debate marks the <u>archival accumulation</u> of settler colonial patterns of research-making. Learning is an <u>iterative process</u> that <u>can be disrupted</u> <u> </h4><p></u><strong>Patel 14</strong> – PhD in Curriculum Development at Boston College [Lisa (Leigh) Patel (2014), Countering Coloniality in Educational Research: From Ownership to Answerability, Educational Studies, 50:4, 357-377, DOI: 10.1080/00131946.2014.924942, Accesed via Taylor Francis Online] </p><p><u><mark>Settler colonization</u> <u><strong>trains</u></strong> <u>people to see<strong> </mark>each other</strong>, the <strong><mark>land</strong></mark>, and <strong>knowledge</strong> as <strong>property</u></strong>, <u>to be in </u>constant <u><strong>insatiable</strong> competition</u> for limited resources. For the vantage of the settler, <u>the focus becomes maintaining those property right</u>s, and <u>all others are positioned in relative locations around that center</u>, <u>being <strong>erased</strong> from visibility or</u> antithetically <u>supporting the settler center while never being able to achieve its status</u>. But <u>even a cursory understanding of cognition</u>, culture, and consciousness <u>tells us that</u>, as Bakhtin (1986) theorized, <u>our <strong>ideas</strong>, our words<strong>, have all been said before</u></strong>. He put it like this: <u>Every utterance must be regarded as</u> primarily <u><mark>a response</mark> to preceding utterances of the given sphere</u> [we understand the word ‘response’ here in the broadest sense]. <u>Each utterance <mark>refutes affirms</mark>, <mark>supplements, and relies upon</mark> the <mark>others</mark>, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into account</u> ... . Therefore, <u>each kind of utterance is filled with</u> various kinds of <u>responsive reactions to other utterances</u> of the given sphere of speech communication. (91) Bakhtin meant response not only in the literal sense of what was just uttered before, but in a much farther-reaching sense, including people near and far in myriad contexts. <u><mark>Responses involve speakers and</mark> <mark>listeners</mark>. There is an answerability in the roles we have with each other. How we interact is not just about that specific moment and context, but echoes across contexts</u>. It’s related to poststructural feminist theorizations of subjectivity (e.g., Ahmed 2006; Grosz 1994), in that the ways that we come into being in space and time, how we carry ourselves and act, are dynamic mixtures of affordances that have been shaped by and echo longstanding yet not sealed histories (Gordon 1994). <u>Our <mark>social locations</mark> and histories <mark>have an impact on</mark> not just what we say but how we<mark> </mark>say it, and what meanings are made of our utterances</u>. <u>Considering educational research’s role in the <mark>perpetuation of</mark> settler-slave-Indigenous <mark>relationships</u></mark>, those of us employed as educational researchers <u>are answerable to these deep trajectories.</u> Given these deep trajectories, <u>research and <strong>researchers</strong> who have <strong>succeeded</strong>, have been <strong>validated</strong> through settler colonial structures of schooling and</u>, consequentially, <u>also have contributed to creating a science that reflects misunderstandings about race, class, and gender</u> (Jordan-Young 2011). Educational researchers must, as one example, answer to ways in which the field has allowed for learning to be lost in the pursuit of test score-driven achievement. <u>Answerability means that<mark> <strong>we have</mark> <mark>responsibilities</mark> as speakers, listeners, and</strong> <mark>those</mark> responsibilities <mark>include <strong>stewardship of</mark> ideas and <mark>learning</strong>, not ownership</u></mark>. As educational researchers, how can we become and stay fundamentally answerable to the core endeavor of learning, not test score production or unachievable achievement in a stratified society? Learning, like all practices, is conducted in context so cannot be seen as a cordoned off space that is not subject to settler colonial relations. Rather, <u><strong><mark>learning</strong></mark> is</u> fundamentally <u><strong><mark>about coming into being and altering that being</u></strong></mark>; in other words,<u><strong> <mark>it is a subjective act</mark>.</u></strong> Coming into being is, in essence, about being-in-relation. Therefore, <u>the</u> study, theorizing, and <u>praxis of learning is the space our integrity should hold and where it has</u>, instead, <u>shown the most discipline-specific manifestations of settler colonialism</u>. How <u>educational <strong>research</strong> serves learning <strong>provides a place to</strong> more fully <strong>embody decolonial stances</strong>, as it <mark>has </mark>the<mark> potential to <strong></mark>materially<mark> alter </strong>how</mark> educational <mark>research is conducted</mark> and for what purposes.</u> I propose a <u>repositioning toward learning, an alteration of researching bodies in places</u>. For this, I must draw on work largely outside educational research. In her study of the places of learning found in media, architecture, and pedagogy, Ellsworth (2005) draws attention to <u>the fundamentally transitional space that is learning</u>. Rather than how the tradition of schooling has materially <u>designed conditions for</u> the transmittal and disciplined <u><strong>mimicry of expert knowledge</u></strong>, and educational research has, in turn and in cahoots, truncated learning to be measureable achievement, meant to be predicted, Ellsworth <u><mark>encourage</mark>s the reader to think about the <mark>conditions that <strong>make</mark> <mark>learning possible</strong> but <strong>still unpredictable</u></strong></mark>. She follows the traditions of thinkers like Grosz (1995), Massumi (1995), and Winnicott (1989), who attend to the social self as one in constant motion, constantly reconfiguring itself, learning, in relation to time, space, and materiality. She wrote: <u><strong><mark>Learning</strong> never takes place in the absence of </mark>bodies, emotions, place, time, sound, image, self-experience, history</u>. It always <u><strong><mark>detours through memory</u></strong></mark>, <u>forgetting, desire, fear, pleasure, surprise, rewriting. </u>And because learning takes place in relation, <u>its detours take us up to and sometimes across the boundaries of habit, recognition, and the socially constructed identities within our selves</u>. (Ellsworth 2005, 55) Through several examples, Ellsworth draws our attention to, in part, the interior changes involved in spaces designed for pedagogy. For example, in discussing how the Civil Rights Museum in Birmingham sets up exterior conditions for interior alterity, Ellsworth (2005) writes, “Such <u>places of learning<mark> implicate bodies in pedagogy</mark> in ways that the field of education has seldom explored</u>. As they do this, <u>they encourage and challenge us to move away from understanding the learning self merely through notions of cognition, psychology, or phenomenology or as being subjected to ideology</u>” (6). Core to this framing is learning as a constant becoming and unbecoming, a constant inquiry and coordinate-taking, which sounds a lot like what research is supposed to be. <u>Such a stance opens up spaces to depart from paradigms that theorize freedom</u>, here to learn, as defined relative to restrictions, as in freedom from, but rather freedom as expansive, as in freedom to (Grosz 2010). <u><strong><mark>Learning </mark>and knowledge</u></strong>, then, <u><strong>are better <mark>approached</u></strong></mark>, particularly <u><strong><mark>in</mark> the name of <mark>decolonization</u></strong></mark>, as fundamentally quixotic, even wild (Sandoval 2008). Consider another example of learning, also imbued with research, this one from choreography. In 2009, an actor named Gregg Mozgala started to work with choreographer Tamar Rogoff (Genzlinger 2009). Mozgala has cerebral palsy, and Rogoff has no formal understanding of the biology, neuroscience, or physical therapy knowledges of cerebral palsy. But their way of working together and taking cues from his body, rather than working around it, altered deeply his way of being with his body. And what they did was <u>use the principles of research—looking, inquiring, keeping track, and doing it all <strong>over again constantly</u></strong>. Like the pauses noted at the start of this article, <u>meaning making and performance was interrupted</u>, slowed down, with observation and bio feedback to return again. This <u>created the space for learning and knowledge production</u>. More specifically, Rogoff introduced Mozgala to a tension-releasing shaking technique. They began doing intensive oneon-one sessions of body work, Ms. Rogoff using her knowledge of the body and dance-training techniques to help Mr. Mozgala find individual bones, muscles, and tendons that he had thought were just collateral damage of the cerebral palsy. Much of this, in the medical field, would be understood to be evidence of neuroplasticity, and although it certainly is, it also speaks fundamentally to what<u><strong> research is.</u></strong> It is contextual, <u>it is about constant coordination of self with other, self within self, and it is in constant motion.</u> I offer these extra-educational examples not to barter in tacit antiintellectualism or to imply that deep, rigorous, discipline-specific study is unimportant, but to promote a radical reconfiguration of being and being-inrelation to knowledge and learning, to foreground <u>“a politics of liberation rather than a politics of recognition”</u> (A. Smith 2010, para 31). <u><strong>If we are to be other than owners invested in settler colonialism</u></strong>, educational <u><strong>research needs a radical restructuring of its relationship to knowledge</u></strong>. Rather than property, we should see knowledge, and more specifically knowledge about learning, as what we are answerable to. <u>We should see ourselves as stewards</u> not of specific pieces of knowledge, but rather <u>of the productive</u> and generative <u>spaces that allow for finding knowledge</u>. To be sure, this is not a new thought or appeal. <u>Much of postmodern</u> and poststructural <u>thought embraces the idea that human practices are much more complex than can be predicted</u> through fine-tuned measurements. Rather, my appeal is that <u>we cease to see the problem in educational research as the lack of application of these ideologies</u>. The problem is not simply one of failure to execute postmodernist or <u>poststructural</u> thought in practice, as these <u>epistemologies do not</u>, in and of themselves, <u>include a critique of the genealogies of coloniality</u>. <u><strong><mark>Interrogating</mark> the <mark>logics of settler</mark> <mark>colonialism frees us to counter those logics</u></strong></mark>. <u>It also demands a</u> productively more <u><strong>precise articulation of researcher reflexivity in relation to settler colonial structures</u></strong>. <u>This kind of being-in-relation addresses and destabilizes</u> potentially <u>deterministic readings of settler colonial structures</u> as some being settlers and others not, <u>which</u> in turn <u>runs the danger of locating responsibility to counter coloniality partial rather than pervasive</u>. Spivak (1990) addressed the less useful pauses that some of her White male students expressed when they had come to grips with their social locations, pauses that were more self-serving than answerable to structures of coloniality. She explained: I say to them: ‘Why not develop a certain degree of rage against the history that has written such an abject script for you that you are silenced?’ Then you begin to investigate what it is that silences you, rather than take this very deterministic position. ... From this position, then, I say you will of course not speak in the same way about the Third World material, but if you make it your task not only to learn what is going on there through language, through specific programmes of study, but also at the same time through a historical critique of your position as the investigating person, then you will see that you have earned the right to criticize, and you will be heard. (62–63).</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Ackerman 17, Evan Ackerman, IEEE Spectrum: Technology, Engineering, and Science News, 8-21-2017, "Full Page Reload," https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/industry-urges-united-nations-to-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-in-new-open-letter SJCP//JG fulltext: explains enforcement CBW ban model – alluding empirical solvency and kills circumventio Today (or, yesterday, but today Australia time, where it's probably already tomorrow), 116 founders of robotics and artificial intelligence companies from 26 countries released an open letter urging the United Nations to ban lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). This is a follow-up to the 2015 anti-"killer robots" UN letter that we covered extensively when it was released, but with a new focus on industry that attempts to help convince the UN to get something done. Here's the letter in full: As companies building the technologies in Artificial Intelligence and Robotics that may be repurposed to develop autonomous weapons, we feel especially responsible in raising this alarm. We warmly welcome the decision of the UN’s Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. Many of our researchers and engineers are eager to offer technical advice to your deliberations. We commend the appointment of Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill of India as chair of the GGE. We entreat the High Contracting Parties participating in the GGE to work hard at finding means to prevent an arms race in these weapons, to protect civilians from their misuse, and to avoid the destabilizing effects of these technologies. We regret that the GGE’s first meeting, which was due to start today, has been cancelled due to a small number of states failing to pay their financial contributions to the UN. We urge the High Contracting Parties therefore to double their efforts at the first meeting of the GGE now planned for November. Lethal autonomous weapons threaten to become the third revolution in warfare. Once developed, they will permit armed conflict to be fought at a scale greater than ever, and at timescales faster than humans can comprehend. These can be weapons of terror, weapons that despots and terrorists use against innocent populations, and weapons hacked to behave in undesirable ways. We do not have long to act. Once this Pandora’s box is opened, it will be hard to close. We therefore implore the High Contracting Parties to find a way to protect us all from these dangers. The press release accompanying the letter mentions that it was signed by Elon Musk, Mustafa Suleyman (founder and Head of Applied AI at Google’s DeepMind), Esben Østergaard, (founder & CTO of Universal Robotics), and a bunch of other people who you may or may not have heard of. You can read the entire thing here, including all 116 signatories. For some context on this, we spoke with Toby Walsh, Scientia Professor of Artificial Intelligence at the University of New South Wales in Sydney and one of the organizers of the letter. Why was it important to release this second open letter? What has happened in the two years since the first letter was released? There are two reasons it is important to put out this second open letter. First, we wanted to demonstrate that the industry putting AI and Robotics into our lives supports the concerns of the research community who signed the first letter. Second, we wanted to add more impetus to the talks at the UN. It is very unfortunate that, despite all sides agreeing of the need to meet quickly, that the first talks have been postponed. We also felt the public needed to know that this issue was stalled for the want of a few hundred thousand dollars. We should be angry that the UN is hampered from finding a solution to this issue due to the lack of a pathetically small amount of money. What is your concern about lethal autonomous weapons? What kind of future are you worried about? In the short term, I worry more about stupid AI than smart AI. We'll give the responsibility to make life and death decisions to machines that cannot comply with international humanitarian law. In the longer term, I am worried we will industrialize war, introducing machines that we cannot defend ourselves against, resulting in an arms race that will destabilise further an already delicate world. It sickens me to think that the AI technologies we work on might be used to cause such harm. I would be much happier if the focus was on all the ways AI could improve our lives, improve health care, education, road safety, and remove the mundane and repetitive from our jobs and many other aspects of our lives. The letter ends with a request to “find a way to protect us all from these dangers.” How, specifically, do you hope that can be accomplished? I believe an international ban, similar to those we have for chemical, biological weapons, and other weapon types like blinding lasers and anti-personnel mines is likely the best way to limit the role of these technologies in the battlefield. While this most recent letter renews the call for a United Nations ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems and makes the perspective from a subset of robotics companies a little more explicit than it might have been before, there has not otherwise been a lot of tangible progress towards an actual ban that we've been able to identify over the past two years. This may be the normal pace of operations for the UN, but essentially all of the questions and concerns that we (and others) raised about the last “killer robots” letter are largely unresolved. Here's a big pile of links to our past coverage: Why the United Nations Must Move Forward With a Killer Robots Ban We Should Not Ban ‘Killer Robots,’ and Here’s Why Why We Really Should Ban Autonomous Weapons: A Response Warfighting Robots Could Reduce Civilian Casualties, So Calling for a Ban Now Is Premature Why Should We Ban Autonomous Weapons? To Survive Ban or No Ban, Hard Questions Remain on Autonomous Weapons One of the primary critiques of a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems is that it would be practically impossible to implement, considering how much usefulness autonomous systems offer in all kinds of other applications, the minimal separation between commercial and military technology, and how little difference there can be between an autonomous system and a weaponized autonomous system, or a weaponized system with a human in the loop and one without. Meanwhile, we asked Clearpath Robotics CTO Ryan Gariepy if, as someone who knows probably way too much about robots and the first person to sign this letter, he had any ideas about where to start when it comes to crafting a lethal autonomous weapons ban that might actually work. (We should note that Ryan is not speaking as a representative of the folks behind this letter; these are his personal opinions.) Do you think that there is a realistic way to implement a purely technological ban on lethal autonomous weapons? At present, I haven't identified (which I don't think would be surprising) any particular aspect which both makes a system transition from a semi-autonomous to a fully autonomous lethal weapons system, and is auditable in a straightforward manner by a third party. What practical steps do you think could be used to help ensure the safety of autonomous weapons systems? Proper, auditable fail-safes. Not to prevent a system from using weapons on its own, but more as an accountability measure against the person who did use these weapons, who chose to authorize that system to take lethal action. There's a lot of technical development that can be done along those lines. Are you then talking about accountability for a human who authorizes a system to take lethal action autonomously, or verifying that there's a human in the loop making all the decisions about whether or not a system can take a lethal action? It's more about the human in the loop. There are open questions about when you authorize an [autonomous] system, what are you authorizing? The release of a single weapon? Prosecuting a target for a defined amount of time? But I think this approach is not only beneficial in cases of autonomous weapons, it would also be immediately applicable to semi-autonomous weapons. We'd like there to be traceability of the person who looked at a particular situation and took action; that accountability gap is a major concern. Fundamentally, Gariepy told us, one of the most important things that could come out of the UN discussions is an understanding that the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems is simply not the way that warfare should happen. That could help put pressure on governments not to use them, even if a specific ban does not exist. A basic question that needs to be addressed in all this is what autonomy means, and what having a human in the loop means, since (as Gariepy alludes to) there are lots of loops, and those loops can get very big and complicated and messy. While I may not agree that a complete ban on autonomous weapons is the right thing to do, I certainly agree that verifiable accountability is vital, and not just when it comes to autonomous systems. If this is the approach that the UN decides to take, as opposed to an outright ban with dubious technical enforceability, I'm all for that.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The aff is try or die and solves the arms race – no circumvention and it’s feasible.</h4><p><strong>Ackerman 17</strong>, Evan Ackerman, IEEE Spectrum: Technology, Engineering, and Science News, 8-21-2017, "Full Page Reload," https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/industry-urges-united-nations-to-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-in-new-open-letter SJCP//JG</p><p>explains enforcement</p><p>CBW ban model – alluding empirical solvency and kills circumventio</p><p>Today (or, yesterday, but today Australia time, where it's probably already tomorrow), <u><strong>116 founders of robotics and artificial intelligence companies from 26 countries released an open letter urging the United Nations to ban lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS).</u></strong> This is a follow-up to the 2015 anti-"killer robots" UN letter that we covered extensively when it was released, but with a new focus on industry that attempts to help convince the UN to get something done. Here's the letter in full: <u><strong>As companies building the technologies in Artificial Intelligence and Robotics that may be repurposed to develop autonomous weapons, we feel especially responsible in raising this alarm. </u></strong>We warmly welcome the decision of the UN’s Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. Many of our researchers and engineers are eager to offer technical advice to your deliberations. We commend the appointment of Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill of India as chair of the GGE. We entreat the High Contracting Parties participating in the GGE to work hard at finding means to prevent an arms race in these weapons, to protect civilians from their misuse, and to avoid the destabilizing effects of these technologies. We regret that the GGE’s first meeting, which was due to start today, has been cancelled due to a small number of states failing to pay their financial contributions to the UN. We urge the High Contracting Parties therefore to double their efforts at the first meeting of the GGE now planned for November. <u><strong><mark>Lethal autonomous weapons</mark> threaten to become the <mark>third revolution in warfare</mark>. Once developed, they will permit armed conflict to be fought at a scale greater than ever, and at timescales faster than humans can comprehend. These can be weapons of terror, weapons that despots and terrorists use against innocent populations, and weapons hacked to behave in undesirable ways. We do not have long to act. Once this Pandora’s box is opened, it will be hard to close. </u></strong>We therefore implore the High Contracting Parties to find a way to protect us all from these dangers. The press release accompanying the letter mentions that it was signed by Elon Musk, Mustafa Suleyman (founder and Head of Applied AI at Google’s DeepMind), Esben Østergaard, (founder & CTO of Universal Robotics), and a bunch of other people who you may or may not have heard of. You can read the entire thing here, including all 116 signatories. For some context on this, we spoke with Toby Walsh, Scientia Professor of Artificial Intelligence at the University of New South Wales in Sydney and one of the organizers of the letter. Why was it important to release this second open letter? What has happened in the two years since the first letter was released? There are two reasons it is important to put out this second open letter. First, we wanted to demonstrate that the industry putting AI and Robotics into our lives supports the concerns of the research community who signed the first letter. Second, we wanted to add more impetus to the talks at the UN. It is very unfortunate that, despite all sides agreeing of the need to meet quickly, that the first talks have been postponed. We also felt the public needed to know that this issue was stalled for the want of a few hundred thousand dollars. We should be angry that the UN is hampered from finding a solution to this issue due to the lack of a pathetically small amount of money. What is your concern about lethal autonomous weapons? What kind of future are you worried about? In the short term, I worry more about stupid AI than smart AI. <u><strong>We'll give the responsibility to make life and death decisions to machines that cannot comply with international humanitarian law. In the longer term, I am worried <mark>we will industrialize war</mark>, <mark>introducing machines that we cannot defend ourselves against</mark>, resulting in an <mark>arms race that will destabilise further an already delicate world</mark>. It sickens me to think that the AI technologies we work on might be used to cause such harm. I would be much happier if the focus was on all the ways AI could improve our lives, improve health care, education, road safety, and remove the mundane and repetitive from our jobs and many other aspects of our lives. </u></strong>The letter ends with a request to “find a way to protect us all from these dangers.” How, specifically, do you hope that can be accomplished? <u><strong>I believe <mark>an international ban</mark>, <mark>similar to</mark> those we have for <mark>chemical</mark>, biological <mark>weapons</mark>, and other weapon types like blinding lasers and anti-personnel mines is likely the <mark>best way to limit the role of these technologies in the battlefield</mark>. While this most recent letter renews the call for a United Nations ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems and makes the perspective from a subset of robotics companies a little more explicit than it might have been before, there has not otherwise been a lot of tangible progress towards an actual ban that we've been able to identify over the past two years. This may be the normal pace of operations for the UN, but essentially all of the questions and concerns that we (and others) raised about the last “killer robots” letter are largely unresolved. Here's a big pile of links to our past coverage: </u></strong>Why the United Nations Must Move Forward With a Killer Robots Ban We Should Not Ban ‘Killer Robots,’ and Here’s Why Why We Really Should Ban Autonomous Weapons: A Response Warfighting Robots Could Reduce Civilian Casualties, So Calling for a Ban Now Is Premature Why Should We Ban Autonomous Weapons? To Survive Ban or No Ban, Hard Questions Remain on Autonomous Weapons One of the primary critiques of a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems is that it would be practically impossible to implement, considering how much usefulness autonomous systems offer in all kinds of other applications, the minimal separation between commercial and military technology, and how little difference there can be between an autonomous system and a weaponized autonomous system, or a weaponized system with a human in the loop and one without.<u><strong> </u></strong>Meanwhile, we asked Clearpath Robotics CTO Ryan Gariepy if, as someone who knows probably way too much about robots and the first person to sign this letter, he had any ideas about where to start when it comes to crafting a lethal autonomous weapons ban that might actually work. (We should note that Ryan is not speaking as a representative of the folks behind this letter; these are his personal opinions.) Do you think that there is a realistic way to implement a purely technological ban on lethal autonomous weapons? At present, I haven't identified (which I don't think would be surprising) any particular aspect which both makes a system transition from a semi-autonomous to a fully autonomous lethal weapons system, and is auditable in a straightforward manner by a third party. What practical steps do you think could be used to help ensure the safety of autonomous weapons systems? Proper, auditable fail-safes. Not to prevent a system from using weapons on its own, but more as an accountability measure against the person who did use these weapons, who chose to authorize that system to take lethal action. There's a lot of technical development that can be done along those lines. <u><strong>Are you then talking about <mark>accountability for</mark> a <mark>human who authorizes a system</mark> to take lethal action autonomously, or verifying that there's a human in the loop making all the decisions about whether or not a system can take a lethal action? </u></strong>It's more about the human in the loop. There are open questions about when you authorize an [autonomous] system, what are you authorizing? The release of a single weapon? Prosecuting a target for a defined amount of time? <u><strong>But I think this approach is not only beneficial in cases of autonomous weapons, it would also be immediately applicable to semi-autonomous weapons. We'd like there to be <mark>traceability of the person</mark> who looked at a particular situation and took action; that accountability gap is a major concern.</u></strong> Fundamentally, Gariepy told us, one of the most important things that could come out of the UN discussions is an understanding that the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems is simply not the way that warfare should happen. That could help put pressure on governments not to use them, even if a specific ban does not exist. <u><strong>A basic question that needs to be addressed in all this is what autonomy means, and what having a human in the loop means, since (as Gariepy alludes to) there are lots of loops, and those loops can get very big and complicated and messy. While I may not agree that a complete ban on autonomous weapons is the right thing to do, I certainly agree that verifiable accountability is vital, and not just when it comes to autonomous systems. If this is the approach that the UN decides to take, as opposed to an outright ban with dubious technical enforceability, I'm all for that.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Sharp et al 2014:, Robert Sharp [Associate Professor Robert (Bob) A. Sharp is the UAE National Defense College Associate Dean for Academic Programs and College Quality Assurance Advisor. He previously served as Assistant Professor of Strategic Security Studies at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) in the U.S. National Defense University (NDU), Washington D.C. and then as Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, collocated with NDU. Most recently at NESA, he focused on security sector reform in Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported regional security engagement events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Palestine and Qatar] and Edward Kennedy [Edward Kennedy is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets], “Climate Change and Implications for National Security”, International Policy Digest, 22 Aug 2014, BE fulltext: Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this carbon – however – is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons. The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>[Sharp et al] Warming causes extinction, nuke war, and structural violence.</h4><p><u>Sharp et al 2014</u>:, Robert Sharp [Associate Professor Robert (Bob) A. Sharp is the UAE National Defense College Associate Dean for Academic Programs and College Quality Assurance Advisor. He previously served as Assistant Professor of Strategic Security Studies at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) in the U.S. National Defense University (NDU), Washington D.C. and then as Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, collocated with NDU. Most recently at NESA, he focused on security sector reform in Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported regional security engagement events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Palestine and Qatar] and Edward Kennedy [Edward Kennedy is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets], “Climate Change and Implications for National Security”, International Policy Digest, 22 Aug 2014, BE</p><p>Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The <u>release of this <mark>carbon</u></mark> – however – <u><mark>is changing our climate at such a rapid rate</mark> that <mark>it threatens our survival and presence on earth.</u></mark> It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The <u><mark>implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life</mark> on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage<mark>.</mark> </u>This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. <u><mark>Climate change</u></mark> writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. <u>It has already <mark>led to an increase in natural disasters including </mark>but not limited to <mark>droughts, storms, floods, fires etc.</u></mark> The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. <u>Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly <mark>36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters.</u></mark> Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. <u><mark>Rising sea levels</mark> will increasingly <mark>threaten</mark> our <mark>coastal population and infrastructure centers</mark> and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations<mark>.</mark> </u>Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. <u>Thus <mark>the impact</mark> is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also <mark>would lead</mark> to conflict and thus impact national security. <mark>Resource war</mark>s are inevitable <mark>as countries</mark> respond, adapt and <mark>compete for</mark> the <mark>shrinking</mark> set of those available <mark>resources.</u></mark> These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. <u>Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.”</u> In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that <u>climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now</u> and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the <u>Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon</u> which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: <u>A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. <mark>Whole countries rendered uninhabitable.</mark> The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. <mark>Demands for</mark> access to <mark>water and farmland backed</mark> up <mark>with nuc</u></mark>lear<u><mark> </u></mark>weapon<u><mark>s.</u></mark> The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant <u>human impacts that <mark>threaten to unravel</mark> decades of <mark>economic development, which will</mark> ultimately <mark>foster conflict.</p></u></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: McGowan 13 (Todd McGowan, Professor of English at the University of Vermont, USA, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” pgs. 172-176)//JRD fulltext: For emancipatory politics, the transformation of knowledge from a vehicle of liberation to an instrument of power has had devastating effects. Emancipatory politics has traditionally relied on knowledge in order to facilitate political change, and even today one of the primary operations of emancipatory politics is getting information out to citizens. In the minds of most people engaged in the project of emancipation, the fundamental task has been establishing class consciousness among the members of the working class. Class consciousness, according to this way of thinking, is the basis for substantive political change. As Georg Lukács puts it in History and Class Consciousness, “The fate of a class depends on its ability to elucidate and solve the problems with which history confronts it.”12 Political change depends, for someone like Lukács, on the knowledge that makes decisive action possible. As long as authority remains in the position of the traditional master, knowledge can have a revolutionary function. Historically, the primary problem for emancipatory politics involved access to education, which is why a key component of the communist program that Marx and Engels outline in The Communist Manifesto is universal access to public education. There are those on the side of emancipation who continue to insist that knowledge will be the source for political change. According to this position, people side with conservative policies against their own self-interest because they lack the proper information. They are the victims of propaganda, and emancipatory politics must respond by providing the missing knowledge. If not for big media’s control over knowledge, the thinking goes, subjects would cease to act against their self-interest and would begin to oppose contemporary capitalism in an active way. For those who adopt this position, political activity consists in acts of informing, raising consciousness, and bringing issues to light. But today the failures of consciousness-raising are evident everywhere. Such failures are the subject of Thomas Frank’s acclaimed analysis, What’s the Matter with Kansas? Frank highlights the proclivity of people in areas of the United States like Kansas to act politically in ways that sabotage their economic interests. He notes: “People getting their fundamental interests wrong is what American political life is all about.”13 The Right’s current success in the United States and around the world is not the sign that more people have become convinced that right-wing policies will benefit them. Instead, conservatism permits people a way of organizing their enjoyment in a way that today’s emancipatory politics does not. Emancipatory politics may offer a truer vision of the world, but the Right offers a superior way of enjoying. Traditionally, the primary advantage that emancipatory politics had in political struggle was its challenge to authority. When one took up the cause of emancipation, one took a stand against an entrenched regime of power and experienced enjoyment in this defiance. One can still see this form of enjoyment evinced in the revolutions of the Arab Spring in 2011. Though emancipatory activity always entailed a certain risk (even of death, to which the fate of innumerable revolutionaries attests), it nonetheless brought with it an enjoyment not found in everyday obedience and symbolic identity. In short, there was historically a strong libidinal component to emancipatory militancy that the risk it carried amplified rather than diminished. The liberating power of emancipatory activity is present in almost every political film. We see activists falling in love as they jointly embark on an emancipatory project or romance burgeoning as a fight for justice intensifies. This dynamic, attesting to the enjoyment inherent in militancy against the oppressive ruling order, manifests itself in Warren Beatty’s Reds (1981), Ken Loach’s Bread and Roses (2000), and Gillian Armstrong’s Charlotte Gray (2001), to name just a few of the many. In each case, the romance seems to spring out of the risk that militancy against an oppressive regime entails. The love that develops between Maya (Pilar Padilla) and Sam (Adrien Brody) in Bread and Roses sparks first at the moment when Maya helps Sam to elude corporate security agents at the office building where he is trying to help unionize the janitors. Maya risks losing her job as a janitor when she aids Sam, and this risk acts as the driving force for the eroticism between them. Conservatism has not traditionally provided much enjoyment of this type, but it has had its own appeal. It took the side of authority and stability. Whereas emancipatory politics could offer the enjoyment that comes from defiance of authority, conservatism could offer the enjoyment that comes from identification with it. This is the enjoyment that one feels when hearing one’s national anthem or saluting the flag. It resides in the fabric of the nation’s military uniform that makes the fingers touching it tingle. This eroticism is not that of emancipatory politics — and it is perhaps not as powerful — but it is nonetheless a form of eroticism. It produces a libidinal charge. The struggle between conservatism and emancipatory politics has historically been a struggle between two competing modes of organizing enjoyment with neither side having a monopoly. Despite the traditional emphasis that the forces of emancipation placed on knowledge, even in the past the struggle between emancipatory politics and conservatism centered on enjoyment rather than knowledge. In the political arena, knowledge is important only insofar as it relates to the way that subjects mobilize their enjoyment. If subjects see through ideological manipulation and have the proper knowledge, this does not necessarily inaugurate a political change. The knowledge that something is bad for us — a president or a Twinkie — does not lessen the enjoyment that we receive from it. It is not that we have the ability to enjoy while disavowing our knowledge but more that the knowledge works to serve our enjoyment. The enjoyment of a Twinkie does not derive from the physiological effect of sugar on the human metabolism but from the knowledge of the damage this substance does to the body. Knowing the harm that accompanies something actually facilitates our enjoyment of it, especially when we are capable of disavowing this knowledge. Enjoyment is distinct from bodily pleasures (which the Twinkie undoubtedly also provides); it depends on some degree of sacrifice that allows the subject to suffer its enjoyment. Sacrifice is essential to our capacity for enjoying ourselves. There is a fundamentally masochistic structure to enjoyment.14 It always comes in the form of an alien force that overcomes us from the outside. As Alenka Zupančič puts it, “It is not simply the mode of enjoyment of the neighbour, of the other, that is strange to me. The heart of the problem is that I experience my own enjoyment (which emerges along with the enjoyment of the other, and is even indissociable from it) as strange and hostile.”15 An initial experience of loss gives birth to the lost object around which we structure our enjoyment, and our subsequent enjoyment demands a return to the experience of loss. Through sacrifice and loss, we reconstitute the privileged object that exists only as an absence. This is why actually obtaining the privileged object necessarily disappoints: when the lost object becomes present, it loses its privileged status and becomes an ordinary empirical object. Knowledge thus helps us to enjoy not in the way that we might think — that is, by showing us what is good for our well-being — but by giving us something to sacrifice: if we know, for instance, that cigarettes are unhealthy and could kill us, this elevates the mundane fact of smoking into an act laced with enjoyment.16 With each puff, we repeat the act of sacrifice and return to the primordial experience of loss. The death that we bring on is not simply the price that we pay for smoking; it is the means through which we enjoy the act of smoking. In this sense, every cigarette is really killing the smoker. If it didn’t, the act would lose its ability to provide enjoyment (though it may still produce bodily pleasure).17 Under the rule of the traditional master, prohibition sustains the possibility for this type of enjoyment: we can enjoy an act because it transgresses a societal prohibition. As Lacan notes in Seminar VII, “Transgression in the direction of jouissance only takes place if it is supported by the oppositional principle, by the forms of the Law. If the paths to jouissance have something in them that dies out, that tends to make them impassable, prohibition, if I may say so, becomes its all-terrain vehicle.”18 Prohibition makes our enjoyment possible by offering us the possibility for sacrifice. We sacrifice the good and violate the prohibition. But prohibition no longer plays this role in contemporary society. No universal prohibition bars certain activities; instead, knowledge about the harm that activities cause begins to play the role that prohibition once played. We don’t avoid smoking simply because it is wrong but because we know the harm that it causes. We don’t refrain from extramarital sex because it is wrong but because we know the societal and physical dangers it entails. Even conservatives think and talk this way. When, for instance, conservatives argue for excluding information about condoms from sex education classrooms, they claim that we know condoms aren’t 100 percent safe in preventing the spread of hiv. In each case, the authority is knowledge, not law. The libidinal charge in politics involved with challenging the master has largely disappeared today, and now that libidinal charge has attached itself to challenging the experts, who represent the new agents of authority.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The attempt to mobilize subjects on the basis of knowledge eschews enjoyment as the basis for action.</h4><p><strong>McGowan 13</strong> (Todd McGowan, Professor of English at the University of Vermont, USA, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” pgs. 172-176<u>)//JRD</p><p>For emancipatory politics, the transformation of knowledge from a vehicle of liberation to an instrument of power has had devastating effects. Emancipatory politics has traditionally relied on knowledge in order to facilitate political change, and even today one of the primary operations of emancipatory politics is getting information out to citizens.</u> In the minds of most people engaged in the project of emancipation, the fundamental task has been establishing class consciousness among the members of the working class. Class consciousness, according to this way of thinking, is the basis for substantive political change. As Georg Lukács puts it in History and Class Consciousness, “The fate of a class depends on its ability to elucidate and solve the problems with which history confronts it.”12 <u>Political change depends</u>, for someone like Lukács, <u>on the knowledge that makes decisive action possible</u>. <u>As long as authority remains in the position of the traditional master, knowledge can have a revolutionary function</u>. <u>Historically, the primary problem for emancipatory politics involved access to education</u>, which is why a key component of the communist program that Marx and Engels outline in The Communist Manifesto is universal access to public education. <u>There are those on the side of emancipation who continue to insist that knowledge will be the source for political change. According to this position, people side with conservative policies against their own self-interest because they lack the proper information.</u> <u>They are the victims of propaganda, and emancipatory politics must respond by providing the missing knowledge. If not for big media’s control over knowledge, the thinking goes, subjects would cease to act against their self-interest and would begin to oppose contemporary capitalism in an active way.</u> <u><strong>For those who adopt this position, political activity consists in acts of informing, raising consciousness, and bringing issues to light.</strong> But today the failures of consciousness-raising are evident everywhere. </u>Such failures are the subject of Thomas Frank’s acclaimed analysis, What’s the Matter with Kansas? Frank highlights the proclivity of people in areas of the United States like Kansas to act politically in ways that sabotage their economic interests. He notes: “People getting their fundamental interests wrong is what American political life is all about.”13 <u>The Right’s current success in the United States and around the world is not the sign that more people have become convinced that right-wing policies will benefit them. Instead, conservatism permits people a way of organizing their enjoyment in a way that today’s emancipatory politics does not. Emancipatory politics may offer a truer vision of the world, but the Right offers a superior way of enjoying.</u> Traditionally, the primary advantage that emancipatory politics had in political struggle was its challenge to authority. When one took up the cause of emancipation, one took a stand against an entrenched regime of power and experienced enjoyment in this defiance. One can still see this form of enjoyment evinced in the revolutions of the Arab Spring in 2011. Though emancipatory activity always entailed a certain risk (even of death, to which the fate of innumerable revolutionaries attests), it nonetheless brought with it an enjoyment not found in everyday obedience and symbolic identity. In short, <u>there was historically a strong libidinal component to emancipatory militancy that the risk it carried amplified rather than diminished</u>. <u>The liberating power of emancipatory activity is present in</u> almost every political film. We see <u>activists falling in love as they jointly embark on an emancipatory project or romance burgeoning as a fight for justice intensifies</u>. This dynamic, attesting to the enjoyment inherent in militancy against the oppressive ruling order, manifests itself in Warren Beatty’s Reds (1981), Ken Loach’s Bread and Roses (2000), and Gillian Armstrong’s Charlotte Gray (2001), to name just a few of the many. In each case, the romance seems to spring out of the risk that militancy against an oppressive regime entails. The love that develops between Maya (Pilar Padilla) and Sam (Adrien Brody) in Bread and Roses sparks first at the moment when Maya helps Sam to elude corporate security agents at the office building where he is trying to help unionize the janitors. Maya risks losing her job as a janitor when she aids Sam, and this risk acts as the driving force for the eroticism between them. <u>Conservatism has not traditionally provided much enjoyment of this type, but it has had its own appeal. It took the side of authority and stability. Whereas emancipatory politics could offer the enjoyment that comes from defiance of authority, conservatism could offer the enjoyment that comes from identification with it. </u>This is the enjoyment that one feels when hearing one’s national anthem or saluting the flag. It resides in the fabric of the nation’s military uniform that makes the fingers touching it tingle. This eroticism is not that of emancipatory politics — and it is perhaps not as powerful — but it is nonetheless a form of eroticism. <u>It produces a libidinal charge.</u> The struggle between conservatism and emancipatory politics has historically been a struggle between two competing modes of organizing enjoyment with neither side having a monopoly. <u>Despite the traditional emphasis that the forces of emancipation placed on knowledge, even in the past the struggle between emancipatory politics and conservatism centered on enjoyment rather than knowledge. In the political arena, knowledge is important only insofar as it relates to the way that subjects mobilize their enjoyment. If subjects see through ideological manipulation and have the proper knowledge, this does not necessarily inaugurate a political change.</u> <u>The knowledge that something is bad for us </u>— a president or a Twinkie — <u><strong>does not lessen the enjoyment that we receive from it. It is not that we have the ability to enjoy while disavowing our knowledge but more that the knowledge works to serve our enjoyment.</u></strong> The enjoyment of a Twinkie does not derive from the physiological effect of sugar on the human metabolism but from the knowledge of the damage this substance does to the body. <u>Knowing the harm that accompanies something actually facilitates our enjoyment of it, especially when we are capable of disavowing this knowledge. Enjoyment is distinct from bodily pleasures</u> (which the Twinkie undoubtedly also provides); <u>it depends on some degree of sacrifice that allows the subject to suffer its enjoyment. Sacrifice is essential to our capacity for enjoying ourselves. There is a fundamentally masochistic structure to enjoyment.</u>14 <u>It always comes in the form of an alien force that overcomes us from the outside. </u>As Alenka Zupančič puts it, “It is not simply the mode of enjoyment of the neighbour, of the other, that is strange to me. The heart of the problem is that I experience my own enjoyment (which emerges along with the enjoyment of the other, and is even indissociable from it) as strange and hostile.”15 An initial experience of loss gives birth to the lost object around which we structure our enjoyment, and our subsequent enjoyment demands a return to the experience of loss. Through sacrifice and loss, we reconstitute the privileged object that exists only as an absence. This is why actually obtaining the privileged object necessarily disappoints: when the lost object becomes present, it loses its privileged status and becomes an ordinary empirical object. <u>Knowledge thus helps us to enjoy not in the way that we might think — that is, by showing us what is good for our well-being — but by giving us something to sacrifice</u>: if we know, for instance, that cigarettes are unhealthy and could kill us, this elevates the mundane fact of smoking into an act laced with enjoyment.16 With each puff, we repeat the act of sacrifice and return to the primordial experience of loss. <u>The death that we bring on is not simply the price that we pay</u> for smoking; it is the means through which we enjoy the act of smoking. In this sense, every cigarette is really killing the smoker. If it didn’t, the act would lose its ability to provide enjoyment (though it may still produce bodily pleasure).17 Under the rule of the traditional master, prohibition sustains the possibility for this type of enjoyment: we can enjoy an act because it transgresses a societal prohibition. As Lacan notes in Seminar VII, “Transgression in the direction of jouissance only takes place if it is supported by the oppositional principle, by the forms of the Law. If the paths to jouissance have something in them that dies out, that tends to make them impassable, prohibition, if I may say so, becomes its all-terrain vehicle.”18 Prohibition makes our enjoyment possible by offering us the possibility for sacrifice. We sacrifice the good and violate the prohibition. But prohibition no longer plays this role in contemporary society. <u>No universal prohibition bars certain activities; instead, knowledge about the harm that activities cause begins to play the role that prohibition once played.</u> We don’t avoid smoking simply because it is wrong but because we know the harm that it causes. We don’t refrain from extramarital sex because it is wrong but because we know the societal and physical dangers it entails. <u>Even conservatives think and talk this way. </u>When, for instance, conservatives argue for excluding information about condoms from sex education classrooms, they claim that we know condoms aren’t 100 percent safe in preventing the spread of hiv<u>. In each case, the authority is knowledge, not law. The libidinal charge in politics involved with challenging the master has largely disappeared today, and now that libidinal charge has attached itself to challenging the experts, who represent the new agents of authority.</p></u><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Kalyanpur ‘18 fulltext: (Nikhil, Graduate Fellow at the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University, Hegemony, Inequality, and the Quest for Primacy Journal of Global Security Studies, 3(3), 2018, 371–384)//TR rc/Pat Scholars have long been frustrated by the separation between political economy and security research. Paying attention to the full causal chain behind important domestic transformations will allow us to better integrate our IR subfields. The social and fiscal crises that Krippner (2011) explores trace their origins to the inflation and deficit pressures instigated by the Vietnam War and the Cold War, respectively. Likewise, Weiss (2014) argues that the transition of the National Security State toward a dual security/commercialization agenda was a function of the resurgence in anti-statist sentiment within the country and especially within the private sector. Linking these factors together, we can see that the social and fiscal crises at time t limited the feasible win-set for the security apparatus, resulting in a change in national security policy at time t + 1. Pushing the state’s role under the private sector’s hood ensured that technologies would come to market, but that the monetary returns would go to the private sector and not the government who could otherwise distribute those gains. Similarly, Oatley’s (2015) work relies on the presence of an adequate number of congressional members will- ing to vote to expand security spending independent of the long-term costs. Thorpe (2014) finds that the gains from the military-industrial complex are disproportionately shared by a handful of rural districts in the Mid- west and the South. These homogenous political areas have grown so dependent on such spending that it leaves their senators with no choice but to run on further in- creasing and reifying this relationship. Examining the financial consequences of hegemony independent of how prior security threats conditioned Congress’s promilitary spending agenda prevents us from seeing the full causal chain. While certain factors like Piketty’s r > g tend to apply across all contexts, we have strong theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the causal pathways driving American inequality may be both different and contingent. This enhances the need to import HI’s toolkit. With only a few exceptions, the United States has been at the forefront of the ICT revolution, making it the first economy to automate. Unsurprisingly, the loss of jobs in manufacturing to automation, when compared to other developed states, happened first and has been most dramatic in the United States. This is not only because the United States created these technologies, forcing it to internalize the effects of automation earlier than other states, but also because export sectors were impacted by America’s exorbitant privilege of issuing the reserve currency. This is in sharp contrast to other states that have experienced less manufacturing job losses, like Germany, who have continually relied on undervalued currencies to boost their exports. The United States further diminishes the need for such states to undertake sudden security spending as they generally fall under the American security umbrella. Moreover, finance plays the largest role in the US economy compared to other OECD states. This is primarily a result of the hierarchical tendencies of the monetary system where capital continues to return back to the hegemon (Oatley et al. 2013). The gains to the 1 percent since the 1970s has correspondingly been the largest in US history. Attempts to maintain primacy and the structural effects of the international system reorganized the American economy and had long-term consequences for domestic inequality. Mainstream theories of IPE would struggle to grapple with the dynamics described in this review essay as both systemic theorizing, and highlighting different causal pathways for the same outcome, are not indicative of the primary modeling strategy. The dominant strand of American IPE, open economy politics, takes an actor- centric approach, utilizing economic theories to assume preferences that can then be extrapolated upward into law-like statements. Research questions focus on why some states are more open than others and which model of economic-theory best explains public opinion. This linear style of theorizing provides important insights but it also negates the possibility that there are systemic features driving economic interests or action, and the pluralistic view of the state assumes governments have no independent preferences, inhibiting geopolitical analyses. The international security field has also begun to take a bottom-up approach with a growing focus on the effect of domestic audiences and domestic institutions. The shift has clearly helped us better understand variation in statecraft but it prevents a full understanding of how levels of analysis can interact. For example, the most recent wave of experiment-based research on audience costs primarily draws its participants from the United States (Tomz 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). This clarifies prospects of international conflict but few have stopped to question whether US military primacy could condition or limit the external validity of such results. Moreover, inequality is often seen as something outside the “high politics” of security studies. The distinction between IR’s subfields is constantly debated, but this has not changed the fact that, given American preponderance and economic globalization, substantively important questions are still falling through our discipline’s self-defined cracks. If we want to understand the economics-security nexus, we need to take a more dynamic approach. The closest coherent agenda that cuts across the IPE/security divide is the work on issue linkage (Poast 2012), which combines multiple arenas into the same bargaining space. Although some authors analyze how domestic politics can temper strategic side payments (Davis 2009), bargaining rounds are generally seen as independent events. We should begin to ask how deals made at time t create feedback loops within the domestic political economy that alter bargaining positions and preferences in future negotiation rounds at time t + 1. Such a model would include not only times when the two areas of inquiry are combined in the negotiation process, but also analyze how an early security round affects economic interests at the domestic level and, then, alters future international security negotiations. In other words, sequencing across the international and domestic divide needs to be considered to ensure that we are making correct inferences. This will not apply to every case or issue, but taking such alternative hypotheses seriously will only improve the accuracy of our work and help cumulatively link knowledge across (sub)fields. IR then needs to grapple with how the changes in the domestic political economy triggered by international forces alter hegemonic power. How does rising inequality affect how the American state can project its power internationally? This could become both symbolically and materially important, as the current moment has no clear dominant economic model in sight. The growing global recognition of inequality as a normative issue potentially diminishes US soft power, while the growing consensus in macroeconomics on the negative growth effects of inequality implies that the American economy will continue to pay long-term costs for its international behavior. This will inevitably inhibit future geopolitical attempts to maintain primacy. More broadly, we should begin to study if and how the task of managing hegemony alters domestic politics in ways that cause endogenous hegemonic breakdown. Overexpansion was the key concern for hegemonic sta- bility theory, with a rising challenger resulting in a power shift. The books here signal a need to ask whether at- tempts to maintain primacy can be sufficient (or neces- sary) for decline and how the resultant domestic cleav- ages alter the possibility for stability in the international system. For example, Caverley’s (2014) recent work illustrates that as militaries become more capital intensive— one of the key transformations and intervening variables of this article—and inequality increases (the outcome in the United States), democratic publics become increasingly war-prone. Caverley (2014) in turn attributes the decision to take on unnecessary and ineffective wars to such political effects. Alternatively, growing inequality could trigger increasing isolationist preferences that then make a hegemon retrench rather than overstretch. While one could study the effects of inequality on hegemonic power without looking at the initial feedback, it would disregard the endogenous process at work.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Turn heg- Inequality makes primacy collapse <u>structurally inevitable</u> and <u>increases war</u>- their ev<strong> is missing all the IL necessary to prevent their impacts</h4><p>Kalyanpur ‘18</p><p></strong>(Nikhil, Graduate Fellow at the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University, Hegemony, Inequality, and the Quest for Primacy Journal of Global Security Studies, 3(3), 2018, 371–384)//TR rc/Pat</p><p>Scholars have long been frustrated by the separation between political economy and security research. Paying attention to the full causal chain behind important domestic transformations will allow us to better integrate our IR subfields. <u>The <mark>social and fiscal crises</mark> that Krippner</u> (2011) <u>explores <mark>trace</mark> their <mark>origins to</mark> the <mark>inflation and deficit pressures instigated by</mark> the <mark>Vietnam</mark> War <mark>and the Cold War</u></mark>, respectively. Likewise, Weiss (2014) argues that the <u>transition of the National Security State toward a <mark>dual security/commercialization</mark> agenda was a function of the resurgence in anti-statist sentiment within the country and especially within the private sector</u>. Linking these factors together, we can see that the social and fiscal crises at time t limited the feasible win-set for the security apparatus, resulting in a change in national security policy at time t + 1. <u><strong>Pushing the state’s role under the private sector’s hood <mark>ensured</mark> that technologies would come to market, but that the <mark>monetary returns</mark> would <mark>go to</mark> the <mark>private sector and not</mark> the government who could otherwise <mark>distribute</mark> those <mark>gains</u></strong></mark>. Similarly, Oatley’s (2015) work relies on the presence of an adequate number of congressional members will- ing to vote to expand security spending independent of the long-term costs. Thorpe (2014) finds that the gains from the military-industrial complex are disproportionately shared by a handful of rural districts in the Mid- west and the South. These homogenous political areas have grown so dependent on such spending that it leaves their senators with no choice but to run on further in- creasing and reifying this relationship. Examining the financial consequences of hegemony independent of how prior security threats conditioned Congress’s promilitary spending agenda prevents us from seeing the full causal chain. While certain factors like Piketty’s r > g tend to apply across all contexts, we have strong theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the causal pathways driving American inequality may be both different and contingent. This enhances the need to import HI’s toolkit. With only a few exceptions, <u>the United States has been at the <mark>forefront of</mark> the <mark>ICT revolution</u></mark>, making it the first economy to automate. Unsurprisingly, <u>the <mark>loss of jobs</mark> in manufacturing <mark>to automation</u></mark>, when compared to other developed states, <u>happened first and has been <mark>most dramatic</mark> in the United States</u>. <u>This is not only <mark>because the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>created</mark> these <mark>tech</u></mark>nologies, forcing it to internalize the effects of automation earlier than other states, but <u><mark>also</mark> because <mark>export sectors</mark> were <mark>impacted by</mark> America’s exorbitant privilege of <mark>issuing</mark> the <mark>reserve currency</u></mark>. This is in sharp contrast to other states that have experienced less manufacturing job losses, like Germany, who have continually relied on undervalued currencies to boost their exports. <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>further <mark>diminishes</mark> the <mark>need for</mark> such <mark>states to undertake</mark> sudden <mark>security spending as they</mark> generally <mark>fall under the</mark> American <mark>security umbrella</u></mark>. Moreover, finance plays the largest role in the US economy compared to other OECD states. <u>This is primarily a result of the hierarchical tendencies of the monetary system where <mark>capital continues to return back to the hegemon</u></mark> (Oatley et al. 2013). <u>The <mark>gains to the 1 percent</mark> since the 1970s has <mark>correspondingly</mark> been <mark>the largest in</mark> US <mark>history</u></mark>. Attempts to maintain primacy and the structural effects of the international system reorganized the American economy and had long-term consequences for domestic inequality. <u><strong><mark>Mainstream theories</mark> of IPE would <mark>struggle</mark> to grapple <mark>with</mark> the dynamics described in this review essay as both <mark>systemic theorizing, and</mark> highlighting <mark>different causal pathways</mark> for the same outcome</u></strong>, are not indicative of the primary modeling strategy. The dominant strand of American IPE, open economy politics, takes an actor- centric approach, utilizing economic theories to assume preferences that can then be extrapolated upward into law-like statements. Research questions focus on why some states are more open than others and which model of economic-theory best explains public opinion. This linear style of theorizing provides important insights but it also negates the possibility that there are systemic features driving economic interests or action, and the pluralistic view of the state assumes governments have no independent preferences, inhibiting geopolitical analyses. The international security field has also begun to take a bottom-up approach with a growing focus on the effect of domestic audiences and domestic institutions. The shift has clearly helped us better understand variation in statecraft but it prevents a full understanding of how levels of analysis can interact. For example, the most recent wave of experiment-based research on audience costs primarily draws its participants from the United States (Tomz 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). This clarifies prospects of international conflict but few have stopped to question whether US military primacy could condition or limit the external validity of such results. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>inequality is</mark> often <mark>seen as</mark> something <mark>outside</mark> the “high politics” of <mark>security studies</u></strong></mark>. The distinction between IR’s subfields is constantly debated, but this has not changed the fact that, given American preponderance and economic globalization, <u>substantively <mark>important questions are</mark> still <mark>falling through</mark> our discipline’s <mark>self-defined cracks</u></mark>. If we want to understand the economics-security nexus, we need to take a more dynamic approach. The closest coherent agenda that cuts across the IPE/security divide is the work on issue linkage (Poast 2012), which combines multiple arenas into the same bargaining space. Although some authors analyze how domestic politics can temper strategic side payments (Davis 2009), bargaining rounds are generally seen as independent events. We should begin to ask how <u>deals made at time t create <mark>feedback loops within</mark> the <mark>domestic political economy</mark> that <mark>alter bargaining positions</mark> and preferences <mark>in future negotiation</mark> rounds at time t + 1</u>. Such a model would include not only times when the two areas of inquiry are combined in the negotiation process, but also analyze how an early security round affects economic interests at the domestic level and, then, alters future international security negotiations. In other words, sequencing across the international and domestic divide needs to be considered to ensure that we are making correct inferences. This will not apply to every case or issue, but taking such alternative hypotheses seriously will only improve the accuracy of our work and help cumulatively link knowledge across (sub)fields. IR then needs to grapple with how the changes in the domestic political economy triggered by international forces alter hegemonic power. How does rising inequality affect how the American state can project its power internationally? This could become both symbolically and materially important, as the current moment has no clear dominant economic model in sight. <u>The growing global recognition of <mark>inequality</mark> as a normative issue potentially <mark>diminishes</mark> US <mark>soft power</u></mark>, <u><mark>while</mark> the growing consensus in macroeconomics on the <mark>negative growth effects</mark> of inequality implies that the American economy will continue to pay long-term costs for its international behavior</u>. <u>This <mark>will</mark> inevitably <mark>inhibit future</mark> geopolitical attempts to maintain <mark>primacy</u></mark>. More broadly, we should begin to study if and how the task of managing hegemony alters domestic politics in ways that cause endogenous hegemonic breakdown. Overexpansion was the key concern for hegemonic sta- bility theory, with a rising challenger resulting in a power shift. The books here signal a need to ask whether at- tempts to maintain primacy can be sufficient (or neces- sary) for decline and how the resultant domestic cleav- ages alter the possibility for stability in the international system. For example, Caverley’s (2014) recent work illustrates that <u><mark>as militaries become more capital intensive</u></mark>— one of the key transformations and intervening variables of this article—<u><mark>and inequality increases</u></mark> (the outcome in the United States), <u><strong>democratic <mark>publics become increasingly war-prone</u></strong></mark>. Caverley (2014) in turn attributes the decision to take on unnecessary and ineffective wars to such political effects. Alternatively, <u>growing <mark>inequality could trigger</mark> increasing <mark>isolationist preferences that</mark> then <mark>make a hegemon retrench</mark> rather than overstretch</u>. While one could study the effects of inequality on hegemonic power without looking at the initial feedback, it would disregard the endogenous process at work. </p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Torres 16 – affiliate scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies (Phil, PhD candidate @ Rice University in tropical conservation biology, Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk, http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/Torres20160807) fulltext: Humanity faces a number of formidable challenges this century. Threats to our collective survival stem from asteroids and comets, supervolcanoes, global pandemics, climate change, biodiversity loss, nuclear weapons, biotechnology, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence. With such threats in mind, an informal survey conducted by the Future of Humanity Institute placed the probability of human extinction this century at 19%. To put this in perspective, it means that the average American is more than a thousand times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a plane crash.* So, given limited resources, which risks should we prioritize? Many intellectual leaders, including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates, have suggested that artificial superintelligence constitutes one of the most significant risks to humanity. And this may be correct in the long-term. But I would argue that two other risks, namely climate change and biodiveristy loss, should take priority right now over every other known threat. Why? Because these ongoing catastrophes in slow-motion will frame our existential predicament on Earth not just for the rest of this century, but for literally thousands of years to come. As such, they have the capacity to raise or lower the probability of other risks scenarios unfolding. Multiplying Threats Ask yourself the following: are wars more or less likely in a world marked by extreme weather events, megadroughts, food supply disruptions, and sea-level rise? Are terrorist attacks more or less likely in a world beset by the collapse of global ecosystems, agricultural failures, economic uncertainty, and political instability? Both government officials and scientists agree that the answer is “more likely.” For example, the current Director of the CIA, John Brennan, recently identified “the impact of climate change” as one of the “deeper causes of this rising instability” in countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine. Similarly, the former Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, has described climate change as a “threat multiplier” with “the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism.” The Department of Defense has also affirmed a connection. In a 2015 report, it states, “Global climate change will aggravate problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions that threaten stability in a number of countries.” Scientific studies have further shown a connection between the environmental crisis and violent conflicts. For example, a 2015 paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences argues that climate change was a causal factor behind the record-breaking 2007-2010 drought in Syria. This drought led to a mass migration of farmers into urban centers, which fueled the 2011 Syrian civil war. Some observers, including myself, have suggested that this struggle could be the beginning of World War III, given the complex tangle of international involvement and overlapping interests. The study’s conclusion is also significant because the Syrian civil war was the Petri dish in which the Islamic State consolidated its forces, later emerging as the largest and most powerful terrorist organization in human history. A Perfect Storm The point is that climate change and biodiversity loss could very easily push societies to the brink of collapse. This will exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions and introduce entirely new power struggles between state and nonstate actors. At the same time, advanced technologies will very likely become increasingly powerful and accessible. As I’ve written elsewhere, the malicious agents of the future will have bulldozers rather than shovels to dig mass graves for their enemies. The result is a perfect storm of more conflicts in the world along with unprecedentedly dangerous weapons. If the conversation were to end here, we’d have ample reason for placing climate change and biodiversity loss at the top of our priority lists. But there are other reasons they ought to be considered urgent threats. I would argue that they could make humanity more vulnerable to a catastrophe involving superintelligence and even asteroids. The basic reasoning is the same for both cases. Consider superintelligence first. Programming a superintelligence whose values align with ours is a formidable task even in stable circumstances. As Nick Bostrom argues in his 2014 book, we should recognize the “default outcome” of superintelligence to be “doom.” Now imagine trying to solve these problems amidst a rising tide of interstate wars, civil unrest, terrorist attacks, and other tragedies? The societal stress caused by climate change and biodiversity loss will almost certainly compromise important conditions for creating friendly AI, such as sufficient funding, academic programs to train new scientists, conferences on AI, peer-reviewed journal publications, and communication/collaboration between experts of different fields, such as computer science and ethics. It could even make an “AI arms race” more likely, thereby raising the probability of a malevolent superintelligence being created either on purpose or by mistake. Similarly, imagine that astronomers discover a behemoth asteroid barreling toward Earth. Will designing, building, and launching a spacecraft to divert the assassin past our planet be easier or more difficult in a world preoccupied with other survival issues? In a relatively peaceful world, one could imagine an asteroid actually bringing humanity together by directing our attention toward a common threat. But if the “conflict multipliers” of climate change and biodiversity loss have already catapulted civilization into chaos and turmoil, I strongly suspect that humanity will become more, rather than less, susceptible to dangers of this sort. Context Risks We can describe the dual threats of climate change and biodiversity loss as “context risks.” Neither is likely to directly cause the extinction of our species. But both will define the context in which civilization confronts all the other threats before us. In this way, they could indirectly contribute to the overall danger of annihilation — and this worrisome effect could be significant. For example, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the effects of climate change will be “severe,” “pervasive,” and “irreversible.” Or, as a 2016 study published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists puts it, the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” Furthermore, a recent article in Science Advances confirms that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet another study suggests that we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible, catastrophic collapse of the global ecosystem. If this were to occur, it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, nuclear terrorism, engineered pandemics, a superintelligence takeover, and perhaps even an impact winter, it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns — at least in the near-term. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Extinction and outweighs everything</h4><p><strong>Torres 16 </strong>– affiliate scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies (Phil, PhD candidate @ Rice University in tropical conservation biology, Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk, http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/Torres20160807) </p><p><u>Humanity faces a number of formidable challenges</u> this century. <u>Threats</u> to our collective survival <u>stem from</u> <u>asteroids</u> and comets, supervolcanoes, global <u>pandemics</u>, <u>climate change</u>, biodiversity loss, <u>nuclear weapons</u>, <u>biotechnology</u>, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence. With such threats in mind, an informal survey conducted by the Future of Humanity Institute placed the probability of human extinction this century at 19%. To put this in perspective, it means that the average American is more than a thousand times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a plane crash.* So, given limited resources, which risks should we prioritize? Many intellectual leaders, including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates, have suggested that artificial superintelligence constitutes one of the most significant risks to humanity. And this may be correct in the long-term. But I would argue that two other risks, namely <u><strong><mark>climate </mark>change </u></strong>and biodiveristy<u> loss</u>, <u>should <strong>take priority</u></strong> right now <u>over</u> <u><strong>every other known threat</u></strong>. Why? <u>Because these ongoing <mark>catastrophes</u> <u><strong></mark>in slow-motion</u></strong> <u>will <mark>frame our <strong>existential predicament</u></strong></mark> on Earth not just for the rest of this century, but <u>for</u> literally <u><strong>thousands of years</u></strong> to come. As such, <u><mark>they</u> <u></mark>have the capacity to <strong><mark>raise </mark>or lower</strong> <mark>the <strong>probability of other risks</mark> scenarios</u></strong> <u>unfolding</u>. Multiplying Threats Ask yourself the following: <u>are <mark>wars </mark>more or less likely in a world marked by <strong>extreme weather events</u></strong>, <u><strong>megadroughts</u></strong>, <u><strong>food supply disruptions</u></strong>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>sea-level rise</u></strong>? <u>Are <mark>terrorist attacks</u> <u>more</mark> or less <mark>likely</mark> in a world beset</u> by <u><strong><mark>the collapse of global ecosystems</u></strong>, <u><strong>agricultural failures</u></strong>, <u><strong>economic uncertainty</u></strong></mark>, and political instability? Both <u>government officials and scientists agree</u> that the answer is <u><strong>“more likely.”</u></strong> For example, the current Director of the CIA, John <u>Brennan</u>, recently <u>identified</u> “the impact of <u>climate change</u>” <u>as one of the “<mark>deeper causes of this rising instability”</u> <u></mark>in</u> countries like <u><strong>Syria</u></strong>, <u><strong>Iraq</u></strong>, <u><strong>Yemen</u></strong>, <u><strong>Libya</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>Ukraine</u></strong>. Similarly, the former Secretary of Defense, Chuck <u>Hagel</u>, has <u>described climate change as a <strong>“threat multiplier”</u></strong> with “the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism.” The Department of Defense has also affirmed a connection. In a 2015 report, it states, “Global <u>climate change will <mark>aggravate</u></mark> problems such as <u><strong><mark>poverty</u></strong>, <u><strong>social tensions</u></strong></mark>, environmental degradation, <u><strong><mark>ineffectual leadership</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>weak </mark>political <mark>institutions</u></strong></mark> <u>that threaten stability</u> in a number of countries.” Scientific studies have further shown a connection between the environmental crisis and violent conflicts. For example, a 2015 paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences argues that climate change was a causal factor behind the record-breaking 2007-2010 drought in Syria. This drought led to a mass migration of farmers into urban centers, which fueled the 2011 Syrian civil war. Some observers, including myself, have suggested that this struggle could be the beginning of World War III, given the complex tangle of international involvement and overlapping interests. The study’s conclusion is also significant because the Syrian civil war was the Petri dish in which the Islamic State consolidated its forces, later emerging as the largest and most powerful terrorist organization in human history. A Perfect Storm The point is that <u>climate change </u>and biodiversity loss <u><mark>could</mark> very easily <mark>push societies <strong>to </mark>the brink of <mark>collapse</u></strong></mark>. <u>This will exacerbate <strong>existing geopolitical tensions</strong> and introduce entirely</u> <u><strong>new power struggles</u></strong> between state and nonstate actors. At the same time, advanced technologies will very likely become increasingly powerful and accessible. As I’ve written elsewhere, the malicious agents of the future will have bulldozers rather than shovels to dig mass graves for their enemies. The result is a perfect storm of more conflicts in the world along with unprecedentedly dangerous weapons. If the conversation were to end here, we’d have ample reason for placing climate change and biodiversity loss at the top of our priority lists. But there are other reasons they ought to be considered urgent threats. I would argue that they could make humanity more vulnerable to a catastrophe involving superintelligence and even asteroids. The basic reasoning is the same for both cases. Consider superintelligence first. Programming a superintelligence whose values align with ours is a formidable task even in stable circumstances. As Nick Bostrom argues in his 2014 book, we should recognize the “default outcome” of superintelligence to be “doom.” Now imagine trying to solve these problems amidst a rising tide of interstate wars, civil unrest, terrorist attacks, and other tragedies? The societal stress caused by climate change and biodiversity loss will almost certainly compromise important conditions for creating friendly AI, such as sufficient funding, academic programs to train new scientists, conferences on AI, peer-reviewed journal publications, and communication/collaboration between experts of different fields, such as computer science and ethics. It could even make an “AI arms race” more likely, thereby raising the probability of a malevolent superintelligence being created either on purpose or by mistake. Similarly, <u>imagine</u> that astronomers discover <u>a</u> behemoth asteroid <u>barreling toward</u> Earth. Will designing, building, and launching a spacecraft to divert the assassin past our planet be easier or more difficult in a world preoccupied with other survival issues? <u>In a relatively peaceful world,</u> <u>one could imagine an asteroid</u> actually <u>bringing humanity together</u> <u>by directing our attention <strong>toward a common threat</strong>.</u> <u><strong>But</u></strong> if <u>the “conflict multipliers” of climate change</u> and biodiversity loss <u>have already <strong>catapulted civilization</u></strong> <u>into</u> chaos <u>and</u> turmoil, I strongly suspect that <u>humanity will become</u> <u>more</u>, rather than less, <u>susceptible to danger</u>s of this sort. Context Risks We can describe the dual threats of climate change and biodiversity loss as “context risks.” Neither is likely to directly cause the extinction of our species. But <u><strong>both will define the context in which civilization confronts all the other threats</u></strong> before us. In this way, <u>they could <strong>indirectly</strong> contribute to the <strong>overall danger of annihilation</u></strong> — and this worrisome effect could be significant. For example, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the effects of climate change will be “severe,” “pervasive,” and “irreversible.” Or, as a 2016 study published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists puts it, the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” Furthermore, a recent article in Science Advances confirms that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet <u>another study suggests</u> that <u>we could be approaching a <strong>sudden</strong>,</u> <u><strong>irreversible</u></strong>, catastrophic <u><strong>collapse of the global ecosystem</u></strong>. If this were to occur, it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” <u>Given the potential for environmental degradation to <strong><mark>elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars</u></strong>, <u><strong></mark>nuclear <mark>terrorism</u></strong>, <u><strong>engineered pandemics</u></strong>,</mark> a <u><strong>superintelligence takeover</u></strong>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> perhaps even <u><strong><mark>an impact winter</u></strong>, <u>it ought to take precedence <strong>over all other risk concerns</u></strong></mark> — at least in the near-term. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight.</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Matt McGrath 21, environment correspondent for BBC News; citing the 2021 IPCC report, UN Secretary General António Guterres, and multiple climate professors, 8/9/2021, “Climate change: IPCC report is 'code red for humanity',” https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-58130705, pacc fulltext: Human activity is changing the climate in unprecedented and sometimes irreversible ways, a major UN scientific report has said. The landmark study warns of increasingly extreme heatwaves, droughts and flooding, and a key temperature limit being broken in just over a decade. The report "is a code red for humanity", says the UN chief. But scientists say a catastrophe can be avoided if the world acts fast. There is hope that deep cuts in emissions of greenhouse gases could stabilise rising temperatures. Echoing the scientists' findings, UN Secretary General António Guterres said: "If we combine forces now, we can avert climate catastrophe. But, as today's report makes clear, there is no time for delay and no room for excuses. I count on government leaders and all stakeholders to ensure COP26 is a success." The sober assessment of our planet's future has been delivered by the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a group of scientists whose findings are endorsed by the world's governments. Their report is the first major review of the science of climate change since 2013. Its release comes less than three months before a key climate summit in Glasgow known as COP26. In strong, confident tones, the IPCC's document says "it is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, oceans and land". According to Prof Ed Hawkins, from the University of Reading, UK, and one of the report's authors, the scientists cannot be any clearer on this point. "It is a statement of fact, we cannot be any more certain; it is unequivocal and indisputable that humans are warming the planet." Petteri Taalas, Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization, said: "By using sports terms, one could say the atmosphere has been exposed to doping, which means we have begun observing extremes more often than before." The authors say that since 1970, global surface temperatures have risen faster than in any other 50-year period over the past 2,000 years. This warming is "already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe". Whether it's heatwaves like the ones recently experienced in Greece and western North America, or floods like those in Germany and China, "their attribution to human influence has strengthened" over the past decade. IPCC report key points Global surface temperature was 1.09C higher in the decade between 2011-2020 than between 1850-1900. The past five years have been the hottest on record since 1850 The recent rate of sea level rise has nearly tripled compared with 1901-1971 Human influence is "very likely" (90%) the main driver of the global retreat of glaciers since the 1990s and the decrease in Arctic sea-ice It is "virtually certain" that hot extremes including heatwaves have become more frequent and more intense since the 1950s, while cold events have become less frequent and less severe The new report also makes clear that the warming we've experienced to date has made changes to many of our planetary support systems that are irreversible on timescales of centuries to millennia. The oceans will continue to warm and become more acidic. Mountain and polar glaciers will continue melting for decades or centuries. "The consequences will continue to get worse for every bit of warming," said Prof Hawkins. "And for many of these consequences, there's no going back." When it comes to sea level rise, the scientists have modelled a likely range for different levels of emissions. However, a rise of around 2m by the end of this century cannot be ruled out - and neither can a 5m rise by 2150. Such outcomes, while unlikely, would threaten many millions more people in coastal areas with flooding by 2100. One key aspect of the report is the expected rate of temperature rise and what it means for the safety of humanity. Almost every nation on Earth signed up to the goals of the Paris climate agreement in 2015. This pact aims to keep the rise in global temperatures well below 2C this century and to pursue efforts to keep it under 1.5C. This new report says that under all the emissions scenarios considered by the scientists, both targets will be broken this century unless huge cuts in carbon take place. Almost every nation on Earth signed up to the goals of the Paris climate agreement in 2015. This pact aims to keep the rise in global temperatures well below 2C this century and to pursue efforts to keep it under 1.5C. This new report says that under all the emissions scenarios considered by the scientists, both targets will be broken this century unless huge cuts in carbon take place. The authors believe that 1.5C will be reached by 2040 in all scenarios. If emissions aren't slashed in the next few years, this will happen even earlier. This was predicted in the IPCC's special report on 1.5C in 2018 and this new study now confirms it. "We will hit one-and-a-half degrees in individual years much earlier. We already hit it in two months during the El Niño in 2016," said Prof Malte Meinshausen, an IPCC author from the University of Melbourne in Australia. "The new report's best estimate is the middle of 2034, but the uncertainty is huge and ranges between now and never." The consequences of going past 1.5C over a period of years would be unwelcome in a world that has already experienced a rapid uptick in extreme events with a temperature rise since pre-industrial times of 1.1C. "We will see even more intense and more frequent heatwaves," said Dr Friederike Otto, from the University of Oxford, UK, and one of the IPCC report's authors. "And we will also see an increase in heavy rainfall events on a global scale, and also increases in some types of droughts in some regions of the world." Prof Carolina Vera, vice-chair of the working group that produced the document, said: "The report clearly shows that we are already living the consequences of climate change everywhere. But we will experience further and concurrent changes that increase with every additional beat of warming." So what can be done? While this report is more clear and confident about the downsides to warming, the scientists are more hopeful that if we can cut global emissions in half by 2030 and reach net zero by the middle of this century, we can halt and possibly reverse the rise in temperatures. Reaching net zero involves reducing greenhouse gas emissions as much as possible using clean technology, then burying any remaining releases using carbon capture and storage, or absorbing them by planting trees. "The thought before was that we could get increasing temperatures even after net zero," said another co-author, Prof Piers Forster from the University of Leeds, UK. "But we now expect nature to be kind to us and if we are able to achieve net zero, we hopefully won't get any further temperature increase; and if we are able to achieve net zero greenhouse gases, we should eventually be able to reverse some of that temperature increase and get some cooling." Five future impacts Temperatures will reach 1.5C above 1850-1900 levels by 2040 under all emissions scenarios The Arctic is likely to be practically ice-free in September at least once before 2050 in all scenarios assessed There will be an increasing occurrence of some extreme events "unprecedented in the historical record" even at warming of 1.5C Extreme sea level events that occurred once a century in the recent past are projected to occur at least annually at more than half of tidal gauge locations by 2100 There will be likely increases in fire weather in many regions While the future projections of warming are clearer than ever in this report, and many impacts simply cannot be avoided, the authors caution against fatalism. "Lowering global warming really minimises the likelihood of hitting these tipping points," said Dr Otto. "We are not doomed."<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Warming is approaching <u>irreversible tipping points</u>---scaling up CCS averts <u>catastrophe</u>.</h4><p>Matt <strong>McGrath 21</strong>, environment correspondent for BBC News; citing the 2021 IPCC report, UN Secretary General António Guterres, and multiple climate professors, 8/9/2021, “Climate change: IPCC report is 'code red for humanity',” https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-58130705, pacc </p><p><u><strong>Human <mark>activity</strong></mark> is <mark>changing </mark>the <mark>climate</mark> in <strong>unprecedented</strong> and</u> sometimes <u><strong><mark>irreversible</strong> ways</u></mark>, a major UN scientific report has said.</p><p>The landmark study warns of <u>increasingly extreme heatwaves, droughts and flooding, and a <strong>key <mark>temperature limit</strong></mark> being <mark>broken in</u></mark> just over <u><strong><mark>a decade</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>The report "is a <strong>code red for humanity</strong>",</u> says the UN chief.</p><p><u>But <strong><mark>scientists</strong> say</mark> a catastrophe can be <strong>avoided</strong> <mark>if </mark>the world <strong><mark>act</mark>s <mark>fast</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>There is hope that deep cuts in emissions of greenhouse gases could stabilise rising temperatures.</p><p>Echoing the scientists' findings, UN Secretary General António Guterres said: "If we combine forces now, <u><mark>we can avert</mark> <strong>climate <mark>catastrophe</strong>. </mark>But</u>, as today's report makes clear, <u>there is <strong><mark>no time for delay</u></strong></mark> and no room for excuses. I count on government leaders and all stakeholders to ensure COP26 is a success."</p><p>The sober assessment of our planet's future has been delivered by the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a group of scientists whose findings are endorsed by the world's governments.</p><p>Their report is the first major review of the science of climate change since 2013. Its release comes less than three months before a key climate summit in Glasgow known as COP26.</p><p>In strong, confident tones, the IPCC's document says "it is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, oceans and land".</p><p>According to Prof Ed Hawkins, from the University of Reading, UK, and one of the report's authors, the scientists cannot be any clearer on this point.</p><p>"It is a statement of fact, we cannot be any more certain; it is unequivocal and indisputable that humans are warming the planet."</p><p>Petteri Taalas, Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization, said: "By using sports terms, one could say the atmosphere has been exposed to doping, which means we have begun observing extremes more often than before."</p><p>The authors say that since 1970, global surface temperatures have risen faster than in any other 50-year period over the past 2,000 years.</p><p>This warming is "already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe".</p><p>Whether it's heatwaves like the ones recently experienced in Greece and western North America, or floods like those in Germany and China, "their attribution to human influence has strengthened" over the past decade.</p><p>IPCC report key points</p><p>Global surface temperature was 1.09C higher in the decade between 2011-2020 than between 1850-1900.</p><p>The past five years have been the hottest on record since 1850</p><p>The recent rate of sea level rise has nearly tripled compared with 1901-1971</p><p>Human influence is "very likely" (90%) the main driver of the global retreat of glaciers since the 1990s and the decrease in Arctic sea-ice</p><p>It is "virtually certain" that hot extremes including heatwaves have become more frequent and more intense since the 1950s, while cold events have become less frequent and less severe</p><p>The new report also makes clear that the warming we've experienced to date has made changes to many of our planetary support systems that are irreversible on timescales of centuries to millennia.</p><p>The oceans will continue to warm and become more acidic. Mountain and polar glaciers will continue melting for decades or centuries.</p><p>"<u>The consequences will <strong>continue to <mark>get worse</strong> for <strong>every bit</strong> of warming</u></mark>," said Prof Hawkins.</p><p>"And for many of these consequences, there's no going back."</p><p>When it comes to sea level rise, the scientists have modelled a likely range for different levels of emissions.</p><p>However, a rise of around 2m by the end of this century cannot be ruled out - and neither can a 5m rise by 2150.</p><p>Such outcomes, while unlikely, would threaten many millions more people in coastal areas with flooding by 2100.</p><p>One key aspect of the report is the expected rate of temperature rise and what it means for the safety of humanity.</p><p>Almost every nation on Earth signed up to the goals of the Paris climate agreement in 2015.</p><p>This pact aims to keep the rise in global temperatures well below 2C this century and to pursue efforts to keep it under 1.5C.</p><p>This new report says that under all the emissions scenarios considered by the scientists, both targets will be broken this century unless huge cuts in carbon take place.</p><p>Almost every nation on Earth signed up to the goals of the Paris climate agreement in 2015.</p><p>This pact aims to keep the rise in global temperatures well below 2C this century and to pursue efforts to keep it under 1.5C.</p><p>This new report says that under all the emissions scenarios considered by the scientists, both targets will be broken this century unless huge cuts in carbon take place.</p><p>The authors believe that <u><strong><mark>1.5C</strong> will be reached by <strong>2040</u></strong></mark> in all scenarios. <u><mark>If emissions aren't slashed in the <strong>next few years</strong></mark>, this will happen even earlier</u>.</p><p>This was predicted in <u>the <strong>IPCC's special report</u></strong> on 1.5C in 2018 <u>and this <strong>new study</u></strong> now <u>confirms</u> it.</p><p>"We will hit one-and-a-half degrees in individual years much earlier. We already hit it in two months during the El Niño in 2016," said Prof Malte Meinshausen, an IPCC author from the University of Melbourne in Australia.</p><p>"The new report's best estimate is the middle of 2034, but the uncertainty is huge and ranges between now and never."</p><p>The consequences of going past 1.5C over a period of years would be unwelcome in a world that has already experienced a rapid uptick in extreme events with a temperature rise since pre-industrial times of 1.1C.</p><p>"We will see even more intense and more frequent heatwaves," said Dr Friederike Otto, from the University of Oxford, UK, and one of the IPCC report's authors.</p><p>"And we will also see an increase in heavy rainfall events on a global scale, and also increases in some types of droughts in some regions of the world."</p><p>Prof Carolina Vera, vice-chair of the working group that produced the document, said: "The report clearly shows that we are already living the consequences of climate change everywhere. But we will experience further and concurrent changes that increase with every additional beat of warming."</p><p>So what can be done?</p><p>While this report is more clear and confident about the downsides to warming, the scientists are more hopeful that <u><mark>if we</mark> can <mark>cut</mark> <strong>global <mark>emissions</strong> in half by <strong>2030</strong></mark> and reach net zero by the middle of this century, <mark>we can</mark> halt and possibly <strong><mark>reverse</strong></mark> the <strong>rise in <mark>temp</mark>erature<mark>s</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Reaching <strong><mark>net zero</strong> involves reducing</u></mark> greenhouse gas <u><mark>emissions</u></mark> as much as possible <u><mark>using <strong>clean tech</mark>nology</strong>, <mark>then burying</mark> any</u> remaining <u><mark>releases using <strong>c</mark>arbon <mark>c</mark>apture and <mark>s</mark>torage</u></strong>, or absorbing them by planting trees.</p><p>"The thought before was that we could get increasing temperatures even after net zero," said another co-author, Prof Piers Forster from the University of Leeds, UK.</p><p>"But we now expect nature to be kind to us and if we are able to achieve net zero, we hopefully won't get any further temperature increase; and <u>if we</u> are able to <u>achieve <strong><mark>net zero</mark> greenhouse gases</strong>, we <mark>should</u></mark> eventually <u>be able to <strong><mark>reverse</u></strong></mark> some of that <u><mark>temperature increase</mark> and get</u> some <u>cooling</u>."</p><p>Five future impacts</p><p>Temperatures will reach 1.5C above 1850-1900 levels by 2040 under all emissions scenarios</p><p>The Arctic is likely to be practically ice-free in September at least once before 2050 in all scenarios assessed</p><p>There will be an increasing occurrence of some extreme events "unprecedented in the historical record" even at warming of 1.5C</p><p>Extreme sea level events that occurred once a century in the recent past are projected to occur at least annually at more than half of tidal gauge locations by 2100</p><p>There will be likely increases in fire weather in many regions</p><p>While the future projections of warming are clearer than ever in this report, and many impacts simply cannot be avoided, the authors caution against fatalism.</p><p>"<u>Lowering global warming</u> really <u><mark>minimises</mark> the <mark>likelihood of hitting</mark> these <strong><mark>tipping points</u></strong></mark>," said Dr Otto. "<u><mark>We are <strong>not doomed</u></strong></mark>."</p><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Adams 18 Gordon Adams, Gordon Adams is emeritus faculty from American University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center. He oversaw national security budgets in the Clinton White House from 1993-97. “Beyond Hegemony And A Liberal International Order.” May 17, 2018. https://lobelog.com/beyond-hegemony-and-a-liberal-international-order/]//recut CHS PK fulltext: America’s place in the world is experiencing an historic turning point. All the mumbo-jumbo about being the “exceptional” and “indispensable” nation, the natural “leader” of something called the “West,” the guarantor of some kind of international system of “rules” is finally being cast into the dustbin of history. This moment is not just about leaving the Iran nuclear agreement, or even the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate agreement. It is not simply attributable to the unpredictable, childish impulses of the current president. Nor is it the result of Obama’s failure to enforce a red line in Syria, or “leading from behind” in Libya. It is not even about Bush’s invasion of Iraq with the goal of regime change, setting in motion the destruction of what little political stability existed in the Middle East. Of course, it is about all these decisions. But in every case, those decisions, and even the critics of those decisions, have failed to realize how they have played into, helped cause, and now accelerate a fundamental shift in global realities—the centrifugal redistribution of power and influence in the international system that has brought to an end the “American century.” The United States has become just another power in a system for which it no longer sets or enforces the rules, if it ever really did. Both political parties fail to cope with this reality. Democrats and liberals insist that Trump’s foreign-policy decisions threaten the “rules-based” international order America built and dominated. A simple change in leadership, they believe, can restore order and America’s primacy. Republicans demand bellicose American assertiveness, believing that force and military strength guarantee that the world will behave. Columnists bewail America’s declining status, arguing that greater iinvestment in allies and diplomacy, combined with military engagement might reverse the tide. Think tanks scurry to define new national security and military policies that can put America back on top. This debate is a circular firing squad. Both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are struggling to recreate a myth: that the US dominates the world by dint of power, values, wisdom, even God’s decisions. America, and only America, can bring order and security to the world. Any other option spells chaos. Power Shifts The latest foreign policy whim—withdrawing from the nuclear agreement with Iran—is the most recent nail in the coffin lid in which the myth is buried. Rather than restore leadership, withdrawing from the agreement simply accelerates the global rebalancing already underway, a tectonic shift that began with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The signs are everywhere. In the Middle East, the power shift is palpable. The United States has treated Iran as a pariah since 1979, trying to stuff the ayatollahs back into some imaginary bottle, hoping that they will go away or be overthrown. This approach has failed, and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal will only make that failure more evident. Iran is a regional power, defending its interests, engaging other powers and movements inside and outside the region, such as Russia. US regime change in Iraq not only destabilized the region but helped usher the Iranians into this active regional role. The other influential countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, will have to deal with this reality. In addition to these three countries, Russia is also key to regional stability and instability. There’s no way of pushing the Russians out, short of direct conflict. Nor can Turkey be forced to comply with American policy. It is clearly asserting its own interests and influence in three directions at the same time: Central Asia and Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq may have helped open this Pandora’s box. The US is rapidly becoming a marginal player in the chaotic security environment of the Middle East. In Asia, decades of US condemnation and containment of China have failed. How dare China rise? How dare China steal intellectual property, stifle democracy, arm its artificial islands in the South China Sea, develop a powerful military, mess in Africa (complete with a military base in Djibouti), and intrude into Latin America? And yet, to paraphrase Galileo, “they move.” There is a new, global, competitive player in the system, a reality the United States can not contain or reverse. That player is disrupting that lovely system of rules, acting without U.S. permission or approval. It is even creating new international institutions—an infrastructure development bank and a global trading infrastructure programs (the Belt and Road initiative) to which the US is not even a party. The balance has changed, permanently, and the rules are being rewritten, whether the United States likes it or not. At the end of the Cold War, American power surrounded Russia, coopting its former satellites, provoking a Russian reaction. Today, the Russian government is, poisoning its citizens overseas, arming Assad, intruding on elections globally, stifling dissent and killing dissenters, and rebuilding its military. Confront Russia, condemn Putin, pretend that they are isolated, treat them with contempt and moral judgment, but Putin does not go away. He is asserting his view of Russia’s interests and Russia’s role in the world, like any great power is likely to do. No amount of US pressure, sanctions, or policy is likely to change that reality. Russia is consciously and actively rebalancing the United States, with some success. American bullying and presidential rhetoric may have played a role in the apparent, but uncertain, willingness of the North Korean regime to put its nuclear program on the table. But if that program disappears, the putative Nobel Peace Prize may actually belong to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and even Kim Jong Un, for seizing an opportunity. Even that regional balance and the key players are shifting. Reckoning with the Shift America has not been able to use its dominant military to prevent this evolution or restore order. Where it has been deployed in large numbers—Iraq and Afghanistan—U.S. military force has failed. War grinds on in Afghanistan with no light suddenly appearing at the end of the tunnel, despite the promises of generations of officers. Rousting the Islamic State from Iraq has not solved the internal problems of that unhappy country, which is still recovering from a US occupation. Special Operations forces in dozens of countries whack at terrorist moles only to find others arising in their place, stimulated by the confrontation. Order is not restored; the American rules are not being obeyed. If the US fails to read global rebalancing accurately and tries either to bully the rest of the world or to “restore” the liberal international order, the entire world will find itself at an even more dangerous moment. Bullying will only accelerate the centrifugal trend. Asserting the superiority of an American “order” and American “rules” will no longer persuade other rising powers. The rules will change with the rebalancing. Eliminating the Trump presidency will not restore the previous order. His actions are not an aberration, but an accelerant, spreading the fires that were already under way. The challenge is to completely redesign US foreign and national security policy to fit with a world where America is just another power, competing and cooperating for influence. The United States must learn to play well with others in the global sandbox.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>Trying to revive American primacy causes counterbalancing and global war.</h4><p><u><strong>Adams 18</u></strong> Gordon Adams, Gordon Adams is emeritus faculty from American University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center. He oversaw national security budgets in the Clinton White House from 1993-97. “Beyond Hegemony And A Liberal International Order.” May 17, 2018. https://lobelog.com/beyond-hegemony-and-a-liberal-international-order/]//recut CHS<u><strong> PK</p><p><mark>America’s</mark> place in the world is <mark>experiencing a</mark>n historic <mark>turning point.</u></strong> </mark>All the mumbo-jumbo about being the “exceptional” and “indispensable” nation, the natural “leader” of something called the “West,” <u><strong>the guarantor of some kind of international system of “rules” is finally being cast into the dustbin of history.</p><p>This moment is not just about leaving the Iran nuclear agreement, or even the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate agreement. It is not simply attributable to the unpredictable, childish impulses of the current president. Nor is it the result of Obama’s failure to enforce a red line in Syria, or “leading from behind” in Libya. It is not even about Bush’s invasion of Iraq with the goal of regime change, setting in motion the destruction of what little political stability existed in the Middle East.</p><p></u></strong>Of course, <u><strong>it is about all these decisions. But in every case, those decisions, and even the critics of those decisions, have failed to realize how they have played into, helped cause, and now accelerate a fundamental shift in global realities—the centrifugal <mark>redistribution of power and influence</mark> in the international system that <mark>has brought</mark> to <mark>an end the</mark> “<mark>American century</mark>.” The United States has become just another power in a system for which it no longer sets or enforces the rules, if it ever really did.</p><p>Both political <mark>parties fail to cope</mark> with this reality</u></strong>. Democrats and liberals insist that Trump’s foreign-policy decisions threaten the “rules-based” international order America built and dominated. A simple change in leadership, they believe, can restore order and America’s primacy. Republicans demand bellicose American assertiveness, believing that force and military strength guarantee that the world will behave. Columnists bewail America’s declining status, arguing that greater iinvestment in allies and diplomacy, combined with military engagement might reverse the tide. Think tanks scurry to define new national security and military policies that can put America back on top.</p><p><u><strong>This debate is a circular firing squad</u></strong>. Both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are struggling to recreate a myth: that the US dominates the world by dint of power, values, wisdom, even God’s decisions. America, and only America, can bring order and security to the world. Any other option spells chaos.</p><p>Power Shifts</p><p>The latest foreign policy whim—<u><strong><mark>withdrawing from the nuclear agreement</mark> with Iran—<mark>is the</mark> most recent <mark>nail in the coffin</mark> lid</u></strong> in which the myth is buried. Rather than restore leadership, <u><strong><mark>withdrawing</mark> from the agreement simply <mark>accelerates</mark> the <mark>global rebalancing</mark> already <mark>underway</u></strong></mark>, a tectonic shift <u><strong>that began with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. </u></strong>The signs are everywhere.</p><p>In the Middle East, the power shift is palpable<u><strong>. The United States has treated Iran as a pariah <mark>since 1979</u></strong>,</mark> trying to stuff the ayatollahs back into some imaginary bottle, hoping that they will go away or be overthrown. <u><strong>This approach has failed, and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal will only make that failure more evident. Iran is a regional power, defending its interests</u></strong>, engaging other powers and movements inside and outside the region, such as Russia. <u><strong>US <mark>regime change</mark> in Iraq not only <mark>destabilized the region</mark> but helped usher the Iranians into this active regional role. The other influential countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, will have to deal with this reality.</p><p></u></strong>In addition to these three countries, <u><strong>Russia is also key to regional stability and instability. <mark>There’s no way of pushing the Russians out, short of direct conflict.</mark> Nor can Turkey be forced to comply with American policy</u></strong>. It is clearly asserting its own interests and influence in three directions at the same time: Central Asia and Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq may have helped open this Pandora’s box. The US is rapidly becoming a marginal player in the chaotic security environment of the Middle East. <u><strong>In Asia, decades of <mark>US condemnation</mark> and containment <mark>of China have failed</u></strong></mark>. How dare China rise? How dare China steal intellectual property, stifle democracy, arm its artificial islands in the South China Sea, develop a powerful military, mess in Africa (complete with a military base in Djibouti), and intrude into Latin America? And yet, to paraphrase Galileo, “they move.” <u><strong>There is a new, global, competitive player in the system</u></strong>, a reality the United States can not contain or reverse. That player is disrupting that lovely system of rules, acting without U.S. permission or approval. It is even creating new international institutions—an infrastructure development bank and a global trading infrastructure programs (the Belt and Road initiative) to which the US is not even a party. <u><strong><mark>The balance has changed, permanently</mark>, and the rules are being rewritten, whether the United States likes it or not.</p><p></u></strong>At the end of the Cold War, American power surrounded Russia, coopting its former satellites, provoking a Russian reaction. Today, the Russian government is, poisoning its citizens overseas, arming Assad, intruding on elections globally, stifling dissent and killing dissenters, and rebuilding its military. Confront Russia, condemn Putin, pretend that they are isolated, treat them with contempt and moral judgment, but Putin does not go away. He is asserting his view of Russia’s interests and Russia’s role in the world, like any great power is likely to do. <u><strong>No amount of US pressure, sanctions, or policy is likely to change that reality.</u></strong> Russia is consciously and actively rebalancing the United States, with some success.</p><p>American bullying and presidential rhetoric may have played a role in the apparent, but uncertain, willingness of the North Korean regime to put its nuclear program on the table. But if that program disappears, the putative Nobel Peace Prize may actually belong to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and even Kim Jong Un, for seizing an opportunity. Even that regional balance and the key players are shifting.</p><p>Reckoning with the Shift</p><p><u><strong><mark>America has not been able to use its</mark> dominant <mark>military to prevent this</mark> evolution or restore order. </u></strong>Where it has been deployed in large numbers—Iraq and Afghanistan—U.S. military force has failed. <u><strong>War grinds on in Afghanistan</u></strong> with no light suddenly appearing at the end of the tunnel, despite the promises of generations of officers. <u><strong>Rousting the Islamic State from Iraq has not solved the internal problems of that unhappy country,</u></strong> which is still recovering from a US occupation. Special Operations forces in dozens of countries whack at terrorist moles only to find others arising in their place, stimulated by the confrontation. Order is not restored; the American rules are not being obeyed.</p><p><u><strong>If the US fails to read global rebalancing accurately and tries either to bully the rest of the world or to “restore” the liberal international order, the entire world will find itself at an even more dangerous moment.</u></strong> Bullying will only accelerate the centrifugal trend. Asserting the superiority of an American “order” and American “rules” will no longer persuade other rising powers.</p><p><u><strong>The rules will change with the rebalancing. Eliminating the Trump presidency will not restore the previous order. His actions are not an aberration, but an accelerant, spreading the fires that were already under way.</p><p></u></strong>The challenge is to completely redesign US foreign and national security policy to fit with a world where America is just another power, competing and cooperating for influence. <u><strong>The United States must learn to play well with others in the global sandbox.</p></u></strong><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Lind, 7/11/18 – [Dara, Staff-writer @ Vox, “A new study blows up Trump’s “catch-and-release” myth”, (https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/11/17525006/catch-release-families-border-trump)]//MM fulltext: After several months of experimenting with punitive policies toward families coming to the US without papers — including separating thousands of children from their parents to detain and prosecute parents — the Trump administration is reluctantly returning to a practice it pejoratively calls “catch and release”: releasing families from immigration detention and allowing them to live in the US while they wait for their asylum claims to be adjudicated. President Donald Trump and other top administration officials have spent months railing against the release of immigrant families as a recipe for widespread lawlessness. They claim that once a family is released from immigration, they’ll simply abscond into the US, skipping their appointed court dates, to live as unauthorized immigrants. The administration makes it seem like this is a deliberate strategy — a known end-run around existing immigration law that takes advantages of extra protections afforded to children, families, and asylum-seekers. But a new study, compiled by a pair of legal advocacy groups, shows that isn’t the case, and that the administration doesn’t have to choose between separating immigrant families (or detaining them indefinitely) and making sure they show up to court. The administration has identified a real problem, but misunderstands, or misrepresents, the cause. The study confirms that families who cross into the US without papers often miss their court dates, but offers suggestive qualitative evidence — collected from families who were contacted by attorneys and notified that they’d missed their court dates — that many families aren’t deliberately absconding at all. They’re trying to stay in the system. It’s just that the system makes it too hard for them, then punishes them with an order of deportation when they fail. The people whom the Trump administration is painting as lawless “absconders” are often just lost, confused, and overwhelmed families in a strange land, working as hard as they can to be allowed to stay here but faced with legal and bureaucratic obstacles that make missing a court date an understandable outcome. If the Trump administration is genuinely concerned about making sure asylum seekers stay in the legal process as long as they’re in the US, this is great news. It shows that they didn’t really need to use punitive tactics like separation and indefinite detention to accomplish that goal. And it shows that, now that they’ve started releasing families together again, they can devote their energy to smoothing the bureaucratic obstacles that are the real heart of the problem. On the other hand, if the Trump administration continues to paint “catch and release” as a recipe for widespread lawlessness instead of trying to help families go through the system the right way, it will indicate that they are more interested in punishment than they are with ensuring the legal process gets followed. Families not showing up to court dates is a real problem Most people who are caught entering the US without papers can be deported quickly without a court hearing. But, to the apparent chagrin of President Trump, there are special protections for some groups, including asylum-seekers, to give them a chance to prove they’re eligible for legal status in the US. Since the road to legal status runs through the incredibly backlogged immigration court system, that can take years, leaving the government with the question of what to do with migrants while their court cases are pending. The way Trump tells it, any migrant who gets released from immigration detention before her court case is resolved will immediately escape into the US and evade detection by the authorities. “We release them. They go someplace into our country. They’re supposed to come back within two or three years for a court case, but nobody ever comes back,” Trump told a West Virginia crowd in April. That’s somewhat overstated, but it doesn’t mean the problem isn’t real. In fiscal year 2016, the last year for which full statistics are available, slightly more than a quarter of all cases decided in immigration courts ended with an order of deportation issued because the defendant hadn’t shown up to court (known as an in absentia order). There aren’t separate in absentia statistics just for asylum-seekers caught entering the US. But statistics suggest that relatively few of the people who say they’re seeking asylum when they’re caught by a Border Patrol agent end up seeing the process of applying for asylum through to the end. Less than 40 percent of people who pass the initial screening interview for asylum submit a written asylum application, which is a necessary step in the process even though they’ve passed the interview and gotten assigned a court hearing. (To the Trump administration, this is proof that the other 60 percent of people were just lying about being persecuted as an excuse to sneak into the US.) The worst group for absenteeism appears to be families. Two legal advocacy groups, CLINIC (the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.) and ASAP (the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project of the Urban Justice Center), used the Freedom of Information Act to get data about all cases involving “adults with children” in the immigration court system from July 18, 2014, to November 2016 — the aftermath of the spring-summer 2014 wave of Central American children and families entering the US. That data showed that more than 70 percent of families’ cases decided during that time ended with in absentia deportation orders. For comparison, during fiscal years 2015 and 2016 — i.e,. between October 2014 and September 2016 — the in absentia rate across all cases was only 26 percent. Not showing up to court is the biggest reason families are losing their asylum cases But just because the Trump administration is correct that people not showing up to court is a problem doesn’t mean it’s correct about why it’s happening. And the data collected by CLINIC and ASAP suggests that families aren’t skipping out because they know their asylum cases are doomed. Oo the contrary, they end up dooming their asylum cases by missing their court dates. Among all immigrants, in absentia cases made up only about a third of deportation orders. Among families, according to the new data, in absentia cases accounted for 83 percent of all removal orders. Meanwhile, families were much more likely to win cases in which they did show up to court than other immigrants. During the period covered in the new report, 83 percent of families’ cases ended with removal orders. But if you take out the removal orders issued in absentia — and look only at cases where families did show up to court — only 40 percent of cases ended with a family ordered deported. That’s a much bigger swing than immigration cases overall saw: In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, 70 percent of all cases ended in removal orders, but taking out the in absentia orders drops the removal rate to 59 percent. The CLINIC/ASAP report says that during this time, asylum screening interviews in family detention centers had a higher approval rate than screening interviews among other border-crossers who claimed a fear of persecution (88 percent versus 77 percent). And the hearings most commonly skipped aren’t the final hearings at which an immigrant’s fate is set; they’re the initial hearings, known as “master calendar” hearings, in which the date for a full hearing is set months or years in the future. (The CLINIC report doesn’t offer data to prove that these are the most commonly missed hearings, but that characterization is consistent with other analyses.) Most suggestively, families that had been in detention at some point, even if they had since been released, were more likely to show up to court than families who’d never been detained. They were also more likely to have legal representation, which CLINIC attributes to the fact that families in detention are often connected to pro bono attorneys and other resources that they can retain even after they get out. The conclusion drawn by the advocacy groups is that people with attorneys were more likely to figure out how to make their court dates, and those without lawyers were at risk of getting swallowed up by the system. Many families are trying to keep up with their cases, but are thwarted by bad information or unclear directions In 2015, CLINIC and ASAP started reaching out to families released from detention to remind them of their court dates. “ASAP and CLINIC consistently encountered families who had missed their hearings for several reasons, mostly outside of the families’ control,” the report says. Some families missed their court dates because of confusion, often exacerbated by the effects of trauma from their home countries or other mental illness. Or because they worried that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would arrest them if they showed up to court. That didn’t happen much under the Obama administration, when this report was conducted, but ICE has since done this to witnesses in criminal cases (and even victims seeking restraining orders) in some cases under Trump. But in a lot of cases, a parent thought she was doing everything right and it just wasn’t enough. If someone moves while their case is pending, the report says, they are “expected to update their address with up to five different entities—the immigration court, USCIS, ICE OCC, ICE ERO, and ISAP—using three different mediums—Form EOIR-33, Form AR-11, and oral or written notice.” That’s a lot of paperwork for someone without an attorney, especially someone whose English skills or general literacy may not be great. And immigrants may not even know they have to go through all that.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>No solvency – Trump has made the system <u>too complex</u> for immigrant families to appear in court – makes <u>deportation</u> and <u>unlawful residence</u> <u>inevitable. </h4><p></u><strong>Lind, 7/11/18<u> – [Dara, Staff-writer @ Vox, “A new study blows up Trump’s “catch-and-release” myth”, (https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/11/17525006/catch-release-families-border-trump)]//MM</p><p></strong>After several months of experimenting with punitive policies toward families</u> coming to the US without papers — including separating thousands of children from their parents to detain and prosecute parents — the Trump administration is reluctantly <u>returning to</u> a practice it pejoratively calls “<u>catch and release</u>”: <u>releasing families from immigration detention and allowing them to live in the US while they wait for</u> their <u>asylum claims to be adjudicated. </u>President Donald Trump and other top administration officials have spent months railing against the release of immigrant families as a recipe for widespread lawlessness. They claim that once a family is released from immigration, they’ll simply abscond into the US, skipping their appointed court dates, to live as unauthorized immigrants. The administration makes it seem like this is a deliberate strategy — a known end-run around existing immigration law that takes advantages of extra protections afforded to children, families, and asylum-seekers. But <u><strong>a new study</u></strong>, <u><strong>compiled by a pair of legal advocacy groups</u></strong>, <u><strong>shows that</u></strong> isn’t the case, and that <u><strong>the administration doesn’t have to choose between separating</u></strong> immigrant <u><strong>families</u></strong> (or detaining them indefinitely) <u><strong>and making sure they show up to court</u></strong>. <u>The administration has</u> identified a real problem, but <u>misunderstands</u>, or misrepresents, <u>the cause.</u> <u><strong>The study confirms that</u></strong> families who cross into the US without papers often miss their court dates, but offers suggestive qualitative evidence — collected from families who were contacted by attorneys and notified that they’d missed their court dates — that <u><strong><mark>many families aren’t</mark> deliberately <mark>absconding</mark> at all. </strong>They’re trying to stay in the system</u>. It’s just that <u><strong><mark>the system makes it too hard for them</u></strong>, <u><strong>then punishes them with an order of deportation when they fail</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>people</mark> whom the Trump administration is painting as lawless “<strong>absconders” <mark>are</u></strong></mark> often just <u><mark>lost</u>, <u>confused</u>, <u>and overwhelmed</mark> families in a strange land</u>, <u>working as hard as they can to be allowed to stay here but <strong><mark>faced with legal and bureaucratic obstacles that make missing a court date</strong> an <strong>understandable</strong> outcome</mark>. </u>If the Trump administration is genuinely concerned about making sure asylum seekers stay in the legal process as long as they’re in the US, this is great news. It shows that they didn’t really need to use punitive tactics like separation and indefinite detention to accomplish that goal. And it shows that, now that they’ve started releasing families together again, they can devote their energy to smoothing the bureaucratic obstacles that are the real heart of the problem. On the other hand, if the Trump administration continues to paint “catch and release” as a recipe for widespread lawlessness instead of trying to help families go through the system the right way, it will indicate that they are more interested in punishment than they are with ensuring the legal process gets followed. Families not showing up to court dates is a real problem Most people who are caught entering the US without papers can be deported quickly without a court hearing. But, to the apparent chagrin of President Trump, there are special protections for some groups, including asylum-seekers, to give them a chance to prove they’re eligible for legal status in the US. Since the road to legal status runs through the incredibly backlogged immigration court system, that can take years, leaving the government with the question of what to do with migrants while their court cases are pending. The way Trump tells it, any migrant who gets released from immigration detention before her court case is resolved will immediately escape into the US and evade detection by the authorities. “We release them. They go someplace into our country. They’re supposed to come back within two or three years for a court case, but nobody ever comes back,” Trump told a West Virginia crowd in April. That’s somewhat overstated, but it doesn’t mean the problem isn’t real. In fiscal year 2016, the last year for which full statistics are available, slightly more than a quarter of all cases decided in immigration courts ended with an order of deportation issued because the defendant hadn’t shown up to court (known as an in absentia order). There aren’t separate in absentia statistics just for asylum-seekers caught entering the US. But statistics suggest that relatively few of the people who say they’re seeking asylum when they’re caught by a Border Patrol agent end up seeing the process of applying for asylum through to the end. Less than 40 percent of people who pass the initial screening interview for asylum submit a written asylum application, which is a necessary step in the process even though they’ve passed the interview and gotten assigned a court hearing. (To the Trump administration, this is proof that the other 60 percent of people were just lying about being persecuted as an excuse to sneak into the US.) The worst group for absenteeism appears to be families. Two legal advocacy groups, CLINIC (the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.) and ASAP (the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project of the Urban Justice Center), used the Freedom of Information Act to get data about all cases involving “adults with children” in the immigration court system from July 18, 2014, to November 2016 — the aftermath of the spring-summer 2014 wave of Central American children and families entering the US. That data showed that more than 70 percent of families’ cases decided during that time ended with in absentia deportation orders. For comparison, during fiscal years 2015 and 2016 — i.e,. between October 2014 and September 2016 — the in absentia rate across all cases was only 26 percent. Not showing up to court is the biggest reason families are losing their asylum cases But <u>just because</u> the <u>Trump</u> administration <u>is correct that people not showing up to court is a problem doesn’t mean it’s correct about why it’s happening. </u>And the data collected by CLINIC and ASAP suggests that families aren’t skipping out because they know their asylum cases are doomed. Oo the contrary, they end up dooming their asylum cases by missing their court dates. Among all immigrants, <u>in absentia cases made up only about a third of deportation orders</u>. <u>Among families</u>, according to the new data, <u>in absentia cases accounted for 83 percent of all removal orders. </u>Meanwhile, <u><mark>families were</mark> much <mark>more likely to win cases in which they did show up to court</mark> than other immigrants</u>. During the period covered in the new report, 83 percent of families’ cases ended with removal orders. But if you take out the removal orders issued in absentia — and look only at cases where families did show up to court — only 40 percent of cases ended with a family ordered deported. That’s a much bigger swing than immigration cases overall saw: In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, 70 percent of all cases ended in removal orders, but taking out the in absentia orders drops the removal rate to 59 percent. The CLINIC/ASAP report says that during this time, <u><mark>asylum screening interviews in</mark> family <mark>detention centers had a higher approval rate</mark> than screening interviews among other border-crossers who claimed a fear of persecution</u> (88 percent versus 77 percent). And the hearings most commonly skipped aren’t the final hearings at which an immigrant’s fate is set; they’re the initial hearings, known as “master calendar” hearings, in which the date for a full hearing is set months or years in the future. (The CLINIC report doesn’t offer data to prove that these are the most commonly missed hearings, but that characterization is consistent with other analyses.) Most suggestively, <u><mark>families</mark> that had been <mark>in detention</mark> at some point</u>, even if they had since been released, <u><mark>were more likely to show up to court</mark> than families who’d never been detained. They were also more likely to have legal representation</u>, which CLINIC attributes to the fact that families in detention are often connected to pro bono attorneys and other resources that they can retain even after they get out. The conclusion drawn by the advocacy groups is that people with attorneys were more likely to figure out how to make their court dates, and <u><strong><mark>those without lawyers were at risk of getting swallowed up</mark> by the system. </u></strong>Many <u><strong><mark>families are trying to keep up with their cases, but are thwarted by bad information or unclear directions</u></strong></mark> In 2015, CLINIC and ASAP started reaching out to families released from detention to remind them of their court dates. “ASAP and CLINIC consistently encountered families who had missed their hearings for several reasons, mostly outside of the families’ control,” the report says. Some families missed their court dates because of confusion, often exacerbated by the effects of trauma from their home countries or other mental illness. Or because they worried that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would arrest them if they showed up to court. That didn’t happen much under the Obama administration, when this report was conducted, but ICE has since done this to witnesses in criminal cases (and even victims seeking restraining orders) in some cases under Trump. But in a lot of cases, a parent thought she was doing everything right and it just wasn’t enough. <u><mark>If someone moves while their case is pending,</mark> the report says, <mark>they are “expected to update their address with up to five different entities</mark>—the immigration court, USCIS, ICE OCC, ICE ERO, and ISAP</u>—<u><mark>using three different mediums</u></mark>—<u>Form EOIR-33, Form AR-11, and oral or written notice</u>.” That’s a lot of paperwork for someone without an attorney, especially someone whose English skills or general literacy may not be great. And <u><strong><mark>immigrants may not even know they have to go through all that.</p></u></strong></mark><\|im_end\|>
<\|begin_of_text\|><\|im_start\|>system You convert citation and fulltext information from an article into a well-formatted html block. Your responses are always valid html only with no clarification. The html must include - A tag in <h4> that expresses the main argument of the evidence - A citation that makes it easy to find the original source - The full text reformatted in html, with underlining. This can be done with <u> and <mark> tags. - Always ensure tags are properly closed. <\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>user citation: Ladelle McWhorter 9, Chair in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Richmond, 2009, Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, second, expanded edition. Chapter 1, “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection,” pp. 6-12, j fulltext: The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things, as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, outside the bounds of human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be inventoried, developed, marketed, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of thinking, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human jurisdiction and authority. And of course even the call to allow this thinking - couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent - is itself a paradox, the first (but only the first) that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never be able to dream. And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves - selves engineered by technologies of power that shaped, indeed, that are modernity - are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernity has posited it - as rationally self-interested individual, as self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent - is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age. Those configurations of forces will resist this call for thinking. Their resistance will occur in many forms. However, one common way that modern calculative selfhood will attempt to reinstate itself in the face of Heidegger's paradoxical call to think the earth is by employing a strategy that has worked so well so many times before; it will feel guilty, and it will try to make others feel similarly. Those of us who are white (at least those of us of a certain age and socio-economic class) know this strategy very well. Confronted with our racism, we respond not by working to dismantle the structures that perpetuate racism but rather by feeling guilty. Our energy goes into self-rebuke, and the problems pointed out to us become so painful for us to contemplate that we keep our distance from them. Through guilt we paralyse ourselves. Thus guilt is a marvellous strategy for maintaining a white racist self. Those of us who are women have sometimes watched a very similar strategy employed by the caring, liberal-minded men in our lives. When we have exposed sexism, pressed our criticisms and our claims, we have seen such men - the 'good' men, by far the most responsive and respectful men - deflate, apologize, and ask us to forgive. But seldom have we seen honest attempts at change. Instead we have seen guilt deployed as a cry for mercy or pity on the status quo; and when pity is not forthcoming we have seen guilt turn to rage, and we have heard men ask, 'Why are you punishing us?' The primary issue then becomes the need to attend to the feelings of those criticized rather than to their oppressive institutions and behaviours. Guilt thus protects the guilty. Guilt is a facet of power; it is not a reordering of power or a signal of oppression's end. Guilt is one of the modern managerial self's manoeuvres of self-defence. Of course guilt does not feel that way. It feels like something distinctly not chosen, something we unwillingly undergo. Insofar as it is an active phenomenon, it feels much more like self-abuse than self-defence. But we who are capable of feeling guilty are selves who have been and are shaped, informed, produced in our very selves by the same forces of history that have created calculative, technological revealing. Inevitably, whenever we are confronted with the unacceptability of what is foundational for our lives, those foundations exert force to protect themselves. The exertion, which occurs as and in the midst of very real pain, is not a conscious choice; but that fact does not lessen - in fact it strengthens - guilt's power as a strategy of self-defence. Calculative, technological thinking struggles to defend and maintain itself through us and as us. Some men feel guilty about sexism; some white people feel guilty about racism; most people in the modern world feel guilty about all sorts of habits and idiosyncrasies that we tell ourselves we firmly believe we should change. For many of us guilt is a constant constraint on our lives, a seemingly permanent state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world - guilt about how much petroleum we burn, guilt about how much trash we throw in landfills and rivers and oceans, guilt about patronizing supermarkets with ten-thousand-kilometre supply lines rather than local organic farms and fruit stands, guilt about eating meat when we know that hog farms are a major source of groundwater pollution and that cattle raising is destroying the rainforests and with them the air, guilt about not always taking the trouble to recycle the plastic bottles from which we drink water from melted glaciers owned and sold by transnational corporations, and on and on and on. And yet we rarely actually alter our behaviour. Guilt is a standard defence against the call for change as it first begins to take root within us. But if we are to think with Heidegger, we must not stop with guilt; we must not respond to his call to reflect simply by deploring our decadent lifestyles and indulging ourselves in token and fleeting fits of remorse. Heidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance. When we respond to Heidegger's call as if it were a moral condemnation, when we feel accused and guilty, we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the Western world. But the history of ethical theory in the West is one with the history of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences. It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked this question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I manage my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbours do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up technologies of the soul, theories of human behavioural control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. Ethics - in the modern world at least - very often functions as just another field of scientific study yielding just another set of engineering goals. Therefore, when we react to problems like ecological crisis by retreating into the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences. On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? Our guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream by insisting that problems - problems like oil spills, acid rain, groundwater pollution, the extinction of whales and songbirds, the destruction of the ozone layer, the rainforests, the glaciers, the wetlands - lie simply in mismanagement or in a failure to manage (to manage ourselves in this case) and by reaffirming to ourselves that if we had used our power to manage our behaviour better in the first place we could have avoided this mess. In other words, when we respond to Heidegger's call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And in so saying we are in yet a new and more stubborn way refusing to hear the real message, the message that human beings are not, never have been, and never can be in complete control, that the dream of that sort of managerial omnipotence is itself the very danger of which Heidegger warns. Thus guilt - as affirmation of human agential power over and against passive matter - is just another way of concealing the mystery. Thus guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are finite and that we must begin to live with the earth instead of trying to maintain total control. Guilt is part and parcel of a managerial approach to the world. Thinking along Heidegger's paths means resisting the power of guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibility of being with our own finitude. It means finding 'the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called into question.' It means holding ourselves resolutely open for the shattering power of the event of thinking, even if what is shattered eventually is ourselves.<\|im_end\|> <\|im_start\|>assistant <h4>The AFF buys into the false hope of managerialism and western “truth” – that insists the solution to the <u>failures</u> of human intervention is <u>more intervention</u>. </h4><p>Ladelle <strong>McWhorter 9</strong>, Chair in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Richmond, 2009, Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, second, expanded edition. Chapter 1, “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection,” pp. 6-12, j</p><p><u>The danger of a <mark>managerial approach</mark> to the world lies </u>not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but <u>in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It <mark>forgets</mark> that any <strong><mark>other truths are possible</strong></mark>, and it forgets that the <strong>belonging together of revealing</strong> with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. </u>What is now especially dangerous about this sense of <u>our</u> own <u>managerial power</u>, born of forgetfulness, is that it <u>results in our viewing the world as <strong>mere resources</strong> to be stored or consumed.</u> <u>Managerial or technological thinkers</u>, Heidegger says, <u><mark>view the earth</mark>,</u> the world, all things, <u><mark>as</u></mark> mere <u>Bestand, <strong><mark>standing-reserve.</u></strong> <u>All is here</mark> simply <mark>for human use</mark>. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem</u> has a life of its own, <u>has any significance, outside the bounds of human desire and need. Nothing</u>, we say, other than human beings, <u>has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will.</u> Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be inventoried, developed, marketed, and sold. <u>The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial</u>, technological <u>mode of thinking</u>, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it <u>is well on its way to <strong>extinguishing all other modes of revealing</u></strong>, all other ways of being human and being earth. <u>It will take</u> tremendous courage and <u>resolve to allow thought of the <strong>mystery to come forth</strong>; thought of the <strong>inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment</strong>, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human jurisdiction and authority.</u> And of course even the call to allow <u>this thinking</u> - couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent - <u>is</u> itself <u>a paradox, the first</u> (but only the first) <u>that must be <strong>faced and allowed to speak to us</strong> and to <strong>shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions</strong>, directions of <strong>which we have not yet dreamed</u></strong>, directions of which we may never be able to dream. And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, <u>our</u> very <u>selves</u> - selves engineered by technologies of power that shaped, indeed, that are modernity - <u>are <strong>at stake.</u></strong> <u>Any</u> <u>thinking that threatens the</u> notion of <u>human being as modernity has posited it</u> - as <u>rational</u>ly self-interested individual, as <u>self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations</u>, as <u>active mental and moral agent</u> - <u>is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age.</u> <u>Those configurations of forces will resist this call for thinking.</u> Their resistance will occur in many forms. However, <u>one</u> common <u>way</u> that modern calculative <u>selfhood will attempt to reinstate itself</u> in the face of Heidegger's paradoxical call to think the earth <u>is</u> by employing a strategy that has worked so well so many times before; it will feel <u><strong>guilt</u></strong>y, and it will try to make others feel similarly. Those of us who are white (at least those of us of a certain age and socio-economic class) know this strategy very well. Confronted with our racism, we respond not by working to dismantle the structures that perpetuate racism but rather by feeling guilty. Our energy goes into self-rebuke, and the problems pointed out to us become so painful for us to contemplate that we keep our distance from them. Through guilt we paralyse ourselves. Thus guilt is a marvellous strategy for maintaining a white racist self. Those of us who are women have sometimes watched a very similar strategy employed by the caring, liberal-minded men in our lives. When we have exposed sexism, pressed our criticisms and our claims, we have seen such men - the 'good' men, by far the most responsive and respectful men - deflate, apologize, and ask us to forgive. But seldom have we seen honest attempts at change. Instead we have seen guilt deployed as a cry for mercy or pity on the status quo; and when pity is not forthcoming we have seen guilt turn to rage, and we have heard men ask, 'Why are you punishing us?' The primary issue then becomes the need to attend to the feelings of those criticized rather than to their oppressive institutions and behaviours. Guilt thus protects the guilty. Guilt is a facet of power; it is not a reordering of power or a signal of oppression's end. Guilt is one of the modern managerial self's manoeuvres of self-defence. Of course guilt does not feel that way. It feels like something distinctly not chosen, something we unwillingly undergo. Insofar as it is an active phenomenon, it feels much more like self-abuse than self-defence. But we who are capable of feeling guilty are selves who have been and are shaped, informed, produced in our very selves by the same forces of history that have created calculative, technological revealing. Inevitably, whenever we are confronted with the unacceptability of what is foundational for our lives, those foundations exert force to protect themselves. The exertion, which occurs as and in the midst of very real pain, is not a conscious choice; but that fact does not lessen - in fact it strengthens - guilt's power as a strategy of self-defence. Calculative, technological thinking struggles to defend and maintain itself through us and as us. Some men feel guilty about sexism; some white people feel guilty about racism; most people in the modern world feel guilty about all sorts of habits and idiosyncrasies that we tell ourselves we firmly believe we should change. For many of us guilt is a constant constraint on our lives, a seemingly permanent state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world - guilt about how much petroleum we burn, guilt about how much trash we throw in landfills and rivers and oceans, guilt about patronizing supermarkets with ten-thousand-kilometre supply lines rather than local organic farms and fruit stands, guilt about eating meat when we know that hog farms are a major source of groundwater pollution and that cattle raising is destroying the rainforests and with them the air, guilt about not always taking the trouble to recycle the plastic bottles from which we drink water from melted glaciers owned and sold by transnational corporations, and on and on and on. And yet we rarely actually alter our behaviour. Guilt is a standard defence against the call for change as it first begins to take root within us. But if we are to think with Heidegger, we must not stop with guilt; we must not respond to his call to reflect simply by deploring our decadent lifestyles and indulging ourselves in token and fleeting fits of remorse. Heidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance. <u>When we respond to Heidegger's call as if it were a moral condemnation</u>, when we feel accused and guilty, <u>we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth.</u> In other words, <u>we insist on <strong>remaining within the discourses</strong>, the power configurations, of the <strong>modern managerial self. </u></strong>Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the Western world. But the history of ethical theory in the West is one with the history of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences. It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked this question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I manage my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbours do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up technologies of the soul, theories of human behavioural control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. <u>Ethics</u> - in the modern world at least - very often <u>functions as just another field of <strong>scientific study yielding</strong> just another set of <strong>engineering goals. </u></strong>Therefore, <u>when we react to</u> problems like <u>ecological crisis by retreating into</u> the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of <u>guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences.</u> On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? <u>Our guilt professes our <strong><mark>enduring faith</u></strong> <u>in the <strong>managerial dream</strong></mark> by <mark>insisting that problems</mark> - problems <mark>like</mark> oil spills, acid rain, groundwater <mark>pollution</mark>, the <mark>extinction</mark> of whales and songbirds, the destruction of the ozone layer, the rainforests, the glaciers, the wetlands - <mark>lie simply in <strong>mismanagement</strong> or</mark> in a <strong><mark>failure to manage</u></strong></mark> (to manage ourselves in this case) <u>and by reaffirming to ourselves that <strong><mark>if we had used our power to manage</strong></mark> our behaviour <strong>better</strong> in the first place <strong><mark>we could have avoided this</strong></mark> mess.</u> In other words, when we respond to Heidegger's call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And <u>in so</u> saying <u>we are</u> in yet a new and more stubborn way <u><mark>refusing to hear the real message</mark>,</u> the message that <u><mark>human</mark> beings are <mark>not</u></mark>, never have been, and never can be <u><mark>in complete control</mark>, that the dream of that sort of <strong>managerial omnipotence</strong> is itself the <strong>very danger</strong> of which Heidegger warns. Thus guilt - as affirmation of <strong>human agential power over</strong> and <strong>against passive matter</strong> - is just another way of <strong>concealing the mystery.</u></strong> Thus <u>guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are <strong>finite</strong> and that we must begin to live with the earth instead of trying to <strong>maintain total control</strong>. Guilt is <strong>part and parcel</strong> of a managerial approach to the world. Thinking along Heidegger</u>'s paths <u>means resisting</u> the power of <u>guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibility of being with our own finitude. It means finding 'the courage to</u> <u>make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called into question.'</u> <u>It means holding ourselves resolutely open for the shattering power of the event of thinking</u>, even if what is shattered eventually is ourselves.</p><\|im_end\|>

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